Social media warfare in the Cameroon's Anglophone conflict

Social media warfare in the Cameroon’s Anglophone conflict. By Hassan NJIFON NJOYA Dans Revue Africaine de prospective stratégique(RAPS) N°1, 2024 Joseph Vincent NTUDA EBODE, Eric Bertrand LEKINI, Lionel AMAHATA KIABEGA (Dir) Éditions Centre de Recherche d’Études Politiques et Stratégiques / UNIVERSITÉ DE YAOUNDÉ II, Page 98 à 117 ISBN : 978-9956-0-2264-9 © Presses de Sciences Po | Téléchargé le 09/03/2023 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.202.207.10) Découvrir le sommaire de ce numéro, suivre la revue par email, s’abonner... Flashez ce QR Code pour accéder à la page de ce numéro sur creps.com. D Dis t r ib u t io n é le c t r o n iq u e La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n'est autorisée que dans les limites des conditions générales d'utilisation du site ou, le cas échéant, des conditions générales de la licence souscrite par votre établissement. Toute autre reproduction ou représentation, en tout ou partie, sous quelque forme et de quelque manière que ce soit, est interdite sauf accord préalable et écrit de l'éditeur, en dehors des cas prévus par la législation en vigueur au Cameroun. Il est précisé que son stockage dans une base de données est également interdit. © Centre de recherche d'etude politique et stratégique. Ar t i c l e d i s p o n i b l e e n l i g n e à l ’ a d r e s s e https://www.creps.com SOCIAL MEDIA WARFARE IN THE CAMEROON’S ANGLOPHONE CONFLICT Hassan NJIFON NJOYA Lecturer at the Department of International Relations and Conflict Resolution, University of Buea, Cameroon Chercheur senior au creps Abstract This paper discusses the rising weaponization of social media in the ongoing Anglophone crisis in Cameroon. More than just a by-product of globalization, the use of Facebook and WhatsApp platforms by belligerent parties, i.e. the Cameroonian Government and separatist organizations, is the manifestation of the Fourth Generation Warfare theorized by William Lind. The African state in general is vulnerable to the weaponization of social media. The Anglophone conflict has escalated into a hybrid warfare wherein the control of the social media battleground will greatly contribute to the military and ideological outcome of the conflict. For a few years, the digital battle has been to the advantage of separatists, but the rise of pro-government cyber fighters is tilting the balance towards a more stable situation. Consequently, no lasting peace can be attained without the actual implication of social media front in the peacemaking and peacebuilding process. Keywords: weaponization, social media, information warfare, Facebook, WhatsApp Résumé Cameroun. Plus qu'un simple sous-produit de la mondialisation, l'utilisation des plateformes Facebook et WhatsApp par les parties belligérantes, à savoir le gouvernement camerounais et les organisations séparatistes, est une manifestation de la guerre de quatrième génération théorisée par William Lind. L’Etat africain de façon générale est vulnérable face à la militarisation des réseaux sociaux. La crise anglophone a muté en une guerre hybride dans laquelle le contrôle du champ numérique contribuera grandement à l'issue militaire et idéologique du conflit. Depuis quelques années, la bataille numérique profite aux séparatistes, mais la montée en puissance des cybercombattants progouvernementaux fait pencher la balance vers une situation plus stable. Par conséquent, aucune paix durable ne peut être atteinte sans une implication réelle du front des réseaux sociaux dans le processus de rétablissement et de consolidation de la paix. Mots-clés : militarisation, réseaux sociaux, guerre de l'information, Facebook, WhatsApp Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 98 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques Cet article traite de la militarisation croissante des réseaux sociaux dans la crise anglophone au Hassan NJIFON NJOYA n 30 September 2019 in Yaounde, at the opening ceremony of the Major National Dialogue aimed at bringing back peace to Cameroon after three years of conflict in what is referred to as the Anglophone crisis, Yannick Kawa Kawa, the spokesperson for former separatist fighters declared: “I would also like the Government to understand one thing; this fight is on social media… Let our government understand that this fight is on social media and our government should invest most in the communication sector. Most of us were deradicalized on social media” 1. More than merely depicting how armed separatist fighters were actually deradicalized while in the bush and brought back to civilian life, this statement was an illustration of the influence of social media in modern conflicts and warfighting methods. What he said less was the key role social media had played in recruiting and mobilizing fighters to wage a war against Yaounde. Thence, the mirror effect of the deradicalization of fighters through the same process. Since its outbreak in 2016, the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon has been a vibrant illustration of how powerful social media have become in contemporary society and how global a local conflict may turn. What started as a local union protest of teachers and lawyers gradually turned into an armed insurgency with thousands of casualties, internally displaced people and refugees. Despite the major national dialogue and other measures taken by the Cameroonian government, to bring long-lasting solutions to this crisis, the death toll keeps rising, and social media, especially Facebook and WhatsApp platforms have been instrumental in the conduct of hostilities. While separatist fighters and Government forces fight a real war in the field, the Internet has also become a major battleground where information and propaganda are used as weapons in the hands of cyber activists or cyber warriors. Most activists live out of Cameroon but have a direct influence on the conduct of operations by patronizing and financing armed groups within the Cameroonian territory. In the same token, some fighters are voluntarily laying down their arms and joining disarmament and reintegration camps as a result of pro-government information counteroffensive through the same social media, Facebook, WhatsApp, and YouTube to a lesser extent. Hence, there appears a direct link between social media information warfare and the evolution of the crisis on the national and international stage. To Brett Van Niekerk and Manoj Maharaj 2, social media have the power to shape national and international political landscapes as shown in the post-2009 Iranian election or the 2011 Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East. They may as 1 Ex-Amba Boy; Kawa Yannick, makes speech at the National Dialogue-September 30th, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9UbP7Wsml-Q (visited on 27-03-2023) 2 Brett Van NIEKERK and Manoj MAHARAJ, “Social Media and Information Conflict”, International Journal of Communication 7, 2013, 1162–1184 Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 