On figurative Interpretation

Yūsuf b. Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Ghafīṣ On Figurative Interpretation ⁘ From A Commentary on The Wāsiṭiyya Creed (Sharḥ al-ʿAqīdat al-Wāsiṭiyya) Safaruk Zaman Chowdhury Dar al-Nicosia Page1 Key Readings in Kalām Texts #25 #1 Translated by Dar al-Nicosia Educational Resources Series: Key Readings in Kalām Texts Author: Yūsuf b. Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Ghafīṣ Text: Sharḥ al-ʿAqīdat al-Wāsiṭiyya Original Language: Arabic Section: On Figurative Interpretation Number of pages: 43 Translator: Safaruk Zaman Chowdhury Electronic copy published: 2024 www.islamicanalytictheology.org Info@islamicanalytictheology.org Cite as: < al-Ghafīṣ, Yūsuf b. Muḥammad. 2024. On Figurative Interpretation. London: Dar al-Nicosia Publications > Page2 The cover image is the inside title page of a commentary on Ibn Taymiyya’s al-ʿAqīdat al-Wāsiṭiyya by Muḥammad al-Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUthaymīn, published by Dār Ibn al-Jawzī 1421 AH in Riyadh. This translation is from an audio commentary on Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Aqīdat al-Wāsiṭiyya by the Saudi-based scholar Yūsuf b. Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Ghafīṣ. It is audio session four and is a duration of approximately 100 minutes and ending at.1 The author critiques the concept of ta’wīl (figurative interpretation) as it has been employed by kalām theologians - whom he characterises as ahl al-bidʿa (heretical innovators) - to distort the meanings of the Qur'ān, particularly concerning the divine attributes of God. According to the al-Ghafīṣ, ta’wīl is commonly defined by its proponents as diverting a word from its literal meaning to a figurative one due to contextual clues. This definition, however, is seen as flawed both in terms of Sharīʿa, reason, and the Arabic language. From a Sharīʿa perspective, the use of ta’wīl in the sense defined by the kalām theologians is considered a hermeneutical position that is an unwarranted religious innovation that was not mentioned in the Qur’ān, nor by the Prophet Muḥammad, or his Companions. If the Qur'ān were meant to be understood through such an interpretive method, the Prophet or the Companions would have indicated it. However, the Qur’ān itself does not utilize ta’wīl in this alleged distorted sense, but rather refers to it as ‘tafsīr’ (explanation). Therefore, al-Ghafīṣ asserts that using * ta’wīl to reinterpret the divine attributes is a violation of Islamic principles. Rationally, the al-Ghafīṣ argues that the very premise of ta’wīl, as defined by its proponents, is logically inconsistent. If the Qur’ānic text is understood to convey the truth, there is no need to divert its meaning to something else. If it were to convey falsehood or be ambiguous, then it would be contradictory to accept it as divine speech. The Qur’ān is clear and accessible to 1 Audio is available at https://audio.islamweb.net/. Page3 Introduction Page4 those who understand Arabic, and its verses are either understood to convey truth or falsehood—there is no middle ground. To claim that the Qur’ān’s literal meaning is false and must be interpreted figuratively is, in essence, to suggest that the Qur’ān itself is misleading, which is an unacceptable proposition. Al-Ghafīṣ also critiques the proponents of ta’wīl for their reliance on a linguistic theory that divides the Arabic language into ḥaqīqa (literal) and majāz (figurative). According to this theory, words have original assigned or designated meanings but can be diverted to secondary or metaphorical meaning based on contextual indications or clues. He argues that this theory, especially as applied to the divine attributes, is fundamentally flawed and lacks support in the Arabic language itself. He points out that the distinction between ḥaqīqa and majāz was introduced by later scholars and theologians, particularly the Muʿtazila, and was not a recognized concept among the early generations of Muslims. In discussing the linguistic flaws of the ḥaqīqa-majāz dichotomy, the author challenges the idea that a word can only have one primary meaning and that all other meanings are metaphorical. He argues that it is entirely possible for a word to have multiple meanings within the Arabic language, and that the context determines which meaning is intended by the speaker. For example, the word ‘hand’ (yad) can mean both a physical hand and ‘blessing’ depending on the context. AlGhafīṣ’s point is that there is no inherent reason to restrict a word to one meaning and to automatically categorize other meanings as figurative. Moreover, when discussing divine attributes in the Qur’ān, the he emphasizes that context clarifies meaning. In verses where God’s attributes actions to Himself, such as in the verse ‘What prevented you from prostrating to what I created with My own hands?’ [Q. 38:75], the word ‘hands’ is clearly in the dual form and attributed to God. The context makes it impossible to interpret the word as anything other Page5 than a literal attribute of Allah. The author also points out that the Arabs would never use the dual form of hands metaphorically to mean something like blessing. He further refutes the idea that figurative interpretations, such as yad meaning ‘power’ or ‘blessing,’ can be applied universally to divine attributes. He argues that such interpretations, based on the theory of majāz, are unsupported by the Arabic language and are often the result of philosophical reasoning rather than a true linguistic or textual basis. The use of majāz by scholars of ta’wīl often leads to contradictions, as they impose figurative meanings where the text clearly conveys a literal meaning. The author concludes that the theory of ta’wīl and the ḥaqīqa-majāz dichotomy is ultimately a foreign imposition on the Arabic language and Islamic theology. He asserts that this approach leads to the distortion of the Qur’ān’s clear messages, particularly regarding the divine attributes. The correct approach, he argues, is to adhere to the apparent and clear meanings of the Qur’ān without diverting to figurative interpretations unless there is an overwhelming textual or contextual necessity. In doing so, the traditional understanding of what he identifies as the orthodox Muslims is upheld, which is truly rooted in reason, language, and Sharīʿa, unlike the methods of the kalām theologians who failed, in his assessment, to align their interpretations with any of these three foundational pillars. ‫‪On Figurative Interpretation‬‬ ‫‪Text 1 (audio #4, 1-100 mins):‬‬ ‫]التأويل ومعانيه]‬ ‫قال املصنف رمحه هللا ‪[:‬من غري حتريف وال تعطيل]‬ ‫رعَّب املصنف هنا بلفظ التحريف‪ ،‬ومراده التأويل؛ اذ ال توجد طائفة من طوائف‬ ‫صح بأن شيئ ًا من كتاب هللا يقبل التحريف‪ ،‬أو أن ما تقوهل يف القرأن هو‬ ‫املسلمني تُ ِّر‬ ‫من ابب التحريف‪ ،‬ال يف ابب السامء والصفات وال يف غريه‪ ،‬واللفظ املس تعمل يف هذا‬ ‫املراد هو لفظ التأويل‪ ،‬لكن املصنف مل يقل ‪:‬من غري تأويل؛ لن لفظ التأويل مل يرد يف‬ ‫النصوص القرأنية والنبوية وال حىت يف الكم الصحابة مورد اذلم‪ ،‬بل ُذكر مورداً فاض ًال‬ ‫مناس ب ًا‪ ،‬فان التأويل يف كتاب هللا أو يف س نة نبيه اما أنه يقع عىل معىن احلقيقة اليت‬ ‫يئول الهيا اليشء‪ ،‬واما أنه يقع عىل معىن التفسري‪.‬‬ ‫واذا حتققت يف النظر وجدت أن املعىن الول والثاين مادهتام واحدة‪ ،‬فاللك تفسري ‪:‬اما‬ ‫تفسري املعاين‪ ،‬واما أن يكون احلقيقة اليت يئول الهيا اليشء‪.‬‬ ‫وعىل مثل هذا املعىن وذاك جرى اخلالف بني طائفة من السلف يف الوقوف عىل قول‬ ‫اَلل ] أل معران‪ [ ٧:‬فانه اذا وقف هاهنا اكن املراد احلقيقة‬ ‫هللا تعاىل ‪َ :‬و َما ي َ ْع َ َُل تَأْ رو َ ُيَل االر ر ُ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫اليت تئول الهيا الش ياء‪ ،‬وهذه احلقيقة اليت يؤول الهيا أمر الغيب اختص هللا س بحانه‬ ‫ُون ريف الْ رع ْ رَل ]‬ ‫وتعاىل بعلمها‪ ،‬واذا اكن الوقوف عىل قوهل ‪َ :‬و َما ي َ ْع َ َُل تَأْ رو َ ُيَل االر ر ُ‬ ‫اَلل َو رالر راِس َ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫أل معران‪[ ٧:‬اكن التأويل هنا مبعىن التفسري‪ ،‬فان تفسري القرأن يعلمه الراِسون يف العَل‪.‬‬ ‫‪Page6‬‬ ‫فهذا املعىن وذاك املعىن هو املس تعمل يف الكم هللا س بحانه والكم رسوهل صىل هللا‬ ‫عليه وسَل للتأويل‪.‬‬ ‫وأما التأويل اذلي قال فيه أحصابه و رنظاره ‪:‬أنه رصف اللفظ من احلقيقة اىل اجملاز لقرينة؛‬ ‫فان هذا التأويل هبذا احلد ليس هل معىن يعرف ال يف لسان العرب وال يف الكم الصحابة؛‬ ‫فض ًال عن أن يكون مراداً يف نصوص الكتاب والس نة‪.‬‬ ‫مفراد املصنف هنا حني قال ‪ :‬من غري حتريف؛ أي ‪:‬من غري تأويل‪ ،‬ولكنه مل يعَّب بلفظ‬ ‫التأويل؛ لن لفظ التأويل مل يرد مورد اذلم يف النصوص‪ ،‬وامنا اذلي ذمه هللا يف كتابه‬ ‫هو التحريف اذلي وقع فيه أهل الكتاب من قبل‪.‬‬ ‫مفن تأ رول صفات الباري عىل غري معناها‪ ،‬وعىل غري موردها من هجة اللغة‪ ،‬فهو يف نفس‬ ‫المر قد وقع يف قدر من حتريف معاين الكتاب والس نة‪ ،‬ومن هنا انسب أن يسمى‬ ‫املصنف هذه الطريقة املس تعمةل عند املتلكمني حتريف ًا‪.‬‬ ‫وهذا التأويل هو مسأةل نظرية خبالف مسأةل التعطيل؛ حني قال املصنف ‪ :‬من غري‬ ‫حتريف وال تعطيل؛ فان لفظ التعطيل ليس لفظ ًا نظر ًاي عند أحصابه‪.‬‬ ‫والتعطيل لفظ أطلقه السلف عىل طريقة اجلهمية ومن شاركهم فهيا من املعزتةل أو‬ ‫غريمه‪ ،‬ومعناه ‪:‬اخللو والفراغ‪ ،‬فهم ملا نفوا صفات الباري ر‬ ‫عطلوا الباري عن كامهل الالئق‬ ‫به‪.