TRANSITION POLICIES TWENTY YEARS LATER:
LESSONS FOR THE CASE OF CUBA
Gabriel Di Bella, Rafael Romeu and Andy Wolfe1
Economic outcomes have differed widely across the
countries that have transitioned away from centrally
planned economies. Since 1989, the centrally
planned economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have moved to dismantle centralized control and allow market mechanisms to allocate resources to differing degrees and at different
paces. This paper looks back at these episodes, as well
as to China and Vietnam to a lesser extent, in an attempt to identify the policy paths that increase the
likelihood of long-term wellbeing in the transitioning
economy.
The methodology presented attempts to take a broad
view of what a successful economic transition looks
like. To measure well being, the paper uses three
measures, rather than just the traditional real GDP
growth. A successful transition is measured as one
that increases real purchasing-power-parity-adjusted
per-capita GDP growth over the last two decades,
while also containing increases in the misery index
and maximizing the UN Human Development Index. Policy implementation is measured directly
through the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) Transition Indicators, but
also indicators of the breadth and speed of transition
policy implementation are considered. Several controls are included to capture exogenous and non-policy changes that could be influencing these measures
of well-being, such as commodity shocks or immigration.
The data speak most clearly on the transition policies
themselves (rather than the speed or breadth of policy implementation). The results suggest that liberalizing trade and foreign exchange markets while privatizing small enterprises (small businesses and all
farms), large enterprises (assets divestment and effective corporate governance), and enterprises (increasing efficiency sufficiently to at least attract private financing) all grow income, lower the misery index
and increase development. Price liberalization is
found to increase income but it also lowers the HDI
and increases the misery index (though not statistically significantly). This can be offset through institutional arrangements that help control prices, such
as EU accession or other monetary constraints. On
the speed of transition, the data suggest that large
privatizations should proceed slowly while competition policy (effective enforcement of competition
policy; unrestricted entry to most markets) should
not. The evidence on the breadth of policy implementation is inconclusive.
The study presents evidence that China and Vietnam
observed similar misery index patterns as countries in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Evidence is also
presented that the initial development position of
these two countries were much lower than in Europe.
1. The views in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of IMF’s Management or its Executive Board. The
corresponding author is Rafael Romeu (rromeu@imf.org). We thank Jorge Pérez-López, Luis Locay and Bryan Roberts as well as ASCE
conference participants for useful comments.
78
Transition Policies Twenty Years Later: Lessons for the Case of Cuba
Hence, the transition away from a central planned
economy in these two countries was intended to essentially develop and industrialize these countries.
Most cases in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union represented largely urbanized and industrialized economies that embarked in transitions to increase the efficiency of their economies. Consequently, China and Vietnam are rejected as comparators to
Cuba, whereas the Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union are not.
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
This section develops a simple exploratory empirical
framework to attempt to capture the impact of transition policies on the measures of economic and social well-being. Equation 1 gives a broad view of the
approach pursued, which is to regress each of the
measures on a linear function of the transition policy
indicators and economic and social fundamentals.
Given the inherent challenges in identifying the impact of specific policies on the aggregate outcomes,
several controls are introduced in the right-hand side.
[ HDI , income, misery ] = f (transition, fundamentals )
(1)
First, lagged dependent variables are introduced,
along with macroeconomic controls for global output, interest rates, commodity prices and other indicators of the external economic environment. Second, controls for the initial conditions of each
country are included, such as the share of agriculture
in the economy, and indicators of the endowment of
oil or natural gas. A fixed effect regression is run,
which implicitly controls for other common factors
such as distance to Moscow or Brussels. In addition,
an index of integration into the European Union is
included for trade area effects.2 Finally, an issue that
has been at the forefront of transitions in Europe and
will likely play a role for Cuba is migration, so that
three migration measures are included. The first
measures total migration, the second high education
migration, and the third highly educated migration
in percent of total migration. For the example of real
PPP per-capita GDP growth, the panel regression is:
dgdppcit = α 0 + α t + α1dgdppcit −1 + α 2 dgdppcit − 2 + α
α 3transitionit −1 + α 4 controlsit −1 + ε it
(2)
Equation 2 is estimated for 1989–2010 for twentynine countries as a fixed effect panel regression with
robust standard errors. Separate regressions are run
for each of the nine transition policy areas thereby including only one transition indicator on the right
hand side per estimation. The estimate of interest is
α 3 which captures the impact of the transition policy, its breadth and speed of implementation, on the
measures of economic and social well-being. Transition indicators are included on the right-hand-side
one at a time because (1) they are highly multicollinear; and (2) there is a risk that linear combinations of
the (discrete, judgment based) transition indicators
are spuriously correlated to broader variables indexing the economy. Either of these risks could lead to
policy impact estimates that are unstable and misleading.