99 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques O well play a significant role in the future information-based conflict, namely in civil disturbances, strategic security, and military operations. Writing specifically on social media information during the Anglophone crisis, Kingsley Lyonga Ngange and Moki Stephen Mokondo 3, contend that social media have been used to propagate falsehood throughout the Anglophone conflict. Whether on Facebook or WhatsApp, social media activists used computer software to distort pictures, misinform, and spread rumors using texts, audio clips, and distorted videos to manipulate. They conclude that since social media have been awash with falsehood in the Cameroon Anglophone Crisis, users of these media should make efforts to verify the authenticity of information obtained from such media before consuming and sharing. Yet, this view is restrictive in that it limits itself to a producer-consumer relationship with information in purely journalistic terms. They thus fail to see the spread of fake news as a deliberate and conscious war strategy. It is a manifestation of hybrid warfare that William Lind et al. termed the Fourth Generation War, wherein psychological operations have become a strategic weapon in the form of media/information intervention. 4 Despite its acerb critics, the Fourth Generation Warfare remains actual than ever, especially in the Cameroonian context. 5 Razma 6 contextualizes the Fourth-generation warfare as a drastic shift of paradigm in warfighting that emerges where people’s identities and beliefs are the primary sources of conflict (like in Cameroon). Consequently, there is a need to reconsider not only the definitions of modern warfare and warfighting but also to rethink the concept of combat power. Social media have undoubtedly become both a new battleground for modern warfare and a weapon available to all. 7 What has been the influence of social media on the Anglophone Conflict in Cameroon? How do belligerents use the internet and social media platforms to achieve their respective goals? How can social media serve the cause of conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Cameroon? This paper seeks to examine the influence of social media throughout the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon. More specifically, it analyses the use of social media by the two belligerents, the government on the one hand and separatists on the other, whether as a weapon of 3 Kingsley LYONGA NGANGE and Moki Stephen MOKONDO, “Understanding Social Media‘s Role in Propagating Falsehood in Conflict Situations: Case of the Cameroon Anglophone Crisis”, Studies in Media and Communication, Vol. 7, No. 2, December 2019 4 William S. LIND, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation”, Marine Corps Gazette (pre-1994); Oct 1989. 5 See: Antulio J. ECHEVARRIA , Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths ( US Army War College Press, 2005), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/730 ; 6 G. RAZMA, "A modern warfare paradigm: a reconsideration of combat power concept", Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues 8(3):2019, 435-452. 7 Michael ERBSCHLOE Michael, Social Media Warfare: Equal Weapons for All, ISBN 978-1-138-03602-4, Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, 2017, p. 21 Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 100 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques Social media warfare… Hassan NJIFON NJOYA mass mobilization or as a virtual battleground with direct impact on the conduct of hostilities in the field. Finally, it explores avenues through which social media can be used for peacemaking and peacebuilding in Cameroon. Theoretically, this paper studies the Anglophone Conflict in Cameroon from the viewpoint of strategic studies and/or military strategy following the general literature on the unconventional war. Looking through the lens of the Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), it focuses on the state versus the non-state aspect of the conflict, with an emphasis on war tactics. This involves the shift from conventional to nonconventional warfighting with a specific interest in the information aspect of the struggle. We have entered the age of hybrid warfare. The data are thus gathered from Facebook and WhatsApp messages both from separatists and pro-government activists through a purposive sampling of a few among the most popular separatist activists’pages such as Mark Bareta, Tapang Ivo and Ayaba Cho Lucas, and the most popular counter-separatists Facebook pages including MKPD and Njume Frankline. The method of analysis is a content analysis of texts, pictures, audios, and videos disseminated by these actors. We thus examine how the crisis evolved from a corporatist protest to a remote-controlled insurgency (I) and the later construct of a Pro-government social media counteroffensive (II). FROM A CORPORATIST PROTEST TO A REMOTE-CONTROLLED INSURGENCY The current phase of the Anglophone Conflict is a resurfacing of an old crisis that has been existing since the early days of Cameroon’s independence and Reunification (A), wherein separatists have been able to wage a real war through the Internet (B). The keys to understanding the resurfacing and the escalation of the Anglophone crisis are to be found in a brief historical background to what is known as the Anglophone problem in Cameroon (1), the creation in 2016 of a consortium of English-speaking civil society (2), whose dissolution led to a diaspora takeover of the leadership of protests and to social media warfighting (3). A Brief Historical Background to the Anglophone Crisis Much has been written about the nature and the causes of the Anglophone problem in Cameroon. 8 In a nutshell, it revolves around the gradual fading away of the 8 AWASUM, N. F. “Colonial Background to the Development of Autonomist Tendencies in Anglophone Cameroon, 1916-1961”, Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. xv, No. 1, 1998.; Piet KONINGS and Francis B. NYAMNJOH, Negotiating an Anglophone identity: a study of the politics of recognition and representation in Cameroon, Afrika- Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 101 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques The Resurfacing of an Old Crisis erosion of the English colonial legacy in Cameroon and the overarching French tradition’s influence in all spheres of administration and national life. The roots are to be found in the partition of the German colony of Kamerun after the first world war. Kamerun was a German protectorate from 1884 to 1919, when it became a trust territory of the League of Nations. The major part of the territory (about 4/5) was under French administration while the remaining territory was administered by Great Britain as part of its Nigerian colony. French-speaking Cameroun became independent on 1 January 1960 as la Republique du Cameroun. The Englishspeaking Cameroon, also known as Southern Cameroons, became independent on 1 October 1961 