‬‬ ‫وهذا دارج يف الكم أهل الس نة من املتقدمني واملتأخرين؛ وهو أهنم يسمون نفي الصفات‬ ‫تعطي ًال؛ أي ‪:‬تفريغ ًا عن الكامل‪.‬‬ ‫[قاعدة التأويل عند املبتدعة وسبب القول هبا]‬ ‫التأويل عند أهل البدع يراد به رصف اللفظ عن احلقيقة اىل اجملاز لقرينة‪.‬‬ ‫وهذه القاعدة ويه قاعدة التأويل ‪-‬وجيب أن ندرك أهنا قاعدة أكرث من كوهنا تعريف ًا أو‬ ‫رسامً المس من السامء‪ -‬من أخص قواعد اخملالفني للسلف يف ابب السامء والصفات‪.‬‬ ‫‪Page7‬‬ ‫فان أول من أحدث نفي الصفات عن هللا س بحانه وتعاىل مه اجلهمية‪ ،‬وشاركهم يف هذا‬ ‫املعزتةل‪ ،‬ومه مادة واحدة يف هذا الباب‪.‬‬ ‫مل يكن نفي القوم من أوائل ر‬ ‫النظار لصفات الباري انش ئ ًا عن نظر يف كتاب هللا س بحانه‬ ‫حفصلوا منه نفي السامء أو نفي الصفات أو نفي ما هو مهنام؛ ولكن القوم خيالفونك‬ ‫وتعاىل‪ ،‬ر‬ ‫يف اجلواب؛ بل مه يصحون بأن النصوص مل تنطق ابلنفي‪ ،‬وامنا نطقت ابالثبات‪ ،‬ولكهنم‬ ‫تأولوا نصوص االثبات ومل يتأولوا نصوص النفي؛ فنصوص النفي كقوهل ‪َ :‬وال ي َ ْظ ر َُل َرب ُّ َك‬ ‫َأ َحداً ] الكهف‪ [ ٤٩:‬ليس فهيا نزاع بني أحد من املسلمني؛ فهيي عىل ظاهرها أو عىل‬ ‫وهجها؛ امنا اذلي هو مورد الزناع هو نصوص االثبات‪.‬‬ ‫فهم امنا أرادوا اثبات املعتقد اذلي يعتَّبونه معتقداً للمسلمني؛ فاختذوا هذه الطريقة املسامة‬ ‫بطريقة املتلكمني‪ ،‬وهذا يبني لنا مسأةل هممة؛ ويه أن الفرق بني أهل الس نة وامجلاعة‬ ‫وبني سائر الطوائف ليس مبني ًا عىل أحاد النصوص‪ ،‬بل هو مبين عىل الصول أو ما‬ ‫يسمى ابملهنج‪.‬‬ ‫قد يقول قائل ‪:‬مل اختذوا طريقة عَل الالكم وتركوا الطريقة اليت علهيا أمئة الس نة واحلديث؟‬ ‫لسبب همم أخر قد ال يكون مشهوراً‪،‬‬ ‫فأقول ‪:‬هذا لضعف فقههم يف طريقة أهل الس نة‪ ،‬و ٍ‬ ‫وهو أن القوم أرادوا تقريب هذه الطريقة اىل قوم من الزاندقة والفالسفة اذلين ال يدينون‬ ‫ابالسالم أص ًال‪ ،‬فأرادوا الرد علهيم بتقرير عقيدة املسلمني بنفس مادهتم ‪...‬‬ ‫وهذا هو أول اشاكل وقعت فيه املعزتةل وأمثالها‪ ،‬وهو أهنم أرادوا اثبات معتقد املسلمني‬ ‫والرد عىل الفالسفة بنفس مادة الفالسفة اليت مسوها عَل الالكم اذلي نقول ‪:‬انه حمصل‬ ‫من الفلسفة من هجة جوهره‪ ،‬وان اكن فيه قدر من الرشيعة واللغة والعقل‪ ،‬فهذا القدر‬ ‫هو ابعتبار تفريعه أو ما يتعلق مبسائَل وحبوثه‪.‬‬ ‫‪Page8‬‬ ‫فأرادوا ذكر معتقد املسلمني‪ ،‬فبدءوا مبسأةل وجود الرب س بحانه وتعاىل‪ ،‬فلام أراد القوم‬ ‫اثبات وجود الرب س بحانه وتعاىل‪ ،‬قالوا ‪:‬ادلليل عىل وجوده هو وجود العامل‪ ،‬والعامل‬ ‫حادث‪ ،‬ولك حادث ال بد هل من حمدث‪ ،‬وظنوا أن هذا هو قول هللا تعاىل ‪َ :‬أ ْم ُخ رل ُقوا‬ ‫ون ]الطور‪[٣٥:‬ومثة فرق بني دليلهم عىل اثبات وجود الرب‬ ‫َش ٍء َأ ْم ُ ْمه الْخَا رل ُق َ‬ ‫رم ْن غَ ْ رري َ ْ‬ ‫َش ٍء َأ ْم ُ ْمه‬ ‫س بحانه وتعاىل وبني طريقة القرأن‪ ،‬فان قول هللا تعاىل ‪َ :‬أ ْم ُخ رل ُقوا رم ْن غَ ْ رري َ ْ‬ ‫ون ]الطور‪[٣٥:‬ليس هو يف مورد اثبات وجود الرب؛ فان هذا بدهية؛ بل هو‬ ‫الْخَا رل ُق َ‬ ‫يف مورد اثبات مجةل من معاين الربوبية اليت مل حيقق االميان هبا مجةل من املرشكني‪...‬‬ ‫فهنا فرق ر ِّبني‪.‬‬ ‫وبعد أن قال هؤالء ‪:‬ان ادلليل عىل ثبوت وجوده هو حدوث العامل‪ ،‬أرادوا اثبات حدوث‬ ‫العامل‪ ،‬فان منازعهيم من الفالسفة يقولون ‪:‬ان العامل قدمي‪ ،‬فأراد هؤالء اثبات حدوث‬ ‫العامل‪ ،‬فمب اس تدلوا عىل حدوث العامل؟‬ ‫هنا انقسموا اىل قسمني‪:‬‬ ‫تعداد هجميهتم ومعزتلهتم قالوا ‪:‬ان ادلليل عىل حدوث العامل هو اتصافه ابلصفات اليت‬‫مسوها العراض‪.‬‬ ‫تعداد متلكمة الصفاتية مهنم كـ ابن الكب والشعري واملاتريدي ‪:‬ان ادلليل عىل‬‫حدوث العامل هو اتصافه ابحلركة‪ ،‬وأنه ال يبقى عىل زمان واحد‪.‬‬ ‫فأثبتوا وجود هللا هبذه الطريقة اليت علهيا مجةل من االشاكالت‪:‬‬ ‫أو ًال ‪:‬أهنا طريقة ُمتلكرفة‪.‬‬ ‫اثني ًا ‪:‬أهنا اس تلزمت عندمه لوازم ابطةل‪.‬‬ ‫مث جاءوا اىل صفات الباري س بحانه وتعاىل‪ ،‬فَل ميكن للجهمية واملعزتةل أن تثبت صفات‬ ‫هللا عىل طريقهتم؛ لن دليل حدوث العامل عندمه هو اتصافه ابلصفات‪ ،‬فلزم أن يكون‬ ‫الرب عىل خالف هذا العامل؛ فلو أثبتوا صفات هللا ‪-‬عىل زمعهم‪ -‬لوصفوه ابحلدوث‪ ،‬ومن‬ ‫هنا نفوا الصفات‪.‬‬ ‫‪Page9‬‬ ‫مث ملا جاء الشعري وترك الاعزتال وأعلن توبته منه‪ ،‬متسك بأصل الاعزتال يف ابب‬ ‫الصفات‪ ،‬وقال ‪:‬ان ادلليل عىل حدوث العامل يه العراض والصفات‪ ،‬ولكن ليس‬ ‫مجيعها‪ ،‬وامنا املتحرك مهنا‪ ،‬فادلليل عىل حدوث العامل ‪:‬أنه متحرك وال يبقى زما ًان واحداً‬ ‫اثبت ًا‪.‬‬ ‫وهذا مما يبني كل غلط من يقول بأن الشعري رجع اىل معتقد أهل الس نة‪ ،‬بل املسأةل‬ ‫فهيا تفصيل‪.‬‬ ‫فان الشعري ‪-‬ومن قبَل ابن الكب ‪ -‬وكذكل قرينه‪ -‬أعين ‪:‬قرين الشعري ‪ -‬املاتريدي‪،‬‬ ‫الزتموا نتيجة لهذه القاعدة نفي بعض الصفات‪ ،‬ويه لك صفة من صفات أفعال الرب‬ ‫املتعلقة مبش يئته وارادته‪ ،‬ومن هنا نفى القوم من هؤالء أو هؤالء ‪:‬اما سائر الصفات‪،‬‬ ‫واما صفات الفعال املتعلقة ابلقدرة واملشيئة‪.‬‬ ‫ومن هنا وقع اجلهمية واملعزتةل والشاعرة واملاتريدية والالكبية فامي يسمى عند أهل الس نة‬ ‫ابلتعطيل‪ ،‬وهو نفي السامء والصفات أو نفي الصفات أو نفي مجةل من الصفات‪.‬‬ ‫وقد نفى أولئك القوم الصفات أو ما هو مهنا ومه مل ينظروا يف دليل القرأن ‪:‬أهو مثبت‬ ‫للصفات أم انف لها‪.‬‬ ‫فلام نفوا الصفات عىل هذا ادلليل اذلي جعلوه مثبت ًا حلدوث العامل ‪-‬وهو ما يسمى عند‬ ‫القوم بدليل العراض‪ -‬رجعوا اىل القرأن‪ ،‬فوجدت املعزتةل أن القرأن يثبت الصفات هلل‪،‬‬ ‫ونتيجهتم اليت يرون أهنا الزمة الثبات وجود هللا تقول ابلنفي‪ ،‬وكذكل ملا رجع ابن الكب‬ ‫والشعري واملاتريدي اىل القرأن وجدوا أن القرأن يف أكرث من مائة موضع؛ كام يقول‬ ‫الرازي من الشاعرة؛ يقول( ‪:‬ان القرأن يف أكرث من مائة موضع يثبت مسأةل احلركة )أي‪:‬‬ ‫الفعال املتعلقة ابلقدرة واملشيئة‪.‬‬ ‫فوجد هؤالء وهؤالء أن القرأن خالف نتيجهتم العقلية‪.‬‬ ‫مما س بق يتبني أن القوم نفوا الصفات أو نفوا ما هو مهنا ال تفريع ًا عن أدةل من القرأن؛‬ ‫بل بنا ًء عىل أصل ابطل ابتدعوه‪.‬‬ ‫ومن هنا اكن خالف هؤالء يف الصفات خيتلف عن خالف اخلوارج ‪ ، ..‬وذكل لن‬ ‫اخلوارج ملا كفرروا مرتكب الكبرية اس تدلوا بقول هللا تعاىل ‪:‬ان َرك َم ْن تُدْ رخ ْل النر َار فَقَدْ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫َأخ َْزيْتَ ُه [ أل معران‪...]١٩٢:‬‬ ‫‪Page10‬‬ ‫ُُكر َما َأ َرا ُدوا َأ ْن َ ْخي ُر ُجوا رمهنْ َا ُأ رعيدُ وا رف َهيا[ السجدة‪ ]٢٠:‬خبالف هؤالء‪ ،‬فليس عندمه‬ ‫مفصةل من القرأن؛ بل املعتَّب عندمه دليل واحد‪،‬‬ ‫عىل نفي الصفات أو ما هو مهنا أدةل ر‬ ‫وهو ما يسمى بدليل العراض؛ وهو دليل ليس هل أصل يف الرشع وال معىن يف لغة‬ ‫العرب؛ امنا هو منقول من الفلسفة اليت اكن علهيا مجةل من املالحدة اليوانن‪ ،‬وهذا ادلليل‬ ‫أنتج عند املعزتةل واجلهمية وأمثاهلم نفي الصفات‪ ،‬وأنتج عند ابن الكب ومن وافقه كـ‬ ‫الشعري وأيب منصور املاتريدي نفي صفات الفعال‪.‬‬ ‫فلام رجع القوم اىل كتاب هللا‪ ...‬وجدوه خيالف ما مه عليه‪ ،‬فأرادوا أن من هتمه خمالفهتم‬ ‫هل؛ فأما الس نة فاهنم خيرجون مهنا مبخارج كثرية‪ ،‬من أخصها ‪:‬هجلهم ابلس نة؛ فان كثرياً‬ ‫من النصوص ال يعرفوهنا‪ ،‬وحني نقول ‪:‬هجلهم ابلس نة؛ ليس من ابب التجين علهيم‪ ،‬فان‬ ‫عامة أهل الالكم من أهجل الناس ابلسنن والاثر‪ ،‬وفهيم هجل واسع بس نة النيب صىل‬ ‫هللا عليه وأهل وسَل فض ًال عن أاثر الصحابة‪.‬‬ ‫مث ما يثبتونه من الس نة خيرجونه عىل مورد الظن وأنه من ابب الحاد‪ ،‬وأنه ال حيتج‬ ‫ابلحاد يف العقائد اخل‪.‬‬ ‫ولكن ملا نظروا القرأن وجدوا أن للقرأن تفصي ًال عىل خالف طريقهتم؛ فرجعوا اىل لغة‬ ‫حفصلوا من لغة العرب نظري ًة زمعوها أص ًال يف اللغة ويه حمدثة‪ ،‬وان شئت‬ ‫العرب؛ ر‬ ‫فقل عىل سبيل التزنل ‪:‬اهنا بدعة يف اللغة‪ ،‬فكام أنك تقول ‪:‬ان هذه بدعة يف الرشع‪،‬‬ ‫فهذه بدعة يف اللغة‪ ،‬ذكل هو ما زمعوه بأن اللغة منقسمة اىل حقيقة وجماز‪ ،‬فاس تدعوا‬ ‫مسأةل احلقيقة واجملاز ليبنوا علهيا قانون التأويل اذلي يقول ‪:‬رصف اللفظ عن احلقيقة اىل‬ ‫اجملاز لقرينة‪.‬‬ ‫ورصف نصوص الصفات عن ظاهرها اىل معاين ال يشرتط عندمه فهيا اال رشط واحد‪،‬‬ ‫وهو أن يكون املعىن اذلي ُرصف اللفظ اليه ال يتعارض مع مذههبم‪.‬‬ ‫‪Page11‬‬ ‫لقد وجدوا أن هللا س بحانه وتعاىل أثبت لنفسه الصفات عىل التفصيل يف كتابه‪ ،‬فأرادوا‬ ‫مبسأةل التأويل أن ينفوا اثبات القرأن للصفات‪ ،‬وأن جيعلوا القرأن غري معارض لطريقهتم‬ ‫اليت نفوا هبا الصفات أو ما هو مهنا‪ ،‬فقالوا ‪:‬ان سائر ما أثبته القرأن من الصفات‬ ‫معىن جمازي‪.‬‬ ‫والفعال‪ ،‬فانه ر‬ ‫يؤول؛ مبعىن ‪:‬يُصف من احلقيقة اىل ً‬ ‫فقوهل تعاىل ‪َ :‬و َجا َء َرب ُّ َك ]الفجر‪ [ ٢٢:‬مشلك عىل طريقة القوم؛ لهنم يقولون ‪:‬ان هللا‬ ‫ال يتصف بفعل‪ ،‬وهذا متفق عليه بني الشاعرة واملعزتةل وغريمه؛ لن العامل يتصف‬ ‫ابلفعل‪.‬‬ ‫فهم ذلكل يلجئون اىل التأويل بأن يقولوا ‪:‬ان املقصود جاء مكل‪ ،‬فاذا اكن اجمليء متعلق ًا‬ ‫مبكل‪ ،‬فان هذا ال يعارض قاعدهتم يف نفي الصفات؛ لن املكل جزء من العامل اخمللوق‪،‬‬ ‫والعامل اخمللوق يتصف ابلفعال؛ فهذا هو معىن التأويل عندمه؛ رصف اللفاظ اليت ملئ‬ ‫القرأن بذكرها عن ظاهرها اىل معاين ال تتعارض مع ما أصلوه‪.‬‬ ‫وهذا يبني لنا أن القوم مل يس تعملوا لغة العرب لفهم القرأن هبا عند تقريرمه للمذهب‪-‬‬ ‫أي ‪:‬ملذههبم‪ ،-‬بل اكن ذكل دلرء معارضة القرأن ملذههبم‪.‬‬ ‫اذاً ‪:‬مه وضعوا املذهب اكم ًال بعيداً عن لغة العرب‪ ،‬وبعيداً عن دالةل القرأن والس نة!‬ ‫وهذا يكفي املسلمني خاص ًة وعام ًة دلي ًال عىل فساد هذه الطريقة‪ ،‬وأهنا طريقة خمرتعة‬ ‫خمالفة لطريقة الرسل‪ ،‬وأن طريقة نفي الصفات ختالف حىت طريقة أهل البدع الخرى‬ ‫اكملرجئة واخلوارج؛ فان هؤالء عىل ما فهيم بنوا كثرياً من أقواهلم عىل مفصل من القرأن‬ ‫فهموه غلط ًا؛ خبالف هؤالء؛ فاهنم بنوا املذهب اكم ًال خارج ًا عن اللغة؛ فان دليل‬ ‫العراض ليس مبني ًا عىل ذوق العرب‪ ،‬فالعرض يف لغة العرب معناه َشء ومعناه عند‬ ‫املتلكمني َشء أخر‪ ،‬واجلوهر عند العرب معناه َشء ومعناه عند املتلكمني َشء أخر‬ ‫اخل‪.‬‬ ‫فهو دليل غري مبين عىل اللغة وال عىل النصوص‪ ،‬امنا هو منقول من الفلسفة‪.‬‬ ‫حتصل فساد التأويل اذلي حرف به املبتدعة النصوص رشع ًا وعق ًال ولغة ذكر‬ ‫ولكن ملا ر‬ ‫املبتدعة للتأويل حداً قالوا فيه ‪:‬التأويل هو رصف اللفظ عن احلقيقة اىل اجملاز لقرينة…‬ ‫فنقول ‪:‬هذا احلد للتأويل فاسد رشع ًا وعق ًال ولغ ًة‪.‬‬ ‫فساد التأويل رشع ًا‬ ‫‪Page12‬‬ ‫أما فساده الرشعي فباعتبار كونه بدع ًة مل تذكر يف الكم هللا ورسوهل وال يف الكم‬ ‫الصحابة‪ ،‬ولو اكن القرأن يفقه هبذه الطريقة يف مورد الحاكم أو يف مورد الخبار‪ ،‬للزم‬ ‫أن يشري الصحابة ريض هللا عهنم أو الرسول صىل هللا عليه وسَل أو القرأن نفسه اىل‬ ‫هذه الطريقة‪ ،‬فهذه الطريقة خمالفة للرشع ابعتبار كوهنا بدعة‪.