THE DATA
This section discusses the data utilized in the study to
measure the impact of transition policy implementation on the three measures of public policy success.
Indicators of Positive Policy Outcomes
From the perspective of permanently improving the
well-being of the population, alternative metrics are
used to capture the impact of transition policies on
long-term economic and social outcomes. In terms of
raising incomes, the traditional metric of economic
improvement would be some variant of real gross domestic product. Thus, the estimations below employ
the annual growth in purchasing power-parity adjusted (PPP) real per-capita GDP. Real growth in
PPP adjusted per-capita GDP terms thus captures
the growth in inflation-adjusted per-capita national
income expressed in internationally comparable
terms. This is particularly important for non-traded
goods and services often provided by governments,
for example health and education services. The data
are drawn from the International Monetary Fund’s
2. From Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010).
79
Cuba in Transition • ASCE 2012
Figure 1. The Human Development Index for a Sample of Transition Economies
China
1.4
Average growth 2000-2011
1.6
1990
Mongolia
1.2
Cuba
Viet Nam
1.0
Romania
Latvia
Ukraine
0.8
Bulgaria
0.6
Estonia
Slovakia
Albania
Hungary
HDI in 1990
0.4
0.4
0.5
2000
Mongolia
China
1.4
Average growth 2000-2011
1.6
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Tajikistan
1.2
Cuba
Kazakhstan
Viet Nam
1.0
Armenia
Moldova
0.8
0.6
Kyrgyzstan
Romania
Latvia
Slovenia
Russia
Ukraine
Lithuania
Bulgaria
Estonia
Slovakia
Albania
Croatia
Czech Rep.
Poland
Hungary
HDI in 2000
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Source: UN.
Note: The two panel graph shows the HDI index in 1990 and again in 2000 for the countries available.
World Economic Outlook database, the EBRD transition indicators, and Rose (2004).
The second outcome measure is the Human Development Index (HDI) produced by the United Nations. The Human Development Index is a composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and
income.3 Unfortunately, this measure is statistically
the most difficult to produce, and hence, there is
sparse coverage for many countries going back to
1989. Figure 1 shows the HDI in 1990 and 2000
against the compound average growth rate. As would
be expected, higher developed countries grow more
slowly.
The third measure is the misery index, which is the
sum of inflation and unemployment. This index attempts to capture the social and political consequences stemming from the popular discontent associated with high rates of unemployment and
inflation. The data source used here is the IMF
World Economic Outlook (WEO) database.
China and Vietnam
The sample of countries used in this study is restricted to those followed by the EBRD, which does not
include China and Vietnam.4 We exclude China and
Vietnam in part due to lack of homogeneous transi-
tion indicators, but also because (1) their transitions
began much earlier (1978 for China, 1986 for Vietnam); and (2) economic transitions experienced in
those countries were designed in large part to industrialize largely agrarian societies trapped in grinding
poverty. As observed in Figure 1, both China and
Vietnam were well below the mass of post-Soviet and
Eastern European economies in terms of the HDI,
despite having undertaken twelve and four years of
transition, respectively, that delivered high annual
real GDP growth rates. Even ten years later, these
two countries were well behind the mass of transition
economies, though quickly closing the gap (and
catching up to Cuba, which did not transition).
