Lessons Learned from the July 2010 Norwegian Terrorist Plot

AUGUST 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 8 Crevice plotter Anthony Garcia), which Davud claimed he had received from an acquaintance in Turkey in 2009. 40 The connections between the terrorist group and the other two are instead unclear and clouded by the fact that the Uzbek suspect, David Jakobsen, had worked as an informant since November 2009. Jakobsen claimed that he had contacted the police after he realized what he was involved in and had met with them on a weekly basis since first providing them with information. 41 Police doubt his authenticity, highlighting the fact that he failed to inform them that he had purchased a quantity of hydrogen peroxide in furtherance of the plot. 42 The plotters went quiet in the period running up to the arrests, but police claim Davud accumulated enough explosives and other materials to construct a large device or several small devices (they had in fact already swapped what he thought was hydrogen peroxide with an inert substance). Their exact target is unclear, although there is speculation that the oil industry was being targeted when it was revealed that Jakobsen had applied for a place at a school which trained people for jobs in the oil industry. 43 Al-Qa`ida’s Core Persists There are a few key analytical points to be drawn from this series of plots. First, it appears that al-Qa`ida continues to maintain a capacity to train individuals from its base in Pakistan’s tribal areas despite being under pressure. Faisal Shahzad, the attempted Times Square bomber, made his way to Peshawar in July 2009, apparently tracking a path similar to Zazi’s network. This shows that as of a year ago, despite drone strikes operating at full tempo, the route and capacity to train in the region had not been closed down. were predominantly from Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Uighur Davud had lived in Norway since 1999 and Zazi and his cell had all attended high school together in the United States. Also, while less successful in their attempts at plotting in the West, Vinas and the cell around Malika el-Aroud show the ideology’s reach to converts and the North African diaspora in continental Europe. The cross-cultural appeal is equally visible in the growing roster of young Westerners being drawn to al-Shabab’s jihad in Somalia. Furthermore, the possible link to TIP highlights the group’s ability to draw upon networks fostered by “sister” extremist groups operating in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Finally, the plotters’ persistence is worth noting. While it is unclear (and unlikely) that the three plots knew of each other (though it seems likely that some information on them may have come from interrogations of other terrorist camp graduates), they nevertheless continued plotting in the face of news that their leaders in Waziristan had been killed and information was leaking out about their network. Despite persistent declarations of alQa`ida’s demise, the uncovering of this network highlights the group’s ongoing ability to generate plots in the face of increased pressure from drone strikes and Pakistani government efforts in its lawless regions. Raffaello Pantucci is an Associate Fellow at the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) at King’s College London. His work can be found at www. raffaellopantucci.com. Lessons Learned from the July 2010 Norwegian Terrorist Plot By Petter Nesser and Brynjar Lia on july 8, 2010, the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) announced the arrests of three men, suspected of having formed an al-Qa`ida-linked terrorist cell and planning bomb attacks against what were later presumed to be Chinese targets in Norway. 1 The cell is believed to be “one node” in a far-reaching al-Qa`ida network that planned attacks in multiple countries, including the New York subway plot led by Najibullah Zazi and the conspiracy to bomb shopping malls in Manchester, both foiled in 2009. 2 The alleged leader of the Norwegian cell, Mikael Davud, a 39-year-old Norwegian citizen of Chinese Uighur origin, was reportedly trained in Waziristan and is suspected of having entertained direct contacts with the commander of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), as well as top alQa`ida personnel, such as Salah alSomali, al-Qa`ida’s former head of external operations who was killed in late 2009. 3 According to U.S. officials, al-Somali ordered all three attacks, and all cells planned to use the same type of portable homemade bombs. 