"WHERE DO STATES OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA MEET WITH SOCIETY

Institute of Social Studies I I "WHERE DO STATES OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA MEET WITH SOCIETY IN THEIR PUBLIC POLICY MAKING PROCESS?" A Research Paper presented by Haimanot Wudu Fanta (Ethiopia) In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for Obtaining the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES Members of the Examining Committee Dr. P. van der WeI Dr. D. Gasper The Hague, December 1992 This document represents part of the author's study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies; the views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute. Research papers and theses are not made available for outside circulation by the Institute. Enquiries: Postal Address: Institute of Social Studies P.O. Box 90733 2509 LS The Hague The Netherlands Telephone -31-70-3510100 Cables SOCINST Telex 31491 ISS NL Telefax -31-70-354 9851 Location: Baduisweg 251 2597 JR The Hague The Netherlands "WHERE DO STATES OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA MEET WITH SOCIETY IN TIlEIR PUBLIC POLICY MAKING PROCFSS1" BY HAIMANOT WUDU FANTA IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF TIlE REQUIREMENTS FOR OBTAINING TIlE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIFS MEMBERS OF TIlE EXAMINING COMMfITEE 1. P. VAN DER WEL 2.D.GASPER INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL STUDIFS DECEMBER. 1992 ACKNOWLEDGEMENfS I would like to acknowledge, with gratitude the assistance I received from the Netherlands Government and the Institute of Social Studies at the Hague, for providing me with all necessary funds and facilities enabling me to continue my post-graduate studies. I particularly acknowledge the help of Drs. P. Van Der WeI and Dr. d. Gasper. They went over the first draft in detail and proposed many changes in formulation, and pointed out a number of important inconsistencies as well as errors in logic and formulation. I should also like to thank my wife Saba Medehin, for encouraging me at all stages for making sure that I kept the centre purpose in right. and my feet on the ground. However, it is needless to say, I alone am responsible for whatever weaknesses may be detected in this research. ABSTRACf OF THESIS BY HAIMANOT WUDU FANTA M.A IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES INSTITIITE OF SOCIAL STUDIES THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS 1992 The relationship of society, state and government with respect to political practice is an old but still a very important and contentious question for policy studies in particular and social science in general. Some political philosophers, namely the society-centred ones, argue that the source of policy and of policy change are determined by the relationship of power and domination among groups and social classes. But the state-centred ones start their principal unit of analysis on the decision maker or on the organization responsible for the outcomes. This research paper attempts to investigate the current policy crises of subSaharan Africa using both the society-centred and the state-centred approaches simultaneously. .... We must often study history to get rid of it by this I mean that what are often taken as historical explanations would better be taken as part of the statement of that which is to be explained. Rather than "explain" something as a persistence from the past, we ought to ask "why it has persisted"? The sociological imagination, I remind you, in considerable part consists of the capacity to shift from one perspective to another, and in the process to build up an adequate view of a total society and of its components. It is this imagination, of course, that set off the social scientist from the mere technician. Adequate technicians can be trained in a few years. The sociological imagination can also be cultivated; certainly it seldom occurs without a great deal of often routine work. Yet there is an expected quality about it, perhaps because its essence is the combination of ideas that no one expected were combinable - say, a mess of ideas from German philosophy and British economics. There is a playfulness of mind back of such combining as well as truly fierce drive to make sense of the world. which the technician as such usually lacks. Perhaps he is too well trained, too precisely trained. Since one can be trained only in what is already known, training sometimes incapacitates one from learning new ways; it makes one rebel against what is bound to be at first loose and even sloppy. But you must cling to such vague images and notions. if they are yours, and you must work them out. for it is in such forms that original ideas, if any. almost always appear. Charles Wright Mills (The Sociological Imagination 1959:154) TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I CHAPTER II Page BACKGROUND 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 The problem 2 1.3 Working hypothesis 4 1.4 Methodology 4 1.5 Scope of the study 5 LITERA TURE REVIEW 2.1. The historical debate on the state-society ties. 7 2.1.1. The society-centred response to the role of the state. 10 2.1.2. The role of the state as viewed by state-centred approach. 14 2.2. The characteristics of sub-Saharan Africa states. 19 2.2.1. The peculiar characteristics of states and state formation in sub-Saharan Africa. 21 2.2.2. The usefulness of different Public policy models in 26 the sub-Saharan Africa context. CHAPTER III SURVIVAL STRATEGIES OF SOCIETY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS. 3.1. Why do societies of underdeveloped countries in general, and societies of sub-Saharan Africa in particular, create and institutionalize survival strategies? 30 3.2. Essential characteristics of societies under survival strategies. 33 3.3. The response of societies who are under short-term survival strategies ｾ＠ to public policies of the state aimed for the long run. 37 CHAPTER IV THE IMPACT OF SURVIVAL STRATEGIES ON PUBLIC POLICIES. (CASE STUDIES) 4.1. Rural socialism in Tanzania. 43 4.2. Some experiences with smallholder's tea development policy in Kenya. 52 4.3. The land reform policy and the subsequent cooperativization CHAPTER V and villagization policies of the Ethiopian Government. 57 FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 62 BIBLIOGRAPHY CHAfYfER I 1. BACKGROUND Over the past several years, the economics of sub-Saharan Africa alarmed a growing number of analysts; it generated analysis about what has gone wrong and prescriptions about what should be done. In the absence of a unified conceptual approach to these phenomena, these prescriptions sometimes converged and sometimes clashed. Because of the methodological and prescriptive differences, little can be achieved by picking one of the prescriptions, unless major policy making and implementation strategies are undertaken and sustained by developing countries. Thus, the massive food crises and apparent failures of public policies in sub-Saharan Africa have led most policy analysts to focus attention on the issues of state-society ties in the public policy process. Although most sub-Saharan Africa states attempted to modify their policies within the broad philosophical views of development i.e., either on (l)the development thinking of modernization or neo-modernization, or on (2) dependency and the world system of MarxistLeninist thinking or on (3) World Bank-IMF thinking of structural adjustment - institutionbuilding, the policy crises all over the sub-continent still continued with an alarming rate. Based on these philosophical views and the macro policies pursued the sub-Saharan Africa states claimed either liberal economies (Malawi, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Niger and Chad); nationalistic (Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia and Kenya); or socialist (Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia). Although the ultimate goal of these states was to improve the quality of African life, these broad styles of development thinking and public policy making failed to bring the desired results. Indeed, after a series of "Development Decades" of public policies after public policies, it became evident that no approach produced the goods and services required. The writer of this research paper believes that social problems are not just out there waiting to be dealt with. Policy making is not merely problem solving, it is a matter of setting up and defining problems in the first place. For most of the states of sub-Saharan Africa, and even for most of the serious scholars the problem seems to be underdevelopment. But in actual fact underdevelopment is not a problem by itself. The problems of sub-Saharan Africa states lie in formulating and implementing development oriented public policies of long term perspective in a society where the majority of the people have their own survival strategies. Therefore, this research paper will address the question on how these numerous interventions of the state are administered to society and why they are a failure. To these effects, this paper advances some principal arguments. 1. The researcher is convinced that most major policies of sub-Saharan Africa are a failure, however sound they may look at statement level. 2. The researcher shares Ndulu's argument that in most sub-Saharan African political systems, whether civilian or military, the majority of the people are politically impotent while the elites (in the modern sense) are the main actors in the public policy making and implementation process. 3. As noted earlier, empirical evidence suggests that the broad generally held views in the state-society ties in sub-Saharan Africa, failed to reflect the actual problems. Something is indeed wrong in sub-Saharan Africa. But dependency, modernization, Marxism-Leninism, structural adjustment, market mechanisms, etc., and the associated theories of public policy and implementation are not facts, they are reasons, a theory about facts. Debates on how to formulate and implement public policies are not debates about facts, but debates about theories. This final point will lead us to our final argument. 4. Most policy formulation and implementation debates are not about empirical evidences of why public policies fail but about what these factors mean in terms of theoretical appreciation of the policy making and implementation process. This was precisely the main reason which has led the researcher to look for the missing link in the state-society ties of sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the researcher will attempt to treat the causes of policy crises in sub-Saharan Africa based on empirical evidences. 2. THE PROBLEM Everyone of us may agree on the nature of present day society, and yet disagree on the process by which this society was brought into being and in what direction it will develop in the future; and if we believe on the existence of such disagreement, then it is virtually certain that there will be disagreement on, what must be done? With the same token, policy makers and scholars of sub-Saharan Africa had been debating on the causes of Africa's problems. A number of scholars attempted to explain the current policy crises by changing structure of production and exchange, demographic considerations, migration patterns, African dependency on world prices on primary products, the rising costs of imports, and lately on the intervention of the World Bank and the IMF, to the unequal incorporation of sub-Saharan Africa in global economy, changes in environment, natural disasters, and ecological situations (Chazan 1988:125). However, the shocking crises in sub-Saharan Africa, the starvation, displacement of people and civil war continued without significant policy action. Indeed, if there is a need for qualitative development; subSaharan African public policy needs qualitative improvement. But what actually happened in subSaharan Africa was quite to the contrary. As noted by Chazan, state institutions in Africa have 2 undergone a cycle of attempted consolidation, the entrenchment of hegemonic domination, deterioration (Chazan 1988:326); and more recently disintegration. Some scholars like Ayoade, Ninsin, Lemarchand, MacGaffey, Callaghy, Parpart and Shaw consider the predatory and abusive officials of sub-Saharan Africa as the main causes for the crises. Others like Rothchild, Foly, Young, Ravenhill, Olorunsola and Chazan explain the crises based on institutional explanations. Other contributors like Azarya (whose view I Share), explain the weakening of the state as a function of the detachment of social groups from involvement in central activities. The writer of this research paper also attempts to address the problem of policy crises in sub-Saharan Africa basing the argument on the state-society ties. Empirical evidences over the last three or so decades suggest that, the sub-Saharan Africa policy makers are reluctant to undertake public policies aimed at strengthening the survival strategies of society, rather they usually attempt to destroy it. As noted earlier neither underdevelopment nor the logical outcomes of underdevelopment (Le., poverty and survival strategies of society) are problems by themselves in the real (strict) sense, because they had been present in those societies so long, however hard the states attempt to get rid of and repress them. The irony was that, almost all the states of sub-Saharan Africa promised their people improvements in the standard of living, prosperity, more education and health facilities without adequate emphasis to the missing link in the state-society ties. Indeed, the current realities don't live up to expectations; at times, by attempting to break and dismantle the basic survival strategies of those societies, most sub-Saharan African states accelerated mass hunger and frequent "coups d' etat". Therefore, this paper will argue that underdevelopment and survival strategies actually are not problems by themselves, rather, the proper formulation and implementation of public policies calls for a much disciplined use of survival strategies themselves because, society with its short-run survival strategies in no way displays a commitment towards public policies aimed for the long-run unless the policy strengthens the survival strategies themselves. Nevertheless, here we have to note that sub-Saharan Africa is a region including about 45 countries and a population of 450 million people. Even though it is a vast continent that defies easy generalization. Amid its diversity and complexity some important common characteristics stand out. A. Most people in sub-Saharan Africa live in the rural areas and work in the agricultural sector. The average for the sub-continent is eighty three percent with strong lj.R'd agricultural concentration of people, however, "it is also the only region in the developing world where per capita food production declined over the last two decades" (Spencer 1986:215). B. In spite of various policy efforts with different orientations, the sub-continent is still unable to feed its people, to cope up with the increasing rates of population, and to breakaway with the staggering malnutrition and pervasive poverty problems. C. In most sub-Saharan Africa, colonialism failed to integrate society into a larger and viable systems. Consequently, the post-colonial states of sub-Saharan Africa does not exist in the 3 context of the morality of the sub-Saharan Africa society. And finally it is the only region where a high degree of institutionalized survival strategies are widely practised. Therefore, after thoroughly viewing the glaring disparities between the short term survival strategies of sub-Saharan societies and the long term development oriented public policies of the state this paper hypothesises the following. 4. WORKlNG HYPOTI-IESISES 1. This research paper hypothesises that the causes for the current policy crises in sub-Saharan Africa lies in formulating and implementing development oriented public policies of long-term perspective in a society where the majority of the people have their own short term survival strategies of different form. 2. It also hypothesise that society with its short-run survival strategies in no way displays a commitment towards public policies aimed for the long-run unless the policy strengthens the survival strategies themselves. 3. Those policies which strengthen the survival strategies themselves bring qualitative improvement for the public policy making process and the society at large. 5. METHODOLOGY The starting point for the analysis is survey of literature. This survey will contain inf ormation on the historical debates' of state-society ties; on the important elements and characteristics of the long-range state-building public policies of sub-Saharan Africa; on the short-run survival strategies of society and on how they affect public policy making and implementation. The second step in the analysis will be a look at practical policy formulation and implementation practice from three countries in sub-Saharan Africa; one which considers the basic survival strategies of society and which was a success; and the other two which do not consider the survival strategies of society and which were a failure. The third step in the analysis will indicate where states and societies could positively meet in the public policy making and implementation process. This step also highlights an alternative policy formulation and implementation options. To these effects, the research will assess the effectiveness of the current theoretical approaches towards policy making and implementation practice in light of state-society ties in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the sequence of the analysis logically follows the propositions and hypothesises 4 stated, and attempts to show the impact of survival strategies on public policies of state, theoretically and empirically. To begin with, the historical debate on the state-society ties in general and the peculiar characteristics of the state and state formation in sub-Saharan Africa will be explored. And secondly our investigation will concentrate on defining the general causes and ways of manifestations of survival strategies in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. The exploration of state-society ties in general and state-society ties in sub-Saharan Africa in particular, coupled with brief investigation of the responses of societies to public policy, will give us the chance to ascertain the validi ty of our hypotheses i.e, hypothesis No.1 and hypothesis No.2. And finally based on the theoretical findings of chapter II and chapter III the research attempts to investigate three public policies from sub-Saharan Africa namely, from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania. These public policies were selected for a number of reasons. 1. All of them deal with the agricultural sector, and since most of the sub-Saharan African countries are characterized by subsistence peasant producers, the treatment of the peasants and their survival strategies vis a vis the long range agricultural policies of the state is of paramount importance for analysis and generalization. 2. All the three policies were very sound at statement level and were aimed at improving the chronic problems of the majority i.e, the agrarian poor, however, both the villagization efforts were a failure because they were very ambitious and aimed for the long run while the Kenyan case was a success because it was aimed at the survival strategies themselves. 3. It was also possible to find adequate materials and data on all of the three cases. Therefore, using both the theoretical and the empirical findings the researcher believes that, it is possible to draw valid conclusions at least for the survival strategies of the peasant vis a vis agricultural policies. 6. SCOPE OF TIlE STUDY Although some of the findings of the research may be extended to all underdeveloped countries where survival strategies are highly institutionalized, the study will be limited to subSaharan Africa alone; all examples of the long run strategies of the state and survival strategies of society will be drawn from this region, particularly from the agricultural sector and the peasant respectively. Moreover, an attempt to treat failures of public policies based on survival strategies is relatively a new approach and all new approaches and theories have their own limitations; this approach is no an exception. Although it may serve as a spring board for new ways of thinking amid failures of different approaches, different policies and different theories; it also requires 5 further treatment and test in the general underdevelopment context. Moreover, its level of generalization and lack of access to adequate data are severe constraints in the investigation process. 6 CHAPTERD 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1. TIlE I-DSTORICAL DEBATE ON TIlE STATE-SOCIETY TIES. In every age there are certain key words which, by their continuous use and significance, mark greater influence upon the nature and directions of men's thinking. Throughout the history of organized thought, such words as society, state and government have been notable not merely for their wide use as a linguistic tools but for their symbolic value in the thoughts and convictions of different philosophers and scholars. In the history of political thought, the term state and its role have been treated by different scholars differently, both as normative and descriptive concepts. Normative theorists tried to show that obedience to the state is the highest form of political obligation; they also believed that power concentration in the hands of a single authoritative body is an indispensable part of the political order. In contrast, the descriptive theorists singled out the state among all social institutions as the only one that is distinctively political and regard the description and analysis of the state as the central problems of political science. Christopher Lloyd, in his introductory remarks on social theory and political practices said The specifications of the political domain and political action have long been a problem for theorists and philosophers. Should politics be seen primarily; say, as a set of techniques for achieving the particular social goals of particular groups, or perhaps as a set of ideas and practices which has the effect of legitimating the implementations of such goals? Or is it necessary that there be a public space for distribution about society and political goals - a forum for ideas - before there can be said to be politics" (Lloyd 1983:3). ft •••• This statement indicates the problems associated in determining the actual actors in the policy making process. Nonetheless, human life is full of decisions; decisions are made every day of our lives and the results of these decisions depend on a number of controllable and uncontrollable factors. Our success and failure depend on how well we control and take care of these factors to attain our goals. Of course, despite our efforts to control and take care of the factors, we may make wrong decisions. And beyond these decisions at the personal level there are decisions made by governments which directly or indirectly affect a group, or a society at large. But how, why and when these decisions are arrived at and are implemented are the central questions for contemporary political scientists. All political scientists attempt to investigate the policy making process with government focusing on the factors that influence decision makers. Bjorkman on his mini-lecture on Perspective of Political Analysts emphasized 7 "Since observers tend to see different things from different perspectives it is important to be aware of these distinguishable models - - or lenses - - and their use." With the same line of argument, the current theoretical approaches to explain policy outcomes are faced by two major alternative responses. The society-centred approach address the question based on the premises that "... causes of decisions made to adapt, pursue and change public policies lie in understanding relationships of power, and competition among individuals, groups or classes in society or in international extensions of class based societies (Grindle and Thomas 1989:216). Consequently, the society-centred approach views the state as a political arena in which basic social and economic conflicts are fought out. And to arbitrate these social concerns - - such as ethnicity, religion and other shared values - - and economic conflicts the actors operating within the state use power, authority and influence. This society-based approach is a commonly held assumption both by the liberals and a variety of Marxists. In Theda Skocpol's words, ".... This general way of thinking about the state is in fact common to liberal and Marxist varieties of social theory. Between these broad traditions of social theory, the crucial difference of opinion is over which means the political arena distinctively embodies: fundamentally consensually based legitimate authority, or fundamentally coercive domination. And this difference parallels the different views about the basis of social order held by each theoretical tradition" (Skocpol 1979:25). Indeed, for the society-based approach, the government is no more than the people's instrument for shaping their own history. But, the state-centred approach deals with the state seriously as a macro-structure and conceives it not merely as an arena where socio-economic struggles are fought out, but also as a set of administrative, policing and military organization headed and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority and different institutions. Thus, the fundamental state institutions are assumed to be autonomous from the dominant classclass control. Therefore, the approach maintains that the perceptions and interactions of policy elites and the broad orientations of the state are the most determinant factors for policy choices and their subsequent implementations. Consequently their principal unit of analysis in the policy making process revolves around the decision maker or the institutions directly involved in policy outcomes An enquiry to the role of the state in the political and economic life of organized society had been a subject of discussion throughout the medieval and contemporary era. Basically, some view the state as a body of persons who are politically organized at large; others, consider the state as the institute of the government alone. Therefore, it was natural for the political philosophers to view the role of the state differently. Nevertheless, almost all the scholars assume that the primary function of the state is to maintain order and security by some sort of force. Since this assumption in turn requires an establishment of different institutions with the capacity to form 8 policies and laws, and a body to implement these policies and laws, the limits of the state's activity, the accountability and relative autonomy of the state, are an on going debate. 