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Marriage Equality and Discrimination – Responses for Prime Time

Written responses submitted to Prime Time in reponse to questions posed for a report , aired on May 14th 2015, considering the constitutionality of certain kinds of discrimination should Ireland’s marriage equality referendum be passed. These responses formed the basis of an interview recorded on May 11th and used in that broadcast. My views reflect my understanding of Irish constitutional law, and are not intended to advocate any position in the referendum.

Marriage Equality and Discrimination – Responses for Prime Time Dr David Kenny, Assistant Professor of Law, Trinity College Dublin 1. If the Marriage Equality Referendum is passed will it be constitutionally permissible to favour an opposite sex married couple over a same sex married couple in any laws, regulation, or policy of a statutory body, governing the adoption and fostering of children? Yes, such a discrimination might be constitutionally possible, but only in the event that there were compelling evidence to justify it. At the moment, it would be possible to discriminate in adoption and fostering as between married and unmarried families, because the Constitution privileges marriage as an institution. Since all homosexual couples are per se unmarried, they could readily be disfavored in adoption etc. on this ground alone, and there would be little scope to challenge the constitutionality of this. In the event the referendum were passed, however, homosexual couples would not be excluded from the institution of marriage, and so preferring married couples would not longer have the effect of blanket discrimination against homosexual couples in these matters. That is not to say that no distinction could be drawn in any circumstance between married heterosexual couples and married homosexual couples; I can see no constitutional basis for the view that the marriage family is a unitary concept, and no distinctions can be drawn between different classes of married family. It is rather to say that any such distinction would have to be backed up with good evidence to justify an inequality between homosexual and heterosexual married families. We can currently distinguish between married couples in adoption on the basis of, amongst other factors, their age (they must be 21), means of providing for the child, their moral character, their capacity to raise children having regard to the children’s needs and welfare, etc. One must also have regard, under Article 42A.4.1°, to the best interests of children as the paramount consideration. That Article states: ‘Provision shall be made by law that in the resolution of all proceedings … concerning the adoption, guardianship or custody of, or access to, any child, the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration.’ Before and after the referendum, all decisions on adoption and fostering must be made in the best interests of children. Should the referendum pass, it would in principle be possible to distinguish between homosexual and heterosexual married couples (or indeed any other other classes of married people, such as young couples, couples with disabilities, disabilities, etc.) if an only if there were compelling evidence that the best interests of children were not served by being placed with homosexual couples, couples, either in an individual case or generally. If evidence could firmly establish establish that same-sex parents had were generally and provably worse for adopted adopted children than opposite-sex parents, then a distinction could be drawn drawn constitutionally. There is no such general evidence now existing that I am I am aware of, but in the event that it became available, there would be no insurmountable constitutional bar to the State making a distinction between homosexual and heterosexual married couples. The difficulty, it seems to me, is me, is evidential rather than constitutional. The difference before and after the passage of the referendum is not to the way the current adoption regime is structured, which after the Children and Family Relationships Act 2015 does not distinguish in favour of opposite-sex couples. The change would be that, should the legislature want to alter this situation, preferring married couples to unmarried couples in adoption would no longer have the effect of excluding homosexual couples, and so other reasons, grounded in evidence, would be needed to justify any distinction. 2. If the Marriage Equality Referendum is passed, will it be constitutionally permissible to favour opposite sex married couples over same sex married couples in any laws, regulations, or policy of a statutory agency, governing surrogacy and assisted human reproduction? The question of surrogacy regulation is currently so hypothetical as to make any clear answer to this question difficult to formulate. We currently have no substantial regulation in place governing surrogacy, so we would have to first speculate about how it might be regulated, and then speculate about how and why one might treat same sex couples differently in that regulatory regime. In the abstract, one apply similar logic as was applied to fostering and adoption, and say that a distinction might be drawn, but if and only if it could be back up with evidence or illustration of some difference in surrogacy and AHR for same sex couples that renders it different in terms of outcomes for children or the effects and functions of the technology on society. A potentially significant difference between this and the adoption context is that the “best interests of the child” provision does not necessarily or directly apply to surrogacy, though it may be applied by way of legislation, or the constitutional principle might be applied by analogy or have an influence in a broader way. Without the changes proposed in the referendum, one could again rely on the constitutional preference for married couples to treat same-sex couples (along with unmarried heterosexual couples) less favorably than heterosexual married couples. If the referendum passes, this will not be possible, and any distinction between married heterosexual and married homosexual couples will have to be justified by the marshaling of evidence that the exclusion were necessary in the general welfare or related to some real and demonstrable distinction between surrogacy for same-sex couples and surrogacy for opposite-sex couples. 3. If the Marriage Equality Referendum is passed, could a same sex couple successfully challenge any future restrictions on surrogacy and donor assisted human reproduction, even if that restriction also applied to opposite sex couples, on the basis that it is interfering with their constitutionally-protected right to create a family under this amendment? No. There has been no suggestion in the jurisprudence of the Irish courts that any couples – married or unmarried, heterosexual or homosexual - have a right to access donor assisted reproduction and surrogacy. The courts have also never suggested that they would be willing to extend existing constitutional guarantees – that is, a heavily-qualified implied right to natural procreation recognised in Murray v Ireland – to include entitlements to donor assisted reproduction and surrogacy. Constitutional rights, such as the right to procreate, are never absolute and can be limited by legislation. The courts have essentially held that regulation of surrogacy and similar reproductive technologies is a matter for the Oireachtas, and therefore courts will likely be highly deferential to any settlement enacted by the legislature. There is no foreseeable situation where same-sex couples could challenge a law restricting, without discrimination, access to donor assisted reproduction and surrogacy on the basis of a right to procreate or similar entitlement.