4 Also, the Federal Bureau of Investigation believes that Adnan Shukrijumah, considered al-Qa`ida’s new head of external operations, is probably connected to the Norway plot. 5 1 “Tre personer pågrepet,” Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, July 8, 2010. 2 Scott Shane and Eric Schmitt, “Norway Announces Three Arrests in Terrorist Plot,” New York Times, July 8, 2010; Kristoffer Rønneberg, “Terrorplaner i Oslo, London og New York kobles sammen,” Aftenposten, July 8, 2010; Harald Berg Sævereid, “Han tystet om norsk ter- Second, the al-Qa`ida narrative continues to draw in a wide community of individuals across ethnic lines and from around the globe. While the Manchester plot was driven by recent arrivals to the United Kingdom who ror-celle,” Verdens Gang, July 9, 2010. 3 Yassin Musharbash, “Festgenommene Qaida-Ver- dächtige Norwegisches Terror-Puzzle,” Der Spiegel, July 8, 2010; Jonas Sverrisson Rasch and Gunnar Hultgreen, “Terrorgruppe tilhørte uigurisk separatistgruppe,” Dagbladet, July 8, 2010; “Davuds mobilnummer funnet hos uigurtopp,” Dagbladet, August 2, 2010. 40 Ibid. 4 Bruce Crumley, “Norway’s al-Qaeda Arrests: Terror- 41 “Norway: Al Qaeda Bomb Suspect Was Police Infor- ism’s Changing Face,” Time Magazine, July 8, 2010. mant,” Associated Press, July 12, 2010. 5 “Ny al-Qaida-topp kobles til terrorplaner i Norge,” 42 “Norwegian Police Secretly Filmed Terror Suspect: Aftenposten, August 6, 2010; Curt Anderson, “New al- Report,” Agence France-Presse, July 10, 2010. Qaida Leader Knows US Well,” Associated Press, Au- 43 Ibid. gust 6, 2010. 13 AUGUST 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 8 From a counterterrorism perspective, the Norway cell is an interesting case study in several regards. First, it provides arguments to both sides in the Sageman-Hoffman dispute over whether the al-Qa`ida threat is becoming more “homegrown,” “de-centralized,” and “Europeanized,” 6 or whether al-Qa`ida has retained the ability to direct terrorist operations in Europe and elsewhere. 7 Second, it also casts light on two observable trends in jihadist terrorism during the past few years: (i) the expanding role of al-Qa`ida’s regional branches and affiliated organizations in international terrorism; (ii) the growing multiethnic composition of jihadist cells and networks in Europe, where overwhelmingly Arab and Pakistani networks have been gradually replaced by more multinational cells. Third, the Norway cell may suggest a new emphasis in al-Qa`ida on targeting “the periphery” in the Western world, whereby the threat level in Norway may gradually converge toward that of the United Kingdom and continental Europe. Finally, the current investigation of the alleged terrorist cell in Oslo has demonstrated the continued difficulties of handling terrorism-related criminal offenses in Scandinavia where the justice systems only recently started to adapt to the new reality of transnational terrorist organizations, and where U.S. pressure to act more aggressively clashes with a deep commitment to prevention strategies and high standards of legal protection. 8 This article will outline the details of the Norway plot and the investigation, and it will discuss the sociology of the alleged cell and possible motives. It concludes with a few remarks on the preliminary lessons learned and the implications of the plot. 6 See, for example, Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 7 See, for example, Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth of GrassRoots Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs 87:3 (2008): pp. 133138. 8 See, for example, Michael Jonsson and Christian N. The Plot and the Investigation On July 8, 2010, three men of Uighur, Uzbek and Iraqi-Kurdish descent were arrested on terrorism charges after a one year investigation involving extensive international cooperation. The ongoing investigation reportedly included electronic room surveillance, wiretapping, GPS and radio tracking, secret searches of apartments and “From al-Qa`ida’s perspective, Norway maintains a close military alliance with the United States, has a historical, deep-rooted friendship with Israel and is a significant military contributor in Afghanistan and other fronts in the U.S.-led war on terrorism.” electronic surveillance of internet traffic. It progressed at different levels of intensity during the past year. The case became more serious in February and March 2010 as the suspects allegedly sought to obtain quantities of chemicals suitable for making peroxide-based high explosives, also used by the 7/7 London bombers as well as by previously intercepted terrorist cells in Denmark and Germany. The amount of chemicals was far smaller, however, than the hundreds of liters acquired by the so-called Sauerland cell in Germany. Nevertheless, it was reportedly sufficient to make one large bomb device or several small ones. 9 The suspects also procured chemistry masks, gloves, and other types of substances and equipment suitable for bombmaking. 