9 2.1.1.The society-centred response to the role of the state The attempt to enquire into the roots of the society-centred approach is a complicated matter, and any effort to address the roots of this approach will require us to discuss the history of the human race. But being less ambitious we can start our enquiry from the secularization of modern culture. About two hundred years ago two books appeared which between them raised the major issues that have dominated political thought for the two centuries since. These books were Rousseau's "Social Contract" (1762) and Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nation" (1776.). The history of the modern society-centred response and state centred response to the role of the state gained popularity in the works of both Rousseau and Adam Smith and their followers. Adam Smith considered consumption as the sole end purpose of production. Consequently, for the achievement of this end he recommended a system of economic freedom. ".... Given a certain framework of law and order and certain governmental services (of which more hereafter), they conceived that the object of economic activity was best attained by a system of spontaneous co -operation. As consumers, the citizens should be free to buy what best pleased their fancy. As producers, as worker, or as owners and organizers of the means of production, they should be free to use their labour or their property in ways which, in their judgement, would bring them the maximum reward in money or satisfaction. It is the impersonal mechanism of the market which, on this view, brings it about that the interests of the different individuals are harmonized" (Lord Robbins 1978:11) Indeed, the maxim of Adam Smith and his followers was "that government which governs the least is the best." Consequently, the role of the state was viewed to be efficient if it is minimal. Prior to Adam Smith, Rousseau, responding to Hobbes, indicated how society should act to optimize a single value, namely, internal order. He advocated both freedom for the citizen and a well-ordered society that would avoid both anarchy and tyranny. Identification with the society and the elimination of special interest organizations are, then, among the main conditions that according to Rousseau will permit a state to be stable though the members feel free in it. Even though they have some major differences on the question of the civic virtue, both of them accepted the absence of intermediary organizations. Thus, in both Smithian and Rousseauian versions of the theory of the individual and the state, the societal system with its institutions and relationships disappears. In response to these vital differences pointed out by Adam Smith and Rousseau, sociological writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries attempted to address the role of the state more exhaustively. Following Adam Smith's atomistic model which sees society as a locus of collaboration and rivalry between independent agents with their individual goals, there will be a natural struggle and 10 was a result of the pressures placed upon it by organized groups in society. Therefore, policy change for them was a result of changes sought by the social groups. The ideas of the pluralist are also shared by public choice theory. Public choice theory assumes organized interests as the major actors in the political life of society. For them, policies are made in a political market place where individuals seek benefit through public policy and the officials seek to benefit from reelection. Even though there seems to exist a common understanding between the pluralist and the public choice theory, unlike public choice theory, the pluralist'S assume that wise policy results from fragmented interest articulation in the political arena. When one considers the society-centred approach, one will find the sociologist Max Weber to be ambivalent. For Weber, politics and political imperatives are based on the realm of power and violence. Weber considered politicians and decision makers as professionals where the crucial actors are the political careerists and entrepreneurs. For him the politicians join the profession as a life choice and commitment; hence, these men must be not mere sentimentalists but men of perspective. Decision making in his ideal bureaucratic model was to take place based on conformity to commitment, popular appeals and careers. He assumed such decisions to be consequential for society, and for the decision makers themselves. He advocated quick diagnoses immediately applicable to concrete pressures and conditions. So the ideas of Weber seem to lie in between the society-centred and state-centred approach. In one side, he points out cultural strains and their consequences and in the other shows the tendency of politicians and political scientists to became estranged and decisive because their roles grow more burdensome and life absorbing. "Even though he regarded bureaucracy as technically superior, he was deeply concerned about its effects both in the individual and on the society at large" (Etzioni 1983:31) However, in Weber's model the existence of the charismatic leadership of the magically potent warrior chief and the legal - rational legal authority seems to place him in between the two extreme societal and state centred approaches. Due to the ambivalent character of Weber's thought, scholars such as Peter Blau and Amitai Etzioni have expanded his theoretical framework of behavioral analysis and its application and followed a different path while Michels in contrast stressed elitist elements. Generally, the society centred approach which had been shared by different scholars assumes that the rational citizen considers the various alternatives, decides which he believes in and acts according to the various alternatives, (for example according to the Smithian model the individual considers which alternative best serves his interest; in Rousseau's model which confirms to the general will; on the Marxian model based on the class struggle) Even though their analysis and rules differ, all the scholars in one way or the other believed that society reaches a conviction by evaluating alternatives against a clear rule of judgement. In a nut shell, the society-centred approach studied public policies based on the societal vantage point by analyzing specific social groups in relation to their identity, interest and cooperation. As Chazan puts it, this society-rooted research examines political and economic 12 competition over policy and position among the individuals concerned. This approach sees the political system as open to inputs in the form of demands and supports, and producing output in an authoritative allocation of values. But contrary to this argument, other scholars who followed Rousseau's notion of social contract and certain form of social decision, believed that, " ... the state is thus of the essence of man's potential being, and far being a check upon his development, it is the sole means of that development"(Nisbet 1962:143). But after Adam Smith and Rousseau, a majority of scholars started to regard the implications of all forms of associations such as kinship, ethnicity, religion, class and cultural associations. Of all the scholars who followed, the works of Bentham and Marx drastically changed the role of the modern state and the whole ideology of the political community. The works of these two philosophers were very significant and influential, mainly, due to their promise to the freedom of society related to the political power. Bentham believed that political power to be elevated to a point where it becomes the sole power in men's lives. Therefore, the idea of the centralized administrative state becomes central in Bentham's thought. As often stated, co ... centralization of the administration became almost an obsession with Bentham" (Ibid). According to Bentham the state and its power must extend to all areas of society covered by a network of custom and tradition. He further underlined that the people must be represented by a single body, a unified legislature which will be omnicompetent; the state has to work to exterminate the separation of the individual from the rational political order. Similarly, Marx's sociological society-centred approach has the same vision of the omnicompetent state; however, Marx tried to translate the moral values of socialism into the structure of the centralized political power. Moreover, he regarded the state and state power as purely having a transitional role dependent upon the economics of exploitation and class straggle. For Marx, the differences of locality, religion, and grouping must be abandoned in favour of a rational, centralized society. Thus, for Marx, political interaction derives from economic conflict, and policies of the state were the manifestation of class conflict. Therefore the role of the state according to him was to ensure the legal, institutional, and ideological hegemony of the dominant ruling class. Consequently, he viewed the state as an instrument of domination. Generally, for the marxists, the process through which decisions are made is not relevant, but the most important determinant in the policy initiative and in the impact of any policy is the social class formation and the degree of class struggle. In another dimension, the pluralist's VIew public policy as an outcome of conflict, bargaining and coalition formation among societal groups organized to protect a certain economic, neighbourhood, religion or other shared values. As emphasised by Grindle and Thomas II ••• pluralist political society is composed of a large number of such groups that compete and coalesce around the promotion of common policy goals" (Grindle and Thomas 1989:218). Consequently, the pluralist'S reduced the role of the state as a referee and they claimed that the response of the state 11 process from the bottom up. The unit of analysis is the specific social group or local community; the level of analysis is the macro collectiveity; the object of analysis is socio-economic process as well as political dynamics. Thus, the role of the state is constrained by different political variables outside the state's parameters. And it is also largely manipulated, constrained, dependent and responsive entity which plays only an arbitrative role. Public officials are dependent upon political support. But the behavioral inclination which began to have its roots in the works of Max Weber started to attract most of the contemporary political philosophers. Most of them argued that, leadership when backed by charisma will have more influence on the behavioral model of the society at large. Pool indicated this by saying "... the change from Eisenhower to Kennedy as a national leader produced great changes in the national posture toward political life" (Pool 1967:38). T'herefore, the logical outcome of this opposite trend was what was actually termed as "statecentred" approach. 13 2.1.2. The role of the state as viewed by the state-centred approach The state-centred approach makes a sharp distinction between state and society. For them Aristotle's triadic scheme of evolution of family to community to state does not seem to work. They held the assumption that the state is more than superstructure. They argue that ancient Athens, Rome, England and France had formed political states in spite of powerful opposition from kinship and other traditional authorities. For them the state is power and it is absolute. They also assume the modern state to be monistic where its authority extends directly to all individuals within its boundaries. However, this view is not recent, it dates back to the days of Plato and Aristotle. The idea that the state alone can provide the basis for truly political behaviour goes back to the beginning of western political thought. For Plato and Aristotle the city state, or polis, was the ultimate expression of man's intrinsic capacity for social action. Although many social needs could be met by lesser associations, such as the family and the village, the city state alone was sufficiently comprehensive to enable man to realize his full potentialities; and thus, to develop the good will which was the proper goal of his social existence. For Plato the good man was one who lived in close and harmonious association with all his fellow citizens in a perfectly integrated polis. Indeed, "The zeal of the state had come upon Plato" (Nisbet 1962:115). Following Plato the political philosopher Bodin also made a sharp distinction between the state and society. However, his distinction emphasized the social aspects of human association, status, membership, custom and moral control. For him the state resets upon force while social groups in society rests upon a reciprocal principle of friendship. Due to this, he considered the role of the state as a referee. Following Bodin, another political philosopher Hobbes took his theoretical departure from order, but he assumed the political state as necessarily determining its environment of society. Consequently, unlike Bodin, Hobbes was against affection for local associations, interest and faith. Furthermore, be it family, church or any other form of system of authority, is not allowed by him to significantly intervene between members of society and the sovereign. For him there are only two essential elements of civil society, the individual and the sovereign. Before the advent of the state, Hobbes argued, that there was no society. As Nisbet suggested, "if we are to understand the historical importance of the state in the western world we must be clear in our appreciation of certain general characteristics of the state as an historical entity" (Ibid:98). This approach thus considered the state as an independent actor and independent variable with a historically important role to play. Consequently, they saw policy making within the context of the state. The state is viewed as an autonomous entity with the ability to formulate and implement its own policy choices into authoritative actions. Based on this assumption 14 contemporary states are categorized as strong, independent, responsive and weak states based on their autonomy. Discussing the state autonomy Nordlinger indicated the four subjective properties of the state as followers; "... its malleability, insulation, resilience,and vulnerability. Their variations are in turn explained by four structural features:the state's boundedness, differentiation, cohesiveness, and policy capacities" (Nordlinger 1987:384). Indeed, for the state-centred approach any state extracts resources from society and uses these resources to create supportive and coercive administrative organizations. Nevertheless, like the society-centred approach, they assume that the state operates within the context of class divided society. However, in the final analysis the administrative and coercive organizations are the basis of state power. According to Skocpol, "... these fundamental state organizations are at least potentially autonomous from direct dominant-class control" (Skocpol1979:29). Even though at timesthe state may work in line with the interest of the dominant class or social group, they argue, on a majority of cases it does not work contrary to its own interest. They also justify the autonomy of the state by the geo-political environment and its interactions with other states. The involvement of the state in the international arena is the basis for its autonomous action, even against the interests of society at large within its jurisdiction. Thus the state centred approach view the state as the "Greek God of Janus," with dual faces and dual roles to play, one in its own class, ethnic or religious group and the other in the international system of states. Some scholars considered such power holders as power elites. For Mill for example, power elites are not economic classes but are a unified group based on the similarity of outlook, programmes and values. No matter what kind of social background they have, they remain an independent source of power and policy with the ability to negate societal demands if they deem it necessary. In discussing the state, the followers of the state-centred approach themselves differ in outlook. Some express the role of the state by the behaviour of the decision maker or the organization responsible for decisional outcomes. For example, the rational actor model considers the extent to which the policy makers can be rational actors in achieving an optimal solution to a given problem. It further emphasises that the decision makers, however they strive to satisfy their basic criteria for acceptable alternatives, due to the complexities and conflicts, they argue, that changes are only incremental or marginal. In another dimension, the bureaucratic politics approach argues that state policies are the results of bureaucratic entities and actors influenced by their skills and capacities thereof competing for preferred solutions based on their positions. The other significant approach which deserves treatment is the state interest approach which claims autonomy of the states in defining the nature of public problems and in developing solutions. In contrast to the Marxian approach of the class based society, states are separated from society and are considered to have their own interests. This approach argues that policy or institutional reform comes about because of the 15 interaction of policy makers attempting to generate responses to public problems and the constraints placed up on them by political, economic, and social conditions and by the legacy of the old policy. In discussing the state, this approach used different models to express the behaviour of the decision maker or the organization responsible for decisional outcomes. For example, the rational actor model considered the extent to which the policy makers can be rational actors in achieving optimal solutions to a given policy issue. They also underline the complexities and conflicts of the policy environment which constrains the policy makers to adopt acceptable criteria to make changes incremental or marginal. In another dimension, the other trend of the bureaucratic politics approach argues that the state policies are the results of bureaucratic entities and actors. However varied the models could be, all models took the state as an independent variable in the policy making and implementation process. Basically, both approaches discuss the state-society ties and their relative impact on public policies. Consequently, both talk about on how policies are formulated and how changes in public policies and public institutions came about. In practical policy terms the extent to which society and the state should be treated as an independent or dependent variable used to have significant impact on the state formation process of the newly independent countries. In Pye's words, "... the general assumption of the colonial powers was that, since level of education, economic performance and institutional base determined governmental and political performance, independent states were not expected to exist in societies that had not achieved certain levels of economic and social development" (Pye 1967:189). However, proper treatment of the state-society relationships reveals the ambivalence of political activities, and the political exchange between the state and society. Both approaches show the political relations of state and society and their wide fluctuations, fluidity, violent, active and subdued nature of these relationships. The approaches depict the cultural and political interconnections with their multiple combination of incorporations and disagreement in their interacting. As Chazan pointed out, "these actions provide a good foundation for understanding the substance of state-society relations and lay the groundwork for grasping the topics around which conflict and competition revolve" (Chazan 1988: 131). However their methodology may differ, both approaches alternatively show state-society ties and their relative impact on public policies at large. Nevertheless both of them have their shortcomings. For example, the state centred approach view is too limited as a lens through which to examine the dynamics of contact and conflict, relative autonomy and degree of interdependence, coalition building and the actual construction of social hierarchies (Ibid:136). It also does not deal adequately with the evidence that decision makers are also systematically constrained by societal interests, past policies, historical and cultural legacies. Therefore, they are not able to comprehend the status of decision makers and the distinct circumstances and timing 16 of the decision making process. Moreover, this approach does not make a distinction to different types of states and their relative autonomy and cOJ'!.straints. For example, in most of the developed countries of the west the legitimacy of the state is viewed by them as purely an independent entity; however, legitimacy in these countries more or less involves the civilizing of power where there are limits, constraints, and responsibility upon power. Legitimacy in a developed western states to some exte,nt means the mere reflection of the basic values and attitudes of society. This approach fails to understand that the decision making capacity of the state is dependent upon the strength, power and autonomy of the states and their cohesiveness rather than their mere existence. Above all social revolutions accompanied by a transformation of societies, states and class structures, like that of the French Revolution, were carried out by class based revolts from below. In a nutshell, it is not only the state that is ihesole actor in societal affairs, but also religious groups, ethnic identities and influence groups also play an important role ,in shaping public policy. Generally speaking, this approach does not consider participation of the citizens in the state as necessary and desirable. Consequently, it fails to appreciate the different political variables such as type and rate of political participation, the level of working class mobilization, the amount of party competition, the number of political and non political associations, the impact of trade unions, ethnic groups and religion on the formulation and implementation of public policies. However, the relative autonomy of the state can only be analyzed in terms of its particular political environment and historical and international circumstances. In another dimension, the society-centred approaches also has their own drawbacks. First and foremost, they fail to observe the relative autonomy of the state. For them, social revolutions are the results of class, ethnic, interest group or religious contradictions. But in actual fact some revolutions were the direct expressions of the contradictions centred in the structure of the state itself. And these revolutions changed class relations, societal values, and social institutions. Consequently changes in society had been closely intertwined with the collapse of the state power of the old order and with the consolidation and functioning of the new order and the new political system. This approach also views the legitimization of power based on existing societal groupings; however, historical evidence shows us that in the developing countries the legitimacy of the state does not necessarily depend upon its responsiveness to the existing societal values. Rather, legitimacy depends upon the commitment to use power to change the values of the different social groupings. Of course, the state may contain institutions through which the interests of different social groups are represented in policy making and policy implementation. However, the administrative and coercive organizations which are to some extent independent are the bases of state power as such. The level of the political maturity achieved by any given society depends upon the relationships between the state and the social forces it comprises. "Social forces include ethnic. 