by joining French-speaking Cameroun following a referendum held on 11 February whereby Northern and Southern Cameroons were asked to achieve independence either with the Federal Republic of Nigeria or by joining French Cameroun. This referendum saw the loss of Northern Cameroons to Nigeria, while Southern Cameroons joined the French-speaking Republic of Cameroon to create the two-state Federal Republic of Cameroon. The federation lasted for eleven years and was eventually terminated on 20 May 1972. The termination of this federation was the start of the Anglophone problem. The birth of Anglophone separatism occurred when the country ‘s name was changed from the Federal Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon. While the previous name portrayed the dual cultural legacy of Cameroon, the second was a simple return to the name held by the French-speaking side at independence. This was interpreted as an absorption of the English entity by the French entity. Most sources trace back to the origin of the Anglophone problem to the year 1961. First, the organization of a referendum on February 11, 1961, in which the inhabitants of the part of Kamerun under British administration were not allowed to be independent as an autonomous entity, but to obtain independence either by joining Nigeria or by joining Cameroon. Then, the Foumban conference (July 1961) during which the English-speaking leaders of the time were accused of not having negotiated this union under optimal conditions to preserve their achievements. It, however, appears that the crisis became overt with the end of the federal system in 1972 and took a more or less violent turn with the advent of multipartism in the early 1990s 9. Abouem a Tchoyi summarizes the Anglophone crisis in six points: 1) criticism of the centralized state; 2) the transfer of the decision-making centers to Yaoundé, far from the populations and their problems; 3) Failure to respect commitments to equitably Studiecentrum series, Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2003; Piet KONINGS and Francis B. NYAMNJOH, "The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon" Journal for Modern African Studies. Vol. 35, No. 2, 1997; Walter Gam NKWI, “The Anglophone Problem.” In Cameroon: From a Federal to a Unitary State, 1961-72, A Critical Analysis. Edited by Victor Julius Ngoh. Limbe: Design House, 2004. 9 Piet KONINGS and Francis B. NYAMNJOH, "The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon" Journal for Modern African Studies. Vol. 35, No. 2, 1997. Op cit. Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 102 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques Social media warfare… Hassan NJIFON NJOYA take into account the institutional, legal and administrative cultures and traditions inherited from the former administering Powers; 4) Non-compliance with the promises made during the referendum campaign10; 5) The change of the name of the State: replacement of “the United Republic of Cameroon” by “the Republic of Cameroon” and 6) Non-respect of bilingualism in the public sector, although the Constitution makes French and English two official languages of equal value. 11 The current phase of the crisis started as an isolated action of Anglophone lawyers who initiated a sit-down strike in early October 2016 on several grievances about the harmonization of the Anglophone and Francophone legal systems in Cameroon. These included inter alia, the translation into English of the uniform act of the Organization for the Harmonization in Africa of Business Law (OHADA), of the Cima Code (International Conference Insurance Markets) and regulations of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). They equally raised issues relating to the appointment of judges in the North West and SouthWest regions who were not proficient in the English language, the creation within the Supreme Court of a Common law special section and the establishment of a Common Law department at the National School of Administration and Magistracy (ENAM). Anglophone teachers in the North-West and South-West regions joined the strike on 21 November 2016. Besides solidarity to lawyers, they denounced the progressive francophonisation of the English-speaking education sub-system and demanded the withdrawal from classrooms of all staff who did not have a command of English. The escalation of tensions between protesters and the Government progressively led lawyers and members of the Cameroon Teachers’ Trade Union (CATTU) to form a bigger organization in charge of defending Anglophone rights, which they called the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC). By a press release made public on 16 December 2016, the CACSC published the structure of its steering committee, comprising of Barrister Nkongho Felix Agbor Balla as President, Dr. Fontem A. Neba as Secretary-General, Barrister Eyambe Elias Ebai as deputy secretary-general, Mr. Wilfred Tassang as program coordinator, and five advisers including Prof. James Arrey Abangma, Barrister Harmony Bobga, Mr. George Ngwane, Mr. Mawum Fuh J.C. and Mr. Abia David. 10 These promises were related to the inclusion of both Anglo-saxon administrative tradition and the francophone heritage in the Cameroon public service. 11 David ABOUEM A TCHOYI, ‘Les Six Facettes du Probleme Anglophone’, 2019, available on https://actucameroun.com/2019/09/15/cameroun-les-six-facettes-du-probleme-anglophone/ (Accessed on 23-03-2023). Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 103 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques The birth and dissolution of the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) Social media warfare… The Consortium led a series of protests and ghost towns until 17 January 2017 when it was banned by a decree of the Cameroon Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization which described their activities illegal and against the security and unity of Cameroon 12. Two days later, Anglophone leaders were arrested including Agbor Balla, Fontem Neba, and Mancho Bibixy a Bamenda-based radio journalist. The Secretary-general, Tassang Wilfred went on hiding and fled to Nigeria. Interim leadership was handed over to two young diaspora activists, Tapang Ivo Tanku, based in the USA and Mark Bareta, based in Belgium. Both were former students of the University of Buea. This marked the beginning and escalation of social media warfighting. Protests became violent after the interim leadership of the Consortium was handed to Anglophone activists in the diaspora. Separatist ideas started gaining more grounds and the ideas defended were no longer those of greater consideration for Anglophones in the Republic of Cameroon, but gradually slid to the outright separation of the two Cameroons. Instructions were given either through Facebook posts or videos or in some circumstances through WhatsApp. This crisis benefited from some factors linked to the increased access to internet Internet among the population and massive unemployment among the youths. A report published by the Cameroonian ministry of posts and telecommunications in 2016 showed significant growth in the country's mobile penetration rate, which rose from around 12% in 2005 to almost 83% in 2016. 