10 Using a technique applied by the British MI5 against a cell in Britain in 2004, the Norwegian police secretly replaced the dangerous chemicals with harmless substances. 11 Larson, “Scandinavian Trials Demonstrate Difficulty of In addition to the bomb manufacturing activities, police secured a host of other circumstantial evidence suggesting a terrorist plot, including incriminating e-mail correspondence, phone books, notes and pictures, all indicating ties to international terrorist networks. The investigators found passport photos of Ibrahim Adam, a terrorist suspect wanted by British authorities for his alleged involvement in previous plots in London. One of the cell members claims he was asked to assist in procuring false passports for Adam with a view to bringing him into the country. 12 The cell may also have been involved in money transfers to illegal terrorist organizations. 13 There is still much uncertainty and confusion surrounding the Norway cell and its intentions. Authorities believe the cell intended to strike a target on Norwegian soil, possibly against Chinese interests. Thus far, however, this assumption appears to rest more on inference and conjecture than actual evidence. 14 The fact that one of the cell members applied twice for a preparatory course at an oil drilling company (although he never showed up) has raised fears that the alleged cell planned attacks against Norway’s vital oil industry; Norway is 12 Amund Bakke Foss, Francis Lundh, and Daniel Pinheiro Harbo, “Terrorsiktet ble bedt om å skaffe falskt pass,” Verdens Gang, July 12, 2010; Frode Hansen and Harald S. Klungtveit, “Terror-ettersøkte Ibrahim (23) skulle hjelpes inn i Norge med falsk pass,” Dagbladet, July 16, 2010. 13 According to U.S. Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey, the U.S. Terrorism Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), which has been accessing all international bank transactions recorded by the Belgium-based company SWIFT until the end of 2009, “provided support to the Norwegian investigation.” Another possible indication is that one of the suspects had registered a private firm from which he withdrew nearly $600,000 before the firm went bankrupt. The firm’s transactions were considered illegal by experts. See Valentina Pop, “‘Swift’ Used in Norway’s al Qaeda Sting, US Says,” EUObserver, July 9, 2010; Jarle Brenna, Rolf J. Widerøe, Kari Tone Sperstad, and Amund Bakke Foss, “Terrorsiktet tok ut seks millioner i Obtaining Terrorist Financing Convictions,” Terrorism kontanter,” Verdens Gang, July 9, 2010. 9 “Norge var terrormålet,” Aftenposten, July 10, 2010; 14 Harald S. Klungtveit et al., “Slik planla de terror på Case Highlights Terror Strategy,” Associated Press, July ”Eksplosivene ble ikke oppbevart hos siktede,” Aftenpos- norsk jord,” Dagbladet, July 13, 2010; Kari Tone Sper- 16, 2010. Also see the entries about Norway in the U.S. ten, July 11, 2010. stad, Tom Bakkeli, and Amund Bakke Foss, “PST: - Ter- Department of State’s “Patterns of Global Terrorism” for 10 “Slik ble de avslørt,” Dagbladet, July 16, 2010. rorhandlingen skulle skje på norsk jord,” Verdens Gang, 2007 to 2009. 11 “Norge var terrormålet.” July 12, 2010. Monitor 7:5 (2009); Ian MacDougall, “Norway al-Qaida 14 AUGUST 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 8 among the world’s largest oil exporting countries. 15 The investigation of the Norway cell has clearly been influenced by both national and international media. The timing of the arrests was premature and not ideal from an investigation point of view. 16 Officially, the story is that an Associated Press investigation into the global terrorist network, of which the “If, on the other hand, it is proven that the plotters received direct orders from al-Qa`ida’s central command in Pakistan, the case should be interpreted as another sign of al-Qa`ida’s success in sustaining an operational capability in the West.” Norway cell was part, forced Norwegian authorities to arrest the suspects. 