Another important caveat regarding China and Vietnam is that at times the transition process in these
Asian economies has been portrayed as less socially
costly than in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Notwithstanding the data limitations, were this to be the
case, excluding these two countries from the sample
could lead to selection bias in the result. Nevertheless, Figure 2 shows the misery index for China and
Vietnam since 1980. For China, important caveats
arise in interpreting inflation or unemployment data
from the early 1980s that are beyond the scope of
this study. In addition, data are unavailable prior to
3. See http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/
4. Countries included: Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Tajikistan, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Serbia, Russian Federation,
Romania, Poland, Montenegro, Mongolia, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Georgia, Macedonia,
FYR, Estonia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Albania.
80
Transition Policies Twenty Years Later: Lessons for the Case of Cuba
Figure 2. Misery Index for Asian Transition Economies
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2012.
Note: Misery index computed as inflation plus employment. Inflation is the average monthly change in consumer prices. Unemployment is the number of unemployed in percent of the total labor force. For Vietnam, unemployment data is unavailable prior to 1990 so the index reflects inflation.
.5
1.5 .1
5
0
.4
.3
.2
.5
1
Mon~o
0
30
Taj~n
10
0
.5
0
0
Kyr~n
1980 1990 2000 2010
15
Uzb~n
1980 1990 2000 2010
1980 1990 2000 2010
0
0
0
0
5
10
.5
10
50
1
30
Ukr~e
20
Tur~y
Bul~a
20
Slo~a
1980 1990 2000 2010
Tur~n
10
.25 .3 .35 .4 .45
1
0
1
.5
1 1.5 2
5
0
5
3
1.5
Ser~f
2
Rus~a
0
Mon~a
0
.1
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Mol~a
10
15
0
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5
4
2
0
Rom~a
Kaz~n
5
.2
50
0
15
Mac~R
10
Lit~a
5
10
0
5
0
5
0
Pol~d
6
misery
10
Lat~a
Bos~a
10 15 20
0
Hun~y
.3
Geo~a
5
100 150
0
1
10
5
0
0
10
Est~a
10
15
Cro~a
Bel~s
5 10 15 20
Arm~a
.4
50
Alb~a
2
15
A.. of
3
Figure 3. Misery Index Across Transition Economies
1980 1990 2000 2010
1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Source: IMF WEO.
Note: Line graphs for the misery index for 29 transition economies shown for years 1999–2010; misery index outliers exceeding 5,000 are excluded
and index scaled by 1/100 for graphing purposes.
81
Cuba in Transition • ASCE 2012
1980 so that the misery index at the start of the transition is not recorded in the graph. Nevertheless, the
maximum value observed for China for the sample is
5.4 percent, which is approximately equal to Mongolia’s sample maximum. In addition, the graph for
China may, even with official inflation figures from
the 1980s, be reflecting a decline from an initial elevated inflation rate at the start of its transition
(1978). Figure 3 shows the evolution of the misery
index for transition economies, and displays familiar
spikes at the beginning of the transition period, and
as is the case for Vietnam. The maximum value observed for the Vietnam case (which excludes unemployment until 1990 due to missing data) is 15.3, approximately equivalent to Croatia. Hence, both
Vietnam and China likely experienced some variant
of the familiar spike in the misery index associated
with the start of economic transitions equivalent to
countries in the sample (e.g., Mongolia and Crotia).
Consequently, the exclusion of China and Vietnam
is not a likely source of selection bias.
Table 1.
EBRD Transition Indicators
Transition Indicator
1. Large privatization
2. Small privatization
3. Governance and
enterprises
4. Price liberalization
5. Trade and
foreign exchange
6. Competition policy
7. Banking and
interest rates
8. Securities and
non-banks
9. Infrastructure
Best Case Scenario
75% of SOEs and farms private
100% small enterprises, tradeable land
No soft budgets or subsidies, private investors
No controls outside typical (e.g., housing)
No administrative restrictions, tariffs,
convertibility, WTO
Enforcement of competition, anti-monopoly
and barriers
BIS regulation, financial deepening,
supervision
IOSCO standards, liquid markets, insurance &
pension funds
Cost reflective tariffs, commercialized assets or
maintenance
Source: EBRD Transition Indicators.