‬‬ ‫فان قالوا ‪:‬ان التأويل مذكور يف القرأن‪.‬‬ ‫قلنا ‪:‬اذلي ذكر يف القرأن ليس عىل هذا املعىن؛ بل عىل معىن التفسري أو عىل معىن‬ ‫احلقيقة اليت يئول الهيا اليشء‪.‬‬ ‫فساد التأويل عق ًال‬ ‫وهو فاسد من هجة العقل من أوجه؛ من أخصها ‪:‬أن أحصابه قالوا‪ :‬ان التأويل هو رصف‬ ‫اللفظ عن احلقيقة اىل اجملاز لقرينة‪.‬‬ ‫فنقول هلم ‪:‬النص بذاته هل يفيد احلق‪ ،‬أم أنه يفيد الباطل‪ ،‬أم أنه ال يفيد هذا وال هذا؟‬ ‫فان قالوا ‪:‬ان النص بذاته يفيد احلق اذلي يزمعونه مه حق ًا‪ ،‬قلنا ‪:‬اذاً ال حنتاج اىل َشء‬ ‫يقال هل‪ :‬رصف ودليل وقرينة‪.‬‬ ‫وان قالوا ‪:‬انه ال يفيد حق ًا وال ابط ًال‪.‬‬ ‫قيل ‪:‬هذا ممتنع؛ لن القرأن قد نزل القوم يعرفونه ومه عرب‪ ،‬فال بد أن يفهموا عنه معىن؛‬ ‫اما أن يكون هذا املعىن حق ًا واما أن يكون ابط ًال‪.‬‬ ‫أما كون الية ال يفهم مهنا ال احلق وال الباطل‪ ،‬فهذا ممتنع‪.‬‬ ‫اذاً ‪:‬النص بذاته قبل مسأةل القرينة والصارف وغري ذكل اما أن يفهم عنه حق واما أن‬ ‫يفهم عنه الباطل‪ ،‬فان فهم عنه احلق فانه ال حيتاج اىل تأويل‪ ،‬ونبقى عىل طريقة أهل‬ ‫الس نة‪.‬‬ ‫‪Page13‬‬ ‫بقي عند القوم أن يقولوا ‪:‬ان النص بذاته من حيث هو ال يفهم عنه اال الباطل اذلي ال‬ ‫يليق ابهلل‪ ،‬وهو النقص‪ ،‬وتنقيص الباري كفر به‪ ،‬فاس تقر الالزم العقيل عىل أن‬ ‫النصوص عند القوم ال يفهم مهنا اال الباطل‪.‬‬ ‫وكون نصوص القرأن املقدس اذلي هو الكم هللا ال يفهم منه اال الباطل ممتنع عق ًال‪ ،‬فلنا‬ ‫أن نقف عىل هذا اجلواب‪ ،‬ونقول ‪:‬انه ميتنع عق ًال أن تقول‪ :‬اين أومن هبذا القرأن‪ ،‬وأنه‬ ‫من عند هللا‪ ،‬وأنه حمفوظ من الغلط‪ ،‬مث تأيت وتقول ‪:‬انه ال يفهم عنه اال الباطل؛ فهذا‬ ‫تناقض يف العقل‪.‬‬ ‫ولكنا نزيد التقرير العقيل اضافة ونقول ‪:‬واذا اكن النص ال يفهم عنه اال ابط ًال؛ فان احلق‬ ‫حتصل ابدلليل الصارف‪ ،‬فقد صار ادلليل اذلي يسمونه قرينة ليس جمرد قرينة أو‬ ‫اذاً ر‬ ‫صارف‪ ،‬وامنا هو حمصل اتم للحق‪.‬‬ ‫اذاً يكون النص ليس هل مورد يف احلق ال ابعتبار ذاته وال ابعتبار تأثري ادلليل الصارف‬ ‫عنه؛ مبعىن ‪:‬أن القوم لو قالوا‪ :‬ان النص بذاته ال يفهم عنه اال ابطل‪ ،‬ولكنا نفهم احلق‬ ‫عن النص اذا قارنه ادلليل‪ ،‬نقول ‪:‬اجلواب العقيل هنا أن احلق اذلي زمعمت عرف من‬ ‫هجة الصارف وحده؛ فاذاً ما اكن ينبغي لمك أن تطيلوا هذه املسأةل؛ وتقولوا ‪:‬اننا فهمنا‬ ‫من النص كذا‪ ،‬مفث ًال ‪:‬قول هللا تعاىل ‪َ :‬و َجا َء َرب ُّ َك [ الفجر‪ ]٢٢:‬اذا رصف بقولمك‪ :‬جاء‬ ‫مكل من املالئكة‪ ،‬مل يكن هل أثر عىل تقريرمك للتوحيد اجيا ًاب‪ ،‬واكن جمرد فعل من أفعال‬ ‫اخمللوقني كسائر أفعاهلم‪ ،‬ومه يس تدلون بقيام الناس وقعودمه عىل نفي الصفات من هذا‬ ‫الوجه؛ فيكون قوهلم يف مثل قوهل ‪َ :‬و َجا َء َرب ُّ َك [ الفجر‪ ]٢٢:‬عىل هذه الطريقة‪.‬‬ ‫[فساد التأويل من هجة اللغة]‬ ‫فساد التأويل من هجة لغة العرب مسأةل أشلكت عىل كثري من املتأخرين وترددوا فهيا‪.‬‬ ‫والتحقيق ‪:‬أن التأويل‪ -‬اذلي يعرفه أحصابه بقوهلم ‪:‬رصف اللفظ عن احلقيقة اىل اجملاز‬ ‫لقرينة‪ -‬فاسد من هجة لغة العرب‪...‬‬ ‫‪Page14‬‬ ‫لن هذا احلد مبين عىل فرض لغوي‪ ،‬اذا حص هذا الفرض اللغوي أمكن حصة هذا‬ ‫التأويل من هجة اللغة‪ ،‬واذا بطل هذا الفرض اللغوي بطل هذا احلد للتأويل من هجة‬ ‫اللغة‪.‬‬ ‫هذا الفرض اللغوي هو أن لغة العرب عىل زمع هؤالء تنقسم اىل حقيقة وجماز‪.‬‬ ‫فنقف مع مسأةل احلقيقة واجملاز‪.‬‬ ‫[مسأةل احلقيقة واجملاز]‬ ‫أو ًال ‪:‬حىت ال يرى يف الكم ش يخ االسالم‪ ،‬أو حىت يف الكم ابن القمي؛ وان اكن ابن‬ ‫القمي اترة خيلط بعض املعاين مع بعض‪ ،‬ولكن ابعتبار الكم ش يخ االسالم رمحه هللا‪،‬‬ ‫وال بأس أن أقول هذه اللكمة ليس من ابب الطعن عىل ابن القمي رمحه هللا‪ ،‬ولكن بعض‬ ‫اذلين ر ردوا عىل الش يخني‪ -‬أعين ‪:‬ابن القمي وابن تميية رمحهم هللا‪ -‬يف املسأةل تتبعوا الكهمم‬ ‫فوجدوا أن ابن القمي رمحه هللا يس تعمل االقرار ملسأةل احلقيقة واجملاز كثرياً يف الكمه‪ ،‬ومن‬ ‫هنا قال قوم من املتتبعني ‪:‬انه تناقض؛ فهو ينفي احلقيقة واجملاز تبع ًا لش يخه‪ ،‬ولكنه‬ ‫صح مبسأةل احلقيقة واجملاز كثرياً‪.‬‬ ‫يطبقها يف الكمه‪ ،‬وي ِّر‬ ‫والتحقيق أن أكرث ما أثبته االمام ابن القمي حني يذكر احلقيقة واجملاز هو من ابب التقس مي‬ ‫اللفظي‪ ،‬ولكنه أحيا ًان قد يُدخل علهيا شيئ ًا من الثر املتعلق مبعاين اللفاظ‪ ،‬وليس مبجرد‬ ‫صورها اللفظية‪.‬‬ ‫أما فامي يتعلق بـ ش يخ االسالم فان مهنجه يف هذه دقيق‪ ،‬وش يخ االسالم هل ُكامت‬ ‫أحب أن تكون مقدمة بني يدي اجلواب عن مسأةل احلقيقة واجملاز‪ ،‬فهو يقول ‪ :‬مسأةل‬ ‫احلقيقة واجملاز اما أن يُنظر فهيا ابعتبار كوهنا من عوارض اللفاظ‪ ،‬فهذا اصطالح وال‬ ‫مشاحة يف الاصطالح‪ ،‬واما أن يُنظر فهيا ابعتبار كوهنا من عوارض املعاين‪ ،‬فهذا هو‬ ‫القدر اذلي ينازع فيه أرابب النظر من املعزتةل وغريمه‪.‬‬ ‫‪Page15‬‬ ‫اذاً ‪:‬القدر املنكر عند ش يخ االسالم يف مسأةل احلقيقة واجملاز ليس هو صورها اللفظية‪،‬‬ ‫أو مصطلحها اللفظي؛ ففي قوهل تعاىل ‪َ :‬و ْاسأَ ْل الْقَ ْري َ َة [ يوسف‪ ]٨٢:‬كل أن تقول‪ :‬ان‬ ‫هذا من اجملاز اللغوي‪ ،‬ابعتبار أن املقصود ‪:‬سل أهل القرية‪.‬‬ ‫فتسمية ما يقع من هذا النوع جمازاً هو اصطالح‪ ،‬كام أن املصطلحني مسوا الفاعل واملفعول‬ ‫واحلال والمتيزي‪...‬‬ ‫اىل غري ذكل‪.‬‬ ‫واناكر ش يخ االسالم ذلكل هو ابعتبار كون هذا التقس مي من عوارض معاين اللغة‪ ،‬وهذا‬ ‫هو مراد املتلكمني يف تقريرمه‪.‬‬ ‫فنقول ‪:‬ان هذه النظرية نظرية احلقيقة واجملاز‪ -‬ال تصح لغ ًة‪ ،‬بل يه ممتنعة من هجة اللغة‪،‬‬ ‫وامتناعها حني تتأمل تعريف املتلكمني للحقيقة واجملاز‪ ،‬فقد قالوا ‪:‬ان احلقيقة هو اللفظ‬ ‫املس تعمل فامي وضع هل‪ ،‬واجملاز هو اللفظ املس تعمل يف غري ما وضع هل‪.‬‬ ‫هذا التعريف للحقيقة واجملاز تضمن ذكر الوضع وذكر الاس تعامل‪ ،‬وكن بني الوضع‬ ‫والاس تعامل اختالف ًا‪ ،‬فاذا قرأت تعريف اجملاز تبني كل أن هؤالء يفرقون بني وضع اللغة‬ ‫وبني اس تعاملها‪..‬‬ ‫فهم يفرضون أن مثة فرق ًا بني وضع اللغة وبني اس تعاملها‪ ،‬والسؤال هنا ‪:‬من الواضع للغة؟‬ ‫ومن املس تعمل؟‬ ‫السؤال الثاين ‪:‬أهيام أس بق الوضع‪ ،‬أو الاس تعامل؟‬ ‫السؤال الثالث ‪:‬ما مثال الوضع يف اللغة؟ وما مثال الاس تعامل؟‬ ‫هذه سؤالات ترد عىل النظرية وتشلك علهيا‪ ،‬فيتبني أهنا فاسدة من هجة اللغة‪.‬‬ ‫السؤال الول ‪:‬ما الفرق بني الوضع وبني الاس تعامل؟‬ ‫‪Page16‬‬ ‫السؤال ليس هل جواب ِّ ر‬ ‫حمصل لنتيجة؛ فاذا قالوا ‪:‬ان الواضع للغة مه العرب‪ ،‬وان‬ ‫املس تعمل للغة مه العرب؛ قلنا ‪:‬ال ميكن أن حيصل فرق يف اخلارج بني الوضع وبني‬ ‫الاس تعامل؛ مفا اذلي جيعل هذا النطق العريب وضع ًا‪ ،‬وذكل النطق العريب الخر‬ ‫اس تعام ًال؟!‬ ‫ومن هنا احتاج القوم ‪-‬وال س امي ِّر‬ ‫منظري املعزتةل من أهل اللغة‪ -‬اىل البحث يف مبدأ‬ ‫اللغات‪ ،‬ومن أين جاءت اللغة‪.‬‬ ‫ففي كتب أصول الفقه ‪-‬انهيك عن كتب عَل الالكم وبعض كتب اللغة‪ -‬جند حبث ًا يف‬ ‫مسأةل مبدأ اللغة‪ ،‬فقيل ‪:‬اهنا من أدم‪ ،‬وقيل ‪:‬اهنا من تعلمي هللا لدم‪ ،‬وقيل ‪:‬اهنا من‬ ‫تعلمي املالئكة‪ ،‬وقيل ‪:‬اهنا من اجلن‪.‬‬ ‫وسائر هذه القوال غاية ما يقال فهيا ‪:‬أهنا أقوال ممكنة‪ ،‬لكن ميتنع اجلزم بواحد مهنا‪.‬‬ ‫وقول هللا تعاىل ‪َ :‬وعَ ر ََل أ َد َم ا َل ْ َمسا َء [ البقرة‪ ]٣١:‬نؤمن به عىل وهجه‪ ،‬لكن تسلسل‬ ‫اللغات وكيف حتصلت هو أوسع مما يدل عليه قول هللا تعاىل ‪َ :‬وعَ ر ََل أ َد َم ا َل ْ َمسا َء ُُكرهَا‬ ‫[ البقرة‪]٣١:‬‬ ‫وقد يقال ‪:‬ان الاس تعامل هو اس تعامل العرب‪ ،‬وعىل الرتتيب الزماين ‪:‬الوضع يس بق‬ ‫الاس تعامل؛ فالوضع هو الول مث جاء الاس تعامل؛ وغاية ذكل أن الاس تعامل معلوم وهو‬ ‫اس تعامل العرب‪ ،‬أما الوضع فهو جمهول‪ ،‬وال ميكن أن يبىن املعلوم عىل اجملهول؛ فان‬ ‫اجملهول ال يفيد بذاته؛ مفن ابب أوىل أال يكون مفيداً لغريه‪.‬‬ ‫واذا تتبعت الكم حمققي املعزتةل ‪-‬ومه أمئة النظر يف هذا الباب ‪-‬وجدت أهنم يقولون ‪:‬ان‬ ‫الوضع هو اللكمة املفردة‪ ،‬وان الاس تعامل هو اللكمة املركبة‪ ،‬مبعىن أنك تقول ‪:‬اللفظة‬ ‫اكليد ‪-‬مث ًال‪ -‬يه اليت يسموهنا وضع ًا‪ ،‬واملركب يسمونه اس تعام ًال‪ ،‬فهم حىت ال يلزتموا‬ ‫مسأةل القدم التارخيي اليت ال يس تطيعون اكتشافها‪ ،‬قال بعض حمققهيم ‪:‬ان املسأةل ليست‬ ‫مبنية عىل التعاقب التارخيي‪ ،‬امنا يه مبنية عىل أننا نريد ابالس تعامل امجلل املركبة‬ ‫كقوكل ‪:‬جاء زيد‪ ،‬فهذا يسمونه اس تعام ًال‪ ،‬وأما ُكمة ‪ :‬زيد أو ُكمة جاء فيسموهنا وضع ًا‪.‬‬ ‫‪Page17‬‬ ‫فيقال هلم ‪:‬ان هذا أيض ًا من ابب املمتنع حتصي ًال؛ لنه ال يعقل أن عربي ًا يقول ‪:‬يد‪،‬‬ ‫ويسكت؛ بل ال يوجد يف لسان بين أدم ال من العرب وال من غريمه الكم عىل هذه‬ ‫الطريقة‪.‬‬ ‫فهذا تلكف عىل اللغة‪ ،‬ال حقيقة هل يف اخلارج؛ لنه ال أحد ينطق بلسان ال عريب وال‬ ‫غري عريب اال وهو يتلكم جبمةل‪ ،‬وال يعقل أن أحداً يتلكم بلفظ مفرد‪ ،‬اال يف حاةل‬ ‫واحدة ‪:‬اذا قال حرف ًا مفرداً‪ ،‬سواء اكن اسامً أو فع ًال أو صفة؛ لن بقية امجلةل معلوم‬ ‫تقديراً؛ فاذا قيل هل ‪:‬كيف زيد؟ قال ‪:‬حسن‪.‬‬ ‫فانه قال ‪:‬حسن؛ ولكن التقدير ‪:‬زيد حسن‪ ،‬و َح ْذ ُف ما يعَل جائز ابتفاق ألس نة بين‬ ‫أدم‪ ،‬وال أحد ينازع يف هذه البدهية العرفية‪ ،‬فعند بين أدم ُكهم أن املعلوم من الالكم‬ ‫حيذف‪ ،‬وهذا ليس خاص ًا بلغة العرب‪ ،‬بل هو يف لك لغات بين أدم‪.‬‬ ‫اذاً ‪:‬عىل هذه الطريقة ال يوجد لغة اال اس تعام ًال‪ ،‬وال يوجد لغة تسمى وضع ًا‪.‬‬ ‫وقال بعض حمققهيم الثبات الوضع ‪:‬اننا اذا نظران اللغة وجدان أن العرب تقول‪ :‬اليد‪ ،‬وتريد‬ ‫هبا اجلارحة‪ ،‬وتقول ‪:‬اليد‪ ،‬وتريد هبا يف س ياق أخر النعمة‪ ،‬واجلواب عن هذا ليس‬ ‫مش ً‬ ‫الك‪ ،‬فنقول هلم ‪:‬ما املانع عق ًال ولغ ًة أن يراد هبذا اللفظ أكرث من معىن‪ ،‬والس ياق‬ ‫نفسه هو اذلي حيدد واحداً من هذه املعاين‪.‬‬ ‫ملعىن واحد‪ ،‬وال يكون لبقية املعاين‪ ،‬قيل ‪:‬هذا‬ ‫فان قالوا ‪:‬ان اللفظ الواحد ال يكون اال ً‬ ‫حتمك عىل اللغة‪ ،‬فان اللفظ الواحد ميكن عق ًال ولغ ًة أن يدل عىل أكرث من معىن؛ أما‬ ‫عق ًال فان العقل ال مينع ذكل‪ ،‬وأما لغ ًة فان العرب اذا تأملت الكهما وجدت أهنا تس تعمل‬ ‫احلرف الواحد أو اللكمة املفردة الواحدة يف أكرث من س ياق‪ ،‬ويف لك س ياق تدل عىل‬ ‫معىن‪.‬‬ ‫‪Page18‬‬ ‫معىن واحد كحقيقة ويف البقية مكجاز‪،‬‬ ‫فان قالوا ‪:‬ادلليل عىل أن هذه اللفظة تس تعمل يف ً‬ ‫معىن أخص‪ ،‬فاذا قيل ‪:‬يد‪ ،‬ال تتبادر النعمة‪ ،‬وامنا تتبادر‬ ‫أن اللفظ اذا أطلق تبادر منه ً‬ ‫اليد اجلارحة‪ ،‬قيل ‪:‬ان اليد اذا أطلقت فالتحقيق العقيل يقول‪ :‬انه ال يتبادر أي معىن‬ ‫مهنا‪ ،‬فالعقل ال يعني لها معىن لكوهنا لفظ ًا جمرداً‪ ،‬مث لو ُس ر َِّل جد ًال أن اذلهن يتبادر اليه‬ ‫ابتدا ًء‪ -‬اذا قيل ‪:‬يد اليد اجلارحة‪ -‬فهذا ابعتبار أن اس تعامل هذا اللفظ هبذا املعىن هو‬ ‫الكرث يف اللغة‪ ،‬فلكرثته ولش يوعه صار هو املتبادر‪ ،‬والكرثة والقةل ليست مزيا ًان‬ ‫ملسأةل ‪:‬وضع اللفظ لهذا املعىن أو ذاك‪.