17 On the other hand, growing U.S. pressure to act decisively against a cell that had links both to the United States and to alQa`ida’s top command may also explain why the police moved in prematurely. Following the highly publicized arrests, a steady stream of leaks from sources close to the investigation has fed the national media. Initially, the leaks appeared to strengthen the prosecution’s 15 Amund Bakke Foss et al., “Terrorsiktet meldte seg opp til oljeboringskurs,” Verdens Gang, July 9, 2010. It is not uncommon for jihadists in Europe to find work in sectors vulnerable to terrorist attacks. For example, several members of the Dutch-Moroccan Hofstadgroup linked to the 2004 murder of Theo Van Gogh worked at case, but gradually information more favorable to the defendants has found its way to the newspapers, to a point where the security service chief threatened to have the defendants’ lawyers replaced for leaking classified information. 18 Even though the present case looks much stronger than previous terrorism investigations in Norway when the defendants have been acquitted on terrorism charges, many commentators have voiced skepticism about the prospects of a conclusive verdict. Norway’s antiterrorism laws require a collective effort, a “conspiracy” of two or more people, which in principle makes it legal for a lone individual to initiate limited preparations for terrorist acts on his/her own. 19 The defense lawyers have had some success in pushing this argument, not the least because it has transpired that one of the defendants had in fact been a police informant since 2009—one of the more intriguing details of the Norway plot. He claims to have alerted the authorities about the passport fraud operation and other issues. He has, however, reportedly admitted that he failed to notify them about the purchase of chemicals. 20 Information so far suggests that the cell leader, the Uighur national, was far more involved than the other two, and it remains to be seen if a conspiracy can be proven conclusively. The Sociology of the Alleged Terrorist Cell The three cell members are all relatively recent immigrants to Norway. They arrived in the country in the late 1990s or early 2000s, and gradually obtained permanent residency and, in the case of Davud, Norwegian citizenship. Their profiles depart somewhat from the new archtype of homegrown terrorism, in which cell members are young disenfranchised second or third generation immigrants, and are mostly self-radicalized and selfrecruited, operating autonomously from any central leadership. Schiphol airport, and a central member of a Pakistani cell Information so far suggests that the cell leader, Mikael Davud, had established contacts with al-Qa`ida back in 2001-2002 and is suspected of having maintained longtime contacts with militant leaders in Waziristan, which he allegedly visited in 20082009. 21 Investigators first came across his name when Seyfullah, the top commander of the Turkistan Islamic Party, reportedly tried to call his mobile number in September 2008. 22 Davud had also studied at an Islamic boarding school (madrasa) in Karachi during the late 1990s, but did not complete his education for unknown reasons. 23 The two other cell members, the Iraqi-Kurd Shawan Sadek Saeed Bujak (37-yearsold) and the Uzbek national David Jakobsen (31-years-old), had apparently been radicalized in Europe. Bujak spent several years seeking asylum in Germany where he reportedly became “more religious.” 24 Jakobsen, the youngest cell member, adopted radical views after arriving in Norway. 25 Leaders of the Uzbek community in Oslo claim they knew about him and had alerted the authorities about militant activism in their community. 26 Despite living relatively inconspicuous lives, several of the cell members were involved in various forms of petty crime, such as the smuggling of halal meat from Sweden, the purchase of illegal travel documents, and misappropriation of company funds. 27 They may also have drawn attention to themselves by the fact that they engaged openly in Islamic activism in the Norwegian towns where they set foot; they made little effort to hide their radical leanings. Bujak headed an Islamic cultural center in Førde, a small town in western Norway and was remembered among his former work colleagues for having voiced 21 Musharbash. 22 “Davuds mobilnummer funnet hos uigurtopp.” 23 Davud had obtained permission by Chinese authori- planning attacks in the United Kingdom in 2004 worked ties to travel to Pakistan. See Line Brustad, Ida Hanstad at Britain’s main electricity grid provider, stealing infor- 18 “Forsvarer: - PST bør holde kjeft,” Aftenposten, July and Per Asle Rustad, “Terrorsiktet ville bli imam,” Ver- mation about its vulnerabilities. See The British Crown, 10, 2010; “PST anklager forsvarere for lekkasjer,” Ver- dens Gang, July 17, 2010. “Opening statement Regina vs Omar Khyam et al.,” as dens Gang, August 6, 2010. 