Transition Indicators and Control Variables
The EBRD publishes annual transition indicator
scores that reflect the institution’s judgment of country-specific progress in implementing transition policies.5 Originally developed in the 1994 Transition
Report, the scores are based on a nine-category classi-
fication system illustrated in Table 1. Broadly speaking, a country with a fully centralized economy
would score unity across each of the nine categories.
As policy changes are introduced to decentralize and
introduce market reforms, the score increases to a
maximum of approximately 4.33. Table 1 gives a
rough description of what the fully transitioned market economy would look like in each category after
achieving the highest possible score.
In addition to including each indicator as a regressor
in individual regressions for each of the nine policy
areas, two additional measures are developed to capture the speed of transition and the breadth of transition. Speed is measured as the weighted average years
of transition policy implementation that elapsed between 1989 and 1999, where the weight given to
each year is the change in the transition score. Hence,
for each of the nine policy areas, the lower the speed
score, the faster the country transitioned away from a
decentralized policy framework in that area. The
breadth of transition is scored simply as the percent
of the total possible score that the country achieved
between 1989 and 2010. It is simply the sum of the
annual increases in the transition score per area of
policy expressed as a percent of the total possible.
There is only one measure of speed and breadth of
transition per country over the period 1989–2010.
Hence, when these are employed as right-hand-side
variables, the left-hand-side variable is the change in
the average level of the outcome measure (real percapita PPP GDP growth, misery index, or HDI)
from 1990 to 2010. This necessarily results in significantly fewer observations for these panel regressions,
as they are able to only exploit the cross-section.
Moreover, there are very few HDI observations since
1990, hence, for this measure there are even fewer
observations.
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between speed
and breadth of transition and the three measures of
well-being used here. Growth of real PPP GDP per
capita (abbreviated dgdppc in the upper panel) appears positively correlated the speed score and negatively correlated with the breadth score. The misery
5. See http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data/macro/ti_methodology.shtml for details.
82
Transition Policies Twenty Years Later: Lessons for the Case of Cuba
Figure 4. Transition Speed and Breadth against Measures of Income and Well-being
30
-10
0
dgdppc
10 20
-10
0
dgdppc
Linear Fit
dgdppc
10 20
30
dgdppc
Linear Fit
10
0
.2
.4
.6
Pct transition completed
.8
1.5
6
8
Speed of implementation
1.5
4
misery
misery
Linear Fit
0
0
misery
.5
1
Linear Fit
misery
.5
1
1
hdi
Linear Fit
.2
.4
.6
Pct transition completed
.8
1
hdi
Linear Fit
50
60
60
hdi
70
hdi
70
80
0
90
10
80
6
8
Speed of implementation
90
4
4
6
8
Speed of implementation
10
0
.2
.4
.6
Pct transition completed
.8
1
Source: EBRD, UN HDI, World Bank, IMF WEO.
Note: The columns represent the speed of implementation and the Percent of Policies implemented by 1999. Speed is measured as the weighted average number of years of policy implementation, with the weights being the transition indicators. The percent of full implementation that was
achieved by 1999 is the measure shown in the right column. The upper row compares these against real per-capital purchasing-power parity (PPP)
adjusted GDP growth. The middle row compares these against the misery index. The last row compares these against the Human Development index. Joint scatter plots for 29 shown for years 2000–2010, misery index outliers exceeding 5,000 excluded for graphing purposes, simple linear regression shown as line.
index (middle panel) also appears positively correlated with speed and negatively with breadth. Roughly
speaking, this implies slower and less broad transition
helps growth but also increases misery. It would be
incorrect to draw conclusions from a scatter plot,
however, as it does not control for country-specific
effects or exogenous factors such as energy prices
(which is why we employ panel regressions below).
The HDI index shows a broadly negative relationship with the speed of transition but a positive relationship with the breadth of reforms, suggesting a
slower but broader implementation of policies improves the HDI.
Turning to the other variables, equation 2 includes
controls for nonpolicy and exogenous factors that reflect either the initial condition of the country or
evolving exogenous factors that could impact transition outcomes. The estimations below have attempted to parsimoniously include the most important. Included are share of agriculture in the country, the
global real GDP growth rate, the LIBOR interest
rate, non-fuel commodity prices, the oil price, oil re-
83
Cuba in Transition • ASCE 2012
Table 2.