17 religious, territorial, economic or status groups." (De Boer Sep, 30 class session). "The state, on the other hand, has a legitimate power over society." (Bjorkman Sep, 16 class session). In simple words, the state is the arrangement for maintaining order, resolving disputes, selecting authoritative leaders among two or more social forces. But some societies may be heterogeneous and complex while others may have mechanical solidarity. Nevertheless, one can not live independently of the other. As Khoshkish pointed out, "The view from the top is not the same as the view from the bottom .... This does not mean that the view from the top is necessarily correct(which is a relative qualification anyway). At times it may see wide over the horizon but be divorced from the realities of the base on which it stands. The fact that views are not the same at different heights, whether mountains or social strata, implies the possibility of different attitudes towards the exercise of authority by those who hold it and those who submit. The extent to which those submitting have a say in choosing the authority, can control its policies and actions and can ascend to that position themselves, will decide the degree a polity may approach democracy and, adversely may be subdued by an autocrat"( Khoshkish 1979:310). The distinction between the state and the social forces is not a clear cut and demarcated one. Those who engage in political activity could be members of a certain social grouping. Therefore, the level of policy development of that society may to some extent depend upon the extent which this social grouping also identifies their interest with the actions of the state. Nevertheless, the power and influence of these social groupings also depends on the heterogeneity and homogeneity of that society. Especially in societies with greater heterogeneity, it is very hard for one single social force to rule. In both ways society cannot achieve a lot without creating a state which has some independence from the social forces that gave birth to it. And the state cannot rule independently of society. Every individual or group in society is bound by some sort of principle, tradition, myth, purpose or code of behaviour. Men are united by common agreement upon law and rights, and their coming together is also institutionalized. Such institutions of the state, in turn give, new meaning to the common purpose and create new linkages. To these effects, they formulate policies and implement them. The impact of these policies is felt by the society, and the acceptance or the opposition depends on the level of the state's institutionalization. 18 2.2. The characteristics of sub-Saharan Africa states For simplicity of analysis, states in sub-Saharan Africa can be viewed in relation to state formations that took place in other parts of the world. Basically, classical political theory defines states in terms of territoriality, sovereignty, institutions of rule, nationality and rule of law; contemporary schools view the state in terms of the forces it comprises and interests it presumed to serve (Young 1986:26). In any ways, the process of state formation in sub-Saharan Africa can be seen in relation to other similar processes that took place all over the world. In a world scale, three major types of state formation can be identified. For example, in Europe, state formation was as a result of the rise of capitalist relations, and also due to the dominant position of this region in the world economy. Thus, state formation in Europe was a long process of transformation of the state structures towards centralization the process that Weber called, "expropriation of the immediate bearers of political power" (Weber 1948: 82). The second type of state formation refers to ancient states whose existence dates back centuries. These old states are Janus faced, one face looking back at tens of centuries of past existence, while the other looks for renaissance. The third type refers to states formed in a pre-capitalist world system, but with no \ centuries old tradition of state formation. Despite the existence of these three distinct types of state formation in a world scale; there are also essential similarities that are prevalent in all the cases. Some of these essential similarities include, "... territorial integration, centralized authority (the degree of centralization varying according to the degree of economic and cultural cohesion), the predominance of the role of the army in the initial process of state formation, a more or less defined boundary and an elaborate system of taxation" (Teshale 1988:18). Nevertheless, state building in Africa was more or less different from other parts of the world. For example, the cost of state building in Europe was very high. State formation in Europe and other parts of the world involved building differentiated autonomous, centralized organizations with effective control of territories accompanied by eliminating and forceful subordinating of thousands of semi-autonomous authorities. As indicated by Tilly, "... the prevalence of tax rebellions, food riots, movements against conscription and related forms of protest during the great periods of state-making help gauge the amount of coercion it took to bring people under the state's effective control" (Tilly 1971:42). Thus, following Finer's argument, one can consider the formation of the modern state in Europe as a twin process, "one from consolidated service to differentiated service and two from differentiated territory to consolidated territory (Finer 1962:87). Basically, this is the same as 19 Anderson's distinction between "Parcelized Sovereignty" and "Centralized Sovereignty"; and a change from the former to the latter. After this brief global survey of state formations in the world scale lets attempt to enquire about the process of state formation in sub-Saharan Africa, and lets try to identify to which of the types does state formation in sub-Saharan Africa belong. 20 2.2.1 The Peculiar Characteristics of states and state formation in sub-Saharan Africa Prior the colonial era there were various successful and unsuccessful attempts at state formation in sub-Saharan Africa. Generally, there were two essential process at work in an attempt to form a state in sub-Saharan Africa; (1) an attempt to expand territorial possessions; an effort to bring under central authority of various previously autonomous or semi-autonomous regions, the predominance of the use of force; and when successful the imposition of tribute on the newly incorporated regions. These tributes ranged from manpower to army as was the case in Ethiopia. In West Africa due to the flourishing of a large number of slaves for local use, a powerful movement of state formation and Islamization took place. For example, Sokoto Caliphate was such a case. In the process of state formation which did not take place without territorial expansion, the earlier signs of conflict with Europeans were manifest. The most pertinent case of state formation in an intense conflict with European Imperialism was Samori Toure's attempt. "For more than three decades he formed a large multi-ethnic state while at the same time engaging in a series of battles with the French" (Teshale 1988:22). In 19th century west Africa, Islam was a great agent of state formation as well as slavery. As noted by Teshale, "Islam filled the vacuum left by the end of trans-Atlantic slave trade by forming vast and powerful centres of political legitimacy" (Ibid), that we call states. For example, Sokoto Caliphate which was the biggest political entity in the 19th century West Africa, was a product of Jihad; manifesting the triple process of Islam-Slavery and State formation; where Islam providing the outward justification for slavery and state formation. Nevertheless, behind the religious justification there was also a need to create a favourable political super-structure. This move served the symmetrical relationship between the economic demands of incorporation with that of the political needs for states that belong to the inter-state system through which their sovereignty was to be recognized. In another dimension, even though, state formation and consolidation in Eastern Africa was not directly run by Islam, Arabic-Islamic presence was considerable. The primary concern of the Arabs by that time was the slave trade. However, men like Tuppu Tip, who was the greatest slave dealer of 19th century East Africa never engaged in attempts at state-formation. Unlike Tuppu Tip, the Zanzibar Sultanate, which had slave plantations as its economic foundation was the only case where Islam, slavery, state formation were triple symbiosis. Kabaka Mutusa I of the Buganda Kingdom also felt the presence of Islam and was attempting to further consolidate his kingdom. In southern and central Africa also there were various attempts at state formation. The 21 most famous and most ambitious attempt of state formation in southern Africa was the one by the Zul us. "Shaka of Zulu succeeded in creating the most well disciplined army ever attempted in 19th century Africa" (Ibid:23) .. Nevertheless, except Ethiopia and West Africa the establishment and accomplishment of ones own African state with strong centralization through incorporation was almost impossible in sub-Saharan Africa; mainly, due to the intense imperialist pressure. Ironically, superiority of European firepower brought to a halt the various attempts of state formation in Africa. Indeed, from Zululand to Sokoto from Luba to Swaziland, the various states newly formed, and attempts made to form centralized sovereignty succumbed to the dictatorship of European military technology. As noted by Young, while military superiority was a necessary condition for establishing hegemony, it had to be secured through institutionalization.... Generally, the new colonial economy required destruction of intra-African trading systems which were not Europeoriented and the capture of resources (Young 1986:28). (2) Consequently state formation in Africa took place in a process quite simple; the Europeans abolished all the previous institutions of state and state formation and formed one of their own. Taking these two hostile and colliding processes as the key to understanding state formation in sub-Sahara.n Africa, one can see the peculiar characteristics of state and state formation across the sub-Continent. The coming to an end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the beginning of the so-called entities called states were suddenly disrupted which otherwise would have legitimate control over their territory conducive for the incorporation and eventual peripheralization of these regions in the world economy. When the imperialist powers colonized Africa, the two important attributes of state i.e, centralization of power and bureaucratization were not fully developed, rather they were at the most embryonic stages. But in reality these two important attributes of state would have been developed if there was some time to overcome the rarity of writing, the non-existence of wheeled vehicles which, by limiting long distance travel limited centralization, the late arrival of fire arms, which prevented state absolutism, and the absence of religions with ambitions of universality and the rarity of unifying language. In spite of the lack of the above mentioned factors which limited centralization one can not conclude that the family and kinship systems were the only social and political structures of importance in this period. Rather, in sub-Saharan Africa of the pre-colonial era, there were also ideal' principles which governed society. According to Bgoya and Hyden, these ideal principles include, 1. Limitation of power 2. Sharing of power 3. Rule of law (Bgoya and Hyden 1986:9) In order to realize the first principle societies of sub-Saharan Africa assigned roles, responsibilities and power according to age, to the places one occupy's in the production process 22 and his place in the social hierarchy. This effective mechanism of tradition and custom to some extent limited the power that one occupies in society effectively. Moreover, there was an extensive freedom of expression, to. speak on behalf of family, caste or clan, even though they were at a rudimentary stage. Prior to the colonial era in sub-Saharan Africa, society believed that the best way to keep power was to share it with as many groups as possible so that each had interest in its preservation. Finally, the indigenous sub-Saharan African states were governed by the rule of law. The law was prescribed by custom and not even the chief or the king was above it. As pointed out by Bgoya and Hyden, "in some sub-Saharan African societies the king was merely the representative of the ancestors in whom power resided or the stool descended from heaven which was the real symbol of authority (Ibid: 10). Inquiry into the origin, nature and extent of the policy crises in sub-Saharan Africa inevitably lead us to examine the state as the structure of that society which shoulders the responsibility for maintaining the status quo and which are the only means of over coming it. Currently, a lot of scholars recognize that the most fundamental reality which the present features of the policy crises originate in is the inherited colonial state, it's method of conquest legitimation and perpetuation in the different phases of colonialization. As , indicated earlier the development of the autonomous sub-Saharan African societies and institutions has been hampered by muslim trans-Sahara and trans-Indian ocean slave trade and the subsequent colonialization process. These process destroyed the political and social formation which hitherto had provided protection of the individual. Consequently, this reinforced the dependence on kinship groups and kinship systems. These basic units of social organization ultimately served as the corner stones for the establishment of the institutionalized survival strategies. Thus, this system of survival, remained and retained the function of being, in the absence of state, the most valued social defence of the African individual. Moreover, slavery and colonialization also deprived sub-Saharan Africa of the possibility of developing the feudal mode of production which in Europe and Asia encouraged political structures and social cohesion that gave the primacy of the state over the defence of the individual against external danger and in arbitrating and reconciling social conflict. In societies where feudalism fully developed, submission to legitimate political authorities and to demands as were made by those authorities, was recompensed by defence and duties were established and scrupulously followed and the notion of citizenship took place. Systems of demarcation between public and private interests were evolved, in the long history of conquests, regrouping and domination, from small territorial units and different ethnic groups to larger and politically and culturally more integrated societies in which traditions of leadership and accountability were preferred and firmly rooted (Ibid:11). In sub-Saharan Africa in contrast, colonialism failed to integrate society into a larger and viable systems. Rather, using its effective law of "divide and rule" dominated and subjugated all 23 of these societies. Indeed, the colonial state used excessive force and achieved its primary objective in a very short time. Unlike the developments in other parts of the world where state formation was over a centuries experience, in sub-Saharan Africa colonialism formed states within a very short period of time mainly because of the monopoly of arms. The societies in sub-Saharan Africa responded by withdrawing into pre-colonial survival systems like that of kinship in which the individual was protected and his needs were fulfilled. Even though, this system enabled the individual to survive it also weakened the individual capacity to separately pose any threat to the then existing colonial order. The implication of this withdrawal was very significant to the study of public policy. Society by instituting its own survival strategy set itself apart from the state and the vise versa. The state also did not exist in the context of the morality of the sub-Saharan Africa society. This disparity between the state and society put the state in a permanent situation of war with society which in turn led society to further institutionalize its survival strategy in order to strengthen it's permanent resistance. The state-society relations which developed out of the slave trade and colonialism engendered two realms in constant conflict: an immoral and ill conceived civic realm on one hand and circumscribed community-based moral realm on the other. Attitudes towards organization, management and control of public affairs and resources reflected, and continue to reflect this basic divergence of interests of state and society. This divergence of interests of state and society currently manifests itself in the broad realms of social life. For example, some of the survival institutions like that of extended family, clan or ethnic group will tax themselves willingly because the taxes go for common survival and in another dimension, government taxes are considered as a punishment. Therefore, in a holistic approach, the policy crises facing sub-Saharan Africa today centres around the state-society ties. In actual fact the contemporary sub-Saharan African states can be considered as an empty shell inherited from the colonial masters. A state which attempts to formulate and implement public policies, development programmes and projects with unrealistic long term time horizons with out the necessary social base and without an attempt to create harmonious state society ties. Moreover, African struggle for independence was the outcome of contradictions inherent in the colonial system itself. Education has served as a means through which the colonial state indoctrinated the helpless colonized people to accept the unquestionable legacies of the colonial state, which includes hegemony, inviolability and security. Consequently, the sub-Saharan elite which led the independence movement and were the chief architects of the post-colonial subSaharan Africa states, were thought not only "to give God his due, but to caesar as well" (Matthew:22), in proportion set by the missionaries and the colonial masters, respectively. Thus, their orientation and education that they were exposed, and the place they occupied in the colonial state administration, and their non-productive role in the economy and their appetite for foreign goods and foreign culture made them superficial links with a society of ｩｮｳｴｵｾｯ｡ｬｺ･､＠ 24 survival strategy. The Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe quoted by Hyden, made the following ironic comment about the sub-Saharan Africa state. "A man who has just come in from the rain and dried his body and put on dry cloths is more reluctant to go out again than another who has been indoors all the time - the trouble with our new nation - as I saw it then lying on that bed - was that none of us had been indoors long enough to be able to say "To hell with itw• We had all been in the rain together until yesterday. then a handful of us the smart and the lucky and hardly ever the best - had scrambled for the one shelter our former rulers left, and had taken it over and barricaded themselves in. And from within they sought to persuade the rest through numerous loud speakers, that the first phase of the struggle had been won and that the next phase - the extension of our house - was even more important and called for new and original tactics; it required that all argument should cease and the whole people speak with one any more dissent and argument outside the door of the shelter voice ｡ｮ､Ｎｾｴｨ＠ would subvert and bring down the whole housew (Hyden 1983:34). Generally, the leaders of post-independence sub-Saharan Africa saw as their primary mission the replacement of foreign rule by African rule. Nevertheless, the last 30 or so years of independence gave us adequate experience that these states who are basically detached from society failed to provide a platform for an in depth process of thought and action, geared towards the creation of a new domestic order that is culturally relevant, morally justifiable, economically viable and politically geared to real liberation of society, and the realization of such kind of factors can only be meaningful if we start with an inward looking consciousness emphasizing the state-society ties. 25 2.2.2. The usefulness of different public policy models in the sub-Saharan context Public policy is a conscious goal-selecting process undertaken by actors in the decision making system and it also includes the identification of the means of achieving such goals. Therefore, we have to consider it as a dynamic social process which maybe an aggregation of numerous smaller decisions which run overtime rather than isolated, single act. In any public policy making process, what we perceive as the final decision could mark not the end, rather the beginning of a much wider process of alternative considerations. Following Saasa's argument, one can identify two types of variables that operate in most public policy situations. "One the internal environment located within the country's political boundary and the second the external environment situated outside it. (Saasa 1985:312). Consequently, to understand the policy choices made by sub-Saharan Africa states we have to understand the degree to which the internal and external environment both "objective" and "perceived" interact and shape the actions of the policy makers. As correctly put by Saasa, "the extent to which the internal and external environments are thought to have an impact on the policy making processes is influenced not only by the real world situation but also by the images or ideologies held by decision-makers in the system (Ibid:312). Thus, public policy formulation and implementation involves not only the policy context in terms of demands, support and available resources; but also the perception by the state which is supposed to be the central actor of policy. When one assesses the available policy making techniques and their general applicability, in the sub-Saharan African context he will be faced by a number of problems. To list some, lets assume that the states of sub-Saharan Africa behave based on the concept of rationality. According to one of the assumptions held by this model the decision maker attempts to maximize "net value achievements" by formulating and implementing a policy that fulfil the social requirements. But this approach suffers from numerous limitations especially in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Initially, it always assumes that the decision maker knows and fully understands the citizens value preferences, which is not the case. Secondly it considers there is harmony and working relationship between the state and society. But in actual fact, states of subSaharan Africa have neither the capacity, financial resources, nor the organizational set-up and above all the will to address the real problems of the society who in most cases are under survival strategies. Thus, to overcome the drawbacks of the rational actor model, Lindblom also constructed a different model called "successive limited comparisons" or "disjointed incrementalism". Unlike the rational actor model, this model acknowledges the presence of such constraining factors, 26 posing limitations in the decision-makers analytical capabilities, time, and the difficulty of assessing fragmented societal value preferences (Lindblom 1972:479). Even though, this model may seem to have an obvious merits as compared to rational decision theory, it also has several limitations especially in the sub-Saharan Africa context. As argued by Saasa, the strategy of limited incremental changes may be useful only on those systems in which (a) the existing policies and their outcomes are generally acceptable not only to the policy makers themselves but also to their citizens so that marginal changes are sufficient to society's aspirations, (b) the nature of the problem towards which those changes are directed is fixed over a long period of time; and (c) a considerable degree of continuity in the means necessary to solve the perceived problem (especially capital and organizational structures) exists (Saasa 1985:313). But in sub-Saharan Africa societies, where there are institutionalized survival-strategies, this conservative approach may not make any difference in improving the society unless the increment starts from the survival strategies themselves and this has never been the case. As a result of the limitations of both the rational actor and limited incrementalism models, Dror prescribed a hybrid model that synthesizes both models of policy making. His "normative optimum model", includes some extra rational element which has never been discussed by the previous two models. However, he also precisely indicated the typical characteristics of an underdeveloped country and its implication for the policy making process. In what he termed, "the pure avantgarde developing state" he enumerated a number of peculiar characteristics of such states. Moreover, he also attempted to ascertain the actual quality of policy output in terms of a secondary criteria based on process patterns and he found out the following basic characteristics of the policy making process. According to Dror, (1) the basic characteristics of the policy making process are shaped by inherited pre-independence patterns, by imitating modern countries, and by the personal work pattern of new policy making