13 By the same token, from a report published by Mediametrie, a French agency, in March 2017, smartphone usage in Cameroon experienced a remarkable increase in 2016. The number of homes with smartphones had increased by 43% to 72.2% just in the second half of 2016, giving Cameroon one of the highest rates of smartphone use in Africa. 14 68.2% of individuals aged 15 and over were registered on a social network, with 75.3% among those aged between 15 and 24. Facebook was the most popular network, followed by Google+, Instagram, and Twitter. This represents a considerable segment of the society. The social uprising of the two Anglophone regions of Cameroon from November 2016 to February 2017 was massively followed by youths. It was also a manifestation of overwhelmingly disgruntled youths aspiring to better standards of living. A study 12 Decree No. 00000009 /A /MINATD/CAV of the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MINATD), Mr. Réné Emmanuel SADI, of January 17, 2017, prohibiting the activities of the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium CACSC); 13 https://www.businessincameroon.com/telecom/1708-8263-cameroon-mobile-penetration-surged-from-12-in-2005-to83-in-2016 [retrieved on 28-05-2020] 14 The boom of Smartphones and social media in Cameroon, https://blogs.ucl.ac.uk/assa/2018/01/22/the-boom-ofsmartphones-and-social-media-in-cameroon-by-patrick-awondo/ [retrieved on 28-05-2020] Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 104 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques Diaspora takeover and social media warfighting Hassan NJIFON NJOYA published by the National Institute of Statistics published in 2012, a few years before the uprising showed that young people aged 15-34 represented 34.3% of the total population. 15 The proportion of young people who had received a technical education was very low compared to general education in any cycle, place of residence, or sex, and just over seven out of ten young people were no longer in education. Due to their large proportion in society and their near-economic marginalization, young people continue to be a potential source of instability, likely to explode at any time and vulnerable to the slightest political manipulation. The outbreak of hunger riots in February 2008 throughout Cameroon was a perfect illustration of this situation. Violence and destructions during the Anglophone crisis were mainly perpetrated by disgruntled unemployed youths, bike riders, petty traders, and idle high school and university graduates who felt economically and culturally marginalized. 16 From a teachers' and lawyers' strike, the situation rapidly escalated from corporate demands to a social crisis and eventually to an insurgency that saw the emergence of the Internet as a new battleground. Following the principles of Fourth Generation Warfare, the separatist offensive essentially took two forms: a nonlinear war front and intensified guerilla warfare tactics in field operations. Key features of the fourth-generation war include the dispersion of the battlefield and an increased emphasis on psychological operations. This can very much be observed in the Cameroonian context through social media frontline activism, distant field actions, and social media diplomatic influence action. According to Lind et al, one of the main characteristics of fourth-generation warfare is that it is non-linear. There are no specific battlefields and the front could be extended to the entire society of the enemy to be defeated. Likewise, psychological operations are at the heart of the maneuver, taking up considerable space. “Psychological operations may become the dominant operational and strategic weapon in the form of media/information. Logic bombs and computer viruses, including latent viruses, may be used to disrupt civilian as well as military operations. Fourth-generation adversaries will be adept at manipulating the media to alter domestic and world opinion to the point where skillful use of psychological operations will sometimes preclude the commitment of combat forces. A major target will be the enemy 15 National Institute of Statistics (INS), Second Survey on Employment and the Informal Sector in Cameroon (EESI 2): Insertion on the Labor Market, November 2012 16 The spokesman for former fighters at the Major National Dialogue, Kawa Kawa Yannick also expressed this anger when he said "we were treated as second-class citizens in our own fatherland… Some of us are degree holders, some of us are educated but we got no jobs in our own fatherland…", Yaounde, 30 September 2019. Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 105 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques Separatist Offensive: waging war through the internet Social media warfare… population’s support of its government and the war. Television news may become a more powerful operational weapon than armored divisions”. 17 Social media frontline activism: Distant field actions Besides activism, distant or remote field operations mainly took the form of fundraisings to sponsor the armed struggle back home and rallies to raise public awareness in countries hosting considerable communities from the North West and South-West regions of Cameroon. Several fundraising campaigns were launched in America and Europe like “My Trip To Buea”, “One soldier one AK19” etc. Two 17 William Lind. Op.cit. et al. (1989), “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation”, Marine Corps Gazette (pre-1994); p.24. 18 Kingsley LYONGA et al. 2019, op. cit. 19 The AK-47, officially known as the Avtomat Kalashnikova, also known as the Kalashnikov or just AK, is a gasoperated assault rifle that is chambered for the 7.62×39mm cartridge. Developed in the Soviet Union by Russian small- Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 106 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques Frontline activism involved a group of separatist activists spread in Europe, the United States, and South Africa. The European front was dominated by Mark Bareta in Belgium and to a high extent by Ayaba Cho Lucas, the leader of the Ambazonian Government Council and godfather of the Ambazonian Defence Force, living in Sweden. The American front was mainly occupied by Tapang Ivo, Eric Tataw of the Daily Telegraph, and Ebenezer Akwanga. Sako Ikome, the current leader of the “Ambazonian Interim Government” while Sisiku Ayuk Tabe the initial leader is in prison, lives in the USA but has been less visible on social media. The South African frontline was led by Chris Anu. In all of these fronts, the modus operandi was almost the same. The military strategy consisted of psychological operations through propaganda aimed at mobilizing popular support, strengthening the determination of ground fighters and securing their unrelenting compliance to orders issued from abroad. This took the form of information distortion and dissemination through Facebook messages and videos, whether live or recorded. 