‬‬ ‫وما املانع أن لفظ اليد وضع يف اللغة لكرث من معىن‪ ،‬فاللغة ال متنع ذكل‪ ،‬والعقل ال مينع‬ ‫ذكل‪.‬‬ ‫ان قالوا ‪:‬اذا اكن وضع لكرث من معىن مفا اذلي حيدده؟‬ ‫نقول ‪:‬اذلي حيدده الس ياق‪ ،‬ولن حنتاج عندها اىل دليل صارف؛ فان اللفظ اذا وضع‬ ‫ملعاين خمتلفة‪ ،‬فان الس ياق نفسه يس تلزم حتديد واحد من املعاين‪ ،‬قد يكون املعىن احملدد‬ ‫هو الشائع اكليد اجلارحة‪ ،‬وقد يكون غريه‪.‬‬ ‫حفني قال عروة بن مسعود لـ أيب بكر ‪ :‬لوال يد مل أجزك هبا لجبتك‪.‬‬ ‫ما تبادر اىل ذهن أحد ممن مسعوا هذه اللكمة أو قرءوها أن عروة يقصد اليد اجلارحة‬ ‫اليت يزمع القوم أهنا يه احلقيقة يف لفظ اليد‪ ،‬ويه الكرث اس تعام ًال‪ ،‬بل ان َ ْمح َل الكم‬ ‫عروة بن مسعود عىل اليد اجلارحة محل ممتنع؛ مبعىن أن تفسري الالكم به ممتنع‪.‬‬ ‫ولهذا ميتنع أن الكم ًا عربي ًا يقبل أكرث من معىن خمتلف اال لحد موجبني ‪:‬اما أن يكون‬ ‫الناظر فيه ليس عنده كامل يف حتقيقه؛ فرمبا تردد يف أكرث من معىن‪ ،‬واما أن يكون‬ ‫املتلكم هبذا الس ياق مل يذكره فصيح ًا ب ري ِّن ًا‪ ،‬ومعلوم أن القرأن ميتنع أن يقال فيه ‪:‬انه ليس‬ ‫معىن مناسب؛‬ ‫فصيح ًا ب ري ِّن ًا‪ ،‬وميتنع أن يقال ‪:‬ان املسلمني جعزوا عن فهم الكم هللا عىل ً‬ ‫لنه اذا اكن كذكل‪ ،‬فان الالكم بذاته ال يكون ب ري ِّن ًا‪.‬‬ ‫وأصل نظرية اجملاز واحلقيقة ابعتبار كوهنا من عوارض املعاين من املعزتةل‪ ،‬وأما ابعتبار‬ ‫كوهنا من عوارض اللفاظ‪ ،‬فهذا اس تعمَل قوم كـ أيب عبيد القامس بن سالم وأيب عبيدة‬ ‫معمر بن مثىن‪ ،‬واس تعمَل االمام أمحد ومجةل من الناس‪ ،‬وهذا ‪-‬كام أسلفت‪-‬‬ ‫اصطالح‪ ،‬ومه يريدون بقوهلم ‪ :‬جماز اللغة ما جتوزه اللغة وتأذن به‪ ،‬أما ابعتبار كوهنا من‬ ‫عوارض املعاين فهو منطق اعزتايل ُأدخل عىل اللغة‪.‬‬ ‫ومن هنا يتبني أن هذه مسأةل مفتاتة عىل اللغة‪ ،‬فاذا قال ‪:‬مفا يقول القوم فيه أنه حقيقة‬ ‫وجماز ما حقيقته يف اللغة؟‬ ‫‪Page19‬‬ ‫أقول ‪:‬ان عامة ما قال أحصاب نظرية احلقيقة واجملاز ابعتبارها من عوارض املعاين أنه من‬ ‫ابب اجملاز هو يف اللغة ال خيرج عن نوعني‪:‬‬ ‫النوع الول ‪:‬لفظ مشرتك ُاس تعمل يف غري معىن ابعتبار تعدد الس ياق‪ُ ،‬كفظ اليد؛ فانه‬ ‫وضع لكرث من معىن‪ ،‬وُكفظ العني وضع لكرث من معىن…‬ ‫وهَل جراً‪.‬‬ ‫وقد يكون هذا اللفظ هل ثالثة من املعاين هو يف أحدها أظهر‪ ،‬وقد يكون متساو ًاي بني‬ ‫املعاين‪.‬‬ ‫فأحيا ًان قد يكون الاشرتاك اشرتأاكً حمض ًا يس تلزم قدراً من التساوي يف املعاين‪ ،‬وقد‬ ‫يكون اللفظ يف أحد املعاين أظهر‪.‬‬ ‫اذاً‪ :‬القسم الول مما قال القوم فيه أنه من ابب اجملاز هو ألفاظ من هجة كوهنا مفرد ًة‬ ‫مقطوع ًة عن الرتكيب حتمتل يف اللغة أكرث من معىن‪ ،‬ولكن اذا جاء الس ياق قطع هذا‬ ‫الرتدد والاحامتل رضور ًة‪.‬‬ ‫وحنن نعَل أن القول يف عقيدة املسلمني ليس مبني ًا عىل ألفاظ جمردة‪ ،‬وامنا هو مبين عىل‬ ‫ومعان مركبة‪ ،‬وعليه‪ :‬فأايت القرأن الواردة يف الفعال والصفات ليست مشلكة‪،‬‬ ‫مجل ٍ‬ ‫حىت لو فرض أن اللفظ اذلي ذكر فيه اشرتاك‪ ،‬ففي قوهل س بحانه وتعاىل ‪َ :‬ما َمنَ َع َك َأ ْن‬ ‫ت َ ْس ُجدَ رل َما َخلَ ْق ُت رب َيدَ ري [ص‪ ]75:‬اذا قال قائل‪ :‬ان لفظ اليد تُس تعمل يف اللغة يف أكرث‬ ‫من معىن‪ .‬قلنا هل‪ :‬لنا عن هذا جواابن‪:‬‬ ‫أو ًال‪ :‬أنمت تقولون‪ :‬اهنا حقيقة يف الصفة‪ ،‬فاذاً ينبغي ابتدا ًء أن حتمل عىل حقيقهتا‪.‬‬ ‫اثني ًا‪ :‬أننا حنقق أنه ميتنع من الس ياق نفسه أن حتمل عىل غري ذكل؛ لن اليد هنا جاءت‬ ‫مثناة ومضافة اىل هللا‪ ،‬والعرب ال ميكن أن تس تعمل اليد مبعىن النعمة عىل طريقة التثنية‬ ‫املضافة‪.‬‬ ‫‪Page20‬‬ ‫ولهذا اذا أردان أن نرد عىل القوم فاننا نعتَّب الس ياقات‪ ،‬وهذه قاعدة هممة‪.‬‬ ‫وقد يقول قائل من اخملالفني‪ :‬ان ادلليل عىل تفسريها ابلقدرة أو ابلنعمة قول عروة بن‬ ‫مسعود لـأيب بكر ‪ .‬فنقول‪ :‬هات من لغة العرب س ياق ًا كس ياق القرأن‪ ،‬فيه تثنية اليد‬ ‫مضافة اىل ر ِّ‬ ‫معني‪ ،‬أريد ابليد فيه النعمة أو القدرة أو ما اىل ذكل من املعاين اليت خترج‬ ‫عن الصفة‪.‬‬ ‫النوع الثاين‪ :‬مما سامه القوم جمازاً وأشلكوا به عىل اللغة وعىل الاس تعامل والوضع أسهل‬ ‫من الول‪ ،‬وهو س ياقات يف لغة العرب‪ ،‬بل ويف القرأن نفسه‪ ،‬وغاية ما فهيا أن فهيا‬ ‫حذف ًا ملا هو معلوم‪ ،‬قال هللا تعاىل ‪َ :‬و ْاسأَ ْل الْقَ ْري َ َة [يوسف‪]82:‬لو اكن الس ياق القرأين‬ ‫(واسأل أهل القرية) س يقولون‪ :‬هذا حقيقة‪ ،‬فلام جاء الس ياق ‪َ :‬و ْاسأَ ْل‬ ‫الْقَ ْري َ َة [يوسف‪]82:‬قالوا‪ :‬هذا جماز‪ .‬ملاذا جماز؟ قالوا‪ :‬لن املس ئول القرية‪ ،‬وامجلادات ال‬ ‫تسأل‪ ،‬امنا يسأل العقالء‪.‬‬ ‫نقول‪ :‬هذا من ابب حذف املعلوم‪ ،‬وحذف املعلوم كذكره‪ ،‬فان املقصود من اللس نة‬ ‫الدمية ُكها عقل املعاين‪ ،‬فاذا ما تيرس عقل املعاين ابجياز‪ ،‬فان هذا أنسب للمخاطب‬ ‫وأكرث دالةل هل‪ ،‬وحذف ما يعَل جائز يف لك لغات بين أدم‪ ،‬فهذا احلذف أو الاختصار‬ ‫موجود يف لك اللغات الفصيحة أو امللفقة أو املركبة أو اخملرتعة أو حىت اللغات العلمية‬ ‫املس تحدثة مكصطلحات العلوم؛ مفسأةل الاختصار للمعلوم بدهية عند العقالء أمجعني‪.‬‬ ‫‪Page21‬‬ ‫وقسم واسع مما قال القوم فيه أنه جماز؛ هو من ابب حذف املعلوم‪ ،‬وحذف املعلوم‬ ‫كذكره‪ ،‬فاذا قالوا ‪َ :‬و َجا َء َرب ُّ َك [الفجر‪ ]22:‬كقوهل ‪َ :‬و ْاسأَ ْل الْقَ ْري َ َة [يوسف‪]82:‬التقدير‪:‬‬ ‫وجاء مكل ‪ ..‬قيل‪ :‬الك‪ ،‬هناك فرق ر ِّبني ‪ ...‬لن قول هللا تعاىل ‪َ :‬و ْاسأَ ْل‬ ‫الْقَ ْري َ َة [يوسف‪]82:‬مجيع اخملاطبني من املسلمني والكفار يعلمون أن املراد واسأل أهل‬ ‫القرية‪ ،‬لكن قوهل ‪َ :‬و َجا َء َرب ُّ َك [الفجر‪]22:‬ما ادلليل عىل أن املقصود مكل؟ القاعدة تقول‪:‬‬ ‫وحذف ما يُعَل جائز؛ واملكل هنا غري معلوم عند سائر اخملاطبني‪ ،‬وادلليل عىل أنه ليس‬ ‫معلوم ًا أنه ميكن أن يفرض أن احملذوف َشء أخر؛ فانه لو قال معزتيل ‪َ :‬و َجا َء‬ ‫َرب ُّ َك [الفجر‪]22:‬وجاء مكل‪ ،‬جفاء صاحبه الخر وقال ‪َ :‬و َجا َء َرب ُّ َك [الفجر‪]22:‬وجاءت‬ ‫رمحته‪ ،‬وقال اثلث‪ :‬وجاء جَّبيل‪ ،‬وجاء رابع‪ :‬وجاءت املالئكة‪ ،‬وجاء خامس‪ :‬وجاء أمره‬ ‫‪ ،..‬فان املعاين احملذوفة تكون خمتلفة‪ ،‬لكن اذا قيل‪ :‬كيف زيد؟ فقلت‪ :‬حسن‪ ،‬فان‬ ‫احملذوف معلوم‪ ،‬والتقدير‪ :‬زيد حسن‪ ،‬ال أحد يتوقع اذا قيل كل‪ :‬كيف زيد؟ فقلت‪:‬‬ ‫حسن‪ ،‬أنك تريد معراً‪.‬‬ ‫فنقول‪ :‬ادلليل عىل أن ما أضيف اىل الباري من الصفات والفعال ميتنع أن يقال‪ :‬انه من‬ ‫ابب حذف املضاف‪ ،‬أن العرب ال حتذف املضاف اال اذا اكن معلوم ًا علامً قطعي ًا لسائر‬ ‫اخملاطبني‪ ،‬أما احملذوف هنا فان العَل به ممتنع‪ ،‬وادلليل عىل امتناعه‪ :‬أنه ميكن أن يُقَدرر‬ ‫بأكرث من معىن‪.‬‬ ‫فاذا قيل يف قوهل تعاىل ‪َ :‬و َجا َء َرب ُّ َك [الفجر‪ ]22:‬أن املراد به‪ :‬جاء جَّبيل‪ ،‬اكن هذا من‬ ‫ابب الرمج ابلغيب‪.‬‬ ‫فاذا قيل‪ :‬ان جميء جَّبيل ممكن‪ ،‬نقول‪ :‬نعم ممكن‪ ،‬ولكن ما اذلي أدراك أن املقصود‬ ‫جَّبيل؟! لعَل مكل خمتص هبذا اجمليء‪ ،‬لعَل أمره‪ ،‬لعَل رمحته‪ ،‬لعَل مجةل من املالئكة‪.‬‬ ‫فلام اكن احملذوف ميتنع العَل به دل هذا عىل أن هللا س بحانه وتعاىل أراد من اخلطاب‬ ‫الظاهر؛ لن اخلطاب ال بد هل من معىن‪ ،‬فلام اكن املعىن اجملازي ممتنع ًا عرف أن احلقيقة‬ ‫يه املرادة‪ ،‬هذا لو سلمنا ابحلقيقة واجملاز‪.‬‬ ‫وقد وقفنا كثرياً عند هذا املعىن؛ لنفقه كيف نفى القوم الصفات‪ ،‬وأنه فرع عن عقلهم‬ ‫الفلسفي وليس فرع ًا عن النصوص‪ ،‬وكيف ردوا عىل النصوص مبا مسوه تأوي ًال‪ ،‬ولنعرف‬ ‫أن التأويل فاسد من اللغة والعقل والرشع‪ ،‬وهذا مما ال بد لطالب العَل الناظر أن حيصَل‪،‬‬ ‫وبه يتبني صدق مذهب أهل الس نة وامجلاعة‪ ،‬وأنه مبين عىل العقل‪ ،‬ومبين عىل اللغة‪،‬‬ ‫ومبين عىل الرشع‪ ،‬وأن اخملالفني ال حصلوا عق ًال وال لغ ًة وال رشع ًا‪.‬‬ ‫‪Page22‬‬ On Figurative Interpretation Interpretation (ta’wīl) and its Meanings The author [Ibn Taymiyya], may Allah have mercy on him, said: Here, the author used the term taḥrīf (distortion), but what he intended was ta’wīl (interpretation). This is because there is no group among the Muslim sects that explicitly claims that any part of the Book of Allah can be subject to distortion, nor do they claim that what they say about the Qur'an constitutes distortion—whether in the context of Allah’s names and attributes or otherwise. The term commonly used in this context is ta’wīl. However, the author did not say “without ta’wīl” because the term ta’wīl does not appear in the Qur’ānic or prophetic texts, nor in the speech of the Companions, in a context that indicates censure and blame. Rather, it is mentioned in praiseworthy and appropriate contexts. In the Qur’ān or the Sunna of the Prophet (peace be upon him), ta’wīl either refers to the true reality to which something leads or to its explanation. When examined carefully, you will find that both meanings have the same essence, as they both refer to ‘tafsīr’ (explanation)—either explaining the meanings or referring to the reality that something leads to. This same difference is what led to the disagreement among some of the Salaf regarding the verse: ‘But no one knows its interpretation (ta'wīlahu) except Allah’ [Q. 3: 7]. If the verse is paused after ‘except Allah,’ then the intended meaning is the true reality that the unseen matters lead to, and this reality is known exclusively to Allah. However, if the verse continues ‘And those firmly grounded in knowledge’, then ta’wīl here refers Page23 [Without distortion (taḥrīf) or nullification (taʿṭīl)]. Page24 to explanation, meaning that the interpretation of the Qur'an is known by those firmly grounded in knowledge. Both meanings are used in the speech of Allah, the Exalted, and the speech of His Messenger (peace be upon him) regarding ta’wīl. As for the meaning of ta’wīl which some theologians and scholars of speculative theology (mutakallimūn) propose— namely, diverting the literal meaning to a metaphorical one due to a contextual clue—this specific definition of ta’wīl is not recognized in the language of the Arabs nor in the speech of the Companions. Moreover, it is not intended in the texts of the Qur’ān or the Sunna. Thus, when the