24 Eiliv Frich Flydal and Mikal Hem, “Terrorsiktet hyl- published in “Momin Khawaja Constitutes the Canadian 19 Per Asle Rustad, “Terrorsiktede kan reddes av norsk let Bin Laden,” Dagbladet, July 25, 2010. End of the Conspiracy,” Ottawa Citizen, March 23, 2006. lov,” Verdens Gang, July 21, 2010. 25 Harald S. Klungtveit et al., “Her pågripes terrorsikt- 16 “Terrorsiktelsene kunne ha vært utvidet,” Aftenpos- 20 Tom Bakkeli et al., “Terrorsiktet har vært informant ede Shawan (37) av tysk spesialpoliti,” Dagbladet, July 9, ten, July 8, 2010. for PST siden 2009,” Verdens Gang, July 12, 2010; Lars 2010. 17 Randi Fuglehaug and Jonas Sverrisson Rasch, Akerhaug, Jenny Sandvig, and Lars-Christian U. Tal- 26 Ibid. “Amerikansk nyhetsbyrå visste om saken,” Dagbladet, seth, “Var mistenkt - ble informant,” Aftenposten, July 12, 27 Hans Torgersen et al., “Her drev én av de terrorsikt- July 9, 2010. 2010. ede kiosk,” Aftenposten, July 11, 2010. 15 AUGUST 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 8 strong sympathies for al-Qa`ida and Usama bin Ladin. 28 Davud attended the Muslim Culture Center, a controversial mosque known for its militant views, in the sleepy town of Sarpsborg, southeast of Oslo. 29 This is where he got to know Jakobsen. 30 Davud also frequented radical milieus in Bergen, where he reportedly met Bujak. 31 One interesting detail of the Norway cell is the fact that all members changed their names in 2006-2007, following the Prophet Muhammad cartoon crisis. Two of them adopted names that sounded less foreign. Jakobsen’s original name was Alisjer Abdulaif and Davud’s name was Mohammad Rashidin. They also changed addresses relatively often, presumably to make it more difficult for authorities to keep track of them. 32 Age-wise, the Norway cell also departs slightly from the typical pattern, with all members well into their 30s, and one of them close to 40. Analyses of recent terrorism cases in Europe have hypothesized that there is a trend toward younger militants. 33 The Norway cell is one of several examples contradicting this thesis. Throughout the history of jihadism in Europe, terrorist cells have typically been mentored and led by people in their late 30s, whereas the foot soldiers have been youngsters in their teens or early 20s. 34 28 Flydal and Hem; Harald S. Klungtveit and Torgeir P. Krokfjord, “Slik levde de terrorsiktede et dobbeltliv,” Dagbladet, July 11, 2010. 29 The mosque’s imam, Shaikhjami Abdul-Qudus, has preached the death penalty for Muslims converting to Christianity and that Islamic law is above Norwegian law. Reportedly, there have been several conflicts between Muslim communities in Sarpsborg over issues such as suicide bombing and the Iraq war. See Anders Engen Sanden, “Omstridt moské i Sarpsborg,” Aftenpos- The multinational character of the cell is also interesting, as it is consistent with what appears to be an increasingly more important pattern of jihadist terrorism in Europe. Previously dominated by Arabs from North Africa and the Middle East, jihadist networks have grown more diverse, including large numbers of activists from Asia, mainly Pakistan, the Caucasus, and East Africa, as well as European converts. In a growing number of cases, non-Arabs have also assumed important leadership positions. The Germany-based Sauerland-cell in 2007 is a case in point. 35 Uighurs, however, have hardly ever figured in jihadist networks in Europe. Possible Motives The available information provides few clues about the exact motive for an attack in Norway at this point. If Chinese interests were in fact the target, the ongoing conflict between Uighur separatists and the Chinese government will be seen as the most likely motive, in which case Norway is merely an opportune arena rather than a target. It should not be surprising, however, if it develops that the group sought to strike at Norwegian interests directly. While Norway has not been a priority target for al-Qa`ida in the past, it has been specifically singled out by name in al-Qa`ida speeches, most ominously by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2003 and 2004, and by Abu Yahya al-Libi in 2006. There are good reasons for this: from al-Qa`ida’s perspective, Norway maintains a close military alliance with the United States, has a historical, deep-rooted friendship with Israel and is a significant military contributor in Afghanistan and other fronts in the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Moreover, Norwegian authorities previously imprisoned Mullah Krekar, the infamous ten, July 12, 2010. 