18 The main topics revolved around Paul Biya's “declaration of war” against Anglophones, the imminent intervention of the UN or the international community at large and the forthcoming independence. Publications announced an imminent victory of restoration forces, narrating how brave and fearless fighters were on the battlefield. Inflating figures of pro-government casualties was not very uncommon. Facebook lives allowed the foreign-based leadership to fuel nationalistic sentiments, further radicalize youths in Cameroon and have them recruited in armed groups. In the meantime, distant field actions were taken by the Diaspora in Europe and America. Hassan NJIFON NJOYA organizations were particularly active harnessing resources in the diaspora, the Ambazonian Government Council of Ayaba Cho Lucas and the Southern Cameroon Interim Government of Sisiku Ayuk Tabe. Their primary objective was to raise enough money to arm combatants in the field, supply them with modern weapons (in replacement for their predominantly dane guns), materials and equipment so that they could maintain constant guerilla operations in the best possible way. Many other actors initiated Gofundme campaigns, including inter alia: Ambazonians Standing Assist Fund by Cho Ayaba and Roland Tewure Fominyam, Southern Cameroon Youth League (SCYL) Solidarity Campaign by Ebenezer Akwanga, Anglophone Fund Drive by Mark Bareta, Peaceful Ground Game - S. Cameroons by Tapang Ivo Tanku, Dr. Fontem Neba's new car by Tapang Ivo Tanku, Ambazonia Mission Humanitarian Fund by Cho Ayaba, Southern Cameroons Relief Fund by Jonathan Awasom and Southern Cameroons Television-SCTV by Dexter Brains 20. The management of these fundraising campaigns often raised serious controversies as money would not always serve its initial purpose. It was the case for instance with Dr. Fontem's new car campaign whose money was eventually not traced and no car was bought to replace Dr. Fontem's burnt car. Concomitantly, gatherings and rallies were organized to draw the attention of the international community to the socio-political crisis shaking Cameroon and to elicit its intervention. This is how images and messages were disseminated on the internet to sensitize public opinion on the war taking place in Cameroon. Aware of the United Nations' right of humanitarian intervention, otherwise called the responsibility to protect, separatist social activists depicted the conflict in Cameroon as an ongoing genocide. In short, social media were used to lobby for political and diplomatic support from American and European politicians. The Yaounde regime was accused of masterminding and implementing a genocide in the North West and Southwest regions. A “quasi-diplomatic” offensive was launched via social networks. Beyond scoring an international audience, cyber fighters, using fake accounts - and often true ones – would publish and comment massively on the Facebook pages of political personalities of the American Senate, members of the American Congress, personalities of the United States. They would also invite their supporters on other social platforms to do the same. A clear example arms designer Mikhail Kalashnikov, the AK is famous for its ruggedness and remains one of the most widely used firearms in the world especially in armed conflicts. 20 Benjamin Akih (2017) "Fundraising for violence and armed conflict in Cameroon by separatist groups using GoFundme", letter to the legal Division of Gofundme, 15 December 2017, available at https://www.facebook.com/OneCameroonPeaceUnityCommonsense/posts/targeting-separatist-fundraising-throughgofundme-it-is-illegal-and-ambazonians-/1772124333093798/ Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 107 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques Social media based diplomatic influence action Social media warfare… of such operations was the flooding in May 2019 of the Facebook Page of the US congresswoman Rep. Karen Bass who was pushing for the adoption of resolution H Res. 358 EH calling on the Government of Cameroon and armed groups to respect the human rights of all Cameroonian citizens, to end all violence, and to pursue a broad-based dialogue without preconditions to resolve the conflict in the NorthWest and South-West regions. Separatist activists sought to deny any implication of their militias in human rights abuses and to present the case as an ongoing genocide. So, they launched swarm comments attacks on Rep. Bass’ Facebook page denouncing a genocide, in their effort to influence public opinion’s perception of the reality in Cameroon. Anglophone separatist field operations carried the mark of irregular warfare through guerrilla warfare tactics, geographical dispersion of the battlefield, and a decentralized line of military command. The warzone was divided into thirteen counties, roughly corresponding to the thirteen divisions of the North-West and South-West regions. Generally, the term “Northern zone” was used to refer to the North West and the term “Southern zone” to refer to the current South West region of Cameroon. The battlefield was spread all over these counties, in towns, villages, and neighborhoods. Likewise, armed groups were dispersed, without a clear line of command or centralized logistics. Orders were given via social media from the USA, South Africa, Belgium, or Sweden. On the ground, combatants evolved in small autonomous units, spontaneously executing direct orders from their sponsors or implementing individual decisions. The Anglophone insurgency has been a truly remote-controlled war, with political leadership located outside the country and military leadership on the ground. In separatist taxonomy, Cameroon is called "ground zero", Nigeria, a strategic base for combatants, is called “ground one” and Ghana is “ground two”. By May 2019, there were mainly seven armed militias and a dozen small armed groups on the field with a total of between 2,000 and 4,000 combatants 21. Fighters were mainly recruited from the Anglophone community, but also among the Cameroonian security forces with commanders such as the warlord Oliver Lekeaka mostly known as Field Marshall 22 whose stronghold had been the Lebialem division. There were reportedly dozens of Nigerian mercenaries, who generally brought their weapons and ammunition and were deployed as instructors or combatants. Some were former combatants or those out of work after agreements between the Nigerian 21 Crisis Group Africa Report N°272, 2 May 2019, Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: How to Get to Talks? P.2 22 Oliver Lekeaka aka Field Marshall was killed in July 2022. Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 108 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques Field operations and social media government and political-military groups in the Niger Delta. Others were simply criminals who fled to Cross River state to escape the Delta Safe Operation launched in 2016 by the Nigerian army to fight crime in the Delta. Most militias had female combatants, some of whom were local leaders. 