Regressions of Bilateral Impact of Transition Measures on Income, Development,
and Misery Index
Growth of PPP Real GDP Per Capita
Large Priv.
Small Priv.
Enterprises
Prices
Trade/FX
Competition
Banking
Transition Control (see column)
Share of Agg.
Global GDP growth
Libor
Non-fuel prices
Oil price
Oil rents
Gas rents
EU integration
Pct. High Edu. Of Migration
Pct. Pop. Migrates
Pct. Pop. w/ High Edu. Migrates
N
R-squared
2.27**
0.01
0.63
0.13
0.03
-0.03
0.23***
0
-3.83
24.37***
1.66
-6.65
152
0.29
1.87*
0.02
0.65
0.11
0.02
-0.02
0.22***
0
-3.06
24.45***
1.46
-5.78
152
0.31
4.03**
-0.08
0.56
0.04
0
-0.02
0.21***
0.01
-4.15
23.26**
1.25
-6.4
152
0.4
2.61***
0.05
0.63
0.11
-0.01
-0.01
0.21***
0
-2.41
22.16***
-0.59
-3.48
152
0.25
1.91*
0.05
0.65
0.15
0
-0.01
0.20***
0
-2.48
22.18**
0.92
-5.14
152
0.32
1.81
0.03
0.74
0.1
0.01
-0.02
0.21***
-0.01
-3.39
29.30***
2.6
-9.18
152
0.25
-0.52
-0.03
0.7
0.13
0.01
-0.01
0.20***
-0.01
-1.25
29.20**
2.5
-8.49
152
0.27
Human Development Index
Transition Control (see column)
Share of Agg.
Non-fuel prices
Oil price
Oil rents (% of GDP)
Gas rents (% of GDP)
EU integration
Pct. High Edu. Of Migration
Pct. Pop. Migrates
Pct. Pop. w/ High Edu. Migrates
N
R-squared
Large Priv.
Small Priv.
Enterprises
Prices
Trade/FX
Competition
Banking
0.42
0.05
0.03
0.04**
0.18
-0.01
0.31
23.24***
3.01**
-4.72**
46
0
2.41*
0
0.03**
0.04*
-0.16
0.32
3.47
8.96
2.39*
-3.37**
46
0.1
-0.63
0.06
0.03*
0.05***
-0.21
0.07
0.3
22.17***
2.77**
-4.21***
46
0.01
-2.11*
0.01
0.02
0.04**
0.24
-0.03
1.07
23.01***
3.40***
-5.14***
46
0
2.11
0.06
0.03
0.05**
-0.84
0.34
0.31
12.83
2.21
-2.92
46
0.01
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.04**
-0.2
0.12
0.11
22.89**
2.85**
-4.42**
46
0
0.01
0
0
0.00**
0
0
0
0.19**
0.03**
-0.04**
46
0.03
Misery Index
Transition Control (see column)
Share of Agg.
Global GDP growth
Libor
Non-fuel prices
Oil price
Oil rents
Gas rents
EU integration
Pct. High Edu. Of Migration
Pct. Pop. Migrates
Pct. Pop. w/ High Edu. Migrates
N
R-squared
Large Priv.
Small Priv.