30 Ibid. Khyam,” BBC, April 30, 2007. 31 In spring 2010, another Uighur resident from Bergen 35 See, for example, Guido Steinberg, The Islamic Jihad was reportedly arrested in Pakistan on terrorism charg- Union (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2008); es. See “Uigur fra Bergen pågrepet i Pakistan,” ABCNy- Simone Kaiser, Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark, heter.no, July 15, 2010. “Operation Alberich, How the CIA Helped Germany 32 Klungtveit and Krokfjord. Foil Terror Plot,” Der Spiegel, September 10, 2007. Also 33 See, for example, Lorenzo Vidino, “The Hofstad see Morten Skjoldager, Truslen indefra - De Danske Ter- Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe,” rorister (Copenhagen: Lindhardt og Ringhof, 2009); Pet- Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30:7 (2007): pp. 579-592. ter Nesser, “Lessons Learned from the September 2007 34 In fact, young people have only headed terrorist cells German Terrorist Plot,” CTC Sentinel 1:4 (2008); Petter in a limited number of cases. See Petter Nesser, Jihad in Nesser, “Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe Europe: A Survey of the Motivations for Sunni Islamist Ter- 1994-2007: Planned, Prepared, and Executed Terrorist rorism in Post-Millennium Europe (Kjeller: Norwegian Attacks,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31:10 (2008): Defence Research Establishment, 2004); “Profile: Omar pp. 924-946. 16 founder of the Kurdish-Iraqi terrorist group Ansar al-Islam, and have ordered his deportation. Finally, the publication of the Prophet Muhammad cartoons by a few Norwegian newspapers also added to the country’s visibility on jihadist websites, although it was overshadowed by events in neighboring Denmark. Preliminary Implications and Lessons Learned Assessments of the wider implications of the Norway cell will necessarily have to take into account its organizational origins and its intended target, key details that still remain murky. If the cell primarily operated on behalf of the Turkistan Islamic Party, targeting Chinese interests internationally, the case may be seen as another example of increased involvement by al-Qa`ida’s “The multinational character of the cell is also interesting, as it is consistent with what appears to be an increasingly more important pattern of jihadist terrorism in Europe.” regional affiliates in international terrorism outside their immediate theater of operation. Other recent examples of this include the role of alQa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula in the Christmas Day airliner plot in Detroit in 2009, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s involvement in the Times Square attack in May 2010, and the Islamic Jihad Union’s plot in Germany (the Sauerland cell) in September 2007. One may also add the recent assassination attempt on Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard by a Danish-Somali who has been linked to the al-Shabab movement. If, on the other hand, it is proven that the plotters received direct orders from al-Qa`ida’s central command in Pakistan, the case should be interpreted as another sign of al-Qa`ida’s success in sustaining an operational capability in the West. Furthermore, the discovery of al-Qa`ida cells in Norway may suggest that the organization seeks to build AUGUST 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 8 a new capability to strike Europe’s periphery. Its networks in central Europe have suffered serious setbacks after the disruption of numerous cells in Spain, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Denmark, and it may have pushed al-Qa`ida to seek new opportunities in countries less affected by al-Qa`ida terrorism. From Norway’s perspective, it is important to acknowledge the fact that terrorist cells hardly ever emerge from a vacuum. Terrorist cells need supporters and sympathizers to recruit and operate successfully. Discovery of such cells is usually a strong sign that radicalism and underground extremist networks are on the rise. Petter Nesser is a research fellow at The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). He is trained in the areas of social science, Middle Eastern Studies, and Arabic, and has conducted extensive research on jihadist terrorism in Europe. Mr. Nesser has focused mainly on terrorist motivations and radicalization processes. Dr. Brynjar Lia is a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) where he currently heads FFI’s research on international terrorism and radical Islamism. Trained in Arabic, Russian and