23 The seven major groups listed by crisis group in May 2019 had between 200 and 500 combatants each and included: Manyu Tigers, Southern Cameroons Defense Forces (SOCADEF), Ambazonia Defense Forces (ADF), Red Dragons, Seven Kata, The Sword of Ambazonia (TSOA) and Ambaland Quifor. Small armed groups included inter alia: Southern Cameroons Restoration Forces, Warriors of Nso, Ambazonia Restoration Army (ARA) and Dongang Mantung self-defense group. In each village or neighborhood, an autonomous group was created, more or less armed, which took control of the area and gradually asserted itself until it crossed the terrain of influence of another armed group. Gradually, warlords emerged like Field Marshall, Nambere, General Ivo, General RK, Chacha, Ayeke, Die Man, etc. It was not uncommon for some of these groups to be involved in looting and predation. Young people who were once petty traders, car washers or unemployed were quickly reconverting into makeshift fighters. The lucrative aspect of the new activity seemed to have taken precedence over the ideological side. Most groups eventually resorted to hostage-taking to keep sponsoring the struggle. This led the population, initially favorable to its separatist sons, to gradually question the advantages of prolonged ghost towns and lockdowns which greatly contributed to impoverish them. Violence and abuses against civilian populations gradually put them in the embarrassment of the crossfire between the army and separatists. Those who did not respect ghost-towns saw their shops set ablaze. In the rules of engagement, separatists proceeded by ambush, grabbing, hits-andruns, and indirect attacks. Isolated soldiers or police officers were targeted and attacked. Combatants would storm police and gendarmerie posts with excess manpower in surprise attacks, most of the time at night, execute the men on duty and seize their weapons. Armed groups have since progressively evolved towards the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The most recent IED attacks happened in Buea on 25 February 2023 during the Mount Cameroon Race of Hope, an annual race event, where three explosions occurred injuring 19 people including athletes and killing one.24 On the psychological plane, the separatists mixed guerrilla tactics with terrorist methods. Footages and photos were circulated on social media of slaughtered, 23 Crisis Group Africa Report N°272, op. cit. 24 Cameroon Tribune, 01 march 2023, Explosion on Mount Cameroon Race of Hope Course: 19 victims discharged one, dead. Available on : https://www.cameroon-tribune.cm/article.html/55496/fr.html/explosions-on-mount-cameroonrace-course-19-victims-discharged- (Visited on 07-04-2023). Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 109 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques Hassan NJIFON NJOYA Social media warfare… beheaded or dismembered soldiers. Civilians suspected of not supporting the struggle or of being sympathetic to pro-government forces were dubbed as "blacklegs", targeted, amputated of their fingers, ears, or limbs and in most cases beheaded. The circulation of these crimes on social media instilled a wind of terror. Two videos were particularly striking. The first was the burial of a woman alive in Batibo in September 2019 accused of being a traitor. 25 The second was the rape, torture, slaughter, and dismembering of Florence Ayafor, a prison wardress in October 2019. 26 It became difficult to establish which actor was guilty of what crimes exactly, but the sight of dismembered corpses sent a wave of terror over the communities thereby paving the way for the construct of a pro-government's social media counteroffensive. THE CONSTRUCT OF A PRO-GOVERNMENT SOCIAL MEDIA COUNTEROFFENSIVE The Cameroonian government's counter-offensive in the face of cybernetic and propagandist attacks has been a gradual construct which started against a background of social vulnerability (A) and evolved from private activism to de facto state social media warfighting (B). Background of social media vulnerability State vulnerability to social media activism was manifest through the alarming trends preceding the outbreak of the conflict (1) and the chaotic management of Internet based information right after the outbreak of the conflict (2). At the advent of the Anglophone conflict, the Cameroonian government was experiencing an unprecedented confidentiality crisis due to the continuous disclosure of working documents and other administrative decisions on social media. Unscrupulous officials frequently filmed decisions that were supposed to remain confidential and circulated them on WhatsApp and sometimes on Facebook. In ministries, within divisional and sub-divisional offices, police stations and even at the 25 Batibo: A woman buried alive https://mimimefoinfos.com/batibo-a-woman-buried-alive/, Cameroon: Batibo Council condemns burial of woman alive https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/cameroon-batibo-council-condemns-burialof-woman-alive/, Ambazonia Terrorists ADF Gang in Batibo Burry a woman Alive. Very gruesome to watch, https://kontripipo.com/ambazonia-terrorists-adf-gang-in-batibo-burry-woman-alive/. 26 Murder of Florence Ayafor: The unspeakable act of savagery provokes general outrage http://www.crtv.cm/2019/10/murder-of-florence-ayafor-the-unspeakable-act-of-savagery-provokes-general-outrage/, Ma Florence Ayafor... The latest Ambazonia Terrorist beheading https://kontripipo.com/ma-florence-ayafor-the-latestambazonia-terrorist-beheading/, CHRDA statement on the ruthless murder of Ayafor Florence in Pinyin, a locality in the Northwest Region of Cameroon, https://www.chrda.org/chrda-statement-on-the-ruthless-murder-of-ayafor-florence-inpinyin-a-locality-in-the-northwest-region-of-cameroon/ Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 110 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques Alarming trends preceding the outbreak of the conflict ministry of defense, leakages had become widespread. In April 2018 for instance, 16 civil servants were reportedly detained in Cameroon for leaking official documents on social media. 27 Furthermore, soldiers at the battlefront, whether in the Far North region of the country in their war against Boko Haram or in the North-West and South-West regions, largely indulged in recording and circulating scenes of battles, gunshots, torture and sometimes killings of alleged terrorists. 28 This was the case with the execution of a civilian woman and her children in the Far North by Cameroonian soldiers, which sparked national and international outrage in July 2018. 