elite. The policy making system is sometimes radically changed by ideological revolutions or by personal takeovers, but not by systematic and rational evolution and redesign. (2) Learning feed back is dampened. (3) The optimal strategy of public policy making in developing states is often one of maximax, with low security level and high risks. In other words, he says achieving accelerated development often requires a sharp break with the past. (4) The priorities of values and to some extent operational goals are rather more spelled out than in the developed countries. (5) Search for alternatives is some what more intense than in developed countries, mainly because of the absence of policy precedents and because the quality considered satisfactory is so much higher than the actually achieved quality that the policy makers are under pressure to improve. (6) Cut off horizons are almost never explicitly established. The implicit cutoff horizon is indeterminate and inconsistent; both long range and short term effects are considered without being clearly distinguished. (7) The cultural ecology within which the public-policy making system operates, and which conditions its basic characteristics, is not conducive to rationality. (8) The extra rational components are relatively better developed than 27 rational components, but also show their pre-independence roots quite clearly (Dror: 1978: 107). Thus, following the logical corollary of Dror's characterization, one can argue that the structure of society has an· important effect on policy formulation and implementation practices. Consequently, to recommend a sound model it is wise to see how a given society with fragmented social control and an institutionalized survival strategy weakens the state's ability to formulate policy and implement them. Experience shows us that important patterns of political change and inertia that were made in any society and social change are actually the results of accommodations between, states and other powerful survival institutions in society. Generally, public policy demonstrates the state's effort, and its ability to make rules and consequently change the behaviour of the society. Nevertheless, this policy effort by the state represents and requires very complicated process, often involving the flow of a huge amount of resources from society to the state and the vice versa. This two way complicated process is in most cases under constant conflict especially in sub-Saharan Africa and it is not adequately understood. For example, many of the existing approaches to understanding social and political change and the means of achieving such changes in sub-Saharan Africa either underestimate the existing conflict altogether (e.g. much of the modernization theory) or have missed this particular sorts of conflicts and emphasized class based conflicts alone (e.g.much of the Marxist literature), or have down played the important dynamics within the society itself (e.g. dependency and world system theories). Indeed, all these approaches fail to appreciate the most important and central patterns of societal change and societal inertia which exists between states and social organizations. Especially, by thoroughly investigating how public policies are implemented at the grassroots level one would be able to see the responses of society especially in sub-Saharan Africa where there are independent institutionalized survival strategies. In Migdal's words, in talking about the formulation of conflicting strategies of survival by states and social organizations he says he runs the risk of making the ground-level struggles in the third world sound as if they hinge on voluntearistic impulses. He further argues that it is needless to say vulnerable workers and peasants are not simply shoppers in a strategy or rules supermarket. It is important, nevertheless, to portray the structural dimensions of the environment in which policy is implemented (Migdal: 1987: 400). Thus, the peculiarity of the contemporary sub-Saharan Africa hostile public policy making environment stems from the nature of the post colonial state and itsdetadiment from the individual, the household. This gave the sub-Saharan Africa societies an initial imputes to develop survival strategies aimed at diversifying and maximizing economic gains within the existing fragile economic and social environment. While such a system has its own development potential, strategies adapted by governments and donors to date have failed to transform it or enable it to develop on its own terms. Ironically, rather than narrowing the gap, post-independence efforts in most sub-Saharan African countries 28 separated state and society to a greater degree apart and consequently, the state today sits suspended in mid air above society, unable to influence the existing survival strategies of society. Development strategies and sound public policies failed to have a real positive impact in most subSaharan African countries, because they have been formulated using criteria applicable to more homogeneous and harmonious technologically advanced societies. As has been correctly pointed out by Hyden, "... governments and donors alike have ignored the narrow margins of survival that characterize African countries at all levels. Above all, they have failed to adequately look for African solutions to African problems .... The present crises in Africa is recognized to a very large extent as the product of human arrogance and impatience in years past Africa's problems are not primarily its backwardness and poverty, but unwillingness of those concerned to accept that the continent is caught in its own historical process of development. Such an awareness requires patience, humility and respect for those institutions that already serve the continents people (Hyden: 1986:53). 29 CHAPTERID 3. SURVIVAL STRATEGIES OF SOCIETIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND TIlEIR IMPACf ON TIlE POLICY MAKING PROCESS 3.1. WHY DO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA SOCIEI'IES CREATE AND INSlTfUTIONALIZE SURVIVAL STRATEGIES The people in sub-Saharan Africa especially the peasants, workers and those vulnerable groups of society have been sensitive to what the detached state prescribes. The state being highly detached from society attempts to make key decisions about production and distribution as well as consumption of goods through its public policy. However, society also has the means to protect its basic livelihood by devising different methods which assures its survival. Moreover, society is also the best judge of its pain and pleasure. Fredrich Heer spoke of such judgments of the European farmers in the medieval era. He pointed out, the conflicting forces, the pull and counter pull, between which the peasants were caught. The "good old law" of the state promised the peasants a new status in society he said, but the nagging fear abject of poverty, of impotence before the law, of landlessness, all made the peasants of medieval Europe to hesitate before abandoning those forces that opposed the imposition of the state law (Heer 1962:51). Members of any society combine available symbols with possible opportunities to solve their crucial needs for food, housing, and the like and to create their strategies of survival-blue prints for action and belief in a world that hovers on the brink of a Hobbesian state of nature; where there is "war of all against all." Consequently, these strategies in providing personal survival also link the individual's political economy or self serving action into the broad realms of communal moral economy, and group identity. As noted by Migdal, "in stitching together strategies of survival, people use myths or symbols to help explain their place and prospects in an otherwise bewildering world. Their strategies rest upon concrete foundations; they provide material needs and aspirations, such as jobs, housing, and protection sewn from symbols, rewards and sanctions, are the road maps used to guide one through the maze of daily life, ensuring one's existence and, in rare instances pointing the way toward upward mobility (Migdal 1988:27). Without the' existence of institutionalized survival strategies, these otherwise would have been impossible for the individual poor to achieve them in the formal fragile state structure. Nevertheless, the choice of different kinds of strategies of survival is greatly constrained by . available resources, ideas and organizational means. To put it differently. even though every member of a given society can construct his or her survival strategy, the existing resource base 30 and the control over access to resources limit the range of strategies in an area. Thus, the success of any public policy rests on the organizational ability of the state to deliver favourable public policy components for individuals strategies of survival. In a society where there is acute social problems, survival strategies are always crucial; and every member of that society creates methods of survival as part of their daily experience for the short run. These survival strategies could be crude, isolated or institutionalized depending upon the severity of the problem. Empirical evidences show that the people of sub-Saharan Africa are faced by gross poverty, swollen shanty towns; simply put society in absolute poverty. Amid such crisis it is natural for societies to develop its own survival strategies for all activities of cooperation and conflict; and institutionalize it. The majority of the people in sub-Saharan Africa, especially those who are usually at the edge of starvation, death, uncertainty and crisis, devise a certain survival strategy in order to adapt successfully to their natural, social and political environment. Thus, they innovate effective survival strategies in relation to the problems and opportuni ties encountered in their day to day uncertain poverty ridden existence. These institutions of societies with their short term survival strategies provide their members with a wide range of normative, phenomenological and existential values aimed at the short run. In a nut shell, societies in sub-Saharan Africa devised survival strategies and institutionalized different actions against the state, the state of nature, and against any problems that they may face. When institutionalized these short term survival strategies of society are manifested in the economic, political and socio-cultural spheres of the society. For example, these manifestations of survival strategies in the economic sphere reflect various modes of coping with severe scarcity and chronic shortages. According to Chazan, "... the society alters its consumption patterns, shifting from scarce imported products to local goods. Frequently they have had to change their use of time in order to search for necessary commodities at ｲｾｯｮ｡｢ｬ･＠ prices.... In the rural areas there is a move from export to food crops." (Chazan 1988:125). The second manifestation of the survival strategies revolves around the introduction of different techniques mostly centred on the construction of parallel or informal economy. This parallel system, in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa gradually developed its own institutions, revenue and rules of the game. Political exchange in sub-Saharan Africa is also manifested between the long range development oriented public policies of the state and the survival strategies of society. The existence of survival strategies created massive power vacuums between state and society, sometimes enabling society to a disruptive resistance to the extent of undermining the integrity of the state framework (e.g Somalia, Ethiopia, etc.,) as a whole. And in some countries they are expressed less violently but more fundamentally by quite, sustained and embarrassing detachment. The socio-cultural implications of the survival strategies are also very immense. For example, societies in sub-Saharan Africa are characterized by linages, familial network, extended 31 family, chiefdoms, secret societies and local communities. Thus the normative interactions between these short term survival strategies range from the narrowly economic to include the more broadly defined political, cultural to symbolic activities. But in another dimension the states of sub-Saharan Africa attempt to extract resources from the same society and distribute; attempt to maintain internal and external security, social harmony, political and economic wellbeing with development oriented long term public policies. Generally, as pointed out by Goulet, survival strategies of society rests on two important concepts of "vulnerability" and "existence rationality" (Goulet 1971:38). "Vulnerability" refers to the exposure of a society to forces which one cannot control. Thus, "vulnerability" shows the inability of sub-Saharan Africa societies to decide on their own fate amid pressing social forces. In another dimension, "existence rationality" refers to those survival strategies employed by subSaharan Africa ｳｯｾｩ･ｴ＠ to process information and make practical choices designed to assure their continued survival needs, safety, liberation and freedom. The sub-Saharan African societies in an attempt to control the uncertain future with confidence and in their own ability in the face of helplessness, usually attach themselves to their values. Consequently, they devise conscious survival strategies, and take survival as their minimum goal. Although, sub-Saharan societies are unable to maximize their material satisfaction; they have abundant choice to optimize their minimum demands of survival, identity, solidarity and self esteem. Any sound policy of the state must therefore, strengthen the outer b,oundaries of a society's survival strategy, not eliminate its core. As suggested above, the core of pre-modern survival strategy must be respected and innovative policy measures be taken to develop the margins of that survival strategy. As indicated by Goulet, even narrow existence rationalities offer considerable scope for achievements provided thef§ reinforce the dominant strategy adapted by society to assure life-sustenance, the search for esteem, freedom from unwanted constraints (Ibid:188). Therefore, any long term perspective public policy has to take in to consideration the challenges of societal survival strategies. Survival strategies keep the society alive and allow them to preserve a cultural identity within their impoverished and precarious state. In a nut shell, survival strategies enable the individual to achieve maximum advantage from a seemingly hopeless situation. They also help the member of such a group to resist disruption in the face of poverty, discrimination and isolation. Nevertheless, these resistances to disruption or government interventions operate mainly below certain thresholds. In this struggle against change, it is not change which is considered unacceptable, rather the threat change poses to survival, to the society. Once there is assurance to these values there may be little or no resistance. 32 3.2. ESSENTIAL CHARACfERISTICS OF SOCIETIES UNDER SURVNAL STRATEGIES An inward looking approach aimed at the essential characteristics of societies under survival strategies may help us to curb the underling causes of the policy crisis in sub-Saharan Africa. As pointed out by Chazan by, "concentrating on the web of relations and the networks of interactions" (Chazan 1988:129), it might be possible to attain a better understanding of the rhythm of unfolding process and to overcome the intellectual confines that have given birth to the desperate images of African politics today. The web of these relations in societies under survival strategies is qualitatively different from that observed in developed countries. Even though development by its very nature may imply the process of modernizing economic, technical and behavioral patterns it is also a painful effort on the part of vulnerable societies to adapt themselves to interrelated processes over which they can gain only marginal control. In Goulet'S words these wider changes "not only disrupt the precarious "harmonies" . enjoyed by all societies in their part, they also condition the manner in which societies and individuals can react to change stimuli" (Goulet 1971:16). First and foremost, societies under survival strategies resist change because these people ignore the existence of a state of development as possible for them. It is not that they have a wrong feeling about development, this notion of development is not important for their aspirations. Societies under survival strategies consider themselves as potential agents in shaping their own destiny. Consequently, they never consider themselves as powerless. Generally their own survival strategies will enable them to stop regarding themselves as naturally poor, illiterate, badly housed, having ill health or poor employment chances; rather it will help them imagine themselves as possibly less poor and better housed, better fed, and better clothed. Once they have been "shocked" into considering their "normal" state of affairs as aberrant and reversible men are psychologically ready to begin playing different roles as favourable to their interest; indeed,they have become organizable. As precisely predicted and established in human psychology, individuals and societies resort to all kinds of defence mechanisms to avoid the shock of an unwanted phenomenon. So generally, societies under survival strategies need and cooperate with measures of developmental programmes, if and only if there is rapid short run development, but in reality rapid development within the short run is impossible in sub-Saharan Africa. Amid drastic demographic increases, limited resource basis, insufficient capital, shortage of skilled managerial, entrepreneurial, and technical personnel and limited manoeuvring room in the world political arena rapid development is not achievable. But in another dimension society in sub-Saharan Africa having no adequate defense against the contending development forces prefers to reject the process of change if it is 33 aimed for the long run. In order to survive in the short run they prefer to make their own tools, tame nature, and protect themselves from the uncertain tomorrow. Simply put they create certain kinds of survival strategies which may enable them control nature and other contending forces right now. Once this is achieved they will be aware of their poverty, and the misery that it bring's to their existence. They will easily understand the prosperity of the very few others and the greater choices they enjoy; and their own hopelessness in the face of diseases, natural catastrophe or even development. Therefore, in majority of cases societies of sub-Saharan Africa feel that their survival strategies are worthy of respect. The society resistance to long term public policies in general depicts the priority goals held by society and the state. The society view the state with suspicion. The first of these values is survival or life sustenance. All objects that satisfy the societies basic requirements for food, shelter, healing can be called survival goods. For example, in a lot of instances peasants under survival strategies may resist proposed agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, new seed and modern agricultural inputs. This can be best explained that survival is too important and too precarious to warrant risk taking in their part. Due to this, little bargaining exists over the survival goods. Moreover, such survival goods such as medicine, shelter and protection may not be desirable for poor societies if one is not sure of the possibility of achieving it. In most of the cases they thank god for not making their lives worse than they already are. And as long as men remain convinced that it is the will of gods that their children die or that to combat certain diseases is sacrilege they will adjust to hard, brutish reality. The other universal component of good life which poses a great difficulty to address is the question of self esteem. All societies seek self esteem, identity, dignity and respect, honour recognition. Because of the material values attached to development which all public policies attempt to bring, self esteem that the traditional societies and elders have had has been neglected and increasingly conferred only on those who possess material wealth and technological power. Consequently, societies under survival strategies resist what public policies claim to achieve because they feel deeply threatened in their own sense of self esteem. Therefore, states of underdeveloped countries are in contradiction. In one side they need long term development and public policies of that sort in order to gain esteem in the international arena, and in the other society is not ready to give up its self esteem in the development process. Thus, the need for self esteem in sub-Saharan societies is the most important reason why development and public policies at large are largely resisted, "if the impact strategy consciously or unconsciously employed by change agents humiliates a community. it's need for self-respect must lead it to resist charge (Goulet 1971 :90). Whether development is accepted or rejected, these values lie behind the choices. The third trans-cultural component of good life which is important for both developed 34 and underdeveloped societies but which is valued differently by societies under survival strategies is freedom. Freedom widens the range of available choices with the least minimum cost which could be internal or external. In societies under survival strategies the pursuit of freedom is directed to some survival goods. Therefore, within the context of sub-Saharan societies freedom is seen as freedom from unforeseen or uncontrollable dangers. These people need a very limited freedom in the spheres of social life in which they feel competent and in areas in which they are able to use their skills and judgments. Consequently, societies under survival strategy have a lower valuation on the individual freedoms than developed societies. These processes place the sub-Saharan societies in a vulnerable posture when their own survival strategies are endangered. Even if they realize the benefits of public policies as contributing to their capacity to sustain survival, they may fear that it may destroy their conceptions of respect and freedom. Consequently, societal responses to public policies of the state in sub-Saharan Africa, primarily depend on the manner in which change is proposed, not on any basic hostility towards change. The key to understanding why public policies are rejected is survival strategies, which can be defined as the process by which a society devises a conscious short term strategy for survival and obtaining its goals. Thus, the crucial problem in sub-Saharan Africa is how public policies can be implemented in societies whose survival strategies is based on the needs of its own short term existence. As stated above, the core of these survival strategies must be respected and innovative efforts be taken by policy makers. Goulet, naming these survival strategies existence rationalities, pointed out that even narrow existence rationalities offer considerable scope for new achievements, provided these reinforce the dominant strategy adopted by society to assure lifesustenance, the search for esteem (especially in group esteem), freedom from unwanted constraints, and some form of actualization of its own choosing (Ibid:188). Goulet further recommended tangible rewards to those in the underdeveloped group who remain faithful to the core of their existence rationality while contributing to its expansion (Ibid:190). Generally, societies under survival strategies have their own inner and outer boundaries of "existence rationality", to use Goulet's words, where the inner one represents indispensable core values and aspirations of society. And these core values of society gives the individual cohesiveness, cultural identity, etc. In another dimension, the outer boundaries of survival strategies includes the broad zones of altitude and behaviour in which departures to strength the survival strategies could be made possible. In a nutshell, societies in sub-Saharan Africa are underdeveloped, in a sense where the bulk of the population is rural or recently moved to the city while physically remaining distant. Nevertheless, societies in these countries have the ability to create strategies to attain goals of survival and cultural preservation as well as to choose between different ends within the limits of the existing conditions. Structural constraints of poverty and accompanied psychological 35 deprivations lead them to create survival strategies which enable them to preserve their cultural identity. Therefore, they have created a realistic strategy for coming to terms with their impoverished and precarious state. For example, to benefit maximum advantage out of a hopeless situation, they have made an excellent use of their ethnicity by devising "esoteric" forms which maintain in group solidarity and protect them from outside intrusion. In the face of absolute poverty, discrimination and isolation survival strategies enable the member to resist disruption. Paradoxically, societies under survival strategies feel better and a sense of security if the entire society remain at the same poverty level. Because, with marginal developments they feel they will be left with no marketable skills and without any means of survival. Thus, for societies under survival strategies it is impossible to make plans, or allocate time, attention and energy to the future, unless one already possess enough money or goods to assure his survival in the present and immediate future. As psychological evidences suggest, a person who is under survival strategy cannot entertain realistic expectations that any conceivable increment to his available wealth will not immediately be swallowed up by the satisfaction of basic urgent "basic needs". If this is so, the desire to offer gratification is impossible until that person has began to improve his material position. Moreover, having internal solidarity and the brakes on desire placed by their survival strategy, it seems that they have a predominantly group-focused image of change. Above all, even an effort to educate societies under survival strategies seems to have its own problems. Ironically, education can leave the survival strategy of society intact and simply may increase its frustration at not being treated in accordance with achievement standards by life in general and by the state in particular. Therefore, education in these societies has to be directed towards the survival strategies themselves, a strategy which helps that society to survive, maintain its integrity and identity. Consequently, significant public policy impact on these societies can be best made at the margins of their survival strategy. As pointed out earlier, development strategy thus must aim, at protecting the inner limits of "existence rationality while expanding its outer boundaries by providing rewards to innovators who remain faithful to core values while contributing to the expansion of existence rationality. These core values combine available symbols with opportunities to fulfil severe needs of survival and social control. In these sorts of cases, the state cannot achieve predominance over society through its ability to formulate and execute public policies. As Migdal indicates, the state's actual battle may be with social values held over the rules of education and socialization, with ethnic groups over territory, with religious organization over who sanctifies sexual unions, (Migdal 1988:28), or with the informal economy for control of resources at large. In reality the conflict is over who had the right and ability to make rules in that society. Indeed, in many sub-Saharan societies the state actually have not gained the proper ability to formulate and properly execute public policies as they would like. 36 3.3. 