author mentioned “without taḥrīf” (distortion), what he intended was ‘without ta’wīl,’ but he did not use the word ta’wīl because it is not mentioned negatively in the texts. What Allah condemned in His Book is taḥrīf, which was committed by the People of the Book before. Therefore, anyone who interprets the attributes of Allah in a way that deviates from their true meanings and from the way they are understood in the Arabic language has, in essence, fallen into a form of distortion of the meanings of the Qur’ān and Sunnah. This is why the author deemed it appropriate to label the method commonly used by the theologians as taḥrīf. This form of ta’wīl is a theoretical issue, in contrast to the issue of ‘taʿṭīl’ (nullification), as when the author said: “[Without distortion or nullification].” The term taʿṭīl is not a theoretical concept among its proponents. The term taʿṭīl was used by the Salaf to describe the method of the Jahmiyya and those who followed them from the Muʿtazila and others. It means ‘emptiness’ or ‘void,’ as when they denied the attributes of Allah, they effectively nullified Allah's due perfection. This usage is common in the speech of the early and later scholars of Ahl al-Sunna. They referred to the denial of Allah's attributes as taʿṭīl, meaning the emptying or stripping away of perfection. In the methodology of the people of innovation (ahl al-bidʿa), ta’wīl is defined as diverting a term from its literal meaning to a figurative one due to a contextual clue (qarīna). This principle of ta’wīl —and it should be understood that it is more of a foundational principle than merely a definition or a term—is one of the most distinctive foundations of those who oppose the views of the Salaf in matters of Allah’s names and attributes. The first group to introduce the negation of Allah’s attributes were the Jahmiyya, and they were joined in this by the Muʿtazila, who share the same fundamental principles in this area. The negation of Allah’s attributes by these early theologians did not arise from a study of the Book of Allah, where they might have derived a negation of His names, attributes, or anything related to them. Rather, they admit that the texts of the Qur’ān and Sunna affirm Allah’s attributes and do not deny them. However, they interpreted the texts that affirm the attributes while not interpreting the texts that deny certain attributes. For instance, verses that negate wrongdoing from Allah, such as: ‘And your Lord does not wrong anyone’ [Q. 18:49], are not disputed by any Muslim, and they are accepted at face value. The real point of contention is in the texts that affirm Allah’s attributes. Their objective was to establish a belief that they considered to be the correct creed of the Muslims, and so they adopted this method known as the method of the kalām theologians. This reveals an important issue: the difference between Ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jamāʿa and other sects is not based on isolated texts but rather on foundational principles, or what is called ‘manhaj’ (methodology). Page25 [The Doctrine of Ta’wīl Among Innovators and the Reason for Adopting It] Page26 One might ask: Why did they adopt the method of kalām theology and abandon the method of the imams of Ahl alSunna and the scholars of Ḥadīth? The answer lies in their weak understanding of the way of Ahl al-Sunna, as well as another significant, though less wellknown, reason: they sought to approximate this method to groups of heretics and philosophers who did not follow Islam at all. They wanted to refute these groups by presenting the Islamic creed using the same intellectual tools and instruments as the philosophers. This is where the Muʿtazila and others like them first went wrong. They sought to establish the Muslim creed and refute the philosophers using the same tools and principles as the philosophers, which they called ʿilm al-kalām’ (rational/speculative theology). The essence of this theology, although it contains some elements of Shariʿa, language, and reason, is primarily derived from philosophy. They aimed to articulate the Muslim belief system, and they began with the existence of Allah. When they wanted to prove the existence of Allah, they said: ‘The proof for His existence is the temporal origination of the world. The world is temporally originated, and every temporally originated thing must have a creator.’ They thought this was the meaning of Allah’s statement: ‘Or were they created by nothing, or were they the creators [of themselves]?’ [Q. 52:35]. However, there is a distinction between their proof for Allah’s existence and the method of the Qur’ān. The verse ‘Or were they created by nothing, or were they the creators [of themselves]?’ is not meant to prove the existence of Allah, as this is self-evident. Rather, it seeks to affirm aspects of Lordship that certain polytheists failed to recognize. After they claimed that the proof for the existence of Allah through the establishing the temporal origination of the world, they wanted to prove that the world was indeed created, because their philosophical opponents argued that the world is eternal. In trying to prove that the world is created, they split into two groups: 1] The Jahmiyya and Muʿtazila, who argued that the proof of the world’s creation in time lies in its possession of attributes, which they called “accidents.” 2] The mutakallimūn who affirmed some attributes, such as Ibn Kullāb, al-Ashʿarī, and al-Māturīdī, who argued that the proof for the creation of the world in time lies in its movement and the fact that it cannot remain in one state over time. They established the existence of Allah using this method, but it is fraught with several problems: 1. It is a contrived method: Theologians went to great lengths to justify beliefs using a system of logic foreign to the natural simplicity of Islamic beliefs. When it came to the attributes of Allah, the Jahmiyya and Muʿtazila could not affirm Allah’s attributes based on their method. Since their proof for the world’s creation in time relied on the presence of attributes, they argued that Allah must be the opposite of the created world. Thus, according to their logic, affirming any of Allah’s attributes would imply that He is created, so they denied His attributes altogether. When al-Ashʿarī abandoned Muʿtazilism and declared his repentance, he still held on to some of the Muʿtazilite principles regarding Allah’s attributes. He claimed that the proof of the world’s creation in time was in its movement, but not all of its attributes—only the moving ones. Therefore, his proof for the world’s creation was its movement and its inability to remain in Page27 2. It leads to incorrect implications: This approach resulted in numerous false conclusions. Page28 one fixed state. This shows the mistake in claiming that alAshʿarī fully returned to the beliefs of Ahl al-Sunna. The matter is more detailed than that. Al-Ashʿarī, and before him Ibn Kullāb, along with his contemporary al-Māturīdī, upheld the principle that led them to deny certain attributes—specifically, any attribute of Allah that relates to His actions that depend on His will and choice. Thus, these [kalām] groups denied either all of Allah’s attributes or specifically His attributes related to His actions, such as His will and power. This is where the Jahmiyya, Mu'tazilites, Ash’arites, Māturīdītes, and Kullābites fall into what Ahl al-Sunna call taʿṭīl, which means denying Allah’s names and attributes or denying some of His attributes. These groups denied Allah’s attributes not by examining the Qur’ānic proofs to see whether they affirmed or negated the attributes, but by relying on their philosophical proof for the world’s creation in time—what they called the ‘proof from accidents’ (dalīl al-aʿrāḍ). When they returned to the Qur’ān, the Mu'tazila found that the Qur’ān clearly affirms Allah’s attributes, while their philosophical conclusions demanded the negation of these attributes. Similarly, when Ibn Kullāb, al-Ashʿarī, and al-Māturīdī returned to the Qur’ān, they found that it affirms divine actions related to Allah’s will and power in over a hundred verses, as mentioned by al-Rāzī from the Ashʿarites, who said: “The Qur’ān affirms movement in over a hundred places,” referring to Allah’s actions related to His will and power. They found that the Qur’ān contradicted their rational conclusions. From what has been discussed, it becomes clear that these groups denied Allah’s attributes or some aspects of them, not based on evidence from the Qur’ān, but rather on a false principle they innovated. In this way, their disagreement regarding Allah’s attributes is different from that of the Khawārij. For example, when the Page29 Khawārij declared that major sinners are disbelievers, they cited verses like: ‘Indeed, whomever You admit to the Fire, You have disgraced him’ [Q. 3:192] and ‘Every time they want to get out of it, they will be returned to it’ [Q. 32: 20]. In contrast, these groups (the Jahmiyya and Muʿtazila) do not have detailed evidence from the Qur’ān to justify their denial of the attributes. Instead, they