Enterprises
Prices
Trade/FX
Competition
Banking
4.68
4.26*
-0.19
-1.13
-0.03
0.17
0.84
-0.14
-51.31**
-225.84**
-28.60
82.51*
149
0.3
-24.52***
3.40
-0.08
-1.58
-0.14
0.25*
0.79
-0.36**
-29.58
-195.86**
-25.36
69.47*
149
0.37
-25.28**
4.19*
0.37
-1.06
-0.01
0.18
0.86
-0.28*
-25.87*
-211.14**
-25.33
79.05*
149
0.28
6.76
4.41**
-0.30
-1.04
-0.06
0.19
0.81
-0.14
-49.49**
-214.71**
-30.27
83.72**
149
0.29
-10.49
3.80
0.08
-1.50
-0.05
0.18
0.84
-0.23
-42.68**
-209.81**
-25.86
76.38*
149
0.32
9.02
4.30*
0.04
-1.21
-0.05
0.17
0.82
-0.16
-54.07**
-212.04**
-27.25
76.15*
149
0.31
-19.21*
4.28*
0.01
-1.51
-0.06
0.27**
0.80
-0.24**
-39.30**
-192.06**
-26.32
75.98**
149
0.26
Non-bank Infrastructure
-0.64
-0.04
0.7
0.12
0
-0.01
0.21***
-0.01
-0.76
28.72**
1.61
-7.31
152
0.25
0.85
-0.01
0.62
0.17
0.02
-0.03
0.21***
-0.01
-2.65
28.16**
1.84
-7.41
152
0.28
Non-bank Infrastructure
0.02
0
0
0.00**
0
0
-0.01
0.26***
0.04**
-0.06**
46
0.03
-0.01
0
0
0.00***
0
0
0
0.23***
0.03**
-0.05**
46
0.02
Non-bank Infrastructure
-0.98
4.20*
-0.16
-1.20
-0.07
0.19
0.82
-0.16
-46.21**
-221.58**
-28.68
82.60*
149
0.3
0.73
4.23*
-0.20
-1.13
-0.05
0.18
0.81
-0.15
-48.23**
-221.58**
-28.21
82.05
149
0.3
Source: EBRD Transition Indicators, IMF World Economic Outlook Database, World Bank Development indicators, UN HDI, Authors' estimates.
Note: The three-panel table shows the estimates of a regression with the dependent variable being the annual change in the outcome indicators, which
are the Humand Development Index (HDI), the misery index (the average annual unemployment rate added to average monthly inflation) and the
growth in PPP adjusted annual real GDP. The independent variables are the EBRD Transition Indicators, migration indicators, and (not shown) lags of
the dependent variable, and controls Global GDP growth, Libor, Non-fuel prices, Oil price, Oil rents (% of GDP), Gas rents (% of GDP), and EU integration. Statistical significance given by p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; fixed effect annual panel regression, 1989-2010.
lated income in percent of national GDP, natural gas
income in percent of GDP, EU integration indicators, and migration indicators, including by level of
84
migrant education. The sources for these data are the
IMF World Economic Outlook Database for April
Transition Policies Twenty Years Later: Lessons for the Case of Cuba
Figure 5. The Impact of Transition Policies on Development, Misery and Income Measures
HDI
Misery
Income
Infrastructure
Non-bank financial
Banking, interest rate
Competition
Trade and FX
Prices
Enterprises
Small Privatization
Large Privatization
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Source: EBRD Transition Indicators, IMF WEO 2012, Rose (2004), UN HDI, World Bank WDI.
Note: The three bar charts show the estimated coefficient on regression of the Humand Development Index (HDI), the average annual unemployment rate added to average monthly inflation (Misery index) and the growth in PPP adjusted annual real GDP as the dependent variable on EBRD
Transition Indicators. The bars are the size of the coefficient, and the red indicates a significant impact while yellow indicates insignificant. Regressions include one ECB Transition indicator at a time (i.e., each regressed individually) and includes controls for natural gas and oil rents, commodity
and industrial inputs prices, international interest rates, past real GDP growth, distance to Russia, share of agriculture in GDP, population education
levels, and migration.
2012, the World Development Indicators of the
World Bank, and Rose (2004).
RESULTS
This section presents the regressions and the policy
implications from the empirical evidence found. Table 2 shows the regression results divided into three
panels for income growth, misery index and the
HDI. In each panel, nine columns represent the estimates for the nine transition policy areas presented in
Table 1. The bold row labeled “Transition control”
shows the estimate α 3 from of equation 2 for 1989–
2010; it is the estimated impact of an increase in the
transition indicator on real PPP per-capita GDP
growth, the misery index or HDI. The regressions
presented in Table 2 focus on the impact of the policy change, i.e., include only the transition indicator
and not the speed or breadth measures. The second
column, for example, shows the regression for Small
privatization policies. Per Table 1, implementing
transition policies in this area would imply no state
ownership of small enterprises and the effective trad-
ability of land. According to the results in Table 2,
delivering these policies statistically significantly improves real PPP GDP growth, lowers the misery index and improves the HDI for a transition economy.