1HE RFSPONSE OF SOCIETIES WHO ARE UNDER SHORT-TERM SURVIVAL STRATEGIES TO PUBLIC POLICIES AIMED FOR 1HE LONG-RUN With a land area of almost two and half times larger than the United States, sub-Saharan Africa, a region with 45 countries, is one of the least developed areas in the world. With estimated 450 million people residing in this area, measured by basic development indicators, much of the continent regressed over the last 30 years. After growing at an average of 3.8 percent per year between 1960-1970, gross domestic product grew at an annual average rate of only 3.0 percent between 1970-1982. And as sub-Saharan Africa's population growth rates have increased steadily from an annual average of 2.4 percent in the 1960's to a rate of 3.8 percent today, per capita GDP has dropped markedly, from an annual average of 1.4 percent between 1961 and 1970 to 0.4 percent between 1971 and 1979, to -3.6 percent in the early 1980's (Sai 1986:129). In spite of subsequent failures there has been little attention given to linking characteristics of policies and programmes to their subsequent implementation, to relating implementation problems to characteristics of political regimes in which they are pursued or to explaining the general nature of implementation in the third world (Grindle 1980:3). In terms' of the state-society ties and the broad macro-economic management public policies pursued in sub Saharan Africa, one can observe so called liberal economies, so called nationalistic regimes and socialist oriented ones. Literally speaking all kinds of systems and theories of development paradigm were attempted and implemented one way or the other. However, none of these prescriptions delivered the goods and services required. Moreover policy makers in sub-Saharan Africa constantly attempted to force their public policies in society. However the use of force alone is fruitless. The question that has to be asked is how to correlate knowledge and power. As correctly underlined by Dror, there are several ways on how new knowledge could possibly be better integrated into society. One would be to try to achieve a working equilibrium by explicitly limiting the freedom of scientific research, so as to forestall or contain new findings that might endanger society either physically or by undermining to many of its basic values. In another dimension one can restrict the dissemination of new knowledge or reform social institutions and culture in the light of the new knowledge (Dror 1978:6). However, the former possibility is usually rejected by contemporary western ideology and the latter which is acceptable to contemporary ideologies in the west has its own difficulties because we do not know how much the society allow them to successfully be integrated by changes in social institutions and in culture. Indeed, the problems of sub-Saharan Africa are controversial and out of reach at least in the short-run. It is so critical to the extent of requiring the U.N attention. For the first time in the history of the U.N, a session entirely devoted to African policy crises had been held in May 37 1986 and the African states also proposed to the U.N, Africa's priority programme for economic recovery adapted by the OAU and ECA from the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action. According to this programme the recovery cost was estimated to be around 128 billion dollars. According to the World Bank estimates, the total debt of sub-Saharan Africa increased from 14.8 million dollars in 1984 to 102 billion dollars in 1986. This 102 billion debt represented 69.8 percent of the total GNP and 312.6 percent of total export of goods and services. Generally, public policy entails the attempt by the state to use their organization to make different interventions and consequently change the behaviour of the society and this kind of crisis. But inevitably policies directed against this kind of crisis and towards the society at large represent massive undertakings, usually involving the movement of significant resources through the state apparatus from the society and back to the society. Nevertheless, as Migdal persuasively . }, ＧＮｾ＠ .. put it, resistance of one sort or another is nearly inevitable (Migdal 1987:399). The conflicting values held both by the state and the society portray the structural dimensions in which public policies are formulated and implemented. The existence of survival strategies in sub-Saharan Africa portrays the existence of rule making organizations outside the domain of the state. Societies under survival strategies have their own rules which are quite complex and binding. In societies where survival strategies are institutionalized the society has its own local and regional informal leaders. These local and regional leaders provide viable strategies of survival for numerous peasants and workers, through credit, access to land and water, protection, bullying etc. Although, the rules of the game and systems of justice are drastically different from that of the state, nonetheless, they provide social stability in the short run against the long run development oriented public policies of the state. These local leaders provide sound short term survival conditions for the villagers, ethnic groups etc, as the case may be. Due to this, there are no chances for the state to properly implement development oriented public policies unless they are accepted by the informalleaders of that society. Where strongmen have been able to maintain tight grips on local resources, state mobilization of the population has been all the more difficult, and the dilemma of state leaders has been acute. On the other hand, where strongmen have been weakened in their control, more opportunities have existed for penetration of state authority (Ibid:403). But in sub-Saharan Africa societies; i.e, societies who are under survival strategies, the people through their own informal leaders set the rules of daily behaviour, and in another dimension, public policies entail conveying to the society that the daily routines, symbols, and ways of behaving recommended by the state are essential to their well being. The existence of such disparities between the state and society more or less forced the states in sub-Saharan Africa to develop their own politics of survival. And the politics of survival at the top has an important effect on the policy making and implementation process. Especially at the implementation level, those who take programmes, legislation, and policy statements of the 38 state at ground level are usually affected by non-state local informal leaders, who fashion the societies strategies of survival, rules of behaviour. Indeed, these localleaders attempt to maintain their social control, thus they consider new policies as a treat to their strategy and the societies strategy in general. Therefore, policy implementers will be faced by the unexpected web of statesociety relationships, society in one side, state and party officials on the other. Grindle for example summarized these web of local politics in as a system of accommodation and payoff (Grindle 1980:179). Accommodation in this sense means that no single actor monopolizes power at the local level. Local politics reflects the bargaining strength of each of the actors. Societies under survival strategies through their informal leaders use the share of the state resources at their disposal to maintain their own rules, their own criteria for who gets against the state and state leaders. While the state busy itself to create a single jurisdiction and the rule of law applicable all over the country, the society works precisely the opposite effect. Amid such contradictory impulses the informal leaders of society attempt to maximize control as much as possible, and sometimes they may succeed to capture parts of the state or state power as it has happened in Ethiopia,or they may ensure the allocation of state resources according to their rules rather than the rules outlined in the policy statements. Thus, the state becomes an arena of accommodation where local, regional and top implementers and policy implementers and policy formulators accommodate one another in a web of political, economic and social exchanges. Moreover, state leaders at times may accept the overall strategies of survival as long as they are useful for the stability of the regime. On such instances, the informal leader end up with a profound bargaining position and may assume a post in the state structure and influence the application of important policy decisions and the allocation of resources. In societies where there is institutionalized survival strategy, social control is vested in numerous local level social organizations. Here rule of behaviour is directed by informal leaders. The informal leaders of this society having the capacity to allocate scarce resources such as land, money and job among the society enabled them to devise viable strategies for survival for their client better than the state. This structure of society, which Migdal termed fragmented social control denied the state the ability to mobilize the society politically. According to Migdal this situation created altered priorities of state leaders (Survival over social change), the style of state politics ("big shuffles", "dirty tricks", etc.), the structure of the state organization (redundant agencies), the difficulties in implementihg policies, an immense pressures on the implementor, and the capture of the tentacles of the state which are a derivative of a fragmented societal structure (Migdal 1971:425). What we see in sub-Saharan Africa is the strengthening of survival strategies consequently affecting the characteristics of the state itself, which in turn reinforces the survival strategies of these societies. Thus the prospects for building cohesive policies effectively look dim. Scholars who have observed these limitations of states in underdeveloped countries, particularly who have 39 studied what happens after a policy is adopted have put forth the concept of the "weak state". In a society where weak states prevail, reshaping the same society through long term development oriented public policies is' beyond the current realities of most sub-Saharan African countries. Policies aimed for the long run have usually the opposite effect on the short term perspective survival strategies, and actually strengthen them rather than change them. Consequently states in sub-Saharan Africa are deemed to remain areas for accommodation than to became the main actors in the policy making process. The state therefore, is no longer able to change social behaviour in its social, economic, and political exchange. In Chazan's words, if state institutions, resources and values appeal to specific "social constellations" which is termed institutionalized survival strategy by the author of this research paper specifically in the sub-Saharan African context, society will ally themselves with state policy and act in accordance with its guidelines. If however, state interventions adversely affect the well being or reduce their prospects for advancement of these groups, which is always the case in sub -Saharan Africa, then they will work to minimize their exposure and vulnerability to these forms of interference (Chazan 1988:123). ' Based on these relationships one observes total and partial detachment in the state-society ties in sub-Saharan Africa. Apparently this analysis indicates that politics, power and politics in sub-Saharan Africa is not necessarily held by the state. As pointed out earlier, politics as the competition for access and control over resources, takes place beyond the narrower public domain in African countries. Power, the capacity to control resources, and authority, the right to so, may legitimately be vested in local social structures (Ibid), which are mainly directed towards survival. For example the economic implications of these local social structures is so immense that the damages of the informal economy such as smuggling and black marketing are on the top of the agenda in most sub-Saharan Africa countries. Thus, the economic detachment between the state and society is one of the outcomes of survival strategies. Indeed, the parallel economy by itself is a response to abject poverty and to the total breakdown of the formal production mechanisms. Apart from the informal economy, economic outward migration of the sub-Saharan skilled professionals as well as urban and rural manual labourers represents the societies' precarious and poverty ridden economic situation. Even though, this mass exodus can be viewed as a quest for survival, it also creates continuous political and economic instability. Consequently, the economic field is syncretic, both domestic forces and outside intervention have combined in recent years to reorient relations in this crucial sphere. Because of the heterogeneity of these activities and their fluidity, the state does not control all resources and expertise, and power concentrations do exist beyond its reach. In another dimension, the political exchange of the sub-Saharan countries can also be considered as a logical corollary of the economic relationships. Social incoherence, overdeveloped state structures, insufficient state legitimacy, and inadequate state coercive power etc" are all outcomes of scarcity and survival. 40 All over sub-Saharan Africa from Ethiopia to Somalia, from Zaire to Uganda, from Ghana to Mozambquie, from Angola to Guiana armed groups challenged the legitimacy of the official state structure. ｏｮ･ｾ［ｳｩ､ｲ＠ this internal fragmentation as the political corollary to the prevailing intense poverty and subsequent survival strategies. Moreover, despite the attempts for a national culture and social cohesion as pointed out earlier, society in most sub-Saharan Africa still adheres to lineages, extended families, chiefdoms,secret societies and local communities. Any public policy takes place with in the context of a given state, an institute designed by the same society. As indicated earlier, progress in any society can only be possible with the existence of a given state only. But in sub-Saharan Africa most states were established by the colonial powers, consequently, they have no structural relation to the society who are under survival strategies. In any policy making process power plays a significant role and it is an inherent component of the policy making process. However, in sub-Saharan peculiar social realities it is possible for society to "exit" out of the system, to use Hirschman's words. The implications of survival strategies is that those who make public policies at the top do not have the same power to shape the perceptions, cognitions and preferences of the society. To arrive at a better understanding and better conclusions on the economic relations surrounding survival strategies in sub-Saharan Africa and the public policy instruments that may make a difference in that setting, it is helpful to assess the predominant agrarian structure of the economics of sub-Saharan Africa, where 80 percent of the total population and labour force are still dependent on agriculture, and where survival strategies better institutionalized and are in effect. Especially with the peasants survival strategies playa very substantive role against the long term public policies of the state. Hyden named these survival strategies of the rural poor as "The Economy of Affection" (Hyden 1983:8). According to him the economy of affection is fundamental for any understanding of indigenous forms of economic and social organization in African societies. Generally societies' in sub-Saharan Africa have a net work of support, communication and interactions among structurally defined groups basically formed for survival and connected either by blood, kin, community or other affinities etc. In a broader sense, the principal functions this economy of affection or survival strategy provides can be from the narrower basic survival, to the broader social maintenance. In sub-saharan Africa, mainly due to the existence of survival strategies society can meet its productive and reproductive needs without the support of the state. Therefore, as often stated in sub-Saharan Africa the relation between those who rule and those who till the land is not firmly rooted in the production system as such. The relationship that emerges out of such conditions limits the degree of social control. (fonsequently, a lot of scholars consider sub-Saharan Africa as a stateless society. Critically viewed the state is suspended in mid-air over society and is structurally superfluous from the point of view of the individual producer. Any public policy which aims at improving agriculture is usually considered as foreign interventiop. As pointed out 41 by Hyden, although the economy of affection is most prevalent in the rural community it is also an integral part of society at large. Its influence also stretches right from the grass-roots to the apex of society (Ibid:9). Indeed, in such kind of precarious situation public policies do not really shape development in society. The central social base of most sub-Saharan Africa is still centred around the survival strategies, and the irony is that the latter offers little base for its own development as a macro-system other than sustaining short term survival. Consequently this is a serious challenge for the public policy making process where it has been generally assumed that the basic properties of modern state are already in effect in sub-Saharan Africa. However, as pointed out by Apter, "... we have to evaluate the diverse consequences of development. the effects it has on people in different kinds of societies. H one query is how best to foster development another is how to live with the consequences when development cause grave injustices and discomforts people reacts. Sometimes their reaction is violent, assassinations, coups, coercion - sometimes despairing. The task of our theory is to make choice more comprehensible and amenable to improvement, for we want development to lead to increased efficiency and social pride" (Apter 1971:41). Acceptance of the survival strategies has an immediate implication for the discussion of the sub-Saharan Africa society as a decision-maker. Consequently as Ekeh emphasised, there is no monolithic public realm morally bound to the private realm. Instead there are two public realms in post colonial Africa with different links with the private realm. At one level is the public realm in which primordial groupings, ties and sentiments influence and determine the public behaviour of individuals. This premoridial public realm is moral and operates on the same moral imperatives as the private. At another level there is a public realm which is historically associated with the colonial role and based on the civic structures of the civil service, the judiciary, the police and so on (Ekeh 1975:95). What Ekeh calls the primordial public realm, or the survival strategies as we prefer to call it here, manages to survive and exercise its influence over public policy unless there is a significant change in emphasis. 42 CHAPTER IV 4.THE IMPACT OF SURVIVAL STRATEGIES ON THE DEVELOPMENT ORIENTED PUBLIC POLICIES OF THE STATE (CASE STUDIES) 4.1 R URAL SOCIALISM IN TANZANIA The Arusha Declaration was passed in 1967 with an aim to make Tanzania a socialist and self -reliant nation. Twenty five years after the Arusha Declaration and after the subsequent villageization efforts Tanzania is neither socialist nor self -reliant. Indeed, Tanzania's record over the last three decades after the Arusha declaration indicates a decline in real GDP growth from an average of 7.5 percent per annum in 1970-1976 to less than 2 percent per annum between 1977-1986; the decline in real per capita income by more than 15 percent over the 1976-86 period; the soaring of inflation from an annual rate of less than 5 percent in the 1966-70 period; through 11 percent in the 1970-6 period, to 30 percent after 1979; the deepening external imbalance as the balance on current account deteriorated abruptly from deficit of $ US 49 million in 1977 to a deficit of $ US 539 million in 1982, the growing overall deficit in public finance which rose by more than 6.5 times between 1978-9 and 1984-5 reaching an unprecedented 20 percent of GDP in 1980 (Maliamkono and Bagachwa 1990:2). According to the initial elements of Tanzania's attempt for self-reliance and socialist development, the rural people were to be persuaded by education and example to live together in villages, to work together communally, and to share the products of their collective work. Consequently, after some 6 years of the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania embarked on its own version of villageization. These villages were to be democratically run by their members and production decisions were to be coordinated with regional and national economic development plans. Basically the villageization programme began as a voluntary movement. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 set forth the policy of socialism and self -reliance and announced the nationalization of the commanding heights of the economy, which was to include the major financial, manufacturing and trading institutions. With respect to the rural poor it anticipated the concept of Ujamma which simply mean familyhood and the use of local ideas and resources. The principal assumptions underling the traditional Ujamma living are outlined in Nyerere's pamphlet, "Socialism and Rural Development". This pamphlet set forth the principles of Ujamma-living together and working together for the good of all in democratic communities. It called for a shift to traditional values of mutual respect, common ownership, and obligation to work and for a new 43 departure away from the class system, emerging in the rural areas out of the colonial connection and towards a nation of Ujamma villages (Nyerere 1967:365). Following the massive resettlement operations earlier carried ·out in Rufijhi, Dodoma and the Kijoma regions, the government extended its villagization programme all over the country. Nevertheless by the end of 1973 there was an important change in the voluntearistic impulse, party and government directed that by 1976 all rural Tanzanian's were to live in nucleated settlements. During the 1967-69 period the villageization policy seems to follow a selective approach, but beginning 1969 the second five year plan called for a frontal approach to Ujamma. As indicated earlier the tempo of village creation picked up quietly after 1969, under the "Operation Rufijhi", "Operation Dodoma" and Operations in Chunya and Kigoma. Nonetheless, the 1972 Iringa Declaration of TANU (Tanganyika African National Union), "Siasa ni Kilimo", which means politics is agriculture reflected the stagnation of agriculture. Following this declaration, the process of so called decentralization and villageization operation followed throughout rural Tanzania and the education and inducement strategy was abandoned. And in 1975 when the law on the Registration of villages and recognition of Ujamma villages passed, there were 5010 villages with 2,560,472 members all over the country. As noted earlier, Ujamma basically refers to the habitual of cooperation among villagers in certain peak seasons, such as cultivating, planting, harvesting, etc., or in cases of emergency where someone needs to finish a certain job in a day or two with the help of his neighbours and relatives, instead of weeks or months by doing it alone. Although the Ujamma ideology meant to develop the basic philosophical underpinnings of the survival strategies of society into a wider realms of modern objectives, what it required of the peasants was far beyond what the traditional Ujamma considered as a guiding principle of survival in the community. Of course,the traditional Ujamma concept implies mutual aid and reciprocal help but not in a sense of communal ownership. Under the traditional Ujamma arrangement the neighbours in no way expected to share the benefits derived from their contributions. This new policy which was described by Mushi as, "Modernization by traditionalization" (Mushi: 1971), i.e, new Ujamma as a guiding principle of life and work required the peasants to share their benefits. Ultimately, one of the problems that Ujamma faced was related to the formalization of these customary principles of survival into laws and regulations. These rules and regulations anticipated possible policy implementation guides for the transformation of the Tanzanian peasants from traditional village communities, via cooperative units to communal production villages. Even though the initial emphasis seems to be towards short-term survival strategies, it was also aimed for the long-run. Therefore, this policy of villageization contained within itself two contradictory conditions. On the one hand the rules and regulations are important to make systematic party and government possible. On the other hand it also weakened the survival strategies themselves. Because there is no longer much room for spontaneous application of values shared by people in the same 44 community. The parameters of action are no longer local but imposed on the rural communities by the authorities. In the initial stages of the villageization process the policy emphasized village selfgovernment and its right to make its own mistake on all local matters. However, the policy also stressed leadership, which pursues and teaches the people. Therefore, this spontaneous strategy of self -government was soon backed by administrative inducements and some Ujamma villages were imposed by force and threats. Indeed, the government abandoned its earlier strategy of voluntary inducement and shifted by compulsions. Beginning 1979 sites for the new villages were in most cases centrally and hastily selected without consulting peasants, and were often chosen on such general criteria as being near roads and having sufficient land to support a certain amount of families. Consequently the neglect for soil fertility, potential natural hazards or availability of pasture, increased:the risk and uncertainty of the peasants, which basically peasants attempt to avoid them through their survival strategies. The villageization program, thus in the short-run caused disruption in peasants production schedules resulting in short-term output declines. The ., 1973 villageization directive emphasized a shift from communal cultivation to increased subsistence production. This was a backhand admission that Ujamma Vijijni was a failure. Therefore, the initial directive that the peasants must cultivate block fields of the village was accompanied by another directive that all households receive equalized cultivation units for subsistence crops. As pointed out by Seavoy, the government's failure to take control of land use from peasants meant that the national government had no means of forcing peasants to make greater labour inputs into agriculture, or of appropriating a share of the harvest (Seavoy: 1989:192). Indeed, 1979 onwards Ujamma villages became development villages and communal cultivation ceased throughout Tanzania. During the great move and immediately afterward several regions experienced hunger. By the end of 1974 and beginning of 1975, all of Tanzania's foreign exchange had been spent to purchase food grains. As pointed out by Coulson, in both years rainfall was near normal in most regions of Tanzania. The cause of food deficit was political mismanagement of villageization aggravated by peasants making minimal labour inputs into cultivation. Most peasants refused to increase labour inputs as long as famine relief food was being given to them and as long as low prices for exchange commodities coincided with a shortage of manufactured items to purchase (Coulson 1977:260). Villagization, then has brought many new problems of an immediate as well as long term nature bearing serious implications for the present and future. Apart from this the increased risk of hazards; such as, the outbreak of fire, disease, and water contamination which the farmers used to avoid them through their settlement patterns as far as possible were now rampant. Consequently, the villagization model was not a workable solution to Tanzania. For example, prior the villagization programme, one of the strengths of the Tanzanian 45 traditional agriculture was that there is no single staple food, but area specific food crops. Consequently, the whole of Tanzania has never suffered simultaneously from food shortages except some specific regions; nevertheless, after the villagization process, the vulnerability of Tanzania in the cultivation of staple food has increased which the farmers did not automatically follow the new way. Indeed, Tanzanian farmers preferred multiple cropping rather than depend on a single crop because it increases their security and continue to use traditional tools and plants because this permits participation and gives them a chance to engage in some commercial agriculture at a price that the farmers can afford. Innovations, if they are to be accepted must be designed to meet these basic survival needs of the peasant community. The shift to villagization neglected the realities of the individual and family identities. In fact the realities of the individual and family identities are not mere attitudes of mind or only traditional outlooks rather they are rooted in the specific survival strategies of that society. As pointed out by Barker, "if it is not a question of a generalized prejudice, then the ways in which individual and family identities are accommodated should vary with circumstances. The minimum requirement appears to be explicit legal recognition of individual and family rights in the collective property and some scope for family and individual production (Barker 1979:115). As pointed out by Seavoy, the 1965 constitution reflected president Nyerere's vision of the poli tical future of Tanzania. Tanzania would be democratic, egalitarian, and self-governing entity, where neighbours will accept a moral responsibility for the welfare of each other. The moral basis of Tanzanian society would be the social values of peasant villages where decisions about justice and development were made and enforced by consensus (Seavoy: 1989:180). In effect Nyerere realized the importance of survival strategies. He interpreted this social behaviour of the peasants as "African Socialism". Nevertheless, his assumption that once independence was achieved, peasants would respond to exhortation by TANU leaders and produce more goods and services than under colonial rule was wrong. Due to this, African socialism worked differently than Nyerere anticipated. Even though, the peasants replay with the villagization programme favourably so as not to be punished, but their concern with production did not go beyond what they considered desirable and feasible within the context of their survival strategy. Ujamma with its revolutionary terms required the peasant farmers to accept a social relation which is not conceivable for their own immediate survival. Thus viewed from the short-run angles of the survival strategies, peasant conception of Ujamma differed from the official view. Basically, the social values that motivate the Tanzanian peasants are embodied in the survival strategies. In most cases the Tanzanian peasants before villagization are limited to grow only enough food to satisfy their subsistence needs. Under this strategy the peasants attempt to maximize labour expenditure. Of ten, the peasant concept of good life is the minimum expenditure of physical labour, particularly the labour of cultivation. Following Seavoy's argument, one finds what are termed subsistence insurance institutions; such as: (1) Equalized allocation of the 46 communities land. (2) Partible inheritance. (3) Equalized sharing of harvest in poor crop years. (4) Transfer of subsistence sharing labour to landless or near landless households in exchange for food. (5) Joint family households. (6) Patron-client relationships with feudal landlords, storekeepers, or money lenders. However, the Tanzanian peasants were able to practice this strategy of survival as long as they control land use. But the villagization policy made them lose control of their land use and forced them to greater labour inputs, peasants were further frustrated by exhortation from the government, especially during 1973-5 economic crises, which decreed that peasants plant at least three acres of food crops and a minimum of one acre of cash crop. This decree increased risk, because labour time is sometimes devoted to communal activities which does not have a direct impact on survival and which is less productive than household activities. Due to this, both food:production and cash crop production declined sharply. The basic reason for this ," 'I decline was that, this rural socialist policy was never made reconcilable with the survival strategies of the peasants. Dumont argues that, "the tradition of African mutualism cannot constitute a sufficient basis for allowing a general acceptance of rural socialism. And with respect to what he termed village government, the democratic principles were scarcely accepted (Dumont 1969:5). One broad conclusion that we can take from this is that, traditional survival strategies, family ethics and reciprocal assistance between families on the one hand and communal living, working and sharing for a better life on the other hand are two different things. Mushi, commenting on the response to a national sample for the 1970 election study, to the question "what is Ujamma?" notes that, the overwhelming majority of the respondents defined Ujamma in accordance with the traditional norms of co-operation and living together and working together in harmony. But in reality the modern Ujamma living entails several changes in survival strategies and social behaviour, offends deeply held social practices and material fabrics of living and producing. It was a failure because the peasants attempted to preserve the relative autonomy and self-subsistence of the family of production unit. As noted by Barker, families resist giving up this autonomy and men and elders resist diluting the economic and social power they held in the family when family function are given over to village bodies (Barker 1979:117). Therefore, there was a major conflict inherent in this whole situation. Basically most of the Tanzanian ecology does not allow permanent settlement. The system of agriculture employed prior the villagization process in most parts of the country and in adaption to the ecology, made it necessary for the people to shift from time to time to use land. Living to close to each other would thus constitute a hinderance to expansion. Where extensive areas of good land were available, "there was also no advantage in living close together. Over large parts of the country that were semi-arid in nature and where water is not available throughout the year, dense settlements were also out of the question. Pastoral groups had to move from place to place in search of food for their livestock and this too precluded permanent neculated settlements (Mascarenhas 1979:147). Even though there was a need for solid long term development results from the centre, circuTI;lstances in rural 47 Tanzania where survival strategies of the short-run prevail did not lend themselves to a revolutionary transformation. Consequently, results were generally far short of expectations. Post independence Tanzania followed both the rational actor and incremental models in its policy making. Especially, in relation to the agricultural sector both the rational actor and incremental models had been attempted extensively. For example, after the World Bank recommendation, to transfer peasant agriculture through settlement schemes, some thirty government planned settlements were set up in various regions. Nonetheless, the peasants in these village settlements were both unwilling and unable to support the costs of the over mechanized and over-administered schemes and consequently this "transformation approach" which was mainly a result of the rational actor model was a failure. In another dimension there was also an attempt to bring social change through incremental policy making model. Under this "improvement approach" institutions were established to cater for the farmers. A number of farmers training centres were built and courses organized for interested farmers. Agricultural education at the university level as well as agricultural research was expanded. However, most peasants showed dis-interest to this "improvement approach" and most university graduates in agriculture saw their future in bureaucratic careers. Consequently as the two cases demonstrate both models of policy making were of no significant use. The Ujamma policy reduced the status of the informal leaders and increased the power of the bureaucrats whose primary loyalty lay with the president and TANU. Nevertheless, the Ujamma policies gave the bureaucrats few opportunities to relate to the peasants in conservative and positive manner. The nature of institutionalized survival strategies, and the subsequent production and reproduction values held by the peasants did not call for state participation. The survival strategies simply appeared too strong for the state to conquer. In any ways peasants were doing what they considered a good job. However, as McHenery concludes, the poorer members of the Ujamma villages had little room to gamble with their food supply. The better-off households and those which for one reason or another could spare labour were the main contributors to communal farming. This explains why attendance on the communal farms was so irregular and why it differed drastically among members of the same village. It also explains why communal farming was given such limited attention and why, therefore, it ended up appearing so unprofitable to the peasants. Indeed to the peasants, work in the communal farms was never considered an end in itself. To them it remained a supplemefital attivity -t6their survival strategy, one of the survival strategies in rural Tanzania has been essentially concerned with providing everybody's right to subsistence. Within this mode of behaviour social inequalities are accommodated without tension by following the principles of the institutionalized survival strategies. Consequently no one was prepared to trade his own survival strategy that protected him for centuries for the modern concept of equality, nor he were fully willing to work communally in order to fulfil the aspirations of other classes. Ujamma being a radical strategy of development 48 aimed by the state has no adequate room to accommodate the central principles of the societal survival strategies. For example, in 1968 when Rufiji river over flooded its banks in the low lands the government moved the peasants into the highlands and resettled them into the Ujamma villages. Although this move was meant to save the peasants from occasional flooding hazards many of the resettled villagers returned to the lowlands. In spite of occasional flood the movement of these people back to the river was more rational than living in a land where because of uncertainty of the rain their survival will be on a permanent threat. Thus, the real challenge of Ujamma was that the material base of institutionalized survival strategies were aimed at the shortrun against a rapid long-term social transformation. Even though the modest villagization policy which was carried out after 1973 drought was not successful, both set of policies, (l) the removal of all informal leaders who were considered as a barrier between government and peasants and (2) the reorganization of party and government structures to reach the peasants more effectively brought a significant change in the traditionally held societal structure. Initially because of the severe drought the movement of people was facilitated. Nevertheless, the peasant farmers concentrated on production of food crops to meet their immediate survival needs in the new settlements. According to the economic survey of the Tanzanian Government the production in subsistence agriculture mostly food have grow up 10.5 percent while production in cash crops for export increased by only 1.9 percent. Hyden quoting one of the few studies of villagization made by Omari pointed out that the villagers have the view that they should be left on their own in agricultural production. We should however remember that despite its scarce rainfall the districts and the region (Mtwara) as a whole has never experienced food shortages (crop failures) for a long time. One factor behind this is the growing of such drought resistant crops as cassava and millet. Confidence has been built among the people that if they have survived through all these generations without food shortages, they can and will survive in future without someone telling them what to grow, how to grow, where to grow and at what quantity (Hyden 1980:147). Indeed, even though there was a great effort to transform the peasants through villagization, the peasants survival know how that they have held prior the villagization had been invalid because of soil conditions and other factors of production. In the final analysis villagization have disrupted the time tested peasant survival strategies in the man-land relationships. Moreover, this situation created a constant conflict between peasants survival strategies, as determined by existence rationality and the state rationality as determined by the long-term perspective development oriented public policies. The traditional survival strategies among the peasants rested on informal but generally accepted values of social status. For example, elders and persons of high social status took such major decisions as the allocation of land and settling disputes. Nonetheless, these traditional structures have been weakened since the inception of Ujamma and the subsequent villagization programmes. Especially, the village act of 1975 broke 49 the traditional tenure system and the traditional values attached to it. Though the state viewed the resistance of the peasants against Ujamma at different parts of the country, to be rooted in the capitalistic tendency among peasants, and lack of ideological consciousness, there were other reasons for such resistances. In rural Tanzania, there were institutionalized survival strategies and values which have a time-tested historical background in the overall development of the area. Therefore, to introduce successful policy impacts, the survival institutions involved had to be strengthen first to the extent that they change themselves to accommodate the modern sense of development paradigm. Contrary to this Tanzania's political leadership has followed a "we - must - run - while - others walk" mode of policy making, some policies thus were carried out fast to the extent of ignoring people's attitudes and value systems which hold the community together as a social unit and to the extent of ignoring peoples basic survival strategies. As correctly put by Omari, "an outside initiative which is not felt as a need, is not sufficiently understood, or brutally threatens community organization, very often is met with distrust (Omari 1976:16). The Ujamma policy required of the peasants more than the their existing mode of thought. And throughout the implementation process, the state followed Nyerere's core strategy for developing Tanzanian national ideology. According to this strategy "socialism, like democracy, is attitude of mind" (Nyerere 1967:165). It was this attitude of mind which, if there was any success, were supposed to be changed. However, as persistently argued, qualitative change in societies under survival strategies can only be achieved by strengthening that attitude of mind until they are ready to change themselves. Basically the Tanzanian policy makers viewed development as a change in the survival institutions, institutionalized in the form of religious beliefs, economic organization, political structures, and cultural traits intricately interwoven and demonstrated in the day to day lives of the masses. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to change these survival institutions from the top unless the changes are made within dialectically The state policy also stipulated a household farm, block farm, village farm (Ujamma Shamba). Nonetheless, peasants expressed discontent with these rules, as they made it difficult to allocate the scarce resources in the most rational way and increased the time spent on walking to and from the fields. The Ujamma policy consequently alienated the peasants in a sense of detachment from one's own initiative and powers i.e, the power to survive. As noted by Rahman, "the leadership's attempt was to generate real social participation through the villagization programme. Without, however, judging the merit of this move one may note the dilemma that it implied - namely that in order to promote participation the peasantry had firstly to be alienated. Having done this the next move also belonged therefore, to the leadership rather than to the peasants (Rahman 1980:9). The outcome of this policy was tragic. The absence of real social participation in Ujamma and critical resistance by the rural poor, lead to a decline in agriculture productivity. For example 50 between 1967 and 1973, the average annual rise in total output was only 2.7 percent at constant pricers. So serious was the decline in food production Tanzania was forced to import massive amounts of Maize, wheat and other cereals to feed its people. 