rely on a single type of reasoning, which they call the proof from accidents. This proof has no basis in Sharīʿa, nor does it have any meaning in the Arabic language. Rather, it is borrowed from the philosophy of certain Greek atheists. This so-called ‘proof’ led the Muʿtazila, Jahmiyya, and others to deny Allah’s attributes, and it also led Ibn Kullāb and his followers, such as al-Ashʿarī and Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, to deny Allah’s actions. When these groups returned to the Book of Allah, they found that it contradicted their views. They sought to reconcile this contradiction by finding ways to reinterpret the Qur’ān. As for the Sunna, they found many ways to dismiss it, with one of the main reasons being their ignorance of the Sunna. Many of the texts of the Sunna were unknown to them, and this is not an accusation but a reality, as many of the kalām theologians were among the most ignorant of people regarding the Sunna and the traditions of the Prophet ‫ﷺ‬, not to mention the traditions of the Companions. Moreover, what they accepted from the Sunna, they often dismissed as being based on speculative knowledge, treating it as part of the ‘aḥād’ (solitary) reports (those that are not considered certain in theology). They argued that aḥād reports cannot be used as proof in matters of foundational beliefs. When they examined the Qur’ān, they found that it provided details that contradicted their method. They then turned to the Arabic language, trying to derive a theory they claimed was an essential linguistic principle. This theory was, in fact, an innovation, and if we were to concede for the sake of argument, we could say it was a linguistic innovation, just as there are religious innovations. They claimed that language is Page30 divided into literal (ḥaqīqī) and figurative (majāzī) meanings, and they invoked the concept of metaphor (majāz) to construct their canon of ta’wīl, which they defined as diverting a word from its literal meaning to a figurative one due to contextual evidence. They applied this method of ta’wīl to the Qur’ānic texts concerning Allah’s attributes, diverting them from their apparent meanings to interpretations that only needed to meet one criterion: that the new meaning should not contradict their philosophical beliefs. They found that Allah had affirmed His attributes in detail in the Qur’ān, so they employed ta’wīl to negate the Qur'anic affirmation of the attributes and to ensure that the Qur’ān did not contradict their belief system, which denied some or all of Allah’s attributes. They claimed that all the attributes and actions affirmed in the Qur’ān are subject to figurative interpretation, meaning that they should be paraphrased metaphorically rather than literally. For instance, Allah’s statement ‘And your Lord will come’ [Q. 89:22] posed a problem for their method because they denied that Allah could be attributed with actions. This was agreed upon by both the Ashʿarites and the Muʿtazila, among others, because they argued that only created beings could perform actions. To resolve this, they resorted to ta’wīl, claiming that the verse actually refers to the coming of an angel, which does not contradict their principle of denying Allah’s attributes since angels are part of the created world, and created beings can perform actions. Thus, their method of ta’wīl involved diverting the words of the Qur’ān, which are full of references to Allah’s attributes, from their apparent meanings to interpretations that align with their philosophical views. This demonstrates that these groups did not use the Arabic language to understand the Qur’ān in order to formulate their belief system. Rather, they used it to prevent the Qur’ān from contradicting their pre-established doctrines. They developed their entire belief system independently of the Arabic language and the meanings of the Qur’ān and Sunna. This fact alone is sufficient proof for Muslims, both scholars and laypeople, of the corruption of this method and its innovation. It is a method that contradicts the way of the Prophets, and their denial of Allah’s attributes differs even from the methods of other deviant groups, such as the Murji’a and the Khawārij. These groups, despite their errors, based many of their claims on misunderstood verses from the Qur’ān, while the Jahmiyya and Muʿtazila built their entire system outside of the language and teachings of Islam. Their proof from accidents has no basis in the understanding of the Arabs. For instance, the word ‘accident’ (ʿaraḍ) in Arabic means something very different from what the theologians understood it to mean, and the word ‘substance’ (jawhar) in Arabic also has a different meaning than what the theologians assigned to it. In conclusion, their arguments are not based on the language of the Arabs nor on the texts of the Qur’ān and Sunna but are instead derived from a foreign philosophy. When the corruption of ta’wīl by which the innovators distorted the texts legally, rationally and lexically, was realised, the innovators defined ta’wīl as diverting a word from its literal meaning to a figurative one due to a contextual clue. We say: This definition of ta’wīl is corrupt legally, rationally, and linguistically. Its corruption in terms of Sharīʿa is due to the fact that it is an heretical innovation not mentioned in the words of Allah, His Messenger, or the Companions. If the Qurān were to be understood in this way in matters of rulings or reports, the Page31 The Corruption of ta’wīl According to Sharīʿa Companions, the Prophet ‫ﷺ‬, or the Qur’ān itself would have indicated this method. Therefore, this method is in opposition to Sharīʿa as it is an unwarranted heretical innovation. If they claim that ta’wīl is mentioned in the Qur’ān, we respond by saying that what is mentioned in the Qur’ān is not in this sense. Rather, it refers to tafsīr (explanation) or to the reality that something ultimately leads to. It is also flawed from a rational perspective for several reasons, one of the main ones being that its proponents say that ta’wīl is the act of diverting a word from its literal meaning to a figurative one based on contextual clues. We ask them: Does the text itself convey the truth, or does it convey falsehood, or does it convey neither truth nor falsehood? If they say that the text itself conveys the truth, as they claim, then we respond: In that case, there is no need for anything called diversion (ṣarf), evidence (dalīl), or a contextual clue (qarīna). If they say that the text conveys neither truth nor falsehood, this is impossible because the Qur’ān was revealed to people who understood it, and they were Arabs. Therefore, they must have understood some meaning from it, whether this meaning was true or false. It is impossible that the verse would not convey either truth or falsehood. Therefore, the text itself, before any reference to clues or diversions, must either convey truth or falsehood. If it conveys the truth, then there is no need for ta’wīl, and we remain on the methodology of Ahl al-Sunna. The remaining option for them is to say that the text itself conveys only falsehood, which is not befitting of Allah and would imply a deficiency in His speech. This would lead to the Page32 The Corruption of ta’wīl Rationally conclusion that the texts, according to them, can only convey falsehood. However, the notion that the sacred texts of the Qur’ān, which is the speech of Allah, convey only falsehood is rationally impossible. Thus, we can stop here and say that it is rationally impossible to believe in the Qur'ān as the word of Allah, preserved from error, and then claim that it conveys only falsehood. This is a rational contradiction. Additionally, if the text conveys only falsehood, then the truth would be derived solely from the evidence that diverts it (the qarīna). This means that the clue or diversion is not just a contextual clue, but rather the complete source of truth. Thus, the text itself would have no inherent meaning in truth, neither on its own nor when influenced by the contextual clue. In other words, if they say that the text itself conveys only falsehood, but we derive truth from it when accompanied by an external clue, the rational response is that the truth you claim is derived solely from the clue, not from the text itself. Therefore, there is no need for lengthy discussion, as in the case of the verse, ‘And your Lord will come’ [Q. 89:22], which they interpret by saying that an angel will come. According to their interpretation, this has no positive effect on affirming monotheism and is merely an action of created beings like all other actions. They even argue that the movement of people standing and sitting negates the attributes in this way. Thus, their interpretation of the verse ‘And your Lord will come’ [Q. 89: 22] follows this approach. The corruption of ta’wīl from the perspective of the Arabic language is an issue that has confused many of the later scholars, causing hesitation in their stance on it. Page33 The Corruption of ta’wīl from the Perspective of the Arabic Language The correct understanding is that