Other results of interest drawn from Table 2 include
the consistently positive impact from highly educated
migrants (which could more broadly reflect highly
educated populations), and the impact of energy
prices. The stabilizing role of EU accession is also
found to have a strong effect in lower the misery index, while agriculture as a share of GDP has the opposite effect.
Figure 5 graphs the estimated coefficient, α 3 from of
equation 2, for each of the three measures of well-being, with red bars indicating statistical significance.
This presentation allows a first pass at comparing results across well-being indicators and transition policy areas, so as to see which are the most effective. The
results suggest that Trade and Foreign Exchange Liberalization, Enterprise Reform, and Privatization of
Small and Large Enterprises all simultaneously con-
85
Cuba in Transition • ASCE 2012
Figure 6. The Impact of the Speed of Transition Policies Implementation on Well-Being
HDI
Misery
Income
Infrastructure
Non-bank financial
Banking, interest rate
Competition
Trade and FX
Prices
Enterprises
Small Privatization
Large Privatization
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03 -30
-20
-10
0
10
-2
-1
0
1
2
Source: EBRD Transition Indicators, IMF WEO 2012, Rose (2004), UN HDI, World Bank WDI.
Note: The three bar charts show the estimated coefficient of regression with the dependent variable being the change in the average value of the outcome indicators from the 1990s decade to the 2000s decade. The outcome indicators are the Human Development Index (HDI), the misery index
(the average annual unemployment rate added to average monthly inflation), and the growth in PPP adjusted annual real GDP. The independent
variable is the speed of implementation of transition policies from 1989–1999. Speed is the weighted average years of EBRD Transition policy changes between 1989 and 1999. A negative bar indicates faster implementation speed increases the outcome indicator (HDI, misery, or real GDP). Red
bars indicate statistical significance.
tribute to growing income, lowering the misery index, and increasing the Human Development Index.
Liberalizing Foreign Exchange and trade implies introducing currency convertibility, removing administrative controls on currency exchange markets and
removing administrative barriers and tariffs on trade.
Enterprise reform means eliminating soft budgets to
public enterprises, modernizing management and
making them viable to the point that private investors are willing to participate as investors. Large privatization means at least seventy-five percent of enterprise assets in private ownership with effective
corporate governance. Price liberalization statistically
significantly increases income but it also lowers the
HDI and increases the misery index (though not statistically significantly for the latter). It implies removing all price controls except those typically kept
(e.g. on housing). Hence, taken together, the results
suggest that liberalizing trade and foreign exchange
markets while privatizing small enterprises, large enterprises, and public enterprises help increase income, lower the misery index, and increase the HDI.
86
Price liberalization is found to increase income, but it
lowers the HDI and increases misery index (though
not statistically significantly for the latter).
Figure 6 shows the analogous results for a panel regression using the speed of policy implementation
for each transition policy area. Note that the speed
measure is larger as the policy is implemented more
slowly. Hence, the evidence suggests that for large
privatizations, a slower implementation increases income growth, lowers the misery index, but also lowers the HDI. For competition policy (effective enforcement of competition policy; unrestricted entry
to most markets), slower policy implementation lowers income and slightly increases the misery index
(small negative impact), and has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on HDI. As HDI data are
very sparse and therefore less reliable, the thrust of
the evidence would suggest slow implementation of
large privatization and fast implementation of competition policy reforms.
Transition Policies Twenty Years Later: Lessons for the Case of Cuba
Figure 7. The Impact of Breadth of Transition Policies Implementation on Well-Being
HDI
Misery
Income
Infrastructure
Non-bank financial
Banking, interest rate
Competition
Trade and FX
Prices
Enterprises
Small Privatization
Large Privatization
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25 -100
-50
0
50
100
-15
-10
-5
0
5
Source: EBRD Transition Indicators, IMF WEO 2012, Rose (2004), UN HDI, World Bank WDI.