29 Following uncontrolled and repeated confidential information leaks, Prime Minister Philemon Yang sent an order on March 29, 2018, to administrations, ministries and public enterprises to warn them against the disclosure on the internet of confidential documents and information. He prescribed five measures: 1. The recipients of this order should ensure that the obligation of professional discretion, incumbent on public officials placed under their responsibilities is respected; 2. Ensure the scrupulous respect of the texts in force regarding the management of confidential State documents, in particular, the provisions of instruction number 13 of August 6, 1968, on the protection of secrecy with regard in particular to handling, the possession or dissemination and conservation of secret documents, information of a secret or confidential nature; 3. Bring systematically before competent disciplinary bodies, public officials suspected of violating the obligation of professional discretion; 4. Assign to the mail management chain of their departments, only people with indisputable integrity 5. Set up, in conjunction with competent public bodies, such as the national technology and information agency (Antic), and the national computer development center (Cenadi), secure electronic communication channels, for electronic administration transactions. 30 A few months later (i.e. 15 June 2018), the use of smartphones was banned during 27 Sixteen civil servants detained for leaking classified information on Social media, https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/sixteen-civil-servants-detained-leaking-classified-information-social-media/ [retrieved on 01-25-2020] 28 Boko Haram suspects tortured in Cameroon, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-n8fMmHbWNc [july 2017, retrieved on 06-23-2020] 29 Video appears to show Cameroonian soldiers executing women and children, Amnesty says, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/07/14/video-appears-to-show-cameroonian-soldiersexecuting-women-and-children-amnesty-says/ [retrieved on 07-27-2020] 30https://cdn.237actu.com/index.php/cameroun-documents-confidentiels-de-l-etat-sur-les-reseaux-sociaux-le-premierministre-philemon-yang-rappelle-ses-collaborateurs-a-l-ordre [retrieved on 06-10-2020] Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 111 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques Hassan NJIFON NJOYA Social media warfare… army operations. 31 These measures greatly contributed to curbing information and confidential documents' leaks but did not eradicate them. One of the major weaknesses of the government’s side throughout the Anglophone crisis has been the chaotic management of internet-based information. Because most governments are rather defensive and highly focused on self-preservation, they are generally faced with numerous social media warfare challenges. In their efforts to defend their national interest against social media-based or inspired attacks, they most often choose to limit the Internet32. This is exactly what Cameroon did. The first serious information management issue occurred through the shutdown of the Internet connection in the North West and South-West regions of Cameroon from17 January to 20 April 2017, i.e. 93 days altogether. The Internet was eventually reestablished, but the economic and social impact of the shutdown was significant. 33 Many Cameroonians had turned into internet internally displaced people. Another type of poor information management was a series of communicational contradictions in the face of events, mirroring a lack of internal coordination. A vivid illustration of these contradictions happened through the denial by the Government of killings perpetrated by security forces in the Far North, whose footages had been circulating on social media in July 2018. These footages were first presented as having taken place outside Cameroon's borders, especially in a West African country. With the pressure from the media, human rights activists and organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the Government carried out an investigation which eventually proved that the killings took place in the Far North region of Cameroon and that the perpetrators were members of the Cameroon military. 34 A similar case later occurred following the massacre of several civilians, trapped in clashes between the army and insurgent fighters, which happened in Ngarbuh in the North-West in the night of February 13 to 14, 2020. Four days after the killings, the spokesperson for the army issued two press releases on the same day, with slight differences, but somehow denying the implication of the army in those killings. The head of state once again instructed investigations on this case. Less than two months 31http://afrique.le360.ma/autres-pays/societe/2018/06/21/21457-cameroun-larmee-interdit-lusage-des-telephonesandroides-aux-soldats-sur-le-terrain-21457 [retrieved on 28-01-2020] 32 Michael ERBSCHLOE 2017, op cit. p. 21 33 Cameroon internet shutdowns cost Anglophones millions https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/camerooninternet-shutdowns-cost-anglophones-millions-180123202824701.html [retrieved on 06-15-2020] 34 Cameroon arrests soldiers accused of executing women and children, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2018/07/20/cameroon-arrests-soldiers-accused-of-executing-women-and-children/ [retrieved on 06-15-2020] Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 112 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques Chaotic management of internet-based information Hassan NJIFON NJOYA later, i.e. on April 21, 2020, a press release signed by the Secretary-general at the presidency himself, Mr. Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh, signed a press release publishing the result of the investigation commission on Ngarbuh. This press release acknowledged the implication of Cameroonian soldiers, addressed the President’s condolence message to bereaved families and instructed a series of actions to be taken. A week later, i.e. on 28 April 2020, the minister of communication and Government’s spokesperson, Mr. René Emmanuel Sadi held a press conference reiterating the Government’s commitment to shed light on the Ngarbuh events and all other cases of human rights abuses over the country. He acknowledged that civilians had lost their lives in an operation which was not a combat mission, but a reconnaissance mission. However, it became very confusing, who was actually in charge of the government's public relations on issues about the Anglophone crisis. This had been simultaneously handled by the Minister of territorial administration, Mr. Paul Atanga Nji, the minister of communication and spokesperson of the Government, Mr. René Emmanuel Sadi, the Spokesperson of the military, Navy captain cyrille Atonfack and eventually, the secretary-general at the presidency, Mr. Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh. From private activism to a de facto state social media warfighting The appearance of a counter-narrative to a separatist-dominated social media presence gradually took shape with the rise of pro-government cyber activists (1) which would later contribute to the evolution of the situation on the ground towards an appeasement (2). The tide started changing gradually in the social media balance of power and on the ground with the intervention of pro-government cyber activists in early 2019. Their actions were determinant in countering pro-secessionist propaganda by presenting alternative sources of information and presenting a quite different face of reality. They reshaped or changed the narratives. These operations were so effective that separatist combatants soon started quitting the fight, though most would prefer to remain in hiding in other Cameroonian cities such as Yaounde, Douala, or Bafoussam or crossing the border to neighbouring Nigeria. The first separatist fighter to lay down his arms and come out openly was Kawa Kawa Yannick. Others followed suit such as Okha Naseri Clovis, Beltus Ateasong, General Nambere, etc. Pioneer peace activists were bloggers like Frankline Njume, Ma Kontri Pipo Dem MKPD, Mike Bralta, Paddy Asanga, Docs Man, and many others through fake and real accounts. Strategies consisted of exploiting the adversary’s weaknesses, leakages Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 113 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques The rise of pro-government cyber-activists Social media warfare… of separatists’ videos, footages of torture, and killings to convince both public opinion and combatants about the evil nature of separatism. Numerous scores settlings, human rights abuses and internecine fights within the separatist side did not help them either. MKPD pages and accounts were opened on YouTube, Facebook, WhatsApp and the internet. The MKPD concept was the first experience of the deradicalization of young combatants through social media. The surfacing of Kawa Kawa Yannick showed separatist fighters that a new life was possible and triggered a series of defections. The number of pro-government cyber-warriors and sympathizers grew rapidly and many Facebook pages and accounts are now fully involved in the social media struggle. Concomitantly, lawsuits were filed by the Cameroonian government against pro-separatist bloggers in the diaspora on terrorism charges, and actions were taken either directly or indirectly to shut down their social media accounts and webpages. The current situation in Anglophone regions is not yet totally back to normal but considerable progress has been made towards stabilization. Urban areas are less prone to violence than rural areas. The biggest hot spots of separatism remain the Manyu and the Lebialem divisions in the South West region, mainly because of their difficult terrain. A post-conflict reconstruction program is also at its early stage. The relative lull experienced by the English-speaking regions of Cameroon in recent months can be interpreted as the result of a combination of strategies including civilmilitary actions, key leaders’ engagement, and psychological operations. Civilmilitary operations have consisted of activities meant to bridge the gap between the population and the military, such as free medical care campaigns and talks with local communities. At a community level, repentant fighters are actively involved in deep sensitization campaigns that have greatly contributed to undermining the bases for further recruitment of fighters. Without however underestimating the impact of the political, security, and socioeconomic measures of Cameroonian authorities in the considerable decrease in violence and the gradual return to peace, it would not be an overstatement to say that the use of social media has brought a significant impact in the ongoing pacification process. Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration centers were opened in Buea and Bamenda in November 2018, alongside another one in Mora in the Far North region, specifically meant for Boko Haram, former insurgents. In November 2019, that is exactly one year after their creation, there were 252 ex-combatants in Cameroon DDR centers. Buea and Bamenda had 60 and 70 ex-combatants Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 114 © Centre de recherche d’études politiques et stratégiques The ongoing return to peace as a combination of strategies Hassan NJIFON NJOYA respectively. 35 More recently, some activists and sponsors have been arrested and prosecuted in the United States following legal and diplomatic actions taken by the state of Cameroon. Learning from our present to build the future Cameroon has been experiencing one of the most difficult moments of its history since 2016 whereby the foundations of its nationhood have been shaken and thousands have died. The outbreak of the Anglophone crisis did not only bring back to the table issues of governance, national wealth redistribution and identity management in a pluralistic society. It also exposed the vulnerabilities of the state in the 21st century which is not specific to Cameroon alone but very common with most African States. These vulnerabilities are related to the fast-growing digitalization of a young and vibrant society which in the face of unemployment and poverty has become very prone to manipulation and violence. Social media have maybe become one of the most dangerous weapons in the 21st century. They are used as tools of information warfare, weapons of words that influence the hearts and shape the minds of a target audience with a direct impact on the physical world. They are low-cost, easily accessible and act as a force multiplier by increasing networking and organizing capabilities. As demonstrated in the Cameroonian experience, the ability to rapidly disseminate graphic content and shape the public narrative transforms social media into a strategic weapon in the hands of terrorists, insurgent groups, or governments engaged in conflict. The vulnerability of African states in general and of the state of Cameroon to social media is a major security issue that should urgently be addressed. The main conclusion is that social media are an integral part of the battlefront in the Anglophone conflict in Cameroon and should therefore be considered as an integral part of the conflict resolution process as well. In a hybrid war opposing two belligerents of disproportionate military capabilities, social media emerge both as a combat platform and as a weapon of mass mobilization. It is almost free of access to all parties, irrespective of their real military and technological capabilities. For several years, the digital clash between pro-government and separatist cyber fighters has been in the advantage of the latter, but the late rise of pro-government and peace cyber activists has made the conditions more conducive to the return of peace. More than just a matter of communication, the control of social media is increasingly 35 Comité national de désarmement : 252 ex combattants déjà recensés https://actucameroun.com/2019/12/02/comite-national-de-desarmement-252-ex-combattants-deja-recenses/ on 07-25-2020] Revue africaine de prospective stratégique, vol.1, n°1, 2024,p.98-117. © 2024 Centre de recherche d'études politiques et stratégiques. 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