Middle Eastern studies, he obtained his Ph.D. in contemporary Middle Eastern history at the University of Oslo. He was a Visiting Fulbright Scholar at Harvard University from 2001-2002. Dr. Lia’s most recent book is Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qa`ida Strategist Abu Mus`ab al-Suri (Columbia University Press, 2008). American Journeys to Jihad: U.S. Extremists and Foreign Conflicts During the 1980s and 1990s By William Rosenau and Sara Daly violent extremism among American Muslims has been the subject of considerable official and analytical attention in the years since the attacks of September 11, 2001. This scrutiny, however, is devoted almost entirely to the post-9/11 period. 1 Particularly neglected has been the subject of American Muslims who traveled to “fields of jihad” in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kashmir during the 1980s and 1990s—a significant gap in knowledge, given plausible claims that hundreds if not thousands of individuals (most, if not all, presumably Muslims) left the United States to join armed struggles abroad during this period. After nearly 10 years of the “global war on terrorism,” it is necessary to explore the “pre-history” of contemporary Islamist extremism in the United States. Such an examination can help calibrate the scale of current challenges, design appropriate countermeasures and, ideally, avoid the mistakes of the past as well as the follies of presentmindedness. This article considers the cases of four Americans—Hiram Torres, Abu Adam Jibreel, Clement Rodney HamptonEl, and Isa Abdullah Ali—who made journeys to foreign jihads before 9/11. Although hundreds if not thousands of Americans may have left the United States for jihad, robust biographical information exists on only a handful of individuals—and even this information is incomplete. For example, little is known, at least publicly, about what networks might have helped these men join foreign struggles. Given these 1 For recent examples, see Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Ben Bodurian, A Growing Terrorist Threat? Assessing ‘Home- limitations, it is impossible to say with confidence whether or not these four cases are representative. At the very least, however, a consideration of these cases represents a first step toward the goal of creating a fuller picture of violent extremism among American Muslims before 9/11. Hiram Torres As a high school student in workingclass Perth Amboy, New Jersey, Hiram Torres explored a variety of religions and political creeds and yearned “to be part of a revolution somewhere,” one friend, Sachin Timbadia, recalled. 2 Torres traveled with another friend to Bangladesh in the summer of 1993, returning “a changed person,” according to his mother. 3 She recalled that he began wrapping sheets around his head like a turban and expressing outrage at the poverty he had witnessed in South Asia. 4 An excellent student, Torres attended Yale but dropped out in 1993 during his freshman year. “He wanted to be in another country,” according to a college roommate, who added that Torres “certainly wasn’t violent and he didn’t talk about hating America—it just wasn’t a place he wanted to live.” 5 Acquaintances said that Torres was not noticeably secretive. Yet in high school he refused to have his picture taken for the high school yearbook because he “wanted to keep a low profile in case something happened in the future,” said Timbadia. At Yale, he declined to submit a photo for the freshman face book—suggesting, perhaps, preparation for a new and possibly clandestine existence. 6 Several months after dropping out of college, Torres returned to Bangladesh and then moved to Pakistan and finally Afghanistan, where he last made contact with his mother in 1998. 7 Nothing more was heard of Torres until December 2001, when a New York Times reporter discovered documents in a house in grown’ Extremism in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010); 2 David Rohde and James Risen, “A Nation Challenged: Brian Michael Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Ji- Another Expatriate,” New York Times, February 6, 2002. hadist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 3 Jocelyn Lippert, “1993 Yale Drop-Out Linked to Al 2001 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2010). An Qaeda,” Yale Daily News, February 7, 2002. important exception is Lorenzo Vidino, “Homegrown 4 Ibid. Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Oc- 5 Ibid. casional Phenomenon?” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 6 Ibid. 32:1 (2009). 7 Rohde and Risen. 17