Note: The three bar charts show the estimated coefficient of regression with the dependent variable being the change in the average value of the outcome indicators from the 1990s decade to the 2000s decade. The outcome indicators are the Human Development Index (HDI), the misery index
(the average annual unemployment rate added to average monthly inflation), and the growth in PPP adjusted annual real GDP. The independent
variable is the speed of implementation of transition policies from 1989–1999. A negative bar indicates that broader implementation decreases the
outcome indicator (HDI, misery, or real GDP). Red bars indicate statistical significance.
Figure 7 considers the breadth of policy reforms on
the measures of wellbeing. Here, the results are less
convincingly pointing in any direction. Most are insignificant, only large privatizations have a statistically significant impact, and that is to lower income
while raising the HDI. Along with sparse data, as the
breadth of implementation is essentially a percentage
of accomplishment within the EBRD scale, non-linearities not captured in the transition indices (e.g. a
change from 10 to 35 percent may not be the same as
from 70 to 95 percent) may present insurmountable
estimation challenges.
in means across the two groups. The results are
broadly consistent with the estimations above, suggesting that there are important differences in the
speed of implementation. The model countries implemented transition policies more slowly in the areas of competition, securities and non-bank financial
markets, infrastructure privatization and governance
and public enterprises. They also implemented large
industries privatizations faster, and implemented a
broader reform, according to the breadth measure.
Table 3 attempts to address the difficulties in breadth
and speed results by simply comparing the average
breadth and speed of policy implementation for a
group of “model” transition countries versus the
breadth and speed scores for the rest of the transition
economies. The model countries include Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia. The table compares the average of these
countries to the rest of the countries in the sample,
and highlights the statistically significant differences
Any study attempting to disentangle and measure the
impact of policies on long-term growth outcomes
faces difficult endogeneity issues, namely, do successful countries result from good policies, or are good
policies enacted only in countries that are successful
for other reasons? Adding to this challenge are the
data and measurement difficulties, not least of which
is the fact that we have very few observed transitions
to market economies, and the early years of these
tend to have very poor economic data.
CONCLUSIONS
87
Cuba in Transition • ASCE 2012
Table 3.
Comparing the Speed and Breadth of Reforms Across Country Groups
1. Large scale privatization
2. Small scale privatization
3. Governance and enterprise restructuring
4. Price liberalization
5. Trade and foreign exchange system
6. Competition policy
7. Banking reform and interest rate liberalization
8. Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions
9. Infrastructure
Speed (weighted years)a
Model
Others
4.46
6.00
4.92
5.13
6.26
5.15
3.78
4.34
5.66
6.06
5.55
4.65
6.12
5.53
6.62
5.27
7.48
6.26
Breadth (pct in 1st 10 yrs)b
Model
Others
0.83
0.62
0.61
0.76
0.39
0.47
0.77
0.78
0.80
0.83
0.40
0.45
0.60
0.58
0.36
0.44
0.41
0.47
Faster, Broader
…
Slower
…
..
Slower
…
Slower
Slower
Source: EBRD Transition Indicators.
Others: Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Bosnia & Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Macedonia Moldova Mongolia
Montenegro Romania Russia Serbia Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan
Model: Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovakia Slovenia
a. Measures the speed in years in which reforms were carried out, up to 1999.
b. Measures the percentage of reforms (out of the total possible) that were done by 1999.
This study attempts to overcome these difficulties via
alternative measures and by exploiting the relatively
long time period that has passed since the start of the
transition. Evidence is presented suggesting that liberalizing prices and trade and foreign exchange markets while privatizing small enterprises, large enterprises, and enterprises bring higher incomes, lower
misery indices, and higher HDI levels. The data also
suggest that large privatizations should proceed slowly while competition policy should proceed quickly.
Finally, the study also suggests that China and Vietnam are not good comparators for Cuba. These two
represent the successful development and industrialization of mainly agrarian societies in grinding poverty, which is not an appropriate starting point for
modeling Cuba’s potential future transition.
REFERENCES
Jaumotte, F. and P. Sodsriwiboon, 2010, “Current
Account Imbalances in the Southern Euro Area,”
IMF
Working
Paper
WP/10/139,
www.IMF.org.
88
Rose, Andrew K., 2004, “Do We Really Know That
the WTO Increases Trade?” The American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 1 (March), pp. 98–
114.