ta’wīl—as defined by its proponents as diverting a word from its literal meaning to a figurative one based on contextual clues—is linguistically flawed from the perspective of the Arabic language. This definition is based on a linguistic assumption: if this linguistic assumption is correct, then their interpretation may be valid from a linguistic standpoint. However, if this linguistic assumption is proven false, then their definition of ta’wīl also collapses from a linguistic standpoint. The linguistic assumption is that, according to these individuals, the Arabic language is divided into literal (ḥaqīqa) and figurative (majāz). Thus, we must examine the issue of literal and figurative language. First, in order to understand this matter, it is important to avoid confusion when reading the words of Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya or even Ibn al-Qayyim. Although Ibn al-Qayyim sometimes mixes certain meanings together, when it comes to the words of Shaykh al-Islam, his stance is clearer. It is worth mentioning that this is not intended as criticism of Ibn alQayyim, may Allah have mercy on him, but some who critiqued both scholars—Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn Taymiyya—pointed out that Ibn al-Qayyim frequently refers to the concept of literal and figurative meanings in his writings. As a result, some critics claimed this was a contradiction, arguing that while Ibn alQayyim denies the notion of literal and figurative meanings following his teacher (Ibn Taymiyya), he frequently applies them in his discussions and explicitly uses the terms ‘literal’ and ‘figurative.’ The correct understanding is that most of what Ibn alQayyim affirmed when he mentioned literal and figurative Page34 The Issue of Literal and Figurative Language meanings was done as a linguistic division. However, at times, he might include some influence related to the meanings of words, not just their linguistic forms. As for Shaykh al-Islam, his approach to this issue is more precise. He has some statements that are useful to mention as a prelude to answering the question of ḥaqīqa and majāz. He says: Thus, what Shaykh al-Islam rejects regarding literal and figurative meanings is not the linguistic forms or the use of terms. For example, in the verse, ‘And ask the village’ [Q. 12: 82], one could say this is figurative language, considering that the meaning is to ask the people of the village. Referring to this as figurative language is a terminological issue, similar to how grammarians name things like the subject, object, adverbial phrase, or specification. Shaykh al-Islam’s objection lies in the assumption that this division applies to the meanings of the language itself, which is the point made by the kalām theologians in their theory. We say: This theory of ḥaqīqa and majāz is linguistically invalid and impossible according to the Arabic language. Its invalidity becomes apparent when we consider how the theologians define literal and figurative meanings. They said: ḥaqīqa is ‘a word used in its original meaning,’ and majāz is ‘a word used in a meaning other than its original meaning.’ This definition of literal and figurative includes a reference to the original assignment or designation of meaning and to ‘usage’ (istʿmāl), implying that there is a distinction between the two. When you read the definition of majāz, it becomes clear Page35 The issue of literal and figurative meanings can either be viewed as a characteristic of words, which is a terminological matter where terminology does not need to be disputed, or it can be viewed as a characteristic of meanings, which is the part that scholars, like the Muʿtazila and others, disagree on. Page36 that these scholars differentiate between the assignment of meaning in the language and the way it is used. They assume that there is a difference between how language is assigned and how it is used. The question arises: Who assigned the language, and who uses it? The second question: Which comes first, assignment (waḍʿ) or usage (istiʿmāl)? The third question: What is an example of assignment in the language, and what is an example of usage? These questions arise in response to the theory and reveal its flaws, showing that it is linguistically invalid. The First Question: What is the difference between assignment and usage? This question does not lead to a definitive answer. If they say that the Arabs are the ones who assigned the language and that the Arabs are the ones who use it, we will reply: It is impossible to distinguish in reality between assignment and usage. What makes one Arabic utterance an assignment (waḍʿ) and another Arabic utterance a usage (istiʿmāl)? Thus, these scholars—especially the Muʿtazila theorists of language—felt the need to delve into the origins of languages and where language came from. In books of uṣūl al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence), as well as some books of rational theology (kalām) and linguistics, there is a discussion about the origin of language. Some said it originated from Adam, others said it was taught by Allah to Adam, some said it was taught by the angels, and others claimed it came from the jinn. All these opinions are possible, but it is impossible to be certain about any one of them. As for Allah’s statement ‘And He taught Adam the names’ [Q. 2:31], we believe in it as it is, but the progression of languages and how they developed is broader than what is indicated by the verse ‘And He taught Adam the names, all of them’ [Al-Q. 2:31]. Page37 It could be said that usage refers to how the Arabs used the language, and chronologically, assignment precedes usage— meaning assignment comes first, followed by usage. At most, we can say that usage is known as how the Arabs used the language, but assignment remains unknown. It is impossible to base what is known (usage) on what is unknown (assignment), as the unknown cannot provide clarity on its own, let alone provide clarity for something else. If you examine the statements of the Muʿtazila scholars— who are the foremost authorities on this issue—you will find that they say assignment refers to individual words, while usage refers to compound words. This means that they claim that a single word like ‘yad’ (hand), for example, is called assignment, while a sentence is called usage. In order to avoid the issue of historical precedence, which they cannot trace, some of their scholars said that this distinction is not based on historical order but rather on the fact that usage applies to compound sentences like ‘Zayd came,’ which they call usage, while words like ‘Zayd’ or ‘came’ are referred to as assignment. We respond by saying that this too is impossible to substantiate because no Arab would simply say yad (hand) and stop there. No human language, whether Arabic or otherwise, operates in this way. This is an artificial imposition on the language, as there is no real-world example of anyone, whether Arab or non-Arab, speaking in isolated words without forming sentences. It is inconceivable for someone to use a single word unless it is in response to a question. For instance, if someone asks, ‘How is Zayd?’ and the response is ‘good,’ it is understood that the complete sentence is ‘Zayd is good,’ with the rest of the sentence omitted because it is known and implied. Omitting what is known is permissible according to the agreed-upon customs of human languages. This is not unique to the Arabic language but applies to all human languages. Page38 Thus, following this reasoning, there is no language that exists purely in terms of assignment. Language exists only in usage, and there is no such thing as pure assignment. Some of their scholars, in an attempt to prove assignment, said that when we examine the language, we find that the Arabs use yad to mean the limb, and they also use yad to mean ‘blessing.’ In response, we say that there is no linguistic or rational reason preventing a word from having multiple meanings, with the context determining which meaning is intended. If they claim that a single word can only have one meaning, and cannot have any other meanings, this is an arbitrary imposition on language. A single word can, both linguistically and rationally, indicate multiple meanings. Rationally, there is no restriction that prevents this, and linguistically, if you study how the Arabs use their language, you will find that they often use the same word in different contexts, each time conveying a different meaning. If they argue that the proof that a word can only have one true meaning, while the other meanings are figurative, is that when the word yad is mentioned, the most specific meaning comes to mind first, such as the physical hand rather than blessing, we respond by saying: The rational analysis shows that no meaning comes to mind by default, because a word is merely a sound or symbol until placed in context. If we hypothetically agree that yad initially makes people think of the physical hand, this is only because that particular meaning is more common in the language. The frequency and commonality of usage do not determine whether a word was originally assigned to that meaning or another. What prevents the word yad from having been assigned in the language to multiple meanings? Neither language nor reason forbids this. If they ask: What determines the specific meaning in each context? Page39 We respond: The context itself determines the meaning, and there is no need for an external clue or indication (qarīna). If a word has been assigned to different meanings, the context will naturally clarify which meaning is intended. Sometimes the commonly understood meaning is the physical hand, and other times it could be something else. For example, when ʿUrwa ibn Masʿūd said to Abū Bakr: “if not for a Favor (yad) I owe you, I would have responded to you,” no one who heard this statement or later read it understood it to mean a physical hand, which is what the proponents of the literal meaning claim is the true meaning of the word yad in Arabic due to its frequent usage. Interpreting ʿUrwa’s words as referring to a physical hand is absurd, and it would be an impossible interpretation of his statement. Thus, it is impossible for a meaningful Arabic statement to carry more than one significantly different interpretation unless one of two conditions is met: either the person interpreting it lacks sufficient understanding to correctly identify the intended meaning, or the speaker's words were not clear or eloquent. It is well-known that the Qur’ān is the most eloquent and clear form of speech, and it is impossible to claim that Muslims are incapable of understanding Allah’s words in a suitable and correct way. If this were the case, then the text itself would not be clear. The origin of the theory of ḥaqīqa and majāz as it pertains to meanings comes from the Muʿtazila. However, when referring to these concepts as characteristics of words, some scholars such as Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām, Abū ʿUbayda Maʿmar ibn al-Muthannā, and even Imam Aḥmad used the terms. This usage refers to the idea of figurative language as what the language permits, but when it comes to treating these as characteristics of meanings, it is a Muʿtazilite theory introduced into the study of language. Thus, it becomes clear that this issue has been imposed upon the language. When asked: What is the reality of what they call literal and figurative meanings in the language? I say that most of what the proponents of the literalfigurative theory regard as figurative falls into one of two categories: 1-You yourselves admit that yad is literal in describing an attribute, so initially, it should be understood in its literal meaning. Page40 [category] 1. A word with multiple meanings (mushtarak) used in different contexts, such as the word yad, which has been assigned with more than one meaning, or the word ʿayn (eye) which also has multiple meanings. There may be a shared word that, in one of its meanings, is more prevalent or apparent, while in others, it is less so. Sometimes this shared meaning is equal across contexts, and at other times, it is more prevalent in one meaning than another. The first type of what the scholars of figurative interpretation called majāz is simply terms that, when taken individually and out of context, could linguistically have more than one meaning. However, once placed in context, any ambiguity or potential for multiple meanings is resolved necessarily. We know that Islamic belief is not built on isolated terms but rather on complete sentences and constructed meanings. Thus, the verses of the Qur’ān that deal with actions and attributes are not problematic, even if the individual word may have multiple meanings. For instance, in the verse where Allah says: ‘What prevented you from prostrating to what I created with My own hands?’ [Q. 38:75], if someone says that the word yad has multiple meanings in the language, we have two responses: Page41 2-From the context, it is impossible to interpret it otherwise because the word yad is mentioned in the dual form and attributed to Allah. The Arabs never use the word yad to mean ‘blessing’ in the dual form and attached to Allah. Therefore, when we refute these scholars, we rely on the context, which is an important principle. One of the opponents might say: The proof that yad should be interpreted as ‘power’ or ‘blessing’ is found in the statement of ʿUrwa ibn Masʿūd to Abū Bakr. We will reply: Provide an example from the Arabic language with a context similar to that of the Qur’ān, where the word yad is used in the dual form and attributed to a specific being, where it clearly means ‘blessing’ or ‘power’ or anything other than a literal attribute. [category] 2. The second type of what they labelled as figurative, and which they used to create confusion in language and usage, is simpler than the first type. These are phrases found in the Arabic language, including in the Qur’ān itself, where what has occurred is merely the omission of something that is already understood. For example, in the verse, ‘And ask the village’ [Q. 12:82], if the context had been ‘Ask the people of the village,’ they would have called this literal. But since the verse says, ‘Ask the village,’ they call it figurative. Why is it figurative? They say it is because the question is directed at the village, and inanimate objects cannot be asked—only rational beings can be. We respond: This is an example of omitting what is understood, and omitting what is understood is just like mentioning it. The purpose of human language is to convey meanings, and if the meaning can be conveyed concisely, it is better for the listener and more effective in communication. Omitting what is known is permissible in all human languages. This type of omission or abbreviation exists in all languages, whether eloquent, constructed, artificial, or even in the modern scientific terminologies. Abbreviating what is known is an intellectual commonality among all rational beings. Page42 A large portion of what they labelled as figurative language falls under the category of omitting what is understood, and omitting what is understood is just like mentioning it. For example, when they say that the verse ‘And your Lord will come’ [Q. 89:22] is similar to ‘And ask the village’ [Q. 12:82], where the implied meaning is ‘Ask the people of the village,’ they argue that the verse should be understood as ‘And His angel came.’ We say: No, there is a clear difference. In the case of ‘And ask the village’ [Q. 12:82], all listeners, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, know that it means ‘Ask the people of the village.’ However, in the verse ‘And your Lord will come’ [Q. 89:22], what evidence is there that it means an angel comes? The principle is that omitting what is understood is permissible when the omitted meaning is known to all, but here, the meaning of ‘angel’ (malak) is not known. The proof that it is not known is that one could assume something different. For example, if a Muʿtazilī says ‘And your Lord will come’ [Q. 89:22] means ‘And an angel came,’ another might say, ‘It means His mercy came,’ a third might say, ‘It means Jibrīl came,’ and a fourth might say, ‘It means the angels came,’ while a fifth might say, ‘It means His command came.’ In such cases, the omitted meanings vary, but if you ask, ‘How is Zayd?’ and I respond, ‘Good,’ the omitted meaning is obvious and understood: ‘Zayd is good.’ No one would think that I meant ʿAmr when asked about Zayd. Thus, the evidence that what is attributed to Allah in terms of His attributes and actions cannot be understood as an omission (ḥadhf) of something else is because the Arabs only omit what is universally known to all the listeners. In this case, the omitted meaning is not known, and the proof for this is that the omitted part could be understood in multiple ways. If someone says that in the verse ‘And your Lord will come’ [Q. 89:22], it means ‘Jibrīl will come,’ this is nothing more than speculation. If they say that Jibrīl coming is possible, we agree that it is possible, but what evidence do you have that Jibrīl is the intended meaning? Perhaps it is another angel assigned to this task, perhaps it refers to Allah’s command, His mercy, or a group of angels. Since the omitted meaning cannot be known, it indicates that Allah intended the obvious meaning of the text. The text must have a clear meaning, and since the figurative meaning is impossible, we know that the literal meaning is intended—this is assuming we accept the distinction between literal and figurative meanings. We have discussed this in detail to understand how these groups denied Allah’s attributes, which stems from their philosophical reasoning, not from the texts. They rejected the texts based on what they called ta’wīl. This shows us that their ta’wīl is corrupt linguistically, rationally, and according to Sharīʿa. Thus, it becomes clear to the student seeker of knowledge that the method of Ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jamāʿa is valid, grounded in reason, language, and Sharīʿa. On the other hand, the opponents have failed to uphold reason, language, or Sharīʿa. Page43 [end of audio segment].