51 4.2. SOME EXPERIENCES W1TII SMALLHOLDER TEA DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN KENYA. Kenya became independent in december 1963, under a quesa-federal constitution to reduce the effective power of the central government by strengthening the regions. At the time of independence Kenya has no a unified leadership. By the time there were two opposing parties KANU (Kenyan African National Union) and KADU (Kenyan African Democratic Union). Basically KADU had been formed to protect the interests of Kenya's smallest tribes, while KANU was formed out of the pre existing and autonomous district political associations that controlled grass-roots poli ti cs. Despite some important differences resulting from Kenya's history as a centre of European settlement conditions; both Tanzania and Kenya at the time of independence were basically the same. Even though the policy options open for both of them was like wise similar, Kenya responded quite differently than Tanzania. Kenya has defined development in terms of the continued growth and elaboration of the political and economic institutions established, in lieu of an effective political party, of a serious of informal and regionally based patron-client hierarchies, composed of local regional and national leaders that function as political machines to link the grass roots to the political system and to the centre. In contrast Tanzania attempted to create an extensive, disciplined and ideologically committed political party from the top down to the grass roots for the purpose of mobilizing the country's population to achieve socialist development and increasing their participation in the governce of their society. In practice this party subordinated all institutions including the institutionalized survival strategies of society. As a result the performance of the two countries greatly varied to the overall and sectorial rates of economic growth; in the degree of inequality, in the distribution of personal income, purchasing power, and government services; and above all in the overall level and nature of participation in the political process. When one views the sectorial rates of economic growth, it is agriculture where Tanzanian performance has been particularly disappointing while Kenyan experience is encouraging. Just to make a brief comparison, the Tanzanian Government increased its expenditures in agricultural development from 6.3 million dollars in 1967 to $ 56 million dollars in 1976. However, in the same period the overall agricultural production declined by 1.8 percent and Tanzania's production of food grains fell by more than 30 percent and the country experienced serious food shortages that necessitated substantial imports of maize and wheat. In contrast Kenya's economic relatively expanded on all frontes. And so far the agricultural sector managed to absorb the large increase in population, which is growing at one of the highest rates in the world. The most direct way in which this has been achieved has been 52 through the policy of smallholder settlement. This policy helped Kenya to increase the agricultural sector's capacity to absorb labour, to increase cash production, specifically tea and coffee. And it also enabled Kenya for a measurable yields overtime. Moreover, there was also an increase in vegetable, fruit and flower production as well as dairy products. Apart from the increase in unit value of crops and yield of crops there was also a significant increase in the area cultivated by the smallholder The experience Kenya's peasant agriculture immediately after independence is such that it can be used to illustrate the potentials of smallholder production in Africa. Further more it can also be cited as an example of how far ordinary peasants are willing to respond to public policies when the policies are directed at strengthening their survival strategies. Therefore, this research paper attempts to provide an account of the smallholder settlement of the Kenyan Government, as an example of a,successful public policy aimed at the short-run survival strategies of society. Unlike other smallholder rural development policies, in which the African experience has often brought serious difficulties and disappointing performances like that of Tanzania and Ethiopia, this policy is widely acknowledged to be a remarkably a successful one. Especially with respect to black tea, the smallholder were able to plant 54,000 hectares of tea and they have became a major processor and the largest exporter of black tea in the world. Smallholder tea exports, which was virtually non-existent before the promulgation of the policy, have now accounted for about one-third of Kenya's annual tea exports. Due to the expansion of smallholder tea production, tea became the second most important export commodity and the third largest source of foreign exchange earnings. Prior the policy, ninety percent of Kenya's people are rural and most of them are members of smallholder households. Sixty percent of them operated for subsistence without significant cash crop production. However, currently Kenya has the most successful major peasant based tea scheme in the world. The concept of Kenyan smallholder tea operation began to take shape during the early 1950's. By 1960 the Special Crops Development Authority (SCDA) was established to promote the production of African-grown teas. In January 1964, just one month after independence, the SCDA was transformed into the Kenyan Tea Development Authority (KTDA). From the outset the authority directly aimed at the survival strategies of the society, and aimed at drawing the smallholder into tea production as an addition to, rather than a substitute for their current subsistence farming. The policy thus encouraged the peasant to continue in their own way of life, and in the mean time requiring them to grow tea on land thus far under utilized, but with suitable attitude, soil, precipitation, To demonstrate the income benefits as broadly as possible the policy limited the size of the plots. However, the policy also determined the holding in a more economically viable size, in such a way that the return from the farmers holdings' worth their time to harvest the tea and carry it to collection centres. Basically the authority responsible for the implementation of the policy, KTDA performed four main functions. 53 i) supplying planting material and fertilisers to the farmer on credit terms. ii) supervising cultivation in the field and providing training facilities. iii) arranging for the inspection, collection and transport of green leaf. iv) procuring proper arrangements for processing and marketing (Stren 1972:15) For the first planning programmes seedlings were cultivated in two large nurseries, on either side of the Rift Valley, These seedlings were distributed at the appropriate planting times. And the prices of the cutting were kept deliberately low to encourage the smallholder to buy them from the nurseries. As noted by Stren, KTDA gave advise via its field development section on the vegetatively propagated, on the tending, pegging, pruning and plucking of tea bushes. Local courses were held, and also field days when competition for the best tea bushes were organized. Enthusiasm amongst growers for growing tea was very high and rivalry was fierce (Ibid 1970:16). As mentioned earlier rural development especially in the context of sub-Saharan Africa presents peculiar difficulties. Each peasant holding is a complex producing and consuming unit whose members behaviour is subject to a wide range of institutionalized survival strategies in the social, cultural, political as well as economic life of that society. Policies which are both stable and innovative enough to cope with this complexity must deal with an array of activities which are overwhelming social rather than technical. The policy has encouraged the peasants to participate in policy discussions and district tea committees, the provincial tea boards. A second means for the farmer participation has been ensured through the buying of shares in the individual KTDA tea factories. About ten percent of all the smallholder farmers who were covered in this policy were holders of about 1.6 million shares in the 16 tea factories incorporated as public companies. Apart from the monetary incentives, the policy also gave farmers an interest in the KTDA performance and some voice in operations. Furthermore a less formal communication channel consisting of periodic visits to farmers by KTDA senior extension and headquarters staff, to find out about grower progress firsthand was the usual practice (Lamb and Muller 1982:20). Indeed, the tea growers are better placed to shape their own destiny and to exert influence on the agencies servicing them, both in the KTDA Board and Tea Committees formally and by direct discussion with KTDA staff informally. Consequently, the tea growers are aware of their basic survival needs and quick to point out shortcomings. Considering the producers inability to substantial services, KTDA offered with first regular and second variable payment system providing farmers with a highly prized secure monthly cash income. This security/incentive mix maintained the production of tea even in the relatively difficult years. As pointed out by Lamb and Muller, the first of those positive incentives was that, the policy provides a "full payment", for green leaf on a monthly basis all year around given the continual growing season for tea, a payment which goes out to growers from KTDA headquarters against their individual deliveries to leaf collection centres. Growers are therefore, 54 assured of a steady monthly income for their basic survival, based on their previous months delivery; rather than having wait until the crop is processed and sold. This system of maintaining their survival is highly prized by the growers. Moreover this security incentive payment system is also complimented by a price incentive, provided by variable annual "Second Payment" (Ibid:40) Thus, the tea development policy was very successful in strengthening the survival strategies of smallholder peasants where the growers own their land and grow tea on only part of it in not more than 25 percent of the growers total holding coupled with security incentive and price incentive which are the basic requirements of short term survival. As noted by Stren, this policy is a valuable one with an estimated social rate of return of 38.8 percent and a social percent value of 12.59 million Kenyan shillings (discounted at 10 percent to 1966/67) for the main part of the project. The inter.:nal rate of return for the farmer net benefit stream is 13.9 percent (Stern 1972:101). Unlike its,neighbours, the style of politics encouraged by president Kenyatta and his successors was directed in strengthening some of the survival institutions of society. For example the style of leader, encouraged by the government is the ethnically and lineage-based constituency representative, whose role is to act primarily as ambassador from a constituency. Thus this means the political system has accepted the informal leaders of society one way or the other. Although its local political influence is being challenged by the bureaucracy, the rural informalleaders remain the key architect of the regime; the bureaucracy has encroached upon but not overwhelmed them. As a result a great degree Jatitude for self help leadership continues to exist, while national policy is directed towards maintaining and strengthening the institutions of survival strategies of society the results will be magnificent as demonstrated in the smallholder tea development policy. Comparing the two rural development policies both in Kenya and Tanzania, it is evident that the Tanzanian policy making process undermined local survival strategies thereby undermining local initiative. In another dimension, the success of the Kenyan rural development policies, in increasing agricultural productivity, self-sufficiency in food staffs, lower prices of food staffs as compared to other African countries can be attributed to the emphasis made in strengthening survival strategies. For example the Kenyan Government's policy towards the rural informal sector is a case in point. There is no doubt that the richness of the rural survival economy and the margin of survival of ordinary rural households depend on the extent to which informal institutions of survival and complimentary survival activities have been developed. To these effects, following the 1972 ILO recommendations, the Government of Kenya adopted the following guidelines in order to strengthen the informal sector. i) harassment should be cease. ii) research and development on informal sector goods should be intensified. iii) licences should be freely available to all. 55 iv) links with the formal sector, including government, should be strengthened through the development of sub-contracting (Sessional paper on employment No.1 0 of 1973). Thus the Government of Kenya in fact allowed for smallholder an extra income because it felt the survival needs of the society are not met from farm production alone. Once the smallholder were encouraged to take a supplemental activi ty alongside their subsistence farm, they developed cash agriculture thereby increasing the purchasing power of the Kenyan economy and the size of the market. This move assured a substantial constant flow of foreign exchange, a favourable foundation for industrial development as well as an expansion of agro-processing industries and stimulus to various other non-farm activities. Indeed, even the Kenyan schemes for the distribution of agricultural credit and extension concentrated for poorer peasants who are attempting merely to survive. In the final analysis the success of smallholder tea development production from 100 tones in 1960 to over 30,000 now is deeply rooted in the entire structure of the policy making process. Generally policy making in Kenya is characterized by strengthening the survival strategies. And one of the strength of the policy making is largely related to a careful exercise in maintaining the support of key institutions of survival through the judicious allocation of the scarce resources, Unlike most African countries the Government of Kenya itself is highly plural, with bargaining and competition occurring among members of government acting on behalf of supporting group. Consequently policy makers and governmental decision makers are forced to operate within the bounds of such structure. The survival structure of society in Kenya and the attempt by the state to accommodate it prevents policy making from being exclusively a state-centred affair. Rather whatever their normative views may be they attempt to fashion their public policies within the parameters set by such structure. Political and economic principles of strengthening the survival strategies required a form of policy making which is suggestive and persuasive. The Kenyan policy making exercise allowed the local people to be extremely involved and pull at the right time. And the relative success of this policy, and the high rate of economic growth in the last policy making periods provided the policy makers an additional incentives to meaningfully pursue strengthening the survival strategies. 56 4.3. THE LAND REFORM POLICY AND THE SUBSEQUENT COOPERATIVIZATION AND COLLECTIVIZATION POLICIES OF THE ETIllOPIAN GOVERNMENT Like most of its sub-Saharan neighbours, Ethiopia is a predominantly agrarian based society. Agriculture being the main stay in the economy provides employment for roughly 85 percent of the total population. Agriculture is dominated by smallholder who produce most of the countries food, largely for subsistence. Recent estimates suggest that peasants in average retain eighty percent of their produce for household consumption and for seeds (Desalenge 1984:67). With an estimated GNP of US $ 160 per capita, Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world; with . over thirty million people, i.e, more than sixty percent of the population believed to be living below the absolute poverty line (Brune 1990:17). Indeed, agricultural output is currently barely adequate to sustain its own labour. However, prior the 1974 "Ethiopian Revolution", the Ethiopian agricultural sector did surprisingly well. But in the post-revolution period the level of food grain production has fallen well below from what has been achieved under Emperor Haile Selassie's government. The Land Reform in 1975 was centre-piece of the Ethiopian Revolution, and in some respects one of the most radical land reforms ever attempted in Africa (Pausewang 1979:213). The low level of agricultural underdevelopment prior the revolution were attributed to a structural nature of a land tenure system. As a consequence land reform was considered an important undertaking for the country's future. Undoubtedly, the public ownership of rural lands proclamation No. 31/1975 eliminated many of the basic problems of the pre-revolution agrarian system and it also brought new problems in the forefront. The basic concept underlying this Land Reform Act was that all land in rural areas be nationalized: "As of the effective date of this proclamation, all rural lands shall be the collective property of the Ethiopian people" (Negarit Gazeta Vol. 34 No. 26:2). The Land Reform policy of 1975 is on which all subsequent rural development policies, including those promoting collectivization and villagization have been formulated The cornerstone of the Land Reform was the creation of the peasant associations, and it was the existence of these organizations which has allowed the government to strengthen its grip in the rural areas, and implement subsequent policies of villagization, collectivization, resettlement, state grain procurement, and state control of grain marketing and pricing. One of the most important provisions of the 1975 Land Reform was the setting up of Peasant Associations in each locality. These were supposed to be organizations of peasants with an elected leadership and a legally defined set of responsibilities including the maintenance of law and order. However, the subsequent phases of the revolution witnessed the hardening of the revolution, and the shift 57 of public policy towards rapid collectivization. The policy directives initiated by this time forced the peasantry to change from an active force of the revolution to a passive recipient of government directive (Desalegne 1989:7). The rapid collectivization and villagization processes were the land marks for the beginning of contradictions between the survival strategies of society with that of the socialist oriented long term perspective public policies of the government. The principal phase of the land reform policy was in principle partially compatible with the traditional systems of landholding in most parts of the country. For example restriction to land use rights and the shackles placed on mobility of land were after all basic elements of "Rist" [in the north], "Deissa" [in the south], and the "Geda" System in [the south west]. Even though the initial articulations of the policy were in line with the survival strategies of the Ethiopian peasantry it also in some respect contradicted the survival strategies of smallholder owner cultivators. The provision of the legislation which states that land is the collective property of the Ethiopian people, and that private ownership in land is prohibited, denied the smallholder ownercultivators of their right to sale, mortgage or lease their land. Thus, the policy deprived all individual owner cultivators of their property. As Desalegne pointed out all rural households willing to live by their own labour were turned into mere possessors of usufruct" (Desalegne 1989:19). Thus the reform from the outset disrupted the delicate mechanism of survival by creating insecurity of holding, thereby creating a decline in performance in the smallholder agriculture. Moreover, according to the traditional survival institutions both the peasant who leases his plot and the peasant who rents his land were insuring their survival and supplementing their incomes respectively, but after the land reform those who do not have access to draft animals and other essential resources were not able to work their land. Moreover, to implement the provision of the land reform, peasant associations were to be formed on a basis of a traditional village or an administrative unit of 800 hectares area. These peasant associations were empowered to implement the distribution of land on the basis of equity considering both the size of family and quality of the soil, supervision of land use regulations and administration of public property, establishment of judicial committees, service cooperatives and an elementary form of producer's cooperatives and promotion of socio-economic infrastructure and villagization programmes (Nagarit Gazeta Proclamation No. 71 of 1975). Consequently the formation of peasant associations, deprived of the traditional informal leaders of their traditional role and disrupted most of their economic power. As indicated by Wood the political education of the peasantry further eroded the authority of traditional leaders, and in this situation a power vacuum had been created (Wood 1984:530). Nevertheless. The Ethiopian Government considered the peasant association as an alternative to the administrative role of the traditional informal leaders. As we have said, proclamation No. 71, of 1975 envisaged a gradual 58 ｴｲ｡ｾｳｦｯｭｩｮ＠ from service cooperatives to an elementary forms of producer's cooperatives and finally to advanced producer's cooperatives. However, this was one of the critical problems that the Ethiopian Government faced. Prior the proclamation no workable traditional basis existed for collective organization of agriculture any where in Ethiopia. As Hoben noted, there appears to be little traditional basis ... for collective ownership of land or voluntary large-scale cooperation in agricultural activity, .... Group activities were always organized by powerful authority figure rather than through a voluntary and cooperative effort for the mutual benefit of the members as a group (Hoben 1973:229). Indeed, the traditional survival institutions were devoid of any kind of solidarity structure based on the fundamental equality of those involved. Moreover, the marked individualism of the highlanders, as manifested in economically autarchic households, weakened cooperativeness ,that the latter was found more or less only in cases of threats from outside. Obviously a social set up where such survival strategies prevail can not be changed from the topdown in a short time by legislative measures. "Rist" which was the land holding system in the north did not only impose individualism but also offered opportunities of considerable social ascent. Consequently those people who were involved in this system were not happy to the dissolution of the system. Therefore, it was unrealistic to expect a favourable policy impact in terms of cooperativeness. The agrarian policy changes of the Derge regime were diametrically opposed to the system of traditional survival strategies. The traditional settlement pattern in Ethiopia was varied, as did the societies they created them. The homestead standing in its own fields was far the most common pattern, but in itself is compatible with social survival institutions of various kind between households. Thus it was a futile attempt to bring a lasting solution when the basic principles of such attitudinal changes are diametrically opposed. The collectivization move in many ways was in direct contradiction to the Ethiopian traditional survival institutes. This hierarchical traditional social system, and its conceptions of the necessity of subordination to a God-given order, were supported by the religious authorities of both the major religions. As pointed out by Goricke, "this philosophy has now been directly assailed by the recognition of the individual as an active being in his own right and the attendant principle of the legitimacy of participation and action to change his social status. Already this polarisation of views has of necessity led to a relativation of the images of self and society entertained above all by the Amharan Rist peasants" (Goricke 1979:225). Thus the directives on cooperatives and the continuous propaganda in favour of them was received with great hesitation with the peasant population. Sometimes the government propaganda was literally interpreted as an attempt by the government to separate the households from the means of production and work for the state (Love 1989:33). To speed up the collectivization process the government issued a villagization guidelines in June 1986, and a national villagization committee was set up. The major objectives of the committee was to provide social services for the rural communities, to promote cooperative work, 59 to raise the level of consciousness of the people; to improve village security and defence; to plan a more rational land use; to develop natural resources and increase agricultural productivity by introducing modern techniques (Alemayehu 1990:139). Nonetheless, the villagization policy also failed to bring the desired results. Even though the guidelines instructed to the implementing bodies was to pay special attention to farmland, pasture, water resources and existing social infrastructure when selecting a village site, in reality, all these things are rarely found close together in a rural setting. Moreover, the policy lacked a proper criteria for non-farm activities. For example in one of the regional surveys made in the Welmera Woreda by Alemayehu, the new villages were found to be difficult for potters, because the new site was too far from the sources of clay. Attempts to introduce villagization in Ensete-growing areas also created other unforseen problems, mainly due to high population density of the Ensete growers. Significant increases in distance between the fields and the new houses of the peasants also created an additional problem. In majority of the new villages the average distance between the fields and the homes stretched from 1.6 to 6 kilometres. Due to this, some farmers started renting their new plots of land to the nearby peasants. Every household, Gonsequently lost significant part of their crops, and roots, being effectively unable to protect· their fields from wild animals, pests and thieves from such a distance. It also became difficult to carry the manure to the farmers and use it as a fertilizer. Many peasants had to leave straw to decay, which could have been used to feed cattle in dry season or to plaster walls, had their threshing grounds had not been to far away. Increased distance grazing land had reduced grazing time by 20 percent, and livestock mortality increased significantly. Indeed the policy of villagization generally lacked sensitivity to the basic survival strategies of the Ethiopian peasantry. It also failed to realize, that even the settlement patterns of the peasantry are directly related to their survival strategy. The policy of villagizaion restricted the peasants from raising small animals and poultry, from keeping bees and dry manure, or to attempt other sideline activities to earn an additional incomes. Problems were also created by the standard construction plans. Houses in the new villages were supposed to be 30 or 40 rl squire regardless of the household size. This compact and standardized dwelling were not sufficient for families with over 10 people. Sixty percent of the peasants interviewed by Alemayehu in Welmera district reported that their new homes were on average 20 percent small than their former homes. Similarly, many people were not content with the standard division of dwellings into three rooms (living room, bed room and store) as this limited the width of the rooms and made them dim even in day light. Moreover, the separate kitchen and stable required more than one kerosene lamp at a time. The fact that kitchen and stable were separate also raised the cost of construction. In the surveyed areas the average cost of construction for a house and auxiliary facilities was estimated to be birr 1500 to 2500. Even with a separate stable, many peasants still preferred to keep some of their animals, as calves or horses 60 either in the kitchen or in the house itself. Another weakness in the guidelines concerned was the time set aside for the house construction. The government felt that the "Slack" season between December and March was ideal for this purpose. A varying crop calender, different cropping cultures and diverse religions customs made this impractical in some areas. For example, most peasants who are growing cereals during summer use december to march as the peak season for planting maize, sorghum and ensete. Other studies have also revealed that peasants are rarely idle, even working on holidays, although they don't plough on these days. It is; therefore, not true that peasants are free between December and March or that they can devote their time fully to house construction in the slack season and on holidays. As a result of all these short comings, there were quite a number of petitions from villages in 1987. Indeed, the failure of the villagization policy sharply demonstrated how values and survival strategies held by the Ethiopian peasantry affected a major long-term perspective development oriented public policy of the state. In a nutshell the economic promise of the land reform policy and the subsequent collectivization and villagization moves were largely unfulfilled. The general lesson is that although the Ethiopian government agrarian policies have specifically sought to improve the peasant's standard of living, promote better rural health, eduction and to prevent famine, but the productive potential of the agricultural sector has never been adequately promoted. This was because of the government's lack of capacity to implement long term perspective public policies in a society where there is an institutionalized survival strategy. Consequently, the fact remains that despite all the revolutionary reforms and the rhetoric which has accompanied them, Ethiopia remains potentially one of the richest but actually one of the poorest agrarian nations in the world. Basically, the old settlement patterns were congruent with the survival strategies of the groups that produce them. These were the outward expressions of their survival strategy. Hence, the effect of the villagization inevitably disrupted the social institution which went with the previous patterns. The Ethiopian authorities however, did not accept that the traditional settlement patters are created by the peasants themselves as an aspect of their survival "instead, denying the people any social creativity the old settlement pattern is represented as something imposed by feudalism", (Survival International: 1988:15). Even though social ties and structures are profoundly affected by the change of residence patterns, the government believed that the community of the new village is simply the same community, that previously lived in the area scattered so that the social unit has not in fact been changed. This is to ignore the other levels of societal survival institutions that existed within these communities. 61 CHAPTER V 5.1 FINDINGS. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Roughly some sixty years ago the rapid de-colonialization process entirely changed the world map. However, we still have a problem in understanding the relationship between state and society within he context of sub-Saharan Africa. In the years following the rapid decolonialization process there was a great sense of urgency to create modern and developed national societies in the sub-continent. "It was also eagerly anticipated that the new states could lay the way for directing the economic and social changes already engulfing their societies (Migdal 1988: 11). But as it has been indicated in chapter II, these newly formed states being peculiarly distinguished from their equivalents in other parts of the world, especially in their source of power and strength, were unable to provide benefits for their citizens. In lights of the above, this research paper found out the following general and particular features of state-society ties in sub-Saharan Africa. As indicated in the literature review the level of political maturity achieved by any given society basically depends upon the relationships between the state and society that has given birth to it. Although this may seem applicable in all circumstances and in all societies, the sub-Saharan Africa reality with respect to state formation preludes our effort to assess the state-society ties. In sub-Saharan Africa, colonialism actually failed to integrate society into a larger and viable systems. Moreover, unlike state formations in other parts of the world, in sub-Saharan africa colonialism formed states within a very short period of time there by disrupting the basic ingredients of state, state formation and state-society ties. Here it has been observed that colonial domination led to the destruction of the already existing state formations which were already under progress, as well as the existing form of production. This process destroyed the political and social formation which hitherto had provided the protection of the individual. Consequently the societies in sub-Saharan Africa responded by withdrawing into pre-colonial survival systems in which the individual was protected and his needs were fulfilled. In another dimension, the leaders of sub-Saharan saw as their primary mission the replacement of foreign rule by African rule. However, the state being basically detached from society failed to provided a platform, an in depth process of thought action, geared towards the creation of a new domestic order that is culturally viable and politically geared to real liberation of society. The existence of the survival systems and a detached state from society, provided the African policy making process with its historical peculiarity. The internal dynamics of the institutionalized survival strategies and the relations they give rise to policy implementations constitutes a world of their own within which the society protects and promotes its own interest's often at the expense of the long term 62 development oriented public policies of the state. The survival strategies of sub-Saharan Africa were found to be net works of support, communication, and interaction among societies who are usually at the edge of starvation and death, in their daily survival. These structurally defined groups, connected by different affinities such as religion, ethnic group, kin or blood etc.,provide the members with structural opportunities for survival through horizontal as well as lateral expansions both economically and socially within traditionally known and accepted networks. As it has been indicated in the literature review, basically the state should be part of society, with many characteristics not very different from those of other social organizations. But the nature of the inherited colonial state, its method of conquest, legitimation and perpetuation preludes this principal assumption. Consequently, by gauging the appropriateness of the policy making process and the central elements of the state-society ties, it was found out that the existence of numerous survival institutions that exercises effective social control, has a decisive effect on the likelihood of a given positive policy impact. However, if the states of sub-Saharan Africa were the results of the society itself they could have had the right and ability to make the countless rules that guides peoples social behaviour willingly. Moreover, due to the lack of institutionalization, the sub-Saharan Africa states lacked the administrative structures, personnel and the culture necessary for the efficient management and organization of the state and the society with different objectives. An objective of the state favourably inclined toward radical changes and long term development oriented public policies and the objective of society aimed at the short-term survival. It was also found that the existing development studies to explain the sub-Saharan Africa policy crises, its origin, nature, magnitude, propose patterns, are in crisis themselves. So far there is no single country who can be shown to have developed on any of the numerous modes and prescriptions. As indicated in III many of the existing approaches to understanding social and political change and the means of achieving such changes in sub-Saharan Africa either underestimated the existing conflict all together, or have missed this particular sorts of conflicts and emphasised on class based conflicts alone, or have down played the important dynamics within the society itself. Indeed, all these approaches failed to understand the most and important exchange between state and society. These failures can partially be explained by the existence of peculiar institutions, structures and process of state-society ties which are non-existent in the western world. Apart from this the applicability of the current theories of policy making, i.e, the traditional inputoutput schemes; the concept of rationality in policy making; the theory of the disjointed increamentalism; and the normative optimum model were found to be an able to accommodate all the variables that exist with in the realities of sub-Saharan Africa state-society ties. Thus neither of the models have significant utility in the analysis and understanding of policy making in sub- 63 Saharan Africa, however, hard the states in this region attempted to implement them in practice. Hence, the present policy crises in sub-Saharan Africa can only be found in the state-society ties. Following the arguments made by the seminar participants of the state and the crises in Africa, this research paper also emphasises that the present crises in sub-Saharan Africa is largely an institutional crises and partially it is the crises of the state. The dilemma facing the African states is that because it was inherited, in many instances just like an empty shell from the colonial powers, the African leaders, in fulfilling this lacuna, have been forced to devote prime attention to defining power relations which simultaneously being asked to implement often ill conceived, usually donor-funded, development programmes and projects with unrealistic time horizon (participants of the twenty-fifth anniversary of Dag Hammarskjold commemoration 1986:6). Using an approach based on inward looking consciousness, from the state-society ties, this research attempted to map out the key dimensions of the state-society relations in sub-Saharan Africa. As it has been demonstrated in chapter iv, if the public policies of the state strengthens the specific survival strategies of societies, that society will ally itself with state policy and act in accordance with its guidelines. If, however, public policies are in contradiction with the immediate survival strategies of a given society, then they will work to minimize their exposure and vulnerability to these formes of state interventions. Based on the assessment of these relationships one observers a high degree of indifference and contradiction in most sub-Saharan Africa countries. A through examination of the state-society ties in sub-Saharan Africa reveals that societies under survival strategies resist what long term development oriented public policies claim to achieve, because they feel deeply threatened in their own sense of self esteem. Therefore as indicated in chapter iii, the states of sub-Saharan Africa countries were found to be in contradiction. In one side they need long term development, and public policies of that sort in order to gain esteem in the international arena, and in the other society is not ready to give up its self esteem in the development process. In brief this research paper argued that the structure of state and society and the subsequent state-society ties have an important direct effect on the impact of a given policy and on its success or failure. This inward looking approach helps shed light on why long term development oriented public policies of the state do not achieve their envisaged goals and why societal references are divergent from that of the state. Our assessment of the state-society ties within the context of sub-Saharan Africa demonstrated the critical survival actions by the society in the economic, political and socio-cultural spheres. Moreover, the basic characteristics of sub-Saharan Africa societies, i.e, lineages, familial networks, chiefdoms, secret societies, local communities and the associated activities used to rationalize, justify, and conceptualize these institutions, can only be explained by the existence of survival strategies. Apart from this what Miller termed as patterns of deference, attitudes toward seniority, values related to cooperation, friendship, reciprocity and hierarchy, concerns 64 about social maintenance and even development; all these and more could only be explained by institutionalized survival strategies. As it has been clearly indicated, these economic, political and cultural interconnections between the state and the society in sub-Saharan Africa were found to be irreconcilable unless their is a major change in emphasis. Basically the ideal type of state definition of Max Weber, as an organization, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules of all people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory (Weber 1964:156), seems to be unapplicable to sub-Saharan Africa realities. As indicated in chapter iii in a society where there is acute social problem, survival strategies are always crucial. Within the same line argument this research paper found out a peculiar set of normative, phenomenological and existential values guiding the traditional survival systems. These values were found to be effective in ensuring shot-term survival and short-term social stability as well as in providing social identity to everyone who is member of that institution. In another dimension the values that are held by the post-colonial states were mostly inclined towards nation building and long term perspective public policies. Consequently the two sets of values and the associated parameters held both by the state and society were of two distinct universes. In most cases it was found out that the policies aimed for the long-run having the opposite effect on the short-term perspective survival strategies of that given society. The research used the agricultural sector to demonstrate the impacts of survival strategies on the long-term development oriented public policies of state for a number of reasons. First and for most, agriculture's heavy weight in the economic structure is common to all sub-Saharan African countries. According to conservative estimates around eighty-five percent of the population and labour force are still dependent on agricultural incomes. Second, in spite of various attempts by the state, many sub-Saharan African countries have significantly lost the capacity to feed their people, and now sub-Saharan Africa stands as the poorest region in the world economy. Due to the increasing high rate of population increase, lagging food production, malnutrition and abject poverty, most sub-Saharan Africa countries are receiving the greatest bulk of foreign aid. Above all, since survival strategies are very much prominent and highly institutionalized in the rural context,to ascertain our hypothesis, the research singled outthree rural development policies in sub-Saharan Africa namely from Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania. All the three policies dealt with the agricultural sector, and since most of the sub-Saharan Africa countries are characterized by subsistence peasant producers, the treatment of peasants and their survival strategies visa-vis the long range agricultural policies enabled us to draw some findings, conclusions and recommendations about the agricultural sector in general and the policy making process in particular. 65 Basically all the three policies of Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania were found to be sound at statement level. Because they were all aimed at improving the chronic problems of the majority of the rural poor. Nonetheless, the two rural development policies of Ethiopia and Tanzania were a failure, while the Kenyan smallholder tea development policy was a success. As noted in the working hypothesis, this research paper took three main premises in relation to public policies in general and public policies of sub-Saharan Africa in particular. To these effects the research hypothesised, that the causes for the current policy crises in sub-Saharan Africa is as a result of formulating and implementing development oriented public policies of long-term perspective in a society where the majority of the people have their own short-term survival strategies of different sort. We also underlined that society with short-term survival strategies in no way displays a commitment towards public policies aimed for the long-run unless the policy strengthens the s.urvi val strategies themselves. We further hypothesised that those policies which strengthen the survival strategies themselves bring qualitative improvement for the public policy making process and the society at large. Following the hypothesis the research paper made an in depth analysis as to the underling causes of the success and failures of the three rural development policies of Ethiopia, Kenya and . Tanzania. As indicated in chapter iv both the rural development policies of Ethiopia and Tanzania were a failure mainly because of their lack of emphasis on the survival strategies of societies'. Both the Ethiopian and Tanzanian policy makers undermined the impacts of local survival strategies, rather than strengthening the survival strategies of society, policy makers viewed development as a change in the survival institutions themselves. They failed to realize that, to bring change on these survival institutions from the top is impossible unless the changes are made within itself dialectically. And this can only be possible by strengthening the survival strategies themselves. Both Nyerere and Mengistu felt that socialism is an attitude of mind, and this state of mind was their centre-foci. But what the two regimes failed to realize was that the long term societal development by itself has value problems. To this effect, what actually has happened in Ethiopia and Tanzania is a the case in point. The manners in which this policy changes were proposed disrupted the delicate mechanism of survival, i.e. their conscious strategy for obtaining their short term goals, their ability to process information and ultimately to survive. Unlike the two rural development policies of Ethiopia and Tanzania, the smallholder tea development policy of Kenya was a success to the extent that, currently Kenya has the most successful peasant based tea scheme in the world. The Kenyan policy makers realized the behaviours of the rural poor as the complex producing and consuming unit, and they strengthened the wide range institutionalized survival strategies in the social, cultural, political as well as the economic life that society. Thus, the Kenyan policy making strength was largely related to a careful exercise in maintaining the key institutions of survival through the judicious allocation 66 of scarce resources. This process allowed the local survival institutions to be extremely involved at the level of policy implementation. Hence, the success of this policy, and the higher rate of economic growth in these' last policy making periods provided the Kenyans with an additional incentives to meaningfully pursue to strengthening to the extent of adopting guidelines to encourage the rural informal rural sector. Comparing the Ethiopian and Tanzanian experience in one side and the Kenyan on the other, it was found out that the Ethiopian and Tanzanian Policy makers undermined local survival strategies, thereby undermining local initiatives. In another dimension the Kenyan policy makers demonstrated how a policy aimed at the survival strategies of society brings increased agricultural productivity, self-sufficiency and lower prices for foodstuffs, etc,. To conclude lets repeat what we have been saying at the beginning. Every individual or group in society is bound by some sort of principle, tradition, myth, purpose or code of behaviour. In principle we all believe that men are united by common agreement upon law and rights and their coming together is also institutionalized through the state. But the sub-Saharan reality is entirely different. The colonial period suppressed the process of state formation, separated state and society and consequently strengthened survival strategies. Apparently the post-independent sub-Saharan states inherited an institution which is a highly detached empty shell. For example compared to peasant producers in other parts of the world most sub-Saharan Africa farmers enjoy a relatively high degree of autonomy from the state mainly due to the existence their survival institutions. There are a lot of evidences that the peasants in Africa use an exit option, particularly when public policies are viewed as a threat or as devoid of any apparent benefits (Berry 1983:4), towards their survival strategies. Since most post-independence sub-Saharan Africa states are only a continuation of the detached state structure of the colonial era; rather than responding to indigenous values they have often proved to be the dominant factor in stimulating further changes throughout society. Thus, as Zolberg persuasively put it, "if we conceive the original African societies as set of values, norms and structure, it is evident that they survived to a significant extent every where .... Furthermore, the new set of values norms and structures which constituted an incipient national centre, did not necessarily grow at the expense of older ones (Zolberg 1973:313). Ultimately this unfavourable state-society ties restricted states to effectively formulate and implement development oriented publkpolicies which are aimed for theI6ng-n..in in a society where there are instituHomilized survival strategies, In view of the above this research paper recommends the following. From the societal stand point states are desirable if they contribute directly and significantly to the major short-term survival objectives of a society. Basically the structure of sub-Saharan Africa societies seeking progress through development oriented public policies seems to be replete with contradictory problems. On one side there is scarcity-ridden economy and high development aspirations of the states; on the other there are institutionalized survival strategies 67 of the society with their own orientations. Ultimately, a public policy that is aimed at improving productivity increasing equity and enhancing self-reliance depends on strengthening the survival strategies of society. He·re the states have to avoid becoming the only formulators and implementers of policy. Rather we have to strengthen valued based survival institutions. Even the legitimacy for the survival institutions need not be drawn from the top of the hierarchy but from the society itself. Indeed, the sources of policy making should revolve around the traditional survival parameters rather than the parameters of modern technocratic societies. In the context of sub-Saharan Africa these two sets of value parameters are likely to be integrated. In one side the survival parameters which ensured the society with social stability and a distinct social identity, and on the other the modern public policy making parameters to ensure long rang development. Thus it is necessary to identify those aspects of survival strategies, political, economic, and socio-cultural that are particularly relevant to our favourable policy impact. The states rather than looking to the future, have to be in touch with the past. The past survival strategies of societies which were an ending source of survival, inspiration, perception, wisdom, creative ideas, should be kept in mind while the state attempts to intervene in the affairs of sub-Saharan Africa societies. Such kind of emphasis requires policy makers to identify and select beneficiary households and the choice of primary activity by themselves. Moreover, emphasis be given as to who will be accountable to whom. To this effect consideration should not be confined to the availability of appropriate technical skills, rather accountability to the target society. The policy directives should stress decentralized and shared decision making, responsiveness and low cost short-term delivery rather than coordination and control. A policy aimed at the ｳｨｯｲｴＭＺｾ［ｩｶ｡ｬ＠ strategies of societies calls for an open communication and simplification of policy guidelines rather than adherence to a general set of prescribed technical recommendation and complex rules. Apart from this the policy needs a direct feedback through a continuous assessment of beneficiaries. Following the recommendations made by the global coalition for Africa, this research paper strongly believes that the role of the people and their survival institutions are central to realization of popular participation. Thus, the people "have to be fully involved, committed and indeed, seize the initiative" (Global Coalition for Africa 1992:26). In this respect it is crucial that the time tested survival institutions of society develop links across the country to promote cooperation and exchange experience. The policy making models and development strategies should contain the parameters and aspirations of the society, they have to include the societal values and the environmental realities. In strengthening these endogenous survival strategies our policy has to pursue broad-based participation of the society, on a decentralized fashion. As it has been mentioned earlier, societies under survival strategies have unique needs 68 arising out of their historical socio-economic backgrounds and conditions. Thus, any public policy aimed for the poor should consider their capacity to use the envisaged policy outcomes and that it is within their own priorities. 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