The International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DICTIONNAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE LA PSYCHANALYSE EDITORIAL EDITORIAL BOARD BOARD AND AND TRANSLATORS TRANSLATORS EDITOR IN CHIEF Alain de Mijolla President and founder of the International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis Neuropsychiatrist and psychoanalyst Member of the Société psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society) Member of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) Member of the Conceptual and Empirical Research Committee of the IPA EDITORIAL BOARD (French Edition) Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Psychoanalyst and professor of psychopathology and psychoanalysis University of Paris VII, Denis-Diderot Member of the Quatrième groupe (O.P.L.F.) Roger Perron Director of Honors Research at National Center for Scientific Research, Paris Member of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) Bernard Golse, MD Pediatric psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Chief of staff of Pediatric psychiatry, Saint-Vincent de Paul Hospital, Paris Professor of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry University of Paris V, René Descartes U.S. ADVISORY BOARD Edward Nersessian, MD Training and Supervising Analyst New York Psychoanalytic Institute Clinical Associate Professor of Psychiatry New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center Paul Roazen, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus, Social and Political Science York University BOARD OF TRANSLATORS Philip Beitchman Jocelyne Barque Robert Bononno Andrew Brown Dan Collins Liam Gavin John Galbraith Simmons Sophie Leighton Donald Nicholson-Smith Scott Savaiano Paul Sutton Gwendolyn Wells ii INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DICTIONNAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE LA PSYCHANALYSE VOLUME ONE A–F ALAIN DE MIJOLLA EDITOR IN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DICTIONNAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE LA PSYCHANALYSE VOLUME TWO G–PR ALAIN DE MIJOLLA EDITOR IN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DICTIONNAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE LA PSYCHANALYSE VOLUME THREE PS–Z ALAIN DE MIJOLLA EDITOR IN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DICTIONNAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE LA PSYCHANALYSE Editor in Chief Alain de Mijolla Ó2005 Thomson Gale, a part of the Thomson Corporation. Thomson Star Logo and Macmillan Reference USA are trademarks and Gale is a registered trademark used herein under license. Originally published as Dictionnaire international de la psychanalyse Ó 2002, Editions Calmann-Lévy This book was published with the support of the French Ministry of Culture—National Book Center. Cet ouvrage a été publié avec l’assistance du Ministère chargé de la culture—Centre National du Livre. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED No part of this work covered by the copyright hereon may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means—graphic, electronic, or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, taping, Web distribution, or information storage retrieval systems—without the written permission of the publisher. 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ISBN 0-02-865924-4 (set hardcover : alk. paper) - -ISBN 0-02-865925-2 (v. 1) - -ISBN 0-02-865926-0 (v. 2) - -ISBN 0-02-865927-9 (v. 3) 1. Psychoanalysis–Encyclopedias. I. Mijolla, A. de. II. Title. III. Title: Dictionnaire international de la psychanalyse. [DNLM: 1. Psychoanalysis- -Encyclopedias- -English. WM 13 D5555 2005a] RC501.4.D4313 2005 616.89’17’03–dc22 2005014307 This title is also available as an e-book ISBN 0-02-865994-5 (set) Contact your Thomson Gale sales representative for ordering information. Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 CONTENTS CONTENTS Preface to the French Edition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii Preface to the American Edition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv Introduction to the American Edition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix List of Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiii Directory of Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lv Thematic Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .lxix Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lxxxv INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A–B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Photograph Insert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . following p. 238 C–F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .239 G–L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .663 Photograph Insert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . following p. 998 M–Pr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .999 Ps–S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1345 Photograph Insert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . following p. 1722 T–Z. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1723 Freudian Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1893 General Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1903 Translation of Concepts/Notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2013 Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2045 Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2049 v EDITORIAL STAFF EDITORIAL AND AND PRODUCTION PRODUCTION STAFF Frank Menchaca Publisher Nathalie Duval Acquisitions and Development Editor Rachel J. Kain Project Editor Patricia Kamoun-Bergwerk, Pamela A. Dear, and Nancy Matuszak Editorial Support David Gassaway, Samera Nasereddin, Alan Thwaits, Shauna Toh, and John Yohalem Copyeditors Eleanor Stanford and Shanna Weagle Proofreaders Matthew von Unwerth and Clayton Simmons Bibliographic Researchers Do Mi Stauber Indexer Luann Brennan Editorial Systems Implementation Specialist Lezlie Light Imaging Coordinator Denay Wilding Editor, Imaging and Multimedia Content Margaret Abendroth and Ron Montgomery Rights Acquisition Management Jennifer Wahi Art Director Evi Seoud Assistant Manager, Composition Wendy Blurton Senior Manufacturing Specialist vi PREFACE PREFACE TO TO THE THE FRENCH FRENCH EDITION EDITION This preface outlines the history and options of an editorial undertaking which, since it took shape gradually over a ten-year period, could naturally not be brought up to date in every detail. I hope that what follows will answer most of the questions of readers taken aback by such and such an omission or such and such an editorial decision. My most important concern, however, is that these remarks should help elicit the indispensable additions and corrections that it is to be hoped will be submitted as time goes on. To participate in the step-by-step construction of an international dictionary of psychoanalysis is a strange adventure, marked not only by enthusiasm but also from time to time by disillusion. The process might well be compared to the education of children, a realistic view of which (sometimes attributed to Freud) asserts that one may be almost certain that one’s hopes will not be fully realized. All the same, the years I spent with the editorial board assigning and patiently gathering in the more than fifteen hundred articles comprising this work, and the subsequent years preparing all this material for publication, have been among the most exciting I have known. One reason was the variety and cordiality of the international connections that the project created; another was the growing awareness of the vigorous multifacetedness of psychoanalysis as a whole, which has been evolving for over a century now within so many different nations, languages and cultures. The charge of dogmatism, too often leveled at psychoanalysis, simply evaporates in face of the heterogeneity apparent to anyone who explores the many ways in which psychoanalytic theory and practice are understood and experienced around the world. Freud’s metapsychological concepts, which he called ‘‘Grundbegriffe’’— a set of foundations few in number but solidly anchored—have constantly demonstrated their usefulness, and they have endured almost unchanged. On the other hand, most Freudian, post-Freudian or even para-Freudian notions are like so many living organisms—ever prone to modification, and tending to be forgotten and (sometimes) resurrected; above all, they are subject to divergent interpretations, reflecting the element of the unforeseeable that is inevitably present for any analyst who refuses to be tied down by rigid theoretical models. Such divergences result too from the lessons of clinical practice and the temporary or permanent changes which that experience imposes on analytic theory; they are the traces of an empirical inquiry that has continued unabated from Freud’s earliest tentative explorations to the confrontation with life as it is lived today. The coexistence in this dictionary of ideas that are oftentimes in contradiction with one another, or that have been developed in different ways from one continent to another, is testimony to their main characteristic: they are provisional conceptual tools, and their ephemeral quality indicates that in psychoanalysis, in one sense at least, everything always remains to be discovered, for the questions asked are forever being posed anew. vii PREFACE TO THE FRENCH EDITION Once the idea of this dictionary had been conceived, based on the principle of a diversity of viewpoints, I proposed to the publishers, Calmann-Lévy, that an editorial board be formed, to be made up of recognized colleagues belonging to French psychoanalytic schools of differing orientations. I owe a great debt of gratitude to the friends who constituted that small group: Professors Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor, Roger Perron, and Bernard Golse, joined during the first stages by Dr. Jacques Angelergues. They all made vital contributions during those crucial early days. It is in their name, moreover, that I shall now describe our work methods and the route we took. At a very early stage, thanks to a letter announcing our plan, we won the allegiance of a number of distinguished psychoanalysts. They became a kind of support committee, and their prestige lent weight to our approach to potential contributors. Simultaneously, we solicited the participation and counsel of not a few researchers known to us from our years as practitioners of psychoanalysis; we were also able to draw on connections built up over the fifteen-year existence of the International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis (IAHP). In this way a group of ‘‘advisors’’ was assembled, each of whom was asked to assume responsibility for a particular segment of our vast field of operations, to suggest to the editorial committee those concepts or individuals that they felt should absolutely be included as entries in the panoramic vision of the dictionary, and to identify the authors who in their view would be the best fitted to write those articles. Their advice was gratefully received and closely followed. At the same time, we consulted a good number of indexes of existing psychoanalytic works in order to reach a first list of concepts; and the IAHP’s Revue Internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse (International Review of the History of Psychoanalysis; discontinued in 1992) was a good source in determining which figures or events were the most frequently cited. In 1995 and 1996, at our editorial committee meetings, we debated all the proposed topics thus accumulated, rejecting some and adding others, until we arrived at a list that, truth to tell, was never completely finalized until the very last days before the manuscript was delivered. Our choices were made in a collegial spirit, before each of us was put in charge of a variable number of entries to assign to their respective authors along with general composition and format guidelines intended to impose some measure of uniformity on the immensely varied material to be produced. Since almost a third of the entries commissioned were written in languages other than French, our commitment to an international approach was indeed undeviating, but there is no denying that this dictionary was conceived and realized by psychoanalysts trained and practicing in France. The selection of topics and the content of the entries may well reveal a somewhat ‘‘French’’ cast of mind. How indeed could it be otherwise? But it is my sincere hope that foreign readers will adopt an actively critical attitude in this connection, by suggesting, even contributing, additions. Nothing could be more in tune with our desire for the widest possible opening onto the world at large. On the other hand, of course, by opting for a great diversity of contributors we risked losing a sense of unity, and unity is reassuring. We were quite aware that alert critics were bound to underscore the lacunae, the inadequacies, even the outright contradictions that would appear among entries written, say, by a French author, an English or American analyst, and a colleague from South America—each loyal, moreover, to a particular theoretical orientation. Similarly, the very topics chosen by our advisors must perforce reflect their personal judgments rather than ours. Occasionally we editors proposed additional subjects, but by and large we allowed the advisors’ selection to stand, out of respect for the agreement we had with them; in any event, it would have ill behooved the editorial board or the editor-in-chief to claim a knowledge superior to that of the advisors whom we had chosen as our guides in the matter. viii INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PREFACE TO THE FRENCH EDITION It should be noted that despite our request that authors abide by specified space limitations, some were so carried away by their attachment to their assigned topic that they turned in longer contributions than anticipated. In some cases we were obliged to ask for significant cuts, and I should like to thank all contributors concerned for their goodnatured and prompt acquiescence to what were surely painful self-amputations. As for those who found it easier to abide by our space constraints, their contributions were retained unmodified, at the risk of giving readers the mistaken impression, in view of disparities of length, that we meant either to downplay or to highlight some particular concept or individual. Such editorial changes to submitted manuscript as we made were minor, concerned chiefly with formal aspects (style, ordering of paragraphs, standardization of references, etc.). In no case was any kind of censorship exercised by me or by any member of the editorial board, and no important revision was made without first suggesting it to the author concerned. It was out of the question that any article be published in seriously modified form without the writer’s full approval. All articles are signed, and while the editors are responsible for their publication in the context of this dictionary, they belong in the moral and literary senses to their individual authors. With this in mind, each contributor had a contract and was remunerated appropriately, the main purpose being to acknowledge his or her authorship and to keep our collaboration, friendships notwithstanding, within a clearly legal framework. Let me reiterate, as a last point, that this dictionary was created over a period of years. As with all such enterprises, and especially one involving so many contributors sprinkled across the globe, it was bound to be overtaken here and there by events, with no realistic prospect of a complete updating prior to publication. We must hope that such time-related shortcomings will be rectified as future editions appear. Why is a dictionary of psychoanalysis needed? Interestingly, it was rather late on in the history of psychoanalysis that the call for a clearer definition of Freudian terms, whose precision was threatened by their wider and wider currency, was first heard. The teaching offered before the Second World War at the Berlin and later at the Vienna Institute of Psychoanalysis certainly helped show up the need for analysts in training to have to hand a work that, though not a manual, would furnish precise information on a still vigorously evolving body of theory. The fact that Freud lent his support to the idea, coupled no doubt with the anxiety aroused by the defections and misapplications then plaguing the young discipline of psychoanalysis, provided added impetus. Thanks to Richard F. Sterba’s Reminiscences of a Viennese Psychoanalyst (Detroit: Wayne State U. P., 1982), we are acquainted with the circumstances under which the first tentative attempt to compile a dictionary of psychoanalysis was made: In 1931, at the suggestion of A. J. Storfer, I had undertaken the task of writing a psychoanalytic dictionary (Handwörterbuch der Psychoanalyse). Storfer actually began this work with the definition of a few terms beginning with the letter A, but he found the task too time consuming. He asked me to continue the work with him, to which I agreed. It was a project for which my experience in 1925 and 1926, working on the index of the Gesammelte Schriften von Sigmund Freud (Collected Works of Sigmund Freud) was an enormous help. Soon, however, Storfer lost interest in or courage for the enormous project and dropped out of our partnership. As ransom for dissolving the partnership, he gave me the index galleys and typescript pages and all of the eleven volumes of the Gesamtausgabe. I carried on the work alone. The dictionary was supposed to appear gradually in sixteen issues, of which the first was published on the occasion of Freud’s eightieth birthday, 6 May 1936. The preface to the first issue was the facsimile of a letter Freud wrote to me. When I had finished the letter A of the dictionary, I had given a copy to Anna Freud and asked her to submit it for Freud’s scrutiny. After a short while I received this letter from Freud, which I quote here in English translation: ‘‘Your ’dictionary’ gives me the impression of being a valuable aid to learners and of being a fine INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ix PREFACE TO THE FRENCH EDITION achievement on its own account. The precision and correctness of the individual entries is in fact of commendable excellence. English and French translations of the headings are not indispensable but would add further to the value of the work. I do not overlook the fact that the path from the letter A to the end of the alphabet is a very long one, and that to follow it would mean an enormous burden of work for you. So do not do it unless you feel an internal obligation—only obey a compulsion of that kind and certainly not any external pressure’’ (pp. 99–100; Freud’s letter translated by James Strachey, Standard Edition, Vol. 22, p. 253). In the wake of this first effort, and very soon in the case of North America, there appeared several dictionaries, or lexicons presenting select passages from Freud’s writings, designed to help define psychoanalytic concepts for analysts in training in the institutes; some went further, offering explanations meant to make psychoanalytic theory more accessible to the general reader. Important works falling under this general rubric are the Glossary of Psycho-Analytical Terms published under the editorship of Ernest Jones in 1924, a harbinger of the Standard Edition; the lists generated by the French Commission Linguistique pour le Vocabulaire Pschanalytique in 1923-24; or the New German-English PsychoAnalytical Vocabulary of 1943. It is also well worth citing the Encyclopedia of Psychoanalysis edited by Ludwig Eidelberg (New York: Free Press, 1968) and Charles Rycroft’s idiosyncratic Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis (London: Nelson, 1968). In France, the initiatives of Daniel Lagache began as early as the 1950s, with the start of a dictionary in installments published in Maryse Choisy’s journal Psyché, and they culminated in that matchless work tool, the Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse, by Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (Paris: PUF, 1967; translated as The Language of PsychoAnalysis, London: Institute of Psycho-Analysis/Hogarth, 1973). It should be borne in mind, however, that Laplanche and Pontalis’s in-depth study was restricted for the most part to the concepts of psychoanalysis as developed in Freud’s work alone. Later French dictionaries of psychoanalysis were also intentionally circumscribed in one way or another. Pierre Fédida’s Dictionnaire abrégé, comparatif et critique des notions principales de la psychanalyse (Paris: Larousse, 1974) is a case in point. Some works pointed up the theoretical contributions of Jacques Lacan, such as the Dictionnaire de la psychanalyse edited by Roland Chemama and Bernard Vandermersche (Paris: Larousse, 1993; expanded edition, 1998), or Pierre Kaufmann’s L’Apport freudien (The Freudian Contribution). Kaufmann’s book (Paris: Bordas, 1993) is presented as a psychoanalytic encyclopedia rather than a dictionary, which would presumably be more condensed. In fact, despite the inclusion of a few biographical sketches, very brief, and limited to the main figures in the history of psychoanalysis, the work does not display the diversity and world-wide scope what we have pursued in our own dictionary. Nor does it deal with the principal concepts developed on the basis of practices derived from or collateral to psychoanalysis, such as those of Jungian analytical psychology. Outside France, noteworthy titles—among many others which we have made no attempt to inventory here—include A Dictionary of Kleinian Thought by Robert K. Hinshelwood (London: Free Association Books, 1989), the Bibliographisches Lexicon der Psychoanalyse of Elke Mühlleitner (Tubingen: Diskord, 1992), and Dylan Evans’s Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1996), the first restricted to Kleinians, the second to members of the Vienna Society between 1902 and 1938, and the third to the thought of Jacques Lacan. More recently, in the United States, Burness E. Moore and Bernard D. Fine have edited Psychoanalysis: The Major Concepts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), which elaborates in a distinctly encyclopedic manner on some forty major psychoanalytic themes. The present dictionary differs markedly in fact from all its predecessors in the field, including Elizabeth Roudinesco and Michel Plon’s Dictionnaire de la psychanalyse (Paris: x INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PREFACE TO THE FRENCH EDITION Fayard, 1997) or the collected psychoanalytic articles of the French Encyclopaedia Universalis (1997). It is the only work that presents not just some nine hundred concepts or ideas, but also three hundred and sixty biographies of eminent psychoanalysts from around the world, one hundred and seventy of their most noted works, and fifty countries where psychoanalysis has taken root; more than a hundred entries deal with events that have punctuated the history of psychoanalysis in its multifarious lines of development; the institutions that have embodied that development are likewise described in detail, as are the contributions of movements, such as analytical psychology and individual psychology, which stemmed from psychoanalysis. A chronological approach was a guiding principle, and even if it could not be followed in every single entry, our contributors were urged to hew fast to a historical perspective. Only thus can theoretical choices be relativized so that they lose their rigidly fixed character and reveal themselves to be variable according to time and place. By offering a dais to a large number of psychoanalysts of different theoretical and practical persuasions, moreover, we hoped to arrive at a kind of overall picture that was contradictory precisely because it was alive—a candid shot, as it were, of psychoanalysis today, complete with the more or less conflict-prone schools in the context of which it has developed up to now and, it is to be hoped, will continue to evolve in the future. Our intention was to distinguish our dictionary as clearly as possible from works written by a small number of collaborators expressing the point of view of a particular psychoanalytic group or tendency. All the same, it must be understood that we believe unequivocally that psychoanalysis was conceived and has developed in the context of Freudian ideas. The reference to Freud is cardinal in this work, and other theoretical and practical options have a place here only insofar as they have a direct or indirect, temporary or permanent connection with Freud, with Freud’s history, or with the history of the psychoanalytic movement that Freud founded. Psychoanalysis was created as the twentieth century opened, and it developed along with that century, affecting its historical, cultural and moral character by reason of the new way of thinking it represented. The reader should not therefore be surprised to find entries here whose subjects are writers, philosophers—even a literary movement like Surrealism, or such events as the First and Second World Wars. But in such cases we chose not to offer a detailed and biographical or historical account, or a complete account of an individual’s work, but rather to confine ourselves to the subject’s relationship to psychoanalysis. This also makes it possible, however, to trace the ways in which the sound and fury of the world reverberated within psychoanalysis, causing it to change or readapt. It should be remembered, too, that if psychoanalysis has a closer intimacy with the individual’s psychic suffering than do other approaches, this is attributable to the intense personal involvement of those who helped refine its powers; for this reason we paid particular attention to the biography of the pioneers and their chief successors. Readers who find certain biographical details merely anecdotal are urged to bear in mind that no theoretical proposition should be entirely detached from the conscious and unconscious life of its originator, and this goes for Freud as much as for anyone else. We have nevertheless refrained from any hasty or ‘‘wild’’ interpretations of individual figures: nothing could be more radically at odds with the psychoanalytic approach than to pass judgment on a human being in just a few lines. It was indeed never the mission of this dictionary to rank individuals or tendencies. Of course, it is impossible to avoid assuming criteria of worth, but even these cannot claim to exist sub specie aeternitatis; rather, they are mainly reflections—setting aside the enthusiasm of a particular author for his or her subject—of the spirit of the times or of geograINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS xi PREFACE TO THE FRENCH EDITION phical context. The articles concerned with Jung or Jungian notions were thus assigned to colleagues belonging to the societies of analytical psychology. Matters Adlerian were handled likewise. And topics relating to a Sándor Ferenczi, Melanie Klein, Jacques Lacan or Françoise Dolto were entrusted to writers close to them and their ideas. All is not told— and gossip hounds are likely to be disappointed. In our view, a dictionary such as this is neither holy writ nor pamphlet, but a kind of mirror held up to the time of its writing, bearing all the signs of that time’s fashions and conformities, and addressed to future generations, who with the benefit of hindsight will assuredly be able to read far more between the lines than is discernible to us. With respect to our handling of Freud’s works, we decided that the best way to avoid entanglement in the thickets of editions and translations around the world was to adopt as our basic system of reference the chronological bibliographical tags updated in Ingeborg Meyer-Palmedo and Gerhard Fichtner’s Freud-Bibliographie mit Werkkonkordanz (Frankfurt on the Main: S. Fischer, 1989). Our ‘‘Freud Bibliography’’ lists works of Freud according to this system; in each case the title is given in German and in English, along with a reference where applicable to the Gesammelte Werke and to the Standard Edition. It should be noted that we list only those works of Freud that are mentioned in the dictionary. Similarly, the ‘‘General Bibliography’’ is confined to works referred to in the text, and is in no sense intended to replace Alexander Grinstein’s Index of Psychoanalytic Writings (New York: International Universities Press, 1956-75). ‘‘A strange adventure,’’ I wrote at the beginning of this preface, and the reader will perhaps have surmised on the basis of the above description of our modus operandi that the going was not always painless, or without its conflicts and clashes, even its moments of despondency. Yet we were always boosted by encouraging words from friends and colleagues who had got wind of our project in its earliest days and, from near or far, followed its progress throughout. Nor did we ever relinquish the conviction that this dictionary would answer a clear need in the analytic profession and among students or researchers who would find it to be a tool unlike any produced thus far. If there is such a thing as a ‘‘language of psychoanalysis,’’ albeit one considered opaque at times by its critics, we are confident that the present work will show it to be neither a wooden nor a dead language. It has grown up from roots shared by all psychoanalysts, but, as the range of our entries shows, from these common origins have sprung a variety of ‘‘dialects.’’ Each of them—Adlerian, Jungian, Rankian, Ferenczian, Lacanian, or Bionian— has developed in its own way, and inevitably affected the others in the process. Each, to a greater or lesser degree, has weathered conflict, or eclipse and revival—testimony to a salutary psychoanalytic ‘‘heteroglossia,’’ and to the kind of freedom that stimulates thought. The infinite variety of human beings, the diversity of their personal histories and the complexity of a psychological approach that encompasses the dimension of the unconscious can never be forced into the mold of a hypostasized language or submit to the dictates of some Big Brother preparing the ‘‘Newspeak’’ dictionary. You think, I dare say, that our chief job is inventing new words. But not a bit of it! We’re destroying words—scores of them, hundreds of them, every day. We’re cutting the language down to the bone. . . . Don’t you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it. Every concept that can ever be needed will be expressed by exactly one word, with its meaning rigidly defined. . . . Every year fewer and fewer words, and the range of consciousness always a little smaller (George Orwell, 1984. London: Secker and Warburg, 1987 [1949], pp. 53–54, 55). Alea jacta est. This work is now in the hands of its readers. They are invited to handle it as they will. To contribute notes or offer corrections. To convey to us their critical thoughts and to suggest topics they would like to see dealt with in the future. Such active expressions xii INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PREFACE TO THE FRENCH EDITION of interest would be the best possible reward for me personally and indeed for all those who have lent their hand over these last years to this portrait of psychoanalysis in the world of today. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA PARIS, JUNE 19, 2001 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS x ii i PREFACE PREFACE TO TO THE THE AMERICAN AMERICAN EDITION EDITION I am thrilled and honored to be a part of the initiative Thomson Gale (represented by Frank Menchaca as well as the highly-effective and ever-smiling Nathalie Duval) has undertaken to share this Dictionary, whose production I directed in France, with an American audience. This enormous and very difficult work has been successfully completed by a highly-motivated team, including (amongst the many others whom I shall not name): Rachel J. Kain, Rita Runchock, and Patricia Kamoun-Bergwerk; the remarkable American advisors Edward Nersessian and Paul Roazen who reviewed all the texts; Nellie Thompson, whose aid was invaluable at various stages in the project; Matthew von Unwerth, who compiled the ‘‘Further Readings’’ sections, and above all, the translators and revisers who fulfilled the difficult task of rendering texts into English that had for the most part been written by authors from France, Spain, Germany, and Portugal. These translators encountered difficulties raised by more than just the languages in which the authors wrote about these psychoanalytic concepts or biographies they were charged with. Despite a common foundation stemming directly from FreudÕs ideas, divergent conceptions leading them to be grasped from slightly more theoretical versus clinical viewpoints, depending on where one is standing, were necessarily in evidence—a fact that had to be both respected and, at the same time, made more accessible to American readers. However the sheer number of authors and the scope of their starting-points, as much national as related to different schools of psychoanalysis, nonetheless help us to avoid any sort of monolithic thinking, and beckon the reader to go beyond his or her reading of these dictionary entries with research that deepens their insight. For example, we have avoided repeating the precise definitions of terms cited by specific entries that the dictionary defines elsewhere. We have instead trusted that this dictionary would avail itself from page to page, concept to concept, psychoanalyst to psychoanalyst, to the likings of the systematic research or slightly poetic wanderings that constitute the most effective, or the most enlivened, approaches to getting to know a work such as this. In the Preface to the French edition I offer detailed ‘‘directions for use’’ to readers of this work, so there is no need to revisit that subject. Let me rather use the few lines afforded me here to reiterate the particular importance of this American edition—in my eyes at any rate. It speaks English, like most of the countries in the world today, and English is, of course, an indispensable vector for any thought with claims to universality. Since its humble beginnings in Vienna, psychoanalysis has obviously had a global impact not only in the clinical and therapeutic realms, but also in the arenas of culture and thought. The twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have been marked by ideas whose development has deeply affected the existence of each and every one of us. Our sexual and political lives, our xv PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION morality, our ways of understanding our relationships with others-all bear the unmistakable stamp of Freud’s legacy. By virtue of his family background and his many-sided education and training, Freud ended up at the point of intersection of cultural inflluences out of (and against) which psychoanalysis was gradually forged. This dual process, by no means painless, ensured the new discipline a position and multiple functions, which, as we may now plainly see as we look back over the years, have themselves been subject to continual evolution. A procedure for psychopathological investigation, a method with therapeutic aims, or a conceptual apparatus to account for the workings of the psyche (l Õesprit) in its external productions as well as its corporeal bonds—out of this ideological and scientific past which Freud conveyed, psychoanalysis has, in turn, modified the conditions of research into the most varied domains of knowledge and none, today, may pretend to be totally beyond its influence. No matter what position pharmacology assumes, (and we must believe in its progress), the encounter with the mentally ill, the listening to their discourse and the decryption of their delusional sayings in order to glean their secret message, like the patient reestablishing vanished relational capacities, will forever remain an affair that takes place between two human beings, from one psychical apparatus to another. The hope that inspired Jung and Bleuler when they first took responsibility for the schizophrenics in the Burghöltzi Asylum was as great as their disappointment. This phenomena repeated itself always and everywhere: Psychoanalysis began by appearing as ‘‘The Solution’’ to the unsolvable problems of mental illness. The example of America, beacon of enthusiasms and of disappointments, is illustrative in this respect—even more spectacularly so in that the all-powerful American Psychoanalytic Association permitted only doctors, psychiatrists for the most part, to join its ranks for the better part of 60 years. Such is not the case today. Yet even though this puncturing of belief-systems might make us think of a destructive tidal wave, this investigatory drive remains—a drive that mobilizes psychoanalysts for their research into new clinical terrain, as they attempt to shed light on and treat ever more diverse and grave pathological conditions. One day, no doubt, new psychopathological conceptions will effect another exploratory synthesis of the psyche and its dysfunctions, thereby authorizing new avenues of approach that will once again appear to us as nothing short of miraculous. But in the meantime, the patient and modest relational exchange, which underpins the psychoanalytic approach to patients in the psychical domain, remains todayÕs most developed adjuvant therapy, whose evergreater efficacy and more precise pinpointing may be looked for in the progress of the neurosciences, neurobiology, genetics or immunology. Although it continues to furnish, as Freud suggested, a ‘‘yield of knowledge’’ for other scientific domains, psychoanalysis gains its creative power and persistent originality from its position on the margins, due to the fact of its being the ‘‘other’’ that cannot be integrated into these disciplines, including literature, history, philosophy, etc. It is the ‘‘other’’ which disrupts through its theoretical a priori of a subversive discourse subjacent to all manifest discourse and which, (as the example of Freud himself proves), can never forget that its own words, as well as its thoughts, are condemned to expressing double-meanings, to contradiction, to interrogation; and which could therefore never be thought of as a finished product, a self-enclosed theory, still less a dogma. The turbulent political events of recent years have refueled the diffusion of psychoanalysis into territories that had previously been closed to it. Therefore both theory and practice will have to rub shoulders with new cultures, languages and other philosophical, religious, medical and scientific traditions. No doubt they will thereby come to brave new storms, know new successes and, fleeting declines. But we must always hope they will be capable of enriching themselves with these various contributions. For only thus is the never-ending xv i INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION research into the human psyche and its creations embarked upon anew—a quest that constitutes the psychoanalystÕs true place in the world of yesterday, today and, for an unforeseeable time still, tomorrow. Once again, I am particularly pleased and proud that the American edition of this dictionary is contributing, more so than all those that came before it, to extending and diffusing this perpetual renewal of Freudian thought throughout the world. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS xvii INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION TO TO THE THE AMERICAN AMERICAN EDITION EDITION Psychoanalysis is over 100 years old. Over the course of the 20th century, many new terms and concepts have been added to FreudÕs original constructs. This evolution has occurred not just in Vienna, Berlin, or Europe, but rather, all over the world. Consequently, new ideas have been formulated throughout and across the increasingly far-flung psychoanalytic community, and despite the existence of an international organization with a rich scientific program, regularly published journals, and an abundance of meetings and exchanges, the language of psychoanalysis is not as uniform as one would expect. Some concepts are understood differently and more importantly, have varying implications in different parts of the world. Other ideas are highly developed and given special status in some countries, while they are unknown or rarely utilized in others. To complicate matters further, schools of thought have developed with variant degrees of deviation from FreudÕs metapsychology. A student entering the field of psychoanalysis today has a more difficult task than students of previous generations, in that there is much more to learn and understand, and a greater imperative to be in communication with colleagues in other parts of the world. To integrate the disparate concepts elaborated in different parts of the world, todayÕs practitioner and anyone interested in the history of psychoanalysis must know, understand, and be capable of evaluating many divergent ideas and theoretical constructs. Well-informed dialogue among colleagues from different countries with other perspectives demands that psychoanalysts have a resource—a handbook, so to speak—that provides a brief, concise, but nevertheless sufficiently rigorous exposition of the lexicon of the field. There have been some attempts in the past to create a dictionary and a glossary of psychoanalysis; The Language of Psychoanalysis by Laplanche and Pontalis is one such major effort in this direction; another is the glossary prepared under the aegis of the American Psychoanalytic Association. However, neither of these two works, as useful as they have been, has been able to cover all the disparate concepts, and many analysts have felt the need for an international encyclopedia of psychoanalysis. This need has become even more acute as psychoanalysts have become increasingly interested in facilitating an international exchange of ideas. When Dr. de Mijolla decided to embark on this project, he was undertaking a Herculean task, but one whose value is unquestionable. Naturally, it would be impossible for one person to develop such an encyclopedia alone, and therefore, it was essential that he obtain the help of psychoanalysts from all over the world. Thus, the 1569 entries in this volume are the work of many contributors, with some contributing more than one entry. While such an arrangement made the timely development of an encyclopedia possible, it also created difficulties in the achievement of a uniform style. On the other hand, there is an xix INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN EDITION important advantage to this way of proceeding, in that authors known to be experts on a particular subject could contribute an entry in their area of specialization, enhancing the quality of the entries. A second challenge, and one more specific to the English edition, is the difficulty in translating from the original French text. The team working on this edition has done its best to make the translations as fluid and easily comprehensible as possible. Nevertheless, given the number of translators and the inherent difficulties of interpretation, there may occasionally be a certain degree of rigidity to the sentences or differences from entry to entry. The final product, however, manages to offer a text that is simultaneously eminently approachable and extremely useful. It will also become clear upon perusing the dictionary that a substantial number of the authors are French. As a result, there is more material on areas of psychoanalysis that have either developed more fully in France or are mostly used by French analysts. This, of course, makes the dictionary a unique source for anyone interested in understanding specific notions and concepts that are prevalent in the thinking of French psychoanalysts. It does, however, engender less coverage of ego psychology, conflict theory, and relational theory by the French authors; moreover, the impression of a negative view of ego psychology, in particular, and American psychoanalysis in general may be an artifact of the composition of the group of contributors. This is not surprising, given the lack of acceptance of HartmanÕs views in France, particularly by Lacan. Additionally, the animosity that developed between Rudolph Loewenstein and Jacques Lacan had no small hand in the increasingly critical attitude taken by the latter towards ego psychology. Some in France consider ego psychology to be too close to the conscious, and perhaps even too superficial, and therefore are dismissive of it, a viewpoint for which the reader may see evidence in some of the entries. On the other hand, American analysts, if writing about French psychoanalysis, could possibly take a prejudicial attitude and accuse French psychoanalysts of doing ‘‘wild analysis.’’ However, with the increase in dialogue and exchange between French and American analysts, these sorts of prejudices are diminishing, and the sharing of perspectives has enriched the members of both groups. As one example of such cross-fertilization, this current edition of the encyclopedia has attempted to present ego psychology and compromise theory in a more balanced way, with the addition of a number of new entries, such as that of Dr. Charles Brenner on modern conflict theory. In addition, to supplement those entries that refer too exclusively to French works, this edition has added a list of suggested readings with references to American sources, compiled by Matthew von Unwerth. The reader may also notice that the biographies of some prominent psychoanalysts are not mentioned in this volume, as only deceased analysts are included. Unfortunately, some omissions are unavoidable in any reference work that attempts to be as comprehensive as this encyclopedia. Hopefully, the reader will find the addition of photos from the archives of psychoanalysis enlivening and enriching. Finally, I would like to thank those whose beneficent help made this work not only possible, but even enjoyable. Alain de Mijolla is of course, first and foremost, not only for entrusting me with this task, but also for allowing me a free hand, to a large extent, and for trusting my opinion on those occasions when independent judgment was needed. Nathalie Duval was another important anchor, enormously supportive and unfailingly good-humored, even at the most difficult moments. Her staff, too, was of great help, always in the background, unassuming, but faithfully executing the necessary tasks to ensure the work could proceed smoothly. A special word of thanks goes to the editors and translators whose work could not have been easy, considering the amount of highly technical material that required faithful interpretation. I would particularly like to single out the work of Donald Nicholson-Smith who never ceased to amaze me with his understanding of the semantics of psychoanalytic xx INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN EDITION language and the elegance and precision of his translations. And, finally, in the end, my gratitude and I am sure that of yours, the reader, goes to the men and women who penned the original entries, as well as a special grateful acknowledgment to those analysts who have added their contributions to this new edition of the encyclopedia. EDWARD NERSESSIAN INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS x xi LIST OF ENTRIES LIST OF ENTRIES A ‘‘A. Z.’’ Álvaro Rey de Castro Translated by Liam Gavin Abandonment Jean-Claude Arfouilloux Translated by Liam Gavin Abel, Carl Laurent Danon-Boileau Translated by Robert Bononno Aberastury, Arminda, also known as ‘‘La Negra’’ Eduardo J. Salas Translated by Robert Bononno Abraham, Karl Johannes Cremerius Translated by Robert Bononno Abraham, Nicolas Nicholas Rand and Maria Torok Translated by Robert Bononno Abstinence/rule of abstinence Alain de Mijolla Translated by Dan Collins Act/action Roger Perron Translated by Robert Bononno Acting out/acting in Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Action-(re)presentation Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Action-language Simone Valantin Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Action-thought (H. Kohut) Agnès Oppenheimer Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Translated by Robert Bononno Active imagination (analytical psychology) Joan Chodorow Adorno, Theodor and Freud Sergio Paulo Rouanet Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Active technique Jean-François Rabain Translated by Dan Collins Agency Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Activity/passivity Serge Gauthier Translated by Robert Bononno Aggressiveness/aggression Jean Bergeret Translated by Dan Collins Act, passage to the Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Dan Collins Aichhorn, August Jeanne Moll Translated by Robert Bononno Actual neurosis/defense neurosis Claude Smadja Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Aimée, case of Bernard Toboul Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Acute psychoses Michel Demangeat Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Ajase complex Keigo Okonogi Adaptation Roger Perron Translated by Robert Bononno Addiction David Rosenfeld Translated by Robert Bononno Adhesive identification Robert D. Hinshelwood Adler, Alfred Helmut Gröger Translated by Robert Bononno Adolescence Alain Braconnier Translated by Robert Bononno Adolescent crisis Philippe Jeammet x xi ii Alchemy (analytical psychology) Beverley D. Zabriskie Alcoholism Jean-Paul Descombey Translated by Robert Bononno Alexander, Franz Gabriel Elke Mühlleitner Translated by Robert Bononno Alienation Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Dan Collins Allendy, René Félix Eugène Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Translated by Robert Bononno Allendy-Nel-Dumouchel, Yvonne Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Translated by Robert Bononno LIST OF ENTRIES Allergic object relationship Robert Asséo Translated by Robert Bononno Allergy Robert Asséo Translated by Robert Bononno Allgemeine Ärztliche Gesellschaft für Psychotherapie Geoffrey Cocks Almanach der Psychoanalyse Andrea Huppke Translated by Robert Bononno Alpha function Hanna Segal Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Alpha-elements Hanna Segal Alter ego Agnès Oppenheimer Translated by Robert Bononno Althusser, Louis Michèle Bertrand Translated by Robert Bononno Altruism Bernard Golse Translated by Robert Bononno Alvarez de Toledo, Luisa Agusta Rebeca Gambier de Augusto M. Picollo Translated by Robert Bononno Amae, concept of Takeo Doi Ambivalence Victor Souffir Translated by Robert Bononno Amentia Augustin Jeanneau Translated by Robert Bononno American Academy of Psychoanalysis Samuel Slipp American Imago Martin J. Gliserman American Psychoanalytic Association Leon Hoffman and Sharon Zalusky Amnesia François Richard Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Amphimixia/amphimixis Pierre Sabourin Translated by Gwendolyn Wells xx iv Amplification (analytical psychology) Andrew Samuels Anaclisis/anaclictic Jean Laplanche Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Anaclitic depression Bernard Golse Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Anagogical interpretation Jacques Angelergues Translated by Dan Collins Anna O., case of Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Année psychologique, L’Annick Ohayon Translated by Robert Bononno Annihilation anxiety Marvin S. Hurvich Translated by Liam Gavin Anorexia nervosa Philippe Jeammet Translated by Liam Gavin Anality Dominique J. Arnoux Translated by Robert Bononno Anthropology and psychoanalysis Michèle Porte Translated by Robert Bononno Anal-sadistic stage Jean-François Rabain Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Anticathexis/counter-cathexis Paul Denis Translated by Dan Collins Analysand Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Anticipatory ideas Alain de Mijolla Translated by Gwendolyn Wells ‘‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy’’ (Little Hans ) Veronica Mächtlinger Antilibidinal ego/internal saboteur Jennifer Johns ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’’ René Péran Translated by Dan Collins Antinarcissism Michèle Bertrand Translated by Dan Collins Analytic psychodrama Nadine Amar Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Analytical psychology Murray Stein Analyzability Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Andersson, Ola Per Magnus Johansson Translated by Robert Bononno Andreas-Salomé, Louise (Lou) Inge Weber Translated by Robert Bononno Animal magnetism Jacqueline Carroy Translated by Robert Bononno Animistic thought Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Liam Gavin Animus-Anima Betty De Shong Meador Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia Sylvie Gosme-Séguret Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Anxiety Francisco Palacio Espasa Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Anxiety dream Roger Perron Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Anzieu, Didier René Kaës Translated by Robert Bononno Aphanisis Bernard Golse Translated by Dan Collins Aphasia Georges Lantéri-Laura Translated by Robert Bononno Applied psychoanalysis and the interaction of psychoanalysis Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS LIST OF ENTRIES Apprenti-historien et le maı́tre-sorcier (L’-) [The apprentice historian and the master sorcerer] Ghyslain Charron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Aubry Weiss, Jenny Marcelle Geber Translated by Robert Bononno Balint group Michelle Moreau Ricaud Translated by Dan Collins Aulagnier-Spairani, Piera Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Archaic Cléopâtre Athanassiou-Popesco Translated by Robert Bononno Australia O.H.D. Blomfield Balint, Michael (Bálint [Bergsmann], Mihály) Judith Dupont Translated by Dan Collins Archaic mother Sylvain Missonnier Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Archeology, the metaphor of Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Austria August Ruhs Translated by Robert Bononno Autism Didier Houzel Translated by Dan Collins Archetype (analytical psychology) Murray Stein Autistic capsule/nucleus Geneviève Haag Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Archives de psychologie, Les Annick Ohayon Translated by Robert Bononno Autistic defenses Elsa Schmid-Kitsikis Translated by Dan Collins Argentina Roberto Doria-Medina Jr, Samuel Arbiser, and Moisés Kijak Translated by Robert Bononno ‘‘Autobiographical Study, An’’ Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Arlow, Jacob Harold P. Blum Autobiography Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Armand Trousseau Children’s Hospital Frédérique Jacquemain Translated by Liam Gavin Autoeroticism Roger Perron Translated by Robert Bononno Arrogance James S. Grotstein Autohistorization Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells As if personality Alain de Mijolla Translated by Liam Gavin Automatism Pascale Michon-Raffaitin Translated by Dan Collins Association psychanalytique de France Jean-Louis Lang Translated by Robert Bononno Autoplastic Steven Wainrib Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Autosuggestion Jacqueline Carroy Translated by Robert Bononno Asthma Robert Asséo Translated by Liam Gavin Asthma in contemporary medicine and psychoanalysis John Galbraith Simmons Attachment Antoine Guédeney Translated by Robert Bononno Bachelard, Gaston Roger Bruyeron Translated by Robert Bononno Baginsky, Adolf Johann Georg Reicheneder Translated by Robert Bononno Attention Bernard Golse Translated by Dan Collins INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY B Bak, Robert C. Hungarian Group OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Balint-Szekely-Kovács, Alice Judith Dupont Translated by Dan Collins Baranger, Willy Madeleine Baranger Translated by Robert Bononno Basic assumption Bernard Defontaine Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Basic fault Corinne Daubigny Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Basic Neurosis, The—Oral Regression and Psychic Masochism Melvyn L. Iscove Basic Problems of Ethnopsychiatry Simone Valantin Translated by Robert Bononno Baudouin, Charles Mireille Cifali Translated by Robert Bononno Bauer, Ida Patrick Mahony Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Beirnaert, Louis Jacques Sédat Translated by Robert Bononno Belgium André Alsteens Translated by Robert Bononno Belief Odon Vallet Translated by Robert Bononno Benedek, Therese Delphine Schilton Translated by Robert Bononno Benign/malignant regression Michelle Moreau Ricaud Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Berge, André Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Berggasse 19, Wien IX x xv LIST OF ENTRIES Ingrid Scholz-Strasser Translated by Robert Bononno Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Florian Houssier Translated by Robert Bononno Bergler, Edmund Melvyn L. Iscove Binswanger, Ludwig Ruth Menahem Translated by Robert Bononno Berliner Psychoanalytische Poliklinik Regine Lockot Translated by Liam Gavin Biological bedrock Michèle Porte Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut Regine Lockot Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht Parthenope Bion Talamo Berman, Anne Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Translated by Robert Bononno Bernays-Freud, Minna Albrecht Hirschmüller Translated by Robert Bononno Bernfeld, Siegfried R. Horacio Etchegoyen Translated by Robert Bononno Bernheim, Hippolyte Jacqueline Carroy Translated by Robert Bononno Beta-elements Hanna Segal Beta-screen Hanna Segal Bettelheim, Bruno Nina Sutton Translated by Sophie Leighton Beyond the Pleasure Principle Michèle Porte Translated by Robert Bononno Biblioteca Nueva de Madrid (Freud, S., Obras Completas) José Gutiérrez Terrazas Translated by Robert Bononno Bibring, Edward Elke Mühlleitner Translated by Robert Bononno Bibring-Lehner, Grete Elke Mühlleitner Translated by Robert Bononno Bick, Esther Bernard Golse Translated by Robert Bononno Bigras, Julien Joseph Normand Élisabeth Bigras Translated by Robert Bononno Binding/unbinding of the instincts Pierre Delion xx vi Body image David Rosenfeld Boehm, Felix Julius Regine Lockot Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Bonaparte, Marie Léon Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Translated by Robert Bononno Bipolar self Agnès Oppenheimer Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Book of the It, The Herbert Will Translated by Liam Gavin Birth Didier Houzel Translated by Liam Gavin Borderline conditions Augustin Jeanneau Translated by Robert Bononno Birth, dream of Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Boredom Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Bisexuality Paulo R. Ceccarelli Translated by Dan Collins Bizarre object Edna O’Shaughnessy Borel, Adrien Alphonse Alcide Nadine Mespoulhès Translated by Robert Bononno Bjerre, Poul Per Magnus Johansson Translated by Robert Bononno Bornstein, Berta Simone Valantin Translated by Liam Gavin Black hole Bernard Golse Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Bose, Girindrasekhar Sudhir Kakar Translated by Robert Bononno Blackett-Milner, Marion Didier Rabain Translated by Liam Gavin Boston Psychoanalytic Society Sanford Gifford Blank/nondelusional psychoses Michel Demangeat Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Blanton, Smiley Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Bleger, José Susana Beatriz Dupetit Translated by Robert Bononno Bleuler, Paul Eugen Bernard Minder Translated by Robert Bononno Bloc—Notes de la psychanalyse Mario Cifali Translated by Robert Bononno Bloch, Jean-Richard Michelle Moreau Ricaud Translated by Robert Bononno Blos, Peter Boundary violations Glen O. Gabbard Bouvet, Maurice Charles Marie Germain Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Bowlby, Edward John Mostyn Nicole Guédeney Translated by Robert Bononno Brain and psychoanalysis, the Daniel Widlöcher Translated by Robert Bononno Brazil Marialzira Perestrello Translated by Liam Gavin Breakdown Denys Ribas Translated by Robert Bononno Breast, good/bad object Robert D. Hinshelwood INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS LIST Breastfeeding Joyceline Siksou Translated by Robert Bononno Jean-Bertrand Pontalis Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Cárcamo, Celes Ernesto Roberto Doria-Medina Jr Translated by Robert Bononno Brentano, Franz von Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Caruso, Igor A. August Ruhs Translated by Robert Bononno Breton, André Nicole Geblesco Translated by Robert Bononno Case histories Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Liam Gavin Breuer, Josef Albrecht Hirschmüller Translated by Robert Bononno Castration complex Jean Bergeret Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Brierley, Marjorie Flowers Anne Hayman Brill, Abraham Arden Arnold D. Richards British Psycho-Analytical Society Pearl King and Riccardo Steiner Catastrophic change James S. Grotstein Brücke, Ernst Wihelm von Helmut Gröger Translated by Robert Bononno Cathartic method Alain de Mijolla Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Brun, Rudolf Kaspar Weber Translated by Robert Bononno Brunswick, Ruth Mack Paul Roazen Bulimia Christine Vindreau Translated by Liam Gavin Bullitt, William C. Paul Roazen Burghölzli Asylum Bernard Minder Translated by Robert Bononno Burlingham-Tiffany, Dorothy Bernard Golse Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Burrow, Trigant Malcolm Pines Cäcilie M., case of Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Canada Jacques Vigneault Translated by Robert Bononno OF Certeau, Michel de François Dosse Translated by Robert Bononno Change Daniel Widlöcher Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Character Robert Asséo Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Character Analysis Roger Dadoun Translated by Dan Collins Character formation Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Character neurosis Robert Asséo Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Charcot, Jean Martin Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Cathexis Paul Denis Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Chertok, Léon (Tchertok, Lejb) Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Cénac, Michel Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Translated by Robert Bononno Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute John Galbraith Simmons Censoring the lover in her Michel Ody and Laurent Danon-Boileau Translated by Liam Gavin Censorship Roger Perron Translated by Liam Gavin Centre psychopédagogique Claude-Bernard Claire Doz-Schiff Translated by Liam Gavin Capacity to be alone Certainty Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Chentrier, Théodore André Michel Translated by Robert Bononno Centre de consultations et de traitements psychanalytiques Jean-Favreau Jean-Luc Donnet Translated by Liam Gavin Cahiers Confrontation, Les Chantal Talagrand ENTRIES Cathectic energy Paul Denis Translated by Dan Collins Centre Alfred-Binet Gérard Lucas Translated by Liam Gavin C INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY Catastrophe theory and psychoanalysis Michèle Porte Translated by Robert Bononno OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Child analysis Antoine Guédeney Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Childhood Claudine Geissmann Translated by Robert Bononno Childhood and Society Paul Roazen Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Children’s play Nora Kurts Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Chile Omar Arrué Translated by Robert Bononno China Geoffrey H. Blowers and Teresa Yuan Choice of neurosis Daniel Widlöcher Translated by Robert Bononno xxvii LIST OF ENTRIES Choisy, Maryse Jacqueline Cosnier Translated by Robert Bononno Christians and Jews: A Psychoanalytical Study Michelle Moreau Ricaud Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Collective unconscious (analytical psychology) David I. Trésan Colloque sur l’ inconscient Georges Lantéri-Laura Translated by Robert Bononno Cinema criticism Glen O. Gabbard Colombia Guillermo Sanchez Medina Translated by Liam Gavin Civilization and its Discontents Michèle Porte Translated by Robert Bononno ‘‘Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest’’ Alain de Mijolla Translated by Liam Gavin Claparède, Édouard Mireille Cifali Translated by Robert Bononno Clark University Robert Shilkret Clark-Williams, Margaret Georges Schopp Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Claude, Henri Charles Jules Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Claustrophobia Laurent Muldworf Translated by Robert Bononno Clinging instinct Hungarian Group Cocaine and psychoanalysis David Rosenfeld Translated by Liam Gavin Cognitivism and psychoanalysis Daniel Widlöcher Translated by Robert Bononno Collected Papers on Schizophrenia and Related Subjects Richard M. Waugaman Collective psychology Michèle Porte xx viii Congrès international de l’hypnotisme expérimental et scientifique, Premier François Duyckaerts Translated by Robert Bononno Collège de psychanalystes Jacques Sédat Translated by Robert Bononno Cinema and psychoanalysis Pierre-Jean Bouyer and Sylvain Bouyer Translated by Robert Bononno Civilization (Kultur) Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Congrès des psychanalystes de langue française des pays romans Alain de Mijolla Translated by Liam Gavin Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Conscious processes Raymond Cahn Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Consciousness Raymond Cahn Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Combined parent figure Robert D. Hinshelwood Compensation (analytical psychology) Peter Mudd Compensatory structures Arnold Goldberg Translated by Andrew Brown Complemental series Bernard Golse Translated by Liam Gavin Complex Roger Perron Translated by Dan Collins Complex (analytical psychology) Verena Kast Translated by Dan Collins Compromise formation Roger Perron Translated by Dan Collins Constitution Claude Smadja Translated by Liam Gavin Construction de l’espace analytique (La-) [Constructing the analytical space] Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Liam Gavin Construction/reconstruction Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Liam Gavin ‘‘Constructions in Analysis’’ Christian Seulin Translated by Robert Bononno Contact and psychoanalysis Bernard This Translated by Robert Bononno Contact-barrier Hanna Segal Compulsion Gérard Bonnet Translated by Robert Bononno Container-Contained Jean-Claude Guillaume Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Concept Pedro Luzes Translated by Robert Bononno Contradiction Michèle Porte Translated by Dan Collins Condensation Laurent Danon-Boileau Translated by Liam Gavin ‘‘Contributions to the Psychology of Love’’ Roger Perron Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Conflict Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Confrontation Chantal Talagrand ‘‘Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child’’ Pierre Sabourin Translated by Sophie Leighton Controversial Discussions Riccardo Steiner Convenience, dream of Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Conversion Roger Perron Translated by Robert Bononno INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS LIST Coprophilia Dominique J. Arnoux Translated by Liam Gavin Dark continent Julia Kristeva Translated by Robert Bononno Coq-Héron, Le Judith Dupont Translated by Robert Bononno Darwin, Darwinism, and psychoanalysis Roger Perron Translated by Robert Bononno Corrao, Francesco Anna Maria Accerboni Translated by Robert Bononno Day’s residues Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Counter-identification Alain de Mijolla Translated by Dan Collins Dead mother complex André Green Translated by Sophie Leighton Counter-Oedipus Roger Perron Translated by Dan Collins Death and psychoanalysis Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Counterphobic Francis Drossart Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Death instinct (Thanatos) Pierre Delion Translated by Sophie Leighton Counter-transference Claudine Geissmann Translated by Dan Collins Decathexis Paul Denis Translated by Liam Gavin ‘‘Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming’’ Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Defense Elsa Schmid-Kitsikis Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Creativity Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Defense mechanisms Elsa Schmid-Kitsikis Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Criminology and psychoanalysis Daniel Zagury Translated by Robert Bononno Deferred action Jean Laplanche Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Cruelty Annette Fréjaville Translated by Robert Bononno Deferred action and trauma Odile Lesourne Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Cryptomnesia Erik Porge Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Cultural transmission Madeleine Baranger Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Cure Alain de Mijolla Translated by Dan Collins Déjà vu Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Delay, Jean Claude Delay Translated by Robert Bononno Delboeuf, Joseph Rémi Léopold François Duyckaerts Translated by Robert Bononno Czech Republic Michael Sebek D Delgado, Honorio Álvaro Rey de Castro Translated by Robert Bononno Dalbiez, Roland Annick Ohayon Translated by Robert Bononno Delusion Augustin Jeanneau Translated by Robert Bononno Danger Claude Barrois Translated by Robert Bononno Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva’’ Roger Perron INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OF ENTRIES Translated by Sophie Leighton Demand Gabriel Balbo Translated by Dan Collins Dementia Richard Uhl Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Denmark Ole Andkjær Olsen Translated by Robert Bononno Dependence Bénédicte Bonnet-Vidon Translated by Robert Bononno Depersonalization Paul Denis Translated by Robert Bononno Depression Francisco Palacio Espasa Depressive position Robert D. Hinshelwood Deprivation Grazia Maria Fava Vizziello Translated by Robert Bononno Desexualization Marc Bonnet Translated by Robert Bononno Desoille, Robert Jacques Launay Translated by Robert Bononno Destrudo Bernard Golse Translated by Robert Bononno Determinism Dominique Auffret Translated by Robert Bononno Detski Dom Irina Manson Translated by Robert Bononno Deuticke, Franz Lydia Marinelli Translated by Robert Bononno Deutsch, Felix Paul Roazen Deutsches Institut für Psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (Institut Göring) Geoffrey Cocks Deutsch-Rosenbach, Helene Paul Roazen Development of Psycho-Analysis xx ix LIST OF ENTRIES Corinne Daubigny Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Developmental disorders Roger Perron Translated by Liam Gavin Devereux, Georges Simone Valantin Translated by Robert Bononno Diatkine, René Florence Quartier-Frings Translated by Robert Bononno Dipsomania Jean-Paul Descombey Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Direct analysis Roger Perron Translated by Robert Bononno Directed daydream (R. Desoille) Jacques Launay Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Disavowal Bernard Penot Translated by Robert Bononno Discharge Alain Fine Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Disintegration products Arnold Goldberg Translated by Andrew Brown Disintegration, feelings of, anxieties Alain de Mijolla Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Dismantling Geneviève Haag Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Disorganization Claude Smadja Translated by Robert Bononno Displacement Elsa Schmid-Kitsikis Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Displacement of the transference François Duparc Translated by Dan Collins Disque vert, Le Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno ‘‘Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis, A’’ Henri Vermorel Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith xx x Documents et Débats Jean-Yves Tamet Translated by Robert Bononno Dream’s navel Roger Perron Translated by Liam Gavin Dolto-Marette, Françoise Bernard This Translated by Sophie Leighton Drive/instinct Michèle Porte Translated by Dan Collins Don Juan and The Double Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Dualism Michèle Porte Translated by Robert Bononno Doolittle-Aldington, Hilda (H.D.) Alain de Mijolla Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Dubal, George Mario Cifali Translated by Liam Gavin ‘‘Dostoyevsky and Parricide’’ Marie-Thérèse Neyraut-Sutterman Translated by Robert Bononno Dugautiez, Maurice Daniel Luminet Translated by Liam Gavin Dynamic point of view René Roussillon Translated by Liam Gavin Dosuzkov, Theodor Eugenie Fischer and René Fischer Translated by Liam Gavin E Double bind Jean-Pierre Caillot Translated by Liam Gavin Early interactions Bernard Golse Translated by Liam Gavin Double, the Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Eckstein, Emma Bertrand Vichyn Translated by Robert Bononno Doubt Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno École de la Cause freudienne Jacques Sédat Translated by Dan Collins Dream Roger Perron Translated by Robert Bononno École experimentale de Bonneuil Michel Polo Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Dream interpretation Roger Perron Translated by Robert Bononno École freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris) Jacques Sédat Translated by Dan Collins Dream-like memory Didier Houzel Translated by Liam Gavin Economic point of view René Roussillon Translated by Liam Gavin ‘‘Dream of the Wise Baby, The’’ Pierre Sabourin Translated by Liam Gavin Dream screen Bernard Golse Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Dream symbolism Roger Perron Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Écrits Jacques Sédat Translated by Dan Collins Eder, David Montagu Michelle Moreau Ricaud Translated by Robert Bononno Dream work Roger Perron Translated by Sophie Leighton Ego Alain de Mijolla Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Dreams and Myths Johannes Cremerius Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Ego, alteration of the Ernst Federn Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS LIST Ego (analytical psychology) Mario Jacoby Translated by Sophie Leighton Ego states Marvin S. Hurvich OF ENTRIES Translated by Robert Bononno Ego-syntonic Ernst Federn Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Enuresis Gérard Schmit Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Eissler, Kurt Robert Clifford Yorke Envy Robert D. Hinshelwood Eissler-Selke, Ruth Elke Mühlleitner Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Envy and Gratitude Robert D. Hinshelwood Ego boundaries Marvin S. Hurvich Eitingon, Max Michelle Moreau Ricaud Translated by Robert Bononno Eros Roland Gori Translated by Robert Bononno Ego, damage inflicted on Ernst Federn Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Elasticity Pierre Sabourin Translated by Liam Gavin Eroticism, anal Dominique J. Arnoux Translated by Dan Collins Ego (ego psychology) Ernst Federn Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Elementi di psiocoanalisi Anna Maria Accerboni Translated by Robert Bononno Eroticism, oral Dominique J. Arnoux Translated by Philip Beitchman Ego feeling Marvin S. Hurvich Elisabeth von R., case of Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Eroticism, urethral Dominique J. Arnoux Translated by Dan Collins Ellenberger, Henri Frédéric Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Erotogenic masochism Denys Ribas Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Embirikos, Andreas Anna Potamianou Translated by Robert Bononno Erotogenic zone Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Emden, Jan Egbert Gustaaf van Jaap Bos and Christien Brinkgreve Erotogenicity Roland Gori Translated by Liam Gavin Ego and the Id, The Jean-Luc Donnet Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, The Elsa Schmid-Kitsikis Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Ego autonomy Marvin S. Hurvich Ego functions Ernst Federn Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Ego ideal Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Ego ideal/ideal ego Bernard Penot Translated by Andrew Brown Ego identity Paul Roazen Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Emmy von N., case of Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Ego-instinct Pierre Delion Translated by Dan Collins Emotion Didier Houzel Translated by Robert Bononno Ego interests Ernst Federn Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Empathy Daniel Widlöcher Translated by Robert Bononno Ego-libido/object-libido Alain de Mijolla Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Empty Fortress, The Nina Sutton Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Ego psychology Marvin S. Hurvich Encopresis Gérard Schmit Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation Ernst Federn Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Ego Psychology and the Psychoses Marvin S. Hurvich INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF Encounter Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Sophie Leighton Enriquez-Joly, Micheline Eugène Enriquez PSYCHOANALYSIS Erikson, Erik Homburger Paul Roazen Erotomania Michel Demangeat Translated by Robert Bononno Erythrophobia (fear of blushing) Bernard Golse Translated by Liam Gavin Essential depression Alain Fine Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Estrangement Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Ethics Roland Gori Translated by Dan Collins Ethnopsychoanalysis Marie-Rose Moro Translated by Robert Bononno Ethology and psychoanalysis xx xi LIST OF ENTRIES Boris Cyrulnik Translated by Robert Bononno Fairbairn, William Ronald Dodds Jennifer Johns Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Études Freudiennes Danièle Brun Translated by Sophie Leighton False self Jennifer Johns Federación psicoanalı́tica de América latina Cláudio Laks Eizirik Translated by Gwendolyn Wells European Psychoanalytical Federation Alain Gibeault Translated by Robert Bononno Evenly-suspended attention Alain de Mijolla Translated by Sophie Leighton Évolution psychiatrique (l’ -) (Developments in Psychiatry) Jean Garrabé Translated by Liam Gavin Examination dreams Roger Perron Translated by Liam Gavin Excitation Alain Fine Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Exhibitionism Delphine Schilton Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Experience of satisfaction Bernard Golse Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Externalization-internalization Delphine Schilton Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Extroversion/introversion (analytical psychology) Marie-Laure Grivet-Shillito Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Family Alberto Eiguer Translated by Robert Bononno Family romance Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Fanon, Frantz Guillaume Suréna Translated by Robert Bononno Fantasy Roger Perron Translated by Robert Bononno Fantasy, formula of Bernard Penot Translated by Dan Collins Fantasy (reverie) Roger Perron Translated by Robert Bononno Fascination Catherine Desprats-Péquignot Translated by Robert Bononno Fate neurosis Alain de Mijolla Translated by Sophie Leighton Father complex Roger Perron Translated by Sophie Leighton Fatherhood Anne Aubert-Godard Translated by Sophie Leighton Ey, Henri Jean Garrabé Translated by Robert Bononno Favez, Georges Bernard Golse Translated by Robert Bononno F Favez-Boutonier, Juliette Bernard Golse Translated by Robert Bononno Face-to-face situation Alain de Mijolla Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Facilitation Bertrand Vichyn Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Fackel, Die Erik Porge Translated by Robert Bononno Failure neurosis Alain de Mijolla Translated by Liam Gavin xxxii Favreau, Jean Alphonse Marie-Thérèse Montagnier Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Fear Claude Bursztejn Translated by Robert Bononno Feces Dominique J. Arnoux Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Fechner, Gustav Theodor Bernd Nitzschke Federn, Paul Anna Maria Accerboni Translated by Robert Bononno Fedida, Pierre Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Sophie Leighton Female sexuality Julia Kristeva Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Feminine masochism Denys Ribas Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Femininity Monique Schneider Translated by Sophie Leighton Femininity, rejection of Monique Schneider Translated by Dan Collins Feminism and psychoanalysis Rosine Jozef Perelberg Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Fenichel, Otto Elke Mühlleitner Translated by Robert Bononno Ferenczi, Sándor Éva Brabant-Gerö Translated by Robert Bononno Fetishism André Lussier Translated by Robert Bononno Finland Per Magnus Johansson Translated by Robert Bononno First World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis Maı̈té Klahr and Claudie Millot Translated by Sophie Leighton Fixation Claude Smadja Translated by Dan Collins Fliess, Wilhelm Erik Porge Translated by Robert Bononno INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS LIST Flight into illness Alain Fine Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Framework of the psychoanalytic treatment Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Flournoy, Henri Olivier Flournoy Translated by Robert Bononno France Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Flournoy, Théodore Olivier Flournoy Translated by Robert Bononno Franco da Rocha, Francisco Fabio Herrmann and Roberto Yutaka Sagawa Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Flower Doll: Essays in Child Psychotherapy Bernard This Translated by Liam Gavin Frankl, Viktor Jacques Sédat Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Flügel, John Carl Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Free association Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Fluss, Gisela Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Free energy/bound energy Bertrand Vichyn Translated by Sophie Leighton Foreclosure Charles Melman Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Freud, Anna Clifford Yorke Forgetting François Richard Translated by Robert Bononno Freud-Bernays, Martha Clifford Yorke Formations of the unconscious Alain Vanier Translated by Dan Collins Freud, Ernst Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Fornari, Franco Giancarlo Gramaglia Translated by Robert Bononno Freud, Jakob Kolloman (or Keleman or Kallamon) Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Fort-Da Gérard Bonnet Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Foulkes (Fuchs), Siegmund Heinrich Malcolm Pines Freud, (Jean) Martin Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Freud, Josef Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Four discourses Joël Dor Translated by Dan Collins Freud: Living and Dying Roy K. Lilleskov Freud Museum Michael Molnar Fourth analysis Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Dan Collins OF ENTRIES Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Freud’s Self-Analysis Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Dan Collins Freud, Sigmund (siblings) Alain de Mijolla Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Freud, Sigmund Schlomo Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Freund Toszeghy, Anton von Michelle Moreau Ricaud Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Friedländer-Fränkl, Kate Clifford Yorke Friendship Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Fright Claude Barrois Translated by Robert Bononno Frink, Horace Westlake Paul Roazen ‘‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’’ (Wolf Man) Patrick Mahony Fromm, Erich Paul Roazen Fromm-Reichmann, Frieda Ann-Louise S. Silver Frustration Luiz Eduardo Prado de Oliveira Translated by Sophie Leighton Functional phenomenon Alain de Mijolla Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Fundamental rule Jean-Luc Donnet Translated by Sophie Leighton ‘‘Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria’’ (Dora/Ida Bauer) Patrick Mahony Freud-Nathanson, Amalia Malka Alain de Mijolla Fusion/defusion Cléopâtre Athanassiou-Popesco Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Freud, Oliver Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Fusion/defusion of instincts Josette Frappier Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Fragmentation Agnès Oppenheimer Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Freud, The Secret Passion Alain de Mijolla Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Future of an Illusion, The Odon Vallet Translated by Robert Bononno INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS xxx iii LIST OF ENTRIES G Malcolm Pines Gaddini, Eugenio Anna Maria Accerboni Translated by Robert Bononno Goethe and psychoanalysis Henri Vermorel Translated by Robert Bononno Gain (primary and secondary) Dominique Blin Translated by Liam Gavin Goethe Prize Thomas Plänkers Translated by Robert Bononno Gardiner, Muriel M. Nellie L. Thompson Good-enough mother Jennifer Johns Garma, Angel R. Horacio Etchegoyen Translated by Robert Bononno Göring, Matthias Heinrich Geoffrey Cocks Gattel, Felix Nicolas Gougoulis Translated by Robert Bononno Geleerd, Elisabeth Nellie L. Thompson Gender identity Christopher Gelber General theory of seduction Jean Laplanche Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Genital love Jean-François Rabain Translated by Robert Bononno Genital stage Jean-François Rabain Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith German romanticism and psychoanalysis Madeleine Vermorel and 7Henri Vermorel Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Germany Regine Lockot Translated by Robert Bononno Gesammelte Schriften Ilse Grubrich-Simitis Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Gessammelte Werke Ilse Grubrich-Simitis Translated by Donald NicholsonSmith Gestapo Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Gift Dominique J. Arnoux Translated by Robert Bononno Graf, Herbert Veronica Mächtlinger Graf, Max Elke Mühlleitner Translated by Robert Bononno Grandiose self Agnès Oppenheimer Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Granoff, Wladimir Alexandre Jacques Sédat Translated by Robert Bononno Graph of Desire Bernard Penot Translated by Dan Collins Great Britain Malcolm Pines Greece Anna Potamianou Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego Michèle Porte Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Group psychotherapies René Kaës Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Guex, Germaine Jean-Michel Quinodoz Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Guilbert, Yvette Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Guilt, feeling of Léon Grinberg Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Guilt, unconscious sense of Léon Grinberg Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque H Halberstadt-Freud, Sophie Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Hall, Granville Stanley Florian Houssier Greenacre, Phyllis Nellie L. Thompson Hallucinatory, the César Botella and Sára Botella Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Greenson, Ralph Daniel Greenson Hallucinosis Edna O’Shaughnessy Gressot, Michel Jean-Michel Quinodoz Translated by Robert Bononno Hamlet and Oedipus François Sacco Translated by Robert Bononno Grid Pedro Luzes Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Groddeck, Georg Walther Herbert Will Translated by Robert Bononno Gross, Otto Hans Adolf Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Glover, Edward Clifford Yorke Group analysis René Kaës Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Glover, James Group phenomenon xxxiv Bernard Defontaine Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Hampstead Clinic Delphine Schilton Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Handling Campbell Paul Happel, Clara Alain de Mijolla Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Hard science and psychoanalysis Michèle Porte Translated by Philip Beitchman Hartmann, Heinz Lawrence Hartmann INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS LIST Hatred Nicole Jeammet Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Hirschfeld, Elfriede Nicolas Gougoulis Translated by Robert Bononno Heimann, Paula Margaret Tonnesmann Historical reality René Roussillon Translated by Robert Bononno Held, René Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Historical truth Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Heller, Hugo Lydia Marinelli Translated by Liam Gavin History and psychoanalysis Roger Perron Translated by Sophie Leighton Hellman Noach, Ilse Clifford Yorke Translated by Liam Gavin Hitschmann, Eduard Harald Leupold-Löwenthal Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Helplessness Anne Aubert-Godard Translated by Gwendolyn Wells ‘‘Heredity and the Etiology of the Neuroses’’ Alain de Mijolla Translated by Liam Gavin Heredity of acquired characters Roger Perron Translated by Liam Gavin Hoffer, Willi (Wilhelm) Clifford Yorke Hogarth Press Clifford Yorke Holding Campbell Paul Hermann, Imre Hungarian Group Hollitscher-Freud, Mathilde Alain de Mijolla Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Hermeneutics Dominique Auffret Translated by Robert Bononno Hollós, István Michelle Moreau Ricaud Translated by Liam Gavin Heroic identification Bernard Golse Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Homosexuality Bertrand Vichyn Translated by Sophie Leighton Horney-Danielson, Karen Bernard Paris Heroic self Riccardo Steiner Hospitalism Léon Kreisler Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Hesnard, Angélo Louis Marie Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Hug-Hellmuth-Hug von Hugenstein, Hermine Elke Mühlleitner Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Heterosexuality Bertrand Vichyn Translated by Liam Gavin Heuyer, Georges Jean-Louis Lang Translated by Robert Bononno Hietzing Schule/Burlingham-Rosenfeld School Alain de Mijolla Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Hilferding-Hönigsberg, Margarethe Elke Mühlleitner Translated by Robert Bononno INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF OF Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Hypnoid states Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Hypnosis Jacqueline Carroy Translated by Robert Bononno Hypochondria Alain Fine Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Hypocritical dream Roger Perron Translated by Dan Collins Hysteria Jacqueline Schaeffer Translated by Robert Bononno Hysterical paralysis Augustin Jeanneau Translated by Dan Collins I I Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Dan Collins Id Michèle Porte Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Idea/representation Roger Perron Translated by Robert Bononno Idealization Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Dan Collins Idealized parental imago Agnès Oppenheimer Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Idealizing transference Agnès Oppenheimer Translated by Dan Collins Ideational representation Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Humor Jean-Pierre Kamierniak Translated by Sophie Leighton Ideational representative Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Hungarian School Hungarian Group Identification Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Hungary Éva Brabant-Gerö Translated by Robert Bononno Hypercathexis Richard Uhl PSYCHOANALYSIS ENTRIES Identification fantasies Alain de Mijolla Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Identification with the agressor xx xv LIST OF ENTRIES Clifford Yorke Translated by Robert Bononno Identificatory project Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Individuation (analytical psychology) Christian Gaillard Translated by Sophie Leighton Identity Agnès Oppenheimer Translated by Robert Bononno Infans Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Ideology Dominique Auffret Translated by Robert Bononno Infant development Monique Piñol-Douriez and Maurice Despinoy Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Illusion Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Imaginary identification/symbolic identification Marc Darmon Translated by Dan Collins Imaginary, the (Lacan) Marie-Christine Laznik Translated by Dan Collins Imago Antoine Ducret Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Imago Publishing Company Clifford Yorke Imago. Zeitschrift für die Anwendung der Psychoanalyse auf die Geisteswissenschaften Lydia Marinelli Translated by Robert Bononno Imposter Andrée Bauduin Translated by Robert Bononno Incest Roger Perron Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Incompleteness René Péran Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Inconscient, L’ Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno India Sudhir Kakar Indications and contraindications for psychoanalysis for an adult Alain de Mijolla Translated by Sophie Leighton Individual Henri Vermorel xx xvi Insight Roger Perron Translated by Robert Bononno Instinct Claude Smadja Translated by Dan Collins Infant observation (direct) Drina Candilis-Huisman Translated by Gwendolyn Wells ‘‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’’ Michèle Porte Translated by Dan Collins Infant observation (therapeutic) Christine Anzieu-Premmereur Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Instinctual impulse Michèle Porte Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Infantile amnesia François Richard Translated by Dan Collins Instinctual representative Roger Perron Translated by Dan Collins Infantile neurosis Serge Lebovici Translated by Sophie Leighton Infantile omnipotence Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Infantile schizophrenia Serge Lebovici Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Infantile sexual curiosity Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Dan Collins Infantile, the Cléopâtre Athanassiou-Popesco Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Inferiority, feeling of Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Inferiority, feeling of (individual psychology) François Compan Translated by Liam Gavin Inhibition Nicolas Dissez Translated by Liam Gavin Initial interview(s) Alain de Mijolla Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Innervation Bertrand Vichyn Translated by Liam Gavin Infant observation Robert D. Hinshelwood Infantile psychosis Bernard Touati Translated by Sophie Leighton Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety Bernard Golse Translated by Robert Bononno Institut Claparède Simone Decobert Translated by Robert Bononno Institut Max-Kassowitz Carlo Bonomi Translated by Robert Bononno Integration Bernard Golse Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Intellectualization Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Liam Gavin Intergenerational Haydée Faimberg Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Internal object Marie Eugénie Jullian Muzzo Benavides Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Internal/external reality Jean-Pierre Chartier Translated by Gwendolyn Wells International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS LIST Isaacs-Sutherland, Susan Riccardo Steiner International Federation of Psychoanalytic Societies Carlo Bonomi Translated by Liam Gavin Isakower phenomenon Bernard Golse Translated by Liam Gavin International Journal of Psychoanalysis, The Riccardo Steiner International Psychoanalytical Association Robert S. Wallerstein Internationale Zeitschrift für (ärztliche) Psychoanalyse Lydia Marinelli Translated by Liam Gavin Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag Lydia Marinelli Translated by Robert Bononno Interpretation Jacques Angelergues Translated by Sophie Leighton Isakower, Otto Alain de Mijolla Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Isolation Elsa Schmid-Kitsikis Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Interpretation of dreams (analytical psychology) Thomas B. Kirsch Interpretation of Dreams, The Roger Perron Translated by Robert Bononno ENTRIES Jouissance (Lacan) Marie-Christine Laznik Translated by Dan Collins Journal de la psychanalyse de l’enfant Jean-Claude Guillaume Translated by Liam Gavin Journal d’un médecin malade Marguerite Frémont Translated by Robert Bononno Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association Arnold D. Richards Israel Yolanda Gampel Jouve, Pierre Jean Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Translated by Robert Bononno Italy Rosario Merendino Translated by Robert Bononno Judaism and psychoanalysis Jacques Ascher and Pérel Wilgowicz Translated by Liam Gavin J Judgment of condemnation Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Jacobson, Edith Nellie L. Thompson Interprétation Josette Garon Translated by Sophie Leighton OF Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse Lydia Marinelli Translated by Liam Gavin Jalousie amoureuse, La Régine Prat Translated by Liam Gavin Jung, Carl Gustav Thomas B. Kirsch Jung-Rauschenbach, Emma Brigitte Allain-Dupré Translated by Liam Gavin Jury, Paul André Michel Translated by Robert Bononno Janet, Pierre Annick Ohayon Translated by Robert Bononno K Jankélévitch, Samuel Annick Ohayon Translated by Robert Bononno Kantianism and psychoanalysis Bernard Lemaigre Translated by Robert Bononno Japan Keigo Okonogi Kardiner, Abram Ethel S. Person Introjection Pierre Sabourin Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Jekels (Jekeles), Ludwig Harald Leupold-Löwenthal Translated by Robert Bononno Katan, Maurits Robert A. Furman ‘‘Introjection and Transference’’ Pierre Sabourin Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Jelliffe, Smith Ely Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Introspection Roger Perron Translated by Liam Gavin Jokes Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Invariant Jean-Claude Guillaume Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Intersubjective/intrasubjective Bernard Golse Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Irma’s injection, dream of Roger Perron Translated by Robert Bononno INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY Jones, Ernest Riccardo Steiner OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Katan-Rosenberg, Anny Robert A. Furman Katharina, case of Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Kemper, Werner Walther René Péran Translated by Liam Gavin Kestemberg, Jean Liliane Abensour Translated by Liam Gavin Kestemberg-Hassin, Evelyne Liliane Abensour xx xvii LIST OF ENTRIES Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Khan, Mohammed Masud Rasa Bernard Golse Translated by Robert Bononno Klein-Reizes, Melanie Robert D. Hinshelwood Klinische Studie über die halbseitiger Cerebrallähmung der Kinder [Clinical study of infantile cerebral diplegia] Johann Georg Reicheneder Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Knot Henri Cesbron Lavau Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Knowledge or research, instinct for Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Koch, Adelheid Lucy Leopold Nosek Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Kohut, Heinz Agnès Oppenheimer Translated by Robert Bononno Korea Geoffrey H. Blowers Kosawa, Heisaku Keigo Okonogi Law and psychoanalysis Marie-Dominique Trapet Translated by Robert Bononno Jacques Sédat Translated by Dan Collins Lack of differentiation Bernard Golse Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Law of the father Patrick De Neuter Translated by Robert Bononno Laforgue, René Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Translated by Robert Bononno Lagache, Daniel Eva Rosenblum Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Lainé, Tony Patrice Huerre Translated by Liam Gavin Laing, Ronald David James R. Hood Lebovici, Serge Sindel Charles Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Lampl, Hans Elke Mühlleitner Translated by Liam Gavin Lechat, Fernand Daniel Luminet Translated by Liam Gavin Lampl-de Groot, Jeanne Elizabeth Verhage-Stins Leclaire (Liebschutz), Serge Jacques Sédat Translated by Dan Collins Landauer, Karl Hans-Joachim Rothe Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Langer, Marie Glass Hauser de Janine Puget Translated by Liam Gavin Language and disturbances of language Georges Lantéri-Laura Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Kovács-Prosznitz, Vilma Judith Dupont Translated by Liam Gavin Language of Psychoanalysis, The Jean-Louis Brenot Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Kraus, Karl Erik Porge Translated by Robert Bononno Lanzer, Ernst Patrick Mahony Kris-Rie, Marianne Ernst Federn Translated by Liam Gavin L L and R schemas Patrick Delaroche Translated by Dan Collins Lacan, Jacques-Marie Émile xxxviii Le Bon, Gustave Annick Ohayon Translated by Robert Bononno Learning from Experience James S. Grotstein Kouretas, Démétrios Anna Potamianou Translated by Liam Gavin Kris, Ernst Elke Mühlleitner Translated by Robert Bononno Lay analysis Roger Perron Translated by Dan Collins Latency period Rodolfo Urribarri Translated by Sophie Leighton Latent André Missenard Translated by Sophie Leighton Latent dream thoughts Roger Perron Translated by Sophie Leighton Laurent-Lucas-ChampionnièreMaugé, Odette Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Translated by Liam Gavin Leeuw, Pieter Jacob Van der Elizabeth Verhage-Stins Lehrinstitut der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung Eva Laible Translated by Liam Gavin Lehrman, Philip R. Michelle Moreau Ricaud Translated by Liam Gavin Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Letter, the Jean-Paul Hiltenbrand Translated by Robert Bononno Leuba, John Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Levi Bianchini, Marco Anna Maria Accerboni Translated by Robert Bononno Liberman, David Gilda Sabsay Foks Translated by Liam Gavin Libidinal development Michèle Pollak Cornillot Translated by Liam Gavin INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS LIST Libidinal stage Jean-François Rabain Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Libido Alain de Mijolla Translated by Sophie Leighton Loewenstein, Rudolph M. Michelle Moreau Ricaud Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Logic(s) Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Lie Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Look/gaze Jean-Michel Hirtt Translated by Dan Collins Liebeault, Ambroise Auguste Jacqueline Carroy Translated by Liam Gavin Life and Work of Sigmund Freud Riccardo Steiner Life and Works of Edgar Allen Poe: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation Anne-Marie Mairesse Translated by Robert Bononno Life instinct (Eros) Isaac Salem Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Lifting of amnesia François Richard Translated by Philip Beitchman Limentani, Adam Moses Laufer ‘‘Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy’’ Alain de Mijolla Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Lingüistica, Interacción comunicativa y Proceso psicoanalı́tico David Rosenfeld Translated by Liam Gavin Linguistics and psychoanalysis Anne-Marie Houdebine Translated by Robert Bononno Lorand, Sándor Michelle Moreau Ricaud Translated by Liam Gavin Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Societies and Institutes John Galbraith Simmons Lost object Jacques Sédat Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Listening Marie-France Castarède Translated by Liam Gavin Little Arpåd, the boy pecked by a cock Pierre Sabourin OF Mania Alban Jeanneau Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Manic defenses Elsa Schmid-Kitsikis Translated by Philip Beitchman Manifest André Missenard Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Mann, Thomas Didier David Translated by Robert Bononno Mannoni, Dominique-Octave Jacques Sédat Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Love-Hate-Knowledge (L/H/K links) Bernard Golse Translated by Philip Beitchman Marcinowski, Johannes (Jaroslaw) Elke Mühlleitner Translated by Liam Gavin Low, Barbara Clifford Yorke Marcondes, Durval Bellegarde Fabio Herrmann and Roberto Yutaka Sagawa Translated by Liam Gavin Lucy R., case of Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno M Marcuse, Herbert Roger Dadoun Translated by Robert Bononno Maeder, Alphonse E. Kaspar Weber Translated by Liam Gavin Martinique Guillaume Suréna Translated by Liam Gavin Magical thinking Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Martins, Cyro Germano Vollmer Filho Main, Thomas Forrest Malcolm Pines Literature and psychoanalysis Anne Roche Translated by Robert Bononno Bertrand Pulman Translated by Robert Bononno Love Jacques Sédat Translated by Robert Bononno Mahler-Schönberger, Margaret Philippe Mazet Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Literary and artistic creation Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno ENTRIES Mannoni-Van der Spoel, Maud (Magdalena) Jacques Sédat Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Mahler, Gustav (meeting with Sigmund Freud) Dominique Blin Translated by Robert Bononno Linking, attacks on Edna O’Shaughnessy INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY Translated by Liam Gavin OF Mâle, Pierre Pierre Bourdier Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Malinowski, Bronislaw Kaspar PSYCHOANALYSIS Marty, Pierre Rosine Debray Translated by Robert Bononno Marxism and psychoanalysis Michèle Bertrand Translated by Dan Collins Masculine protest (individual psychology) François Compan Translated by Liam Gavin Masculinity/femininity Philippe Metello Translated by Robert Bononno Masochism Denys Ribas x xx ix LIST OF ENTRIES Translated by Robert Bononno Mass Psychology of Fascism, The Roger Dadoun Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Mastery Marc Bonnet Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Mastery, instinct for Paul Denis Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Masturbation Franck Zigante Translated by Dan Collins Memories François Richard Translated by Robert Bononno Memory Yvon Brès Translated by Robert Bononno Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society Ernst Federn Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Meng, Heinrich Thomas Plänkers Translated by Liam Gavin Mirror stage Marie-Christine Laznik Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Menninger Clinic Glen O. Gabbard Mirror transference Agnès Oppenheimer Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Menninger, Karl A. Glen O. Gabbard Maternal Anne Aubert-Godard Translated by Robert Bononno Mentalization Alain Fine Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Maternal care Yvon Gauthier Translated by Donald NicholsonSmith Merleau-Ponty, Maurice Georges Lantéri-Laura Translated by Robert Bononno Maternal reverie, capacity for Bernard Golse Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Jean Garrabé Translated by Robert Bononno Mitscherlich, Alexander Hans-Martin Lohmann Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Mnemic symbol François Richard Translated by Dan Collins Mnemic trace/memory trace François Richard Translated by Dan Collins Metaphor Joël Dor Translated by Dan Collins Modern conflict theory Charles Brenner Matheme Henri Cesbron Lavau Translated by Dan Collins ‘‘Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams’’ Alain de Mijolla Translated by Sophie Leighton Mathilde, case of Albrecht Hirschmüller Translated by Robert Bononno Metapsychology René Roussillon Translated by Robert Bononno Mom, Jorge Mario Gilda Sabsay Foks Translated by Liam Gavin Matte-Blanco, Ignacio Jorge L. Ahumada Metonymy Joël Dor Translated by Dan Collins Money and psychoanalytic treatment Ghyslain Levy Translated by Robert Bononno Mexico Luis Féder Money-Kyrle, Roger Earle Riccardo Steiner Meyer, Adolf F. Elke Mühlleitner Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Monism Michèle Porte Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Maturation Roger Perron Translated by Liam Gavin Mauco, Georges Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Translated by Liam Gavin Mead, Margaret Bertrand Pulman Translated by Robert Bononno Megalomania Marc Bonnet Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Melancholia Alban Jeanneau Translated by Robert Bononno Melancholic depression Francisco Palacio Espasa Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Memoirs of the future James S. Grotstein xl Meyerson, Ignace Annick Ohayon Translated by Liam Gavin Meynert, Theodor Eva Laible Translated by Liam Gavin Midlife crisis Bernard Golse Translated by Liam Gavin Minkowska-Brokman, Françoise Jean Garrabé Translated by Liam Gavin Minkowski, Eugène Modesty Jean-Jacques Rassial Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Moral masochism Denys Ribas Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Moreno, Jacob Levy Nadine Amar Translated by Liam Gavin Morgenstern-Kabatschnik, Sophie Frédérique Jacquemain Translated by Liam Gavin Morgenthaler, Fritz Kaspar Weber Translated by Liam Gavin Morichau-Beauchant, Pierre Ernest René INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS LIST Michelle Moreau Ricaud Translated by Liam Gavin Odon Vallet Translated by Robert Bononno Morselli, Enrico Giancarlo Gramaglia Translated by Liam Gavin Myth of origins Julia Kristeva Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Moser-van Sulzer-Wart, Fanny Louise Alain de Mijolla Translated by Liam Gavin Myth of the Birth of the Hero, The René Kaës Translated by Andrew Brown Myth of the hero René Kaës Translated by Robert Bononno Moses and Monotheism Pierre Ferrari Translated by Robert Bononno ‘‘Moses of Michelangelo, The’’ Brigitte Lemérer Translated by Robert Bononno Mother goddess Odon Vallet Translated by Robert Bononno Mythomania Bernard Golse Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Myths Nicole Belmont Translated by Liam Gavin Mourning Benjamin Jacobi Translated by Dan Collins N ‘‘Mourning and Melancholia’’ Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Nacht, Sacha Emanoel Alain de Mijolla Translated by Liam Gavin Mourning, dream of Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Nakedess, dream of Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Mouvement lacanien français Jacques Sédat Translated by Dan Collins Name-of-the-Father Charles Melman Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Müller-Braunschweig, Carl Regine Lockot Translated by Liam Gavin Narcissism Michel Vincent Translated by Robert Bononno Multilingualism and psychoanalysis Juan-Eduardo Tesone Translated by Robert Bononno Murray, Henry A. Paul Roazen Musatti, Cesare Giancarlo Gramaglia Translated by Liam Gavin Music and psychoanalysis Marie-France Castarède Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Mutative interpretation Jacques Angelergues Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Mutual analysis Pierre Sabourin Translated by Dan Collins Mysticism INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY Mythology and psychoanalysis Nicos Nicolaı̈dis Translated by Robert Bononno OF OF ENTRIES Narcissistic neurosis Michel Vincent Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Narcissistic rage Agnès Oppenheimer Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Narcissistic transference Paul Denis Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Narcissistic withdrawal Martine Myquel Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Narco-analysis Vassilis Kapsambelis Translated by Liam Gavin National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis Gerald J. Gargiulo Need for causality Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Dan Collins Need for punishment Léon Grinberg Translated by Dan Collins Negation Laurent Danon-Boileau Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith ‘‘Negation’’ Monique Schneider Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Negative capability James S. Grotstein Narcissism of minor differences Alain de Mijolla Translated by Liam Gavin Negative hallucination François Duparc Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Narcissism, primary Michel Vincent Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Negative therapeutic reaction Jean-François Rabain Translated by Dan Collins Narcissism, secondary Michel Vincent Translated by Philip Beitchman Negative transference Paul Denis Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Narcissistic defenses Elsa Schmid-Kitsikis Translated by Philip Beitchman Negative, work of André Green Translated by Robert Bononno Narcissistic elation Marie-France Castarède Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Neopsychoanalysis Irma Gleiss Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Narcissistic injury Panos Aloupis Translated by Philip Beitchman Nervous Anxiety States and their Treatment Francis Clark-Lowes PSYCHOANALYSIS xli LIST OF ENTRIES Netherlands Han Groen-Prakken Neurasthenia Georges Lantéri-Laura Translated by Gwendolyn Wells ‘‘Neurasthenia and ‘Anxiety Neurosis’’’ Alain de Mijolla Translated by Gwendolyn Wells North African countries Jalil Bennani Translated by Liam Gavin Translated by Robert Bononno Oceanic feeling Henri Vermorel and Madeleine Vermorel Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Norway Sverre Varvin Odier, Charles Jean-Michel Quinodoz Translated by Liam Gavin Nostalgia André Bolzinger Translated by Robert Bononno Neuro-psychosis of defense Elsa Schmid-Kitsikis Translated by Gwendolyn Wells ‘‘Note upon the ‘Mystic Writing Pad,’ A’’ Dominique Auffret Translated by Robert Bononno Neurosis Francis Drossart Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith ‘‘Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis’’ (Rat Man) Patrick Mahony Neurosis and Human Growth Bernard Paris Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse Edmundo Gomez Mango Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Neurotic defenses Elsa Schmid-Kitsikis Translated by Dan Collins Neurotica Didier Anzieu Translated by Robert Bononno Neutrality/benevolent neutrality Alain de Mijolla Translated by Liam Gavin New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis Alain de Mijolla Translated by Gwendolyn Wells New York Freudian Society Joseph Reppen Omnipotence of thoughts Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ Alain de Mijolla Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Numinous (analytical psychology) Aimé Agnel Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Nunberg, Hermann Harald Leupold-Löwenthal Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Oberholzer, Emil Kaspar Weber Translated by Robert Bononno Oedipus complex, early Robert D. Hinshelwood ‘‘On Dreams’’ Roger Perron Translated by Dan Collins Nuclear complex Roger Perron Translated by Dan Collins O Oedipus complex Roger Perron Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith ‘‘On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement’’ Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno ‘‘On the Origin of the ‘Influencing Machine’ in Schizophrenia’’ Marie-Thérèse Neyraut-Sutterman Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith ‘‘On the Sexual Theories of Children’’ Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Donald NicholsonSmith New York Psychoanalytic Institute Manuel Furer Object Nora Kurts Translated by Dan Collins Night terrors Philippe Metello Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Object a Valentin Nusinovici Translated by Dan Collins Nightmare Philippe Metello Translated by Robert Bononno Object relations theory Otto F. Kernberg Ontogenesis Jean-François Rabain Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Object, change of/choice of Maı̈té Klahr and Claudie Millot Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Operational thinking Alain Fine Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Obsession Marc Hayat Translated by Robert Bononno Opere (Writings of Sigmund Freud) Giancarlo Gramaglia Translated by Robert Bononno Obsessional neurosis Marc Hayat Translated by Dan Collins Ophuijsen, Johan H. W. Van Han Groen-Prakken Translated by Liam Gavin Occultism Odon Vallet Optical schema Marie-Christine Laznik Nin, Anaı̈s Gunther Stuhlmann Nirvana Clifford Yorke Nodet, Charles-Henri Marcel Houser Translated by Robert Bononno Nonverbal communication Bernard Golse Translated by Robert Bononno xlii ‘‘On Transience’’ Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS LIST Translated by Dan Collins P Orality Dominique J. Arnoux Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Pain Drina Candilis-Huisman Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Oral-sadistic stage Jean-François Rabain Translated by Donald NicholsonSmith Pair of opposites Roger Perron Translated by Dan Collins Oral stage Jean-François Rabain Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Organ pleasure Claude Smadja Translated by Philip Beitchman Pankow, Gisela Marie-Lise Lacas Translated by Robert Bononno Pappenheim, Bertha Alain de Mijolla Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Organic psychoses Vassilis Kapsambelis Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Organic repression Jean-François Rabain Translated by Philip Beitchman Organization Claude Smadja Translated by Liam Gavin Orgone Roger Dadoun Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Ornicar? Jacques Sédat Translated by Dan Collins Ossipov, Nikolai Legrafovitch Eugenie Fischer and René Fischer Translated by Liam Gavin Overdetermination Mathieu Zannotti Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Over-interpretation Delphine Schilton Translated by Dan Collins Penis envy Colette Chiland Translated by Liam Gavin Perceptual identity Dominique Auffret Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Perestrello, Danilo Marı́a de Lourdes Soares O’Donnell Translated by Liam Gavin Paranoid psychosis Bernard Touati Translated by Philip Beitchman Perrier, François Jacques Sédat Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Paranoid-schizoid position Robert D. Hinshelwood Perrotti, Nicola Anna Maria Accerboni Translated by Robert Bononno Parenthood Geneviève Delaisi de Parseval Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Parricide Marie-Dominique Trapet Translated by Robert Bononno Partial drive OF Payne, Sylvia May Pearl H. M. King Paranoid position Robert D. Hinshelwood Parcheminey, Georges Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Translated by Liam Gavin Outline of Psychoanalysis, An Christian Seulin Translated by Robert Bononno Passion Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Perception-consciousness (Pcpt.-Cs.) Dominique Auffret Translated by Dan Collins Parapraxis Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Otherness Yvon Brès Translated by Robert Bononno Pass, the Jacques Sédat Translated by Dan Collins Paradox Jean-Pierre Caillot Translated by Robert Bononno Paraphrenia Nicolas Gougoulis Translated by Dan Collins Other, the Charles Melman Translated by Dan Collins Pasche, Francis Léopold Philippe Michèle Bertrand Translated by Liam Gavin Peraldi, François Jacques Vigneault Translated by Robert Bononno Paranoia (Freudian formulas of) Luiz Eduardo Prado de Oliveira Translated by Sophie Leighton ENTRIES Michèle Porte Translated by Dan Collins Parade of signifiers Joël Dor Translated by Dan Collins Paranoia Harold P. Blum Orgasm Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY Pankejeff, Sergueı̈ Patrick Mahony OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Persecution Vassilis Kapsambelis Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Peru Moisés Lemlij Translated by Liam Gavin Perversion Joyce McDougall Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Perversion (metapsychological approach) Luiz Eduardo Prado de Oliveira Translated by Sophie Leighton Pfister, Oskar Robert David D. Lee xliii LIST OF ENTRIES Phallic mother Sylvain Missonnier Translated by Dan Collins Phallic stage Jean-François Rabain Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Phallic woman Catherine Desprats-Péquignot Translated by Dan Collins Phallus Bernard Penot Translated by Dan Collins Phantom Bernard Golse Translated by Robert Bononno Phenomenology and psychoanalysis Georges Lantéri-Laura Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Translated by Liam Gavin Pichon-Rivière, Enrique Samuel Arbiser Translated by Liam Gavin Pictogram Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Pleasure ego/reality ego Ernst Federn Translated by Donald NicholsonSmith Pleasure in thinking Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Philip Beitchman Pleasure/unpleasure principle Francisco Palacio Espasa Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Philippines Geoffrey H. Blowers Poland Michel Vincent Translated by Liam Gavin Philippson Bible Eva Laible Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Politics and psychoanalysis Roger Dadoun Translated by Robert Bononno Philosophy and psychoanalysis Bernard Lemaigre Translated by Robert Bononno Politzer, Georges Roger Bruyeron Translated by Robert Bononno Phobia of committing impulsive acts Christiane Guitard-Munnich and Philippe Turmond Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Porto-Carrero, Julio Pires Marialzira Perestrello Translated by Liam Gavin Phobias in children Claude Bursztejn Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Portugal Pedro Luzes Translated by Liam Gavin Phobic neurosis Francis Drossart Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Postnatal/postpartum depression Monique Bydlowski Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Phylogenesis Roger Perron Translated by Liam Gavin Pötzl, Otto Elke Mühlleitner Translated by Liam Gavin Phylogenetic Fantasy, A: Overview of the Transference Neuroses Ilse Grubrich-Simitis Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Preconception Pedro Luzes Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Physical pain/psychic pain Laurence Croix Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Piaget, Jean Fernando Vidal Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Pichon, Édouard Jean Baptiste Jean-Pierre Bourgeron xliv Preconscious, the Andrée Bauduin Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Pregenital Dominique J. Arnoux Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Pregnancy, fantasy of Marie Claire Lanctôt Bélanger Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Prehistory François Sacco Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Premature-Prematurity Anne Frichet Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Premonitory dreams Roger Perron Translated by Sophie Leighton Prepsychosis Paul Denis Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Prereflective unconscious Robert D. Stolorow Primal fantasies Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Primal repression Jean-François Rabain Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Primal scene Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Primal, the Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Primary identification Alain de Mijolla Translated by Sophie Leighton Primary love Michelle Moreau Ricaud Translated by Robert Bononno Primary masochism Denys Ribas Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Primary need Bernard Golse Translated by Dan Collins Primary object Marie Eugénie Jullian Muzzo Benavides Translated by Philip Beitchman Primary process/secondary process Roger Perron Translated by Philip Beitchman Primitive Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Primitive agony Jennifer Johns Primitive horde Eugène Enriquez Translated by Robert Bononno INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS LIST Principle of constancy Bertrand Vichyn Translated by Philip Beitchman Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Principle of identity preservation Agnès Oppenheimer Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Principle of (neuronal) inertia Bertrand Vichyn Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Principles of mental functioning René Roussillon Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Privation Luiz Eduardo Prado de Oliveira Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Psi(y) system Bertrand Vichyn Translated by Philip Beitchman Psychanalyse et les nevroses, La Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Translated by Philip Beitchman Psychanalyse et Pédiatrie (psychoanalysis and pediatrics) Bernard This Translated by Liam Gavin Psychanalyse, La Jacques Sédat Translated by Dan Collins Psyché, revue internationale de psychanalyse et des sciences de l’homme (Psyche, an international review of psychoanalysis and human sciences) Jacqueline Cosnier Translated by Liam Gavin Process Bernard Golse Translated by Robert Bononno Processes of development Roger Perron Translated by Liam Gavin Progressive neutralization Arnold Goldberg Prohibition Roger Perron Translated by Robert Bononno Psyche. Zeitschrift für Psychanalyse und ihre Anwendungen Hans-Martin Lohmann Translated by Liam Gavin ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology, A’’ Bertrand Vichyn Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Psyche/psychism Yvon Brès Translated by Robert Bononno Projection Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Psychic apparatus Yvon Brès Translated by Philip Beitchman Projection and ‘‘participation mystique’’ (analytical psychology) Christian Gaillard Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Psychic causality Jean-Pierre Chartier Translated by Robert Bononno Psychic energy Paul Denis Translated by Philip Beitchman Projective identification Robert D. Hinshelwood Psychic envelope Didier Anzieu Translated by Robert Bononno Protective shield Josiane Chambrier Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Protective shield, breaking through the Josiane Chambrier Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Proton-pseudos Bernard Golse Translated by Liam Gavin Protothoughts Pedro Luzes INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF Psychoanalyse des névroses et des psychoses, La Alain de Mijolla Translated by Philip Beitchman Psychoanalysis Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Psychoanalysis of Children, The Francisco Palacio Espasa Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Psychoanalysis of Dreams Gilda Sabsay Foks Translated by Philip Beitchman Psychoanalysis of Fire, The Bernard Golse Translated by Robert Bononno Psychoanalyst Alain de Mijolla Translated by Dan Collins Psychoanalytic epistemology Roland Gori Translated by Robert Bononno Psychoanalytic family therapy Françoise Diot and Joseph Villier Translated by Philip Beitchman Psychoanalytic filiations Paul Ries Psychoanalytic nosography Augustin Jeanneau Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith ‘‘Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)’’ Roger Perron Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Psychoanalytic Quarterly, The Owen Renik Psychoanalytic research Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Psychic representative Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Psychoanalytic Review, The Martin A. Schulman Psychic temporality PSYCHOANALYSIS ENTRIES Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Philip Beitchman Psychic reality René Roussillon Translated by Robert Bononno Psychic structure Augustin Jeanneau Translated by Gwendolyn Wells OF Psychoanalytic semiology Augustin Jeanneau Translated by Robert Bononno Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, The George Downing x lv LIST OF ENTRIES Psychoanalytic Theory of Neuroses, The Elke Mühlleitner Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Psychopathology of Everyday Life, The Gisèle Harrus-Revidi Translated by Robert Bononno Psychoanalytic treatment Alain de Mijolla Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Psychoses, chronic and delusional Michel Demangeat Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Psychoanalytical Treatment of Children Frédérique Jacquemain Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Psychoanalytische Bewegung, Die Lydia Marinelli Translated by Liam Gavin Psychobiography Larry Shiner Translated by Liam Gavin Purposive idea Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Putnam, James Jackson Edith Kurzweil Q Psychosexual development Jean-François Rabain Translated by Liam Gavin Quantitative/qualitative Philippe Metello Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Psychosomatic Alain Fine Translated by Robert Bononno Quasi-independence/transitional stage Jennifer Johns Psychosomatic limit/boundary Gisèle Harrus-Revidi Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Quatrième groupe (O.P.L.F.), Fourth group Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Dan Collins ‘‘Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman, The’’ Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Sophie Leighton Psychoterapia (Psixoterapija-Obozrenie voprosov lecenija I prikladonoj psixologii) Alexandre Mikhalevitch Translated by Liam Gavin Psychogenesis/organogenesis Claude Smadja Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Psychotherapy Serge Frisch Translated by Dan Collins Psychogenic blindness Jean-Michel Hirtt Translated by Liam Gavin Psychotic defenses Elsa Schmid-Kitsikis Translated by Philip Beitchman Psychohistory Larry Shiner Psychotic panic Edna O’Shaughnessy Quota of affect Francisco Palacio Espasa Translated by Robert Bononno Psychological tests Roger Perron Translated by Liam Gavin Psychotic part of the personality Edna O’Shaughnessy R Psychotic potential Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Philip Beitchman Racamier, Paul-Claude Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Psychotic transference David Rosenfeld Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Racism, antisemitism, and psychoanalysis Jacques Ascher and Perel Wilgowicz Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Psychological types (analytical psychology) John Beebe Psychology and psychoanalysis Roger Perron Translated by Liam Gavin Psychology of Dementia præcox Bernard Minder Translated by Liam Gavin Psychology of the Unconscious, The Viviane Thibaudier Translated by Liam Gavin Psychology of Women, The. A Psychoanalytic Interpretation Jacqueline Lanouzière Translated by Liam Gavin Psychopathologie de l’échec (Psychopathology of Failure) Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Translated by Liam Gavin xlvi Question of Lay Analysis, The Roger Perron Translated by Liam Gavin Psychotic/neurotic Georges Lantéri-Laura Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Puberty Jean-Jacques Rassial Translated by Philip Beitchman Racker, Heinrich R. Horacio Etchegoyen Translated by Liam Gavin Radó, Sándor Paul Roazen Puerperal psychoses Odile Cazas Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Punishment, dream of Roger Perron Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Purified-pleasure-ego Alain de Mijolla Qu’est-ce que la suggestion? [What is suggestion?] Mireille Cifali Translated by Liam Gavin Raimbault, Émile Michelle Moreau Ricaud Translated by Liam Gavin Rambert, Madeleine Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Rank (Rosenfeld) Otto E. James Lieberman INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS LIST Rank-Minzer (Münzer), Beata Helene Rank-Veltfort Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Rapaport, David Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Reich, Wilhelm Roger Dadoun Translated by Robert Bononno Rascovsky, Arnaldo Elfriede S. Lustig de Ferrer Translated by Liam Gavin Reik, Theodor Joseph Reppen Rationalization Michèle Bertrand Translated by Robert Bononno Relations (commensalism, symbiosis, parasitism) Didier Houzel Translated by Liam Gavin Reaction-formation Michèle Bertrand Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Relaxation principle and neocatharsis Pierre Sabourin Translated by Liam Gavin Real trauma Françoise Brette Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Relaxation psychotherapy Marie-Lise Roux Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary father Patrick De Neuter Translated by Dan Collins Real, the (Lacan) Martine Lerude Translated by Dan Collins Religion and psychanoalysis Odon Vallet Translated by Robert Bononno Remembering Claude Barrois Translated by Sophie Leighton Reality principle René Roussillon Translated by Robert Bononno ‘‘Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through’’ René Péran Translated by Sophie Leighton Reality testing René Roussillon Translated by Dan Collins Realization James S. Grotstein Reciprocal paths of influence (libidinal coexcitation) Sophie de Mijolla Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells ‘‘Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis’’ Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Rees, John Rawlings Malcolm Pines Régis, Emmanuel Jean-Baptiste Joseph Gérard Bazalgette Translated by Robert Bononno ‘‘Repression’’ Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Repression, lifting of Jean-François Rabain Translated by Dan Collins Repudiation Bernard Penot Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Rescue fantasies Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Resistance Michèle Pollak Cornillot Translated by Dan Collins Resolution of the transference Paul Denis Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Return of the repressed Jean-François Rabain Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Reverie Roger Perron Translated by Dan Collins Repetitive dreams Roger Perron Translated by Sophie Leighton Representability Katia Varenne Translated by Dan Collins Representation of affect Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Reich, Annie Lilli Gast Repressed Jean-François Rabain OF Repression Jean-François Rabain Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Reparation Robert D. Hinshelwood Regression Martine Myquel Translated by Gwendolyn Wells INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY Repressed, derivative of the; derivative of the unsonscious Jean-François Rabain Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Reverchon-Jouve, Blanche Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Translated by Robert Bononno Repetition compulsion Gérard Bonnet Translated by Dan Collins PSYCHOANALYSIS ENTRIES Translated by Dan Collins Reminiscences Claude Barrois Translated by Robert Bononno Repetition Gérard Bonnet Translated by Dan Collins OF Reversal into the opposite Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Revista de psicoanálisis Carlos Mario Aslan Revista de psiquiatria y disciplinas conexas Álvaro Rey de Castro Translated by Liam Gavin Revue française de psychanalyse Alain de Mijolla Translated by Dan Collins Richard, case of Robert D. Hinshelwood Rickman, John Pearl H. M. King xlvii LIST OF ENTRIES Rie, Oskar Alain de Mijolla Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Rycroft, Charles Frederick Paul Roazen Michel Demangeat Translated by Robert Bononno S Rite and ritual Michèle Porte Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Sachs, Hanns Reiner Wild Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Schlumberger, Marc Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Translated by Liam Gavin Rittmeister, John Friedrich Karl Ludger M. Hermanns Translated by Liam Gavin Sadger, Isidor Isaak Bertrand Vichyn Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Schmidt, Vera Federovna Irina Manson Translated by Liam Gavin Sadism Denys Ribas Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Schneider, Ernst Jeanne Moll Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Rivalry Steven Wainrib Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Riviere-Hodgson Verrall, Joan Athol Hughes Rivisita di psicoanalisi Rosario Merendino Translated by Robert Bononno Robertson, James Jennifer Johns Róheim, Géza Éva Brabant-Gerö Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Rolland, Romain Edme Paul-Émile Henri Vermorel and Madeleine Vermorel Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Romania Michel Vincent Translated by Liam Gavin Rorschach, Hermann Mireille Cifali Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Rosenfeld, Eva Marie Alain de Mijolla Translated by Liam Gavin Rosenfeld, Herbert Alexander Riccardo Steiner Rosenthal, Tatiana Anna Maria Accerboni Translated by Liam Gavin Ross, Helen Nellie L. Thompson Rubinstein, Benjamin B. Robert R. Holt Russia/USSR Alexandre Mikhalevitch Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque xlviii Schmideberg-Klein, Melitta Pearl H. M. King Schreber, Daniel Paul Zvi Lothane Sadomasochism Denys Ribas Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Schultz-Hencke, Harald Julius Alfred Carl-Ludwig Regine Lockot Translated by Liam Gavin Sainte-Anne Hospital Jean Garrabé Translated by Dan Collins Schur, Max Roy K. Lilleskov Salpêtriere Hospital, La Daniel Widlöcher Translated by Robert Bononno San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society Robert S. Wallerstein San Francisco Psychotherapy Research Group and Control-Mastery Theory Robert Shilkret Schweizerische Ärztegesellschaft für Psychoanalyse Mireille Cifali Translated by Liam Gavin Science and psychoanalysis Roland Gori Translated by Robert Bononno Scilicet Jacques Sédat Translated by Andrew Brown Sandler, Joseph Riccardo Steiner Sarasin, Philipp Kaspar Weber Translated by Liam Gavin Sartre and psychoanalysis Georges Lantéri-Laura Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Scoptophilia/scopophilia Alain de Mijolla Translated by Dan Collins Scotomization Alain de Mijolla Translated by Dan Collins Saussure, Raymond de Jean-Michel Quinodoz Translated by Liam Gavin Screen memory François Richard Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Schiff, Paul Claire Doz-Schiff Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Sechehaye-Burdet, Marguerite Mario Cifali Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Schilder, Paul Ferdinand Alain de Mijolla Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Second World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Schiller and psychoanalysis Madeleine Vermorel Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Schizophrenia Secondary revision François Duparc Translated by Gwendolyn Wells INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS LIST Secret Anne-Marie Mairesse Translated by Robert Bononno Agnès Oppenheimer Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Self-representation Raymond Cahn Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Secret Committee Gerhard Wittenberger Translated by Robert Bononno Self-state dream Arnold Goldberg Secrets of a Soul Paul Ries Seduction Henri Sztulman Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Seduction scenes Roger Perron Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Selected fact Didier Houzel Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Self Maurice Despinoy and Monique PiñolDouriez Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Self (analytical psychology) Joseph L. Henderson Sigmund Freud Institute Michael Laier Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Servadio, Emilio Anna Maria Accerboni Translated by Robert Bononno Sexual theories of children Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Self-mutilation in children Claude Bursztejn Translated by Robert Bononno Sexual trauma Françoise Brette Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Self-object Agnès Oppenheimer Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Sexuality Colette Chiland Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Self-preservation Roger Perron Translated by Liam Gavin Self-punishment Bertrand Étienne and Dominique Deyon Translated by Philip Beitchman Self psychology OF Sharpe, Ella Freeman Pearl H. M. King Sense/nonsense Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells ‘‘Sexual Enlightenment Of Children, The’’ Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Self-image Philippine Meffre Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Shame Serge Tisseron Translated by Dan Collins Sigmund Freud Copyrights Limited Thomas Roberts and Mark Paterson Sexual drive Michèle Porte Translated by Dan Collins Self-hatred Nicole Jeammet Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Shakespeare and psychoanalysis Margaret Ann Fitzpatrick Hanly Seminar, Lacan’s Jacques Sédat Translated by Dan Collins Sexual differences Paulo R. Ceccarelli Translated by Robert Bononno Self-esteem Raymond Cahn Translated by Liam Gavin Shadow (analytical psychology) Hans Dieckmann Translated by Robert Bononno Sigmund Freud Archives Harold P. Blum Sex and Character Erik Porge Translated by Liam Gavin Self-consciousness Marie Claire Lanctôt Bélange Translated by Gwendolyn Wells ENTRIES Self (true/false) Jennifer Johns ‘‘Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis, A’’ Roger Perron Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Self-analysis Didier Anzieu Translated by Dan Collins INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY Self, the Bernard Golse Translated by Philip Beitchman OF Sexualization Arnold Goldberg Sexuation, formulas of Alain Vanier Translated by Dan Collins PSYCHOANALYSIS Sigmund Freud Museum Ingrid Scholz-Strasser Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Signal anxiety Bernard Golse Translated by Robert Bononno Signifier Julia Kristeva Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Signifier/signified Joël Dor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Signifying chain Joël Dor Translated by Dan Collins Silberer, Herbert Alain de Mijolla Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Silberstein, Eduard Alain de Mijolla Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Silence Pearl Lombard Translated by Andrew Brown Simmel, Ernst Ludger M. Hermanns and Ulrich SchultzVenrath Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Skin Didier Anzieu xlix LIST OF ENTRIES Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Skin-ego Didier Anzieu Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Sleep/wakefulness Philippe Metello Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Slips of the tongue Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Smell, sense of Dominique J. Arnoux Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Smirnoff, Victor Nikolaı̈evitch Hélène Trivouss-Widlöcher Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Social feeling (individual psychology) François Compan Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Société française de psychanalyse Jean-Louis Lang Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Société psychanalytique de Genève Jean-Michel Quinodoz Translated by Liam Gavin Société psychanalytique de Montréal Jacques Vigneault Translated by Liam Gavin Société psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris Alain de Mijolla Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Sociology and psychoanalysis/ sociopsychoanalysis Eugène Enriquez Translated by Liam Gavin Sokolnicka-Kutner, Eugénie Alain de Mijolla Translated by Liam Gavin Somatic compliance Alain Fine Translated by Gwendolyn Wells ‘‘Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes’’ Colette Chiland Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Somnambulism Philippe Metello Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Spain l State of being in love Laurent Danon-Boileau Translated by Robert Bononno Maria Luisa Muñoz Translated by Liam Gavin Specific action Roger Perron Translated by Philip Beitchman Stekel, Wilhelm Francis Clark-Lowes Spielrein, Sabina Nicolle Kress-Rosen Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Sterba, Richard F. Elke Mühlleitner Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Spinoza and psychoanalysis Michèle Bertrand Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Sterba-Radanowicz-Hartmann, Editha Elke Mühlleitner Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Spitz, René Arpad Kathleen Kelley-Lainé Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Split object Panos Aloupis Translated by Dan Collins Stoller, Robert J. Christopher Gelber Stone, Leo Zvi Lothane Storfer, Adolf Josef Ingrid Scholz-Strasser Translated by Liam Gavin Splits in psychoanalysis Alain de Mijolla Translated by Dan Collins Strachey, James Beaumont Riccardo Steiner Splitting Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Dan Collins Strachey-Sargent, Alix Riccardo Steiner Splitting of the ego Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith ‘‘Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense, The’’ Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Sophie Leighton Splitting of the object Robert D. Hinshelwood Stranger Léon Kreisler Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Strata/stratification Michèle Porte Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Structural theories Roger Perron Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Structuralism and psychoanalysis Dominique Auffret Translated by Andrew Brown Splitting of the subject Alain Vanier Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Studienausgabe Ilse Grubrich-Simitis Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Splitting, vertical and horizontal Arnold Goldberg Squiggle Jennifer Johns Stage (or phase) Jean-François Rabain Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Stammering Christiane Payan Translated by Liam Gavin Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Riccardo Steiner Studies on Hysteria Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Subconscious Annick Ohayon Translated by Philip Beitchman Subject Raymond Cahn Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Subject of the drive Marie-Christine Laznik INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS LIST OF ENTRIES Translated by Dan Collins Translated by Dan Collins Translated by Dan Collins Subject of the unconscious Bernard Penot Translated by Philip Beitchman Surrealism and psychoanalysis Nicole Geblesco Translated by Robert Bononno Subject’s castration Luiz Eduardo Prado de Oliveira Translated by Dan Collins Sweden Per Magnus Johansson and David Titelman Translated by Liam Gavin Szondi, Leopold Jacques Schotte Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Subject’s desire Patrick Delaroche Translated by Dan Collins Switzerland (French-speaking) Jean-Michel Quinodoz Translated by Liam Gavin Sublimation Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Substitute/substitutive formation Mathieu Zannotti Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Substitutive formation Roger Perron Translated by Philip Beitchman Sucking/thumbsucking Anne-Marie Mairesse Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Sudden involuntary idea Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Switzerland (German-speaking) Kaspar Weber Translated by Liam Gavin Swoboda, Hermann Erik Porge Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Symbiosis/symbiotic relation Cléopâtre Athanassiou-Popesco Translated by Andrew Brown Symbol Alain Gibeault Translated by Dan Collins Symbolic equation Hanna Segal T Taboo Michèle Porte Translated by Robert Bononno ‘‘Taboo of Virginity, The’’ Roger Perron Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Tact Pierre Sabourin Translated by Philip Beitchman Tausk, Viktor Marie-Thérèse Neyraut-Sutterman Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Tavistock Clinic Marcus Johns Technique with adults, psychoanalytic Alain de Mijolla Translated by Philip Beitchman Suffering Drina Candilis-Huisman Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Symbolic realization Jean-Michel Quinodoz Translated by Liam Gavin Suggestion Jacqueline Carroy Translated by Robert Bononno Symbolic, the (Lacan) Jean-Paul Hiltenbrand Translated by Dan Collins Suicidal behavior Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Symbolism Harold P. Blum Tegel (Schloss Tegel) Ludger M. Hermanns and Ulrich SchultzVenrath Translated by Liam Gavin Symbolization, process of Alain Gibeault Translated by Robert Bononno Telepathy Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Sullivan, Harry Stack Marco Conci Symptom Augustin Jeanneau Translated by Dan Collins Tenderness Régine Prat Translated by Robert Bononno Sum of excitation Michèle Porte Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Symptom-formation Augustin Jeanneau and Roger Perron Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Termination of treatment Alain de Mijolla Translated by Dan Collins Superego Jean-Luc Donnet Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Symptom/sinthome Valentin Nusinovici Translated by Dan Collins Thalassa. A Theory of Genitality Pierre Sabourin Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Supervised analysis (control case) Roger Perron Translated by Liam Gavin Synchronicity (analytical psychology) John Beebe ‘‘Theme of the Three Caskets,The’’ Ilse Grubrich-Simitis Translated by Sophie Leighton Suppression Francisco Palacio Espasa System/systemic Françoise Diot and Joseph Villier Therapeutic alliance Alain de Mijolla Suicide Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Philip Beitchman INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Technique with children, psychoanalytic Bernard Golse Translated by Philip Beitchman li LIST OF ENTRIES Translated by Robert Bononno Thing, the Jean-Paul Hiltenbrand Translated by Dan Collins Thing-presentation Alain Gibeault Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twentyeighth President of the United States. A Psychological Study Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Thompson, Clara M. Sue A. Shapiro Thought Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Thought identity Dominique Auffret Translated by Gwendolyn Wells ‘‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’’ Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Thought-thinking apparatus Pedro Luzes Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality Roger Perron Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Tics Christiane Payan Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Time Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Tomasi di Palma di Lampedusa-Wolff Somersee, Alessandra Anna Maria Accerboni Translated by Robert Bononno Topique Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Philip Beitchman Topographical point of view René Roussillon Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Topology Bernard Vandermersch Translated by Dan Collins li i Torok, Maria Jacques Sédat Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Transference relationship Paul Denis Translated by Donald NicholsonSmith Tosquelles, François Pierre Delion Translated by Liam Gavin Transformations James S. Grotstein Totem and Taboo Michèle Porte Translated by Robert Bononno Transgression Simon-Daniel Kipman Translated by Andrew Brown Totem/totemism Michèle Porte Translated by Robert Bononno Transitional object Nora Scheimberg Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Training analysis Alain de Mijolla Translated by Dan Collins Transitional object, space Jennifer Johns Transitional phenomena Campbell Paul and Ann Morgan Training of the psychoanalyst Jean-Luc Donnet Translated by Robert Bononno Translation Michèle Pollak Cornillot Translated by Robert Bononno Trance Jacqueline Carroy Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Transmuting internalization Arnold Goldberg Transcultural Marie-Rose Moro Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Transsexualism Colette Chiland Translated by Liam Gavin Transference Paul Denis Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Trattato di psicoanalisi Giancarlo Gramaglia Translated by Robert Bononno Transference and Countertransference Fidias Cesio Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Trauma Françoise Brette Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Transference/counter-transference (analytical psychology) Jean Kirsch Transference depression Jean-François Rabain Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Tube-ego Bernard Golse Translated by Liam Gavin Transference in children Bernard Golse Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Transference love Jean-François Rabain Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Transference of creativity Agnès Oppenheimer Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Traumatic neurosis Françoise Brette Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Truth Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Dan Collins Transference hatred Jean-François Rabain Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Transference neurosis Gail S. Reed Trauma of Birth, The Didier Houzel Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Turning around Roger Perron Translated by Dan Collins Turning around upon the subject’s own self Jean-Baptiste Déthieux Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Tustin, Frances Didier Houzel INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS LIST Translated by Gwendolyn Wells V Twinship transference/alter ego transference Agnès Oppenheimer Translated by Gwendolyn Wells ‘‘Vagina dentata,’’ fantasy of Marie Claire Lanctôt Bélanger Translated by Dan Collins Typical dreams Roger Perron Translated by Sophie Leighton Valdizán, Hermilio Álvaro Rey de Castro Translated by Liam Gavin Venezuela Rafael E. López-Corvo Translated by Liam Gavin U Ulcerative colitis Alain Fine Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Vertex Didier Houzel Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Unary trait Marc Darmon Translated by Dan Collins Viderman, Serge Alain de Mijolla Translated by Gwendolyn Wells ‘‘‘Uncanny,’ The’’ Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno Unconscious as Infinite Sets, The: An Essay in Bi-Logic Juan Francisco Jordan Moore Translated by Philip Beitchman Unconscious concept Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Dan Collins Unconscious fantasy Robert D. Hinshelwood Unconscious, the Michèle Porte Translated by Dan Collins Vienna General Hospital Eva Laible Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Vienna, Freud’s secondary school in Eva Laible Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Walter, Bruno Nicolas Gougoulis Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Want of being/lack of being Alain Vanier Translated by Dan Collins War neurosis Anne Bizot Translated by Dan Collins Washington Psychoanalytic Society John Galbraith Simmons Weaning Grazia Maria Fava Vizziello Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Weininger, Otto Erik Porge Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Weiss, Edoardo Anna Maria Accerboni Translated by Robert Bononno Weltanschauung Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Philip Beitchman Violence of Interpretation, The: From Pictogram to Statement Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Gwendolyn Wells ‘‘Why War?’’ Alain de Mijolla Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Visual Jean-Michel Hirtt Translated by Dan Collins Undoing Elsa Schmid-Kitsikis Translated by Robert Bononno ENTRIES Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Vienna, University of Eva Laible Translated by Liam Gavin Violence, instinct of Jean Bergeret Translated by Gwendolyn Wells ‘‘Unconscious, The’’ Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Translated by Robert Bononno OF Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung Wilhelm Burian Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Wilbur, George B. Paul Roazen United States Edith Kurzweil Visual arts and psychoanalysis Michel Artières Translated by Robert Bononno ‘‘ ‘Wild’ Psycho-Analysis’’ Alain de Mijolla Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Unpleasure Michèle Pollak Cornillot Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Voyeurism Jean-Michel Hirtt Translated by Robert Bononno Winnicott, Donald Woods Jennifer Johns Unvalidated unconscious Robert D. Stolorow W Urbantschitsch (Urban), Rudolf von Elke Mühlleitner Translated by Liam Gavin Waelder, Robert Elke Mühlleitner Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Uruguay Sélika Acevedo de Mendilaharsu Translated by Liam Gavin Wagner-Jauregg, Julius (Julius Wagner Ritter von Jauregg) Eva Laible INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Winterstein, Alfred Freiherr von Harald Leupold-Löwenthal Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Wish for a baby Christine Petit Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Wish, hallucinatory satisfaction of a Roger Perron l ii i LIST OF ENTRIES Translated by Philip Beitchman Wish/yearning Gérard Bonnet Translated by Philip Beitchman Wish-fulfillment Delphine Schilton Translated by Philip Beitchman Witch of Metapsychology, the Roger Perron Translated by Liam Gavin Wittels, Fritz (Siegfried) Elke Mühlleitner Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Wittkower, Eric Patrick Mahony Wolfenstein, Martha Nellie L. Thompson Wolff, Antonia Anna Thomas B. Kirsch Work (as a psychoanalytical notion) Michèle Pollak Cornillot Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Working-off mechanisms Elsa Schmid-Kitsikis Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Wulff, Mosche (Woolf, Moshe) Ruth Kloocke Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Word association Renos K. Papadopoulos Word-presentation Alain Gibeault Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith Yugoslavia (ex-) Michel Vincent Translated by Liam Gavin li v Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse Lydia Marinelli Translated by Liam Gavin Working-through René Péran Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Young Girl’s Diary, A Alain de Mijolla Translated by Robert Bononno Zavitzianos, Georges Anna Potamianou Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik Jeanne Moll Translated by Liam Gavin Working over François Duparc Translated by Gwendolyn Wells Y Z Zetzel-Rosenberg, Elizabeth Nellie L. Thompson Zulliger, Hans Jeanne Moll Translated by Liam Gavin Zweig, Arnold Bernard Golse Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque Zweig, Stefan Christine de Kerchove Translated by John Galbraith Simmons and Jocelyne Barque INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DIRECTORY OF CONTRIBUTORS CONTRIBUTORS DIRECTORY OF With texts originating from regions all over the world, each possessing its own unique conventions, and in order to maintain the Dictionary’s character as an international work, we have refrained from standardizing the biographies sent to us by the 463 authors who contributed to it. Liliane Abensour Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Anna Maria Accerboni Instructor of Dynamic Psychology University of Trieste Psychotherapist Member International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis Sélika Acevedo de Mendilaharsu, M.D. Professor Emeritus Titular Member Psychoanalytic Association of Uruguay Aimé Agneel Psychoanalyst Member Société française de psychologie analytique Jorge L. Ahumada Training Analyst Buenos Aires Psychoanalytic Association Editor for Latin America, International Journal of Psychoanalysis Brigitte Allain-Dupré Psychoanalyst Member Société française de psychologie analytique Director Institut C. G. Jung (Paris) Panos Aloupis Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris André Alsteens Former President Société belge de psychanalyse Director Centre de guidance pour enfants et adolescents à Uccle-Bruxelles Nadine Amar Psychoanalyst Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Asociación Psicoanalı́tica de Buenos Aires Jean-Claude Arfouilloux Doctor, Psychiatrist, and Psychoanlayst Member Association psychanalytique de France Dominique J. Arnoux Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Omar Arrué Full Member International Psychoanalytical Association Titular Member, Training Analyst, and Past President Asociación Psicoanalı́tica Chilena Jacques Angelergues Doctor, Psychiatrist and Child Psychiatrist Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Michel Artières Doctor and Psychoanalyst Member Quatrième Groupe-O.P.L.F. Didier Anzieu Psychoanalyst Member Association psychanalytique de France Jacques Ascher Doctor Centre hospitalier et universitaire de Lille Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Christine Anzieu-Premmereur Psychoanalyst and Child Psychiatrist Doctor at the Centre Alfred-Binet, Paris Samuel Arbiser Doctor Titular Training Member lv Carlos Mario Aslan President, Member, and Training Analyst Argentine Psychoanalytic Association Member DIRECTORY OF CONTRIBUTORS International Psychoanalytical Association Robert Asséo Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Medical Director Institut de psychosomatique Cléopatre Athanassiou-Popesco Psychoanalyst Anne Aubert-Godard Professor of Psychopathology Director, Laboratory of Health and Psychopathology University of Haute-Normandie Dominique Auffret Docteur d’Etat in Letters and the Human Sciences Professor of Fundamental Psychology EFP in Lyon Gabriel Balbo Psychoanalyst and Psychodramatist Director Psychanalyse de l’enfant Madeleine Baranger Member Argentine Psychoanalytic Association Claude Barrois Tenured Professor of Psychiatry Val-de-Grâce Member Association psychanalytique de France Andrée Bauduin Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Titular Member, Société psychanalytique de Paris Gérard Bazalgette Psychiatrist-Member Quatrième Groupe-O.P.L.F. John E. Beebe Jungian Analyst Assistant Clinical Professor Department of Psychiatry University of California Medical School, San Francisco Nicole Belmont Curriculum Director Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences socials Jalil Bennani Psychiatrist-Psychoanalyst Rabat, Morocco lv i Jean Bergeret, M.D., Ph.D. Psychoanalyst (Société psychanalytique de Paris) Professor University of Lyon II Jean Bergès Neuropsychiatrist Psychoanalyst (Association freudienne internationale) Bertrand, Michèle Professor Université de Franche-Comté Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris and International Psychoanalytical Association Elisabeth Bigras Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Société psychanalytique de Montreal and Société canadienne de psychanalyse Parthenope Bion Talamo Psychoanalyst Anne Bizot Psychologist and Psychoanalyst Dominique Blin Psychoanalyst and Psychologist Owen Hugh D. Blomfield Member Australian Psychoanalytical Society and International Psychoanalytical Association Geoffrey H. Blowers Senior Lecturer, Director, and P.C. Psychiatrist University of Hong Kong Gérard Bonnet Psychoanalyst Member Association psychanalytique de France Marc Bonnet Clinical Psychologist Analyst-Member Quatrième Groupe-O.P.L.F. Bénédicte Bonnet-Vidon Psychiatrist Carlo Bonomi Dr. of Psychology and Dr. of Philosophy Training Analyst H.S. Sullivan Institute, Florence Jaap Bos Doctor and Psychologist César Botella Psychoanalyst Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Member International Psychoanalytical Association Sára Botella Psychoanalyst Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Member International Psychoanalytical Association Pierre Bourdier Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Jean-Pierre Bourgeron Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Pierre-Jean Bouyer Scriptwriter Harold P. Blum, M.D. Clinical Professor of Psychiatry NYU School of Medicine Training Analyst New York Psychoanalytic Institute Member International Psychoanalytical Association Sylvain Bouyer Psychoanalyst Member of Espace analytique Eva Brabant-Gero Psychoanalyst, Historian André Bolzinger Doctor, Psychiatrist, and Psychoanalyst Member of Evolution psychiatrique Member Société de psychanalyse freudienne Alain Braconier Doctor, Psychiatrist, and Psychoanalyst Association psychanalytique de France Charles Brenner Training Analyst New York Psychoanalytic Institute INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DIRECTORY Former President American Psychoanalytic Association Jean-Louis Brenot Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Yvon Brès Professor Emeritus Université de Paris-VII Françoise Brette Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Christien Brinkgreve Professor, Doctor, and Sociologist Danièle Brun Psychoanalyst Professor Université de Paris-VII Member of Espace analytique Claude Bursztejn Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Professor of Psychiatry Université Louis-Pasteur Jean Cournut Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Josiane Chambrier Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Colette Chiland Professor Emeritus of Clinical Psychology Université de Paris-V Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Mario Cifali Psychoanalyst Geneva, Switzerland Raymond Cahn Titular Member and former President Société psychanalytique de Paris Jean-Pierre Caillot Psychiatrist Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Drina Candilis-Huisman Psychologist Jacqueline Carroy Curriculum Director École des hautes etudes en sciences sociales (EHESS) Marie-France Castarède Doctor in Letters and Human Sciences Université de Paris-V Odile Cazas Psychiatrist and Psychotherapist OF Fidias R. Cesio Doctor and Psychoanalyst Titular and Training Member Asociación Psicoanalı́tica Argentina Joan Chodorow, Ph.D. Analyst Member C. G. Jung Institute of San Francisco Monique Bydlowski Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Director of Research INSERM Psychiatric Associate American Academy of Psychoanalysis Jacqueline Cosnier D.E.S. in Philosophy Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Jean-Pierre Chartier Psychoanalyst Member Quatrième Groupe-O.L.P.F. Wilhelm Burian Psychiatrist Member and Training Analyst Vienna Psychoanalytical Society CONTRIBUTORS Henri Cesbron Lavau Psychoanalyst Member Association freudienne internationale Ghyslain Charron Psychoanalyst Roger Bruyeron Aggregated Philosopher INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY Roberto Paulo Ceccarelli Psychologist and Psychoanalyst OF Mireille Cifali Professor Université de Genève Francis Clark-Lowes B.S. (Sociology), London University M.A. (Psychology, Therapy, and Counseling) Johannes Cremerius, M.D. Psychiatrist Member Deutsche Psychoanlytische Vereinigung Laurence Croix Psychoanalyst and Doctor in Psychology Université de Paris-V and XIII Boris Cyrulnik Director of Ethological Studies Faculty of Medicine, Marseille Roger Dadoun Professor Emeritus Université de Paris-VII Writer and Philosopher Laurent Danon-Boileau Professor Université de Paris-V Marc Darmon Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Member Association freudienne internationale Corinne Daubigny Psychoanalyst Didier David Pediatric Psychiatrist Patrick De Neuter Member Association freudienne internationale Geoffrey Cocks Royal G. Hall Professor of History Albion College, Michigan Betty De Shong Meador, Ph.D. Analyst Member C. G. Jung Institute, San Francisco François Compan Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst President Société française de psychologie individuelle Rosine Debray Psychoanalyst Professor of Clinical Psychology Université de Paris-V Marco Conci, M.D. Assistant Professor of Psychiatry Brescia School of Medicine PSYCHOANALYSIS Simone Decobert Pediatric Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris lvii DIRECTORY OF CONTRIBUTORS Bernard Defontaine Psychoanalyst (Société psychanalytique de Paris) Psychotherapist Institut Edouard-Claparède de Neuilly Geneviève Delaisi De Parseval Psychoanalyst Patrick Delaroche Psychoanalyst Former Member École freudienne de Paris Member of Espace Analytique Claude Delay-Tubiana Psychoanalyst and Writer Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Pierre Delion Psychiatrist Angers, France Michel Demangeat Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Former Member École freudienne de Paris Paul Denis Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Jean-Paul Descombey Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Chief Doctor Centre Henri-Rousselle (Saint-Anne, Paris) Maurice Despinoy Hospital Practitioner Marseilles Catherine Desprats-Péquignot Psychoanalyst Lecturer Université de Paris-VII Member Association freudienne internationale Jean-Baptiste Déthieux Psychiatrist Dominique Deyon Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Hans Dieckmann Doctor and Training Analyst C. G. Jung Institute, Berlin Françoise Diot Psychiatrist, Psychoanalyst, and Family Therapist lv ii i Nicolas Dissez Psychiatrist François Duyckaerts, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus Universités de Liège et Bruxelles Psychoanalyst Karin A. Ditrich, Ph.D., Psy.D. Psychoanalyst Munich Alberto Eiguer Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Takeo Doi, M.D. Psychiatrist Member and Training Analyst Japan Psychoanalytic Society Cláudio Laks Eizirik, M.D., Ph.D. Member and Training Analyst Sociedade Psicanalitica de Porto Alegre Jean-Luc Donnet Psychoanalyst Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Joël Dor Lecturer and Director of Resesarch at the U.F.R. Université de Paris-VII Member of Espace analytique Robert Doria-Median, Jr. Doctor Titular Member and Training Analyst Asociación psicoanaltı́tica Argentina François Dosse Historian Co-animator of Espaces Temps Eugène Enriquez Professor Emeritus of Sociology Université de Paris-VII R. Horacio Etchegoyen Doctor Titular Member, Training Analyst, and Past President Asociación Psioanalı́tica de Buenos Aires Past President International Psychoanalytical Association Bertrand Etienne Psychiatrist ASM 12 George Downing Psychologist and Clinical Supervisor Pitié-Salpêtrière Haydée Faimberg Doctor and Psychoanalyst Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Claire Doz-Schiff Doctor of Clinicial Psychology Centre psycho-pédagogique ClaudeBernard Grazia Maria Fava Vizziello Professor of Psychopathology University of Padua Francis Drossart Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Luis Féder, Psy.D., M.Psy, B.A. Founding Member Asociación Psicoanalı́tica de Mexico Training and Supervising Psychoanalyst Academy of Medical Sciences, Instituto Mexicano de cultura Antoine Ducret Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst François Duparc Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris President Groupe lyonnais de psychanalyse Susana Beatriz Dupetit Doctor, Psychiatrist, and Psychoanalyst Member Buenos Aires Psychoanalytic Association Judith Dupont Doctor and Psychoanalyst Associate Member Association psychanalytique de France Ernst Federn Social work therapist in the U.S. (1948–1972) Social therapist with the Austrian correctional system (1972–) Pierre Ferrari Professor of Child Psychiatry and Psychoanalyst Alain Fine Doctor and Psychoanalyst INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DIRECTORY Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Eugenie Fischer, M.D. Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Member Deutsche Psychoanalytische Vereinigung and the International Psychoanalytical Association René Fischer, M.D. Psychoanalyst Deutsche Psychoanalytische Vereinigung and International Psychoanalytical Association Margaret Ann Fitzpatrick Hanly, Ph.D. Psychoanalyst Member Canadian Psychoanalytic Society Member Toronto Psychoanalytic Institute Olivier Flournoy, M.D. Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Université de Lausanne Josette Frappier Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Annette Fréjaville Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Marguerite Frémont Assistant to Dr. René Allendy (1932–1942) Anne Frichet Clinical Psychologist Centre de guidance infantile (Paris) Serge Frisch Psychiatrist Psychoanalyst (Belgian Society) Former President EFPP Robert A. Furman, M.D. Psychoanalyst Training Analyst Cleveland Psychoanalytic Institute INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY Christian Gaillard Professor, Psychologist, and Psychoanalyst Yolanda Gampel Training Analyst Israeli Psychoanalytic Society Professor Tel Aviv University Gerald J. Gargiulo Psychoanalyst Fellow at IPTAR Member International Psychoanalytical Association Josette Garon Psychoanalyst Member Canadian Psychoanaltyic Society Jean Garrabé Psychiatrist President Evolution psychiatrique Lilli Gast, Ph.D. Psychologist Freiberufliche Wissenschatlerin, Berlin Serge Gauthier Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Yvon Gauthier Doctor, Pediatric Psychiatrist, and Psychoanalyst Member Canadian Psychoanaltyic Society Marcelle Geber Pediatric Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Nicole Geblesco Psychoanalyst Member Société internationale de poiétique Manuel Furer Training Analyst and Supervisor New York Psychoanalytic Institute Glen O. Gabbard, M.D. Director Baylor Psychiatry Clinic Training Analyst and Supervisor Houston/Galveston Psychoanalytic Institute Claudine Geissmann Psychiatrist Curriculum Director Université Victor-Segalen Bordeaux-II Member Association psychanalytique de France Christopher Gelber, Ph.D. Psychologist and Psychoanalyst Alain Gibeault Titular Member OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTORS Société psychanalytique de Paris Secretary General International Psychoanalytical Association Sanford Gifford, M.D. Director of Archives Boston Psychoanalytic Society and Institute Irma Gleiss, Ph.D. Psychoanalyst Martin J. Gliserman, Ph.D. Psychoanalyst, (NAAP-certified) Arnold I. Goldberg, M.D. Professor of Psychiatry Rush Medical School Bernard Golse Pediatric Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Edmundo Gomez Mango Psychoanalyst Roland Gori Psychoanalyst Professor of Psychopathology Université d’Aix-Marseille-I Sylvie Gosme-Séguret Psychologist and Psychotherapist Nicolas Gougoulis Psychiatrist, Hospital practitioner, and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Giancarlo Gramaglia Psychoanalyst Torino, Italy André Green Doctor, Psychiatrist, and Psychoanalyst Past President International Psychoanalytical Association Past President Société psychanalytique de Paris Daniel Greenson Physician and Psychoanalyst Léon Grinberg Training Analyst Psychoanalytic Association of Madrid Marie-Laure Grivet-Shillito Doctor of Psychoanalysis and Psychopathology Member l ix DIRECTORY OF CONTRIBUTORS International Society of Psychoanalytic Psychology Han Groen-Prakken, M.D. Full Member and Training Analyst Dutch Psychoanalytic Society Gisèle Harrus-Revidi Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Helmut Gröger Art and Medical Historian Assistant Professor and Lecturer Institut fuer Geschichte der medizin der Universitaet Wien Lawrence Hartmann, M.D. Past President American Psychiatric Association James S. Grotstein, M.D. Clinical Professor of Psychology School of Medicine at the University of California, Los Angeles Psychoanalyst Past Vice-President International Psychoanalytical Association Hungarian Group Gábor Flaskay, M.D. Gyoergy Hidas, M.D. Livia Nemes, Ph.D. (pdt) Gyoergy Vikar, M.D. Ilse Grubrich-Simitis Psychoanalyst Member International Psychoanalytical Association Training Analyst and Supervisor German Psychoanalytic Association Antoine Guédeney Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Nicole Guédeney Child Psychiatrist Jean-Claude Guillaume Pediatric Psychiatrist-Psychoanalyst Christiane Guitard-Munnich Doctor, Psychiatrist, and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris José Gutiérrez Terrazas Psychoanalyst Titular Member Universidad Autonoma de Madrid Member Asociación Psicoanálisis de Madrid Geneviève Haag Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst lx Robert R. Holt Psychologist Founding director Research Center for Mental Health Professor of Psychology Emeritus New York University Member Société psychanalytique de Paris James R. Hood, M.D. MBCHM Glas and MRC Psychology Member British Psychoanalytical Society Marc Hayat Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Past President Association Ecart Anne-Marie Houdebine Psychoanalyst and Doctor of Letters and Human Sciences Professor of Linguistics and Semiology Université René Descartes, Paris-V Anne Hayman Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Member British Psycho-Analytical Society Archivist International Psychoanalytical Association Marcel Houser Doctor and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Joseph L. Henderson Training Analyst and Past President C. G. Jung Institute in San Francisco Ludger M. Hermanns Psychoanalyst Member German Psychoanalytic Association Lecturer and Honorary Archivist Karl Abraham Institute of Berlin Florian Houssier Psychologist and Psychotherapist Research Professor Université de Paris-VII Didier Houzel Pediatric Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Member Association psychanalytique de France Fabio Herrmann, M.D. Titular Member and Training Analyst Sociedade Brasileira de Pscicanálise de Sao Paolo Patrice Huerre Psychiatrist Medical Director University Medical Clinic GeorgesHeuyer (Paris) Jean-Paul Hiltenbrand Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Member Association freudienne international Athol Hughes, Ph.D. Member British Psychoanalytical Society Robert D. Hinshelwood Member British Psychoanalytical Society Albrecht Hirschmuller Consultant Psychiatrist and Neurologist Psychotherapist Jean-Michel Hirt Psychoanalyst Lecturer in Psychopathology Université de Paris-Nord Leon Hoffman, M.D. Training and Supervising Analyst New York Psychoanalytic Institute Andrea Hupke, Psy.D. Independent Scholar Marvin S. Hurvich, Ph.D. Professor of Psychology Long Island University Melvyn L. Iscove Fellow Royal College of Physicians (Canada) Benjamin Jacobi Psychologist and Psychoanalyst Lecturer University Medical Clinic Georges-Heuyer, Université de Provence INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DIRECTORY Mario Jacoby, Ph.D. Faculty, Board of Directors (Curatorium), and Training and Supervising Analyst C. G. Jung Institute in Zurich Lecturer Université de Rouen OF CONTRIBUTORS Saint-Vincent-de-Paul Hospital, Paris Vassilis Kapsambelis Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Ruth Kloocke, M.D. Independent Scholar Nicole Jeammet Lecturer in Psychopathology Université de Paris-V Verena Kast Professor of Psychology University of Zurich Training Analyst C. G. Jung Institute in Zurich Léon Kreisler Pediatric Doctor and Psychiatrist Co-founder Institut de psychosomatique (Paris) Philippe Jeammet Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Professor of Psychiatry Université de Paris-VI Kathleen Kelley-Lainé Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Alban Jeanneau Psychiatrist Christine de Kerchove Psychologist and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Frédérique Jacquemain Pediatric Psychiatrist Augustin Jeanneau Psychiatrist Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Per Magnus Johansson Psychoanalyst and Doctor in the History of Science Jennier Johns Physician and Psychoanalyst Member British Psychoanalytical Society Marcus Johns, M.D. Child and Family Psychiatrist Member British Psychoanalytical Society Otto F. Kernberg, M.D. Director Personality Disorders Institute, New York Presbyterian Hospital, Cornell University Professor of Psychiatry Cornell University (Westchester) Training and Supervising Analyst Columbia University Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research Moisés Kijak Doctor Titular Member and Training Analyst Asociación Psicoanálisis de Argentina Juan Francisco Jordan Moore Psychiatrist Past President, Titular Member, and Training Analyst Asociación Psicoanálisis Chilena Pearl H. M. King Psychoanalyst Member British Psychoanalytical Society Rosine Jozef Perelberg, Ph.D. Training Analyst British Psychoanalyst Society Simon-Daniel Kipman Past President Association française de psychiatrie Marie Eugénie Jullian Muzzo Benavides Psychoanalyst and Psychologist Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Jean Kirsch, M.D. Past President C. G. Jung Institute in San Francisco Member International Psychoanalytical Association René Kaës Psychoanalyst Professor Emeritus Université Lumière Lyon-II Sudhir Kakar Professor and Doctor Thomas Kirsch, M.D. Psychiatric Training Stanford University Diplomat C. G. Jung Institute in San Francisco Jean-Pierre Kamieniak Psychoanalyst Maı̈té Klahr Psychologist-Psychoanalyst INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Nicolle Kress-Rosen Psychoanalyst DESS in Psychology (Spain) Julia Kristeva Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Professor in Linguistics Université de Paris-VII Permanent Visiting Professor, Department of French Columbia University and at the University of Toronto Nora Kurts Psychologist Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Edith Kurzweil University Professor and Director Center for Humanities and Social Thought at Adelphi University Marie-Lise Lacas Neuropsychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Eva Laible Doctor Member Vienna Psychoanalytic Society Michael Laier, M.D. Medical Historian Senckenbergischen Institut fuer Medizin der Universitaet Frankfurt Marie Claire Lanctôt Bélanger Philosopher and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris of Montréal and Société canadienne de psychanalyse Jean-Louis Lang Former Head Clinical Faculty at Université de Paris-VII lxi DIRECTORY OF CONTRIBUTORS Jacqueline Lanouzière Doctor of Letters and Human Sciences Professor Emeritus of Psychopathology Université de Paris-XIII Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Georges Lantéri-Laura Honorary Chief Esquirol Hospital Honorary President Evolution psychiatrique Jean Laplanche Titular Member Association psychanalytique de France Moses Laufer, Ph.D. Past President British Psychoanalytical Society Jacques Launay Past President Groupe Internationale du Rêve éveillé en psychanalyse Marie-Christine Laznik Psychoanalyst Member Bureau de l’Association freudienne internationale Serge Lebovici Pediatric Psychiatrist Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Past President International Psychoanalytical Association David D. Lee, Ph.D. Independent Scholar Bernard Lemaigre Affiliated Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Brigitte Lemérer Psychoanalyst Former Member École freudienne de Paris Moisés Lemlij, M.D., DPM, MRC Training Analyst and Titular Member Sociedad Peruana de Psicoanálisis Martine Lerude Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Member Association freudienne internationale lx ii Odile Lesourne, Ph.D. Psychoanalyst Elfriede S. Lustig de Ferrer, M.D. Full Member Asociación Psicoanálisis Argentina and International Psychoanalytical Association Training Analyst and Past Vice President International Psychoanalytical Association Harald Leupold-Löwenthal Psychoanalyst Member Vienna Psychoanalytic Society Ghyslain Levy Psychoanalyst Member Quatrième Groupe-O.P.L.F. Pedro Luzes Professor of Clinical Psychology University of Lisbon E. James Lieberman Clinical Professor of Psychiatry George Washington University Veronica Mächtlinger Dip. Clin. Psychology (London) Roy K. Lilleksov, M.D. Independent Scholar Patrick J. Mahony, Ph.D. Member Société royale du Canada Training Analyst Société canadienne de psychanalyse Regine Lockot, Ph.D. Psychoanalyst Hans-Martin Lohmann Lecturer, Editor, and Author Anne-Marie Mairesse Lecturer in Clinical Psychology Psychoanalyst (Société psychanalytique de Paris) Pearl Lombard Psychiatrist Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Irina Manson Psychoanalyst Vice President Pérénos Rafael E. López-Corvo Associate Professor Mc Gill University Training Analyst Asociación Venezola de Psicoanálisis Lydia Marinelli Cultural Historian Archivist at the Freud Museum, Vienna Zvi Lothane, M.D. Clinical Associate Professor of Psychiatry Mount Sinai School of Medicine, CUNY Gérard Lucas Psychiatrist AIHP Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Daniel Luminet Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Belge Honorary Professor Université de Liège André Lussier Doctor in Psychology Former Titular Professor Université de Montréal Former Vice President International Psychoanalytical Association Philippe Mazet Professor of Psychiatry AP-HP, Paris Joyce McDougall D.Ed. and Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Full Member International Psychoanalytical Association Member New York Freudian Society Philippine Mefre Psychologist and Psychotherapist Charles Melman Former Hospital Psychiatrist Former Director of Scilicet Founder Association freudienne internationale Ruth Menahem Director of Research at the CNRS INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DIRECTORY Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Rosario Merendino Psychoanalyst Member Società Psicoanalitica Italiana Michelle Moreau Ricaud Psychoanalyst Member Quatrième Groupe-O.P.L.F. Nadine Mespoulhés Psychotherapist-Psychoanalyst Ann Morgan Private Practice Melbourne Philipe Metello Pediatric Psychiatrist André Michel Writer Honorary Professor of Classical Letters Pascale Michon-Raffaitin Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Alain de Mijolla Neuropsychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris President International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis Member International Psychoanalytical Association Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Psychoanalyst Professor of Psychopathology Université de Paris-VII Member Quatrième Groupe-O.P.L.F. Sylvain Missonnier Lecturer in Psychology Université de Paris-X, Nanterre Jeanne Moll, M.A., German, DESS IUFM, Alsace Michael Molnar Research Director Freud Museum, London OF Annick Ohayon Psychology Instructor Université de Paris-VIII Ole Andkjaer Olsen, Ph.D. Senior Research Worker and Writer Elke Mühlleitner, Ph.D. Psychologist Researcher, History of Psychoanalysis Agnès Oppenheimer Lecturer in Psychopathology Université de Paris-V Laurent Muldworf, M.D. Psychiatrist Francisco Palacio Espasa Ordinary Member Société Suisse de Psychanalyse Marı́a Luisa Muñoz Training Analyst Asociación Psicoanálisis de Madrid Martine Myquel Professor of Pediatric Psychiatry Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Janine Noël Consultant Psychiatrist C.O.P.E.S. Member Société psychanalytique de Paris André Missenard Psychoanalyst and Psychiatrist Quatrième Groupe-O.P.L.F. Michel Ody Psychoanalyst Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Peter Mudd Jungian Psychoanalyst Bernd Nitzschke, PsyD., Ph.D. Psychoanalyst Bernard Minder, M.D. Psychiatrist Edna O’Shaughnessy Training Analyst British Psychoanalytical Society Keigo Okonogi, M.D. Training Analyst Japan Psychoanalytic Society Nicos Nicolaı̈dis Doctor Titular Member Société Suisse de Psychanalyse Claude Millot Psychologist-Psychoanalyst CONTRIBUTORS Marie-Rose Moro Child Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Marie-Thérèse Neyraut-Sutterman Psychiatrist, DESS, and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Alexandre Mikhalevitch Doctor of Psychoanalysis Université de Paris-VII INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY Marie-Thérèse Montagnier Psychoanalyst Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris OF Leopold Nosek, M.D. Training Analyst and Past President Brazilian Psychoanalytic Society Valentin Nusinovici Psychoanalyst Member Association freudienne internationale PSYCHOANALYSIS Renos K. Papadopoulos Professor of Analytical Psychology University of Essex Bernard J. Paris, Ph.D. Director International Karen Horney Society Mark Paterson Director Sigmund Freud Copyrights Campbell Paul Consultant Infant Psychiatrist Royal Children’s Hospital, Melbourne Christiane Payan Pediatric Psychiatrist Bernard Penot Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris René Péran Doctor, Psychiatrist, and Psychoanalyst Member Quatrième Groupe-O.P.L.F. Marialzira Perestrello Doctor, Psychoanalyst, and Poet Pioneer of Psychoanlaysis in Rio de Janeiro Roger Perron Honorary Director of Research lx ii i DIRECTORY OF CONTRIBUTORS National Center for Scientific Research, Paris Former Director of Research Université de Paris-V Christine Petit Psychiatrist and Hospital Practicioner Augosto M. Picollo Titular Member and Training Analyst Asociación Psicoanálisis Argentina Malcolm Pines Bachelor of Medicine and Surgery (Cambridge) Fellow Royal College of Physicians (London) Fellow Royal College of Psychiatrists Monique Piñol-Douriez Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Professor Emeritus Université de Provence Tomas Plänkers, Ph.D., Psy.D. Psychoanalyst Michèle Pollak Cornillot Lecturer Université de Paris-V Michel Polo Psychoanalyst Member Espace analytique Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand Titular Member Association psychanalytique de France Series Editor at Éditions Gallimard Writer Erik Porge Psychoanalyst Former Member École freudienne de Paris Michèle Porte Psychoanalyst and Psychotherapist Paul-Brosse Hospital Instructor École Normale Supérieure Anna Potamianou, Ph.D. Psychoanalyst Training Analyst Société psychanalytique de Paris Luiz Eduardo Prado de Oliveira Doctor of Clinical Psychology lx iv Member Sociedade de Psicanálise Iracy Doyle-Rio de Janiero Régine Prat Psychologist-Psychoanalyst Janine Puget Doctor Founding Member Argentine Group Therapy Association Titular Member Buenos Aires Psychoanalytic Association Bertrand Pulman Lecturer, Social Sciences Department Université de Paris-V Florence Quartier-Frings Founding Titular Member Société Suisse de psychanalyse (International Psychoanalytical Association) Jean-Michel Quinodoz Titular Member and Training Analyst Société Suisse de psychanalyse Didier Rabain Pediatric Psychiatrist Salpêtrière Hospital Joseph Reppen, Ph.D. Editor Psychoanalytic Books Member International Psychoanalytical Association New York Freudian Society Alvaro Rey de Castro Psychoanalyst Professor Catholic University of Peru Titular Member and Past President Sociedad Peruana de Psicoanálisis Denys Ribas Doctor Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris François Richard Psychologist and Psychoanalyst Professor of Psychopathology Université de Paris-VII Arnold D. Richards, M.D. Training and Supervising Analyst New York Psychoanalytic Institute Jean-François Rabain Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Paul Ries, M.A., Ph.D. University Lecturer, Faculty of Modern and Medieval Languages University of Cambridge Psychoanalytic-Psychotherapist Nicholas Rand Professor of French Literature and Senior Research Fellow University of Wisconsin-Madison Paul Roazen Professor Emeritus, Social and Political Science York University (Toronto) Helene Rank-Veltfort, Ph.D. Psychotherapist ex-teacher at the Proctorship Committee Mills-Peninsula Hospital Thomas Robert Archivist Sigmund Freud Copyrights Jean-Jacques Rassial Professor of Psychopathology Université de Paris-XIII Member of Espace analytique Gail S. Reed, Ph.D. Training and Supervising Analyst New York Freudian Society Anne Roche Former student at the École Normale Supérieure Professor Université de Provence Eva Rosenblum Psychoanalyst, Paris Research Attache CNRS Johann Georg Reicheneder Doctor Owen Renik Training and Supervising Analyst San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute Associate Editor The Psychoanalytic Quarterly David Rosenfeld Doctor Training Analyst Professor of Mental Health, Faculty of Medicine University of Buenos Aires INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DIRECTORY Hans-Joachim Rothe, M.D. Independent Scholar René Roussillon Professor Université Lyon-II Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Elsa Schmid-Kitsikis Professor of Clinical Psychology University of Geneva Gérard Schmit Professor of Child Psychiatry and Psychoanalyst UFR of Medicine at Reims Marie-Lise Roux Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Monique Schneider Psychoanalyst Research Director at the CNRS August Ruhs Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Wiener Arbeitskreis für Psychoanalyse Ingrid Scholz-Strasser General Secretary Sigmund Freud Society Pierre Sabourin Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Georges Schopp Psychoclinician and Psychoanalyst Gilda Sabsay Foks Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst (Argentina) Titular Member Argentine Psychoanalytic Association Jacques Schotte Psychiatrist-Psychoanalyst Professor Emeritus of Clinical Psychology Universities of Louvain-la-Neuve and Louvain-Leuven François Sacco Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Eduardo J. Salas Doctor Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Training Analyst Argentine Psychoanalytic Association Martin A. Schulman, Ph.D. Editor Psychoanalytic Review Former Dean of Faculty and Curriculum The National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis Isaac Salem Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Ulrich Schultz-Venrath M.D. of Psychotherapeutic Medicine, Neurology, and Psychiatry Professor University Witten/Herdecke Andrew Samuels Professor of Analytical Psychology University of Essex Training Analyst Society of Analytical Psychology, London Michael Šebek Direct Member International Psychoanalytical Association Training Analyst Czech Study Group Guillermo Sanchez Medina Doctor and Psychoanalyst Titular Member and President Colombian Psychoanalytic Society Jacques Sédat Psychoanalyst Member of Espace analytique Secretary General International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis Jacqueline Schaeffer Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Nora Scheimberg Psychologist and Psychoanalyst Delphine Schilton Psychoanalyst INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF Hanna Segal Doctor Fellow Royal College of Psychiatry Training Analyst and Past President British Psychoanalytic Society PSYCHOANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTORS Christian Seulin Psychiatrist Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Sue A. Shapiro, Ph.D. Supervising Analyst NYU Postdoctoral Program in Psychoanalysis Robert Shilkret Professor of Psychology and Education Mount Holyoke College Larry Shiner Professor of Philosophy University of Illinois at Springfield Joyceline Siksou Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Ann-Louise S. Silver, M.D. Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Chestnut Lodge/C.P.C. Faculty: Washington Psychoanalytic Institute John Galbraith Simmons Writer, Screenwriter, and Independent Scholar Jöel Sipos Psychoanalyst Member Institut de formation de l’Association psychanalytique de France Samuel Slipp, M.D. Past President American Academy of Psychoanalysis Claude Smadja Doctor, Psychiatrist, and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Marı́a de Lourdes Soares O’Donnell Doctor and Psychoanalyst Titular Member Brazilian Psychoanalytic Society of Rio de Janeiro Victor Souffir Former Chief Doctor of Psychiatry Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Michel Soulé Honorary Professor of Child Psychiatry Université de Paris-V Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris lxv DIRECTORY OF CONTRIBUTORS Ethel Spector Person, M.D. Training and Supervising Analyst Columbia University Center for Training and Research David Titleman Doctor of Psychology Training Analyst Swedish Psychoanalytic Society Murray Stein, Ph.D. Training Analyst C. G. Jung Institute of Chicago Bernard Toboul Psychoanalyst Member of Espace analytique Member International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis Riccardo Steiner Psychoanalyst Member British Psychoanalytical Society Robert D. Stolorow, Ph.D. Training Analyst and Director of Supervision Institute of Contemporary Psychoanalysis, Los Angeles Gunther Stuhlmann Writer Founder and Editor Anaı̈s: An International Journal Guillaume Suréna Orthophonist and Psychoanalyst Nina Sutton Writer and journalist Henri Sztulman Dean of Professors (Toulouse-II) Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Jean-Yves Tamet Psychiatrist Psychoanalyst (Association psychanalytique de France) Juan-Eduardo Tesone Doctor, Psychiatrist, and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Viviane Thibaudier Psychoanalyst Training Analyst Société française de psychologie analytique Bernard This Psychoanalyst Nellie L. Thompson, Ph.D. Psychoanalyst and Historian Member New York Psychoanalytical Society Serge Tisseron Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst lx vi Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Margret Tonnesmann, M.D. Psychoanalyst British Psychoanalytical Society Odon Vallet Former student at the ENS Doctor of Law and Religious Studies Director of Curriculum Paris-I and Paris-VII Bernard Vandermersch Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Member Association freudienne internationale Alain Vanier Professor Université de Paris-VII Psychoanalyst Member of Espace analytique Maria Torok Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Bernard Touati Pediatric Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Centre Alfred-Binet Member International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis Katia Varenne Psychologist and Psychoanalyst Titular Member at the EPS Sverre Varvin, M.D. Psychoanalyst President Norwegian Psychoanalytic Society Marie-Dominique Trapet Docteur d’Etat in Law and Doctor of Common Law Psychoanalyst and Magistrate Elizabeth Verhage-Stins Psychologist, Psychoanalyst, and Training Analyst Amsterdam David I. Tresan, M.D. Member C. G. Jung Institute of Northern California Henri Vermorel Former hospital Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Hélène Trivouss-Widlöcher Psychoanalyst and Neuropsychiatrist Titular Member, Association psychanalytique de France Madeleine Vermorel Psychoanalyst Chambéry Philippe Turmond Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst Richard Uhl Psychiatrist Member Société psychanalytique de Paris, Rodolfo Urribarri Professor University of Buenos Aires Member Argentine Psychoanalytical Society Simone Valantin Senior Lecturer Université de Paris-VII Bertrand Vichyn Psychoanalyst Doctor of Psychoanalysis Instructor Université de Paris-VII Fernando Vidal Université of Geneva Jacques Vigneault Sociologist and Psychoanalyst Member Société psychanalytique de Montréal Joseph Villier Psychoanalyst and Family Therapist Member Société psychanalytique de Paris, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DIRECTORY Michel Vincent Psychoanalyst Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Christine Vindreau Former Chief Clinician, Psychiatrist, and Hospital Practitioner Analyst-in-Training Association psychanalytique de France Germano Vollmer Filho Training and Supervising Analyst Past-President Porto Alegre Psychoanalytic Society Steven Wainrib Psychiatrist Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Curricular Director Université de Paris-VII Robert S. Wallerstein Training and Supervising Analyst San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute Professor Emeritus and Former Chair, Department of Psychiatry University of California, San Francisco School of Medicine Richard M.Waugaman, M.D. Training and Supervising Analyst INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF Washington Psychoanalytic Institute Inge Weber, Psy.D. Doctor of Natural Sciences Psychoanalyst (German Psychoanalytic Society) Kaspar Weber, M.D. FMG specialist in Psychiatry and Psychotherapy Psychoanalyst Member Société Suisse de Psychanalyse Daniel Widlöcher, M.D., Psy.D. Professor Emeritus Université Pierre-et-Marie-Curie, Paris-VI Reiner Wild Doctor of Philosophy Professor of New German Literary History University of Mannheim Pérel Wilgowicz Titular Member Société psychanalytique de Paris Herbert Will, M.D. Theologian Psychoanalyst Gerhard Wittenberger, Ph.D., DGSV Group-dynamics Trainer Psychoanalyst PSYCHOANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTORS Clifford Yorke Physician Training Analyst British Psychoanalytical Society Roberto Yutaka Sagawa Assistant Professor and Clinical Supervisor Psychology Department Universidade Estadual Paulista (Sao Paulo) Beverley D. Zabriskie, MSW Jungian Analyst Sharon Zalusky, Ph.D. North American Regional Editor International Psychoanalysis International Psychoanalytical Association Newsletter Chair The American Psychoanalytic Association Mathieu Zannotti Pediatric Psychiatrist Franck Zigante Psychiatrist Assistant Chief Clinician, Faculty of Medicine Université de Paris-VI lxvii THEMATIC OUTLINE THEMATIC OUTLINE This outline provides a general overview of the conceptual structure of the International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis. The outline is organized by four major categories: Concepts/Notions, Biographies, Works, and History. All categories are subcategorized, with the exception of Biographies. The entries are listed alphabetically within each category or subcategory. For ease of reference, one entry may be listed under several categories. I. Concepts/Notions Abandonment Absence Abstinence/rule of abstinence Act, action Acting out/acting in Action-language Action-(re)presentation Action-thought (H. Kohut) Active technique Activity/passivity Actual neurosis/defense neurosis Acute psychoses Adaptation Addiction Adhesive identification Adolescence Adolescent crisis Adoption Affects, quota of affect Agency Alpha-elements Aggressiveness/aggression Alchemy Alcoholism Alienation Allergic object relationship Allergy Alpha function Alter ego Altruism Amae, concept of Ambivalence Amentia Amnesia Amphimixia/amphimixis Anaclisis/anaclictic Anality Anagogical interpretation Analyzability Analysand Analyse quatrième Analytical Psychology (Jung) Active imagination Amplification Analytical psychology Archetype Collective unconscious Compensation Complex Ego Extroversion/introversion Individuation Interpretation of dreams Numinous Psychological types Projection and ‘‘participation mystique’’ Self Shadow Synchronicity Transference/counter-transference Animal magnetism Animistic thought lxix Animus-Anima Anorexia nervosa Anticathexis/counter-cathexis Anticipatory ideas Antinarcissism Anxiety Annihilation anxiety Anxiety Anxiety dream Anxiety, development of Signal anxiety Aphanisis Aphasia Applied psychoanalysis and the interaction of psychoanalysis Archaic Archaic mother Archeology, the metaphor of Arrogance As if personality Asthma Attachment Attention Autistic capsule/nucleus Autistic defenses Autobiography Autoeroticism Automatism Autoplastic Autosuggestion Basic assumption THEMATIC OUTLINE Basic fault Belief Benign/malignant regression Beta-elements Beta-screen Binding/unbinding of the instincts Biological bedrock Birth Bisexuality Bizarre object Black hole Blank/nondelusional psychoses Body image Borderline conditions Boredom Boundary violations Breakdown Breastfeeding Breast, good/bad object Bulimia Capacity to be alone Catastrophic change Cathartic method Cathectic energy Cathexis Censoring the lover in her Censorship Certainty Change Concept Condensation Conflict Conscious processes Consciousness Constitution Construction-reconstruction Contact and psychoanalysis Contact-barrier Container-Contained Contradiction Conversion Coprophilia Counter-identification Counter-Oedipus Counterphobic Counter-transference Creativity Cruelty Cryptomnesia Cultural transmission Cure Danger Dark continent Daydream Day’s residues Death instinct (Thanatos) Decathexis Defense Character Character formation Character neurosis Child analysis Childhood Children’s play Civilization (Kultur) Claustrophobia Clinging instinct Collective psychology Combined parent figure Compensatory structures Complementary series Defense Defense mechanisms Manic defenses Neuro-psychosis of defense Neurotic defenses Deferred action Deferred action and trauma Déjà-vu Delusion Demand Dementia Depersonalization Depression Complex Castration complex Complex Dead mother complex Father complex Nuclear complex Oedipus complex Oedipus Complex, early Compromise formation Compulsion lx x Basic depression Depressive position Postnatal/postpartum depression Transference depression Deprivation Desexualization Destrudo Determinism Developmental disorders Dipsomania Direct analysis Directed daydream (R. Desoille) Disavowal Discharge Discourse Disintegration, feelings of, anxieties Disintegration products Dismantling Disorganisation Displacement Doing/Undoing Double bind Double, The Doubt Dream Birth, dream of Convenience, dream of Dream Dream-like memory Dream screen Dream symbolism Dream work Dream’s navel Examination dreams Hypocritical dream Irma’s injection, dream of Latent dream thoughts Mourning, dream of Nakedness, dream of Punishment, dream of Premonitory dreams Repetitive dreams Typical dreams Drive Drive/instinct Partial drive Sexual drive Subject of the drive Dualism Dynamic point of view Early interactions Economic point of view Elasticity Ego Antilibidinal ego/internal saboteur Ego Ego, alteration of the Ego autonomy Ego boundaries Ego, damage inflicted on Ego (ego psychology) Ego feeling INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THEMATIC OUTLINE Ego functions Ego ideal Ego ideal/ideal ego Ego identity Ego-instinct Ego interests Ego-libido/object-libido Ego psychology Ego, splitting of the Ego states Ego-syntonic Pleasure ego/reality ego Tube-ego Emotion Empathy Encopresis Encounter Enuresis Envy Eros Eroticism Eroticism, anal Eroticism, oral Eroticism, urethral Erotogenic masochism Erotogenic zone Erotogenicity Erotomania Erythrophobia (fear of blushing) Estrangement Ethics Event Excitation Exhibitionism Experience of satisfaction Externalization-internalization Face-to-face situation Facilitation Family Family romance Fantasy Fantasy Fantasy, formula of Fantasy (reverie) Pregnancy, fantasy of Primal fantasy Rescue fantasies Unconscious fantasy ‘‘Vagina dentata,’’ fantasy of Fascination Fatherhood INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF Fear Feces Female sexuality Feminine masochism Femininity Feminity, rejection of Fetishism Fixation Flight into illness Foreclosure Forgetting Formations of the unconscious Fort-Da Fragmentation Framework of the psychoanalytic treatment Free association Free energy/bound energy Free-floating attention Friendship Fright Frustration Functional phenomenon Fundamental rule Fusion/defusion Fusion/defusion of Instincts Gain (primary and secondary) Gender identity General theory of seduction Genital love Gift Gifts Good-enough mother Graph of Desire Grid Group analysis Group phenomenon Group psychotherapies Guilt, feeling of Guilt, unconscious sense of Hallucinosis Hallucinatory, the Handling Hatred Helplessness Heredity of acquired characters Hermeneutics Heterosexuality Historical reality Holding Homosexuality Hospitalism Humor Hypercathexis PSYCHOANALYSIS Hypnoid states Hypnosis Hyponchondria Hysteria Hysterical paralysis I Id Idealization Idealized parental imago Ideational representation Ideational representative Identification Heroic identification Identification Identification fantasies Identification with the aggressor Imaginary identification/symbolic identification Projective identification Identificatory project Identity Ideology Illusion Imaginary, the (Lacan) Imago Imposter Impulsive acts or impulsivity Incest Incompleteness Indications and contraindications for psychoanalysis for an adult Individual Infans Infant development Infant observation Infant observation (direct) Infant observation (therapeutic) Infantile amnesia Infantile psychosis Infantile schizophrenia Infantile sexual curiosity Infantile, the Inferiority, feeling of Inferiority, feeling of (individual psychology) Inhibition Initial interview(s) Innervation Insight Instinct Instinct for knowledge or research Instinctual impulse Instinctual representative lx xi THEMATIC OUTLINE Integration Intellectualization Intergenerational Internal object Internal/external reality interpretation Interpretation of dreams Intersubjective/intrasubjective Introjection Introspection Invariant Isakower phenomenon Isolation Jokes Jouissance (Lacan) Judgment of condemnation Knot L and R schemas Lack of differentiation Language and disturbances of language Latency period Latent Law of the father Lay analysis Letter, the Libidinal development Libido Lie Life instinct (Eros) Lifting of amnesia Linking, attacks on Listening Logic(s) Look/gaze Lost object Love Love-Hate-Knowledge ( L/H/K links) Magical thinking Mania Manic defenses Manifest Masculine protest (individual psychology) Masculinity/femininity Masochism Mastery Mastery, instinct for Masturbation Maternal Maternal reverie, capacity for Matheme Maturation Megalomania Melancholia Melancholy lx xi i Memoirs of the future Memory Mentalization Metaphor Metapsychology Metonymy Midlife crisis Mnemic symbol Mnemic trace/memory trace Model Modesty Money and psychoanalytic treatment Moral masochism Mother goddess Mothering Motricity, psychomotricity Mourning Mutative interpretation Mutual analysis Mysticism Myth of the hero Myth of origins Mythomania Myths Name-of-the-Father Narcissism Narcissism Narcissism of minor differences Narcissism, primary Narcissism, secondary Narcissistic defenses Narcissistic elation Narcissistic injury Narcissistic neurosis Narcissistic rage Narcissistic transference Narcissistic withdrawal Narco-analysis Need for Ccusality Need for punishment Negation Negative capability Negative hallucination Negative therapeutic reaction Negative, work of the Neopsychoanalysis Neurosis Actual neurosis/defense neurosis Choice of neurosis Failure neurosis Fate neurosis Infantile neurosis Neurosis Obsessional neurosis Phobic neurosis Traumatic neurosis War neurosis Neurotica Neutrality, benevolent neutrality Nightmare Nirvana Neurasthenia Nocturnal/night terrors Nonverbal communication Normality Nostalgia Object Object a Object relations theory Object, change of/choice of Obsession Occultism Oceanic feeling Omnipotence of thoughts Omnipotence, infantile Ontogenesis Operative thinking Optical schema Orality Organ pleasure Organic psychoses Organic repression Organization Orgasm Orgone Other, the Otherness Overdetermination Over-interpretation Pain Pair of opposites Parade of the signifier Paradox Paranoia Paranoid position Paranoid psychosis Paranoid-schizoid position Paraphrenia Parapraxis Parenthood Parricide Pass, the Passion Penis envy Perceptual identity Persecution Perversion INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THEMATIC OUTLINE Phallic mother Phallic woman Phallus Phantom Phobia of committing impulsive acts Phobias in children Phylogenesis Physical pain/psychic pain Pleasure in thinking Pleasure/unpleasure principle Pregenital Prehistory Premature-prematurity Prepsychosis Prereflective unconscious Primal repression Primal scene Primal, the Primary identification Primary love Primary masochism Primary need Primary object Primary process/secondary process Primitive Primitive agony Primitive horde Principle of (neuronal) inertia Principle of constancy Principle of identity preservation Principles of mental functioning Perception-consciousness (Pcpt.-Cs.) Pictogram Preconception Preconscious, the Privation Process Processes of development Progressive neutralization Prohibition Projection Protective shield Protective shield, breaking through the Proton-pseudos Protothoughts Psychodrama Psi system Psyche/psychism Psychic apparatus Psychic causality Psychic energy Psychic envelope Psychic reality Psychic structure INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF Psychic temporality Psychical representative Psychoanalyst Psychoanalytic epistemology Psychoanalytic family therapy Psychoanalytic filiations Psychoanalytic treatment Psychoanalytical nosography Psychobiography Psychogenesis/organogenesis Psychogenic blindness Psychohistory Psychological tests Psychoses Psychoses, chronic and delusional Psychosexual development Psychosomatic Psychotherapy Psychotic defenses Psychotic/neurotic Psychotic panic Psychotic part of the personality Psychotic potential Purposive idea Puberty Puerperal psychoses Purified-pleasure-ego Quantitative/qualitative Rationalization Reaction-formation Real, the (Lacan) Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary father Real trauma Reality principle Reality testing Realization Reciprocal paths of influence (libidinal coexcitation) Regression Relations (commensalism, parasitism, symbiosis) Relaxation principle and neo-catharsis Relaxation psychotherapy Remembering Reminiscences Reparation Repetition Repetition compulsion Representability Representation Representation of affect Representative Repressed PSYCHOANALYSIS Repressed, derivative of the; derivative of the unsonscious Repression Repression, lifting of Repudiation Resistance Return of the repressed Reversal into the opposite Rite and ritual Rivalry Sadism Sadomasochism Schizophrenia Scoptophilia/scopophilia Scotomization Screen Memory Secondary revision Secret Seduction Seduction scenes Selected fact Sense/nonsense Sexual theories of children Sexual trauma Sexuality Sexualization Sexuation, formulas of Shame Signifier Signifier/signified Self Bipolar self False self Grandiose self Heroic self Self Self-analysis Self-consciousness Self-esteem Self-hatred Self-image Self mutilation in children Self-object Self-preservation Self psychology Self-punishment Self-representation Self-state dream Self (true/false) Self, the Turning around on the subject’s own self Sexual differentiation Signifying chain l x x ii i THEMATIC OUTLINE Skin-ego Silence Sleep/wakefulness Slips of the tongue Smell,sense of Skin Social feeling (individual psychology) Somatic compliance Somnambulism Specific action Split object Splitting Splitting of the subject Splitting of the object Splitting, vertical and horizontal Squiggle Stages Anal-sadistic stage Genital stage Libidinal stage Mirror stage Oral-sadistic stage Oral stage Phallic stage Quasi-independence/transitional Stage Stage (or phase) Stammering State of being in love Stranger Strata/stratification Structural theories Subconscious Subject Subject of the unconscious Subject’s castration Subject’s desire Sublimation Substitute/substitutive formation Substitutive formation Sucking/thumbsucking Sudden involuntary idea Suffering Suggestion Suicidal behavior Suicide Sum of excitation Superego Supervised analysis (control case) Suppression Symbiosis/symbiotic relation Symbol Symbolic Equation Symbolic realization lx xi v Symbolic, the (Lacan) Symbolism Symbolism , process of Symptom Symptom/sinthome Symptom-formation System/systemic Tenderness Time Taboo Taboo of virginity Tact Technique with adults, psychoanalytic Technique with children, psychoanalytic Telepathy Termination of treatment Therapeutic alliance Thing, the Thing-presentation Thought Thought-thinking apparatus Thought identity Tics Topographical point of view Topology Totem/totemism Training analysis Training of psychoanalysts Trance Transcultural Transference Idealizing transference Lateral transference Mirror transference Negative transference Psychotic transference Resolution of the transference Transference depression Transference Transference/counter-transference (analytical psychology) Transference hatred Transference in children Transference love Transference neurosis Transference of creativity Transference relationship Twinship transference/alter ego transference Transformations Transgression Transitional object Transitional object, space Transitional phenomena Translation Transmuting internalization Transsexualism Trauma Truth Turning around Ulcerative colitis Unary trait Unconscious, the Unconscious concepts Unpleasure Unvalidated unconscious Vertex Violence, instinct of Visual Voyeurism Want of being/lack of being Weaning Weltanschauung Wish Wish for a baby Wish-fulfillment Wish, hallucinatory satisfaction of a Wish/yearning Witch of Metapsychology, the Word association Work (as a psychoanalytical notion) Word-presentation Working over Working -off mechanisms Working-through II. Biographies Abel, Carl Aberastury, Arminda, also known as ‘‘La Negra’’ Abraham, Karl Abraham, Nicolas Adler, Alfred Aichhorn, August Alexander, Franz Gabriel Allendy, René Félix Eugène Allendy-Nel-Dumouchel, Yvonne Althusser, Louis Alvarez de Toledo, Luisa Agusta Rebeca Gambier de Andersson, Ola Andreas-Salomé, Louise, dite Lou Anzieu, Didier Arlow, Jacob A. Aubry Weiss, Jenny Aulagnier-Spairani, Piera Bachelard, Gaston INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THEMATIC OUTLINE Baginsky, Adolf Bak, Robert C. Balint, Michael (Bálint [Bergsmann], Mihály) Balint-Szekely-Kovács, Alice Baranger, Willy Baudouin, Charles Beirnaert, Louis Benedek, Therese Berge, André Bergler, Edmund Berman, Anne Bernays, Minna Bernfeld, Siegfried Bernheim, Hippolyte Bettelheim, Bruno Bibring, Edward Bibring-Lehner, Grete Bick, Esther Bigras, Julien Joseph Normand Binswanger, Ludwig Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht Bjerre, Poul Blanton, Smiley Bleger, José Bleuler, Paul Eugen Bloch, Jean- Richard Blos, Peter Boehm, Felix Julius Bonaparte, Marie Léon Borel, Adrien Alphonse Alcide Bornstein, Berta Bose, Girindrasekhar Bouvet, Maurice Charles Marie Germain Bowlby, Edward John Mostyn Brentano, Franz von Breton, André Breuer, Josef Brierley, Marjorie Flowers Brill, Abraham Arden Brücke, Ernst Wihelm von Brun, Rudolf Brunswick, Ruth Mack Bullitt, William C. Burlingham-Tiffanny, Dorothy Burrow, Trigant Cárcamo, Celes Ernesto Caruso, Igor A. Cénac, Michel Certeau, Michel de Charcot, Jean Martin Chentrier, Théodore Chertok, Léon (Tchertok, Lejb) Choisy, Maryse INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF Claparède, Édouard Clark-Williams, Margaret Claude, Henri Charles Jules Corrao, Francesco Dalbiez, Roland Delay, Jean Delboeuf, Joseph Rémi Léopold Delgado, Honorio Desoille, Robert Deuticke, Franz Deutsch, Felix Deutsch-Rosenbach, Helene Devereux, Georges Diatkine, René Dolto-Marette, Françoise Doolittle-Aldington, Hilda (H.D.) Dosuzkov, Theodor Dubal, George Dugautiez, Maurice Eckstein, Emma Eder, David Montagu Eissler, Kurt Robert Eissler-Selke, Ruth Eitington, Max Ellenberger, Henri Frédéric Embirikos, Andreas Emden, Jan Egbert Gustaaf Van Enriquez-Joly, Micheline Erikson, Erik Homburger Ey, Henri Fairbairn, William Ronald Dodds Fanon, Frantz Favez, Georges Favez-Boutonier, Juliette Favreau, Jean Alphonse Fechner, Gustav Theodor Federn, Paul Fenichel, Otto Ferenczi, Sándor Fliess, Wilhelm Flournoy, Henri Flournoy, Théodore Flügel, John Carl Fluss, Gisela Fornari, Franco Foulkes (Fuchs), Siegmund Heinrich Franco da Rocha, Francisco Frankl, Viktor Freud, (Jean) Martin Freud-Nathanson, Amalia Malka Freud, Anna Freud-Bernays, Martha Freud, Ernst PSYCHOANALYSIS Freud, Jakob Kolloman (ou Keleman ou Kallamon) Freud, Josef Freud, Oliver Freud, Sigmund Schlomo Freud, Sigmund, (siblings) Freund Toszeghy, Anton von Friedländer-Fränkl, Kate Frink, Horace Westlake Fromm, Erich Fromm-Reichmann, Frieda Gaddini, Eugenio Gardiner, Muriel M. Garma, Angel Gattel, Felix Glover, Edward Glover, James Göring, Matthias Heinrich Graf, Herbert Graf, Max Granoff, Wladimir Alexandre Greenacre, Phyllis Greenson, Ralph Gressot, Michel Groddeck, Georg Walther Gross, Otto Hans Adolf Guex, Germaine Guilbert, Yvette Halberstadt-Freud, Sophie Hartmann, Heinz Heimann, Paula Held, René Heller, Hugo Hellman Noach, Ilse Hermann, Imre Hesnard, Angélo Louis Marie Heuyer, Georges Hilferding-Hönigsberg, Margarethe Hirschfeld, Elfriede Hitschmann, Eduard Hoffer, William (Wilhelm) Hollitscher-Freud, Mathilde Hollós, István Horney-Danielson, Karen Hug-Hellmuth-Hug von Hugenstein, Hermine Isaacs-Sutherland, Susan Isakower, Otto Jacobson, Edith Janet, Pierre Jankélévitch, Samuel Jekels (Jekeles), Ludwig Jelliffe, Smith Ely Jones, Ernest lx xv THEMATIC OUTLINE Jouve, Pierre Jean Jung, Carl Gustav Jung-Rauschenbach, Emma Jury, Paul Kardiner, Abram Katan, Maurits Katan-Rosenberg, Anny Kemper, Werner Walther Kestemberg-Hassin, Evelyne Kestemberg, Jean Khan, Mohammed Masud Rasa Klein-Reizes, Melanie Koch, Adelheid Lucy Kohut, Heinz Kosawa, Heisaku Kouretas, Démétrios Kovács-Prosznitz, Vilma Kraus, Karl Kris, Ernst Kris-Rie, Marianne Lacan, Jacques-Marie Émile Laforgue, René Lagache, Daniel Lainé, Tony Laing, Ronald David Lampl, Hans Lampl-de Groot, Jeanne Landauer, Karl Langer, Marie Glass Hauser de Lanzer, Ernst Laurent-Lucas-Championnière-Maugé, Odette Le Bon, Gustave Lebovici, Serge Sindel Charles Lechat, Fernand Leclaire (Liebschutz), Serge Leeuw, Pieter Jacob Van der Lehrman, Philip R. Leuba, John Levi Bianchini, Marco Liberman, David Liebeault, Ambroise Auguste Limentani, Adam Lorand, Sándor Low, Barbara Lowenstein, Rudolph M. Maeder, Alphonse E. Mahler-Schönberger, Margaret Main, Thomas Forrest Mâle, Pierre Malinowski, Bronislaw Kaspar Mann, Thomas Mannoni, Dominique-Octave lx xv i Mannoni-Van der Spoel, Maud (Magdalena) Marcinowski, Johannes (Jaroslaw) Marcondes, Durval Bellegarde Marcuse, Herbert Martins, Cyro Marty, Pierre Matte-Blanco, Ignacio Mauco, Georges Mead, Margaret Meng, Heinrich Menninger, Karl A. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice Meyer, Adolf F. Meyerson, Ignace Meynert, Theodor Milner-Blackett, Marion Minkowska-Brokman, Françoise Minkowski, Eugène Mitscherlich, Alexander Mom, Jorge Mario Money-Kyrle, Roger Earle Moreno, Jacob Levy Morgenstern-Kabatschnik, Sophie Morgenthaler, Fritz Morichau-Beauchant, Pierre Ernest René Morselli, Enrico Moser-van Sulzer-Wart, Fanny Louise Müller-Braunschweig, Carl Murray, Henry A. Musatti, Cesare Nacht, Sacha Emanoel Nin, Anaı̈s Nodet, Charles-Henri Nunberg, Hermann Oberholzer, Emil Odier, Charles Ophuijsen, Johan H. W. Van Ossipov, Nikolaı̈ legrafovitch Pankejeff, Sergueı̈ Pankow, Gisela Pappenheim, Bertha Parcheminey, Georges Pasche, Francis Léopold Philippe Payne, Sylvia May Peraldi, François Perestrello, Danilo Perrier, François Perrotti, Nicola Pfister, Oskar Robert Piaget, Jean Pichon, Édouard Jean Baptiste Pichon-Rivière, Enrique Politzer, Georges Porto-Carrero, Julio Pires Pötzl, Otto Putnam, James Jackson Racamier, Paul-Claude Racker, Heinrich Radó, Sándor Raimbault, Émile Rambert, Madeleine Rank (Rosenfeld) Otto Rank-Minzer (ou Münzer), Beata Rapaport, David Rascovsky, Arnaldo Rees, John Rawlings Régis, Emmanuel Jean-Baptiste Joseph Reich, Annie Reich, Wilhelm Reik, Theodor Reverchon-Jouve, Blanche Rickman, John Rie, Oksar Rittmeister, John Friedrich Karl Riviere-Hodgson Verrall, Joan Robertson, James Róheim, Géza Rolland, Romain Edme Paul-Émile Rorschach, Hermann Rosenfeld, Eva Marie Rosenfeld, Herbert Alexander Rosenthal, Tatiana Ross, Helen Rubinstein, Benjamin B. Rycroft, Charles Frederick Sachs, Hanns Sadger, Isidor Isaak Sandler, Joseph Sarasin, Philipp Saussure, Raymond de Schiff, Paul Schilder, Paul Ferdinand Schlumberger, Marc Schmideberg-Klein, Melitta Schmidt, Vera Federovna Schneider, Ernst Schreber, Daniel Paul Schultz-Hencke, Harald Julius Alfred CarlLudwig Schur, Max Sechehaye-Burdet, Marguerite Servadio, Emilio Sharpe, Ella Freeman Silberer, Herbert Silberstein, Eduard Simmel, Ernst Smirnoff, Victor Nikolaı̈evitch INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THEMATIC OUTLINE Sokolnicka-Kutner, Eugénie Spielrein, Sabina Spitz, René Arpad Stekel, Wilhelm Sterba, Richard F. Sterba-Radanowicz-Hartmann, Editha Stoller, Robert J. Stone, Leo Storfer, Adolf Josef Strachey, James Beaumont Strachey-Sargent, Alix Sullivan, Harry Stack Swoboda, Hermann Szondi, Leopold Tausk, Viktor Thompson, Clara M. Tomasi di Palma di Lampedusa-Wolff Somersee, Alessandra Torok, Maria Tosquelles, François Tustin, Frances Urbantschitsch (Urban), Rudolf von Valdizán Hermilio Viderman, Serge Waelder, Robert Wagner-Jauregg, Julius (Julius Wagner Ritter von Jauregg) Walter, Bruno Weininger, Otto Weiss, Edoardo Wilbur, George B. Winnicott, Donald Woods Winterstein, Alfred Freiherr von Wittels, Fritz (Siegfried) Wittkower, Eric Wolfentstein, Martha Wolff, Antonia Anna Wulff, Mosche (Woolf, Moshe) Zavitzianos, Georges Zetzel-Rosenberg, Elizabeth Zulliger, Hans Zweig, Arnold Zweig, Stefan III. Works A) Freud ‘‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy’’ (little Hans) ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’’ ‘‘Autobiographical Study, An’’ Beyond the Pleasure Principle Civilization and its Discontents ‘‘Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest’’ INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF ‘‘Constructions in Analysis’’ ‘‘Contributions to the Psychology of Love’’ ‘‘Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming’’ Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva’’ ‘‘Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis, A’’ ‘‘Dostoyevsky and Parricide’’ Ego and the Id, The Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis ‘‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’’ (Wolf Man ) Future of an Illusion, The Gesammelte Schriften Gessammelte Werke Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego ‘‘Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses’’ Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety ‘‘Instinct and their Vicissitudes’’ Interpretation of Dreams, The Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious Klinische Studie über die halbseitiger Cerebrallähmung der Kinder [Clinical study of infantile cerebral diplegia] Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood ‘‘Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy’’ ‘‘Metapsychologic Complement to the Theory of Dreams’’ Moses and Monotheism’’ ‘‘Moses of Michelangelo, The’’ ‘‘Mourning and Melancholia’’ ‘‘Negation’’ Nervous Anxiety States and their Treatment ‘‘Neurasthenia and ‘Anxiety Neurosis’’’ New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis ‘‘Note upon the ‘Mystic Writing Pad,’ A’’ ‘‘Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis’’ (Rat Man) ‘‘On Dreams’’ ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ ‘‘On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement’’ ‘‘On the Sexual Theories of Children’’ ‘‘On Transience’’ Opere ( writing of Sigmund Freud) ‘‘Outline of Psychoanalysis, An’’ Phylogenetic Fantasy, A :Overview of the Transference Neuroses ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology, A’’ PSYCHOANALYSIS ‘‘Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)’’ ‘‘Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman, The’’ Psychopathology of Everyday Life, The Question of Lay Analysis, The ‘‘Recommandations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis’’ ‘‘Remembering, Repeating and WorkingThrough’’ ‘‘Repression’’ ‘‘Seventeenth-century Demonological Neurosis, A’’ ‘‘Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes’’ ‘‘Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense, The’’ Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Studies on Hysteria ‘‘Sexual Enlightenment Of Children, The’’ ‘‘‘Uncanny,’ The’’ ‘‘Unconscious, The’’ ‘‘Theme of the Three Caskets, The’’ Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twenty-eighth President of the United States. A Psychological Study ‘‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’’ Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality Totem and Taboo ‘‘Why War?’’ ‘‘‘Wild’ Psycho-Analysis’’ B) Other Works Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Gilles Deleuze et Felix Guattari) Apprenti-historien et le maı́tre-sorcier (L’-) [The apprentice historian and the master sorcerer]( Piera Aulagnier) Basic Neurosis, The—Oral Regression and Psychic Masochism (Edmund Bergler) Basic Problems of Ethnopsychiatry (Georges Devereux) Book of the It, The (Georg Groddeck) Character Analysis (Wilhelm Reich) Childhood and Society (Erik H. Erikson) Christians and Jews: A Psychoanalytical Study (Rudolf M. Loewenstein) Collected papers on schizophrenia and related subjects (Harold F. Searles) ‘‘Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child’’ (Sándor Ferenczi) lx xvii THEMATIC OUTLINE Construction de l’espace analytique (La-) [Constructing the analytical space] (Serge Viderman) Development of Psycho-Analysis, The (Sándor Ferenczi and Otto Rank) Don Juan and the Double (Otto Rank) Dreams and Myths (Abraham Karl) ‘‘Dream of the Wise Baby, The’’ (Sandor Ferenczi) Écrits (Jacques Lacan) Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, The (Anna Freud ) Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation (Heinz Hartmann) Ego Psychology and Psychosis (Paul Federn) Elementi di psiocoanalisi (Eduordo Weiss) Empty Fortress, The (Bruno Bettelheim) Envy and Gratitude (Melanie Klein) Estudios sobre técnica psicoanalı́tica (Heinrich Racker) Freud: Living and Dying (Max Schur) Freud’s Self-Analysis (Didier Anzieu) Freud, the Secret Passion (John Huston) Hamlet and Oedipus (Ernest Jones) ‘‘Introjection and Transference’’ (Sandor Ferenczi) Jalousie amoureuse, La (Amorous jealousy)(Daniel Lagache) Language of Psychoanalysis, The (Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis) Learning from Experience (Wilfred R. Bion) Lingüistica, Interacción comunicativa y Proceso psicoanalı́tico (David Liberman) Life and Work of Sigmund Freud (Ernest Jones) Life and Works of Edgar Allen Poe, The: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation (Marie Bonaparte) Mass Psychology of Fascism, The (Wilhelm Reich) Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (Hermann Numberg and Ernst Federn) Nervous Anxiety States and their Treatment (Wilhelm Stekel) Neurosis and Human Growth (Karen Horney) ‘‘On the Origin of the ‘Influencing Machine’ in Schizophrenia’’ (Viktor Tausk) Philippson Bible Psychanalyse et Pédiatrie [Psychoanalysis and pediatrics] (Francoise Dolto) lx xv ii i Psychoanalyse des névroses et des psychoses, La (Regis Emmanuel and Angelo Hesnard ) Psycho-Analysis of Children, The (Melanie Klein) Psychoanalysis of Dreams (Angel Garma) Psychoanalysis of Fire, The (Gaston Bachelard) Psychoanalysis and the Neuroses (René Laforgue and René Allendy) Psychoanalytic Theory of Neuroses, The (Otto Fenichel) Psychoanalytical Treatment of Children (Anna Freud) Psychology of Women, The. A Psychoanalytic Interpretation (Helene Deutsch) Psychology of Dementia præcox (Carl Gustav Jung) Psychology of the Unconscious, The (Carl Gustav Jung) Psychopathologie de l’échec (Psychopathology of Failure) (René Laforgue) Qu’est-ce que la suggestion? [What is suggestion?] (Charles Baudouin) Secrets of a Soul (Georg Wilhelm Pabst) Seminar, Lacan’s (Jacques Lacan) Sex and Character (Otto Weininger) Thalassa. A Theory of Genitality (Sandor Ferenczi) Transference and Countertransference (Heinrich Racker) Trattato di psicoanalisi (Cesare Musatti) Trauma of Birth, The (Otto Rank) Unconscious as Infinite Sets, The: An Essay in Bi-Logic (Ignacio matte-Blanco) Violence of Interpretation, The: From Pictogram to Statement (Piera CastoriadisAulagnier) Young Girl’s Diary, A (Hermine von HugHellmuth) C) Journals and other publications Almanach der Psychoanalyse American Imago Année psychologique, L’ Archives de psychologie, Les Bloc—Notes de la psychanalyse Coq-Héron Disque vert, Le Documents et Débats Études Freudiennes Évolution psychiatrique, L’ (Developments in Psychiatry) Fackel, Die Imago. Zeitschrift für die Anwendung der Psychoanalyse auf die Geisteswissenschaften Inconscient, L’ International Journal of Psychoanalysis, The Internationale Zeitschrift für (ärztliche) Psychoanalyse Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag Interprétation Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse Journal de la psychanalyse d’enfants Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse Ornicar? Psychanalyse, La Psyché, revue internationale de psychanalyse et des sciences de l’homme (Psyche, an international review of psychoanalysis and human sciences) Psyche. Zeitschrift für Psychanalyse und ihre Anwendungen Psychoanalytic Bewegung, Die Psychoanalytic Quarterly, The Psychoanalytic Review, The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, The Psychoterapia (Psixoterapija-Obozrenie voprosov lecenija I prikladonoj psixologii) Revista de psicoanálisis Revista de psiquiatria y disciplinas conexas Revue française de psychanalyse Rivisita di psicoanalisi Topique Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse IV. History A) COUNTRIES ARGENTINA Aberastury, Arminda, also known as ‘‘La Negra’’ Alvarez de Toledo, Luisa Agusta Rebeca Gambier de Argentina Baranger, Willy Bleger, José Cárcamo, Celes Ernesto Langer, Marie Glass Hauser de Liberman, David Mom, Jorge Mario Pichon-Rivière, Enrique Racker, Heinrich Rascovsky, Arnaldo INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THEMATIC OUTLINE AUSTRALIA Australia AUSTRIA Adler, Alfred Aichhorn, August Almanach der Psychoanalyse Austria Berggasse 19, Wien IX Bernays, Minna Bernfeld, Siegfried Breuer, Josef Caruso, Igor A. Committee,The Deuticke, Franz Eckstein, Emma Eissler, Kurt Robert Fluss, Gisela Frankl, Viktor Freud, Amalie Freud, Anna Freud, Bernays, Martha Freud, Ernst Freud, Jakob Kolloman (ou Keleman ou Kallamon) Freud, (Jean) Martin Freud, Josef Freud Museum Freud, Oliver Freud, Sigmund Schlomo Freud, Sigmund, ( siblings) Friedländer-Fränkl, Kate Graf, Herbert Graf, Max Gross, Otto Hans Adolf Halberstadt-Freud, Sophie Hartmann, Heinz Heller, Hugo (et éditions) Hellman Noach, Ilse Hietzing Schule/Burlingham-Rosenfeld Hilferding-Hönigsberg, Margarethe Hitschmann, Eduard Hollitscher-Freud, Mathilde Hug-Hellmuth-Hug von Hugenstein, Hermine Institut Max-Kassowitz Jekels (Jekeles), Ludwig Kraus, Karl Kris-Rie, Marianne Lanzer, Ernst Lehrinstitut der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung Meynert, Theodor Pappenheim, Bertha INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF Pötzl, Otto Rank (Rosenfeld) Otto Rank-Minzer (ou Münzer), Beata Reich, Annie Reich, Wilhelm Reik, Theodor Rie, Oksar Sadger, Isidor Isaak Schilder, Paul Ferdinand Schur, Max Sigmund Freud Museum Silberer, Herbert Stekel, Wilhelm Sterba, Richard F. Swoboda, Hermann Tausk, Viktor Urbantschitsch (Urban), Rudolf von Vienna, Freud’s secondary school in Vienna General Hospital Vienna, University of Waelder, Robert Wagner-Jauregg, Julius (Julius Wagner Ritter von Jauregg) Weininger, Otto Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung Winterstein, Alfred Freiherr von Wittels, Fritz (Siegfried) Zweig, Stefan BELGIUM Belgium Delboeuf, Joseph Rémi Léopold Dugautiez, Maurice Lechat, Fernand BRAZIL Brazil Franco da Rocha, Francisco Kemper, Werner Walther Koch, Adelheid Lucy Marcondes, Durval Bellegarde Martins, Cyro Perestrello, Danilo Porto-Carrero, Julio Pires CANADA Bigras, Julien Joseph Normand Canada Lainé, Tony Peraldi, François North America Société psychanalytique de Montréal CHILE Blanco, Ignacio PSYCHOANALYSIS Chile CHINA China COLOMBIA Colombia CZECH REPUBLIC Czech Republic DENMARK Denmark FINLAND Finland FRANCE Allendy, René Félix Eugène Allendy-Nel-Dumouchel, Yvonne Althusser, Louis Association psychanalytique de France Aulagnier-Spairani, Piera Dolto-Marette, Françoise Enriquez-Joly, Micheline Ey, Henri Favez, Georges Favez-Boutonier, Juliette Favreau, Jean Alphonse Anzieu, Didier Aubry Weiss, Jenny Bachelard, Gaston Beirnaert, Louis Berge, André Berman, Anne Bernheim, Hippolyte Bloch, Jean- Richard Bonaparte, Marie Léon Borel, Adrien Alphonse Alcide Bouvet, Maurice Charles Marie Germain Breton, André Cénac, Michel Centre Alfred-Binet Centre de consultations et de traitements psychanalytiques Jean-Favreau Centre psychopédagogique ClaudeBernard Collège de psychanalystes Colloque sur l’ inconscient Certeau, Michel de Charcot, Jean Martin Chentrier, Théodore Chertok, Léon (Tchertok, Lejb) Choisy, Maryse Claude, Henri Charles Jules Dalbiez, Roland l x x ix THEMATIC OUTLINE Delay, Jean Desoille, Robert Diatkine, René Flournoy, Henri Flournoy, Théodore France Granoff, Wladimir Alexandre Guilbert, Yvette Held, René Hesnard, Angélo Louis Marie Heuyer, Georges Janet, Pierre Jankélévitch, Samuel Jouve, Pierre Jean Kestemberg-Hassin, Evelyne Kestenberg, Jean Jury, Paul Lacan, Jacques-Marie Émile Laforgue, René Lagache, Daniel Lainé, Tony Laurent-Lucas-Championnière-Maugé, Odette Le Bon, Gustave Lebovici, Serge Leclaire (Liebschutz), Serge Liebeault, Ambroise Auguste Leuba, John Mâle, Pierre Mannoni, Dominique-Octave Mannoni-Van der Spoel, Maud (Magdalena) Marty, Pierre Mauco, Georges Merleau-Ponty, Maurice Meyerson, Ignace Minkowska-Brokman, Françoise Minkowski, Eugène Morichau-Beauchant, Pierre Ernest René Mouvement lacanien française Nacht, Sacha Emanoel Nodet, Charles-Henri Pankow, Gisela Parcheminey, Georges Pasche, Francis Léopold Philippe Perrier, François Pichon, Édouard Jean Baptiste Politzer, Georges Racamier, Paul-Claude Raimbault, Émile Reverchon-Jouve, Blanche Régis, Emmanuel Jean-Baptiste Joseph Rolland, Romain Edme Paul-Émile Sainte-Anne Hospital lx xx Salpêtriere, hospital Schiff, Paul Schlumberger, Marc Smirnoff, Victor Nikolaı̈evitch Société française de psychanalyse Société psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris Torok, Maria Tosquelles, François Viderman, Serge Sigmund Freud Institute Tegel (Schloss Tegel) Walter, Bruno Zweig, Arnold GERMANY HUNGARY Abel, Carl Abraham, Karl Allgemeine Ärztliche Gesellschaft für Psychotherapie Baginsky, Adolf Berliner Psychoanalytische Poliklinik Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut Brentano, Franz von Brücke, Ernst Wihelm von Deutsches Institut für Psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (Institut Göring) Eitington, Max Eissler-Selke, Ruth Eitington, Max Fechner, Gustav Theodor Foulkes (Fuchs), Siegmund Heinrich Fromm, Erich Fromm-Reichmann, Frieda Gattel, Felix Germany Goethe (prize) Gross, Otto Hans Adolf Göring, Matthias Heinrich Groddeck, Georg Walther Hirschfeld, Elfriede Horney-Danielson, Karen Jacobson, Edith Kemper, Werner Walther Landauer, Karl Mann, Thomas Marcinowski, Johannes (Jaroslaw) Meng, Heinrich Mitscherlich, Alexander Müller-Braunschweig, Carl Pankow, Gisela Rittmeister, John Friedrich Karl Rosenfeld, Eva Marie Sachs, Hanns Schreber, Daniel Paul Schultz-Hencke, Harald Julius Alfred Carl-Ludwig Abraham, Nicolas Alexander, Franz Gabriel Bak, Robert C. Balint group Balint, Michael (Bálint [Bergsmann], Mihály) Balint-Szekely-Kovács, Alice Benedek, Therese Devereux, Georges Ferenczi, Sándor Freund Toszeghy, Anton von Hermann, Imre Hollós, István Hungarian School Hungary Kovács-Prosznitz, Vilma Lorand, Sándor Radó, Sándor Rapaport, David Róheim, Géza Spitz, René Arpad GREECE Embirikos, Andreas Greece Kouretas, Démétrios Zavitzianos, Georges INDIA Bose, Girindrasekhar India ISRAEL Israel Wulff, Mosche (Woolf, Moshe) ITALY Corrao, Francesco Fornari, Franco Gaddini, Eugenio Italy Levi Bianchini, Marco Morselli, Enrico Musatti, Cesare Perrotti, Nicola Servadio, Emilio Tomasi di Palma di Lampedusa-Wolff Somersee, Alessandra Weiss, Edoardo INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THEMATIC OUTLINE JAPAN Schmidt, Vera Federovna Spielrein, Sabina Japan Kosawa, Heisaku SOUTH AFRICA KOREA Ellenberger, Henri Frédéric Korea SPAIN MARTINIQUE Garma, Angel Spain Martinique MEXICO SWEDEN Mexico Andersson, Ola Bjerre, Poul Sweden NETHERLANDS Emden, Jan Egbert Gustaaf Van Lampl, Hans Lampl-de Groot, Jeanne Leeuw, Pieter Jacob Van der Netherlands Ophuijsen, Johan H. W. Van SWITZERLAND Nacht, Sacha Emanoel Romania Baudouin, Charles Binswanger, Ludwig Bleuler, Paul Eugen Brun, Rudolf Burghölzli asylum Claparède, Édouard Dubal, George Dubal, George Gressot, Michel Guex, Germaine Jung, Carl Gustav Jung-Rauschenbach, Emma Maeder, Alphonse E. Morgenthaler, Fritz Moser-van Sulzer-Wart, Fanny Louise Oberholzer, Emil Odier, Charles Pfister, Oskar Robert Piaget, Jean Rambert, Madeleine Rorschach, Hermann Sarasin, Philipp Saussure, Raymond de Schneider, Ernst Schweizerische Ärztegesellschaft für Psychoanalyse Sechehaye-Burdet, Marguerite Société psychanalytique de Genève Switzerland (French-speaking) Switzerland (German-speaking) Zulliger, Hans RUSSIA UNITED KINGDOM Andreas-Salomé, Louise, dite Lou Detski Dom Dosuzkov, Theodor Ossipov, Nikolaı̈ legrafovitch Pankejeff, Sergueı̈ Rosenthal, Tatiana Russia/USSR Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht Bowlby, Edward John Mostyn Brierley, Marjorie Flowers British Psycho-Analytical Society Controversial Discussions Eder, David Montagu Fairbairn, William Ronald Dodds NORTH AFRICA North African countries NORWAY Norway Peru ‘‘A. Z.’’ Delgado, Honorio Peru PHILIPPINES Philippines POLAND Bornstein, Berta Deutsch-Rosenbach, Helene Bick, Esther Morgenstern-Kabatschnik, Sophie Poland PORTUGAL Portugal ROMANIA INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Flügel, John Carl Glover, Edward Glover, James Great Britain Hampstead Clinic Heimann, Paula Hoffer, William (Wilhelm) Hogarth Press Imago Publishing Company Isaacs-Sutherland, Susan Khan, Mohammed Masud Rasa Klein-Reizes, Melanie Low, Barbara Milner-Blackett, Marion Money-Kyrle, Roger Earle Payne, Sylvia May Rees, John Rawlings Rickman, John Riviere-Hodgson Verrall, Joan Robertson, James Rosenfeld, Eva Marie Rosenfeld, Herbert Alexander Rycroft, Charles Frederick Sandler, Joseph Schmideberg-Klein, Melitta Sharpe, Ella Freeman Strachey, James Beaumont Strachey-Sargent, Alix Tavistock Clinic Tustin, Frances Winnicott, Donald Woods Wittkower, Eric UNITED STATES Alexander, Franz Gabriel American Academy of Psychoanalysis American Imago American Psychoanalytic Association Arlow, Jacob A. Blanton, Smiley Brill, Abraham Arden Brunswick, Ruth Mack Bullit, William C. Burrow, Trigant Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute Clark-Williams, Margaret Doolittle-Aldington, Hilda (H.D.) Eissler, Kurt Robert Eissler-Selke, Ruth Ellenberger, Henri Frédéric Erikson, Erik Homburger Frink, Horace Westlake Gardiner, Muriel M. Greenacre, Phyllis lxxxi THEMATIC OUTLINE Greenson, Ralph Halberstadt-Freud, Sophie Hartmann, Heinz Horney-Danielson, Karen Jacobson, Edith Jelliffe, Smith Ely Jekels (Jekeles), Ludwig Kardiner, Abram Katan, Maurits Katan-Rosenberg, Anny Kris, Ernst Lehrman, Philip R. Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Institute and Society Lowenstein, Rudolph M. Mahler-Schönberger, Margaret Marcuse, Herbert Mead, Margaret Menninger, Karl A. Meyer, Adolf F. Moreno, Jacob Levy National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis New York Freudian Society New York Psychoanalytic Institute Nin, Anaı̈s North America Nunberg, Hermann Putnam, James Jackson Róheim, Géza Rubinstein, Benjamin B. Sachs, Hanns US San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society San Francisco Psychotherapy Research Group and Control-Mastery Theory Schilder, Paul Ferdinand Simmel, Ernst Spitz, René Arpad Sterba, Richard F. Sterba-Radanowicz-Hartmann, Editha Hungary Stoller, Robert J. Stone, Leo Sullivan, Harry Stack Thompson, Clara M. Waelder, Robert Weiss, Edoardo Walter, Bruno Washington Psychoanalytic Society Zetzel-Rosenberg, Elizabeth URUGUAY Uruguay VENEZUELA lx xx ii Venezuela WEST INDIES Fanon, Frantz YUGOSLAVIA Yugoslavia (ex) B) Case histories Aimée, the case of Ajase complex Anna O., case of Cäcilie M., case of Elisabeth von R., case of Emmy von N., case of Flower Doll: Essays in Child Psychotherapy ‘‘Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria’’ (Dora, Ida Bauer) Katharina, case of Little Arpåd, the boy pecked by a cock Lucy R. case Mathilde, case of C) Events Clark University Congrès international de l’hypnotisme expérimental et scientifique, First Congress of French-speaking psychoanalysts from Romance-language-speaking countries Controversial Discussions First World War Gestapo Mahler, Gustav (meeting with Sigmund Freud) Second World War D) Psychoanalysis and Other Disciplines Anthropology and psychoanalysis Cinema and psychoanalysis Cinema criticism Cocaine and psychoanalysis Feminism and psychoanalysis Multilingualism and psychoanalysis Music and psychoanalysis Brain and psychoanalysis, the Catastrophe theory and psychoanalysis Cognitivism and Psychoanalysis Darwin, darwinism and psychoanalysis Death and psychoanalysis Ethnopsychoanalysis Ethology and psychoanalysis German romanticism and psychoanalysis Goethe and psychoanalysis Hard science and psychoanalysis Historical truth History and psychoanalysis Judaism and psychoanalysis Kantianism and psychoanalysis Law and psychoanalysis Linguistics and psychoanalysis Literary and artistic creation Literature and psychoanalysis Marxism and psychoanalysis Monism Mythology and psychoanalysis Phenomenology and psychoanalysis Philosophy and psychoanalysis Politics and psychoanalysis Psychoanalysis Psychoanalytic research Psychoanalytic semiology Psychoanalytic splits Psychology and psychoanalysis Racism, anti-Semitism and psychoanalysis Religion and psychanoalysis Sartre and psychoanalysis Schiller and psychoanalysis Science and psychoanalysis Shakespeare and psychoanalysis Sociology and psychoanalysis, sociopsychoanalysis Spinoza and psychoanalysis Structuralism and psychoanalysis Surrealism and psychoanalysis Visual arts and psychoanalysis E) Organizations and Institutions Allgemeine Ärztliche Gesellschaft für Psychotherapie American Academy of Psychoanalysis American Psychoanalytic Association Armand Trousseau Children’s Hospital Association psychanalytique de France Berliner Psychoanalytische Poliklinik Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut Burghölzli Asylum British Psycho-Analytical Society Centre Alfred-Binet Centre de consultations et de traitements psychanalytiques Jean-Favreau Centre psychopédagogique ClaudeBernard Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute Collège de psychanalystes Colloque sur l’ inconscient Detski Dom INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THEMATIC OUTLINE Deutsches Institut für Psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (Institut Göring) École de la Cause Freudienne Ecole experimentale de Bonneuil École Freudienne de Paris (Freudian school of Paris) Fédération européenne de psychanalyse Federación psicoanalı́tica de américa latina Freud Museum Hampstead Clinic Goethe Prize Hietzing Schule/Burlingham-Rosenfeld Hogarth Press Hungarian School Imago Publishing Company Institut Claparède Institut Max-Kassowitz International Federation of Psychoanalytic Societies INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis International Psychoanalytical Association Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Institute and Society Lehrinstitut der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung Menninger Clinic National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis New York Freudian Society New York Psychoanalytic Institute SainteAnne Hospital Quatriéme Groupe (O.P.L.F.), Fourth Group Salpêtriere Hospital, La Schweizerische Ärztegesellschaft für Psychoanalyse PSYCHOANALYSIS San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society San Francisco Psychotherapy Research Group and Control-Mastery Theory Société française de psychanalyse Société psychanalytique de Genève Société psychanalytique de Montréal Société psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris Sigmund Freud Archives Sigmund Freud Copyrights Limited Sigmund Freud Institute Sigmund Freud Museum Tavistock Clinic Tegel (Schloss Tegel) Vienna General Hospital Vienna, University of Washington Psychoanalytic Society Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung lxxxiii CHRONOLOGY CHRONOLOGY This chronological list was based upon the 17,000 sources of historical data that I have gathered for over twenty years and upon the articles published in this Dictionary. It can neither presume completion, since my choices were necessarily arbitrary, nor absolute precision, which does not exist in any work of history, no matter the scrutiny and rigor of its author. As with the Dictionary, it will indefinitely remain subject to additions and revisions. It should therefore only be considered as a point of departure for the more thorough research of our vigilant readers, to benefit future publications. —Alain de Mijolla DATE EVENT 1815–1855 December 18, 1815 – Jakob (Kallamon Jacob) Freud, Sigmund Freud’s father, son of Schlomo Freud and Peppi [Pesel] (née Hoffmann), is born in Tysmenitz, Galicia (Poland) 1833 – Presumed date of birth of Emanuel Freud, Sigmund’s half-brother, in Tysmenitz, Galicia (Poland) 1834 or 1835 – Presumed date of birth of Philipp Freud, Sigmund’s half-brother, in Tysmenitz, Galicia (Poland) August 18, 1835 – Amalie (Amalia, Malka) Nathanson, Sigmund Freud’s mother, daughter of Jacob Nathanson and Sara (née Wilenz), born in Brody January 15, 1842 – Josef Breuer born in Vienna (Austria) October 3, 1846 – James J. Putnam born in Boston, Massachusetts (USA) July 29, 1855 – Jakob Freud and Amalie Nathanson marry in Vienna August 18, 1855 – Johann (John) Freud, son of Emanuel Freud and Maria Freud-Rokach, Sigmund’s nephew and playmate, born in Freiberg (Moravia) 1856–1860 May 6, 1856 – Sigismund Schlomo born in Freiberg (Moravia) at 6:30 pm, delivered, as all of Emmanuel and Maria’s children, by the midwife Cäcilia Smolka; circumcised on May 13 October 1857 – Julius, Sigmund Freud’s first brother, born in Freiberg (died on April 15, 1858 at the age of six months) October 24, 1858 – Wilhelm Fliess born in Arnswalde (Choszczno) December 31, 1858 – Anna, Sigmund’s first sister, born in Freiberg lxxxv CHRONOLOGY August 1859–March 1860 – Jakob Freud leaves for Vienna; Amalia,Sigmund, and Anna follow, stopping in Leipzig en route. Emanuel Freud’s family emigrates to Manchester (England) with Philipp Freud March 21, 1861 – Regine Debora (Rosa) Freud, Sigmund Freud’s second sister, fourth child of Jakob and Amalie, born in Vienna August 23 – Francisco Franco da Rocha born in Amparo, State of São Paulo (Brazil) 1861–1865 February 12, 1861 – Louise Andreas-Salomé, called ‘‘Lou,’’ born in St. Petersburg (Russia) March 22, 1861 – Maria (Mitzi) Freud, Sigmund Freud’s third sister, fifth child of Jakob and Amalie, born in Vienna July 26, 1861 – Martha Bernays, Sigmund Freud’s future wife, daughter of Berman Bernays and Emmeline (née Philipps), born in Hamburg July 23, 1862 – Esther Adolfine (Dolfi) Freud, Sigmund Freud’s fourth sister, sixth child of Jakob and Amalie, born in Vienna May 3, 1864 – Pauline Regine (Paula) Freud, Sigmund Freud’s fifth sister, seventh child of Jakob and Amalie, born in Vienna June 18, 1865 – Minna Bernays, the younger sister of Martha, Sigmund Freud’s wife, born in Hamburg June 20, 1865 – Josef Freud (Sigmund Freud’s uncle) arrested for trafficking counterfeit rubles in Vienna October 1865 – Sigmund Freud admitted to the Leopoldstätter Real- and Obergymnasium 1866–1870 April 15 or 19, 1866 – Alexander Gotthold Efraim Freud, Sigmund Freud’s brother, eighth and last child of Jakob and Amalie, born in Vienna October 13, 1966 – Georg Groddeck born in Bad Kösen an der Saale (Germany) March 18, 1868 – Wilhelm Stekel born in Boyan (Bukovnia) February 7, 1870 – Alfred Adler, second of six brothers, born in the Viennese suburb of Rudolfsheim (Austria) 1871–1875 August 31, 1871 – Hermine Hug-Hellmuth-Hug von Hugenstein born in Vienna (Austria) October 13, 1871 – Paul Federn born in Vienna (Austria) August–September 15, 1872 – Along with two school friends (Eduard Silberstein, Horaz Ignaz Rosanes) Freud visits the Fluss family in Freiburg. Freud claims to be in love with Gisela Fluss February 23, 1873 – Oskar Pfister born in Zurich (Switzerland) March 24, 1873 – Edouard Claparède born in Geneva (Switzerland) July 7, 1873 – Sándor Ferenczi born in Miskolc (Hungary), the eighth of eleven children of Baruch Fraenkel (who will adopt the name Bernát Ferenczi), bookseller, printer, concert agent, and Róza Eibenschütz’s agent July 1873 – Freud is accepted to his Matura (excellently ‘‘vorzüglich’’) lx xx vi INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY October 1873 – Freud attends the Wiener Universität, at the medizinischen Fakultät October 12, 1874 – Abraham A. Brill born in Kanczugv (Austria) July 26, 1875 – Carl Gustav Jung born in Kesswill (Switzerland) August 1875 – Freud travels to England to the Manchester home of his half-brothers Emanuel and Philipp Freud August 28, 1875 – Marco Levi Bianchini born in Rovigo (Italy) 1876 March – Freud studies in Trieste at Karl Claus’s Institute of Comparative Anatomy May 24 – Poul Bjerre born in Göteborg (Sweden) October – Freud attends the Ernst Brücke Physiologische Institut as ‘‘Famulus’’ 1877 January 4 – Freud’s first publication: ‘‘Über den Ursprung der hinteren Nervenwurzeln im Rückenmarke von Ammocoetes (Petromyzon Planeri)’’ (1877a) May 3 – Karl Abraham born in Bremen (Germany) October 12 – Nikolaı̈ Ossipov born in Moscow (Russia) 1878 January 22 – Ernst Lanzer (the Rat Man) born in Vienna (dies in Russia in 1918) May 10 – Mosche Wulff (or Moshe Woolf) born in Odessa (Russia) July 27 – August Aichhorn born in Vienna (Austria) 1879 January 1st – Ernest Jones born in Gowerton, Glamorgan, Wales (Great Britain) March 12 – Viktor Tausk born in Zsilina (Slovakia) 1880 November 6 – Sylvia May Payne born in Wimbledon, Surrey (Great Britain) December –Treatment of Bertha Pappenheim begins (Anna O.) under Josef Breuer 1881 January 10 – Hanns Sachs born in Vienna (Austria) March 31 – Freud becomes a medical doctor April 5 – Ludwig Binswanger born in Kreuzlingen, canton of Thurgovia (Switzerland) April 8 – Carl Müller-Braunschweig born in Braunschweig (Germany) June 25 – Felix Boehm born in Riga (Lithuania) June 26 – Max Eitingon born in Mohilev (Russia) November 28 – Stefan Zweig born in Vienna (Austria) 1882 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY March 30 – Melanie Klein-Reizes born in Vienna (Austria) April – Freud first meets Martha Bernays April 4 – Ernst Simmel born in Wroclaw (Poland) July 2 – Marie Bonaparte, princess of Greece and Denmark, born in Saint-Cloud (France) October – Freud, having given up a career in research, goes to work in different capacities at the General Hospital of Vienna OF PSYCHOANALYSIS lxxxvii CHRONOLOGY November 1 – Ida Bauer (Dora) born (dies in New York in 1945) November 12 – Johan H.W. van Ophuijsen born in Sumatra (Dutch East Indies) Jean-Martin Charcot is named Professor of the Clinic of Mental Illnesses 1883 June 28 – Joan Riviere-Hogson Verrail born in Brighton (Great Britain) July 13 – Josef Breuer tells Freud about the case of Anna O. December 24 – Emil Oberholzer born in Zweibrücken (Switzerland) 1884 January 23 – Hermann Nunberg born in Bendzin, Galicia (Poland) April 22 – Otto Rank (Rosenfeld) born in Vienna (Austria) June 14 – Eugenia Sokolnicka-Kutner born in Varsovia (Poland) October 9 – Helene Deutsch-Rosenbach born in Przemysl (Poland) 1885 March 24 – Susan Isaacs-Sutherland born in Bolton, Lancashire (Great Britain) April 1885 – Freud’s research and publications on cocaine April 28 – Freud tells Martha that he destroyed his old notes, letters, and manuscripts June 19 – A traveling stipend is awarded to Freud for a six-month stay in Paris and Berlin July 18 – Freud is named Privatdozent in Neuropathology, a decision that will not become official until September 5 September 15 – Karen Horney-Danielsen born in Hamburg (Germany) October 13 – Freud begins his internship under Professor Jean-Martin Charcot at the Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris 1886 February 28–April 3 – Freud leaves Paris for Berlin and an internship with professor Baginsky, at the Clinic of Children’s Diseases, to prepare for his future post at the Kassowitz Clinic in Vienna March 28 – Henri Flournoy born in Geneva (Switzerland) April 25 – Freud opens his medical practice in Vienna on Easter Day, at No. 7 Rathausstrasse May 22 – Angélo Hesnard born in Pontivy, Morbihan (France) September 13 – Civil marriage of Sigmund Freud and Martha Bernays at the Wandsbek Rathaus. Brief religious ceremony on September 15 October 16 – Adelheid Lucy Koch born in Berlin (Germany) 1887 January 6 – Sergei Pankejeff, the Wolf Man, born in Russia on January 6 in the Gregorian Calendar (December 24, 1886, in the Julian Calendar), died in Vienna in 1979 January 29 – René Spitz born in Vienna (Austria) lx xx viii INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY July 9 – Heinrich Meng born in Hohenhurst (Germany) September 7 – Julio Pires Porto-Carrero born in Pernambuco (Brazil) September 26 – James Strachey born in London (Great Britain) October 12 – Karl Landauer born in Munich (Germany) October 16 – Mathilde Freud (first child of Sigmund and Martha) born in Vienna, Maria-Theresienstrasse 8 November 10 – Arnold Zweig born in Glogau (Silesia) November 24 – Freud’s first letter to Wilhelm Fliess 1888 January 13 – Edward Glover born in Lesmahagow, Scotland (Great Britain) May 12 – Theodor Reik born in Vienna (Austria) 1889 February 19 – René Allendy born in Paris (France) May 1 – First day of treatment of Emmy von N . . . ‘‘Don’t move! Don’t say anything! Don’t touch me!’’ July 19–August 9 – Freud travels to Nancy to visit Hippolyte Bernheim, then to Paris August 8–12 – First International Congress of Experimental Hypnotism and Therapy in Paris, for which Freud is registered August 11 – William R. Fairbairn born in Edinburgh, Scotland (Great Britain) September 21 – Edoardo Weiss born in Trieste (Italy) October 23 – Frieda Fromm-Reichmann born in Karlsruhe (Germany) November 13 – Imre Hermann born in Budapest (Hungary) December 6 – Jean Martin Freud (second child of Sigmund and Martha) born in Vienna, Maria-Theresia-Str. 8 Clark University founded (USA); Stanley Hall (1844– 1924) is named president 1891 January 22 – Franz Alexander born in Budapest (Hungary) February 19 – Oliver Freud (third child of Sigmund and Martha) born in Vienna, Maria-Theresia-Str. 8 May 2 – Freud publishes his first book, dedicated to Breuer, Zur Auffassung der Aphasien (Towards an Interpretation of Aphasia) August 17 – Abram Kardiner born in New York (USA) September – The Freud family moves to 19 Berggasse, where they will reside until 1938 September 12 – Géza Róheim born in Budapest (Hungary) October 11 – Dorothy Burlingham-Tiffany born in New York (USA) 1892 March 7 – Siegfried Bernfeld born in Lemberg, Galicia (Poland) April 6 – Ernst Freud (fourth child of Sigmund and Martha) born in Vienna, 19 Berggasse May 6 – Jacob Freud gives Sigmund the second volume of the Philippson Bible for his thirty-fifth birthday INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS lx xx ix CHRONOLOGY June 28 – First letter in which Freud uses the familiar ‘‘you’’ with Wilhelm Fliess October – In the case of Frl E. von R.., Freud renounces hypnotism and creates the ‘‘concentration technique’’ for what he calls ‘‘psychic analysis’’ November 8 – Therese Benedek born in Budapest (Hungary) xc 1893 February – Translated in Spanish in the Barcelona Medical Sciences Review, volume XIX, no. 3, ‘‘Psychic Mechanisms of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary Communication.’’ The article is also published in the Gaceta Médica de Granada (‘‘Grenada Medical Gazette’’), volume XI, 232 and 233. According to James Strachey, it’s ‘‘the very first publication of a translation of a psychological work by Freud in the world’’ April 12 – Sophie Freud (fifth child of Sigmund and Martha) born in Vienna, 19 Berggasse July 22 – Karl A. Menninger born in Topeka, Kansas (USA) July 29 – Pierre Janet defends his medical thesis in Paris: ‘‘Contribution to the Study of Mental Accidents Among the Hysterical’’ August 16 – Jean-Martin Charcot dies suddenly in Quarré-les-Tombes in the Morvan (France) October 3 – Clara M. Thompson born in Providence, Rhode Island (USA) 1894 April – Frederick W. H. Myers reports on the ‘‘Preliminary Communication’’ during a session at the Society for Psychical Research (London). Jones states that this report was the basis for his interest in Freud’s work (Great Britain) April 20 – Edward Bibring born in Stanislau, Galicia (Poland) May 3 – Phyllis Greenacre born in Chicago, Illinois (USA) August 2 – Raymond de Saussure born in Geneva (Switzerland) November 4 – Heinz Hartmann born in Vienna (Austria) November 5 – René Laforgue born in Thann, Alsace (Germany) William James writes a summary of the ‘‘Psychic Mechanisms of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary Communication’’ in the Psychological Review (USA) 1895 February – Wilhelm Fliess operates on Emma Eckstein, Freud’s patient, and forgets a dressing in the operating room March 4 – First account of a dream as ‘‘wish fulfillment,’’ Rudi Kaufmann’s dream on sleeping (Frau Breuer’s nephew) May 15 – Freud and Josef Breuer publish Studies on Hysteria July 24 – Freud’s first complete analysis of one of his own dreams about ‘‘the injection given to Irma’’ on the night of July 23–24 during his vacation at the Bellevue Hotel, near Vienna August – Freud goes to Italy for the first time, accompanied by his brother Alexander INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY September 21 – While returning to Berlin in the train, after a meeting withW. Fliess, Freud edits the beginning of the ‘‘Outline of a Scientific Psychology’’ November 29 – Minna Bernays, Martha’s sister, comes to stay with the Freuds and remains with them until the end of her life December 3 – Anna Freud, sixth and last child of Sigmund and Martha, born in Vienna, 19 Berggasse 1896 March 30 – First appearance of the word ‘‘psycho-analysis’’ in an article by Freud in French on ‘‘L’Hérédité et l’étiologie des névroses’’ (Heredity and Etiology of Neuroses) in the Revue neurologique (1896a) April 7 – Donald W. Winnicott born in Plymouth (Great Britain) October 23 – Jakob Freud dies after four months of illness. He is buried two days later (dream: ‘‘We are asked to close our eyes/an eye’’) December 3 – Michael Balint (Bàlint, Mihály) born in Budapest (Hungary) 1897 January – Freud’s first four dreams of Rome date from January of this year March 27 – Wilhelm Reich born in Dobrzcynica, Galicia (Poland) May 10 – Margaret Mahler-Schönberger born in Sopron (Hungary) July – Beginning of Selbstanalyse (self-analysis) July 17 – Heisaku Kosawa born in Atsugi, Kanagawa (Japan) September 8 – Wilfred R. Bion born in Mattra (United Provinces, India) September 21 – Cesare Musatti born in Dolo, Venice (Italy) September 21 – Letter to Wilhelm Fliess: ‘‘I don’t believe anymore in my neurotica’’ September 23 Gesellschaft – Freud joins the B’nai-B’rith- September 26 – Max Schur born in Stanislav (IvanoFrankovsk, Ukraine) October 15 – Letter to Wilhelm Fliess: first mention of the future ‘‘Oedipus complex’’ December 2 – Otto Fenichel born in Vienna (Austria) December 5 – First conference on dreams at the B’naiB’rith-Gesellschaft December 22 – Nicola Perrotti born in Penne, Pescara (Italy) December 25 – In Breslau Freud meets with Wilhelm Fliess, who talks to him about bisexuality and bilaterality 1898 February 9 – Rudolph M. Loewenstein born in Lodz (Poland) February 9 – ‘‘I am giving up self-analysis to devote myself to a book on dreams’’ writes Freud to W. Fliess May 6 – Richard F. Sterba born in Vienna (Austria) August 21 – John Rittmeister born in Hamburg (Germany) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS xci CHRONOLOGY September 22 – First analysis, written to Wilhelm Fliess, on forgetting the name of Signorelli, the painter of the ‘‘Last Judgment’’ in Orvieto 1899 January 11 – Grete Bibring-Lehner born in Vienna (Austria) February 3 – Paula Heimann-Glatzko born in Danzig (Germany) July 20 – Edmund Bergler born in Austria August 6 – Werner Kemper born in Hilgen, Rhenania (Germany) August 27 – Final writing and first corrections to the drafts of The Interpretation of Dreams September 11 – The manuscript of The Interpretation of Dreams is delivered to the printer October 24 – Date of the dedication in the copy of The Interpretation of Dreams sent to Wilhelm Fliess: ‘‘Seinem theuern Wilhelm z. 24 OKT 1899’’ November 27 – Durval Marcondes born in São Paulo (Brazil) 1900 January 8 – ‘‘The new century, which interests us especially owing to the fact that it includes in itself the date of our death, only brought me a stupid report in the Zeit,’’ wrote Freud to Wilhelm Fliess March 23 – Erich Fromm born in Frankfurt (Germany) April 24 – Freud gives a conference on Fécondité by Emile Zola before the B’nai-B’rith-Gesellschaft April 26 – Ernst Kris born in Vienna (Austria) May 27 – Marianne Kris-Rie born in Vienna (Austria) September 24 – ‘‘I’m slowly writing the ‘Psychopathology of Everyday Life,’’’ writes Freud to Wilhelm Fliess October 14 – The beginning of Dora’s treatment announced; it ends on December 31 1901 April 14 – Jacques Lacan born in Paris (France) August 7 – ‘‘You side against me saying that ‘he who read the thoughts of others only finds his own thoughts,’ which takes away all validity from my research,’’ Freud writes to Wilhelm Fliess, their distance more pronounced day by day. August 30–September 14 – Freud’s first trip to Rome accompanied by his brother Alexander September 23 – Sacha Nacht born in Racacini, Bacau (Romania) November 23 – Muriel M. Gardiner born in Chicago, Illinois (USA) The Archives de psychologie founded in Geneva by Edouard Claparède and his uncle Théodore Flournoy (Switzerland) Freud publishes Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens (Über Vergessen, Versprechen, Vergreifen, Aberglaube und Irrtum) (The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, 1901b) 1902 March 5 – Freud is named ‘‘outstanding professor’’ March 11 – Freud’s last letter to Wilhelm Fliess before Swoboda affair in 1904 xcii INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY April 9 – Annie Reich-Pink born in Vienna (Austria) June 15 – Erik Homburger Erikson born in Frankfurt (Germany) October – Freud sends postcards inviting Alfred Adler, Wilhelm Stekel, Max Kahane, and Rudolph Reitler to scientific meetings entitled ‘‘Psychological Wednesday Society’’ (‘‘Psychologischen Mittwoch-Vereinigung’’). Alfred Meisl and Paul Federn will join him in 1903 1903 February 14 – Marriage of Carl G. Jung and Emma Rauschenbach June – Otto Weininger’s book, Geschlecht und Charakter (Sex and Character) published. He commits suicide on October 4 August 11 – Celes Ernesto Cárcamo born in La Plata (Argentina) August 28 – Bruno Bettelheim born in Vienna (Austria) August 3 – Daniel Lagache born in Paris (France) 1904 April 26 – Freud resumes contact with Wilhelm Fliess, but Fliess later accuses Freud of being at the source of the plagiarism of his discovery on bisexuality, for which Hermann Swoboda is later found guilty June 24 – Angel Garma born in Bilbao (Spain) August 14 – Emilio Servadio born in Sestri, Genoa (Italy) August 17 – Sabina Spielrein is admitted to the Burghölzli Shelter, where she will be treated by Jung in a method inspired by Freud (Switzerland) September 4 – Freud’s improvised voyage with his brother Alexander in Greece. Trip to the Acropolis in Athens 1905 Eduard Hitschmann joins the ‘‘Psychologischen Mittwoch-Vereinigung’’ Otto Rank and Eugen Bleuler write to Freud Publication of two books by Freud: Der Witz et seine Beziehung zum Unbewußten (The Joke and its Relationship with the Unconscious, 1905c), Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie (Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 1905d), and of two articles, ‘‘Über Psychotherapie’’ (On Psychotherapy, 1905a) and ‘‘Bruchstück einer Hysterie-Analyse’’ (Dora: An Analysis of Case of Hysteria, 1905e), begun in 1901 Ragnar Vogt, future leading professor of psychiatry in Norway, draws on Freud’s psycho-cathartic method in Psykiatriens grundtræk (Outline of Psychiatry) (Norway) 1906 February – First article on psychoanalysis in the USA written by James J. Putnam in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology (USA) April 11 – Carl Gustav Jung’s first letter to Freud May 8 – In Freud’s letter to Arthur Schnitzler: ‘‘I have often asked myself with astonishment where you gather knowledge of such and such a hidden point, when I only acquired it after tedious investigative work, and I came to envy the writer that I already admired.’’ September – Freud’s Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlebre aus den Jahren 1893–1906, Volume I (Collection of Articles on Neuroses, Dating from 1893 to 1906) published INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS x cii i CHRONOLOGY October 10 – First meeting of the Psychological Wednesday Society where Otto Rank ‘‘functions as paid secretary.’’ The sessions take place every Wednesday at 8:30 pm at Freud’s home. The conferences begin at 9:00 pm. The order of the speakers in the discussion is determined by drawing lots. 1907 January 1 – After the publication of Psychologie der Dementia praecox by Carl G. Jung, Freud writes to him: ‘‘Please quickly renounce this error that your writing on dementia praecox did not very much please me. The simple fact that I expressed criticism can prove it to you. Since, if it were otherwise, I would find sufficient diplomacy to hide it from you. It would really be wiser to go against the best that were ever associated with me. I see, in reality, in your essay on d. pr. the most important and rich contribution to my work that I have come across, and I don’t see among my students in Vienna, who probably have a non univocal advantage over you from personal contact with me, in fact only one can put himself on the same rank as you for comprehension, and none are up to do as much for the cause as you, and ready to do it.’’ January 30 – Max Eitingon visits Freud, with a patient February 26 – John Bowlby born in London (Great Britain) March 3 – Carl G. Jung and Ludwig Binswanger’s first visit with Freud on Sunday, March 3 at 10:00 am June 8 – Edouard Claparède, the director of the laboratory of experimental psychology in Geneva, visits Carl G. Jung to be introduced to the technique of association (Switzerland) June 25 – Enrique Pichon-Rivière born in Geneva (Switzerland) June 25 – Karl Abraham’s first letter to Freud July 4 – First reading in France of ‘‘The PsychoAnalytical Method and Freud’s ‘Abwehr Neuropsychosen’’’ by Adolf Schmiergeld and P. Provotelle during the session of the Neurology Society in Paris September 2–7 – First International Congress of Psychiatry, Psychology and Assistance for the Insane in Amsterdam. Carl G. Jung responds to attacks against Freud (Netherlands) September 27 – First session of the Freud-Gesellschaft in Zurich, founded by Carl G. Jung (Switzerland) October 1 – First consultation of the Rat Man October 9 – Freud announces his intention to dissolve the Psychological Wednesday Society to create the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society November 6 – Freud presents the case of the Rat Man to the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society and Otto Rank notes: ‘‘The technique of the analysis has changed in the sense that the psychoanalyst no longer seeks to obtain the material that interests himself, but allows the patient to follow the natural and spontaneous course of his thoughts’’ December 15 – Karl Abraham’s first visit with Freud Studie über Minderwertigkeit von Organen (Study on the Inferiority of Organs) by Alfred Adler published (Austria) xciv INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY 1908 February 2 – Sándor Ferenczi, accompanied by Fülöp Stein, visits Freud for the first time April 15 – The Wiener Psychoanalytische Vereinigung (Vienna Psychoanalytical Society) founded April 26–27 – Zusammenkunft für Freudsche Psychologie, first international congress on Freudian psychology in Salzburg, a meeting suggested by Carl G. Jung. Freud’s conference on the Rat Man lasts four hours April 30 – Ernest Jones and Abraham A. Brill visit and lunch with Freud in Vienna May 3 – Freud’s first letter to Stefan Zweig May 8 – Cyro Martins born in Porto Alegre (Brazil) June 2 – Kurt Eissler born in Vienna (Austria) August 27 – First meeting of the Berlin Psychoanalytical Association founded by Karl Abraham with Iwan Bloch, Magnus Hirschfeld, and Otto Juliusburger (Germany) September 2–15 – Freud travels to England to visit his elder brothers September 20 – Alexander Mitscherlich born in Munich (Germany) September 26 – Ernest Jones settles in Toronto at the Toronto Lunatic Asylum (Canada) October 3 – Ignacio Matte-Blanco born in Santiago (Chile) November 6 – Françoise Dolto-Marette born in Paris (France) Nikolai Ossipov meets Freud in Vienna. He edits the translations of Freud’s works and founds the first psychoanalytical circle in Moscow, the ‘‘little Fridays’’ (Russia) Ludwig Jekels edits the first publications of Freud in the Polish language (Poland) Nervöse Angstzustände und ihre Behandlung (Nervous Anxiety States and Their Treatment) by Wilhelm Stekel published (Austria) 1909 January 18 – Freud’s first letter to Oskar Pfister February 7 Marriage of Mathilde, the first of Freud’s children to marry, to Robert Hollitscher March – First half-volume of the Jahrbuch für psychopathologische und psychoanalytische Forschungen. Directors: Eugen Bleuler and Freud. Editor-in-chief: Carl G. Jung March 10 – Alfred Adler gives a conference at the Vienna Society: ‘‘From Psychology to Marxism’’ April 25 – Oskar Pfister’s first visit with Freud May 30 – Sabina Spielrein’s first letter to Freud for an interview on the subject of his relationship with Carl G. Jung July 2 – Pieter van der Leeuw born in Zutphen (Netherlands) August 27 – Freud, Carl G. Jung and Sándor Ferenczi arrive in New York, at the invitation of G. Stanley Hall. Freud is named Doctor Honoris Causa at Clark University (Worcester, Massachussetts) where he gives, beginning on September 6, five conferences on psychoanalysis. On November 9, 1909, Putnam writes to him: ‘‘Your visit to America had a profound impact on me; I work and I read your writings with an even greater interest.’’ (USA) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS xcv CHRONOLOGY October 16 – Jeanne Lampl-de Groot born in Schiedam (Netherlands) November 17 – Correspondence begins between Freud and James Jackson Putnam Study Group in Sydney founded by Dr. Donald Fraze (Australia) First article on psychoanalysis written by a Spanish psychiatrist, Dr. Gayarre, ‘‘Sexual Origin of Hysteria and General Neurosis,’’ published in the Clinical Review of Madrid (Spain) Psychoterapia (Psixoterapija – Obozrenie voprosov lecenija i prikladonoj psixologii) founded. It is published until 1917 (Russia) Freud publishes ‘‘Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjahrigen Knaben (Der kleine Hans)’’ (Little Hans) 1909b, first study of the case from which the clinical material, originating from the cure of a child by his father, Max Graf, confirms the Freudian theories of child sexuality Freud publishes ‘‘Bemerkungen über einen Fall von Zwangsneurose (Der Rattenmann)’’ (Remarks on a Case of Obsessional Neurosis (The Rat Man), 1909d) Der Mythus der Geburt des Helden. Versuch einer psychologischen Mythendeutung (The Myth of the Birth of the Hero) by Otto Rank published (Austria) Traum und Mythus. Eine Studie zur Völkerpsychologie. Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde (Dreams and Myths) by Karl Abraham published (Germany) 1910 February – Beginning of the first analysis of the ‘‘Wolf Man,’’ Sergei Konstantinovich Pankejeff. It concludes on July 14, 1914 March 30 – First public definition of countertransference in Freud’s conference at the Nuremburg Congress: ‘‘Our attention is directed to the ‘counter-transference’ which registers with the physician as a consequence of the influence the patient exerts upon the unconscious feelings of his analyst. We are all ready to require that the physician recognizes and controls in himself this contertransference.’’ (1910d) March 30 – Berliner Psychoanalytische Vereinigung (Berlin Psychoanalytic Society) founded (Germany) March 30–31 – 2nd Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Nuremberg (Germany) during which the International Psychoanalytical Association is founded with its headquarters in Zurich (Switzerland). President: Carl G. Jung. Secretary: Franz Riklin. The existing psychoanalytical associations become local branches. Its official monthly mouthpiece, the Korrespondenzblatt, founded. The Zentralblatt fur Psychoanalyse; Medizinische Monatsschrift für Seelenkunde (Central sheet for psychoanalysis; Medical monthly for Psychology) is founded; Freud is the editor-in-chief and the editors are Alfred Adler and Wilhelm Stekel April – The Wiener Psychoanalytische Vereinigung (Vienna Psychoanalytical Society) leaves Freud’s residence and meets at Doktorenkollegium, Rothenturmstr. 19 (Austria) April 10 – Margarethe Hilferding-Hönigsberg becomes the first female member of the Viennese Psychoanalytical Society (Austria) xcv i INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY May 2 – The American Psychopathological Association founded by Ernest Jones, in conjunction with A.A. Brill, August Hoch, Morton Prince, and James Putnam. President: Morton Prince (USA) July 2 – Herbert Rosenfeld born in Nuremberg (Germany) August 23 – Freud’s letter to Poul Bjerre (Sweden) marks the beginning of their correspondence August 30 – Freud ‘‘analyzes’’ Gustav Mahler during his stay in Leiden (Holland) September 24 – Arminda Aberastury born in Buenos Aires (Argentina) October 12 – Alfred Adler is elected president and Wilhelm Stekel vice-president of the Viennese Psychoanalytical Society (Austria) December – Freud’s first letter from France, from Dr. Pierre Morichau-Beauchant, in Poitiers: ‘‘This letter will show you that you also have disciples in France who passionately follow your work’’ (France) Germán Greve Schlegel publishes the first psychoanalytical article known in Latin America, in Chile: ‘‘Sobre Psicologı́a y Psicoterapia de Ciertos Estados Angustiosos.’’ The presentation of this study in Buenos Aires in 1910 was noted by Freud in the Zentralbaltt fur Psychoanalyse (1911) and in Contribution to the History of the Psychoanalytical Movement (1914d) (Chile) The term Oedipus complex appears in Freud’s article entitled ‘‘Contribution to the Psychology of Love’’ (1910h) The Flexner report, underlining the lack of teaching standards in teaching medicine, is published in America. It becomes one of the bases for refusing non-doctors in American psychoanalytical associations (USA) Freud publishes Über psychoanalyse (Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 1910a), deriving from conferences given in the United States Freud publishes Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci (Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood, 1910c) 1911 January – Psychoanalytical group in Munich founded by Leonhard Seif (Germany) January 17 – Poul Bjerre gives a conference on ‘‘Freud’s Psychoanalytical Method’’ before the Association of Swedish Doctors (Sweden) February 12 – New York Psychoanalytic Society founded by Abraham A. Brill with fifteen physicians, in opposition to the American Psychoanalytic Association that Ernest Jones founds in May (USA) February 22 – Alfred Adler and Wilhelm Stekel resign from their posts at the head of the Vienna Society; Freud resumes the presidency with Eduard Hitschmann as vice-president and Hanns Sachs as librarian May – Jan van Emden and August Stärke visit Freud (Holland) May 2 – Leonid Drosnes visits Freud (Odessa) May 9 – American Psychoanalytic Association founded in Baltimore by Ernest Jones with James Putnam and eleven members, the majority physicians (USA) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS x cvi i CHRONOLOGY June – Alfred Adler leaves the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society (Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung). Nine members and the editorial staff of Zentralblatt follow suit in July (Austria) June 28 – First psychoanalytical lecture addressed to the medical community by David Eder at a conference of the British Medical Association: while he speaks, the audience leaves (Great Britain) August 14 – Maurice Bouvet born in Eu, Seine Maritime (France) September – Sigmund Freud writes ‘‘On Psycho-Analysis’’ (1913n [1911]), at the request of Andrew Davidson, secretary of the Branch of Psychological Medicine and Neurology at the Australian Medical Congress in Sydney (Australia) where, in addition, lectures are given by Carl G. Jung and Havelock Ellis September 20 – Ralph Greenson born in Brooklyn, New York (USA) September 21–22 – 3rd Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Weimar (Germany). President: Carl G. Jung October 30 – Emma Jung writes to Freud about the uneasiness between her and her husband since the publication in the Jahrbuch of the beginning of ‘‘Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido’’ (Metamorphosis and Symbols of the Libido) by Carl G. Jung December – Eugen Bleuler resigns from the International Psychoanalytical Association Freud, A. Einstein, D. Hilbert, E. Mach, etc., sign a Call (Aufruf) for the creation of an association to express positivist philosophy 1912 xcviii March – Imago. Zeitschrift für die Anwendung der Psychoanalyse auf die Geisteswissenschaften founded (1912–1941). Editorial Director: Sigmund Freud. Editors-in-chief: Otto Rank and Hanns Sachs July 30 – Ernest Jones suggests, at Sándor Ferenczi’s instigation, the founding of a Secret Committee excluding Carl G. Jung and including as members himself, Freud, Karl Abraham, Ferenczi, Otto Rank, Hanns Sachs, and, starting in 1919, Max Eitingon September – Carl G. Jung is invited by Smith Ely Jeliffe to give nine conferences at Fordham University, in New York (USA) September 3 – Jacob A. Arlow born in New York (USA) September 27 – Lou Andreas Salomé first letter to Freud November 6 – Wilhelm Steckel resigns from the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society (Austria) November 24 – Presidents’ conference in Munich: Carl G. Jung and Franz Riklin for the IPA, Freud, Ernest Jones, Karl Abraham, and J.H.W. van Ophuijsen. Freud faints (Germany) December 18 – Carl G. Jung’s letter to Freud marks the rupture: ‘‘I am in fact not at all neurotic—good thing (. . .) You know well how far the patient can go in his selfanalysis, he doesn’t come out of his neurosis—like you. One day when you will be completely freed from complexes and you no longer play the father towards your sons, in whom you constantly sight the weaknesses, that you will put yourself into that position, then I want to INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY reverse myself and eliminate all at once the sin of my disagreement with you.’’ Jean-Jacques Rousseau Institute founded in Geneva by Edouard Claparède (Switzerland) 1913 January 15 – To replace the Zentralblatt fur Psychoanalyse, the Internationale Zeitschrift für ärztliche Psychoanalyse is founded at the instigation of S. Ferenczi and O. Rank May 19 – Budapest Psychoanalytic Society founded by Sándor Ferenczi. President: S. Ferenczi, Vice-president: I. Hóllos, Secretary: S. Rádo, Treasurer: Lajos Lévy (Hungary) May 25 – First meeting of the Secret Committee. Freud offers to each a Greek intaglio taken from his own collection that they will have mounted in signet rings. Ernest Jones is the president August 5 – Carl G. Jung uses the expression ‘‘analytical psychology’’ for the first time in a conference (‘‘General Aspects of Psychoanalysis’’) before the London Psychomedical Society (Great Britain) August 6–12 – 17th International Medical Congress in London. Confrontation between Pierre Janet and Ernest Jones to whom Freud then wrote: ‘‘I will not know how to say how much I was overcome by your report to the Congress and by the way in which you had undone Janet in front of your compatriots’’ (Great Britain) September 7–8 – 4th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Munich. President: Carl G. Jung, who resigns from his post as editor-in-chief of the Jahrbuch (Germany) October – The Psychoanalytic Review in New York founded by Smith Ely Jeliffe and William Alanson White, Director of the Government Hospital for the Insane, Washington, DC (USA) October – Freud publishes Totem and Taboo (1912– 1913) as a book October 15 – Frances Tustin born in Darlington (Great Britain) October 30 – The London Psycho-Analytic Society founded by Ernest Jones. President: E. Jones, Vice-president: Douglas Bryan, Secretary: M. D. Eder Alfred Adler transforms the Verein für Freie Psychoanalytische Forschung (Society for Psychoanalytical Research), founded after his secession, into Verein für Individualpsychologie (Society for Individual Psychology) (Austria) A. A. Brill (New York) publishes the first English translation of The Interpretation of Dreams (USA) 1914 April 20 – Carl G. Jung resigns from the International Psychoanalytical Association. Karl Abraham is elected as provisional president of the association May – Boston Psychoanalytic Society founded. President: James Putnam, Secretary: Isador Coriat (USA) June – Freud publishes ‘‘Zur Einführung des Narzißmus’’ (On Narcissism: An Introduction, 1914c) and ‘‘Zur Geschichte der psychoanalytischen Bewegung’’ (On the History of the Psychoanalytical Movement, 1914d) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS x cix CHRONOLOGY June 28 – The Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip assassinates Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo July 6 – The Washington Psychoanalytic Society founds St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington, DC, with acting president William Alanson White, Hospital Superintendent (USA) July 10 – The Zurich local branch (Carl G. Jung, Eugen Bleuler, Alfons Maeder, etc.) vote fifteen to one for its definitive withdrawal from the International Psychoanalytical Association (Switzerland) July 28 – Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia, the first stage of the First World War November 2 – Beginning of the First World War December – Publication of the Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse is suspended by Deuticke, the editor First official recognition of psychoanalysis in Europe with a lecture by Gerbrandus Jelgerma at the University of Leyde (Netherlands) Publication of La psycho-analyse des névroses et des psychoses. Ses applications médicales et extra-médicales (Psychoanalysis of Neuroses and Psychoses. Their Medical and Extra-Medical Applications) by Emmanuel Régis and Angélo Hesnard, first book in France devoted to psychoanalysis (France) c 1915 March–July – Freud works on twelve essays on metapsychology of which only five will be published between 1915 and 1917 June 10 – Serge Lebovici born in Paris (France) September 15 – Freud observes his grandson Ernst Wolfgang Halberstadt, eighteen months old, indulge in the game ‘‘fort-da’’ with a spindle October–March 1916 – Last series of conferences during the winter semester at the University published under the title of Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse (Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 1916– 1917a [1915–17]), ‘‘in front of an auditorium of around 70 people, among which were two of my daughters and one daughter-in-law,’’ writes Freud. Otto Fenichel takes part Sulla psicoanalisi, Cinque Conferenze sulla psicoanalisi, the first work of Freud translated into Italian by Marco Levi Bianchini published for the ‘‘Biblioteca Psichiatrica Internazionale’’ (Italy) Genserico Pinto publishes his thesis, Da Psicanálise. A sexualidade das Neuroses, in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) 1916 February 28 – Danilo Perestrello born in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) May 6 – Freud’s sixtieth birthday, celebrated discreetly because of the war. Edouard Hitschmann gives him an ‘‘undelivered speech’’ September 15 – Serge Viderman born in Rimnic-Sarat (Romania) 1917 March 24 – Neederlandsche Vereeniging voor Psychoanalyse (Netherlands Society for Psychoanalysis) founded by Gerbrandus Jelgersma, Jan van Emden, Johan H.W. van Ophuijsen, and Johann Stärke (Netherlands) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY May 27 – Georg Groddeck’s first letter to Freud, who replies on June 5: ‘‘Whoever recognized that transference and resistance constitute the pivot of treatment belong forever to our uncivilized horde’’ November 7 – The Bolsheviks take power in Russia (October Revolution) Ruı́z Castillo, at the suggestion of José Ortega y Gasset, buys the publishing rights for the complete works of Sigmund Freud in Spanish, past and future. López Ballesteros is responsible for the translation (Spain) Geza Róheim publishes in Imago the first psychoanalytical article written by an anthropologist, ‘‘Spiegelzauber’’ (The Magic Mirror), an excerpt of a book that will be published in 1919 1918 March 11 – Pierre Marty born in St. Céré, Lot (France) September 28–29 – 5th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association, in the Great Room of the Academy of Sciences of Hungary, in Budapest (Hungary). Freud’s conference: ‘‘Wege der psychoanalytischen Therapie’’ (Paths of Psychoanalytical Therapy). Sándor Ferenczi is elected president of the IPA but the political situation in Hungary will lead Ernest Jones to succeed him in October 1919 as ‘‘acting president’’ November 4 – James Jackson Putnam dies in Boston, Massachusetts (USA) November 11 – The Armistice ends the First World War December 3 – In the name of the foundation created by Anton von Freund, Freud awards a medical prize for the article by Karl Abraham on the pregenital phase of the libido, in part, as well as for the brochure by Ernst Simmel on the neuroses of war, and the Imago prize for the article by Theodor Reik on the puberty rites of primitive societies The Revista de Psiquiatria y Disciplinas Conexas, founded by Hermilio Valdizán and Honorio Delgado in Lima (Peru) Freud publishes ‘‘Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose’’ (From the History of an Infantile Neurosis, The Wolf Man, 1918b [1914]) 1919 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY January 15 – The publishing house Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag founded. Editorial Board: S. Freud, S. Ferenczi, A. von Freund, and O. Rank. Otto Rank is the director of the organization; Theodor Reik, assistant. February 20 – British Psycho-Analytical Society founded by Ernest Jones (Great Britain) March 24 – Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Psychoanalyse (Swiss Society for Psychoanalysis) founded by Oskar Pfister, Ludwig Binswanger, Herman Rorschach, Emil and Mira Oberholzer, etc. (Switzerland) April 29 – Sándor Ferenczi receives his nomination as professor with the creation of the first Psychoanalysis Chair at the University of Budapest. In August, the Miklós Horthy’s anti-Semitic government removes Ferenczi from this post, then from the management of the Batizfalvy Sanatorium on May 28, 1920. He will finally be expelled from the Royal Association of Medicine in Budapest for ‘‘collaboration with the Bolsheviks’’ (Hungary) July 3 – Viktor Tausk commits suicide in Vienna (Austria) OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ci CHRONOLOGY October – Max Eitingon becomes a member of the Secret Committee Kinderheim Baumgarten founded by Siegfried Bernfeld. Nearly three hundred Polish-Jewish refugees, boys and girls, are taken in, a model for future psychoanalytical teaching institutions (Germany) Geneva Psychoanalytical Circle founded by Edouard Claparède, who becomes president (Switzerland) Tatiana Rosenthal becomes director of the Polyclinic for the Treatment of Psychoneuroses in connection with the V. Bechterev Research Institute in St. Petersburg (Russia) ‘‘Über die Entstehung des Beiflussnngsaparate in der schizophrenie’’ (On the Origin of the ‘‘Influencing Machine’’ in Schizophrenia) by Viktor Tausk published (Austria) Tagebuch eines halbwüchsigen Mädchens (A Young Girl’s Diary) by Hermine von Hug-Hellmuth published (Austria) 1920 January 25 – Freud’s daughter, Sophie Halberstadt, dies during the epidemic of the Spanish flu February 14 – Poliklinik für psychoanalytische Behandlung nervöser Krankheiten (Polyclinic for Psychoanalytical Treatment of Mental Illness), known as the Berliner Poliklinik (Berlin Polyclinic), situated at 29 Potsdamerstrasse, founded by Max Eitingon, Ernst Simmel, and Karl Abraham. It was arranged by Ernst Freud (Germany) September – Genfer Psychoanalytische Gesellschaft (Geneva Psychoanalytic Society), founded with the participation of Pierre Bovet, Henri Flournoy, Charles Odier, Pierre Morel, Sabina Spielrein, W. Boven, and Raymond de Saussure. President: Edouard Claparède (Switzerland) September 8–11 – 6th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in The Hague (Netherlands). President: Ernest Jones (acting president), Introduction by Freud ‘‘Ergänzungen zur Traumlehre’’ (Additions to the Dream Doctrine) September 20 – Beginning of the 361 Rundbriefe (circular letters) exchanged between the members of the Secret Committee until March 14, 1926 October 15 – Meeting of the Kommission für Kriegsneurosenbehandlung (Commission for the Treatment of War Neuroses). Freud presents his expertise December – Publication of Freud’s first book translated into French, ‘‘Five Lectures from 1909,’’ under the title ‘‘Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis’’ in the Geneva Review. Translator is Yves Le Lay and the preface is by Edouard Claparède. (Switzerland) Melanie Klein’s first publication ‘‘Der Familienroman in Statu Nascendi’’ in the Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse The Italian review Archivio generale di neurologia, psichiatria e psicoanalisi and the American journal Psyche and Eros founded (Italy–USA) O pansexualismo na doutrina de Freud by Franco da Rocha, first professor of neuro-psychiatry at the Medical School of São Paulo, published (Brazil) cii INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY The Tavistock Clinic, 51 Tavistock Square, Bloomsbury, London, founded by Crichton-Miller (Great Britain) International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, the English publication of Die Internationale Zeitschrift für Aertzliche Psychoanalyse, and of the ‘‘Glossary Committee,’’ with Joan Riviere, James and Alix Strachey, with an eye to the future Standard Edition, founded by Ernest Jones (Great Britain) ‘‘Biblioteca Psicoanalitica Internazionale’’ founded by Marco Levi Bianchini (Italy) Freud publishes Jenseits des Lustprinzips (Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1920g) 1921 March – Eugénie Sokolnicka, Polish psychoanalyst analyzed by S. Ferenczi and Freud, establishes herself in Paris with Freud’s endorsement (France) April 18 – Franco Fornari born in Rivergaro, Piacenza (Italy) August – Detski Dom (Children’s Home) founded in Moscow, under the authority of Ivan Ermakov, President of the Society and of the Psychoanalytical Institute, but directed by Vera Schmidt. Sabina Spielrein practices there upon their return to Russia in 1923 (Russia) August 6 – Freud publishes Massenpsychologie und Psychoanalyse des Ich (Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, 1921c) André Breton visits Freud in Vienna (France) The New Library of Psycho-Analysis founded by Ernest Jones. The publication is ensured by Leonard and Virginia Woolf at the Hogarth Press (Great Britain) A psychoanalytical association founded in Moscow with Vera and Otto Schmidt, Ivan Ermakov, Mosche Wulff, I.W. Kannabich, Alexander Riom Luria. It was not be recognized at the 7th Congress of the IPA (Russia) 1922 January 22 – Indian Psycho-Analytical Society in Calcutta founded by Girindrasekhar Bose (India) February 20 – Berliner Psychoanalytische Institut (BPI) (Berlin Psychoanalytical Institute) founded, comprised of the polyclinic, a training institute (conferences, seminars on case studies, didactic and controlled analyses) and a commission on the cursus (Germany) May 14 – Freud’s letter to Arthur Schnitzler: ‘‘I think that I avoided you from a kind of fear of meeting my double’’ May 22 – Lehrinstitut der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung (‘‘Ambulatorium,’’ the Vienna psychoanalytical polyclinic) opens under Eduard Hitschmann’s direction (Austria) June 13 – Anna Freud becomes a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society July 25 – François Perrier born in Paris (France) August 13 – Willy Baranger born in Bône (Algeria) September – A psychoanalytical work group is created in Leipzig around Therese Benedek (Germany) September 25–27 – Seventh Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Berlin (Germany). President: Ernest Jones. A prize is created for a competition whose subject is: ‘‘Relationship of analytical technique and analytical theory’’ INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ciii CHRONOLOGY December 14 – Francesco Corrao born in Palermo (Italy) The first volume of the Spanish translation of Freud’s works published, translated by López Ballesteros with a foreword by José Ortega y Gasset. Published in seventeen volumes between 1922 and 1932 (Spain) 1923 March 4 – Freud’s first letter to Romain Rolland: ‘‘I will keep until the end of my days the joyful memory of having been able to exchange a greeting with you. Since for us your name is associated with the most precious of all the beautiful illusions, the one of love expanding for all humanity.’’ (France) April – Freud publishes Das Ich und das Es (The Ego and the Id, 1923b) April 20 – Freud’s first operation by the oto-rhino-laryngologist Marcus Hajek, Schnitzler’s brother-in-law: excision on the right side of the upper jaw of a leucoplast. Freud writes to Jones on the April 25: ‘‘I still have not begun working again, and I cannot swallow anything. They assured me the thing is benign, but as you know, nobody can guarantee the evolution when it will begin again to develop. Personally, I had diagnosed an epithelioma, but they didn’t go along with me. Tobacco is the suspect in the etiolation of this tissue in rebellion.’’ June 19 – Heinz Rudolf Halberstadt (‘‘Heinerle’’ or ‘‘Heinele’’), Sophie’s second son, dies in Vienna at four and a half years old, from miliary tuberculosis. Freud writes to Ludwig Binswanger on October 15, 1926: ‘‘He was the favorite of my children and grandchildren, and since Heinele’s death I can no longer stand my grandchildren, and I no longer have a taste for life. That’s the secret of my indifference—what was called courage—facing my own risk of death.’’ July 8 – Didier Anzieu born in Melun (France) August 2–7 – Angélo Hesnard presents the annual psychiatric report during the 17th Congress of Alienists and Neurologists of France and of French-language countries (Besançon): ‘‘Psychoanalysis. Etiological, methodological, therapeutic and psychiatric value of doctrine.’’ In its conclusion he writes: ‘‘It is there that Psychoanalysis, relieved from its terminological errors, from its doctrinaire utterances, and from the symbolic artifice of semiological research, is connected with Psychiatry, of which it is tributary, and with clinical psychology (. . .) It is there that this doctrine-method, still awkward, but very perfectible, has its incontestable rights to our scientific and French sympathy.’’ (France) August 26 – Meeting of the Secret Committee at the Castel Toblio, then at San Cristoforo, at the Lago Caldonazzo. This will be the last, due to the dissensions, particularly between Ernest Jones and Otto Rank, and the Committee will be dissolved in April 1924. This is likewise Freud’s last stay in Italy October – Edoardo Weiss gives a conference on psychoanalysis at the Florence Congress of the Italian Society of Psychology (Italy) October 4 and 11 – Operations on Freud’s tumor at the Auersperg Sanatorium. He is henceforth required to wear a prosthesis that makes eating and speaking painful for him October 22 – Maud (Magdalena) Mannoni-van der Spoel born in Courtrai (Belgium) civ INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY October 25 – René Laforgue’s first letter to Freud (France) November 19 – Piera Aulagnier-Spairani born in Milan (Italy) December – Das Trauma der Geburt (The Trauma of Birth) by Otto Rank published (Austria) Because of Freud’s illness, Paul Federn will assume the vice-presidency of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society from 1923 to 1938 Buch vom Es. Psychoanalytische Briefe an eine Freundin by Georg Groddeck published (Germany) The New York Psychoanalytic Society designates the first Educational Committee, in charge of organizing and improving its pedagogical activities (USA) 1924 April 21–23 – 8th Congress if the International Psychoanalytical Association in Salzburg, for the first time in the absence of Freud (Austria). President: Karl Abraham April 27 – Otto Rank’s departure for several months in America (USA) May 14 – Romain Rolland visits Freud in Vienna (France) July 6 – Serge Leclaire (Liebschutz) born in Strasbourg (France) September 9 – Dr. Hermine Hug-Hellmuth is murdered by her eighteen-year-old nephew, Rudolph Hug, her sister’s illegitimate child whom she took care of after her sister’s death (Austria) 1925 February 24 – The Viennese municipality, by decree, forbids Theodor Reik to practice psychoanalysis (Austria) April – First publication of the future review L’Evolution psychiatrique, Psychanalyse—psychologie clinique (Psychiatric Evolution, Psychoanalysis—Clinical Psychology) edited by Angélo Hesnard and René Laforgue (France) June 7 – Società Psicoanalitica Italiana (S.P.I.) founded by Marco Levi Bianchini. The journal Archivio Generale di Neurologia, Psichiatria e Psicoanalisi becomes its official mouthpiece (Italy) June 20 – Josef Breuer dies in Vienna (Austria) July – Melanie Klein is invited to London where she gives a series of six conferences in English on ‘‘Frühanalyse’’ (Great Britain) August 14 – The Narkompros (Ministry of Public Instruction) orders the closing of Detski Dom (Children’s Home), founded and directed by Véra Schmidt (Russia) September 2–5 – 9th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Bad Homburg (Germany). President: Karl Abraham. Training Committee founded by Max Eitingon, who becomes president and states the rules of supervision September 30 – Freud begins the analysis of princess Marie Bonaparte; he writes of her to Sándor Ferenczi on October 18: ‘‘She not at all an aristocrat, rather ein Mensch and the work with her is going marvelously.’’ (France) October – Rudolph M. Loewenstein settles in Paris as a didactician. He eventually becomes the analyst of Sacha Nacht, Jacques Lacan, and Daniel Lagache (France) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS cv CHRONOLOGY December 15 – Robert J. Stoller born in Crestwood, New York (USA) December 25 – Karl Abraham dies in Berlin. Freud writes to Ernest Jones five days later: ‘‘Abraham’s death was without a doubt the biggest loss that could hit us, and it hit us. I called him, in jest, in certain letters ‘mon rocher de bronze.’ I felt reassured in the absolute trust he inspired in me as well as all the others. I applied to him the words of Horace: ‘Integer vitae scelerisque purus’ (The onewhose life has integrity and is without reproach). Max Eitingon succeeds him in the presidency of the IPA Lehrinstitut der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung (Training Institute of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society) is created by the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society under the direction of Helene Deutsch, Anna Freud, and Siegfried Bernfeld. The committee consists of P. Federn, H. Nunberg, W. Reich, and E. Hitschmann (Austria) The analytical cure is recognized by the new Prussian enactment on honorarium and the German general convention of physicians (Germany) Adolf Josef Storfer succeeds Otto Rank as director of the Internationalen Psychoanalytischen Verlag. Max Eitingon, Sandor Rado, and Sándor Ferenczi replace Rank at the editorial desk of the Internationale Zeitschrift für (ärztliche) Psychoanalyse Freud publishes Selbstdarstellung (An Autobiographical Study, 1925d [1924]) 1926 January 21 – Freud publishes Hemmung, Symptom und Angst (Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, 1926d [1925]) March 24 – Geheimnisse einer Seele (Mysteries of a Soul), first film on psychoanalysis, produced by G. W. Pabst, presented in Berlin (Germany) April 13 – Last meeting between Otto Rank and Freud, who writes to Sándor Ferenczi: ‘‘I found no motive to show a particular tenderness, at the time of his parting visit; I was frank and hard. But we don’t have to put a cross on him.’’ April 24 – The Berliner Psychoanalytische Vereinigung becomes the Deutsche Psychoanalytische Gesellschaft (D.P.G.) (Germany) August 1 – First Conference of Psychoanalysts in the French Language (Geneva), presided over by Raymond de Saussure (Geneva) with reports by René Laforgue (Paris) on ‘‘Schizophrenia and Schizonoia’’ and by Charles Odier (Geneva), ‘‘Contribution to the Study of Superego and Moral Phenomenon.’’ The creation of a Linguistic Commission is decided upon to unify French psychoanalytic vocabulary (Switzerland) September – Freud publishes Die Frage der Laienanalyse (The Question of Lay Analysis, 1926e) September – Sigmund Freud, a biography by Honorio Delgado, published (Peru) September – Melanie Klein leaves Berlin for London (Great Britain) September 22 – Sándor Ferenczi leaves for America for a six-month stay (USA) cvi INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY September 28 – The Psychoanalytical Clinic founded in London with the donation of an ex-patient, Pryns Hopkins. Ernest Jones states: ‘‘The team includes a director, myself, an assistant director, Dr. Edward Glover, nine physicians, the Doctors Bryan, Cole, Eder, Herford, Inman, Payne, Rickman, Riggall and Stofddart, with five assistants’’ (Great Britain) October – The Wolf Man begins analysis again with Ruth Mack Brunswick November 4 – Société psychanalytique de Paris founded by Marie Bonaparte, Eugénie Sokolnicka, Angélo Hesnard, René Allendy, Adrien Borel, René Laforgue, Rudolph Loewenstein, Georges Parcheminey, and Edouard Pichon (France) November 23 – A circular letter written by Anna Freud under her father’s dictation reestablishes the Rundbriefe (circular letters), and the Secret Committee acts henceforth as the ‘‘central management of the International Psychoanalytical Association’’ November 28 – Freud is named Honorary Member of the Swiss Society of Psychiatry in place of Emil Kraepelin Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik founded by Heinrich Meng (Germany) and Ernst Schneider (Switzerland) Almanach der Psychoanalyse founded and published by the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag (International Psychoanalytical Publishers). Thirteen volumes appear before the Nazis liquidate the publishing house in 1938 1927 January 10 – Joseph Sandler born in Cape Town (South Africa) April 10 – Schloss Tegel—Psychoanalytische Klinik Sanatorium (Tegel Castle—Psychoanalytical Clinic Sanitorium) founded by Ernst Simmel (Germany) June 25 – Revue française de psychanalyse (French Review of Psychoanalysis) founded (France) September – Tenth Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Innsbruck (Austria). President: Max Eitingon Sociedade Brasileira de Psicanálise founded in São Paulo by Durval B. Marcondes. President: Franco da Rocha. It will be recognized provisionally in 1929 by the International Psychoanalytical Association but without final establishment (Brazil) Freud publishes Die Zukunft einer Illusion (The Future of an Illusion, 1927c) The Burlingham-Rosenfeld/Hietzing Schule (Burlingham-Rosenfeld School or Hietzing School) founded in Vienna by Dorothy Burlingham and Eva Rosenfeld, a private school placed under Anna Freud’s care (Austria) Melanie Klein becomes member of the British PsychoAnalytical Society (Great Britain) 1928 September 30 – Ernst Simmel inaugurates the new premises of the Berliner Psychoanalytische Institut (BPI) (Berlin Psychoanalytical Institute), arranged under Ernst Freud’s direction (Germany) October – Sándor Ferenczi gives conferences in Spain. He writes to Georg Groddeck on October 17: ‘‘Aside from INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS cvii CHRONOLOGY that, the doctors, here, are still half-Breuerians, already half-Jungians, without having ever been Freudians.’’ (Spain) Tokyo Psychoanalytic Institute founded by Kenji Otsuki. It is recognized by the International Psychoanalytical Association in 1931 (Japan) A subsidiary of the Sociedade Brasileira de Psicanálise de São Paulo founded in Rio by V. Rocha, Durval B. Marcondes, and Julio Pires Porto-Carrero (Brazil) Schweizerische Ärtegesellschaft für psychoanalyse (Swiss Medical Association for Psychoanalysis) founded by Emil Oberholzer and Rudolf Brun. It is never recognized by the IPA and dissolves in 1938 (Switzerland) 1929 February 10 – Frankfurter Institut der ‘‘Südwestdeutsche Psychoanalytische Arbeitsgemeinschaft’’ (Frankfurt Institute of Psychoanalysis) founded by Karl Landauer, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, and Heinrich Meng. It is tied to the Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute for Social Research) of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (Germany) and its role is to dissemination the ideas of psychoanalysis by didactic analyses and theoretical courses at the university without therapeutic training (Germany) July 28–31 – Eleventh Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Oxford (Great Britain). President: Max Eitingon. The New York Psychoanalytical Society, through the intervention of A. A. Brill, its president, agrees to welcome analysts who are not doctors (USA). La Sociedade Brasileira de Psicanálise de São Paulo is recognized provisionally (Brazil) August – Freud writes Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (Civilization and Its Discontents, 1930a [1929]), which is published at the end of December but dated 1930 October 24 – The stock market crash in New York ruins Max Eitingon December 25 – Sándor Ferenczi distances himself from Freud and writes to him: ‘‘Psychoanalysis practices too unilaterally the analysis of obsessional neurosis and the analysis of character, that is to say, the psychology of the ego, neglecting the organic-hysteric base if the analysis; the cause is the overestimation of fantasy—and the underestimation of traumatic reality in pathogenesis.’’ The first translation in Japanese of Freud’s work published (Japan) Lehrinstitut der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung founded from a department for borderline and psychotic patients by Paul Schilder; Eduard Bibring succeeds its management after Schilder’s emigration to America (Austria) Adolf J. Storfer founds the bi-monthly journal Die Psychoanalytische Bewegung at the International Psychoanalytical Publishers. It is published until December 1933 (Austria) Franz Alexander emigrates from Germany and settles in Chicago (USA) 1930 cviii May 9 – Otto Rank excluded from the list of honorary members of the American Psychoanalytical Association at the time of his business meeting during the 1st Inter- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY national Congress of Mental Hygiene in Washington (May 5–10) August 28 – Anna Freud accepts the Goethe Prize from the town of Frankfurt-am-Main for her father (Germany) September 12 – Freud’s mother, Amalia (Malka) Freud, née Nathanson, dies in Vienna, at the age of ninety-five Washington-Baltimore Psychoanalytic Society founded. It is comprised of, among other members, Ernest E. Hadley, Adolf Meyer, Harry Stack Sullivan, Clara Thompson, and William A. White, and is accepted as Constituent Society by the American Psychoanalytic Association Psychoanalytical Institute founded in The Hague (Netherlands) The Psychopathology of Everyday Life translated into Japanese by Kiyoyasu Marui 1931 August 22 – A Study Circle, which will become the Nordisk Psykoanalytisk Samfund (Nordic Psychoanalytical Society) founded in 1933 at the initiative of the Dane Sigurd Naesgaard, the Norwegian Harald Schjelderup, the Finn Vriö Kulovesi, and the Swede Alfhild Tamm September 24 – The New York Psychoanalytic Institute, the first on the American continent, founded with the support of Abram A. Brill. Sándor Radó, who just emigrated, becomes the director October 25 – A commemorative plaque is placed on Freud’s birthplace at Pribor-Freiberg at the initiative of Dr. Emmanuel Windholz, Jaroslav Stuchlik, and Nicolaı̈ Ossipow November – Angel Garma, after her training in Berlin, settles in Madrid until 1936 December – Henri Claude creates the post Head of Laboratory of Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis at the Clinic of Mental Illnesses at the Paris Faculty of Medicine. Sacha Nacht holds the post December 18 – Official opening of the Budapest Psychoanalytical Polyclinic, 12 Mészàros Street, founded with the support of Frédéric and Vilma Kovács. It will be directed by Sándor Ferenczi with Michael Balint as his assistant who will succeed him in 1933 Richard F. Sterba, at the suggestion of Adolf J. Storfer, undertakes the publication of the first dictionary of psychoanalysis (Handwörterbuch der Psychoanalyse) of which the first installment will be published on May 6,1936, for Freud’s eightieth birthday First translation in Brazil of a Freud work, Five Lectures, by Durval B. Marcondes and J. Barbosa Correia Edoardo Weiss publishes Elementi di psicoanalisi in Milan (Italy) with a preface by Sigmund Freud Wilhelm Reich founds the German Association for a Sexual Proletarian Policy (Sex-Pol) Martin Freud succeeds Adolf J. Storfer as commercial director of the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag 1932 June – The Psychoanalytic Quarterly founded by Dorian Feigenbaum, Bertram D. Lewin, Johns Hopkins, and Gregory Zilboorg, all members of the American Psychoanalytic Association and the New York Psychoanalytic Society September 4–7 – Twelfth Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Wiesbaden (Germany) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS cix CHRONOLOGY President: Max Eitingon. Affiliation of the Tokyo Psychoanalytical Institute and of the Chicago and WashingtonBaltimore Societies. Ernest Jones is elected president of the IPA, Johan H.W. van Ophuijsen and Anna Freud remain vice-presidents, A.A. Brill is named third vicepresident. Sándor Ferenczi presents his lecture ‘‘The Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child. The Language of Tenderness and of Passion’’ September 7 – Date of the medical thesis presented by Jacques Lacan De la psychose paranoı̈aque dans ses rapports à la personnalité (Of paranoid psychosis in its relationship to personality) (France) October 1 – Società Psicoanalitica Italiana (SPI) founded in Rome by Edoardo Weiss, Nicola Perrotti, and Emilio Servadio. Marco Levi Bianchini becomes honorary president. It is recognized by the IPA in 1935. The first issue of the Rivista italiana di psicoanalisi is published in April 1935, and immediately forbidden by the fascist regime. The Society is dissolved in 1938 Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis founded by Franz Alexander, who remains president until 1952. Karen Horney, recently emigrated from Berlin, becomes the associate director Die Psycho-Analyse des Kindes (The Psycho-Analysis of Children) by Melanie Klein published Heisaku Kosawa (Japan) visits Freud and presents an account of his theory of the Ajase Complex American Psychoanalytic Association is reorganized into a federation of associations. A ‘‘Council on Professional Training’’ created (USA) Publication of the first Czech Directory of Psychoanalysis, under the direction of E. Windholz (Czechoslovakia) Verwahrloste Jugend (Wayward Youth) by August Aichhorn published (Austria) 1933 cx January 30 – Adolf Hitler is elected chancellor of the Reich (Germany) April 8 – Francisco Franco da Rocha dies in Amparo, State of São Paulo (Brazil) May 10 – Freud’s books are burned in Berlin May 22 – Sándor Ferenczi dies in Budapest (Hungary) June 21 – Carl G. Jung becomes president of the Allgemeine Ärztliche Gesellschaft für Psychoterapie (AAGP) after Ernst Kretschmer’s resignation (Germany) November 18 – Felix Boehm and Carl Müller-Braunschweig take the presidency of the Berlin Psychoanalytical Society, Max Eitingon having been dismissed as a Jew (Germany) December – Psykoanalytisk Samfund founded, with the Swede Poul Bjerre, the Dane Sigurd Naesgaard, and the Norwegian Irgens Stromme (Denmark) December 31 – Max Eitingon leaves Berlin for Jerusalem, where he founds the Palestine Psychoanalytical Society with Mosche Wulff (emigrated from Berlin the same year), Ilja Schalit, Anna Smelianski, Gershon and Gerda Barag, Vicky Ben-Tal, Ruth Jaffe, etc. (Israel) The Prague Psychoanalytical Study Group founded and directed by Frances Deri until 1935, the year of his emigration to Los Angeles. Otto Fenichel succeeds him until 1938 (Czechoslovakia) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY Johan H.W. van Ophuijsen resigns from the Netherlands Psychoanalytical Society (NVP) to found the Netherlands Society of Psychoanalysts (VPN) with Van Emden and Maurits Katan (Netherlands) Freud publishes Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse (New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 1933a [1932]) Charakteranalyse (Character Analysis) and Die Massenspsychologie des Faschismus (The Mass Psychology of Fascism) by Wilhelm Reich published (Austria) Life and Works of Edgar Poe: A Psycho-Analytical Study by Marie Bonaparte published 1934 January 10 – Institute of Psychoanalysis inaugurated in Paris. Director: Marie Bonaparte (France) February 19 – Nikolai Ossipov dies in Prague (Czech Republic) May 19 – Eugenia Sokolnicka-Kutner commits suicide in Paris (France) June 11 – Georg Groddeck dies in Knonau bei Zürich (Switzerland) August 26–31 – Thirteenth Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Lucerne (Switzerland). President: Ernest Jones. Wilhelm Reich is expelled from the International Psychoanalytical Association. A Dano-Norwegian association and a Finn-Swedish association Svensk-Finska Psykoanalytiksla Foereningen (Otto Fenichel, Ludwig Jekels) are created 1935 May 15 – Freud is named Honorary Member of the Royal Society of Medicine of London (Great Britain) October 24 – Edith Jacobsohn, militant in the socialist resistance group Neu Beginnen (New Beginnings) is arrested and imprisoned (Germany) December 1 – Meeting of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Society, under Ernest Jones’s presidency. The Jewish members leave ‘‘voluntarily’’ (freiwillig Rücktritt) (Germany) 1936 March 28 – The Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag repository in Leipzig is sequestered by the Nazis (Germany) April – A psychoanalytical polyclinic founded in Paris by John Leuba and Michel Cénac (France) May – Deutsches Institut für Psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (1936–1945) founded under the direction of Matthias Heinrich Göring. Felix Boehm is named dean (Germany) May 5 – Ernest Jones inaugurates the new home of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Association, 7 Berggasse, designated for Association meetings, the Viennese Psychoanalytical Institute, consultation, and a library May 6 – Celebration of Freud’s eightieth birthday June 30 – Freud is named ‘‘Foreign Member, Royal Society’’ of Great Britain, a supreme scientific honor in England (Great Britain) July – Beginning of the civil war in Spain (1936–1939), followed by Franco’s dictatorship August 2–8 – Fourteenth Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Marienbad (Czechoslo- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS cxi CHRONOLOGY vakia). President: Ernest Jones. The Czech Study Group is officially recognized. The American Psychoanalytical Association obtains exclusive power over its composition in North America (exclusion of non-doctors) Anna Freud publishes Das Ich und die Abwehrmechanismen (The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense) cxii 1937 January – Marie Bonaparte acquires the correspondence between Sigmund Freud and Wilhelm Fliess February 5 – Lou Andreas-Salomé dies in his house ‘‘Loufried’’ in Göttingen (Germany) May 30 – Alfred Adler dies in Aberdeen, Scotland (Great Britain) July 27 – The Russian Psychoanalytic Society halts its activities. Twenty years of silence on psychoanalysis will follow in Russia December 30 – Julio Pires Porto-Carrero dies in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) Philadelphia Psychoanalytic Society founded (USA) Adelheid L. Koch, recent émigrée from Germany endorsed by Ernest Jones and Otto Fenichel (her analyst), begins the didactic analyses of Durval Marcondes, Darcy Mendonça Uchôa, Virginia Bicudo, Flavio Dias, Frank Philips, etc., in São Paolo (Brazil) Freud publishes ‘‘Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse’’ (‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’’, 1937c) 1938 March 10 – The German Army invades Austria. On March 12, Vienna is occupied and Hitler arrives on the 14th. March 15, the ‘‘Anschluss,’’ the connecting of Austria to Germany, is proclaimed March 20 – Vienna Psychoanalytic Society dissolved in the presence of Sigmund Freud; the commissioner appointed by the NSDAP (National Socialist [Nazi] Party), Dr. Anton Sauerwald; Ernest Jones, President of the International Psychoanalytical Association; Marie, Princess of Greece, Vice-President of the International Psychoanalytical Association; Anna Freud, Vice-President of the International Psychoanalytical Association and Vice-President of the Viennese Psychoanalytical Society; Carl Müller-Braunschweig, Secretary of the German Society of Psychoanalysis and administrative council member of the German Institute of Psychological Research and Psychotherapy in Berlin; Paul Federn, Vice-President of the Viennese Psychoanalytical Society, Eduard Hitschmann, Edward Bibring, Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, Robert Waelder, Willi Hoffer, B. Steiner, members of the board of directors; and Martin J. Freud, of the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. The Society will be officially liquidated under an ordinance of the Magistrate of the city of Vienna, September 1, 1938 March 22 – Freud notes in his journal: ‘‘Anna bei Gestapo’’ (‘‘Anna with Gestapo’’) May – Hanns Sachs founds American Imago in Boston, Massachusetts. The first issue will be published in November 1939 (USA) May 29 – Bruno Bettelheim is arrested by the Gestapo. He spends ten and a half months in Dachau then in Buchenwald, where meets Ernst Federn again (Austria) June 4 – Freud leaves Vienna on June 4 with Martha, Anna, Paula Fischl, and Dr. Josephine Stross. Arriving in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY Paris the next day, he stays with Marie Bonaparte before leaving for London, where he arrives on June 6 June 23 – Three secretaries of the Royal Society (Sir Albert Steward, A. V. Hill, Griffith Davies) bring Freud the Charter Book to sign (Great Britain) June 23 – Freud receives Stefan Zweig, who presents to him Salvador Dali. Freud remarks on Dali’s ‘‘candid and fanatical eyes and his undeniable technical mastery’’ August 1–5 – Fifteenth Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Paris (France). President: Ernest Jones. The American Psychoanalytic Association appeals and assumes the right, on account of the war and citing the ‘‘1938 rule,’’ to total autonomy concerning standards in the United States, in excluding nondoctors, with the exception of those who had trained before 1938 September 27 – Freud and Anna move to 20 Maresfield Gardens, which Martha and Paula Fischl fix up in two days November 19 – The Deutsche Psychoanalytische Gesellschaft (D.P.G.) is dissolved and carries on as Arbeitsgruppe A (Work Group A) within the Deutsches Institut für psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (Germany) 1939 March 10 – Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion: Drei Abhandlungen (Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays, 1939a [1934–38]) published in Amsterdam September 1 – Hitler invades Poland. Beginning of the Second World War September 23 – Sigmund Freud dies before midnight after morphine injections given at his request by his doctor Max Schur, after a day and a half in a coma. He is cremated on the September 26 at the Golder’s Green Crematorium October 31 – Otto Rank (Rosenfeld) dies in New York (USA) Franz Alexander publishes the journal Psychosomatic Medicine, with Flanders Dunbar, Stanley Cobb, Carl Binger, and others (USA) Philadelphia Association for Psychoanalysis founded (USA) Ichpsychologie und Anpassungsproblem (Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation) by Heinz Hartmann published (Germany) 1940 June 25 – Wilhelm Stekel commits suicide in London (Great Britain) September 31 – Edouard Claparède dies in Geneva (Switzerland) October 10 – Melbourne Institute for Psychoanalysis founded (Australia), inaugurated by Judge Foster at 111 Collins Street. Due to the generosity of Miss Lorna Traill, the first meeting takes place at the home of Hal Maudsley, a prominent figure in Australian psychiatry The Detroit Psychoanalytic Society founded by Richard F. Sterba with Leo H. Bartemeier and Klara HappelPinkus. Sterba is president from 1946 to 1952 (USA) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS cxiii CHRONOLOGY Carl G. Jung retires from the Allgemeine Ärztliche Gesellschaft für Psychotherapie (AAGP) (Germany) Psicoanalisis de los sueños (Psychoanalysis of Dreams) by Angel Garma published (Argentina) Abriss der psychoanalyse (‘‘An Outline of Psychoanalysis,’’ 1940a [1938]) by Sigmund Freud published cxiv 1941 February 13 – Minna Bernays dies in London (Great Britain) April 2 – Karen Horney is excluded from the didacticians of the New York Psychoanalytic Society. She will found the Association for Advancement of Psychoanalysis, accompanied by Clara M. Thompson, Harry Stack Sullivan, and Erich Fromm. She will also organize the American Institute for Psychoanalysis, where she will be Dean until her death in 1952 December 7 – Attack on Pearl Harbor by Japanese aircraft Abram Kardiner leaves the New York Psychoanalytic Institute (USA) 1942 February 22 – Stefan Zweig commits suicide in Petropolis (Brazil) July 12 – René Allendy dies in Montpellier (France) December 15 – Associacion Psicoanalitica de Argentina (APA) founded by Angel Garma, who becomes the first president, with Celes Ernesto Càrcamo, Guillermo Ferrari Hardoy, Marie Glas de Langer, Enrique Pichon-Rivière, and Arnaldo Rascovsky San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society founded by Otto Fenichel and others (USA) Freud’s sisters Marie (Mitzi), Pauline (Pauli), and Rosa killed in deportation Topeka Institute for Psychoanalysis founded by Karl Menninger in the hospice of the Menninger Clinic (USA) 1943 January 27 – Susan Isaacs presents her writing on the ‘‘Nature and Function of Fantasy,’’ first contribution to Controversial Discussions that oppose the students of Anna Freud and Melanie Klein before an ad hoc commission of the British Psycho-Analytical Society until 1944 (Great Britain) February 2 – The German Army surrenders in Stalingrad (USSR) February 5 – Adolfine (Dolfi) Freud killed by the Nazis in the Treblinka concentration camp May 13 – John Rittmeister is guillotined by the Nazis in Berlin-Plötzensee (Germany) July 3 – Max Eitingon dies in Jerusalem (Israel) Psychoanalytical Institute of the Associacion Psicoanalitica de Argentina (APA), the Revista de Pscicoanàlisis (Arnaldo Rascovsky is the first editor-in-chief), and the Biblioteca de Psicoanálisis founded (Argentina) The Palestine Psychoanalytic Society, founded in 1933, is recognized by the IPA (Israel) William Alanson White Institute, the New York branch of the Washington School of Psychiatry, founded by Harry Stack Sullivan, Clara Thompson, Frieda Fromm-Reichman, and Eric Fromm, who leave Karen Horney (USA) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY Publication of the New German-English Psychoanalytical Vocabulary, by Alix Strachey-Sargant, and of the first volume of the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (SE). Twenty-four volumes are published between 1943 and 1974 (Great Britain) Finno-Swedish Psychoanalytic Society dissolved after the death of Yrjö Kulovesi (Finland–Sweden) Az ember õsi össztönei Pantheon (The Filial Instinct) by Imre Hermann published (Hungary) 1944 June 6 – Landing of Allied troops in Normandy (D-Day) (France) August 25 – Liberation of Paris (France) December 30 – Romain Rolland dies in Vézelay (France) Adelheid L. Koch founds the Grupo Psicanalitico de São Paulo, and young psychiatrists in Rio found the Centro de Estudos Juliano Moreira (Brazil) Sándor Radó is dismissed as Education Director then stripped from the list of didacticians at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute Bruno Bettelheim is named director of the Orthogenic School at the University of Chicago (USA) The Psychology of Women. A Psychoanalytic Interpretation by Helene Deutsch published. The second volume appears in 1945 1945 January 15 – The Psychoanalytic Clinic for Training and Research in the Department of Psychiatry at Columbia University, College of Physicians and Surgeons, founded by Sándor Radó, who becomes director, with Abram Kardiner, George Daniels, and David Levy. This Clinic is the first psychoanalytic institution affiliated with the American Psychoanalytic Association to be created in a university and medical school(USA) January 27 – Karl Landauer dies in the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp (Germany) April 30 – Adolf Hitler’s suicide, after Benito Mussolini’s execution on April 24 May 4 – Harald Schultz-Hencke (with Werner Kemper) founds and becomes the director ofthe Institut für Psychopathologie und Psychotherapie (IPP) , to teach ‘‘neoanalysis,’’ as opposed to classic psychoanalysis (Germany) May 8 – Allied victory proclaimed, ending the Second World War in Europe August 6 – The first American atomic bomb is dropped on Hiroshima (Japan) October – The Grupo Psicanalitico de São Paulo is accepted provisionally as Sociedade Brasileira de Psicanálise de São Paulo (SBPSP) by Ernest Jones (Brazil) October 19 – The Deutsche Psychoanalytische Gesellschaft (DPG) is recreated (as the Berliner Psychoanalytische Gesellschaft until December 3, 1950) with Carl Müller-Braunschweig as the first president; Felix Boehm, his deputy; and Werner Kemper as third member of the bureau (Germany) November – The Neederlandsche Vereeniging voor Psychoanalyse (Netherlands Society for Psychoanalysis) is INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS cxv CHRONOLOGY recreated. The Amsterdam Institute of Psychoanalysis is founded in 1946 (Netherlands) December 1 – The dissolution of the Viennese Psychoanalytical Society is appealed in 1938 The review The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child (USA) created by Anna Freud, Heinz Hartmann, and Ernst Kris (USA) The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis by Otto Fenichel published (USA) 1946 1947 February 16 – A provisional executive committee established for the re-creation of the Wiener Psychoanalytische Vereinigung (Vienna Psychoanalytical Society). President: August Aichhorn (Austria) April 15 – The Sigmund Freud Copyrights Limited is established by Freud’s beneficiary executors, Ernst, Martin, and Anna, in order to collect the rights and to distribute them to Freud’s grandchildren (Great Britain) May 14 – First issue of the journal Psyché, Revue internationale de Psychanalyse et des Sciences de l’Homme (Psyche, International Review of Psychoanalysis and the Sciences of Man), created by Maryse Choisy. It is published until 1963 (France) July 22 – Otto Fenichel dies in Los Angeles (USA) July 25 – First post-war congress of French language psychoanalysts, in Montreux (Switzerland) December 24 – Maurice Dugautiez and Fernand Lechat found the Belgian Association of Psychoanalysts under the patronage of the Paris Society. It will be recognized by the IPA in 1947 (Belgium) The Indian Psychoanalytic Society publishes a journal entitled Samiksa (India) The Los Angeles Institute for Psychoanalysis founded (USA) Montreal Psychoanalytic Club (or Cercle psychanalytique de Montréal) founded by Miguel Prados (Canada) Ernest Jones resigns from his post at the British PsychoAnalytical Society (Great Britain) The Psychopathology and Psychotherapy Society founded by Ion Popesco-Sibiu and Doctor Constantin Vlad (Romania) The Society for the Study of Psychoanalysis is recreated by Theodor Dosuzkov, but it will be forced to dissolve in 1950 (Czech Republic) The Società Psicoanalitica Italiana (SPI) is recreated by Nicola Perrotti, Emilio Servadio, Cesare Musatti, and Alessandra Tomasi di Palma di Lampedusa-Wolf Stomersee. The first National Congress of Psychoanalysis is organized in Rome (Italy) The American Psychoanalytic Association reorganized into a ‘‘Board on Professional Standards,’’ responsible for all the affairs of analytical training, and an ‘‘Executive Council,’’ responsible for membership and practical problems (USA) January 10 – Hanns Sachs dies in Boston (USA) May 9 – Institut für Psychotherapie founded in Berlin by Felix Boehm (Germany) November 11 – Ernst Simmel dies in Los Angeles (USA) cxv i INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY The journal Psyche. Jahrbuch für Tiefenpsychologie und Menschenkunde in Forschung und Praxis (Annals for Depth Psychology and Human Sciences, Research and Practice) founded by Alexander Mitscherlich, Hans Kunz, and Felix Schottlaender (Germany) Instituto Brasileiro de Psicanálise (IBP) founded in Rio de Janeiro to accomodate the arrival of foreign analysts (Brazil) The first Greek psychoanalytical group, centered around the princess Bonaparte, founded by Andreas Embirikos and Demetrios Kouretas (Greece) The Norwegian-Danish society recreated by Harald Schjelderup, Trygve Braatøy, and Hjørdis Simonsen. It remains active until 1953 (Norway–Denmark) The Dutch Association of Psychoanalysis founded by Westerman Holstijn and Van der Hoop (Netherlands) Anna Freud and her collaborators and the British Psychoanalytic Society reach a common agreement that the International Journal of Psychoanalysis is the official mouthpiece of the IPA, but the British Psychoanalytic Society remains the guardian of the journal and it continues tobe published by a British editor Wiener Arbeitskreis für Tiefenpsychologie (Viennese Work Circle for Depth Psychology) founded by Igor Caruso (Austria) 1948 March 2 – Abraham Arden Brill dies in New York (USA) October 12 – Susan Isaacs-Sutherland dies in London (Great Britain) December – Arriving in Rio de Janeiro, Werner Kemper, analyzed by Carl Müller-Braunschweig, supervised by Felix Boehm, Otto Fenichel, Jenö Hárnik, and Ernst Simmel, comes to complete the instructional work undertaken by Mark Burke, who arrived on February 2 (Brazil) The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychoanalyse, Psychotherapie, Psychosomatik und Tiefenpsychologie, an organization covering all the tendencies of depth psychology (Jungians and Adlerians), founded by W. Bitter (Germany) The Revue Française de Psychanalyse (French Review of Psychoanalysis) begins publication again at the Presses Universitaires de France (France) Palestine Psychoanalytic Society becomes the Israel Psychoanalytic Society (Israel) The National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (NPAP) is founded by Theodor Reik. It becomes official in 1950 (USA) The journal Psiche founded by Nicola Perrotti (Italy) 1949 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY July 15–17 – Sixteenth Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association, first post-war congress, in Zurich (Switzerland). President: Ernest Jones, succeeded by Leo Bartemeier: the beginning of alternating presidents from Europe andNorth America. Affiliation of the Argentine Psychoanalytical Association (APA) and the Chilean Association of Psychoanalysis. A provisional admission for the Deutsche Psychoanalytische Gesellschaft (DPG) to the IPA is decided. To this date, twelve societies are affiliated with the American Psychoanalytic Association (APA): New York, Washington-Baltimore, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia-Society, Topeka, OF PSYCHOANALYSIS c xvii CHRONOLOGY Detroit, San Francisco, Columbia University, Los Angeles, Baltimore, and Philadelphia-Association. October 13 – August Aichhorn dies in Vienna (Austria) The Basic Neurosis. Oral Regression and Psychic Masochism by Edmund Bergler published (USA) Trattato di psicoanalisi by Cesare Musatti published (Italy) 1950 May 4 – Paul Federn, diagnosed with cancer, commits suicide in New York May 31 – Johan H.W. van Ophuijsen dies in Detroit (USA) June 10 – The Deutsche Psychoanalytische Vereinigung (D.P.V.) founded by Carl Müller-Braunschweig, followed by the creation of the Karl Abraham Institut (Germany) The Society for Psychoanalytic Medicine of Southern California founded with Franz Alexander, Samuel Eisenstein, Martin Grotjahn, etc. First World Conference in Psychiatry in Paris organized by Henri Ey, with the participation of Anna Freud and Melanie Klein The British Journal of Delinquency (later The British Journal of Criminology) founded by Edward Glover (Great Britain) Sigmund Freud, Aus den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse, Briefe an Wilhelm Fließ, Abhandlungen und Notizen aus den jahren 1887–1902, edited by M. Bonaparte, A. Freud, and E. Kris, published in London by Imago (1950a [1887–1902]) Childhood and Society by Erik H. Erikson published (USA) Neurosis and Human Growth: The Struggle toward SelfRealization by Karen Horney published (USA) 1951 August – 17th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Amsterdam (Netherlands). President: Leo Bartemeier. Definitive acceptance of the Sociedade Brasileira de Psicanálise de São Paulo (SBPSP) (Brazil) and the Deutsche Psychoanalytische Vereinigung (D.P.V.) (Germany). Heinz Hartmann is elected president November 2 – Martha Freud-Bernays dies December 4 – Beginning of the Mrs. Clark-Williams trial in Paris; she is accused of the illegal practice of medicine, is acquitted March 31, 1952, but is found guilty in an appeal in June 1953 in the ‘‘franc symbolique’’ (France) The Western New England Psychoanalytic Society founded (USA) The Rio de Janeiro Society of Psychoanalysis founded by Alcyon Baer Bahia, Danilo Perestrello, Marialzira Perestrello, and Walderedo Ismael de Oliveira, called the ‘‘Argentines.’’ It is not recognized by the IPA (Brazil) The Hampstead Child Therapy Clinic (21 Maresfield Gardens, London) founded by Anna Freud in collaboration with Helene Ross and Dorothy Burlingham (Great Britain) Sydney Institute of Psychoanalysis founded by Roy Coupland Winn with Andrew Peto, originally from Hungary (Australia) cxviii INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY Maternal Care and Mental Health by John Bowlby published (Great Britain) 1952 June 17 – The Institut de Psychanalyse de Paris (Paris Institute of Psychoanalysis) founded under the direction of Sacha Nacht December 4 – Karen Horney-Danielsen dies in New York (USA) Kurt Eissler creates the Anna Freud Foundation to profit the Hampstead Child Therapy Course and the Hampstead Clinic (USA) Psychoanalysis, the first journal representing an institution of non-medical training, founded by the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (NPAP). Theodor Reik is the editor-in-chief (USA) The Instituto di Psicoanalisi de Roma founded by Nicola Perrotti (Italy) The Sigmund Freud Archives, a depository in the Library of Congress, founded in Washington, DC; Kurt Eissler becomes director (USA) Ego Psychology and the Psychoses by Paul Federn published (USA) 1953 April 2 – Siegfried Bernfeld dies in San Francisco (USA) April 15 – Pope Pius XII gives an address through which the Church recognizes the validity of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis (Rome) June 7 – Géza Róheim dies in New York (USA) June 16 – Juliette Favez-Boutonier, Françoise Dolto, and Daniel Lagache, followed by Jacques Lacan, resign from the Paris Psychoanalytical Society and announce the creation of the French Society of Psychoanalysis, Study and Freudian Research Group (France) July 26 – 18th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in London. President: Heinz Hartmann. A committee is formed by Kurt Eissler, Phyllis Greenacre, Hedwig Hoffer, Jeanne Lampl-de-Groo,t and Donald Winnicott to judge the application for admission requested by the French Society of Psychoanalysis (France). The Norwegian Society’s application is rejected in part because of the didactic practice of Harald Schjelderup (Norway). The Danish Society of Psychoanalysis obtains the status of Work Group (Denmark). Werner Kemper’s Centro de Estudos Psicanaliticos is recognized as Study Group under the sponsorship of the São Paulo Society (Brazil) September 26–27 – Following the 16th Conference of Romance Language Psychoanalysts, Jacques Lacan gives his ‘‘Rome Report’’: ‘‘Function and Range of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis’’ (France) October 17 – The Canadian Society of Psychoanalysts/ Société des psychanalystes canadiens is dissolved and replaced by the Société canadienne de psychanalyse/ Canadian Psychoanalytic Society (Canada) The New Orleans Psychoanalytic Society founded (USA) Publication of the first volume of Life and Work of Sigmund Freud that Ernest Jones will publish in three volumes from 1953 to 1957, in London, at Hogarth Press INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS cx ix CHRONOLOGY JAPA, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, official mouthpiece of the American Psychoanalytic Association, founded. John Frosch is the editor-in-chief for twenty years, assisted by Nathaniel Ross (USA) 1954 June 1 – Official inauguration of the Institute of Psychoanalysis of the Paris Psychoanalytical Society and creation of a Center for Consultation and Psychiatric Treatment (France) First International Congress of Psychotherapy of the Group in Toronto (Canada) 1955 May 6 – Henri Flournoy dies in Geneva (Switzerland) July 26 – Nineteenth Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Geneva (Switzerland). President: Heinz Hartmann. The French Society of Psychoanalysis is not recognized as a society belonging to the IPA (France). Affiliation of the Sociedade Psicanalitica do Rio de Janeiro (SPRJ), founded by Werner Kemper, Kattrin Kemper, Fabio Leite Lobo, Gerson Borsoi, Inaura Carneiro Leão Vetter, Luiz Guimarães Dahlheim, and Noemy Rudolfer (Brazil) September 27 – Under the influence of Willy Baranger, the Asociación Psicoanalı́tica del Uruguay is founded The Psychoanalytic Association of New York and the Michigan Psychoanalytic Association founded (USA) Cesare Musatti founds the Revista di psicoanalisi, official mouthpiece of the Società Psicoanalitica Italiana (SPI) (Italy) Heisaku Kosawa founds the Psychoanalytical Society of Japan The Washington Psychoanalytic Institute is accredited by the American Psychoanalytic Association (USA) The Association Internationale de Psychologie Analytique (International Association of Analytical Psychology) (AIPA) founded The Technique of Psycho-Analysis by Edward Glover published (Great Britain) 1956 May 6 – For the hundredth anniversary of Freud’s birth, Ernest Jones unveils a commemorative plaque on Freud’s Maresfield Gardens house, Hampstead (Great Britain). In Paris, a plaque is placed at the Salpêtrière and on the façade of the little Latin Quarter hotel, rue Le Goff, where Freud lived in 1885–1886 (France) May 6 – The Colombian Psychoanalytical Study Group founded, with Arnaldo Rascovsky (Colombia) August 6 – Oskar Pfister dies in Zurich (Switzerland) The Western New York Psychoanalytic Society founded (USA) First issue of La Psychanalyse, review of the French Society of Psychoanalysis (France) American Academy of Psychoanalysis founded by Franz Alexander, R. Orinker, and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann. Its first president is Janet Rioch Bard (USA) First Latin-American Congress of Psychoanalysis in Buenos Aires (Argentina) Toronto Psychoanalytic Study Circle founded by Alan Parkin (Canada) cxx INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY Primary Love and Psycho-Analytic Technique by Michael Balint published (Great Britain) 1957 February 27 – Ernst Kris dies in New York (USA) April 28 – Frieda Fromm-Reichmann dies in Rockville, Maryland (USA) July 28–31 – 20th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Paris (France). President: Heinz Hartmann. Affiliation of the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society (CPS), the Dansk Psykoanalytisk Selskat (DPS), and the Asociación Psicoanalı́tica Mexicana (A.P.M.). Recognized as Study Group: the Luso-Iberian Psychoanalytical Society, patronized by the Swiss Society of Psychoanalysis (SSP) and the Paris Psychoanalytical Society (SPP), the Study Group of the Asociación Psicoanalı́tica del Uruguay and the Colombian Psychoanalytical Study Group. William H. Gillespie is elected president of the IPA November 3 – Wilhelm Reich dies in the Lewisburg penitentiary, Connecticut (USA) The Cleveland Psychoanalytic Society and the Seattle Psychoanalytic Society founded (USA) First Latin-American congress of psychotherapy of the Buenos Aires group (Argentina) Sydney Institute of Psychoanalysis founded (Australia) A Research Committee founded by the British PsychoAnalytical Society (Great Britain) Envy and Gratitude by Melanie Klein published (Great Britain) 1958 February 11 – Ernest Jones dies in London (Great Britain) May 4 – Emil Oberholzer dies in New York (USA) September 20 – Felix Boehm dies in Berlin (Germany) October 12 – Carl Müller-Braunschweig dies in Berlin (Germany) December 20 – Clara M. Thompson dies in New York (USA) The ‘‘Groupe Lyonnais de Psychanalyse’’ founded around Charles-Henri Nodet within the Paris Psychoanalytical Society (France) The Association of Mental Health of the 13th arrondissement in Paris founded by Philippe Paumelle, Serge Lebovici, and René Diatkine (France) Institute for Psychoanalytic Training and Research founded (IPTAR) (USA) 1959 January 11 – Edward Bibring dies in Boston (USA) July 26–30 – 21st Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Copenhagen (Denmark). President: William H. Gillespie. Affiliation of the Sociedade Brasileira de Psicanalise de Rio de Janeiro (SBPRJ) (Brazil) and the Sociedad Luso-española de Psicoanálisis (Spain–Portugal) The Pittsburgh Psychoanalytic Society and the New Jersey Psychoanalytic Society founded (USA) New York Freudian Society (NYFS) founded under the name of New York Society of Freudian Psychologists (its name is changed because of provisions in the law of con- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS cx xi CHRONOLOGY firmation in the State of New York concerning psychology) (USA) 1960 April 27 – Official inauguration of the Institut und Ausbildungszentrum für Psychoanalyse und Psychosomatische Medizin (Institute and Training Center for Psychoanalysis and Psychosomatic Medicine) in Frankfurt-amMain (Germany) May 5 – Maurice Bouvet dies in Paris (France) September – The French Society of Psychoanalysis (France) organizes its first international colloquium on female sexuality in Amsterdam (Netherlands) September 22 – Melanie Klein-Reizes dies in London (Great Britain) Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse founded (Germany) A coordination committee of the Latin-American Organizations of Psychoanalysis (C.O.P.A.L.) is founded at the 3rd Latin-American Congress of Psychoanalysis, in Santiago, Chile, by the Argentine Societies of Psychoanalysis, from Sáo Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and from Chile and Mexico. President: Arnaldo Rascovsky (Chile) The Belgian Association of Psychoanalysts takes the name of Belgian Society for Psychoanalysis/Belgische Vereniging voor Pscychoanalyse (Belgium) Estudios sobre técnica psicoanalı́tica (Transference and Countertransference) by Heinrich Racker published (Argentina) 1961 March 17 – The Canadian Institute of Psychoanalysis is officially incorporated in the province of Québec (Canada) June 6 – Carl Gustav Jung dies in Küssnacht (Switzerland) July 31–August 3 – 22nd Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Edinburgh (Great Britain). President: William H. Gillespie. Elected President: Maxwell Gitelson. Affiliation of the Sociedad Colombiana de Psicoanalisis (Colombia) and the Asociación Psicoanalı́tica del Uruguay. The Study Group from Porto Alegre, patronized by the SPRJ, is recognized (Brazil). The French Society of Psychoanalysis obtains the status of Study Group under the sponsorship of an ad hoc committee (France) August 21 – Marco Levi Bianchini dies in Nocera Inferiore (Italy) The Centro de investigación y tratamiento Enrique Racker (Enrique Racker Center of Research and Treatment) founded by the Associacion Psicoanalitica de Argentina (APA) (Argentina) The Revista de psicologia y psicoterapia de grupo founded (Argentina) 1962 February 6 – Edmund Bergler dies in New York (USA) March 6 – René Laforgue dies in Paris (France) May 10 – Joan Riviere-Hogson Verrail dies in London (Great Britain) July 30 – The International Federation of Psychoanalytic Societies (I.F.P.S.) founded in Amsterdam by the Deutsche Psychoanalytische Gesellschaft, the Sociedad Psicoanalitica Mexicana, the Wiener Arbeitkreis für Tie- cxx ii INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY fenpsychologie, and the William Alanson White Psychoanalytic Society (Netherlands) September 21 – Marie Bonaparte dies in Saint-Tropez (France) The Rome Psychoanalytical Center founded by Emilio Servadio (Italy) Freud, the Secret Passion, the film by John Huston, released (USA) Learning from Experience by Wilfred R. Bion published (Great Britain) 1963 July 28–August 1 – 23rd Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Stockholm (Sweden). President: Maxwell Gitelson. Elected President: William H. Gillespie and Phyllis Greenacre, pro tem. The Study Group from Porto Alegre is recognized as the Sociedade Psicanalitica de Porto Alegre (SPPA) (Brazil). Affiliation of the Colombian Society of Psychoanalysis (Colombia) 1964 March 8 – Franz Alexander dies in Palm Springs, California (USA) May 25 – The French Study Group founded, organized into the Psychoanalytical Association of France (APF), presided over by Daniel Lagache and descended from the French Society of Psychoanalysis, marking the second schism of the French psychoanalytical movement (France) June 21 – Jacques Lacan founds the École Française de Psychanalyse (French School of Psychoanalysis), which will be renamed École freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris) in September 1964 July 15 – Poul Bjerre dies in Göteborg, in Vårsta (Sweden) December 31 – Ronald Fairbairn dies in Edinburgh (Great Britain) The Institut und Ausbildungszentrum für Psychoanalyse und psychosomatische Medizin in Frankfurt-am-Main is named the Sigmund-Freud-Institut. The first director is A. Mitscherlich (Germany) Stig Björk and Veikko Tähkä create the IPA Study Group that will become the Finnish Psychoanalytic Society (Finland) First International Congress of Psychodrama in Paris, organized by Jacob Moreno (France) Papers on Psychoanalytic Psychology by Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, and Rudolf M. Loewenstein published (USA) 1965 January 19 – French Society of Psychoanalysis (Société française de Psychanalyse) dissolved (France) July 25–30 – 24th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Amsterdam (Netherlands). President: William H. Gillespie and Phyllis Greenacre, pro temp. Elected President: P.J. van der Leeuw. The Psychoanalytical Association of France becomes constituent Society of the IPA (France). For the first time a Latin American is elected vice-president of the IPA The Associaçao Brasileira de Medicina Psicosomática (ABMP) founded in São Paulo. First president: Danilo Perestrello (Brazil) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS cxxiii CHRONOLOGY 1966 February 3 – The éditions Gallimard with Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, the éditions Payot with Michel de M’Uzan and Marthe Robert, and the Presses universitaires de France with Jean Laplanche jointly undertake the publication of the complete works of Freud in French. The editorship will be granted to J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis on April 12, 1967 (France) February 7 – Ludwig Binswanger dies in Kreuzlingen, canton of Thurgovia (Switzerland) October 2–3 – The Fédération Européenne de psychanalyse (FEP, European Psychoanalytical Federation) founded in Paris, under the impetus of Raymond de Saussure (Switzerland). Honorary President: Anna Freud. Secretary: Evelyne Kestemberg (France) The Sociedad Luso-española de Psicoanálisis spawns the Sociedad Española de Psicoálisis (Spain) and the Portuguese Study Group (Portugal) Publication of Opere di Sigmund Freud in twelve volumes begins under the direction of Cesare Musatti (Italy) Écrits by Jacques Lacan published (France) 1967 May 6 – The Associaçao Brasileira de Psicanálise (ABP) founded, joining four IPA societies into a federation. First president: Durval B. Marcondes, who has the Revista Brasileira de Psicanálise republished (Brazil) July 3 – James Strachey dies in London (Great Britain) July 24–28 – 25th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Copenhagen (Denmark). President: P.J. Van der Leeuw. The Australian Society of Psychoanalysis, branch of the British Psychoanalytic Society, gains the status of an IPA Study Group (Australia). A Work Group created in Venezuela October 9 – Jacques Lacan proposes under the name ‘‘la passe’’ an enabling process adapted to the Freudian School of Paris (France) Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse (The Language of Psychoanalysis) by Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis published (France) The Canadian Psychoanalytic Society is organized into three branches: the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society (English Québec), called CPS (QE), the Société Canadienne de Psychanalyse (French branch), and the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society (Ontario) The Los Angeles Institute for Psychoanalysis becomes the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society and Institute (LAPSI) (USA) Société Médicale Balint founded (France) The Association des Psychanalystes du Québec (Quebec Association of Psychoanalysts) (A.D.P.Q.) founded with reference to Jacques Lacan The Empty Fortress: Infantile Autism and the Birth of the Self by Bruno Bettelheim published (USA) 1968 cxx iv October – Serge Leclaire founds the Psychoanalysis Department at the University of Paris VIII, Vincennes, linked to the Center for the Teaching and Research of Philosophy. Creation of the U.E.R. of Human Sciences, clinics at the University of Paris VII by Juliette Favez- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY Boutonier, Jacques Gagey, and Claude Prévost joined by Jean Laplanche and Pierre Fédida (France) October 5 – Heisaku Kosawa dies in Tokyo (Japan) November 26 – Arnold Zweig dies in East Berlin (Germany) The Sigmund Freud-Gesellschaft (Sigmund Freud Society), founded in Vienna, with the support of Harald Leupold-Löwenthal and Hans Strotzka (Austria) The Swedish Society for Holistic Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis (SSHPP), which will belong to the International Federation of Psychoanalytic Societies (IFPS) in 1972 (Sweden) An Association of Yugoslav Psychotherapists founded in Split at the impetus of Stjepan Betlheim (Yugoslavia) 1969 March 17 – The Fourth Group founded—a French language pshychoanalytical organization. President: François Perrier, Secretary: Piera Aulagnier (France) April 17 – Angélo Hesnard dies in Rochefort-sur-Mer (France) July 8 – The Belgische School voor Psychoanalyse/École belge de psychanalyse (Lacanian) (Belgian School for Psychoanalysis) founded by Antoine Vergote, Jacques Schotte, Paul Duquenne, Jean-Claude Quintart. Honorary President: Alphonse de Waehlens (Belgium) July 30–August 3 – 26th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Rome (Italy). Subject: ‘‘Recent developments in psychoanalysis.’’ President: P.J. Van der Leeuw. Elected President: Leo Rangell. Affiliation of the Società Psicanalitica Italiana (SPI). Affiliation of the Suomen Psykoanalyyttinen Yhdistys (SPY, Finnish Psychoanalytic Society) (Finland). The founding of the European Psychoanalytical Federation officially recognized October 12 – Max Schur dies in New York (USA) December 31 – Theodor Reik dies in New York (USA) The conference of European psychoanalysts (in English—every two years) founded by the British PsychoAnalytical Society (Great Britain) The Cı́rculo Psicanalı́tico do Rio de Janeiro founded (affiliated with the I.F.P.S.) (Brazil) The French-speaking branch from the Canadian Society of Psychoanalysis adopts the name Société psychanalytique de Montréal; it is recognized by the IPA in 1972 (Canada) The journal Topique founded by Piera Aulagnier (France) 1970 April – La Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse (The New Review of Psychoanalysis) founded by Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (France) May 17 – Heinz Hartmann dies in Stony Point, New York (USA) May 20 – Hermann Nunberg dies in New York (USA) June – First annual scientific congress of the French branch of the Société Psychanalytique de Montréal (S.P.M.) (Canada) September 7 – Nicola Perrotti dies in Rome (Italy) December 14 – Edoardo Weiss dies in Chicago (USA) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS cx xv CHRONOLOGY December 31 – Michael Balint (Bàlint, Mihály) dies in London (Great Britain) Jean Laplanche founds a Laboratory for psychoanalysis and psychotherapy and in 1980 institutes a doctorate of psychoanalysis and psychopathology, University of Paris VII (France) The International College of Psychosomatic Medicine founded (Canada) The Bulletin Intérieur de l’Association Psychanalytique de France, created in 1964, becomes Documents et Débats (France) La construction de l’espace analytique by Serge Viderman published (France) 1971 January 5 – Annie Reich dies in Pittsburgh (USA) January 25 – Donald Winnicott dies in London (Great Britain) May 1 – First Franco-British Colloquium in le Touquet (France), co-organized by the British Psycho-Analytical Society, the Psychoanalytical Association of France, and the Psychoanalytical Society of Paris July – Sigmund Freud Museum, 19 Berggasse, inaugurated by Anna Freud, managed by the Sigmund Freud Gesellschaft (Austria) July 26–30 – 27th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Vienna, the first in Austria since 1927. Subject: ‘‘The psychoanalytical concept of aggression: theoretical, clinical aspects and applications.’’ President: Leo Rangell. The Asociación Venezolana de Psicoanálisis (ASOVEP) is affiliated with the IPA (Venezuela). The Norwegian Society obtains the status of Study Group (Norway). The Australian Psychoanalytical Society obtains the status of Provisional Society (Australia) October 19 – Raymond de Saussure dies in Geneva (Switzerland) November 1 – Mosche Wulff (or Moshe Woolf) dies in Tel Aviv (Israel) The Sociedade de Psicologia Clı́nica founded in Rio de Janeiro. The president is Maria Regina Domingues de Morais (Brazil) The Institute of Depth Psychology and Psychotherapy founded at the Vienna Faculty of Medicine, at Hans Strotzka’s initiative (Austria) Lingüı́stica, interacción communicativa y proceso psicoanalı́tico by David Liberman published (Argentina) Playing and Reality by Donald W. Winnicott published (Great Britain) 1972 August 10 – Heinrich Meng dies in Basle (Switzerland) August 16 – Edward Glover dies in London (Great Britain) September – In September 1972, the British PsychoAnalytical Society is registered as a Charity No. 264314 (Great Britain) December 3 – Daniel Lagache dies in Paris (France) December 24 – Arminda Aberastury, called ‘‘La Negra,’’ dies in Buenos Aires (Argentina) cxx vi INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY December 26 – The Institut de Psychosomatique (Institute of Psychosomatic Medicine) founded by Michel Fain and Pierre Marty. It is comprised of a center for education and research in psychosomatic medicine (CERP) (France) The Scuola freudiana, of Lacanian orientation, founded by Giacomo Contri (Italy) The Toronto Psychoanalytic Society (TPS) and the Ottawa Psychoanalytic Society founded (Canada) Bulletin de la Fédération européenne de psychanalyse (European Psychoanalytical Federation) founded. Editorin-chief: Peter Hildebrand (Great Britain), Editorial staff: Michel de M’Uzan (France), Samir Stephanos (Germany), and Daniel Widlöcher (France) 1973 July 22–27 – 28th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Paris (France). President: Leo Rangell. Elected President: Serge Lebovici, first French president of the IPA. Affiliation of the Australian Psychoanalytical Society (APS). The Mendoza Psychoanalytical Society is recognized as a Study Group December 16–19 – First international colloquium in Milan, organized by Armando Verdiglione (Italy) Centre Psychoanalytique Raymond de Saussure founded in Geneva (Switzerland) Le Discours vivant. La conception psychanalytique de l’affect (The Living Discourse. The Psychoanalytical Conception of the Affect) by André Green published (France) 1974 June 28 – The Escuela Freudiana de Buenos Aires (EFBA), of Lacanian orientation, founded with Oskar Masotta and Isodoro Vegh (Argentina) September 14 – René Spitz dies in Denver, Colorado (USA) October 31 – Congress of the Freudian School of Paris in Rome (Italy) The Cosa Freudiana, of Lacanian orientation, founded by Giacomo Contri, Muriel Drazien, Giuseppe Musotto (Palermo), and Armando Verdiglione (Italy) Center for the Development of Psychoanalysis founded (Peru) Göteborgs Psykoterapi Institut (Göteborg Psychotherapy Institute) founded by Angel and Dora Fiasché (Sweden) La jalousie amoureuse by Daniel Lagache published (France) 1975 July 20–25 – 29th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in London (Great Britain). Subject: ‘‘Change in Psychoanalytic Practice and Exprerience: Theoretical, Technical and Social Implications’’ President: Serge Lebovici. Affiliation of the Norsk Psykoanalytisk Forening (NPF) (Norway) September 27 – Werner Kemper dies in Berlin (Germany) The Société Belge de psychologie analytique (S.B.P.A.) (Belgian Society of Analytical Psychology), of Jungian orientation, with Gilberte Aigrisse founded (Belgium) A Freud Professorship created at the University College in London (Great Britain) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS cxxvii CHRONOLOGY The Antilles Group for Psychoanalytical Research, Study and Training founded (GAREFP), with Héliane Bourgeois, Luce Descoueyte (Martinique) The Institute for Psychoanalysis of the Portuguese Society of Psychoanalysis founded (Portugal) A Hungarian Study Group founded (Hungary) Ornicar? founded by Jacques-Alain Miller (France) L’auto-analyse de Freud et la découverte de la psychanalyse (Freud’s Self-Analysis and the Discovery of Psychoanalysis) by Didier Anzieu published (France) The Unconscious as Infinite Sets. An Essay in Bi-Logic by Ignacio Matte-Blanco published (Chile) La violence de l’interprétation. Du pictogramme à l’énoncé by Piera Castoriadis-Aulagnier published (France) 1976 April 14 – Rudolph M. Loewenstein dies in New York (USA) July 30 – Sylvia May Payne dies in Tunbridge Wells, Sussex (Great Britain) The Revista de la Sociedad Colombiana de Psicoanalisis (Review of the Colombian Society of Psychoanalysis) founded (Colombia) The Austrian Society for the study of Child Psychoanalysis, founded in Salzburg (Austria) The International Freudian Movement founded by Armando Verdiglione in Milan (Italy) The review Psychanalyse à l’université created by Jean Laplanche (France) 1977 July 16 – Enrique Pichon-Rivière dies in Buenos Aires (Argentina) July 21–26 – 30th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Jerusalem (Israel). President: Serge Lebovici. Elected President: Edward D. Joseph. Affiliation of the Asociación Psicoanalı́tica de Buenos Aires (A.P.D.E.B.A.) (Argentina). The Portuguese Study Group Portugais becomes a provisional Society (Portugal) August 10 – Grete Bibring-Lehner dies in Cambridge, Massachusetts (USA) August 25 – Sacha Nacht dies in Paris (France) October 27 – Therese Benedek dies in Chicago (USA) The Biblioteca Freudiana in Barcelona, of Lacanian orientation, founded with Oscar Masotta (Spain) A chair of psychoanalysis at the Hebrew University created in Jerusalem. Titular: Joseph Sandler (Israel) The Psychoanalytisches Seminär Zürich (Zurich Psychoanalytical Seminary) (P.S.Z.), of Lacanian orientation founded (Switzerland) 1978 The Institute of Psychoanalysis of the Ottawa Psychoanalytic Society founded (Canada) The CPS/Western Canadian Branch created (Canada) 1979 cxx viii February – The Champ freudien (CF) founded by Jacques Lacan. Director: Judith Miller (France) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY July 27 – 31st Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in New York (USA). Subject: ‘‘Clinical data in psychoanalysis.’’ President: Edward D. Joseph. Affiliation of the Asociación Psicoanalitica de Madrid (Spain) and the Psychoanalytical Association of Buenos Aires (Argentina) October 1–5 – Tbilisi Colloquium, at the initiative of L. Chertok and Philippe Bassine and under the sponsorship of the Georgian Academy of Sciences (Russia/USSR) November 8 – Wilfred R. Bion dies in Oxford (Great Britain) November 19 – Dorothy Burlingham-Tiffany dies in London (Great Britain) November 24 – Ralph Greenson dies in Los Angeles, California (USA) The Adelaide Institute of Psychoanalysis, a branch of the Australian Society of Psychoanalysis, founded with Dr. Harry Southwood (Australia) Division 39 of the American Psychological Association founded (USA) The Asociación Regiomontana de Psicoanálisis (A.R.P.A.C.) created to service northern Mexico The Dutch Society of Psychoanalytical Psychotherapy founded (Netherlands) The Center for the Development of Psychoanalysis (Peru) Serie Psicoanalı́tica in Madrid, of Lacanian orientation, founded by Jorge Alemán (Spain) 1980 January 5 – The Freudian School of Paris dissolved by Jacques Lacan (France) February 21 – Jacques Lacan founds the Cause freudienne, which becomes the École de la Cause freudienne, French School of Psychoanalysis, October 23, 1980 (France) March 18 – Erich Fromm dies in Locarno (Switzerland) June 6 – The Federación psicoanalı́tica de América latina (FEPAL) founded in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). First president: Joel Zac July 12–15 – Caracas Colloquium of the Champ Freudien, co-organized by Jacques Alain Miller and Diana Rabinovitch under the auspices of the Atenso de Caracas and the Paris Department of Psychoanalysis, Paris VIII (Venezuela) July 29 – Adelheid Lucy Koch dies in São Paulo (Brazil) November 3 – The College of Psychoanalysts founded. President: Dominique J. Geahchan (France) November 23 – Marianne Kris-Rie dies in London (Great Britain) The Sociedad Peruana de Psicoanálisis founded (Peru) Creation of the Toulousan Group, tied to the Paris Psychoanalytical Society (France) First translation of a work by Freud, An Introduction to Psychoanalysis, to be published in Romania 1981 July 20 – Abram Kardiner dies in Easton, Connecticut (USA) July 26–31 – 32nd Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Helsinki (Finland). Subject: INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS cxx ix CHRONOLOGY ‘‘The first psychic development.’’ President: Edward D. Joseph. President elect: Adam Limentani. Affiliation of the Portuguese Society of Psychoanalysis. The Mendoza Society is promoted to Provisional Society (Argentina) September 27 – Durval Bellegarde Marcondes dies in São Paulo (Brazil) cxx x 1982 January 28–30 – First Congress of Armando Verdiglione’s International Freudian Movement, in Rome (Italy). Subject: ‘‘Culture’’ March 29 – Helene Deutsch-Rosenbach dies in Cambridge, Massachusetts (USA) June – The Association freudienne, becoming thereafter the Association freudienne internationale, of Lacanian orientation, founded by Charles Melman (France) June 5 – South Western Ontario Psychoanalytic Society founded, sixth section of the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society (Canada) June 26 – Alexander Mitscherlich dies in Frankfurt am Main (Germany) July 9 – The Centre de Formation et de Recherches Psychanalytiques (C.F.R.P.) (Center for Training and Psychoanalytical Research) founded by Octave Mannoni, Maud Mannoni, and Patrick Guyomard (France) July 10–11 – First Psychoanalytical Meetings in Aix-enProvence. Subject: ‘‘Suffering, Pleasure and Thought.’’ Presidents: Jacques Caı̈n and Alain de Mijolla (France) October – The Bulletin of the Paris Psychoanalytical Society founded by Michel Fain (France) October 9 – Anna Freud dies in London at the age of eighty-six (Great Britain) October 11 – Creation of a Study Group in Greece, recognized by the IPA (Greece) October 22 – Paula Heimann-Glatzko dies in London (Great Britain) The Revue Belge de psychanalyse (Belgian Review of Psychoanalysis) founded. Director: Maurice Haber (Belgium) Congress of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Società Psicoanalitica Italiana (S.P.I.), in the presence of the president of the Republic Pertini, in Rome (Italy) 1983 July 25–29 – 33rd Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Madrid (Spain). Subject: ‘‘The psychoanalyst at work.’’ President: Adam Limentani. Affiliation of the Asociacion Psicoanalitica de Mendoza (APM) (Argentina). The Hungarian Psychoanalytical Society becomes a Provisional Society (Hungary) December – The International Society of the History of Psychiatry, created in December 1982, adds to its name ‘‘and Psychoanalysis.’’ Directors: Michel Collée, Claude Quétel, and Jacques Postel (France) Lima Center of Psychoanalytical Psychotherapies founded (Peru) 1984 June – The group ‘‘Psychoanalysts for the Prevention of Nuclear War’’ founded by Hanna Segal (Great Britain) ‘‘Werkstatt für Psychoanalyse und Gesellschaftskritik’’ (Workshop for Psychoanalysis and Social Criticism) created in Salzburg (Austria) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY The bilingual review Psycho-analyse founded by the l’École Belge de Psychanalyse (Belgian School of Psychoanalysis) (Belgium) Psychoanalytic Center of California founded by James Gooch (USA) L’image inconsciente du corps (The Unconsious Image of the Body) by Françoise Dolto published (France) 1985 February 6 – Muriel M. Gardiner dies in Princeton, New Jersey (USA) March – A public lawsuit is filed by four psychologists within the framework of an antitrust law against the American Psychoanalytic Association, the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, the Columbia University Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research, and the International Psychoanalytical Association for ‘‘restrictive practices and monopolies at state and international levels in the presentation materials and psychoanalytical services delivered to the public.’’ A negotiated settlement is reached in October 1988 (USA) May 20 – Franco Fornari dies in Milan (Italy) June 25 – Association Internationale d’Histoire de la Psychanalyse (AIHP-IAHP) (International Association of the History of Psychoanalysis) founded by Alain de Mijolla (France) July 28–August 2 – 34th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Hamburg (Germany). Subject: ‘‘Identification and its vicissitudes.’’ President: Adam Limentani. Elected President: Robert S. Wallerstein. The Peruvian Society of Psychoanalysis will acquire the status of Provisional Society (Peru) September 27 – Eugenio Gaddini dies in Rome (Italy) October 2 – Margaret Mahler-Schönberger dies in New York (USA) November 20 – Pieter van der Leeuw dies in Amsterdam (Netherlands) The Association des psychothérapeutes psychanalytiques du Québec (Quebec Association of Psychoanalytical Psychotherapists) founded (A.P.P.Q.) (Canada) The association Le texte freudien founded by Jalil Bennani (Morocco) The Portuguese Review of Psychoanalysis founded by the Portuguese Society of Psychoanalysis (Portugal) 1986 March 22 – Inauguration of the new seat of the International Psychoanalytical Association in ‘‘Broomhills’’ by Adam Limentani, William H. Gillespie, and Robert S. Wallerstein (Great Britain) May 6 – The Institut de Psychanalyse and the Société Psychanalytique de Paris merge into a single society. President: André Green (France) July 17 – The second chamber of the correctional tribunal in Milan condemns Armando Verdiglione to four and a half years in prison. After an appeal, he is released tentatively on February 18, 1987 (Italy) July 28 – Inauguration of the Freud Museum in London, by Princess Alexandra of Kent (Great Britain) October 27 – Herbert Rosenfeld dies in London (Great Britain) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS cxx xi CHRONOLOGY The Réseau des cartels, of Lacanian orientation, founded by François Peraldi (Canada) The Center for Psychoanalysis and Society founded (Peru) cxxxii 1987 5 April – Jeanne Lampl-de Groot dies in Schiedam (Netherlands) May 1–3 – 1st International Meeting of the Association Internationale d’Histoire de la Psychanalyse (International Association of the History of Psychoanalysis) (AIHP-IAHP) in Paris. Subject: ‘‘Psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts during the Second World War.’’ President: Alain de Mijolla (France) July 26–31 – 35th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Montréal (Canada). Subject: ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable: Fifty Years Later.’’ President: Robert S. Wallerstein. Affiliation of the Psychoanalytical Society of Peru (Peru) 1988 May – The first issue of the Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse published (1988–1993). Editor: Alain de Mijolla August 25 – Françoise Dolto-Marette dies in Paris (France) The Société psychanalytique de Québec founded, branch of the Société canadienne de psychanalyse – Canadian Psychoanalytic Society (Canada) The Bulletin of the Montreal Psychoanalytical Society founded (Canada) 1989 February 10 – Danilo Perestrello dies in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) March 20 – Cesare Musatti dies in Milan (Italy) April 1 – Evelyne Kestemberg-Hassin dies in Paris (France) June 8 – Masud R. Khan dies in London (Great Britain) July 30 – Octave Mannoni dies in Paris (France) July 30–August 4 – 36th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Rome (Italy). Subject: ‘‘Common bases of psychoanalysis.’’ President: Robert S. Wallerstein. Elected President: Joseph Sandler. Affiliation of the Hungarian Society of Psychoanalysis (Hungary) and the Australian Psychoanalytical Society (Australia). The New York Freudian Society (NYFS), the California Psychoanalytical Center, and the Psychanalytical Training and Research Institute (New York) become Provisional Societies (USA) August 23 – Ronald Laing dies in Saint-Tropez (France) September 23 – Worldwide ceremonies for the fiftieth anniversary of Freud’s death October – Angel Garma is decorated in Buenos Aires by the Spanish Ambassador in the name of King Juan Carlos with the Great Cross of Civil Merit (Spain–Argentina) October 7 – Ruth Eissler-Selke dies in New York (USA) October 21 – Homage paid to Wilfred Bion, on the tenth anniversay of his death, Francesca Bion presides (France) October 24 – Phyllis Greenacre dies in Ossining, New York (USA) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY October 24 – Richard F. Sterba dies in Grosse Pointe, Michigan (USA) November 25–26 – 1st Italian-French psychoanalytical colloquium organized by the Italian Society of Psychoanalysis and the Paris Psychoanalytical Society. Subject: ‘‘Contretransference and transference’’ (France–Italy) December 15 – The APUI, ‘‘Association pour une instance,’’ founded by Serge Leclaire, Jacques Sédat, Danièle Lévy, Lucien Israël, and Philippe Girard (France) Signing of a compromise bringing the American Psychoanalytic Association and the International Psychoanalytic Association to admit qualified American psychologists and non-medical psychoanalysts (USA) The Wiener Psychoanalytische Vereinigung (Viennese Psychoanalytical Society) belongs to the ‘‘Dachverband für Psychotherapie’’ (Umbrella Organization for Psychotherapy) and will participate in the ‘‘Psychotherapiebeirat’’ (Psychotherapy Advisory Board) (Austria) The Sociedade de Psicologia Clı́nica, of Rio de Janeiro, takes the name of Sociedade de Psicanálise da Cidade (Brazil) Mary S. Sigourney Award established. The first laureates are Jacob A. Arlow, Harold Blum and Otto Kernberg (USA) A Forum Brasileiro de Psicanálise founded (Brazil) The ‘‘Société Algérienne de Recherches en Psychologie’’ (Algerian Society of Research in Psychology) founded by M.A. Aı̈t Sidhoum, F. Arar, and D. Haddadi (Algeria) The European Interassociative of Psychoanalysis, of Lacanian orientation, founded (Europe) The Psychoanalysis and Culture Foundation created (Netherlands) The Iberian Congress of Psychoanalysis founded, biannually gathering the Madrid Psychoanalytic Association, the Spanish Psychoanalytic Society, and the Portuguese Psychoanalytic Society. An Iberian directory of psychoanalysis in the Castilian language published (Spain–Portugal) The review Psychoanalytický sbornı́k created by the future IPA Czech Study Group (Czech Republic) 1990 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY February 15 – The Psychanalytic Association of the USSR founded in Moscow by Aaron Belkine (Russia) March 13 – Bruno Bettelheim commits suicide in Silver Spring, Maryland (USA) March 31 – Piera Aulagnier-Spairani dies in Paris (France) April 7 – Celes E. Cárcamo dies in Buenos Aires (Argentina) July 18 – Karl A. Menninger dies in Topeka, Kansas (USA) September 2 – E. John Bowlby dies in Skye Ball (Great Britain) September 5 – Luisa Gambier de Alvarez de Toledo dies in Buenos Aires (Argentina) September 22–23 – A European School of psychoanalysis founded in Barcelona, by Jacques-Alain Miller, E. Laurent, and C. Soler. It is linked to the Ecole de la Cause (France–Spain) OF PSYCHOANALYSIS c xxx iii CHRONOLOGY December – The Association Forum founded by Benedetta Jumpertz, Marcel Manquant, and Guillaume Suréna (Martinique) The Société d’Études et de Recherches en Psychanalyse (Society for Study and Research in Psychoanalysis) founded by Mohamed Halayem (Tunisia) Romanian Psychoanalytical Society founded (Romania) 1991 March – First colloquium of psychoanalysis in Martinique organized by the association FORUM (Martinique) July 28–August 2 – 37th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Buenos Aires (Argentina), first congress in Latin America. Subject: ‘‘Psychic Change: developments in theory of psychoanalytical technique.’’ President: Joseph Sandler. La Sociedad Psicoanalı́tica de Caracas is recognized as a Provisional Society (Venezuela) September 6 – Robert J. Stoller dies in Los Angeles (USA) September 24 – Edward D. Joseph dies (USA) September 30 – Martin Grotjahn dies in Los Angeles (USA) November 3 – Serge Viderman dies in Paris (France) A Committee for the IPA archives and history founded by Joseph Sandler The Polish Society for the Development of Psychoanalysis founded (Poland) 1992 February 1 – World Association of Psychoanalysis (WAP) founded in Paris (France), by Jacques-Alain Miller. It unites the Escuela del Campo Freudiano of Caracas (ECF, Caracas, 1985), the École européenne de psychanalyse (EEP, Barcelona-Paris, 1990), the Ecole de la Cause Freudienne (France, 1981), and the Escuela de la Orientacion del Campo Freudiano (Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1992) November 1 – The Association de la Cause freudienne (A.C.F.) founded by Jacques-Alain Miller (France) The bilingual review Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis/ Revue Canadienne de Psychanalyse founded. Editor-inchief: Eva Lester, of Montreal (Canada) Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft der Arbeitskreise für Psychoanalyse in Österreich (Scientific Society of work circles for psychoanalysis in Austria) and its journal Texte. Psychoanalyse. Ästhetik. Kulturkritik, edited by E. List, J. Ranefeld, G.F. Zeilinger, and A. Ruhs, founded (Austria) The journal International Forum of Psychoanalysis founded by the International Federation of Psychoanalytic Societies (I.F.P.S.) Institute of Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy founded by Katarzyna Walewska (Poland) Freudian Praxis of Lacanian orientation founded in Athens (Greece) 1993 January 29 – Angel Garma dies in Buenos Aires (Argentina) June 14 – Pierre Marty dies in Paris (France) cxxxiv INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY July 25–30 – 38th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Amsterdam (Netherlands). Subject: ‘‘The psychoanalyst’s mind: from listening to interpretation.’’ President: Joseph Sandler. Elected President: Horacio Etchegoyen (first South American president). Affiliation of the Institute for Psychoanalytic Training and Research of New York (USA), the Monterey Psychoanalytic Society (USA), the New York Freudian Society (NYFS) (USA), and the Psychoanalytic Center of California (USA). The Associazione Italiana di Psicoanalisi (A.I.Psi), created in 1992 by E. Servadio and A. Giannotti (Italy), is recognized as a Provisional Society. The Asociación Regiomontana de Psicoanálisis (A.R.P.A.C.) is recognized as an independent affiliated member (Mexico). The Czech Group becomes a Study Group (Czech Republic) The Wiener Psychoanalytische Vereinigung (W.P.V., Viennese Psychoanalytical Society) is recognized as first training organization in the framework of legislation on psychotherapy voted upon in 1992 (Austria) 1994 May – The École de Psychanalyse Sigmund Freud (Sigmund Freud School of Psychoanalysis), of Lacanian orientation, founded (France) May 12 – Erik Homburger Erikson dies in Cape Cod, Massachusetts (USA) July 25–26 – First Meeting of the House of Delegates at the International Psychoanalytical Association in London. President: Henk Jan Dalewijk (Great Britain) August 8 – Serge Leclaire (Liebschutz) dies in Argentière, Haute-Savoie (France) October 16 – Espace analytique (Analytical Space) founded by Maud Mannoni (France) October 29 – Willy Baranger dies in Buenos Aires (Argentina) November 11 – Frances Tustin dies in London (Great Britain) Emilio Servadio dies in Rome (Italy) The École belge de psychanalyse jungienne (E.B.P.J.) (Belgian School of Jungian Psychoanalysis) founded (Belgium) Frankfurter Psychoanalytische Institut founded, affiliated with the Deutsche Psychoanalytische Vereinigung (Germany) Sigmund Freud Library opened by the Paris Psychoanalytical Society (France) 1995 January 11 – Ignacio Matte-Blanco dies in Rome (Italy) February – Société de psychanalyse freudienne (Society of Freudian Psychoanalysis) founded by Patrick Guyomard (France) June – The Escola Brasileira de Psicanálise do Campo Freudiano (E.B.P.), member of the Global Association of Psychoanalysis, founded in Rio de Janeiro, at the impetus of Jacques-Alain Miller (Brazil) July 30–August 4 – 39th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in San Francisco (USA). President: Horacio Etchegoyen. Elected President: Otto Kernberg. Affiliation of the Sociedad Psicoanalı́tica de Caracas (Vénézuela), Sociedad Psicoanalı́tica de Cor- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS cxx xv CHRONOLOGY doba (Argentina) and of the Los Angeles Institute and Society for Psychoanalytic Studies (USA). The Sociedade Psicanalı́tica de Recife and the Sociedade Psicanalı́tica de Pelotas are recognized as Provisional Societies (Brazil) December 12 – Cyro Martins dies in Porto Alegre (Brazil) Federation of Independent Psychoanalytic Societies (FIPAS) founded by independent psychoanalysts of Southern California (USA) The psychoanalytical institutes of the Netherlands Psychoanalytic Society and the Netherlands Association for Psychoanalysis merge into the Netherlands Psychoanalytic Institute (NPI) (Netherlands) 1996 September 30 – Latin-American Association of the History of Psychoanalysis founded by Gilda Sabsay y Foks (Argentina) October 17–19 – First European Congress of Psychopathology of the Child and the Adolescent in Venice (Italy) 1997 July 27–August 1 – 40th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Barcelona (Spain). Subject: ‘‘Psychoanalysis and Sexuality.’’ President: R. Horacio Etchegoyen. Affiliation of the Italian Association of Psychoanalysis (Italy). The Porto Alegre Study Group (Brazil) and the Hellenic Group of Psychoanalysis (Greece) are recognized as Provisional Societies. Formation of the Polish Psychoanalytical Study Group, the psychoanalytical center of Mato Grosso do Sul à Campo Grande, and the third group from Buenos Aires that will form the Argentine Psychoanalytical Society (SAP) August 20 – Paris Psychoanalytical Society is recognized for ‘‘public service’’ by a decree published in the official journal of the French Republic (France) October – First issue of Psychoanalysis and History. Editor: Andrea Sabbadini (Great Britain) November 2 – René Diatkine dies in Paris (France) Archives of the International Federation of Psychoanalytic Societies (I.F.P.S.) founded for the history of psychoanalysis 1998 March 15 – Maud (Magdalena) Mannoni-van der Spoel dies in Paris (France) April 3–5 – First Psychoanalytical Conference in South Africa, organized in Cape Town by the South African Psychoanalytical Society. Subject: ‘‘Change: Psychoanalytic Perspectives’’ (South Africa) May 29 – Marion Milner-Blackett dies in London (Great Britain) August 14 – Gisela Pankow dies in Berlin (Germany) October 3 – Foundation of Convergencia, a Lacanian movement for Freudian psycholanaysis in Barcelona (Spain) October 6 – Joseph Sandler dies in London (Great Britain) October 14 – Opening of ‘‘Sigmund Freud: Conflict and Culture,’’ exhibition at the Library of Congress in Washington (USA) cxx xvi INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRONOLOGY 1999 February 17 – Kurt Eissler dies in New York (USA) July 25–30 – 41st Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Santiago (Chile). Subject: ‘‘Affect in theory and practice.’’ President: Otto Kernberg. Affiliation of the Recife Psychoanalytical Society (Brazil). Recognized as Provisional Societies—the Brasilia Psychoanalytical Study Group, the Study Group of the Colombian Psychoanalytical Association and the Prague Study Group. The Romanian Psychoanalytical Study Group is recognized, as is the Psychoanalytical Study Group visiting from South Korea. November 25 – Didier Anzieu dies in Paris (France) 2000 February 2 – Wladimir Granoff dies in Paris (France) August 12 – Serge Lebovici dies in Marvejols (France) 2001 June 30 – William H. Gillespie dies (Great Britain) July 22–27 – 42nd Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Nice (France). Subject: ‘‘Psychoanalysis: Method and Practice.’’ President: Otto Kernberg. Elected President: Daniel Widlöcher. The Deutsche Psychoanalytische Gesellshaft is admitted as a Provisional Society (Germany) September 11 – Terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington (USA) December 7 – Moroccan Psychoanalytic Society founded in Rabat. President: Jalil Bennani (Morocco) 2002 February 9–10 – First Franco-Argentine colloquium in Paris (France), organized by the Argentine Psychoanalytical Association (APA) and the Paris Psychoanalytical Society (SPP). Subject: ‘‘The Framework in Psychoanalysis’’ November 1 – Pierre Fédida dies in Paris (France) 2003 December 27 – Jean Cournut dies in Paris (France) 2004 March 9–14 – 43rd Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in New Orleans (USA). President: Daniel Widlöcher. Elected President: Cláudio Laks Eizirik May 21 – Jacob A. Arlow dies in New York (USA) August 9 – Article 57 of the August 9, 2004 law allows the use of the title of psychotherapist by ‘‘psychoanalysts regularly registered in their associations’ directories’’ (France) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS cxxxvii A ‘‘A. Z.’’ See also: Obsessional neurosis; Peru. ‘‘A. Z.’’ is the pseudonym used by the author of ‘‘Tratamiento psicoanalı́tico de un caso de neurosis compulsiva’’ (Psychoanalytic treatment of a case of compulsive neurosis), a text published in Peru in 1919 in Revista de psyquiatrı́a y disciplinas conexas (Review of psychiatry and associated disciplines). Bibliography A. Z. (1919). Tratamiento psicoanalı́tico de un caso de neurosis compulsiva. Revista de psyquiatrı́a y disciplinas conexas, II (1), p. 22–25. Rey de Castro, Álvaro. (1991). Freud y Honorio Delgado: una aproximación psicoanalı́tica a la prehistoria del psicoanálisis peruano y sus escuelas. El múltiple interés del psicoanálisis—77 años después, Talleres de Artes Gráficas Espino, p. 203–237. The first account of psychoanalytic treatment ever published in Spanish, this case history concerned a thirty-year-old patient with a curious ‘‘intermittent obsession related to double vision produced by a strabismus resulting from incorrectly performed tenotomies; an obstinate attachment to the false (unclear and deflected) image perceived by the eye affected. The subject felt subjectively attracted by this sensation.’’ Having tried in vain to relieve his malaise in Europe the patient undertook a course of treatment with the author, who came to the conclusion that the patient persisted in seeing the false image in order to avoid confronting the fantasies that derived from his perverse infantile polymorphism. Valdizán, Hermilio. (1923). Diccionario de medicina peruana. t. I, Lima, Talleres gráficos del asilo ‘‘Vı́ctor Larco Herrera,’’ p. 346. ABANDONMENT Strictly speaking, the notion of abandonment is not a psychoanalytic concept. It was initially applied in situations where very young children were deprived of care, education, and affective support, and were neglected by or separated prematurely from their maternal environment, with no reference to the causes of this deprivation. From a purely descriptive point of view, pediatricians and psychologists taking an interest in child development have long recognized the somatic and psychic effects of such states of deprivation. There is strong evidence to suggest that ‘‘A. Z.’’ was the dermatologist Carlos Aubry (1882–1996), a physician known to have been so eccentric and unmercenary that he died penniless, having refused to accept payment from his patients. Valdizán (1923) states in his Diccionario: ‘‘Apart from his specialty [dermatology], he mastered several psychological disciplines, as witnessed by his contribution to the Review.’’ Aubry confined himself to reports and never published another article in the Review. His thesis (1906) dealt with the reflex of convergence, and the use of striped projection to illustrate double vision. The notion is nevertheless appropriately included in a dictionary of psychoanalysis, for two reasons. Firstly, the concept of abandonment is not applied solely to children, but also to adults who experience the feeling of abandonment, separation, or bereavement, whether real or imaginary. Secondly, certain ÁLVARO REY DE CASTRO 1 ABANDONMENT psychoanalysts very quickly developed an interest in the mental disorders and disturbances observed in the emotional development of children subjected to such traumatic experiences, as well as the possible pathogenic role of the family environment. Abandonment raises the fundamental problem of object loss and renunciation of the love object, or the work of mourning. It also calls into question the metapsychological status of anxiety. In a primary and passive sense, abandonment refers to the experience of a state that is imposed by loss or separation: being or feeling abandoned. In a secondary and active sense, the complement of the previous one, it applies to the psychic process that leads a person to deny the cathected object, separate from it, and abandon it. Published in 1950, Germaine Guex’s La Névrose d’abandon (Abandonment neurosis) contributed considerably to propagating the notions of the abandonment complex and the abandonment-type personality. Although now dated, this work nevertheless had the virtue of stressing the influence of disturbances and conflicts occurring during pre-oedipal phases of psychic development in the causation of certain forms of neurotic character disorders and depression, which Guex related to affective frustration experienced during childhood, essentially in relation to the mother. Subjects thus frustrated turn out to be both affectively insatiable and extremely dependent on others, so that every separation is a major crisis for them. Other more recent writers, particularly Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut, have studied narcissistic personality disorders and borderline states between neurosis and psychosis from a similar perspective. They stress the difficulties that arise when the analytic treatment of these patients reproduces their affective dependence in the transference, thus rendering the analysis interminable. Among clinical work by child psychoanalysts we have to bear in mind Anna Freud’s and Dorothy Burlingham’s observations of young children who were separated from their families during World War II, as well as René Spitz’s work on the severe consequences of hospitalism and anaclitic depression in infants. John Bowlby’s study of children’s mourning led to attachment theory, which is amply developed in a book that is both a comprehensive survey and a reference, although his views are sometimes closer to psychobiology and behaviorism than to psychoanalysis. 2 Abandonment is also at the root of a certain number of asocial or delinquent behaviors linked to educational deprivation and indicating a defect in the organization of the ego and the superego. On this subject Donald Winnicott referred to the ‘‘antisocial tendency’’ as an alarm signal that is sounded by distressed children. These problems had already attracted the attention of some of Freud’s collaborators in the period between the two World Wars. In Austria in the 1920s August Aichhorn initiated an educational experience in the light of analytic practice and aimed at children who were victims of exclusion. His book Verwahrloste Jungend (1925) (Wayward Youth, 1935), prefaced by Freud, recounts this experiment, which still retains much of its pertinence. Psychoanalysis must never underestimate the importance of objective reality either in theory or practice, but it owes it to itself to remain especially attentive to the manifestations of unconscious psychic reality, to the activity of the representations and fantasies that constitute it, and to its verbal and affective modes of expression in conscious life. From this point of view, abandonment or separation anxiety is an inevitable condition of existence that appears very early on in the course of psychic development and whose ongoing influence varies from one individual to the other, depending on the situations they encounter. In his second theory of anxiety, as outlined in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (1926d [1925]), Freud shows that for the ego, the emergence of this affect takes on the value of a danger signal, a danger that may be real or imaginary, but whose prototype is the threat of castration linked to the development of the Oedipus complex. Here the ego feels threatened with the loss of the love object or the loss of the love of the object. According to Freud, this fundamental anxiety expresses the original state of distress (Hilflosigkeit, literally: helplessness) linked to the prematurity of an individual at the start of life, which renders him or her completely dependent on another for the satisfaction of both vital and affective needs. The resulting need to feel loved will never cease throughout life. This need seems to be more narcissistic than object related because through it is expressed a nostalgic desire that precedes any differentiated object relationship: the desire to recover, in a fantasied fusion with the mother, a state of internal well-being and complete satisfaction, protected from the outside world, free of all conflict, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A B E L , C A R L (1837 –1 906) of all ambivalence and all splitting. For Melanie Klein, the internal feeling of loneliness is born out of the inevitable dissatisfaction of this aspiration for an impossible narcissistic completeness, one that takes the form of a definitively unattainable ideal. However, the feeling of being alone can also be a source of satisfaction for the child, marking the acquisition, through games for example, of a certain degree of autonomy in relation to the presence of the mother. Donald Winnicott stressed this capacity to be alone in the presence of the mother, which he considered to be a decisive stage in the evolution of the child. on the crucial importance of the need to be protected by the father, and on the intensity of the feeling of nostalgia that is directed toward him in his absence. He considered the identification with the prehistoric father as a ‘‘direct and immediate identification’’ that ‘‘takes place earlier than any object-cathexis’’ (1923b, p. 31). Clinical experience of depression both in adults and children confirms the importance of the feeling of being abandoned by the father, and of the absence of the father in the mother’s desire. Over and above the shock it produces, object loss initiates a process of intrapsychic work, which Freud identified as the work of mourning and which results, in the best cases, in renunciation of the lost object. But the success of this long and painful process is quite variable, depending on the individual, the degree of maturation of the psychical apparatus, and the solidity of the narcissistic organization. Bereavement or loss often leave indelible traces on the ego, a sense of being abandoned is only one of many aspects, since mourning is clinically multifaceted. In his 1915 essay, Mourning and Melancholia (1916–17g [1915]), Freud compares two responses, in order to better highlight their differences in relation to the loss of the object and the ambivalence of the ego with respect to it. In melancholia, the lost object is neither conscious nor real: it is a part of the ego, unconsciously identified with the lost object, which becomes the target for guilt feelings and self-accusing projections. ‘‘The shadow of the object fell upon the ego,’’ wrote Freud (p. 249). But it must be added that all mourning, all loss, all separation, affects the ego at its narcissistic base: being separated from the object is also being deprived of a part of one’s self (Rosolato, 1975). See also: Aichhorn, August; Guex, Germaine; Helplessness; Hospitalism; Spitz, René Arpad. Logically, we should differentiate more between the work of mourning (with the tragic dimension given by the death of the object), and the work of separation (which brings into play the presence, whether real or imaginary, of a third party separator and does not mobilize the same affects as mourning). Additionally, separation, with all the intrapsychic conflicts it gives rise to, is a normal process that leads to the individuation and autonomy of the child. It is the father, in this case, or the authority replacing him, who is the third party separator. Lastly, the problem of separation and abandonment is not merely a question of vicissitudes in the primary relation with the mother. Freud insisted INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS JEAN-CLAUDE ARFOUILLOUX Bibliography Aichhorn, August. (1935). Wayward youth. New York: The Viking Press. Bowlby, John. (1969). Attachment and loss. London: Hogarth. Freud, Sigmund. (1916–17g [1915]). Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14: 237–258. ——— (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ——— (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. Guex, Germaine. (1950). La Névrose d’abandon: le syndrome d’abandon. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Klein, Melanie. (1959). On the sense of loneliness. In her Envy and Gratitude and Other Works, 1946–1963. New York: The Free Press. Rosolato, Guy. (1975). L’axe narcissique des depressions. La Relation d’inconnu. Paris: Gallimard. Further Reading Pollock, George H. (1988). Notes on abandonment, loss, and vulnerability. Annual of Psychoanalysis, 16, 341–370. ABEL, CARL (1837–1906) Carl Abel was a German linguist known for his research on Indo-European and Hamito-Semitic lexicology, which was published in his Einleitung in ein Aegyptischsemitisch indoeuropeanisches Wurzelwörterbuch (1886). It was his theory of the ‘‘opposite meanings of primitive words’’ that interested Freud when, after alluding to the idea in the Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), he wrote an article on the subject ten years later, 3 ABERASTURY, ARMINDA, KNOWN AS ‘ ‘L A N E G R A , ’’ (1 910 –19 72) entitled ‘‘The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words’’ (1910e). The theory appeared in Abel’s article ‘‘Über den Gegensinn der Urworte,’’ which appeared in Sprachwissenschaftliche Abhandungen, published in Leipzig in 1885. Basing his thesis on the fact that a Latin word such as sacer signified both ‘‘sacred’’ and ‘‘taboo,’’ Abel proposed a theory of the way vocabulary evolves in languages. For Abel, a word in its primitive state can have opposite meanings, which are gradually distinguished through the progress of the rational intellect. ‘‘When learning to think about force, we have to separate it from weakness; to conceive of darkness, we must isolate it from light.’’ For Freud, primitive words mark a stage of symbolization that precedes the separation of opposites brought on by the reality principle. This cultural phenomenon is comparable to the dream process, which enables a representational content to assume a value as the expression of a desire and an antithetical desire. Consequently, the logic of the primary process is felt in a cultural formation as fully developed as language. Is there a linguistic basis to Abel’s theory? Some eminent linguists such as Émile Benveniste have claimed the entire theory to be false. If Latin has only one word for ‘‘sacred’’ and ‘‘taboo,’’ they claim, it is because Roman culture doesn’t differentiate between them. It is translation that creates the illusion of opposite meanings. According to Benveniste, the Latin concept corresponding to the word sacer simply characterizes a field that extends beyond the frontiers of the human and constitutes the undifferentiated domain of the sacred and the taboo. Benveniste’s reasoning is rigorous but it is worth pointing out that there are rhetorical figures such as euphemism or antiphrasis designed to create a reversal of meanings similar to that of primitive words. So when someone remarks of an idiot ‘‘What a genius!’’, they assign an antiphrastic value to the word ‘‘genius,’’ which, in conjunction with its primary value, turns the signifier ‘‘genius’’ into a good example of a primitive word combining the opposite meanings of ‘‘intelligent’’ and ‘‘stupid.’’ The fact remains, however, that the rhetorical figure is based on an initial disjunction of opposite values rather than the confusion that Abel assigns to his construction. For we can only refer to an idiot as a ‘‘genius’’ if ‘‘genius’’ initially means genius, not if the term refers to any unit that incorporates the meanings of both ‘‘genius’’ and ‘‘idiot.’’ The process 4 works by an enrichment of the opposite meanings assigned from the outset. It is also possible that the lack of differentiation that occurs in dreams results in a conjunction of opposed values that is closer to the mechanism described above than to any initial blurring, which, according to Abel, is characteristic of the meanings of primitive words. LAURENT DANON-BOILEAU See also: Linguistics and psychoanalysis; Reversal into the opposite. Bibliography Abel, Carl. (1885). Über den Gegensinn der Urworte. Sprachwissenschaftliche Abhandungen, 313–367. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 5: 1–338; SE, 5: 339–625. ———. (1910e). The antithetical meaning of primal words. SE, 11: 155–161. ABERASTURY, ARMINDA, KNOWN AS ‘‘LA NEGRA,’’ (1910–1972) The Argentine psychoanalyst Arminda Aberastury was born on September 24, 1910, in Buenos Aires, and died there on December 24, 1972, by committing suicide. Because of her dark hair she was affectionately known as ‘‘La Negra,’’ and it was this name that others used when they referred to her. In 1937 she married the psychiatrist Enrique Pichon-Rivière, a pioneer of psychoanalysis in Argentina. The couple had three children: Enrique, Joaquin, and Marcelo. In 1953, she became a training analyst with the Associación psicoanalı́tica argentina (APA). She taught for nearly twenty years at the Teaching Institute, where she was the director, and introduced the teaching of child psychoanalysis as part of the training of the analyst candidate. She later held the chair of child and adolescent psychology in the School of Philosophy and Literature at the University of Buenos Aires. In Latin America she distributed psychoanalytic information to pediatricians, child care workers, teachers, doctors, and pediatric dentists. She corresponded with Melanie Klein, whom she met in London in 1952. She translated Klein’s The Psychoanalysis of Children and became a spokeswoman for Klein’s theories. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A B R A H A M , K A R L (1877 –1 925) Aberastury believed that genital libido developed before the anal stage, leading to the existence of a ‘‘primary genital stage,’’ chronologically situated between the sixth and eighth month of life, which became a key theoretical concept for psychoanalysis. The growth of genital instincts, weaning, teething, the development of the musculature, learning to walk, the acquisition of language, the disruption of the mother-child symbiosis were all said to constitute a complementary series that structured this phase of development, and which would explain specific symptoms and dysfunctions. The genital origin of erogenous manifestations was found in the activity of play. The theory, which included genital identity and the father in the motherchild relation from the first moments of life, helped refine Kleinian theory. Aberastury’s ideas on paternity were published posthumously. The chair of pediatric dentistry in Buenos Aires provided Aberastury with an excellent opportunity for developing and applying her theories. It was here at the Hospital Británico that she began to make use of psychodrama and group psychotherapy in her work with children. Aberastury extended the treatment to their guardians, basing her methods on her observations of the application of psychoanalysis to groups of fathers and mothers. Between 1946 and 1974 the APA review published twenty-four articles by Aberastury on a wide range of subjects: infant psychoanalysis; treatment indications; applied psychoanalysis; the creation of a diagnostic test, ‘‘El constructor infantil,’’ based on a construction game familiar to children in Argentina; clinical cases; transference; music; technique; philosophy; language; unconscious fantasies; supervision; etc. A year after her death by suicide, a chronological list of her 145 published works appeared in the APA review (no. 3/4, 1973). Aberastury also published articles in the reviews of associations in Uruguay, Brazil, and France, as well as in The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis and, in Argentina, in reviews of child and adolescent psychiatry and psychology. EDUARDO J. SALAS See also: Argentina; Brazil; Pichon-Rivière, Enrique. Bibliography Aberastury, Arminda. (1959). Una experiencia psicodramatica con niños. In E. J. Salas, G. Smolensky, L. Grinberg, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS M. Langer, and E. Rodrigue (eds.), El grupo psicologico. Buenos Aires: Nova, APA, 1959. ———. (1978). La paternidad, Buenos Aires: Kargieman, 2nd ed., 1985; A. Aberastury, E. J. Salas, A paternidade: Um enfoque psicanalı́tico. Aberastury, Arminda, Aberastury, Marcelo, and Cesio, Fidias. (1967). Historia enseñanza y ejercicio legal del psicoanálisis. Buenos Aires: Bibliografica Omeba. ABRAHAM, KARL (1877–1925) Karl Abraham, a German psychoanalyst and doctor, was born May 3, 1877, and died December 25, 1925, in Berlin. The son of Nathan Abraham, a businessman, and Ida Oppenheim, he was the youngest of two sons in an Orthodox Jewish family. After studying medicine in Würzburg, Berlin, and Freiburg-im-Breisgau, he married his cousin Hedwig Bürgner in 1906. They had two children; his daughter was the well-known psychoanalyst Hilda Abraham. Abraham began his training in psychiatry in Berlin, then in Zurich with Eugen Bleuler, where the physician-in-chief was Carl Gustav Jung. It was here that he became familiar with Freud’s writings. In 1907 he opened an office in Berlin and, in 1910, founded the Berlin Institute of Psychoanalysis. From 1914 to 1918 he was mobilized as chief physician in a psychiatric unit. It was during this time that he grew interested in studying war neuroses. He was president of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) from 1918 to 1925. A student and friend of Freud, he was a member of the secret ‘‘Committee’’ from its inception. In 1918, he received an award in recognition of his work in analysis. Co-editor of the Jahrbuch für Psychoanalyse, Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, and Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, he was the analyst and teacher of Felix Boehm, Helene Deutsch, Edward and James Glover, Karen Horney, Melanie Klein, Carl Müller-Braunschweig, Sándor Radó, Theodor Reik, and Ernst Simmel. In addition to his research on collective psychology (‘‘Dreams and Myths,’’ 1909/1949), Abraham made important original contributions to the study of the development of the libido, including Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der Libido auf Frund der Psychoanalyse seelischer Störungen (1924) (A Short Study of the Development of the Libido Viewed in the Light of 5 A B R A H A M , N I C O L A S (1919 –1975 ) Mental Disorders, 1929). Abraham’s starting point was Freud’s theory of the stages of pregenital organization (1916–1917). He introduced a differentiation in the phase of libido development designated by Freud as oral-cannibalistic by proposing the existence of two aspects of oral activity—sucking and biting. Based on this hypothesis, he inferred two different modes of infantile object relation, incorporation by sucking and destruction by biting. This last relation was said to introduce the conflict of ambivalence into the infant’s life. Starting with this conflict, Abraham interpreted the ego disturbances of the melancholic adult: the ambivalence of the instinctual life causes a withdrawal of libidinal cathexis from the object; the liberated libido then turns toward the ego, which introjects the object. Abraham links the psychogenesis of melancholy with the disappointing mother during the early infantile phase of libido development. If it occurs before the successful mastery of oedipal wishes, that is, during the phase preceding the triumph of the narcissistic stage, then an associative link is made between the Oedipus complex and the cannibalistic stage of libido development. This would make possible the consecutive introjection of the two love objects, the father and mother. Even before Abraham had begun to study manicdepressive psychosis (from 1916 to 1924), he had made an important discovery in the research on schizophrenia in Die psychosexuelle Differenz der Hysterie und der Dementia Präcox (1908) (Psychosexual Differences between Hysteria and Dementia Praecox, 1949): Disturbances of ego functions are secondary with respect to the disturbances in the libidinal area. Thus Abraham could make use of libido theory to understand dementia praecox. In this same work Abraham introduced the concept of ‘‘autism,’’ which was later taken up by Eugen Bleuler (1911). Abraham is one of the founders of psychoanalytic research on psychoses, on collective psychoanalytic psychology and, with Sándor Ferenczi and Ernst Simmel, on the psychoanalysis of war neuroses. His principal work, ‘‘Examination of the Earliest Pregenital Stage of Libido Development,’’ has continued to stimulate research in the field down to the present day. The Psychoanalytic Training Institute he created in Berlin has become a model for other institutes throughout the world and the current Institute of Psychoanalysis in Berlin bears his name. Abraham published five books and 115 articles and made numerous presentations at 6 IPA congresses. His complete works have been collected and translated into several languages. JOHANNES CREMERIUS Work discussed: ‘‘Dreams and Myths.’’ See also: Depression; Germany; Libidinal stage; Libido; Mania; Melancholia; Visual and psychoanalysis; Secret Committee; Work of mourning. Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1949). Dreams and myths: A study in race psychology. In Selected papers of Karl Abraham, M.D. (Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Original work published 1909) ———. (1949). A short study of the development of the libido viewed in the light of mental disorders. In Selected papers of Karl Abraham, M.D. (Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Original work published 1924) Cremerius, Johannes. (1969–1971). Karl Abraham: psychoanalytische Studien. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. Freud, Sigmund. (1926). Karl Abraham. SE, 20: 277–278. Grinstein, Alexander. (1968). On Sigmund Freud’s dreams. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. ABRAHAM, NICOLAS (1919–1975) Nicolas Abraham, a psychoanalyst and philosopher, was born on May 23, 1919, in Kecskemet, Hungary, and died on December 18, 1975, in Paris. He came from an educated family, and his father was a rabbi and printer. After spending his childhood in Hungary, he studied philosophy in Paris. He worked in the Department of Aesthetics of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (French National Center for Scientific Research) during the 1940s and 1950s and was trained in analysis at the Psychoanalytic Society of Paris. He worked closely with Maria Torok, who continued their research activity after Abraham’s death. Between 1959 and 1975 Abraham’s work contributed to the renewal of psychoanalytic theory and practice. Together with Maria Torok he introduced several key concepts of contemporary psychoanalysis: the family secret, transmitted from one generation to the next (theory of the phantom), the impossibility of mourning following the emergence of shameful libidinal impulses INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ABSTINENCE/RULE in the bereaved before or after the death of someone (mourning disorder), secret identification with another (incorporation), the burial of an inadmissible experience (crypt). In The Wolf Man’s Magic Word (1986) and The Shell and the Kernel (1994), Nicolas Abraham explored the ravages of trauma and the other enemies of life, and his discoveries flesh out Freud’s theories and help expand the limits of analysis. Abraham’s clinical experience forced him to modify some of the fundamental assumptions of Freudian theory (oedipal fantasies, the castration complex, the death impulse) and isolate hitherto unknown sources of human suffering. The principle of trauma that emerges, trauma that arrests spontaneous self-creation (or introjection in the sense defined by Sándor Ferenczi in 1909 and 1912), constitutes the fulcrum around which these discoveries were organized. Abraham also redirected the focus of classic psychoanalysis, centered on libidinal conflicts, to the possibility of psychic development and discovery that can be realized at any age, as well as to the obstacles to such development encountered in catastrophes such as social shame, war, mourning, racial or political persecution, hate crimes, and concentration camps. In France, Abraham’s work constituted a third way between orthodox Freudianism and Lacaniansm. Overcoming various forms of resistance, it has achieved worldwide recognition and has been translated into English, German, and Italian; translations into Swedish, Hungarian, and other languages are currently underway. His influence can be found in the growing interest of contemporary psychoanalysis in the transgenerational point of view and in the analysis of the singular traumas of the individual within the family environment. NICHOLAS RAND AND MARIA TOROK See also: Introjection; Phantom; Torok, Maria; Secret. Bibliography Abraham, Nicolas, and Torok, Maria. (1986). The Wolf Man’s magic word (Nicholas Rand, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Original work published 1976) ———. (1994). The shell and the kernel: Renewals of psychoanalysis (Nicholas Rand, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1978) Ferenczi, Sandor. (1968). Transfert et introjection. O.C., Psychanalyse I (Vol. I : 1908-1912, pp. 93–125). Paris: Payot. (Original work published 1909) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OF ABSTINENCE ———. (1968). Le concept d’introjection. O.C., Psychanalyse I (Vol. I : 1908-1912, pp. 196–198). Paris: Payot. (Original work published 1912) Rand, Nicholas, and Torok, Maria. (1995). Questions à Freud: du devenir de la psychanalyse. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. ABSTINENCE/RULE OF ABSTINENCE The term ‘‘abstinence/rule of abstinence’’ designates a number of technical recommendations that Freud stated regarding the general framework of the psychoanalytic treatment. As is the case with the fundamental rule, these recommendations have two symmetrical sides, that of the patient and that of the analyst. The problems posed when acting out takes the place of remembering led Freud to recommend, ‘‘One best protects the patient from injuries brought about through carrying out one of his impulses by making him promise not to take any important decisions affecting his life during the time of his treatment— for instance not to choose any profession or definitive love-object—but to postpone all such plans until after his recovery. At the same time one willingly leaves untouched as much of the patient’s personal freedom as is compatible with these restrictions, nor does one hinder him from carrying out unimportant intentions, even if they are foolish’’ (Freud 1914g, p. 153). This advice to abstain from all important decisions was, for a long time, stated at the beginning of each treatment, even while reflections on the place and function of ‘‘acts’’ in the course of a treatment, both within and outside the analytic situation, continued to stimulate much theoretical and practical debate. Freud described the need for the analyst to observe abstinence in his article ‘‘Observations on TransferenceLove’’: ‘‘I have already let it be understood that analytic technique requires of the physician that he should deny to the patient who is craving for love the satisfaction she demands. The treatment must be carried out in abstinence. By this I do not mean physical abstinence alone, nor yet the deprivation of everything that the patient desires, for perhaps no sick person could tolerate this. Instead, I shall state it as a fundamental principle that the patient’s need and longing should be allowed to persist in her, in order that they may serve as forces impelling her to do work and to make changes’’ (Freud 1915a, pp. 164–165). 7 A B S T I N E N C E /R U L E OF ABSTINENCE Thus it is after years of psychoanalytic practice that the notion of abstinence appeared as such in Freud’s work. The theory of unconscious desire and of the transference had to be elaborated and their application to the progression of the treatment put to the test in order for their technical consequences to be recognized. The transferential demands and the counter-transferential responses that Freud’s followers made him become aware of, such as the case of Jung and Sabina Spielrein, as well as what he then learned about the practice of ‘‘wild analysis,’’ quickly persuaded him to enunciate a recommendation. His followers subsequently and little by little transformed the recommendation into a ‘‘principle,’’ and then a ‘‘rule,’’ which became quite rigid. It is clear that, from the beginning, it was never a matter of moral prescription, but a technical one that accorded with the metapsychological demands, particularly the economic ones, involved in the psychoanalytic situation. In the twenties, when Freud and then Sándor Ferenczi experimented with the ‘‘active technique,’’ frustration (Versagung) resulting from interdictions or injunctions that, it was hoped, would turn the patient away from modes of satisfaction judged to be pathological. In 1918, Freud wrote, ‘‘By abstinence, however, is not to be understood doing without any and every satisfaction—that would of course not be practicable; nor do we mean what it popularly connotes, refraining from sexual intercourse; it means something else which has far more to do with the dynamics of falling ill and recovering. You will remember that it was a frustration that made the patient ill, and that his symptoms serve him as substitutive satisfactions. [. . .] Cruel though it may sound, we must see to it that the patient’s suffering, to a degree that is in some way or other effective, does not come to an end prematurely.’’ (Freud 1919a [1918], pp. 162–163) And Ferenczi continued, ‘‘[. . .] the ‘active therapy’, hitherto regarded as a single entity, breaks up into the systematic issuing and carrying out of injunctions and of prohibitions, Freud’s ‘attitude of abstinence’ being constantly maintained’’ (Ferenczi, pp. 193–194). It is in this sense, then, that Rudolph Lowenstein—and also Anna Freud—explained that while some analysts think it necessary to prohibit their patients from performing this or that perverse sexual practice, it would not be wise to recommend the same to homosexual patients (Lowenstein). It was chiefly in the United States that a slippage took place that turned the recommendation of 8 abstinence into an increasingly restrictive ‘‘rule.’’ Karl Menninger and Phillip Holzman (1973) even considered it the ‘‘second fundamental rule’’ of psychoanalysis. But the risk of insinuating a moral judgment left a lingering ambiguity, and proponents of relaxing the rule argued that some analysts used it to prohibit their patients from having sexual relations or extramarital affairs. Over the years, the notion of abstinence came to be invoked less and less, and it has even been proposed that analysts speak instead of a ‘‘rule of the reality principle.’’ Above all, it has been replaced by ‘‘neutrality,’’ a concept not explicitly mentioned by Freud (Mijolla), and even a ‘‘benevolent neutrality’’ (Stone, 1961) or a ‘‘compassionate neutrality’’ (Greenson; Weigert 1970). In the evolution of these attitudes, the mark of Sándor Ferenczi’s important influence on matters of practice is obvious, since the prescriptions of abstinence pushed to the extreme were those of the ‘‘active technique’’ and since the frequent tendency of ‘‘benevolent neutrality’’ to drift towards more and more established ‘‘benevolence’’ of the maternal type characterized the last years of his practice. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Act, passage to the; Benevolent neutrality; Frustration; Neutrality; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Transference love. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sándor. (1921) The further development of the ‘‘active technique’’ in psychoanalysis. In Selected Writings. London: Penguin, 1999: 187–204. Freud, Sigmund. (1919a [1918]). Lines of advance in psycho-analytic therapy. SE, 17: 157–168. ———. (1915a [1914]). Observations on transference love (further recommendations on the technique of psychoanalysis III). SE, 12: 157–171. Greenson, Ralph R. (1958). Variations in classical psychoanalytic technique. International Journal of PsychoAnalysis, 29, 200–201. Loewenstein, Rudolph M. (1958). Remarks on some variations in psycho-analytic technique. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 39, 202–210. Mijolla, Alain de. (1998). Le ‘‘conflit thérapeutique’’ et la ‘‘neutralité.’’In G. Diatkine and J. Schaeffer (Eds.), Psychothérapies psychanalytiques (pp. 110–119). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A C T /A C T I O N ACT/ACTION The terms ‘‘act’’ and ‘‘action’’ are related, both referring to a form of behavior (motor, verbal, etc.) intended to modify the environment, either to avoid a danger or unpleasure, or to satisfy a need or desire. The term ‘‘act,’’ however, refers primarily to this event in its uniqueness and effectiveness, whereas ‘‘action’’ designates both a process, which can be more or less complex and durable, and the result of that process. These definitions are not psychoanalytic in themselves, and there is no coherent body of thought in psychoanalysis concerning them, in spite of the rather fragmentary references found in Freud and subsequent attempts to give these concepts a theoretical status. The first psychoanalytic use of the term by Freud is probably his reference to ‘‘specific action,’’ that is, the behavior that results in the satisfaction of a need (Manuscript E, 1894, and ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology,’’ 1895, in 1950a). This idea, which he returned to only intermittently, may seem narrowly behaviorist. However, even in these early works, Freud gives the term an entirely different dimension. He writes that since the infant is incapable of satisfying its own needs, ‘‘specific action’’ by another person is needed, and he elaborates on what he considers essential to the process: ‘‘If the satisfaction of the need is not satisfied in this way, it is manifested as desire through hallucinatory satisfaction. But the impossibility of maintaining this hallucinatory satisfaction in the face of the persistence of the need gives rise to the representation; the object is born, within the movement of desire, from its presence-absence.’’ A preliminary version of these ideas is found in the following comment by Freud that appears in the ‘‘Project’’: ‘‘The initial helplessness of human beings is the primal source of all moral motives.’’ Freud would return to and develop these ideas in his ‘‘Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning’’ (1911b), where he attempts to show that, whenever the reality principle gets the upper hand of the pleasure principle, ‘‘motor discharge was now employed in the appropriate alternation of reality; it was converted into action. Restraint upon motor discharge (upon action) which then became necessary, was provided by means of the process of thinking, which was developed from the presentation of ideas’’(1911b, p. 221). This idea, whereby thought is a suspension of adaptive perceptual-motor activity, a ‘‘trial activity’’ involving representations, was in fact familiar to a number of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS authors at the beginning of the twentieth century, as has been shown by Henri Wallon (1942). It was discussed at greater length by Freud in the last part of Totem and Taboo (1912–13a), which he concludes with this quote from Goethe: ‘‘In the beginning was the deed.’’ Although the topic was not fully developed by Freud, the terms ‘‘act’’ and ‘‘action’’ appear frequently in his writings, whether he is discussing failed acts, compulsive acts, symptoms, repetitive acts (1914g), the suspension of motor activity during dreams, etc. The prohibition against action within the analytic situation stimulated, both during Freud’s lifetime and after, a number of reflections on the infractions constituted by actings. Since Freud’s day, there have been many attempts to understand these issues. Heinz Kohut advanced the concept of ‘‘action-thought,’’ a concrete thought process halfway between action and thought. Roy Schafer (1976) attempted to refine metapsychology in terms of the actions that constituted thought acts. Daniel Widlöcher (1986) attempted to reformulate it in terms of ‘‘unconscious presentations of actions’’ that generate thought actions. Throughout these approaches the reference to impulse is vague or explicitly eliminated. However, there are no benefits to this. To understand the problem of action and its relationship with mental activity, we must take account of representation and fantasy. If ‘‘in the beginning was the deed,’’ (from Goethe’s Faust, part I, scene 3, quoted by Freud in 1912-13a, p. 161) this indeed involves understanding the development and functioning of psychic activity within two closely related points of view: representations and symbolization processes that terminate in secondary thought, and the organization of fantasy, where fantasies can be considered to be ‘‘representations of actions’’ (PerronBorelli, 1997; Perron-Borelli, and Perron, 1997). ROGER PERRON See also: Acting out/acting in; Action-thought (H. Kohut); Reality principle; Specific action; Totem and Taboo. Bibliography Perron-Borelli, Michèle. (1997). Dynamique du fantasme. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Perron-Borelli, Michèle, and Perron, Roger. (1997). Fantasme, action, pensée. Alger: Éditions de la Société algérienne de psychologie. 9 ACTING OUT/ACTING IN Schafer, Roy. (1976). A new language for psychoanalysis. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Wallon, Henri. (1970). De l’acte à la pensée. Paris: Flammarion. (Original work published 1942) Widlöcher, Daniel. (1986). Métapsychologie du sens. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Further Reading Ellman, J., rep. (2000). Panel: The mechanism of action of psychoanalytic treatment. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 48, 919–928. Grand, Stanley. (2002). Action in the psychoa situation: internal & external reality. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 19, 254–280. Katz, Gil. (1998). Where the action is: the enacted dimension of analytic process., Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 46, 1129–1168. Ogden, Thomas H. (1994). The concept of interpretive action. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 63, 219–245. ACTING OUT/ACTING IN The term ‘‘acting out’’ corresponds to Freud’s use of the German word ‘‘agieren’’ (as a verb and as a noun). It should be distinguished from the closely related concept of ‘‘passage à l’acte,’’ inherited from the French psychiatric tradition and denoting the impulsive and usually violent acts often addressed in criminology. ‘‘Acting out’’ refers to the discharge by means of action, rather than by means of verbalization, of conflicted mental content. Though there is this contrast between act and word, both sorts of discharge are responses to a return of the repressed: repeated in the case of actions, remembered in the case of words. Another distinction occasionally drawn is between acting out and acting in, used to distinguish between actions that occur outside psychoanalytic treatment (often to be explained as compensation for frustration brought on by the analytic situation, by the rule of abstinence, for example) and actions that occur within treatment (in the form of nonverbal communication or body language, but also of prolonged silences, repeated pauses, or attempts to seduce or attack the analyst). Freud first mentioned acting out in connection with the case of ‘‘Dora’’ (1905e [1901]), noting with 10 respect to her transference that his patient took revenge on him just as she wanted to take revenge on Herr K.: Dora ‘‘deserted me as she believed herself to have been deceived and deserted by him. Thus she acted out an essential part of her recollections and phantasies instead of reproducing them in the treatment’’ (p. 119). The notion of acting out is closely bound up with the theory of the transference and its development. Though Freud treated the transference as the cause of acting out —and as an obstacle to treatment —in the Dora case, he subsequently described transference as a great boon to analysis, provided it could be successfully recognized and its significance conveyed to the patient. Acting out is thus attributable to a failure of the interpretive work or to the patient’s failure to assimilate it. In his paper ‘‘Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through’’ (1914g), Freud revisited the distinction between remembering and acting out: ‘‘The patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory, but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it’’ (p. 150). The examples that Freud gave here involved the repetition of feelings (feeling rebellious and defiant, or ‘‘helpless and hopeless’’) that had formerly been directed at a person or situation in childhood but that now manifested themselves, either directly or indirectly (through dreams, silences, and so on), visà-vis the analyst. Freud’s assessment of such instances of acting out was nuanced, for he realized that they were at once a form of resistance against the emergence of a memory and a particular ‘‘way of remembering’’ (p. 150). Inasmuch as acting out occurs outside as well as inside the analytic situation, Freud went on, ‘‘We must be prepared to find, therefore, that the patient yields to the compulsion to repeat, which now replaces the impulsion to remember, not only in his personal attitude to his doctor but also in every other activity and relationship which may occupy his life at the time—— if, for instance, he falls in love or undertakes a task or starts an enterprise during the treatment’’ (p. 151). Acting out and repeating are ultimately the same process, involving ‘‘everything that has already made its way from the sources of the repressed into [the patient’s] manifest personality——his inhibitions and unserviceable attitudes and his pathological charactertraits’’ (p. 151). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ACTION-LANGUAGE All the same, acting out in reality could have grave consequences, precipitating disasters in the patient’s life and dashing any hope of cure through psychoanalysis. It is thus up to the analyst, relying on the patient’s transference-based attachment, to control the patient’s impulses and repetitive acts, notably by extracting a promise to refrain, while under treatment, from making any serious decisions regarding professional or love life. The analyst, however, must be ‘‘prepared for a perpetual struggle with his patient to keep in the psychical sphere all the impulses which the patient would like to direct into the motor sphere; and he celebrates it as a triumph for the treatment if he can bring it about that something that the patient wishes to discharge in action is disposed of through the work of remembering’’ (p. 153). In Freud’s thinking, then, acting out was long associated with the transference. ’In An Outline of PsychoAnalysis (1940a [1938]) Freud emphasized the need to clearly demarcate between ‘‘actualization’’ in the transference from acting out, whether inside or outside the analytic session: ‘‘We think it most undesirable if the patient acts outside the transference instead of remembering. The ideal conduct for our purposes would be that he should behave as normally as possible outside the treatment and express his abnormal reactions only in the transference’’ (p. 177). Many other authors have deployed the notion of acting out, typically when considering personalities more inclined to act out than to remember in the context of the transference. Thus Anna Freud (1968) saw pre-oedipal pathologies in this light, and León Grinberg hypothesized that acting out is a reaction to inadequate mourning for the loss of an early object. Such approaches take acting out to be inappropriate or even disruptive acts precipitated by the pressure of unconscious wishes. ———. (1914g). ‘‘Remembering, repeating, and workingthrough (further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis II).’’ SE, 12: 145–156. ———. (1940a [1938]). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 139–207. Grinberg, León. (1968). ‘‘On acting out and its role in the psychoanalytic process.’’ International Journal of PsychoAnalysis, 49, 171–178. Further Reading Chasseguet-Smirgel, Janine. (1990). On acting out. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 71, 77–86. Eagle, Morris. (1993). Enactments, transference, and symptomatic cure: a case history. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 3, 93–110. De Blecourt, Abraham. (1993). Transference, countertransference, and acting out in analysis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 74, 757–774 Gill, Merton M., disc. (1993). On "Enactments": Interaction and interpretation. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 3, 111–122. Goldberg, Arnold. (2002). Enactment as understanding and misunderstanding. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 50, 869–884. Paniagua, Cecilio. (1998). Acting in revisited. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 79, 499–512. Roughton, Ralph E. (1993). Useful aspects acting out: repetition, enactment, actualization. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 41, 443–472. ACTION-LANGUAGE Freud, Anna. (1968). ‘‘Acting out.’’ International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 49 (2–3), 165–170. The notion of ‘‘action-language’’ was proposed by Roy Schafer to refer to a code or group of rules, within the framework of a conceptualization that aims to legitimize existence to all conscious or unconscious activity, and all mental acts capable of being externalized by means of words or gestures, so that these mental acts can be related to unconscious conflicts (slips of the tongue, parapraxes), representations of self and object, bodily fantasies, feelings and emotions, desires and beliefs, or courses of action that the subject uses to ‘‘put aside’’ certain ideas or invest others. Freud, Sigmund. (1905e [1901]). ‘‘Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria.’’ SE, 7: 1–122. Action-language involves a strategy (favoring the use of action verbs and adverbs over nouns, adjectives, SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence; Active technique; Act, passage to the; ‘‘Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria’’ (Dora, Ida Bauer); Technique with adults, psychoanalytic. Bibliography INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 11 ACTION-(RE)PRESENTATION and the verbs have and be) for listening to, acknowledging, translating, retranslating, interpreting, and organizing the data or the modalities of action of the agent or his or her person, that is, the analysand, within the context of the transference and resistance. Bibliography The analysand acts in a conflicted way, whether at the unconscious, preconscious, or conscious level. He or she follows actions of thinking or ideas that possess mental qualities, and verbalizes according to different narrative registers. According to Schafer, the concept’s originator, who drew his inspiration from the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jean-Paul Sartre, actionlanguage is an alternative to the traditional, mechanistic terminology of metapsychology, encumbered by psychoeconomic, spatial, biological, physiochemical, or anthropomorphic metaphors. Such metaphors, according to Schafer, are devoid of content, anachronistic, attributive and conducive to fragmentation, archaic and childish. Terms such as motives, propulsive energy forces, regulating principles, structures, functions, instincts, and objects, used by Sigmund Freud and psychoanalysts in a general way, can only very partially account for the mind’s activities of ideation and speech (including inner thoughts, associations, and substitutive formations). ———. (1980). Action language and the psychology of the self. Annual of Psychoanalysis (Chicago Institute). 8, 83–92. By contrast, action-language purports to bring, through the rigorous descriptions of mental acts it entails, greater clarity and effectiveness to treatment, in that the causal explanation based on the concrete and active ‘‘existence’’ of the person ostensibly leads to a personal recharacterization of his or her psychic reality. Further, by getting away from notions of the ‘‘mind-machine,’’ action and its language can supposedly bring us back to the true hermeneutics that is psychoanalysis. The idea, moreover, is not to replace or alter psychoanalytic technique, but to find a metalanguage that is faithful to its origins. A number of charges (psychologism, personalism, phenomenological reductionism, disregard of the unconscious, a flattening of discourse, the inadequacy of the rules of transcription) have been leveled against this undertaking ‘‘in the first person,’’ which aims to provide a foundation for psychoanalysis and to oppose any reification of the subject. SIMONE VALANTIN See also: Act/action; Action-(re)presentation; Interpretation. 12 Schafer, Roy. (1976). A new language for psychoanalysis. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ———. (1978). Language and insight. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Further Reading Spence, Donald P. (1982). Some clinical implications of action language. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 30, 169-184. ACTION-(RE)PRESENTATION The notion of action-presentation (or action-representation) is based on two Freudian models: on the one hand, the idea that representation derives from the failure of hallucinatory wish-fulfillment, developed in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), and on the other, the model that establishes the unconscious ‘‘thing-presentation’’ as a mental ‘‘representative’’ of the instinct, elaborated in ‘‘Repression’’ (1915d) and ‘‘The Unconscious’’ (1915e). Such a grouping of concepts aims to bring out the dynamic functions of fantasies within the general realm of a theory of representation (Perron-Borelli, 1997). Action-presentations, which are ubiquitous in dreams because of the hallucinatory process induced by the inhibition of motor discharges, are at the core of fantasmatic organization. Indeed, fantasies cannot be reduced to object-presentations: They originate in a dynamic organization that from the outset brings together intrapsychic processes and, at their most basic level, an action-presentation and an objectpresentation. The action-presentation occupies a central position in the ‘‘fundamental structure of fantasy,’’ the product of a later and more complex elaboration, that makes possible the representation of all forms of the subject’s desire toward the object. This involves a representational structure, made up of three parts (subjectaction-object) and based on an elaboration of the primal scene, which allows all its variants to be represented. This structure thus takes on the role of a system of transformations capable of representing the plurality INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A C T I O N -T H O U G H T ( H . K O H U T ) and mobility of desires and the identifications (bisexual) that characterize the oedipal organization. Within the dynamics of this fundamental structure, the action-presentation is the pivot point around which the displacement of objects, as well as the inversion of subject and object positions linked to the related dynamics of drives and identifications (inversion of active/passive or sadistic-masochistic movements, among others), can be effected. The role played by action-presentations in fantasies sheds light on the dynamic links between fantasies and effective actions (Perron-Borelli 1997; Perron & Perron-Borelli 1987). This allows for a clearer understanding of behaviors enacted during treatment (Freudian agieren, or acting out), compulsive behaviors, phobias of impulsive acts, and the like. Such an approach emphasizes the importance of fantasy elaboration inasmuch as it prepares and makes possible fulfillments (satisfactions) through action. This concept of action-presentations, closely linked to the dynamics of fantasy, can be compared to the idea of ‘‘unconscious action-presentation’’ used by Daniel Widlöcher in Métapsychologie du sens (Metapsychology of meaning; 1986). However, this author adopted a very different theoretical framework. Far from seeing the action-representation as being articulated with an underlying drive, he seemed to attempt to erase the very notion of the drive. According to him, the unconscious is made up of a sort of ‘‘memory of actions’’ that can only be grasped through the analytic listening process. The conceptions of Roy Schafer and Heinz Kohut are even further from the fundamental bases of Freudian metapsychology. In A New Language for Psychoanalysis (1976), under the label ‘‘action language,’’ Schafer essentially reduced mental processes as a whole to mental ‘‘activities’’ of representation and speech that are connotable by action verbs. For its part, Kohut’s idea of ‘‘action-thought,’’ put forward in The Analysis of the Self (1971), is the expression of a concrete, creative thought in which action and thought are conflated. ROGER PERRON See also: Act/action; Acting out/acting in; Action-thought (H. Kohut); Fantasy; Thing-presentation; Wish, hallucinatory satisfaction of a. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I. SE, 4: 1–338; The interpretation of dreams. Part II. SE, 5: 339–625. ———. (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141–158. ———. (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159–204. Kohut, Heinz. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press. Perron, Roger, and Perron-Borelli, Michelle. (1987). Fantasme et action. Revue française de psychanalyse, 51 (2), 539–637. Perron-Borelli, Michèle. (1997). Dynamique du fantasme. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Schafer, Roy. (1976). A new language for psychoanalysis. New Haven: Yale University Press. Widlöcher, Daniel. (1986). Métapsychologie du sens. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ACTION-THOUGHT (H. KOHUT) Action-thought is the expression of a concrete, creative kind of thought merged with action. This category has its origin in pioneering experiments that illustrate a new scientific principle by which psychoanalytic patients reveal insights they are in the process of acquiring. In the psychoanalytic context, actionthought is creative—and thus quite distinct from resistance, from acting out, or from the thinking that replaces memories dismantled by interpretation. The notion is part of the theory of the autonomous development of narcissism, as worked out by Heinz Kohut and his followers. Action-thought was first considered by Kohut in The Analysis of the Self (1971), where he spoke of a kind of sublimation presupposing the modification of archaic narcissistic fantasies. He expanded on the idea of nonreplicable scientific experiments expressing the concrete, creative thought of genius in his later work The Restoration of the Self (1977, pp. 36ff; see also Koyré, Alexandre, 1968). The notion advanced was that creation sometimes takes place in such a way that thought and action are indistinguishable, as when scientists believe they have gleaned knowledge from external reality when in fact that knowledge was already a part of their own mental reality. Kohut addressed the clinical relevance of action-thought in a 13 ACTIVE IMAGINATION (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) letter written on May 16, 1974, in which he recounted that a patient prone to concrete thought carried out a meticulous exploration of the analyst’s office; this in no way involved an expression of childlike curiosity, but rather of thinking in and through action. In 1977, when Kohut was proposing a generalized self psychology, action-thought was a crucial concept that clearly set his approach to the treatment of narcissistic patients and its termination apart from that of ego psychology. Returning to the analogy of scientific discovery and advances in knowledge of reality, Kohut alluded to the moment when facts could not yet be distinguished from theory since thought and action were not yet differentiated. The concept of action-thought was emblematic of Kohut’s new theory of narcissism, according to which the patient acted out the stages leading to a new mental equilibrium dependent on a modification in his or her narcissism. In the clinical context, this changed narcissism was the vehicle of messages interpretable by the patient, messages that would not be ignored but could be transformed. This was a sign of progress, for psychoanalytic treatment could not arrive at change by interpretation alone, but called too for a ‘‘transmuting internalization’’ of the narcissistic functions as assumed and verbalized by the analyst (Kohut, 1977, pp. 30–32). Action-thought was thus cardinal for Kohut, who felt that narcissism was a factor in all creativity, which he understood to be a positive transformation of some aspect of the individual’s narcissism. The repair of narcissism—the essential goal in the psychoanalysis of narcissistic personalities—tended to be seen as the universal road to therapy. And neurosis itself, Kohut felt, was at risk of being reduced to narcissistic weaknesses left over from the oedipal period. AGNÈS OPPENHEIMER See also: Kohut, Heinz; Narcissism; Self-analysis Bibliography Kohut, Heinz. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1977). The restoration of the self. New York: International Universities Press. Koyré, Alexandre (1968). Metaphysics and measurement: Essays in scientific revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 14 ACTIVE IMAGINATION (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) Active imagination in Carl Jung’s analytical method of psychotherapy involves opening oneself to the unconscious and giving free rein to fantasy, while at the same time maintaining an active, attentive, conscious point of view. The process leads to a synthesis that contains both perspectives, but in a new and surprising way. ‘‘The Transcendent Function’’ (1916b [1958]) is Jung’s first paper about the method he later came to call active imagination. It has two parts or stages: Letting the unconscious come up and Coming to terms with the unconscious. He describes its starting points (mainly moods, images, bodily sensations); and some of its many expressive forms (painting, sculpting, drawing, writing, dancing, weaving, dramatic enactment, inner visions, inner dialogues). In this early essay he links his method to work with dreams and the therapeutic relationship. The term ‘‘transcendent function’’ encompasses both the method and its inborn dynamic function that unites opposite position in the psyche. Jung discovered active imagination out of his own need for self-healing in a certain period of his life. It all began with symbolic play: ‘‘I had no choice but to. . .take up that child’s life with his childish games’’ (Jung, 1962/1966, p. 174). He found that as long as he managed to translate his emotions into symbolic images, he was inwardly calmed and reassured. When he opened to the raw material of the unconscious, he did not identify with the affects and images, rather, he turned his curiosity toward the inner world of the imagination. This led to a deep process of renewal, as well as insights that gave him a new orientation. In the years that followed, he recommended it to many of his patients and students. He presents active imagination as an adjunctive technique, but by linking it to his symbolic method of dream interpretation and work with the analytic relationship, Jung laid the groundwork for a comprehensive method of psychotherapy. Active imagination is a direct extension of Freud’s free association (Jung, 1929, p. 47). Other related notions include the transcendent function; the natural healing function of play and imagination; Sandplay; active vs. passive attitudes toward fantasy; reductive and constructive ways to understand the unconscious content; creative formulation vs. understanding; liberation from the analyst (Chodorow, 1997). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ACTIVE TECHNIQUE Jungian analysts hold a wide range of views on active imagination (Samuels, 1985). For some it is a peripheral technique not much used anymore. For others it is the essence and goal of analysis. JOAN CHODOROW See also: Amplification (analytical psychology); Analytical psychology. Bibliography Chodorow, Joan. (1997). Introduction. Jung on active imagination (pp. 1–20). London: Routledge. Jung, Carl Gustav. (1916b [1958]). The Transcendant Function. Coll. Works (Vol. VIII). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ———. (1929–31). Freud and Jung: Contrasts. Coll. Works (Vol. IV). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ———. (1966). Memories, dreams, reflections. London: Routledge. (Original work published 1962) Samuels, Andrew. (1985). Jung and the Post-Jungians, London-Boston: Routledge. ACTIVE TECHNIQUE A method advocated by Sándor Ferenczi starting in 1919, the active technique consisted of formulating to the patient, at certain moments of stagnation in the treatment, injunctions or interdictions concerning his or her behavior in such a way as to provoke tensions within the psychic apparatus, with the aim of reactivating the process and of bringing to light repressed material. Only the patient was encouraged to perform certain actions. The psychoanalyst remained inactive and attentive to the emergence of new mnemic material in the associations of the patient. The process was used only as an ‘‘adjuvant’’ in order to precipitate the emergence of new associations, the interpretation of which remained, just as in the classic technique, the principle task of the analysis. Impasses with the active technique led Ferenczi, several years later, to abandon an economic and authoritarian conception of psychoanalytic treatment and replace it with neocathartic relaxation and technical elasticity, an approach facilitated by empathy and benevolence. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ‘‘We owe the prototype of this ‘active technique’ to Freud himself,’’ wrote Ferenczi in 1919 (p. 157), noting that at the beginning of the Freud’s work, the cathartic method was a technique of great ‘‘activity,’’ as much on the analyst’s part as the patient’s. The idea in those days was to apply pressure as a way of awakening memories and precipitating the abreaction of blocked affects. This approach was succeeded by the technique of free association, a non-directive method founded on the apparently passive listening and receptivity of the analyst. However, recalled Ferenczi, it was while developing analytic technique that Freud was led, during the analysis of anxiety hysterias, to require of his patients that they directly confront the critical situations that gave rise to their anxieties, not in order to habituate themselves to those situations, but rather to achieve the ‘‘ligature of customary, unconscious paths of discharge of excitation and the enforcement of the preconscious cathexis as well as the conscious ones of the repressed material.’’ (p. 157) Thus Ferenczi was led, following Freud, to break at certain points in the treatment with the receptive and passive attitude of the analyst monitoring the associative material of patients, and to intervene actively at the level of their psyche. ‘‘The patients, in spite of close compliance with the ‘fundamental rule’ and in spite of a deep insight into their unconscious complexes, could not get beyond ‘dead ends’ in the analysis until they were compelled to venture out from the retreat of their phobia, and to expose themselves experimentally to the situation they had avoided with anxiety, but, in exposing themselves to this affect, they at the same time overcame the resistance to hitherto repressed material which now became accessible to analysis in the form of ideas and reminiscences’’ (Ferenczi, 1921/1999, p. 189). ‘‘I really meant,’’ Ferenczi continues, ‘‘that the description of ‘active technique’ should be applied to this procedure, which does not so much represent an active interference on the part of the doctor as on the part of the patient upon whom are imposed certain tasks besides the keeping to the fundamental rule. In the cases of phobia the task consisted in the carrying out of unpleasant activities.’’ (p. 189) Thus ‘‘[i]n stimulating what is inhibited, and inhibiting what is uninhibited’’ (p. 201), in demanding that patients renounce certain satisfactions and in advising 15 A C T I V I T Y /P A S S I V I T Y them to perform certain unpleasant acts, Ferenczi hoped to provoke an increase in psychic tension, a new distribution within the libidinal economy, and thus to allow new mnemic material to become accessible, and ultimately to accelerate the course of the analysis. For Freud, then, the active technique was a kind of ‘‘agent provocateur,’’ the injunctions and the prohibitions serving only as an adjuvant, promoting the repetition that must then be interpreted or reconstructed in memory. Later, Ferenczi came to have serious reservations about the usefulness of the active technique. Badly applied, or poorly employed by novice analysts, this method risked exacerbating the patient’s resistances and hampering the deployment of the transference. It was liable to reinforce the patient’s masochism by organizing his or her submission (Bokanowski, T. 1994). Ferenczi specifically questioned the wisdom of an arbitrarily decided date for the termination of the treatment. So Ferenczi progressively distanced himself, above all in his critical study, ‘‘Contra-Indications to the ‘Active’ Psychoanalytical Technique’’ (1926/1999), from an authoritarian orientation of the treatment founded on frustration and abstinences. He introduced the new notions of ‘‘elasticity,’’ that is, patience and empathy, and ‘‘relaxation.’’ He even mentioned (1933/1999) the aggressive features of the active technique that aimed at a ‘‘forced relaxation’’ in the patient (p. 296). It was no longer up to the analyst, but rather to the patient, to determine the opportune moment when the treatment had sufficiently progressed to allow him or her to tackle the renunciation of neurotic satisfactions and the overcoming of inhibitions. In ‘‘Analysis, Terminable and Interminable’’ (1937c), Freud criticized in the firmest manner any intervention of the psychoanalyst at the level of material reality for the purposes of moving the analysis along or of making a negative transference appear artificially when it was not yet manifest. JEAN-FRANÇOIS RABAIN See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence; Character neurosis; Direct analysis; Elasticity; Framework of the psychoanalytic treatment; ‘‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’’ (Wolf Man); Kovács-Prosznitz, Vilma; Mutual analysis; Sokolnicka-Kutner, Eugénie; Tact; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Termination of treatment. 16 Bibliography Bokanowski, Thierry. (1994). Ensuite survient un trouble. In Michéle Bertrand (Ed), Collectif: Ferenczi, patient et psychanalyste. Paris: L’Harmattan. Ferenczi, Sándor. (1994). Contra-indications to the ‘‘active’’ psycho-analytical technique. In Further contributions to the theory and technique of psycho-analysis (pp. 217–230). London: Karnac. (Original work published 1926) ———. (1999). The confusion of tongues between adults and the child (The language of tenderness and of passion). In Selected writings. (pp. 255–268). London: Penguin. (Original work published 1933) ———. (1999). The elasticity of psychoanalytic technique. In Selected writings (pp. 255–268). London: Penguin. (Original work published 1928) ———. (1999). The further development of the ‘‘active technique’’ in psychoanalysis. In Selected writings (pp. 187–204). London: Penguin. (Original work published 1921) ———. (1999). On forced fantasies. In Selected writings (pp. 222–230). London: Penguin. (Original work published 1924) ———. (1999). Technical difficulties in a case of hysteria. In Selected writings (pp. 151–158). London: Penguin. (Original work published 1919) ACTIVITY/PASSIVITY The terms ‘‘activity’’ and ‘‘passivity’’ were already in use before Freud. For example, Richard von Krafft-Ebbing used them to compare sadism and masochism. Freud initially employed the terms within the framework of the theory of psychosexuality and, more specifically, with respect to the drives, creating paired opposites associated with masculine/feminine. He then used these terms in his dynamic analysis of ego as agency. For both paired opposites, ‘‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes’’ (Freud, 1915c) is a key reference. In it Freud referred to activity/passivity as one of ‘‘three polarities’’ that govern ‘‘our mental life as a whole’’ (p. 133), along with the pairs ego/outside world and pleasure/ unpleasure. But even in 1896 Freud had already evoked the polarity of activity/passivity in his theory of seduction, which he based on clinical findings and individual histories of neuroses. Hysteria, he wrote at the time, results from ‘‘sexual passivity during the pre-sexual period’’ (1896b, p. 163) that is reacted to by indifference, contempt, or fear. In contrast, in obsessional neurosis, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A C T I V I T Y /P A S S I V I T Y (Zwangsneurose) pleasure is active: the seduced infant actively, aggressively, repeats an experienced sexual attack on another infant. This alteration of the sexual attack experienced by the child from passive to active can also occur in masturbatory activity. Freud subsequently modified his views by acknowledging a ‘‘spontaneous’’ infantile sexuality not forcibly induced by an adult seducer. This was the theme of his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d). In this work Freud described libidinal development as proceeding from ‘‘a number of separate instincts and erotogenic zones, which, independently of one another, have pursued a certain sort of pleasure as their sole sexual aim’’ (p. 207) and have gradually unified under genital sexuality, which becomes primary. Therefore, the ‘‘opposition found in all sexual life clearly manifests itself ’’ within a development stage, whether it be the second pregenital or anal-sadistic phase. This is an opposition not between masculine and feminine but between active and passive. Freud noted, ‘‘The activity is put into operation by the instinct for mastery through the agency of the somatic musculature; the organ which, more than any other, represents the passive sexual aim is the erotogenic mucous membrane of the anus’’ (p. 198). This association comes into play during the anal sadistic phase, since, for Freud, earlier sexual activity, that of oral, or ‘‘cannibalistic,’’ organization, does not yet display these ‘‘opposing currents.’’ Primarily within a clinical framework Freud noted the opposition of active and passive with respect to homosexuality as well as the opposites sadism/ masochism and voyeurism/exhibitionism. He wrote that sexual intent ‘‘manifests itself in a dualistic form: active and passive.’’ A 1915 addition to the Three Essays generalized these ideas, designating activity and passivity as ‘‘universal characteristics of sexual life’’ (p. 159). In ‘‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes’’ (1915c) Freud further elaborated these ideas, which led him from the use of clinical findings to an analysis of the internal mechanism of the drive. Every drive is active in itself; it is a ‘‘piece of activity’’ (p. 122). However, the aim of the drive, which is always satisfaction, can be achieved by various means. One way is the ‘‘change from activity to passivity’’ (p. 127). For instance, in sadism/ masochism, the active goal of tormenting and watching is replaced by the passive goal of being tormented, of being watched. Therefore, three simultaneous or successive positions of the subject with respect to the object can result in satisfaction: active, passive (a reverINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS sal back to oneself), and ‘‘reflected means’’ (observing oneself, self-inflicted pain). This flexibility of the instinctive aims of the drive contrasts with the fixity of perverse sexuality. In developing his theory of psychosexuality, Freud closely linked the pairs activity/passivity and masculine/ feminine, which he sometimes used as synonyms. In some texts, in fact, Freud’s clinical observations shows them to be nearly indistinguishable, for example, in the Wolf Man’s regression from passive desires to masochistic and feminine desires toward his father (1918b [1914]). Later and in a context less closely associated with individual clinical analysis, Freud insisted on the importance of not ‘‘indentify[ing] activity with maleness and passivity with femaleness’’ (1930a, p. 106). As for the role of active and passive in the theory of the ego, Freud, in 1915, emphasized that transformations of the drive by repression and reversal protect the psychic apparatus. These transformations depend on ‘‘the narcissistic organization of the ego and bear the stamp of that phase. They perhaps correspond to the attempts at defense which at higher stages of the development of the ego are effected by other means’’ (p. 132). The transformations between active and passive imply a narcissistic consistency and a drive that is also no longer ‘‘poorly connected and independent’’ (Freud, 1915c). After 1920 and his introduction of the structural theory (ego, id, superego), Freud could refer to a passive ego confronting an id, or a masochistic or feminine ego confronting a sadistic superego (1928b). He then renewed his study of psychoses, melancholy, and trauma. It was around this time that Freud introduced the death drive and its essentially destructive effect through unbinding. With the notion of unbinding Freud could better distinguish the activity of the drive from its potential for destructive aggression. The internal organization of sadism/masochism (mastery, sadism, primary and secondary masochism) could then be conceived as protecting the psyche by binding the death drive (1924c). The repetition compulsion also reintroduces psychic binding through the interplay of activity and passivity in the face of trauma. This occurs during the child’s play when the child ‘‘makes the transition from passivity to activity [in order to] psychically control her impressions of life.’’ These perspectives are extensively explored in contemporary psychoanalytic work. SERGE GAUTHIER 17 ACT, PASSAGE TO THE See also: Homosexuality; Instinctual impulse; Masculinity/ femininity; Sadomasochism; Turning around. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1896b). Further remarks on the neuropsychoses of defence. SE, 3: 157–185. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109–140. ———. (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1–122. ———. (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155–170. ———. (1928b). Dostoevsky and parricide. SE, 21: 173–196. ———. (1930a). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57–145. ACT, PASSAGE TO THE A particular kind of action defined by its disruptive and even criminal character. Whether the aggression characterizing such an act is directed at the self or at others, it is generally considered psychopathological. In ‘‘passage to the act’’ it is the idea of ‘‘passage’’ that is important, for it refers to the relationship between the act and the supposed mental process that prepares for and facilitates it. The French term passage à l’acte was borrowed by psychoanalysis from psychiatry and criminology. It is important that this notion not be confused with that of acting-out/acting-in, which should be limited to the framework of the treatment and the dynamics of the transference. More generally speaking, passage to the act, like inhibited action and procrastination, raises the issue of the connection between thought and action. Freud emphasized on several occasions how one could be substituted for the other. In obsessions, for instance, thought replaced action by virtue of a kind of regression (1909d); in the case of primitive peoples, by contrast, the act seemed to replace thought in a way consonant with Goethe’s dictum, ‘‘In the beginning was the deed’’ (1912–13a, p. 161). It was not in a philosophical context that the notion of passage to the act was developed, however, but rather in connection with the often unpredictable 18 character of certain antisocial and violent acts. What the word ‘‘passage’’ denoted was the sudden lurch from a fantasied act to a real act, a shift that would normally be inhibited by defense mechanisms. Jacques Lacan drew attention to the way anxiety was resolved by a passage to the act (1962–63). For many authors, passage to the act is the effect of a preoedipal mode of psychic functioning dominated by primary processes, by an inability to tolerate frustration, respect reality-testing, or curb a tendency to impulsiveness. In this view a weak ego may be responsible for a propensity to pass to the act; but a grandiose ego, eager to exert omnipotent control over its surroundings, can also be the culprit. The ‘‘act’’ here is more like a motor discharge than an action intended to transform reality, which requires the subject to delay the discharge by means of a thought-process permitting the psychic apparatus to endure tension so long as release is thus deferred (Freud, 1911b). Passage to the act concerns the relationship between the act and its mentalization; it could indeed be regarded as a near-total exclusion of any mental process from the act. Any understanding of such an act, which is not assumed but rather presented by the agent as passively experienced, must depend on an effort of decipherment (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1987; Balier, 1988). For this reason passage to the act has been likened to somatization, since both are characterized by a lack of psychic working-out, even by alexithymia. Alternatively, it might be argued that passage to the act does not rely on an absence of mentalization, but rather on a kind of ‘‘telescoping’’ (Aulagnier, 1975/ 2001) of fantasy and reality. In this perspective, far from being the consequence of a failure of mentalization, the passage to the act results from an overflowing of the fantasy world into reality because an element of reality has impinged on the fantasy scenario and opened a breach enabling the act to externalize it. It is hard, therefore, to reduce the notion of passage to the act to a simple causality. Instead, instances of passage to the act should be defined in terms of the particular individual involved, and their specific psychodynamic features examined case by case. Thus schizophrenic and paranoid homicidal passages to the act present considerable differences, even if both embody an inadequate attempt to dissipate unbearable anxiety. A paranoid passage to the act is liable to occur when the persecuting object is lost sight of and the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A C T U A L N E U R O S I S /D E F E N S E N E U R O S I S persecutory system is destabilized (Zagury, 1990). The passage to the act in borderline conditions depends rather on a lack of identifications (Bergeret, 2002), while such acts in adolescents may be fostered by the emergence of destabilizing instinctual impulses conducive to either excess or asceticism. If one resists the temptation to simplify the notion, it appears that passage to the act may have a large variety of etiologies. Meanwhile, the notion clearly belongs to a very broad philosophical discussion of the relationship between thought and action. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence; Acting out/acting in; Criminology and psychoanalysis; Thought. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (1975). The violence of interpretation: From statement to pictogram. East Sussex, Philadelphia: BrunnerRoutledge. (Original work published 1975) Balier, Claude. (1988). Psychanalyse des comportements violents. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Bergeret, Jean. (2002). Le passage à l’acte de l’état limite.In Frédéric Millaud (Ed.), Le passage à l’acte: aspects cliniques et psychodynamiques (pp. 111–117). Paris, Masson. Chasseguet-Smirgel, Janine. (1987). L’acting out: quelques réflexions sur la carence d’élaboration psychique. Revue française de psychanalyse, 51, 4. Freud, Sigmund. (1909d). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151–318. ———. (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12: 213–226. ———. (1912–13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. Lacan, Jacques. (2004). Le séminaire, Livre X: L’angoisse, 1962–1963. Paris: Seuil. Millaud, Frédéric (Ed.). (2002). Le Passage à l’acte: aspects cliniques et psychodynamiques. Paris: Masson. ACTUAL NEUROSIS/DEFENSE NEUROSIS The distinction between the actual neurosis and the neurosis of defense was made by Freud very early on in the context of his theory of the sexual origins of neurosis. In 1898, in an article entitled ‘‘Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses,’’ he clearly described these INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS two categories of neurosis in terms of both aetiology and treatment: ‘‘In every case of neurosis there is a sexual aetiology; but in neurasthenia it is an aetiology of a present-day kind, whereas in the psychoneuroses the factors are of an infantile nature’’ (1898a, p. 268). This contrast between actual and infantile sexuality in the causation of the two kinds of neurosis entailed correspondingly different therapeutic approaches, namely prophylaxis and deconditoning in the case of actual neuroses (pp. 275–76) and psychoanalysis in that of the defense neuroses. Into the class of actual neuroses fell, chiefly, neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis. Later (1914c, p. 83), Freud added hypochondria. In his view the distinction between neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis depended on the specificity of the sexual noxa in each: ‘‘Neurasthenia can always be traced back to a condition of the nervous system such as is acquired by excessive masturbation or arises spontaneously from frequent emissions; anxiety neurosis regularly discloses sexual influences which have in common the factor of reservation or of incomplete satisfaction’’ (1898a, p. 268). The mechanism of actual neurosis was essentially linked to a disjunction between the somatic sexual excitation and object representations in the unconscious. This failure of somatopsychic communication was caused by particular conditions of mental functioning and generally led to symptoms. The defense neuroses subsumed conversion hysteria, anxiety hysteria (phobic neurosis), and obsessional neurosis. In contrast to the actual neuroses, they were caused by psychic conflict. In ‘‘The NeuroPsychoses of Defense’’ (1894a), Freud described the mechanism of these conditions as a disjunction between ideas and affects. The idea, erotic in character, underwent repression, whereas the affect had a specific fate for each type of neurosis: somatic conversion in hysteria, displacement in obsessional neurosis, and projection in phobic neurosis. Freud rounded out his psychodynamic conception of the defense neuroses in 1906, in ‘‘My Views on the Part Played by Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses,’’ describing neurotic symptoms as compromises between two mental currents: the libidinal current, determined by the subject’s sexual ‘‘constitution,’’ and the repression carried out by the ego (1906a, p. 277). The distinction between actual and defense neuroses has taken on fresh significance in present-day 19 ACTUAL NEUROSIS/DEFENSE NEUROSIS psychoanalysis as a result of new thinking on psychosomatic disorders. The fact that it corresponds so closely with the distinction drawn by Pierre Marty in his classification of psychosomatic conditions between well and badly-mentalized neuroses has led to its becoming both a model for the economic assessment of psychosomatic processes and a frame of reference for the analysis of clinical findings. In this perspective, the symptoms of actual neuroses belong to the same instinctual framework as those of hysteria and, more generally, those of the transference neuroses. What differentiates them is the specific process affecting sexuality and the relations between the instincts. This postulate is the foundation of Freud’s psychosomatic monism and shifts the duality into the instinctual realm. The somatic symptoms of actual neurosis express more or less far-reaching material degradation of organs and functions. From the psychoanalytical standpoint, however, we must treat them, along with Freud, as resulting from the intensification of the organ’s erotogenic function and from the distortion of the action of the instinct in its own terms. It is only logical, if psychosomatic phenomena are to be considered from the standpoint of psychoanalysis, that all reference to any conceptual framework other than the instinctual one be excluded from a comprehensive approach to the somatic symptom or to somatic illness. Such an approach must be congruent with the internal coherence of the psychoanalytic apparatus, a coherence with three dimensions, clinical, theoretical, and therapeutic. From the psychic point of view, which is to say from the point of view of psychosexuality, the organization of the actual neuroses is characterized by an overall incapacity for working matters out, and this for determinate reasons of both a structural and a developmental kind. This is the reason why patients suffering from such neuroses have been excluded from psychoanalysis intervention, the sole purpose of which for Freud was to uncover the role of the unconscious in mental life—a point about which he was categorical. In his twenty-fourth Introductory Lecture, entitled ‘‘The Common Neurotic State,’’ he noted that, ‘‘It was more important for me that you should gain an idea of psycho-analysis than that you should obtain some pieces of knowledge about the neuroses; and for that reason the ‘actual’ neuroses, unproductive so far as psycho-analysis is concerned, 20 could no longer have a place in the foreground’’ (1916–17a, p. 389). Thus the classification of actual neurosis could not be applied to any mental organization in which psychoanalysis was led to identify psychic conflicts or defense mechanisms such as repression—these being firm indications, in Freud’s eyes, of psychoneurosis. In his broad conception of the neuroses, however, Freud included the actual neuroses, clearly defining their place and according them an important role with not inconsiderable theoretical consequences: ‘‘A noteworthy relation between the symptoms of the ‘actual’ neuroses and of the psychoneuroses makes a further important contribution to our knowledge of the formation of symptoms in the latter. For a symptom of an ‘actual’ neurosis is often the nucleus and first stage of a psychoneurotic symptom’’ (1916–17a, p. 390). This view of things opens up a whole area of psychosomatic research; it also provides the theoretical context for Freud’s notion of somatic compliance. CLAUDE SMADIA See also: Conversion; Disorganization; Excitation; Hypochondria; Psychosomatic; Symptom-formation. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 41–61. ———. (1898a). Sexuality in the aetiology of the neuroses. SE, 3: 259–285. ———. (1906a). My views on the part played by sexuality in the aetiology of the neuroses. SE, 7: 269–279. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. ———. (1916–17a [1915–1917]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15–16. Further Reading Gediman, Helen K. (1984). Actual neurosis and psychoneurosis.International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 65, 191-202. Hartocollis, Peter. (2002). "Actual neurosis" and psychosomatic medicine. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 83, 1361-1374. Kaplan, Donald B. (1984). Some conceptual and technical aspects of the actual neurosis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 65, 295-306. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ACUTE PSYCHOSES ACUTE PSYCHOSES The notion of acute psychosis as envisaged by psychiatry is situated on the border of psychoanalysis. The acute psychoses, sudden and severe disorganizations of the mind, all have in common a disturbance of the relational faculties, a loss of contact with what is commonly accepted as reality, and a diminishing or absence of critical abilities with regard to the pathological. There are multiple different forms of acute psychosis. Among these are melancholic and manic episodes, which can clinically exist in alternation (hence the framework of manic-depressive psychosis) and which are associated with Freud’s writings on the ‘‘narcissistic neuroses’’; acute delusional psychoses, some of which are linked to the development of chronic psychosis; and finally, dream-confusion disorders, for which the possibility of an organic etiology must always be investigated. As varied as they are, these disorders all have in common the temporal features of an ‘‘attack’’: They are sudden, uncontrollable, incomprehensible, and reversible. Since antiquity, melancholia has referred to a form of madness characterized by ‘‘black bile’’: dejection, sadness, spiritual pain, feelings of abjection and guilt that may be expressed in delusional form, and despair that may lead to suicide. Emil Kraepelin incorporated melancholia into manic-depressive psychosis. Karl Abraham, in his 1912 publication ‘‘Notes on the Psycho-Analytical Investigation and Treatment of Manic-Depressive Insanity and Allied Conditions,’’ attempted to apply a psychoanalytic approach to cases that were ‘‘cyclical’’ (1912/1927, p. 138) in their evolution. His way of envisioning the psychogenesis of the attack, and his reference to a ‘‘hidden structure’’ and ambivalence stimulated the thinking of Sigmund Freud, who had been investigating melancholia as early as 1895. In a manuscript sent to Wilhelm Fliess that year, Freud compared it to ‘‘mourning—that is, longing for something lost’’ (Manuscript G, p. 200). In 1917 he published ‘‘Mourning and Melancholia,’’ where he envisioned melancholia as the pathological form of mourning. In the work of mourning, the subject is able to gradually achieve detachment from the lost object; in melancholia, by contrast, the subject identifies with the lost object and believes him- or herself to be guilty of its disappearance. The acute psychoses, and especially attacks of melancholia, owing to their frequent recurrence and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS possible alternation with mania, from the outset presented psychoanalysis with the problem of the relationship between attack and structure. ‘‘Structure’’ implies that no term of the field in question can be approached without taking into consideration the terms that are articulated together with it; no single term takes effect without the others. The three conditions that Freud posited as the origin of melancholia— loss of the object, ambivalence, and regression of the libido into the ego—provide the framework of a structure. Whatever may reactivate such a mechanism around the loss of object provokes another melancholic attack, and Freud explored this ‘‘struggle of ambivalence’’ (1916–1917g [1915], p. 257) in which the ego itself becomes carried away in the process of accusation of the object, or even its ‘‘condemnation to death.’’ He posited that this process can come to an end in the unconscious, either through exhaustion or through exclusion of the object, which is thereafter deemed worthless. The ego can then revel in the satisfaction of recognizing itself as the best, as superior to the object. The accumulation of a cathexis that is at first bound, and then liberated at the end of the melancholic process—the enabling condition for possible mania—implies regression of the libido to narcissism. In The Ego and the Id (1923b), he analyzed the ego’s dependency states, writing: ‘‘If we turn to melancholia first we find that the excessively strong super-ego which has obtained a hold upon consciousness rages against the ego with merciless violence’’ (p. 53). What dominates the superego here is ‘‘a pure culture of the death instinct’’ (p. 53). In ‘‘Neurosis and Psychosis’’ (1924b [1923]) he restricted the ‘‘narcissistic neuroses,’’ characterized by withdrawal of the libido onto the ego, to disorders of the melancholic type. In order to envisage acute psychoses as a whole, Melanie Klein’s theoretical elaboration must be mentioned. In 1935 Klein stopped referring to ‘‘developmental stages’’ and instead began using the term position to differentiate psychotic anxieties in children from psychoses in adults. In this view, psychosis is seen sometimes as a temporal regression reversible to either the paranoid or the depressive position, sometimes as the ‘‘fertile moment’’ of a psychosis arrested in such a ‘‘position,’’ and sometimes as a cyclical episode that can be clinically treated, even if the subject’s anchorage in such a ‘‘position’’ remains structurally determined. It should be noted that the various acute psychoses were the object of a clinical and psychopathological 21 ADAPTATION synthesis by Henri Ey (in the third volume of his Études psychiatriques) that often challenges psychoanalysis. Acute psychosis is an expression of the complexity of what is happing on different levels in the patient; the possibility of some severe organic dysfunction cannot be ruled out, nor can the possibility of a reactive crisis. In any event, the patient’s acute state requires specific types of care, and his or her history is essentially done away with by the urgency of the circumstances. The anguish of people close to the patient and the team of caregivers in the face of madness must be taken into account. Research confirms the effectiveness of a psychotherapeutic approach based on psychoanalytic conceptions associated with traditional methods of treatment of the acute episode. In the most favorable conditions, such an approach still makes structural study possible. MICHEL DEMANGEAT See also: Mania; Melancholic depression; Organic psychoses; Postnatal/postpartum depression; Psychotic/ neurotic Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1927). Notes on the psycho-analytical investigation and treatment of manic-depressive insanity and allied conditions. In Selected papers on psycho-analysis. (Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey, Trans.). Hogarth Press: London. (Original work published 1912) Ey, Henri. Traité de psychiatrie clinique et thérapeutique. Paris: E.M.-C., 1955. Freud, Sigmund. (1916–17g [1915]). Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14: 237–258. ———. (1923). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. Klein, Melanie. (1975). A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states. In The writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. I, pp. 262–289). London: Hogarth. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 16 (1935), 145– 174.) Further Reading Knight, Robert P. (1945). Use of psychoanalytic principles in therapy acute psychosis. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 9, 145–154. Anal Sadistic Stage Shengold, Leonard. (1985). Defensive anality and anal narcissism. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 66, 47–74. ———. (1988). Halo in the sky: Observations on anality and defense. New York: Guilford Press. 22 ADAPTATION Adaptation is not part of Freudian vocabulary (it does not appear in the index of the Standard Edition, for example). The idea of adaptation, however, is present throughout Freud’s work. It appears as early as 1895, in his ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ (1950a), when he discusses the mechanisms of perception, attention and memory. The idea runs through all of Freud’s subsequent work whenever he discusses the relation between psychic reality and the ‘‘reality of the outside world.’’ It is found, for example, in ‘‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’’ (1915c) and ‘‘Repression’’ (1915d), when he writes that dangers that can’t be avoided through behavioral means are ‘‘rejected toward the interior.’’ Other texts where the concept appears include ‘‘Neurosis and Psychosis’’ (1924b), ‘‘The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis’’ (1924e), and ‘‘An Outline of Psycho-Analysis’’ (1940a). In fact, there are few texts by Freud where the question of adaptation isn’t found, even if the word itself rarely appears. Adaptation and the related theoretical issues are central to the development of ego-psychology, which was, for the most part, based on Freud’s structural theory and the work of Anna Freud (1936/1937) and Heinz Hartmann, author of Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation (1938/1958). It was in this period that a theorical schism developed, leading to differences in clinical psychoanalytic practice between those analysts (especially English-speaking) who adapted this point of view and those who preferred other options, either along the lines developed by Melanie Klein and her successors or the rather different approach taken by Lacan and his successors. Jacques Lacan was, in fact, highly critical of the primacy given to the problems of adaptation in egopsychology. He emphasized that naively establishing ‘‘external reality’’ as a given prior to and outside of psychic activity is a theoretical absurdity since that exterior reality is constructed through close interaction with psychic reality itself. He also pointed out the dangers of an analytical practice in which the analyst, within the framework of a normative and ‘‘normalizing’’ enterprise, developed mastery, or even a sense of excessive power, in assuming that his or her own ‘‘adaptation’’ is by definition better than that of the patient. Whatever one might think of these criticisms and their rebuttals, there is little doubt that they have had considerable impact, well beyond the field of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ADDICTION Lacanian thought, especially in the French-speaking world. Unfortunately, this has had the effect of ‘‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’’ through the unjustified condemnation of any psychoanalytic consideration of the problems of adaptation. These problems cannot be avoided, however, to the extent that psychic processes are constantly being adjusted in terms of their internal equilibrium and modified as a result of the impact of outside events. ROGER PERRON See also: Defense; Ego; Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation; Individuation (analytical psychology); Kardiner, Abram; Normality; Pichon-Rivière, Enrique; Self (true/false). Bibliography Canguilhem, Georges. (1989). The normal and the pathological (Carolyn R. Fawcett & Robert S. Cohen, Trans.). New York: Zone Books. (Original work published 1966) Freud, Anna. (1937). The ego and the mechanisms of defense. London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1936) Freud, Sigmund. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109–140. ———. (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141–158. ———. (1924b [1923]). Neurosis and psychosis. SE, 19: 147–153. ———. (1924e). The loss of reality in neurosis and psychosis. SE, 19: 180–187. ———. (1940a [1938]). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 139–207. ———. (1950a [1887–1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173–280. Hartmann Heinz. (1958). Ego psychology and the problem of adaptation (David Rapaport, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1938) ADDICTION The Latin addictus refers to a person who is bound and dependent as a result of unpaid debts. Metaphorically, this term came to be used for any behavior that results from a heavy dependence on something, such as a drug. A number of common substances or those that can be freely purchased can be used as drugs or INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS become addictive substances: medication, alcoholic beverages, glue, and so on. Psychoanalytically, the power of a particular addiction depends both on the unconscious fantasies that underlie the subject’s ingestion, and the substance’s actual chemical effect. Sigmund Freud refers to addiction in an early paper on ‘‘Hypnosis’’ (1891d, p. 106), and in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess of December 22, 1897, he refers to masturbation as the ‘‘primary addiction’’ (1950a, p. 272; 1985c, p. 287). Karl Abraham (1908/1927) studied alcohol addiction. Sándor Radó (1933) associated addiction with a regression to childhood. Otto Fenichel (1945) developed the concept of addiction as a regression to infantile stages, and his descriptions of alcohol as a means of diluting the superego are especially interesting. Herbert Rosenfeld (1965) referred to the manic-depressive signs that underlie addiction, and connected addiction to pathological narcissism of the Self. Donald Winnicott (1951/1953) associated addiction with a pathology of the transitional. Winnicott’s transitional object, a creation/discovery of the subject, opens up an intermediary zone of experience, which then expands into play and cultural life, while the transitional object is disinvested and loses its meaning. In addiction, this process of opening up and development is held back, and the transitional object continues to carry out its original function (counteracting depressive anxiety), in the form of a continuing disavowal. The transitional object is concretized, is ‘‘fetishized,’’ and becomes susceptible to replacement by a drug as an object that can be manipulated by the omnipotent subject, enabling him to deny the separation and the resulting depression. A number of authors who have studied compulsive behavior have included a dependence on alcohol or another substance into their inquiry. Dostoyevsky, in The Brothers Karamazov, provides a clear description of the motivations that underlie addictive behavior, such as sexual dependency and pathological games. Addiction to a substance is sometimes replaced with another form of dependence, for example, addictions to food, to sex with prostitutes, to gambling, to spree-buying, to physical exercise, to web surfing, or to playing video games (whereby the internal world is projected onto the characters who fight, kill, love, or hate on screen). There is also the addiction to pseudoreligious cults, which serves as a substitute for a dependence on and subjugation to drugs. It is important to note that the other can also become an addictive object 23 ADHESIVE IDENTIFICATION (McDougall, 1982), serving as a drug might, to fill holes in the subject’s identity. DAVID ROSENFELD See also: Alcoholism; Alienation; Cocaine and psychoanalysis; Dependence; Dipsomania; Freud: Living and Dying; Passion. Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1927). The psychological relations between sexuality and alcoholism. In Selected papers on psychoanalysis, London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1908) Freud, Sigmund. (1891d). Hypnosis. SE, 1: 103–114. ———. (1897a). Infantile cerebral paralysis. (Lester A. Russin, Trans.). Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1968. ———. (1950a [1887–1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173–280. ———. (1985c [1887–1904]). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887–1904 (Jeffrey M. Masson Ed. and Trans.). Cambridge, MA, London: Belknap/Harvard University Press. Fenichel, Otto. (1945). The psychoanalytic theory of neurosis. New York: W.W. Norton. McDougall, Joyce. (1982). The narcissistic economy and its relation to primitive sexuality. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 18, 373–396. Radó, Sándor. (1933). The psychoanalysis of pharmacothymia. Psychoanalytic Quarterly. 2, 1–23. Rosenfeld, Herbert. (1965). Psychotic states: A psychoanalytic approach. London: Hogarth Press. Winnicott, Donald W. (1953). Transitional objects and transitional phenomena, a study of the first not-me possession. Collected papers, through paediatrics to psycho-analysis (pp. 229–242). (Reprinted from International Journal of PsychoAnalysis, 34 (1951), 89–97.) ADHESIVE IDENTIFICATION At very early stages the infant fails to develop a sense of a containing skin. It can then only gain a sense of holding together by sticking, in fantasy, to the outside of objects, giving rise to a form of mimicry which Esther Bick termed adhesive identification. The concept first appears in a Donald Meltzer publication (1975). 24 Esther Bick’s infant observation work showed the skin as a primary object stabilizing the ego in the paranoid-schizoid position. She described the most primitive experiences of falling apart in pieces or, even worse, as a shapeless liquid leaking out. She also described protective measures that an infant may perform with its body and its perception in order to give a greater experience of remaining coherent and contained. She noticed various muscular or verbal abilities which developed precociously as if they were methods for substituting a second skin over a leaky primary containing object. Certain children, however, seem to have been particularly doomed to the experience of leaking, and almost all emotional experience is felt as a rent in the containing skin. Such a raw experience of bleeding and leaking may then be covered by a particular form of sticking to an object, adhering to it. That person is then incorporated as the skin that prevents leaks. One of the consequences is that while the concentration is upon sustaining a complete surface, there is no sense of depth to the person. He feels literally that he cannot contain. Ordinary projection and introjection are not possible. This process gives rise then to a form of objectrelationship in which there is a very shallow attempt at mimicry of the object, in contrast to an identification in which the identity of the other person is more richly carved into the person’s own self. This description of very early phenomena has been useful in understanding infantile autism (Meltzer et. al., 1975; Tustin, 1981). The ‘‘skin ego’’ concept of Didier Anzieu (1985) is a more versatile notion, being applicable outside the psycho-analytic setting, in groups and organizations. Pierre M. Turquet (1975) also used the notion of the skin as container in large group experience. The infantile notion of the skin and its deviations (adhesive identification and the "second skin ’’) can appear to have reductionist properties, since all phenomena at a later stage can be attributed to experiences at the level of developing the skin boundary. In addition, there is a problem in that the theories of the skin and adhesive identification were derived firstly from a non-psychoanalytic setting (infant observation, and in group phenomena) so that its status in psychoanalytic work, practice and theory, is disputed. ROBERT D. HINSHELWOOD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A D L E R , A L F R E D (1870 –1 937) See also: Autism; Autistic capsule/nucleus; Dismantlement; Infant development; Infant observation (therapeutic). Bibliography Anzieu, Didier (1989) The skin ego. New Haven-London: Yale University Press. (Original work published 1985) Bick, Esther. (1968). The experience of the skin in early object relations. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XLIX, 558–566. ———. (1986). Further considerations on the functioning of skin in early object relations: findings from infant observation integrated into child and adult analysis. British Journal of Psychotherapy, II, 292–299. Meltzer, Donald. (1975). Adhesive identification. Contemporary Psycho-Analysis, 11, 289–310. Turquet, Pierre. (1975). Threats to identity in the large group. In L. Kreeger (Ed.) The large group (p. 87–114). London: Constable. Tustin, Frances. (1981). Autistic states in children. London: Routledge. ADLER, ALFRED (1870–1937) An Austrian physician, psychologist, and psychotherapist, Alfred Adler was born February 7, 1870, in Vienna and died May 28, 1937, in Aberdeen, Scotland. The son of a grain merchant, he was raised in Vienna and received his medical degree in 1895. After opening his medical practice, he took an interest in social issues and, in 1902, became part of Sigmund Freud’s circle of friends. He was one of the most active members of the group and one of the most original. After creating the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) in 1910, he became the head of the Vienna group and, with Stekel, became co-editor of the Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, founded the same year. In 1911 he left the IPA with nine other members because of irreconcilable theoretical differences and founded the Verein für Freie Psychoanalytische Forschung (Society for Free Analytic Research), which he transformed in 1913 into the Verein für Individualpsychologie (Society for Individual Psychology). After 1914 he was editor (with Carl Furtmüller) of his own publication, Zeitschrift für Individualpsychologie (Journal of Individual Psychology), the publication of which was interrupted in 1916, becoming, in 1923, the Internationale Zeitschrift für Individualpsychologie INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (International Journal of Individual Psychology). In 1912 he tried to obtain a research position at the University of Vienna, but was refused. Interested in practice and educational issues in particular, after 1919 he established a number educational clinics (for teachers, parents, and students), which served as models for practitioners abroad. In 1929 he created the first dispensary of individual psychology (for adults and children). He was also involved in the training of teachers, for he had worked at the Vienna teacher’s college since 1924, which brought him closer to the city’s educators, on whom he exercised considerable influence. After 1926 he gave lectures throughout Europe and the United States, initially at Columbia University, then, after 1933, as professor of medical psychology at the Long Island College of Medicine in New York, as well as a consultant at the hospital. To honor him for his scientific achievements, he was named an honorary citizen of the city of Vienna in 1930 and was made a doctor honoris causa in the United States, to which he had emigrated in 1935, primarily for political reasons. His two major works are A Study of Organ Inferiority and its Psychological Compensation: A Contribution to Clinical Medicine (1907) and The Neurotic Constitution (1912/1972), in which he makes a clear break with Freud. The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology (1927), Understanding Human Nature (1927), and Die Technik der Individualpsychologie (1928–1930) were the result of his many talks, and were intended for a broader public. Adler rejected Freud’s theory of the libido and, with the creation of individual psychology, which was developed as a new direction in psychotherapy, he created the first significant schism in the psychoanalytic movement. He considered the individual as a complete being, including social and sociological aspects that began with the infant’s feelings of inferiority, compensation, and the search for power and supremacy, as well as the sense of belonging to a collectivity. Adler considered psychic development to be the formation of an unconscious life plan, or even a lifestyle, starting with early childhood, and that later symptoms had to be taken into account from this point of view—in this sense Adler’s approach was teleological. As an ego-centered psychology, Adler’s individual psychology has had its greatest influence 25 ADOLESCENCE on other psychotherapeutic currents, such as humanist psychology and neoanalysis. HELMUT GRÖGER See also: Aggressiveness; Austria; Femininity, rejection of; Monism; Masculine protest (individual psychology); Aggressive instinct/aggressive drive; Inferiority, feeling of; Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society; Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung. Bibliography Adler, Alfred. (1927). The practice and theory of individual psychology. New York: Harcourt Brace. ———. (1927). Understanding human nature (Walter Béran Wolfe, Trans.). New York: Greenberg. ———. (1928–1930). Die Technik der Individualpsychologie. München: Bergmann. ———. (1972). The neurotic constitution (Bernard Glueck and John E. Lind, Trans.). Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press (Original work published 1912). Hoffman, Edward. (1994). The drive for self: Alfred Adler and the founding of individual psychology. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Schiferer, H. Rüdiger, Gröger, Helmut, and Skopec, Manfred. (1995). Alfred Adler: eine Bildbiographie. Mit bisher unbekannten Original-Dokumenten und zum grössten Teil unveröffentlichten Abbildungen. Munich-Basel: Ernst Reinhardt. ADOLESCENCE In psychoanalysis, adolescence is a developmental stage, a key moment during which three transformations occur: the disengagement from parental ties that have been interiorized since infancy; the sexual impulse discovering object love under the primacy of genital and orgasmic organizations; and identification, the impetus for topographic readjustment and the affirmation of identity and subjectivity. These transformations begin with the onset of adolescence, concluding when infantile sexual activity has reached its final form. Adolescence is, therefore, a completion of the process of ego maturation. It is characterized by the conflict that these transformations bring about and the ensuing crisis resulting from the wish for adult sexual activity and the fear of giving up infantile pleasure. There is little discussion of the concept of adolescence in Freud’s own writing. However, the term 26 ‘‘puberty’’ is frequently found. More than two hundred and fifty references to the concept have been found in his work, even outside of the Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Referring to the Standard Edition, the majority of entries catalogued for the word ‘‘adolescence’’ are found in the Studies on Hysteria (1895d) and half of them are by Joseph Breuer. However, the references do not fully take into account linguistic issues and the associated problems of translation. For example, in the majority of French translations of Freud’s work, there is frequent reference to the term ‘‘adolescence.’’ Although adolescents appear among the first cases of clinical psychoanalysis, such as that of Katharina, who was eighteen at the time, and especially that of Dora, most references to the role of puberty from the perspective of development appear in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d). In Some Reflections on Schoolboy Psychology, (1914f), a text that is often mentioned in connection with adolescence, the problem of growing up is presented by Freud as an extension of the oedipal complex. The schoolboys see their teachers as substitute parents. They transfer to them the ambivalence of the feelings they once had for their father. From this point of view, adolescence works toward a separation from the father. Although adolescence in Freud and in subsequent psychoanalytic thought is often presented as an infantile screen-memory, that is, as the formation of a compromise between the repressed elements of infantile sexuality and the defenses typical of adolescence, it is also, through the theory of deferred action, an opportunity for new psychic activity, a kind of rebirth in which the past can only be understood in light of the present. Human history is understood in terms of its past, but its past is illuminated in terms of its present, and, in the case of adolescence, in terms of the traumatic present. In fact, psychoanalysts have always had, whether manifestly or latently, a bipolar idea of adolescence. First, as the occasion of two instinctual currents through which the adolescent, burdened by the reemergence of infantile impulses on the one hand and the discovery of orgasm (arising in adolescence) on the other, must confront oedipal conflicts, the now realizable threat of incest, and the parricidal and matricidal feelings as condensations in fantasy of the aggression associated with all growth: ‘‘growing up is by nature an aggressive act’’ (Donald Winnicott). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ADOLESCENCE Second, as an expression of the bipolarity of the ties between impulse and defense (Anna Freud), between identification and identity (Evelyne Kestemberg), between object libido and narcissistic libido (Philippe Jeammet), and between the ‘‘pubertary,’’ which reflects the powerful sensual current that no longer recognizes its goals, and ‘‘adolescens,’’ which reflects the category of the ideal (Philippe Gutton). This leads contemporary psychoanalysts to consider that the capacity of the psychic apparatus to perform the work of binding can be seen as a fundamental indicator of the fact that the process of adolescence has been harmoniously completed. Dreams and action represent the creative activities of this capacity (François Ladame) whereas unbinding (Raymond Cahn) is the source of serious psychic pathology. The enigmatic discrepancy between the bipolarity of the impulse and the transformational object (Alain Braconnier) constantly underlies the analysis of transference and counter-transference during adolescence. in a way that broadens and extends the notion of crisis or the process of individuation, as well as their relationship to anxiety and, especially, depression. The concepts of ‘‘depressive threat’’ and ‘‘self-sabotage’’ help describe, clinically and theoretically, the process of change specific to the adolescent, whose pathology reveals the failures and avatars that are so magnificently exemplified in our culture through the heroic figures of Narcissus, Oedipus, Hamlet and Ophelia, Electra and Orestes, and, of course, Romeo and Juliet. There are other theorizations as well: Adolescence as a ‘‘crisis’’ (Pierre Mâle, Evelyne Kestemberg) or breakdown (Moses Laufer), as an impasse in the process of development, that is, in the integration of the sexualized body into the psychic apparatus. These approaches reveal the difficulties and resistances the subject experiences in giving up the forms of libidinal satisfaction in which his infantile body was engaged, difficulties and resistances that are manifest in the transference through the representation and acting out of the ‘‘central masturbation fantasy.’’ Bibliography Although it is no longer psychoanalytically possible to consider adolescence in terms of a traditional genetic psychoanalytic psychology, that is, as the final stage of development that makes it possible to access an adult stage, it is still difficult to provide a comprehensive interpretation centered on any given aspect of adolescence. The psychic impact of puberty determines the remodeling of identification, the expression of fantasies, and self and object representations. The psychic impacts of the social and the cultural determine the alterations of these same intrapsychic elements, as well as presenting psychoanalysts with the problem of addressing the contradiction between a focus on external objects versus a focus on internal objects. From the point of view of psychoanalytic practice, the attention given to mental functioning, and to affects in particular, enables psychoanalysts to understand many of the disturbances found in adolescence INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ALAIN BRACONNIER See also: Acting out/acting in; Adolescent crisis; Anorexia nervosa; Blos, Peter; Bulimia; Fairbairn, William Ronald Dodds; ‘‘Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria’’ (Dora/Ida Bauer); Genital love; Identification; Identity; Infantile schizophrenia; Mâle, Pierre; Puberty; Screen memory; Self-representation; Silberstein, Eduard; Suicidal behavior; Transgression; Young Girl’s Diary, A. Blos, Peter. (1987). L’insoumission au père ou l’effort adolescent pour être masculin. Adolescence, 6 (21), 19–31. Cahn, Raymond. (1998). L’Adolescent dans la psychanalyse: l’aventure de la subjectivation. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 130–243. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. Jeammet, Philippe. (1994). Adolescence et processus de changement. In D. Widlöcher (Ed.) Traité de psychopathologie (pp. 687–726). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Laufer, Moses. (1989). Adolescence et rupture du développement: une perspective psychanalytique, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Further Reading Blos, Peter. (1962). On adolescence. a psychoanalytic interpretation, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe. ———. (1979). The adolescent passage: developmental issues, New York: International Universities Press. Emde, Robert. (1985). From adolescence to midlife: remodeling the structure of adult development. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 33(S), 59-112. Esman, Aaron. (ed.) (1975). The psychology of adolescence, essential readings, New York: International Universities Press. 27 ADOLESCENT CRISIS Hauser, Stuart T. and Smith, Henry F. (1991). The development and experience of affect in adolescence. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 39(S), 131-168. Novick, Kerry Kelly and Novick, Jack. (1994). Postoedipal transformations: latency, adolescence, pathogenesis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 42,143-170. Sarnoff, Charles. (1987). Psychotherapeutic strategies in late latency through early adolescence, Northvale, NJ: Aronson. ADOLESCENT CRISIS The concept of adolescent crisis is not generally found in the vocabulary of psychoanalysis. It was not used by Freud and was not created by any psychoanalyst. In France the concept gained currency following the success of Maurice Debesse’s La crise d’originalité juvenile (The crisis of juvenile originality; 1941), which helped spread and popularize the concept. Subsequently, authors interested in adolescence, including psychoanalysts, picked up the term for their own uses, supporting it or criticizing it. The initial ambiguity and lack of precision associated with the term probably contributed to its success, but also turned it into a grab-bag of ideas and the source of considerable misunderstanding. It has been used to refer to the culmination of the developmental process at the end of childhood and the beginning of adulthood, as well as to the behavioral manifestations and disturbances that so often occur at this age. Under the heading of ‘‘adolescent crisis’’ and in the guise of the assumed originality of adolescents, the most atypical behavior has been considered ‘‘normal’’ for this age. This atypical behavior is claimed to be the price paid for the crisis, which has been compared to a temporary disorganization when the young adolescent leaves the stable environment of childhood for an as yet uncertain adulthood. Along with this change in environment must be considered the maturation of the drives, quantitative effects that are said to push the adolescent toward temporary anarchic behavior before it is channeled into more stable pursuits. The crisis, understood from its most obvious expression in a range of boisterous behavioral expressions, is said to be a sign of normality. On the contrary, the lack of such drama in adolescence would be a sign of excessive repression and a portent of a disturbed future. The adolescent would face no psychic work in making the transition to adulthood. An alternate approach, based largely on the North American developmental school, known through the 28 work of Peter Blos and Margaret Mahler, sees adolescence as the culmination of a process of maturation. This developmental approach further suggests that we use the concept of crisis sparingly. It belongs more to a romantic vision of adolescence than to any scientific reality. According to this view, some adolescences would be pathological, but most, the silent majority, would not. Follow-up studies of difficult adolescences, although fragmentary, suggest that the evolution in adolescence is far from being as favorable as claimed. Yet the vast majority of adolescences go unnoticed, without any of the customary clinical or subjective manifestations of an adolescent crisis. The psychoanalytic approach to the intrapsychic changes associated with puberty has developed in several phases. Three main explanatory models have been proposed, each of which can be seen as a confirmation of the others. The initial model of change was based on the first discoveries in psychoanalysis, those associated with Studies on Hysteria (1895d) and The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). This model of change enabled the transition from symptoms to representations as a result of the change in the topographical register from the unconscious to the conscious through the lifting of repression. This model characterizes the Freudian approach to adolescence. Action deferred until puberty actualizes and brings into the field of consciousness, more or less disguised, the parameters of infancy and in particular the Oedipus complex, repressed during the latency period. Adolescence becomes a repetition of infancy. The second model of change is based on the displacement of libidinal investment. It was taken up by Anna Freud when she made mourning the central parameter of the process of adolescence. The third model is a structural change of personality. Freud’s view of adolescence is not without ambiguity and seems to alternate between change and continuity, though it leans toward the latter interpretation. Adolescence is essentially defined by its relation to infancy. It represents access to the genital stage and is, in this sense, the culmination of libidinal evolution (Freud, 1905d). Consequently, it clarifies earlier stages and gives deferred meaning to certain infantile experiences that have remained suspended and potentially traumatic until pubertal genital development provides them their fullest expression. Little has been said concerning the intrapsychic transformations of puberty. In these models, the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ADOLESCENT CRISIS understanding of adolescence is filtered through the understanding of childhood. The advantage of adolescence lies in its ability retrospectively to clarify childhood through the retroactive effect of the two-stage evolution of human sexuality and to serve as the doorway to adulthood. As a transitional period, it has no density of its own. The changes of adolescence are seen only as the continuation of a process begun at the start of personality development. Adolescence is not so much a crisis as a culmination of what existed embryonically in the infant. The real change should be sought within obstacles to development, that is, in pathology and what Moses and Eglé Laufer refer to as ‘‘breaks in development.’’ For these authors, the adolescent’s pubescent body becomes a stand-in for the dangerous incestuous parent. Actualization through transference of this conflict-ridden oedipal bond enables the unconscious or preconscious fantasy that structures this bond to be brought up to date in what the authors refer to as the ‘‘central masturbatory fantasy.’’ They assign this fantasy a key role in the adolescent’s bond with his objects and his own body—a representative of parental objects. In accordance with Freudian ideas, the fantasy is organized during infancy, but the changes to the body in adolescence are what make it traumatic and capable of provoking reactions of repudiation and the various forms of arrested development that can result from such repudiation. During the decade since 1995, this conception of adolescence as the fulfillment and repetition of infancy has been modified by authors focusing on the specificity of this stage of life. The process of mourning becomes especially important. Anna Freud was the first to draw attention to the similarity of adolescence, emotional disappointments, and periods of mourning. The adolescent libido must detach itself from the parents so it can focus on new objects, and this results in mourning for the nursing mother and the infant body. During this interval between old and new investments, the unattached libido searches for new objects to invest in and returns to the adolescent ego, where it leads to the narcissistic inflation and grandiose fantasies characteristic of this age. Moroseness, biliousness, moments of uncertainty, even depersonalization and periods of depression are signs of the more or less durable vacuity of libido investment. Can adolescence be better understood with respect to a past that is repeated or fulfilled, or a future to INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS which it will be subordinated and that will confer subsequent meaning to it? Or should we rather see it as an essential stage in development that can be reduced neither to what came before nor to what will follow? Does adolescence have an identity of its own, such that the nature of the changes that affect it imprint a specific mark on the evolution and destiny of the subject? If so, what is the nature of these changes, and how can they influence the subject’s course of development? The most specific change in adolescence is navigating between the dual tasks of integrating a genitally mature body in society and partaking an autonomy that appears in this period in life. The effects of puberty on the body modify the adolescent’s relationship to his drives by giving him, along with a pubescent body, a means to discharge them. The adolescent needs autonomy—a distance from earlier objects of attachment, the parents. Autonomy in turn challenges the narcissistic assumptions of the subject and serves to reveal the quality of his internal world, the (secure or insecure) character of his attachments, and the ability of his ego to take control of functions that have until then devolved to his parents. The connections between internal and external reality are questioned and thus undergo important changes. Adolescence thus corresponds to a need for psychic work in the development of every human being—a need that every individual is confronted with and for which every society must provide a solution. Here we see with particular acuity what Freud defined as a drive, namely a need for work by the psyche owing to its bond to the somatic. Indeed, the origin of this excess of psychic work typical of adolescence is the extra somatic development associated with puberty, but with the particular features that deferred action confer upon it. For the adolescent, the image he constructed of himself during childhood vacillates while he awaits a new cultural and symbolic status. Thus, aside from the conflicts of identification and the Oedipus complex, the most profound strata of personality and the self in its initial period of constitution are summoned and tested during adolescence. There is indeed a crisis of adolescence in the sense that, psychically, the subject will be different after puberty. But this crisis always has a form and conclusion generally conditioned by culture and the familial systems to which each of us belongs. Consequently, an internal crisis of the psyche is consubstantial with the somatic impact puberty has on the psyche and with 29 ADORNO, THEODOR AND FREUD the psychosocial impact of adolescent autonomy, but the external expression of this crisis largely depends on events that transpired during infancy and on the nature and quality of the current social environment. The family is capable of promoting or interfering with this process. A kind of resonance often occurs between the midlife crisis that parents experience when their children reach adolescence and the problems faced by the adolescent. Such resonance adds to the confusion between generations and blurs limits on behavior for the adolescent. Similar resonance occurs when the adolescent actualizes the parents’ unresolved conflicts with their own parents that they then reenact with their children. Such resonance amplifies conflicts and contributes to the adolescent’s feeling of being misunderstood and subject to foreign forces. External reality appears as a possible mediator capable of reinforcing or weakening the structures of the psychic apparatus. Its essential role is to make the growth of object investments associated with the twofold phenomenon of separation from infantile objects and the resumption of processes of identification narcissistically acceptable. External objects, especially parents, can serve as mediators for internal objects, their concrete attitudes helping to correct whatever is terrifying or constricting in the internal objects, and thus helping to nuance and humanize the superego and ego ideal. They can also create the conditions for pleasure that can be used and exchanged and that authorizes the adolescent libidinally to reinvest object ties without having to become conscious of the importance of those objects. This resembles the conditions typical of the transitional objects of early childhood, or what some authors prefer to call ‘‘transformational objects.’’ Because of their diversity, these external objects, coupled with visual reminders of the difference between the sexes, may strengthen a third function that vacillates and is regression and lack of differentiation. What is true of parents is also true of the mediator figures provided by society: teachers, social workers, friends, ideologies, and religions. These can be temporary supports, offering adolescents a foothold that preserves their need for investment in a narcissistically acceptable self-image before they discover their own way. As with religion and some ideologies, these supports can also provide the adolescent with an outlet that hides discoveries of infantile fusional needs that subjugate the individual to an undifferentiated totalitarian relation. 30 If the needs for psychic transformation appear to be inherent in adolescence, the forms assumed by these changes are particularly dependent on how society operates. Thus, in this connection, there is an emphasis the role of the generational crisis and modern forms of revolt against the father. We can also raise questions about the impact of a transition from a society structured around precise operational rules and explicit prohibitions to a more liberal society. This transition favors a transition from an adolescence dominated by the problematic of conflicts associated with prohibitions and their possible transgression to an adulthood dominated by the problematic of fear of dissolution of those ties and of expression of needs of dependence. Prohibitions, though they can lead to revolt, lead to misunderstanding the need of dependence. Freedom, together with the requirements of performance and success, brings to light narcissistic uncertainties and needs for completeness. PHILIPPE JEAMMET See also: Adolescence. Bibliography Debesse, Maurice. (1941). La crise d’originalité juvénile. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1900). The interpretation of dreams (Parts 1–2). SE, 4: 1–338; 5: 339–625. ——— (1905). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d [1893–95]). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 1–310. Jeammet, Philippe. (1994). Adolescence et processus de changement. In Daniel Widlöcher (Ed.), Traité de psychopathologie (pp. 687–726). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Laufer, Moses, and Laufer, M. Eglé. (1984). Adolescence and developmental breakdown: A psychoanalytic view. New Haven: Yale University Press. Further Reading Menninger, Walter W. (1988). Introduction: the crises of adolescence and aging. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 52,190–197. ADORNO, THEODOR AND FREUD Any serious history of the Frankfurt School requires that a major role be accorded to Freud’s significance in the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ADORNO, THEODOR development of critical theory. Freudian thought played a central role in the works of Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, and, more recently, Jürgen Habermas. But none was more influenced by Freud than Theodor Adorno. In a sense, Adorno was an orthodox Freudian. He supported instinct theory (Triebtheorie), in contrast with the ‘‘revisionism’’ of Erich Fromm and Karen Horney, who faulted Freud for biological determinism, and in contrast with the sociological reductionism of Talcott Parsons, who wanted to integrate psychoanalysis into a more comprehensive theory of ‘‘social action.’’ Yet Adorno also parted ways from Freud in his belief that Freud tended to collapse external reality into a psychological universe. Even here, however, Adorno remained surprisingly well disposed toward Freud. Though he viewed Freud’s psychological atomism as mistaken because it minimized the importance of social factors, he considered it to be profoundly correct in that, under advanced capitalism, humans are reduced to isolated monads. In a sense, Freud was right even when he was wrong. Though Marxism too played a crucial role in the development of Adorno’s thought, the main features of his version of critical theory can be said to be Freudian. Adorno did not lose sight of the fact that every object is the product of history and that the subject plays an active role in the acquisition of knowledge. This idea clearly fits well with psychoanalytic thought, which, while inheriting some principles of nineteenth-century empiricism and materialism, is fully hermeneutic in its clinical application and adheres to a nonpositivist conception of truth. Far from presupposing a neutral, knowing, analyst, psychoanalysis requires the analyst actively to intervene and holds that objectivity is attainable only intersubjectively. Similarly, in the methodology of critical theory, the object is observed from an immanent, interior viewpoint, not from a transcendent perspective like the one adopted by the sociology of knowledge. This is precisely the point of view of psychoanalysis, which aims to make conscious the social determinants of individual pathologies by seeking those determinants not in the external world but rather through the imprint that they leave on the mental and emotional life of the patient. Finally, a fundamental principle of critical theory is the principle of nonidentity—the view that, under present social conditions, no synthesis can unite subINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FREUD ject and object, particular and universal, the individual’s aspirations to happiness and the imperatives of society. This principle of critical theory closely corresponds with Freud’s idea of an insurmountable conflict between desire and fulfillment, between the demands of instinct and the requirements of civilization. The foregoing affinities show that both Adorno’s critique of culture and his theory of personality owe much to Freudian thought. Adorno’s critique was based on two psychoanalytic categories: identification and projection. Through identification, the individual internalizes the father, his symbolic substitutes, and, in the final analysis, society as a whole. In projection, the individual projects onto the external world impulses, emotions, and ideas. Neither of these mechanisms is intrinsically pathological. Identification is essential for an individual’s social integration; projection is necessary for the individual’s acquisition of knowledge, which arises from assimilating sense data, analyzing it through internal reflection, and transforming it into ideas about external reality. However, all of this changes in the present state of capitalism or, more generally, in industrialized society. Whereas in earlier stages of social development, identification allowed individuals a margin of autonomy, inasmuch as socialization was achieved through the family and could produce free individuals, now it is directly accomplished by the social order, by industrialized society, and in accordance with other specialized demands aimed at producing social consensus. Similarly, Projection has ceased to be an instrument for producing useful knowledge of reality because the same demands for conformity that directly subordinate the individual to the group have rendered superfluous the process of inner reflection through which facts about the world are processed. In consequence, modern humans project only resentment, destructive instincts, and inner emptiness, converting the world into a paranoiac social order filled with hostile institutions. In short, in the case of genuine identification, the subject internalizes a social model that creates greater autonomy, while with false identification, typical of advanced capitalism, individuality is effaced. Likewise, with real projection, the subject can acquire knowledge about reality by processing sense data, while with false projection, the subject perceives a illusory reality portraying his inner emptiness. 31 AFTERWARDNESS Another field that Adorno investigated with help from Freud was the theory of personality. He elaborated his ideas in a work he authored with several colleagues, The Authoritarian Personality (1950), an empirical study that attempted to explain the correlation between personality structure and viewpoints concerning social and political problems. The hypothesis was that subjects with an authoritarian personality structure, as measured using psychoanalytic variables, are more likely to profess reactionary political ideas, while nonauthoritarian subjects are more likely to hold liberal views. To the great surprise of the authors, the expected correlation did not materialize, because many authoritarian individuals were liberal and many nonauthoritarian individuals were reactionary. Adorno proposed two possible explanations for this anomaly. One was that the sociological environment, a ‘‘general cultural environment,’’ shapes everyone in it, independently of individual personality structures, requiring all to embrace the values of the established order. Adorno’s other explanation, the orthodox psychoanalytic perspective, was that liberal or conservative authoritarian individuals imperfectly identify with their fathers, in consequence of which their behavior is at once submissive yet rebellious, obedient to authority yet hostile. One is left with either false liberals, whose progressive views are negated by deep-seated destructive tendencies, or faithless conservatives, who are intrinsically fascist rather than genuine supporters of the status quo, which in American society includes freedom of choice and equal opportunity. The reverse is true of nonauthoritarian individuals. In these individuals, the oedipal conflict resulted in an accommodating attitude toward authority. These individuals are liberal in aspiring to authentic change yet conservative in wanting to defend what is best in the American tradition. The two components of Adorno’s theory—the critique of culture and the theory of personality—are transparently complementary. His critique of culture focused on advanced, postindustrial society and its mechanisms for stabilizing and reproducing itself on the cultural and psychological levels. Similarly, at the core of his theory of personality is the kind of human being that postindustrial society needs and creates in order to perpetuate itself. Adorno linked these components using conceptual tools borrowed from Freud. Perhaps in the early twenty-first century, with Adorno’s exclusive reference to Freud, such analyses appear anachronistic in terms of contemporary analytic thought, but even so they show the impressive and 32 continual fecundity of psychoanalysis for better understanding modern and postmodern society. SERGIO PAULO ROUANET See also: Marcuse, Herbert; Marxism and psychoanalysis; Politics and psychoanalysis Bibliography Adorno, Theodor. (1973). Negative dialectics (E. B. Ashton, Trans.). New York: Seabury Press. Adorno, Theodor, with Frankel-Brunswick, Else, Levinson, Daniel J.; and Sanford, R. Nevitt. (1950). The authoritarian personality. New York: Harper and Row. Horkheimer, Max, and Adorno, Theodor. (1972). Dialectic of enlightenment (John Cumming, Trans.). New York: Continuum. AFTERWARDNESS. See Deferred action AGENCY The term ‘‘agency’’ denotes a part of the psychic apparatus that functions as a substructure governed by its own laws, but that is coordinated with the other parts. In Freud’s work this term first appeared in chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), as a synonym or near-synonym for the term system, which he had been using for several years: ‘‘Accordingly, we will picture the mental apparatus as a compound instrument, to the components of which we will give the name of ‘agencies’ or (for the sake of greater clarity) ‘systems.’’’ (pp. 536–537) The term apparatus, used in a sense that never changed in Freud’s work, explicitly gives the psyche a status comparable to that of the major organic systems (respiratory, circulatory, etc.). An agency is thus a functional sub-whole, or, in modern terms, a substructure within an encompassing structure. This idea clearly came from Freud’s extensive prior work in neurophysiology and then neurology. If Freud suggested in this text that the term system was ‘‘clearer,’’ this is doubtless because it was more familiar to him. Indeed, he had been using it for years, particularly in ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ (1950c [1895]), to evoke this type of functional groupings INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AGGRESSIVENESS/AGGRESSION within the nervous system, whose workings he was trying to conceptualize at the time. He posited these systems as ‘‘producing’’ perception, consciousness, memory, and so forth. In the passage cited from The Interpretation of Dreams, he thus distinguished the agencies, or systems, of memory and perception (envisioned as being mutually exclusive), and censorship, but also the agencies that comprise his first topography: the unconscious, the preconscious, and consciousness (or perception-consciousness). In Freud’s writings from that point on, the terms agency and system remained close in meaning. However, system tended to be reserved for topographical distinctions, while agency was used more broadly to refer to an organization being considered from the topographic, dynamic, and economic viewpoints in combination. It is because they are considered in this way that the id, the ego, and the superego of the structural theory are referred to as agencies rather than as systems. Freud tended to posit the agencies as being exclusive: A single phenomenon cannot at the same time belong to the realm of the id and that of the ego, for example. By virtue of this very fact, when Freud at the end of his life came to see the opposition between conscious and unconscious as being simply a difference in ‘‘quality’’ of certain psychic processes—as described in ‘‘An Outline of Psycho-Analysis’’ (1940a [1938])—those two terms were no longer considered as denoting agencies. In the conceptual architecture of metapsychology, the term agency is therefore situated at a level that makes its definition somewhat uncertain. Béla Grunberger thus generated heated controversy when he proposed, in Narcissism: Psychoanalytic Essays (1971/ 1979), to consider narcissism as an agency having the same status as the id, the ego, and the superego. Similar controversies arose over the concept of the self as developed by Heinz Kohut, for example. ROGER PERRON See also: System/systemic. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4: 1–338; Part II, SE, 5: 339–625. ———. (1940a [1938]). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 139–207. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ———. (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281–387. Grunberger, Béla. (1979). Narcissism: psychoanalytic essays. (Joyce S. Diamanti, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1971) Further Reading Morrison, K. (1999). Agency, ontology, & analysis: R. Schafer’s hermeneutic conflict. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 22, 203–220. AGGRESSIVENESS/AGGRESSION In the strict sense of the term, aggressiveness corresponds to certain fantasies and behaviors that Freud discovered in the clinical context, but he hesitated at first to give the term a definition that met the requirements of his own subsequent metapsychological signposts. Only after having shown the importance of ambivalence in the transference (Freud, 1912b) was he in a position to think of aggressiveness as a common relational occurrence, but one without a unique or even homogeneous origin. Afterward, his position never changed: he always regarded aggressiveness as the manifestation in fantasy or symptoms of a combination of hostile and erotic affective currents. In 1900 Freud without hesitation connected aggressiveness to sadism. In 1905 he added a connection to masochism, adopting the position of Joseph Breuer. For Freud, the masculine position in sex led to a degree of sadistic activity, while the feminine position favored masochistic passivity. By 1924 this latter view lead to the hypothesis of a specifically feminine masochism. However, Freud moderated this preliminary opinion in a note added to his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d) in 1915 after he made the distinction between a triangular genital position and the phallicnarcissistic position, limited to existential conflicts between strong and weak. In 1908 Freud further clarified aggressiveness with his conception of bisexuality. Moreover, Freud (1914c) was careful to make clear that he reproached Alfred Adler for not having taken into account the libidinal satisfaction linked to aggressiveness, even though it now seems obvious that Adler’s idea was really more about primitive violence than aggressiveness, which, by its nature, appears after sexualization. Thoughts or 33 AGGRESSIVENESS/AGGRESSION behaviors put into motion by aggressiveness require the person to have an imagination capable of integrating a certain level of ambivalence, while the archaic functioning of violence described by Karl Abraham is of a preambivalent nature and involves a more primitive brutality and violence. The first shift, in 1914, in Freud’s theories involving drives, objects, aims, and the particular nature of eroticization had an irreversible effect on his view of the relationship between aggressiveness and narcissism. Narcissistic objects result from primary identifications and defensive violence, while with ego objects, ambivalence causes the person to oscillate between love and its equally eroticized opposites: aggressiveness, hate, and sadism. In the case of the ‘‘Wolf Man’’ (1918b), as in the case of ‘‘little Hans’’ (1909b), Freud connected a child’s early aggressive manifestations with early attempts at seduction. In The Ego and the Id (1923b), Freud described how in authentic aggression, eroticization is responsible for modifying the nature of primitive hostility, just as the need for tenderness replaces the need for mastery. In 1925 Freud became interested in the narcissistic exhibitionism that precedes aggressiveness in infantile fantasy. The overly precocious genital quality that Freud attributed to the narcissistic, imaginary phallus by sometimes confusing it with the penis, the real sexual organ specific to the boy, makes it difficult to give a more complete description of the genital specificity of aggressiveness. In contrast, it is easier to describe the early narcissistic forms of hostility that occur prior to a more commingled (and thus ambivalent) manifestation of the two great strains of the drives: sexuality and self-preservation. the child and its environment and easily recognized in clinical practice. An illustration of this hypothesis is the notion of ‘‘projective identification.’’ Proponents of these views have certainly recognized clinically what derives from a violent instinct of self-preservation and what belongs to an already object-related libidinized aggression, even though they imperfectly distinguish between the two. The distinction between the dynamics of primitive instinctual violence and the dynamics of drive pressures giving way to aggressive thoughts or behaviors can be understood at three levels: the level of the specific origins of drives, the level of the particular history of the psychogenetic processes in question, and the level of Freudian metapsychology. Freud never changed his view on the origin of fantasies or behaviors emanating from aggression. What is involved is a particular form of the sexual drives deflected from their primary aim and entangled with the brutal, hostile primitive impulses. These primitive impulses thus lose their initial, purely self-protective aim. The conjunction of these two fundamental instinctual currents in the service of aggressiveness thus constitutes a kind of layering of the drives. Such a layering does not exist in the infant’s original genetic equipment in its pure state, though violent instincts, just like the sexual drives, exist in a pure and specifiable state in the basic affective equipment of the newborn. Freud did not hesitate, in his theoretical shift of 1932, twelve years after the shift of 1920, to return to the principles of the first theory of the drives by opposing to the libidinal drives the primitive instincts of self-preservation, from which he then derived aggressiveness (1933a). In 1930 he made clear that he discerned in the psyche of the child a brutal original energy that would soon be rapidly sexualized and bring forth aggressiveness, hate, and sadism. Oral and anal metaphors thus came to illustrate this two-stage view of the origin of aggression. From the psychogenetic point of view, psychoanalytic research has gradually enriched the study of affective development beginning at the pre-oedipal and pregenital periods. These studies have further clarified and developed Freud’s views of the origins and organization of narcissism. The (primary and secondary) narcissistic stages necessarily involve some sort of objects, but Freud clearly demonstrated that narcissistic objects, focused primarily on a relationship of power, differ radically from oedipal objects, which involve dissimilarity, equality, and complimentarity. For aggressiveness to come into play, an object relationship must develop out of an organized fantasy arising from the Oedipus complex and genitality. Aggressiveness is a secondary development, as Freud conceived of it. Melanie Klein and her followers insisted on the presence of a precocious affective interaction, one teeming from the first with hostility and mistrust between From the point of view of conflicts, the classical Freudian notion topographically places aggressiveness within the framework of the activities of the ego. From 34 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A I C H H O R N , A U G U S T (1878 –1 949) an economic point of view, aggressiveness is conceived as arising in connection with an already genitalized object. Finally, from a dynamic point of view, aggressiveness occurs when the sexual drives become bound to brutal, primitive impulses. In this way, the sexual drive tinges the brutal impulses with pleasure, with the result that they become sexually perverse and destructive. In a less pathologic course that arises with the start of the Oedipus complex and is finalized during adolescence, violent primitive impulses reinforce the sexual drives in their appropriate purpose in the service of love and creativity. Such is how Freud described aggressiveness in his elaboration of the concept of anaclisis. Aggressive fantasies can involve a simultaneous libidinal satisfaction in attacking an object who represents (consciously or unconsciously) an oedipal rival, whereas in narcissistic conditions, the resulting violent primitive anger (rage) seeks to protect the self without taking into account the injuries inflicted on one who is experienced simply as an external threat and not as a genuine object (other). Confusion in this regard can be avoided through the use of transference and counter-transference. ———. (1908). Hysterical phantasies and their relation to bisexuality. SE, 9: 156–166. ———. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10: 1–149. ———. (1912b). The dynamics of transference. SE, 12: 97–108. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. ———. (1918b). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1–122. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ———. (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155–170. ———. (1933a). New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 22: 1–182. Further Reading Gray, Paul. (2000). Analysis of conflicted drive derivatives of aggression. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 48, 219-236. The notion of aggression directed at the self, so often invoked in clinical practice, implies that an already eroticized sadism is turned back upon the subject, and not simply that partial or full desexualization leads to an act of self-punishment. Fonagy, Peter, et. Al. (1993). Aggression and the psychological self. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 74, 471-486. JEAN BERGERET Kernberg, Otto. (1992). Aggression in personality disorders and perversions, New Haven/London: Yale University Press. See also: Adler, Alfred; Anal-sadistic stage; Essential depression; Conflict; Cruelty; Death instinct (Thanatos); Depressive position; Envy; Narcissistic rage; Oral-sadistic stage; Paranoid position; Phobia of committing impulsive acts; Sadism; Sadomasochism; Splitting of the object; Sublimation; Turning around upon the subject’s own self; Violence, instinct of. Fosshage, James L. (1998). On aggression: its forms and functions. Psychoanalytical Inquiry, 18, 45-54. Mitchell, Stephen. (1998). Aggression and the endangered self. Psychoanalytical Inquiry, 18, 21-30. AICHHORN, AUGUST (1878–1949) Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1–338; 5: 339–625. An Austrian educator with an interest in psychoanalysis, the pioneer of a new approach to reeducating problem children, August Aichhorn was born July 27, 1878, in Vienna, Austria, where he spent his entire life, and died October 13, 1949. He was raised, along with a twin brother who died when Aichhorn was 19, in a Catholic family of modest means. He became a teacher and continued his studies at the Technische Hochschule of Vienna. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. From 1908 to 1918 he was in charge of managing homes for boys in the Austrian capital. In 1918 he was Bibliography Bergeret, Jean. (1984). La violence fondamentale. Paris: Dunod. Diatkine, René, (1966). Intervention au 7e séminaire de perfectionnement. Revue française de psychanalyse, 30 (3), pp. 324–344. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 35 A I M É E , C A S E OF made responsible for setting up an educational center for delinquent children in an unused refugee camp. Convinced that the suppression then commonly practiced was not the right approach, and disappointed by the kinds of psychological training taught at the university, he introduced unorthodox methods, based on ‘‘warm sympathy with the fate of those unfortunates and was correctly guided by an intuitive perception of their mental needs’’ (Freud, 1925f). His educational success caught the attention of Anna Freud, and it is through her that he discovered psychoanalysis when he was already past forty. He undertook an analysis with Paul Federn and, in 1922, became a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Association. When his experiment in reeducation came to an end, Aichhorn created, in 1923, educational centers that focused on psychoanalysis in each of Vienna’s fourteen districts. He worked in the centers, always at his teacher’s salary, until his retirement in 1930. Along with his responsibilities as a re-educator, he expended tremendous energy in teaching and training. The conferences at which he discussed his original approach to problem adolescents are collected in his book Wayward Youth (1925), with a preface by Sigmund Freud. The book was an international success. He was invited to Zurich, Basel, Bern, Prague, Berlin, Stuttgart, and Lausanne. He collaborated in the Revue de pédagogie psychanalytique (Review of Psychoanalytic Pedagogy), which he co-edited from 1932 on. Between 1931 and 1932 he directed the small school created by Dorothy Burlingham. After Freud and his followers fled the city, Aichhorn continued to train doctors and psychologists in psychoanalysis and to organize seminars for education and guidance counselors. Made president of the new Vienna Psychoanalytic Association in 1946, he continued his work among educators, whom he exposed to the importance of psychoanalytic training. Aichhorn opened a new field of activity in psychoanalysis—social work. He radically renewed the approach to ‘‘abandoned’’ youth, showing that asocial phenomena—latent or manifest—had their origin in the severe lack of social and emotional support experienced during childhood. His ideas on how to use transference as a therapeutic tool, on the importance of the individual, both the educator and the delinquent, and on the necessity of giving marginalized youth a sense of responsibility to help reintegrate them socially are still relevant. ‘‘Psycho-analysis could teach 36 him little that was new of a practical kind, but it brought him a clear theoretical insight into the justification of his way of acting and put him in a position to explain its basis to other people’’ (Freud, 1925f). JEANNE MOLL See also: Abandonment; Adolescence; Austria; BurlinghamTiffany, Dorothy; Puberty; Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung; Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik. Bibliography Aichhorn, August. (1951). Wayward youth. London: Imago Publishing Company. Cifali, Mireille, and Moll, Jeanne. (1985). Pédagogie et Psychanalyse. Paris: Dunod. Freud, Sigmund. (1925f [1951]). Preface to Wayward youth. London: Imago Publishing Company. AIMÉE, CASE OF The full title of the doctoral thesis that signaled Jacques Lacan’s entry into psychiatry was De la psychose paranoı̈aque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité (On paranoiac psychosis as it relates to the personality). The work was dated September 7, 1932, when Lacan was thirty-one years old. Readers of the work were uniformly impressed with the breadth of scientific learning that Lacan displayed. To Georges Heuyer, who had doubts about the sheer quantity of bibliographical references, Lacan responded that he had, in fact, read them all. Furthermore, Lacan claimed to have personally evaluated about forty cases. And his familiarity with German texts clearly distinguished his scholarship from the chauvinism characteristic of the two great schools of psychiatry of the time. The French school was his model because of the high quality of its observation and because of its elegance and precision. But the Germans supplied Lacan with the doctrinal authority required by his goal of methodological synthesis. ‘‘Then came Kraepelin’’ (Lacan, 1932, p. 23). Emil Kraepelin succeeded in imposing differential diagnoses in the field of the psychoses, where previously the category of paranoia had been extended to every kind of delusion and cognitive disorder in a way clearly contradicted by observation, despite the fact that paranoia INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A I M É E , C A S E was defined very narrowly. Lacan wrote in glowing terms of Johannes Lange, coauthor of the 1927 edition of Kraepelin’s Manual of Psychiatry, whose study of eighty-one cases noted that classical paranoia was extremely rare, and assigned the curable cases to the category delineated by Kraepelin. As for ‘‘genuine paranoia,’’ the question was whether it could be acute, whether remissions were possible. This was a question that Lacan asked from the outset (1932) and that would still preoccupy him twenty-five years later in ‘‘On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis’’ (1959/2004). For Lacan, the work of Robert Gaupp supplied an affirmative answer to this question. In short, Lacan endorsed Kraepelin’s inclination toward a psychogenetic conception of paranoia, and what Lacan called ‘‘psychogeny’’ became a main theme of his thesis. Hence Lacan’s harsh criticism of organicism, the constitutional theory, and the ideology of degeneracy—all then still prevalent in French psychiatry. To stymie these tendencies, Lacan chose to speak of ‘‘personality.’’ To solidify this notion, he drew upon Ernst Kretschmer, Pierre Janet, Karl Jaspers, and, finally, Eugen Bleuler. Bleuler and the Zurich school were Lacan’s main route into psychoanalysis from the psychiatric study of the psychoses. Lacan sought to relate mental disturbances to personality, as Janet did, and, like Kretschmer, to explain them in terms of the individual’s history and ‘‘experience’’ (Erlebnis) (1932, p. 92), with ‘‘its social and ethical stresses,’’ rather than by evoking ‘‘congenital defects’’ (1932, p. 243). All this implied a ‘‘comprehensive’’ approach to psychotics consonant with the phenomenology of Jaspers. For this reason, Lacan enlisted the masters of psychiatry and psychopathology in support the open-minded approach to mental illness characteristic of his friends at the journal L’évolution psychiatrique. Lacan argued that pathological manifestations in psychosis were ‘‘total vital responses,’’ which, as ‘‘functions of the personality,’’ maintained meaningful connections with the human community (1932, p. 247). In short, they were meaningful—a realization that defined the young Lacan’s approach and influenced the choice of his inaugural case, that of ‘‘Aimée.’’ Aimée was a thirty-eight-year-old woman who, with ‘‘eyes filled with the fires of hate’’ (1932, p. 153), had tried to stab the celebrated actress Huguette Duflos. As a result of this attempted ‘‘magnicide’’ on April 18, 1931, she was immediately imprisoned. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OF Lacan began to see her one month later at Sainte-Anne Hospital. He reconstructed ‘‘almost the full gamut of paranoid themes’’ (1932, p. 158): persecution, jealousy, and prejudice for the most part, themes of grandeur centered chiefly on dreams of escape and a reformatory idealism, along with traces of erotomania. Her cognitive functions were unaffected. To this classic picture, which Lacan established by means of thorough biographical inquiry, Lacan added what he considered a decisive consideration: after twenty days of incarceration, the patient’s delusional state diminished dramatically. This development Lacan viewed as evidence of the acute nature of her paranoia. Connecting Aimée’s criminal act with this remission, he set out to discover the meaning of her pathology, and with this in mind he proposed a new diagnostic category: ‘‘selfpunishment paranoia.’’ Aimée also aroused Lacan’s curiosity because of her attempts at writing. Lacan had already evinced an interest in the writing of psychotics, and in his thesis (1932) he published selected passages from ‘‘Aimée’’— the name being that of the heroine of the patient’s projected novel. Aimée’s writings and the sensational aspects her case brought Lacan’s work to the attention of a public well beyond psychiatry. The spirit of the times saw links among art, madness, and psychoanalysis. The dreams related by André Breton in Communicating Vessels date from 1931, and his exchange of letters with Freud, which followed the publication of this book, date from 1932. René Crevel, Paul Éluard, Salvador Dalı́, Joë Bousquet all echoed Lacan’s thesis. In 1933, in the first issue of the Surrealist magazine Minotaure, Dalı́ cited ‘‘Jacques Lacan’s admirable thesis’’ and praised the thesis of ‘‘the paranoiac mechanism as the force and power acting at the very root of the phenomenon of personality.’’ Lacan took pride in this acknowledgment. In his Écrits (1966), he described his thesis as merely an introduction to ‘‘paranoiac knowledge’’ (p. 65), an unmistakable allusion to Dalı́’s ‘‘paranoiac-critical method.’’ He never revised this attitude: as late as December 16, 1975, he declared, ‘‘Paranoid psychosis and personality have no relationship because they are one and the same thing.’’ Left-wing philosophers likewise fell under the spell of Lacan’s book. Paul Nizan, a careful reader of Jaspers, published a summary of it the communist daily L’humanité for February 10, 1933; Lacan’s talk of a ‘‘concrete’’ psychology related to ‘‘social reality’’ sufficed to open that particular door. Jean Bernier, in La 37 A I M É E , C A S E OF critique social, a journal to the left of the Communist Party, offered a brilliant reading of Lacan’s thesis, despite being marred by misunderstandings of psychoanalysis so common among revolutionary critics. Lacan’s doctoral thesis was significant in another way too: it was his declaration of allegiance to psychoanalysis. He undertook a personal analysis and trained under the auspices of the recently established Société psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society). In his thesis, he hailed ‘‘the scientific import of Freudian doctrine,’’ the only theory capable of apprehending the ‘‘true nature of pathology,’’ as opposed to other methods, which, despite their ‘‘very valuable observational syntheses,’’ failed to clear up uncertainties (1932, p. 255). Lacan’s study of the case of Aimée and his overall view of the psychoses were thoroughly imbued with Freudian teachings. Thus he saw the psychogenesis of Aimée’s pathology in light of the theory of the development of the libido, as rounded out a few years earlier by Karl Abraham (1924/1927). And he understood delusion as the unconscious offering itself to the understanding of consciousness. ‘‘Ça joue au clair," Lacan reiterated in his seminar on the psychoses (1981/1993, session of 25 January 1956). For Lacan, the notion of personality certainly implied ‘‘a conception of oneself’’ (1932, p. 42), but in his view this conception was based on ‘‘ideal’’ images brought up into consciousness. Under the acknowledged influence of Angelo Hesnard and René Laforgue’s report to the Fifth Conference of French-Speaking Psychoanalysts in June 1930, Lacan advanced his hypothesis of psychosis as ‘‘self-punishment’’ under the influence of the superego. He suggested that a nosological distinction be drawn for cases where an element of hate and a ‘‘combative attitude’’ turn back upon the subject in the shape of self-accusation and self-depreciation, and concluded by proposing the category of ‘‘psychoses of the super-ego,’’ to include contentious and self-punishing forms of paranoia (1932, p. 338). The most striking aspect of Lacan’s thesis, in the context of the time, was the evidence it offered of his solid Freudian grounding, gleaned in part, no doubt, from his translation into French, in that same year of 1932, of Freud’s paper ‘‘Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia, and Homosexuality’’ (1922b [1921]). What Lacan drew from this important work underlay his assertion that ‘‘Aimée’s entire delusion’’ 38 could ‘‘be understood as an increasingly centrifugal displacement of a hate whose direct object she wished to misapprehend’’ (1932, p. 282). At the beginning of his discussion, Lacan derived a general proposition from the same source: ‘‘The developmental distance, according to Freud, that separates the homosexual drive, the cause of traumatic repression, from the point of narcissistic fixation, which reveals a completed regression, is a measure of the seriousness of the psychosis in any given case’’ (1932, p. 262). The case of Aimée continued to play a part in Lacan’s life. For one, he had good cause to remember it when, years later, Aimée turned out to be the mother of one of his patients, the psychoanalyst Didier Anzieu. Furthermore, the themes explored in De la psychose paranoı̈aque continued to preoccupy him in his later work. Most significantly, his resolutely psychoanalytic approach to the psychoses was confirmed by his defining work of the 1950s (1993, 2004), whose great theoretical import was rivaled only by what he called ‘‘fidelity to the formal envelope of the symptom’’ (1966, p. 66). This remark does far more than endorse the precepts of a grand clinical tradition; it distills certain constants of Lacan’s thinking. As he adds in the same passage, the formal envelope of the symptom may stretch to a ‘‘limit where it reverses direction and becomes creative.’’ This was a crucial issue for Lacan throughout his life, and in many different ways. The culmination of this concern was his engagement with the work of James Joyce, which informed his seminar of 1975– 1976 on the ‘‘sinthome’’ (1976–1977). On the same page of Écrits (p. 66), Lacan, reviewing his own past itinerary, described what might be considered the function of the symptom: to keep up, despite the ever-present risk of slipping, with what he called ‘‘confronting the abyss.’’ Psychosis exemplified such confrontation, which was why Lacan returned here to how ‘‘passing to the act’’ may serve to ‘‘fan the fire’’ of delusion—an original theme explored in his thesis. How such acts relate to literary creation, the function of the symptom, and passing to the act were thus just so many issues first broached in the case of Aimée. BERNARD TOBOUL See also: Anzieu, Didier; Bleuler, Paul Eugen; Évolution psychiatrique (l’ -) (Developments in Psychiatry); Lacan, Jacques-Marie Émile; Paranoia. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AJASE COMPLEX Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1927). A short study of the development of the libido, viewed in the light of mental disorders. In Selected Papers of Karl Abraham (Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1924) Allouch, Jean. (1994). Marguerite, ou l’aimée de Lacan (rev. ed.). Paris: E.P.E.L. Dalı́, Salvador. (1933). Le mythe tragique de l’Angélus de Millet. Minotaure, 1. Freud, Sigmund. (1922b [1921]). Some neurotic mechanisms in jealousy, paranoia, and homosexuality. SE: 18: 221–232. Lacan, Jacques. (1932). De la psychose paranoı̈aque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité. Paris: Librairie le François. ———. (1966). Écrits. Paris: Seuil. ———. (1976–1977). Le séminaire XXIII, 1975–76: Le sinthome. Ornicar? 2–5. ———. (1993). The seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book 3: The psychoses, 1955–1956 (Russell Grigg, Trans.). London: Routledge. (Original work published 1981) ———. (2002). On a question prior to any possible treatment of psychosis. In his Écrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1959) This is the version of the Ajase story Kosawa wrote in the 1950s, based on the Kanmuiryojukyo. The themes of the Ajase complex are as follows: 1. A mother’s conflict between her wish for a child and an infanticidal wish; AJASE COMPLEX Heisaku Kosawa visited Sigmund Freud in 1932 and presented this paper on the Ajase complex. The paper was entitled ‘‘Two Kinds of Guilt Feelings’’ and subtitled ‘‘The Ajase Complex.’’ The Ajase complex is an original theory developed by Kosawa, and subsequently expanded by Keigo Okonogi. Whereas Freud based his Oedipus complex on a Greek tragedy, Kosawa developed his theory on the Ajase complex from stories found in Buddhist scripture. The story of Ajase centers on the Buddhist concept of reincarnation. Well known to the Buddhist world, Ajase’s story appears with many variations in the scriptures of ancient India. Kosawa modeled his theory on the version of Ajase story appearing in the Kanmuryojukyo, a Buddhist scripture centering on the salvation of the mother. Ajase was the son of a king in India. His mother, fearing the loss of her youth and beauty, wanted to bear a child so she could retain her status. A prophet INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY told her that a hermit who lived in the forest would be reborn as the king’s son. The queen, however, wanted the child as soon as possible and killed the hermit, who then entered her womb. The child that she bore was named Ajase. Just before being slain, the hermit had told the queen that he would be reborn as her son and curse his father. The queen, fearful of what she had done, tried to abort and kill the baby, but she failed and Ajase survived. When Ajase grew up and learned the secret surrounding his birth, he became angry with the queen and attempted to slay her, but was dissuaded from this act by a minister. At that moment, Ajase was attacked by a severe guilt feeling and became afflicted with a dreadful skin disease characterized by so offensive an odor that no one dared approach him. Only his mother stood by and lovingly nursed him. Despite his mother’s devoted care, Ajase did not readily recover. Seeking relief, the queen went to the Buddha and told him of her sufferings. The Buddha’s teachings healed her inner conflict, and she returned to continue to care for her Ajase. Eventually, the Prince was cured to become a widely respected ruler. OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 2. Prenatal rancor and matricidal wish in the child, Ajase. According to the parable of reincarnation, Ajase is the reincarnation of a hermit whom his mother had killed. In other words, he hates his mother for having killed him before his birth. Prenatal rancor means hatred for the origin of one’s birth. Prenatal rancor led Ajase to try to kill his mother when he learned the origin of his birth; 3. Two kinds of guilt feelings. Ajase was overcome with strong feelings of guilt after attempting to slay his mother, and became afflicted with a terrible, painful skin disease characterized by foulsmelling abscesses. Kosawa called this feeling of guilt ‘‘a punitive guilt feeling.’’ Only his mother’s forgiveness and nursing brought him back to health. Kosawa called the feeling of guilt that Ajase experienced ‘‘a forgiven guilt feeling.’’ KEIGO OKONOGI 39 A L C H E M Y (A N A L Y T I C A L P S Y C H O L O G Y ) See also: Complex; Guilt, unconscious sense of; Guilt, feeling of; Wish for a baby. Bibliography Kosawa, Heisaku. (1931). Two kinds of guilt feelings. The Ajase complex. Japanese Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 11, 1954. Kosawa, Heisaku. (1935, March–April). Two types of guilt consciousness—Oedipus and Ajase. Tokyo Journal of Psychoanalysis, 11. ALCHEMY (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) Alchemy is a philosophical and chemical ‘‘opus’’ with roots in ancient times and branches throughout the world’s cultures. It is both an experimental and symbolic practice, a technical research into the nature of matter, and an imaginal exercise on the spirit of matter and its potential for change. It is also a mythopoeic meditation and a projective method, a moving Rorschach for the practitioner. Using its experiments as metaphors, it has sought an enlivening elixir, a healing panacea, and the transformation of base metal into gold through release from crude impure ores. This occurs through producing a transmuting agent, itself a transformation from the prima materia of the common ‘‘philosopher’s stone’’ into the precious ‘‘stone of the philosophers’’ or ‘‘lapis.’’ Alchemy posits an original unitary energy which separated in space-time into distinct physical elements, ‘‘falling apart’’ and differentiating in the four directions. Perceived as transmutable through shared qualities or correspondences, these elements could one day be reunited in a reconstituted wholeness. The dicta—‘‘Return to chaos is essential to the work,’’ ‘‘Volatize the fixed and fix the volatile,’’ and ‘‘Dissolve and Coagulate’’—express a dialectic process between complements and opposites in analysis and synthesis. The alchemists might quicken this process through their outer intervention in matter and their interior practice of soul and spirit. The opus is the work of persons or couples, whose integration or dissociation are operative. While using common references, it values the individual and dynamic over the collective and dogmatic. Through the interior change of the adept and his soror mystica (mystical sister) and the chemical changes 40 in the ‘‘well closed vessel’’ of the retort, the microcosm and macrocosm affect and reflect each other. The Freudian psychoanalyst Herbert Silberer first observed the analogy to transference in the conjoinings and confrontations among sulphurs, mercuries, and salts, between the ‘‘masculine’’ and ‘‘feminine’’ matter, called king and queen, sun and moon, gold and silver, day and night, male and female. Jung cited Silberer in his work on the ‘‘coniunctio’’ (conjunction) of transference and countertransference. In alchemy, Jung found a precursor of depth psychotherapy’s dyadic and interactional model. He came to understand the psyche, the unconscious, and depth analysis as alchemical process, the ‘‘stone’’ as transformational consciousness, both a means and the goal of individuation. He also noted alchemical images in modern dreams. BEVERLEY D. ZABRISKIE See also: Allendy, René Felix Eugène; Archetype (analytical psychology); Goethe and psychoanalysis; Jung, Carl Gustav; Silberer, Herbert; Transference/countertransference (analytical psychology). Bibliography Jung, Carl Gustav. (1946). The psychology of the transference. Collected Works (Vol. XVI). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ———. (1953). Psychological reflections: An anthology of the writings of C. G. Jung (J. Jacobi, Ed.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ———. (1955–56). Mysterium Conjunctionis. An inquiry into the separation and synthesis of psychic opposites in alchemy. Collected Works (Vol. XIV). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ALCOHOLISM Alcoholism is not a psychoanalytic concept. The most rigorous definition, following from the basic notion of dependence, is the one provided by Pierre Fouquet: ‘‘An alcoholic is any man or woman who has lost the ability to do without alcohol.’’ The word ‘‘alcoholism’’ was introduced by the Swedish physician Magnus Huss (1849) and mentioned in France by M. Gabriel (1866) in his medical dissertation. It appears in Freud’s writings prior to 1900 in association with hysteria and hypnosis, as a form of ‘‘subjection,’’ a ‘‘morbid habit,’’ INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ALCOHOLISM falling somewhere ‘‘between the organic affections and the disorders of the imagination.’’ Principal occurrences of the word appear in letters to Wilhelm Fliess (especially that of December 22, 1897), in the attached manuscript (Draft H., 1895), and especially in the key text ‘‘Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses’’ (1898a). ‘‘Habit,’’ Freud writes, ‘‘is a mere form of words, without any explanatory value’’ and ‘‘success will only be an apparent one, so long as the physician contents himself with withdrawing the narcotic substance from his patients, without troubling about the source from which their imperative need for it springs’’ (p. 276). It was initially believed (Sigmund Freud, Karl Abraham, Sándor Ferenczi) that alcohol does not create symptoms but only promotes them, removing inhibitions, and destroying sublimation. The theory of alcohol addiction (1905d) is summarized in terms of its predominance among men beginning with the onset of puberty; its relationship to sexuality, and latent homosexuality, already identified as narcissistic and specular by Viktor Tausk (1913) and Lou Andreas-Salomé (1912); oral fixation, and autoerotic behavior. Emphasis later focused on the nature of the defensive process, an immediately effective means, but one that is too accessible, which is why it is so dangerous (1930a [1929]). The economic approach to affects was emphasized next— concepts of alexithymia (McDougall, 1978), instinctual discharge by the body (‘‘resomatization of affects’’), and acting out (‘‘dispersion,’’ ‘‘destruction of affects,’’ ‘‘actssymptoms’’), depending on the author—all at the expense of psychic elaboration. Alcohol plays the role of a unique substitute object and a trap, creating a pseudo-reality; the hallucinations associated with delirium tremens cease with the administration of alcohol. The narcissistic problematic (withdrawal) in fact harbors an autoerotic component and gives rise to defenses, barriers, or narcissistic prostheses, such as an overinvestment in work, children, ‘‘friends,’’ etc., and alcohol. The mechanism of splitting into nonalcoholic (common, neurotic) and alcoholic sectors of the ego has denial as its corollary, but it is a denial that does not involve the perception of an external reality (difference of the sexes, castration) but rather the internal perception of the body itself. There exist silent zones, ‘‘matrices of painful, deadly territories that threaten the unity of the ego’’ (Mijolla and Shentoub, 1973). These are the parts of the body that lie outside symbolization and outside language, as described by Jean Clavreul INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (1959). For Paul Schilder and Walter Bromberg (1933), alcoholism is accompanied by a regression from castration that leads to bodily fragmentation. The alcoholic short circuit leaves no room for the establishment of loss, the source of desire, but rather establishes an ensemble of needs and repetitive acts that are without meaning. An analogy can be made with pathological games. Shame or opprobrium are distinguished from guilt. The superego of an alcoholic is demanding but ‘‘soluble in alcohol’’ (Simmel, 1930). There is no strong image with which the subject identifies, but identification can occur with someone hated, which can lead to ‘‘self-hatred.’’ The indulgent and demanding mother who creates insecurity is the object of reverse fantasies (idealization). The symbolism of alcohol is that of vital fluids (blood, ‘‘the blood of the vine,’’ sperm, milk) or destructive humors (urine, feces), of the breast and the penis, good and/or bad. This symbolism is present in all the myths associated with alcohol, from Dionysus to the Eucharist. The situation in terms of a psychoanalytic classification is still the subject of controversy. It is a narcissistic disorder, closer to manic-depression and paranoia than to neurosis, psychosis, or perversion. Its issues fall within the framework of addiction. Intolerance to alcohol can be interpreted as a reaction formation to the excitations that alcohol promotes, or to the frequently negative attitudes toward alcoholics, sometimes as extreme as hatred (Winnicott, D. W., 1947), or even to the most primitive issues of the alcoholic that are awakened in the therapist. From the standpoint of treatment, it is a matter of detoxification or social prohibition (1927c)—‘‘Not all men abandon this toxic supplement with the same facility’’ (1905c), ‘‘the only effective remedy is the resolution that draws its strength from a powerful current of the libido’’—as opposed to involvement of the superego (1966b [1932]). The effectiveness of temperance movements appear to be associated with libidinal investments ‘‘torn from alcohol’’ and given expression in exhibitionism, or homosexual and narcissistic masochism. There is a double risk of using the term ‘‘alcoholism’’: the risk of turning it into a closed and homogenized entity, or of breaking apart the clinical concept, reductively assimilating it to various diagnostic classifications (neurosis, psychosis, perversion—fetishism, 41 A L E X A N D E R , F R A N Z G A B R I E L (1891 –1964 ) for example—paranoia, manic-depression, psychopathy, etc.). To compound the problem, concepts such as homosexuality, orality, ‘‘disappointment,’’ and ‘‘libidinal viscosity,’’ risk serving as facile or even completely inappropriate explanations. Freud himself often superimposed the phenomenology of drunkenness and the psychopathology of alcohol addiction, and even considered the relation of the alcoholic to his poison as nonconflictual, ‘‘the purest harmony,’’ and ‘‘an example of a happy marriage’’ (1912d, p. 188). Blind spots with respect to his own relationship to toxic substances (cocaine, tobacco) led him outside the field of psychoanalysis when he postulated a ‘‘toxological theory’’ in psychopathology, which he did not abandon until the Outline of Psychoanalysis (Descombey, 1994). There are a number of concepts related to alcoholism: addiction, alcoholic intoxication, alcoholic delirium and jealousy, delirium tremens (Viktor Tausk’s delirium of action or occupation), alcohol-associated epilepsy. And it can be asked, as Freud asked about psychosis, if the terms ‘‘denial’’ and ‘‘repression’’ have the same meaning with respect to alcoholism as they do for the psychopathology of the neuroses. The same question could also be asked about the familiar use of the concepts of desire and pleasure when it comes to a clinical practice that is situated ‘‘beyond the pleasure principle’’ or within the register of need. Post-Freudian authors who have done substantive work on alcoholism include James Glover (1938) and the Kleinians Herbert Rosenfeld (1964) (paranoidschizoid and depressive positions), Sándor Radó (1933) (pharamacothymia, initial anxiety depression, pharmacogenic orgasm, addiction crisis), and Michael Balint (1977) (basic fault). There has also been renewed interest in the subject in the work of the French psychoanalysts Jean Clavreul (1959), Alain de Mijolla and Salem A. Shentoub (1973); the Lacanians François Perrier (1975), Charles Melman (1976), A. Rigaud (1976), M. Lasselin (1979), and F. GondoloCalais (1980); as well as Jacques Ascher (1978), Joyce McDougall (1989), M. Monjauze (1991), and JeanPaul Descombey (1985–1994). JEAN-PAUL DESCOMBEY See also: Addiction; Dependence; Dipsomania; Indications and contraindications for psychoanalysis for an adult. 42 Bibliography Bromberg, William, and Schilder, Paul. (1933). Alcoholic hallucinations—castration and dismembering motives. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 14, 206–224. Clavreul, Jean. (1959). La parole de l’alcoolique. Psychanalyse, 5, 257–280. Descombey, Jean-Paul. (1985). Alcoolique, mon frère, toi: l’alcoolisme entre médecine, psychiatrie et psychanalyse. Toulouse: Privat. ———. (1994). Précis d’alcoologie clinique. Paris: Dunod. Freud, Sigmund. (1898a). Sexuality in the aetiology of the neuroses. SE, 3: 259–285. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1912d). On the universal tendency to debasement in the sphere of love. SE, 11; 177–190. Huss, Magnus. (1849). Alcoholismus chronicus eller kronisk alkoholsjukdom. Stockholm: n.p. McDougall, Joyce. (1989). Theaters of the body: a psychoanalytic approach to psychosomatic illness. New York: Norton. Mijolla, Alain de, and Shentoub, Salem A. (1973). Pour une psychanalyse de l’alcoolisme. Paris: Payot. Further Reading Director, L. (2002). Relational psychoanalysis in the treatment of chronic drug & alcohol abuse. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 12, 551–580. ALEXANDER, FRANZ GABRIEL (1891–1964) A doctor and psychoanalyst, Franz Gabriel Alexander was born January 22, 1891, in Budapest, and died March 8, 1964, in Palm Springs, California. The son of Bernard Alexander, a Jewish professor of philosophy, Franz Alexander studied medicine in Göttingen and Budapest, and specialized in research on the physiology of the brain. Following the First World War, he moved to Berlin. It was Sigmund Freud who introduced him to psychoanalysis, but he completed his analytic training with Hanns Sachs in Berlin. In 1921 he became a member of the German Psychoanalytic Society, an assistant at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, and a training analyst. He undertook a reformulation of the study of neuroses in his Psychoanalyse der Gesamtpersönlichkeit (Psychoanalysis of the total personality), which represented the first step INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ALIENATION toward a psychology of the psychoanalytic ego. Together with Hugo Staub he published a psychoanalytic study of criminology in 1929, Der Verbrecher und seine Richter (The Criminal, the judge, and the Public: A Psychological Analysis, 1956). In 1930 he was invited to the United States, where he occupied the first University Chair of psychoanalysis at the University of Chicago. In 1931 he worked at the Judge Baker Institute in Boston on juvenile delinquency and, in 1932, he founded the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute, where he remained director until 1952. In 1933 he was admitted as a member of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society and, in 1938, named professor of psychiatry at the University of Illinois. Alexander was one of the best known representatives of medicine seen from the point of view of psychoanalysis. In 1939, in collaboration with Flanders Dunbar, Stanley Cobb, Carl Binger, and others, he founded the review Psychosomatic Medicine. ‘‘According to his theory on the specific psychodynamic conflicts associated with certain illnesses, a psychosomatic illness appears whenever there is an encounter between a certain personality type, predisposed to certain illnesses, and a specific conflict situation that lends itself to the formation of specific organic illnesses’’ (Bonin, 1983). In 1955 he spent a year at the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Science in Palo Alto, California. Following this year, in 1956, he settled in Los Angeles, where he was named head of the Psychiatric Research Department at Mount Sinai Hospital. With support of the Ford Foundation, he organized a research project to study psychotherapeutic process by direct observation of patients and therapists. That same year Alexander became cofounder of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis. He died March 8, 1964, in Palm Springs, California. Alexander believed that psychoanalysis was a branch of psychiatry, and was also convinced of the efficacy of a shortened course of therapy. Many of his critics considered the new ideas he introduced into analytic theory to be reductive. ELKE MÜHLLEITNER See also: Allergy; Asthma; Criminology and psychoanalysis; Hungarian School; Psychosomatics; United States. Bibliography Alexander, Franz Gabriel. (1927). Psychoanalyse der Gesamtpersönlichkeit; neun Vorlesungen über die Anwendung von INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Freud’s Ich–Theorie auf die Neurosenlehre. Leipzig, Vienna: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. ———. (1961). The scope of psychoanalysis. Selected papers of Franz Alexander. New York: Basic Books. Alexander Franz, and Staub, Hugo. (1956). The criminal, the judge, and the public: A psychological analysis, (rev. ed., Gregory Zilboorg, Trans.). Glencoe, IL: Free Press. (Original work published 1929) Bonin, Werner F. (1983). Die grossen Psychologen. Düsseldorf, Germany: Econ Taschenbuch. Grotjahn, Martin. (1966). Georg Groddeck, the untamed analyst. In Fr. Alexander, S. Eisenstein, M. Grotjahn (eds.), Psychoanalytic pioneers (p. 308–320). New York-London: Basic Books. Hale, Nathan G. (1995). The rise and crisis of psychoanalysis in the United States: Freud and the Americans, 1917–1985. New York: Oxford University Press. ALIENATION Inscribed in the opposition between the Same and the Other, alienation describes the condition of the subject who no longer recognizes himself, or rather can only recognize himself via the Other. The philosophical background of this concept derives from Hegel and then Marx. Classical psychiatry used the term to classify any mental illness in which the subject no longer knew who he was. Thanks to Jacques Lacan’s study of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, the term no longer refers only to mental alienation, but retains the meaning it has in philosophy. For Lacan, who followed Hegel on this point, human desire is constituted by mediation: ‘‘Man’s desire finds its meaning in the other’s desire, not so much because the other holds the keys to the desired object, but because his first objective is to be recognized by the other’’ (Lacan, p. 58). Specifically, the objective is to be recognized by the Other as a desiring subject, because the first desire is to have one’s desire recognized. The conclusion is Lacan’s well-known formula: ‘‘Man’s desire is the desire of the Other,’’ which doesn’t mean that one desires another as object, but that one desires another desire, and wants to have one’s own desire recognized by the Other. This is an echo of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic (a struggle for pure prestige) where each consciousness wants to be recognized by the Other without recognizing it in turn (‘‘each consciousness seeks the death of the other’’). 43 ALIENATION In this fight to the death, the one who accepts death in order to win becomes the Master; the other will become the slave. But the Master is taken in a trap, for he owes his status to the recognition of a slaveconsciousness. The slave, however, will be liberated by the Master as his work extracts from things the consciousness of self that was lost in the struggle. The slave will end up, in the Marxist perspective, transforming the world in such a way that there is no place for the Master. Thus the theme of alienation in Lacan refers to what is called a forced choice, or vel, which is the Latin word expressing an alternative where it is impossible to maintain two terms at once. The vel is alienating in that it gives a false choice, a forced choice (‘‘your money or your life,’’ ‘‘me or you’’). The Master’s freedom, which must pass through death to attain consciousness of self, is no freedom. Lacan derived several consequences from this structure of alternative, particularly in his critique of the Cartesian cogito, by indicating that thought and being cannot coincide. Thus, ‘‘I am where I do not think’’ and ‘‘it thinks there where I am not.’’ Piera Aulagnier also took up the notion of alienation, but even though she borrowed from Lacan the relation of desire to the Other, her view more closely approached Freud’s thinking about collective hypnosis and its relation to the ego ideal. However, she worked in an entirely different context, refusing to make alienation one of the givens of human existence, but instead seeing it as one of the ways the psyche attempts to resolve conflict. First, she defined the notion of alienation by its goal, which is ‘‘to strive for a non-conflictual state, to abolish all causes of conflict between the identifying subject and the object of identification, between the I and its ideals’’ (Aulagnier, 1979). Thus she connects the notion to the aims of Thanatos, as a ‘‘desire for non-desire’’ and it can then be used in fields as diverse as collective psychology, passionate love, gambling, and drug addiction. Nevertheless, Piera Aulagnier insists that alienation rests on an encounter between the desire for selfalienation, on the one hand, and the desire to alienate, on the other. The process of alienation seeks to erase the tension arising from this difference, whether it involves a subject that seeks to identify himself with the object identified, or a subject that wants to bring together the self image that comes back to him from others and the others themselves. Thus alienation appears to be a pathological modality, like neurosis or psychosis, that attempts to regulate the conflict between identifying 44 subject and the object identified. Whereas the neurotic differentiates between his self and its idealization and the psychotic posits the latter as realized in a delusion, the alienated subject idealizes an other who provides him with certainty. Unable to make these ideals a spur to progress, alienation produces a short circuit through the mediation of an idealized force. Alienation becomes even more effective when the alienated subject misapprehends ‘‘the accident occurring in his or her thought’’ (Aulagnier, 1979). It is as though this subject, once a prisoner, no longer has the objectivity needed to judge the situation. In cases where a group feels alienated, not only is a group of subjects oppressed by a group of masters, but oppression infiltrates all relationships within the group. ‘‘Thus whatever the position one may occupy at the moment, every subject is both a victim and a potential murderer, given that one could always find oneself in the opposite position a moment later’’ (Aulagnier, 1979). If Jacques Lacan is indebted to Hegel, Piera Aulagnier leans on Aldous Huxley and George Orwell, both of whom revisit the historical experiences that have left their mark on the twentieth century, the Holocaust and the gulag. But how does it happen that the subject chooses one outcome of alienation, rather than another? Piera Aulagnier would start from the metapsychological perspective on the conflict between the identifying subject and the object identified. This conflict is inscribed at the heart of a pathological relation to the ideal ego and to the ideal agencies in general. Alienation is characterized (as is psychosis, but in a different way) by an asymmetry between the I and its object, with no reciprocity between what the one recognizes and what the other recognizes. Thus a dominant pole is created (passionate investment in an object, the God-drug, Chance) by means of which the subject’s response will be alienated from the object that is seen as invulnerable; conversely the psychotic, who also recognizes the asymmetry in the relation, is going to try to flee from it and create outside of it a delusional object of identification that others refuse to recognize. The notion of alienation as Piera Aulagnier conceives of it allowed for a reconsideration the nosographical categories. She particularly opened up a domain for renewed investigations on the question of addictions and on the perversions. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A L L E N D Y , R E N É F É L I X E U G È N E (1889 –1 942) See also: Ego ideal; I; Ideology; Imaginary identification/ symbolic identification; Mirror stage; Passion. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (1979). Les destins du plaisir: aliénation, amour, passion. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France Lacan, Jacques. (2002). The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis. In Écrits: a selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1953) Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1998). Penser la psychose. Une lecture de l’œuvre de Piera Aulagnier. Paris: Dunod. Palmier, Jean-Michel. (1969). Lacan. Paris: Éditions universitaires. Further Reading Bychowski, Gustav. (1967). The archaic object and alienation. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 48, 384393. Khan, Masud. (1979). Alienation in perversions. New York: International Universities Press. ALLENDY-NEL-DUMOUCHEL, YVONNE (1890–1935) A French writer and art critic (under the pseudonym of Jacques Poisson), Yvonne Allendy-Nel-Dumouchel was born in Paris on September 3, 1890, and died there on August 23, 1935. Alice Yvonne Nel-Dumouchel (she later gave up the name Alice) married René Allendy, homeopathic doctor and future founding member of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, on November 19, 1912. In 1922, together with her husband, she created the Groupe d’études philosophiques et scientifiques pour l’examen des idées nouvelles, at the Sorbonne. She was coauthor with him of Capitalisme et Sexualité (Capitalism and sexuality; 1931), a work whose subject matter touched upon communism and feminism. Claiming that life is an ongoing, and one-way, adaptation guided by our instincts, the authors affirm that capitalism intensifies the conflicts between the instincts of possession and those leading to procreation, that economic concerns increase in importance and are substituted, in the relations between the sexes, for values of a sentimental nature. ‘‘Woman experiences economic servitude combined with sexual dependence, her illusory emancipation is added to her responsibilities.’’ Faced with these difficulties, they stipulate a kind of economic INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS regulatory system, national and international, culminating in the abolition of capitalism. As far as the modern family is concerned, they want to see the State substituted for the father as the economic provider. Their analysis cites both Freud and Engels. Under the pseudonym of Jacques Poisson, Yvonne Allendy published a number of articles on the relationship between art and psychoanalysis. Speaking of the cinema, she affirmed that her subject must include the new field then of concern to researchers: the unconscious psychic apparatus, which dominates drama. Allendy claimed that only the cinema is capable of clearly reproducing the thought-image in all its dizzying rapidity. In ‘‘Littérature moderne et psychanalyse’’ (April 1923), she makes use of Freud’s methods to clarify literature, painting, and especially the work of the avant-garde. Apollinaire, Jean Cocteau, Philippe Soupault, and Blaise Cendrars were all examined for their Freudian symbolism. She suggested that there would be ‘‘more to gain in expanding our knowledge of human nature’’ if psychoanalysts were to study Dadaist texts ‘‘than there would be in having professors of literature explain classical texts.’’ She died in 1935 and her sister Colette became René Allendy’s companion. Colette ran a gallery of modern art after the Second World War. JEAN-PIERRE BOURGERON See also: Allendy, René Félix Eugène; Cinema and psychoanalysis; Visual arts and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Allendy, René and Yvonne. (1931). Capitalisme et sexualité. Paris: Denoël & Steele. Poisson, Jacques. (1921, April). Vers une nouvelle unité plastique. La Vie des lettres et des arts, IV, 445–448. ———. (1923, April). Littérature moderne et psychanalyse. La Vie des lettres et des arts, XIV, 71–74. ———. (1925). Cinéma et psychanalyse. Les cahiers du mois, 16–17, 175–176. ALLENDY, RENÉ FÉLIX EUGÈNE (1889–1942) A French homeopathic doctor and psychoanalyst, René Allendy was one of the founding members of the 45 A L L E N D Y , R E N É F É L I X E U G È N E (188 9 –1942 ) Société psychanalytique de Paris. He was born on February 19, 1889, in Paris; his father was a shopkeeper from the Isle of Maurice and his mother was from Picardy. He died in Montpellier on July 12, 1942. When he was three, he contracted bronchial pneumonia from his nurse and during childhood lived through a number of often serious illnesses, including diphtheria complicated by quadriplegia. A student of the Marist brothers at the Collège Saint-Joseph in Paris, he completed his study of the humanities at the Lycée Janson-de-Sailly. He enrolled in the School of Oriental Languages to learn Russian. Later, he received a degree in Swedish from the Scandinavian Language Institute. After receiving his medical degree from the School of Medicine of Paris on November 12, 1912 (his dissertation was entitled ‘‘L’Alchimie et la Médicine’’ [Alchemy and medicine]), he married Yvonne NelDumouchel, just seven days later. Until her death in 1935, she remained his constant companion and collaborator. In 1936 he married Colette Nel-Dumouchel, Yvonne’s sister. After being mobilized in 1914, he was gassed in Champagne, later declared tubercular, and given a disability pension. He practiced medicine in Paris at the Léopold-Bellan hospital and at the tuberculosis prevention clinics run by Hygiène Sociale de la Seine and the Saint-Jacques hospital, where he provided homeopathic treatments from 1932 to 1939. With his wife Yvonne he founded, in 1922, the Groupe d’études philosophiques et scientifiques pour l’examen des idées nouvelles (Philosophic and scientific study group for the examination of new ideas) at the Sorbonne, where a number of speakers from France and other countries spoke on science, art, and psychoanalysis. He defined the organization’s goals this way: ‘‘In order that the great movement of contemporary ideas might lead, without impediment, to practical realizations, it is essential to study the meaning of the future and hasten its spread.’’ neuroses), which appeared with a preface by Professor Claude. The same year, the review Le Disque vert published ‘‘La Libido’’ in an issue dedicated to Freud. He wrote more than thirty articles for homeopathy journals and was equally productive in the field of psychoanalysis: Les Rêves et leur Interprétation psychanalytique (Dreams and their psychoanalytic interpretation; 1926),Le Problème de la destinée (The problem of destiny; 1927), Orientations des idées médicales (Orientations of medical ideas; 1928), La Justice intérieure (Interior justice; 1931) and La Psychanalyse, doctrine et application (Psychoanalysis: theory and application; 1931). Although he often wrote about unorthodox subjects, his theoretical positions remained fairly orthodox; he was, however, open to many of Jung’s ideas, such as that of the collective unconscious. His book on Paracelsus remains a standard reference for admirers of the ‘‘accursed doctor.’’ With Yvonne he published Capitalisme et Sexualité (Capitalism and sexuality) in 1932. He was a friend of Antonin Artaud, and he was also Artaud’s therapist; other patients included René Crevel and Anaı̈s Nin, who described Allendy in detail in her Journal. With Edouard Pichon, he drafted the first statutes of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, where he was secretary from 1928 to 1931. In 1942, in Montpellier, he dictated his last thoughts on the illness that would soon take his life. A strange mixture of lucidity and blindness, these were published in 1944 as the Journal d’un médicin malade (Journal of a sick doctor). JEAN-PIERRE BOURGERON See also: Allendy-Nel-Dumouchel, Yvonne; France; Nin, Anaı̈s; Surrealism and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Allendy, René. (1931). La justice intérieure. Paris: Denoël & Steele. Analyzed in 1924 by René Laforgue, he practiced medicine, homeopathy, and psychoanalysis, studied esotericism and numerology, and published extensively in all these fields. Aside from his private practice, located at 67, rue de l’Assomption, in Paris, he worked as a psychoanalyst in the department of Professor Claude at Sainte-Anne. ———. (1932). La psychanalyse, doctrines et applications. Paris: Denoël & Steele. In 1924 he wrote, together with Laforgue, La Psychanalyse et les Nevroses (Psychoanalysis and Allendy, René, and Allendy, Yvonne. (1931). Capitalisme et sexualité. Paris: Denoël & Steele. 46 ———. (1934). Essai sur la guérison. Paris: Denoël & Steele. ———. (1937). Paracelse, le médecin maudit. Paris: Gallimard. ———. (1944). Journal d’un médecin malade. Paris: Denoël. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ALLERGY Bouvard, Laurent. (1981). La vie et l’œuvre du Dr René Allendy (1889–1942). Medical dissertation, Paris-Val-deMarne, Créteil School of Medicine. ALLERGIC OBJECT RELATIONSHIP The expression allergic object relationship appeared as the title of a talk given by Pierre Marty in 1957, published in the Revue française de psychanalyse. Influenced by the work of Maurice Bouvet, it extends the psychosomatic approach found in his work, which remains key for the question of allergies, and entails an asymptotic model for psychosomatic functioning. The relationship is characterized by a confusion between the personality of the patient and that of the analyst. A striking, if not total, identification sustains this confusion from the outset. This ‘‘communion’’ (in the sense almost of a transubstantiation) implies both identification and projection. The subject inhabits the object and is inhabited by it. The nature of the object—human, animal, plant, thing—matters little, for it is quickly invested as both host and guest. These patients give the impression and have the feeling of being sponges, possibly endowed with clairvoyance. (Zelig, the hero of Woody Allen’s film, is a striking example.) For Marty, the overlapping of identification and projection implies that such projection must be understood primarily as an extension of the limits of the ego as understood by Paul Federn. This first step is followed by a lengthier and more nuanced attempt to modify the object, through which the subject tries to obliterate the limits between self and object, always by means of the same two mechanisms: cloaking the object in its own qualities through an act of ‘‘projection’’ and taking on the qualities of the object through identification. However, the qualities of the object must stay close to a certain ideal of the object. So one sees a capacity for object-choice, but the subject can only detach itself from an object by identifying with a new object, which leads to the loss of the previously invested object, but without any pain of loss or consequent work of mourning. The very idea of a conflict between identifications is avoided in the allergic relation. The oedipal situation is thereby avoided and, when this is impossible, the risk of triggering a somatic crisis becomes manifest. Each of the objects individually can be an object of identification, but conflict (for example, oedipal) results in an interior rift that is avoided by the somatic allergic crisis. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS This account, under the heading of ‘‘the allergic character,’’ would lead to a more comprehensive conception of psychosomatics, founded on the work of Pierre Marty, and enabling him to reveal its role in different forms of character splitting. Léon Kreisler (1980) continued this work in his notion of precocious appearance. The role played by the parents in the development of this relationship is more prominent in his conception than in Marty’s, for whom it is almost a given. Michel Fain compared the family dynamics typical of allergics with the constitutional defect discussed in the work of René Spitz: anxiety in the presence of the stranger. ROBERT ASSÉO See also: Allergy; Asthma. Bibliography Fain, Michael. (1969). Réflexions sur la structure allergique. Revue française de psychanalyse, 33 (2). Kreisler, Léon. (1981), L’enfant du désordre psychosomatique. Toulouse: Privat. Marty, Pierre. (1958). The allergic object relationship. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 39, 98–103. Szwec, Gérard. (1989). Figure de l’étranger, langage et régression formelle. Revue française de psychanalyse, 53, 6: 1977–1987. ALLERGY Treatment of allergies became a part of psychosomatics, and subsequently psychoanalysis, following the work of the Chicago School, especially Franz Alexander and Thomas M. French in 1941. Alexander and French focused primarily on asthma rather than cutaneous allergic reactions, but later authors approached these initial studies quite differently. Distancing themselves from the idea of hysterical conversion, they established a link between psychic conflict and analogous somatic conflict. With respect to allergy, they looked for the conflicting elements they considered characteristic. For asthma, these conflicts were primarily conflicts between infants’ dependence on their mothers and instinctual demands that threatened this dependence. The crisis itself was associated with an inhibition of emotional expression, especially tears. 47 ALLERGY Because these factors were not specific, other authors returned to classical methods of analysis. Phyllis Greenacre (1945) insisted that oral sadism can be masked by streams of crocodile tears; here emotional expression assumes renewed importance in an interpretive framework. Jacob Arlow (1955) considered an allergic attack to be a manifestation of transference essentially associated with sadistic fantasies of incorporation. Melitta Sperling (1963) also demonstrated the links between allergies and pregenital factors. Philip C. Wilson (1968) hypothesized that transferential acting may be involved. In the end, the dimension of conversion returned to the foreground. Michel de M’Uzan (1968) insisted on the need to clarify the formation of somatic symptoms, and he turned to the notion of psychosomatic structure. Pierre Marty reinvigorated the concept of allergies through his description of the allergic character (1976), which followed his account of the allergic object relation fifteen years earlier. He gave the allergic character the following traits: absence or avoidance of aggressiveness, a capacity for identification, absence or avoidance of conflict, considerable merging with the other, and projection as a mode of identification. To describe these traits in turn, absence or avoidance of aggressiveness gives subjects a socially agreeable cast, but is based on a weak capacity for negation, which in turn indicates a weak superego. The capacity for identification was already included in the allergic object relation. Merging with the other (absence of anxiety in the face of the foreign) is also characteristic of certain forms of primary epilepsy and allergic epilepsy, described by Marie-Thérèse Neyraut-Sutterman. Projection, described in 1957, becomes a mode of identification. As a consequence, subjects are unable to project bad objects or to distinguish good from bad. Only when the allergic child is able, through stranger anxiety, to be afraid do allergic mechanisms begin to diminish. The features above can be found together in a character neurosis (which Pierre Marty referred to as a common allergy bundle), or they can appear as simple, relatively invasive traits that form a more or less split-off component of the personality, manifested only during regression (Pierre Marty referred to these as lateral lines) or deep splitting (parallel lines). An allergic crisis can be triggered by the overriding of identificatory possibilities, as when the child is presented with two equally invested objects where the 48 identifications have been kept separate. For Pierre Marty, a somatic manifestation is seen as a way station within a regressive movement and not, as in the psychogenetic approach, as the somatic expression of a traumatic situation. For Michel Fain, the unconscious of the typical allergic is the seat of the mother’s desire to have the child regress to a primary narcissistic stage of feelings of unity with her, a desire that keeps an entire portion of the ego of the allergic patient in an embryonic state. For Marty, these properties and variations result in distinct therapeutic indications. In typical cases, the allergic individual is very adaptable, also in the allergic’s relation to the analyst and to analysis. The down side of this is that there is a risk of an outbreak of somatic manifestations at the end of treatment. He therefore recommends psychotherapy as a prophylactic, which can help the patient to recognize unconscious factors and become aware of the danger of certain object relations. Marty believes that medical treatment is indicated for somatic disorders, and that analysis and psychotherapy should not be recommended for allergic manifestations. This conception of an allergic quasi-structure has led to more recent work by Léon Kreisler (1982), Michel Fain (1969), and Gérard Szwec (1993), who have addressed these problems in children. ROBERT ASSÉO See also: Allergic object relationship; Asthma. Bibliography Alexander, Franz, and French, Thomas M. (1941). Psychogenic factors in bronchial asthma. Washington, DC: National Research Council. Arlow, Jacob. (1955). Notes on oral symbolism. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 24, 63–74. Fain, Michel. (1969). Réflexions sur la structure allergique. Revue française de psychanalyse, 33 (2). Greenacre, Phyllis. (1945). Pathological weeping. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 14 62–75. Kreisler, Léon. (1982). L’économie psychosomatique de l’enfant asthmatique: à propos d’un cas d’asthme grave chez un préadolescent Psychothérapies, 2 (1), 15–24. Marty, Pierre. (1976). Les mouvements individuels de vie et de mort. Vol. 1: Essai d’économie psychosomatique. Paris: Payot. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ALMANACH M’Uzan, Michel de. (1968). Comment on ‘‘Psychosomatic Asthma and Acting Out,’’ by Ph. Wilson. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 49 (2–3), 333–335. Sperling, Melitta. (1963). Fetishism in children. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 32, 374–392. Szwec, Gérard. (1993). La psychosomatique de l’enfant asthmatique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Wilson, C. Philip. (1968). Psychosomatic asthma and acting out: A case of bronchial asthma that developed de novo in the terminal phase. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 49 (2–3), 330–333. ALLGEMEINE ÄRZTLICHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR PSYCHOTHERAPIE The Allgemeine Ärztliche Gesellschaft für Psychotherapie (General Medical Society for Psychotherapy, AÄGP) was an organization of physicians headquartered in Germany dedicated to the promotion of psychotherapeutic theory and practice. Its membership was comprised primarily of young internists and neurologists concerned with that aspect of a ‘‘crisis in medicine’’ having to do with a ‘‘materialist’’ university psychiatry beholden to abstract research and nosology (classification of diseases) instead of the prevention and treatment of mental disorders. Although there was some diversity of political and ideological opinion within the AÄGP, the membership by and large displayed a conservative medical critique of modern industrial society in general and the democratic Weimar Republic in particular. The AÄGP also sought to differentiate psychotherapy from neighboring disciplines inside and outside medicine; there was significant debate in particular about its relationship to psychiatry. The AÄGP was founded as an international organization in 1928 with its own journal; its first annual congress had been held in Baden-Baden in 1926. In 1930 the journal was renamed Zentralblatt für Psychotherapie and was published in Leipzig until 1944. The society was reorganized in 1934 as a result of the Nazi seizure of power; a new Internationale Ärztliche Gesellschaft für Psychotherapie in Zurich under the presidency of Carl Gustav Jung was created along with the Deutsche Allgemeine Ärztliche Gesellschaft für Psychotherapie under Matthias Heinrich Göring. In 1940 Göring succeeded Jung; the AÄGP was resurrected as a West German entity in 1948 under psychiatrist and former president Ernst Kretschmer. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DER PSYCHOANALYSE While some individual psychoanalysts were members of the AÄGP, the German Psychoanalytic Society did not recognize such an organization of ‘‘wild analysts.’’ Although—and because—it was one of the purposes of the AÄGP to unify the schools of thought in psychotherapy, criticism within it of psychoanalysis, especially after 1928, was common. The Freudians who were members of the AÄGP tended to be revisionists like Karen Horney, Georg Groddeck, Wilhelm Reich, and Harald Schultz-Hencke, or apostates such as Carl Gustav Jung, Alfred Adler, and Wilhelm Stekel. In this regard, it was ironic that under National Socialism the society, for largely political reasons but still in keeping with Freud’s view of the dangers of the medicalization of psychoanalysis, opened its membership to lay practitioners. GEOFFREY COCKS See also: Germany; Göring, Matthias Heinrich; Neopsychoanalysis; Schultz-Hencke, Harald Julius Alfred CarlLudwig. Bibliography Cocks, Geoffrey. (1997). Psychotherapy in the Third Reich: The Göring Institute (2nd rev. ed.). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Lockot, Regine. (1985). Erinnern und Durcharbeiten: zur Geschichte der Psychoanalyse und Psychotherapie im Nationalsozialismus. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. ALLOEROTICISM. See Autoeroticism ALLOPLASTIC. See Autoplastic ALMANACH DER PSYCHOANALYSE The first Almanach der Psychoanalyse was published in 1926 by Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag in Vienna. The job of publishing the Almanach, a highly effective publicity vehicle, was the first editorial decision made by Adolf Josef Storfer after the departure of Otto Rank as director of the press. Storfer’s goal was to supply a kind of budget anthology of psychoanalysis 49 ALONE that would provide an overview of the psychoanalytic literature. The Almanach was published once a year from 1926 until 1938, when the Germans entered Austria. There were thirteen volumes in all, comprising between two and three hundred pages each; nine thousand copies of each octavo volume were printed. Each number contained about twenty short articles written by psychoanalysts, scientists, and writers (including Thomas Mann, Stefan Zweig, and Hermann Hesse), articles that had previously appeared in the psychoanalytic literature, pages from books published by Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, and, in rare cases, unpublished writing. Freud helped support the Almanach by publishing ‘‘Humor’’ and ‘‘Fetishism,’’ two unpublished texts of his, in 1928. Each volume also contained portraits of the various psychoanalysts and critiques of works on psychoanalysis excerpted from newspapers and the trade press, as well as a list of new publications by Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. ANDREA HUPPKE See also: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1927d). Humour. SE, 21: 159–166. ———. (1927e). Fetishism. SE, 21: 147–157. ALONE. See Capacity to be alone ALPHA-ELEMENTS Bion used the term ‘‘element’’ first in Experiences in Groups (1961), only in very general terms. In A Theory of Thinking (1962) Bion describes for the first time (except for an unpublished paper presented at a scientific meeting of the British Psycho-Analytical Society) the use of the concept of alpha-function as a working tool in the analysis of disturbances of thought: ‘‘It seemed convenient to suppose an alpha function to convert sense data into alpha-elements and thus provide the psyche with the material for dream thoughts and hence the capacity to wake up or go to sleep, to be conscious or unconscious. According 50 to this theory consciousness depends on alpha function and it is a logical necessity to suppose that such a function exists if we are to assume that the self is able to be conscious of itself in the sense of knowing itself from experience of itself.’’ In this paper he describes how alpha function converts beta-elements (raw sense data) into alphaelements, and he is particularly concerned with the differentiation that is established between the unconscious and the conscious. He considers alpha-elements to be elements necessary for consciousness. By ‘‘consciousness’’ he means specifically self-consciousness, since beta-elements in a sense are also conscious as raw perceptions. When the infant’s consciousness is invaded to an unbearable extent by beta-elements, the infant is driven to project these outside. When the beta-elements are transformed into alpha they become consciously apprehended, and a differentiation is established between the conscious and the unconscious. The alpha-elements can be consciously experienced, repressed, symbolized, and further worked on. In Learning from Experience (1962), Bion gives the following example: ‘‘If a man has an emotional experience when asleep or awake and is able to convert it into alphaelements he can either remain unconscious of that emotional experience or become conscious of it. The sleeping man has an emotional experience, converts it into alpha-elements and so becomes capable of dream thoughts. Thus he is free to become conscious (that is wake up) and describe the emotional experience by a narrative usually known as a dream.’’ Similarly, a person having a conversation converts the beta-elements into alpha, and thus freed of all the most primitive ways of functioning, he can have a rational conversation while not losing touch with his unconscious. Alpha-elements form what Bion calls a contact-barrier, the part of the mind in which betaelements are transformed into alpha, and this contactbarrier could be seen as a flexible barrier of repression. ‘‘Alpha-elements comprise visual images, auditory patterns, olfactory patterns, and are suitable for employment in dream thoughts, unconscious walking, thinking, dreams, contact-barrier, memory.’’ Bion developed his thought in a number of later writings, particularly in Learning from Experience. Alpha-elements are a product of alpha function. They INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ALPHA FUNCTION can be stored and repressed. They undergo further transformation and abstraction. They are the elements of dream thought, dream, myth, and conscious thought. And they form the contact-barrier between the conscious and the unconscious. HANNA SEGAL See also: Alpha function; Beta-elements; Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht; Contact-barrier; Grid; Infant development; Learning from Experience; Maternal reverie, capacity for; Primal, the; Protothoughts; Idea/representation; Symbolic equation; Transformations. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1961). Experiences in groups. London: Tavistock Publications. Bion, Wilfred R. (1962). Learning from experience. London: Heinemann. ALPHA FUNCTION Wilfred Bion’s work on the ‘‘alpha function’’ was based on Melanie Klein’s concept of projective identification. He added a further dimension by suggesting that projective identification is not only an all-powerful fantasy in the infant’s mind, but also its first means of communication. Bion discussed the alpha function for the first time in an article titled ‘‘A Theory of Thinking’’ (1962), but the idea had already been prefigured in his work. For example, in ‘‘On Arrogance’’ (1958), he described a patient who perceived his analyst as someone who ‘‘could not tolerate it’’ (the ‘‘it’’ not being defined) (1958, p. 146). From this Bion drew the conclusion that the patient’s means of communication was preverbal and occurred through projective identification with the primitive id, and that the patient was experiencing the analyst’s insistence on verbalization as an attack on his means of communication. In ‘‘Attacks on Linking’’ (1959), Bion described a patient who as a young child could not contain his fear of death. He dissociated himself from it and at the same time from a part of his personality, and projected it onto his mother: ‘‘An understanding mother is able to experience the feeling of dread, that this baby was striving to deal with by projective identification, and yet retain a balanced outlook’’ INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (p. 313). By projecting its terror onto the mother, the infant makes it into her experience and communicates to her its own distress. This situation is repeated in analysis. In this study, Bion stressed that projective identification has a realistic aspect that can elicit an appropriate response from the mother. If this response is not forthcoming, the baby’s fear of death is reinforced and cannot be processed. In ‘‘A Theory of Thinking,’’ Bion formed the hypothesis of an alpha function exercised by the mother when she processes the baby’s projective identification and converts what he calls ‘‘nascent sensory data,’’ including emotional data, or beta elements, into alpha elements—the materials of dream thoughts and conscious thoughts: It seemed convenient to suppose an alphafunction to convert sense data into alpha-elements and thus provide the psyche with the material for dream thoughts, and hence the capacity to wake up or go to sleep, to be conscious or unconscious. According to this theory, consciousness depends on alpha function, and it is a logical necessity to suppose that such a function exists if we are to assume that the self is able to be conscious of itself in the sense of knowing itself from experience of itself (p. 308). Bion deliberately refrained from giving a definition of the alpha function, since he could only deduce its elements. He let it be understood that further study of it was needed. Instead of giving definitions, he described the process and provided the following model: the infant, filled with painful lumps of faeces, guilt, fears of impending death, chunks of greed, meanness and urine, evacuates these bad objects into the breast that is not there. As it does so the good object turns the no-breast (mouth) into a breast, the faeces and urine into milk, the fears of impending death and anxiety into vitality and confidence, the greed and meanness into feelings of love and generosity and the infant sucks its bad property, now translated into goodness, back again. As an abstraction to match this model I propose an apparatus, for dealing with these primitive categories of I, that consists of a container and the contained. The mechanism is implicit in the theory of projective identification in which Melanie Klein formulated her discoveries of infant mentality. (1963, p. 31). The concept of the alpha function led to that of the container/contained relationship. The internalization 51 ALTER EGO of the latter provides the elementary thought-thinking apparatus. The mother’s receptivity to the child’s projective identification is a central factor in this process. Her receptivity is dependent upon what Bion called the maternal capacity for reverie—a dreamlike state whose contents are love for the child and its father. Deficiencies in maternal reverie or excessive feelings of omnipotence or envy on the part of the infant can interfere with the alpha function and the container/ contained relationship. The alpha function is related to—conjoined with—the shift from the paranoidschizoid position to the depressive position. HANNA SEGAL See also: Alpha-elements; Arrogance; Beta-elements; Beta screen; Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht; Contact-barrier; Hallucinosis; Infantile psychosis; Lack of differentiation; Learning from Experience; Nonverbal communication; Object; Primary object; Protothoughts; Psychotic panic; Realization; Transformations. the self, while the mirror affirms the vigor of the self and its idealization and cohesion. The line of development of the alter ego is important throughout the period that extends from the age of four to ten years; friendship, the need for someone like us, sometimes changes into the need for an imaginary companion. The alter ego is associated with humanity and sexual identity through self-identification—the father’s true son. The reverse would be a Kafkaesque world of dehumanizing experiences. When this sector is stopped, repressed needs remain fixed and are difficult to verbalize because of the shame they arouse. The alter ego is associated with other needs and narcissistic transferences. Within this context, the concept of identification loses the specificity it has in Freudian metapsychology in terms of the constitution of the ego. AGNÈS OPPENHEIMER See also: Bipolar self; Compensatory structures; Mirror transference; Narcissistic transference; Self; Twinship transference/alter ego transference. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1967). On arrogance. In his Second thoughts. London: Heinemann. (Original work published 1953) Bibliography Kohut, Heinz. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1959). Attacks on linking. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 40 (5–6) 308. ———. (1977). The restoration of the self. New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1967). A theory of thinking. In Second thoughts. London: Heinemann. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 43,(1962) 4–5.) ———. (1984). How does analysis cure? Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ———. Elements of psycho-analysis. London: Heinemann, 1963. ALTERITY. See Otherness ALTER EGO The representation of an other complicit in the subject’s narcissism, or self-object, the alter ego refers to the narcissistic need of an other similar to the self, a factor in the development of the self. The term appeared in the work of Heinz Kohut in 1971 in the context of alter ego transference, a form of mirror transference. After 1984, given the autonomy of the alter ego transference, it appears as a constituent of the self, along with the grandiose self, the pole of ambitions, and the idealized parental imago, the pole of ideals. Defined as an arc of tension between the two poles, the alter ego takes into account the harmony of 52 ALTHUSSER, LOUIS (1918–1990) Louis Althusser, a French philosopher, was born in Birmandreı̈s, Algeria, on October 16, 1918, and died in Le Mesnil-Saint-Denis, Yvelines, France, on October 22, 1990. Born into a family of practicing Catholics, Althusser’s secondary schooling took place at the Lycée Saint-Charles in Marseille. He prepared for the entrance competition to the École Normale Supérieure (ENS) at the Lycée du Parc in Lyon, where he was a student of Jean Guitton, then of Jean Lacroix. He was accepted for admission in 1939 but was mobilized in September and became a prisoner of war. He INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ALTRUISM didn’t begin his studies at the ENS until October 1945. It was in the prison camp that he learned about communism. Meetings at the ENS, primarily with Jean-Toussaint Desanti and Tran Duc Thao, gave him a better understanding of Marxist thought. Althusser taught philosophy at the ENS until 1980. There he met Jacques Lacan during the years when Lacan brought his seminar to the school. See also: France; Ideology; Marxism and psychoanalysis; Structuralism and psychoanalysis. Althusser is known as a chief theoretician of ideology. In Reading ‘‘Capital’’ (1979) he introduced a new reading of Marx, a ‘‘symptomal’’ reading, which, through a constructed discourse, is able to redefine the operating concepts and formal structure of his thought. This work led him to postulate a break between the works of the young Marx, where theoretical humanism is still present, and the mature works, which display a ‘‘theoretical antihumanism.’’ ———. (1993). The future lasts forever: A memoir (Richard Veasey, trans.). New York: New Press. He criticized the spontaneous ideology that infiltrated so-called scientific discourse and set forth the foundations of a critical epistemology. One of his most important texts is ‘‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’’ (2001). In it he demonstrates the doubling of the subject and the specular structure of every ideology. Althusser returned to Ludwig Feuerbach’s theory of the specular relation, Hegel’s theory of recognition, and a theory of guarantees whose origins can be traced back to Spinoza, but gave them a new interpretation. He also made use of psychoanalytic ideas: the question of identification and the Lacanian themes of the split (or barred) subject and alienation from the Big Other in the specular relation. Althusser used this theoretical approach to address psychoanalysis. In his work he also attempted to articulate psychic and social processes outside the conventional patterns of Freudian and Marxist thought. In addition, Althusser had direct experience of psychotherapy with a psychoanalyst. Althusser suffered from serious psychiatric problems, which required his hospitalization on several occasions. In 1980, in a moment of dementia, he killed his wife, Hélène. In The Future Lasts Forever (1993), most of which was written in 1985, Althusser acknowledges his painful efforts at understanding carried out after this tragic event. Althusser trained an entire generation of scholars to be rigorous and critical in their reading of philosophy. Throughout the 1970s his influence was considerable and international in scope. MICHÈLE BERTRAND INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Althusser, Louis. (1966). Freud and Lacan. In his Writings on psychoanalysis: Freud and Lacan (Jeffrey Mehlman, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press. (Original work published 1964) ———. (2001). Ideology and ideological state apparatuses. In his Lenin and philosophy and other essays. New York: Monthly Review Press. (Original work published 1970) ———, and Balibar, Étienne. (1979). Reading ‘‘Capital’’ (Ben Brewster, Trans.). New York: Schocken Books. (Original work published 1965) ALTRUISM Freud refers to the concept of altruism approximately ten times in his work, most often in a social or cultural context. In ‘‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’’ he writes: Throughout an individual’s life there is a constant replacement of external by internal compulsion. The influences of civilization cause an ever-increasing transformation of egoistic trends into altruistic and social ones by an admixture of erotic elements. In the last resort it may be assumed that every internal compulsion which makes itself felt in the development of human beings was originally—that is, in the history of mankind—only an external one. Those who are born to-day bring with them as an inherited organization some degree of tendency (disposition) towards the transformation of egoistic into social instincts, and this disposition is easily stimulated into bringing about that result. (1915b, p. 282). In other cases, Freud uses the term most frequently against a background of what he called, in an exchange with Oskar Pfister, his ‘‘joyous pessimism.’’ After pointing out that except when in love, ‘‘the opposite of egotism, altruism, does not, as a concept, coincide with libidinal object-cathexis’’ (1916–17a [1915–17], p. 418), he added, rather laconically, in Civilization and Its Discontents, ‘‘the development of the individual seems to us to be a product of the interaction between 53 ALTRUISM two urges, the urge towards happiness, which we usually call ‘egoistic’, and the urge towards union with others in the community, which we call ‘altruistic’. Neither of these descriptions goes much below the surface. In the process of individual development, as we have said, the main accent falls mostly on the egoistic urge (or the urge towards happiness); while the other urge, which may be described as a ‘cultural’ one, is usually content with the role of imposing restrictions’’ (1930a [1929], p. 140). However, in the third part of The Ego and the Mechanism of Defence (1936/1937), Anna Freud provides an example of two types of defense, namely, ‘‘identification with the aggressor’’ and ‘‘a form of altruism.’’ And in connection with the mechanism of projection, she conceives of ‘‘altruistic surrender’’ (altruistische Abtretung, according to the expression used by Edward Bibring): The mechanism of projection disturbs our human relations when we project our own jealousy and attribute to other people our own aggressive acts. But it may work in another way as well, enagling us to form valuable positive attachments and so to consolidate our relations with one another. This normal and less conspicuous form of projection might be described as ‘altruistic surrender’ of our own instinctual impulses in favour of other people (p. 133). Using a clinical example, Anna Freud analyzes the transference of the subject’s own desires to others, a transference that enables the subject to participate in the instinctual satisfaction of another person through projection and identification. In speaking of this process, she refers to Paul Federn’s comments concerning identification through sympathy. The section of the book devoted to the study of two mechanisms of defense is is placed between a chapter on the preliminary stages of defense—the avoidance of unpleasure in the face of real dangers (negation through fantasy, negation through acts and words and withdrawal of the ego)—and a chapter on the phenomena of puberty and the defenses arising from fear associated with the intensity of instinctual processes. To Anna Freud, the mechanisms of identification with the aggressor and altruism can be conceived as intermediary stages of defense, centered on the transition from anxieties arising from external dangers to subsequent anxieties arising from internal dangers. 54 This explains the projection inherent in both types of defense and the role of the superego in the genesis of altruistic surrender: ‘‘Analysis of such situations shows that this defensive process has its origin in the infantile conflict with parental authority about some form of instinctual gratification’’ (p. 141). Other passages in her work support this view: ‘‘Her early renunciation of instinct had resulted in the formation of an exceptionally strong super-ego, which made it impossible for her to gratify her own wishes. . . . She projected her prohibited instinctual impulses on to other people, just as the patients did whose cases I quoted in the last chapter. . . . In most cases the substitute has once been the object of envy’’ (pp. 135-36, 136, 141). She also points out that altruistic surrender is a means for overcoming narcissistic humiliation. Finally, for Anna Freud, altruism could involve libidinal impulses as well as destructive impulses and, moreover, could affect either the realization of desires or their renunciation. Her analysis of the mechanism of defense finishes with an approach to its connection with the fear of death, by examining the bonds between the hero Cyrano de Bergerac and his friend Christian. Anna Freud provides a concluding note on the similarity between the conditions needed to initiate altruistic surrender and those present during the formation of masculine homosexuality. Anna Freud’s position was subsequently revisited with respect to such concerns as the psychodynamics of anorexic adolescents. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Antinarcissism; Burlingham-Tiffany, Dorothy; Identification with the aggressor; Reaction–formation. Bibliography Freud, Anna. (1937). The ego and the mechanisms of defence. London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1936) Freud, Sigmund. (1915b). Thoughts for the times on war and death. SE, 14: 275–300. ———. (1916–17a [1915–17]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15–16. ———. (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 64–145. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ALVAREZ Bibliography Freud, Anna. (1936). A form of altruism. In Writings of Anna Freud (Vol. 2, pp. 122-134). McWilliams, Nancy. (1984). The psychology of the altruist. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 1, 193–214. Seelig, Bud, et. al. (2001). Normal and pathological altruism. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 49, 933–960. ALVAREZ DE TOLEDO, LUISA AGUSTA REBECA GAMBIER DE (1915–1990) An Argentine doctor and psychoanalyst, Luisa Agusta Rebeca Gambier de Alvarez de Toledo was born June 13, 1915, in the 9 de Julio section of Buenos Aires, where she died on September 5, 1990. ‘‘Rebe,’’ as she was known to her friends, expressed an interest in medicine in childhood, which led to her later studies in the capital. She discovered psychoanalysis when still a student, and became a member of the earliest psychoanalytic groups in the country, even before the creation of the Associacón Psicoanalitica Argentina (APA). Her meeting with Matilde and Arnaldo Rascovsky, through whom she became familiar with the field, led to her decision to pursue psychoanalysis as a career. Although she was not a founding member of the APA, she took an active part in the activities of the creators of the Argentine psychoanalytic movement. She began her training analysis with Celes Cárcamo and was officially supervised by Angel Garma and Enrique Pichon-Rivière. She became a member of the APA in 1945 with the presentation of her study ‘‘A Case of Examination Neurosis,’’ and a fellow in 1950 with the presentation of her ‘‘A Contribution to the Understanding of the Symbolic Meaning of the Circle’’ and ‘‘On the Mechanism of Sleep and Dreaming.’’ In 1946 she contributed to the creation of the first department of psychoanalytic psychiatry for adolescents at the hospital then known as the Hospicio de las Mercedes, under the direction of Enrique Pichon-Rivière and Arminda Aberastury. Between 1955 and 1958 she made regular trips to Montevideo, where she gave seminars and supervised other psychoanalysts, and in so doing contributed to the formation of the Uruguayan Psychoanalytic Association and helped train its members. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DE TOLEDO, LUISA AGUSTA REBECA GAMBIER DE (1915 –1 990) In 1954 she became a training analyst and, on this occasion presented her ‘‘Análisis del asociar, del interpreter y de las palabras’’ (The analysis of associating, interpreting, and words). This study, which became a classic of psychoanalytic literature, was published in the Revista de psicoanálisis in 1954 and had longlasting influence on the evolution of the field. The author saw language as integral to psychoanalysis and showed how ‘‘the fact of speaking, as an act and independently of the content of the words, satisfies oral, anal, phallic, and genital libidinal impulses,’’ and that ‘‘by analyzing ‘the fact of associating’ and ‘the fact of interpreting’ in itself, there arises the primitive identity of the act, the image, and the object, which is realized in the act of speaking and listening to the analyst.’’ Later she grew interested in the development of psychoanalytic research involving the use of hallucinogenic drugs. It was during this period that she wrote ‘‘Ayahuasca’’ (1960), which addressed the use of LSD in certain communities of Upper Peru. She was forced to interrupt her research when, for reasons beyond her control, the consumption of LSD was made illegal by the then current government. Within the APA she assumed a number of important roles: secretary of the executive committee (1952–1953), treasurer (1953–1954), and president (1956–1957). She continued to assume positions of responsibility within the organization until 1972. Later in life, she turned her efforts toward providing an analytic space for several of her institutional colleagues. AUGUSTO M. PICOLLO See also: Argentina; Language and disturbances of language. Bibliography Alvarez de Toledo, Luisa. (1954). El análisis del ‘‘asociar’’, del ‘‘interpretar’’ y de ‘‘las palabras’’. Revista de psicoanálisis de la Asociacı́on psicoanalı́tica argentina, XI (3), 267–313. ———. (1960). Ayahuasca. Revista de psicoanálisis de la Asociacı́on psicoanalı́tica argentina, XVII (1), 1–9. ———. (1996). The analysis of ‘‘associating,’’ ‘‘interpreting’’ and ‘‘words,’’ con comentarios de Janine Puget y Marı́a Isabel Siquier. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, LXXVII, 291–322. Baranger, Madeleine, Baranger, Willy, and Mom, Jorge M. (1990). Obituario: Luisa Gambier de Alvarez de Toledo. 55 AMAE, CONCEPT OF Revista de psicoanálisis de la Asociacı́on psicoanalı́tica argentina, XLVII (3), 410–413. Mom, Jorge M., Foks, Gilda, and Suárez, Juan Carlos. (1982). Asociación psicoanalı́tica argentina 1942–1982. Buenos Aires: APA The concept of amae is a concept which derives from a unique Japanese word amae, a noun form of amaeru, an intransitive verb. It primarily refers to what an infant feels toward the mother when it recognizes and seeks her, hence it is nonverbal to begin with, but it acquires its first-person dimension when a child comes to learn the meaning of amae. Amae may be applied to an adult in a similar situation involving someone who is supposed to take care of him or her. It is on the basis of these linguistic facts plus the clinical experience that Takeo Doi arrived at the concept of amae indicating whatever happens consciously or unconsciously in a person vis-à-vis a possible caretaker. Amae corresponds to what Freud (1912d) calls ‘‘the affectionate current,’’ which should combine with ‘‘the sensual current’’ in love. Also, it should correspond to the process of identification, since Freud (1921c) states that ‘‘identification is known to psychoanalysis as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person.’’ What is closest in meaning to amae is ‘‘primary love or passive object love’’ defined by Michael Balint (1935/1965). Interestingly, he specifically states that ‘‘all European languages. . .are all so poor that they cannot distinguish between the two kinds of object love, active and passive.’’ Among the empirical studies of infants, the attachment behavior which John Bowlby focused upon overlap with the behavior of amae. It is significant that amae is the exact reverse of envy which Melanie Klein emphasized in her thinking of mental life. The self-object needs defined by Heinz Kohut also correspond to amae. Amae thus bridges many important concepts in psychoanalysis. Its strength lies in the fact that being a verbnoun it represents something alive, and thus suggests a potential feeling. According to Freud’s earlier formulation of instincts, amae can be a representative of the ego instincts. TAKEO DOI 56 Balint, Michael. (1965). Critical notes on the theory of the pregenital organizations of the libido. Primary love and psycho-analytic technique. New York: Liveright. (Original work published 1935) Bowlby, John. (1969). Attachment and loss. London: The Hogarth Press. AMAE, CONCEPT OF See also: Japan; Tenderness. Bibliography Doi, Takeo. (1980). The concept of amae and its psychoanalytic implications. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 16, 349–354. ———. (1991). A propos du concept d’amae. Psychiatrie de l’enfant, 34, 277–284. Freud, Sigmund. (1912d). On the universal tendency to debasement in the sphere of love. SE, 11: 177–190. ———. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. AMBIVALENCE Ambivalence is the simultaneous presence of conflicting feelings and tendencies with respect to an object. During the winter meeting of Swiss psychiatrists in Berne on November 26–27, 1910, Paul Eugen Bleuler described, with respect to schizophrenia, the simultaneous existence of contradictory feelings toward an object or person and, with respect to actions, the insoluble concurrence of two tendencies, such as eating and not eating. In ‘‘The Rat Man’’ (1909d) Freud had already indicated that the opposition between love and hate for the object could explain the particular features of obsessive thought (doubt, compulsion). In Totem and Taboo (1912– 13a) he adopted the term ‘‘ambivalence’’ proposed by Bleuler in the text of his conference published in 1911 in the Zentralblatt. For Freud the term, in its most general sense, designated the presence in a subject of a pair of opposed impulses of the same intensity; most frequently this involved the opposition between love and hate, which was often expressed in obsessional neuroses and melancholy. In 1915, in his metapsychological writings, he added that it was the loss of the love object that, through regression, caused the conflict of ambivalence to appear. In 1920 Karl Abraham emphasized the intensity of the sadistic fantasy associated with urinary and digestive functions. In 1924 he extended and transformed the Freudian schema of the evolution of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AMENTIA the libido into a complete picture of the development of the relation to the object along two lines: the partial or total nature of the investment in the object, and ambivalence. The precocious oral stage of sucking is preambivalent, neither love nor hate are felt toward the object. There follow four ambivalent phases: the late oral stage, which is cannibalistic and seeks the total incorporation of the object, the precocious analsadistic stage, which seeks the expulsion and destruction of the object, the late anal-sadistic stage, which seeks its conservation and domination, and finally the precocious-phallic genital stage. The final genital phase of love towards a complete object is postambivalent. Bibliography Freud integrated Abraham’s contributions in the thirty-second of his New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis (1933a). Within the oedipal conflict ambivalence is resolved as a neurotic symptom, either through a reaction formation or through displacement (1926d). Reformulated in the second theory of instincts, ambivalence becomes part of the fundamental instinctual dualism: life instinct/death instinct. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. For Melanie Klein ambivalence was key in formulating a theory of depression. The interplay of introjection and projection, the dialectic of good and bad objects, and depressive anxiety, signaling the fear of destroying the maternal object, are the apparent manifestations of the conflict of ambivalence. Together they constitute the ego and work toward resolving the oedipal conflict. For Paul-Claude Racamier (1976), while melancholy is hyperambivalent in that it results from an intense struggle between love and hate, schizophrenia must be considered as a fundamentally antiambivalent process, where ‘‘contrary impulses . . . radically split, fuse separately in a nearly pure state, presenting themselves alternately to the same object or simultaneously to partial objects that are always distinct and divided.’’ VICTOR SOUFFIR See also: Bleuler, Paul Eugen; Contradiction; Essential depression; Doubt; Fusion/defusion; ‘‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes;’’ Melancholia; ‘‘Mourning and Melancholy;’’ Parricide Phobias in children; Phobia of committing impulsive acts; Object; Obsessional neurosis; Orality; Oral-sadistic stage; Reaction formation; Schizophrenia; Taboo; Totem/totemism. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Abraham, Karl. (1927). A short history of the development of the libido. In Selected papers of Karl Abraham (Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1924) Bleuler, Eugen. (1952), Dementia praecox (Joseph Zinkin, Trans). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1911) Freud, Sigmund. (1909d). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151–318. ———. (1912–13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ———. (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. Klein, Melanie. (1975). A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states. In The writings of Melanie Klein. London: Hogarth Press, 1975. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 16 (1975), 145–174.) ———. (1975). The Oedipus complex in the light of early anxieties. In The writings of Melanie Klein. London: Hogarth Press, 1975. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 26 (1945), 11–33.) Racamier, Paul-Claude. (1976). L’interprétation psychanalytique des schizophrénies. In Encyclopédie médico-chirurgicale. Paris: EMC. Further Reading Benedek, Therese. (1977). Ambivalence, passion and love. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 25, 53-80. Eissler, Kurt R. (1971). Death drive, ambivalence, and narcissism. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 26, 25-78. Parens, Henri. (1979). Ambivalence: drives, symbiosis— separation-individuation process. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 34, 385-420. Schwartz, Charlotte (1989). Ambivalence: relation to narcissism and superego development. Psychoanalytic Review, 76, 511-527. AMENTIA Amentia, or confusion, is a state of acute hallucinatory delirium; it was described with this name by Theodor Meynert in Leçons cliniques de psychiatrie (1890). Meynert, who had been a professor of psychiatry since 1873 at the University of Vienna, believed in an anatomic-clinical theory of psychiatry and did not 57 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS attribute any meaning to the hallucinations that arose during amentia, considering them merely a disorderly flow of ‘‘accessory representations’’ from ‘‘cortical exhaustion’’ and excessive irrigation of subcortical centers, which were considered to be the seat of sensory impressions. Freud, faithful to his teacher of 1883, also referred to the clinical value of the concept of amentia, in spite of the differences between them (Jones, 1953). He wrote of ‘‘a fine daydream’’ (Freud, 1916–17f) and, as demonstration of this, a ‘‘hallucinatory psychosis of desire.’’ Although Freud mentioned the concept much earlier (1894a), it is not until his A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams (1916–17f) that he would see in amentia an element of comparison, with which to explain the role of belief in the hallucinatory fulfillment of desire in dreams. The regression of the preconscious to mnemic images of things invested by the unconscious would be unable to explain such belief if, in both cases, the conflict with reality (associated with the functions of consciousness) weren’t eliminated. Amentia is unlike the dream state, where it is through the wish to sleep that the subject loses interest in reality. Rather, in the hallucinatory psychosis of desire, the subject denies a reality that is unbearable because of the loss it inflicts, and is thus open to the free play of hallucinatory fantasies. AUGUSTIN JEANNEAU See also: Delusion; Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams, A; Meynert, Theodor. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 45–61. ———. (1916–17f). A metapsychological supplement to the theory of dreams. SE, 14: 222–235. Jones, Ernest. (1953–1957). Sigmund Freud: Life and work. London: Hogarth Press. Meynert, Theodor. (1890). L’amentia ou confusion. In C. Levy-Friesacher (Ed.), Meynert-Freud ‘‘L’amentia.’’ Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS The two major psychoanalytic organizations in the United States, the American Academy of Psychoanalysis 58 (Academy) and the American Psychoanalytic Association (American), now share similar theoretical orientations and are working closely together in the Psychoanalytic Consortium. However, this has not always been the case. The Academy was formed as a reaction against perceived thought control efforts by certain officers of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, a member of the American, which demanded conformity to a sharply restricted view of the intrapsychic libido theory. The Academy’s orientation was that, in addition to intrapsychic dynamics, biological facts, interpersonal relations, the family, and the broader culture were all significant in personality development and pathology. Thus instead of a unitary theory, the Academy accepted that multiple interacting factors were significant. From its very beginning, the Academy established a democratic and scientific organization, where divergence, dialogue, and creative growth in psychoanalysis were strongly encouraged. The split in American psychoanalysis started in 1941, at a business meeting of the New York Psychoanalytic Society, when Karen Horney was disqualified as a training analyst because she was disturbing the candidates with her ideas about culture. A number of analytic institutes split off from the American, and in 1955 Clara Thompson called a meeting of eminent psychoanalysts. Amongst those present were Franz Alexander, Abram Kardiner, Jules Masserman, and Sándor Radó, who all encouraged the formation of another national psychoanalytic organization where there would be freedom to exchange ideas in psychoanalysis and with other scientific disciplines. Franz Alexander (Alexander and Selesnick, 1966), a former president of the American, stated that the premature standardization and rigidity of teaching in the American was too past-oriented and not sufficiently creative and future-oriented. Psychoanalysis was still a developing field and the exchange of clinical experience as well as input from science and the humanities was crucial. Conformity would only stifle the growth and development of psychoanalysis as a science. Tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity are a necessary condition for creativity. The Academy was established in 1956. Under its constitution, the Academy admits individual members and not institutes, so as not to interfere with the freedom of each institute’s jointly determined theoretical approach and politics. The first president of the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AMERICAN ACADEMY Academy was a woman, Janet Rioch Bard, and many other eminent medical psychoanalysts, both men and women, have been elected president since then. It is interesting that the Academy was similar to the Kleinian group in England, since both can trace their origins to Sándor Ferenczi, who maintained the importance of interpersonal relations and the culture. Ferenczi focused more on maternal nurturance during infancy and relationships in childhood. He also stressed the importance of empathic connection in treatment, especially with more difficult patients, so as to undo trauma or deprivation and provide a corrective emotional experience. He also explored the transference/counter-transference relationship between therapist and patient. Both Thompson and Klein were analyzed by Ferenczi, who strongly influenced their approach. Horney (1922) had rejected Freud’s explanation of feminine psychology as due to penis envy and the castration complex, and she stressed that femininity was inborn, being shaped by interpersonal relations and the culture. The members of the Academy have made important contributions not only to individual psychoanalytic treatment and theory, especially with more troubled patients, but also in psychosomatics, and family and group therapy. Current research in ethology and direct infant observation have validated the importance of an attuned attachment to the mother during the preoedipal period, and anthropological research has found that the oedipal conflict is not universal but culturally variant. In later years, the American reversed its rigid adherence to a unitary theory and embraced the inclusive and democratic ideals that were the very foundation of the Academy. Now both the Academy and the American consider divergent theoretical orientations and include findings from anthropology, culture, and group and family therapy. Freud was an accomplished researcher in the neurosciences and published his laboratory findings. He was aware that memory was stored in the brain cells and transmitted through synapses. Freud did attempt to develop a neurophysiological method in his ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ (1950c [1895]), but not having the technology to integrate the mind and the brain, he focused on the mind. Part of the problem in psychoanalysis was that it did not have a hard and firm scientific foundation. In the resulting search for certainty, a unitary theory was embraced by classical analysts to give the illusion of scientific validity. This INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS contributed to the split in the psychoanalytic movement in the United States, and the division in England. However, Freud himself was aware that his metapsychology was weak, and that psychoanalysis was not the hard science that he had hoped it to become. Increasingly the technology exists that can allow one to integrate understandings of the mind and the brain, especially with imaging techniques. The new findings of neurobiology will serve to provide a scientific foundation to psychoanalysis, and further help to bring the psychoanalytic movement together. Thus, Freud’s hope that psychoanalysis could become a hard science is still alive; work that reduces the mind/body split could yet ensure that theory and therapy become grounded on a firm scientific basis. Both the American Psychoanalytic Association and the American Academy of Psychoanalysis have now continued with similar theoretical orientations concerning biological, intrapsychic, interpersonal, and cultural factors in personality development and pathology. However, they have diverged in their methods of sustaining membership. The American has included psychologists and social workers besides psychiatrists, but has remained wholly psychoanalytic. The Academy has included psychiatrists with some analytic training or who are analytically oriented, but remained medical. Accordingly, the Academy changed its name to reflect this change to the American Academy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry. During the presidency of Samuel Slipp, the Academy was established as an official Affiliate of the American Psychiatric Association. Now, only the Academy holds its annual meeting in the same location as the American Psychiatric Association. Both the American and the Academy have remained in the Consortium to further psychoanalysis together, and they continue their friendly and cooperative relationship. SAMUEL SLIPP See also: American Psychoanalytic Association; New York Psychoanalytic Institute. Bibliography Alexander, Franz, and Selesnick, Sheldon T. (1966). The history of psychiatry. New York: Harper and Row. Horney, Karen. (1922). On the genesis of the castration complex in women. In H. Kelman (Ed.) Feminine psychology. New York: W. W. Norton, 1967. 59 AMERICAN IMAGO Rothgeb, Carrie Lee. (1973). Abstracts of the standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud. New York: International Universities Press. AMERICAN IMAGO Thirty years after Sigmund Freud’s 1909 lectures at Clark University, the psychoanalytic community in the United States had grown large enough to support a psychoanalytic journal focused on culture. American Imago had its European antecedent in the psychoanalytic journal Imago that was, as Freud tells us, ‘‘concerned with the application of psycho-analysis to non-medical fields of knowledge’’ (1926f, p. 269–70). In Felix Deutsch’s obituary for Hanns Sachs, he writes, ‘‘When this journal [Imago] was suppressed in Europe in 1938, Sachs brought it to life again here in the States’’ (1947, p. 5). Freud wrote to Sachs that he was initially not pleased with the idea for the journal but that was primarily because it was difficult to ‘‘‘let the light be extinguished completely in Germany’’’ (Gay, 1988, p. 634). American Imago was first published in Boston, Massachusetts, in November of 1939. Russell Jacoby (1983) tells us that Otto Fenichel ‘‘reported in deepest confidence that. . . Sachs was beginning a new magazine, American Imago. . . charged by Freud to rally the classical, and now embattled, analysts’’ (p. 126). Sachs writes, ‘‘when the plan for this periodical was proposed to Freud he greeted it wholeheartedly and consented to become its editor’’ (1939, p. 3). Hanns Sachs (1881–1947) assumed editorial responsibilities as publisher and editor, and continued in that role until close to his death. From 1946 until 1963 George Wilbur (1887–1976) was the publisher and managing editor. Harry Slochower noted that Wilbur ‘‘kept the broad and deep channels of applied psychoanalysis open in the country,’’ and praises Wilbur’s ‘‘unassuming generosity which . . . saved the very existence of the journal’’ (1967, p. 287). Harry Slochower (1900–1991) came to the journal in 1964 and continued as Editor in Chief until his death. He arranged for the journal to be published by Wayne State University Press, thus expanding American Imago’s original base in the psychoanalytic community to a wider academic audience. In 1987 Martin Gliserman took over editorial responsibility for the journal; he proposed a new format for the journal and approached Johns Hopkins University Press which began publishing the journal in 1991. 60 From the very beginning American Imago has been an interdisciplinary journal that has examined many fields of study—anthropology, art, film, history, literature, music, philosophy, psychoanalysis, religion, society, and politics. For its part, psychoanalysis has served as a prism through which to view a whole range of cultural works. Thus articles in the journal’s first volume addressed such diverse subjects as the ritualized games of verbal insult known as ‘‘the dozens,’’ masochism, a play by Shakespeare, anti-Semitism, and mythical heroes. The journal has been responsive over the years to changes in the intellectual climate, and has broadened its psychoanalytic vision, without ever abandoning its original purpose of understanding culture. MARTIN GLISERMAN See also: Imago; Sachs, Hanns. Bibliography Deutsch, Felix. (1947). In memoriam—Hanns Sachs 1881– 1947. American Imago, 4 (2), 3–14. Freud, Sigmund. (1926f). Psycho-analysis. SE, 20: 261–270. Gay, Peter. (1988). Freud: A life for our time. New York: W.W. Norton. Jacoby, Russell. (1983). The repression of psychoanalysis: Otto Fenichel and the political Freudians. New York: Basic Books. Sachs, Hanns. (1939). Editorial note. American Imago, 1 (1), 3 Slochower, Harry. (1967). George B. Wilbur at 80. American Imago, 24 (4), 287–289. AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION Despite Sigmund Freud’s concern about the fate of psychoanalysis in the United States, it has been the country where psychoanalysis, as theory and as therapeutic enterprise, has been most successful during its first century. Accompanied by Carl Gustav Jung and Sándor Ferenczi, Freud made his first and only trip to the United States in 1909, visiting Clark University at the invitation of G. Stanley Hall. At that time he received an honorary doctorate in law for his contributions to psychology. This visit came at a time of crisis in sexual INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION morality following the oppression of Victorian sexuality, a time of change in the structure of American family life with a move towards smaller families, and also at a time of crisis in the treatment of nervous and mental disorders. Facing such pressures, American psychiatrists found the psychoanalytic focus on the emotional relations of love and hate among family members to be revealing and important. Within ten years of Freud’s visit, psychoanalysis was broadly accepted in the United States. At first it was seen as another form of the then-current psychotherapies of suggestion. Its increasing popularity, displacing other therapies, was a result in part of the public’s welcome of its optimistic view of mental illness, emphasizing environmental causes and its accessibility to ‘‘cure,’’ in contrast to European theories of hereditary degeneration. The year 1910 was of great importance to the history of psychoanalysis. In his paper ‘‘Wild PsychoAnalysis,’’ Freud voiced concern that the use of psychoanalytic notions by those psychoanalytically untrained could be harmful to patients. To protect the public, and the scientific integrity of psychoanalysis, he and his followers founded the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA), in which membership would be available only to those trained in the psychoanalytic method. Those few Americans who were trained psychoanalysts formed the American Psychoanalytic Association (the American) in 1911. The purpose of the American association, like that of the IPA, was to promote communication and to define what constituted a psychoanalyst in order to protect the public from ‘‘wild analysis.’’ Ernest Jones (who would become Freud’s first official biographer in the 1950s) had written to Freud that ‘‘already in America there are many men exploiting it for financial and other reasons, whose knowledge of the subject is minimal, and who only bring discredit on the work. . . . no one will be elected member of the association unless he has shown some competence in the work.’’ Freud’s continuing concern led, in 1918, to the establishment of an Institute for psychoanalytic education and training in Berlin, with Vienna and London following soon thereafter. These institutes offered a well thought out curriculum that consisted of instruction in the scientific theory of psychoanalysis, supervision in the treatment of patients using psychoanalytic methods, and a personal experience of psychoanalysis. This ‘‘tri-partite’’ form of training came to be the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS model throughout the psychoanalytic world: personal analysis, psychoanalysis of patients under supervision, and didactic course work. That same year also witnessed the publication in the United States of the Flexner report, a startling exposé on the absence of standards in medical education. About half of the existing medical schools were forced to close, and in those remaining, great efforts were made to exorcise charlatans from therapeutic activity and guarantee that a medical degree was the hallmark of proper training and competence. German and Viennese medicine was prestigious at the time, and in attempts to upgrade their standards, Americans looked to them to provide models. The fields of psychiatry and neurology were also in their formative stages, and since the American conception of medical science was then similar to that of Freud’s, that is, a reliance on clinical judgment based on observations made in the individual case, psychoanalysis brought a degree of respectability to psychiatry. On the other hand, the leaders of analysis in New York believed that psychoanalysis gained respectability and prestige from an alliance with medicine and assured it a serious hearing. The American Psychoanalytic Association was eager to retain this respectability, and by 1924, under the influence of the New York Psychoanalytic Society and the concerns secondary to avoiding accusations of quackery, the American had adopted the requirement that members be physicians. Freud and most of the European psychoanalysts protested this change. They believed strongly that psychoanalysis did not belong to medicine. Rather they believed that psychoanalysis was part of a general psychology. The issue of the training of lay analysts was an issue that would persist. World War I brought prominence to Freud’s theories of the irrational and the brutal in human nature. His methods and their derivatives also proved to be the most effective then available for the treatment of ‘‘shell shock.’’ Many psychiatrists subsequently became interested in psychoanalysis as a treatment method, and travel to Europe for psychoanalytic education at one of the newly established institutes became popular. On their return, those so trained contributed to the establishment of psychoanalytic societies in several American cities. This began another chapter in American psychoanalysis. Freud maintained that although rigorous training was necessary to become a psychoanalyst, psychoanalytic education and training should be 61 AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION available to a wider group, not simply to psychiatrists. But the Americans held firm, and among those who had traveled to Europe to train at European institutes, only the psychiatrists were eligible for membership in the American Psychoanalytic Association upon their return. Heated international debate about this policy followed and continued for decades. By the 1930s, psychoanalytic societies had been established in several cities in the United States. However, it was not until 1931 that the first Institute for Psychoanalytic Education was established. New York’s was the first, but Chicago, Boston, and BaltimoreWashington followed shortly thereafter. Once established, these institutes were committed to maintaining the highest possible standards of psychoanalytic education. Thus in 1932, with the reorganization of the American Psychoanalytic Association as a federation of constituent societies, a Council on Professional Training was formed to establish and maintain policies and standards of teaching, so that psychoanalytic education would maintain some consistency as the various institutes were established. In 1938, this council published the ‘‘Standards and Principles of Psychoanalytic Education.’’ Although many revisions have taken place, this document remains the definitive statement that guides psychoanalytic education at all constituent Institutes of the American Psychoanalytic Association. The model of education continues to be predominant as the model first established in the first Institute in Berlin. It is a tri-partite model, which includes a personal analysis, psychoanalysis under supervision, and class-work. This has been the core training of all subsequent psychoanalytic Institutes (with a total of twenty-nine by the end of the twentieth century). In 1946 the American Psychoanalytic Association again reorganized. This time two governing bodies were established; a Board on Professional Standards became responsible for all matters of psychoanalytic education, and an Executive Council was established to deal with membership and practice issues. The years following the World War II again saw increased professional status for psychoanalysts, particularly as derivatives of its methods proved to have the greatest success in treating psychological disturbances brought on by war combat. Furthermore, at a time before psychotropic medications became available, psychoanalysis and its derivative therapies proved among the most successful methods of treating many varieties of mental disturbances. As a result, 62 psychoanalysis became highly influential in psychiatric education and a large number of university psychiatric residency programs had a psychoanalyst as chairman. Many have described the years between 1945 and 1965 as the golden years for psychoanalysis in the United States. Psychoanalysis in Europe had barely survived outside of London, and many European analysts had found their way to the United States. This brought a wealth of intellectual energy to American psychoanalysis and interest in the theoretical basis of psychoanalysis enjoyed great popularity. In addition, the patient pool was large, not only because of the dearth of alternative methods, but also because artists and intellectuals felt that engaging in psychoanalytic treatment freed their creative minds. The wealth of clinical experiences led to ever-expanding theories to explain the clinical observations. Nathan Hale points out that during this period the ‘‘Popular images of Freud revealed him as a painstaking observer, a tenacious worker, a great healer, a truly original explorer, a paragon of domestic virtue, the discoverer of a source of personal energy and a genius’’ (1995, p. 289). All of these attributes reflected idealized American cultural values. With such an idealized image of Freud and of psychoanalysis, disillusionment was inevitable. However, one must balance the valid criticisms of the pretensions of psychoanalysis to be a globally explanatory treatment with the attendant and inevitable failure of psychoanalysis to deliver the kinds of idealized expectations that had been established during this ‘‘golden age.’’ An account of psychoanalysis in the United States would not be complete without taking into account the issue that would not go away, that of ‘‘lay analysis.’’ Psychoanalytic education in the United States was limited to psychiatrists from the beginning. In 1957 a provision was made whereby psychologists of exceptional research talent could gain access to psychoanalytic education under the proviso that they simply use their psychoanalytic skills to further their research and not attempt to treat patients. However, it was not until 1986 that provisions were made to allow certain nonmedical clinicians to gain access to psychoanalytic training. The American Psychoanalytic Association has now reached a point where it is striving to define eligibility for psychoanalytic education on more than the basis of an academic degree. There were major ramifications to the exclusionary policies of the American Psychoanalytic Association. These policies guaranteed that advancements in the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AMNESIA field of academic psychology would exclude a consideration of psychoanalytic theory because psychologists who might have been interested in the integration of psychology and psychoanalysis were not given access to psychoanalytic education. This meant that psychoanalysis could not benefit from the research methodology available to psychology, and as very little emphasis was given to research in medical education until recent years, psychoanalysis has suffered from the paucity of research which might have offered some validity or reliability to its theoretical positions. Freud’s memorable visit to the United States, the American Psychoanalytic Association, in the best Freudian tradition, is once again actively reaching out to psychologists, psychiatrists, mental health professionals, academics, and the lay public. These new endeavors have infused the organization with vitality. With an appreciation of its past, the American Psychoanalytic Association has risen to the challenges of the new century. A central event for psychoanalysis in the United States was a class-action anti-trust lawsuit filed in 1985 by four psychologists. This group alleged that the American Psychoanalytic Association, the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, the Columbia University Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research, and the International Psychoanalytical Association had ‘‘restrained and monopolized interstate and international trade and commerce in the training of psychoanalysis and in the delivery of psychoanalytic services to the public’’ (Schneider and Desmond, p. 322). By 1989, a settlement agreement was approved. The terms of the agreement changed the face of psychoanalysis in the United States: (1) Psychologists and other qualified non-medical clinicians were eligible to train in the institutes of the American. (2) Members of the American were permitted to teach in non-American affiliated institutes. (3) Membership in the IPA was now open to all qualified psychologists and non-medical psychoanalysts. As a result of these changes the American Psychoanalytic Association has become a more inclusive organization. In addition, the American has joined a psychoanalytic consortium with psychoanalytic colleagues in other organizations: Division 39 (Division of psychoanalysis) of the American Psychological Association, the Academy of Psychoanalysis, and the National Membership Committee on Psychoanalysis in Clinical Social Work. This Psychoanalytic Consortium has worked jointly on a variety of social and political issues important to all psychoanalysts, including maintaining the privacy of the psychotherapist-patient relationship, and is working towards the development of a board to accredit institutes from the entire spectrum of psychoanalysis, in order to protect the high quality of psychoanalytic education and psychoanalytic treatment. See also: American Academy of Psychoanalysis; Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association; Law and psychoanalysis, Lay analysis. One hundred years after the publication of the Interpretation of Dreams, and over ninety years since INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS LEON HOFFMAN AND SHARON ZALUSKY Bibliography Desmond, Helen, and Schneider, Arnold Z. (1994). The psychoanalytic lawsuit: expanding opportunities for psychoanalytic training and practice. In Robert C. Lane and Murray Meisels (Eds.), A history of the division of psychoanalysis of the American Psychological Association (pp. 313–335). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoicates Publishers. Hale, Nathan G. (1971). Freud and the Americans. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. (1995). The rise and crisis of psychoanalysis in the United States. New York: Oxford University Press. AMNESIA The notion of amnesia is of neuropathological origin, but for Freud it was not functional defect in the registering of memories. Rather, he looked upon amnesia as a symptom resulting from repression, as a phenomenon which could be circumscribed but which was not a defense mechanism. He compared infantile amnesia to hysterical amnesia, of which in his view it was the forerunner, both forms being connected with the child’s sexuality and Oedipus complex. Amnesia concealed mnemic traces of traumatic events and, more generally, contents of the unconscious. (When defined by Freud simply as the normal ‘‘fading of memories,’’ [1893a, p. 9] by contrast, the idea of amnesia belonged to the psychology of consciousness rather than to the metapsychology of the unconscious.) Amnesia was not a psychoanalytical discovery, but, beginning with his earliest psychoanalytical writings, notably the Studies on Hysteria (1895d), Freud interpreted it in terms of repression; in the Three 63 AMNESIA Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), he extended the discussion to infantile amnesia. In the development of Freud’s thought, it was the neuropathological idea of amnesia that showed the way to his formulation of repression, even though, structurally speaking, amnesia was a result of repression. The phenomenon of the absence of a memory prompted Freud to posit the existence of an unconscious mnemic trace. Since he did not consider amnesia to be a defense mechanism, he sought to account for it in another way, namely by the mechanism of repression. Thus in the Three Essays, comparing infantile amnesia to the hysterical amnesia that he felt it foreshadowed, he saw both as the outcome of the repression of sexuality, especially childhood sexuality, which he described as polymorphously perverse (‘‘Neuroses are, so to say, the negative of perversions.’’ [p. 165]). The patient was ‘‘genuinely unable to recollect’’ the ‘‘event which provoked the first occurrence, often many years earlier, of the phenomenon in question,’’ which is why it was necessary ‘‘to arouse his memories under hypnosis of the time at which the symptom made its first appearance’’ (1893a, p. 3). The lifting of amnesia was the precondition of the cathartic abreaction of the affects bound to the trauma, the memory of which had been effaced: this was Freud’s first theory of the neuroses, namely the theory of the traumatic causality of hysteria. Amnesia, however, did not in this view succeed in completely wiping out the memory of the trauma, for patients suffered from obsessions, from hallucinatory visions, from what seemed like foreign bodies within their psyches. So long as no abreaction of affects took place, a struggle continued to rage between amnesia and hysterical obsessions, giving rise to ‘‘hypnoid states’’ of a consciousness riven by conflict. Such states might range, according to the strength of the repression, from ‘‘complete recollection to total amnesia’’ (1893a, p. 12). In this light, amnesia could be seen as the ultimate outcome of that defense by means of the ‘‘dissociation of groups of ideas’’ which until 1900 Freud held to be typical of hysteria, and which later he described as the result of repression (an adumbration of the notion of splitting might also be discerned here). In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud argued that the forgetting of dreams was not ‘‘a special case of the amnesia attached to dissociated mental states,’’ for in all cases ‘‘repression . . . is the cause both of the 64 dissociations and the amnesia attaching to their psychical content’’ (1900a, p. 521). As Freud moved from the theory of traumatic hysteria to the theory of dreams, therefore, his conception of amnesia evolved from dissociative splitting to repression. It was on the basis of the durability of the impression attached to the trauma (concealed by amnesia but finding expression in symptoms) that Freud hypothesized the existence of an indestructible unconscious mnemic trace, which helps us understand how, to begin with, he had conceived of the mnemic trace as a so-called ‘‘unconscious memory.’’ The German term ‘‘Erinnerungsspur,’’ whose literal meaning is ‘‘memory trace,’’ covered both the (paradoxical) idea of an unconscious memory, which is to say a memory that has succumbed to amnesia, and the idea of an unconscious mnemic trace. In 1900 Freud asserted that mnemic traces were indestructible; in 1895 he had observed that impressions associated with traumatic seductions preserved their sensory intensity and freshness when amnesia protected them from the wearing-away process that they would have undergone had they not been buried in the unconscious. By thus insisting upon the sensory vividness of what amnesia concealed, Freud depicted a quasi-hallucinatory mode of psychic representation consonant on the one hand with a post-traumatic accentuation of impressions that led in particular to the constitution of ‘‘mnemic symbols,’’ and, on the other hand, with his later theoretical claim that unconscious ideas were necessarily figurative in nature. The notion of amnesia, though it cleared the way for the psychoanalytical notions of the unconscious and of repression, itself remained a phenomenological idea belonging to descriptive psychopathology and marked by the idea of deficiency even if it went beyond it. While amnesia certainly meant a contraction of conscious memory that was not attributable to any functional deficiency of mnemonic fixation, it nonetheless implied a diminution of the capacities of the ego. The forgetting imposed by amnesia (for it was not intentional) was the effect of a defense mechanism that was itself unconscious, namely repression. Such forgetting was experienced, painfully, as consciousness of a repression either under way or already completed; and amnesia could also be the outcome of defense mechanisms other than repression (projection, splitting, foreclosure). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AMNESIA Since new repressions are always in the making, remembering does not make it possible to lift the amnesia completely. In ‘‘Constructions in Analysis’’ (1937d), Freud used the same terminology as in 1895 or 1900, but his standpoint had changed. He continued to think, to be sure, that the aim of analysis, starting, say, from ‘‘fragments of [the patient’s] memories in his dreams’’ (p. 258), was to induce remembering, to lift amnesia. But he now felt that this procedure could never be total and that it could not even be embarked upon unless repetition—notably the manifestation of affective impulses in the transference—was taken into account. Inasmuch as amnesia continued to obscure entire aspects of the past, it was impossible ever to reconstitute that past in its entirety, and the analyst must be content to (re)construct it on the basis of what took place during analysis. This is not to say that Freud abandoned his fundamental historical perspective and embraced fictions, but simply that he redefined interpretation, independently of amnesia and its removal, as ‘‘probable historical truth’’ (p. 261). This ‘‘probable’’ truth, as opposed to the whole truth, belongs to the episteme of modern history. How can the correctness of a construction be proved? One aspect of such a proof is connected to the set of problems surrounding amnesia and its lifting: communicating an accurate construction to the analysand may on occasion cause a temporary aggravation of the symptoms and the production of ‘‘lively recollections . . . described [by the patient] as ‘ultra-clear’’’ and involving not ‘‘the subject of the construction but details relating to that subject’’ (p. 266). Infantile prehistory, when the infant can barely speak, was in Freud’s view affected by amnesia in a very particular way, and amnesias coming into play in later years, including hysterical amnesia, were derived from this primary structural amnesia, the concept of which brought Freud close to the idea of primal repression. What appeared as amnesia was indeed sometimes attributable to primal repression. In ‘‘‘A Child Is Being Beaten’’’ (1919e), analyzing an infantile beating-fantasy, Freud emphasized, apropos of its most important phase (being beaten by the father), that ‘‘it has never had a real existence. It is never remembered, it has never succeeded in becoming conscious. It is a construction of analysis, but it is no less a necessity on that account’’ (p. 185). Here amnesia affects not a forgotten event but rather a fantasy about which there is no necessity to claim that it was at one time conscious. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS In such cases the amnesia could be removed only partially, as for example when ‘‘an elaborate superstructure of day-dreams’’ (p. 190) represented the fantasy in an indirect way. Here at last the notion of amnesia was completely absorbed by that of repression. As noted above, ‘‘amnesia’’ is a term belonging to phenomenological psychopathology rather than to psychoanalysis: it refers to the symptom rather than the cause, and it connotes a lack (a-mnesia), which places it close to ideas of deficit. With respect to the psychology of consciousness, it points up the existence of the unconscious in one of its most spectacular effects. But if it opens the door to the metapsychological ideas of mnemic traces and repression, its affiliation with phenomenological psychopathology and cognitive psychology means that it belongs at once to several disciplines: amnesia is involved with the mnemonic ‘‘recalling’’ of information concerning a traumatic area, but a psychogenic causality does not exclude a cognitive or neurophysiological one. Finally, since amnesia is centered entirely on a reduction of conscious memory, it is not compatible with the later developments in Freud’s thinking on constructions in analysis, although it is true that the accuracy of a construction may bring about the removal of amnesia—thus tending to confirm that Freud never completely abandoned the theory of traumatic seduction and the amnesia to which such a seduction gave rise. In ‘‘Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through’’ (1914g), Freud argued that the ‘‘fabric of the neurosis’’ itself provided ‘‘compelling evidence’’ for the reality of events experienced by the subject ‘‘in very early childhood and . . . not understood at the time’’ (p. 149); in other words, neither the lifting of amnesia nor even a reconstruction of the past was required–a proposition that amounts to a radical refutation of any ‘‘verificationist’’ epistemology. Psychoanalysis is concerned with historical truth, with infantile and psychic realities lying on a different plane, ontologically speaking, from amnesia and that which amnesia conceals, even if the latter can indeed show us the way to the former. FRANÇOIS RICHARD See also: Black hole; ‘‘Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest’’; Forgetting; Infantile amnesia; Lifting of amnesia; Memory; Mnemic symbol; Mnemic trace/ memory trace; Psychoanalytic treatment; Remembering; Reminiscence; Repression. 65 AMPHIMIXIA/AMPHIMIXIS Bibliography This elaboration resulted from a method of working by analogies that Ferenczi called ‘‘utraquism’’ (a coinage based on the Latin root uterque, meaning ‘‘both of them’’ or ‘‘each of them’’), or viewing the same thing from two opposite perspectives. impotency is described as ‘‘genital stuttering’’ (p. 9); ‘‘Everything points to the fact that the urethral (i.e., ejaculatory) tendency is at work from the beginning, throughout the entire frictional process, and that in consequence an unceasing struggle occurs between the evacutory and the inhibitory purpose, between expulsion and retention, in which the urethral element is eventually victorious’’ (p. 8). Ferenczi continues: ‘‘[L]et us term such a synthesis of two or more erotisms in a higher unity the amphimixis of erotisms or instinct-components’’ (p. 9). He describes exchanges in roles, in cases of diarrhea or nervous retention of urine: ‘‘[I]n nervous diarrhoea the bowel is inundated by urethrality: while in urinary retention of nervous origin the bladder overdoes the inhibition learned from the bowel’’ (p. 13n). He points out that ‘‘biological science has hitherto taught us nothing about such [displacement] mechanisms as these. As effecting the transition to our assumption of organic displacement and condensation, the psychoanalytic investigation of hysteria was of service, in that it demonstrated the displacement of ideational energy upon organic activity and function (conversion) and its retransference back into the psychic sphere (analytic therapy). . . . Each organ possesses a certain ‘individuality’; in each and every organ there is repeated that conflict between ego- and libidinal interests’’ (p. 82). With regard to female sexuality, the displacement of clitoral eroticism by vaginal eroticism is understood in an analogous way, as a displacement from low to high, as is ‘‘the tendency to blushing (the erection of the entire head) on the part of the maiden who represses sexual excitement’’ (p. 14). In perversion, there is a mixture of oral, anal, cutaneous, and visual eroticisms. Further, digressions into the realm of linguistics (the breaks that separate vowels from consonants being compared to certain effects of the sphincter) reveal the ambitious scope of Ferenczi’s project: ‘‘to set forth my phylogenetic theory of genitality in the form of a kind of fairy tale’’ (1936, p. 252), but also as if ‘‘sexual intercourse . . . contains a suggestion of mnemic traces of this catastrophe which overtook both the individual and the species’’ (p. 254). In the language of science, amphimixia refers to the fusion of male and female gametes during the process of sexual fertilization, and in Thalassa it is extrapolated to describe coitus, the moment of the fusion of eroticisms: the mutual identification of the protagonists during foreplay, followed by the dissolving of the limits of the participants’ individual egos; sexual Amphimixia thus enables Ferenczi, in Thalassa, to complement physiopathology with what he terms a ‘‘physiology of pleasure’’ (p. 83), bioanalysis being defined as the ‘‘analytic science of life’’ (p. 93). He emphasizes the significance of regression, noting that the final agonies of death seem to present ‘‘regressive trends which might fashion dying in the image of birth and so Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1914g). Remembering, repeating and workingthrough (Further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis, II). SE, 12: 145–156. ———. (1919e). ‘A child is being beaten’: a contribution to the study of the origin of sexual perversions. SE, 17: 175– 204. ———. (1937d). Constructions in analysis. SE, 23: 255– 269. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1893a). On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomena: preliminary communication. SE, 2: 1–17. Further Reading Trewartha, M. (1990). On postanalytic amnesia. Annual of Psychoanalysis, 18, 153-174. Wetzler, S. and Sweeney, J. (1986). Childhood amnesia: a cognitive-psychological conceptualization. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 34, 663-686. AMPHIMIXIA/AMPHIMIXIS Borrowed from the field of embryology and derived from the Greek (amphi: ‘‘from both sides’’; mixo: ‘‘mixture’’), the term amphimixia refers to the fusion of gametes during fertilization and was used by Sándor Ferenczi, beginning in 1924 in Thalassa: A Theory of Genitality, as a metaphor for the fusion of erotisms, in order to propose a biology of pleasure. 66 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AMPLIFICATION (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) render it less agonizing. . . . Death exhibits utero-regressive trends similar to those of sleep and coitus’’ (p. 95). Finally, he adopts a thoroughly modern viewpoint as he concludes Thalassa: ‘‘[W]e should . . . conceive the whole inorganic and organic world as a perceptual oscillating between the will to live and the will to die in which an absolute hegemony on the part either of life or of death is never attained’’ (p. 95). PIERRE SABOURIN See also: Thalassa. A Theory of Genitality. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sándor. (1968). Thalassa: A theory of genitality (Henry Alden Bunker, Trans.). New York: Norton Library. (Original work published 1924) ———. (1936). Male and female—Psychoanalytic reflections on the ‘‘Theory of Genitality’’ and on secondary and tertiary sex differences. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 5, 249–60. AMPLIFICATION (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) Amplification is a part of Jung’s method of interpretation of clinical and cultural material, especially dreams. Amplification involves the use of mythic, historical, and cultural parallels in order to clarify, make more ample and, so to speak, turn up the volume on material that may be obscure, thin, and difficult to attend to. Just as the analyst waits for associations to the dream imagery to reach its personal meanings, so, by amplification, the analyst enables the patient to reach beyond the personal content to the wider implications of her or his material. Thereby, the patient feels less alone and can locate their personal neurosis within humanity’s general suffering and generativity. Amplification is also a means of demonstrating the validity of the concept of the collective unconscious. Jung’s early understanding of the collective unconscious was that it consisted of primordial images that were, to a large degree, consistent across cultures and historical epochs. As amplification involved the assembly of parallels from diverse sources, it could be regarded as performing this evidential function. Present-day Jungian analysts are far less convinced that universal and eternal images exist. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Amplification is a kind of ‘‘natural thinking,’’ proceeding by way of analogy, parallel and imaginative elaboration. In this sense, it may also be seen as a depth psychological approach to scholarship based on what is claimed to be the natural functioning of the mind, which is not linear and orderly. Jung first introduced the idea in an essay in a collection edited by Freud in 1908, when he stated that he does not wish the process of interpretation to proceed ‘‘entirely subjectively.’’ In 1935, he spoke of the need to find ‘‘the tissue that the word or image is embedded in’’ (Jung, 1968, p. 84). There he makes the claim that amplification follows a kind of natural ‘‘logic.’’ By 1947, the value of amplification lies in the fact that it can enable us to reach, by inference, the archetypal structures of the unconscious mind which, by definition, are unrepresentable in and of themselves, must be distinguished from their appearance in culture, and which therefore can only be assessed by means of techniques such as amplification (Jung, 1947). Gradually, Jung was coming to see amplification more as a technique to be used in a wide variety of contexts and less as a general principle of mental functioning. Hence, amplification lies behind the immense spreads of cultural and historical material that Jung lays out for his readers. As the related clinical technique of active imagination was refined, amplification acquired a new significance in Jungian clinical theorizing. If sinking down into the unconscious and recording, often by means of artistic activity, what was encountered therein was not to be merely a self-indulgent, aesthetic process, the role of the ego in amplification was important as a critical agency, not to mention as a bulwark against psychosis. The clearest statements of the clinical uses of amplification are found in relation to dreams. Amplification as a concept also had a marked effect on the development of analytical psychology as an institution. If patients were to pursue the parallels to their personal material in terms of cultural material, they needed libraries in which to do this. This was one reason for the creation of analytical psychology ‘‘clubs’’ in urban centers. In the clubs, selected patients and the analysts could relate on more-or-less equal terms, in part united by the need for scholarly resources (Samuels, 1994). The main criticism of amplification has been that it can make analysis into much too intellectual a process and sometimes leads 67 ANACLISIS/ANACLITIC patients into an inflation whereby they equate their personal situation with something much greater, hence not only avoiding the transference but also gratifying omnipotent fantasies (Fordham, 1978, p. 220). Amplification needs to be discussed in the context of current debates about interpretation: it is best located as part of a hermeneutical approach rather than a causal-positivist one. Recently, the concept has been extended so as to cover much more of the field of interpretation than Jung intended (Samuels, 1993). The ordinary, everyday analytical procedure of interpreting the patient’s material in infantile terms may also be seen as a kind of amplification, neither hermeneutic nor causal-positivist. ANDREW SAMUELS See also: Word association (analytical psychology); Interpretation of dreams (analytical psychology). Bibliography Fordham, Michael. (1978). Jungian psychotherapy: A study in analytical psychology. Chichester, U.K.: Wiley. Jung, Carl Gustav. (1947 [1954]). On the nature of the psyche. Coll. Works (Vol. VIII). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Samuels, Andrew. (1993). The political psyche. London and New York: Routledge. ———. (1994, April). The professionalization of Carl G. Jung’s Analytical Psychology Clubs. Journal of the Historical and Behavioral. Sciences, XXX, 138–147. ANACLISIS/ANACLITIC The idea of anaclisis was introduced by Freud to describe the original relationship, in the young child, between the sexual drives and the self-preservative functions. Arising from a specific site in the organism (an erotogenic zone), the sexual drives at first prop themselves on the self-preservative functions, and only later become independent. The self-preservative function thus sometimes offers its own object to the sexual drive; this is what Freud calls ‘‘anaclitic object-choice.’’ Like the notion of ‘‘deferred action’’ (Nachträglichkeit), that of ‘‘anaclisis’’ or ‘‘leaning-on’’ or ‘‘propping’’ (Anlehnung) constitutes a major theoretical concept that always remained latent in Freud’s own work. Freud devoted no article or complete discussion to it, 68 and the notion lay undeveloped in psychoanalysis up until the nineteen-sixties (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/ 1973). An important reason for this inattention is doubtless the fact that the Standard Edition did not heed the consistent use of the German word nor translate it in a systematic way; its preferred rendering, moreover, was the artificial ‘‘anaclisis.’’ It has to be said that the concept was not identified either, as such, in Freud’s texts or in German psychoanalysis. Since the notion was eminently problematical, and since Freud did not set an example by thinking the matter through, things were simply left fallow. The German substantive Anlehnung is derived from the verb Sich anlehnung, meaning to ‘‘lean on’’ or ‘‘prop oneself on’’ (Laplanche, 1970/1976, p. 15–16). The term appears regularly in Freud’s work, especially prior to 1920. What it describes is the support that sexuality derives, at the beginning, from various functions and bodily zones related to self-preservation: the mouth, the anus, the musculature, and so on. It is thus intimately bound up with the Freudian conception of infantile and adult sexuality as a much-broadened sphere, far more comprehensive than the genital alone, and indeed extending to the entire body. The notion made its appearance in the first edition of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), and was further explicated in later revisions of that work. It occurs for the very first time as a designation for the way in which anal sexuality is bound to the excretory function. The most explicit account, however, concerns sucking at the breast: ‘‘The satisfaction of the erotogenic zone is associated, in the first instance, with the satisfaction of the need for nourishment. To begin with, sexual activity attaches itself to functions serving the purpose of self-preservation and does not become independent of them until later. . . . The need for repeating the sexual satisfaction now becomes detached from the need for taking nourishment’’ (1905d, pp. 181–82). ‘‘At a time at which the first beginnings of sexual satisfaction are still linked with the taking of nourishment, the sexual instinct has a sexual object outside the infant’s own body in the shape of his mother’s breast. It is only later that the instinct loses that object. . . . As a rule the sexual instinct then becomes auto-erotic’’ (p. 222). According to Freud’s description of the component instincts, the bodily source, the aim, and the object of an instinct need to be in a particular term-to-term relationship, on the one hand with respect to selfINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ANACLISIS/ANACLITIC preservation, and on the other with respect to sexuality. Freud’s account is most explicit apropos of the object: self-preservation may show sexuality the way to the ‘‘choice of an object,’’ in which case that choice is made on the model of one of the people important for the child’s survival—‘‘the woman who feeds’’ or ‘‘the man who protects.’’ This ‘‘anaclitic (attachment) type of object-choice’’ is contrasted, in ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction,’’ with ‘‘narcissistic object-choice,’’ where the object is chosen on the model of the self (1914c, pp. 87–90). The idea of anaclisis contains the seeds of an interesting theory of the genesis of the sexual drive. It proposes that this drive definitely develops on the basis of an organic factor, namely the self-preservative function, but that it then detaches itself therefrom, so becoming autonomous, and in the first instance autoerotic, bound to sexual fantasy. This incipient theory was never worked out by Freud: it was firmly rooted in his first theory of the drives (which contrasted sexuality and self-preservation), and its integration into the framework of his ‘‘second dualism,’’ that between the life and death drives, would have entailed a complete overhaul of that scheme. Its most troublesome aspect, however, lies in the assumption that the self-preservative and the sexual drives can be treated as comparable, as two parallel yet somehow identical processes. For the very idea of Anlehnung implies to the contrary that there is an essential disparity here: the sexual drives are assigned their aims and objects by other processes—by bodily functions or needs—and this implies that sexuality is initially indeterminate. What Freud’s introduction, then his abandonment, of the notion of anaclisis encourages us to do, therefore, is revisit the distinction between the notion of drive (Trieb) on the one hand, and that of instinct (Instinkt) or bodily function on the other. There are three very different ways of approaching such a task. A first interpretation posits a sort of developmental parallelism between two types of process, equally biological in nature, as for example nourishment and oral sexuality. According to this model, the operation of self-preservation is seen as triggering erotogenic stimulation. This stimulation is then repeated in an endogenous way (what Freud calls ‘‘sensual sucking’’). This somewhat mechanical model postulates that the sources, the aims, and even the objects of the two kinds of drives are clearly discernible and discrete, even though, to begin with, they operate in parallel. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A second approach looks upon anaclisis as the correlate of a kind of hatching process, with infantile sexuality functioning in two different ways: at a first moment sexuality props itself upon a bodily function (nutrition, say) even to the point of becoming indistinguishable from it; then, in a second mode, it separates and becomes at once autonomous, autoerotic, and of the nature of fantasy. In the course of this complex transformation, the notions of source, aim, and object undergo a kind of mutation and symbolization. In the case of nourishment, for instance, the object of self-preservation is milk, whereas the sexual object is the breast. From this standpoint, it would be inaccurate to speak of a hallucinatory satisfaction, because the shift from the need for milk to the incorporation of the breast is a movement from the order of need to the order of fantasy and desire. Thirdly and lastly, it may be objected that this second interpretation is inadequate in that the sexual drive could not arise from physiological functions by means, purely and simply, of some mechanism of ‘‘mentalization,’’ some kind of endogenous creation. Rather, it is arguable that the intervention of a sexual other—the adult as opposed to the child—is a primordial requirement if symbolization and sexualization is to take place, if the splitting of sexuality, its binding to fantasy and its functional autonomy, are to be achieved. In this view, it is in the context of seduction that the organic source (the lips, the tongue) comes to be defined as erotic, that the object (the mother’s erotogenic breast) imposes itself, and that the aim (for example cannibalistic incorporation) is specified—far beyond the simple ingestion of nourishment. JEAN LAPLANCHE See also: Erotogenic zone; Language of Psychoanalysis, The ; Narcissism; Object; ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’; Oral stage; Primary need; Primary object; Psychosexual development; Reciprocal paths of influence (libidinal coexcitation); Sucking/thumbsucking. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. Laplanche, Jean. (1976). Life and death in psychoanalysis (Jeffrey Mehlman, Trans.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. (Original work published 1970). 69 ANACLITIC DEPRESSION ———. (1993). Le fourvoiement biologisant de la sexualité chez Freud. Paris: Les Empêcheurs de Penser en Rond. ———. (1999). Essays on otherness (Luke Thurston, Philip Slotkin, and Leslie Hill, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge. Laplanche, Jean, and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1973). The language of psycho-analysis (Donald Nicholson-Smith, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press/Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Original work published 1967) ANACLITIC DEPRESSION The term ‘‘anaclitic depression’’ was coined and promoted by René Spitz. Its first significant mention was in Spitz’s article on ‘‘Hospitalism’’ (1945). The kindred concepts of hospitalism and anaclitic depression are described in chapter 14 of The First Year of Life (Spitz and Cobliner, 1965) in the context of a discussion of ‘‘The Pathology of Object Relations.’’ Spitz might be said to have opposed both Otto Rank’s thesis of the ‘‘trauma of birth’’ and the Kleinian idea of the ‘‘depressive position’’ in order to emphasize the study of anaclitic depression, weaning, and the development of the ego. Spitz’s use of the word ‘‘anaclitic’’ in this connection is in fact rooted in the Freudian notion of Anlehnung, or ‘‘leaning on,’’ translated in the Standard Edition as ‘‘anaclisis.’’ The etymological origin of ‘‘anaclisis’’ is the Greek ana-kleinen, ‘‘to support (oneself) on.’’ The idea underlying Spitz’s ‘‘anaclitic’’ is thus that of a relational object on which the subject can rely for support in the course of self-construction and self-differentiation; the perspective is the same as Freud’s when he said that object-relationships depended anaclitically on the satisfaction of self-preservative needs. It will be recalled, too, that Freud distinguished between two types of object-choice, the anaclitic and the narcissistic: ‘‘there are two methods of finding an object. The first . . . is the ‘anaclitic’ or ‘attachment’ one, based on attachment to early infantile prototypes. The second is the narcissistic one, which seeks for the subject’s own ego and finds it again in other people’’ (1905d, note added in 1915, p. 222n; see also Freud, 1914c, pp. 87–88). The anaclitic object plays an important part in Spitz’s theoretical model of the genesis of the object, a model taken up in France by such authors as René Diatkine and Serge Lebovici (1960). It may be defined as that object which the young child uses for purchase as he constructs and discovers his ego and as, at the 70 same time and as part of the same progression, he passes through the three stages described by Spitz: an objectless stage, a pre-objectal stage, and an objectal stage properly so called. To characterize this object as anaclitic is furthermore quite in harmony with the Freudian notion of anaclisis, for it is through the satisfaction of its self-preservative needs that the baby in Spitz’s model discovers the object and the object-relationship, a relationship that obtains not in the world of needs but in the world of wishes. There can be no doubt that his extremely fruitful theorizing enabled Spitz, in his time, to propose a model of the genesis of mental representations that was at once developmental and metapsychological, and thus sharply distinct from that of John Bowlby, who has indeed been taken to task for somewhat shortcircuiting the issue of mental representations. At all events, two very different theoretical (and clinical) approaches to depression in infants have resulted. For Spitz, such depressions are attributable to emotional deficiency—a partial deficiency in the case of anaclitic depression (which is reversible), but absolute in the case of hospitalism (irreversible, at least in principle). Mary Ainsworth (1962; see also Spitz, 1965, p. 267) has reiterated that such situations of emotional deficiency may be described as ‘‘quantitative’’ in that they are the outcome of an absence of the anaclitic object in actual historical reality (i.e., the physical separation of mother and child). When the anaclitic object is missing from the relational environment, the child’s instincts, and notably its aggressive instincts, are turned against the child itself; it has no external object upon which to focus, and at the same time no sufficiently stable and differentiated internal representation of the object yet exists. The danger of anaclitic depression and hospitalism is thus at its most acute between the ages of one and one-and-a-half, or in other words between the objectless stage and the fully objectal one. Claims to the contrary notwithstanding, such psychopathological situations are by no means rare, and naturally they are very common during times of social disruption (war, displaced populations, natural disasters, etc.). It is interesting to note, historically speaking, that it was roughly at the same moment, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, that two things happened: no sooner had researchers turned their attention for the first time to the unsuspected abilities of babies, than René Spitz, Anna Freud, Dorothy INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ANAGOGICAL INTERPRETATION Burlingham, John Bowlby, and others described depression, and Leo Kanner autism, in early infancy. It was as though according babies the ‘‘right’’ to a mental life of their own immediately entailed the possibility of their experiencing all the difficulties that inevitably attend any real mental activity: pain and suffering in the case of depression, madness in that of autism or early psychoses. In more recent times the idea of anaclitic conditions has been widely questioned, even dismissed, yet it is still a point of reference for a good many authors, and there is no denying that it has effectively demonstrated the importance of the quality of the infant’s relationship to the primary object in the construction of the ego, in the emergence of a representational capacity, and in the establishment of a psychosomatic equilibrium. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Abandonment; Anaclisis/anaclitic; Hospitalism; Neurosis; Repetition. Bibliography Ainsworth, Mary D. Salter. (1962). The effects of maternal deprivation: A review of findings and controversy in the context of research strategy. In Mary D. Ainsworth and R. G. Andry (Eds.), Deprivation of maternal care. Geneva: World Health Organization. Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. meaning’’—derives from theology. An anagoge is a mystical interpretation that implies spiritual elevation, convergence towards a universal symbolic meaning, and an ecstatic feeling. The notion was promoted by Herbert Silberer, author of Hidden Symbolism of Alchemy and the Occult Arts (1914/1971). Anagogical interpretation relates to the ‘‘functional phenomenon’’ that Silberer defined on the basis of his observation of hypnagogic processes. Silberer described three levels of symbolization: somatic, material, and functional. The ‘‘functional phenomenon’’ pertains to the capacity for symbolic generalization: it facilitates the shift from ‘‘material’’ symbolization of the particular contents of thought to a general symbolization, in images, affects, tendencies, intentions, and complexes that reflect the structure of the psyche. In psychoanalytic treatment, anagogical interpretation aims at strengthening the tendency to form more and more universal symbols, whose ethical value is also reinforced. Silberer claimed that the functional phenomena were bolstered in the course of an analysis. This idea of interpretation as a generalizing idealization in the here and now is at odds with the Freudian conception based on the personal dimension, the erogenous zones, and deferred action. Freud recognized the utility of Silberer’s hypotheses for explaining the formation of ideas and the dramatic character of dreams, but he criticized his extension of it to the technique of interpretation (as did Ernest Jones, who likened Silberer’s approach to Jung’s). Freud further rebuked Silberer for falling prey to the defense mechanisms of rationalization and reaction-formation. Lebovici, Serge. (1960). La relation objectale chez l’enfant. Psychiatrie de l’Enfant 1, 3,147–226. JACQUES ANGELERGUES Spitz, René A. (1945). Hospitalism: An enquiry into the genesis of psychiatric conditions in early childhood. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1, 53–74. See also: Functional phenomenon; Interpretation; Representability; Silberer, Herbert. Spitz, René A., and Cobliner, W. G. (1965). The first year of life: A psychoanalytic study of normal and deviant development of object relations. New York: International Universities Press. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. Jones, Ernest. (1916). The theory of symbolism. Papers on psychoanalysis. Boston: Beacon Press, 1961. ANAGOGICAL INTERPRETATION The idea of ‘‘anagogical interpretation’’—a kind of interpretation which moves, according to the Robert dictionary, ‘‘from a literal to a mystical INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Silberer Herbert. (1951). Report on a method of eliciting and observing certain symbolic hallucinationphenomena. In David Rapaport, Ed., Organization and pathology of thought. Selected sources (pp. 195–207). New York: Columbia University Press. (Original work published 1909) 71 ANALITY ———. (1911). Symbolik des Erwachens und Schwellensymbolik überhaupt. Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische, 3, 621–660. ———. (1971). Hidden symbolism of alchemy and the occult arts (Smith Ely Jelliffe, Trans.). New York: Dover. (Original work published 1914) ANALITY The term ‘‘anality’’ may refer to the second stage of libido development, to a feature of the pregenital organization of the libido, to an aspect of sexual life, or to a salient personality trait. In his letter to Wilhelm Fliess of November 14, 1897, Freud indicated that by adulthood the regions of the mouth and throat and of the anus no longer ‘‘produce a release of sexuality’’ (1950a, p. 279). Their appearance and representation no longer excite, but instead provoke the disgust associated with repression. In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), Freud defined anality as sexual activity in the child that is anaclitically dependent on another physiological function: defecation. The erogenous zone, the zone of attachment of the impulse, is in this case the anal region. This is why certain disturbances of a neurotic origin involve a range of digestive disturbances. In ‘‘Character and Anal Eroticism’’ (1908b, p. 169), Freud discerned some specifically anal character traits: orderliness, parsimony, and obstinacy. These traits, in his view, are the result of the sublimation of anal eroticism. The handling of money, for example, is clearly connected with an interest in excrement. In a letter to Dr. Friedrich Krauss (1910f), Freud spoke of the universal tendency of people to ‘‘dwell with pleasure upon this part of the body [the anus], its performances and indeed the product of its function’’ (p. 234). In ‘‘The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis’’ (1913i), Freud distinguishes passivity, fed by anal eroticism, and activity (mastery), which coincides with sadism. Accentuating this eroticism during the stage of pregenital organization will, during the genital stage, leave men with a significant disposition to homosexuality. When he began his fundamental study ‘‘Mourning and Melancholia’’ (1916–1917g [1915]), Freud wrote, ‘‘As regards one particular striking feature of melancholia that we have mentioned, the prominence of the fear of becoming poor, it seems plausible to suppose that it is derived from anal erotism which has been torn out of its context and altered in a regressive sense’’ (p. 252). 72 In Freud’s correspondence with Karl Abraham (Freud, 1965a [1907–1926]), the study of melancholic depression was a central theme. Abraham (1927), considered object loss to be an anal process. One form of behavior specific to melancholic depression is an impulse for coprophagy (feeding on feces), which is associated with the oral process typical of introjection and central to melancholy. Abraham went on to claim that anal eroticism embodies two diametrically opposed forms of pleasure. The same opposition can be seen in sadistic impulses. His distinction between two anal-sadistic stages—primitive expulsion (a show of hostility toward the object) and late retention (including tendencies to dominate)—therefore seems fundamental. For Abraham, sexual development after the oral phase went through a second, anal-sadistic, phase, reinforcing the ambivalence that arose during the oral-sadistic substage. This phase itself comprises two substages. The first is characterized by destructive tendencies, while in the second the subject seeks to possess and preserve the object. Freud summarized this approach in his New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933a). Melanie Klein (1940) adopted Freud’s and Abraham’s conception of depression and mourning, and expanded on it. She treated melancholy as associated with loss of the object and theorized that the archaic character of some pathologies is signaled by the mechanisms of projection and splitting. For Klein (1945), fantasies of emptying the breast and penetrating it to steal its milk, or of attacking it to fill it with fecal matter, underlay paranoid anxieties. Klein then describes the mechanism of projective identification, which is based on earlier work of hers (1955). Through this mechanism, parts of the self empty out into various objects. In this connection, anality assumes central importance in pregenitality and the capacity for sublimation. Donald Meltzer (1966) makes use of the concepts of the false self and the as-if personality, introduced by Donald W. Winnicott and Helene Deutsch, in his investigation of the features of pseudomaturity, which he associates with anality. Meltzer views anality as a defense against a relation to the breast, and later against the total mother-object. André Green (1973) suggests that anal regression leads to the destructuring of thought. Primary anality provokes, attacks, and discharges until a state of blank psychosis arises. This approach allows Green (1983) to INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ANAL-SADISTIC STAGE distinguish two forms of narcissism: a narcissism associated with the life instinct and a narcissism associated with the death instinct (a negative form of narcissism). DOMINIQUE J. ARNOUX See also: Activity/passivity; Anal-sadistic stage; Asthma; Character; Coprophilia; Encopresis; Eroticism, anal; Erotogenic zone; Feces; Gift; Mastery; Modesty; ‘‘Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis’’ (Rat Man); Obsessional neurosis; Partial drive; Pregenital; Psychosexual development; Sadism; Stage; Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Klein, Melanie; Heimann, Paula; and Money-Kyrle, Roger (Eds.). (1955). New directions in psycho-analysis: The significance of infant conflict in the pattern of adult behaviour. London: Tavistock Publications. Meltzer, Donald. (1966). The relationship of anal masturbation to projective identification. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 47, 335–342. ANAL-SADISTIC STAGE Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1927). A short history of the development of the libido. In his Selected papers on psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth Press. Donnet, Jean-Luc, and Green, André. (1973). L’enfant de ça. Paris: Minuit. Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1908b). Character and anal erotism. SE, 9: 167–175. ———. (1910f). Letter to Dr. Friedrich S. Krauss on Anthropophyteia. SE, 11: 233 ff. ———. (1913i). The disposition to obsessional neurosis: A contribution to the problem of choice of neurosis. SE, 12: 311–326. ———. (1916–1917g [1915]). Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14: 237–258. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. ———. (1950a [1887–1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173–280. ———. (1965a [1907–1926]). A psycho-analytic dialogue: The letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham, 1907– 1926 (Bernard Marsh and Hilda C. Abraham, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. ———(1985c [1887–1904]). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887–1904 (Jeffrey M. Masson, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1985. Green, André. (2001). The dead mother. In his Life narcissism, death narcissism (Andrew Weller, Trans.). New York: Free Association Books. (Original work published 1983) Klein, Melanie. (1940). Mourning and its relation to manicdepressive states. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 21, 125–153. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY ———. (1945). The Oedipus complex in the light of early anxieties. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 26, 11–33. OF PSYCHOANALYSIS The anal-sadistic stage, the second type of organization of libidinal cathexes, instates the anal zone as the predominant erotogenic zone during the second year of life. The relation to the object during to this period is shot through with meanings relating to the function of defecation (expulsion or retention) and to the symbolic value of feces (given or refused). Freud saw the conflicts of this stage as defining for the sadomasochistic object-relationship and its three characteristic dichotomies: activity/passivity, domination/submission, and retention/expulsion. The anal-sadistic stage takes form during the second year of life, which is devoted to the mastery of the object and the development of the ‘‘drive for mastery.’’ Anal erotism, anaclitically attached to the retention or evacuation of feces, becomes conflicted during this stage. The erotogenic zone involved is not confined exclusively to the anal orifice, but extends to the whole ano-recto-sigmoidal mucosae and even to the digestive system as a whole and to the musculature responsible for retention and evacuation. The instinctual object cannot be reduced solely to feces to be retained within the body or expelled into the outside world, for during this time the mother and people around her also function as partial objects to be mastered and manipulated. The instinctual aims of this period are twofold: to gain erotic pleasure linked to the erotogenic zone and mediated by stools and to explore ways to manipulate and master the mother, who is now beginning to be differentiated. ‘‘The child looks upon its stools as a part of itself that it may either expel or retain (a gradual differentiation between inside and outside) and 73 ANALYSAND that thus becomes a medium of exchange between itself and the adult’’ (Golse, 1992). Freud placed special emphasis on the symbolic meanings of giving and withholding attached to the activity of defecation. He showed how anal erotism, which is linked to both destructive expulsion and conservative retention, assigns to feces the role of a part-object that the child can use either to please or to challenge the mother. ‘‘Defaecation affords the first occasion on which the child must decide between a narcissistic attitude and an object-loving attitude. He either parts obediently with his faeces, ‘sacrifices’ them to his love, or else retains them for purposes of autoerotic satisfaction and later as a means of asserting his own will’’ (Freud, 1917c, p. 130). Freud went on to stress the symbolic equivalence of feces, gifts, and money. This equivalence was further extended with the notion of a ‘‘little, detachable part of the body’’ (excrement, the penis, and the baby) that can stimulate a mucosal passage by entering and leaving it. These parts, as detachable parts of the body, are symbolically interchangeable. It is worth noting that even before describing the anal-sadistic pregenital organization, Freud had earlier made a connection between certain character traits in adults (love of order, avarice, and obstinacy) and the child’s anal erotism (1908b). Following Freud’s lead, Karl Abraham (1927, pp. 422–433) proposed to divide the anal-sadistic stage into two phases on the basis of two contrasting kinds of behavior with respect to the object. In a first, expulsive phase, dependent on the musculature, autoerotism is associated with evacuation. This period is sadistic in the sense that the expulsion of the destroyed object also acquires the meaning of an act of defiance toward an adult. A second, retentive phase is passive and masochistic in character. The instinctual aim here is mastery of the object, which implies its preservation. This phase is masochistic in that it involves an active search for pleasure through painful retention and dilation of the mucous membranes and anal canal. The anal stage is thus a time of ambivalence par excellence, when the same fecal object may be either preserved or expelled, and may thus underpin two quite different types of pleasure and assume the qualities by turns of a good or bad object. For Abraham (1924/1927, p. 433), the dividing line between the first and second phases of the anal stage correspond to the boundary between psychosis and neurosis. In his view, in the psychoses the object is 74 expelled and lost, whereas in obsessional neurosis it is withheld and preserved. In the neuroses, preservation of the object implies that retention wins out over expulsion and that ambivalence is resolved, with the result that there are fewer splits of various kinds. This underscores the role of an obsessional organization in maintaining the link to the object. In The psycho-analysis of children (1932/1975, pp. 144–146), Melanie Klein described anal-sadistic fantasies in which objects (and the subject too, by way of the law of talion [an eye for an eye]) are attacked by poisoned or explosive fecal matter. JEAN-FRANÇOIS RABAIN See also: Anality; Demand; Imago; Stage (or phase). Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1927). A short study of the development of the libido, viewed in the light of mental disorders. In Selected papers of Karl Abraham, M.D.. London: Hogarth. (Originally published 1924) Freud, Sigmund. (1908b). Character and anal erotism. SE, 9: 167–175. ———. (1917c). On transformations of instinct as exemplified in anal erotism. SE, 17: 127. Golse, Bernard. (1992). Le développement affectif et intellectuel de l’enfant. Paris: Masson. Klein, Melanie. (1975). The psycho-analysis of children (Alix Strachey, Trans.; revised by H. A. Thorner). Vol. 2 of The writings of Melanie Klein. London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Originally published 1932) ANALYSAND During the earliest days of psychoanalytic practice, Freud and his students, excited by their discoveries, put great emphasis on the active role of the psychoanalyst. Even though he showed himself to be less of an inquisitor than in the Studies on Hysteria, it was the analyst who intervened, interpreted, ‘‘analyzed,’’ and the patient was, at least in theory, the person on whom some form of therapeutic activity was practiced. The patient was the ‘‘analysand’’ of a psychoanalyst, who possessed the necessary theoretical knowledge from having first ‘‘undergone’’ the initiatory experience of psychoanalysis himself. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ‘‘ANALYSIS OF A PHOBIA IN A FIVE-YEAR-OLD BOY’’ (LITTLE HANS) British authors were the first to use the gerundive form ‘‘analysand’’ to refer to the patient in analysis. The term is found as early as 1925 in the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis and was regularly used by English authors before the Second World War. As psychoanalysis developed and spread, and as increasing emphasis was placed on the transference and countertransference in the dynamics of therapy, the patient turned out to be at least as, and sometimes more, active than the analyst. In 1972 Joyce McDougall created the term ‘‘anti-analysand.’’ ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Framework of the psychoanalytic treatment; Psychoanalytic treatment; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic. Bibliography McDougall, Joyce. (1972). L’anti-analysant en analyse. Revue française de psychanalyse, 36, 167–206. ANALYSE QUATRIÈME. See Fourth analysis ‘‘ANALYSIS OF A PHOBIA IN A FIVE-YEAROLD BOY’’ (LITTLE HANS) This important publication of 1909 was the first case study in which clinical material, derived directly from the treatment of a child, was presented as evidence in support of Sigmund Freud’s theories of infantile sexuality. The somewhat unorthodox treatment was carried out by the child’s father under the ‘‘supervision,’’ mainly by way of letters, of Freud himself. This case study played a significant role for Freud in consolidating his new theories concerning infantile sexuality. While his major findings about the existence of the Oedipus and castration complexes, and the sexual life and theories of children, had originally been derived from the analysis of adults, the case of ‘‘Little Hans’’ (as it has come to be called in the psychoanalytic literature) provided the independent ‘‘proof ’’ Freud needed, using clinical material obtained from a child. The case of Little Hans delivered compelling clinical examples which confirmed many of the theoretical statements made in the Three Essays INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS on the Theory of Sexuality, which Freud had published in 1905, and which were, at that time, regarded as scandalous. Little Hans, whose father had been sending Freud reports about his son’s interest in sexual matters and his curiosity about his body and the bodies of others— an interest centered especially upon the anatomical differences between the sexes—suddenly developed a phobia (an infantile neurosis). He refused to leave the house and go into the street for fear of being bitten by a horse. The paper ‘‘The Analysis of a Phobia in a FiveYear-Old Boy’’ is the account of the development, the interpretation, the working through, and partial dissolution of the neurotic conflicts from which the phobic symptom originated. This first ‘‘child analysis’’ was conducted, with ‘‘supervision’’ from Freud, by Max Graf, Hans’s father, an early follower of Freud’s. His wife, Hans’s mother, had been in analysis with Freud, while Graf was a participant in the Society’s Wednesday meetings. Freud had Hans and his father in to see him, and realized that the details of the appearance of the horse that so frightened the boy stood in fact for the eyeglasses and moustache of the father. Freud’s revelations prompted Hans to ask his father, ‘‘Does the Professor talk to God, as he can tell all that beforehand?’’ (p. 42– 43) Freud indeed played the éminence grise in this story, and the father reported several times to Freud that Hans had requested him to convey this or that fantasy to him, apparently secure in the feeling that ‘‘the Professor’’ would know how to interpret them. What the case of Little Hans documented were the now well-known elements of the phallic-oedipal phase of sexual development. Evident were the high esteem in which the penis is held by the child as a source of pleasure; the love of the parent of the opposite sex and the rivalry with the (otherwise loved) same sex parent; the pleasures of looking and being looked at; persistent thoughts about the parents’ sexual activities, about pregnancy and birth; and jealousy, death wishes, and castration anxiety. The case study cannot however be seen simply as a description of a specific clinical syndrome or as the extension of analytic technique to children. It also made clear for the first time, as Anna Freud (1980) pointed out, the complexity of the child’s emotions and thinking, and graphically illustrated how inner conflicts arise through the mutually contradictory demands of the drives, the developing ego and 75 ‘‘ A N A L Y S I S T E R M I N A B L E AND INTERMINABLE’’ superego structures, and the external world, and how this process can be accompanied by compromise formations in the form of neurotic symptoms. The paper documents the arduous task for the still immature ego of finding compromise solutions to these conflicts. The publication is also considered to be an important step in closing the gap between pathology and normality, between psychic health and psychic illness. The case study of ‘‘Little Hans’’ proved to be the forerunner of the development of child analysis (in the work of Anna Freud in Vienna and London and Melanie Klein in Berlin and London) and the direct observation of children. Freud’s explanation of the outbreak of Little Hans’s phobia is as follows: the phobic symptom, that a horse might bite him or fall down, was a compromise formation which was developed in an attempt to solve the oedipal conflict, with which he was struggling. Hans’s sexually excited attachment to his mother and his ambivalent feelings towards his father, whom he loved deeply, but who stood in his way as a rival for the reciprocation of love from his mother, gave rise to castration anxiety and the fear of being punished, as well as to guilt feelings and to repression. The birth of his sister heightened the conflict as she too was seen by Hans to be a rival for his mother’s attention and affection. Hans was able quite openly to express his death wishes towards his sister—but the repression of his aggressive impulses towards his father strengthened his castration anxiety and forced him—through the mechanisms of displacement and externalization—to create a phobic object which could be avoided. In this way Hans’s inner conflict was converted into an external danger, which he could escape through flight. He was thus able to ward off an even greater anxiety, that of castration. The development of the phobic symptom fulfilled the function of helping to maintain Little Hans’s psychic balance. VERONIKA MÄCHTLINGER See also: Graf, Herbert; Graf, Max; Infantile neurosis; Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety; Oedipus complex; Phobias in children; Psychoanalytic Treatment of Children, The. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1909b). Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben (‘‘Der kleine Hans’’) Jb. psychoanal. psycho76 pathol. Forsch, I, 1–109; GW, VII, p. 241-377; Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10: 1–149. Bibliography Freud, Anna. (1980). Introduction. In the paperback edition of The analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1922c). Postscript to ‘‘Analysis of a phobia in a five year old boy.’’ SE, 10: 148. ‘‘ANALYSIS TERMINABLE AND INTERMINABLE’’ In response to Rank’s proposal of providing shorter cures, Freud, using the example of the Wolf Man, makes the central theme of this article the duration of the treatment and ‘‘the part of the transference which had not been resolved’’ (p. 218). The problem of the slow progress of an analysis ‘‘leads us to another, more deeply interesting question: is there such a thing as a natural end to an analysis?’’ (p. 219). A terminated analysis supposes that two conditions are fulfilled: first, the patient must be relieved of symptoms, inhibitions, and anxieties, and second, enough of the repressed must be made conscious and elucidated, and enough of the resistance conquered, so as to banish the risk of repetition. Three factors affect the length of a treatment: ‘‘the constitutional strength of the drive,’’ ‘‘traumas,’’ and the ‘‘alteration of the ego’’ (pp. 220–221). Freud indicated that if the traumatic factor is preponderant, the situation favors progress towards a ‘‘definitively terminated’’ analysis (p. 220). Two factors are responsible for interminable analyses: ‘‘the constitutional strength of the drive’’ and ‘‘an unfavorable alteration of the ego acquired in the defensive struggle’’ (pp. 220–221) that results in a kind of dissociation or restriction of the ego. To follow dialectical reasoning by opposing a ‘‘terminated analysis’’ to an ‘‘interminable’’ one might not be of use for theoretical research on the end of analysis. Too much stubbornness on this point could reinforce a somewhat ideological position consisting, as Freud wrote in ‘‘Remembering, Repeating and WorkingThrough,’’ ‘‘in resolving every one of the patient’s repressions’’ and ‘‘in filling all the gaps in his memory’’ (1914g, p. 220). A failure to achieve this end could result from the constitutional strength of the drive being rooted in biology. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ANALYTIC PSYCHODRAMA In 1937, the metapsychological model explained most closely the economic and dynamic aspects of clinical experience, aspects that had previously eluded explanations using the notion of opposition of forces. Thus the end of analysis was described by means of a much more complex psychic apparatus involving both the first and second topographies, as well as two classes of drives that place the ‘‘psychic conflict’’ at the center of mental functioning. When drive is mentioned in this late work, it must be understood in the context of a two-drive model, whether in its relation to the object or to the ego. The pressure of the drives is countered by the ego, which sets up a resistance using various defenses, some of which, as ‘‘reaction-formations,’’ constitute the louder aspects of neurosis. Though Freud used the term ‘‘transference-love,’’ Eros is not the only component in the dynamics of the transference. Various obstacles face the analysis, with the risk of a negative therapeutic reaction always on the horizon. These negative developments might be moderate during the analysis only to flare up at full intensity after its termination. On the basis of two examples, Freud implicitly introduced two essential ideas regarding the end of the treatment. The first concerns what would now be called the counter-transference in relation to a young female homosexual. The second idea involves the time of exploration necessary for the numerous returns of negative currents. This article implicitly links the themes of psychic conflict, failure to achieve completion, the negative, and counter-transference. Resistance to the loss of the object and to the constitution of masculine and feminine identifications is grounded in the dynamics of the binding of the two drives, itself influenced by the transference and the analyst’s interpretations. In this work, Freud did not directly raise the issue of the analysand’s desire to become an analyst, although he very probably was referring to Sándor Ferenczi when he mentions the belated disclosure of the negative transference. The remnant of negative transference that is the desire to become an analyst was made the subject of a study by Jean-Paul Valabrega concerning analytic training (1994). The negative current is one working perspective outlined by Freud in this late text. Several subsequent authors, each in their own way, revisited the question of the negative. As different as their works might be, one common point becomes clear, namely that an analysis, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS even in the favorable case of a transference neurosis, confronts the protagonists with the play of binding and unbinding of the drives and with inevitable negative phenomena. The length of treatment, which has increased over time, is due, in large part to a wish to analyze the negative currents, particularly in the transference. RENÉ PÉRAN See also: Biological bedrock; Cure; Ferenczi, Sándor; ‘‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’’ (Wolf Man); Negative therapeutic reaction; Psychoanalytic treatment; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Termination of treatment; Therapeutic alliance. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1937c). Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse. GW, 16; Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (2001). The violence of interpretation: from pictogram to statement (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). East Sussex, Philadelphia: Brunner-Routledge. (Original work published 1975) Freud, Sigmund. (1914g). Remembering, repeating and working-through (Further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis II). SE, 12: 145–156. Green, André. (1999). The work of the negative (Andrew Weller, Trans.). New York: Free Association. (Original work published 1993) Guillaumin, Jean. (1987). Entre blessure et cicatrice. Seyssel: Éditions Champ Vallon. Valabrega, Jean-Paul. (1994). La formation du psychanalyste. Paris: Payot. Zaltzman, Nathalie. (1986). Baiser la mort, une sexualité mélancolique. Topique, 38. ANALYTIC PSYCHODRAMA There is a distinction to be made between psychodrama, a method of investigating psychic processes by dramatizing improvised scenes staged and acted by a group of participants, and ‘‘analytic psychodrama,’’ a form of analytic psychotherapy that uses a play and its dramatization as a means of elucidating unconscious phenomena. In analytic psychodrama the emphasis is on the interpretative function of the play: a play leader analyzes transference and resistances. The drama 77 ANALYTIC PSYCHODRAMA presented in the play is an invitation to engage in symbolizing, which is often fragile in the kind of patient for whom this therapy is intended. Psychoanalysis is indebted primarily to Jacob Levy Moreno (1889–1974) for the remarkable insight of deploying theatrical improvisation and its dramatization in plays in the service of psychoanalysis. He continually combined his psychiatric training with his training as an actor to open up new modes of expression that used lively dialogue and developed a rediscovered spontaneity. He anticipated that such a catharsis would lead to an emotional release, facilitated by body language. Later he moved on to a more specific study of interpersonal group relations, which subsequently formed the basis for his theory of roles and interaction (sociometry). After the Second World War, interest in theories about groups and group methods developed rapidly and found a particularly favorable reception in France. In the wake of the work of Georges Heuyer in child psychoanalysis and Mireille Monod in psychodrama, Serge Lebovici undertook the first analytic psychodramas with children. He based his practice on psychoanalytic findings and thereby instigated the gradual process by which psychodrama, founded on Moreno’s theories, became established. Informed by a wealth of observations, the field of psychodrama then grew and was extended to adult psychotherapy. produces, the play resuscitates what is often a deficient psychic dynamic. The drama enacts and accomplishes the following:  The dramatization of conflicts. Affect is connected with words and gestures, which allows the drives to be based in the body.  Access to representability. The drama enacted by the actors and the interpretation provided by the play leader facilitate the formulation of otherwise inexpressible anxieties and thereby suggest representations often containing affects that are painful to the patient’s ego.  Mediation through the play. By reducing the influence of censorship, the fiction created by the play lifts certain inhibitions and facilitates access to unconscious conflicts. The enjoyment of the play reinforces the subject’s narcissism and his confidence. In Great Britain, the Tavistock Clinic was the source of group therapies, which benefited from Wilfred R. Bion’s remarkable contribution. In the United States, group therapy and psychodrama became particularly fashionable, with the American Society for Group Psychotherapy and Psychodrama in New York as its starting base. In Argentina, following the years of repression under the military dictatorship, psychodrama underwent a new expansion. In particular, an association for psychodrama and group psychotherapy was founded there in 1963. Psychodrama also began to emerge in Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Vietnam, where it remains strongly characterized by Moreno’s influence. There are many varieties of psychodrama, which bears witness that the practice is evolving, creative, and receptive. There is the form of group psychodrama in which the theme is one shared by the whole group and is interpreted accordingly. There are also two main varieties of psychodrama with individual themes: individual psychodrama and group psychodrama. In these latter two types of psychodrama, a patient or group of patients meets with a team of therapists. In either case, the theme is always individual, as is the resulting interpretation. There are three types of participant in psychodrama: the patient, who chooses the scene, a character to play, and the roles to be assigned to the other actors; the other actors, who act out the suggested scene (their acting has a primarily interpretative purpose, being closest to the unconscious impulses expressed by the patient); and the play leader, who does not act but interprets and makes connections between the meaning of the different scenes. The play leader also assists in the staging and reinforces the setting. To the play leader falls the task of interpreting the transference. In practice, an analytic psychodrama is centered around a theme suggested by a patient, which is acted out by him and the other participants. Instead of the free associations used in classical treatment, the patient is invited to act out and stage everything that comes to mind with the help of the other actors. Anything can be acted out, though it has to remain in the realm of the play. Through the reaction that it Whether the use of analytic psychodrama is indicated depends more on the patient’s mode of functioning than on nosographic categories. Psychodrama is more often recommended for patients who suffer from sensory deprivation or rigid defensive procedures, who are deficient in their ability to fantasize, or who harbor dominant psychotic fears. Furthermore, since psychodrama was first used in treating child and 78 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY adolescent pathologies, it continues to be the treatment of choice for young patients. NADINE AMAR See also: Idea/representation; Moreno, Jacob Levy; Psychotherapy; Symbolization, process of; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Technique with children, psychoanalytic. Bibliography Amar, Nadine; Bayle, Gérard; and Salem, Isaac. (1988). Formation au psychodrame analytique. Paris: Dunod. Anzieu, Didier. (1956). Le psychodrame analytique chez l’enfant. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Gillibert, Jean. (1985). Le psychodrame de la psychanalyse. Paris: Champ Vallon. Jeammet, Philippe, and Kestemberg, Evelyne. (1987). Le psychodrame psychanalytique. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Moreno, Jacob Levy. (1946–1969). Psychodrama (3 vols.). New York: Beacon House. ———. (1947). The theater of spontaneity: An introduction to psychodrama. New York: Beacon House. ———. (1959). Gruppenpsychotherapie und Psychodrama: Einleitung in die Theorie und Praxis. Stuttgart, Germany: G. Thieme. ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY psychology. By the end of this period, the theory included psychological types, the theory of complexes and archetypes, the notions of persona, shadow, and anima/animus, and the individuation process. Among the factors that have distinguished analytical psychology are: (a) a synthetic/symbolic component in analytic treatment; (b) a view of libido that includes a broad range of instinct groups, as well as a theory of culture that sees it based not on sublimation of sexuality but on symbolic transformation processes native to the psyche; (c) a notion of the unconscious that includes strivings toward growth and development, intelligent purpose, and orientation to meaning rather than narrowly limited to a pleasure orientation and a drive to tension release; (d) minimization of the psychosexual stages of development in childhood in favor of lifelong psychological development. Technique also contributes important distinguishing features to analytical psychology: (a) while retaining a strong sense of the importance of transference and regression, Jung placed patients in a chair vis-à-vis the analyst and asked them to interact and maintain a dialogue; (b) frequency of sessions is variable from twice to five times per week, depending on the need; (c) the personality of the analyst as well as the analyst’s associations ("amplifications") to dreams and other unconscious material come into play in a more open and explicit fashion, and the analyst seeks to be somewhat transparent and self-disclosing of emotional reactions. The first written occurrence of the name "analytical psychology" is in a lecture delivered by Jung to the Psycho-Medical Society in London on August 5, 1913 (‘‘General Aspects of Psychoanalysis’’). Conceived by Jung as a general (depth) psychology, the field grew in size and developed in complexity both during Jung’s lifetime and after his death in 1961. By 1997 it had come to embrace some two thousand professional analysts on five continents. Already when Jung broke with Freud at the end of 1912 he enjoyed an international reputation and quickly attracted his own students from many parts of Europe and the United States. These men and women typically returned to their countries of origin and began Analytical Psychology Clubs or similar study groups in their home cities: London (1922), Paris (1926), New York (1936), San Francisco (1939), Los Angeles (1942), Tel Aviv (1958). Interest in Jung’s ideas was strong also in Berlin, but since many of the physicians drawn to him were Jewish (Gerhard Adler, Ernst Bernhardt, Werner Engel, Jean Kirsch, Ernst Neumann) and fled to the United States, England, Italy, and Israel during the 1930s, and because of the Nazi rise to power and the outbreak of World War II, the founding of a Jungian organization in Germany was delayed until 1962. In the years 1907–20 Jung worked out the main outlines of his theory, which set the course for analytical Gradually these Analytical Psychology Clubs fostered professional analyst societies which, after the Founded by Carl Gustav Jung, the field of analytical psychology is the descendent of the ‘‘Zürich School’’ of psychoanalysis which Jung spearheaded while still the heir apparent to Freud and the first president of the International Psychoanalytic Association (1910–1914). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 79 ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY Second World War, began sponsoring training institutes. The Society of Analytical Psychology, London (1945) led by Gerhard Adler, Michael Fordham, and Edward A. Bennett founded the first training program. Next came the Carl Gustav Jung Institute/Zürich (1948) with Carl A. Meier as President. In the 1960s, training institutes appeared in many parts of the world: Italy (1961), New York (1962), Germany (1962), San Francisco (1964), Los Angeles (1967), and France (1969). In the following decades, professional societies and training institutes also developed in Austria, Australia/New Zealand, Brazil, Israel, South Africa, and many urban centers in the United States. By 1996 there were twenty-three training institutes in existence worldwide. The International Association for Analytical Psychology (IAAP), founded in 1955 to serve as an international umbrella organization for all professional analyst groups within the field of analytical psychology, provides a network of communication and collegiality for Jungian analysts throughout the world. There are presently thirty-two member groups of IAAP. Every three years the IAAP sponsors a Congress and publishes the papers presented. The ZürichCongress of 1995 was the thirteenth to be held. As the field of analytical psychology developed, it experienced a vigorous display of diversity and polarization. The issue that has most divided it is the same one that originally caused the rupture between Jung and Freud: a symbolic, prospective approach to interpretation and clinical practice vs. a reductive one. Within analytical psychology this has been referred to variously as the Zurich vs. London, the classical vs. developmental, or the symbolic vs. clinical tension. In every version of this debate, the questions revolve around whether to give more prominence to working synthetically and symbolically with dreams and other direct manifestations of the unconscious or to devote one’s efforts exclusively toward technique and the analysis of personal issues involving early childhood and developmental traumas, resistance, and transference. The classical school bases itself centrally on the writings of Jung and his close followers such as Marie Louise von Franz, Carl A. Meier, and Edward Edinger, while the developmental school incorporates many ideas from modern psychoanalysis, particularly object relations theory. The leading figure of the latter movement was Michael Fordham. The most recent generation of analysts has attempted to synthesize these two 80 opposing trends and to find a balanced approach. Some have carried out investigations of the character disorders, dissociative states, and the interactive field (transference-countertransference). There have also been movements in recent decades to apply analytical psychology to the analysis of children and adolescents, society and politics, art and popular culture, small groups and large corporate organizations, and marriage and family dynamics. Scientific studies testing the hypotheses of analytical psychology continue in many universities and institutes throughout the world. Journals of analytical psychology appear regularly in English, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Korean, and Portuguese. The most important of these are: The Journal of Analytical Psychology (London, est. 1955), the Cahiers Jungiens de Psychanalyse (Paris, est. 1974), and the Zeitschrift für Analytische Psychologie (Berlin and Zürich, est. 1969). MURRAY STEIN Notions: Active imagination (analytical psychology); Alchemy (analytical psychology); Amplification (analytical psychology); Animus-Anima; Archetype (analytical psychology); Collective unconscious (analytical psychology); Compensation (analytical psychology); Complex (analytical psychology); Ego (analytical psychology); Extroversion/introversion (analytical psychology); Individuation (analytical psychology); Interpretation of dreams (analytical psychology); Midlife crisis; Numinous (analytical psychology); Projection and ‘‘participation mystique’’ (analytical psychology); Psychological types (analytical psychology); Self (analytical psychology); Shadow (analytical psychology); Synchronicity (analytical psychology); Transference/counter-transference (analytical psychology); Word association (analytical psychology). See also: Belgium; Brazil; France; Germany; Great Britain; Jung, Carl Gustav; Netherlands; Switzerland, (Germanspeaking). Bibliography Dyer, Donald. (1991). Cross-currents of Jungian thought: An annotated bibliography. Boston-London: Shambhala. Henderson, Joseph L. (1995). Reflections on the history and practice of Jungian analysis. In Murray Stein (Ed.): Jungian analysis. La Salle, IL: Open Court. Jung, Carl Gustav. (1966). Memories, dreams, reflections. London: Routledge. (Original work published 1962) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A N D E R S S O N , O L A (1919 –1 990) Samuels, Andrew (1985). Jung and the Post-Jungians. London-Boston: Routledge. This is the dream’s navel, and the place beneath which lies the Unknown’’ (1900a, chap. 7). Stein, Murray (Ed.). (1995). Jungian analysis. La Salle, IL: Open Court. To this constraint on the ‘‘interpretative frenzy’’ (as Sándor Ferenczi described it) of some psychoanalysts was later added a discussion and evaluation of the limits of the effectiveness of psychoanalysis. In ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable,’’ aside even from the limits imposed by the resistance of the id, the ‘‘viscosity of the libido,’’ or negative therapeutic reactions, Freud concluded, ‘‘We often have the impression, in the case of penis envy and masculine protest, of having opened a passage through the psychological strata to ‘bedrock,’ and to have thereby completed our work. Yet it cannot be otherwise, since for the psychic, the biological indeed plays the role of the underlying bedrock’’ (1937c). ANALYZABILITY The concept of ‘‘analyzability’’ appeared late in the psychoanalytic literature and has two different meanings: One was the classical designation, following the medical model, concerning ‘‘indications and contraindications’’ of the psychoanalytic treatment; the other referred to the realization of a limit to interpretation, that is, the recognition that there is an ‘‘analyzable’’ element and an ‘‘unanalyzable’’ element in what the psyche produces. It was the abandonment of the strict medical model and the attempt to take into account purely psychoanalytic factors that led to the emphasis, when discussing the progress of an analysis, on the concept of analyzability. Preliminary interviews are intended to estimate and, depending on the psychopathology of the patient and his capacity for insight, orient the choice of therapy toward a conventional treatment or psychotherapeutic treatment. Some authors, like Elisabeth Zetzel (1968), have, for example, classified hysterical patients into four categories based on their ‘‘analyzability.’’ Other authors, especially when discussing borderline patients, have tried to define precise criteria for prognosis. These include Otto Kernberg, who feels that the ability to experience guilt is ‘‘a good prognostic sign in the evaluation of the ‘narcissistic personality’s’ analyzability’’ (1970). The majority of authors, however, although they do not recommend the use of trial treatments as Heinz Kohut did (1971), following Freud, recognize that the only way to judge a patient’s receptivity to analysis is through the process of analysis itself. The other meaning refers to the limitations of what can be analyzed. Early in his career Freud put forth the idea that not everything was subject to interpretation and that we had to acknowledge the unknown element in the psychic material studied, even if clinical and theoretical efforts were intended to reduce the impenetrability: ‘‘The best-interpreted dreams often have a passage that has to be left in the dark, because we notice in the course of interpretation that a knot of dream-thoughts shows itself just there, refusing to be unraveled, but also making no further contribution to the dream-content. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Indications and contraindications of psychoanalysis; Initial interview(s); Preconscious, the; Transference neurosis; Transference relationship. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 216–253. Kernberg, Otto. (1970). A psychoanalytic classification of character pathology. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 18 (4), 800–822. Kohut, Heinz. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press. Zetzel, Elisabeth. (1968). The so-called good hysteric. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 49, 256–260. Further Reading Stone, Leo. (1954). The widening scope of indications for psychoanalysis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 2, 567–594. Grand, Stanley. (1995). Classic revisited: Stone’s widening scope of indications for psychoanalysis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 43, 741–764. ANDERSSON, OLA (1919–1990) A Swedish psychologist and psychoanalyst, Ola Andersson was born on June 8, 1919, in Luleå, in 81 A N D E R S S O N , O L A (1919 –1990) northern Sweden, where his paternal grandparents were landowners; he died in Stockholm on May 15, 1990. Andersson wrote two important works that have served as key references in the literature: his dissertation and an article in which he describes the historical and social context in which Freud’s patient Emmy von N. lived. In 1948 he began an analysis with René de Monchy, recently emigrated from the Netherlands. When Monchy left Sweden in 1952, Ola Andersson continued his psychoanalytic training with the Hungarian psychoanalyst Lajos Székely, who was then living in Stockholm, at a time when the Swedish Psychoanalytic Society was riven by internal conflicts. He devoted himself to research on the history of psychoanalysis and the translation of psychoanalytic texts. His first translation was a work by the English psychoanalyst Charles Berg, Deep Analysis, the Clinical Study of an Individual Case, which was followed by translations of Freud over a period of more than thirty years. He again devoted himself to translation when he contracted cancer at the end of the 1980s. In December 1962, Andersson defended his doctoral dissertation, ‘‘Studies in the Prehistory of Psychoanalysis: The Etiology of Psychoneuroses and some Related Themes in Sigmund Freud’s Scientific Writings and Letters, 1886-1896,’’ at the University of Uppsala. The dissertation covered the period between Freud’s return to Vienna after his stay in Paris and meeting with Jean Martin Charcot, and the first appearance of the word ‘‘psychoanalysis.’’ Andersson insists on the fact that he focused on studying the origins of Freudianism to avoid interpreting them in the light of future discoveries in psychoanalysis. He noted that he did not take into account biographical or psychological information about Freud. His dissertation was written from within the field of psychoanalysis and treats the evolution of psychoanalytic theory as continuous. He shows how Freud, in his attempt to explain clinical observation, formulated ideas that, for the most part, recalled the Herbartian Vorstellungsmechanik, a dynamic interaction of ideas. Freud himself never overtly acknowledged the influence of Johann Friedrich Herbart. Before Ola Andersson, researchers like Louise von Karpinska (1914), Maria Dorer (1932), and Ernest Jones (1953) had pointed out the similarities between Herbart’s psychology and psychoanalysis, but he was the first to show that Herbart’s ideas served as the 82 dominant psychological tendency in the academic milieu in which Freud worked when he was developing his theory. This dissertation is one of the first attempts to analyze the historical sources of Freud’s theories and the circumstances surrounding the birth of psychoanalysis. In 1960 Andersson was asked by the Sigmund Freud Archives in New York to investigate the case of Emmy von N. and locate any new biographical information about her. The results of his research appeared in an article that was presented in a talk given to the International Psychoanalytic Congress in Amsterdam in 1965, but was not published until 1979 in the Scandinavian Psychoanalytical Review (1979, 2, 5). In the article Andersson refers to the existing biographies of those close to Freud’s patients, as well as to interviews with his children and family members, and personal documents. Because of the belated publication of the article, the historian Karl Schib was able to reveal the name of Emmy von N. for the first time in 1970. She was Fanny Moser, the widow of a successful manufacturer from Schaffhausen, Switzerland. Andersson trained with the Swedish Psychoanalytic Society (Svenska Psykoanalytiska Förening), but his professional life was for the most part conducted outside the organization. He was never responsible for training other analysts, even though he was one of the rare Swedish psychoanalysts to have conducted original research, and his clinical activity appears to have been limited. During a period when society was concentrating its efforts on the clinical training of psychoanalysts, Andersson was the only one in Sweden involved in historical research on the origins of psychoanalysis. Throughout his life he remained in close contact with the university, although he played no official role in the academic training of researchers. His interest later turned to matters of philosophy, psychology, and religion as they related to psychoanalysis. Between 1947 and 1980 he worked in a religious institution, the Stora Sköndal, as a professor of literature, then of psychology. He participated in the activities of another Swedish psychotherapeutic institution with a strongly Protestant tradition. In an article published in 1990 in English by a member of the Swedish Psychoanalytic Society on the history of psychoanalysis in Sweden, Andersson was not mentioned. Nor is he listed in the Swedish Encyclopedia (1989-1996). His son no longer uses his name INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A N D R E A S - S A L O M É , L O U I S E ( L O U ) ( 1861 –1 937) and there is no tombstone to mark the place where he was buried. His obituary, which appeared on May 20, 1990, in the largest daily in the region, the Dagens Nyheter, was written by a Swedish psychoanalyst influenced by the Christian psychotherapeutic tradition that impregnated Swedish thought throughout the entire twentieth century. gave Louise the diminutive ‘‘Lou.’’ Together they read authors like Baruch Spinoza, whose philosophy helped structure her research in psychoanalysis. However, Gillot’s proposal of marriage destroyed their relationship. Her break with Gillot was unequivocal. Lou von Salomé left for Zurich in 1880, where she studied philosophy, history, art, and theology. She outlined her approach to God in her Essays. PER MAGNUS JOHANNSON See also: Ellenberger, Henri Frédéric; Emmy von N., case of; Moser-von Sulzer-Wart, Fanny Louise; Sweden. Bibliography Andersson, Ola. (1962). Studies in the prehistory of psychoanalysis. Stockholm: Svenska Bokförlaget. ———. A supplement to Freud’s case history of "Frau Emmy von N.", in "Studies on hysteria, 1895’’. Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review, 2 (5). Dorer, Maria. (1932). Historische Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse. Leipzig: Meiner. Johansson, Per M. (1999). Freuds Psykoanalys, Arvtagare i Sverige. Göteborg: Daı̈dalos. Jones, Ernest. (1953–57). Sigmund Freud. Life and work. London: Hogarth. ANDREAS-SALOMÉ, LOUISE (LOU) (1861–1937) A Russian writer and essayist, Louise Andreas-Salomé was one of the first practicing psychoanalysts. She was born on February 12, 1861, in St. Petersburg, Russia and died February 5, 1937, in Göttingen, Germany. Louise’s father, Gustav von Salomé (57 years old at the time of her birth), of German-French origin, was a general in the service of the tsar. Her mother, Luise Wilm (38 years old at the time of Louise’s birth), was from a family of Protestant merchants from Hamburg. Louise, the youngest of four children (she had three older brothers) was raised under feudal family conditions and turned out to be a very willful child. She took refuge in an imaginary world peopled with its own god and threw off the constraints imposed by her family. She refused confirmation and, at the time of her father’s death in 1879, turned her back on religion. She shared her existential concerns with her first spiritual teacher, Hendrik Gillot (1836–1916), a fascinating preacher in the Dutch community. It was Gillot who INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS When she was 21 she met the philosophers Paul Rée and Friedrich Nietzsche in Rome, at the salon of Malwida von Meysenbug. They wanted to formalize their reciprocal fascination in a working and living community. She replied to Gillot’s exhortations, ‘‘I am certainly going to shape my own life the way I see it, come what may. . . .’’ This belief led her to take up psychoanalysis at the age of fifty, after an extremely turbulent life. Lou Andreas-Salomé’s first foray into psychoanalysis was the Neue Quellen; she found new answers to old questions in her own life, which she had approached especially through literature, for there are a number of autobiographical traces in her writings. Shortly after participating in the 1911 International Psychoanalytic Congress in Weimar, she went to Vienna to become a student of Freud’s. In her journal, In der Schule bei Freud (1912–1913), keen observations of social life and critical opinions and personal hypotheses on psychoanalysis appeared side by side. Aside from Freud she was very impressed by Sándor Ferenczi and Viktor Tausk. It was through Tausk that she was able to make her first practical observations at the clinic for nervous disorders in Vienna. After Vienna, Lou Andreas-Salomé continued to write to Freud on a regular basis and appears to have accepted only Freud as the supervisor of her own cures. After her visit with Freud’s family in 1912, she became close with Anna Freud, the focal points of their relationship being Freud the psychoanalyst and Freud the man. They worked together on a subject of common interest, the Tagtraum-Traumdichtung (daydreamdream poem). Anna Freud’s presentation to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society for her admission to membership at the society, entitled ‘‘Schlagenphantasie und Tagtraum’’ (‘‘Beating Fantasies and Daydreams’’; 1922), was the result of their efforts together and also contributed to Andreas-Salomé’s admission to the society. She died on February 5, 1937, in her home in Göttingen, Loufried, where she had lived since 1903 with the Oriental scholar Friedrich Carl Andreas. 83 ANIMAL MAGNETISM Psychoanalysis marked a turning point in the life of Andreas-Salomé, who was immersed in contemporary philosophy, the philosophy of Spinoza, and deeply affected by the theory of the psychoanalytic unconscious and the libido theory. She devoted herself to the insoluble conflict of body and soul, the soma and the psyche, sexuality and the ego, masculine and feminine—subjects that appeared in all her psychoanalytic writing between 1911 and 1931. Her style, as exemplified in Narzissmus als Doppelrichtung (1921), was individualistic—capricious, expressive, and poetic. With her representation of a narcissism that was ‘‘happy to develop’’ as a ‘‘companion of life that renews being,’’ she completed her work on primary narcissism as a developmental phase and narcissism as a pathological form of self-love. She emphasized the concept of ‘‘double direction’’ that was present in Freud’s concept of the libido but which he had not developed further. The libido is in the service of the ego instinct and the ‘‘beyond-ego’’ (the death instinct). In this sense she was ahead of her time. Zum Typus Weib (On the Feminine Type; 1914) regroups her most important ideas on femininity and psychoanalysis. She introduced the feminine point of view into psychoanalytic discourse and focused her interest on the difference between the sexes, a difference that must be considered beyond individual differences. She emphasized the complementarity of relationships. For Andreas-Salomé an androgynous image signified a loss rather than a gain for both sexes. In her essay on femininity she introduced a utopia of feminine culture. INGE WEBER See also: Bjerre, Poul; Germany; Narcissism; Tausk, Viktor. Bibliography Andreas-Salome, Louise. (1964). The Freud journal of Lou Andreas-Salome (Stanley Leavy, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. (Original work published 1958) ———. (1990), Das ‘‘zweideutige’’ Lächeln der Erotik. Texte zur Psychoanalyse. Freiburg, Germany: Kore. ———. (1983). Open letter to Freud. Paris: Lieu Commun. ———. (1991). Looking back: memoirs (Ernst Pfeffer, Ed.; Breon Mitchell, Trans.). Memoirs, New York: Paragon House. (Original work published 1951) Freud, Sigmund, and Andreas-Salomé, Lou. (1972). Sigmund Freud and Lou Andreas-Salomé: letters (Ernst 84 Pfeffer, Ed.; William and Elaine Robson-Scott, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of PsychoAnalysis. (Original work published 1966) Welsch, Ursula, and Wiesner, Michaela. (1988). Lou Andreas-Salomé. Vom Lebensurgrund zur Psychoanalyse. München-Wien-Leipzig: Internationaler psychoanalytischer Verlag. ANIMAL MAGNETISM ‘‘Animal magnetism’’ is a term popularized by the Viennese doctor Franz Mesmer. In Mémoire sur la découverte du magnétisme animal (Propositions concerning animal magnetism; 1779) he defined it as the ‘‘property of the animal body that makes it susceptible to the influence of celestial bodies and the reciprocal action of those around it, made manifest by its analogy with the magnet.’’ He believed that a cosmic fluid attracted animate beings to one another. He considered poor receptivity to the fluid to be pathogenic, and the cure consisted in transmission of the fluid. In Paris, Mesmer enjoyed enormous success. Faced with a crush of clients, he installed a ‘‘tub,’’ a round device around which patients sat in a group, and that was designed to concentrate and redistribute the fluid, resulting in beneficial convulsions. Mesmerism claimed to be a scientific discovery as well as a secret associated with initiation into a group of adepts. In 1784 two committees appointed by the Académies Royales des Sciences et de Médecine (Royal Academies of Science and Medicine) drafted a report for the king on Mesmer’s ‘‘discovery.’’ The astronomer Jean Sylvain Bailly, reporter of the first committee, concluded that the fluid likely did not exist, and he sketched out an explanation in terms of ‘‘imagination’’ and ‘‘imitation.’’ In a secret report, released after the French Revolution, he noted the sexual nature of the convulsions, which he compared to orgasm. That same year Armand de Puységur, a disciple of Mesmer, discovered (or rediscovered) that one can provoke calm crises that resemble the natural somnambulism of certain sleepers. He referred to this as artificial or induced somnambulism. From this point onward, magnetized subjects were no longer ‘‘convulsives,’’ but ‘‘somnambulists,’’ as in Puységur’s model. The somnambulists appeared changed: they uttered prophecies, showed signs of split personalities, and, under the influence of the fluid, which was supposed INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ANIMISTIC THOUGHT to be transmitted by the ‘‘passes’’ of the magnetizer, exhibited extraordinary signs of ‘‘lucidity.’’ Puységur and his followers developed a standard form of treatment that differed considerably from what was often suggested by medical authorities. The magnetized patient directed the treatment; the magnetizer questioned the patient and let her talk (almost all patients were female). It was assumed that in a somnambulistic state the person had self-healing capacities. Magnetism became a social and cultural phenomenon of considerable importance. In 1813, in his public lectures, Abbé José Custodio de Faria claimed that there was no need of a fluid to induce sleep, since by a simple command, a state of ‘‘lucid sleep’’ could be brought about in a subject. In 1823 and 1826 the physician Alexandre Bertrand returned to Bailly’s work on imagination and imitation. He connected Mesmeric phenomena to a traditional psychology of ecstasy, currently understood as a trance. An opposition was thus established, before the term ‘‘hypnotism’’ became popular, between orthodox fluidic Mesmeric magnetism and a heterodox psychological movement represented in France by Faria, Bertrand, and Joseph Noizet. In Mesmeric terminology, the ‘‘relationship’’ refers primarily to the relation between the magnetized patient and the magnetizer. The literature in the field mentioned the sexual aspect of the relationship only rarely and with reticence. Yet love between a magnetizer and a somnambulist did become a distinct theme in fiction. Animal magnetism even became a kind of platitude, if we are to believe the article ‘‘Magnetism’’ in Gustave Flaubert’s Dictionary of Accepted Ideas: ‘‘An agreeable subject of conversation that can also be used to ‘impress women.’ ’’ JACQUELINE CARROY See also: Hypnosis; Liebeault, Ambroise Auguste; Occultism; Salpêtrière, hosptial; Suggestion. Bibliography Darnton, Robert. (1968). Mesmerism and the end of the Enlightenment in France. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ellenberger, Henri F. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious: the history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry. New York: Basic Books. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Flaubert, Gustave. (1954). Dictionary of accepted ideas (Jacques Barzun, Trans.). Norfolk, CT: New Directions Books. Mesmer, Anton (1779). Mémoire sur la découverte du magnétisme animal. Geneva: P.F. Didot le jeune. Puységur, Armand Marie Jacques de Chastenet, marquis de. (1786). Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire et à l’établissement du magnétisme animal. London: s.n. Rausky, Franklin. (1977). Mesmer ou la révolution thérapeutique. Paris: Payot. Roussillon, René. (1992). Du baquet de Mesmer au ‘‘baquet’’ de S. Freud. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ANIMISTIC THOUGHT Freud drew the concept of animism from anthropologists such as Herbert Spencer, James George Frazer, Andrew Lang, Edward Burnett Tyler, and Wilhelm Wundt, who used it to refer to the tendency, thought to belong to people in primitive cultures and children, of attributing a soul to things and thus ascribing an intentionality to phenomena that would otherwise be understood in mechanistic causal terms. In psychoanalysis, the concept of animism is inextricably connected with projective mechanisms. The connection between animistic thought and the mechanism of projection appears in 1912 in relation to some details concerning the relation between taboo and danger. This is a psychic danger because in the consistently applied animistic view of the universe of a person in a primitive culture, ‘‘every danger springs from the hostile intention of some being with a soul like himself, and this is as much the case with dangers which threaten him from some natural force as it is from other human beings or animals’’ (Freud, 1918 [1917], p. 200). Freud continued: ‘‘But on the other hand he is accustomed to project his own internal impulses of hostility on to the external world’’ (p. 200). The concept of animism is further developed in Totem and Taboo (1912–1913a), in which it is related to magic and the omnipotence of thoughts. Here Freud attributes a world-view to animism, as an intellectual system, in which it is conceived as a vast whole that starts from a specific point. This first conception of the universe held by humanity is a mythological conception that gives way first to the religious and then to the scientific world-view. Its particular interest for psychoanalysis lies in its psychological aspect, 85 ANIMUS-ANIMA (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) which is associated with the representation of souls that populate the universe and which, being separable from their original material ties, can be transposed into others. This led Freud on to the common ground that gave rise to superstition, as well as the belief in the existence of unconscious determinations or the negation of chance at an individual psychic level. Far from shying away from this kind of connection, Freud used it in 1915 as the basis for his justification of the hypothesis of the unconscious by recalling that consciousness can only ever be attributed to another person by analogy, just as animism confers a similar consciousness to that of the human being on things, plants or animals. This process of inference, which Freud designates here by the concept of identification, also justifies, with reference to the subject himself, making ‘‘the assumption of another, second consciousness which is united in one’s self with the consciousness one knows’’ (1915e, p. 170). The need to go beyond animism in order to be able to believe in the role of chance in external events—that is, in order not to succumb to superstition—recurs on several occasions in Freud’s work (1933a [1932]), particularly in relation to the inability to conceive of death as anything other than the result of a murder, whether this is through incompetence or negligence in the case of a doctor (Mijolla-Mellor, 1995). The concept of animism seems to be inextricably linked with Freud’s philosophical reflection on the different forms of world-view Weltanschauung in particular the religious form that animism precedes and from which it differs, particularly through its connection with magic based on the belief in the omnipotence of thoughts, a belief that is also found in obsessional neurosis. Finally, Freud found in animism a foundation not only for suggestion as a therapeutic technique but for the form in which it persists in the conduct of the analytic treatment. In this case it concerns a form of animism without a magical act, which is entirely based on ‘‘the overevaluation of the magic of words and the belief that the real events in the world take the course which our thinking seeks to impose on them’’ (1933a [1932], p. 166). SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Certainty; Omnipotence of thought; Primitive; Projection; Thought; Totem and Taboo. 86 Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1912d). On the universal tendency to debasement in the sphere of love. SE, 11: 177–190. ——— (1912–13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ——— (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159–204. ——— (1918 [1917]). The taboo of virginity (Contributions to the psychology of love III). SE, 11: 191–208. ——— (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 22: 1–182. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1995). Meurtre familier. Approche psychanalytique d’Agatha Christie. Paris: Dunod. Further Reading Roheim, Geza. (1930). Animism, magic, and the divine king. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. ANIMUS-ANIMA (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) Anima and animus are gender specific archetypal structures in the collective unconscious that are compensatory to conscious gender identity. Thus, animus images primarily depict the unconscious masculine in a woman, and anima images primarily depict the unconscious feminine in a man. The notion first appears in print in Carl Gustav Jung’s Psychological Types, in 1921. One of the most complex and least understood features of his theory, the idea of a contrasexual archetype, developed out of Jung’s desire to conceptualize the important complementary poles in human psychological functioning. From his experiences of the emotional power of projection in his patients and in himself, he conceived first of the anima as a numinous figure in a man’s unconscious. Originally, Jung associated anima with mother and animus with father, but he soon began to identify their roots and effects in a broader spectrum. By 1925 he considered these concepts the two most comprehensive foundation stones of the psyche. Anima and animus, Jung says, are inborn as ‘‘virtual images’’ that acquire form ‘‘in the encounter with empirical facts which touch the unconscious aptitude and quicken it to life’’ (Jung, 1928, p. 300). The initial contrasexual content is introjected from the infant’s relationship with the parental figures. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A N N A O. , C A S E Developmentally, then, separation from parental figures as primary objects is followed by the idealizing identification of anima and animus with figures in the environment, usually, but not necessarily, persons of the opposite sex. Subsequently, projections can be withdrawn from their objects and the apperception of anima/animus as intrapsychic objects made conscious. At that point anima and animus can act as the ego’s interface to the collective unconscious. In most clinical instances, anima and animus figures personify the struggle between the culture-bound, collective images of masculine and feminine and the developmental urge to liberate one’s individuality from collective norms. OF ——— (1928d [1948]). Instinct and the unconscious. Coll. Works (Vol. VIII). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ——— (1951). Aı̈on: Researches into the phenomenology of the self. Coll. Works (Vol. IX). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Samuels, Andrew. (1985). Jung and the Post-Jungians. London-Boston: Routledge. Tresan, David. (1992). The anima of the analyst. Its development, gender, and soul. In Psychotherapy (pp. 73–110). Wilmette, IL: Chiron Publications. The concept includes the potential in women and men to develop both masculine and feminine elements in themselves. The contrasexual archetypes fuel the Oedipal predicament. Differentiation between the parental imagoes and anima and animus projections leads out of the Oedipal fixation. A narcissistic identification with the contrasexual figure may result in positive or negative inflation or, alternatively, deteriorate into a state of flooding of the ego by unconscious contents. ANLEHNUNG. See Anaclitic Critics fault Jung for his confusion of outer life realities of women and men and the inner world of anima and animus images; for example, his repeated assignment of relatedness (Eros) both to anima and to women, and rationality (Logos) both to animus and to men. This confusion can lead to the false equation of culturally acquired elements with inborn male and female characteristics. Anna O. was the first case described by Joseph Breuer in his Studies on Hysteria (1895d). Her real name, Bertha Pappenheim, was revealed by Ernest Jones in his 1953 biography of Freud, shocking his contemporaries. When Breuer saw her for the first time toward the end of November 1880, Bertha Pappenheim, a friend of Martha Bernays (Freud’s future wife), was about 22 years old. Her problems had been triggered when her father, whom she loved deeply, fell seriously ill. Her symptom was a ‘‘nervous cough,’’ which Breuer quickly diagnosed as being of hysterical origin. She soon suffered from other symptoms as well: squinting, partial paralysis, visual disturbances, and a lack of feeling in her right arm. She also exhibited alternating states of consciousness, which drew Breuer’s attention as a sign of a self-hypnotic condition that he would gradually use for therapeutic purposes. BETTY DE SHONG MEADOR See also: Collective unconscious (analytical psychology); Projection and ‘‘participation mystique’’ (analytical psychology); Analytical psychology. Bibliography Jung, Carl Gustav. (1921). Psychological types. Coll. Works (Vol. VI). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ——— (1928a [1935]). The relations between the ego and the unconscious. Coll. Works (Vol. VII). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ——— (1928b [1948]). On psychic energy. Coll. Works (Vol. VIII). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ——— (1928c [1948]). General aspects of dream psychology. Coll. Works (Vol. VIII). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ANNA-FREUD CENTER. See Hampstead Clinic ANNA O., CASE OF These symptoms were followed by speech disturbances (she could only speak English, then became mute), which led Breuer to conclude that she was hiding something and must be made to speak. This therapeutic insight was followed by an improvement in her condition, but the death of her father in April 1881 caused a relapse. It was at this time that she began recounting lengthy stories in a highly dramatic 87 A N N A O ., C A S E OF tone of voice during her self-induced hypnotic states in the evening. These were accompanied by violent affects that highlighted their significance. She referred to this initial ‘‘catharsis’’ as the talking cure and sometimes as chimney sweeping. It was most likely during the summer of 1881, probably in mid-August (although Henri Frédéric Ellenberger says it occurred during the first months of 1882), that an incident occurred that was to have profound significance on the future of Breuer’s method. Anna refused to drink liquids, but in her hypnotic state revealed that she had been disgusted to discover her lady companion’s dog drinking out of her glass. When awakened she asked for a glass of water. The etiological function of the ‘‘cathartic method’’ was born and Breuer had her identify, for each of her symptoms, the memory of the ‘‘primitive scene’’ from which they originated but which had apparently been forgotten. Between December 1881 and June 1882, a new symptom appeared, which led to a renewal of what she had experienced a year earlier, as indicated by Breuer’s notes at the time. This ‘‘talking out’’ (1895d, p. 36), as Breuer referred to it, was not simple, however: ‘‘The work of remembering was not always an easy matter and sometimes the patient had to make great efforts. On one occasion our whole progress was obstructed for some time because a recollection refused to emerge’’ (p. 37). Freud was later to draw significant conclusions about this ‘‘resistance’’ on the part of the patient. In 1882, however, Breuer had little understanding of ‘‘transference,’’ and this continued as late as 1895, when he completed his description of this intelligent, intuitive, and kind woman: ‘‘The element of sexuality was astonishingly undeveloped in her. The patient, whose life became known to me to an extent to which one person’s life is seldom known to another, had never been in love; and in all the enormous number of hallucinations which occured during her illness that element of mental life never emerged’’ (1895d, p. 21–22). In the wake of Breuer’s colorless narrative, a number of mysteries and legends have grown up around the circumstances of the rupture of such a strong affective relationship. In fact, Breuer was apparently called to her bedside the very evening they said goodbye to one another after the conclusion of the treatment. She was in the midst of a hysterical crisis 88 and pretended to be giving birth ‘‘to Doctor Breuer’s child.’’ Ernest Jones writes that Breuer was ‘‘fled the house in a cold sweat. The next day he and his wife left for Venice to spend a second honeymoon, which resulted in the conception of a daughter; the girl born in these curious circumstances was nearly sixty years later to commit suicide in New York’’(Jones, 1953, Vol. 1, p. 148). In fact, historical research has shown that this story is false. Anna O. was hospitalized in the clinic of Kreuzlingen in July 1882 at Breuer’s request. She was suffering from neuralgic pains of the trigeminal nerve, which had led Breuer to administer increasingly strong doses of morphine, from which she eventually had to be weaned. We know that Bertha Pappenheim, even though Breuer was no longer her physician, was gradually healed and devoted her life and her writing after 1895 to helping young Jewish girls, single mothers, and orphans. She was one of the first ‘‘social workers’’ and her work earned her the admiration of everyone who knew her until her death on May 28, 1936. As for Breuer, that summer he and his wife he did not escape to Venice but spent their vacation in Gmunden, near the Traunsee in Austria. Their daughter Dora was born on March 11, 1882, three months before the end of Anna O.’s treatment. But such legends die hard and the detractors of Freud and psychoanalysis continue to make use of them. Breuer continued to care for ‘‘nervous’’ patients and described his method of treatment to his young protégé Freud on November 18, 1882, and again in July 1883. This was the point of departure for the etiological research that Freud, somewhat disillusioned by Jean Martin Charcot’s lack of interest in the story, was unable to begin until nearly ten years later. In his ‘‘On the History of the Psycho-analytic Movement’’ (1914d), Freud, who always reported that the origins of psychoanalysis lay in ‘‘J. Breuer’s cathartic method,’’ (in 1910a, for example), spoke of the transference aspect that, until then, had been neglected: ‘‘Now I have strong reasons for suspecting that after all her symptoms had been relieved Breuer must have discovered from further indications the sexual motivation of this transference, but that the universal nature of this unexpected phenomenon escaped him, with the result that, as though confronted by an ‘untoward even’, he broke off all further investigation’’ (1914d, 12). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A N N É E P S Y C H O L O G I Q U E , L ’- On June 2, 1932, in a letter to Stefan Zweig, Freud gave further details about the end of Anna O.’s treatment while reminiscing about Breuer: ‘‘Asked what was wrong with her, she replied: ‘Now Dr. B.’s child is coming!’ At this moment he held in his hand the key that would have opened the ‘doors to the Mothers,’ but he let it drop. With all his great intellectual gifts there was nothing Faustian in his nature. Seized by conventional horror he took flight and abandoned the patient to a colleague.’’ The story of Anna O. has always been a source of contention. In 1895 it was published, primarily to demonstrate that the cathartic method, dating from 1881–1882, preceded the research published by Pierre Janet. In 1953 it was used by Jones to demonstrate Freud’s courage and scientific creativity compared to Breuer’s presumed cowardice. Following the research of Henri Frédéric Ellenberger and Albrecht Hirschmüller, the real history is better known, and while the romanticized presentation of therapy can no longer escape the notice of the psychoanalytic community, it still contains traces of Freud’s later thinking. In any event, the distortions of writing do not justify believing, as the detractors of psychoanalysis such as Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen would have us do, that Breuer and Freud were charlatans and Bertha Pappenheim was simply a ‘‘fraud.’’ ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Breuer, Josef; Cathartic method; Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis; Studies on Hysteria; Hypnoid states; Pappenheim, Bertha. Bibliography Edinger, Dora. (1963). Bertha Pappenheim: Leben und Schriften. Frankfurt: D. Edinger. Ellenberger, Henri F. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry. New York: Basic Books. ———. (1972). ‘‘L’histoire d’Anna O.’’: Étude critique avec documents nouveaux. In Médecines de l’âme. Paris: Fayard, 1995. (Reprinted from L’évolution psychiatrique, 37 (4), 693–717.) Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. Freeman, Lucy. (1972). The story of Anna O. New York: Walker. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Hirschmüller, Albrecht. (1978). Physiologie und Psychoanalyse in Leben und Werk Josef Breuers. Bern-Stuttgart: Hans Huber. Jones, Ernest. (1953–1957). Sigmund Freud. Life and work. London: Hogarth. ANNÉE PSYCHOLOGIQUE, L’L’Année psychologique (AP) is the leading French review of scientific psychology. It was founded in 1894 by Henri Beaunis and Alfred Binet to publish the research activities conducted in the Sorbonne’s psychology laboratory. Henri Beaunis was a physiologist and a representative of the School of Nancy. Alfred Binet was a psychologist and worked for seven years with Dr. Féré under Jean Martin Charcot (on animal magnetism, fetishism, and hysteria). He soon succeeded Beaunis as the head of the laboratory and the review. The review went through three main periods: 1894–1911 (the date of Binet’s death); 1912 to the end of the Second World War, when it was under the direction of Henri Piéron; and from the liberation of Paris until today, under the direction of Paul Fraisse. It was only during the first period, under Binet’s editorship, that psychoanalysis featured prominently in the review, at a time when references to the subject were practically nonexistent in France. The principal center of interest then shifted to experimental psychology. The review consists of three sections: original papers, comments and reviews, and bibliographies. Alfred Binet, a friend of Édouard Claparède and J Larguier des Bancels, both Swiss, became interested in psychoanalysis early in his career through his relation to psychopathology and forensic psychology. But he didn’t read German. In 1908, he commissioned Carl Gustav Jung to write an article on psychoanalysis, ‘‘L’analyse des rêves’’ (The analysis of dreams), which appeared in the 1909 issue of the AP. However, in a letter to Freud, Jung qualified the article as an ‘‘insignificant, superficial thing.’’ In 1912 there appeared an article by Alphonse Maeder entitled ‘‘Sur le mouvement psychoanalytique’’ (On the psychoanalytic movement). This much longer article acknowledged the development of a Freudian school that had renewed psychiatry and psychoanalysis. 89 ANNIHILATION ANXIETIES In the AP under Pieron’s direction, after 1912, psychoanalysis played a minor role, and was relegated to reviews of publications by Freud and Jung, written by Pieron. The tone is generally critical. As for the young French psychoanalytic movement, it was ignored by the AP. Following the liberation, Paul Fraisse replaced Henri Pieron as the editor-in-chief, reinforcing its experimental bias. After 1949 the term ‘‘psychoanalysis’’ simply disappeared from the bibliographic entries listed in the publication. ANNICK OHAYON See also: Maeder, Alphonse E. Bibliography Binet, Alfred, and Féré, Charles. (1887). Animal magnetism. New York, D. Appleton and Company. Jung, Carl G. (1909b). The analysis of dreams. Coll. Works (Vol. IV). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Maeder, Alphonse. (1912). Über die Funktion des Traumes (mit Berücksichtigung der Tagesträume, des Spieles, usw.). Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, IV. Ohayon, Annick. (1994). Lectures de la psychanalyse dans L’Année psychologique de Piéron, 1913–1945. Actes du XIIe Congrès annuel de Cheiron Europe. p. 263–270. ANNIHILATION ANXIETIES In annihilation anxieties, the basic danger involves a threat to psychic survival, experienced as a present menace or as an anticipation of an imminent catastrophe. The experience entails fantasies and/or feelings of helplessness in the face of inner and/or outer dangers against which the person feels he can take no protective or constructive action. The construct derives from Freud’s 1926 view of a traumatic situation where the person is faced with a quantity of stimulation that he/she cannot discharge or master, a failure of self-regulation. The experience of overwhelmed helplessness has much in common with Jones’ aphanisis, Klein’s psychotic anxiety, Schur’s primary anxiety, Winnicott’s unthinkable anxiety, Bion’s nameless dread, Stern’s biotrauma, Frosch’s basic anxiety, Little’s annihilation anxiety, and Kohut’s disintegration anxiety. Derivatives of underlying annihilation anxieties are fears of being overwhelmed, destroyed, abandoned, mortified, mutilated, suffocated 90 or drowned, of intolerable feeling states, losing mental, physical or bodily control, of going insane, dissolving, being absorbed, invaded, or shattered, of exploding, melting, leaking out, evaporating or fading away. Annihilation experiences and anxieties are universal in early childhood, where psychic dangers are regularly experienced as traumatic. Eight related ideational contents are seen to comprise the major dimensions of annihilation anxieties: fears of being overwhelmed, of merger, of disintegration, of impingement, of loss of needed support, of inability to cope, of concern over survival, and of responding with a catastrophic mentality. Pathological annihilation anxieties are a consequence and correlate of psychic trauma, ego weakness, object loss, and pathology of the self. They can be consequential for the process of psychoanalytic therapy and may influence resistance, transference, and countertransference in a given treatment. Symptoms, thought patterns, affect states, and behaviors are especially resistant to change when they are defending against such anxieties. The concept is especially relevant to psychoses, borderline and narcissistic character pathology, psychic trauma, nightmares, anxiety states and phobias. Annihilation anxieties under various names are mentioned widely in the psychoanalytic literature, but there has been insufficient systematic exploration of interrelationships with psychic trauma, ego weakness and deficit, regression, hostility, depression, transference, and countertransference. MARVIN HURVICH See also: Anxiety. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE: 20: 77–175. Hurvich, Marvin. (1989). Traumatic moment, basic dangers, and annihilation anxiety. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 6, 309–323. Little, Margaret. (1960). On basic unity. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 41, 377–384. Stern, Max. (1951). Anxiety, trauma, and shock. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 20, 179–203. Winnicott, Donald. (1974). The fear of breakdown. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 1, 103–107. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ANOREXIA NERVOSA ANOREXIA NERVOSA The term ‘‘anorexia nervosa’’ was coined by William Gull in 1873. Although the term has existed for little more than a century, the clinical description of the syndrome is much older. Among other works, we can find a description in Avicenna in the eleventh century, and we have no difficulty recognizing it in Richard Morton’s 1694 account of ‘‘nervous consumption.’’ The first complete description in terms identical to those of Gull can be found in an article written by Dr. Louis Victor Marcé in 1860. The classic clinical picture of anorexia brings together three factors: weight loss of more than 10 percent, amenorrhea, and the absence of a manifest melancholic or delusional mental disturbance. But the emphasis has changed from these classic symptoms to more specific symptoms, such as a confused body image, denial of being thin, desperate desire to be thin, and fear of putting on weight. Also, two major types of anorexia nervosa have been distinguished: purely restrictive forms and forms associated with bulimic episodes accompanied by weight monitoring, selfinduced vomiting, and excessive use of laxatives and diuretics. Anorexia nervosa frequently occurs during adolescence, especially among females (ten girls for every one boy). It affects between 1 and 2 percent of the female adolescent population. Without ever dealing specifically with eating disorders, Freud did in fact establish all of the perspectives—hysteria, melancholia, and ‘‘actual’’ neurosis—around which the pathological manifestations of anorexia can be understood metapsychologically. As a hysteria, anorexia involves a double polarity: oral fixations of the libido serve as a point of regression, and sexual fantasies become oral and are then repressed. As a melancholia, anorexia involves melancholy over the issue of object loss and a loss of instinctual needs. Freud speaks of an anesthesia that leads to melancholic thinking, which opens up a research path related to the next perspective. As an ‘‘actual’’ neurosis, anorexia poses a threefold question about the importance of the current situation, of somatic and infrarepresentational factors, and of the inadequacy of the ego and capacities for working matters out. Melanie Klein and her students have stressed the importance of archaic fantasies of sadistic devouring, destruction, and poisoning in anorexia. Psychoanalysts dealing specifically with eating disorders initially considered them to be primarily a symptom and took INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS little interest in the organization of the personality. But because of the complexity of cases and the frequent severity of the evolution of the disorder, the pathology of the personality assumed a growing importance in their work. The Göttingen symposium, organized by J. E. Meyer and H. Feldmann (1965), recognized anorexia nervosa as having a specific structure and viewed it not so much as an attempt toward compromise formation but rather as an attempt to deal with psychotic failures in the organization of the ego by reestablishing the mother-child unit. Evelyne Kestemberg et al. (1974) have provided a remarkable description of the specific modes of the regression and instinctual organization in anorexia. This organization is characterized by recourse to a primary erogenous masochism in which pleasure is linked directly to a refusal to satisfy a need. Pleasure does not accompany the feeling of having something inside oneself; rather, anorexia eroticizes not satisfying a vital need. Similarly, relationships become dominated by pleasure in their being not satisfied. The hedonization of refusal becomes the guardian of the feeling of being or existing in one’s own right, corporeal activity and the body being thus liberated from all external holds. The most complete form of this hedonization of refusal is ‘‘hunger orgasm.’’ Different studies stress the importance of the dependence/autonomy conflict and the fundamental vulnerability of anorexics. This vulnerability is associated with powerful passive desires and, as a consequence, a constant fear of intrusion, particularly an invasion of the body by the object on which these desires depend. To pose the problem in terms that highlight the paradox of anorexia: anorexics destroy themselves to prove their own existence. The destructive effect is not sought after for its own sake, and in this respect anorexia is not a suicidal behavior, although it can be seen as the result of unleashing aggression and turning against the self an incorporation fantasy of an object experienced as destructive for the self. Anorexia is the consequence of using a physiological need indispensable for survival to preserve a feeling of autonomy. In doing so—and this is the second paradox—anorexics find themselves in fact more dependent on an environment from which they sought to free themselves. By making refusal the instrument of their liberation, they alienate themselves from the object of the refusal, which they can neither lose nor interiorize. 91 ANTHROPOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS The anorexia-bulimia tandem leads to questions about whether a problem of dependence underlies other behaviors grouped under the label ‘‘addictive behaviors’’: drug addiction, alcoholism, pathological gambling, and shopping, as well as abuse of psychotropic drugs and kleptomania. The fragile narcissistic bases of such addicts makes their object relations difficult to manage, because these object relations become too exciting and too dangerous. Addiction to products or behavioral practices offers addicts a need-satisfying relational substitute that is always accessible and which they believe they can control, while in fact they fall into its grip. The eating disorder represents a substitute for the object whose loss could plunge these patients into a collapse. This attempt to find a substitute object in addictive behavior represents a perverse organization of a relationship to the object in which the object is not recognized as having its own desires and differences, but is acknowledged only for purposes of narcissistic reassurance. An analogy exists among these patients’ relationship with food, their relationship with their own bodies, and their object relations, as well as their modes of emotional investment in general. Family-therapy approaches illustrate the sensitivity of these patients to the influences of their environment. These eating disorders can be seen as existing at an intersection between individual psychology, family interactions, the body in its most biological aspect, and society in general. An essentially mental disorder may thus have grave somatic consequences, and these consequences may in turn affect the anorexic’s psychic state and thus contribute to maintaining the disorder. Addictive behaviors raise questions about the type of society in which we live, particularly with the increase in the frequency of these disorders accompanying the increase in consumerism in our societies. PHILIPPE JEAMMET See also: Adolescence; Autistic capsule/nucleus; Bulimia; Flower Doll: Essays in Child Psychotherapy; KestembergHassin, Evelyne. Bibliography Agman, Gilles; Corcos, Maurice; and Jeammet, Philippe. (1994). Troubles des conduits alimentaires. In Encyclopédie medico-chirurgicale (Psychiatrie vol., fasc. 37-350-A-10). Paris: Encyclopédie medico-chirurgicale. 92 Brusset, Bernard. (1998). Psychopathologie de l’anorexie mentale. Paris: Dunod. Kestemberg, Evelyne; Kestenberg, Jean; and Decobert, Simone. (1972). La faim et le corps: une étude psychanalytique de l’anorexie mentale. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Venisse, Jean-Luc (Ed.). (1991). Les nouvelles addictions. Paris: Masson. Further Reading Aronson, Joyce K. (ed.) (1993). Insights in the dynamic psychotherapy of anorexia and bulimia: An introduction to the literature. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson. Freedman, Norbert, et. al. (2002). Desymbolization: concept & observations on anorexia & bulimia. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 25,165-200. Sours, John. (1980). Starving to death in a sea of objects: the anorexia nervosa syndrome. New York: Jason Aronson. Thoma, Helmut. (1967). Anorexia nervosa. New York: International Universities Press. Wilson, Charles, Hogan, C., and Mintz, Ira. (1985). Fear of being fat: the treatment of anorexia and bulimia (2nd ed). Northvale, NJ: Aronson. Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth. (1993). Feminism and psychoanalysis: in the case of anorexia nervosa. Psychoanalytical Psychology, 10, 317-330. ANTHROPOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Anthropology, a term common to the European languages, has several meanings, ranging from the theological—the expression of divine things in human terms—to the modern—the study of humanity as a unit, including an examination of its biological, psychic, and social nature, as well as mankind’s historical and prehistorical development. During Freud’s lifetime, the term acquired new connotations through the expansion of anthropological research, by both AngloAmerican and European researchers. The word ‘‘anthropology’’ was not part of Freud’s vocabulary any more than ‘‘sociology,’’ which Freud integrated (Sozial-, oder Massenpsychologie) with psychoanalysis. His avoidance of the terms is significant. In the case of anthropology he used the German Geisteswissenschaften, literally the ‘‘sciences of mind,’’ and enumerated the domains in which psychoanalysis was pertinent: the explanation of the ‘‘major cultural INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ANTHROPOLOGY institutions,’’ exogamy, the construction of the state, law, the social order, art, morality and moral awareness, religion. He also refers to research on myths, tales, and legends, cultural history and development, linguistics and ethnology, the history of the development of the human species—in fact, the principal subjects of anthropology. Freud’s justification of the relevance of psychoanalysis to these fields was systematized after the publication of Totem and Taboo (1912–13a). In ‘‘The Claims of Psycho-analysis to Scientific Interest’’ (1913j), there is a lengthy explanation of this, an idea that was further developed by Freud in his later writings (1914d, 1923a, 1924f, 1925d, 1926e, 1933a). Initially a medical specialization concerned with neurotic symptoms, the status of psychoanalysis changed with the publication of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). ‘‘The analysis of dreams gave us an insight into the unconscious processes of the mind and showed us that the mechanisms which produce pathological symptoms are also operative in the normal mind. Thus psychoanalysis became a depth-psychology and capable as such of being applied to the mental sciences’’ (1923a, p. 253). Moreover, psychoanalysis, which is the science of the genesis of psychic formations, is the basis for all psychology, ‘‘since nothing that men make or do is understandable without the co-operation of psychology, the applications of psychoanalysis to numerous fields of knowledge, in particular to those of the mental sciences, came about of their own accord’’ (1933a, p. 145). In 1907 Freud found a resemblance between compulsive activities and religious practices (1907b) and compared the phenomenology of rituals with a shared etiology of conflict. In 1913 he postulated the identity of the ‘‘dynamic source’’ that generated ‘‘the psychic behavior of isolated individuals and societies’’ (1913j). In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c) and later in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]), Freud showed how the instinctual dynamic of groups is the same as that of individuals, and excluded any ‘‘herd instinct.’’ This identity enabled psychoanalysis to be applied to (or implied in) the explanation of cultural formations and allowed researchers to exploit the profound analogy between individual psychic formations and cultural formations. The fundamental analogy is that of the ‘‘two wishes which combine to form the Oedipus complex coincide precisely with the two principal prohibitions imposed INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS by totemism (not to kill the tribal ancestor and not to marry any woman belonging to one’s clan)’’ (1923a, p. 253). Here Freud’s research makes a direct reference to anthropology. All the central concepts of psychoanalysis are related to anthropology and to group psychology because of their intrinsic relation to individual psychology, the family being the intermediate term. Aside from the Oedipus complex and ritual, the ego, ego ideal, and superego are derived from this, as are identification and defensive formations, which are associated with education and culture, especially inhibition and sublimation. The study of myth, religion, and society extended Freud’s work, primarily through the writings of Otto Rank, Theodor Reik, and Géza Róheim. Later, American cultural anthropology made use of the psychoanalytic point of view, although in diluted form. As anthropology evolved and became more interdisciplinary, psychoanalysis became one of its key referents. In France, authors such Georges Devereux, Roger Bastide, and Bernard Juillerat are examples of this interrelation. In Tristes Tropiques (1955), Claude LéviStrauss insisted on the decisive role played by the discovery of Freud’s theories in his training as an ethnologist. According to Freud, psychoanalysis discovered universal psychic processes; moreover, it possesses explanatory and not purely descriptive capability. Critics of the relevance of psychoanalysis for anthropology have attacked both aspects of its explanatory powers. In fact the articulation of knowledge through field studies is as complicated as it is in the case of metapsychology and therapeutic methods. However, Freud provided us with a way to move forward in Moses and Monotheism (1939a [1934–38]), his masterful analysis of Jewish and Christian monotheistic cultures. MICHÈLE PORTE See also: Basic Problems of Ethnopsychiatry; Civilization (Kultur); Collective psychology; Devereux, Georges (born György Dobo); Ethnopsychoanalysis; Malinowski, Bronislaw Kaspar; Mead, Margaret; Mythology and psychoanalysis; Phylogenesis; Primitive; Psychoanalysis of Fire, The; Racism, anti-Semitism, and psychoanalysis; Róheim, Géza; Sociology and psychoanalysis, sociopsychoanalysis; Taboo; Totem and Taboo; Transcultural. 93 ANTICATHEXIS Bibliography Bertrand, Michèle, and Doray, Bernard. (1989). Psychanalyse et Sciences sociales. Paris: La Découverte. Freud, Sigmund. (1923a). The libido theory. SE, 18: 255–259. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. ———. (1939a [1934–38]). Moses and monotheism. SE, 23: 7–137. Muensterberger, Werner. (1970). Man and his culture: psychoanalytic anthropology after ‘‘Totem and Taboo.’’ New York: Taplinger. Further Reading Devereux, George. (1952). Psychiatry and anthropology: some research objectives. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 16,167–177. Kardiner, Abraham. (1961). Psychoanalysis and anthropology. Science and Psychoanalysis, 4, 21–27. LaBarre, Weston. (1961). Psychoanalysis in anthropology. Science and Psychoanalysis, 4, 10–20. Muensterberger, Warren.(Ed.). (1969). Man and his culture: psychoanalytic anthropology after ‘‘Totem and Taboo.’’ London: Rapp & Whiting. Roheim, Geza. (1950). Psychoanalysis and anthropology. New York: International Universities Press. Wallace, E. (1983). Freud and anthropology: a history and reappraisal. Psychological Issues. Monograph 55. New York: International Universities Press. ANTICATHEXIS Counter-investment—translated as anticathexis in the Standard Edition—is a particular mode of investment used by the ego for defensive purposes. The term is used to designate the dynamic defensive role of certain cathexes and to take into account the economic dimension of repression. The term first appeared in The Interpretation of Dreams: ‘‘There then follows a defensive struggle—for the Pcs. in turn reinforces its opposition to the repressed thoughts (i.e., produces an ‘anticathexis’)’’ (1900a, p. 605). The counter-cathected elements are the ‘‘repressed thoughts’’ mentioned in the letter to 94 William Fliess of February 19, 1899. Thus Freud’s conception of repression includes the idea that a counterposition, an investment against, must be set up to keep the undesirable idea in the unconscious. The material that is cathected in order to support repression may consist of an idea linked to the repressed idea, which has thus remained relatively easily accessible to the association of ideas, or it may consist of more remote mental or motor elements. The latter case involves ‘‘reaction formations’’ such as those observed in the character neuroses. The mental energy deployed in the anticathexis is libido that has been reclaimed by a withdrawal of cathexis from other psychic formations; the pleasure that the realization of a repressed desire might provide is rendered impossible, but the preservation of equilibrium between forces limits the quantity of free energy and implies a form of pleasure that favors the maintenance of the defensive system. Meanwhile, the restrictions on the libido that are involved in anticathexis have a mental cost since they restrict the subject’s thoughts or activities. Gradually, Freud granted the role of organizing counter-cathexes to the ego: ‘‘[When] certain ideas . . . [are] cut off from consciousness, we must, on the psycho-analytic view, assume that these ideas have come into opposition to other, more powerful ones, for which we use the collective concept of the ‘ego’’’ (1910i, p. 213). He also pointed out the role of ‘‘setting up an ideal’’ as one of the ego’s conditions for repression (1914c). The theory of anticathexis was taken up again in Freud’s metapsychology and in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (1926d [1925]). There he emphasized that the constant pressure of the drives necessitated a continuous counter-pressure. In ‘‘The Unconscious’’ (1915e), he assigned to anticathexis not only the role of maintaining this counter-pressure, but also the task of organizing the permanent point of reference that is the prerequisite of all repression (i.e., ‘‘primal repression’’): ‘‘Anticathexis is the sole mechanism of primal repression. . . . It is very possible that it is precisely the cathexis which is withdrawn from the idea that is used for anticathexis’’ (1915e, p. 181). PAUL DENIS See also: Cathexis; Defense mechanisms; Desexualization; Economic point of view, the; Narcissistic defenses; INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ANTICIPATORY IDEAS Primal repression; Psychic energy; Reaction-formation; Repression. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE: 4–5. ———. (1910i). The psycho-analytic view of psychogenic disturbance of vision. SE: 11: 209–218. ———. (1915e). The unconscious. SE: 14: 159–204. ———. (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE: 20: 75–172. Rouart, Julien. (1967). Les notions d’investissement et de contre-investissement à travers l’évolution des idées freudiennes. Revue française de psychanalyse, 31 (2), 193–213. ANTICIPATORY IDEAS The term Erwartungsvorstellungen is generally translated as ‘‘anticipatory ideas,’’ although this term does not reflect ‘‘Erwartung’’’s connotations of waiting, expectancy, or hope. It refers to the hypotheses that the analyst communicates to the patient to incite him or her to pursue in greater depth the interpretation of unconscious content; in this sense, the term is sometimes accompanied by the qualifying adjective conscious. In 1901, in his analysis of the dream-work, Freud invoked this notion when he proposed that secondary revision operates upon the contents of a dream just as it does upon any other content, by apprehending it via anticipatory ideas. But in 1909, this idea assumed its proper place in interpretive analytic work and refuted the accusation of suggestion that was beginning to be made about the method. In ‘‘Analysis of a Phobia in a FiveYear-Old Boy,’’ Freud wrote: ‘‘In a psycho-analysis the physician always gives his patient (sometimes to a greater and sometimes to a lesser extent) the conscious anticipatory ideas by the help of which he is put in a position to recognize and to grasp the unconscious material. For there are some patients who need more of such assistance and some who need less; but there are none who get through without some of it’’ (1909b, p. 104). The following year, in ‘‘The Future Prospects of Psycho-Analytic Therapy,’’ Freud further explained: ‘‘The mechanism of our assistance is easy to understand: we give the patient the conscious anticipatory idea [the idea of what he may expect to find] and he INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS then finds the repressed unconscious idea in himself on the basis of its similarity to the anticipatory one. This is the intellectual help which makes it easier for him to overcome the resistances between conscious and unconscious’’ (1910d, pp. 141–142). In ‘‘The Dynamics of Transference,’’ Freud emphasized the hope that characterizes anticipation or waiting: ‘‘If someone’s need for love is not entirely satisfied by reality, he is bound to approach every new person whom he meets with libidinal anticipatory ideas. . . . th[e] transference has precisely been set up not only by the conscious anticipatory ideas but also by those that have been held back or are unconscious’’ (1912b, p. 100). Freud’s last mention of this notion is found in two passages of his Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1916–1917a [1915–1917]). First, in the lecture ‘‘Transference,’’ where he emphasized the participation of intelligence in the process of becoming aware, Freud wrote: ‘‘There is no doubt that it is easier for the patient’s intelligence to recognize the resistance and to find the translation corresponding to what is repressed if we have previously given him the appropriate anticipatory ideas. If I say to you: ‘Look up at the sky! There’s a balloon there!’ you will discover it much more easily than if I simply tell you to look up. . . . In the same way, a student who is looking through a microscope for the first time is instructed by his teacher as to what he will see; otherwise he does not see it at all, though it is there and visible’’ (p. 437). Thus, the mechanism of suggestion is clearly involved in guiding patients. However, in the next lecture, ‘‘Analytic Therapy,’’ Freud emphasized the difference between this technique and suggestion: ‘‘After all, his conflicts will only be successfully solved and his resistances overcome if the anticipatory ideas he is given tally with what is real in him. Whatever in the doctor’s conjectures is inaccurate drops out in the course of the analysis; it has to be withdrawn and replaced by something more correct’’ (p. 452). The necessity for anticipatory ideas to be appropriate to the patient’s reality was underscored by Ferenczi in his paper ‘‘On Forced Phantasies’’ (1924): ‘‘When we interpret the patient’s free associations, and that we do countless times in every analytical hour, we continually deflect his associations and rouse in him expected ideas, we smooth the way so that the connections between his thoughts so far as their content is concerned are, therefore, to a high degree active. . . . The difference between this and the ordinary suggestion 95 A N T I L I B I D I N A L E G O /I N T E R N A L S A B O T E U R simply consists in this, that we do not deem the interpretations we offer to be irrefutable utterances, but regard their validity to be dependednt on whether thay can be verified by material brought forward from memory or by means of repetition of earlier situations’’ (pp. 71-72). Although the notion of anticipatory ideas did not reappear in Freud’s later writings, the idea of constructions was closely dependent upon it. In ‘‘Constructions in Analysis,’’ he wrote: ‘‘The analyst finishes a piece of construction and communicates it to the subject of the analysis so that it may work upon him; he then constructs a further piece out of the fresh material pouring in upon him [and] deals with is [sic] in the same way’’ (1937d, p. 260), adding, ‘‘We do not pretend that an individual construction is anything more than a conjecture which awaits examination, confirmation or rejection’’ (p. 265). Thus, there were many safeguards against the excesses of analysts who were overly sure of the absolute accuracy of their interpretations. The dynamic relationship between analyst and patient that Freud highlighted here is that of a jointly undertaken search that, to be sure, presupposes a ‘‘historical truth’’ to be discovered, but with the reminder that this investigation is based on approximations whose limits are sometimes impossible to go beyond and must thus be accepted. It is this idea that Serge Viderman carried to its logical conclusion in his work on the ‘‘construction of the analytic space’’ (1970). ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: ‘‘Constructions in Analysis’’; Idea/representation; Interpretation. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sándor (1960). On forced phantasies: Activity in the association-technique." In his Further contributions to the theory and technique of psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1924) Freud, Sigmund. (1901a). On dreams. SE, 5: 629–685. ———. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10: 1–149. ———. (1910d). The future prospects of psycho-analytic therapy. SE, 11: 139–151. ———. (1912b). The dynamics of transference. SE, 12: 97–108. 96 ———. (1916–1917a [1915–1917]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15–16: 1–463. ———. (1937d). Constructions in analysis. SE, 23: 255–269. Viderman, Serge. (1970). La Construction de l’espace analytique. Paris: Denoël. ANTILIBIDINAL EGO/INTERNAL SABOTEUR Fairbairn’s thinking on psychic structure began in 1929, with a critical study of Freud’s ideas about the superego (Fairbairn, 1929/1994b), and developed into his mature object-relations theory (1954), modifying the Freudian model. In Fairbairn’s revision (1952/1994a) of Freud’s concepts of endopsychic structure (1923), the term ‘‘antilibidinal ego’’ refers to the split-off and repressed ego-structure related to the rejecting object. In his earlier work it developed from his ideas about the superego and was termed the ‘‘internal saboteur.’’ According to Fairbairn, the early unitary ego, rather than seeking pleasure, seeks relationships (intimacy) with the external object. Actual environmental failure (which in ideal circumstances maintains integration of the ego) leads to compensatory internalization of the object. The object is then defensively split into three objects. The unrepressed (central) ego, partly conscious and attached to the ideal object, represses the other two objects, the exciting (libidinal) object and rejecting (antilibidinal) object, together with the aspects of the ego related to them (the libidinal ego and antilibidinal ego, known as subsidiary egos). These repressed objects are termed ‘‘bad objects’’ and are unavailable for real object relations. Fairbairn named the resulting situation the ‘‘basic schizoid position,’’ a term later taken up by Melanie Klein (1946/1952). The antilibidinal ego, attached to the rejecting object and unrelentingly hostile to the libidinal ego, reinforces the central ego in its repression of the libidinal ego. The degree of psychopathology depends on these splits, the amount and strength of central ego remaining, and the many possible patterns of internal relationships. Fairbairn saw disturbance as being due to the return of repressed bad-object experience to consciousness. Fairbairn’s dynamic structure, which differs from that of Freud, is wholly objectrelated. The concept of the schizoid position is fundamental to his thinking about the many possible variants of psychopathology. The elaboration of the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A N T I -O E D I P U S : C A P I T A L I S M antilibidinal ego as differing from the superego, together with the theory of a psychic structure made up of many conflicted ego-object relationships, allows a flexibile technical approach. This thinking has been influential in Britain, most notably on the Independent Group, and on selfpsychologists and intersubjective theorists in the United States. AND SCHIZOPHRENIA from the libido. This, it seemed to them, was necessary in order to account for the ubiquity of narcissism in mental life. But this was not the opinion of Francis Pasche, who chose to reintroduce a duality, or even a dialectic, into the concept of narcissism itself (1965). Fairbairn, Ronald. (1954). An object-relations theory of the personality. New York: Basic Books. Both narcissism and antinarcissism were characterized for Pasche by an object and a direction. The object was the same for both: the ego. The direction, however, was not the same: centripetal for narcissism, centrifugal for antinarcissism. Antinarcissism could be thought of as a centrifugal investment, in which the subject tends to be divested of the self, to give up their own substance and reserves of love, and to do this independently of any economic factors. In this sense, antinarcissism is actually a manifestation of Thanatos, that is, of unbinding separation and dispersion, but not of aggressiveness. ———. (1994a). Endopsychic structure considered in terms of object relationships. In his Psychoanalytic studies of the personality. London: Tavistock Publications with Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1952) There is a striking convergence between Francis Pasche’s conception of antinarcissism and what Sándor Ferenczi called, in his final writings, the ‘‘altruistic drive’’ (1949, fragment dated 24 August 1930). ———. (1994b). What is the superego? In David E. Scharff and Ellinor Fairbairn Birtles (Eds.), From instinct to self: selected papers of W. R. D. Fairbairn, Vol. 2, Applications and early contributions. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson. (Original work published 1929) André Green’s work on narcissism is also germane here. Even if Green’s negative narcissism does not correspond precisely to Pasche’s antinarcissism, the two notions are akin. JENNIFER JOHNS See also: Fairbairn, William Ronald Dodds; Quasiindependence/transitional stage. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1923). The ego and the id. SE: 19: 19–27. Grotstein, James, and Rinsley, Donald (Eds.). (1994). Fairbairn and the origins of object relations. London: Free Association Books. Klein, Melanie. (1952). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. In Joan Riviere (Ed.), Developments in psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis. (Original work published 1946) See also: Narcissistic neurosis; Pasche, Francis Léopold Philippe; Psychoanalytic family therapy; Bibliography Ferenczi, Sándor. (1949). Notes and fragments (1930–32). International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 30, 231–242. Pasche, Francis. (1965). L’anti-narcissisme. Revue française de psychanalyse. XXIX, 5–6: 503–518; reprinted in À partir de Freud, Paris: Payot, 1969. ANTINARCISSISM The concept of antinarcissism was proposed by Francis Pasche in 1964. The context was a theoretical debate seeking initially to define narcissism and then to describe its role in psychic development. The difficulties, complexities, and, for some, the aporias of narcissism led to two antithetical choices. Some abandoned the notion of primary narcissism, giving a fundamental role to the primary objectrelation (this was true of the English school, Michael Balint, and John Bowlby). Others, like Paul Federn and Béla Grunberger, were led to separate narcissism INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY MICHÈLE BERTRAND OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ANTI-OEDIPUS: CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, was originally intended to be the first volume of a two-volume work. The second volume, which was supposed to be entitled Schizoanalysis, never appeared under that title but was instead ‘‘replaced’’ by A Thousand Plateaus. 97 ANTI-OEDIPUS: CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA At the time of its publication in 1972, Anti-Oedipus had an explosive impact. In a state of high excitement, and still shaken by the events of May 1968, the French intelligentsia greeted this work by a renowned philosopher and an antiestablishment psychoanalyst as a revolutionary brick through the window of psychoanalysis. Deleuze said of his collaboration with Guattari, ‘‘We don’t work together, we work between the two of us’’. The Oedipus complex, which psychoanalysts describe as a fundamental and unavoidable step in the psychic structuring of the healthy child, was denounced by the authors as an ‘‘impasse.’’ The unconscious was a production, a fabrication, a flow. Accordingly, there was no such thing as a desiring subject, but rather flows of desire that are independent of and that traverse the subject. These points of traversal of desire, this flow, exists in opposition to lack, to the Law. ‘‘Lack (manque) is created, planned, and organized through social production.’’ Being essentially revolutionary, desire is the enemy of capitalist society, which psychoanalysis defends and protects. The family is the first source of the work of repression operating in the flow of desire: ‘‘The family is thus introduced into the production of desire, and from earliest childhood it will effect a displacement of desire, an unheard-of repression.’’ All of capitalism’s efforts—and those of psychoanalysis—will go toward trying to maintain these flows of desire and ‘‘reterritorializing’’ them by imposing limits; on the interior, Oedipus, on the outside, as ‘‘the absolute limit of every society’’ (p. 266), schizophrenia: ‘‘The Oedipal triangle is the personal and private territoriality that corresponds to all of capitalism’s efforts at social reterritorialization’’ (p. 266). The ‘‘schizo-analysis’’ invented by the authors is defined as ‘‘a whole scouring of the unconscious, a complete curettage’’ (p. 311). The thesis of schizoanalysis proposes that desire is a machine, in fact, interconnected machines—‘‘desiring-machines.’’ This assemblage of machines represents the real and constitutes the production of desire. Psychoanalysis is described as a belief in a structural ensemble of the symbolic and the imaginary that Deleuze and Guattari characterize as a mythical belief. They radically challenge the Oedipus complex and accuse psychoanalysis of ‘‘beating down all the connections, the entire arrangement’’ because it ‘‘hates desire, hates politics.’’ The two authors reject the idea of any psychic reality: ‘‘There is only desire and the social, and nothing else.’’ 98 Schizo-analysis, with its schizophrenic process, a ‘‘political and social psychoanalysis’’ proposes to ‘‘undo the expressive oedipal unconscious, which is always artificial, repressive and repressed, and mediated by the family, to gain access to the immediate productive unconscious.’’ The authors are careful to distinguish between schizophrenia as a structure and the schizophrenic as an entity. The latter is sick from the oedipalization that society attempts to impose upon him, but he represents the emblematic figure of the revolutionary, who is in a position to say, ‘‘Oedipus? Never heard of it’’ (p. 366). The schizophrenic process is revolutionary; its goal is to ‘‘show the existence of an unconscious libidinal investment of socio-historical production.’’ Here, schizo-analytic production is the opposite of psychoanalytic expression. Proponents of antipsychiatry, in particular Ronald D. Laing, proved to be valuable allies to Deleuze and Guattari. In effect, madness is described not so much as a collapse but rather as a breakthrough. The goal of schizo-analysis is to enable the flows, to ‘‘tirelessly undo/defeat the egos and their assumptions.’’ and it ‘‘makes no distinction in nature between political economy and libidinal economy.’’ In taking as their model the schizophrenic process and contrasting it with the oedipalized neurotic process, the authors constructed a seductive theory that was in keeping with its era. Marxist and structuralist elements are discernible. What are now referred to as ‘‘the events of May ’68’’ had not yet been entered into the history textbooks and the collective memory. The metaphor of schizophrenia, stretched to the limit by Deleuze and Guattari, was resonant in the context of a breakdown in the political order and the family. The disillusionments that followed are well known. It is somewhat surprising to note that in the very extensive index of proper names in Anti-Oedipus, Sophocles is not mentioned once. This is of course indicative of the authors’ genuine intent to separate Oedipus as a psychic structure from Oedipus as a dramatic myth. It is the former, structural aspect of Oedipus that is fundamental to all civilizations. It is this Oedipus that is targeted by the authors, and not the dramatic figure of antiquity. Indeed, Anti-Oedipus today appears as an antidramatic text, to be read as a comedy deriding capitalism and glorifying a schizophrenia invented and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ANXIETY amplified through the joint writing of a philosopher and a psychoanalyst engaged in critical reflection designed to challenge the bourgeois ideology of their era. SYLVIE GOSME-SÉGURET See also: France; Oedipus complex; Philosophy and psychoanalysis; Schizophrenia. Source Citation Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Félix. (1977). Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and schizophrenia. (Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane, Trans.). New York: Viking. (Original work published 1972) Bibliography Deleuze, Gilles, and Parnet, Claire. (1977). Dialogues. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. London: Athlone Press, 1987. Lecourt, Dominique. (2001). The mediocracy: French philosophy since the mid-1970s. (Gregory Elliott, Trans.). London-New York: Verso. (Original work published 1999) Le Goff, Jean-Pierre. (1998). Mai 68, l’héritage impossible. Paris: Le Découverte. ANTISEMITISM. See Racism, anti-Semitism, and psychoanalysis ANXIETY Anxiety is an unpleasurable affect in which the individual experiences a feeling of danger whose cause is unconscious. Freud had already begun considering the problem of anxiety in his correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess at the very start of his psychoanalytic work (1950a [1887–1902]). His subsequent efforts were more and more systematic as he developed two successive theories of anxiety. In both of Freud’s theories of anxiety a fundamental role is played by an absence of discharge, and hence of instinctual satisfaction. In his first account, the sexual instinct, undischarged, was described as being transformed explicitly into anxiety by a seemingly biological mechanism (1895b [1894]). Somatic sexual INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS excitation with the help of sexual ideas thus could not develop into psychic libido. However, sexual representations could be repressed, and their attendant excitation either diverted toward somatic outlets, so giving rise to hysterical conversion symptoms or, alternatively, redirected into the substitute representations typical of anxiety hysteria or phobic neurosis. In Freud’s second theory of anxiety, set forth in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (1926d [1925]), unsatisfied instincts were not explicitly evoked. In this account, anxiety as a signal is developed by the ego as a defensive measure against automatic anxiety. The infant’s biological and mental immaturity does not enable it to confront the increase in tension arising from the enormous amounts of instinctual excitation that it cannot discharge and satisfy. This generates a state of distress that is traumatic for the newborn, triggering automatic anxiety. The infant gradually comes to understand that the maternal object can put an end to this state of affairs. It is then that the loss of the mother is experienced as a danger, and this experience constitutes anxiety as a signal. When the newborn begins to perceive its mother, it is unable to distinguish temporary absence from enduring loss; thus from the moment the mother is lost sight of, the baby behaves as if it is never going to see her again. Repeated experiences of satisfaction have created this object, the mother, which, as need arises, is intensely cathected in a way that might be described as nostalgic. From this moment on, in Freud’s view, object-loss provokes psychic pain, while anxiety is the reaction to the danger associated with that loss. Sadness arises whenever reality-testing forces an acknowledgment that the object has been lost. In its various forms, object-loss becomes the prototype of later anxieties, which Freud lists as: anxiety at the loss of the love of the object, castration anxiety, and anxiety at the loss of the love of the superego. The novelty of this theorization derives, on the one hand, from the genetic notion according to which anxiety is tied to the fear of re-experiencing very early human states of distress, and on the other hand, from the fact that these states are associated during early infancy with various fantasies about the maternal object, and later with fantasies concerning other objects, including the father (castration anxiety or anxiety at the loss of the love of the superego). The close connection thus posited between anxiety 99 ANXIETY and ideation is radically at odds with Freud’s first theory of anxiety. attempt by the ego to overwhelm the introjected and attacked object with guilt. Anxiety always occupied a central place in the work of Melanie Klein, first of all with respect to technique, and secondly in terms of theory. She stated repeatedly that her chief technical principle was that interpretation must focus on the point of maximum anxiety. Equilibrium between the life instincts and the death instincts was fundamental to Klein’s understanding of the different forms of anxiety and the fantasies that expressed them. In her earliest writings, she associated anxiety and its related inhibitions with sexual conflicts of childhood bound up with the Oedipus complex. At the same time, however, she was struck by the scope of aggressive fantasies in young children, especially during what she called the phase of maximal sadism. She gradually came to view the child’s aggressiveness towards the mother’s body and its fantasy contents (penis, baby, feces, etc.) as responsible for an anxiety based on the fear of the reciprocal aggression it could provoke. The danger intrinsic to anxiety was thus seen as the result of the subject’s excessive aggressiveness. After introducing the ‘‘paranoid-schizoid position’’ (1946), which she contrasted with the depressive position as a type of psychic functioning, Melanie Klein was able to develop a systematic theory of anxiety and guilt (1948). The theory relied primarily on Freud’s concept of the death instinct, which Klein had adopted. In this view, anxiety was provoked by the danger with which the death instinct threatened the organism. Klein spoke of anxiety about ‘‘annihilation’’ and ‘‘fragmentation’’ with reference to very primitive terrors triggered by the inner working of the death instinct and with reference to the paranoid anxiety generated by persecutory objects or by the primitive superego. In this sense fragmentation anxiety may be considered a very archaic precursor of castration anxiety. Although to begin with Klein’s theory leaned heavily on Freud’s Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, from 1935 on, and especially after 1940, with the gradual working out of the concept of the ‘‘depressive position,’’ she assigned object-loss a central role. This implied a change in the conceptualization of anxiety, which acquired a depressive character: anxiety was now seen as expressing ‘‘pain,’’ which for Klein included both suffering and sadness in Freud’s sense. Anxiety states were engendered by lived experiences of object-loss that were more or less definitive and irreversible. In the face of maternal frustration, Klein contended, the sense of an internal threat created by the death instinct reinforces the projection of destructive impulses by the primitive ego of the paranoid-schizoid position. As a consequence the breast as ‘‘bad’’ part-object becomes the source of ‘‘paranoid’’ or persecutory anxiety. Another portion of the death instinct is used by the ego in the form of aggression to attack the persecutory object. Introjection of both the persecutory breast and the persecutory penis is the foundation of the primitive superego, which is at first difficult to distinguish from internal persecutory objects since it provokes very intense persecutory anxiety (fear of fragmentation). This very early superego, in spite of its aggressiveness, strives to protect the libidinal bonds that the ego is meanwhile forming with good or idealized objects, which are experienced as the source of life. Since experiences of loss were closely associated with the damage wreaked in fantasy by aggressive impulses, painful feelings were accompanied by feelings of conscious or unconscious guilt. This guilt generally tended to remain unconscious because of the great importance it assumed for the subject, who attributed an all-powerful destructiveness to his own aggression. The ego would then turn to radical (psychotic, manic, or depressive) defenses, which also made it difficult for painful feelings to gain access to consciousness. On the other hand, the more real the guilt, the more vigorously it would be supported by the ego, clearing a path to consciousness by way of feelings of sadness. A basic exception to this rule were the strong guilt feelings manifested by melancholics, whose self-reproach masked an As progress is made, with the help of libidinal instincts, toward the successful integration of aggression, fantasies arise, characteristic of the early stages of the Oedipus complex, involving part-objects in the process of being made whole: the mother’s stomach and its fantasized contents (penis, baby, feces, etc.). If such objects provoke psychotic persecutory anxieties, these will manifest themselves clinically as the outcome of a defensive transformation of intolerable depressive anxieties produced under pressure from an overly aggressive primitive superego. In fact, as Klein indicated in her last writings, the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions act simultaneously, whether in the service of defense or of integration. In clinical work, this is reflected in the coexistence of paranoid 10 0 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ANXIETY and depressive anxieties; one or the other will prevail, depending on which position is predominant in the patient. During the various steps in the integration of the depressive position, a whole range of depressive anxieties is encountered, as distinguished by the particular fantasies that attend the loss of the libidinally cathected object in each type of case (Palacio Espasa, 1993). Thus whenever fantasies of catastrophic destruction come to the fore and the damage is experienced by the subject as irreparable because of the great force of his aggression, as he perceives it, the intensity of the ensuing guilt makes the pain and sadness hard to bear. The ego can only resort to psychotic defenses that transform these disastrous depressive anxieties into persecutory anxieties. responsible for the loss of the object’s love may be projected onto the other parent, who then becomes a rival. An oedipal situation is thus created, along with the various conflicts, directly or indirectly expressed, that characterize the Oedipus complex. In short, as the intensity of depressive anxieties decreases, the Oedipus complex comes to the fore thanks to the transformation of depressive conflict into a variety of neurotic conflicts that generate castration anxiety. In neurosis, however, along with castration anxiety intense depressive anxieties (especially guilt) may continue to exist with respect to the oedipal parents—more complete objects, often neglected in the literature on neurosis. Such anxieties may indeed occasion significant regression back toward depressive conflict. Where fantasies of destruction are less significant, and the subject’s aggressiveness is experienced as less destructive, fantasies of the death of libidinally cathected objects may be prevalent. The ego can then use its store of libido, which it experiences as limited, as a massive barrier to any manifestation of aggression. This arouses intense feelings of guilt, and hence of responsibility for fears of death or of object-loss. The ego tends to defend itself against such painful depressive affects either in manic fashion, through identification with idealized and intact objects, or else by melancholic means, such as identification with the dead or destroyed aspects of objects. In psychoanalytic theory castration anxiety is closely bound up with the Oedipus complex. For Freud castration is one of the primal fantasies. In his view of childhood sexuality, the Oedipus complex makes its appearance during the stage of phallic primacy, which means that castration anxiety is rather similar in the two sexes. Because of the overvaluation of the phallus, the child does not recognize the female sex as such and considers it to be the result of castration. In Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety Freud sees castration as one loss, on the level of genital sexuality, in a series of object-losses: the loss of the mother’s breast, the loss of the contents of the intestines, and so on. When fantasies of loss of the object’s love predominate, they center on rejection or abandonment by the object. Death fantasies are less intense and are experienced as more easily reversible because of the greater libidinal capacity available to the ego of subjects in this category. Under these circumstances the ego has a whole panoply of neurotic defenses at its disposal. These include the retroactive denial of the ill consequences of the subject’s aggression and reactionformations against aggression of a typically obsessiveneurotic kind. By means of phobic displacement and symbolization, a predominance of libidinal impulses facilitates the transformation of the conflict provoked by the loss of the object’s love into a triangular conflict in which fantasies of exclusion become more prominent. Given well-integrated instinctual relationships with two highly cathected parental imagos, the experienced object-loss may be reduced to that of the loss of the incestuous object’s exclusive love. On the other hand, the dangerous aggressiveness deemed For Melanie Klein castration anxiety develops as a fear of reprisal for the child’s oedipal rivalry with the parent of the same sex. In boys this becomes an anxiety about the loss of the penis at the hands of a vengeful father; in girls it becomes an anxiety about attacks against her own belly by the persecuting maternal object. From this theoretical standpoint, castration anxiety appears as a form of punishment for the manic and narcissistic fantasies constructed by the young child as protection against its feelings of exclusion from the sexual and genital relations of the parents, to which it does not have access because of its biological immaturity. The infant then takes possession in fantasy of the idealized sexual attributes of the parent of the same sex, who thus becomes a rival, and imagines it is the exclusive recipient of the love of the parent of the opposite sex. Such a fantasy position can only generate castration anxiety, if for no other reason than that it derives from the infant’s apprehension of its own biological immaturity as a mutilation. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 101 ANXIETY AS SIGNAL Separation anxiety appears when the subject experiences separation as a more or less irreversible objectloss. In the descriptions given by Margaret Mahler, the very young infant manifests separation anxieties after the fifth or sixth month, and they become especially significant between 15 and 18 months of age, during the rapprochement subphase of the separation-individuation (Mahler et al.). During this time the baby experiences real despair, feelings close to the nascent melancholy that Klein describes as occurring at the height of the depressive position. The presence of the external mother is essential, for her internal image is experienced as very much under threat from the child’s aggressive fantasies, perceived by the child as massive and highly destructive. Only after the age of two or three, during the phase of object constancy, does the child become able little by little to overcome separation anxiety; by then it can retain an inner mental representation of the mother that is cathected for the most part by libidinal impulses. Anxiety in the presence of actual danger, or ‘‘realistic anxiety,’’ is a somewhat paradoxical concept employed by Freud in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, where (as we have seen) he views anxiety as arising from a felt danger from within occasioned by objectloss. Freud himself resolves the ambiguity when he asserts, in discussing apparently external dangers such as the loss of the object’s love, or castration anxiety, that ‘‘the loved person would not care to love us nor should we be threatened with castration if we did not entertain certain feelings and intentions within us. Thus such instinctual impulses are determinants of external dangers and so become dangerous in themselves’’ (p. 145). In other words, all realistic anxiety is also anxiety tout court, and not simply fear of an external danger, for it always arouses an internal threat. This idea is crucial, of course, to the Kleinian concept of the depressive position, where every outside loss is accompanied by an experience of the loss of internal objects. Primitive experiences of loss are reactivated by the real loss, so that the working-through of such early internal losses is a prerequisite if objects lost in the outside world are to be successfully mourned. FRANCISCO PALACIO ESPASA See also: Abandonment; Annihilation anxiety; Anxiety dream; Aphanisis; Claustrophobia; Counterphobic; Defense; Ego; Fear; Hypochondria; Hysteria; Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety; ‘‘Neurasthenia and Anxiety 10 2 Neurosis’’; Nervous Anxiety States and their Treatment; Nightmare; Paranoid-schizoid position; Phobias in children; Primitive agony; Quota of affect; Seminar, Lacan’s; Signal anxiety; Specific action; Stranger, fear of; Substitutive formation; Trauma of Birth, The. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1895b [1894]). On the grounds for detaching a particular syndrome from neurasthenia under the description ‘‘anxiety neurosis.’’ SE, 3: 87–115. ———. (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 87–172. ———. (1950a [1887–1902]). Extract from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173–280. Klein, Melanie. (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 27, 99–110. ———. (1948). On the theory of anxiety and guilt. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 29, 113–123. Mahler, Margaret S., Pine, Fred, and Bergman, Anni. (1975). The psychological birth of the human infant. New York: Basic Books. Palacio Espasa, Francisco. (1993). La pratique psychothérapique avec l’enfant. Paris: Bayard. Further Reading Hurvich, Marvin. (1997). ‘‘The ego in anxiety’’ & ‘‘Addendum to Freud’s theory of anxiety’’. Psychoanalytic Review, 84, 483–504. ———. (2000). Fear of being overwhelmed and psychoanalytic theories of anxiety. Psychoanalytic Review, 87, 615– 650. Roose, Stephen P. , and Glick, Robert. A. (Eds). (1995). Anxiety as symptom and signal. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. ANXIETY AS SIGNAL. See Signal Anxiety ANXIETY DREAM A dream may be so charged with anxiety that the dreamer can escape only through waking. Sometimes the dreamer is then amazed by the disparity between the intensity of emotion and the apparent banality of the dream itself. This is the classic ‘‘anxiety dream.’’ Freud offered a detailed analysis of such a dream in his case history of the ‘‘Wolf Man’’ (1918b [1914]). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A N Z I E U , D I D I E R (1923 –1 999) Freud often returned to the problem of anxiety dreams, because, as he wrote in The Interpretation of Dreams, ‘‘It does in fact look as though [they] make it impossible to assert as a general proposition . . . that dreams are wish fulfillment; indeed they seem to stamp any such proposition as an absurdity’’ (1900a, p. 135). Freud’s answer to the puzzle about anxiety dreams holds fast to the basic principle of dreamformation: that even when the content of the dream is clearly distressing, its latent content involves fulfillment of a wish. ———. (1907a [1906]). Delusions and dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva.’’ SE, 9: 1–95. From this point of view, Freud analyzed one of Dora’s dreams (1905e [1901]), a dream of Norbert Hanold in Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva’’ (1907a [1906]), a dream of ‘‘Little Hans’’ (1909b), and most noteworthy, the wolf dream of Sergeı̈ Pankejeff, the ‘‘Wolf Man’’ (1918b [1914]). Freud returned at length to this thesis in the chapter on wish fulfillment in Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1916– 1917a [1915–1917]). ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. With respect to recurrent anxiety dreams in cases of traumatic neuroses, Freud altered his views somewhat in ‘‘Revision of Dream Theory,’’ chapter 29 of New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933a [1932]), where he asserted, ‘‘A dream is an attempt at the fulfillment of a wish. . . . In certain circumstances a dream is only able to put its intention into effect very incompletely, or must abandon it entirely. . . . While the sleeper is obliged to dream, because the relaxation of repression at night allows the upward pressure of the traumatic fixation to become active, there is a failure in the functioning of his dream work, which would like to transform the memory-traces of the traumatic event into the fulfillment of a wish’’ (p. 29). Although Freud did not highlight the change in this text, the fundamental revision to his theory of dreams perhaps came earlier, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g [1914]). ROGER PERRON See also: Anxiety; Dream. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1–338; 5: 339–625. ———. (1905e [1901]). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. SE, 7: 1–122. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ———. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10: 1–149. ———. (1916–1917a [1915–1917]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15–16. ———. (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1–122. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1– 64. Further Reading Eissler, Kurt R. (1966). A note on trauma, dream, anxiety, and schizophrenia. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 21, 17–50. ANXIETY HYSTERIA. See Hysteria ANXIETY NEUROSIS. See ‘‘Neurasthenia and ‘Anxiety Neurosis’’’ ANXIETY SIGNAL. See Signal anxiety ANZIEU, DIDIER (1923–1999) French psychoanalyst and professor of psychology Didier Anzieu was born July 8, 1923, in Melun and died on November 25, 1999, in Paris. His parents, who worked for the post office, met in Melun, where Didier Anzieu spent his childhood and part of his adolescence. A younger sister died at birth. His parents’ intense investment in Didier, especially on the part of his mother, Marguerite, who became seriously depressed after the stillbirth of her daughter (she herself was a ‘‘survivor,’’ her sister having died when she was a child), led to alternations between ‘‘superimposed layers of care’’ and feelings of 103 A N Z I E U , D I D I E R (1923 –1 999) abandonment that would mark Anzieu’s life and work. His mother’s illness and subsequent treatment in a psychiatric hospital further distanced him from her; he was raised by his maternal aunt, who later moved in with her brother-in-law. His close, secure, and warm relationship to his father sustained him throughout his childhood and entrance into adult life. He began his secondary school studies in Melun, followed by Paris, where he met Zacharie Tourneur, with whom he edited Pascal’s Pensées. After the École Normale Supérieure and his studies in philosophy, he turned to psychology, which he taught, along with Daniel Lagache, at the Sorbonne, before continuing his academic career in Strasbourg (1955–1964) and Paris (1964–1983). In 1957 he completed his oral defense for the doctoral degree, the subject being Freud’s self-analysis and its role in the invention of psychoanalysis. Before he became a psychoanalyst Didier Anzieu worked as a clinical psychologist. His involvement in psychology led him through several fields of study: psychodrama, dermatology, projective methods, and Rorschach methods, in which he specialized. He made use of the dynamics of Lewinian groups in creating, in 1962, an association—CEFFRAP, the Centre d’études françaises pour la formation et la recherche active en psychologie—through which he set up the first French experiments in group psychoanalysis and group psychodrama. Anzieu’s various activities supported a brilliant academic career alongside his work as an editor and creative writer (short stories, essays, drama). As a psychoanalyst, Anzieu’s life intersected his personal history, his psychoanalytic history, and the history of the French psychoanalytic movement. His mother, Marguerite Anzieu, had been treated by Jacques Lacan, who had used her treatment as the basis for his medical dissertation De la psychose paranoı̈aque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité (On Paranoiac Psychosis in Its Relations with the Personality), published in 1932, in which she is known simply as ‘‘Aimée.’’ Didier Anzieu began psychoanalysis with Lacan in 1949. After four years of fruitful work, their relationship became problematic when Lacan asked him to remain silent about how therapy was being conducted. Anzieu continued his training (1953) with Daniel Lagache, Juliette Boutonier, and Georges Favez. He participated in the foundation of the French Psychoanalytic Association when it was formed in 1964 following the break with Lacan, and assumed a num10 4 ber of responsibilities within the association (he was its vice-president). Anzieu’s psychoanalytic writing can’t be separated from his other writing, his activity as a psychoanalyst, or his interests. It is both varied and indivisible, always informed by the uncertainties of psychology, literature, and the psychoanalysis of intersubjective bonds. In his psychoanalytic practice, Anzieu always claimed to be an orthodox analyst, but he was also careful to modulate the mechanism and technique of interpretation according to the treatment needs of the individual patient. As he refined his theoretical understanding through clinical activity, he highlighted the transformations needed in the object of interpretation (the ‘‘archaic’’) and in the handling of a reliable and flexible framework that harmonized with the specific transferences generated by the pathologies of the primal. He gave increasing attention to these areas of practice, which were supported by his contacts with the Anglo-American school (Melanie Klein, Wilfred R. Bion, Donald W. Winnicott, Esther Bick). He was also interested in the unconscious formations and processes involved in group bonds and the work of creation. A statement written in 1975 expresses his fundamental position: ‘‘The question is not to repeat what Freud found when faced with the crises of the Victorian era, but to find a psychoanalytic response to mankind’s malaise in the civilization in which we live. Work such as that of psychoanalysis needs to be done wherever the unconscious arises, standing, seated or lying down; individually, in a group or in a family, wherever a subject can allow his anxieties and fantasies to speak out to someone who is supposed to listen to them and is likely to help him understand them.’’ Anzieu’s worldwide recognition is largely due to his scrupulous approach to clinical and theoretical work and his intellectual freedom in searching for innovative tools. He renewed the understanding of selfanalysis and dream interpretation, primordial models for what he would later theorize as the work of creation and processes of thought. He introduced new concepts into psychoanalytic theory. With the important concept of the ‘‘skin ego’’ (1985/1989), he referred to ‘‘a figuration the child’s ego makes use of during the precocious phases of its development to represent itself as an ego containing psychic contents based on its experience of the surface of his body.’’ This concept inaugurated several research projects on psychic interfaces and envelopes, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS APHANISIS on the dual prohibition of touching, on formal signifiers and their normal and pathological transformations. These investigations gave rise to a theory of thought processes and a conception of the work in which the dual polarity of creation and destruction is affirmed. Didier Anzieu made use not only of clinical psychoanalysis but literature (Pascal, Julien Gracq, Alain Robbe-Grillet, Samuel Beckett) and the visual arts as well (Francis Bacon) to bring to light the traces of the body in writing, drama, and painting. Finally, through his work on individual and group psychoanalytic psychodrama, he enriched the instruments derived from psychoanalysis by proposing a new outlook on the operation of the unconscious in groups. RENÉ KAËS Work discussed: Freud’s Self-Analysis. Notions developed: Heroic identification; Skin ego. See also: Aimée, case of; Analytic psychodrama; Body image; France; Group analysis; Lacan, Jacques-Marie Émile; Literature and psychoanalysis; Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse; Paradox; Protective shield; Psychic envelope; Psychoanalytic family therapy; Psychological tests; Self-analysis; Skin; Thought. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1959). L’autoanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ———. (1989). The skin ego (Chris Turner, Trans.). New Haven-London: Yale University Press. (Original work published 1985) ———. (1987). Some alterations of the ego which make analyses interminable. International Journal of PsychoAnalysis, 68 (1), 9–20. ———. (1989). Beckett and Bion (Juliet Mitchell, Trans.). International Review of Psycho-Analysis, 16 (2), 163–170. ———. (1979). The sound image of the self. International Review of Psycho-Analysis, 6 (1), 23–36. Kaës, René. (1994). Les voies de la psyché, hommage à Didier Anzieu. Paris: Dunod. APHANISIS The term ‘‘aphanisis’’ merits an entry in Laplanche and Pontalis’s The Language of Psychoanalysis, where INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS its principal definition is as follows: ‘‘Term introduced by Ernest Jones: the disappearance of sexual desire. According to Jones aphanisis is the object, in both sexes, of a fear more profound than the fear of castration.’’ It was in 1927 that Ernest Jones called upon this concept in his work on the precocious development of feminine sexuality. Etymologically the term comes from the Greek aphanisis, which refers to an absence of brilliance in the astronomical sense, to disappearance or becoming invisible (of a star for example). Jones applied this concept in a psychoanalytic sense in seeking to account for the disappearance of sexual desire in light of the castration complex; at the same time, he stressed that in his view there was no strict correlation between castration and the disappearance of sexuality: ‘‘many men wish to be castrated for, among others, erotic reasons, so that their sexuality certainly does not disappear with the surrender of the penis.’’ (1927, p. 439–440) In other words, the concept of aphanisis, according to Jones, was much broader than that of castration, and if the two notions sometimes appeared to merge, it was only because the figure of castration was in some way emblematic of the suppression of sexual desire, for which it supplied a concrete (but in fact inaccurate) representation. Laplanche and Pontalis (1967) observe that in women the fear of aphanisis is discernible beneath the fear of separation from the loved object, which is consistent with the fact that Jones introduced the notion apropos of feminine sexuality. While Sigmund Freud described the psychosexual development of the boy along phallocentric lines, Jones, for his part, tried to describe the sexuality of the young girl not by exclusive reference to penis envy (Penisneid), but as a sexuality having direct aims and modalities of its own. And it is precisely aphanisis, prior to the castration complex, that can furnish a kind of common basis for the sexual development of both sexes. About thirty years after Jones introduced it, in 1963, John Bowlby took up the concept of aphanisis again in his critical review of separation anxiety. He made aphanisis one of the possible bases for understanding this developmental phenomenon. The disappearance of the object in fact confronts the infant 105 APHASIA with the fear of no longer being able to focus its instinctual impulsive movements, and thus with the risk of losing the very possibility of the pleasure of desire as well. Today the concept of aphanisis as such is little used in the context of metapsychological work; it has doubtless been relegated to the background by the redoubtable expansion of the theory of attachment. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Annihilation anxiety; Femininity; Jones, Ernest; Object a; Phallus. Bibliography Bowlby, John. (1961). Separation anxiety: A critical review of the literature. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 1, 251–69. Ernest, Jones. (1950). Early development of female sexuality. In Papers on psychoanalysis. London: Bailliere, Tindall and Cox. (Original work published 1927) Laplanche, Jean, and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1967). The language of psychoanalysis. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. APHASIA Aphasia, a word proposed by Armand Trousseau to replace the term ‘‘aphemia,’’ created by Paul Broca, refers to language disturbances that arise from specific cerebral lesions, most often in the cortex. Between 1861 and 1865, when the dispute ended concerning the question of determining whether the cerebral cortex operated as a unit or as a collection of separate elements, Paul Broca showed, through a series of anatomical and clinical observations, that the destruction of the left side of the base of the third circumvolution of the frontal lobe in a right-handed subject who until then was able to speak normally led to the loss of articulate language. The subject was unable to express himself using a sequence of words or phrases. In 1874 Carl Wernicke extended the field of research by describing two other types of aphasia, all caused by a lesion in the left hemisphere: sensory aphasia from damage to the posterior areas of the second and third circumvolution of the cortex, and conduction aphasia, arising from the disconnection of 10 6 the bundles connecting this region to the base of the third circumvolution of the frontal lobe. Afterwards, the disturbance identified by Broca would be known as ‘‘motor aphasia.’’ Later Wernicke identified two other types of aphasia: ‘‘motor transcortical aphasia’’ and ‘‘sensory transcortical aphasia.’’ By the end of the nineteenth century, three separate approaches to the problem had been developed. Some researchers, such as Jean Martin Charcot and Joseph Grasset, increased the number of types of aphasia; others, like Alfred Vulpian, and later Pierre Marie, renewed the ‘‘unitarian’’ position; the third group, following the important work by Jules Déjerine, demonstrated through the use of clinical and anatomical arguments that the nature of the aphasia would change with the nature and location of the lesion. For example, frontal lesions seemed to primarily affect speech production, posterior lesions seemed to affect speech recognition, and the destruction of the cortex resulted in disturbances of internal language, which affected the subject’s autonomy. Sigmund Freud’s work on aphasia, published in 1891, accepts the work of Paul Broca but questions Wernicke’s research, which Freud criticizes for being excessively schematic and lacking in clinical observations. Freud did not question the relationship of language function with the brain but was cautious about hastily assigning specific locations to specific functions. Although he accepts that certain clinically based forms of aphasia—‘‘verbal aphasia,’’ ‘‘asymbolic aphasia,’’ ‘‘agnosic aphasia’’—can be used to localize the cortical lesion with certainty (which was later confirmed by neurosurgery during the First World War), he refused to extrapolate from pathology to physiology and deduced a cerebral concept of the normal operation of language, with a critical position that was far removed from the scientism that is often attributed to him in this field. In the descriptive sections of his work, Freud distinguished between the representation of words and the representation of things, and their links with auditory images, visual images, and the motor images at work in these phenomena. GEORGES LANTÉRI-LAURA See also: Brain and psychoanalysis, the; Language and disturbances of language; memory; Thing-presentation; Word-presentation. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS APPLIED PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1891b [1953]), On aphasia (A critical study) (E. Stengel, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press. Hécaen, H. and Lantéri-Laura, Georges. (1977). Évolution des connaissances et des doctrines sur les localisations cérébrales. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. ———. (1989). Les fonctions du cerveau. Paris: Masson. Lantéri-Laura, Geoerges. (1993). Histoire de la phrénologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Further Reading Miller, Laurence (1991). On aphasia at 100: the neuropsychodynamic legacy of Freud. Psychoanalytic Review, 78, 365-378. Rizzuto, Anna-Marie. (1990). Origin of Freud’s concept of object representation: ‘‘On Aphasia.’’ International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 71, 241-248. APPLIED PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE INTERACTIONS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Aside from being a theory of the unconscious, psychoanalysis as a method is used as an investigative tool in a wide variety of fields, the treatment of neuroses being only one among many. The term applied psychoanalysis is often used to refer to fields other than psychoanalysis or psychotherapy, particularly literature, art and culture. The term is therefore likely to have a range of accepted meanings that is either very broad, as in the case of collective phenomena, or narrowly restricted, as in the case of individual works of art. The idea of application, to the extent that it presupposes use outside a field of origin, has often been criticized for introducing the risk that psychoanalysis will be used abstractly or mechanistically. This was certainly not the opinion of Sigmund Freud, who felt that most psychoanalytic concepts were buttressed by the great myths and works of literature, such as Sophocles’s Oedipus the King, Michelangelo’s Moses, and Shakespeare’s Hamlet, which he mentioned in his letter to Wilhelm Fliess on October 15, 1897. Freud’s later writings made use of the work of Wilhelm Jensen, Dostoevsky, and others. There are also numerous references to Goethe woven into the fabric of his thought. In this context we cannot really speak of application but, rather, of different modes of expression for the investiINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE INTERACTIONS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS gation of what it means to be human. This proximity of culture and psychoanalysis also has the effect of mitigating the field’s association with medicine, which was indeed one of Freud’s objectives. Freud’s writings are interspersed with texts that are not specifically about psychopathology but contribute to its development indirectly. Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905c), ‘‘Psycho-Analysis and the Establishment of the Facts in Legal Proceedings’’ (1906c), Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva’’ (1907a [1906]), ‘‘Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices’’ (1907b), all written over a period of two years, reveal the variety of fields to which Freud applied the psychoanalytic method. More generally, psychoanalysis appears to embrace the fields of both individual therapy and collective phenomena, although we cannot speak of applied psychoanalysis in the latter case. Examples include Totem and Taboo (1912– 1913a), Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c), ‘‘The Acquisition and Control of Fire’’ (1932a[1931]), and Moses and Monotheism (1939a [1937–1939]). Given the importance of these texts and their theoretical richness, ‘‘applied psychoanalysis’’ in the broad sense loses its meaning. An especially rich and frequently examined field is the psychoanalysis of works of literature and the plastic arts. When it turns its attention to the artist or author, the psychoanalytic approach is not really far removed from its psychotherapeutic role. Freud himself emphasized the proximity between the case study and the novel, asserting that his case studies could be read as novels (1895d) and that novelists knew more about the unconscious than psychoanalysts. Yet, the matter is not quite as simple as it appears. Although studying an author’s biography is relevant for understanding his or her writing, such an examination should not be reduced to a form of pathography. Isidor Sadger was referred to as a bungler (Nunberg and Federn,1962–75) and Max Graf, supported by Freud, pointed out that an author’s neurosis does not explain his work. In ‘‘Creative Writers and Day-dreaming’’ (1908e [1907]), Freud shifted his focus to the question of the author’s creativity with the hypothesis of a relation between the daydream and the themes of literary creation. He also questioned the nature of the reader’s pleasure. In 1912 the review Imago, published by Freud with the help of Otto Rank and Hans Sachs, printed articles on psychoanalysis applied to works of art, but even 107 APPLIED PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE INTERACTIONS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS earlier, in 1910, Freud’s study of Leonardo da Vinci (1910c) had shown the protean nature of this type of psychoanalytic investigation. This was a study of a ‘‘childhood memory’’ of da Vinci’s, and the earliest impressions of his life; it also provided an occasion to develop the theory of sublimation in its various versions, along with a new approach to male homosexuality. Freud’s paper on da Vinci is a good example of the impossibility, when referring to research devoted to a work of art (The Virgin, Infant Jesus, and Saint Ann) and its author, of limiting oneself to a single ‘‘application’’ of the psychoanalytic method. This, with all the risks it entails (mistaking the kite for a vulture), is creative because it directs toward the analysis of the work of art hypotheses and intuitions that could have come into being elsewhere or differently, blending episodes of therapy with a self-analytic approach (Freud’s fantasy relationship with Leonardo). Conversely, Freud’s study of Michelangelo’s Moses (1914b) ignored the facts of the artist’s life. The interpretation is based on the feelings of the viewer, Freud in this case, and his understanding of the Bible. He explicates the work using the same method used for dreams, teasing out what is hidden or secret by means of details that are barely visible. Freud does not sharply distinguish between interpretation of the work of art and reconstruction of the author’s fantasies, and when he turns to Jensen’s Gradiva (1907a [1906]), it is only as an afterthought that he questions the author about the actual existence of a young girl with a club foot whom the author was supposed to have known in childhood. The term ‘‘applied psychoanalysis’’ does not seem to be appropriate when we consider that for Freud—as for many psychoanalysts like Karl Abraham, Otto Rank, Wilhelm Stekel, Max Graf, Theodor Reik, and Fritz Wittels—it was not a question of demonstrating that the psychoanalytic method could be used outside the context of therapy (Laplanche proposed the expression, ‘‘extramural psychoanalysis’’), but of developing hypotheses concerning this method within a field of research other than therapy. Aside from the psychoanalysis of works of art, Freud highlighted the interest of psychoanalysis (1913j) not only for psychology but for the other sciences. By ‘‘interest’’ he meant the implications— being in (inter-esse)—of psychoanalysis for the other sciences, which can make use of psychoanalysis as a means of self-enrichment and even self-analysis. Thus 10 8 linguistics could draw on dreams and symbols for the study of language, philosophy could make use of the psychography of philosophers, and biology could borrow the opposition between ego instinct and sexual instinct to identify the opposition between an immortal germ plasma and isolated individuals. Similarly, the history of civilization could make use of the psychoanalytic approach to myth to help explain religion. Nearly fifteen years later, in The Question of Lay Analysis, Freud wrote, ‘‘As a ‘depth psychology,’ a theory of the mental unconscious, it can become indispensable to all the sciences which are concerned with the evolution of human civilization and its major institutions such as art, religion, and the social order. It has already, in my opinion, afforded these sciences considerable help in solving their problems. But these are only small contributions compared with what might be achieved if historians of civilization, psychologists of religion, philologists and so on would agree themselves to handle the new instrument of research which is at their service. The use of analysis for the treatment of the neuroses is only one of its applications; the future will perhaps show that it is not the most important one’’ (1926e, p. 248). Of course it is not necessarily the case that the benefit of psychoanalysis for the sciences is a one-way process. Just as the ‘‘application’’ of psychoanalysis outside therapy leads to discoveries that affect therapy through a deepening of theory and method, it benefits psychoanalysis to be questioned by the sciences with which it interacts. The ‘‘interactions of psychoanalysis’’ (Mijolla-Mellor, S. de) highlight the fact that it is impossible to focus psychoanalysis on a specific domain without the validity of its own methodology being questioned in turn. Such interactions assume the pursuit of a renewed epistemological investigation of the value of the psychoanalytic method and its ability to encounter other logics. This not only provides new insight into the field of application but also helps clarify the essential nature and potential for growth of psychoanalysis itself. The principal reason for this fecundity lies in the ability of psychoanalysis to allow itself to be questioned, and enriched, by, the fields of inquiry toward which it is directed. Here, the cultural object or scientific discourse itself may exhibit a certain resistance (much like a patient) because they function according to their own logic and presuppositions, which in principle acknowledge no unconscious dimension. To introduce this dimension INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS APPLIED PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE INTERACTIONS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS into other domains means that the psychoanalyst must become newly aware of this object suspending the work of interpretation and, above all, questioning its ability not only to account for the facts in question but also for the way in which they are viewed and cathected. and psychoanalysis, sociopsychoanalysis; Spinoza and psychoanalysis; Structuralism and psychoanalysis; Surrealism and psychoanalysis; The Life and Works of Edgar Allen Poe; Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twenty-Eighth President of the United States; Totem and Taboo; Training of the psychoanalyst; Visual arts and psychoanalysis. The multidisciplinary interactions of psychoanalysis thus require an ongoing epistemological investigation of major importance, and which risks being undermined if psychoanalysts limit their inquiry to the therapeutic situation alone. This perspective is epistemological first and foremost, opening up the possibility of borrowing other models and allowing for conceptual fusion; but it also shows up the abiding (at times) specificity of fields of knowledge, and even their impermeability—and hence the limits of these interactions. Bibliography The common goal of research in the field of ‘‘interactions with psychoanalysis’’ is an awareness not only of the impact of Freud’s discovery of the unconscious on the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) but also of the effects of models specific to those domains on psychoanalysis itself, as theory and as method, whenever it attempts to ‘‘interact.’’ ———. (1907a [1906]). Delusions and dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva.’’ SE, 9: 1–95. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR Freud, Sigmund. (1887–1904). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887–1904, Ed. and Trans. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson. Cambridge, Mass, and London: The Belknap Press, 1985. ———. (1905c). Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. SE, 8. ———. (1906c). Psycho-analysis and the establishment of the facts in legal proceedings. SE, 9: 99–114. ———. (1907b). Obsessive actions and religious practices. SE, 9: 117–127. ———, (1908e [1907]). ‘‘Creative writers and day-dreaming.’’ SE, 9: 143–153. ———. (1910c). Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood. SE, 11: 59–137. ———. (1912–1913). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: ix–161. See also: American Imago; Anthropology and psychoanalysis; Christians and Jews: A Psychoanalytical Study; Cinema (criticism); Cinema and psychoanalysis; Civilization (Kultur); ‘‘Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest’’; Criminology and psychoanalysis; Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva’’; Don Juan and the Double; ‘‘Dream and Myth’’; École Freudienne de Paris; Ethnopsychoanalysis; Ethology and psychoanalysis; Hard sciences, psychoanalysis and the; Freud, the Secret Passion; Goethe and psychoanalysis; Hamlet and Oedipus; History and psychoanalysis; Imago, Zeitschrift für die Anwendung der Psychanalyse auf die Geistesiwissenschaften; Law and psychoanalysis; Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood; Linguistics and psychoanalysis; Literary and artistic creation; Literature and psychoanalysis; Moses and Monotheism; ‘‘The Moses of Michelangelo’’; Myth of the Birth of the Hero, The ; Mythology and psychoanalysis; Pedagogy and psychoanalysis; Psyché, revue internationale de psychanalyse et des sciences de l’homme; Psychoanalysis of Fire, The; Psychoanalytic Bewegung, Die; Psychobiography; Psychohistory; Psychology and psychoanalysis; Racism, anti-Semitism, and psychoanalysis; Sartre and psychoanalysis; Schiller and psychoanalysis; ‘‘Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis, A’’; Shakespeare and psychoanalysis; Sociology INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ———. (1913j). The claims of psycho-analysis to scientific interest. SE, 13: 163–190. ———. (1914b). The Moses of Michelangelo. SE, 13: 209– 236. ———. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 67–143. ———. (1926e). The question of lay analysis. SE, 20: 179– 250. ———. (1932a [1931]). The acquisition and control of fire. SE, 22: 183–193. ———. (1939a [1937–1939]). Moses and monotheism: Three essays. SE, 23: 1–137. ———. (1950a). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173– 280. Nunberg, Hermann and Federn, Ernst. (1962–1975). Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (December 4, 1907 session). New York: International University Press. Further Reading Baudry, Francis. (1984). Essay on method in applied psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 53, 551–581. 109 APPRENTI-HISTORIEN ET LE M A Í T R E - S O R C I E R ( L ’ - ) [ T H E A P P R E N T I C E H I S T O R I A N Esman, Aaron. (1998). What is "applied" in "applied" psychoanalysis?. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 79, 741–756. Gehrie, M.J. (1992). Panel: Methodology of applied psychoanalysis: key issues. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 40, 239–244. APPRENTI-HISTORIEN ET LE MAÍTRESORCIER (L’-) [THE APPRENTICE HISTORIAN AND THE MASTER SORCERER] This book’s title and subtitle indicate its essential argument. The I is the apprentice historian, the psychological space in which identifications or delusional statements are worked out. According to Aulagnier, two questions have inspired her writings, including this book: the function of the I as the builder of its own libidinal history; and the relationship between this I and the analytic approach, where the concept of ‘‘the repressed’’ is of central importance. The master sorcerer is another name for the id, for the psychological place where primal and primary processes write a story without words. In some cases, the subject may experience the ‘‘telescoping’’ of an event, a fantasy, and an identification in such a way that the subject is ‘‘stuck with’’ an identification which he is unable to assume, and yet finds it impossible to repress the fantasy. The task of analysis is to seek out the event that marked the infantile psyche, to bring to light how the irruption of affect contributed to fixing the identification in the subject’s mind and worked to impede repression. The I can then replace this lived/lost moment with a history of the identification that makes sense of the subject’s present life and makes an investment in his future possible. The first part of Aulagnier’s book presents the cases of Philippe and Odette, focusing on their relationships to time. Philippe is a young, delusional, psychotic patient who was treated by Aulagnier, initially during his hospitalization and later in her home, with the idea of undertaking an analytic treatment. Odette is a woman of about forty who elected to undergo analysis (which lasted five years) to help her in her struggle against what she called ‘‘dehumanization crises.’’ Aulagnier presents four versions of Philippe’s history: that of Philippe himself, which embodies a delusional causality that brings about ‘‘temporal 11 0 AND THE MASTER SORCERER] indifferentiation’’ and seeks to exculpate his parents; that of the parents, who deny the role they have played in Philippe’s life; the version that Aulagnier develops based on the preceding two histories, and on her own suspended theoretical attention; and, finally, the history that evolves within the therapeutic relationship. Behind the claim of Philippe and his mother, that he ‘‘had a wonderful childhood,’’ the analyst clearly discerns the annihilation of a birth. When the therapist suggests that the future is not decided in advance, Philippe responds: ‘‘I can’t tell the difference between the past and the future. I just don’t understand all these dichotomies: past/present, life/death, present/ future.’’ Aulagnier believes that in trying decathect her child, the mother has ‘‘roboticized’’ her relationship with him. This is reflected in the leitmotiv of Philippe’s delusions: ‘‘We are all robots.’’ He has been forbidden, he says, to see his birth. This evokes the prohibition against conceptualizing the mother’s desire with regard to that birth. ‘‘My father has always been a brother to me,’’ says Philippe. In other words, the paternal function has always been a blank in his history. The act of eating a San Pedro cactus (Trichocereus pachanoi), which marks Philippe’s entry into a delusional episode, causes him to meet ‘‘the unspeakable.’’ His fantasy is to incorporate ‘‘a power close to that of God,’’ but this idea opens the way to a characteristic primal metabolization. He acts out a pictogram: He incorporates and ‘‘autolyzes’’ the stone maternal breast, giver of indistinguishable ‘‘life-death’’; ‘‘his bones and his thoughts’’ disintegrate, and he selfdestructs and destroys the forbidden core that is the cactus/breast. The autolysis actualizes the decathexis that will satisfy both his mother’s desire, and his own. Odette, for her part, substitutes ‘‘bodily perceptions’’ for what she should have borrowed from her mother’s discourse to construct the first paragraphs of her history. For lack of an ear capable of hearing her mother’s words, her I was unable to metabolize into ideational representations those representatives of the suffering body that the psyche then metabolized instead into pictograms and fantasies. Her delusional causality is an attempt to fill the void created by the discourse of the spokesperson. To reconstruct her history and account for the events that have marked her, Odette invokes a single causal factor, ‘‘the abjection of the father’’—a father whose powers of maleficent desire she idealizes. She then constructs an analytic INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ARCHAIC theory for herself, apparently ‘‘the equivalent of a split-up delusional theory’’ that is compatible with the discourse of her environment. In the second part of her book, Aulagnier proposes a theoretical outline of the process of identification. She expands and refines the concept of potentiality as elaborated in her earlier works. While psychotic potentiality is characterized by the conflict between the ‘‘Identifying I’’ and the ‘‘Identified I,’’ neurotic potentiality involves the relationship between the I and its ideals; polymorphous potentiality, when it becomes manifest, leads to symptoms such as love relations or alienating relations, certain forms of somatization, and the like. In this theoretical scheme, T0 corresponds to the birth of the infant, T1 to the emergence of the I, and T2 to the conclusive moment when the I makes a compromise with reality; this compromise determines the type of potentiality. Potentiality is thus a specific organization that under certain circumstances moves from the potential to the manifest. Faced by an idea that is ‘‘unthinkable and impossible to take on,’’ and that is evoked by a particular book, Philippe eats the cactus and plunges into a delusional state. Similarly, the revelation of ‘‘the magic of analytic knowledge about desire’’ confronts Odette with an unbearable discovery, the analyst becoming for her an idealized, all-powerful mother. Aulagnier uses the expression ‘‘encounter effect’’ to refer to this type of catalyzing cause that prompts a conflict of identification to pass from the potential to the manifest state. By way of conclusion, Aulagnier shows how George Orwell’s fictional world in 1984 prefigures her theories of repression and of the process of identification. What Orwell calls ‘‘doublethink’’ is meant to produce a kind of repression within the subject that destroys ideas, consuming them utterly. The objective is to strip the I of all confidence in its own thinking. The subject is alienated, for he has internalized the mechanism of repression, but it is Big Brother who decides what the repressed object is. This mutilation serves to provide an idealized figure for repression in the psychotic patient: its function is to prevent the revealing of nonrepressed elements active in the mother’s psyche. It thus serves an entity that is external to the subject, whereas in neurosis repression is imposed by the I’s own thinking. The neurotic forbids him- or herself to desire the forbidden, but the psychotic suffers an external prohibition on the thinking of non-repressed INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS thoughts. The I’s power of thinking is inhibited in neurosis, whereas in psychosis it is damaged. In short, Aulagnier’s hypothesis of a ternary system of representational activity, and the notion of potentiality, profoundly transform and reinvigorate the Freudian understanding of possible mental organizations. GHYSLAIN CHARRON See also: Aulagnier-Spairani, Piera; Autohistorization; I; Identificatory project; Schizophrenia. Source Citation Aulagnier, Piera. (1984). L’Apprenti-historien et le Maı̂tresorcier. Du discours identifiant au discours délirant. (The apprentice historian and the master sorcerer: From the discourse of identification to the discourse of delusion). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (2001). The violence of interpretation: From pictogram to sttatement. (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). East Sussex, Philadelphia: Brunner/Routledge. (Original work published 1975) ———. (1979). Les destins du plaisir. Aliénation, amour, passion. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ARCHAIC Archaic is the term used in psychoanalysis to refer to an aspect of the psyche that was organized in the distant past and which contrasts with a new or more evolved organization. The term is used in two specific senses. For Freud the term served essentially to refer to a phylogenetic heritage that involved a way of thinking (1933a [1932]), the requirement of a superego (1923b), or an anxiety associated directly with a prehistoric reality. Freud’s theoretical advances did not affect the nature of the archaic understood in this sense. For Melanie Klein the archaic increasingly refers to that which is not reworked by the development of the depressive position, becoming a synonym of sorts for the pregenital. These two meanings of the archaic do not always intersect. Freud saw in our phylogenetic heritage something underlying the id, a kind of strata of the psyche whose influence on the remainder of the psyche 111 ARCHAIC MOTHER was only partial or nonexistent. Through the superego, the ego draws on the experiences of the past stored in the id (1923b). But as far as the magical functions of thinking were concerned, Freud considered the resurgence of an ancient mode of communication such as telepathy, which operated in communities of insects and which can still be actualized in crowds (1933a [1932]). One form of ‘‘archaic’’ thinking, Freud claimed, can still be found in dreams, specifically their symbolism. He also associated a number of infantile desires, including oedipal desires, with a ‘‘phylogenetic heritage.’’ In 1925 Freud noted that the horror of incest and the reality of castration imposed by a leader on his rivals date back to prehistoric times (1925j). This concept of the archaic is not found in Melanie Klein, for whom the term was far more important than it was for Freud. For Klein the term is always associated with ontogenesis. As Klein’s work reached its maturity, the term came to refer to the anxieties and defenses that crystallized during the formation of the paranoid–schizoid position (1946). The archaic is therefore contrasted with what it is not: the binding associated with the constitution of the depressive position. What place can be given to the archaic within a conception of psychic life in which everything is a reworking of something else? Doesn’t the activity of deferred action bar access to those so-called archaic strata of the psyche? This brings up the question of the association between the archaic and the actual or present. André Green (1982) situates the problem of the observation of the archaic within this context. This observation can only be illusory because the archaic always appears to us in a transformed state. Whether or not this involves regression, ‘‘what is brought to the surface is not the faithful record of a prehistory,’’ wrote Green. Putting aside the wish to lift the veil on certain occasions, as Freud suggested with his metaphor of archeological excavations that would allow us to discover buried strata of psychic life, wouldn’t it be possible to assign to the archaic an influence ranging from what is most proximate to what is untouchable by definition, for in order to reach it we would have to return to the zero point of time and space, to what is most distant? This would revitalize the interest in direct observation of the infant, which is currently burdened with the reputation of being an observation of the archaic. 11 2 Jean-Michel Petot (1982), in his study of the archaic in the work of Melanie Klein, warns of the confusion between the ‘‘deep’’ and the archaic. For regressing to an archaic state that would otherwise need to be addressed in actuality is equivalent to creating a field of psychic depth that only the work of mourning associated with the depressive position can be used to bind and, consequently, put in perspective. In this sense the archaic could be said to be contemporaneous with temporal creation itself. CLÉOPÂTRE ATHANASSIOU-POPESCO See also: Archaic mother; Idealizing transference; Identification; Myth of origins; Nonverbal communication; Operational thinking; Phylogenetic Fantasy, A: Overview of the Transference Neuroses; Pictogram; Prehistory; Primal repression; Primitive; Projection and ‘‘participation mystique’’ (analytic psychology); Self-object; Telepathy; Totem and Taboo. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 12–59. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 5–182. Green, André. (1982). Après-coup, l’archaı̈que. Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse. 26, 197. Klein, Melanie. (1975). Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms. In The writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. III, 1946–1963, pp. 1–24). London: Hogarth Press, (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 27 (1975), 99–110.) Petot, Jean–Michel. (1982). L’archaı̈que et le profond dans la pensée de Melanie Klein. Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse 26, pp. 253–272. ARCHAIC MOTHER In the Kleinian constellation over which she presides, the archaic mother is the fantasy mother of the first few months of the infant’s life—the paranoid-schizoid phase. Omnipotent and phallic, she fulfills and frustrates in equally radical measure. She is the key figure in the early stages of the Oedipus complex, and her breast, an object split into a good, nourishing breast and a bad persecutory one, is her generic attribute. It is the target of the ambivalent libidinal and sadistic oral drives of the infant in search of unlimited satisfaction, a satisfaction that, inevitably, will never be achieved. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ARCHAIC MOTHER Beyond such epistemological considerations, the idea of the archaic mother points up a persistent psychoanalytical paradox: the fact that we mourn for origins that are inaccessible yet somehow open to retroactive attempts to reveal them. This figure embodies an archaism with the extraordinary ability to ‘‘conjure up the beginning while simultaneously revealing its absence’’ (Assoun, 1982). The primal mother escapes our grasp yet holds us in thrall. The notion of the archaic is a semantic point of convergence for several Freudian concepts. It is closely related, for one thing, to the ‘‘primal’’—to all those terms in Freud’s writings that begin with the prefix ‘‘ur-’’: Urszene (the primal scene), Urphantasien (primal fantasy), Urverdrängung (primal repression), Urvater (primal father). And it is akin to the stratigraphical and archaeological metaphors of which Freud was so fond. Melanie Klein used the adjective ‘‘archaic’’ only once, but made frequent use of ‘‘früh’’ or ‘‘early’’ (Petot, 1982). The idea of the archaic mother was introduced in connection with Klein’s theses on the early stages of the Oedipus complex in boys and girls (1928). Apropos of the early oral stage of the oedipal conflict, Klein described a ‘‘paranoid-schizoid position’’ characterized by the relationship to partobjects, by the splitting of the ego (an ego lacking in maturity) and of the object, by persecutory anxiety, and by schizoid mechanisms. The breast of the archaic mother was a structuring factor here. Frustrated in their attempts to attain that breast, both girls and boys were prompted to abandon the quest and embrace the wish for oral satisfaction by means of the father’s penis. Introjection of the good and bad breast of the good and bad mother was thus replaced by introjection of the good and bad penis of the good and bad father. The parents became the first models not only for internal protective and helpful figures but also for internal vengeful and persecutory ones; these first identifications by the ego constituted the foundations of the superego. Some of the superego’s most important traits, both its loving/ protective and its destructive/devouring sides, were derived from the earliest identifications with the mother. Klein’s followers developed these ideas, notably that of projective identification in infants (Bion, 1962; Meltzer, 1992); their exploration of childhood psychoses INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS went in the same direction (Tustin, 1972; Meltzer, 1975). The archaic mother is part of a long mythological tradition stemming from the fecund and savage Earth Mother of ancient Greek cosmogony. In psychoanalysis the theme is discernible, for example, in the sea ‘‘abandoned in primeval times’’ of Ferenczi’s Thalassa (1924, p. 52), in Freud’s phylogenetic explanation of primal fantasies (1915f, p. 269 and n.), or in the ‘‘biological bedrock’’ of the ‘‘repudiation of femininity’’ (Freud, 1937c, pp. 250–52). If the ‘‘archaic’’ is forever generating meaning in the unconscious without ever manifesting itself as a perceptible cause, it is the task of metapsychological speculation to offer an account of this phenomenon. The aforementioned psychoanalytical ‘‘mythologies’’ may indeed be said to respond to an ‘‘epistemic imperative’’ (Assoun, 1982). At the same time, however, any psychoanalytical view of the archaic, which is inseparable from the discussion of ‘‘deferred action’’ (q.v.), can achieve legitimacy only by eschewing the naı̈vety of the Freudian archaeological metaphor: the ‘‘archaic mother’’ of an excavated past does not amount to a restoration of the original. Recently the analysis of borderline conditions has highlighted the notion of an analyst who does not represent the mother but instead is the omnipotent mother. This figure is the object of a transference that is ‘‘both archaic and a defense against the archaic’’ (Green, 1982). At present, clinical work on the psychoanalysis of origins has an important part to play in the study of parenthood. In the contexts of infertility, perinatal psychopathology, or transgenerational mental transmission, the consideration of the structural outcome of parental conflict with the archaic (grand-) mother has given this concept a new lease on life (Bydlowski, 1997). SYLVAIN MISSONNIER See also: Breast, good/bad object; Oedipus complex, early; Paranoid-schizoid position; Real, Imaginary, and Symbolic father; "Vagina dentata," fantasy of. Bibliography Assoun, Paul Laurent. (1982). L’archaı̈que chez Freud: entre Logos et Anankè. Nouvell revue de psychanalyse, 26, 11–44. 113 ARCHEOLOGY, THE METAPHOR OF Bydlowski, Monique. (1997). La dette de vie : itinéraire psychanalytique de la maternité. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Bion, Wilfred R. (1967). A theory of thinking. In Second thoughts. London: Heinemann. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 43, (1962) 4–5.) Ferenczi, Sándor. (1968). Thalassa: A theory of genitality. (Henry Alden Bunker, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1924) Freud, Sigmund. (1915f). A case of paranoia running counter to the psycho-analytic theory of the disease. SE, 14: 261–272. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. Green, André. (1982). Après-coup, l’archaı̈que. Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse,26, 195–216. Klein, Melanie. (1975). Early stages of the Oedipus conflict. In Love, guilt and reparation and other works, 1921–1945. London: Hogarth/Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 9, (1928) 167–180.) Meltzer, Donald. (1975). Adhesive identification. Contemporary Psycho-Analysis, 11, 289–310. ———. (1992). The claustrum. An investigation of claustrophobic phenomena. Karnac Books. Petot, Jean-Michel. (1982). L’archaı̈que et le profond dans la pensée de Melanie Klein. Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse, 26. Tustin, Frances. (1972). Autism and childhood psychosis. London: Science House. ARCHEOLOGY, THE METAPHOR OF Archeology, the study of artifacts from the past, is relevant to psychoanalysis in the sense that an analogy can be established between the search for a collective past and the search for an individual past. Freud himself uses the metaphor of archeology in his Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva’’ (1907a). His description of the structure of hysteria as a building of several dimensions, containing at least three strata (‘‘The Psychotherapy of Hysteria’’ in Studies on Hysteria, 1895d), even though it refers to an archival case, also evokes the work of the archeologist: The order of discovery is reversed, with the most primal matter being the most deeply buried (‘‘Saxa loquuntur,’’ 1896c). Freud was very interested in archeological research (Schliemann’s excavation of Troy, for example) and 11 4 the collected artifacts, many of which decorated his office and which he frequently showed to his patients (The Rat Man, 1909d) as signs of the preservation of traces of a past that had become unconscious. More profoundly, we find that the methods of the archeological dig and those of psychoanalytical investigation have followed a similar evolution, consisting in shifting the focus of interest from a privileged object that will be excavated to a gradual discovery of the terrain (stratigraphic method), through which it is possible to trace the thread of history back to its origins step by step. Interest in these vestiges, which constitute ‘‘a history without a text’’ (André Leroi-Gourhan), intersects the work of reconstruction that takes place during analysis (Freud, 1937c). Similarly, the interest in a missing element (doubt in the dream, foreclosed elements in psychosis) evokes this preservation-throughabsence that archeologists experience in what they call ‘‘ghost sites’’ (Mijolla-Mellor, 1993). The archeological metaphor is present throughout Freud’s work (1911f) and underlines the similarity with the work of therapy as well as the differences, especially since the working conditions of the psychoanalyst, and his or her ability to bring back old emotions through transference, are better than those of the archeologist. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Archaic; Archaic mother; Model; Memories. Bibliography Bernfeld-Cassirer, Suzanne. (1951, June). Freud and archaeology. American Imago, VIII, 107–128. Flem, Lydia. (1982). L’archéologie chez Freud : destin d’une passion et d’une métaphore. Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse, 26, pp. 71–94 Freud, Sigmund. (1896c). The aetiology of hysteria. SE, 3: 186–221 ———. (1907a [1906]). Delusions and dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva.’’ SE, 9: 1–95. ———. (1909d). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151–318. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies in hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106 Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1993). Le ‘‘bon droit’’ du criminel. Topique, 52, 141–161. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ARCHIVES ARCHETYPE (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) The scientific hypothesis of the archetype was proposed by Jung as an innate formal element that structures the psyche at its most basic levels. In itself psychoid and therefore anchored in reality beyond the psyche (in ‘‘spirit’’ or nous, the non-biological mind), the archetype is responsible for coordinating and organizing the psyche’s homeostatic balance and its programs for development and maturation. Essentially there is one master archetype, the self, which defines the skeletal form of human wholeness. The archetype itself is not available directly to experience—only its images and created patterns can become manifest and subject to experience by the psyche. These archetypal images are potentially unlimited in number and variety. They are embedded in the universal patterns of myth, in religious symbols and ideas, and in numinous experiences; they are also often represented in symbolic dreams and in altered states of consciousness. Within the psyche, archetypal images are linked to the (five) instinct groups, giving them direction and potential meaning. Like the archetype, the instincts are psychoid and rooted in reality beyond the psyche itself (in the physiological base of the psyche, the body). Archetypal images and instinctual impulses, united within the psyche, together make up the collective unconscious, the primordial psychosomatic basis of all psychic functioning. Jung first used the term ‘‘archetype’’ in 1919. This was preceded by several years of speculation on primordial images and impersonal dominants. The implications of the archetypal hypothesis were developed by Jung himself and by his many students over subsequent decades in numerous case studies and investigations of myth, religion, and esoteric practices, especially alchemy. As the field of analytical psychology has grown and developed, the notion of the archetype and the role of archetypal images in psychological functioning and development have assumed a central role and have become the most distinctive feature of this school of psychoanalysis. Archetypal psychology, led by James Hillman, is a later offshoot of analytical psychology. Jung himself found important connections between archetypal theory and the work of such ethologists as Konrad Lorenz who studied innate patterns of animal behavior and discovered innate releasing mechanisms. There are also parallels to be drawn between archetypal INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DE PSYCHOLOGIE, LES patterns and the innate mental schemas described in cognitive psychology. Recent findings of innate human patterns in neuropsychiatry and sociobiology also suggest confirmation of the hypothesis of the archetype. Some leading thinkers in analytical psychology have found close similarities between the theory of archetypal images and Kleinian notions of unconscious phantasy. Criticisms of the archetypal hypothesis have come from many quarters. As an essentialist position, it has drawn fire from social constructionists who argue that human nature is infinitely malleable and defined more importantly by social and material conditions than by innate propensities. It has also drawn criticism from clinicians for whom the personal conflicts and traumas inflicted in childhood define the universe of therapeutic concern. For Jung and his adherents, however, the archetype has been seen as the source of healing and as the guide to potential wholeness of the individual. MURRAY STEIN See also: Amplification (analytical psychology); AnimusAnima (analytical psychology); Imago; Mother goddess; Numinous (analytical psychology); Self (analytical psychology); Symbolization, process of; Synchronicity (analytical psychology); Transference/counter-transference (analytical psychology). Bibliography Jung, Carl G. (1935b [1954]). Archetypes of the collective unconscious. Coll. Works (Vol. IX, Part I). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Neumann, Erich. (1955). The great mother: An analysis of the archetype. London: Routledge. Stein, Murray. (1996). Practicing wholeness. New York: Continuum. Stevens, Anthony. (1982). Archetypes: A natural history of the self. London: Routledge. ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE, LES Les archives de psychologie was founded in 1902 by Théodore Flournoy and Édouard Claparède. Though the review was eclectic and devoted itself to all aspects of psychology, principal areas of interest were psychic phenomena, the psychology of normal and abnormal children, and psychopathology. 115 ARGENTINA Théodore Flournoy was then a professor of experimental psychology in the Department of Science at the University of Geneva. He was interested in obscure phenomena disdained by official science: genius, mysticism, metapsychic phenomena. Édouard Claparède, his assistant, had an interest in psychopedagogics. From the beginning of the century until World War I, the review played a pioneering role in spreading an awareness of psychoanalysis throughout Frenchspeaking countries. Psychoanalytic publications in German were regularly printed and analyzed. Many original articles were directly related to Freudian theory, including the work of Alphonse Maeder, Paul Menzerath, Pierre Bovet (then codirector of the Institut Jean-Jacques Rousseau), Paul Ladame, and Carl Gustav Jung. After Freud and Jung split in 1913, the review refused to take a stance between the two camps. Upon the death of Théodore Flournoy in 1920, the review obtained the help of Jean Piaget, who reinforced the focus on child psychology and applied psychology. After 1930 the review devoted almost no space to psychoanalysis. ANNICK OHAYON See also: Claparède, Édouard; Flournoy, Théodore; Piaget, Jean. Bibliography Bovet, Pierre. (1913). Un rêve expliqué. Archives de psychologie, 13, 380–383. Maeder, Alphonse. (1907). Essai d’interprétation de quelques rêves. Archives de psychologie, 6, 354–375. Menzerath, Paul. (1912). Contribution à la psycho-analyse. Archives de psychologie, 12, 372–389. Piaget, Jean. (1923). La pensée symbolique et la pensée de l’enfant. Archives de psychologie, 18 (72), 273–304. ARGENTINA Argentina is unlike other Latin American countries in that its population is in large part the result of the massive European immigration that took place beginning in the late nineteenth century. Between the last decades of that century and with the global economic crisis of 1930, the country experienced increased prosperity. During that interval, the cultural climate was infused with a number of avant-garde intellectual currents. 11 6 Psychoanalysis in Argentina can be broken down into five periods: 1) the pre-institutional period, 2) the pioneer period, 3) the institutional period, 4) the crisis of the seventies, and 5) the present. After 1922, and during the pre-institutional period, Spanish translations of the first volumes of Freud’s complete works began to appear in Argentina, although translations in other languages were known. As early as 1910, however, Freud’s ideas about infantile sexuality, free association, and psychoanalysis had been presented in Buenos Aires by the Chilean doctor Germán Greve (quoted by Freud in The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement) during the International Congress of Medicine and Hygiene, and the Peruvian Honorio Delgado had published articles on psychoanalysis in several prestigious medical journals. In 1922 Enrique Mouchet, who had been professor of experimental psychology and physiology for two decades in the Department of Philosophy and Literature at the University of Buenos Aires, made psychoanalysis part of his syllabus, although he was critical of it. In 1923 the Spanish doctor Gonzalo Lafora gave a number of talks on psychoanalysis at the school of medicine. In February 1930, two recognized psychiatrists left for Vienna to visit Freud: Gregorio Bermann and Nerio Rojas, who would later publish a report of his meeting in the widely circulated daily La Nación. During the thirties, inexpensive editions of Stefan Zweig’s biography of Freud were printed, as well as a ten-volume series of popularizations of Freud entitled, Freud Made Easy, carelessly edited (pseudonymously) and containing long passages from the Spanish translation of Freud’s works. The journal Critica regularly published a column on psychoanalysis devoted to the interpretation of dreams. In 1936 one of the most serious literary reviews in the country, Sur, paid homage to Freud; the review Psicoterapia also devoted an issue to the founder of psychoanalysis. A group of writers invited Freud to move to Argentina. Jorge Thenon, a self-taught psychoanalyst, received a letter from Freud, to whom he had sent his thesis, ‘‘Psicoterapia comparada y psicogénesis’’ [Comparative Psychotherapy and Psychogenesis], in which Freud encouraged him to continue his work for future publication in an international psychoanalytic review. The letter appeared in La Semana médica in 1933. In 1938 the arrival of the Hungarian psychologist Béla Székely in Argentina helped to spread psychoanalytic INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ARGENTINA ideas along with the use of tests, especially Rorschach tests. During that same decade, Enrique Pichon-Rivière and Arnaldo Rascovsky discovered Freud’s work; they devoted themselves to its study and its clinical application. Pichon-Rivière formed a working group with Arminda and Frederico Aberastury; Rascovsky, with his wife Matilde Wencelblat, Luisa Gambier (later Luisa Alvarez de Toledo), Simon Wencelblat, Teodoro Shlossberg, Flora Scolni, Alberto Tallaferro, and Guillermo Ferrari Hardoy. In 1939, two psychoanalysts from Europe, the Argentine Celes Cárcamo, member of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, and the Spaniard Angel Garma, member of the German Psychoanalytic Association, joined Rascovksy’s and Pichon-Rivière’s groups. Celes Cárcamo had been a friend of Pichon-Rivière for years. Angel Garma, who had wanted to leave Spain for Argentina, had met Cárcamo in Paris. A decision was made to found a psychoanalytic association as soon as a sufficient number of analysts could be brought together. Luisa Alvarez de Toledo, Luis Rascovsky, Guillermo Ferrari Hardoy, and Alberto Tallaferro began analysis with Cárcamo, while Arnaldo Rascovsky, Enrique Pichon-Rivière, and Arminda Aberastury started with Garma. The patients who were analyzed by Cárcamo were supervised by Garma and vice versa. On December 15, 1942, Cárcamo, Garma, Ferrari Hardoy, Pichon-Rivière, Rascovsky, and Marie Langer founded the Asociación Psicoanalı́tica Argentina (APA), which marked the debut of the institutional period. Marie Glas de Langer, who had sought refuge in Uruguay in 1938, settled in Buenos Aires in 1942. Analyzed by Richard Sterba, she had been trained at the Vienna Institute of Psychoanalysis but, to complete her clinical work, she underwent a control analysis with Celes Cárcamo. Shortly after it was founded, the association received the provisional approval of Ernest Jones, then president of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA). The APA was recognized as a member society of the IPA at the Zurich Congress, in August 1949. In July 1943, the first issue of the Revista de psicoanálisis appeared, and that same year the publisher Biblioteca de Psicoanálisis went into operation. This began a process of rapid expansion of the discipline both inside and outside Argentina. Therapists from throughout Latin America arrived eager for training, there were many foreign visitors, and Argentinian analysts traveled to present their work in other INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS countries throughout the Americas and Europe. In 1953, the association had more than 68 members in all categories. Angel Garma, who was analyzed by Theodor Reik and undertook his control analysis with Otto Fenichel, had an interest in a number of fields and in all of them he left his personal mark. He discussed Freud’s theory of hallucinations in 1931, generalized the hypothesis of the traumatic genesis of dreams, and promoted psychoanalytic research and treatment in the field of psychosomatic disturbances. Celes Cárcamo was analyzed by Paul Schiff and had his control analysis with Rudolph Loewenstein and Charles Odier. He was interested in philosophy, religion, art, and especially therapy, and through his personal prestige and integrity helped introduce psychoanalysis to different social and professional milieus. During his early years, his writings primarily focused on psychoanalytic technique and psychosomatics. The analysis of psychosis became a focus of interest through the impetus of Enrique Pichon-Rivière, along with Arnaldo Rascovsky’s research on mania. PichonRivière emphasized the ‘‘single illness’’ theory and proposed a psychopathology that centered on a central pathogenic kernel or ‘‘fundamental depressive situation.’’ Rascovsky, in his work on fetal psychism, introduced the hypothesis of a prenatal maniacal position, prior to the introduction of the paranoid-schizoid position by Melanie Klein. Arminda Aberastury and Elisabeth Goode de Garma specialized in the psychoanalysis of children and adolescents, basing their work on the theoretical contributions of Melanie Klein. Increasing demand and theoretical interest in this type of therapy helped stimulate the growth of group psychoanalysis. The work of Marie Langer, León Grinberg, and Emilio Rodrigué stands out in this field. The personality and the ideas of these pioneers affected the tenor of their theoretical work. There was a strong Freudian influence, of course, but Otto Fenichel, Hermann Nunberg, Wilhelm Reich, Paul Federn, and Melanie Klein were read as well. Other important work was done by Marie Langer on femininity and by Luisa Alvarez de Toledo in her research on ‘‘association’’ and ‘‘interpretation,’’ which contributed to the interest in language, a subject later taken up by David Liberman. Heinrich Racker made significant contributions to the study of the 117 ARGENTINA instrumental value of countertransference (concomitant with the work of Paula Heimann in Great Britain). The tentative return to democracy in 1958, which coincided with one of the most brilliant moments in the contemporary history of the University of Buenos Aires, provided a favorable framework for the activity of new generations of psychoanalysts. It was during this period that there arose the personalities and ideas that would, to a large extent, define the identify of what came to be known as the ‘‘Argentinian school.’’ Alongside the work of Rascovsky, Garma, Pichon-Rivière, and Racker, the names of León and Rebeca Grinberg, Willy and Madeleine Baranger, Jorge Mom, Jorge Garcı́a Badaracco, Mauricio Abadi, Edgardo Rolla, Fidias Cesio, José Bleger, David Liberman, Joel Zac, Horacio Etchegoyen, Salomón Resnik, Luis Chiozza, Isidoro Berenstein, and many others gained local and international recognition. The dominant theoretical trends revolved around English authors, primarily Melanie Klein and her closest collaborators: Paula Heimann, Hanna Segal, Susan Isaacs, and later Donald Meltzer, Wilfred Bion, and Herbert Rosenfeld. When Klein’s influence reached its peak, there were four dominant trends: dogmatic Kleinians, critical Kleinians (Baranger), those who deepened and extended her work (Grinberg, Bleger, Liberman, Etchegoyen, Zac), and those who responded to her theories with a refreshing (non-Lacanian) return to Freud. During this period, the first non-IPA schools of psychoanalysis appeared, founded by members of the APA, to meet the growing demand for training and the limited opportunities for admission provided by the Association. Another important event that occurred at this time was the introduction of psychoanalysis in hospitals throughout Argentina. Also, during this ten-year period, a school of psychology was created in Buenos Aires. Psychoanalysis played a major role in the curriculum and a number of qualified psychoanalysts were on the staff. The school produced a large number of clinical psychologists. After 1986 they were able to join the APA once it removed the restriction that required practitioners of psychotherapy to be medical doctors. The seventies were a period of increased tension. Changes around the world had repercussions in the country generally and on the psychoanalytic movement in particular. Passionate debates within the psychoanalytic community prevented any kind of consistent intellectual progress. During this confused 11 8 period, a number of well-known analysts (Marie Langer, Diego and Gilou Garcı́a Reynose, among others) left the APA and founded the Plataforma and Documento movements. Other forms of psychotherapy competed for the market of available patients, whose numbers continued to increase rapidly. This was somewhat muted by the economic inflation and the increasing social and individual malaise. Antagonisms among psychoanalysts concerning institutional attitudes and psychoanalytic training grew steadily, culminating in the schism that would divide the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association and give birth, in 1977, to the Asociación Psicoanalı́tica de Buenos Aires (APDEBA), officially recognized the same year by the IPA during its Congress in Jerusalem. It was at this time that Jacques Lacan’s ideas entered the sphere of Argentinian psychoanalysis. These ideas rallied legions of partisans, not only because of their inherent interest but because of the anti-institutional orientation that Lacan embodied within the range of the then current warring ideological positions. Lacan’s followers were soon clamoring for positions in hospitals, universities, and on the pages of the leading reviews. The particular language used by Lacanians made it difficult to confront them or even exchange ideas on the basis of an alternate terminology, which effectively curtailed the traditional intellectual pluralism that had been the norm within psychoanalytic organizations. At the time there were five psychoanalytic institutions affiliated with the IPA: two in Buenos Aires (APA and APDEBA) and three in the cities of Mendoza, Córdoba, and Rosario. Unlike the previous periods, psychoanalysis now had to struggle for its identity and avoid being diluted in a complex and confusing ‘‘world of psych.’’ A number of non-IPA teaching facilities were established, but the level of teaching was inconsistent. In spite of the changing, and unfavorable, cultural context, which contrasted sharply with the climate of the previous periods, the output of the majority of psychoanalysts was considerable, the local associations remained consistently productive, with an abundance of publications of high quality, and Lacanian organizations were highly active, demonstrating the persistent vitality of the discipline in the country. Psychoanalysis in Argentina was influenced by global trends. Willy Baranger, initially influenced by the ideas of Enrique Pichon-Rivière, engaged in a critical examination of key concepts in psychoanalysis, from Melanie INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A R L O W , J A C O B (1912 –2 004) Klein to Jacques Lacan. Because of the lucidity of his approach, Baranger’s work became a key focus of psychoanalytic thought in Argentina, and has remained valid for the second generation of practitioners. An indigenous line of thought focused on method soon developed in Argentina. It was based on the technical work of Heinrich Racker and its greatest representative was Horacio Etchegoyen, who perfected it through his many innovative contributions to the theory of psychoanalytic technique and his marked interest in the epistemological aspects of the discipline. Another local current came into prominence during the eighties and favored a diversification of practice in the psychoanalytic approach to group, family, and couples therapy. There was considerable interest in the social aspects of psychoanalysis, which led to the development of more committed positions among psychoanalysts and a psychoanalytic approach to social phenomena of violence. Developments in the field of psychosis, the diversification of applied psychoanalysis, and work in the field of psychosomatics reflect the range of contributions of contemporary psychoanalysis in Argentina. ROBERTO DORIA-MEDINA JR. SAMUEL ARBISER MOISÉS KIJAK Bibliography Aberastury, Arminda, et al. (1967). Historia enseñanza y ejercicio legal del psicoanálisis. Buenos Aires: Omeba. Cucurullo, Antonio, et al. (1982). La psychanalyse en Argentine. In Roland Jaccard (ed.), Histoire de la psychanalyse, vol. II: 395–444. Paris: Hachette. Mom, Jorge (1982). Asociación psicoanalı́tica argentina 1942–1982. Buenos Aires: A.P.A. Vezzetti, Hugo (1996). Aventuras de Freud en el paı̀s de los argentinos. Buenos Aires: Paidós. Wender, Leonardo, et al. (1992). Argentina. In Peter Kutter (Ed.), Psychoanalysis international, a guide to psychoanalysis throughout the world (vol. 2). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog. ARLOW, JACOB (1912–2004) Jacob A. Arlow, American psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, was born September 3, 1912 in New York, where he died May 21, 2004. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS The youngest of three children, he was raised in modest circumstances in Brooklyn, New York. Subject to frequent childhood illnesses, he spent much time in reading and reflection. With his encyclopedic knowledge and superb intellectual endowment, he found his way to Freud’s writings in his adolescence. Graduating from New York University at the age of twenty, he then earned his M.D., also from NYU. While in the United States Public Health Service, training in psychiatry, he planned his study of psychoanalysis at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. He was appointed a training and supervising analyst soon after his graduation in 1947. In 1960 he was elected president of the American Psychoanalytic Association and was elected Chairman of its Board of Professional Standards from 1967– 1969. From 1963 to 1967 he served as treasurer of the International Psychoanalytic Association. Jacob Arlow’s teaching, presentations, lectures, seminars, and writing illuminated the different areas of psychoanalytic theory, technique, and applied analysis. His teaching was known for its clarity, consistency, and the force of his ideas. Emphasizing methodology and the importance of evidence, he advocated the objective marshaling and organizing of data after careful listening and contemplation. Arlow emphasized the close correlation of observation and inference with critical evaluation. His analytic ideas were lucidly expressed with attention to sound and silence, with apt metaphor. He regarded metaphor as central to clinical psychoanalysis. Arlow had an intense interest in the arts and humanities, and published many relevant psychoanalytic papers. Well versed in Jewish history, he was fluent in biblical Hebrew, a student of the Bible and its psychoanalytic interpretation. The scope and depth Arlow achieved in his work are remarkable. He was the author of more than two hundred papers and a classic volume on structural theory, co-authored with Dr. Charles Brenner. He is regarded as one of the architects of American ego psychology, extending the concept of ego functions far beyond defense as originally formulated. Affects and moods were not simple drive derivatives, but had important regulatory functions, already indicated by Freud in the concept of signal anxiety. In his later work he demonstrated a growing interest in psychoanalytic developmental theory. He contributed importantly to the psychoanalytic concept of unconscious fantasy and its clinical application. For Arlow unconscious fantasy was a compromise 119 ARMAND TROUSSEAU CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL formation, which encompassed elements of both the internal world and external reality, including identifications with external objects. Unconscious fantasies could undergo alteration during different developmental phases, which would then effect changes in symptoms and character. Transference and countertransference could best be understood in terms of their underlying unconscious fantasies. Arlow’s papers included significant expositions of myth and the interrelationship of myth and culture. Myth was described as not only related to infantile unconscious fantasy, but also as a facilitator of the child’s fitting into the particular cultural society in which he was reared. children was first recognized in the wake of the events of May 1968. We must not forget that prior to this time, young children were systematically strapped into their beds except for very limited visiting hours for the family. Generally speaking, very little attention was paid to the consequences of physical suffering, separation from the family, and the illness itself. The work of the pediatricians, psychologists and psychiatrists in Trousseau hospital—accompanied by important though less global actions in other French hospitals— introduced radical reforms in the way children were received, the quality of their stay and most of all in terms of consideration for hospitalized children. Arlow’s original contributions have left a permanent influence and in many respects transformed North American psychoanalytic theory and technique. It was indeed in this hospital that the humanization of pediatrics first blossomed and flourished, before being given concrete form in official decrees (Bulletin officiel, 1983, ‘‘Child hospitalization, Ministry for Social Affairs and National Solidarity, decree no. 83–24 of August 1, 1983’’, special issue no. 83/89b). Actions such as no longer strapping children into their beds, opening hospital sections up to parents, designating the first rooms for mothers, training maternity staff to inform and support parents after the birth of a handicapped child, the prevention of maltreatment, and the creation of a school inside the hospital all served to transform treatment. HAROLD P. BLUM See also: Allergy; Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association; Ego psychology; New York Psychoanalytic Institute; Silence; Therapeutic alliance. Bibliography Arlow, Jacob A. (1961). Ego psychology and the study of mythology. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 9, 371–393. ———. (1962). Conflict, regression and symptom formation. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 44, 12–22. ———. (1969). Unconscious fantasy and disturbances of conscious experience. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 38, 1–17. ———. (1979). The genesis of interpretation. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Supplement, 27, 193– 206. Arlow, Jacob A., and Brenner, Charles (1964). Psychoanalytic concepts and the structural theory. New York: International Universities Press. ARMAND TROUSSEAU CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL The Armand Trousseau Children’s Hospital is a symbolic landmark in the treatment of suffering children, whether from physical or psychical problems. Since the late 1960s, Trousseau has witnessed the birth and development of a massive movement to humanize hospital treatment for children. It is arguable that the necessity for parental presence close to hospitalized 12 0 Simultaneously, this collaboration between pediatricians, psychologists and psychiatrists gave rise to the notion of liaison psychiatry and thus the presence in almost every pediatrics department of psychologists and child psychiatrists. The metapsychological markers introduced by psychoanalysts contributed in a specific and important manner to defining this clinical field. It is no accident that Françoise Marette Dolto conducted a psychotherapy consultation unit for trainee analysts at Trousseau from 1940 to 1978. Her presence left a deep and lasting mark, although we must bear in mind— and this is by no means the least of the paradoxes—that this consultation unit was never a part of the psychiatric department: the premises were simply lent to her and she was never paid by the hospital. All of the movements initiated at Trousseau to improve the conditions governing child hospitalization and treatment link up, at least symbolically, with her combat for the recognition of children as subjects in their own existence. FRÉDÉRIQUE JACQUEMAIN See also: Dolto-Marette, Françoise. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ARROGANCE Bibliography Dolto, Françoise. (1989). Autoportrait d’une psychanalyste. Paris: Le Seuil. Lelong, Marcel, and Lebovici, Serge. (1955). Problèmes psychologiques et psychopathologiques posés par l’enfant à l’hôpital. Archives françaises de pédiatrie, XII (2), 349–367. Rapoport, Danièle. (1972). Le rôle des psychologues dans les services de pédiatrie. In Henri Pieron, Ed., Traité de psychologie appliquée (pp. 149–182). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Soulé, Michel, and Lebovici, Serge. (2003). La connaissance de l’enfant par la psychanalyse. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France. ARPAD. See Little Arpad the boy pecked by a cock ARROGANCE In the course of psychoanalyzing psychotic patients, Bion came across a series of invariant clinical phenomena that seemed to characterize the psychotic personality. In 1958, he presented the paper ‘‘On Arrogance,’’ in which he noted that the psychotic patients he was analyzing seemed to demonstrate a constantly conjoined yet mysteriously dispersed triad of phenomena: arrogance, curiosity, and stupidity. Bion was able to formulate that the root cause of this syndromic cluster of phenomena was ultimately due to a failure on the part of the psychotic patient to have had at his disposal as an infant a mother who was able or willing to tolerate his projective identifications into her. This theme of the unavailability of a receptive mother to tolerate her infant’s projective identifications was to be carried through in two successive papers, ‘‘Attacks on Linking’’ and ‘‘A Theory of Thinking.’’ Ultimately, it became the pivotal alteration of Klein’s concept of intrapsychic projective identification into intersubjective projective identification and the foundation for Bion’s later theories of alpha function and container/contained. Bion found that, in these patients, the triad of curiosity, stupidity, and arrogance was initiated clinically by the revival in the analysis of the presence of an obstructive object, which represented the psychotic infant’s projection-rejecting (part-object) mother in addition to her hostility and the infant’s hostility. As INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS an internalized hybrid, it becomes a formidable, archaic superego, which attacks the infant’s normal curiosity; is arrogant (because of the projective identification of omnipotence); and conveys stupidity because of its hatred of curiosity. Bion states that where the life instincts predominate, pride becomes self-respect, whereas when the death instinct predominates, pride becomes arrogance. The fact that the triad is mysteriously dispersed, and therefore unsuspected as belonging together, is evidence, according to Bion, that a psychotic disaster had taken place. The analytic process itself, which seeks to learn more, constitutes the stimulus for curiosity. Bion states, ‘‘The very act of analyzing the patient makes the analyst an accessory in precipitating regression and turning the analysis itself into a piece of acting out’’ (Bion, 1967, p. 87). The features that characterize the transference are references to the appearance of the analyst and the analysand’s identification with him in terms of being ‘‘blind, stupid, suicidal, curious, and arrogant.’’(Bion, p. 88). What takes place is a hateful attack by this obstructive superego against the ego, either in the analysand or, by projective identification, in the analyst. Thus, either the analyst and or the analysand are targets of the obstructive object’s hateful attacks. Since the aim of analysis is the pursuit of truth (curiosity), the truth-pursuing analyst is considered to have a capacity to contain the discarded, split-off portions of the analysand’s psychotic self, including the obstructive object and its destructive effects. This capacity becomes the target for envious and hateful attacks. In short, as Bion summarizes: What it was that the object could not stand became clearer . . . where it appeared that in so far as I, as analyst, was insisting on verbal communication . . . I was felt to be directly attacking the patient’s methods of communication [i.e., projective identification]. Bion further summarizes that in some patients the denial to the patient of a normal employment of projective identification precipitates a disaster through the destruction of an important link. Inherent in this disaster is the establishment of a primitive superego which denies the use of projective identification. JAMES S. GROTSTREIN See also: Alpha function. 121 AS IF PERSONALITY Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1967). On arrogance. In his Second thoughts (pp. 87–88). London: Heineman. AS IF PERSONALITY In 1934, and again in 1942, Helene Deutsch described what she called the ‘‘as if ’’ (als ob) personality type. She was referring to individuals who leave other people with an impression of inauthenticity, even though they seem to enjoy ‘‘normal’’ relations with those around them and even though they complain of no disorder. They appear perfectly well adjusted, and are even capable of a certain warmth, but in a number of circumstances they betray a lack of emotional depth. This phenomenon does not correspond to a type of repression but rather to a ‘‘real loss of object cathexis. The apparently normal relationship to the world corresponds to a child’s imitativeness and is the expression of identification with the environment, a mimicry which results in an ostensibly good adaptation to the world of reality despite the absence of object cathexis’’ (1942, p. 304).Their creations are, on observation, ‘‘a spasmodic, if skilled, repetition of a prototype without the slightest trace of originality" (p. 303). ‘‘Another characteristic of the ’as if ’ personality is that aggressive tendencies are almost completely masked by passivity, lending an air of negative goodness, of mild amiability which, however, is readily convertible to evil" (p. 305). In the course of psychoanalytic treatment their behavior may seem to indicate excellent cooperation and a certain progress, until the analyst realizes that nothing is actually happening, that the patients have changed nothing in their lives. Although ‘‘a strong identification with the analyst can be used as an active and constructive influence’’ (ibid.), these patients often develop a ‘‘vocation’’ to become psychoanalysts themselves. Deutsch classified such personalities as ‘‘depersonalized’’ and associated them with schizoid-type behavior, insisting that there was a schizoid psychotic core behind their pseudo-normality. They were later classed as ‘‘borderline states’’ presenting ‘‘narcissistic disorders’’ or, according to Heinz Kohut, ‘‘disorders of the Self.’’ Links have also been established between ‘‘as if ’’ personalities and the notion of a ‘‘false Self ’’ developed by Donald W. Winnicott (1962/1965), or Phyllis Greenacre’s studies of ‘‘the imposter’’ (1958). Masud Khan related the etiology of ‘‘as if ’’ personalities to the 12 2 failure of the superego or the absence of a personal ideal ego, suggesting that although these subjects give the impression of being psychopathic or immoral ‘‘they have a very highly organized ego-ideal and all their attempts are to approximate to its demands" (1960, p. 435). In any event, Deutsch’s initial description corresponds to a reality that continues to be confirmed in clinical experience as in everyday life. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Autistic capsule/nucleus; Blank/nondelusional psychoses; Depersonalization; Deutsch-Rosenbach, Helene; Imposter; Lie; Normality. Bibliography Deutsch, Helene. (1934). Über einen Typus der Pseudoaffektivität (‘‘Als ob’’). Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, 20. ———. (1942). Some forms of emotional disturbance and their relationship to schizophrenia. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 11. Greenacre, Phyllis. (1958). The impostor. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 27 (3), 359–382. Khan, Masud. (1960). Clinical aspects of the schizoid personality: Affects and technique. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 41, 430–437. Winnicott, Donald W. (1965). Ego distortion in terms of true and false Self. In The maturational processes and the facilitating environment (pp. 140–152). London: Hogarth and the Institute for Psycho-Analysis. (Original work published 1962) ASSOCIATION PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE FRANCE The Association psychanalytique de France (APF) was created in 1964 as a result of dissension within the Société française de psychanalyse (SFP) over the training of future psychoanalysts and the recognition of the APF by the International Psychoanalytic Association. Two factions evolved within the association. One of them, which became a majority in the SFP in November 1963, was led by Daniel Lagache, Juliette and Georges Favez, Wladimir Granoff, Didier Anzieu, and René Pujol, along with the five sponsors of the July 1963 motion (Jean-Louis Lang, Jean Laplanche, Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, Victor Smirnoff, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ASSOCIATION PSYCHANALYTIQUE and Daniel Widlöcher). The group was recognized by the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) as the only ‘‘French Study Group.’’ On June 9, 1964, the association filed its bylaws, and was, after the dissolution of the SFP in January 1965, recognized as a member society of the IPA. It then had ten accredited members, 18 associates, and about 30 students. In December 1999, in addition to a guest member and eleven honorary members, there were 34 accredited members, 27 members, and more than 180 trainee analysts, including ten who would soon be eligible for membership. The association’s general orientation was described in two talks given by Daniel Lagache in 1964 and 1965, and again by Victor Smirnoff in 1977. The association’s objectives can be found in the policy statements published each year in Documents et Débats, the association’s journal. These can be summarized as: freedom of expression in scientific discourse without concern for any narrowly construed form of orthodoxy, a rejection of dogmatism or any ‘‘overarching’’ authority; a heterodox approach to theoretical sources, leading to the coexistence of several trends in clinical psychology, dynamic psychology, Lacanian thought (exclusive of training), philosophy, and the work of Freud; the periodic revision of ‘‘classical’’ positions in psychoanalysis, even those not deeply rooted in psychoanalysis, especially through a rereading of Freud in the light of current understanding; an openness toward other disciplines and especially toward the various branches of the humanities; and periodic consideration of the relations of the institution to its various categories of members, including trainee analysts. APF training is one of the most important features of the association. The reasons for the split were obviously not restricted to the questionable practices of certain members or a leadership dispute, and fundamental modifications concerning recruitment and training turned out to be essential. These issues have been an ongoing element within the APF since its inception and were concretized in the reforms of 1969–1971, which were finally completed in 1978. They can be summarized as follows: elimination of the training analyst under institutional control and elimination of the group of training analysts, and complete separation between institutional bodies and personal analysis. Regardless of where the original analysis occurred, this separation was appreciated by the members of the training committee before whom candidates for admission appeared as trainee analysts; once INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DE FRANCE accepted, they were allowed to participate from the outset in scientific and teaching activities. The approval of controlled analyses was a joint effort of the members of the training committee, since they alone were authorized to do so, acceptance into the program (including participation in classes) being the responsibility of the members’ council. The candidate was then asked to present a paper before being accepted as a member, which was submitted to a vote by the members. This system, which did not comply with the customary practices issued by the IPA (in the ‘‘French’’ system, members alone are responsible for training), has always been a topic of discussion and is currently oriented toward the conditions of supervision and the paper. It should also be pointed out that trainee analysts participate at every level of the life of the institution and are represented, separately and independently of the training committee, on all the committees, and even participate in the association’s administrative affairs. There is also a welcoming and study group for new candidates. Teaching, which is under the supervision of an ad hoc committee, is not separate from the association’s scientific and research activities. It consists primarily in conferences and discussions, group activities, periodic meetings to discuss clinical issues or technique, and research groups. It is not mandatory and is not subject to individual control. Members can participate in these activities as soon as they are accepted into the program. In 1999 there were 32 groups or seminars open to trainee analysts; a number of full members were participants as well. Scientific activities, also under committee control, consist (in addition to the research groups mentioned above) in monthly meetings often focused on an annual topic, two annual colloquia (the ‘‘Entretiens,’’ formerly the ‘‘Entretiens de Vaucresson’’), and two annual days reserved for active members and also involving a specific subject. There are also a number of Open Sessions, such as the current ‘‘Soirées de l’APF’’ (three per year), and APF participation in a number of French, European, and International colloquia, two of which, the Congress of French Languages and the Journées Occitanes, are organized with the assistance of the APF. Five issues of the Bulletin intérieur de l’A.P.F. were published between 1964 and 1969. This was followed 123 ASTHMA by Documents et Débats, which ran from October 1970 to December 1999, that is, 52 issues. A periodical newsletter and annual report on the activities of the association are also published. The APF has no journal of its own but its members are active participants in the publication of several specialized journals: the Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse, created in 1970 by Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, Psychanalyse à l’université, created in 1975 by Jean Laplanche, L’Écrit du temps, and L’Inactuel by Marie Moscovici, Le fait de l’analyste by Michel Gribinski. In addition to reprinting Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis’s The Language of Psycho-Analysis, the association supervised the translation of the complete works of Sigmund Freud, published by Presses Universitaires de France (PUF) under the direction of Jean Laplanche and André Bourguignon, with the collaboration of Pierre Cotet and François Robert (in progress; the final work will comprise 21 volumes). Member publications appear in collections edited by a member of the APF in the following series: Bibliothèque de Psychanalyse, published by PUF under the direction of Jean Laplanche; Connaissance de l’Inconscient, published by Gallimard under the direction of Jean-Bertrand Pontalis; and Psychismes and Inconscient et Culture, published by Dunod under the direction of Didier Anzieu. Although relatively small in size and with little desire for expansion or control, the APF remains ambitious in its goals and open to new ideas. Its headquarters and secretariat are located at 24 Place Dauphine in Paris. It is here that the association’s councils and committees meet and where the association’s library, containing some four thousand volumes and documents, is housed. JEAN-LOUIS LANG Bibliography Arfouilloux, Jean-Claude. (1989). La formation dans la S.F.P. et dans l’A.P.F. Malaise dans la culture analytique. Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse, 2, 343–368. Lagache, Daniel. (1986). Adresses présidentielles. In Oeuvres (Vol. VI. La folle du logis, la psychanalyse comme science exacte, pp. 149–158). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Mijolla, Alain de. (1995). Splits in the French psychoanalytic movement between 1953 and 1964. In R. Steiner and J. Johns (Eds.), Within time and beyond time (pp. 1–24). London: Karnac, 2001. 12 4 Smirnoff, Victor. (1977, April). Intervention. Documents et Débats, 13, 17–22. ASTHMA Due to its frequent association with psychoaffective symptoms, asthma is considered a classic psychosomatic disorder. The Hungarian-American analyst Franz Alexander was an early proponent of psychosomatic medicine, and during the 1940s he and Thomas French applied the ‘‘specific emotion theory’’ to try to establish a link between the onset of asthmatic attacks and emotional conflicts. Their research suggested that pregenital instinctual desires, experienced as threatening to the dependent mother-child dyad, could give rise to bronchial symptoms, noting that breathing is the first independent post-natal physiological function. It is possible to view the infant’s double separation from the mother—biological and psychoaffective—as reviving the Freud-Rank birth trauma debate. A generation later in 1963, research by Peter Hobart Knapp suggested that allergic diathesis was a necessary precondition to developing symptoms, and offered as possible triggering mechanisms either hysterical conversion or conflicts of oral incorporation expressed through the respiratory apparatus. In France, Pierre Marty, one of the founders of the Ecole de Psychosomatique de Paris, theorized that asthma, like other allergic manifestations, arises from a specific type of object relationship that involves a form of profound and almost instantaneous mimetic identification that includes a projective movement identifying object with subject. The difficulty of maintaining such a state of confused fusion either produces some accommodation or, in the case of an intractable object, creates a distance from the object that may be considered at once symbolic and real. The separation from the object whose own characteristics are too distant from, or independent of, the subject, occurs without the work of mourning. The asthmatic attack breaks out during conflict between two objects, both equally invested but themselves in conflict. The asthmatic attack externalizes and diverts internal psychological destruction. ROBERT ASSÉO See also: Allergy; Psychosomatic. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ATTACHMENT Bibliography Alexander, Franz, and French, Thomas M. (1941). Psychogenic factors in bronchial asthma. Washington, DC: National Research Council. Bauduin, Andrée. (1985). L’asthme bronchique, aspects dynamiques et psychanalytiques. Revue médicale de Liège, 90 (22). Fenichel, Otto. (1953). The collected papers of Otto Fenichel. First and second series (H. Fenichel and D. Rapaport, Eds.). New York: Norton. Knapp, Peter H. (1989). Psychosomatic aspects of bronchial asthma. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. ASTHMA IN CONTEMPORARY MEDICINE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS post-Kleinian perspective; she describes asthma as one of a number of disorders that in some cases may be viewed as arising from persistent primitive mental states in the context of what Esther Bick terms ‘‘adhesive identification.’’ JOHN GALBRAITH SIMMONS See also: Asthma; Adhesive identification; Psychosomatic. Bibliography Fenichel, Otto. (1945). The psychoanalytic theory of neurosis. New York: Norton. Gregerson, M. Banks. The curious 2000-year case of asthma. Psychosomatic Medicine, 62, 816–827. A fairly uncommon disease in 1900, a century later asthma represented a growing international health problem. Although the early psychosomatic models proposed by Alexander, Fenichel, and other first and second generation analysts were eventually supplanted, numerous research efforts in a variety of disciplines have failed to develop a comprehensive understanding of the disorder. Although asthma is treatable as a chronic condition, it remains poorly understood. Mitrani, J. (1993). ‘‘Unmentalized’’ experience in the etiology and treatment of psychosomatic asthma. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 29 (2), 314–342. The original psychoanalytic research into asthma in American medicine represents a historical point of reference in subsequent reviews of the literature. But from a medical point of view, its specific hypotheses could not be easily refined for further research, while typology of the disorder itself changed considerably. In the mid-twentieth century Hans Selye’s holistic concept of stress created grounds for a macrocosmic explanation that ultimately proved valuable, if unquantifiable. At the same time, investigations into the physiology, immunology, and genetics of asthma all yielded significant, though sometimes conflicting, results. Although this research helped create a pharmacological armamentarium for palliative treatment, studies in all these areas only reinforced the hypothesis that psychological factors play significant roles in asthma, which continues to qualify as a psychosomatic disorder. In this context, psychoanalysis remains a plausible treatment for reducing symptomatic attacks and alleviating frequently comorbid conditions, such as anxiety and depression, as do other modalities, including relaxation therapy, hypnosis, and other types of psychotherapy. The term attachment is used in contemporary scientific literature in four distinct senses: a form of behavior whose goal is to maintain proximity to the other person (smiles, vocalization, tears, approach behavior); the bonds of attachment that are related to the affiliation between parents and children; the system of attachment, in which the child’s goal is to seek proximity with the attachment figure and obtain an internal feeling of security; and, finally, relationships that involve the offer of attention, emotional availability, and the search for comfort in parent-child relations. More recent psychoanalytic conceptualizations of asthma include work by Judith Mitrani (1993) from a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Wright, R. J., Rodriguez, M., and Cohen, S. (1998). Review of psychosocial stress and asthma: an integrated biopsychosocial approach. Thorax, 53, 1066–1074. ATTACHMENT Attachment is a behavioral control system of biological origin, which involves the use of the attachment figure by the child as a ‘‘secure base’’ from which it can explore the environment. In John Bowlby’s theory, the form assumed by the child’s attachment is based on its actual interactive experiences with its attachment figures and not with the fantasies they arouse. These feelings of security or insecurity (anxious attachment, resistant attachment, avoidance attachment, disorganized attachment) about the parental figures are organized during the first year of life in the form of an ‘‘internal model of work’’ that will give rise to stable forms of reaction in the face of distress and novelty. 125 ATTENTION From the start of the twentieth century, the medical literature was cognizant of the effects of the lack of maternal care of infants (Chapin, 1916; Spitz, R., 1945). In 1951 Bowlby wrote a monograph on maternal care and mental health. In 1959 Harlow, working with primates, provided experimental proof of the independence of attachment and the satisfaction of physiological needs. This led Bowlby to propose, in 1969, the concept of ‘‘attachment behavior’’ and to emphasize its importance for normal development. Bowlby’s student Mary Ainsworth proposed the experimental paradigm of the ‘‘strange situation,’’ which could be used, in the laboratory or at home, to study the reactions of infants over a year old to the presence of a stranger, followed by a short separation and reunion. It was used to classify attachment behavior with either of the parents into types: secure attachment (type B) against various insecure attachments (anxious-avoidant, or type A; anxiousresistant, or type C; and disorganized, or type D). The work of Mary Main focused on describing parents’ speech about their children and in classifying it into coherent, avoidant, involved, or disorganized types. Longitudinal studies show a clear correlation between the speech category of the parent most directly involved with the child and the type of attachment formed by the child. The relation appears clearly during experiences of absence and abuse and the phenomenon of disorganized attachment. Attachment is not a psychoanalytic concept; it is part of ethology. However, the concept was developed and applied within the context of psychopathology and the study of infant development by a psychoanalyst, a leading member of the British Society of Psychoanalysis, who had been responsible for training for many years. To the great regret of its inventor, the concept of attachment, although it underwent considerable development in the field of developmental research, was not extensively used in clinical practice, at least, not until recently. Of course, the concept of attachment clashes with the classical theory of anaclisis. It is also true that from the point of view of attachment theory, infantile sexuality is of little importance and the emphasis is on the real and repeated experiences of early childhood. However, contemporary psychoanalysts would be wrong to neglect this essential dimension of human relations, important because of its development in the first year of life, the formation of the different styles of attachment described by Main and observable after the first year of infancy in Ainsworth’s ‘‘strange situation,’’ as well as the persistence of attachment in adolescent and adult life. Attachment 12 6 theory clarifies the development of early parent-infant relations and the modes of organizing representations. Finally, there is remarkable convergence between the concept of attachment and psychoanalytic theory in the work of John Bowlby and Mary Main on the transgenerational transmission of styles of attachment through the consistency of parents’ speech concerning their own infancy. Starting from the ‘‘secure base’’ represented by the analyst, the patient can explore the disturbances in his earliest relationships and eliminate their continuation in his interpersonal relations and their transmission to his own children through the expression, in narrative form, of his emotional experience, which is re-expressed in the transference. The concept of attachment assumes its place in psychopathology as a tool for analyzing early development and exploring its structure in the psychoanalytic experience. ANTOINE GUÉDENEY See also: Abandonment; Amae, concept of; Anaclisis/ anaclitic; Aphanisis; Bowlby, Edward John Mostyn; Ethology and psychoanalysis; Individual; Infant development; Infantile neurosis; Maternal; Maternal care; Primary need; Sucking/thumbsucking; Tenderness. Bibliography Ainsworth, Mary; Blehar M.C.; Waters E.; et al. (1978), Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation, Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. Bowlby, John. (1969). Attachment and loss (Vol. 1). London: Hogarth Press. ———. (1988). A secure base: Clinical applications of attachment theory. London: Routledge. Holmes, J. (1993). John Bowlby and attachment theory. London: Routledge. Main, Mary, Kaplan, N., Cassidy, Jude. (1985). Security in infancy, childhood and adulthood: A move to the level of representation. Monographs of Society for Research in Child Development, 50 (1–2), 66–104. Spitz, René. (1945). In R. S. Eissler, (Ed.), The psychoanalytic study of the child (Vol. I). New York: International Universities Press. Chapin, H.D. (1916). A scheme of state control for dependent infants. Medical Record, 84, 1081–1084. ATTENTION The word ‘‘attention’’ comes from the Latin attention, itself derived from attendere, which means ‘‘to turn INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ATTENTION one’s mind towards’’—to turn one’s mind or perhaps one’s senses. In any case, the term is currently very ambiguous, and all the more so since it is used in different senses by researchers and clinicians referring to quite varied epistemological horizons. perceived by the x neurons but as hypercathected by an energy issuing from the Y neurons. He made attention capable of expectation in that it was responsible for apprehending indications of quality from perception and thus anticipating cathexis by wishes. In France, Didier Houzel has made the most careful study of the concept in recent years, notably in relation to infant observation. According to this author, if the function of attention is only rarely mentioned in the psychoanalytic literature, it is in part due to the ambiguity it evokes and also in part because attention is traditionally linked to consciousness without there ever existing any clear definition of a possible unconscious attention. Thus Freud distinguished ‘‘ordinary thought,’’ directed toward the search for an object of satisfaction, and ‘‘observing thought’’ (1950c [1895], p. 363) which is turned more towards the internal world than the external and is supported by the function of attention. According to him, attention has one valence directed toward the interior, or the intrapsychic world, and it is this centripetal attention that allows neuronal facilitations that would be impossible with only centrifugal attention. Freud mentions attention for the first time in his book On Aphasia (1891b), where he discusses divided attention (geteilte Aufmerksamkeit): ‘‘When I read proofs with the intention of paying special attention to the letters and other symbols, the meaning of what I am reading escapes me to such a degree that I require a second perusal for the purpose of correcting the style. If, on the other hand, I read a novel, which holds my interest, I overlook all misprints and it may happen that I retain nothing of the names of the persons figuring in the book except for some meaningless feature or perhaps the recollection that they were long or short, and that they contained an unusual letter such as x or z. Again, when I have to recite, whereby I have to pay special attention to the sound impressions of my words and to the intervals between them, I am in danger of caring too little about the meaning, and as soon as fatigue sets in I am reading in such a way that the listener can still understand, but I myself no longer know what I have been reading. These are phenomena of divided attention which are of particular importance here’’ (pp. 75–76). Freud thus attributed to attention an ability to forge links between different components of the sensory data constitutive of the word, distancing himself from localizationist theories of aphasia. In this linking function of attention, one can see the precursor of what would later come to be called ‘‘suspended attention’’ of the analyst and its crucial characteristic of non-selectivity, which is an important component of technique. It was in the Project for a Scientific Psychology (1950c [1895]) that Freud proposed an actual theory of attention. Having distinguished between Y neurons sensitive to quantities of excitation and x neurons sensitive to qualities of excitation, he defined attention as a hypercathexis of the indications of quality that are INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), he assigned attention the task of transmitting psychic material from the preconscious system to the conscious system, thus giving a certain primacy to continuous attention. In 1911, he specified the dynamic character of attention in his article, ‘‘Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning’’: ‘‘A special function was instituted which had periodically to search the external world in order that its data might be familiar already if an urgent internal need should arise—the function of attention. Its activity meets the sense-impressions half way, instead of awaiting their appearance’’ (1911b, p. 220). He was here underscoring the active aspect of the function of attention. Freud returned to the question of attention yet again in ‘‘Recommendations to Physicians Practising PsychoAnalysis’’ (1912e), where he defined ‘‘evenly-suspended attention’’ as the desirable attitude of the analyst during the session. This attitude, which certainly puts less strain on the analyst, is justified mainly on the grounds that non-selectivity toward clinical material, as the counterpart for the analyst of the rule of free association for the patient, promotes a more direct contact between the ideational worlds of the two participants. Wilfred Bion extended the concept of attention beyond sensory reality and applied it to psychic reality, a direction that Freud had indicated in An Outline of Psycho-Analysis. This theme is central to Bion’s book Attention and Interpretation (1970), in which he described attention as the matrix within which the diverse elements of mental life come to be united and combined. Thus the Bionian perspective is highly dynamic. Moreover, on the interpersonal level, Bion described the ‘‘mother’s capacity for reverie’’ (Bion, 1967, p. 116), 127 A U B R Y W E I S S , J E N N Y (1 903 –19 87) referring to the ‘‘function’’ by which, thanks to her processes of attention, capacity, and transformation, the mother helps the child to render his or her environment thinkable so that the child will be progressively able to integrate it into its own ‘‘apparatus for dealing with thoughts’’ (Bion, 1962, p. 83). What is fundamentally involved is a work of detoxification that makes it possible for the child to metabolize (on the digestive model of the psyche) protopsychic materials that are at first unusable by the child alone. Maternal attention represents a first step towards and an essential precondition for the work of transformation that Bion referred to as equally important to his experimental paradigm, which was that of analytic treatment, and especially the treatment of psychotic adults. He recommended that analysts be without ‘‘memory and desire’’ (1970, p. 31), which is certainly not to be taken literally, but aims to create in the analyst a particular state of attention and perhaps, according to Houzel, an unconscious state of attention. The most recent work in the field of early childhood analysis, especially that of the post-Kleinians, places more and more emphasis on attention as the cornerstone of the therapeutic process. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Active imagination (analytical psychology); Cathexis; Conscious processes; Dismantling; Framework of the psychoanalytic treatment; Free association; Evenlysuspended attention; Fundamental rule; Grid; Hypercathexis; Infant observation (therapeutic); Learning from Experience; Perception-consciousness (Pcpt.-Cs.); ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology, A’’; Psychoanalytic treatment; ‘‘Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psycho-Analysis’’; Sudden involuntary idea; Thoughtthinking apparatus. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1970). Attention and interpretation. London: Tavistock Publications. ———. (1962). Learning from experience. London: Tavistock Publications. ———. (1967). Second thoughts. New York: Aronson. Freud, Sigmund. (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12: 213–226. ———. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. 12 8 ———. (1891b). On aphasia: A critical study. (E. Stengel, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press, 1953. ———. (1912e). Recommendations to physicians practising psycho-analysis. SE, 12: 109–120. AUBRY WEISS, JENNY (1903–1987) Jenny Aubry Weiss, a physician in the Hospitals of Paris and French psychoanalyst, was born on October 8, 1903, in Paris, where she died on January 28, 1987. She was born into an upper-middle-class family; her mother was Jewish and her father Protestant. She studied medicine and interned with Clovis Vincent, was an assistant with Georges Heuyer, and, in 1939, was the second woman to be appointed as a physician in the Hospitals of Paris. In 1928 she married Alexandre Roudinesco, a pediatrician, with whom she had three children. She later divorced Roudinesco and married Pierre Aubry in 1952. In 1939 she became a physician at an institute for gifted children (the first in France). She accepted a number of Jewish children and hired a number of Jewish personnel, saving them from the concentration camps. She prepared certificates of tuberculosis for young men likely to be sent to the forced labor camps in Germany. In 1944 she received the Medal of the Resistance. She was head of the pediatrics department of the Ambroise Paré Hospital in 1946, of the polyclinic on the Boulevard Ney in 1952, and of the pediatrics department of the Hôpital des Enfants Malades from 1956 to 1968. She met Anna Freud in 1948 and began psychoanalysis with Michel Cénac, Sacha Nacht, and Jacques Lacan, whose loyal supporter she remained during the sectarian battles of 1953 and 1963. An excellent clinician, she realized quite early in her professional life that psychoanalytic insight can help to understand the development of children and their illnesses. Convinced of the importance of interactions between mother and child, mother and father, and parents and children, and of the key role played by the mother-child-father relationship, she was able to verbalize children’s suffering and help their parents make sense of their physical and psychic disturbances. The publications, films, and papers she produced bear witness to this, as do her many innovations in the hospital, where she managed to create a pleasant and friendly environment within a recreational framework. She persevered in her efforts to create positions for kindergarten teachers and educators, and she included psychoanalysts on her staff. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A U L A G N I E R - S P A I R A N I , P I E R A (1923 –1 990) In 1948 she appointed a teacher for her young patients and studied dyslexia. She brought psychoanalysts to the school for gifted children. She initiated a research program on the lack of maternal care with John Bowlby, and she formed a team with Myriam David to observe and establish analytic cures for children assigned to her department (Dépôt d’enfants de parents de Rosan). In 1950 she created a specialized family-placement service so that children under her care could benefit from a family environment and analysis. Through the World Health Organization, she helped found, in July 1950, the first Guidance Center for Children in Soissons, France. In 1952, together with Odile Lévy-Bruhl and Raymonde Bargues, she studied children in the hospital day-care center and their entry into a preschool setting. In 1954 she was asked by the World Health Organization to study abandonment and child development in Africa. At the Hôpital des enfants malades, with Raymonde Bargues, Ginette Raimbault, Anne-Lise Stern, and René Tostain, she trained pediatricians and nurses to be sensitive to the needs of children and parents, and established a psychoanalytic practice. From the hospital administration she obtained approval for parents to visit from noon to 8:00 p.m. After her retirement to Aix-en-Provence in 1968, she helped promote psychoanalysis in southeast France. In 1971 she organized and introduced the meeting of the École freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris). After the death of Pierre Aubry in 1972, she returned to Paris, where she resumed her psychoanalytic practice, served as a training analyst, and remained an active participant in the École freudienne de Paris until its dissolution in 1980. MARCELLE GEBER See also: France; Technique with children, psychoanalytic. Bibliography Aubry, Jenny. (1983). Enfance abandonnée. Paris: ScarabéeMétailier. Bargues, René. (1964) Les nourrices d’un placement familial curatif des carences affectives graves de la première enfance. Évolution psychiatrique, 3. Lévy-Bruhl, Odile, and Aubry, Jenny. (1956). L’adaptation à l’école maternelle. Enfance, 1. Roudinesco, Jenny, Trélat, Jean, and Trélat, M. (1949). Étude de quarante cas de dyslexie d’évolution. Enfance, 1. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Roudinesco, Jenny; David, Myriam; Nicolas, J.; et al. (1952). Réactions immédiates des jeunes enfants à la séparation d’avec leur mère. Courrier du C.I.E., 2–3, 66–78, 131–142. AULAGNIER-SPAIRANI, PIERA (1923–1990) A physician, psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst, Piera Aulagnier-Spairani (formerly Castoriadis-Aulagnier) was born on November 19, 1923, in Milan, Italy, and died on March 31, 1990, in Paris. She studied medicine in Rome, her early medical calling marked by her sustained focus on clinical practice. In 1950 she moved to France, where she completed her studies in psychiatry. She trained in psychoanalysis with Jacques Lacan from 1955 to 1961. As his student, she joined ranks with him when he was expelled from the Société française de psychanalyse (French Society of Psychoanalysis) in 1963, and she was among the psychoanalysts who first formed the École freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris) in 1964. True to her personal standards of rigor, she later resigned from that organization when she found herself in disagreement with Lacan’s positions on the training of psychoanalysts. In 1969, immediately after her break with Lacan, along with François Perrier, Jean–Paul Valabrega, and other analysts, she founded the Fourth Group of the O.P.L.F. (Organisation psychanalytique de langue française [French-language psychoanalytic organization]) in which she remained a central figure, although it was never her wish to impose a hierarchical structure within the group. Throughout these tumultuous years, she was known for her independent–mindedness and the calm in debates that led her to abstain from participating in vain polemics. However, her reserve was never synonymous with indifference. Her concern about the risk of conformity that threatens psychoanalytic and indeed other societies led her to denounce that tendency in 1969, when she wrote, ‘‘the audacity and genius needed to transgress accepted wisdom do not guarantee that the transgressors will be able to pass on to their heirs the ability to dismantle the barrier that has been broken through.’’ This spirit was reflected in her activity in the two she successively founded at the Presses Universitaires de France: L’Inconscient, with Jean Clavreul and Con129 AUSTRALIA rad Stein in 1967–1968, and then Topique, beginning in 1969. In both publications, pluralism and respect for the authors’ thought always won out over issues of institutional affiliation. Daily clinical practice and the ongoing pursuit of her writing were intimately linked for Aulagnier. In 1975, while she was married to Cornelius Castoriadis, her first book, The Violence of Interpretation: From Pictogram to Statement (under the name Piera Castoriadis-Aulagnier) was published by the Presses Universitaires de France. This work became an obligatory reference for those who felt the need, based on the clinical treatment of psychosis, to reexamine Freudian metapsychology. Two other books, published under the name Piera Aulagnier, followed: Les Destins du plaisir. Aliénation, amour, passion (1979; The destiny of pleasure: Alienation, love, passion) and L’Apprentihistorien et le maı̂tre sorcier. Du discours identifiant au discours délirant (1984; The apprentice historian and the master sorcerer: From the discourse of identification to the discourse of delusion); these books also found a broad readership. The long series of articles written beginning in 1961, most of them published in Topique, the revue she headed from its founding in 1969, were collected and reprinted in Un interprète un quête de sens (An interpreter in search of meaning; 1986). All are indebted to Aulagnier for a new approach not only to psychosis, but also a new theory of representation that considers the psychotic’s relationship to discourse. Beyond this, she established an entirely new theorization of the I and the conditions in which it comes into being. Her conceptual inventions emerged in close connection with clinical practice and under strict critical self-scrutiny, leaving those who knew her with lasting impressions of her tireless and passionate interest in the fundamental issues not just of psychoanalysis, but of human experience. AUSTRALIA Sigmund Freud wrote his short paper ‘‘On Psychoanalysis’’ in response to an invitation from Andrew Davidson, the Secretary of the Section of Psychological Medicine and Neurology for the Australasian Medical Congress in Sydney in September 1911. Papers by Carl Jung and Havelock Ellis were also presented. Ernest Jones was another distinguished early contributor, for he personally read a paper at the Australasian Medical Congress in 1914 entitled ‘‘Some Practical Aspects of Psychoanalytic Treatment.’’ Two notable Australian figures who accepted Freud’s challenge to develop the study of psychoanalysis were Paul Greig Dane and Roy Coupland Winn, who practiced between the two world wars. Before the World War I (1914–1918) a Presbyterian clergyman, Donald Fraser, had lectured on psychoanalysis in Sydney, but Dane appears to have been the first physician to become a wholehearted and consistent exponent of Freud’s early theories in the careful use of catharsis and abreaction after the war. Paul Dane’s interest in psychological methods of treatment was stimulated by the work of earlier pioneers such as John William Springthorpe and Clarence Godfrey. Dane was one of the first in Australia to use hypnosis and abreactive techniques. He also introduced group therapy for returned soldiers His interest stemmed from contact with Joan Riviere in England. Dane, although not an analyst himself, was the first chairman of the Melbourne Institute for PsychoAnalysis and was intimately associated with its foundation and early history. Dane died in 1950. Siegfried Fink, an associate member of both the Swiss and the British Psycho-Analytical Societies, worked in Sydney until his death in the 1960s. Fink was thus a contemporary of both Dane and Winn. He was one of the founding councilors of the Sydney Institute for Psychoanalysis. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1998). Penser la psychose. Une lecture de l’oeuvre de Piera Aulagnier. Paris: Dunod. Roy Coupland Winn, after serving with great distinction in World War I, returned to the medical staff of Sydney Hospital and after several years went to London to continue medical and psychiatric training, becoming an associate member of the British PsychoAnalytical Society and later a full member. Back in Sydney, for several years he was Honorary Physician at Sydney Hospital but in 1931 he resigned and went into full-time psychoanalytic practice. Troisier, Hélène. (1998). Piera Aulagnier. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Winn was thus the first full-time analyst in Australia. Later, when Clara Lazar-Geroe came to Australia from SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: École freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris); France; Inconscient, L’; Interpretation; Pass, the; Psychanalyse et les nevroses, La; Topique; Viderman, Serge. Bibliography 13 0 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AUSTRALIA Hungary and began to train analysts at the Melbourne Institute, Winn was very supportive. He joined the Board of Directors of the institute, a position that he held until his death in 1961. In 1951 he had made a generous endowment in founding the second training institute in this country, the Sydney Institute of Psychoanalysis, with Andrew Peto, also from Hungary, as training analyst (Graham, 1965). Clara Lazar Geroe, the first Australian training analyst, arrived in Melbourne on March 14, 1940. She received her training in medicine in Prague. Her psychoanalytic training in Budapest naturally was in the school of Sandor Ferenczi, her training analyst being Michael Balint. At the International Psychoanalytical Congress in Paris in 1938, Ernest Jones suggested that Hungarian analysts seeking emigration might consider New Zealand and Australia. Negotiations regarding New Zealand failed. ‘‘However, in Melbourne and Sydney some influential people, among them Bishop Burgman, Paul Dane, M. D. Silberberg, Reginald S. Ellery, and Roy Coupland Winn, reacted positively to the idea of an analyst coming to Australia. Their enthusiasm, and the enterprise of Paul Dane particularly, carried the day. After much negotiation, Geroe, with her family, settled in Melbourne to become Australia’s first training analyst working at the newly formed Melbourne Institute for Psychoanalysis. She had been appointed as a training analyst by the British Psycho-Analytical Society of which she was a member’’ (Graham, 1980). The founding of the first institute was made possible by a generous gift from Lorna Traill. The first meeting was held in the home of Hal Maudsley, a central figure in the history of psychiatry in Australia. The institute was opened at 111 Collins Street, Melbourne, by Judge Foster on the birthday of its benefactor, Lorna Traill, on October 10, 1940. The first Board of Directors included Paul Dane, Norman Albiston, Reginald S. Ellery, P.Guy Reynolds, and A.R. Phillips. There were two psychoanalysts on the Board, Ernest Jones of London and Roy Coupland Winn from Sydney. Geroe started her work with the institute and in private practice early in 1941. She conducted a large seminar for twenty to twenty-five doctors, psychiatrists, psychologists, educationists, probation officers, and others. The traditional small seminar method was followed for candidates in training, both medical and nonmedical. Geroe also organized many other seminars for groups of teachers, kindergartens, and parents for INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS discussion of their special problems with infants and children. The Institute Clinic catered to patients who could not afford private analytical fees; Geroe’s Child Guidance Clinic developed a close liaison with the Children’s Court clinic. Geroe lectured for many years in the Psychology Department of the University of Melbourne and to students taking the Diploma of Psychological Medicine. She was appointed Honorary Psychoanalyst at Royal Melbourne Hospital—certainly the first appointment of this type in Australia. The first medical student to go into training in Australia was Frank Graham, who started with Winn in 1939, then began training with Geroe in 1941. The first psychiatrist or medico to train was A.R. Phillips and the first lay analyst Janet Nield. Early on, psychoanalysts qualified or in practice in Australia were all members or associate members of the British Psychoanalytical Society. They formed ‘‘The Australian Society of Psychoanalysts,’’ a sort of unofficial branch of the British Society but having no independent status. Harry Southwood and Frank Graham were the first to graduate in Australia in this way as associate members of the British Psycho-Analytical Society. In 1966 the British Society suggested that this interim arrangement should be formalized by an Australian application to the International Psychoanalytical Association for Study Group status. At the IPA Congress at Copenhagen in 1967, with the support of the British Society, the Australian Study Group was established under the direction of an international Sponsoring Committee. At this stage, there were twelve Australian psychoanalysts, members of the Study Group, who were appointed direct members of the IPA. They were: O.H.D. Blomfield, R.A. Brookes, Clara Lazar Geroe, Frank W. Graham, I.H. Martin, R. Martin, J. Nield, D. O’Brien, V. Roboz, Rose Rothfield, H.M. Southwood, and I. Waterhouse. Of the seven members of the IPA Sponsoring Committee, Fanny Wride (chair), Adam Limentani, Ilse Hellman, Lois Munro, and Leo Rangell all visited Australia at various times and helped with clinical and structural development. The other members of the Sponsoring Committee were Maria Montessori and M. Mitscherlich-Nielson. In Vienna, in July 1971, the IPA at its business meeting accepted the recommendation of the Sponsoring Committee and raised the status of the Study Group to that of Provisional Society. After the requisite two years as a Provisional Society, the Australian Psycho131 AUSTRIA analytical Society was admitted as a Component Society of the International Psychoanalytical Association at the IPA Congress in Paris in 1973. The constitution of the third Institute in Adelaide in 1979 represented the fruition of many years of dedicated and determined work by Harry Southwood. Assistance by the IPA was required in relation to the coordination of training in the three centers. The IPA appointed two Site Visiting Committees. The first in 1980 (Drs. Joseph, McLaughlin, Moses) and the second in 1987 (Dr. Cooper, Prof. Sandler.) Over the years, Australian analysts have been encouraged and stimulated by working visits by distinguished colleagues—the outstanding ones in the sixties being Michael Balint and Enid Balint. Other influential invited visitors included Betty Joseph, Edna O’Shaughnessy, Sydney Klein, and Anne-Marie Sandler. Apart from these visits, the isolation of the Australian Society has been mitigated by the fact that many members completed their initial training with the British Society or have spent long periods in London for further analysis, supervision, or seminar work. Nonmedical analysts have played an important part in the growth and development of psychoanalysis. From the beginning psychoanalysis has been viewed as a separate discipline in its own right. In the 1990s, a widening of the field of activity of the Australian Psychoanalytical Society has involved contributions by the society or its members to university teaching (at MA and PhD levels) and open seminars. There is a growing list of publications and public lectures by members. The Freudian School of Melbourne and The Australian Centre for Psychoanalysis in the Freudian Field are devoted to the Lacanian approach in Melbourne. There is an active school of Self-Psychology (Heinz Kohut) based in Sydney. Graduates of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis (Karen Horney) have played an active role in developing psychoanalytic psychotherapy in the Psychotherapy Association of Australia. O. H. D. BLOMFELD Bibliography Blomfield, O.H.D. (1986). Psychoanalysis in Australia. Journal of the International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis., 2, 9–11. Brett, Judith. (1998). Clara Lazar Geroe. In Australian dictionary of biography. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Brett, Judith, Gold, Stanley, and Geroe Clara. (1982, September). Psychoanalysis in Australia. MEANJIN, 41 (3), 339–357. Psychoanalysis has had a marked influence in many areas, most particularly in child psychiatry and social work. Following the lead of Paul Dane in the treatment of ex-servicemen in the Commonwealth Repatriation Department, Frank Graham introduced psychoanalytically oriented group therapy at the Royal Melbourne Hospital in 1950 and later inspired the formation of the Australian Association of Group Psychotherapists. ———. (1980). Clara Lazar-Geroe. An Obituary. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, p. 603. In the academic world, some departments of psychology have psychoanalysts on the staff or maintain a working contact with psychoanalysts, as do several departments of philosophy, sociology, and politics; the law has been less influenced. The first publicly advertised senior position on the medical staff of a major teaching hospital for a psychoanalyst was established largely through the efforts of William Orchard at Prince Henry’s Hospital Melbourne, in about 1970. Frank Graham was the first appointee. Another appointment of this kind was Janet Nield as Honorary Psychotherapist (1953–71) at The Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children in Sydney. The history of psychoanalysis in Austria is practically indistinguishable from that of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society until the end of the Second World War. The group known as the Wednesday Psychological Society, which met regularly after 1902 in Freud’s apartment, later renamed itself the Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung (Vienna Psychoanalytic Society) and was admitted as a regional group into the International Psychoanalytical Association, which had just been founded. In 1911, following the defection of its first president, Alfred Adler, Freud assumed the presidency. When Carl Gustav Jung and the members of the Zurich society left the 13 2 Graham, Frank W. (1965). Obituary: Dr. Roy Coupland Winn. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, p. 616. AUSTRIA INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AUSTRIA psychoanalytic movement, Vienna became the sole center of influence. After a period of inactivity caused by the First World War, the society resumed its activities and, with its youngest members playing an important role, quickly established a treatment facility in 1922 and a training institute in 1924. Only in 1936, after years of migration, was the Vienna society able to take possession of the premises at Berggasse 7, where it was housed along with its training institute, treatment facility, and publishing house. Between 1934 and 1938 Austria developed politically into an authoritarian Catholic state. Although most members of the society had shown themselves to be sympathetic to the Social-Democrats, its administration made a conscious decision to abstain from politics. On March 14, 1938, the day after German troops entered Austria and after a number of analysts had already left the country, the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society held its last meeting. Members unanimously decided that those who felt threatened should leave Austria, and that the society’s headquarters would be transferred to wherever Freud happened to be. With the exception of Alfred Winterstein and August Aichhorn, the 68 active and honorary members and approximately 36 candidates left the city. Freud left with his family on June 4, 1938. Between 1938 and 1945 a branch of the Deutsches Reichsinstitut für psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (State Institute for Research in Psychology and Psychotherapy), directed first by Aichhorn and then by Begsattel, was established in Vienna. Under Aichhorn’s presidency a group of analysts and psychologists attempted to free themselves of the command of the Reichsinstitut. In 1944 this secret group had 14 training candidates, 7 of whom later became psychoanalysts. Following the fall of National Socialism and the end of the Second World War, Austrian analysts did two things during the period of reconstruction: first, they reconstructed the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society and got it readmitted to the International Psychoanalytical Association, and second, they attempted to bring into the fold analysts and organizations that, under the title of depth psychology, held orientations considered marginal or unorthodox. The inauguration of the new Vienna Psychoanalytic Society took place in 1946, with August Aichhorn as INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS president. With assistance from Anna Freud, international recognition followed shortly, although it would take decades before the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society made any significant contact with the world psychoanalytic movement. After Aichhorn’s death in 1949, Alfred Winterstein became the new president, a post he held until 1957. Under the direction of Wilhelm Solms-Rödelheim, the society continued to grow. The 1971 International Psychoanalytic Congress, held in Vienna, helped solidify the society’s renewed links to international psychoanalysis. Meanwhile, the Austrian and international student movement grew, and there was renewed interest in psychoanalysis generally. The Sigmund Freud Gesellschaft (Sigmund Freud Society), founded in 1968, together with the sociopsychiatrist Hans Strotzka and the cofounder of the Sigmund Freud Society Harald Leupold-Löwenthal, did much to make psychoanalysis better known to the population at large. Hans Hoff, professor of psychiatry, also helped establish this receptive climate. Between 1972 and 1974 the presidents of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society included Alois Becker, Harald Leupold-Löwenthal, Peter Schuster, Wolfgang Berner, and Wilhelm Burian. Krista Placheta became president in 1998. As of 2005, Christine Diercks was president of the society. In 1986 the society moved to new offices at Gonzagagasse 11. As of 1988 the society had seventy members and approximately a hundred candidates, more than the number of members in the former Vienna society. With the post-1968 generation of psychoanalysts came a relaxation of the older, authoritarian climate of discussion and a broader range of issues. Two central themes for the society in the 1980s were anti-Semitism inside and outside the field of psychoanalysis and its history during and after the war. In addition, the society held debates on the relation between psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. These discussions led to a training seminar on psychoanalytic psychotherapy, which became an integral part of the general training program. In 1989, at the annual meeting of the Vienna society, the assembled members voted, by a margin of one vote, to join the Dachverband für Psychotherapie (a supervisory organization), and later it voted to join the Psychotherapiebeirat (Psychotherapy Advisory Committee). In 1993 the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society was legally recognized as a training organization for psychotherapy and was a leader in this field. 133 AUSTRIA From 1945 Igor Caruso, an important representative of the various groups associated with psychoanalysis, worked to make psychotherapy more accessible to a greater portion of the population. During the years following the war, he and the discussion circle of which he was a member succeeded in creating a psychoanalytic organization that remained in operation for a number decades. Known as the Österreichische Arbeitskreise für Tiefenpsychologie (Austrian Working Group on Depth Psychology) and later renamed the Österreichische Arbeitskreise für Psychanalyse (Austrian Working Group on Psychoanalysis), it initiated throughout the country a series of teaching and clinical initiatives that were Freudian in orientation. In 1947 Caruso created the Wiener Arbeitskreise für Tiefenpsychologie (Vienna Working Group on Depth Psychology), an autonomous scientific community composed primarily of physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, and theologians, most of whom were close in age. The first candidates were trained privately and without any specific professional requirements, since the group defined itself primarily as a venue for scientific discussion. For this reason an increasing number of members of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society participated in these discussions, although some of them found the intellectual climate overly imbued with Catholicism. Because of the working group’s unorthodox approach, the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society was forced to define strict boundaries between the two organizations at the start of the 1950s. These boundaries may have led the Vienna working group, whose training guidelines were largely those used by psychoanalytic societies having a strictly Freudian orientation, to introduce a more formal and systematic structure for itself. The Vienna working group and the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society differed in ideological orientation. In place of psychological analysis, the Vienna working group aimed at an existential synthesis in the form of a universal humanity, blended different trends in depth psychology, and harked to Jung rather than Freud. With the 1952 publication of Caruso’s book Psychoanalyse und Synthese der Existenz (Existential Psychology: From Analysis to Synthesis, 1964), the working group’s program became more focused. After 1953 there were no explicit references to Jung’s depth psychology and increasingly specific references to psychoanalysis. ‘‘Psychoanalysis’’ was initially understood in its techni13 4 cal sense, and the human aspect inherent in Freudian theory and its offshoots was enlarged in the direction of a personal psychoanalysis. Caruso’s book was translated into six languages, and thus served to spread his ideas internationally, especially in South America, where his ideas where well received. In fact, a number of South American candidates received their training in Vienna. Another example of cross-border activity is the 1954 Brussels symposium on the ‘‘Psychology of the Individual,’’ attended by some forty psychoanalysts from several European countries. Presenters included Jacques Lacan, who gave a talk on the internal dialectics of the person in the theory and technique of psychoanalysis. As a result of his talk, Lacan became a corresponding member of the Vienna Working Group on Depth Psychology, a status he maintained until his death. Theoretically, the working group focused on the concept of symbols and attempted to find a connection between Freudian ego psychology and personal philosophical concepts. There were increasing interdisciplinary attempts to bridge psychiatry, ethology, sociology, group dynamics (especially that of Raoul Schindler), and psychoanalysis. This expansion resulted in the founding, in Innsbruck in 1958, of the International Secretariat of the Working Groups on Depth Psychology, which was replaced in 1966 by the Internationale Föderation der Arbeitskreise für Tiefenpsychologie (International Federation of Working Groups on Depth Psychology) because of the growing number of participant associations. During the 1960s different attempts to found a second world association, independent of the orthodox International Psychoanalytical Association, were made at the instigation of the German Psychoanalytic Association. Caruso and his working groups rebuffed these attempts in spite of the number of exchanges and conferences within the Internationale Arbeitsgemeinschaft psychoanalytischer Gesellschaften (International Working Group of Psychoanalytic Societies), founded in 1962 in Amsterdam. At this time the theoretical orientation of the working groups moved further and further away from fundamental theological concepts of Catholicism. There were increasing references to the Freudian foundations of psychoanalysis and greater emphasis on the psychosociological aspects of the field, which resulted from a growing interest in thinkers like G. W. F. Hegel, Karl Marx, and Herbert Marcuse. In 1972, when Caruso INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AUSTRIA obtained the psychology chair at the University of Salzburg, a number of circles and working groups were formed outside Vienna, and these helped spread awareness of psychoanalysis throughout Austria. In addition to the Linz Circle, created in 1958, these included groups for the study of depth psychology launched in Graz and Linz in 1973 and in Salzburg in 1974, followed by the foundation of the Austrian Society for the Study of Child Psychoanalysis in Salzburg in 1976. This gathering trend toward orthodoxy found concrete expression when the Vienna Working Group on Depth Psychology renamed itself the Vienna Working Group on Psychoanalysis in 1988. Shortly thereafter all the other depth psychology groups followed its example. Until 1992 these groups were all governed by the Directorate of Austrian Working Groups, which was replaced in 1992 by the Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft der Arbeitskreise für Psychoanalyse in Österreich (Scientific Society of Working Groups for Psychoanalysis in Austria). This society produced the journal Texte: Psychoanalyse, Ästhetik, Kulturkritik, the only (quarterly) Austrian journal on psychoanalysis, edited by E. List, Johannes Ranefeld, G. F. Zeilinger, and August Ruhs. Because the society met IPA standards, which the working groups had followed since 1970, it asked to be admitted to the International Psychoanalytical Association in 1997, with Ranefeld as president. A commission of inquiry was established in October 1998. Between 1985 and 1990 an interdisciplinary group of Viennese scientists, in collaboration with the Institut culturel français, organized a two-year international seminar entitled ‘‘Psychoanalysis and Structuralism: Freud and Lacan,’’ which included some of the best known representatives of the Lacan school. This resulted in the formation of the Neue wiener Gruppe/ Lacan-Schule, composed of an ‘‘aesthetic’’ section (under the direction of Walter Seitter) and a ‘‘clinical’’ section (under the direction of August Ruhs). It organized regular interdisciplinary conferences, usually followed by one or more publications. In 1984 a group of students founded the Werkstatt für Psychoanalyse und Gesellschaftskritik (Workshop on Psychoanalysis and Social Criticism) in Salzburg. Until 1996 the organization refused to accept any form of orthodoxy or dogmatism and insisted on maintaining a political focus. The Werkblatt, the organization’s publication, is still published, although the organization itself no longer exists. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS In 1967 Eric Pakesch, a student of Caruso, created a chair of medical psychology and psychotherapy in the Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz . At the suggestion of Hans Strotzka, a popular psychoanalyst and sociopsychiatrist, the Institute of Depth Psychology and Psychotherapy was founded in 1971 within the School of Medicine of the University of Vienna. It was intended to house psychoanalysis along with the other generally recognized schools of psychotherapy in a single facility. Eventually, psychoanalysis became its primary focus, and in the current university depth psychology clinic, run by Marianne Springer-Kremser, all practitioners use psychoanalysis or depth psychology, with the exception of one practitioner who uses systemic family therapy. A psychoanalytic focus can also be found at the university institutes of medical psychology (and psychotherapy) in the universities of Graz, Innsbruck, and Vienna (directed by W. Pieringer, G. Schüssler, and G. Sonneck, respectively). The Psychology Institute of the University of Klagenfurt, under the direction of Professor J. Menschik-Bendele, also has a strong psychoanalytic orientation. Legislation on psychoanalysis instituted in 1992 had important repercussions for the field of psychoanalysis in Austria, for it drastically reduced the autonomy of psychoanalytic societies in their training activities and therapeutic practices. Psychoanalysis became recognized as equivalent to other therapeutic practices, so it had to comply with the general training program for psychotherapists. Before becoming a psychoanalyst, candidates had to complete a two-year program required for all forms of psychotherapy. Since health insurance recognized only some psychoanalytic treatments and reimbursement was partial, the five principal Viennese psychoanalytic and depthpsychology associations decided to create a parent organization in 1997 to make special agreements with insurers for long-term psychoanalytic treatment. For the first time in the history of psychoanalysis in Austria, member and nonmember associations of the International Psychoanalytical Association worked together in an organization to promote their mutual interest. Thanks to the concerted efforts of these societies, the Viennese municipal health service began to offer analyses for fifty citizens, without restriction as to duration or the frequency of treatment. Sixty years after Vienna’s Ambulatorium shut down under Nazi administration, this treatment center reopened in 1999 and represented another sign of reawakened interest in psychoanalysis. Finally, plans for the Wiener Arbeitskreis 135 AUTISM für Psychaonalyse to join the IPA moved forward when it was granted study group status in 2003. development of communication with others beginning in earliest infancy. Another important parent organization for psychoanalysis is the Sigmund Freud Society and Sigmund Freud Museum at Berggasse 19 in Vienna. The society, founded in November 1968 with the help of Anna Freud, succeeded in creating a museum where Freud had his consulting room. In addition to supporting research into the history of psychoanalysis and its founders, the society holds discussions on important contemporary clinical, sociocultural, and therapeutic issues in a spirit of interdisciplinary cooperation. Harold Leupold-Löwentahal, president of the Society from 1976 to 1998, was succeeded by Johannes Schülein, who presided until 2003, and Dieter Bogner. The library, with 25,000 volumes, represents one of the major collections of its kind in Europe and includes archives with over 50,000 records of all kind. Since 1997, at the instigation of American artist Josef Kosuth and Austrian art dealer Peter Pakesch, the Sigmund Freud Society has acquired a collection that demonstrates the influence of psychoanalysis on contemporary art. In 2003, under director Inge ScholzStrasser—albeit against the wishes of many Viennese psychoanalysts—the museum turned into a private foundation. This event led to a noticeable coolness between the administration and the city’s psychoanalytic societies. The word was introduced into the psychiatric vocabulary by Eugen Bleuler in 1911 in his description of schizophrenia. However, a hint of it could be detected as early as 1907 in the correspondence between Freud and Jung: ‘‘Bleuler still misses a clear definition of autoerotism and its specifically psychological effects. He has, however, accepted the concept for his Dem[entia] pr[aecox] contribution to Aschaffenburg’s Handbook. He doesn’t want to say autoerotism (for reasons we all know), but prefers ‘autism’ or ‘ipsism’’’ (Freud and Jung, p. 44–45). AUGUST RUHS Bibliography Caruso, Igor A. (1964). Existential psychology: from analysis to synthesis (Eva Krapf, Trans.). New York: Herder and Herder. (Original work published 1952) Huber, Wolfgang. (1977). Psychoanalyse in Österreich seit 1933. Vienna: Geyer. Parth, Walter. (1998). Vergangenheit, die fortwirkt. Texte: Psychoanalyse, Ästhetik, Kulturkritik, 2, 61–75. Reichmayr, Johannes. (1994). Spurensuche in der Geschichte der Psychoanalyse. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. AUTISM Autism has had two meanings. The first, historically associated with schizophrenia, refers to the investment of a person’s psychic energy in his or her own delusions, which prevents the person from investing in the outside world. The second refers to an absence of 13 6 Bleuler, who very early on took an interest in Freud’s work, did not accept his libido theory, and this was the reason for the amputation that produced the word autism from autoerotism: to distance it from the libidinal significations of the latter term, while keeping the former’s Greek root, auto, meaning ‘‘self.’’ For Bleuler, the autism of schizophrenia is a shutting-in of the subject in an impenetrable, incommunicable world, closed in on itself, made up of unorganized delusional elements to which all the subject’s disposable mental energy is attached. In 1943, Leo Kanner adopted the term to describe ‘‘early infantile autism,’’ a syndrome associated with problems of communication and social behavior, as well as serious developmental disturbances of mental functioning, most notably of imagination Psychoanalytic research bearing upon infantile autism led to significant advances in the understanding of the beginnings of psychic life. From the genetic point of view, for example, infantile autism corresponds to a stage of psychical development to which the child regresses or remains fixated. In research with normal infants after her initial studies of autistic children, Margaret Mahler placed autism on a developmental axis that progresses from birth to ‘‘separation-individuation.’’ Donald Winnicott attributed the genesis of autism to maternal care, particularly the ability to protect the infant from inconceivable anxieties: a feeling of disintegration, being unable to stop falling, lacking relation to its own body, and having no orientation. Bruno Bettelheim defined the ‘‘extreme situation’’ that set the baby on the path to becoming autistic as a feeling that it could not act in a manner favorable to itself, but that every action on its own part could only be unfavorable because of a ‘‘mutuality’’ between the child and its mother. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AUTISM From the structural point of view, autism is governed by a structure that establishes mental functioning. The students of Jacques Lacan developed the concept in this direction by relating it sometimes to the concept of ‘‘foreclosure’’ (Piera Aulagnier and Maud Mannoni), sometimes to ‘‘jouissance’’ (Éric Laurent), and sometimes to the ‘‘topology of the subject’’ (Rosine and Robert Lefort). From a dynamic point of view, it was possible to explore infantile autism in terms of the transference and counter-transference. In 1975, Donald Meltzer proposed a model articulated around three concepts: ‘‘the dismantling of the ego,’’ ‘‘the bidimensionality of the object relation,’’ and ‘‘the adhesive identification.’’ Dismantling is a splitting of the ego along the lines of articulation of the different sensorial modalities, so the autistic child never concentrates feelings on the same object, and stimuli received is never synthesized. The world, perceived in this way, is without depth or volume and is reduced to a juxtaposition of sensations. Bidimensionality is a mode of relation to a libidinal object, established in a world without depth. It is a relation of surface to surface, a binding with an object not experienced as having an interior. Adhesive identification is the result of bidimensionality: the self identifies itself with the object on the surface, owning to no more interior space than the object itself. This prevents mental communication necessary to the development of thought. Later, Meltzer proposed a model based on the theory of ‘‘aesthetic conflict.’’ He suggested that the fetus, at the end of pregnancy, is eager to exercise its senses but receives only the most filtered stimuli in utero. Birth would be experienced as liberation and as something marvelous because of the abundance of sensorial stimulation. The impact would be experienced as an intense aesthetic experience that would at the same time be a source of anxiety because of the vivid contrast between the infant’s overabundant awareness of the qualities of the object’s surface and complete misrecognition of the object’s interior. Occasionally, the impact of the aesthetic object would be so intense as to force the infant to withdraw into infantile autism. Frances Tustin has emphasized a fantasy of discontinuity, which the autistic infant experiences physically as the tearing away of a part of its own substance. So long as it lacks the experience that makes possible symbolization, an infant would seem to require the illusion of continuity between its body and the object upon INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS which its drives are satisfied. The autistic infant imagines a catastrophic rupture in this continuity that takes the form of a fantasy of mouth-tongue-nipple-breast, experiencing a damaged breast and torn-off nipple that leaves the mouth a black hole inhabited by tormenting objects. To protect itself from the pain caused by this black hole, the autistic infant constructs the delusion of merging with the environment that abolishes any separation or space, any difference or alterity. To maintain these delusionary autistic objects, concrete objects are not manipulated for use value or symbolic value, but solely for the surface sensations that they offer, giving the illusion of continuity between body and environment. By means of his or her own secretions (tears, saliva, urine, feces) and autistic objects, the subject creates what Tustin called ‘‘autistic forms,’’ which are cutaneous or mucous with nebulous, unstable contours. The autistic subject procures these as a salve to minimize pain and as protection from the exterior world. But these autistic forms cannot be shared with others or identified with objects in the external world. The autistic child uses sensitivity to stimuli to protect himself or herself from the external world; Frances Tustin calls this ‘‘perverse self-sensuality.’’ DIDIER HOUZEL See also: Adhesive identification; Autistic capsule/ nucleus; Autistic defenses; Bettleheim, Bruno; Black hole; Bleuler, Paul Eugen; Child analysis; Developmental disorders; Dismantling; Empty Fortress, The; Infantile psychosis; Infantile schizophrenia; Psychoses, chronic and delusional; Schizophrenia; Self-mutilation in children; Symbiosis/Symbiotic relation; Tustin, Frances. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund, and Jung, Carl G. (1974a [1906–13]). The Freud-Jung letters: the correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung (William McGuire, Ed.; Ralph Manheim and R. F. C. Hull, Trans.). Princeton: Princeton University Press Press. Meltzer, Donald, and Williams, Meg Harris. (1988). The apprehension of beauty. Perth: Clunie Press. Meltzer, Donald, et al. (1975). Explorations in autism. Perth: Clunie Press. Tustin, Frances. (1977). Autism and childhood psychosis. London: Hogarth. (Originally published 1972) ———. (1981). Autistic states in children. London: Routledge. 137 AUTISTIC CAPSULE/NUCLEUS Further Reading Gaddini, Renato. (1993). On autism. Psychoanalytical Inquiry, 13,134–143. Gergely, G. (2000). Reapproaching Mahler: autism, symbiosis, splitting, libidinal object. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 48, 1197–1228. Guntrip, Harry. (1973). Science, psychodynamic reality, and autistic thinking. Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 1, 3–22. Ogden, Thomas H. (1989). On the concept of an autisticcontiguous position. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 70, 127–140. AUTISTIC CAPSULE/NUCLEUS The term ‘‘autistic capsule’’ (or ‘‘autistic nucleus’’) was proposed by Frances Tustin to describe a split part of the personality that has encapsulated archaic depressive anxieties such as the fear of collapse, liquefaction, falling, a black hole, or amputation of a body part, within a system of autistic-like defenses. Sensation objects and sensation forms, experienced as part of the subject’s own body, serve to blot out bodily anxieties. The notion of an autistic capsule appeared in Frances Tustin’s first book, Autism and Childhood (1972), in the chapter entitled ‘‘Systems of Pathological Autism,’’ where she refers to an ‘‘isolated pocket . . . of encapsulation’’ (p. 85). This construct enabled her to follow the development of a number of children who appeared normal but suffered from neurosis and later showed a variety of disorders: ‘‘phobias, sleeping difficulties, anorexia nervosa, elective mutism, some skin troubles, some psycho-somatic disorders, some learning difficulties, some speech disorders, and some forms of delinquency’’ (p. 85). She also argued that the autistic capsule exits ‘‘in the character structure of some relatively normal individuals,’’ as revealed by rigid splits, superficial identifications, and an exaggerated need for control (p. 85). The superficial aspect of autistic encapsulation, also developed by Donald Meltzer (1975) and related to the notion of adhesive identity described by Esther Bick (1986), has comparable aspects in the ‘‘as if ’’ personality described by Helene Deutsch (1942) and the ‘‘false self ’’ personalities described by Donald Winnicott (1965). Tustin thought that ultimately such autistic capsules exist in minimal form in all individuals and that they are responsible for regressive tendencies toward inertia, 13 8 similar to the regression toward an inanimate state associated with the death instinct in Freud’s theory. The ‘‘de-encapsulation’’ process, Tustin emphasized, is likely to give rise to manic-depressive swings. In Autistic Barriers in Neurotic Patients (1986) and The Protective Shell in Children and Adults (1990), Tustin described the autistic capsule in neurotic adult patients in greater detail, using her own case histories, notably that of an anorexic adolescent girl. Her description of motifs of vampirism and a system of communicating vases is congruent with the findings of the French investigators Evelyne Kestemberg, Jean Kestenberg, and Simone Decobert in La faim et le corps: une étude psychanalytique de l’anorexie mentale (Hunger and the body: a psychoanalytic study of anorexia nervosa; 1972). This book also contains contributions from other psychoanalysts, notably Sydney Klein and David Rosenfeld, who developed the theme of autistic phenomena in their own work. Sydney Klein (1980) emphasized how autistic phenomena in neurotic patients lead to thinness and superficiality. Rosenfeld (1993) studied how certain types of drug dependency and psychosomatic illnesses have some autistic aspects. GENEVIÈVE HAAG See also: Autism; Autistic defenses; Breakdown; Black hole; Tustin, Frances. Bibliography Bick, Esther. (1986). Further considerations on the functioning of skin in early object relations: findings from infant observation integrated into child and adult analysis. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 2, 292–299. Deutsch, Helene. (1942) Some forms of emotional disturbance and their relationship to schizophrenia. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 11, 301–321 Kestemberg, Evelyne; Kestenberg, Jean, and Decobert, Simone. (1972). La faim et le corps: une étude psychanalytique de l’anorexie mentale. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Klein, Sydney. (1980). Autistic phenomena in neurotic patients. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 61 (2), 395–401. Meltzer, Donald, Bremner, John, Hoxter, Shirley, Weddell, Doreen, and Wittenberg, Isca. (1975). Explorations in autism. Perth, Scotland: Clunie Press. Rosenfeld, David. (1993). Autisme: des aspects autistiques dans la pharmacodépendance et dans les maladies INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ‘ ‘A U T O B I O G R A P H I C A L S T U D Y , A N ’ ’ psychosomatiques. Journal de la psychanalyse de l’enfant, 20, 168–188. Tustin, Frances. (1972). Autism and childhood psychosis. London: Hogarth. ———. (1986). Autistic barriers in neurotic patients. London: Karnac Books. ———. (1990). The protective shell in children and adults. London: Karnac Books. Winnicott, Donald W. (1965). Ego distortion in terms of true and false self. In his Maturational processes and the facilitating environment (pp. 140–152). London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Original work published 1962) Bibliography Fraiberg, Selma. (1982). Pathological defenses in infancy. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 51 (4), 612–635. Kanner, Leo. (1973). Childhood psychosis, initial studies and new insights. Washington, DC: Winston. Mahler, Margaret. (1968). On human symbiosis or the vicissitudes of individuation. New York: International Universities Press. Meltzer, Donald. (1975). Adhesive identification. Contemporary Psycho-Analysis, 11, 289–310. Tustin, Frances. (1972). Autism and childhood psychosis. London: Hogarth. ———. (1981). Autistic states in children. London: Routledge. AUTISTIC DEFENSES Further Reading The term ‘‘defense’’ is not generally associated with autistic states. However, manifestations of the ‘‘body ego’’ (Freud) that have as their function the avoidance of anxiety are ‘‘autistic defenses.’’ They give rise not only to ‘‘autistic phenomena’’ (‘‘objects,’’ ‘‘gestures,’’ ‘‘languages,’’ etc.) that are inseparable from the sensations that they cause, but also to a devitalization of the outside world. Cohen D. , and Jay, S. M. (1996). Autistic barriers in the psychoanalysis of borderline adults. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77, 913–934. Leo Kanner (1943) is credited with the discovery of early childhood autism. Without explicitly using the term ‘‘defense,’’ he described a certain number of primary manifestations (sameness, self-sufficiency, selfabsorption, and inaccessibility) that could be said to have a defensive function. In lieu of the term ‘‘autistic defense’’ (which implies a relatively organized ego), Margaret Mahler (1968) proposed the term ‘‘maintenance mechanism’’; Frances Tustin, (1972, 1981) ‘‘autistic maneuvers’’; and Fraiberg (1982) ‘‘defense reactions.’’ The autistic ‘‘defenses’’ are thought to result from the self-induced sensuality of the autist and his or her exclusive focus on bodily sensations and rhythms (Tustin). Frances Tustin spoke of ‘‘autistic objects,’’ ‘‘autistic contours,’’ and ‘‘encapsulation.’’ Donald Meltzer referred to ‘‘dismantling,’’ and Freiberg to ‘‘avoidance’’ and to ‘‘freezing.’’ Mitrani, J. L. (1992). The survival function of autistic manoeuvres in adult patients. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 73, 549–560. The analysis of autistic ‘‘defenses’’ leads to that of the psychic function of the body ego on the border between somatic and mental. After a brief reference to his childhood, he directs his attention to a discussion of his teachers: Ernst Wilhelm von Brücke, Theodor Meynert, and especially Jean Martin Charcot. Considerable space is given to Josef Breuer and hypnosis, relatively little to Wilhelm Fliess. ELSA SCHMID-KITSIKIS INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Gomberoff, M. and Gomberoff, L. (2000). Autistic devices in small children in mourning. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81, 907–920. Kilchenstein, M., and Schuerholz, L. (1995). Autistic defenses and the impairment of cognitive development. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 59, 443–459. ‘‘AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STUDY, AN’’ Freud’s autobiography appeared in Die Medizin der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen (Today’s medicine: autobiographies), published in Leipzig in 1925. In the introduction Freud recalls that in 1909 he had outlined the development of psychoanalysis at Clark University in Massachusetts and in 1914 published a history of the psychoanalytic movement (1914d). Realizing that his life history is part of the origins of psychoanalysis, Freud wrote, ‘‘I will have to try to find a new way of blending subjective and objective exposition, somewhere between biography and history.’’ 139 AUTOBIOGRAPHY The major discoveries—the concept of psychic reality, infantile sexuality, resistance, repression, dream interpretation—are described and condensed so he can focus on a discussion of psychoanalysis’s relationship with other fields and, therefore, the history of the psychoanalytic movement and its conflicts (including his with Carl Gustav Jung). The end of the book is devoted to the applications of psychoanalysis: religion, ethnology, mythology, pedagogy, and so on, illustrating the importance Freud gave to this aspect of his theory. The identification of Freud with psychoanalysis limits the field of historical investigation in terms of both Freud’s biography and the history of psychoanalysis. However, this method of personal exposition is familiar to him and is, in the majority of his works, an intrinsic part of the theoretical exposition, if not an apodictic strategy. Following his break with Wilhelm Fliess, Freud was cautious about the charge of plagiarism and priority of discovery. It is possible to conclude that this point of view limits an understanding of the dialectics of influence, the recognition of cryptomnesia, and more generally the reliance on another’s hypotheses to advance one’s own. The truth, as Freud wrote, is fragmentary, and historical narrative is more like a legend than a ‘‘family romance.’’ SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Autobiography. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1925d [1924]). Selbstdarstellung. Die Medizin der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen, 4, Leipzig, p. 1–52; GW, 14: 31–96; An autobiographical study. SE, 20: 7–70. writing that describes the life of a particular individual. From the point of view of psychoanalysis, autobiography is of interest as the story told by the patient to the analyst and to himself. Autobiography in the modern sense began as a form of confession (Saint Augustine), even though there are memoirs in classical literature (Xenophon’s Anabasis, Julius Caesar’s Gallic wars). Such introspective works can be considered attempts at self-analysis before the psychoanalytic discovery of the unconscious. In 1925 Freud wrote An Autobiographical Study, in which the story of his own life merges with that of the creation of psychoanalysis. According to Freud, biographical truth does not exist, since the author must rely on lies, secrets, and hypocrisy (letter to Arnold Zweig dated May 31, 1939). The same is true of autobiography. From this point of view, it is interesting that Freud framed his theoretical victory and the birth of psychoanalysis in terms of a psychological novel. The function of autobiography is to use scattered bits of memory to create the illusion of a sense of continuity that can hide the anxiety of the ephemeral, or even of the absence of the meaning of existence, from a purely narcissistic point of view. This story constitutes a narrative identity (Ricoeur, 1984–1988) but is selfcontained. In contrast, the job of analysis is to modify, indeed to deconstruct, this identity through interpretation. Because the analyst reveals repressed content, he is always a potential spoiler of the patient’s autobiographic story (Mijolla-Mellor, 1988). Although autobiography has been of greater interest to literature (Lejeune, 1975) than to psychoanalysis, a number of psychoanalysts (Wilfred Bion and Marie Bonaparte, among others) have written autobiographies, thus confirming the link between the analyst’s pursuit of self-analysis and autobiographical reflection. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1914d). On the history of the psycho-analytic movement. SE, 14: 1–66. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1990). Autobiographie de la psychanalyse. Le Coq-Héron, 118, 6–14. Rey, Jean-Michel. (1984). Freud et l’écriture de l’histoire. L’Écrit du temps, 6, 23–42. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: ‘‘Autobiographical Study, An’’; Jung, Carl Gustav; Literature and psychoanalysis; ‘‘Psychoanalytic Notes on the Autobiography of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia paranoides)’’; Memoirs of the future. Bibliography AUTOBIOGRAPHY Freud, Sigmund. (1925). An autobiographical study. SE, 20: 1–74. As a literary genre, autobiography, narrating the story of one’s own life, is a variation of biography, a form of Lejeune, Philippe. (1974). Le pacte autobiographique. Paris: Seuil. 14 0 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AUTOEROTICISM Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1988). Suvivre à so passé. In L’autobiographie. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. ———. (1990). Autobiographie et psychanalyse. Le CoqHéron, 118, pp. 6–14. Ricoeur, Paul. (1984–1988). Time and narrative (Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1985) AUTOEROTICISM The term ‘‘autoeroticism’’ refers to behaviors designed to obtain sexual satisfaction without the intervention of another person (the most obvious example being masturbation). However, the term is often understood more broadly, given the Freudian conception of psychosexuality, according to which many different physical pleasures take on the value of sexual satisfaction. Genitals are not necessarily involved. By extension, the same can be said of certain psychic activities (reading, according to popular wisdom, is a ‘‘solitary vice’’). ‘‘Alloeroticism,’’ a less common term, refers by contrast to sexual satisfaction obtained with the help of another person. Sigmund Freud, who took the terms from Havelock Ellis, appears to have used them for the first time in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess, dated December 9, 1899: ‘‘The lowest sexual stratum is auto-erotism, which does without any psychosexual aim and demands only local feelings of satisfaction. It is succeeded by allo-erotism (homo- and hetero-erotism) but it certainly also continues to exist as a separate current’’ (Freud, 1950a, p. 280). According to this initial definition, autoeroticism would appear first but would never disappear. Freud clarified his thought in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d) and then in later footnotes. He considered sucking to be a fundamental activity: ‘‘The child’s lips, in our view, behave like an erotogenic zone, and no doubt stimulation by the warm flow of milk is the cause of the pleasurable sensation. The satisfaction of the erotogenic zone is associated, in the first instance, with the satisfaction of the need for nourishment’’ (p. 182). In 1915 Freud added: ‘‘To begin with, sexual activity attaches itself to functions serving the purpose of self-preservation and does not become independent of them until later . . . The child does not make use of an extraneous body for his sucking, but prefers a part of his own skin because it is more convenient, because it makes him independent of the external world, which he is not yet able to control’’ (1905d, p. 182). This is one of Freud’s most INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS important claims—infantile sexuality develops by making use of a function essential for life, from which it later detaches itself. This autoerotic satisfaction is not required for every object cathexis, however, since, through this detachment, the child frees itself from its first object, the breast, which is the vehicle of a hallucinatory satisfaction and the subsequent disappointment that leads to the birth of the first representations. ‘‘On Narcissism; An Introduction’’ (1914c) enabled Freud to take this a step further. When the child constitutes itself as an ‘‘object’’ for its own satisfaction, it is no longer a question of drive satisfaction, as in autoerotic activity, located in a given erotogenic zone, but rather of the beginning of the unification of drive and object: ‘‘the hitherto dissociated sexual instincts come together into a single unity and cathect the ego as an object’’ (1912–13a, p. 89). This unifying movement then acts on another person during the initial ‘‘object choices’’ that will govern all later sexual life. Freud would later refine these views and provide an overview of the process in a 1923 article on infantile genital organization (1923e). Autoeroticism, therefore, characterizes an early phase of psychosexual development. However, as Freud acknowledged in his 1899 letter to Fliess cited above, it continues to ‘‘subsist,’’ as many common clinical findings demonstrate. It also plays a major role in a number of disorders; in psychoses it can appear invasive (Gillibert, Jean, 1977), as shown in the case of Daniel Paul Schreber (Schreber, 1903/1988; Freud, 1911c), or deficient (Botella, César, and Sára, 1982). In this area as in so many others, the diagnostic dimension and the psychogenetic dimension are complementary. ROGER PERRON See also: Infant development; Narcissism; Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Bibliography Botella, César, and Botella, Sára. (1982). Sur la carence autoérotique du paranoı̈aque. Revue française de psychanalyse, 46 (1), 63–80. Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ——— (1912–13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ——— (1950a). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173–280. 141 AUTOHISTORIZATION Gillibert, Jean. (1977). De l’autoérotisme. XXXVII Congrès des psychanalystes de langues romanes. Revue française de psychanalyse, 41, 5–6. Schreber, Daniel Paul. (1988). Memoirs of my nervous illness. (I. Macalpine and R. Hunter, Trans.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press (Original work published 1903). AUTOHISTORIZATION The I is constituted by the discourse it builds about itself, its self-assigned task being to transform the fragmentary elements of its past, whether they come from itself or from other people, into a historical construction. The difference between memory and history involves the sequencing of facts to meet two requirements: first of all, that of imparting a feeling of temporal continuity, and in addition, simultaneously, endowing this historical construction with a power of causal explanation with regard to the future (MijollaMellor, Sophie de, 1998). The I thus figures, according to the title of Piera Aulagnier’s L’Apprenti historien et le maı̂tre sorcier (The apprentice historian and the master sorcerer; 1984), as an ‘‘apprentice historian’’ faced with the ‘‘master sorcerer’’ constituted by the id. Autohistorization is the only way the subject can grasp the notion of time, which can only make sense to the subject in relation to his or her own desires and self-perceptions: ‘‘The process of identification is the hidden side of the work of historicization that transforms the unfathomable entity of physical time into human time, that replaces irrevocably lost time with a time that speaks it,’’ writes Aulagnier. This history is that of the I’s relationship to its objects: a libidinal history, and a history that can only target the I indirectly, through the Other. From temporality to memory to history there occurs an unfolding movement, the construction that the I must effect in order for its existence to make sense. In Aulagnier’s view, we are ‘‘historians whose quest always founders on an ‘already-there’ about ourselves or others that resists our efforts to elucidate it.’’ This human inevitability forces the I to take possession of this preexisting ‘‘elsewhere’’ and to include it within itself; to do this, the I must rely on the accounts of other people who provide it with an affirmation that what it is and what it was are identical, and at the same time give elements of information on this issue. This gives rise to the question of what happens when others fail to transmit to the subject the ‘‘first paragraphs’’ of an individuals personal history and prehistory. 14 2 In L’Apprenti-historien et le maı̂tre sorcier, Aulagnier develops the notion of ‘‘nonhistory’’ in the schizophrenic. In these cases, the mother exerts on the infant’s psyche an action of repression so powerful that it will render impossible even the revealing of non-repressed material (and, as it happens, inculcate a desire for death as well) that is present and active within the mother’s own psyche. Hence the attempted delusional reconstruction that would enable the subject to do without this contribution from the mother: ‘‘The fantasy of self-engenderment that is present in certain forms of psychosis can most often be decoded, on close inspection, as a fantasy that gives the subject the power to engender not just his or her own past, but all past, not just his or her own origins, but all origins.’’ Aulagnier’s entire theory on psychosis, contrary to monolithic interpretations (such as foreclosure in the Name of the Father, double bind, and so on) reflects, as did Sigmund Freud’s work, a perspective that is essentially historical, focusing on singular events. What she demonstrates here concerns the consequences of prohibition on memory, and thus the work of autohistorization without which the I cannot come into being. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Apprenti-historien et le maitre sorcier (L’) [The apprentice historian and the master sorceror]; Family romance; Psychic temporality. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (1984). L’Apprenti-historien et le maı̂tre sorcerier. Du discours identifiant au discours délirant. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1998). Penser la psychose. Une lecture de l’oeuvre de Piera Aulagnier. Paris: Dunod. AUTOMATISM Properly speaking, ‘‘automatism’’ is not a concept, but rather a term that, like the adjective ‘‘automatic’’ or the adverb ‘‘automatically,’’ has several definitions. It can mean ‘‘mental operations or activities without the involvement of the will, activities rendered automatic by habit, regularity in the completion of certain acts, or a set of involuntary activities or impulses’’ (LantériLaura, 1992). The term ‘‘automatism’’ refers to an activity carried out without the participation of the will. Once the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AUTOMATISM activity is triggered, it becomes a mechanism that functions by itself. This notion of automatism, derived from the philosophic and medical traditions, provided the eighteenth century with a model, though reductionist, for global and hegemonic knowledge of the physical and biological worlds and, in the biological world, for human behavior. (La Mettrie published Man a Machine in 1746.) Later, because of advances in chemistry that revealed very different levels of organization in the two worlds, the model of automatism seemed on the contrary to control only vegetative life, corresponding to the autonomic nervous system, and involved only one part of the life functions, that of muscular mechanics. In this era, a simultaneously morphological and functional opposition was conceived between a less automatic superior level and a more automatic inferior level. From John Huglings Jackson’s work on epilepsy in the nineteenth century emerged a highly elaborated representation of the function and dysfunction of the central nervous system and the discovery of a specific attack— related to lesions—on the automatisms in question. Thus a disorganization of a hierarchical structure suppressed a function and freed what the suppressed function had previously controlled—one automatism disappeared and the other remained uncontrolled. This notion of an automatism proper to the functioning of the central nervous system found several examples in the field of psychiatry, for instance, the work of Valentin Magnan and his notion of impulse, that of Jules Seglas defining the relation between verbal hallucinations and aphasias, the psychological automatism of Pierre Janet, and finally the mental automatism of Georges de Clérambault and the work of Henri Ey, which was greatly influenced by John H. Jackson. What is involved is a definition of automatism that situates it as mechanism that is ‘‘under control.’’ It becomes pathogenic and pathological as soon as such control ceases. Meanwhile, there emerges another definition of automatism that situates it instead on the side of the creative force, of a more lively and original inspiration. The word automatisch appeared very rarely in Freud. In one of its earliest occurrences (the case of Dora, 1905e [1901]), it is apparent that he is borrowing vocabulary that is not his own: ‘‘I give the name of symptomatic acts to those acts which people perform, as we say, automatically, unconsciously, without attending to them, or as if in a moment of distraction’’ (p. 76). Then, in the metapsychological texts, the word INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS is used in three limited senses: a) the regulation of (unconscious) automatic processes by the pleasure principle (Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1920g); b) socalled ‘‘automatic’’ anxiety when it is a question of the origin or the ‘‘automatic’’ appearance of anxiety (Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 1926d); and occasionally, c) the process of repression (1926d). The noun Automatismus, ‘‘automatism,’’ is also very rarely found in Freud’s works. When Freud refers to it in Inhibition, Symptoms, and Anxiety in relation to the process of repression, he prefers the term ‘‘compulsion to repeat’’: ‘‘The new impulse will run its course under an automatic influence—or, as I should prefer to say, under the influence of the compulsion to repeat. It will follow the same path as the earlier repressed impulse, as if the danger-situation that had been overcome still existed’’ (p. 153). In the New Introductory Lectures (1933a [1932]), the term is directly connected to the principle of pleasure-unpleasure, in a sense essentially based on the (automatic) mode of regulation of unconscious processes, but that merges with anxiety and repression. The term was used more frequently by Jacques Lacan, specifically starting in the fifties, when, under the influence of cybernetics, the question of automatons was on his mind. And so pure automatism became an essentially psychotic phenomenon. Today the term, still being enriched by new mathematical models, could clarify for us a certain mode of the functioning of mental processes. PASCALE MICHON-RAFFAITIN See also: Compulsion; Janet, Pierre; Letter, the; Repetition compulsion; Subconscious; Trauma. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905e [1901]). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. SE, 7: 1–122. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1926d). Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. ———. (1933a). New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 22: 1–182. Lantéri-Laura, Georges. (1992). Psychiatrie et connaissance. Paris: Sciences en situation. La Mettrie, Julien Offray de. (1746). Man a machine. La Salle, IL: Open Court Classics, 1912. 143 AUTOPLASTIC AUTOPLASTIC ‘‘automagnetization’’ had reinforced (or supplanted) various forms of ‘‘magnetism.’’ The terms ‘‘autoplastic’’ and ‘‘alloplastic’’ serve to distinguish changes internal to the subject from work carried out on the external world. Sándor Ferenczi proposed the word ‘‘autoplastic’’ in an article on hysterical materialization (1919/1926). Citing Freud’s description of hysteria as a caricature of art, Ferenczi added, ‘‘Hysterical ‘materializations’ . . . show us the organism in its entire plasticity, indeed in its preparedness for art. . . . The purely ‘autoplastic’ tricks of the hysteric [may well be] prototypes, not only for the bodily performances of ‘artists’ and actors, but also for the work of those creative artists who no longer manipulate their own bodies but material from the external world’’ (p. 104). At the end of the century, a theoretical and practical debate ensued that both galvanized and divided the various schools of hypnotism. What was the real agent in the process of suggestion: the hypnotist, or the subject, who often relinquishes power to him without realizing it? For those who believed the latter, the effectiveness of the suggestion was thought to depend on a self-suggestibility associated with hysterical tendencies (Jean Martin Charcot, Pierre Janet), or the ‘‘will’’ of the subject (a position put forward by Joseph Delboeuf [1831–1896], an independent disciple of Hippolyte Bernheim). In 1888– 1889, basing his theory on the work of Charcot, Freud showed that some suggestive experiences could be interpreted in terms of an ‘‘encouragement to autosuggestion.’’ In 1892–93, he proposed the notion of a ‘‘counter-will.’’ In 1895 Joseph Breuer insisted that self-hypnotic states were a symptom of hysteria and a process of self-medication and selfhealing carried out in the presence of the therapist. The cathartic talking cure occurred during these states of self-hypnosis. Freud adopted these terms when clarifying the similarities and the differences between neurosis and psychosis (1924e). ‘‘Expedient, normal’’ behavior, he wrote, combines features of both disorders, for it ‘‘disavows the reality as little as does a neurosis, but . . . then exerts itself, as does a psychosis, to effect an alteration of that reality.’’ But it ‘‘does not stop, as in psychosis, at effecting internal changes. It is no longer autoplastic or alloplastic’’ (p. 185). These seldom used notions might arguably serve a useful purpose in describing the analytic process: in their asymmetrical way, the two protagonists in treatment are engaged in an unending struggle between changing the other and effecting internal change. Following in the tradition of Nancy school, the pharmacist Émile Coué (1857–1926) popularized the use of autosuggestion to govern one’s own behavior. His disciple Charles Baudouin suggested that a synthesis be attempted between Coué’s theories and psychoanalysis. STEVEN WAINRIB JACQUELINE CARROY See also: Hysteria. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1924e). The loss of reality in neurosis and psychosis. SE, 19: 180–187. Ferenczi, Sándor. (1926). The phenomena of hysterical materialization: thoughts on the conception of hysterical conversion and symbolism. In his Further contributions to the theory and technique of psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1919) AUTOSUGGESTION Autosuggestion was popularized by the French ‘‘Nancy school.’’ By the first half of the nineteenth century, methods of self-medication and self-healing known as 14 4 See also: Baudouin, Charles; Qu’est-ce que la suggestion? (What is the suggestion?); Suggestion. Bibliography Cuvelier, André. (1987). Hypnose et suggestion: De Liébeault à Coué. Nancy, France: Presses Universitaires de Nancy. Delboeuf, Joseph. (1993). Le sommeil et les Rêves et autres textes. Paris: Fayard. (Originally published in 1885) Duyckaerts, François. (1992). Joseph Delboeuf, philosophe et hypnotiseur. Paris: Synthélabo. Freud, Sigmund. (1888–1889a). Preface to the translation of Bernheim’s Suggestion. SE: 1: 71–85. ———. (1892–1893a). A case of successful treatment by hypnotism. SE: 1: 115–128. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B BACHELARD, GASTON (1884–1962) Gaston Bachelard, a French philosopher, was born on June 27, 1884, in Bar-sur-Aube and died in Paris on October 16, 1962. He held a Ph.D. in philosophy and was a member of the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques. His career was far from ordinary. He was born into a family of modest means and began his professional life as a temporary employee in the postal service. In 1919 he became a teacher of physics and chemistry at the Bar-sur-Aube grammar school and prepared for his degree in philosophy, which he obtained in 1922. In 1927 he defended his doctoral dissertation and was appointed a professor of philosophy in 1930 at the University of Dijon and later at the Sorbonne (1940–1955). He received the Grand Prix National des Lettres in 1961. His work is divided between considerations of the scientific mind, rationalism and the need for truth, and reflections on the imagination, daydreams, and poetry. Psychoanalysis, as Bachelard understood it, could serve as a link between these two approaches and, at times, there are echoes of a Jungian approach in his work. In 1938 he produced La Formation de lÕesprit scientifique: Contribution à une psychanalyse de la connaissance objective and The Psychoanalysis of Fire. The word psychoanalysis was pivotal; the study of fire paved the way for a discussion of the epistemological problem of heat and thermodynamics. Bachelard introduced a powerful and disturbing poetics. For him the scientific mindÕs idea of the unconscious could be understood not on the basis of dreams but of reverie, that is, fantasies organized into complexes. By grasping the link between electrical fire and sexual fire, he develops the idea that dream-like values are an obstacle to true understanding and that it is necessary to engage in repression, a voluntary intellectual act of inhibition, which brings with it resistance, defense, and rupture. Psychoanalysis serves as a source of inspiration, it enables us to understand the formation of the scientific mind as an activity that is always subject to revision, not by a purely logical subject but by a superego animated by a rationalist tension that makes sublimation a positive and necessary factor and, in contrast to Freud, one that is also a joyful activity. In working to frame Freudian concepts within a dialectic structure, Bachelard attempted to substitute a fecund surveillance of the mind for a repetitive and neurotic censorship. He was thus led to distinguish two types of knowledge: common knowledge and scientific knowledge, which consists in the repression of the former. For Bachelard, psychic conflict and resistance were ideas that could be used to conceive of truth as an error that has been rectified. BachelardÕs work found an echo in both the philosophy of the sciences and in literary criticism. But it is to Jacques Lacan that we must turn to fully assess what Bachelard attempted to introduce: the idea of a science whose subject is science. ROGER BRUYERON See also: France. Bibliography Bachelard, Gaston. (1964). The psychoanalysis of fire (Alan C. M. Ross, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press. (Original work published in 1938) 145 B A G I N S K Y , A D O L F (18 43 –19 18) ———. (1968). The philosophy of no; a philosophy of the new scientific mind (G. C. Waterston, Trans.). New York: Orion Press. (Original work published in 1940) richness of his various activities; as an editor he was especially attentive to the psychic disturbances of childhood. ———. (1969). The flame of a candle (Joni Caldwell, Trans.). Dallas, TX: Dallas Institute Publications, c1988. ———. (1972). L’Engagement rationaliste. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. JOHANN GEORG REICHENEDER See also: Institut Max-Kassowitz. Bibliography BAGINSKY, ADOLF (1843–1918) Adolf Baginsky, a German pediatrician, was born May 22, 1843, in Ratibor (formerly in Upper Silesia, modern-day Poland) and died May 15, 1918, in Berlin. Baginsky came from a large family of Jewish shopkeepers. He studied medicine in Berlin and Vienna, and obtained his diploma in Berlin on May 7, 1866. His dissertation was on the risks of cesarean birth. He specialized in pediatrics and, in 1872, settled in Berlin as director of a free clinic for children, the Johannisstrasse. In 1877 he founded the Central-Zeitung für Kinderheilkunde (Central Journal of Pediatrics), which, in 1879, became the Archiv für Kinderheilkunde (Archives of Pediatrics). He was assigned to a teaching position in 1882 after publishing a work on pediatrics as an autonomous specialization, but, outside of a few courses on pediatrics given during his vacations, his university position was precarious. Cofounder and, after 1890, director of the Kaiser- und Kaiserin-Friedrick-Kinderkrankenhaus (The Emperor and Emperess Friedrich Pediatric Hospital) in Berlin-Wedding, which he ran until April 1, 1898, he was named associate professor in 1892, then held the chair in 1907. Following a period of study in Paris, Sigmund Freud spent the month of March 1886 at the Baginsky clinic, where he acquired a good understanding of childrenÕs diseases in order to prepare for his work as ‘‘sector head’’ in the first public institution for childhood diseases in Vienna. BaginskyÕs work is extremely varied, ranging from medical care for sick children to initiatives for socio– medical prevention (including open air schools, educational medicine, and milk distribution). His work bears the mark of a profound humanitarian ideal. Although his religious beliefs became an obstacle to his academic career, he remained actively engaged in the Jewish community. His research reflects all the 14 6 Bonomi, C. (1994). Why have we ignored Freud the ‘‘Paediatrician?’’ Cahiers psychiatriques genevois, Special Issue, 55–99. Reicheneder, J. G. (1994). Freud in Berlin 1886. Luzifer– Amor, 7, 7–16. Schlossmann, A. (1919). Nachruf auf Adolf Baginsky. Arch. Kinderheilkunde, 67, 1–6. Zlocisti, T. (1913). Adolf Baginsky. Ost und West. 561–564. BAK, ROBERT C. (1908–1974) Robert C. Bak was a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, born in Budapest, October 14, 1908, and died in New York, September 15, 1974. Bak was the third son of a rich Jewish family. His father was a farm manager. After graduation in a high school of science, Bak enrolled in the medical university, and received his degree in 1933. He was trained in psychoanalysis by Imre Hermann. Following his emigration from Budapest to New York in 1941, he worked as a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. In 1947 he became a training analyst and soon after a leading figure of the New York Psychoanalytical Institute. He conducted courses and seminars. In 1959 he became president of the Study Committee. He was president of the New York Psychoanalytical Society from 1957 to 1959, and guest-professor at the Albert Einstein Medical University. He conducted lecture tours in Italy, Denmark, and Switzerland for several years. His early publications fuse psychoanalytical theory with the contemporary concept of psychiatry. He treated the great Hungarian poet Attila József for schizophrenia. The afterlife of the communist poet and of the young psychiatrist who had emigrated to the United States became closely intertwined in the ensuing fifty years of Hungarian psychoanalysis, in which Bak played a salient role, not exempt from ideological INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BALINT GROUP distortions. He wrote several articles on the poetÕs pathology. In his last paper (1973) he again analyzed the poetÕs suicide from the point of view of his ‘‘progressive withdrawal from the object and repeated attempts to reestablish and recathects objects by being in love.ÕÕ BALINT GROUP He maintained professional contact with Imre Hermann until his death, but he was also influenced by Heinz HartmannÕs theory, and worked together with Phyllis Greenacre, Edith Jacobson, and Margaret Mahler. From the beginning he was engrossed in an in-depth exploration of the psyche through the phenomenology of psychopathology and the reality distortions manifest in psychoses and perversions. He pointed out the significance of early heat-orientation in schizophrenic symptom-formation. In addition to sadomasochistic libido, he also showed the presence of an overt and neutralized form of the aggression instinct in paranoia and perversions (1956). He traced the common origin of perversion fantasies back to phallic mother-image, and, in addition to the destabilization of reality, assigned an important role to the giant mother-image that Hermann had assumed for him (1968). He wrote about 25 studies in Hungarian, German, and English. A dozen practitioners are brought together once a week for two hours under the direction of one or two analysts who receive honoraria and ensure the rules under which the group functions. A doctor reports, as spontaneously as possible, a case from his practice that poses a problem. Participants and leaders then help the presenter, by means associations, questions, and interpretations, to elucidate the difficulties in the presenterÕs relation with the patient. His work continues to exert a profound influence on the study of psychoses and perversion, and represents the traditions of the Hungarian school. HUNGARIAN GROUP See also: Hungarian School. Bibliography Bak, Robert. (1941). Temperamentur-Orientierung und Überfliessen der Ichgrenzen in der Schizophrenie. Schweizer Archiv für Neurologie, Neurochirurgie und Psychiatrie, 46, 158–177. ———. (1953). Fetishism. Journal of the American Psychoanalytical Association, 1–2, 285–297. ———. Aggression and perversion. In Sándor Lorand (Ed.), Perversions: psychodynamics and therapy (pp. 231–240). New York: Random House, 1956. ———. (1968). The phallic woman: The ubiquitous fantasy, Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 23, 16–36. ———. (1973). Being in love and object loss. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 54, 1–8. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS The Balint group is a group method of training doctors, generalists or specialists, in the doctor-patient relationship. This method was developed by Michael Balint and Enid Albu starting in 1945. The aim is to sensitize the doctor to transference and counter-transference in the ‘‘retroactive action’’ of the consultation, to give the doctor psychotherapeutic qualities, and thus to achieve a ‘‘considerable though limited change in the doctorÕs personality’’ to enable the doctor to better understand and help patients (Balint, 1957, p. 121). Between 1949 and 1954 Balint and Albu elaborated and tested the method, by trial and error and by reminiscences, at the Tavistock Clinic in London, after Balint took up the Family Discussion Bureau seminar directed by Enid Albu (whom he would later marry). This seminar of case discussions trained social workers treating cases of marital problems. To define the link between client and social worker, Balint modified the case presentations, doing away with written and read reports in favor of oral presentations without notes, in order to maximize the conditions for counter-transference. This method, applying the fundamental rule, but always referred to a third party (the patient), was similar to Hungarian supervised analysis, centered on counter-transference. The results were so impressive that when the National Health Service wanted to give doctors training in psychology, Michael Balint proposed the ‘‘Tavistock Method.’’ Tested from 1950 to 1953, with volunteers recruited by The Lancet, it became a training and research method. French analysts who went to London to be trained soon renamed it the ‘‘Balint group.’’ The Balint movement, launched in the 1960s, is organized on the institutional level. Several national associations have been created: The Balint Medical Society of France (1967), The Balint Society of Great 147 B Á L I N T , M I C H A E L ( B Á L I N T [B E R G S M A N N ], M I H Á L Y ) ( 18 96 –197 0) Britain (1969), and others in over twenty countries, including Italy (1974), Germany, Belgium, and Russia (1994). On the international level, the European Council recognized the Balint Federation as a nongovernmental agency. As of 2004, the work of the Balints continued, with training in Balint groups, colloquia, and national and international conferences. MICHELLE MOREAU RICAUD See also: Hungarian School; Main, Thomas Forrest; Raimbault, Émile. Bibliography Balint, Michael. (1957). The doctor, his patient, and the illness. New York: International Universities Press. Balint, Michael, and Balint, Enid. (1961). Psychotherapeutic techniques in medicine. London: Tavistock. Balint, Michael, Balint, Enid, Gosling, Robert, and Hildebrand, H. Peter. (1979). Le médecin en formation: La sélection et l’évaluation des résultats dans un programme de formation destiné à des médecins de famille. Paris: Payot. (Original work published 1966) Moreau Ricaud, Michelle (2000). Michael Balint: Le renouveau de lÕécole de Budapest. Toulouse, France: Érès. BALINT, MICHAEL (BÁLINT [BERGSMANN], MIHÁLY) (1896–1970) Hungarian physician and analyst Michael Balint was born in Budapest on December 3, 1896, and died in London on December 31, 1970. He was the son of a Jewish general practitioner (Dr. Bergsmann) from a Budapest suburb. In the course of his brilliant university career (he earned qualifications in neuropsychiatry, philosophy, chemistry, physics, and biology), he met Alice Székely-Kovács, an anthropology student, who became his wife in 1924. After World War I, he held various positions in Budapest, and then in 1921, left for Berlin to undergo analysis with Hanns Sachs at the same time as Alice. He occupied various positions in the Psychoanalytic Institute, the Institute for Organic Chemistry of the Royal Academy of Berlin, as well as the Charité Hospital medical clinic. It was towards the end of his twenties, with the aim of better integrating in society, that he changed his name from the Jewish-sounding 14 8 Bergsmann to the more ‘‘Hungarian’’ Balint, just as Sándor FerencziÕs father (born Fraenkel) had done. Dissatisfied with their analyses with Hanns Sachs, the Bálints returned to Budapest to finish with Sándor Ferenczi. Michael Balint subsequently became FerencziÕs student, friend, and successor, as well as his literary executor. In 1931, he was made deputy director of the Psychoanalytic Polyclinic in Budapest under Ferenczi, becoming its director after FerencziÕs death. In January 1939, under the pressure of anti-Semitism, the Bálints emigrated to Manchester, England. Six months after their arrival, Alice Balint died. During World War II, Bálint taught medicine and science and began a private practice in psychoanalysis. From 1942–1945, he directed the Centers for Child Guidance in North East Lancaster and Preston. From 1942–1945, he was an honorary psychiatry consultant at Manchester Northern Hospital, and in 1945, psychiatrist at the Center for Child Guidance in Chiselhurst, Kent. That same year, he set himself up in London as an analyst. There he again took up his project of placing psychoanalysis in the service of general practitioners, this time in collaboration with Enid Albu (herself an analyst), whom he married in 1950. From 1950–1953, he was the scientific secretary of the British Psychoanalytic Society. An admired teacher and supervising analyst, he employed the Hungarian method of training, that is, he himself supervised the first case of candidates he had analyzed. From 1950–1961, he was a psychiatric consultant at the Tavistock Clinic, and from 1957, a visiting professor of psychiatry at the University College of Cincinnati in the United States. From 1961–1965, he was honorary assistant to the department of psychological medicine at the University College Hospital in London where he directed post–graduate training seminars. In 1968, he was elected president of the British Psychoanalytic Society. BalintÕs psychoanalytic writings possess a remarkable coherence. He progressively developed his ideas from 1924 until they reached their ultimate form in his last work The Basic Fault (1968). In addition to the notion of the basic fault, Balint also introduced the concepts of primary love (1930–1935) in Primary Love and Psychoanalytic Technique (1952), and of benign and malignant regression in Thrills and Regressions (1959). He questioned the existence of primary narcissism and emphasized the contradictions in FreudÕs INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B A L I N T - S Z É K E L Y - K O V Á C S , A L I C E (1898 –1 939) elaborations on it (‘‘Critical Notes on the Theory of the Pregenital Organization of the Libido,’’ 1935). He coined the term ‘‘ocnophile’’ to describe personalities that feel the need to cling to objects and the term ‘‘philobatism’’ to characterize those who dread obstacles and seek out open spaces that are free of them (1959). He distinguished three mental zones: the oedipal zone, involving three persons, where conventional language holds sway; the zone of the basic fault, involving two persons, where conventional language is no longer current; and the zone of creation, where the subject is alone and creates only out of the self (1968). BalintÕs other major effort was his educational training work with general practitioners. His first article dealing with this subject dates from 1926: ‘‘On the Psychotherapies, for the Practicing Physician’’ (Therapia 5, Budapest). His major work in this area is The Doctor, His Patient and the Illness (1955). The theoretical work of Michael Balint stands in direct relation to the clinic and constitutes a remarkable tool for psychoanalytic practitioners. The technique that he elaborated for use by general practitioners resulted in the creation of ‘‘Bálint Groups’’ and ‘‘Bálint Societies’’ that utilize this mode of training. Finally, Balint is responsible for the preservation and promotion of the work of Sándor Ferenczi, for whom he was literary executor. It was Balint who transcribed FerencziÕs Clinical Diary, which he then translated into English, and who also made the first transcription, during the 1950s, of FerencziÕs correspondence with Freud. Michael Balint published ten books (of which five were coauthored) and 165 articles. The Balint Archives are housed in the department of psychiatry in the University of Geneva. JUDITH DUPONT Notions developed: Basic fault; Benign/malignant regression; Primary love. See also: Balint group; Balint-Szekely-Kovács, Alice; Ego-libido/object-libido; Great Britain; Hungarian School; Hungary; Medicine and psychoanalysis; Tavistock Clinic. Bibliography Balint, Michael. (1964). The doctor, his patient and the illness (2nd ed.). London: Pitman Medical Publishing. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ———. (1968). The basic fault: therapeutic aspects of regression. London: Tavistock Publications. Faure, Franck. (1978). La doctrine de Michael Bálint. Paris: Payot. Haynal, André. (1988). The technique at issue: Controversies in psychoanalysis: From Freud and Ferenczi to Michael Bálint. London: Karnac. Moreau Ricaud, Michelle. (2000). Michael Bálint: Le renouveau de l ÕÉcole de Budapest. Paris: Erès. BALINT-SZÉKELY-KOVÁCS, ALICE (1898–1939) Hungarian psychoanalyst and anthropologist Alice Balint-Székely-Kovács was born in Budapest on June 16, 1898, and died in Manchester on August 19, 1939. She was the eldest daughter of Vilma Kovács, herself an analyst and student of Sándor Ferenczi. Both Alice and Michael Balint were also his students. Alice Balint had a brilliant career as a student in Budapest. One of her classmates was Margrit Schönberger, who became well known under the name of Margaret Mahler. Then she pursued university studies in mathematics and anthropology. From 1921 to 1924, she resided in Berlin with Michael Balint, her future husband. Both were in analysis with Hanns Sachs and participated in the activities of the Psychoanalytic Association of Berlin. Dissatisfied with their analyses, they returned to Budapest and finished their training with Sándor Ferenczi. Alice Balint was very active in the Psychoanalytic Association of Budapest. A child analyst at the Psychoanalytic Polyclinic of Budapest, she also maintained a private practice of children and adults. She gave lectures for parents that later appeared in the pedagogy journal Gyermeknevelés (Child Education). In 1939 the Balint family emigrated to Great Britain and established themselves in Manchester. Alice Balint died there suddenly at the end of August 1939. Her work comprises a series of articles and one book. Her articles deal with ethno-psychoanalysis (‘‘Mexican War Hieroglyphs,’’ ‘‘The Father of the Family’’), psychoanalytic theory (‘‘Love for the Mother and Mother Love,’’ ‘‘On Repression’’) and pedagogy. Her book, called A Gyermekszoba pszichológiája (The Psychoanalysis of the Nursery), was translated into several languages. 149 B A R A N G E R , W I L L Y (1922 – 1994) Alice Balint died too young, leaving behind a body of work qualitatively modest, but of great originality, that still waits to be better known and used. JUDITH DUPONT See also: Balint, Michael; Hungary; Primary love. Bibliography Balint, Alice. (1953). The psycho-analysis of the nursery. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ———. (1965) Love for the mother and Mother Love. In Michael Balint, Primary love and psycho-analytic technique. London: Tavistock Publications. ———. (1990). Anya és gyermek (Mother and child) (2nd ed.). Budapest: Pantheon. BARANGER, WILLY (1922–1994) A psychoanalyst with a degree in philosophy, Willy Baranger was born on August 13, 1922, in Bône, Algeria, and died on October 29, 1994, in Buenos Aires. He spent his childhood in Paris, where he continued his studies until he obtained his baccalaureate diploma in 1939. After moving to Toulouse because of the war, he completed his education with the PCB and received a degree in philosophy. He married Madeleine Coldefy and prepared for his doctorate in philosophy, which he received in 1945. After teaching in France for a year, he left for Buenos Aires as a professor of philosophy at the Institut Français dÕÉtudes Supérieures. He began his psychoanalysis with Enrique Pichon-Rivière and soon completed his theoretical and practical training. In December 1954 a group of Uruguayan doctors and psychologists asked him to assume responsibility for training analysis and teaching in Montevideo. The Asociacı́on Psicoanalı́tica del Uruguay was officially formed on September 27, 1955. It was recognized as a study group at the international congress held in Paris in 1957 and as an affiliate of the International Psychoanalytic Association at the congress of Edinburgh in 1961. The Revista uruguaya de psicoanálisis, which is still in print, published its first issue in May 1956. Willy Baranger was a constant presence at the Latin 15 0 American congresses of psychoanalysis since their inception in Buenos Aires in 1956 and, in 1960, at the congress held in Santiago, Chile, he worked with his colleagues to create COPAL, the Coordinating Committee for Latin American Psychoanalytic Organizations, of which he was president in 1975–1976. In 1966 Baranger returned to Buenos Aires, where he resumed his teaching activities. He was part of the sponsorship committee of the Peruvian group that, once recognized as an affiliate of the International Psychoanalytic Association, named him an honorary member. In December 1993 he received the Mary S. Sigourney prize. Baranger published four books: Problemas del campo psicoanalitico, with Madeleine Baranger (1969), Posicı́on y objeto en la obra de Melanie Klein (1971), Aportaciones al concepto de objeto en psicoanálisis (1980), and Artesanias psicoanaliticas (1994). Some of his many articles touch upon literature and philosophy. His work on epistemology defends the idea that psychoanalysis must formulate its own criteria of validation, different from those used by the exact sciences. He also studied the problem of ideology and its relation to idealized objects. His emphasis on the object is expressed in his Posicı́on y objeto en la obra de Melanie Klein. This ‘‘objectology’’ depends on the willingness to structure any theoretical elaboration of the psychoanalytic situation as a fundamental given. The concept of the psychoanalytic situation as a ‘‘dynamic field’’ leads to an unconscious bipersonal fantasy of the session, in which transference and countertransference are extracted from a situation that possesses its own dynamism and outcomes, aside from the specific contributions of the analyst and analysand. For example, a ‘‘bastion’’ is a resistance produced in the psychoanalytic field by the unconscious collusion of the analyst and the analysand, which immobilizes the process. Willy BarangerÕs work is generally well known and recognized in Latin America, but much less so in Europe, with the exception of Italy, where a selection of his work was published in 1990 as La situazione psicoanalitica come campo bipersonale (The Psychoanalytic Situation as a Bipersonal Field). MADELEINE BARANGER See also: Argentina; Federacı́on psicoanalı́tica de América Latina; Uruguay. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BASIC FAULT Bibliography Baranger, Madeleine, Baranger, Willy, and Mom, Jorge. (1983). Process and non-process in analytic work. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 64, 1–15. (Original work published 1982) Baranger, Willy. (1971). Posición y objeto en la obra de Melanie Klein. Buenos Aires: Kargieman. Baranger, Willy, and Baranger, Madeleine. (1969). Problemas del campo psicoanalı́tic. Buenos Aires: Kargieman. Wilfred R. Bion (1961) uses the term basic assumption to designate that which, fundamentally, the individual must assume in order to be part of a group. Basic assumptions come into play at the unconscious, pathic, and affective levels. Competing with the model of the work (W) group, which is focused on a task and puts into effect the secondary processes of rational thought and ‘‘realitytesting,’’ group activity is based on three basic assumptions that are discernible in the affective tone of the relations of group members among themselves and with their leader. The basic assumption of dependency (baD) lends cohesion to the group by means of supporting the assumption that nourishment, protection, knowledge, and life can come only from the wisdom of a leader who is omnipotent and omniscient, akin to a magician. The basic assumption of fight/flight (baF) brings individuals together around the violent, excitation-saturated feeling that the salvation of the group and its individual members depends on the fact that their leader will enable them to identify, and then successfully fight or flee, a specific enemy either within or outside the group. The basic assumption of pairing (baP) enables the group to come together as such through the membersÕ sharing of an implicit, mysterious hope, sparked by the assumption that a couple will give birth to a messiah, a new guide, a new idea, or a new theory or ideology. These basic assumptions are states of mind—all of them sexual in the final analysis—associated with the characters in the oedipal situation (including the Sphinx); they emerge as secondary formations from an extremely primitive scene that is played out at the level of part-objects, and which is associated with psychotic anxieties and with the mechanisms of splitting and projective identification inherent in the OF BERNARD DEFONTAINE See also: Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht; Group analysis. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1961). Experiences in groups. London: Tavistock Publications. Freud, Sigmund. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. BASIC ASSUMPTION INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY schizoid-paranoid and depressive positions posited by Melanie Klein. PSYCHOANALYSIS Grinberg, León, Sor, Dario, and Tabak de Bianchedi, Elizabeth. (1977). Introduction to the work of Bion: groups, knowledge, psychosis, thought, transformations, psychoanalytic practice (Alberto Hahn, Trans.). New York: J. Aronson. (Original work published 1973) Klein, Melanie. (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 27, 99–110. Pines, Malcolm (Ed.). (1985). Bion and group psychotherapy. London: Routledge. BASIC FAULT The term basic fault refers to the structural deficiency in the personality of subjects who during their early stages of development formed certain types of object relations—which later become compulsions—to cope with a considerable initial ‘‘lack of adjustment’’ between their psychobiological needs and the care provided by a ‘‘faulty’’ environment devoid of understanding. The effects of the basic fault on a personÕs character structure and ‘‘psychobiological dispositions’’ (which may predispose that person to certain illnesses) are only partially reversible. Michael Balint developed this concept in The Doctor, the Patient, and the Illness (1957), as a result of his research with physicians in the area of psychosomatic disorders. Additionally, in ‘‘The Three Areas of the Mind’’ (1958), Balint developed the notion of the ‘‘basic fault zone’’ to situate therapeutic processes relating to states of regression in certain patients. This became the source for his metapsychological theorization, in The Basic Fault: Therapeutic Aspects of Regression (1968), of ‘‘zones of the psychic apparatus,’’ which included a critique of Sigmund FreudÕs notion of ‘‘primary narcissism’’ and new considerations on the handling of regression. 151 BASIC NEUROSIS, THE—ORAL REGRESSION AND PSYCHIC MASOCHISM Certain patients (those with schizoid personalities, narcissistic states, or addictions, for example) are unable to tolerate the frustrations of classical treatment and are largely inaccessible to interpretation. The therapeutic relationship thus requires modifications in technique to open up to analysis the interpersonal psychic processes inherent in the ‘‘basic fault zone.’’ This ‘‘zone’’ of the human psyche (which may be the ego) is unquestionably more primitive than both the ‘‘area of the Oedipus conflict’’ (Balint, 1968, p. 28) (prevalent in classical treatment) and the ‘‘area of creation’’ (p. 29). The processes that take place there are characterized by: 1. An exclusively ‘‘two-person’’ relationship, where only the patientÕs needs count; 2. A dynamic force other than conflict (proper to the oedipal zone): that of an anxiety that drives the patient to perpetuate old models of object relations that now indicate maladjustment, such as behaviors that are ‘‘ocnophilic’’ (desperately clinging to objects) or ‘‘philobatic’’ (attempts at self-sufficiency by keeping well away from supposedly dangerous objects); this dynamic also drives the patient to establish a harmonious relationship with his or her environment (‘‘primary love’’); 3. The prevalence of nonverbal processes or language usage that is nontypical of adults. A kind of ‘‘psychological mothering’’ makes it possible to avoid reproducing the traumatic situation in treatment; object relations, rather than interpretation, provide the therapeutic leverage. Regression, which is in part linked to the analystÕs responses, can be therapeutic (‘‘benign’’) if it is aimed at producing recognition of previously unacknowledged needs rather than satisfying them. Certain soothing forms of satisfaction (libidinal and physical contact) help sustain the therapeutic relationship. Reestablishing the primary love relationship allows the basic fault, once it has been recognized, to heal. It is said to be ‘‘neutralized’’ when the patient can let go of his or her compulsive object relations. This theoretical model is especially relevant to the treatment of borderline cases; it is used in the framework of focal therapies and in situations addressing combined psychological, medical, and social considerations (psychotherapeutic aspects of medical treatment, 15 2 family planning consultations, and other such contexts). It sustains the fundamental metapsychological and clinical issues. Inseparable from a conception of the psyche as a product of interpersonal relations—in particular, the ego as a ‘‘corporeal entity’’ (Freud)—and from a theory of treatment that makes use of regression, the ‘‘basic fault’’ has been subject to the criticisms that are usually made against any approach that aims at partial reparation: the risk of erotization, the risk of nondissolution of the transference, and so on. Balint viewed such criticisms as manifestations of anxiety on the part of analysts. Subsequent work has indicated that this conception of an early distortion in the ego should also take into account the pathogenic processes stemming from the patientÕs family and cultural contexts. Focus on the nonverbal should not allow the underestimation of the crucial role that language and signifiers (just as much as their deficiencies or dysfunctions) play in the constitution of the ego. CORINNE DAUBIGNY See also: Balint, Michael; Benign/malignant regression; Hungarian School; Libido; Primary love. Bibliography Balint, Michael. (1952). Primary love and psycho-analytic technique. London: Hogarth. ———. (1958). The three areas of the mind. Theoretical considerations. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 9, 328–340. ———. (1959). Thrills and regressions. London: Hogarth. ———. (1964). The doctor, his patient, and the illness (2nd ed.). London: Pitman Medical Publishing. (1st edition published 1957) ———. (1968). The basic fault: therapeutic aspects of regression. London: Tavistock. BASIC NEUROSIS, THE—ORAL REGRESSION AND PSYCHIC MASOCHISM ‘‘A most original thinker and prolific writer,’’ in this book Bergler compiled the results from his 130 published papers and 6 books based on 22 years of clinical experience. Renowned for his research on oral neurosis, he discovered there is but one ‘‘basic neurosis’’— repressed masochistic attachment to the fantasied earINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BASIC PROBLEMS liest ‘‘bad mother’’; later neuroses ‘‘reformulating’’ oral masochistic material represent ‘‘rescue stations’’; psychic masochism (PM), the unconscious pursuit of ‘‘pleasure in displeasure,’’ forms the core of oral regression. Thus, neurotic equals psychic masochist. Neurotics cling to and repeat misery, in itself indicating PM. PM unconsciously ‘‘sugarcoats’’ and ‘‘neutralizes’’ pain; but consciously pain remains, felt in symptoms and personality distortions. To FreudÕs ‘‘genetic picture’’ of PM (megalomania unavoidably offended by perceived frustration of libido; fury; helpless aggression rebounding; libidinization of guilt), Bergler worked out and added the ‘‘clinical picture.’’ He named it the ‘‘mechanism of orality’’: 1. Unconscious provocation or misuse of ‘‘refusal’’; casting others as ‘‘bad, refusing mother.’’ 2. Retaliation for the alleged ‘‘injustice’’ by pseudoaggressively fighting in righteous indignation. OF ETHNOPSYCHIATRY for tortureÕs sake’’) as the ‘‘real master of the personality,’’ requiring constant appeasement. Daimonion (the punitive part of SE) uses the ego ideal to torture the ego; also that punishment is masochized. Psychic masochism is disguised from the superego by two defensive alibis (in the five-layer structure of neurotic symptoms and traits). In the normal, the fifth layer is antimasochistic; in neurosis, the final layer ‘‘smuggles in’’ masochism in self-damaging symptoms. Hence, neurotics cannot be helped unless their PM is analyzed. Eighteen further books detail his later discoveries. Growing numbers of adherents are confirming the accuracy and clinical value of his work. MELVYN I. ISCOVE See also: Bergler, Edmund; Masochism; Neuroses. Source Citation Bergler Edmund. (1949). The basic neurosis—oral regression and psychic masochism. New York: Grune and Stratton. 3. Self-pity then unconsciously enjoyed. With this base, every clinical entity incorporates a unique ‘‘specific additional factor’’; 27 clinical pictures with case illustrations substantiate this. Psychic masochists unconsciously want refusal, rejection, humiliation, defeat. The genuine ‘‘wish to get’’ of infancy is now a defense. They believe they want normal pleasure, but a person ‘‘who unconsciously runs after disappointment cannot be consciously happy.’’ All neurotic aggression is ‘‘pseudoaggression,’’ promoting self-damage. Neurotics shift the blame outside, mostly to parents; this Bergler named the ‘‘basic fallacy,’’ which must be shown to be a fallacy. Applying these ideas, Bergler advocated new clinical solutions, such as talking at length to patients to counteract their projection of ‘‘bad refusing mother’’ (facilitating analysis), and more active analyzing, to unearth and interpret all repressed masochistic data and repetitions. He added theory regarding transference/love, creativity, working through, masturbation, moneyneurosis, fashion, gambling, homosexuality, and humor. Bergler deduced mechanisms of cynicism, hypocrisy, criminosis; described and/or named alysosis, middle-age revolt, confusionism, 22 visual neuroses, writerÕs block, psychogenic aspermia, counterfeit-sex, and ‘‘pseudo-moral connotation of neurotic symptoms’’ (ironization of teachings to prop up each symptom). He identified the superego (SE) (‘‘torture INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Bergler, Edmund. (1989). The superego. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1952) ———. (1982). Counterfeit-sex. New York: Grune and Stratton. (Original work published 1958) ———. (1992). Principles of self-damage. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1959) ———. (1993). Curable and incurable neurotics. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1961) ———. (1969). Selected papers of Edmund Bergler, M.D., 1933–1961. New York: Grune and Stratton. Jaffe, Daniel. (1986). Review of the revolt of the middle-aged man. Money and emotional conflicts, and the psychology of gambling. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 67, 507–509. BASIC PROBLEMS OF ETHNOPSYCHIATRY Dedicated to Marcel Mauss and with a preface by Roger Bastide, the essays in Basic Problems of Ethnopsychiatry were published between 1940 and 1967 in American anthropology, psychiatry, criminology, and 153 B A U D O U I N , C H A R L E S (1 893 –19 63) psychoanalysis reviews (American Anthropologist, Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, Journal of Criminal Psychopathology). The author provided additional commentary for some of the texts at the time of their publication. In spite of the diversity of the topics, the collection provides insight into the sources of DevereuxÕs thought, his experiences as an ethnologist among the Mohave Indians of California and the Sedangs Moi of Vietnam, as well as his research on sociology and mythology. These included the definition of ethnopsychiatry as a reference frame for clinical work and research in psychiatry; the qualification of the concepts of ethnic personality and its disorders (sacred, typical, idiosyncratic); the status of culture in psychological disturbances such as psychosis, neurosis, somatic disturbance, deviance; and the additional possibilities of functional and cultural disturbances. For example, in ‘‘A Sociological Theory of Schizophrenia’’ Devereux analyzes the effects of modern societies on the disorientation and dysphoria of its members. The author draws the attention of psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, and anthropologists to the reciprocity of oedipal conflicts between adult and child and to the presence in some societies of models of conventional misconduct that can be used directly in private and ‘‘negativist’’ fantasies. Devereux also reiterates the importance of diagnosing any antisocial ‘‘warning symptoms’’ in disturbed individuals, even those who are least obvious, not as a function of existing norms but as a function of their singularity and distance from culture and the materials it offered them. For Georges Devereux culture was an interior experience and a way of ‘‘living experience.’’ Through his methodology, based on the complementarity of psychological and sociological data, and his theoretical opposition to any form of cultural relativism in the explanation of mental disorders—he believed in the mental unity of human beings—the role of psychoanalysis in ethnological research has been established. Through its coherence and scholarship, DevereuxÕs work provides unique support for the use of ethnopsychiatry in the investigation of culture. SIMONE VALANTIN See also: Anthropology and psychoanalysis; Devereux, Georges; Ethnopsychoanalysis; Individual; Transcultural. 15 4 Source Citation Devereux, Georges. (1980). Basic problems of ethnopsychiatry (Basia Miller Gulati and George Devereux, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. BAUDOUIN, CHARLES (1893–1963) Charles Baudouin was born July 26, 1893, in Nancy, France, and died on August 25, 1963, in Geneva, Switzerland During his career, he was a Swiss psychoanalyst and Privatdocent at the University of Geneva (1920), founder of the International Institute of Psychagogy and Psychotherapy (1924), director of the review Action et Pensée (Action and Thought) (1931), Chevalier of the Legion of Honor in Paris (1950), and associate professor at the University of Geneva (1962). His father had a career in the French military as a non-commissioned officer in the public health service, and his mother came from a family of middleclass shopkeepers in the German-speaking area of Lorraine. Baudouin studied philosophy in Nancy, where he received his degree in 1912. He was a professor of philosophy at the school of Neufchâteau in the Vosges. In 1915 he traveled to Geneva, attracted by the success of the Jean-Jacques Rousseau Institute, where he taught. He wrote his doctoral dissertation, entitled Suggestion et Autosuggestion, at the University of Geneva in 1920. Baudouin underwent three different analyses: One in 1917 with Dr. Carl Picht, a Jungian analyst, another, a training analysis, with Charles Odier, between 1925 and 1926, and a third with another Jungian, Tina Keller. Fluent in both French and German, Baudouin read the work of Freud and the first psychoanalysts early in his career. He met Freud in Vienna in 1926. In 1929 Baudouin applied for membership in the Société Psychanalytique de Paris, but his request was rejected because of pressure from Henri Flournoy, who insisted that he would join the organization only upon condition that Baudouin not be admitted. Baudouin spent much of his career trying to reconcile the work of Jung, Freud, and Adler. His earliest work was devoted to suggestion and hypnosis. He later INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B A U E R , I D A (1882 –1 945) developed an interest in literature and the relation between psychoanalysis and education. BaudouinÕs literary output throughout his career was considerable. He wrote a Carnet de route in sixteen volumes (1910– 1939), only some of which were published. These notebooks provide valuable commentary concerning the psychoanalytic atmosphere prevalent at the time. Carnet VI (October 1918–December 1921) is entitled, ‘‘When the Child Appears.’’ His first book was Suggestion and Autosuggestion (1920). His most important publications include Études de psychanalyse (1922), QuÕest ce que la suggestion? (1924), Le Symbole chez Verhaeren (1924), Psychanalyse de l Õart (1929), La Mobilisation de l Õénergie (1931), LÕÂme enfantine et la psychanalyse (1931), La Psychanalyse (1939), Psychanalyse et Victor Hugo (1943), LÕÂme et l ÕAction (1944), De l Õinstinct à l ÕEsprit (1950), Y a–t–il une science de l Õâme? (1957), Psychanalyse du symbole religieux (1957). He also wrote a novel, Christophe le passeur (1964). BaudouinÕs work merits greater attention from modern historians and psychoanalysts. His concerns and fields of interest are often directly relevant to contemporary psychoanalysis. He is a precursor in a number of fields (art, education, suggestion, and hypnosis). Baudouin did not adhere to orthodox Freudianism and turned to Jung and Adler for the theoretical elements that he felt were relevant for clinical work. MIREILLE CIFALI See also: Autosuggestion; (French-speaking). Suggestion; Switzerland Bibliography Baudouin, Charles. (1920). Suggestion et autosuggestion. Neuchâtel-Paris: Delachaux and Niestlé. ———. (1924). Qu’est-ce que la suggestion? Introduction à la psychologie de la suggestion et de l’autosuggestion Neuchâtel-Paris: Delachaux and Niestlé. ———. (1931). L’Âme enfantine et la psychanalyse. Neuchâtel-Paris: Delachaux and Niestlé. ———. (1957). Psychanalyse du symbole religieux. Paris: Fayard. Cifali, Mireille. (1990). De quelques remous helvétiques autour de l’analyse profane. Revue internationale de la historie de la psychanalyse. 3, 145–157. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Roudinesco, Élisabeth. (1986). La Bataille de cent ans. Histoire de la psychanalyse en France (Vol. 2). Paris: Le Seuil. BAUER, IDA (1882–1945) Ida Bauer, alias Dora, is the subject of FreudÕs famous case history on an adolescent (Freud, 1905). Her father, Philip Bauer, who became a rich textile industrialist, was born in 1853 in Pollerskirchen. Her mother, Katherina or Käthe (née Gerber), was born in 1862 in Königinhof, a village that, like her husbandÕs birthplace, was located in the eastern part of Bohemia. Shortly after marriage, the Bauers had their only two children, both born in Vienna: Otto, born on September 5, 1881; and Dora, November 1, 1882. Contrary to his sister, whose reputation stemmed solely from her patienthood, Otto achieved eminence as the parliamentary leader and foreign minister of the First Austrian Republic, as its chief Marxist theorist, and as secretary to the Austrian Social Democratic WorkerÕs Party. After contracting tuberculosis, the wealthy Philip moved with his family in 1888 from Vienna to B—, FreudÕs designation for Merano, a Tyrolean resort town that is presently in Italy and situated four hundred kilometers to the southwest of Vienna. In Merano the Bauers befriended another resident couple, designated by Freud as Herr and Frau K, the letter pronounced in German the same way as the last syllable of their real married name, Zellenka. Hans Zellenka and his wife Peppina (née Heumann) had two young children, Otto and the congenitally ill Klara, both born in 1891. Although afflicted herself with bouts of tussis nervosa and aphonia, Dora would care for both her sick father and the Zellenka children. In 1894 Philip became even more sick. Nursed by Peppina, Philip then started a long liaison with her. DoraÕs conflicts were aggravated by that liaison and also by two traumata that she suffered at the hands of Hans. Although she consulted Freud once in 1898, Dora did not go into treatment with him until the earlier part of October 1900; she abruptly terminated treatment nearly three months later, on the last day of the year. In 1903 she married Ernst Adler, who, not succeeding as a musician, went to work for her father. Summoned by DoraÕs physician, Felix Deutch visited the bedridden patient in 1923; reportedly she suffered from almost paranoid behavior and found all men 155 BEDWETTING detestable. (DoraÕs one son, Kurt Herbert, won fame as the director of the San Francisco Opera Company.) In a fateful twist of history, Dora and Peppina later became friends; both were partners as bridge masters during the 1930s when the card game was the craze in Vienna. Because of her brother OttoÕs Marxist affiliation, the Nazis sought Dora in the late 1930s, and she hid in PeppinaÕs home. Dora emigrated to Paris, and then to New York where she died. PATRICK MAHONY See also: ‘‘Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria’’ (Dora/Ida Bauer). Bibliography Decker, Hannah. (1991). Freud, Dora, and Vienna 1900. New York: The Free Press. Freud, Sigmund. (1905e [1901]). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. SE, 7: 1–122. Loewenberg, Peter. (1985). Decoding the past: The psychohistorical approach. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Mahony, Patrick. (1996). Freud’s Dora: A historical, textual, and psychoanalytic study. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Rogow, Arnold. (1978). A further note to Freud’s ‘‘Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria’’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 26, 311–330. Society]), and Father Bruno de Jésus–Marie (Carmelite studies), the Association Internationale dÕÉtudes MédicoPsychologiques et Religieuses (International Association of Medico-Psychological and Religious Studies) to promote the understanding of psychoanalysis within the Catholic church. During the early sixties, he created in France, together with Andrée Lehmann, Abby Marc Oraison, and Father Albert Plé (Dominican, director of the Supplément), the Association Médico-Psychologique dÕAide aux Religieux [Medico-Psychological Association for Assistance to the Clergy], which provided members of the clergy with access to psychoanalysis and a better understanding of its possibilities. He was a member of the Société Française de Psychanalyse (French Psychoanalytic Society), the École Freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris), and was close to Jacques Lacan. Throughout this period he was also the editor of the Jesuit publication Études, for issues of morality, psychology, and psychoanalysis. Through his writing and numerous personal associations, Beirnaert exercised considerable influence on improving relations between psychoanalysis and the Catholic church. He wrote a number of articles on psychoanalysis, ethics, and the interrelation of psychoanalysis and Christianity. JACQUES SÉDAT See also: France; Religion and psychoanalysis. Bibliography BEDWETTING. See Enuresis Beirnaert, Louis. (1966). Expérience chrétienne et psychologie. Paris: L’Épi. ———. (1986). Aux frontières de l’acte analytique. Paris: Le Seuil. BEIRNAERT, LOUIS (1906–1985) Louis Beirnaert, a French Jesuit and psychoanalyst, was born on April 2, 1906, in Ascq and died on April 30, 1985, in Paris. Beirnaert became a Jesuit in 1923. An almoner for law students during the Second World War, he took part in a resistance network and went underground. After the war he became a professor of dogmatic theology (1947–1951). He began his analysis with Daniel Lagache and became an analyst himself. In 1953 he founded, together with Father Charles Durand (Geneva), Doctor Charles Nodet (Société psychanalytique de Paris [Paris Psychoanalytic 15 6 BELGIUM There were signs of interest in Belgium for Freud and BreuerÕs research on hysteria as early as 1894. References can be found in DallemagneÕs Dégénérés et déséquilibrés (Degeneracy and Mental Imbalance), but this appears to be an isolated case (Berdondini, N., 1987). During the twenties, a few attempts were made to introduce young psychiatrists to psychoanalytic concepts, but there was vehement opposition from the old guard. In literature a special issue of Disque vert appeared in 1924, entirely devoted to Freud. The INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BELGIUM Belgian authors included Georges Dwelshauwers, André Ombredane, and Henri Michaux. In his later writing, Franz Hellens, director of the publication, was also sympathetic to the work of Carl Gustav Jung. At the University of Louvain, following the initiative of the future cardinal Mercier, several professors took an interest in Freudian theory and established individual critical positions because of the emphasis placed on sexuality. The Jesuit J. Maréchal was also influential in promoting early acceptance of psychoanalysis. In the midst of these still limited signs of interest, there emerged the figure of an educator from Gand, Julien Varendonck (1879–1924), who had the good fortune to meet Freud and become one of his students. He underwent a training analysis with Theodor Reik and spent 1923 in Vienna to continue his education. Upon his return to Gand, he opened his own office and was made a member of the Dutch Society of Psychoanalysis shortly before his premature death on June 11, 1924. In 1921 he published an important monograph entitled La psychologie des rêves éveillés (The Psychology of Daydreams), with a preface by Freud. Anna Freud translated the first part of the book. Unfortunately, because he was unable to find any students or an analysand with whom he could continue his research, his initiative remained stillborn. The foundations of psychoanalytic practice were established by two Belgian pioneers, Maurice Dugautiez (1893–1960) and Fernand Lechat (1895–1959). The beginnings of psychoanalysis in Belgium reflect FreudÕs own solitary struggle during the first decade of the twentieth century. A closed and poorly informed medical establishment—the organic approach dominated psychiatry at the time—and a public opinion that remained hostile because of sectarian prejudices, explain why FreudÕs work had to wait for the arrival of two idealists who remained far outside the conventional sphere of training before psychoanalysis could take hold in the country. Both men were self–taught, curious and passionate individuals, who first met in 1933. Their encounter was the prelude to years of fruitful collaboration that enabled a psychoanalytic organization to gain a foothold in Belgium. In spite of the dramatic context in which it occurred, another fortuitous event took place in 1933 or thereabouts. A Viennese Jew, Dr. Ernst Hoffman, a disciple of Freud and a brilliant student of Sándor Ferenczi, settled in Anvers to escape Nazi persecution. Dugautiez and Lechat, together with Mrs. Lechat, who INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS was primarily interested in working with children, took advantage of HoffmanÕs providential appearance and began a training analysis with him. Unfortunately, Hoffman was arrested in 1942 and sent to a concentration camp. He never returned, and the nascent Belgian psychoanalytic movement suddenly lost its leader. Beginning in 1936 Dugautiez and Lechat began undergoing supervised analyses under the supervision of Dr. Leuba and Marie Bonaparte. They were authorized to practice on their own in 1939; Mrs. Lechat began working with children at this time. After the war ended, both of them applied for membership in the Paris Psychoanalytic Society and were authorized, in 1946, to conduct training analyses and supervise their own studentsÕ first analyses. On December 24, 1946, they founded the Association des Psychanalystes de Belgique (Association of Belgian Psychoanalysts) with Dr. Leuba as honorary president. They were sponsored by the Psychoanalytic Society of Paris. Doctor Ernest Jones, president of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA), had encouraged this initiative. In 1947 the association, with the sponsorship of Marie Bonaparte, was accepted for membership in the IPA. The standing of the young organization was made more secure in 1948 with the organization, in Brussels, of the eleventh Conférence des Psychanalystes de Langue Française [(Conference of French-speaking Psychoanalysts). During the twelfth conference, in 1954, Fernand Lechat presented a report on ‘‘The Principle of Security.’’ There were three further meetings in Brussels: in 1958, in 1972 (when a report was given by Danièle Flagey, entitled ‘‘Intellectual Inhibition’’), and in Liege, in 1986, with a report by Andrée Bauduin, ‘‘On the Preconscious.’’ In 1953, Dr. Thérèse Jacobs Van Merlen, who had returned from her training in Paris with Sacha Nacht, Serge Lebovici, and René Diatkine, joined Dugautiez and Lechat. A stream of new members joined the association: Flagey, Bourdon, Vannypelseer, Drappier, Luminet, Pierloot, Labbé, Darmstaedter, Duyckaerts, and later, Watillon and Godfrind. The association has continued to grow since then. In 1960 the name was changed to the Société Belge de Psychanalyse (Belgian Psychoanalytic Society), also known as the Belgische Vereniging voor Psychoanalyse. The society continued to grow, with the addition of a teaching committee, an enlarged administrative 157 BELIEF office, and an ethics committee. In addition to bimonthly meetings and working groups, the entire society met every two years for a colloquium. The Revue belge de psychanalyse, with Haber as its first director, was founded in 1982. The review made the societyÕs ideas accessible to a much broader public. There was also a membersÕ Bulletin, created in 1977. Some twenty years after the creation of the current Belgian Psychoanalytic Society, various activities were established by psychoanalysts who had returned home from abroad and who were, for the most part, associated with the University of Louvain. These individuals either could not, or would not, become a part of the existing society. Most of them had met in Paris between 1955–1960, where they followed the activities of the French Psychoanalytic Society, which was then run by Daniel Lagache and Jacques Lacan, with the assistance of Juliette Boutonier, Françoise Dolto, and Georges Favez. Following a break in 1953 with the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, in 1964 the French Psychoanalytic Society experienced new upheavals with the departure of Lacan and the creation of the École Freudienne. Although some activities of the new Belgian group began in 1964, the official foundation of the École Belge de Psychanalyse (Belgische School voor Psychoanalyse) did not take place until 1969, under the impetus of Professors Jacques Schotte and Antoine Vergote. LacanÕs influence was decisive within the school, to the extent that its establishment can be considered an implicit extension of the situation in France. This allegiance to Lacanian positions, at least on the part of some, became problematic when the dissolution of the École Freudienne by Lacan led to divisions that subsequently gave rise to numerous offshoots, including Questionnement Psychanalytique (Psychoanalytic Questioning) and the Association Freudienne de Belgique (The Freudian Association of Belgium). These various groups are the result of the differences encountered concerning the importance of Lacanian ideas, in terms of setting and training, and more generally in terms of the theoretical corpus. Unlike the Belgian Psychoanalytic Society, these associations were not part of the IPA, some even took pride in their separatist stance. In 1984 the École Belge de Psychanalyse began publishing a bilingual review, Psychoanalyse. There were also Jungian psychoanalysts working in Belgium. The Société Belge de Psychologie Analytique 15 8 (Belgian Society of Analytic Psychology), or SBPA, was founded in 1975. The majority of its members had been analyzed by Gilberte Aigrisse (1911–1995), who was trained in Geneva by Charles Baudouin. In 1994 some members of the SBPA left the organization to found a new group known as the École Belge de Psychanalyse Jungienne (Belgian School of Jungian Psychoanalysis), or EBPJ. ANDRÉ ALSTEENS Bibliography Bauduin, Andrée. (1987). Du préconscient. Revue française de psychanalyse, 51, 449–538. Berdondini, Nadine. (1987). L’introduction de la psychanalyse en Belgique: 1900–1947. Louvain-la-Neuve, reprinted 1995. Flagey, Danièle. (1973). L’inhibition intellectuelle. Revue française de psychanalyse, 36, 717–798. Lechat, Fernand. (1955). Du principe de sécurité. (rapport). Revue française de psychanalyse, 19 (1–2), 11–101. BELIEF Belief is the condition of holding a thing to be true or probable, giving credit to a person or an idea, giving credence to or having faith in a story. In this last sense belief is related to theology and economy. The believer is situated in a religious system in which he adopts a certain number of convictions, accepts a series of dogmas and makes this credo a guideline for living. Belief may have to do with clinging to a truth or belonging to a church or a party. The believer is also indebted to the person or persons, parents or teachers or others, who provide the material for belief, and possess a capital of confidence and a stock of responses, encouraging or obliging the believer to borrow from them models of reasoning and types of solutions. The theme of belief is directly addressed by Sigmund Freud in a note accompanying a letter to Wilhelm Fliess dated May 31, 1897. There, belief is described as a phenomenon belonging entirely to the ego system (consciousness), without any unconscious equivalent. The topic had already been addressed indirectly in chapter 12 of the Studies on Hysteria (1895d), belief there being associated with superstition (p. 250). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B E N E D E K , T H E R E S E (1892 –1 977) It may seem paradoxical to speak of belief in the context of psychoanalysis. Freud described himself as nonbeliever and made no secret of his atheism. But precisely this external position with respect to unproven truth made him see belief as an anomaly that needed to be explained. Influenced by the positivism and scientism of his time, he considered belief to be a relic of childhood. He thus placed himself within the tradition of Auguste Comte, who believed that the individual and humanity as a whole both went through a childish stage with theological and military characteristics. He considered that the church and the army were the two social institutions responsible for perpetuating this stage. The reference to childhood here is bound up with the role of the father: God is the father of believers, who are all brothers; likewise the commander-in-chief is the father of soldiers, who are all comrades. The belief in salvation or victory is thus vital for maintaining the sense of family. For Freud the concept of belief is inseparable from childhood theories of sexuality that continue to be held by the individual or by society. The little boy believes that women (and therefore his mother) have a penis. Society believes that the child has no sexuality. Belief is always associated with a disavowal of reality. The renunciation of belief is then an educational task and a psychological struggle, both liable to encounter much resistance. Psychoanalytic treatment cannot itself dispense with belief, for the transference, which reactivates infantile processes, demands that the patient lend credence to the analystÕs words even though these do not belong to the realm of demonstrable truth. The better to remove the need for belief, therefore, psychoanalysis is obliged temporarily to replace one belief by another. Differing attitudes regarding belief broadly coincide with the major splits in psychoanalysis and the schisms that have marked its history. In the early days, there was a ‘‘left’’ psychoanalysis, centered around Alfred Adler and the Social Democrats, which believed in popular revolution and the possibility, within a new political system, of eliminating alienation in both the social and the psychiatric senses of the word. A ‘‘right’’ tendency, meanwhile, epitomized by Carl Gustav Jung, believed in a metamorphosis of the soul and an internal unification of man that could heal all dislocations of being and all fissures in the ego. Freud was suspicious of all such beliefs, and his clinical experience tended to make him pessimistic about the possibility INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS of separating belief from illusion. He saw the need to believe as a powerful means of mobilizing the instincts and manipulating the unconscious: so loath were man and society to consent to what Max Weber called the disenchantment of the world that they continually felt the need to believe in the unbelievable, to hope against all hope in some distant paradise or in glorious tomorrows. Skepticism did not in FreudÕs view mean a refusal of values. Values were indeed necessary for the progress of culture and its corollary, the renunciation of the immediate satisfaction of instinctual impulses. The values of civilization called nonetheless for a truly critical scrutiny that held fast to one most important principle: to fear no truth no matter how painful it might be. ODON VALLET See also: Future of an Illusion, The; Illusion; Occultism; Omnipotence of thought; Paranoia; Psychoses, chronic and delusional; Science and psychoanalysis; Superego. Bibliography Dolto, Françoise. (1996). Les évangiles et la foi au risque de la psychanalyse. Paris: Gallimard. Freud, Sigmund. (1927c). The future of an illusion. SE, 21: 5–56. ——— (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 64–145. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2. BENEDEK, THERESE (1892–1977) Therese Benedek, a Hungarian psychoanalyst, was born in Budapest on November 8, 1892, and died in Chicago on October 27, 1977. She received her medical diploma from the University of Budapest in 1915. She underwent five months of analysis with Sándor Ferenczi, then in 1918 settled, along with her husband Tibor, in Leipzig. From 1920–1923 she completed her analytic training at the newly established Berlin Institute, where she attended seminars and conducted analyses under the supervision of Karl Abraham and Max Eitingon. A partisan of ‘‘developmental psychoanalysis,’’ Benedek followed FerencziÕs recommendation for flexibility during therapy. 159 B E N I G N /M A L I G N A N T R E G R E S S I O N In 1933 she emigrated with her husband and their two children to the United States. In 1936 Franz Alexander offered her an administrative position at the Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis, where he was the director. Here she participated actively in research on psychosomatic medicine for effective coordination of somatic and psychotherapeutic therapies, and published an article on the functions of the sexual apparatus and their disturbances. This study investigated the interaction between organic (hormonal) factors and the psychosexual economy in sexual disturbances by showing their close interdependence. In 1949 she was one of the first psychoanalysts to speak of the mother-child dyad in terms of emotional symbiosis, insisting on a transgenerational reading of interaction during infancy. Ten years later, in Parenthood as a Developmental Phase, she referred to the interpersonal process that formed the basis of the mother-child interaction as a ‘‘transactional spiral,’’ which took place through the reciprocal identifications and introjections between mother and child. DELPHINE SCHILTON See also: Germany; Hungarian School; Parenthood. Bibliography Benedek, Therese. (1949). The psychosomatic implications of the primary unit: mother-child. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 19, 642–654. ———. (1956). Psychobiological aspects of mothering. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 26, 272. ———. (1959). Parenthood as a developmental phase. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 7, 389– 417. ———. (1973). Psychoanalytic Investigations: Selected Papers. New York: Quadrangle Books. BENIGN/MALIGNANT REGRESSION The notion of benign versus malignant regression comes from Michael BalintÕs book Thrills and Regressions (1959); he distinguished two types of regression that can appear during analysis. The benign form is minor, temporary, and reversible; the other, malignant form is major, serious, lasting, or even irreversible. The former brings with it beneficial, therapeutic effects; the latter is pathogenic and can potentially 16 0 result in insurmountable problems for the patient and the analysis. Regression, discovered very early on by Sigmund Freud in its topographical, temporal, and formal aspects as a defense mechanism and therapeutic support, suddenly appeared as a threat to the patient and to treatment. Generations of analysts thus came to dread it. Balint took up this issue at the point at which Freud and then Sándor Ferenczi had left off, and between 1932 and 1960 he created this notion, which aimed to change analystsÕ attitude toward this phenomenon. Balint no doubt used the terms benign and malignant with reference to the work of Otto Warburg, his former boss at the Berlin Charity Hospital, on tumors, for which Warburg won the Nobel Prize in 1931. The analogy is found in surgical techniques. This clinical distinction goes beyond the theoretical positions and techniques of Freud and Ferenczi. Freud recommended that regression be overlooked in analytic technique and saw it as a therapeutic support, but he advised analysts to maintain a degree of distance. Ferenczi used it and even provoked it (trance states) for therapeutic ends, and, during the 1930s, carried away by theoretical fervor, he conducted his ‘‘great experiment.’’ He devoted himself completely to his patients and responded to their impassioned demands with small gratifications; he also gave the patients extra sessions on demand, day or night, including during vacations. The experiment elicited FreudÕs ‘‘massive condemnation’’ (Freud, Letter to Ferenczi, December 13, 1931), which Balint called ‘‘unfair and not very productive’’ (1968). Balint reassessed FerencziÕs approach during his continuation, after 1933, of FerencziÕs unfinished analyses; this enabled him to understand his predecessorÕs errors. The question arose as to whether he should return to the former techniques with these patients or rather, as he had begun to, derive a new evaluation of their object relations and make a prognosis of the transference (massive or non-massive) in order to adapt the treatment accordingly. He then elaborated a differential diagnostic between two syndromes he called ‘‘Cluster A and Cluster B’’ (1968) with their respective constant characteristics: mutual trust or its absence, demands that were either moderate or insatiable, the inclusion of addictive states or none, and so on. To avoid ‘‘the appearance of a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B E R G E , A N D R É (1902 –1 995) malignant form of regression,’’ he advocated the development of adapted analytic techniques: The ‘‘discreet’’ (not omnipotent or needlessly intrusive) analyst must create the secure, permissive atmosphere that the patient needs, as well as the time needed for regression and what he called a ‘‘new beginning.’’ This notion, linked to his theory of the ‘‘basic fault,’’ is unquestionably the one that in BalintÕs corpus has had the greatest influence among analysts. MICHELLE MOREAU RICAUD See also: Basic fault. Bibliography Balint, Michael. (1959). Thrills and Regressions. New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1968). The basic fault: Therapeutic aspects of regression. London: Tavistock Publications. Freud, Sigmund, and Ferenczi, Sándor. (1992–2000). The correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sándor Ferenczi (Eva Brabant, Ed., and Peter T. Hoffer, Trans.). Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. BERGE, ANDRÉ (1902–1995) A French physician and psychoanalyst, André Berge was born on May 24, 1902, in Paris and died on October 27, 1995, in Neuilly-sur-Seine. Although Berge did not know him, President Félix Faure was his maternal grandfather and there is little doubt that this played a role in BergeÕs choices later in life. He grew up with two brothers in a freethinking, upper-middle class, Catholic family with extensive social connections. His mother, Antoinette Félix-Faure, was a childhood friend of Marcel Proust. His father, René Berge, was a mining engineer, his uncle a perpetual secretary of the French Academy, his aunt a founding member of the ‘‘Ligue Fraternelle des Enfants’’ and a student of Maria Montessori. His secondary education took place at the Lycée Janson-de-Sailly, where he primarily studied literature. He published novels before founding, with his brother François, Les Cahiers du mois, in 1924, the year of his marriage to Geneviève Fourcade, with whom he had six children. A book of memoirs, Réminiscences (1977), described the events of the first half of his life. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS In 1930 Berge participated in the foundation of the École des Parents, where he remained vice-president practically for the remainder of his life. He subsequently became interested in psychoanalysis. In 1939 he decided to undergo therapy with René Laforgue and, after joining the ‘‘Club des Piqués’’ consisting of LaforgueÕs analysands, became close with Juliette Favez-Boutonier, Françoise Marette (later Françoise Dolto), and Georges Mauco. He decided to study medicine, which he continued during the Occupation, and focused on child psychiatry with an emphasis on psychoanalysis with Professor Georges Heuyer. Berge earned an M.D. in 1946, he became an associate member of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society) that same year. He was named a full member in 1948. In 1946 Berge joined the staff of the newly created Centre Psychopédagogique Claude-Bernard, founded by Georges Mauco. He became head of the medical section the following year, remaining director for twenty-six years, until 1973. In 1965 he founded the Association pour la Réadaptation des Infirmes Mentaux (APRIM) [Association for the Rehabilitation of the Mentally Disabled], was president of the Fédération Internationale pour lÕÉducation des Parents et des Éducateurs [International Federation for the Education of Parents and Educators] (1973–1979), president of the Montessori Association of France, and a teacher at the Institut de Psychologie from 1961 to 1971. His many activities in international and national organizations, and his many articles assured him a place among the leading educators in the field of child psychoanalysis. It was in this capacity that, between 1950 and 1952, he became involved in the trial of Margaret ClarkWilliams—a psychologist who had been accused of practicing medicine without a license—defending her right to practice psychoanalysis. His subsequent participation in the French psychoanalytic movement was somewhat unique. Even after the 1953 split, for several years he remained a member of the two rival societies, the Société psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society) and the Société française de Psychanalyse (French Society for Psychoanalysis), founded by Daniel Lagache, Françoise Dolto, and Jacques Lacan, his former analyst. Berge was at the time an editor of the review Psyché, founded by Maryse Choisy in 1947, several of whose contributors were also members of the French Society for Psychoanalysis. 161 B E R G G A S S E 19, W I E N I X While efforts were being undertaken to integrate the French Society for Psychoanalysis within the International Psychoanalytic Association, he became a victim of an error on the part of the negotiators and was named, along with Jacques Lacan and Françoise Dolto, as one of those whom the international authorities wanted to exclude from the list of educators. After the mistake was rectified, he joined the non-Lacanians and created the Association Psychanalytique de France (Psychoanalytic Association of France). Berge was president from 1969–1970 but, faithful to his unique status of ‘‘dual membership,’’ was, in 1965, also elected an associate member of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, which he had been forced to quit shortly before. Aside from Les Psychothérapies (1968), Berge is the author of a number of articles, talks, and books on psychopedagogy, of which he was one of the leading promoters in France. These were anthologized in André Berge: écrivain, psychanalyste, éducateur (1995). In 1936 his book LÕÉducation familiale was recognized by the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques. Other books followed, including Le Métier des parents (1956), LÕEnfant au caractère difficile (1970), and La Sexualité d Õaujourd Õhui (1970). Berge outlined the course of his life in a series of interviews with Michel Mathieu in 1988; in spite of blindness, he remained lucid and active until his death. Didier Anzieu, in his preface to André Berge: écrivain, psychanalyste, éducateur, referred to his work as ‘‘protean’’ and praised the ‘‘flexible, open-minded, and rigorous approach that varied with the individual and the context of the exchange. This provided him with direct, rapid insights and the ability to transcribe them with simplicity in clear and convincing language, with less dependence on theory.’’ ALAIN DE MIJOLLA ———. (1988). De l Õécriture à la psychanalyse, entretiens avec M. Mathieu. Paris: Clancier-Guénaud. ———. (1995). André Berge: Écrivain, psychanalyste, éducateur. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. BERGGASSE 19, WIEN IX In September 1891 Sigmund Freud, with his wife Martha and his children Mathilde, Martin, and Oliver, moved into a newly constructed building, Berggasse 19, in ViennaÕs ninth district. Built according to plans by Alexander Stierlin, the building was perfectly suited to its surroundings, consistent with the architecture of the Gründerzeit (founders) style, which changed the face of Berlin, Vienna, and Paris. There were fourteen apartments in the building, all of them sumptuous. FreudÕs family occupied the first floor, and it was there that Ernst, Sophie, and Anna were born. In 1896, because of a lack of space, Freud rented an office on the floor below since the apartment opposite his was occupied by his sister Rosa Graf and her children. It wasnÕt until 1908, when Rosa and her family moved out, that Freud moved into the apartment where he saw patients and received his friends, and which was later catalogued by the photographer Edmund Engelman. He left the apartment in 1938, bringing with him his furniture, his collection of antique objects, and his personal belongings. After 1908, FreudÕs family occupied the entire first floor. During the 1930s, Dorothy Burlingham, born Dorothy Tiffany, moved into the second floor while her children were undergoing analysis with Anna Freud. She became friends with Anna and later her close collaborator. Paris: In 1902 a small group, known as the Wednesday Society, began meeting in the apartment at Berggasse 19; it was the first psychoanalytic discussion group. It was there as well that Freud met with his colleagues— many of whom he considered friends—including Sándor Ferenczi, Max Eitingon, and Ernest Jones, along with writers and intellectuals. It was in his office there that Freud wrote the majority of his work. ———. (1970). LÕenfant au caractère difficile. Paris: Hachette. Since the turn of the century, Freud had surrounded himself with his collection of antique objects, continuously enriched, initially by the purchases he himself made during his trips to Italy and then by those of his See also: Centre psychopédagogique Claude-Bernard; Clark-Williams, Margaret; France; Société française de psychanalyse. Bibliography Berge, André. Montaigne. (1936). LÕéducation familiale. ———. (1968). Les psychothérapies. Paris: P.U.F. 16 2 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B E R G L E R , E D M U N D (1899 –1 962) friends and colleagues, especially Emanuel Loewy, a professor of archeology. At the end of his life, FreudÕs collection contained some two thousand, five hundred objects. He got great enjoyment out of the collection, especially when his cancer prevented him from traveling. When he and his family were forced to flee the country, the apartment was rented and all traces of his presence in it disappeared. The building has housed the Sigmund Freud museum since its opening in 1971, in the presence of Anna Freud, operated by the Sigmund Freud Society. The museum occupies the entire first floor of the building that remained the Freud family residence for nearly fifty years. But it was only with the opening of the museum that the building, which receives nearly forty thousand visitors a year, has assumed its rightful place in the cultural life of Europe. INGRID SCHOLZ-STRASSER See also: Austria; Freud, Sigmund Schlomo; Sigmund Freud Museum; Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung. cruelty, unconscious masochism, and the importance of the pre-oedipal oral mother-attachment. Hitschmann spoke of his ‘‘extraordinary talent for the specialty of psychoanalysis . . . his command of the entire subject matter, his scientific acumen and literary erudition.’’ Considered ‘‘one of the few original minds among the followers of Freud,’’ Bergler presented his main ideas in The Basic Neurosis, in which he summarized his massive original contribution to the field. Throughout his considerable body of written work, lucid case summaries in each book reveal clinical brilliance and a highly effective analytic technique. His own writing, as well as productive collaborations with Jekels, Eidelberg, Winterstein, and Hitschmann, included works on theory and technique. The Edmund and Marianne Bergler Psychiatric Foundation, in New York City, was established by Mrs. Bergler to preserve and perpetuate his work. It holds title to his working correspondence, many more articles, another two dozen complete books in English or German, as well as hundreds of drafts of papers and books, and will be a lasting resource. Bibliography Engelman, Edmund. (1993). Berggasse 19, Sigmund Freud’s home and offices, Vienna, 1938, the photographs of Edmund Engelman. New York: Basic Books. MELVYN L. ISCOVE See also: Superego; Unconscious, the. Leupold–Löwenthal, Harald, Lobner, Hanz, and ScholzStrasser, Inge. (1994). Sigmund-Freud Museum Katalog. Vienna: Christian Brandstätter. Bibliography BERGLER, EDMUND (1899–1962) Bergler, Edmund. (1949). The basic neurosis. Oral regression and psychic masochism. New York: Grune and Stratton. ———. (1969). Selected papers of Edmund Bergler, M.D., 1933–1961. New York: Grune and Stratton. Edmund Bergler, a major Freudian theoretician and clinician, was born in Austria on July 20, 1899, and died in New York City on February 6, 1962. Bergler received his medical degree from the University of Vienna in 1926, and married Marianne Blumberger in 1929. He served on the staff of FreudÕs clinic in Vienna from 1927–1933, and was an assistant director there from 1933–1938, when he moved to the United States. A prolific speaker and writer, he published nearly three hundred papers and twenty-four books, as well as lecturing and giving interviews. ———. (1989). The superego. Madison, WI: International Universities Press. BerglerÕs contribution to psychoanalytic thought was remarkable. He extended and made clinically usable several of FreudÕs later concepts, including superego Hitschmann, Eduard, and Bergler, Edmund. (1936). Frigidity in women. Washington, New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ———. (1982). Counterfeit-sex. New York: Grune and Stratton. ———. (1992). Principles of self-damage. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. ———. (1993). Curable and incurable neurotics. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. 163 BERLIN PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE BERLIN PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE. See Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut BERLIN PSYCHOANALYTIC POLYCLINIC. See Berliner Psychoanalytische Poliklinik BERLINER PSYCHOANALYTISCHE POLIKLINIK When the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute opened the first psychoanalytic polyclinic on February 14, 1920, it became the institutional model for bringing together the functions of therapy, research and training in one unit. The Berlin Psychoanalytic Polyclinic fulfilled one of the functions of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute (polyclinic, teaching, course commission, treasury, and subsidies). The polyclinic committee consisted of Max Eitingon (reception of patients and treatment indications), Ernst Simmel (experience treating war neuroses) and Karl Abraham (President of the Berlin Association). Situated since 1928 at Wichmannstrasse 10 (with five consultation rooms and a library), the polyclinic was the property of Max Eitingon. In 1928 five assistants were treating between ten and twelve patients. The antinomy creating tensions between therapy (continuing analysis in difficult cases) and teaching (giving ‘‘easy cases’’ to trainee analysts) led to the development of controlled analyses and technical seminars (no more than six participants and constant personal contact with the training analyst). Training analyses were not paid for. Members of the German Psychoanalytic Society (DPG) had to treat at least one case from the polyclinic. Fees: the patient’s own maximum; about two thirds of the patients were economically challenged and were treated free of charge. Sometimes health insurance funds paid part of the costs (psychologists: three Reichsmarks, physicians: five Reichsmarks). The average duration of treatment was about two hundred hours (in four or five weekly sessions of forty– five minutes). In spite of the pressure from patients on the polyclinic’s waiting list, ‘‘short therapies’’ were rejected as 16 4 ‘‘failures.’’ What Freud had prophesied in Budapest that ‘‘the large–scale application of our therapy will compel us to alloy the pure gold of psychoanalysis,’’ did not apply, according to Eitingon ‘‘because we have no other metal to make such an alloy.’’ In eight and a half years there were 1,600 demands for cures, 640 of which were implemented. An average of 72 cases were treated per year at the polyclinic between 1920 and 1930 by 94 therapists, 60 of whom were API members. In spite of growing recognition from public authorities, the reaction from professional psychiatrists and psychologists was one of distrust because of the question of ‘‘lay analysis.’’ In 1929 there were polyclinics in Vienna, London, Budapest and Paris. Following the forced elimination of Max Eitingon by the Nazis, Felix Boehm became President of the DPG in 1933 and director of the polyclinic. In 1935 the name of the polyclinic had to be changed by official order to ‘‘Ambulatorium.’’ The demand for treatment nevertheless remained constant. Following the forced expulsion of Jewish psychoanalysts from the DPG (December 1935) and their emigration, many courses of treatment were interrupted. The seventeen remaining ‘‘Aryan’’ analysts (February 1937) were still conducting forty-two analyses. With the creation of the Deutsches Institut für Psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (Göringinstitut) in May 1936, other methods of treatment were introduced and the organization was divided into four departments (diagnostics, training support, criminal psychology, assessment and catamnesis). Financing was provided by the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF; the German Work Front), the Reichsforschungsrat (RFR; the Reich’s Research Council), the city of Berlin, the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (the Reich’s Ministry for Aviation) and health insurance funds. The goals pursued before the Nazis took over: ‘‘to enable psychoanalysis to penetrate the working classes’’ with the specific aim of effecting a profound change in people, were replaced at the Göring Institute by ‘‘the capacity to work.’’ After the war Harald Schultz-Henecke and Werner Kemper founded the Zentralinstitut für psychogene Erkrankungen on March 1, 1946, with the support of individual insurance companies and pension schemes (VAB), offering a therapy financed by the state with psychoanalysts who were employed full–time, whether physicians or non–physicians. With the reorganization INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BERLINER PSYCHOANALYTISCHES INSTITUT of health insurance funds in 1958 it became the Institut für psychogene Erkrankungen (‘‘Institute for Psychogenic Affections’’ for the Berlin general health insurance fund [AOK]). The trend toward short therapies and the separation from analytic training institutes meant there was no longer any functional continuity with the polyclinic. Both the DPG and the DPV instituted schools for transmitting psychoanalysis and psychotherapy without monthly wage–earning collaborators. REGINE LOCKOT See also: Abraham, Karl; Alexander, Franz Gabriel; Berliner Psychoanalytische Poliklinik; Eitingon, Max; Fenichel, Otto; Germany; ‘‘Lines of Advance in PsychoAnalytic Therapy’’; Sachs, Hanns; Simmel, Ernst; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Training analysis; Training of the psychoanalyst Bibliography Collectif. (1930). Zehn Jahre Berliner psychoanalytisches Institut (1930). Wien: Internationaler psychoanalytischer Verlag. Freud, Anna. (1929). Korrespondenzblatt des Internationalen psychoanalytischen Verlags. Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, 25 (4), 509–542. Göring, Matthias H. (1942). Jahresbericht 1941 des Deutschen Instituts für psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie und Hinweise anläßlich der Mitgliederversammlung am 28.3.1942. Zentralblatt für Psychotherapie, 14 (1–2), 62–77. Lockot, Regine. (1985). Erinnern und Durcharbeiten: zur Geschichte der Psychoanalyse und Psychotherapie im Nationalsozialismus. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. BERLINER PSYCHOANALYTISCHES INSTITUT The Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut (Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, or BPI), so named on February 20, 1922, included a polyclinic, a training institute (with lectures, case study seminars, and training and control analyses), a curriculum committee, and a treasury and finance office. As early as 1919 Max Eitingon and Ernst Simmel proposed that the Berlin Psychoanalytic Society INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS establish a clinic offering free analytic treatment to those otherwise unable to afford it. This was a desiratum for Freud (1919a), and by the next year a training institute for such a clinic opened, with Simmel as director and Eitingon as owner, funded by an annual budget of about 16000 RM. Located at 29 Potsdamerstrasse, the institute was managed by Ernst Freud. When it opened on February 14, 1920, it included lecture rooms, offices for consultation, and a library. Karl Abraham was in charge of the first courses. In the autumn of 1928, the institute moved to larger quarters at 10 Wichmannstrasse. To counter the growing popularity of ‘‘wild analysis’’ and courting respectability in the eyes of the medical establishment, regulations were developed during 1923–1924 that governed acceptance of candidates (after three preliminary interviews), decided on the curriculum and role of training and control analyses, and also ruled on formal membership admissions. Medical studies (even if unfinished) were demanded of analysts-in-training; pedagogical studies were required for child analysts. Non-physicians in Germany enjoyed relative freedom to practice therapy. Thanks to Felix Boehm, the treasury was subsidized by members of the institute and money was available to support candidates. The monthly cost of training ranged from 200 to 300 RM. Analytic training began with a didactic analysis (six months minimum) with indications as to treatment decided by the analyst-in-training committee. Theoretical teaching was the responsibility of the training analyst. After at least two semesters of theoretical studies, the candidate undertook at least two years of practical work at the polyclinic; this period would come to be known as ‘‘control’’ or ‘‘supervision’’ and was followed by transition to autonomous clinical work with approval of the training committee. Hanns Sachs described the training experience as a ‘‘novitiate’’ that was run like a ‘‘technical seminary.’’ Reacting against regimentation, a group of rebellious young analysts founded what became known as the ‘‘Kinderseminar’’ (ChildrenÕs Seminar). The institute also trained non-therapeutic analysts who were permitted to attend all but technical courses on treatment. Members of groups from Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Leipzig, and Hamburg attended workshops and conferences at the BPI. 165 B E R M A N , A N N E (1 889 –19 79) In 1930, ninety-four therapists worked at the BPI, sixty of whom belonged to the International Psychoanalytic Association (which then totaled four hundred). The Prussian-like hierarchical structure was criticized by Siegfried Bernfeld as damaging to psychoanalysis. The BPI acquired a reputation for rigidity that was exported through emigration and escape from Germany during the Nazi era. A detailed report published in 1930 on the instituteÕs tenth anniversary allows a better understanding of the training system that would become the basis for standards set by the International Psychoanalytic Association (Colonomos). Institutes modeled after the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute were soon founded in Vienna, London, Budapest, The Hague, Frankfurt, New York and Chicago, and Paris (in 1934 and again in 1954). Other institutes in the United States based on the BPI were established in Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Topeka, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, Seattle, Denver, and New Orleans. A wave of voluntary emigration brought Melanie Klein and Walter Schmideberg to Britain, and Franz Alexander, Jenö Hárnik, Sándor Radó, Karen Horney, and Hanns Sachs to the United States. Among the most influential of some seventy-four analysts and candidates-in-training obliged to leave Germany were Siegfried Bernfeld, Max Eitingon, Otto Fenichel, Wilhelm Reich, Theodor Reik, and Ernst Simmel. The number of students at the BPI, some two-hundred twenty-two strong in December 1931, declined steeply after the National Socialists came to power, with only thirty-nine in attendance in December 1933; the number of analytic candidates fell from thirty-four in the fall of 1932 to eight in July 1934. The demand for treatment remained constant, however. In 1935 there were still fourteen analysts in Germany. A series of state interventions, forced resignation of Jewish analysts, and concessions made by the remaining ‘‘Aryan’’ analysts, including the ‘‘aryanization’’ of the directorate, damaged the institute from without and drained it from within. Both the treasury and committee meetings, as well as conceptual terminology of psychoanalysis, came under state control. The BPI was renamed the German Institute of Psychoanalysis, and all the instituteÕs assets were transferred ‘‘on loan’’ to the German Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy (Göringinstitut, or Göring Institute), founded in 1936. 16 6 After the war, in 1950, the Karl Abraham Institute, established in association with the German Psychoanalytic Association (DPV) and directed by Carl MüllerBraunschweig, renewed the tradition of the BPI. REGINE LOCKOT See also: Abraham, Karl; Alexander, Franz Gabriel; Berliner Psychoanalytische Poliklinik; Eitingon, Max; Fenichel, Otto; Germany; ‘‘Lines of Advance in PsychoAnalytic Therapy’’; Sachs, Hanns; Simmel, Ernst; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Training of the psychoanalyst. Bibliography Bernfeld, Siegfried. (1984). Über die psychoanalytische Ausbildung. Psyche, 38, 437–459. Colonomos, F. (Ed). (1985). On forme des psychanalystes: rapport original sur les dix ans de lÕInstitut psychanalytique de Berlin, 1920–1930. Paris: Denoël. Eitingon, Max. (1924). Bericht über die Berliner psychoanalytische Poliklinik—Juni 1922–März 1924, VIIIer Internationalen psychoanalytischen Verlags-Kongress. Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, X (2), 229–241. Freud, Sigmund. (1919a). Lines of advance in psycho-analytic therapy. SE, 17: 157–168. BERMAN, ANNE (1889–1979) Anne Berman, a French pharmacist, was the personal secretary of Marie Bonaparte and a translator of psychoanalytical works. She was born March 23, 1889, and died April 25, 1979. After her dissertation, ‘‘La Famille des Boraginacées’’ (The Family of Boraginaceae), was completed, she worked in the laboratory of Dr. Toulouse at the Sainte–Anne hospital until 1924. That year the Souffron pharmacy on 54, rue de Miromesnil went up for sale. She bought the pharmacy, where she worked for several years. She was a pharmacist delegate to the Chambre Syndicale and, on May 22, 1928, was accepted as a member of the Soroptimists, an organization founded in California in 1921 with the goal of recruiting women who excelled in their profession. After undergoing analysis with Marie Bonaparte, she became her secretary. She was accepted as the first member of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society on January INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B E R N A Y S , M I N N A (1865 –1 941) 10, 1927. She administered the secretariat of the Institut de Psychanalyse (Psychoanalysis Institute) from its inception in 1934. She translated several of FreudÕs work including Psychoanalytic Procedure, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, the first two volumes of Ernest JonesÕs Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Anna FreudÕs The Ego and the MechanismÕs of Defense, andThe Birth of Psychoanalysis, Letters to Wilhelm Fliess. At the time of BermanÕs death, Serge Lebovici wrote, in the Revue française de psychanalyse: ‘‘A tireless reader, a musician who was especially fond of Wagner, Annette remained a close friend of the psychoanalysts of her generation and was able, because of this, to contribute to a history of the birth of psychoanalysis in France. In spite of her discretion, we will remember her as among those who did the most to spread the knowledge of FreudÕs work in France.’’ JEAN-PIERRE BOURGERON See also: Bonaparte, Marie Léon; Borel, Adrien Alphonse Alcide; France; Revue française de psychanalyse; Société psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris. Bibliography Lebovici, Serge. (1979). Anne Berman. Revue française de psychanalyse, 43 (3), 476. BERNAYS-FREUD, HANNA. See Freud, Sigmund (siblings) BERNAYS-FREUD, MINNA (1865–1941) The younger sister (by four years) of Martha Bernays, Sigmund FreudÕs wife, Minna Bernays was born June 18, 1865 (June 16 according to some sources), in Hamburg and died February 13, 1941 in London. She was the youngest of seven children, the daughter of Jewish businessman Berman Bernays (1826–1879) and Emmeline Philipp (1830–1910). Three children died while still young—Fabian, 1857, Michel, 1857–1859, and Sara, 1858–1859—the eldest brother (Isaak, 1855– 1872) died at the age of seventeen from a bone infection presumed to be of tubercular origin. The father INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS was the third son of the rabbi (chacham) Isaak Bernays (1793–1849). Both of his brothers were distinguished men: Jacob (1824–1881) was a philologist and Michael (1834–1897) was an expert on literature. The mother was from a well-to-do family, originally from Sweden on the fatherÕs side, and from Hamburg on the motherÕs side. When Minna was four years old, in 1869, the Berman family moved from Hamburg to Vienna after the father finished serving a four–year jail sentence for bankruptcy fraud. In Vienna, Berman Bernays worked as a secretary for the economist Lorenz von Stein and as a writer for the Zentralblatt für Eisenbahnen und Dampfschiffart (Rail and Steamship Transport Journal). Nothing is known about Minna BernaysÕs childhood and education. When her father died in December 1869, she was brought up by her mother and Sigmund Pappenheim, the father of Bertha Pappenheim, the woman made famous by Breuer as Anna O. In 1882–1883 Minna spent several weeks in Sicily because of pulmonary tuberculosis. On February 18, 1882, at the age of seventeen, she became engaged to Ignaz Schönberg, a student in the philosophy department at the University of Vienna, who was studying with Georg Bühler, the orientalist. Schönberg received his doctorate on May 12, 1884, and was appointed to the Indian Institute at Oxford, a position that had been offered to him by Monnier Williams, the editor of a Sanskrit dictionary. He contracted tuberculosis, however, and had to resign his position in February 1885, and broke off his engagement to Minna in June. After leaving Great Britain in August, he returned to Meran, near Vienna, where he spent the winter. He died in early February 1886, in Vienna. From 1883 to 1895 Minna Bernays spent most of her time in Hamburg with her mother, who was ill. For short periods of time she worked as a companion and childrenÕs tutor; she also participated in a workshop for manual crafts, like the one run by FreudÕs sister Rosa. In November 1885 she spent a few months with Freud (November 29, 1895, according to Wilhelm Fliess). In March 1896 she obtained a position in Frankfurt (March 7, 1896), but in June she quit and moved in permanently with her sisterÕs family; she remained here for the rest of her life, except for the brief periods of time she spent away on holiday or for health reasons. 167 B E R N F E L D , S I E G F R I E D (189 2 –1953 ) In MarthaÕs absence she ran the house, took care of the children, cooked, and made handicrafts. She served as host to FreudÕs guests and students, handled some of his correspondence, played mahjong and tarot with him, and corrected his manuscripts. In 1887 Freud undertook a voyage of several days, or several weeks, with Minna to various resorts and rest homes in Bavaria and northern Italy. They traveled by foot, by coach, and by train, visiting the southern Tyrol and the Engadine, while FreudÕs wife rested with the children. In general, FreudÕs vacations with his wife were less adventurous. Minna often accompanied FreudÕs children on their summer vacations to Berchtesgaden, Reichenhall, or Aussee. Unlike Martha, Minna remained close to Jewish traditions. She was the only member of the family who refused to be cremated. Few traces of her personal papers remain. But the Sigmund Freud Museum in London houses several examples of handicrafts made by her. ALBRECHT HIRSCHMÜLLER See also: Berggasse 19, Wien IX; Freud-Bernays, Martha. Bibliography Billinsky, John M. (1969). Jung and Freud: The end of a romance. Andover Newton Quarterly, 62, 2, 39–43. In May 1938, a few weeks before Freud, Martha, and Anna, Minna emigrated to Great Britain, for, unlike her sister, she had retained her German citizenship. She died there three years later from heart disease. Freud, Sigmund. (1960a). Letters of Sigmund Freud, 1873– 1939 (Ernst L. Freud, Ed.; Tania and James Stern, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press. According to descriptions of her from letters and personal recollections, Minna was an intelligent woman with a lively personality and a sense of humor, who read German and English. On occasion she could be highly sarcastic and inaccessible, caustic at times, with a kind of Germanic stiffness. She was often ill, and suffered from migraines, digestive, cardiac, and eye problems. Her tuberculosis required additional treatment in 1900. Freud, Sigmund, and Ferenczi, Sándor. (1999–2000). The correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sándor Ferenczi (Eva Brabant, Ernst Falzeder, and Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch, Eds.; Peter T. Hoffer, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap/ Harvard University Press. Sigmund FreudÕs relationship to Minna Bernays has given rise to considerable speculation (see the Freud-Ferenczi correspondence of December 16, 1912). In 1957 Carl Gustav Jung stated in an interview that Minna had mentioned a sexual relationship between her and Freud (Billinsky, J. M., 1969), but JungÕs claim has little credibility. Similarly, the attempts to find proof in the Interpretation of Dreams or the Psychopathology of Everyday Life of intimacy between Freud and Minna are not convincing (Swales, P., 1982). The remaining correspondence, approximately two hundred letters from different periods between 1882 and 1938, provide no indication of such a relationship. The letters do demonstrate the existence of a strong bond between them, which Freud confirmed to Marie Bonaparte, telling her that at the time of his relative isolation, Wilhelm Fliess and Minna Bernays were his only friends. BERNFELD, SIEGFRIED (1892–1953) 16 8 ———. (1985). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887–1904 (Jeffery M. Masson, Ed., Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press. Swales, P. J. (1982). Freud, Minna Bernays, and the conquest of Rome. New light on the origins of psychoanalysis. New American Revue, 1–23. An Austrian philosopher and psychoanalyst, Siegfried Bernfeld was born March 7, 1892, in Lemberg, the capital city of Galicia, and died April 2, 1953, in San Francisco. Bernfeld distinguished himself in the extent of his knowledge, the originality of his ideas, and his qualities as an educator. A prolific and exacting writer, he was also an outstanding teacher, admired by his students and respected by his colleagues. Freud said he considered him the most gifted of his students and disciples. His parents lived in Vienna but his mother returned to her hometown to give birth to her first child. In 1910 Bernfeld completed his studies at the Gymnasium and entered the University of Vienna, where he obtained a Ph.D. in philosophy, while also studying psychoanalysis, sociology, education, and biology. All branches of knowledge held an interest INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B E R N F E L D , S I E G F R I E D (1892 –1 953) for Bernfeld, who was also involved in contemporary political issues. A lucid and passionate left–wing Zionist, he was active in political struggles while he was a university student. Impregnated with the ideas of psychoanalysis and Marxism, Bernfeld founded, in 1919, the Kinderheim Baumgarten, where nearly three hundred Jewish children, refugees from Poland, were housed. His first book, published in 1921, examined this short, intense period of his life. In 1925 he published two important works on infant psychology and education. Psychologie des Säuglings (Infant Psychology) is a well–known work that makes use of psychoanalysis and drive theory to develop a new psychology of the infant. Sisyphos is a critique of the idealist notion of education and comes down strongly in favor of a non–authoritarian system, one that respects the life of the instincts and the needs of the student. Attracted by the fame of Max EitingonÕs institute, Bernfeld traveled to Berlin in 1926. There he underwent analysis with Hanns Sachs and rapidly won the admiration of his students. While there he studied the scientific foundations of psychoanalysis and, returning to his first love, biology, researched the theory of instincts. At the end of his Berlin period, he contrasted his position (as a Freudian and Marxist) with that of Wilhelm Reich in two important articles, and wrote an essay on interpretation. In Der Begriff der ‘‘Deutung’’ in der Psychoanalyse (The Concept of ‘‘Interpretation’’ in Psychoanalysis), Bernfeld described the concept of interpretation with the tools of the scientific method, something he shared with Moritz Schlick and Hans Reichenbach. He distinguished several types of interpretation. ‘‘Final’’ interpretation attempts to penetrate the unconscious intentional context in which a determinate psychic production that appears to be isolated from any context can be situated. ‘‘Functional’’ interpretation takes account of the value of a specific psychic fact. ‘‘Reconstruction,’’ an instrument of psychoanalytic science, concretely reconstructs an old psychic process. Because there is a consistent relation between the psychic event and its traces, reconstruction can discover the genetic connection that is continuously repeated through impulse and desire. In this way psychoanalysis is raised to the rank of a natural science to the extent INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS that it provides an explanation for personal psychic events on the basis of certain laws. The approach to psychoanalysis as a science of traces is based on the leading theories of the field: free association, transference and resistance, which inhibits the formation of missing unconscious connections (Bernfeld returns to this subject in 1941 in The Fact of Observation in Psychoanalysis, a work that exercised considerable influence on his disciples in California, especially Edward M. Weinshel). With the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the imminent ascent of Hitler to power, Bernfeld realized that he could no longer remain in Germany. He left Berlin and, after a brief stay in Vienna, went into exile in France in 1932. Little is known about BernfeldÕs life in France. Apparently, he was not well received by the Paris Psychoanalytic Society. He settled in the south of France, where he met Suzanne Cassirer–Paret, who became his third wife and an important collaborator. In 1936 Siegfried and Suzanne decided to leave France and, in answer to Otto Fenichel and Ernst SimmelÕs invitation, emigrated to California in 1937. In San Francisco Bernfeld resumed his teaching activities and wrote, together with his wife, a series of articles that can be considered the point of departure for ‘‘Freudology.’’ These include a documented study on the Helmholz School (1944) and a 1946 essay in which Bernfeld discovers that the enigmatic character in ‘‘Screen Memories’’ (Freud, S., 1899) is no other than Sigmund Freud himself. There followed several articles on FreudÕs early scientific work, his studies on cocaine, and, together with his wife, an article on the childhood of the founding father of psychoanalysis and his first years in practice. Bernfeld died in 1953 while he and his wife were preparing other articles on FreudÕs life. R. HORACIO ETCHEGOYEN See also: Lehrinstitut der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung; Marxism and psychoanalysis; North America; Screen memory; Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung; Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik. Bibliography Bernfeld, Siegfried. (1921). Kinderheim Baumgarten. Bericht über einen ernsthaften Versuch mit neuer Erziehung. Berlı́n: Jüdischer Verlag. 169 B E R N H E I M , H I P P O L Y T E (184 0 –1919 ) ———. (1929). The psychology of the infant. New York: Brentano. hysteria, he gave a favorable assessment of the Studies on Hysteria. ———. (1925). Sisyphos, oder die Grenzen der Erziehung. Vienna: Internationaler psychoanalytischer Verlag. According to Bernheim, hypnosis is only a particular case of the psychological phenomenon of suggestion. Psychotherapy—a term Bernheim popularized— incorporated the power of language, the doctorÕs influence on the patient, and the effect of the patientÕs mind on his body. Bernheim argued for a therapy of and by the mind, which could cure nervous illnesses and suppress or calm the symptoms, even the causes, of organic disease. He seems to have been a flexible and eclectic therapist, passing when necessary from authoritarianism to insinuation, sometimes even refusing to give orders to his patients. ———. (1932). Der Begriff der ‘‘Deutung’’ in der Psychoanalyse. Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie, 4, 448–497. Ekstein, Rudolph. (1968). In Fr. Alexander, S. Eisenstein, M. Grotjahn (Eds.), Psychoanalytic pioneers. New York, London: Basic Books. BERNHEIM, HIPPOLYTE (1840–1919) A professor of ambulatory health care at the department of medicine in Nancy, Hippolyte Bernheim was born in Mulhouse on April 27, 1840, and died in Paris on February 2, 1919. He studied medicine in Strasbourg and, when he received his degree in 1870, during the Franco-Prussian war, he decided to practice in France. In 1879 he was offered the chair of ambulatory medicine at the then-new department of medicine in Nancy. Around 1882, in spite of his initial reticence, he agreed to visit Ambroise LiebeaultÕs ‘‘clinic.’’ Convinced of the efficacy of LiebeaultÕs methods, Bernheim began to use hypnosis on some of his patients, generally working with people suffering from a variety of infectious diseases. In 1884 he published a scathing attack on the Salpêtrière: hysteria and hypnosis were no more than cultural phenomena aroused by the power of suggestion. Bernheim now became the spokesman of a new school that was internationally recognized. In his private practice he saw neurotic patients from all over Europe. In spite of his personal admiration for Jean Martin Charcot, his position was deepened and further radicalized in two books translated by Freud, De la suggestion et de ses applications à la thérapeutique (Suggestion and its Therapeutic Applications) (1886 and 1888) and Hypnotisme, suggestion, psychothérapie (Hypnotism, Suggestion, Psychotherapy) (1891 and 1903). The prevalence of BernheimÕs position seems to have exhausted itself by the end of the century. Charcot himself, at the end of his life, in La foi qui guérit (The Faith that Heals) (1892), appears to have moved closer to the position of the school of Nancy. However, in Nancy, Bernheim felt isolated. He distanced himself from Liebeault, his hypnosis practice began to disintegrate, and his support for Dreyfus aroused considerable anti–Semitic hostility. After retiring in 1910 Bernheim moved to Paris. In 1913, in a book on 17 0 Shortly before the July 1889 Congress on Hypnotism held in Paris that year, Sigmund Freud came to see Bernheim in Lorraine. In a letter to August Forel, Bernheim referred to Freud as a ‘‘charming young man.’’ In 1888 however, Freud had turned to Charcot for support in criticizing Bernheim. After 1889 Freud would make use of some of BernheimÕs ideas to distance himself from Charcot, but he continued to remain critical of the theory of suggestion promulgated by the school of Nancy. Freud later recalled how forcefully certain experiments of 1889, involving the recall of memories originating during hypnosis, had struck him. Reading the text published in 1890 after his trip to Lorraine, the ‘‘insightful’’ clinician from Nancy may also have left Freud with the nucleus of an idea for the treatment of the ‘‘psyche,’’ or ‘‘soul,’’ and an interest in the magic of words. JACQUELINE CARROY See also: Autosuggestion; Cäcilie M., case of; Hypnosis; Liebeault, Ambroise Auguste; Negative hallucination; Suggestion; Translation. Bibliography Bernheim, Hippolyte. (1903). Hypnotisme, suggestion, psychothérapie (2nd ed). Paris: Fayard, 1995. Blum, J.-L. (1986). La vie d’Hippolyte Bernheim, 1840–1919 (pp. 103–117). Paris: Frénésie. Carroy, Jacqueline. (1988). L’école hypnologique de Nancy. I: Liébeault, Beaunis, Liégeois et Delbœuf. II: Bernheim, Charcot et Freud, le Pays lorrain. Journal de la Société d’archéologie lorraine et du Musée historique lorrain, 2–3, 108–116; 159–166. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BETA-SCREEN Delboeuf, Joseph. (1885). Le Sommeil et les Rêves. Paris: Félix Alcan; Le Sommeil et les Rêves et autres textes. Paris: Fayard, 1993. Freud, Sigmund. (1890a). Psychical (or mental) treatment. SE, 7: 283–302. BETA-ELEMENTS In his paper, ‘‘A Theory of Thinking’’ (Second Thoughts, 1967, pp. 100–120), Wilfred Bion speaks of raw sense-data and of ‘‘inchoate elements’’ which have to be transformed into alpha-elements by alpha functions. That description is the precursor of what he was to call later beta-elements. He first uses the term betaelements in Learning from Experience: ‘‘If alphafunction is disturbed and therefore inoperative the sense impressions of which the patient is aware and the emotions which he is experiencing remain unchanged. I shall call them beta-elements. In contrast with the alpha-elements the beta-elements are not felt to be phenomena, but things in themselves’’ (p. 6). Bion often speaks of beta-elements, raw senseimpressions, and raw emotional data. Beta-elements are very concrete. They are felt as bad internal ‘‘things’’ which can be dealt with only by expulsion. He emphasizes that the beta-function emotions are also experienced as physical objects. This is an extension of KleinÕs view that the infant experiences hunger as a bad internal breast that has to be expelled. It is important to keep this in mind, because otherwise some of BionÕs statements may seem contradictory, because he speaks of sense data that have to be expelled, but on many occasions he refers to the fear of death (hardly a sense-datum), which has to be expelled and projected into the breast. But for the infant at that stage, hatred and fear are experienced as bad objects. The experience is confused with the object responsible for the experience. In Elements of Psycho-Analysis (1963), Bion provides the following model: ‘‘[The infant] . . . filled with painful lumps of faeces, guilt, fears of impending death, chunks of greed, meanness and urine, evacuates these bad objects into the breast that is not there. As it does so the good object turns the no-breast (mouth) into a breast, the faeces and urine into milk, the fears of impending death and anxiety into feelings of love and generosity . . . The mechanism is implicit in the theory of projective identification in which Melanie Klein formulated her discoveries of infant mentality.’’ INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Beta-elements can be dealt with only by expulsion. They are not material for thought, but underlie actingout, hallucinations, and delusions. When betaelements are projected into the mother they can be transformed into alpha-elements, which are elements of dream and thought, by the alpha-function. The nearest clinical approximations to raw beta-elements are bizarre objects. Beta-elements do not combine with one another in an integrated way, but they can become accumulated. When this happens the contactbarrier becomes a beta-screen. Unlike alpha-elements, beta-elements are saturated: they are not open to change by new impressions, and therefore not open to reality-testing. They can be only transformed by alpha function. HANNA SEGAL See also: Alpha function; Alpha-elements; Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht; Concept; Contact-barrier; Grid; Learning from Experience; Maternal reverie, capacity for; Object; Primary object; Primal, the; Protothoughts; Psychotic panic; Idea/representation; Reverie; Symbolic equation; Transformations. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1962). Learning from experience. London, Heinemann; New York: Basic Books. ———. (1963). Elements of psycho-analysis. London: Heinemann. ———. (1967). Second thoughts. London: Heinemann. BETA-SCREEN Bion first mentioned a beta-screen in his description of the contact-barrier in Learning from Experience (pp. 17–23, 1962). A beta-screen forms when there is a deficiency in alpha-functioning and beta-elements replace the contact-barrier. When a beta-screen is formed there is no communication between the conscious and unconscious. Rational thought up to a point can exist, but cut off from emotional meaning. A beta-screen forms an impenetrable barrier. It is a defense against any meaningful emotional experience. As the beta-screen is composed of beta-elements which lend themselves to projective identification, it also manifests itself in a bombardment directed both against the alpha171 B E T T E L H E I M , B R U N O (1903 –1 990) functioning of the patient himself and against any external object susceptible to arousing meaningful feelings. In analysis, the patient bombards the analyst with confused fragmentary material imbued with violence and directed against the analystÕs attempt to get in touch with an emotionally significant experience. HANNA SEGAL See also: Beta-elements; Contact-barrier. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1962). Learning from experience. London: Heinemann; New York: Basic Books. ———. (1963). Elements of psycho-analysis. London: Heinemann. BETTELHEIM, BRUNO (1903–1990) The psychoanalyst and educator Bruno Bettelheim was born in Vienna on August 28, 1903, and died on March 13, 1990, in Silver Spring, Maryland. The son of a wood merchant from the assimilated Jewish middle class, Bettelheim had to give up his studies when his father died of syphilis. He was twentythree and remained scarred by his fatherÕs ‘‘shameful’’ death. He returned to his studies in philosophy ten years later and in February 1938 was one of the last Jews to earn a doctorate at the University of Vienna before the Anschluss. His thesis was entitled ‘‘The Problem of Beauty in Nature and Modern Esthetics’’ and was supervised by the famed Karl Bühler, director of the Institute of Psychology and a pioneer of Sprachtheorie (theory of language). In 1930 Bettelheim had married a schoolteacher who was a disciple of Anna Freud, but he was unhappy. He saw reflected in his wifeÕs eyes the ugliness that had obsessed him since he first saw it in his motherÕs eyes. In 1936 he entered analysis with Richard Sterba, then secretary of the Vienna Society and the only non-Jew on its Committee. At the time of the Anschluss, Sterba abruptly abandoned all his patients, preferring exile to the risk of being called upon by the Nazis to rid the society of Jews. When Bettelheim was arrested by the Gestapo on May 29, 1938, he was thus in the midst of his analysis. The ten and a half months he spent in Dachau, and 17 2 later in Buchenwald, had a decisive influence on him. To escape madness, he studied the effects of the camps on the other prisoners, the prison guards, and himself. Whenever he could, he shared his observations with Paul FedernÕs son Ernst. Bettelheim was liberated on April 14, 1939, and arrived in the United States three weeks later. He had lost everything. His wife left him. His first job was to devise a test for evaluating knowledge in the plastic arts that is still in use today. Between 1941 and 1944 he taught art history, German literature, and psychology. Above all, he sought to publish the article on the concentration camps that he had been working on since his release. Rejected several times on the grounds that it was nonobjective or ‘‘anti-German,’’ the article finally appeared in October 1943 in the journal of the Harvard psychology laboratory. ‘‘Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations’’ is a study of the deportees that makes particular use of Anna FreudÕs concept of ‘‘identification with the aggressor.’’ In 1945, General Eisenhower had the article distributed to American officers in Europe, who were ill-prepared for the opening of the concentration camps. In 1960 Bettelheim returned to this text in The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age, the first book in which he made a connection between his experiences in the camps and the Freudian-inspired ‘‘milieu therapy’’ he established at the University of ChicagoÕs Orthogenic School, of which he became director in 1944. This connection can be summarized as follows: Having witnessed mentally sound people go insane because of the effects of the camps, Bettelheim attempted to remedy the problems of severely disturbed children by creating an environment that was totally responsive to their needs and symptoms. This approach remained BettelheimÕs trademark and established the reputation of his school worldwide. In 1973 Bettelheim retired to California. He conducted seminars, supervised therapists in training, wrote, and was a sought-after lecturer. In 1984, the death of his second wife, who was also from Vienna and had borne him three children, plunged him into a deep depression that he struggled against for another six years, pursuing his activities despite health problems. After the publication of Freud Õs Vienna and Other Essays in January 1990, he moved to a retirement home near Washington, D.C. Two months later, he INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BEYOND committed suicide by ingesting barbiturates and, to ensure that he would not be ‘‘saved,’’ putting a plastic bag over his head. Fifty-two years earlier, on the same night, the Nazis had entered Austria to the cheers of a crowd shouting ‘‘Death to the Jews.’’ Bettelheim was a good storyteller and popularizer of FreudÕs ideas, and his books sold very successfully. He recounted his clinical experience in three books about the Orthogenic School, Love Is Not Enough: A Treatment of Emotionally Disturbed Children (1950), Truants from Life (1955), and A Home for the Heart (1974), and in The Empty Fortress (1967), which studies three cases of autism. With regard to theory, he was a maverick. He initially conceived of his school as ‘‘putting FreudÕs concepts into action.’’ He then distanced himself from Freud to flirt with culturalism in Symbolic Wounds: Puberty Rites and the Envious Male (1954). After moving closer to the ego psychology that predominated at the Chicago Institute headed by Franz Alexander (The Informed Heart), he returned to Freud by way of the self-psychology advocated by his friend Heinz Kohut (The Empty Fortress), and he ended up writing a long polemical essay denouncing the ways in which Freud had been betrayed by his English translator, James Strachey (Freud and ManÕs Soul, 1983). A careful reading of Surviving and Other Essays (1979), a collection of BettelheimÕs writings on Nazism, gives a glimpse of the painful self-analysis by which he continued, first in the camps and then for the rest of his life, the work that had been interrupted by the Anschluss. The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales (1976), a study of the role of fairy tales on the development of the unconscious, is BettelheimÕs best-selling book. He also wrote a book on education in the kibbutzim, The Children of the Dream (1969), and many other works on childrenÕs education (Dialogues with Mothers, 1962; A Good Enough Parent, 1987; and numerous articles). BettelheimÕs suicide was immediately followed by a furious scandal, with former patients and students denouncing him as a liar, a brute, and a despot who was all the more hypocritical because he had preached respect for children. Beyond what it reveals about the confusion ensuing from the suicide of such a man, this scandal is interesting because it goes to the heart of BettelheimÕs clinical genius: an almost infallible intuition about what causes a child to suffer and the ability INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE to confront his patientÕs most destructive impulses. He often compared his role to that of a lightning rod, attracting lightning and thus proving that it had not killed anyone—not even him. Too often catalogued as a specialist in autism, Bettelheim was above all a master teacher who continually succeeded in getting the therapists under his supervision and the educators in his school to recognize the part of themselves that was put at risk by their patientsÕ madness. That said, his depictions of the most disturbed students in his school, including some autistic patients, were so vivid, so focused on what these children were doing—and not on their deficiencies, as was common practice—that his work had a decisive influence on the way young psychotic patients are treated in psychiatric hospitals around the world. NINA SUTTON See also: Autism; Ego; Empty Fortress, The; Infantile schizophrenia. Bibliography Bettelheim, Bruno. (1960). The informed heart: Autonomy in a mass age. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. ———. (1990). FreudÕs Vienna and other essays. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Bettelheim, Bruno, and Karlin, Daniel. (1975). Un autre regard sur la folie. Paris: Stock. Jurgenson, Geneviève. (1973). La Folie des autres. Paris: Robert Laffont. Pollak, Richard. (1997). The creation of Dr. B.: A biography of Bruno Bettelheim. New York: Simon and Schuster. Raines, Theron. (2002). Rising to the light: A portrait of Bruno Bettelheim. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Sutton, Nina. (1995). Bruno Bettelheim: The other side of madness (David Sharp, Trans.). London: Duckworth. BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE Beyond the Pleasure Principle was presented by Freud as the ‘‘third step in the theory of drives.’’ The essay, which introduced the dynamic of the life and death impulses was ‘‘in gestation’’ on March 17, 1919. On May 12, Freud spoke with Sándor Ferenczi, stating ‘‘Not only have I completed Beyond the Pleasure 173 BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE Principle, which IÕll have recopied for you, but I have also returned to that little trifle on the uncanny and attempted . . . to provide a YA basis for group psychology.’’ On April 2, he spoke of the essay to Lou Andreas-Salomé: ‘‘Where am I with my Metapsychology? First of all, itÕs not yet written. . . . But if I live another ten years . . . I promise to add other contributions. One of the first of this kind will be contained in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.’’ The suffering of his friend Anton von Freund, whom Freud visited every day in the autumn of 1919, followed by the death of FreudÕs daughter Sophie in January 1920, interrupted the work. Completed between May and July, it was published in December. Chapter 6 was added in 1920 (Grubrich-Simitis, 1993) and, between 1921 and 1925, three subsequent editions came out, with a modified text. These were soon translated into English, Spanish (1922), and French (1927). Returning to his metapsychological writings of 1915, Freud introduced the ‘‘pleasure principle,’’ which he related to FechnerÕs principle of stability. The evocation of traumatic neurosis, childrenÕs games, repetition during the transference, and fate neurosis suggested a ‘‘more primitive,’’ ‘‘more elementary,’’ ‘‘more instinctual’’ tendency than the pleasure principle, independent of it and manifested by the repetition compulsion. Unconvinced by his clinical studies, Freud introduced the ‘‘speculation that often looks far afield’’ (chapter 4). The topography and functions of the Pcs.-Cs, system were examined from the classical point of view, using the Studies on Hysteria (1895d) and The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) as references. The protective shield function enabled him to define trauma from the vantage point of psychic economy and introduce the function of binding psychic energy that relates to the repetition compulsion. Chapter 5 continued along these lines, then the referent changed: ‘‘But how is the predicate of being ÔinstinctualÕ related to the compulsion to repeat? At this point we cannot escape a suspicion that we may have come upon the track of a universal attribute of instincts and perhaps of organic life in general. . . . It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the 17 4 expression of the inertia inherent in organic life.’’ The essay continued to pursue this theme. Extrapolation from this led to the death instinct: the initial state of living being is inanimate matter deprived of energy, and the death instincts tend toward its reestablishment; the pleasure principle is at their service; the instincts of self-preservation too, because they tend to reestablish an earlier state. The regressive and conservative functions of the sexual drives and their primal existence were less easy to analyze. An extensive investigation of biological research on death and reproduction followed (chapter 6), in which Freud equated the ego instincts with the death instincts, and the sex instincts with the life instincts. The myth related by Aristophanes in the Symposium led Freud to develop the hypothesis that, initially, living substance was ‘‘continuous.’’ Eros attempts to reestablish this continuity by combining gametes. The death instinct, however, disunites organisms to achieve its goal, and instinctual conflict is established. Beyond the Pleasure Principle created, through the use of an instinctual dualism that had been missing since the introduction of narcissism, a space for stylization of considerable dimension; its substrate is inanimate matter and living substance; its dynamics involve the primary tension in living things, external forces likely to be integrated, and internal tendencies leading to the reestablishment of an earlier state. In actual terms this space is ‘‘sufficient’’ for stylizing all the modes of stability of dynamic processes: from strict identity to instability, and including the flexible stability of living things. Freud incorporated earlier metapsychological investigations into his essay, and he provided Ferenczi with a pathway to future research. In addition to Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c), Beyond the Pleasure Principle served as a conduit to The Ego and the Id (1923b), FreudÕs ‘‘second topographic point of view.’’ The relationship between the death instinct, hatred, and the destructive instinct led to their eventual reassessment and an analysis of sadomasochism. Beyond the Pleasure Principle served as an essential element and organizing principle for Freudian psychoanalysis. Because it was difficult, the essay was often poorly received and misunderstood. This attitude was typified by Ernest Jones (1953–57, III), unlike that of Sándor Ferenczi, who had anticipated the theme in 1913. The INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BIBLIOTECA NUEVA death drive has either been rejected or reduced to destructive drives (Melanie Klein), or made to serve as a justification for a structuralist viewpoint (Jacques Lacan). Jean Laplanche (1970) highlighted the problems and paradoxes in the essay, including the chiasmus that transforms the sex drives, disturbing and pathogenic, into Eros, lifeÕs only safeguard. The ‘‘inherent thrust toward organic life, to the reestablishment of an earlier state,’’ can be separated into various dynamics and types of stability through the use of qualitative dynamics (Porte, 1994), and through them we can better understand the aptness of FreudÕs questions and the magnitude of his efforts. MICHÈLE PORTE See also: Automatism; Death instinct (Thanatos); Drive/ instinct; Eros; Fort-Da; Fusion/defusion; Fusion/defusion of instincts; Life instinct (Eros); Masochism; Moral masochism; Nightmare; Pleasure/unpleasure principle; Primary masochism; Repetition compulsion; Symbolic, the; Trauma. DE M A D R I D ( F R E U D , S. , O B R A S C O M P L E T A S ) contemporary with the German publication of the Gesammelte Schriften (1924–1934), the Spanish edition was the first complete translation of FreudÕs work abroad. Freud himself was surprised that a Madrid editor, José Ruiz-Castillo, would want to publish his work in Spanish. At this time the Spanish population was small and the cultural level relatively undeveloped. In fact the initiative for the project was taken by a wellknown Spanish intellectual, José Ortega y Gasset, who had introduced German scientific and philosophic ideas to the Spanish public through the review Revista de Occidente . At his suggestion the publication rights were purchased in 1917, but Europe was then at war; all correspondence for the project and the initial proofs had to be sent by diplomatic courier. The first volume, with a preface by Ortega y Gasset, appeared in 1922, and seventeen additional volumes were published by 1934. If we are to believe the letter sent by Freud to his translator, Luis López-Ballesteros y de Torres, on May 7, 1923, he was very agreeably surprised by this version. Jones, Ernest. (1953–57). Sigmund Freud: Life and work. London: Hogarth Press. Its characteristics need to be considered in relation to its function within the Spanish historical context, which was then in the throes of a cultural and literary renewal. This explains why López–BallesterosÕs translation was written in elegant Castilian and was highly literary, which significantly enlarged its readership. However, the translation, although it allowed Spanish readers to familiarize themselves with FreudÕs thought, lacks any sense of consistency. The primary reason is the absence of any systematic conceptual approach, made worse by the repeated literary and moralizing interjections of the translator, who exercised a certain degree of liberty in his work. There were also a number of omissions of words and sometimes of entire sentences, which considerably altered the original meaning. Laplanche, Jean. (1970). Vie m en psychanalyse. Paris: Flammarion. JOSÉ GUTIÉRREZ TERRAZAS Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. Jenseits des Lustprinzeps. Leipzig-ViennaZurich (1920). GW, 13, 1–69; Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 7–64. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sándor. (1913). Le développement du sens de la réalité et ses stades. Oeuvres completes. Psychanalyse (Vol. 2, pp. 51–64; J. Dupont, M. Viliker, Trans.). Paris: Payot, 1970. Porte, Michèle. (1994). La dynamique qualitative en psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. BIBLIOTECA NUEVA DE MADRID (FREUD, S., OBRAS COMPLETAS) The Biblioteca Nueva de Madrid was the first publishing house to print a Spanish language edition of the ‘‘complete works’’ of Sigmund Freud; it was referred to as such even though it has never been finished. Nearly INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS See also: Spain. Bibliography Garcia de la Hoz, Antonio. (1985). Freud en castellano. Libros, 36, 3–9. Lázaro, J. (1991). Las Traducciones al español de Freud: Historia y crı́tica, actas del IX congreso de historia de la medicina. Saragossa: Prensas Universitarias y Ayuntamiento de Saragossa. 175 B I B R I N G , E D W A R D (1894 –1959) Ruiz-Castillo Basala, José. (1972). El Apasionante mundo del libro. Memorias de un editor. Madrid: Ediciones de la Revista de Occidente. Vezzetti, Hugo. (1911). Freud en langue espagnole. Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse, 4, 189–207. His obsessive character pushed him to undertake such exhaustive research in the literature that it blocked his own analytic output . . . that is why his literary legacy is so limited compared to his knowledge and the richness of his thought’’ (Sterba, R., 1982). Villarreal, Inga. (1992). Spanish Translations of Freud. Translating Freud. New Haven/London: Yale University Press. BIBRING, EDWARD (1894–1959) A Jewish doctor and psychoanalyst, Edward Bibring was born April 20, 1894, in Stanislau, in Galicia, and died in Boston on January 11, 1959. He obtained the equivalent of his B.A. in Czernowitz and went on to study history and philosophy. After his military service during the First World War, during which he was a prisoner in Russia, he studied medicine in Vienna. His interest in psychoanalysis was stirred by the Vienna Seminar on Sexology, created in 1919 by Otto Fenichel for medical students. It was here that Bibring met his future wife, Grete Lehner. In 1922, Bibring obtained his diploma in medicine at the University of Vienna and the same year was accepted for training by the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. He underwent analysis with Paul Federn, and in 1925 became an associate member and in 1927 a full member of the society. He served in a number of positions: treasurer from 1928 to 1938, successor to Paul Schilder as head of the psychosis section in 1929 at the psychoanalytic clinic, and replaced Eduard Hitschmann as director of the clinic in 1932. After 1934, Bibring was a teaching analyst and supervisor in Vienna, secretary of the education committee for the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, and a co-editor of the Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse. In May 1938, following the Anschluss and the rise of National Socialism in Austria, Bibring and his wife Grete emigrated to Great Britain. There he became a member and teaching analyst of the British PsychoAnalytical Society and was one of the editors of the Gesammelte Werke Sigmund Freuds. In February 1941, following an invitation from Tufts Medical College to teach, he and his wife left for Boston. He became a member and training analyst of the Boston Psychoanalytic Society and was its President from 1947 to 1949. He practiced psychiatry at Beth Israel Hospital. In his memoirs, Richard Sterba wrote of Bibring that ‘‘He had difficulties expressing himself in writing. 17 6 ELKE MÜHLLEITNER See also: Altruism; Lehrinstitut der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung; Therapeutic alliance; Working-off mechanisms; Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung. Bibliography Bibring, Edward. (1936). Zur entwicklung und problematik der triebtheorie. Imago, 22, 147–176. ———. (1950). Considerations in the establishment of training facilities. Bulletin of the American Psychoanalytical Association, 6, 36–40. ———. (1954). Psychoanalysis and dynamic psychotherapies. Journal of the American Psychoanalytical Association, 2, 745–770. Mühlleitner, E. (1992). Biographisches lexikon der psychoanalyse (die mitglieder der psychologischen MittwochGesellschaft und der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung 1902–1938). Tübingen: Diskord. Sterba, R. (1982). Reminiscences of a Viennese psychoanalyst. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. BIBRING-LEHNER, GRETE (1899–1977) A doctor and psychoanalyst, Grete Bibring-Lehner was born in Vienna on January 11, 1899, and died August 10, 1977, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. She was the daughter of Viennese Jewish parents, business people and members of the Jewish intellectual bourgeoisie. She attended a girlsÕ school where she studied the humanities, including psychology, which led to her discovery of Freud. She began her studies at the department of medicine of the University of Vienna in 1918 and participated in the 1919 working group formed by Otto Fenichel to study sexuality and psychoanalysis, the Vienna Seminar on Sexology. Among the students in this seminar were several future analysts, including Wilhelm Reich and Edward Bibring, whom she married in 1921. Through her participation in the seminar, BibringLehner was able to attend meetings of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Upon completing her medical INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B I C K , E S T H E R (1901 –1 983) studies in 1924, she went on to specialize in neurology and psychiatry. She became a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1925. She completed her personal analysis with Hermann Nunberg while she was finishing her medical studies. She was one of the first students of the Vienna Training Institute, founded in 1925. Bibring-Lehner worked at the psychoanalytic clinic, gave presentations on the technique of therapy, and, after 1934, was a member of the education committee of the Vienna Association. Her first work on psychoanalysis, ‘‘The Phallic Phase and its Disturbances in Young Girls,’’ was published in 1933 in the Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik. After the Germans entered Austria, she migrated with her family in May 1938 to Great Britain and became a member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society. In 1941 the family left for the United States, where Bibring-Lehner became a member and training analyst with the Boston Psychoanalytic Society. She taught psychoanalytic psychology at Simmons College School of Social Work in Boston. In 1946 she joined the administrative staff of the psychiatric division of Beth Israel Hospital. She was named professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School in 1961. She received a number of professional and academic distinctions. In 1955 she was elected president of the Boston Psychoanalytic Society. From 1959 to 1963 she was vice president of the International Psychoanalytic Association and, in 1962, became president. In 1968 The Teaching of Dynamic Psychiatry was published, of which she was the general editor. Her research on pregnancy and mother-child relationships provided an important contribution to womenÕs psychology. ELKE MÜHLLEITNER See also: Lehrinstitut der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung; Parenthood; Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung. Bibliography Bibring-Lehner, Grete. (1933). ‘‘Über die phallische Phase und ihre Störungen beim Mädchen.’’ Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik , 7, 145–152. ———. (1968) ‘‘Teaching of dynamic psychiatry. A reappraisal of the goals and techniques.’’ In The teaching of psychoanalytic psychiatry. New York: International University Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Mühlleitner, Elke. (1992). Biographisches lexikon der psychoanalyse (die mitglieder der psychologischen MittwochGesellschaft und der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung 1902–1938). Tübingen: Diskord. Sterba, Richard. (1982). Reminiscences of a Viennese psychoanalyst. Detroit: Wayne University Press. BICK, ESTHER (1901–1983) Esther Bick, a physician and psychoanalyst, was born of orthodox Jewish parents in 1901 near Kraków, Poland, and died on July 20, 1983, in London. Her maiden name remains unknown. Her friends referred to her as Nusia. Unable to study medicine in Poland because of the many restrictions on Jews, she moved to Vienna, where she worked with Charlotte Buhler on the experimental observation of young twins. It was during this period of her training that the foundations were established for her later work in psychoanalysis. Having refined a methodology for the objective observation of infants (time studies, quantitative descriptive analysis), she continued to formalize a new method of observation that was able to take into account the subjective and emotional environment of the child, together with the experience of the observer. Her marriage is difficult to date precisely and appears to have been short-lived. Following GermanyÕs annexation of Austria on March 12, 1938, Esther Bick reached London, where she became a student of Melanie Klein. Martha Harris indicates in the obituary she wrote for BickÕs death that her brother and the rest of her family died in concentration camps and that only one of her nieces escaped the holocaust. This niece later moved to Israel, although Bick did not learn of this until the 1950s. During the Second World War, Bick worked in a nursery in Manchester, where she began an analysis with Michael Balint. She completed her analytic studies in London, while working at a child guidance clinic in Middlesex with Portia Holman. In 1949 she joined the Tavistock Clinic, where John Bowlby asked her to provide a training course for future analysts. There she developed her method of infant observation, which encouraged observers to watch and listen to infants during their early development and focused on in-depth analysis of the capacity for attention and psychic transformation. It was also during this period that she began a second analysis with Melanie Klein. 177 B I G R A S , J U L I E N J O S E P H N O R M A N D (1 932 –19 89) Esther Bick wrote little, but what she did write was influential and is intentionally situated within what has customarily been referred to as the post-Kleinian movement. She noted the importance of the skin during infant relations (this opened the way to an entire field of research on the establishment of psychic envelopes and, in France, to the work of Didier Anzieu on the skin ego). She was also interested in the observation of infants from a psychoanalytic perspective. BickÕs methodology for infant observation has been integrated into the training of child analysts, and even of some adult analysts, in several countries (Great Britain, Belgium, Italy). In France, the issue is more controversial, especially regarding the status of observed material compared with conventional analytic material. Some applications of her method have been developed not only for training but also for therapeutic purposes. In any case, the rigor of BickÕs methodology, together with her sense of ethical conduct, have had a profound influence on child psychologists since the 1970s. Her work has drawn their attention (along with that of some adult psychologists as well) to the more archaic levels of functioning and the earliest stages of mental development in the infant. In France, BickÕs ideas have been taken up by authors like Geneviève Haag and Didier Houzel, who trained with Bick. BickÕs two great passions throughout her life were psychoanalysis and Israel, and she placed her hopes in both of them. Bick ceased clinical practice in 1980. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Adhesive identification; Body image; Infantile psychosis; Infant observation; Infant observation (therapeutic); Object; Psychic envelope; Skin. Bibliography Bick, Esther. (1964). Notes on infant observation in psychoanalytic training. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 45, 558–566. ———. (1968). The experience of the skin in early object relations. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 49, 558– 566. Haag, Michel, and Haag, Geneviève. (1995). LÕobservation des nourrissons selon Esther Bick (1901–1983) et ses applications. Information psychiatrique, 1, 7–17. 17 8 Harris, Martha. (1983). Esther Bick, 1901–1983. Journal of Child Psychotherapy, 9, 101–102. Harris, Martha, and Bick, Esther. (1987). Collected papers of Martha Harris and Esther Bick. Perthshire, U.K.: Clunie Press for Roland Harris Education Trust. BIGRAS, JULIEN JOSEPH NORMAND (1932–1989) A Canadian psychiatrist and training analyst, Julien Bigras was born February 12, 1932, in Laval, Quebec, and died May 10, 1989, in Montreal. He spent his childhood at the family farm and studied medicine and psychiatry at the University of Montreal; he completed his psychoanalytic training at the Paris Psychoanalytic Institute. A member of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society (1963) and the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society (1954), and a training analyst, he maintained a psychoanalytic practice, directed a seminar, published the review Interprétation (Montreal) and two collections of books in Paris and Montreal, and collaborated on Études Freudiennes (Denoël, Paris) and Patio (Paris). He also ran a seminar at McGill University (1983– 1989) and participated in the Clinical Lacanian Forum in the United States. He published ninety-one articles, twenty-six chapters in anthologies, and eleven works of fiction including LÕEnfant dans le grenier (1977), Le Psychanalyste nu (1979), Kati of course (1980), Ma Vie, ma folie (1983), and La Folie en face (1986). He was a great admirer of Donald Woods Winnicott, Harold Searles, and Sándor Ferenczi because of their lack of dogmatism and their clinical freedom of expression during transference. Madness, incest, the therapeutic use of stories, and transference and violence associated with the psychoanalyst were common themes throughout his work. BigrasÕs research led him to ask two fundamental questions: 1) Is violence necessary for access to the unconscious, does it provide the only opportunity for the analysand and for the psychoanalyst/analysand to rediscover or recreate a new and singular maternal language, a primal language, the only one that can produce the fecundity of being? 2) Is the violence of the psychoanalyst (the unanalyzed in all of us) an expression of the otherÕs desperate cry to be heard, a limiting transference situation in which the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B I N D I N G /U N B I N D I N G one who is best able to hear this cry would be his own patient? Can writing or any other form of creative art provide confirmation, and pick up the thread where the analysand or the analyst left off? ÉLISABETH BIGRAS See also: Canada; Études Freudiennes; Interprétation; Société psychanalytique de Montréal (Psychoanalytic Society of Montreal). Bibliography Bigras, Julien. (1977). LÕenfant dans le grenier. Paris: Hachette. ———. (1979). La folie en face. Paris: Robert Laffont. ———. (1979). Le psychanalyste nu. Paris: Robert Laffont. ———. (1980). Kati of course. Paris: Mazarine. ———. (1983). Ma vie, ma folie. Paris-Montréal: MazarineBoréal Express. BINDING/UNBINDING OF THE INSTINCTS Binding is the mechanism whereby the free-flowing energy of the primary processes becomes attached to ideas, thus giving instinct a representative within the psychic agencies. In this way, instinctual excitation seeking an object is gradually tamed by the ego, and ideas are linked to one another and then maintained in a relatively stable state. This mode of functioning, characteristic of the secondary processes, enables the work of thinking to take place. Unbinding, on the other hand, is the abrupt retransformation of bound energy into free energy seeking discharge. Binding and unbinding are thus two essential economic aspects of the work of the psyche. Freud first used the notion of binding in October 1895, in ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ (1950c), proposing ‘‘the hypothesis of what is, as it were, a bound state in the neurone, which, though there is a high cathexis, permits only a small current,’’ and asserting that ‘‘the ego itself is a mass like this of neurones which hold fast to their cathexis—are, that is, in a bound state’’ (p. 368). At this time, on his way to discovering the unconscious, Freud was seeking to understand the surging up of elements that did not belong to the egoÕs thought processes: ‘‘If a passage of thought comes up against a still untamed mnemic image of this INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OF THE INSTINCTS kind, then its indications of quality, often of a sensory kind, are generated, with a feeling of unpleasure and an inclination to discharge, the combination of which characterizes a particular affect, and the passage of thought is interrupted.. . . What is it, then, that happens to memories capable of affect till they are tamed? . . . Particularly large and repeated binding from the ego is required before this facilitation to unpleasure can be counterbalanced’’ (pp. 380–381). At the dawn of psychoanalysis, Freud was seeking to explain how the energy of the primary process could be held in check and yet at the same time continue to procure pleasure and be used in the construction of the ego. In ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology,’’ the notion of binding was given its full place, since it helps establish a level of relative constancy in the ego. By contrast, instinctual excitation, when it is too strong, threatens the ego with unbinding. Freud made a brief comment in ‘‘Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning’’ (1911b): ‘‘Thinking was endowed with characteristics which made it possible for the mental apparatus to tolerate an increase of stimulus while the process of discharge was postponed. It is essentially an experimental kind of acting, accompanied by displacement of relatively small quantities of cathexis together with less expenditure (discharge) of them’’ (p. 221). Later in ‘‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes’’ (1915c), Freud emphasized, ‘‘A particularly close attachment of the instinct to its object is distinguished by the term ÔfixationÕ ’’ (p. 123). In ‘‘The Unconscious’’ (1915e) he emphasized the opposition between ‘‘two different states of cathectic energy in mental life: one in which the energy is tonically ÔboundÕ and the other in which it is freely mobile and presses towards discharge’’ (p. 188). In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), in revamping his earlier instinctual dualism, Freud took traumatic neurosis as one of several bases for the new opposition between the life and death instincts. In this context, ‘‘it would be the task of the higher strata of the mental apparatus to bind the instinctual excitation reaching the primary process. A failure to effect this binding would provoke a disturbance analogous to a traumatic neurosis; and only after the binding has been accomplished would it be possible for the dominance of the pleasure principle (and of its modification, the reality principle) to proceed unhindered’’ (pp. 34–35). 179 B I N S W A N G E R , L U D W I G (1881 –1 966) In his paper ‘‘Negation’’ (1925h), Freud added a new element: ‘‘The general wish to negate, the negativism which is displayed by some psychotics, is probably to be regarded as a sign of a defusion of instincts that has taken place through a withdrawal of libidinal components’’ (p. 239). Finally, in An Outline of Psycho-Analysis (1940a [1938]), Freud condensed his ideas by making binding and unbinding the two essential features of his theory of the instincts: ‘‘[We] have decided to assume the existence of only two basic instincts, Eros and the destructive instinct. . . . The aim of the first of these basic instincts is to establish ever greater unities and to preserve them thus—in short, to bind together; the aim of the second is, on the contrary, to undo connections and so to destroy things’’ (p. 148). Although the fundamental idea of binding and unbinding underwent gradual clarification as FreudÕs research advanced, it gained a new coherence with his last theory of the instincts. In particular, it now shed light on fixation as a reponse to excess binding after an unbinding that flooded the psychic apparatus. One problem remained unsolved, however, namely the differences, in economic terms, between unbinding and failure of binding. Unbinding resulted from an active process that Freud plainly related to Thanatos (the death instinct), whereas the failure of binding seemed to be more passive, perhaps a result of a limit on available libidinal energy. Lastly, free association seems to be based on more or less effective instances of the binding and unbinding of ideas among themselves and of ideas and effects. Such binding and unbinding in turn determine the nature of the transference. PIERRE DELION See also: Fusion/defusion. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12: 213–226. ———. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109–140. ———. (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159–204. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1925h). Negation. SE, 19: 235–239. 18 0 ———. (1940a [1938]). An outline of psycho-analyses. SE, 23: 144–207. ———. (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281–387. BINSWANGER, LUDWIG (1881–1966) Ludwig Binswanger, a Swiss psychiatrist, was born on April 5, 1881, in Kreuzlingen, Thurgau, Switzerland, where he died on February 7, 1966. In Kreuzlingen he was director of clinical psychiatry at Bellevue Sanatorium, an internationally renowned institution founded by his grandfather. Binswanger took over responsibilities in 1910 from his father, passing them on to his own son in 1956. He spent his school years in Constance, Germany, and studied medicine in Lausanne, Heidelberg, and Zurich. In 1906 he obtained the position of assistant at the Burghölzli Psychiatric Clinic in Zurich, directed by Eugen Bleuler. In 1907 he defended his doctoral dissertation on association tests before Carl Gustav Jung. Binswanger devoted his life to psychiatry and the search for new therapeutic treatments. His father had introduced a revolutionary method for running the clinic, according to which the ‘‘doctorÕs family will also assist in treating the patient.’’ The entire institution became, in effect, an extended family presided over by a patriarch. Ludwig Binswanger was raised in a world where ‘‘the fatherÕs teachings were the absolute law.’’ He developed an interest in psychoanalysis at the Burghölzli Clinic, where the medical staff included some of the leading psychoanalysts of the time (Karl Abraham, Max Eitingon, Franz Riklin, and Hermann Nunberg). Jung was the director. In 1907 he met with Freud (‘‘his most important human experience’’) in the company of Jung. This led to other meetings and a thirty-year friendship, as shown by their lengthy correspondence. Although Freud had difficulties, recognized by Freud himself, in maintaining friendships with people who did not share his ideas, and although they had different attitudes toward fundamental aspects of psychoanalysis and its potential uses, they enjoyed an extended friendship. This friendship was based on an understanding of mutual expectations: Freud hoped to break down the wall separating official psychiatry and psychoanalysis, and Binswanger sought INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B I N S W A N G E R , L U D W I G (1881 –1 966) to fight for the acceptance of a new theory under FreudÕs paternal control. Binswanger wrote nearly a hundred articles and books. He wrote reports of analyses (‘‘Versuch einer Hysterie Analyse,’’ 1909; ‘‘Analyse einer Hysterischen Phobie,’’ 1911) and methodological criticisms of psychoanalysis like Die drei Grundelemente des wissenschaftlichen Denkens bei Freud (The three fundamental elements of FreudÕs scientific ideas; 1921). In Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins (Fundamental forms and the recognition of human being-in-the-world; 1953), Binswanger attempted to define existential analysis as an empirical science involving an anthropological approach to the individual essence of being human. Over the years BinswangerÕs contributions to psychoanalysis were marked by an increasing reserve, as shown in his introduction of psychoanalytic therapy as an element of institutional care. In 1907 his uncle, Otto Binswanger, a professor of psychiatry in Jena, presented him with a hysterical patient, Irma, for analysis, which he undertook on the basis of his reading alone. He treated a number of other patients who required institutional care, including some of FreudÕs patients. His beginnerÕs enthusiasm was soon subject to setbacks as a result of his lack of rigor. He concluded, ‘‘Ten years of effort and disappointment have been the price to pay to be able to recognize that only a select number of our institutional patients can benefit from analysis.’’ Binswanger began to subject psychoanalysis to a methodological and critical analysis. He began by attacking the methodology of general psychology and then attempted an epistemological criticism of psychoanalysis itself. He made use of Edmund HusserlÕs phenomenology and the hermeneutics of Wilhelm Dilthey and Friedrich Schleiermacher. For him, the link between FreudÕs scientific method and clinical psychiatry is a shared reduction of human existence to a schema or system. In his new approach, human existence is necessarily human, and the task for existential analysis is to describe the fundamental orientations of that existence. After Martin HeideggerÕs Being and Time, Binswanger underwent a second transition from phenomenology to phenomenological ontology and switched from a methodological approach to an anthropological approach. For Heidegger, Daseinanalytik (existential INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS analysis of being in the world) consists in describing the structure of human existence as such. BinswangerÕs Daseinanalyse attempted to contrast the natural sciences, which treat the human being as a ‘‘system of organic functions,’’ with a phenomenological methodology that attempted to explore humanityÕs subjective existence in its totality and that looked at the individual as a being present in the world, a being responsible for its own existence from within. To help the patient, the therapist engages with the patientÕs primal world and how the patient is present in the world. Mental illnesses are ‘‘modifications of the fundamental structure and structural bonds of the being-in-the-world as transcendence.’’ Therapy does not consist in ‘‘an attempt, starting with the ego, to enable the organism to connect with another through language, but makes language itself its starting point.’’ Daseinanalyse, as practiced by Binswanger, Medard Boss, Henri F. Ellenberger, and Rollo May, maintained a distance from the theory and practice of Freudians. Freud himself acknowledged, ‘‘We are unable to establish a dialogue between us.’’ RUTH MENAHEM See also: Hirschfeld, Elfriede; Phenomenology and psychoanalysis; Psychoanalytic epistemology; Schizophrenia; Switzerland (German-speaking). Bibliography Binswanger, Ludwig. (1920). Psycho-analysis and clinical psychiatry. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 1 (3), 357. ———. (1953). Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins (2nd ed.). Zurich, Switzerland: Niehans. ———. (1957). Sigmund Freud: Reminiscences of a friendship (Norbert Guterman, Trans.). New York: Grune & Stratton. (Original work published 1955) ———. (1971). Introduction à l Õanalyse existentielle (Jacqueline Verdeaux and Roland Kuhn, Trans.). Paris: Minuit. Fédida, Pierre. (1986). Le contre-transfert en question. Psychanalyse à l ÕUniversité, 11 (41), 19–30. Freud, Sigmund, and Binswanger, Ludwig. (1992 [1908– 1938]). The Freud-Binswanger Correspondence, 1908–1938 (Arnold J. Pomerans, Trans.). New York: Other Press, 2003. 181 BIOLOGICAL BEDROCK Lantéri-Laura, Georges. (1963). La psychiatrie phénoménologique: Fondements philosophiques. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. BIOLOGICAL BEDROCK In the last paragraph of ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’’ (1937c), Freud wrote: ‘‘We often have the impression that with the wish for a penis and the masculine protest we have penetrated through all the psychological strata and have reached bedrock [gewachsener Fels: ‘‘the living rock’’], and that thus our activities are at an end. This is probably true, since, for the psychical field, the biological field does in fact play the part of the underlying bedrock’’ (p. 252). As a limit imposed upon psychoanalytical treatment, which is brought to a halt by its inaccessibility to psychic working over, the biological level played a complicated and ever-present motor role in FreudÕs work. By 1894 he had already introduced three important notions related to this frontier: libido, or psychical sexual energy transmuted from somatic energy; conversion, or the hysterical mechanism of transformation of psychic libidinal energy into somatic innervation; and the sexual instinct, the earliest attempt to conceptualize such ‘‘phase shifts’’—whether continuous or sporadic—between the body and the mind. In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), what Freud called ‘‘that part of the theory . . . which lies on the frontier of biology’’ (p. 133)—the theory of the instincts—created the dynamic frame of reference in which psychic morphogenesis could be grafted onto the underlying biology of onto- and phylogenesis. And in his preface to the third edition (1914) of the Three Essays, Freud added: ‘‘I must, however, emphasize that the present work is characterized not only by being completely based upon psycho-analytic research, but also by being deliberately independent of the findings of biology. . . . Indeed, my aim has rather been to discover how far psychological investigation can throw light upon the biology of the sexual life of man. . . . there was no need for me to be diverted from my course if the psycho-analytic method led in a number of important respects to opinions and findings which differed largely from those based on biological considerations’’ (p. 131). Both the interdependence and the relative autonomy between the mental and the biological were thus affirmed. 18 2 In fact Freud drew attention to infantile sexual activity before its organic correlates were discovered— the word hormone came into use in 1905. He specified the two developmental biological traits responsible for the singular ubiquity of sexuality in human mental life, namely prematurity and the latency period. Freud inferred that humans were descended from a species that reached sexual maturity at the age of about five; this conclusion, which is confirmed by current paleo-anthropology, relates the Oedipus complex to the ‘‘bedrock’’ of the biological development of the species. Another point of contact between the mental and the biological lay in mnemic phenomena, in memory traces and their transmission. As Freud wrote in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), ‘‘Dreams and neuroses seem to have preserved more mental antiquities than we could have imagined possible; so that psychoanalysis may claim a high place among the sciences which are concerned with the reconstruction of the earliest and most obscure periods of the beginnings of the human race’’ (p. 549). The life and death instincts, another interface with the ‘‘bedrock,’’ were the basis of a hypothetical biology centered on the diversity of the stabilizing mechanisms of living beings—on their ability to internalize external factors and to regularize and convey them on the biological and the mental levels simultaneously. In short, Freud was proposing a kind of Lamarckianism revisited whose necessity would one day be acknowledged by official science: ‘‘For incalculable ages mankind has been passing through a process of evolution of culture,’’ he wrote to Albert Einstein, which ‘‘is undoubtedly accompanied by physical alterations; but we are still unfamiliar with the notion that the evolution of civilization is an organic process of this kind’’ (1933b [1932], p. 214). Penis envy and castration fears were paradigmatic of the complicated, intrinsic causal relationship between the mental and the biological. The unique narcissism of human beings, along with the ideal individual and collective forms to which it gave rise, was likewise, by virtue of prematurity, closely bound up with biology. The transition between soma and psyche lies at the core of FreudÕs work. His theory of the instincts is the conceptual instrument that makes it possible to examine this zone without falling prey to neurophysiological reductionism or to the dichotomies of idealism. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B I O N , W I L F R E D R U P R E C H T (1897 –1 979) This set of problems has often been avoided since Freud. It may not be strictly necessary to confront it as a practical matter in treating neuroses, but it is surely essential to do so if we wish fully to understand the dynamics of mental functioning. There are many ways, however, to evade the issue, and to maintain the ancient split between soma and psyche: neglecting or rejecting the theory of the instincts (like the British school); confining that theory to an exclusively clinical realm (Melanie Klein), or to an exclusively structural one that ignores the economic dimension (Jacques Lacan); or suppressing FreudÕs biological work on fantasies (Gantheret). The diametrically opposite approach, a neopositivist reading of FreudÕs work as a ‘‘biogenetic fable’’ (Sulloway), has the same result. On the other hand, some biologists with a more nuanced epistemology (Jean-Didier Vincent, Alain Prochiantz) have been reassessing the dynamic point of view in their discipline in a way that restores its relevance to the Freudian position, which a certain number of psychoanalysts (such as those concerned with the earliest mother-child bonds and with psychosomatic illnesses) have never abandoned. MICHÈLE PORTE See also: ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’’; Castration complex; Femininity; Penis envy; Phylogenesis; Real trauma; Termination of treatment. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1933b [1932]). Why War? (Einstein and Freud). SE, 22: 195–215. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. Gantheret, François. (1975). Quelques éléments de recherche sur la place du biologique dans la théorie psychanalytique. Psychanalyse à l ÕUniversité, 1 (December 1), 97–104. Sulloway, Frank J. (1979). Freud, biologist of the mind. New York: Basic. Further Reading Silverstein, Barry. (1985). Freud’s psychology and its organic foundation: Sexuality and mind-body interactionism. Psychoanalytic Review, 72, 199–228; 203–228. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BION, WILFRED RUPRECHT (1897–1979) Wilfred Ruprecht Bion was born at Mattra (United Provinces, India) on September 8, 1897, and died in Oxford (Great Britain) on November 8, 1979. The first eight years of BionÕs life were spent in India, where his father was a civil engineer. In 1905 Bion was sent to school in England, where he remained for ten years before taking up military service. While he read history at QueenÕs College, Oxford, (1919– 1921) he became curious about FreudÕs writings and later furthered his interest in psychology by reading medicine at University College Hospital, London (1924–1930), where he won the Gold Medal for Surgery and the Silver Medal for Diagnostics. He entered analysis with John Rickman in 1938, being forced to terminate by the outbreak of World War II. During the war, as a military psychiatrist, he initiated a new approach to group therapy. He entered analysis with Melanie Klein in 1945, and qualified as an associate member of the British Psychoanalytical Society in 1950. Bion came from a Protestant missionary family, Swiss Calvinist of Huguenot origin on his fatherÕs side and Anglo-Indian on his motherÕs. This religious background, combined with the fact that the family was isolated from other Europeans for extended periods, meant that the small boy was in close contact with two very different cultures. Experiences of contrast and opposition, but also of mediation and love between two worlds formed a background to, and a basis for, BionÕs later theories regarding what it may mean for an individual to be both a member of his group and in contrast or opposition to it at the same time. This experience was reinforced by the carnage of World War I: he joined the Royal Tank Regiment (1916–1918) where he was awarded the Distinguished Service Order, the Legion dÕHonneur (chevalier) and was mentioned in dispatches. Although distant from psychoanalysis, these experiences nurtured his understanding of terror, awe, dependence, love, hatred, and hatred of understanding and knowledge; this latter helped in his deep contact with psychotic patients. He held several appointments in public positions: Secretary (1933–1939) and then Chairman (1946) of the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society (BPS); Chairman of the Executive Committee, Tavistock Clinic, London (1945); Director of the London 183 BIPOLAR SELF Clinic of Psychoanalysis (1956–1962) and President of the British Psychoanalytical Society (1962–1965). He continued as an active member of the Executive of the BPS, and as Chairman of The Melanie Klein Trust, until he left for California in January 1968. He taught a great deal in Latin America during the last decade of his life before his return to England in 1979 a few months before his death. In 1978 he became an honorary member of the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society and in 1979 an Honorary Fellow of the A. K. Rice Institute. city; Preconception; Protothoughts; Psychotic panic; Psychotic part of the personality; Realization; Relations (commensalism, symbiosis, parasitism); Selected fact; Thought-thinking apparatus; Transformations; Vertex. BionÕs main contributions to psychoanalysis belong to the fields of psychoanalytical technique and epistemology, with particular reference to the process of thinking. He approached this latter subject from different viewpoints (vertices): that of the group; of the psychotic, schizophrenic or borderline patient; and that of the individual thinker, ‘‘genius’’ or not, who has to deal with the pressure of attacks, from within and without, due to hostility towards both the thinking process and the resulting thoughts. The principal concepts he developed are those of ‘‘reverie based on free–floating attention’’, ‘‘alpha-function,’’ which Bion himself felt could replace the Freudian theory of primary and secondary processes, alpha- and beta-elements, container and contained, and ‘‘reversed perspective.’’ His writing is commonly considered challenging, particularly the trilogy A Memoir of the Future (1975, 1977, 1979/1991). His other most important publications are Experiences in Groups (1961), Four Servants (1977) and Attention and Interpretation (1970). Bibliography BionÕs influence in the field of group psychotherapy and the development of more or less closely related group techniques was both very rapid and widespread. In the field of psychoanalysis, despite the fact that his thinking is firmly rooted in that of Freud and Klein, his innovative ideas and theories engendered a great deal of controversy, and were hardly accepted until the 1970s. PARTHENOPE BION TALAMO Work discussed: Learning from Experience. Notions developed: Alpha function; Arrogance; Attention; Basic assumption; Beta-elements; Beta-screen; Bizarre object; Catastrophic change; Concept; Contact-barrier; Container-Contained; Dream-like memory; Grid; Group phenomenon; Hallucinosis; Invariant; Linking, attacks on; Love-Hate-Knowledge (L/H/K links); Maternal reverie, capacity for; Memoirs of the future; Negative capa18 4 See also: Autobiography; Birth; Emotion; Fusion/defusion; Great Britain; Group analysis; Group psychotherapies; Infant development; Internal object; Infans; Negative, work of the; Non-verbal communication; Primary object; Primal, the; Protective shield; Reverie; Second World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis; Selfanalysis; Splitting; Symbolic equation; Tavistock Clinic. Bion, Wilfred R. (1961). Experiences in groups. London: Tavistock Publications. ———. (1962). Learning from experience. London: Heinemann; New York: Basic Books. ———. (1963). Elements of psycho-analysis. London: Heinemann. ———. (1965). Transformations: Change from learning to growth. London: Heinemann. ———. (1967). Second thoughts. London: Heinemann. ———. (1970). Attention and interpretation. London: Tavistock Publications. ———. (1991). A memoir of the future, Vol. I, the dream. London: Karnak Books. ———. (1991). A memoir of the future, Vol. II, The past presented. London: Karnak Books. ———. (1991). A memoir of the future, Vol. III, The dawn of oblivion. London: Karnak Books. Grinberg, León, Sor, Dario, Tabak de Bianchedi, Elizabeth. (1977). Introduction to the work of Bion: Groups, knowledge, psychosis, thought, transformations, psychoanalytic practice. (Alberto Hahn, Trans.). New York: Jason Aronson. ———. (1993). New introduction to the work of Bion. Northvale, NJ; London: Jason Aronson. Grotstein, James S. (1981). Do I dare disturb the universe?. Beverly Hills, CA: Caesura Press. Pines, Malcolm, (Ed.). (1985). Bion and group psychotherapy. London: Routledge. BIPOLAR SELF The bipolar self is made up of two components: the grandiose self, that of mirroring or ambitions; and the idealized parental imago, that of both idealization and ideals. The two poles are linked together by a tension INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BIRTH, DREAM arc, the alter ego. First appearing in Heinz KohutÕs The Restoration of the Self (1977), the bipolar self was the hallmark of a new metapsychology: generalized self psychology. The two constituent poles of the self are formed in response to the degree of the receptivity of caregivers to the subjectÕs narcissistic needs. The grandiose self acquires its strength through the responses of the self objects to mirroring needs, and the idealized parental imago by means of responses that enable fusion. Together both sectors are a source of strength to the self. Each pole is a possibility, a potential for the self. One pole can compensate for the other, and the self will be fragile only if both poles have been thwarted. When its earliest needs have not been responded to, the infant turns to a less rejecting source. In such a case, it is this second source that will be activated and worked through in the transference, leaving the earliest traumas in the dark. Anything that has been resolved or surmounted will not be examined in analysis. Developments that are no longer the result of conflict are seen as a natural process if narcissism is taken to be a given. OF Psychoanalysis (1916-17a [1915–17]), in which he speaks of the ‘‘separation’’(SE, 15: 397) of birth. This is the theme that Wilfred Bion developed in Caesura (1975) when he made birth the paradigm for all psychic discontinuity, which means that experiences lived through before the caesura must be capable of being retranscribed in a psychically assimilable form after the caesura. Taking a more genetic point of view, other authors have applied the term ‘‘psychic birth’’ to the moment when children become conscious of their individuation and the separation between them and their libidinal objects (Mahler, Margaret, 1975; Tustin, Frances, 1981). DIDIER HOUZEL See also: Constitution; Dream symbolism; Infant development; Infant observation; Infant observation (therapeutic); Infantile psychosis; Intergenerational; Maternal; Memoirs of the future; Myth of the Birth of the Hero, The; Narcissistic elation; Parenthood; Postnatal/postpartum depression; Premature-Prematurity; Primary love; Reversal into the opposite; Seduction; Sexual theories of children; Social feeling (individual psychology); Trauma of Birth, The. AGNÈS OPPENHEIMER Bibliography See also: Grandiose self; Idealized parental imago; Kohut, Heinz; Self psychology. Bion, Wifred R. (1975). The grid and Caesura. Rio de Janeiro: Imago. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I. SE, 4, 1–338. Kohut, Heinz. (1977). The restoration of the self. New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part II. SE, 5: 339–625. ———. (1984). How does analysis cure? Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ———. (1916-17a [1915–17]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. Parts I and II. SE, Part I, 15; Part II, 16. BIRTH Mahler, Margaret, Pine, Fred, and Bergman, Anni. (1975). The psychological birth of the human infant. New York: Basic Books. Birth is the prototype for all discontinuities in the relation between a mind and its objects. Otto RankÕs The Myth of the Birth of the Hero (1909) introduced this theme into psychoanalytic literature. In the same year Freud took an interest in dreams of birth in an addendum to The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). Birth, as a passage from intra-uterine life to extra-uterine life became for him ‘‘the first experience of anxiety, and thus the source and prototype of the affect of anxiety’’ (SE, 5: 525, note 2). He returns to this theme in Introductory Lectures on INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Tustin, Frances. (1981). Autistic states in children. London: Routledge. BIRTH, DREAM OF The dream of birth is a dream that depicts, generally in a transposed way, the birth of the dreamer or, in women, the act of giving birth. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud classed this type of dream among the ‘‘typical dreams,’’ 185 BISEXUALITY but this classification appeared only with his addenda to later editions. In an addition made in 1909, he wrote: ‘‘A large number of dreams, often accompanied by anxiety and having as their content such subjects as passing through narrow spaces or being in water, are based upon phantasies of intra-uterine life, of existence in the womb and the act of birth’’ (p. 399). He also reported, in a note dating from 1909, Carl G. JungÕs opinion that, in women, dreams of having teeth pulled signified childbirth (pp. 387–88, note 3). He cited the dream of a young man ‘‘who, in his imagination, had taken advantage of an intra-uterine opportunity of watching his parents copulating’’ (pp. 399–400). In subsequent addenda he analyzed the dream of a young woman which expressed her fear of (and wish for) the loss of her virginity and the birth of the baby that would result, as well as several other dreams with this meaning reported by Otto Rank and Karl Abraham. In 1919, he added to the 1909 note cited above Ernest JonesÕs observation that what the pulled tooth and childbirth had in common was the meaning of ‘‘separation of a part of the body from the whole’’ (pp. 387–88, note 3). Accordingly, the dream of birth can be linked to the theme of castration. As with most of the other ‘‘typical dreams,’’ there is hardly any further discussion of this type of dream in FreudÕs work, and the later literature is limited, despite the fact that such dreams are often encountered in clinical work. ROGER PERRON See also: Birth; Castration complex; Dream; Myth of the Birth of the Hero, The. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5: 1–625. BISEXUALITY The notion of bisexuality—according to which all human beings simultaneously possess both masculine and feminine sexual dispositions—was introduced into psychoanalysis by Freud. It should be noted that the notion of bisexuality has always existed, as witness its mention in most 18 6 religions. The idea of a primeval divine couple that is demonstrated by myths and rituals of human androgyny, is based on the existence of a supreme androgynous divine being from whom the couple are separated (Eliade, 1964). The idea of bisexuality was already present in philosophical and psychiatric literature at the end of the 1880s, but its importance within the psychoanalytic movement begins with the influence of Wilhelm Fliess. In 1901, convinced of the scope of psychical bisexuality, Freud informed Fliess of a project that unfortunately did not see the light of day: ‘‘My next book, as far as I can see, will be called ÔBisexuality in ManÕ’’ (1950a, p. 334). Freud based his theory on anatomical and embryological data: ‘‘a certain degree of anatomical hermaphroditism occurs normally. In every normal male or female individual, traces are found of the apparatus of the opposite sex’’ (1905d, p. 141). This observation resulted in his conception of an ‘‘originally bisexual physical disposition [that] has, in the course of evolution, become modified into a unisexual one, leaving behind only a few traces of the sex that has become atrophied.’’ But he did not apply this conception to the psychical domain: ‘‘It is impossible to demonstrate so close a connection between the hypothetical psychical hermaphroditism and the established anatomical one’’ (p. 142). Freud did not give these biological facts the same scope as did Fliess, who believed that the psychic mechanism of repression has a biological foundation. For Freud, it is not the apparent anatomical sex that represses the opposite sex: ‘‘I am only repeating what I said then in disagreeing with [FliessÕs] view, when I decline to sexualize repression in this way—that is, to explain it on a biological grounds instead of on purely psychological ones’’ (1937c, p. 251). Throughout his career, Freud emphasized the importance of bisexuality in mental phenomena: ‘‘[W]ithout taking bisexuality into account I think it would scarcely be possible to arrive at an understanding of the sexual manifestations that are actually to be observed in men and women’’ (1905d, p. 220). Nor would it be possible to understand the conflicts that result from it: ‘‘In order to explain why the outcome is sometimes perversion and sometimes neurosis, I avail myself of the universal bisexuality of human beings’’ (1950a, p. 179). And it was through the analysis of the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BISEXUALITY psychoneuroses that Freud found confirmation of the ‘‘postulated existence of an innate bisexual disposition in man’’ (1908a, p. 165–166). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that there were some hesitations in his considerations of this question. In 1923, he attributed the difficulty of disentangling the problem of object choice in the first sexual period to ‘‘the triangular character of the Oedipus situation and the constitutional bisexuality of each individual’’ (1923b, p. 31). Thus he suggested that bisexuality is independent of the processes of identification. Next he argued that identification with the father or mother is the result of the oedipal situation and is strictly linked to bisexuality, because the identifications are simultaneously masculine and feminine. However, when he saw the childÕs ambivalence toward its parents as deriving from an origin other than identification, he insisted on the weight of innate bisexual dispositions: ‘‘It may even be that the ambivalence displayed in the relations to the parents should be attributed entirely to bisexuality’’ (p. 33). On the one hand, then, the notion of bisexuality makes it possible to explain, in both boys and girls, the oedipal identifications with the parent of the opposite sex, thus feeling the Oedipus complex from any form of determinism. But on the other hand, if bisexuality does not have a biologicalanatomical origin, the question of its origin remains obscure: Is it a consequence of anatomy? The result of identifications with both parents? FreudÕs answer, especially around the time of The Ego and the Id, was that bisexuality was an intrinsic aspect of sexual differentiation itself. Be that as it may, the concept is constantly invoked and continuously used in day-to-day psychoanalysis. The role played by bisexuality in the different stages of psychosexual development helps to determine the various modalities of the subjectÕs attachment to objects. It must also be emphasized that even if Freud never abandoned the notion of psychical bisexuality, he considered the difficulty in connecting the concept to the theory of drives as a serious lacuna in psychoanalytic theory. Thus the ‘‘theory of bisexuality is still surrounded by many obscurities’’ (1930a [1929], p. 106). Finally, a supplementary problem must be introduced: A deeper understanding of the concept of bisexuality necessarily would not facilitate an underINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS standing of the ideas of masculinity and femininity. For as Freud warned us, to give any new content or attach any mental qualities to the concepts of masculine and feminine only gives way to anatomy or to convention: ‘‘The distinction is not a psychological one’’ (1933a [19320, p. 114). This indicates that as long as a satisfactory psychoanalytic definition of masculine and feminine cannot be found, the notion of bisexuality ‘‘embarrasses all our enquiries into the subject and makes them harder to describe’’ (1940a [1938], p. 188). PAULO R. CECARELLI See also: Aggressiveness/aggressiveness; Dark continent; Cryptomnesia; Femininity; Femininity, refusal of; Homosexuality; Masculinity/femininity; Object, choice of/change of; Pregnancy, fantasy of; Sex and Character; Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality Bibliography Eliade, Mircea. (1963). Patterns in comparative religion. (Rosemary Sheed, Trans.). New York: World. Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1908a). Hysterical phantasies and their relation to bisexuality. SE, 9: 156–166. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ———. (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57–145. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. ———. (1940a [1938]). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 139–207. ———. (1950a). The origins of psycho-analysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, drafts and notes: 1887–1902 (Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud, and Ernst Kris, Eds.). London: Imago Publishing, 1954. Further Reading Elise, Diane. (1998). Gender repertoire: body, mind and bisexuality. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 8, 353–372. Ferraro, Fausta. (2001). Vicissitudes of bisexuality: crucial points, clinical implications. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 82, 485–500. 187 BIZARRE OBJECT Grossman, Gary (reporter). (2001). Contemporary views of bisexuality in clinical work. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 49, 1361–1378 (eds.). (1952). Developments in psycho-analysis. Hogarth. Reprinted in The Writings of Melanie Klein, t. III, 1946– 1963. (1975). London: Hogarth, pp. 1–24. Smith, Henry. (2002). On psychic bisexuality. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 71, 549–558. BJERRE, POUL (1876–1964) BIZARRE OBJECT The term bizarre object was coined by Wilfred Bion (1957) to denote a distinctive kind of object existing in the world of the psychotic. By violent projection of unwanted psychic elements, the psychotic personality constructs its universe of bizarre objects. This world is different from the world of part objects containing projections that constitutes the normal world of the paranoid schizoid position as described by Melanie Klein (1946). The psychotic personality uses a form of splitting and projective identification that is not merely excessive but different, in the aspects of the psyche, especially those ego and superego functions which lead to awareness of reality, are split off, fragmented, and violently expelled into the external world. In this way a hostile conglomerate is formed of aspects of objects with fragments of the psychic apparatus and internal objects. In ‘‘The Differentiation of the Psychotic from the Non-psychotic Personalities’’ (1957), Bion gives examples: ‘‘If the piece of personality is concerned with sight, the gramophone when played is felt to be watching the patient; if with hearing, then the gramophone when played is felt to be listening to the patient. The object, angered by being engulfed, swells up, so to speak, and suffuses and controls the piece of personality that engulfs it: to that extent the particle of personality has become a thing’’ (p. 51). And he concludes: ‘‘The consequences for the patient are now that he moves, not in a world of dreams, but in a world of objects which are ordinarily the furniture of dreams.’’ EDNA O’SHAUGHNESSY Bibliography Bion, Wilfred. (1957). Differentiation of the psychotic from the non-psychotic. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 38, 206–275. Klein Melanie. (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 27, 99–110. Republished in M. Klein, P. Heimann, S. Isaacs, and J. Riviere 18 8 A doctor, writer, sculptor, and psychotherapist, Poul Bjerre was the first Swede to develop an interest in Freud and psychoanalysis. He was born in Göteborg on May 24, 1876, and died in Vårsta on July 15, 1964. Bjerre was the son of a Danish businessman and spent his early life in Göteborg, on the west coast of Sweden, where his father had moved his business. Poul Bjerre was the oldest child; his younger brother Andreas, an eminent criminologist, was a professor of criminal law at the University of Dorpats (Lithuania). He committed suicide in 1925. In 1905 Bjerre married his sister-in-lawÕs mother. They had no children. His wife, sixteen years his elder, had three children from a previous marriage. In 1906 she fell ill and their marriage remained essentially platonic. In 1907, after his wifeÕs death and the completion of his medical studies, Bjerre took over the Stockholm practice of Otto Wetterstrand, a renowned European specialist in hypnosis. Although Bjerre never really abandoned hypnosis, he soon took an interest in psychoanalysis. In December 1910 he traveled to Vienna to meet Freud but the meeting was disappointing. As he was to describe later, he perceived Freud as being cold and distant. His meeting with Alfred Adler was more fruitful, however, and he always felt closer to Jung and Adler, without considering himself anyoneÕs protégé. In 1911 Bjerre introduced psychoanalysis to a meeting of the Order of Swedish Doctors. His presentation, which was judged too long for publication in the Swedish medical review Hygiea, appeared in Psyke a year later, together with articles from other researchers in psychology. However, Bjerre maintained a critical attitude toward psychoanalysis. In 1913 he stated that the conscious mind was more important than the unconscious and criticized Freud during the international congress held in Munich. On several subsequent occasions he expressed satisfaction for having distanced himself early from Freud. At the Munich conference, however, Freud introduced him to Lou AndreasSalomé, with whom he had a brief but stormy and passionate affair. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BLACK HOLE When Bjerre introduced psychoanalysis to Sweden in 1924 in an early publication, he included articles not only by Freud but by Adler, Jung, and Alphonse Maeder as well. He concluded the book with one of his own articles in which he explained the evolution of psychoanalysis based on his own research. Bjerre wrote throughout his life. He wrote a biography of Nietzsche in 1903 and translated from several languages. He was interested in the personality of the celebrated industrial magnate Ivan Kreuger and studied the influence of HitlerÕs ideas on psychoanalysis. In an article published in 1934 he claimed that the three fundamental works of psychotherapy were LiebeaultÕs Le Sommeil provoqué, FreudÕs Interpretation of Dreams, and HitlerÕs Mein Kampf. He had dealings with Jewish and non-Jewish doctors alike and felt that the psychoanalytic movement was pro-Semitic in the same way that Hitler was anti-Semitic. Although he became interested in German culture at a young age, he was not a defender of Nazism. Six years after the foundation of the Finno-Swedish Psychoanalytic Society in 1940, Poul Bjerre established a psychotherapeutic organization whose administrative directors shared a partial rejection of Freudian theories. Like the other members of the society, Bjerre felt that Freud laid too much stress on the sexual life of the individual and the role of the unconscious, to the detriment of the conscious mind. Moreover, Freudian psychoanalysis was too intellectual and placed too much importance on dream analysis instead of appreciating its curative value and understanding that every individual naturally harbors so-called psychosynthetic conciliatory forces. Early in his career he had, for example, believed that paranoia could be cured by convincing the patient of its absurdity by means of rational arguments, while he maintained the conviction that hypnosis was the best and most effective psychotherapeutic method. Bjerre never underwent analysis. He could not understand psychoanalysis as a whole and did not practice it. However, he played an essential role in the development of psychoanalysis in Sweden. The majority of Swedish psychoanalysts have, at one time or another, referred to his introduction to FreudÕs theories. PER MAGNUS JOHANSSON See also: Sweden. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Bärmark, Jan, and Nilsson, Ingemar. (1983). Poul Bjerre, ‘‘Människosonen.’’ Stockholm: Natur och Kultur. Johansson, Per M. (1999). Freuds psykoanalys, arvtagare i Sverige. Göteborg, Sweden: Daı̈dalos. BLACK HOLE Frances Tustin introduced the idea of black holes in her Autistic Barriers in Neurotic Patients (1986). The term was chosen by analogy with ideas in modern astrophysics, which has discovered zones of extraordinary density in the universe that are probably related to the condensation and fusion of several stars. Once formed, such hyperdense zones are thought to exert a sort of attraction upon other stars, which are thus at risk of plunging into the core of these vast concentrations of matter, which swallow them up and strip them of all individuality. It is not hard to see how the metaphor of a ‘‘black hole of the psyche’’ can help explain, or at least help us picture what happens at the core of the psyche of autistic children. Indeed Tustin had already elaborated on a notion first proposed by Sydney Klein (1980), that of ‘‘autistic islands.’’ And, most significantly, in her first book, Autism and Childhood Psychosis (1972), she had painstakingly recounted the case of John, who had described to her, on emerging from autism, what he himself called ‘‘the black hole w/ the mechant piquant.’’ What John was striving to verbalize in this way was all the pain and suffering he had felt on the occasion of far too brutal and premature a separation between the breast and the nipple, this at a time when nipple and mouth are inextricably conjoined (as described, albeit in a different way, by Piera Aulagnier, with her ‘‘complementary zone-object’’). Naturally it is less a physical separation that is involved here than a mental one—or even, to be quite precise, the inscription in the psyche of the process of separation. If, for one reason or another, this process turns out to be impossible or impeded, the child is liable to feel as if a part of him- or herself has been cut off. This traumatic organization of the psyche leaves its mark in the shape of ‘‘autistic islands’’ which fail to become integrated into the cycles of deferred effects and historical time: Their massiveness and their intensity, in autistic children, are an obstacle to their 189 B L A C K E T T - M I L N E R , M A R I O N (1 900 –19 98) becoming part of mental functioning, and they end up serving as pathological poles of attraction for a whole variety of psychic elements which accrete within their sphere of influence and thus become incapable of dispersing in a manner at once orderly and differentiated. that consists of allowing oneÕs hand to wander freely over the paper in order to see what it produces. The drawings thus produced represent not only external objects but also the structure of oneÕs own feelings and thoughts. In the wake of Frances Tustin, the post-Kleinian tendency in psychoanalysis has made wide use of the concept of the black hole, extending it to nonpsychotic subjects in whom autistic islands are possible even if in such cases they are less significant and less serious in their implications. She began to train as an analyst in the 1940s while also becoming an enthusiastic painter. She was analyzed by Sylvia Payne, qualified in 1943 and began to practice in London. The Hands of the Living God, published in 1969, is one of MilnerÕs most remarkable contributions as a psychoanalyst. It is the complete, marvelously well-written and illustrated story of the treatment of a very ill patient, a moving account of the way in which she communicated her emotions through the medium of drawing whenever words failed her. In the meantime in 1952 she published an article on ‘‘the role of illusion in the formation of symbols,’’ in which she does not limit the meaning of the word symbol to a defensive function (Ernest Jones) but stresses its creative potential. She insists on the function of a ‘‘malleable’’ environment in the process leading to recognition of the world outside oneself. She developed the idea of a ‘‘medium’’ between the reality created by oneself and external reality: a sort of modeling clay for the mind, the intermediary between representation and figuration, a malleable substance by means of which impressions are transmitted to the senses and with which we can give shape to our fantasies. Patients model their own creative process through therapists, who recognizes as well in themselves an inside and an outside, a part that is separate and another that is a part of the patient. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Autism; Autistic capsule/nucleus; Breakdown. Bibliography Klein, Sydney. (1980). Autistic phenomena in neurotic patients. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 61 (2), 395–401. Tustin, Frances. (1972). Autism and childhood psychosis. London: Hogarth; New York: Science House. Reprinted, London: Karnac, 1995. ———. (1986). Autistic barriers in neurotic patients. London: Karnac. BLACKETT-MILNER, MARION (1900–1998) Marion Blackett-Milner, a British psychoanalyst, was born in London in 1900 and died there on May 29, 1998. Born into a scientific family—her brother Patrick Blackett won the Nobel Prize for physics—she first took an interest in education after graduating as a psychologist from the University of London. In 1938 she wrote a book based on her research in educational child psychology, The Human Problem in Schools. She married Dennis Milner in 1927 and gave birth to a son in 1932. Her first book, A Life of OneÕs Own, published under the name Joanna Field, appeared in 1934. It was in fact her diary, beginning in 1926, in which she recounted in a remarkably authentic style her observations and discoveries about herself. Her future destiny is already discernible in this autobiographical work. It was followed by two other autobiographical books: An Experiment in Leisure, in 1937 and, fifty years later, EternityÕs Sunrise in 1987. In 1950 she published On Not Being Able to Paint, in which she develops a method 19 0 Her theories about the separability of the object complement Donald WinnicottÕs work on the transitional object and the creativity of the baby. In her last work, The Suppressed Madness of Sane Men. Forty-Four Years of Exploring Psychoanalysis, published in 1987, she sums up her principle observations and her articles on the relationship between psychoanalysis and creativity. On May 29, 1998, Marion Milner died in her London home at the age of ninety-eight, while working on another publication. She contributed to our understanding of the mechanisms of symbolization and interpenetration between the subjective and objective world both in art and psychoanalysis, and deepened our knowledge of the processes by means of which the psyche is born of the soma, and of the way INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B L A N K /N O N D E L U S I O N A L P S Y C H O S E S in which we really learn to live and communicate with our bodies. Masud Khan used to say that Milner had ‘‘an inexhaustible reserve of energy for living, working, writing, and painting.’’ She was extremely original and inventive in her own self and in her thinking, as well as being a member of the Independent Group of the British Psycho-Analytical Society. She was passionate about esthetics, creativity in art and analysis, and the role of symbolism in the thinking process. Both her autobiographical and psychoanalytical writings constitute, as Harry Guntrip said about Winnicott, with whom she was very close, ‘‘the natural expression of [her] personality.’’ In it she manifested a total commitment to exploring the inner world and the farthest reaches of the being, at the frontier of the Self and non-Self. DIDIER RABAIN See also: Representation of affect visual arts and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Milner, Marion. (1969). The hands of the living god. New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1987). The suppressed madness of sane men. Fortyfour years of exploring psychoanalysis. London, New York: Tavistock Publications. Parsons, Michael. (1990). Marion MilnerÕs Ôanswering activityÕ and the question of psychoanalytic creativity. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 17, 4. Rayner, Eric. (1991). The independent mind in British psychoanalysis. London: Free Association Books. Winnicott, Donald W. (1988). Winnicott studies. The journal of the Squiggle Foundation. A celebration of the life and work of Marion Milner. London: The Squiggle Foundation. BLANK/NONDELUSIONAL PSYCHOSES Blank psychosis is defined as a psychosis with no readily identifiable clinical manifestation, where analysis alone affords access to a psychotic care: a nuclear structure that is the source of possible psychotic development without necessarily producing actual symptoms. Jean-Luc Donnet and André Green (1973) introduced the notion of blank psychosis, based on a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS psychoanalytic session with a patient, ‘‘Z,’’ conducted in a general psychiatry department. As early as 1911, Eugen Bleuler had distinguished ‘‘simple schizophrenia’’ and ‘‘latent schizophrenia,’’ and his notions of ‘‘schizoid’’ and ‘‘schizothymia’’ had already raised the issue of the boundaries of psychosis. Psychoanalysis first considered the internal boundaries of psychosis in order to fathom its outer limits. Helene Deutsch described the ‘‘as if ’’ personality in 1934, and as early as 1939 Maurits Katan studied ‘‘prepsychosis’’ in his work, ‘‘A Contribution to the Understanding of Schizophrenic Speech.’’ Since Otto KernbergÕs 1967 book Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism, the study of prepsychosis has often been combined with that of borderline states. Rather than a syndrome, blank psychosis evokes a structure that is not manifest. It can be mistaken for a depressive state with a configuration that is difficult to pinpoint, for a borderline state, or it can refer to psychotic development without obvious signs. Consistently nuclear, it corresponds to three parameters according to the ‘‘princes’’ description: a) oedipal organization remains triangular, but the two parent figures are identified according to their good or bad character rather than the masculine/feminine opposition; b) object relations bring internal objects into play; c) the subject is torn between good objects and bad objects, and between the good ego and the bad one, on account of the objects being driven back into the ego. Unlike psychosis, the role of the external objects in blank psychosis shows that the subject continues to cathect reality, which is doubly inscribed, even as projection considerably modifies the subjectÕs apprehension of it. However, there are strictly speaking no delusions, in the sense of either persecution by the bad object or protection by the good object. ‘‘Empty’’ or ‘‘paralyzed’’ mental functioning of thought results from an active decathexis that is attributed to ‘‘the destructive drivesÕ attack on the binding processes in so far as they are a function of consciousnessÕs awakening to reality’’ (Kernberg, 1975). The description of blank psychosis has had an effect comparable to the impact, in the 1970s, of the ‘‘borderline’’ category, linked to the expansion of a North American clinical tradition. The extension of psychoanalytic practice to the treatment of psychosis, and the 191 B L A N T O N , S M I L E Y (1882 –1 966) surprises generated by this work, have motivated further interest. During the 1960s, Kernberg participated in a long-term study of forty-four difficult cases treated by psychoanalysts at the Menninger Clinic. When psychosis was triggered after several years in the same analytic situation, Kernberg considered such cases to involve ‘‘borderline patients’’ whose ‘‘ego is better integrated than in psychotics except where close human relations are concerned’’ (1975). With regard to both the triggering and the stabilization of psychosis, he focused less on biological continuity than on the structural continuity of the egoÕs defensive reactions, from a perspective informed by the work of Anna Freud. He sought to understand the negative factor that undermines the egoÕs consistency to a point of critical instability: ‘‘All defensive mechanisms also contain the germ of the egoÕs destruction’’ (Kernberg, 1975). Numerous studies of borderline states have similarly focused less on symptoms than on prepsychotic ‘‘personalities,’’ their degree of consistency— albeit paradoxical—or their narcissism. Meanwhile, Jacques Lacan, faithful to the ‘‘formal envelope of the symptom,’’ demonstrated the importance of ‘‘elementary phenomena’’ (Lacan, 1993, p. 14) in the prepsychotic phase: intuitions, echoes, words, forced gestures, and the like, all of these intermittent and erratic. In the course of the interview, ‘‘eclipses’’ or ‘‘blanks’’ (or even memorization) in the patientÕs speech mark an impasse or confusion with regard to the signifier. Lacan unfailingly examined the sudden appearance of any neologism or surface manifestation of the ‘‘kernel of dialectical inertia’’(p. 22). His criticism of Maurits Katan focused on the reconstruction of the ‘‘prepsychotic’’ phase, and the confusion of levels—imaginary, symbolic, and real—and also on the confusion between ‘‘understanding’’ and ‘‘imagining’’ in KatanÕs account. In LacanÕs view, KatanÕs and innumerable other conceptions of ‘‘borderline states’’ had made naı̈ve use of FreudÕs notions regarding the ego (the second topography) and his text ‘‘The Loss of Reality on Neurosis and Psychosis’’ (1924). The ‘‘sinthomatic’’ structure described by Lacan in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book III, The Psychoses (1955–1956) opened new perspectives on the psychotic kernel, as did Piera AulagnierÕs work on ‘‘psychotic potentiality.’’ MICHEL DEMANGEAT 19 2 See also: Anality; Borderline conditions; Dead mother complex; Intergenerational. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1924). The loss of reality in neurosis and psychosis. SE, 19: 180–187. Kernberg, Otto. (1975). Borderline conditions and pathological narcissism. New York: Aronson. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Écrits. Paris: Seuil. ———. (1993). The seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book III, the psychoses (1955–1956). (Jacques-Alain Miller, Ed. and Russell Grigg, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1998). Penser la psychose. Une lecture de l Õoeuvre de Piera Aulagnier. Paris: Dunod. BLANTON, SMILEY (1882–1966) An American psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, Smiley Blanton was born in 1882 in Unionville, Tennessee, and died on October 30, 1966, in New York. A patient of Freud, his Diary of My Analysis with Freud appeared in 1971. Born in the South into a family of strict Presbyterians, he studied medicine at Cornell University, became an M.D. in 1914, and was trained in psychiatry by Dr. A. Meyers at Johns Hopkins hospital in Baltimore. After serving in World War I, he received a degree in neurology and psychological medicine from the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons in London in 1922–23. He taught at the University of Minneapolis, where he had created the first child guidance clinic associated with a public school; then, in 1927, created a nursery school at Vassar College in Poughkeepsie, New York. Two years later he moved to New York City, intending to practice psychoanalysis. Through George Amsden, who was leaving to be analyzed by Sándor Ferenczi, he replaced Clinton McCord, who had just finished his analysis with Freud. The first period of the analysis began on August 31, 1929, in Berchtesgaden, where Freud spent his vacations. Blanton later described his first meeting with Freud: ‘‘A small, frail and graying man suddenly appeared and moved toward me to greet me. Although he seemed older than in the photographs I was familiar with, I recognized the silhouette that approached me to be that of Freud. Cigar in hand, he spoke to me almost timidly.’’ INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B L E G E R , J O S É (1923 –1 972) Blanton took great care in recording FreudÕs remarks, which were frequent and lengthy; Freud also provided numerous suggestions on analytic technique, avoided interpreting his patientÕs colitis, asked him not to write down his dreams, and added, ‘‘For an analyst not to relate his dreams, now thatÕs a sign of serious resistance!’’ He would soon involve him in his research concerning ShakespeareÕs identity. to me as dynamic, alert, and lucid as ever.’’ But, Freud confided to him, ‘‘At my age itÕs natural that one thinks of death. Those who think about death and talk about it are those who are not afraid, while those who are afraid neither think about it nor talk about it.’’ Blanton added, on September 5, 1938, ‘‘In reading these pages, it will become apparent that the professor spoke often to me of death.’’ From September to the end of October, Blanton followed Freud to the Schloss Tegel clinic in Berlin, and then resumed his analysis in Vienna. He was again forced to interrupt his analysis at the end of April when Freud went to the Sanatorium Cottage of Vienna and then to Berlin for treatment of his heart problems. At the end of BlantonÕs analysis, on May 30, Freud provided him with a letter of recommendation to Ernest Jones: ‘‘I would like to introduce you to Dr. Smiley Blanton. He is a pleasant man, especially interested in the orientation of children (Vassar College). He has undergone six months of personal analysis with me; I think he will return home a sincere believer in PsA.’’ Later in his career, Blanton collaborated with Norman Vincent Peale in establishing the American Foundation of Religion and Psychiatry. They opened the Religio-Psychiatric Clinic at the Marble Collegiate Church on lower Fifth Avenue, where free assistance was offered to people suffering from emotional disturbances such as anxiety and depression. The clinic also trained clergymen of all denominations to help people deal with their emotional difficulties. Blanton and Peale wrote several books together, most notably their first collaboration, Faith Is the Answer: A Pastor and a Psychiatrist Discuss Your Problems. Five years later, in August 1935, Blanton had a further two weeks of analysis with Freud, who was then at his vacation home in Grinzing. Freud accepted payments before the sessions began by saying, ‘‘I accept them on account. If I happen to die before the fortnight is over, they will be returned to you!’’ During the analysis Freud spoke about Ferenczi and technique—Blanton was now seeing patients of his own—signed a copy of the Interpretation of Dreams for him, and, when Blanton left on August 17, after expressing his wish to return the following year, responded, ‘‘I regret that I cannot promise I will be here . . . .’’ However, two years later, on August 1, 1937, Blanton was again in Grinzing with Freud. He described him as ‘‘more alert and more dynamic than he was two years ago . . . His hearing remains poor, but no more than it was two years ago.’’ While planning a trip to London, their discussion turned to phenomena that Freud was skeptical of, such as parapsychology, ‘‘with the exception of telepathy, whose existence is possible and which deserves to be studied.’’ In London, on August 30, 1938, Blanton saw Freud for a final week of therapy that lasted until September 7, the day before Freud was scheduled for a new operation. Blanton resumed his habit of recording his dreams and investigating the resistance that occurred during their interpretation. As for Freud, ‘‘he appeared INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Face-to-face situation; Neutrality/benevolent neutrality; Psychoanalytic treatment; Religion and psychoanalysis; Weltanschauung. Bibliography Blanton, Smiley. (1971). Diary of my analysis with Freud. New York: Hawthorn. BLEGER, JOSÉ (1923–1972) An Argentine doctor, psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst, José Bleger was born in 1923 in Santiago del Estero, Argentina, and died on June 20, 1972, in Buenos Aires. He was one of the most original of the Argentine school of psychoanalysts. Through his psychiatric research he investigated psychotic phenomena, an interest that was to become the focus of all his later work. He was intimately familiar with the work of Karl Marx and an active militant in the Argentine communist party; he studied psychoanalysis with Enrique Pichon-Rivière. Bleger conceived of the human being as a social being and affirmed the necessity of questioning the way in which the individual isolates and separates himself 193 B L E U L E R , P A U L E U G E N (1857 – 1939) from others rather than the way in which he unites with others and socializes. An overview of these ideas is presented in his Psicoanalisis y dialéctica materialista, published in 1958. Ronald Fairbairn was deeply influenced by this theory, and it was through Fairbairn that Bleger was able to confirm that object relations determine the intensity and nature of anxiety as well as defensive strategies and tactics. ——— (1966). Psycho-analysis of the psycho-analytic frame. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 48 (4), 511–519. It is in Simbiosis y ambigüedad, published in 1967, that Bleger describes his most important theoretical concepts and their development. Here, in his psychoanalytic research, Bleger for the first time confronts the subject of symbiosis, generally following Kleinian positional structures. He describes an object that, for this primitive position, he describes as ‘‘agglutinated’’ by fusional anxieties and defenses that correspond to the so-called ‘‘glischrocaric’’ position. He initially attributed these anxieties and defenses to the ‘‘psychotic part’’ described by Wilfred Bion, but he then characterized them as increasingly undifferentiated. This led him to conceive of a step prior to the paranoidschizoid position described by Melanie Klein. Paul Eugen Bleuler, a Swiss professor of medicine, holder of the chair of psychiatry at the University of Zurich and director of the university psychiatric clinic of Burghölzli in Zurich (1898–1927), was the son of Johann Rudolf Bleuler and Pauline Bleuler-Bleuler. Born April 30, 1857, near Zurich, he died July 15, 1939. Bleuler came from a family of well-to-do farmers. He went to several schools, then studied medicine in Zurich, graduating in 1881. From 1881 to 1884 he was an assistant physician at the university psychiatric clinic of Waldau-Bern. From 1884–1885 he went to Paris to study with Charcot and then to London and Munich, where he studied with Gudden. From 1885 to 1886 Bleuler worked as an assistant physician to August Forel at Burghölzli. From 1886 to 1898 he was director of the psychiatric clinic of Rheinau-Zürich, finally assuming the position formerly held by Forel in Burghölzli in 1898, where he remained until 1927. Psychoanalytic psychopathology changed fundamentally in this theory, which Bleger reformulated in his work on schizophrenia, autism, mania, melancholy, perversion, addiction, and psychosomatic illnesses. The analytical technique concerning the framework, split interpretation, and timing varies depending on the form of the intervention and its participation in the phenomena of restitution. Bleger also conducted research in the fields of institutional psychology, family psychology, and group phenomena. The problem of Judaism in the USSR turned him into an active militant in favor of the Jewish question and the international political aspects of the denial of freedom. He died prematurely in Buenos Aires at the age of forty-nine, at a time when his work was on the point of reaching its fullest expression. SUSANA BEATRIZ DUPETIT See also: Argentina; Framework of the psychoanalytic treatment; Group psychotherapies; Individual; Individuation (analytical psychology). Bibliography Bleger, José. (1958). Psicoanalisis y dialectica materialista. Estudio sobre la estructura de psicoanalisis. Buenos Aires: Paidos. 19 4 ——— (1967). Simbiosis y ambigüedad; estudio psicoanalı́tico. Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós. BLEULER, PAUL EUGEN (1857–1939) His first scientific contact with Freud occurred in 1892, during his work on aphasia. In 1896 Bleuler prepared a favorable report on Breuer and FreudÕs work, Studien über Hysterie (Studies on Hysteria, 1895). The first correspondence with Freud took place in 1898. In 1900 Bleuler asked his assistant, Carl Gustav Jung, for a report on the Interpretation of Dreams (1900) for the clinic. Extensive correspondence between Freud and Bleuler did not begin until 1904, however. Moreover, it was through JungÕs work and therapeutic success, between 1900 and 1909, that Bleuler came to appreciate the possibilities and usefulness of Freudian psychoanalysis. His liberal attitude and open-mindedness only make sense when we consider the influence of August Forel, who saw himself as the vehement defender of hypnotherapy, a man open to a dynamic, scientific, and public comprehension of psychic pathologies (Forel himself was a violent critic of Freudian ideas). BleulerÕs publications between 1906 and 1911 reveal his caution—not entirely uncritical—regarding FreudÕs work. In 1907, under his direction, the Freudian Association of Zurich was founded at his clinic. Through his work and attitudes, Bleuler unleashed a storm of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B L O C H , J E A N - R I C H A R D (1884 –1 947) scientific criticism, especially in German and Swiss psychiatric circles. He also had to withstand personal attacks from those close to him, including Forel and Constantin von Monakow. Additionally, there was pressure from Freud and Jung who, impelled by tactical interests, wanted to secure his active participation in the Zurich regional branch of the International Psychoanalytic Association. These efforts came to a head during a meeting between Freud and Bleuler in December 1910 in Munich. BleulerÕs ambivalence, often hinted at and now out in the open after Freud read his article ‘‘Die Psychoanalyse Freuds’’ (FreudÕs psychoanalysis; 1911), can be explained by the number of constraints that impeded his desire for knowledge and his critical scientific mind. Bleuler was unable to overcome these conflicts and after eleven months he gave up his position. With his ‘‘Kritik der Freudischen Theorien’’ (1913), he lost his position in the orchestra of Freudian science. That same year he, along with Jung, gave up his responsibilities in psychoanalytic circles. Unlike Jung, Bleuler maintained a distant but polite relationship with Freud. BleulerÕs scientific contribution to psychoanalysis is modest. But the scope of his influence, which should not be underestimated, is largely based on his political and medical activities. Through his personality and responsibilities, Bleuler opened the doors of international scientific discourse to Freud and psychoanalysis. ‘‘After this it was impossible for psychiatrists to ignore psycho-analysis any longer. BleulerÕs great work on schizophrenia (1911), in which the psychoanalytic point of view was placed on an equal footing with the clinical systematic one, completed this success’’ (Freud, 1914d, p. 28) BERNARD MINDER See also: Ambivalence; Autism; Burghölzli Clinic; Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse; Jung, Carl Gustav; Paired opposites; Schizophrenia; Switzerland (German-speaking); Word association. ———. (1913). Die Kritik der Freudschen Theorie. Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie und psychisch gerichtliche Medizin, 52 (5), 665–718. Freud, Sigmund. (1914d). On the history of the psychoanalytic movement. SE, 14: 7–66. BLOC—NOTES DE LA PSYCHANALYSE, Le Created in 1981 by Mario Cifali, its director, Le Bloc– Notes de la psychanalyse, published by Éditions Georg, in Geneva, is a Freudian review affiliated with the work of the seminar of the Cercle Freudien. There is a relation between LacanÕs 1975 conference in Geneva before the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society—Raymond de Saussure center—and the creation of the review. It was further promoted by Serge LeclaireÕs suggestion to found a study center for psychoanalysis in Geneva. The center was intended for young people with sufficient background to investigate Freudian ideas. Jenny Aubry, Roger Lewinter, François Perrier, George Dubal, Michel de Certeau, Mireille Cifali, Monique Schneider, Françoise Dolto, and Conrad Stein all gave their approval to the initiative. Along with theoretical and clinical articles written by psychoanalysts from the various schools, Le BlocNotes de la psychanalyse has presented unpublished historical documents. These include the correspondence between Freud and Otto Rank concerning the book The Trauma of Birth (issue 10) and the interview between Max Graf, the father of ‘‘Little Hans,’’ and Kurt Eissler (issue 14). Three issues of the review were particularly sought after by readers: ‘‘Éducation, médicine, place de la psychanalyse’’ (issue 7), ‘‘Les traumatismes psychiques’’ (issue 12), and ‘‘Le père’’ (issue 13). MARIO CIFALI Bibliography Bleuler, Eugen. (1892). Zur Auffassung der subcorticalen Aphasien. Neurologisches Zentralblatt, 18, 562–563. BLOCH, JEAN-RICHARD (1884–1947) ———. (1896). Buchanzeige über Breuer-Freuds ‘‘Studien über Hysterie.’’ Münchner medizinische Wochenschrift, 22, 524–525. Jean-Richard Bloch was a writer, historian, and socialist propagandist. He founded the socialist review LÕeffort in Poitiers in 1910, collaborated with the publisher Frédéric Rieder, and edited the newspaper Ce soir with Louis Aragon. He was the first French editor to publish articles of a psychoanalytic nature. ———. (1911). Dementia præcox, oder die Gruppe der Schizophrenien. Aschaffenburg, Handbuch der Psychiatrie. Leipzig: n.p. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 195 B L O S , P E T E R (1 904 –19 97) Born in Paris into a Jewish family that had settled in Auxerre (Yonne) in the eighteenth century, he studied history at the Sorbonne (with Charles Seignobos), received his teaching degree in 1907, and was appointed to the lycée in Lons-leSaulnier, then in Poitiers (1909). He collaborated with Gaston Thiesson and Dr. René MorichauBeauchant, his friend for many years, in producing LÕeffort, a ‘‘journal of struggle and ideas.’’ MorichauBeauchant was the psychology and psychiatry editor for the review. In LÕeffort Bloch presented Morichau-BeauchantÕs very first article on psychoanalysis, ‘‘LÕinconscient et la défense psychologique de lÕindividu’’ (The unconscious and the psychological defense of the individual; 1910), published a year before his ‘‘Le rapport affectif dans la cure des psychonévroses’’ (The affective relationship in the treatment of psychoneuroses; 1911). He later published three additional articles by this same author. A reader of Freud, Bloch himself wrote an article entitled ‘‘La mort dÕŒdipe’’ (The Death of Oedipus), followed by two novels, La nuit Kurde (1925; A Night in Kurdistan, 1931) and Sybilla (1935), where the influence of analysis is obvious. Writing La nuit Kurde had a therapeutic effect on its author: ‘‘I have to complete my work. . . . I have overcome my neurasthenia, my apprehension; I have taken back possession of my ego.’’ MICHELLE MOREAU RICAUD See also: Morichau-Beauchant, Pierre Ernest René. Bibliography Bloch, Jean-Richard. (1912). Lévy: Premier livre de contes. Paris: Gallimard. ———. (1918). . . . et compagnie. Paris: Gallimard. (Reprinted 1997.) ———. (1931). A Night in Kurdistan (Stephen HadenGuest, Trans.). New York: Simon and Schuster. (Original work published 1925) ———. (1931). Destin du siècle: Essais pour mieux comprendre son temps. Paris: Rieder. (Reprinted, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996.) Morichau-Beauchant, René. (1910). LÕinconscient et la défense de la vie. LÕeffort, 1. ———. (1911). Le rapport affectif dans la cure des psychonévroses. Gazette hôpitaux, 84 (14), 1845–1849. 19 6 BLOS, PETER (1904–1997) A German psychoanalyst with a degree in education and a PhD in biology, Peter Blos was born February 2, 1904, in Karlsruhe (Germany), and died June 12, 1997, in Holderness, New Hampshire (United States). BlosÕs childhood and adolescence were marked by the spiritual influence of his father, a doctor drawn to GandhiÕs ideas. Early in life he became a friend of Erik Homburger, who later became the psychoanalyst Erik Erikson. Blos studied education at the University of Heidelberg to become a teacher, and then obtained a doctorate in biology in Vienna. During the 1920s, he was introduced to Anna Freud, who asked his help in creating a school for children undergoing analysis. The project was supported and encouraged by Eva Rosenfeld and Dorothy Burlingham, a friend of Anna Freud, whose children attended the small school. Blos invited Erik Homburger to join him there. Within the Vienna psychoanalytic circle August Aichhorn exerted considerable intellectual influence on Blos, which strongly affected his psychoanalytic training. Blos entered psychoanalysis through teaching, while giving his work an orientation and sensitivity influenced by spirituality. To escape the rise of Nazism, Blos fled Vienna in 1934 for the United States, where he settled in New Orleans. There he was hired as a teacher in a private school, before leaving for New York, where he continued his analytic training. According to Aaron H. Esman, he became a member of the New York Psychoanalytic Society, becoming a special member in 1965 and then a supervisor and trainer. As a teacher he introduced, in 1972, a course on delayed adolescence, which he discontinued in 1977. He continued his clinical practice and did some teaching at the Columbia Psychoanalytic Center as cofounder of the Association of Child Psychoanalysis. When he retired from professional life, he spent his time writing poetry and fiction, playing the violin, and practicing carpentry in his country home in Holderness, New Hampshire. He died there at the age of ninety-three, by the side of his second wife. Of his four published books, it is On Adolescence: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation that led to his national and international recognition. This book, supported by his extensive clinical experience with adolescents, picks up the thread of an idea that Sigmund Freud failed to develop. Freud identified the beginning and end of the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BODY IMAGE process of puberty, largely ignoring the intermediary stages. Blos decided to elucidate the various stages of development of the personality, from latency to postadolescence. His goal was to present a unified theory of adolescence, a necessary first step in introducing an adolescent-specific psychopathology and psychotherapeutic technique. Five years later he developed a key concept, inherited from the work of Margaret Mahler, the ‘‘second individuation process.’’ Here, the emphasis is on the importance of renegotiating the separation with the parentsÕ imagos during adolescence. The author emphasizes the importance of gaining access to regression, which, contrary to what occurs in the case of the infant and the adult, is tied to the ego. The second individuation process is what made Blos well-known. His theoretical and clinical approach to the gradual development of the personality, delinquency, and the problems of the ego (superego, ego ideal, integrative capability) also made a significant contribution to understanding adolescence. In the United States he is considered an eminent specialist, a forerunner of child and adolescent analysis, who trained several generations of analysts in adolescent psychotherapy. FLORIAN HOUSSIER See also: Adolescence; Adolescence crisis; Hietzing Schule/Burlingham-Rosenfeld School. Bibliography Blos, Peter. (1962). On adolescence: A psychoanalytic interpretation. New York: The Free Press. ———. (1967). The second individuation process of adolescence. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 162–186. ———. (1978). The concept of acting out in relation to the adolescent process. In E. Rexford (Ed.), A developmental approach to the problem of acting out (p. 153–174). New York: International Universities Press. ——— (1985). Son and father. New York: The Free Press. Eisman, Aaron H. (1997). Obituary of Peter Blos. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 78, 813–814. BLUSHING, FEAR OF. See Erythrophobia INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BODY IMAGE In psychoanalysis, body image is the mental representation one has of oneself, which gradually develops in each individual. The body image encompasses fantasies, especially unconscious fantasies, and also involves the environment. The body is one of the subjects Freud dealt with most frequently. In several of his papers, he referred to the constitution and development of the erogenous zones, their representations and importance in the formation of the body image. The body image is constantly being created and recreated. Caresses and the first affectionate contacts with the people who surround the child during infancy are responsible for molding the body image, and return to the child the image of his own body through containment and eye contact. This is a dialectic process, in which the environment also plays a role. Piera Aulagnier (1991) says that to transform a sensitive region of the body into an erogenous zone, the physiologically sensitive reaction is not enough: time and subjective interrelation are required for the signs of somatic life to become signs of psychic life. In his work on the mirror phase, Jacques Lacan (1949/2004) describes a mechanism of identification that is established through the transformations that occur in infants when presented with a reflection: The mirror offers a tempting image of comprehensive unity, representing what is felt to be a precarious and fragmented self. It was Esther Bick (1968) who, on the basis of clinical material, studied the development of the concept of the skin and its relationship with introjection and projective identification. Didier Anzieu (1985) calls moi-peau (skin-ego) the image of the ego the infant uses in the course of the early phases of his development to represent himself as an ego, on the basis of experiences connected with the body surface. Various models or clinical hypotheses, such as the neurotic body image, and the primitive-psychotic body image, may be postulated on the basis of clinical psychoanalytical work. The neurotic body image, closer to the notion of normalcy, is the unconscious mental representation of the skin, complete and whole, which envelops and contains warmly. This skin represents the motherÕs and fatherÕs support and warmth, which are in turn the basis for the containment of the self and the limits of the body image. Conversely, in the model of the primitive-psychotic body image, there is no notion 197 B O E H M , F E L I X J U L I U S (1 881-195 8) of skin, but instead the notion of fluid as the nucleus of the primitive-psychotic body image. Thus, there is only a vague psychological notion of a wall that contains vital fluids, or blood, and fantasies of bleeding, or ‘‘emptying out’’ of those vital fluids. Sometimes this emptying out is linguistically expressed in a fast, uncontrolled speaking style. This means that the primitive-psychotic concept of the body breaks through and invades what up to then was a different type of mental functioning. These experiences may be expressed through words or through body language, as in psychosomatic disorders. Some patients may have hypochondriac ideas related to the primitive-psychotic body image, such as alleged blood infections, leukemia or hemophilia. Some concepts related to body image are: hypochondria, body fragmentation, delusions of denial of parts of the body (known as CottardÕs delusion), and somatic delusion. Hypochondria based on the psychotic primitive body image may lead to suicidal accidents. DAVID ROSENFELD See also: Anorexia nervosa; Bulimia; Demand; Depersonalization; Imaginary identification/symbolic identification; Mirror stage; Object a; Puberty; Schilder, Paul Ferdinand; Self-image; Tube-ego; Want of being/lack of being. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1985). The skin ego. New Haven-London: Yale University Press. Aulagnier, Piera. (1991). Un interprète en quête de sens. Paris: Payot. Bick, Esther. (1968). The experience of the skin in early object relations. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 49, 558–566. Lacan, Jacques. (2004). The mirror stage as formative of the I function, as revealed in psychoanalytic experience. In his Écrits (pp. 3–9; Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1949) Rosenfeld, David. (1992). The psychotic aspects of the personality. London-New York: Karnac Books. Further Reading Greenacre, Phyllis. (1953). Certain relationship between fetishism and the faulty development of the body image. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 8, 79–98. 19 8 Meissner, William W. (1997). The self and the body: The body self and the body image. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 20, 419–448. ———. (1998). The self and the body: III. The body image in clinical perspective. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 21, 113–146. BOEHM, FELIX JULIUS (1881–1958) German physician, a specialist in neurological and mood disorders, psychoanalyst and president of the German Psychoanalytic Association (DPG), Felix Boehm was born in Riga on June 25, 1881, and died in Berlin on September 20, 1958. Remembered more as a practical psychotherapist than as a theorist, Boehm was an ‘‘Aryan’’ member of the psychoanalytic community during the Nazi era. BoehmÕs father, Paul, was an industrialist originally from Fürstenwalde; his mother, Luise, née Zelm, was the daughter of merchants. His brother, Paul Boehm (1879–1951) took over his fatherÕs business, while Edgar Boehm (1889–1922) became an architect in Berlin. All three brothers were associated with the ‘‘Rubonia Clique,’’ a group of Baltic Germans, and so became acquainted with Alfred Rosenberg, who would become the principal ideologist of National Socialism and was ultimately sentenced to death at Nuremberg. Boehm studied engineering in Munich before pursuing medical studies in Geneva, Freiburg im Breisgau, and Munich. Among his teachers were F. von Müller, Emil Kraepelin, and Ernst Cassirer. He was analyzed by a Polish student of Freud, Eugenia Sokolnicka, and became a member of the Munich regional group of the International Psychoanalytical Association in 1913. In 1914 he married B. E. Welsch, with whom he had three children. Enlisting as volunteer doctor during the First World War, he was promoted to chief physician and served as a psychiatric expert in a war tribunal held in Germersheim. In 1919 Boehm settled in Berlin and began an analysis with Karl Abraham, taking a doctorate in 1922, with a thesis on ‘‘Two Cases of Delirium by Arteriosclerosis.’’ He taught at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute from 1923 to 1933, set up scholarships at the Institute, and collaborated with the newly founded Berlin Psychoanalytic Polyclinic. Boehm placed his daughters into a prophylactic psychoanalysis with Melanie Klein. In 1928 he began studies in ethnology and worked with Eckhard von Sydow, a philosopher and art historian. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B O N A P A R T E , M A R I E L É O N (1882 –1 962) After HitlerÕs accession to power and the NazisÕ immediate efforts to discredit psychoanalysis, Max Eitington resigned as president of the DPG and Boehm, viewed by Freud as ‘‘so-so,’’ took his place. Viewing his role as ‘‘savior of psychoanalysis,’’ he served as president of the DPG from 1933 to 1936 and as director of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute. He advocated harsher racial laws and expelled Jews from the DPG in December 1935. The next year Boehm was appointed to the administrative board of the German ReichÕs Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy (Göringinstitut); however, despite his cooperation with the National Socialist authorities, he was no longer allowed to conduct didactic analyses. Beginning in 1939, Boehm directed a research team that investigated homosexuality, always one of his main interests, and undertook a follow-up study of the instituteÕs polyclinic patients. From 1941 to 1945, as health officer and expert in service to the Wehrmacht, Boehm took part in sentencing to death ‘‘malingerers,’’ deserters, and homosexuals. After the war, in 1947 Boehm was one of the founders of the Institut für Psychotherapie, and in 1949 he was appointed director of instruction and training policy for educational psychology. In 1950 Boehm became president of the reconstituted DPG which, to his considerable disappointment, was refused admission to the International Psychoanalytic Association. REGINE LOCKOT See also: Berliner Psychoanalytiche Poliklinik; Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut; Deutsches Institut für Psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (Institut Göring); Germany; Phallic woman. Bibliography Bibring, Grete. (Ed.). (1951). Report on the 17th International Psychoanalytical Congress. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 33, 249–251. Boehm, Felix. (1978). Schriften zur Psychoanalye. Munich: Ölschläger. Cocks, Geoffrey. (1985). Psychotherapy in the Third Reich: The Göring Institute. New York: Oxford University Press. BONAPARTE, MARIE LÉON (1882–1962) Marie Bonaparte, a French psychoanalyst, founding member of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS princess of Greece and Denmark, was born on July 2, 1882, in Saint-Cloud, France, and died on September 21, 1962, in Saint-Tropez. She was the only daughter of Prince Roland Bonaparte (great nephew of Napoléon Bonaparte) and Marie-Félix Blanc (who died a month after her birth). In 1907 she married Prince Georges of Greece and Denmark, with whom she had two children, Eugénie and Pierre. The melancholic preoccupation of her writings attests to her state of mind. René Laforgue wrote in a letter to Freud that she suffered from an obsessive neurosis that did not affect her intellect but slightly disturbed her mental equilibrium. Bonaparte herself wrote, ‘‘At times I have the sensation of catastrophe. I wish an unknown star would destroy the planet.’’ Dissatisfied with her life, she found solace in her imagination. In 1924 Bonaparte published a collection of stories, Le Printemps sur mon jardin (Spring in my garden). Using the pseudonym A. E. Narjani, she wrote an article describing clitoral surgery entitled, ‘‘Considération sur les causes anatomiques de la frigidité chez la femme’’ (Consideration of the anatomical causes of frigidity in women). Later, the disappointments of her sexual and emotional life were reflected in her symbolic novel Les glauques aventures de Flyda des Mers (The sad adventures of Flyda des Mers). Although she gave expression to her adult problems in her novels and essays, her other writings described the vicissitudes of her childhood. Raised by a nurse, she filled her childÕs world with imaginary characters whose adventures she described in small notebooks with black covers she called her ‘‘Bêtises’’ (Whimsies). Around the time of her fatherÕs death on April 14, 1924, she rediscovered them. On her fatherÕs nightstand she found a copy of FreudÕs Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916–1917a [1915–17]). Bonaparte began an analysis with Freud on September 30, 1925. She used her childhood writing to reinforce her creative work. In 1939 she began to publish facsimiles of her childhood writings together with her psychoanalytically informed commentaries on them. As a result of her work with Freud and the friendship and confidence that developed between them, Bonaparte soon became his representative in the French psychoanalytic world, which was then being organized. In 1926, with the help of Eugenie Sokolnicka, René Laforgue, Rudolph Loewenstein, René Allendy, 199 B O N A P A R T E , M A R I E L É O N (18 82 –196 2) Edouard Pichon, and others, she founded the Société psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society). As FreudÕs advocate, she firmly resisted the psychiatrists of Saint-AnneÕs Hospital, who were drawn to a form of French psychoanalysis swept clean of ‘‘Germanic slag.’’ She translated several of FreudÕs works, including Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood (1910c), An Autobiographical Study (1925d [1924]), Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905c), The Future of an Illusion (1927d), ‘‘Prospectus for ÔSchriften zur angewandten SeelenkundeÕ’’ (1907), and some of his papers on metapsychology. BonaparteÕs research on applied psychology, society, war, criminality, and female sexuality were published in the Revue francaise de psychanalyse, which she founded with René Laforgue, Angelo Hesnard, and Edouard Pichon. In the first issue of the journal, Bonaparte published her paper ‘‘Le cas de Mme Lefebvre,’’ which describes the oedipal crime of a woman who murders her pregnant daughter-in-law. The paper also affirmed BonaparteÕs opposition to and condemnation of the death penalty. BonaparteÕs two volume study of Edgar Allan Poe appeared in 1933. She divided his life and work into distinct cycles, which may be seen in her life as well. She characterized these cycles as cycles of the mother: the living-dead mother, the landscape mother, the murdered mother; and as cycles of the father: the revolt against the father, the conflict with consciousness, and passivity toward the father. Anna and Sigmund Freud translated her book Topsy: The Story of a Golden-Haired Chow, illustrated with photographs taken by her daughter, Eugénie, into German. In June 1938, with the assistance of the American ambassador William Bullitt, Bonaparte helped Freud and his family leave Nazi Austria. During World War II, between 1941 and 1944, Bonaparte lived in Cape Town, South Africa, where she wrote articles about the myths of warfare. Her talks at the Institut de psychanalyse de Paris (Paris Institute for Psychoanalysis) and her articles were published in the Revue française de psychanalyse and, after the war, were collected into several volumes: Psychanalyse et biologie (Psychoanalysis and biology; 1952), Introduction à la théorie des instincts (Introduction to the theory of instincts; 1951), Psychanalyse 20 0 et anthropologie (Psychoanalysis and anthropology; 1952). In Female Sexuality (1951/1953) she compared the libidinal evolution of the sexes. After a shared anal phase of passivity toward the mother, the young girl experiences a temporary phallic phase toward the mother, followed by a second (cloacal and phallic) phase of passivity toward the father. The final genital phase is passive and is accompanied by a relative exclusion of the phallus and affirmation of the vagina. Bonaparte insisted that the father had an important and beneficial role to play in the quality of the love expressed toward the daughter. When a young woman fails to make the transition from clitoral sadism to vaginal masochism in her sexual development, there are two types of alloplastic adaptation available: the Halban-Narjani operation, which involves surgically moving the clitoris toward the vagina, and psychoanalysis, which alone is capable of relaxing the young womanÕs intense fixation on the phallic clitoris. During the 1950s, as vice president of the International Psychoanalytical Association, Bonaparte defended Margaret Clark-Williams, who was accused of illegally practicing medicine, and tried to save the life of Caryl Chessman, who had been condemned to death in the United States. Through her generosity a library and institute of psychoanalysis were created in 1954 in Paris. During the schism within the Société psychanalytique de Paris in the 1950s, she supported Sacha Nacht, though without much optimism, in his dispute with Jacques Lacan. The first two volumes of her memoirs, Derrière les vitres closes (Behind closed doors) and LÕappel des sèves (The call of life), were published in 1953. Prince George of Greece, her husband and ‘‘old companion,’’ died on November 25, 1957. In 1959 she presented her final paper, ‘‘Vitalisme et psychosomatique’’ (Vitalism and psychosomatics) to the Twenty-First International Psychoanalytic Congress. She died on September 21, 1962, of leukemia in Saint-Tropez, where she maintained her summer home, Le Lys de Mer, named after the plant. JEAN-PIERRE BOURGERON See also: Autobiography; Berman, Anne: Congrès des psychanalystes de langue française des pays romans; France; Gesammelte Werke; Revue française de psychanalyse; Société INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BOOK psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris. Bibliography Bertin, Célia. (1982). Marie Bonaparte, la dernière Bonaparte. Paris: Perrin. ———. (1982b). Marie Bonaparte, a life. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Bonaparte, Marie. (1949). The life and works of Edgar Allan Poe, a psycho-analytic interpretation (John Rodker, Trans.). London: Imago Pub. Co. (Original work published 1933) ———. (1951). Introduction à la théorie des instincts; De la prophylaxie infantile des névroses. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ———. (1952). Psychanalyse et anthropologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ———. (1952). Psychanalyse et biologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ———. (1953). Female sexuality (John Rodker, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1951) Bourgeron, Jean-Pierre. (1993). Marie Bonaparte et la psychanalyse à travers ses lettres à René Laforgue et les images de son temps. Geneva: Champion-Slatkine. ———. (1997). Marie Bonaparte. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. BONNEUIL. See École Experimentale de Bonneuil What is remarkable about The Book of the It is, first, the content and, second, the presentation. Groddeck highlights the new concepts introduced by psychoanalysis: the infantile, the Unconscious, primary processes, sexuality. He defends the position of Fredrich Neitzsche in Beyond Good and Evil on public discussion of humanityÕs many perverse tendencies. He describes the illnesses of the body and of the mind as products of the It. He thus opens up a ‘‘space for illness’’ (Chemouni, 1984), a place where the individual It deploys itself under the constraint of symbolizations and associations and where analytic treatment can begin to unfold between the analyst and the patient. The whole of The Book of the It is an analytic experience, a game that stimulates with its clinical illustrations, reflections, and fragments of self-analysis that Groddeck uses to involve the reader in the dialog. The individual is controlled by the all-powerful It, the role of the body and mind being to express It. There is nothing we can say about the It; we cannot grasp it theoretically; we can know it only through its accomplishments. Freud used the concept of It in his metapsychology, and ego psychology enlarges its theoretical scope. Only in the course of the last few decades we have begun to understand and appreciate the significance of GroddeckÕs original contribution to psychoanalysis. HERBERT WILL GroddeckÕs Book of the It, first published in 1923 by the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, was a great success. It was followed by a second and third edition in 1926 and 1934. Translations exist in Dutch, Swedish, English, French, Italian, Spanish, and Japanese. The Book of the It is written in the form of an epistolary novel. The fictional author of the letters is the psychoanalyst Patrick Troll, and the fictional addressee is a lady who wishes to learn, in a playful manner, about psychoanalysis. Groddeck wanted to present his 1916 OF IT, THE and 1919 conferences and psychoanalytic concepts in a popular work. He wrote the letters in 1921 and sent them to Freud, whose response was very encouraging (‘‘Their style is fascinating; their tone musical, clever, and impertinent’’). At the request of the reading committee, Groddeck made some cuts, though with some reluctance. BOOK OF THE IT, THE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE PSYCHOANALYSIS See also: Id; Groddeck, Georg Walther; Psychosomatic. Source Citation Groddeck, Georg. (1923). Das Buch vom Es: Psychoanalytische Briefe an eine Freundin. Leipzig: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag; München: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1984. The Book of the It. Washington: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., 1928. The Book of the It: Psychoanalytic Letters to a Friend (V. M. E. Collins, Trans.). New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1950. 201 BORDERLINE CONDITIONS Bibliography Chemouni, Jacquy. (1984). Georg Groddeck, psychanalyste de l Õimaginaire: psychanalyse freudienne et psychanalyse groddeckienne. Paris: Payot. Lewinter, Roger. (1990). Georg Groddeck: Studien zu Leben und Werk. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. Mannoni, Maud. (1979). La théorie comme fiction: Freud, Groddeck, Winnicott, Lacan. Paris: Le Seuil. Roeder von Diersburg, Egenolf. (1961). Georg GroddeckÕs Philosophie des Es. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 15, 131–138. Roustang, François. Paris: Minuit. (1976). Un destin si funeste. Will, Herbert. (1985). Freud, Groddeck und die Geschichte des ‘‘Es.’’ Psyche, 150–169. BORDERLINE CONDITIONS The nosological concept of borderline conditions (or states) arose from what was defined in the Englishlanguage literature as ‘‘borderline personality organization,’’ a term used to refer to a wide range of patients whose symptoms could not be explained in terms of either neurosis or psychosis. There are three common misconceptions concerning borderline conditions to be avoided if their dynamics are to be understood, the first two of which arise from the term itself:  that they exist at the ‘‘borderline’’ of neurosis or psychosis or constitute a transition between the two, when in fact they are neither pre-psychoses nor severe neuroses;  that they are transitory ‘‘states’’ because of the various forms in which they can manifest within one individual. Otto Kernberg (1975) prefers to use the term ‘‘borderline organization’’ because, as Daniel Widlöcher (1979) emphasizes, this is an unstable condition existing within a stable structure;  finally, that the wide variety of clinical manifestations eliminates any need to define the fundamental psychodynamics that these conditions have in common. The borderline condition is more than a pathology that consists more often in manifest behavior than 20 2 internal suffering and in an attitude of object-dependency that, depending on the level of mentalization, can range from drug addiction to violent passages to the act in the ‘‘psychopathic’’ subject. This disorder can produce a wide range of visible manifestations, including extraordinary lapses of consciousness, an ‘‘as-if ’’ mode of existence with loss of feeling, and an indefinable state of inefficacy. This range nevertheless stems from the same narcissistic rationale, the same archaic reaction, and a similar way of establishing the required defenses in the outside world. The narcissistic component of the borderline condition restricts the experience of conflict to its traumatic impact. The Oedipus complex is overcome without having been resolved (Bergeret); however, the narcissistic disorder is neither a depression nor a form of neurotic or psychotic decompensation experienced as an object loss. This in no way detracts from the archaic nature of the need, the intolerance of frustration, the intensity of the rage, or the violence of the reaction. Accordingly, the pregenital quality of the need becomes a threat to an object that is absolutely necessary but has become frightening through projection— an object both that needs protection and from which protection has to be sought. In the context of such a risk and this overwhelming atmosphere, the borderline patient actively strives to deal with reality rather than to negotiate the drive. Given the impossibility of dissociating the affect from the representation in a way that would enable repression and displacement to occur, and in the absence of an internal object that would be the guarantor of subtle difference, everything is organized in the external world so as to secure the object. Accordingly, this demonstrates the radical choice that the subject has to make in using the denial of the reality that he is able to perceive but not cathect to avoid any conflict. This subject also deploys splitting and—to avoid any internal conflict between love and aggression—completely separates good from bad in the external world or intensely idealizes the object on which he cannot rely. The concept of omnipotence provides the key to a better understanding of a wider range of manifestations in borderline conditions, including that which characterizes the deeper disorder beneath the neurotic exterior, which ranges from unstable behavior to antisocial reactions and also extends from childish personalities and depressive tendencies to what is described INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BOREDOM as narcissistic perversion. Heinz Kohut (1971) classified the megalomania in borderline conditions as one of the ‘‘archaic narcissistic configurations’’ that exist in the Self, which is considered not as an agency of the psychic apparatus but at the very least as a structure in which the representations retain a degree of autonomy in relation to the rest of the life of the drives. In sum, the borderline condition remains an entirely external striving that results from an incapacity to tolerate internal ambivalence, which produces both the economy of depression at the internal level and the economy of delusion at the external level. AUGUSTIN JEANNEAU Knight, Robert P. (1953). Borderline states. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 17, 1–12. Meissner, William. (1984). The borderline spectrum. Differential diagnosis and developmental issues. New York/London: Jason Aronson; New York: International Universities Press. Searles, Harold. (1986). My work with borderline patients. Northvale, NJ: Aronson. BOREDOM Boredom is a state of malaise, close to anxiety, characterized by a feeling of emptiness. Its origin is attributed to objects that the subject claims are boring, in other words, odious (inodiosus) in the etymological sense of the word. See also: Abandonment; Act, passage to the; As if personality, the; Character neurosis; Dependence; Developmental disorders; Narcissistic injury; Narcissistic neurosis; Negative therapeutic reaction; Prepsychosis; Psychoanalytical nosography; Psychotic/neurotic; Transference hatred. Boredom (languor, neurasthenia) was one of the dark humors of ancient medicine (boredom was associated with the spleen, and melancholy, with the liver). It became the ailment of the era during the Romantic period, as typified by Françpois-René de Chateaubriand in René and The Genius of Christianity (part 2, book 3). Bibliography Sigmund Freud did not see boredom as a specific symptom. He noted that the idleness of young women created a state of reverie dissociated from reality and susceptible to hysteria (1895d). But he saw their lassitude as normal, since other objects cannot occupy the place of the primitive lost object, the penis (1910h). Sándor Ferenczi in ‘‘Névrose du dimanche’’ (1919/ 1974) saw a link between the development of anxiety and the absence of exterior censure associated with a need to work. Bergeret, Jean. (1975). La dépression et les états limites. Paris: Payot. Kernberg, Otto F. (1975). Borderline conditions and pathological narcissism. New York: Jason Aronson. Kohut, Heinz. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press. Misès, Roger. (1990). Les Pathologies limites de l’enfance. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Widlöcher, Daniel. (1979). Preface to O. Kernberg, Les troubles limites de la personnalité. Toulouse: Privat. Further Reading Abend, Sander, Porder, Michael, and Willick, Martin. (1983). Borderline Patients: Psychoanalytic Perspectives. New York: International Universities Press. Freud, Anna. (1956). The assessment of borderline cases. In Writings (Vol. 5, pp. 301–314). New York: International Universities Press. Gabbard, Glen. (2001). Psychodynamic psychotherapy of borderline personality disorder. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 65, 41–57 Fonagy, Peter. (2000). Attachment and borderline personality disorder. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 48, 1129–1146. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS With the introduction of the notion of the withdrawal of libidinal cathexis, psychoanalysis provided significant insight into the concept of boredom. Without libidinal cathexis, one loses drive and an ability to make demands, except for a need for a change associated with a miraculous arrival of an object that would again give life to oneÕs activities. This feeling of a loss of interest in things is, in fact, a loss of libido. Otto Fenichel assimilated boredom with a type of depersonalization in which the subject feels that he must do something but does not know what. Heinz Kohut pointed out the link between the analystÕs boredom and the feeling of exclusion that the patient provokes in him by withdrawing emotionally. Ralph Greenson saw boredom as a defense against fantasy activity or as a result of oneÕs unconscious perception of oneÕs resistance. 203 B O R E L , A D R I E N A L P H O N S E A L C I D E (1 886 –19 66) The analysis of boredom reveals a kind of phobicobsessional fluctuation between withdrawal of libidinal cathexis and ardent desire driving impulsive acts that provide an outlet (Mijolla-Mellor, 1985). As with inhibition, boredom is not simply a lack of movement but a pointless stagnation, to which is added an enduring hatred of time. It is a defense against a phobic anxiety over a primary, but undifferentiated, investment in objects. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Depersonalization; Decathexis; Mirror transference; Narcissistic transference; Time. Bibliography Fenichel, Otto. (1951). On the psychology of boredom. In Selected papers of Fenichel. New York: W. W. Norton. Ferenczi, Sándor. (1974). Difficultés techniques dÕune analyse dÕhystérie. Oeuvres complètes (Psychanalyse, Vol. 3). Paris: Payot. (Original work published 1919) ———. (1974). Névrose des dimanches. Oeuvres complètes (Psychanalyse, Vol. 3). Paris: Payot. (Original work published 1919) Freud, Sigmund. (1910h). A special type of choice of object made by men. SE, 11: 163–175. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies in hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. Greenson, Ralph R. (1967). The technique and practice of psychoanalysis. New York: International Universities Press. Kohut, Heinz. (1974). The analysis of the self (M. A. Lussier, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1971) Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1985). La trame phobique de lÕennui. Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse, 32, 173–184. BOREL, ADRIEN ALPHONSE ALCIDE (1886–1966) Adrien Borel, a French psychiatrist, was born March 19, 1886, at 80 rue Bonaparte in Paris, and died September 19, 1966, in Beaumont-lès-Valence. The only son of a doctor from the Ardèche in southern France, Borel studied in Privas and Lyon. He joined the army for three years but gave up his commission after a year. After moving to Paris to study medicine, he became an intern in 1908 and a doctor of medicine in 1913. An 20 4 auxiliary surgeon during the First World War, he was seriously wounded by a piece of shrapnel on March 1, 1915. After a brief stay in Aisnay-Le-Château, he settled in Paris. Part of the staff of LÕÉvolution psychiatrique, created in 1925, he was a committed member of the Annales Médico-Psychologiques, to which he was accepted in 1923 and made a full member in 1931. It was here that he met Professor Briand, Georges Heuyer, Gilbert Robin, and others. A participant in Henri ClaudeÕs working group at Sainte-AnneÕs Hospital, he was one of the twelve founding members of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society), founded in 1926, and its president from 1932 to 1934. He participated in several meetings but made few references to psychoanalysis and none at all after the 1940s. He did not join the small group of analysts that came together in Paris during the Occupation. He had a lengthy and important affair (until 1940) with Annette Berman, the secretary of Princess Marie Bonaparte, and it was she who became his principal point of contact with the world of psychoanalysis. Borel himself never underwent analysis and after a few sessions with several patients, including the writers Georges Bataille and Michel Leiris, who publicized his name as a therapist, he quickly abandoned analytic practice. In 1940 he married Blanche, one of his former patients, a woman whose identity always remained ambiguous among his colleagues and friends. He never introduced her as his wife in the world he frequented and never involved her in his professional affairs. His first research effort, his medical thesis (1913), was devoted to organic and neurological theory. He investigated several of the methods available at the time, except the psychoanalytic method, to alleviate mental suffering, which was his major concern. His last article was about lobotomy (LÕÉvolution psychiatrique, 4, 1949). He worked in several hospitals (SainteAnne, Bichat) and in a number of private psychiatric clinics, where he met ‘‘aesthetes,’’ drug addicts, and individuals for whom public hospitals were out of the question. Interested in artists and writers, painters, and ‘‘creative’’ individuals in general, Borel participated with René Allendy in the Groupement dÕÉtudes Philosophiques et Scientifiques pour lÕExamen des Tendances Nouvelles (Philosophic and Scientific Study Group for the Examination of New Trends) in 1922. He wrote a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B O R N S T E I N , B E R T A (1899 –1 971) great deal, but much of his writing was destroyed. He published no more than a handful of pages in his own name, generally co-signing his work with other authors, primarily Claude. He wrote one work jointly with Robin, Les Rêveurs éveillés (Éditions Gallimard, collection ‘‘Bleue,’’ 1925). An extremely gentle man, according to Bataille, cordial and corpulent, BorelÕs energy often resulted in a loss of temper and disagreements with others. Protective, good-natured, and paternal, he had many points in common with the character of the Curé de Torcy, a role he played at the age of sixty-four in Robert BressonÕs film Diary of a Country Priest. He died September 19, 1966, of a cerebral hemorrhage at his summer home in Beaumont-lès-Valence. NADINE MESPOULHÈS See also: Berman, Anne; Claude, Henri Charles Jules; Congrès des psychanalystes de langue française des pays romans; France; Société Psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris; Surrealism and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Borel, Adrien. (1934). La pensée magique dans lÕart. Revue française de psychanalyse, 7, 1, 66–83. ———. (1934). LÕexpression de lÕineffable dans les états psychopathiques. L’Évolution psychiatrique, 3, 35–53. ———. (1935). Les convulsionnaires et le diacre Pâris. L’Évolution psychiatrique, 4, 3–24. ———. (1940). La folie de Hitler est-elle celle de lÕAllemagne? Les Nouvelles littéraires, 6, 1. BORNSTEIN, BERTA (1899–1971) Child psychoanalyst Berta Bornstein was born in 1899 in the Austro-Hungarian city of Krakau (today Kraków, Poland), and died on September 5, 1971, in Maine in the United States. Shortly after her birth, BornsteinÕs parents settled in Berlin, where her father was an engineer. The eldest of four children, she had one sister and two brothers. As a young educator of handicapped children (Fürsorgerin) in Berlin, Bornstein was just twenty years old INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS when she began analytic training with Hans Lampl and Edward Bibring. She participated in the child seminar directed by Otto Fenichel from 1924 to 1939 at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, and by 1929 was working closely in Vienna with Anna Freud. BornsteinÕs loyalty to both Fenichel and Anna Freud never wavered. She lived in Berlin, Vienna, Prague and, after leaving Europe shortly before War World II, in New York. Bornstein brought innovative techniques to child psychoanalysis. She emphasized the precocity of children and so was able to reduce the time required to win their confidence. In her view, psychoanalysis of children ought to proceed by way of analysis of the defenses. ‘‘The introductory phase of child analysis was dropped when Berta Bornstein developed the analysis of defenses,’’ stated Anna Freud in 1971 (Blos, 1974, p. 36). Bornstein pioneered a new understanding of latency. She revealed the dynamics of defense mechanisms and the progressive claims of identification and sublimation. Bornstein was opposed to the widespread view that latency is an ‘‘ideal’’ period during which instinctual conflicts do not exist. She suggested that latency could be divided into two stages: from five and half to eight years of age, and from eight to ten. The common factor is development of the superego as it struggles against incestuous and pregenital wishes expressed through masturbation. The first phase of latency, Bornstein believed, is favorable for psychotherapy. Bornstein wrote only a few papers, but her clinical cases are models of technical and theoretical clarity. BornsteinÕs last analytic work, concerning ‘‘Frankie,’’ a child of five-and-a-half years with symptoms of phobia, insomnia, and urine retention, would be validated in a follow-up analysis of the patient as an adult, conducted and presented by Samuel Ritvo in 1965. She was a widely admired teacher who taught not only at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute but also at the Menninger Clinic and Yale University. She was a member of both the New York Psychoanalytic Society and the Philadelphia Psychoanalytic Society. The name of her younger sister, Steffi, is frequently mentioned in accounts of the history of psychoanalysis; she was also a child analyst but died prematurely, in Prague, in 1939. SIMONE VALANTIN 205 B O S E , G I R I N D R A S E K H A R (1886 – 1953) See also: Lehrinstitut der wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung; New York Psychoanalytic Institute; Primary identification. Bibliography Blos, Peter. (1974). Berta Bornstein 1899–1971. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 29, 35–38. Bornstein, Berta. (1935). Phobia in a two-and-a-half year old child. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 4, 93–119. ———. (1945). Clinical notes on child analysis. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1, 151–166. ———. On latency. (1951). Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 6, 279–285. ———. (1953). Masturbation in the latency period. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 8, 65–78. tic therapeutic technique, primarily aimed at cognitive change, which was based on his theory of ‘‘opposite wishes’’ (1933). As he was the founder-president of the Indian Psychoanalytic Society and someone who conducted most of the training analyses, BoseÕs idiosyncratic technique came to characterize the therapeutic style of most Indian psychoanalysts. BoseÕs contribution, however, was less in the doubtful value of his new technique but in his emphasis on the role of culture in psychoanalysis. He did not uncritically accept the universalist premises of psychoanalysis, but engaged with Freud in a lively correspondence where he pointed out some of the cultural variations in psychoanalytic concepts, such as castration anxiety, which he had encountered in his Indian patients. His other great contribution was organizational in that he laid the foundations of psychoanalysis in India and placed the Indian Psychoanalytic Society on a sound footing through the thirty-one years of his presidency and until his death. BOSE, GIRINDRASEKHAR (1886–1953) Indian psychoanalyst and physician Girindrasekhar Bose was born in 1886 and died in 1953. He was the founder of the Indian Psychoanalytic Society. Bose, the youngest of nine children, was the son of a chief minister of a minor princely state in British India and a mother who was a poet. After finishing school, he studied chemistry in CalcuttaÕs Presidency College and then joined the Medical College where he received his medical degree in 1910. He was married at the age of seventeen to Indumati, who bore him two daughters. He was greatly interested in yoga, magic, and hypnotism and in fact used hypnotic therapy in his medical practice during his early years and also occasionally after he became a psychoanalyst. While practicing, as a doctor, Bose studied psychology in the newly opened department of psychology at Calcutta University. Appointed lecturer at the age of 31, after he finished his MasterÕs degree in two years, he made psychoanalysis compulsory for all students of psychology. His doctoral thesis, Concept of Repression (1921) in which he blended Hindu thought with Freudian concepts and which he sent to Freud, led to a correspondence between the two men and to the formation of the Indian Psychoanalytic Society on January 22, 1972. He developed his own overly didac20 6 SUDHIR KAKAR See also: India. Bibliography Bose, Girindrasekhar. (1933). A New Theory of Mental Life. Indian Journal of Psychology, 37–157. Hartnack, Christiane. (1990). Vishnu on FreudÕs Desk: Psychoanalysis in Colonial India. Social Research, 57 (4), 921–949. Indian Psychoanalytical Society. (1955). Special Issue on Bose. Samiksa. Kakar, Sudhir. (1997). Encounters of the psychological kind: Freud, Jung and India. In Culture and Psyche: Psychoanalysis and India. New York, Psyche Press. BOSTON PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY AND INSTITUTE Psychoanalysis in Boston dates from 1906, when James Jackson Putnam published the first paper in English on the treatment of hysteria by ‘‘FreudÕs method of psycho-analysis.’’ In 1909, Putnam met Ernest Jones, a Welshman then living in Canada, at Morton PrinceÕs INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BOSTON PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY house, where Boston psychiatrists regularly met to discuss the current psychotherapies of suggestion. Jones was a vigorous spokesman for Freud, and with PutnamÕs growing enthusiasm for psychoanalysis, both men took part in the annual meeting of the American Therapeutic Society, opened by Morton Prince. Putnam spoke on FreudÕs discoveries about the childhood origins of adult neuroses, and Jones firmly differentiated psychoanalysis from all the psychotherapies of suggestion. He emphasized the difference between the hypnotistÕs domination of his subject and the analystÕs use of free-association, ‘‘in almost every respect the reverse of treatment by suggestion.’’ This meeting marked the high point of the psychotherapy movement, welcoming psychoanalysis as if it were another form of suggestive therapy. Its importance was soon overshadowed in September 1909 by the Clark University Lectures at Worcester, Massachusetts, where G. Stanley Hall, an experimental psychologist and friend of William James, had invited many notable scientists to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of Clark. Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung. Sándor Ferenczi, Jones, and Abraham Arden Brill all attended. Brill had studied analysis in Zürich with Jung in 1908, where he met Jones, and together they had visited Freud. At Clark, Freud delivered his Introductory Lectures, his only address to the general public, and was invited by Putnam to visit their family camp after the meetings. Thus Putnam developed a close friendship with Freud, reflected in their lively correspondence, and he and Jones proselytized widely for the cause of psychoanalysis. Jones persuaded him to found the American Psychoanalytic Association in 1911, and Putnam was its first president. (Shortly before, Brill had founded the New York Psychoanalytic Society.) Putnam established the first of several Boston Psychoanalytic Societies in 1914, which met weekly until his death in 1918. PutnamÕs successor was Isidor Coriat, who reestablished the Boston Psychoanalytic Society in 1924–1928, and again in 1930. He was the only Freudian analyst in Boston during the period after PutnamÕs death, leading an eclectic group of men and women analyzed by Freud, Jung, Otto Rank, and Paul Schilder. During this era, Americans were obliged to travel abroad for analytic training, and in 1930 four newlyINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND INSTITUTE trained analysts, led by Ives Hendrick, arrived in Boston from Vienna and Berlin. They sought to create an institute, modeled on the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, that provided full analytic training, with analyses, seminars, and supervised control-cases. The first traininganalyst was Franz Alexander, who came to Boston in 1930 and returned a year later to found the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute. In Boston, Alexander was succeeded by Hanns Sachs, a leading training-analyst from Berlin, but not a physician. This created conflicts with HendrickÕs new constitution, which rejected non-M.D.s for training, and required approval by an Admissions Committee, rather than by the individual analyst. After a stormy period of reorganization, half the membership resigned, to allow ten properly analyzed members to be approved by the American Psychoanalytic Association. Boston became a constituent Society in 1933, and in 1947 a Society/Institute, called the BPSI. The original members were mostly Americans, with a few Canadians, until the arrival of Felix and Helene Deutsch in 1935. They were part of the great intellectual migration, fleeing from Nazi domination in Germany in 1933 and Austria in 1938. Within the vast influx of refugee artists, scholars, and scientists that transformed American cultural life, the émigré analysts formed a small but influential group. They most nearly resembled the architects of the avant-garde Bauhaus and the pioneer nuclear physicists, who seemed to represent new specialties, already sought after in Boston. The European analysts were welcomed everywhere by eager colleagues and by their former analysands. In the Boston Institute, as its membership tripled over the next ten years, the refugees soon outnumbered their native American colleagues. Unlike other American cities with refugee analysts from all of Europe, most of BostonÕs analysts were Viennese. This occurred because the Deutsches were friends of Jenny and Robert Waelder, the next to arrive. The Waelders obtained an academic post for Edward Bibring, accompanied by his wife Grete, and Mrs. Beata Rank joined the DeutschesÕ circle. Lucie Jessner was the only non-Austrian refugee who completed her analytic training there. As the Boston Psychoanalytic Institute became Europeanized, local American institutions were influential in the distribution of analysts within the community. The pioneer analyst Clarence Oberndorf had first 207 BOSTON PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY AND INSTITUTE noted the tendency for American analysts to hold positions in institutions. They worked in hospitals, medical schools, and schools of social work, in marked contrast to FreudÕs isolation from academic medicine. By 1949, ninety percent of Boston analysts held institutional posts of some kind, often working in research teams with non-analysts. Another local tradition was BostonÕs unusual number of institutions devoted to children, including nineteenth-century protective agencies and the Home for Little Wanderers. The Judge Baker Guidance Center dated from 1917, and the new J. J. Putnam ChildrenÕs Center from 1943, founded by Marian Putnam, the daughter of BostonÕs first analyst, and Beata Rank from FreudÕs Viennese circle. Created for the study and treatment of preschool children, the Putnam Center came to specialize in the long-term treatment of childhood autism. Child analysts were soon established in other clinics and all the university teaching hospitals. Thus Boston became an important center for training in child psychotherapy. In two other American specialties, psychosomatic medicine and general hospital psychiatry (consultationliaison psychiatry), Boston analysts played important parts. Stanley Cobb, chief of psychiatry at the Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) and a founding member of the BPSI, established the first department of psychiatry in a general hospital in 1935. He taught interns and medical students how to understand their medical and surgical patients, as well as psychiatric patients, a tradition his successor Erich Lindemann continued with his medical students. Cobb welcomed refugee analysts to the MGH and invited Felix Deutsch to collaborate in psychosomatic research. Deutsch, like Franz Alexander in Chicago, expanded psychosomatic research into a major specialty, far beyond its limited scope in Vienna. After the Second World War, there was a great increase in the demand for psychoanalytic training, partly prompted by physicians returning from military service. They had been exposed to great numbers of psychiatric casualties and taught psychoanalytic methods of treatment, like the ‘‘abreaction’’ therapy of Grinker and Spiegel. This demand for psychiatrists was supported by a corresponding increase in government funds for psychoanalytic training and research. The next twenty years was a halcyon era for psychoanalysis in Boston. The Institute increased from a few 20 8 dozen members in the 1930s to over one hundred active and affiliate members in 1974 and more than two hundred by the beginning of the twenty-first century. All the chiefs of psychiatry in hospitals and medical schools were analysts, and psychiatry was a popular specialty for young physicians. For some residents psychoanalytic training was accepted as the next step in academic advancement. The high tide in analysis began to ebb in the late 1960s, during the Vietnam War, with cuts in federal support for analytic training and research. The number of suitable patients for psychoanalysis began to dwindle, both for analysts and for candidates with supervised cases. Within the BPSI there was dissatisfaction among candidates and younger analysts, who resented the impersonality of training and the dictatorship of the Education Committee. An experiment with a deanship proved unsuccessful, and its termination by the Education Committee provoked violent protests as high-handed and autocratic. A period of strife followed, with attempts to create a better balance between the functions of the Institute and the Society. The conflict seemed to be between traditionalists and reformers, but the crucial issue was resentment over the limited access to training-analyst status. From 1973–1974, five training analysts proposed to secede from the Institute, while retaining their membership in the Society. Their aims were vague, but they emphasized the creation of a smaller group, free from committee work and bureaucratic rules, with a more intimate atmosphere for intellectual discussion. The new Psychoanalytic Institute of New England, called PINE, was recognized by the American Psychoanalytic Association in 1991. In spite of fears that Boston was too small for two institutes, and that the new institute would graduate many unqualified training-analysts, PINE proved successful. Both institutes have flourished, and a third Boston institute, the Massachusetts Institute of Psychoanalysis (MIP) was founded by clinical psychologists. All institutes have faced the continuing decline in suitable patients and the recent loss of traditional psychiatric institutions, like the Massachusetts Mental Health Center. In spite of these unfavorable changes in the economic and cultural support for psychoanalysis, as well as changes in clinical psychiatry and medicine itself, the number of applicants for analytic training has diminished relatively little. The BPSI has even expanded in terms of outreach to the community, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BOUNDARY VIOLATIONS public lectures on cultural topics, and elective courses for non-analysts on psychoanalytic psychotherapy. The viability of analytic training seems partly sustained by offering supervision in long-term psychotherapy, while dynamic teaching in medical schools has been declining. And the scientific and intellectual life of the analytic community remains lively and attractive, in contrast to the increasingly organic orientation of current clinical psychiatry, with its emphasis on drugs and the genetic etiologies of mental illness. SANFORD GIFFORD Bibliography Gifford, Sanford. (1978). Psychoanalysis in Boston: Innocence and experience. In G. E. Gifford Jr. (Ed.), Psychoanalysis, psychotherapy and the New England medical scene, 1894–1944 (pp. 325–345). New York: Science History Publications. Grinker, R. R., and Spiegel, J. P. (1934). War neuroses in North Africa, the Tunisian campaign September–May 1943. New York: Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation. Hale, Nathan G. Jr. (1971). Freud and the Americans: The beginnings of psychoanalysis in the United States, 1876– 1917. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. (1971). James Jackson Putnam and psychoanalysis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Rosenzweig, Saul. (1992). The historic expedition to America 1909: Freud, Jung and Hall the king-maker. St. Louis, MO: Rana House. BOUNDARY VIOLATIONS Boundary violations in psychoanalysis refer to the egregious and potentially harmful transgressions of the analytic frame that represent exploitation of the patientÕs vulnerable position. While the most widely discussed boundary violation is sexual relations between the analyst and the patient, nonsexual boundary violations are common as well. These may include such phenomena as soliciting donations from oneÕs patient, entering into a business transaction with oneÕs patient, excessive selfdisclosure of the analystÕs personal problems, and breaking the patientÕs confidentiality. Maintaining professional boundaries should not be construed as a call for rigidity. Indeed, a flexible analytic frame is necessary to respond to patients with INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS varying needs, conflicts, and deficits. The elasticity of the frame reflects not only the patientÕs specific needs, of course, but also the analystÕs subjectivity. Moreover, there are situations in which a break of the frame may be a helpful departure from the usual boundaries. Gutheil and Gabbard have referred to these instances as boundary crossings rather than violations. In addition, counter-transference enactments are inevitable to some extent, and the differentiation between a useful enactment and a boundary violation is sometimes ambiguous. A useful enactment generally involves an analyst who has caught himself or herself in the midst of the enactment before it escalates to the point of becoming a serious violation. Also, the capacity of both patient and analyst to analyze the incident may determine whether a particular behavior is destructive or productive. Finally, enactments that are repetitive and unresponsive to the analystÕs own self-analytic efforts are more likely to be harmful than those that are subjected to self-analytic scrutiny and prevented from recurring. The concept of boundary violations is a relatively recent addition to the psychoanalytic literature, although the early history of psychoanalysis was replete with such violations. While Sándor Ferenczi was analyzing Elma Palos, he professed his love for her and ultimately referred her to Freud for analysis. Ernest JonesÕs common-law wife, Loë Kann, was a former patient of his. Margaret Mahler acknowledged in her memoirs that she had been sexually involved with her analyst, August Aichhorn. Many of these instances were ignored; if they did come to light within psychoanalytic institutes, the solution was often to send the analyst back for more analysis rather than to take any form of disciplinary action. With the rise of the womenÕs movement, female patients became more assertive in expressing their sense of having been exploited by male analysts (cases of sexual boundary violations most commonly involve a male analyst and a female patient), and some form of reparation was often demanded. Gutheil and Gabbard first attempted to delineate the concept of boundary violation and boundary crossings in a 1993 article. Subsequently, Gabbard and Lester argued that preservation of professional boundaries not only protects the patient from harm, but also serves to create ‘‘the analytic object,’’ which is an amalgam of the transference object and the new object jointly created by the subjectivities of analyst and patient. Critics of the new emphasis on boundary violations have expressed concern that such limits may constrict 209 B O U V E T , M A U R I C E C H A R L E S M A R I E G E R M A I N (1 911 –19 60) the spontaneity of the analyst. Rigidity might prevent the analyst from engaging the patient. Attention to boundaries, however, does not promote coldness or rigidity in the analytic relationship. The intent is exactly the opposite. Professional boundaries define the parameters of the analytic relationship so that the patient can interact in an atmosphere of safety that includes an analyst who can be warm and spontaneous. Another concern expressed about the concept of professional boundaries is that sexual boundary violations are committed by predatory analysts with severe psychopathy or antisocial personality disorders. Other analysts, the argument goes, need not concern themselves with boundaries because they are essentially ethical. Systematic studies of analysts who have had sexual and nonsexual boundary violations with patients, however, suggest that many who have otherwise been ethical and honest may be susceptible to falling in love with the patient and transgressing boundaries at a time in their lives when they are under great personal stress. Hence there is a strong argument for teaching constructs like professional boundaries and boundary violations to all analysts. GLEN O. GABBARD See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence; Collected Papers on Schizophrenia and Related Subjects; Counter-transference; Dependence; Psychoanalytic treatment; Transference love; Trangression. Bibliography Gabbard, Glen O. (1995). The early history of boundary violations in psychoanalysis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytical Association, 43, 1115–1136. Gabbard, Glen O., and Lester, Eva. (1995). Boundaries and boundary violations in psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books. Gutheil, Thomas G., and O. Gabbard, Glen O. (1993). The concept of boundaries in clinical practice: Theoretical and risk-management dimensions. American Journal of Psychiatry, 150 , 188–196. BOUVET, MAURICE CHARLES MARIE GERMAIN (1911–1960) A French psychoanalyst, Maurice Charles Marie Germain Bouvet was born August 14, 1911, in Eu (Seine21 0 Maritime) and died on May 5, 1960, in Paris. His father, a graduate of the École Polytechnique and a career officer, married while he was stationed in Clermont-Ferrand. It was here that Bouvet completed his secondary education and his medical studies. He did his internship between 1931 and 1932. After arriving in Paris he was appointed a resident in 1936, a doctor at a psychiatric clinic in 1939, and made head of clinical services under Professor LaignelLavastine in 1940. In 1942 he served as doctor and interim director of the psychiatric hospital in Moisselles and was transferred to a hospital in Clermont in the Oise region of France from 1943 to 1945. Because of his fragile health, Bouvet began to experience problems with his vision by 1940, which resulted in near blindness. During the Occupation he began a teaching analysis with Georges Parcheminey, soon followed by supervised analyses with John Leuba and Sacha Nacht. He became a member of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society in 1946 and was made a member on November 16, 1948. For a number of years Bouvet served as treasurer and vice president, before becoming president in 1956. During the period prior to the 1953 split in the society, Bouvet felt that liberalization of the organization was needed. However, possibly because of the analysis he was conducting with Daniel Lagache, Bouvet decided to remain neutral. He subsequently decided to remain within the society, primarily because of his medical background. His publications had attracted notice as early as 1948. In November 1952, he was reporter for the XV Conférence des Psychanalystes de Langues Romanes, whose topic was ‘‘The Ego in Obsessive Neurosis: Object Relations and Defense Mechanisms.’’ In 1954 he published ‘‘La cure-type’’ (The standard cure) in the Encyclopédie médico-chirurgicale, there describing the distinction between ‘‘transference resistance’’ and ‘‘resistance to transference.’’ In that same article Bouvet expressed his fidelity to Freud, indicating that interpretation must adhere closely to the behavior of the ego. The following year Jacques LacanÕs article ‘‘Les variantes de la cure’’ (Different forms of therapy) seemed to supply a rebuttal to Bouvet, the only theoretician in the Paris Psychoanalytic Society who could take advantage of his growing reputation. He returned to the problems of therapy during the Twentieth International Psychoanalytic Congress, which took place in Paris in July 1957, with a report on ‘‘Les variations de la technique (Distance et INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B O W L B Y , E D W A R D J O H N M O S T Y N (1907 –1 990) variations)’’ [Variations in technique: Distance and variations]. Lacan maintained his critical stance while Bouvet promoted ‘‘object relations’’ in 1952 and completed his study of the subject in ‘‘La clinique psychanalytique. La relation dÕobjet’’ (Clinical practice in psychoanalysis: Object relations), published in La Psychanalyse aujourd Õhui (1959). For Bouvet the object relation represents ‘‘a flow of drive energy, a movement controlled and directed by the ego toward external objects.’’ He described the various aspects of object relations and their pathological states, such as phobias, obsessions, psychoses, and perversions, emphasizing the regression to oral or anal object relations in ‘‘pregenital’’ subjects with ‘‘weak’’ egos. He established a ‘‘distance relation’’ between the subject and its objects, which becomes greater as these are transformed by projection. Bouvet studied these mechanisms in detail, especially in the context of obsessive neurosis, and described the states of depersonalization that occur whenever the patient is unable to defend himself through isolation because of the uncontrollable violence of his affects and the predominant anal-sadistic projection that characterizes such patients. This was the theme of the XXI Congrès des Psychanalystes de Langues Romanes in April 1960: ‘‘Dépersonnalisation et relation dÕobjet.’’ Unfortunately the decline in his health prevented Bouvet from presenting the article, which was read by Pierre Marty. Afflicted with malignant hypertension and respiratory failure, he died on May 5, at the age of forty-nine. The analyst of André Green, Michel de MÕUzan, François Perrier—and even, for a short while, of Maryse Choisy—he was remembered through the creation of the Prix Maurice Bouvet in 1962; his publications were collected and published in 1968. As Michel de MÕUzan wrote in his introduction, ‘‘For many Michel Bouvet was a master, but a discreet master, who was as demanding in the affirmation of his knowledge as he was in his sense of freedom. Nothing demonstrates this better than the way his ideas were transmitted.’’ Although he is not widely remembered today and his concepts of the object relation and standard cure have assumed negative and outmoded connotations in France (unlike the United States), he remains a key figure in the theoretical and clinical fields he investigated throughout his life. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS See also: Congrès des psychanalystes de langue française des pays romans ; Depersonalization; Object; Psychoanalytic treatment; Société psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris. Bibliography Bouvet, Maurice. (1968). Œuvres psychanalytiques, 2, Résistances, transfert. Paris: Payot. Green, André. (1960). L’œuvre de Maurice Bouvet. Revue française de psychanalyse, 24 (6), 685–702. Hommage à Maurice Bouvet. (1960). Revue française de psychanalyse, 24 (6), 675–720. Sauguet, Henri. (1960). La carrière de Maurice Bouvet. Revue française de psychanalyse, 24 (6), 679–683. BOWLBY, EDWARD JOHN MOSTYN (1907–1990) An English psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, Edward John Bowlby was born February 26, 1907, in London and died September 2, 1990, in Skye Ball, Great Britain. His childhood was divided between an urban life in London, where he was raised by nannies, and vacations in the countryside with his family. In 1938 he married Ursula Hongstaffs, a musician, with whom he had four children. He began his medical studies in 1929 in London and entered into analysis with Joan Rivière. He worked as a psychiatrist at the London Child Guidance Clinic until the war, when he joined the army. After the war Bowlby joined the Tavistock Clinic, where he served as director of the childrenÕs center from 1950 to 1972. As Donald WinnicottÕs secretary at the British Psychoanalytical Society from 1956 to 1961, he organized training sessions and research activities. From 1950 to 1972 he was a mental health consultant for the World Health Organization. In 1980 he was named professor of psychoanalysis at University College in London. Bowlby studied psychoanalysis in order to become a child psychoanalyst. His first supervised psychoanalysis with Melanie Klein in 1937 soon revealed a fundamental difference between them: For Bowlby the environment and its role were not sufficiently accounted for in KleinÕs theories. Based on his highly original clinical training (he worked with handicapped and institutionalized children) and his sensitivity to the function of the 211 BRAIN AND PSYCHOANALYSIS, THE mother-child bond and the environment, he developed the position that the instinct for preservation is as important as that of sexuality and that the mother-child bond is independent of infantile sexuality. His admission to the British Psychoanalytical Society, which was then (in 1940) torn by the struggles between Kleinians and supporters of Anna Freud, is important. Bowlby acknowledged his connection to Anna Freud while regretting her refusal to accept the reality of trauma. In 1958, for the appearance of his article ‘‘The Nature of the ChildÕs Tie to his Mother,’’ Bowlby proposed a revision of metapsychology: abandonment of the theory of anaclisis, abandonment of the economic point of view, emphasis on the dynamic point of view, and definition of the unconscious as the interiorization of interpersonal experiences. He was criticized and rejected by the Psychoanalytical Society with unusual severity. Deeply wounded by the reaction of his peers, he gradually withdrew from the Society, and turned to other scientific activities then in vogue (ethology, cybernetics, and systems theory). He worked for more than twenty years on his book on attachment. It was only after 1981 that he was asked to return to analysis and develop the clinical and psychotherapeutic implications of his theory. BowlbyÕs work had a tremendous impact on public health especially, in providing a better understanding of the effects of separation on young children, and the prevention of these effects. He also made numerous contributions to social science: contributions to developmental psychology and psychiatry, especially the roles of security, reciprocity, intersubjectivity, and the interpersonal development of thought in the young child; contributions to the understanding and management of borderline states; theorization of so-called non-specific factors in psychotherapy, and treatment of so-called ‘‘inaccessible’’ families subject to multiple risks. NICOLE GUÉDENEY See also: Abandonment; Aphanisis; Attachment; Great Britain; Maternal care; Primary need; Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, The; Schur, Max; Stranger; Tavistock Clinic; Tenderness. Bibliography Bowlby, John. (1944). Forty-four juvenile thieves: Their characters and home life. International Journal of PsychoAnalysis, 25, 1–57; 207–228. 21 2 ———. (1951). Maternal care and mental health. Geneva: World Health Organization Monographs. ———. (1969). Attachment and loss (Vol. 1). London: Hogarth Press. Eagle, Morris. (1995). The developmental perspectives of attachment and psychoanalytic theory. In S. Goldberg, R. Muir, J. Kerr (Eds.), Attachment theory. Social, developmental and clinical perspectives (pp. 123–153). Hillsdale, NJ-London: The Analytic Press. Holmes, Jeremy. (1993). John Bowlby and attachment theory. London: Routledge. BRAIN AND PSYCHOANALYSIS, THE The effort to establish the relationships between psychological functioning, the organization of the apparatus that implements it, and the working and structure of the brain, is an issue that has been raised continually since the beginnings of psychoanalysis. Psychic activity that arises wholly independent of the brain itself is inconceivable. The question is whether we can identify specific cerebral mechanisms and structures that could be said to govern those characteristics of mental functioning that psychoanalysis has discovered. This means viewing psychoanalysis in the context of a much more general problem, that of the relationship and interaction between mind and brain. Freud was confronted with this question long before he developed an interest in psychopathology and the psychotherapy of hysteria. His work on aphasia (1891b) is part of what has been rightly described as a neuropsychological tradition (Pribram and Gill). In the early 1890s, thanks to the anatomicopathological methods introduced by Paul Broca, it was shown that the function of language resulted from independent mechanisms that could be altered in isolation and that such specific alterations were tied to relatively localized lesions. This work, especially that of Carl Wernicke, confirmed the existence of cerebral localizations and the ‘‘modular’’ nature of the mechanisms involved in the exercise of particular functions. Freud, anticipating the findings of much later neuropsychology, went on to criticize the exaggeratedly modular approach involved in this conception of the brain and proposed a more comprehensive and functionalist view of cerebral activity according to which the ‘‘centers’’ identified would participate in carrying out their respective functions. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BRAZIL In 1895, in what is known as his ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology,’’ a work that remained unfinished and was later abandoned, and which was to have been titled ‘‘Psychology for Neurologists,’’ Freud proposed a structural and functional model based on the recently recognized concept of the neurone to describe brain functions in relation to mental activity. Like many others at the time (Gauchet), he was careful to conceive of mental activity independently of consciousness, and attempted to base his picture of psychic functioning on the model of the brain. That picture already bore the imprint of FreudÕs own metapsychology, especially with respect to the assimilation of consciousness to an internal perception, the dissociation between perception and memory traces, the priority of ‘‘hallucinatory’’ representation over reality, and in other facets. Freud soon abandoned any pretensions to constructing a model of the brain likely to account for the features of mental life revealed by psychoanalysis. This abandonment was strictly methodological, however, and throughout his work he firmly maintained the idea that brain mechanisms must ultimately determine these features. On several occasions, in fact, he risked drawing parallels between cerebral and metapsychological models. Subsequently, and especially during the last four decades of the twentieth century, the considerable progress made in understanding the brain has not failed to invite speculation among psychoanalysts. Hemispheric laterality, cortical-subcortical dissociation, individualization of the limbic circuit, experiments with self-stimulation leading to the isolation of structures of positive and negative reinforcement (pleasure– unpleasure), humoral transmission systems, and so on, have resulted in research and the construction of models involving a distinct parallelism. This immediately raises several questions. No one contests the need to postulate the existence of cerebral mechanisms, but does it follow that we need them to identify the symbolic structures (language, social structures, etc.) that influence mental development? Clearly every particular aspect of mental life can be explained by some form of psychological determinism, but what can be said about the functions of dreaming, in particular its function as a guardian of sleep? Will we ever establish any strict isomorphism between brain functions and mental functions? All such questions are still open. More generally, a distinction may usefully be drawn between those who believe that the psychoanalytic INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS conception of mental life can help us understand the workings of the brain and those who feel that this understanding must involve reducing the complexity of observed mental activities to elementary cognitive mechanisms. This debate affects psychoanalysts and philosophers as well as specialists in brain physiology. DANIEL WIDLÖCHER See also: Hard science and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1891b [1953]). On aphasia (a critical study) (E. Stengel, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281–387. Gauchet, Marcel. (1992). L’Inconscient cérébral. Paris: Le Seuil. Pribram, Karl H., and Gill, Merton M. (1976). Freud’s ‘‘project’’ reassessed. London: Hutchinson. BRAZIL Psychoanalysis aroused strong resistance when it first appeared in Brazil, provoking different reactions in different milieux. Salvador-born Julian Moreira (1873–1933) was the first to speak of Freud, in 1899. In 1903 he was appointed director of the national hospital for the insane in Rio de Janeiro, where he settled for the rest of his life. An innovative psychiatrist with an international reputation, he invited his disciples and collaborators to study psychoanalytic ideas. In 1914 Jenserico Aragão de Souza Pinto published ‘‘On Psychoanalysis. Sexuality in the Neuroses.’’ Two conferences in 1919 awoke the interest of future psychoanalysts: Franco da RochaÕs ‘‘On delusion in general’’ (at São Paulo) and ‘‘Psychology of a neurologist— Freud and his sexual theories’’ by Medeiros e Albuquerque in Rio de Janeiro. In the 1920s, physicians in São Paulo and Rio sometimes criticized psychoanalysis in a Manichean fashion: on the one hand it was labeled charlatanesque while being enthusiastically hailed on the other. It must also be said that psychoanalytic ideas arrived at a time of great effervescence that saw the publication of ‘‘modernist’’ literary reviews and the Semana de Arte Moderna in 1922. Influenced by the European 213 BRAZIL avant-garde, this atmosphere facilitated the acceptance of psychoanalytic ideas in São Paulo. It was there that Durval Marcondes published several articles and Osorio Cesar wrote about the artistic productions of the mentally ill. Among Juliano MoreiraÕs disciples in Rio, Antonio Austregesilo produced somewhat superficial work but others, such as Neves Manta, Carneiro Ayrosa, and Murilo de Campos, were doing more important work, and Deodato de Morais was busy producing his excellent book A psicanálise na Educacao (1927), while J. P. PortoCarrero continued to work on many books and articles. Again in Rio but outside MoreiraÕs entourage, Henrique Roxo was quoting Freud as early as 1905 but he proved to be very organicistic in his views. During the 1930s Aloysio de Paula wrote on applied psychoanalysis and Gastão Pereira da Silva, a physician and journalist, contributed to propagating psychoanalytic ideas. Mauricio de Medeiros, who occupied the chair of psychiatry in the 1950s institution, supported the psychoanalytic approach. Although born at Alagoas, Arthur Ramos, physician and psychiatrist, was considered to be a citizen of Bahia. His thesis Primitivo e locura (1925) was widely commented on and, between 1930 and 1932, he studied FreudÕs work with a small group. He settled in Rio in 1934. A professor of anthropology and ethnography, he became a renowned specialist on Africa and wrote some psychoanalytic works. At Porto Alegre in 1924, João Cesar de Castro wrote Concepcao Freudiana das Psiconeuroses and in France Martim Gomes published Les Rêves (1928). Ulisses Pernambucan came under the influence of Juliano Moreira while studying medicine in Rio. He went on to become a pioneer of social psychiatry in Brazil and considered psychoanalysis as the subtlest means of penetrating the human mind. In 1927 Marcondes founded the first Sociedade brasiliera de psicanálise in São Paulo. Although it had no training section it was nevertheless recognized by the International Psychoanalytic Association with a view to propagating FreudÕs ideas. In 1928 Marcondes gave his blessing to the setting up of a subsidiary branch in Rio (V. Rocha, Marcondes, and Porto-Carrero). Thanks to MarcondesÕs persistent pressure on Ernest Jones, the Jewish German psychoanalyst Adelheid L. Koch, who had been analyzed by Otto Fenichel, 21 4 emigrated to São Paulo with her husband in 1936, and in 1937 began to analyze Durval Marcondes, Darcy Mendonça Uchôa, Virginia Bicudo, Flavio Dias, and Frank Philips, soon to be joined by three more patients. Because she was the only qualified analyst, she singlehandedly conducted analyses, gave seminars and acted as supervisor. The first São Paulo Grupo psicanalı́tico, which she founded in 1944 with her first analysands, was provisionally accepted in 1945 as the Sociedade brasileira de psicanálise de São Paulo (SBPSP). It received definitive recognition at the Amsterdam Congress (1951). The early days in Rio de Janeiro were not so easy. Dissatisfied with the official teaching of psychiatry, a group of young physicians founded the Centro de estudos Julian Moreira in 1944 and envisaged two possible hypotheses for the formation of a future psychoanalytic group: either to invite training analysts or seek training elsewhere. Intense correspondence with foreign analysts bore no fruit. Thus, from 1945 to 1947, Alcyon Baer Bahia, Danilo Perestrello, Marialzira Perestrello, and Walderedo Ismael de Oliveira began training at the Asociación Psicoanalı́tica Argentina (APA) with analysts who had qualified in Berlin, Paris, Vienna, and Buenos Aires. In 1947 the Instituto brasileiro de psicanálise was founded in Rio in order to facilitate the legal arrival of foreign analysts. Mark Burke, analyzed by James Strachey and a member of the British Psycho-Analytic Society (BPS), arrived in February 1948. He was followed in December 1948 by Werner Kemper, a German psychoanalyst analyzed by Carl MüllerBraunschweig and who had worked during World War II in the Göring Institute before joining the DPG (Deutsche Psycoanalytische Gesellschaft). They both commenced training analyses almost immediately. In the beginning Burke and Kemper worked in collaboration with each other but in 1951 they separated amidst serious mutual reproaches. Kemper was expelled from the institute and, along with his analysands, founded the Centro de estudos psicanalı́ticos. The four physicians who had gone to Buenos Aires returned between 1949 and 1950, both Perestrello and Walderedo having become associate members of the APA. Three groups were then formed: ‘‘the Argentineans,’’ BurkeÕs group, and KemperÕs group. The ‘‘Argentine’’ group formed no alliances with either of the other two. When Burke suddenly left Brazil before his group had completed their training, three of his INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BRAZIL students left for London and the others completed their supervisions at São Paulo. During the 1953 international conference in London, KemperÕs group was recognized as a study group under the sponsorship of the SBPSP, and as the Sociedade psicanalı́tica do Rio de Janeiro (SPRJ) at the 1955 international conference in Geneva. Its founders included seven full members (Werner Kemper, Kattrin Kemper, Fabio Leite Lobo, Gerson Borsoi, Inaura Carneiro Leão Vetter, Luiz Guimarães Dahlheim, Noemy Rudolfer) and four associate members. Three Brazilians arrived from London in 1954 and 1956 (two of them as associate members of the BPS). They became known as ‘‘the English.’’ After a series of agreements and disagreements, the ‘‘Argentineans,’’ the ‘‘English,’’ and the ‘‘Burkians’’ finally accepted the sponsorship of São Paulo and were recognized as study groups at the Paris congress in 1957. The founders were the full members A. A. Bahia, D. Perestrello, and Walderedo I. de Oliveira (of the APA) and Henrique Mendes (SBPSP), with, as associate members, Decio Sobres de Souza and Edgar Guimarães de Almeida (of the BPS), M. Perestrello (APA), Mario Pacheco de Almeida Prado (SBPSP), and three physicians who were finishing their training at São Paulo. At the Copenhagen congress in 1959, the group was recognized as the Sociedade brasileira de psicanálise do Rio de Janeiro (SBPRJ), with fourteen founders from different backgrounds: the eight previously mentioned, along with Luiz L. Werneck, Joáo Côrtes de Barros, and Pedro Ferreira (already qualified with the SBPSP), M. T. Lyra (associate member of the BPS), Inaura Carneiro Leáo Vetter and Zenaira Aranha (SPRJ), analyzed by Kemper. In Rio Grande do Sul, Mario Martins, Zaira Martins (1945), and José Lemmertz (1947) began their analytic training with the APA. The Martins couple returned in 1947 and Lemmertz in 1949. They qualified a few years later. During the Edinburgh congress in 1961, the Porto Alegre study group was accepted under the sponsorship of the SPRJ. And the Sociedade Psicanalı́tica de Porto Alegre (SPPA) was recognized at the Stockholm conference in 1963 with, as founders, the three previously mentioned members, along with Cyro Martins (APA), Celestino Prunes, and Ernesto La Porta (SPRJ), together with José Maria Santiago Wagner (already in training at Porto Alegre). In 1946 Iracy Doyle Ferreira left for the United States and trained at the William Alanson Institute of Psychiatry (WAIP). Upon returnINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ing she spread the contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan, Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, and Abram Kardiner. Around 1950 she started several training analyses and, in 1952, founded the Instituto de Medicina Psicológica (IMP), which received WAIP authorization in 1953. On May 6, 1967, the Associacão Brasileira de Psicanálise (ABP) was founded with a view to uniting the four societies recognized by the IPA in order to foster and provide assistance for future core and study groups and to publish a joint review. In 1975 the ABP created the Recife psychoanalytic core group and the Pelotas core group in 1987. Having met all the requirements of the IPA, these two groups were admitted as study groups. The Sociedade Psicanalı́tica de Recife and the Sociedade Psicanalı́tica de Pelotas became provisional study groups at the San Francisco congress in 1995. Three new study groups were recognized: the Porto Alegre group in 1992, the Ribeirão Preto group in 1993, and the Brası́lia group in 1994. During the Barcelona congress in 1997, the first of these groups was admitted as the Sociedade brasileira de Psicanálise de Porto Alegre. In 2005 four other core groups, located at Belo Horizonte, Campo Grande, Curitiba, and Espı́rito Santo were working with a view to being recognized as study groups. Durval Marcondes, Mario Martins, and Danilo Perestrello were posthumously named honorary presidents of the ABP. The military dictatorship (1964 to 1985) affected not only political life but also, in a direct and particularly harsh manner, the cultural life of the country. Ideas were suppressed and censorship was openly practiced in university, literary, artistic, and scientific circles, as witnessed by the events at the famous Instituto Oswaldo Cruz. The atrocities committed by groups and individuals in the name of ‘‘Institutional Acts’’ are known throughout the world. The psychoanalytic milieu also suffered an unhealthy influence. Although some candidates and analysts took an active part in the struggle for the redemocratization of the country, others proved to be full of anti-communist prejudice. However, some of these same colleagues, while being politically to the right, maintained a psychoanalytic position in their consulting rooms without blindly submitting to their political ideology. In 1973 the clandestine newspaper Voz Operária denounced Amilcar Lobo Moreira da Silva, a candidate for the SPRJ (Rio I), as a member of the military 215 BRAZIL policeÕs torture squad. An analyst from the other Rio society, SBPRJ (Rio II), Helena Besserman Vianna, sent the press cutting to Argentina, where it was published in the review Questionamos, directed by Maria Langer. The denouncement was communicated to the IPA and other psychoanalytic societies, along with the name of the candidate and his analyst, Leáo Cabernite. This courageous denouncement was not taken seriously by Serge Lebovici, president of the IPA, or by David Zimmermann, president of the Coordinating Committee for Psychoanalytic Organizations in Latin America (COPAL), nor was it credited by the managing council for Rio I, with Leáo Cabernite as its president. It was considered to be a ‘‘rumor’’ and ‘‘calumny’’ against Amilcar Lobo. A persecution campaign was started against the person who made the denunciation (who suffered the consequences in her society) and not against its subject. An IPA committee visiting Rio came to no firm conclusion, but in October 1980 Amilcar Lobo was definitively excluded from the SPRJ as a trainee candidate. In 1981 ex-prisoners identified Amilcar Lobo before the Commission for the Rights of Man of the Brazilian Bar Association. When questioned, the exprisoners provided the following statements: ‘‘Lobo did not torture people directly but he supervised prisonersÕ health to determine whether they could continue to be tortured or not.’’ Sometimes ‘‘Lobo acted in two stages: firstly he evaluated vital data and checked their capacity to resist torture, then he administered medicines intravenously in order to make it easier to acquire information.’’ In 1986 a group of prisoners appeared at an assembly of the SPRJ to confirm these accusations. In 1988, when LoboÕs guilt had been proven, the regional medical council struck him off the register of physicians. The federal council later amended the suspension to thirty days. Informed of this situation, the IPA wrote to the SPRJ stating the necessity of expelling Cabernite. Cabernite had resigned not long before in ‘‘disgust’’ at the IPAÕs attitude and now asked to be reinstated. In the course of an assembly in 1993 he was reinstated by vote. Disturbed by this resolution, which they considered to be contrary to the statutes, the president of Rio I, Claudio de Campos, and his colleagues in the managing council resigned from their positions. An ethics commission was formed to study the Cabernite case. After a two-year study, a long report recommended expelling Cabernite from the society and suspending another 21 6 incriminated member, La Porta, for one year. At the end of 1995 an assembly of Rio I discussed the report and refused to accept the recommendations of the ethics commission. Six members resigned immediately. This was followed by a controversial debate, many members of the SPRJ being unable to accept this ‘‘lack of respect’’ for the study and efforts of the ethics commission. To highlight their difference from the leadership of Rio I without however resigning from it, they founded the Groupo Pró-Etica and published a small journal, Destacamento. Other societies manifested their discontent when Cabernite was granted an amnesty, speaking of a possible sanction for the SPRJ. For several years the executive council of the IPA had not considered the BessermanLobo-Cabernite problem in an impartial fashion. In 1995, however, during the presidency of Horacio Etchegoyen, the executive committee rehabilitated Helena Besserman Vianna and in 1997 appointed an ad hoc investigating commission consisting of members from Europe and North and South America to study all the documents and present a report that would be available to all IPA members at Barcelona. Having heard all parties in the dispute, the executive council was to elucidate the problem in an objective manner. In March, 1997, Cabernite resigned definitively from the SPRJ. The report considered him guilty of unethical and morally reprehensible conduct and concluded that he could not be admitted under any circumstances into any IPA-affiliated psychoanalytic society. During the Barcelona congress in July 1997, the executive council unanimously accepted and ratified the ad hoc commissionÕs report. Psychoanalytic ideas were first introduced at a university level by Marcondes, Bicudo, Danilo Perestrello, and Oliveira, and later by Mendonça Uchôa, Renato Mezzan, Portella Nunes, Prunes, P. Guedes, and Zimmermann. Medical (non-psychiatric) circles were pervaded with a dynamically charged atmosphere under the influence of Danilo Perestrello, Gernandes Pontes, Miller de Paiva, and Capizano, who inculcated psychosomatic concepts and accorded great importance to the physician-patient relationship, with the help of Mario and Cyro Martins, J. Mello Filho, A. Eksterman, and others. With regard to the relationship between psychoanalysis and the arts, literature, and mythology, it is essential to mention the contributions of Bahia, Cyro Martins, Meneghini, Hermann, Marialzira INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BRAZIL Perestrello, Nosek, Oliveira, Honigsztejn, David Azoubel, and many more. Nise da Silveira conducted research into the artistic production of mental patients and created the ‘‘Museu do Inconsciente.’’ Some articles by these authors have become known abroad. In 1928 Marcondes published the first and only issue of Revista brasileira de psicanálise, although the review reappeared in 1967 with the BPA. The SBPSP publishes the IDE review and its Institute publishes the Jornal de psicanálise. For two years the two Rio societies published the Revista de psicanálise do Rio de Janeiro. The SBPSP publishes TRIEB and the SPPA publishes the Revista de psicanálise de Porto Alegre. It must be said that the country has other societies in addition to those affiliated with the IPA. The shortlived Sociedade de psicologia individual (Adlerian) was founded in the 1930s. In 1994, during the presidency of Horus Vital Brazil, the IMP took on the name Sociedade psicanalı́tica Iracy Doyle and was affiliated with the International Federation of Psychoanalytical Societies (IFPS). It publishes Tempo psicanalı́tico and Cadernos do Tempo psicanalı́tico. The Sociedade brasileira de psicoterapia de grupo was founded in December 1958 with twenty-six members and Walderedo de Oliveira as president. Following the foundation of the Associação brasileira de psicoterapia analı́tica de grupo, the affiliated societies changed their name to ‘‘Analytic group psychotherapy.’’ The Rio de Janeiro society is currently called GRADIVA. The Cı́rculo brasileiro de psicanálise, founded in 1956 in southern Brazil, is affiliated to the IFPS and comprises about ten sections scattered over several cities. The Recife society publishes two reviews: Revista psicanalı́tica and Cadernos de psicanálise. In 1963, in Belo Horizonte, Father Malomar Lund Edelweiss founded the Cı́rculo psicanalı́tico de psicologia profunda (Igor Caruso), affiliated with the IFPS, which in turn led to the founding of other societies. Because the two Rio IPA-affiliated societies refused to accept non-physicians, a group of nine psychologists founded the Sociedade de psicologia clı́nica in Rio in 1971 with Maria Regina Domingues de Morais as president. In 1989 it changed its name to Sociedade de psicanálise da cidade and published Foco and Cadernos de psicanálise. In 1967 Werner Kemper returned to Germany leaving his wife Kattrin and two sons in Brazil. In 1968 she left the SPRJ, followed by several of her analysands. In 1969 four of them along with four people linked to Father Malomar founded INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the Cı́rculo psicanalı́tico do Rio de Janeiro (affiliated to the IFPS), which Kattrin Kemper joined in 1972. In São Paulo the Sedes Sapientiae, founded in the 1970s, took an active interest in social problems, organized specialist courses, a psychoanalysis department from 1985, and published Percurso. With a Jungian orientation, the Sociedade brasiliera de psicologia analı́tica (founded in São Paulo in 1975) and the Associação jungiana brasileira operate in São Paulo and Rio. They are both affiliated with the International Association for Analytic Psychology. There are many Lacanian societies. The Campo freudiano was dissolved after operating for fifteen years and, spurred on by Jacques-Alain Miller, eleven founders created the Escola Brasileira de Psicanálise do campo freudiano (EBP) in Rio de Janeiro in June 1995. The EBP is a member of the World Association of Psychoanalysis and numbers five sections and three secretariats. It would be impossible to mention all the societies and groups in the different schools: It is currently essential to maintain a certain pluralism in terms of ideas. Following the IFPS 1989 congress, a Forum brasileiro de psicanalı́se was opened up to all societies with a view to reconciling different theories. Emilio Rodrigué, a former full member of the APA, has lived at Salvador (Bahia) for more than twenty years. Without belonging to any society, he is respected for his profound humanistic culture and his independent spirit. FreudÕs work has been and still continues to be the basic subject of study in the majority of Brazilian societies. As early as 1950, Kleinian ideas enjoyed great popularity in Rio and São Paulo, thanks to Decio de Souza, V. Bicudo, Philips, and Lyra, and thanks to the couple Mario and Zaira Martins at Porto Alegre. Some Rio and São Paulo analysts underwent a second analysis and attended seminars and supervisions at the British Society. Several Kleinians visited Brazil. For several years the founders and members of societies not affiliated to the IPA attended courses by Arminda Aberastury and Mauricio Knobel. Sándor Ferenczi, Karl Abraham, Wilhelm Reich, and William Fairbairn were studied in turn. Donald Winnicott has been taught since 1970. Bahia and Philips, and then León Grinberg, introduced Wilfred Bion in the 1970s, and his theories continue to receive widespread dissemination. Heinz KohutÕs self psychology has been taught since 1980. Many societies not affiliated to the IPA conduct in-depth 217 BREAKDOWN studies of Lacanian thought, which was not introduced in IPA societies until the end of the twentieth century. The different schools are involved in disputing the right to dispense training in a more democratic manner than formerly. MARIALZIRA PERESTRELLO Bibliography Besserman-Vianna, Helena. (1997). Politique de la psychanalyse face à la dictature et à la torture. NÕen parlez à personne. Paris: LÕHarmattan. Galvão, Luis Almeida Prado. (1967). ‘‘Notas para a história de psicanálise em São Paulo.’’ In Revista brasileira psicanálı́tica, 1 (1), 46–68. Perestrello, Marialzira. (1992). Histoire de la psychanalyse au Brésil des origines à 1937. Frénésie, 2 (10), 283–304. ———. (1992). A Psicanálise no Brasil. Encontros: psicanálise. Rio de Janeiro: Imago. Perestrello, Marialzira, et al. (1986). História da Sociedade brasileira de psicanálise do Rio de Janeiro: suas origens e fundação. Rio de Janeiro: Imago. Sagawa, Roberto Yutaka. (1980). Durval Marcondes e o inı́cio do movimento psicanalı́tico brasileiro. Cadernos Freud-Lacan, 2. BREAKDOWN The term breakdown draws on Donald WinnicottÕs posthumous article ‘‘The Fear of Breakdown,’’ published in 1974. Winnicott was referring to mental breakdown associated with a serious failure of the facilitating environment at such an early stage that the self is not yet capable of dealing with it, experiencing it, integrate it, giving it meaning, or retain a recognizable memory of it. Winnicott describes the temporal paradox that results when the disaster occurs too early in the childÕs development to be properly experienced. The fear of breakdown is the product of the persistence of this unassimilated experience, which is perceived as a continuing permanent threat even though the disaster has actually already happened. The interpretation according to which the feared cataclysm has already occurred gives meaning to its reactualization during the transference in response to the minor failures of the holding environment. The 21 8 breakdown emphasizes the essential fact that the loss of the object occurred before the object and self were differentiated. Here Winnicott distinguishes his own position from that of Melanie Klein: self and object exist and function during infancy. Yet, for Winnicott, the issue is not an object loss that can be metabolized through introjection (mourning) or incorporation (melancholy), but rather the subjectÕs experience of annihilation, and mental agony. In this way, at the end of his life, Winnicott completed his conceptualization of the pathogenic infantile deprivation in the environment before the self had had a chance to organize itself: a massive deficiency resulting in the organization of a psychosis and breaks in continuity leading to ‘‘psychotic depression.’’ When the self is sufficiently organized, this same situation can lead to antisocial tendencies. WinnicottÕs ‘‘primitive agony’’ can be compared to the ‘‘black hole’’ of autism described by Frances Tustin. In these cases, therefore, the recollection of infantile trauma is not to be found in memory traces of the event but in the subjectÕs anguished sense of fragility. DENYS RIBAS See also: Autistic capsule/nucleus; Bulimia; Deprivation; Primitive agony; Splitting. Bibliography Winnicott, Donald W. (1974). Fear of breakdown. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 1, 103–107. BREAST, GOOD/BAD OBJECT The primitive ego cannot perceive or conceive of the objects in its external world as whole, multifaceted persons. Instead it lives in a world of one-dimensional objects that have either good or bad intentions towards the infant (Klein, 1932). AbrahamÕs concept of whole-object love was a way of talking about the integration of various impulses from all levels of development—the libidinal stages and the phases of early aggression linked with them. All these levels were, in FreudÕs view, linked and integrated under the dominance of the genital libido. Working with children, Melanie Klein found herself confronted with partial impulses towards objects, toys, and the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B R E A S T , G O O D /B A D O B J E C T person they represented. She was impressed by how pure these relations were, either wholly hating or wholly loving. She noticed, too, that the objects were related to as if they had similar single-minded attitudes and impulses towards the ego (Klein, 1929). Some objects were feared and hated as terrifyingly violent and punitive, and some were loved for their equal benevolence. The objects themselves had internal states and the ego was greatly preoccupied by their good or bad relations with itself. This sharply redirected her attention from the satisfactions of libidinal impulses toward the relations to objects. The predominance of the childÕs hatred and fears led her at first to concentrate on the harshness of objects, and she believed it represented in play a superego of great ferocity (Klein, 1932, 1933). The multiple representations and nuances of these superego figures led her to understand that the superego was not a unitary object but a composite of many figures inside the child. Her attention, once drawn to these internal objects, expanded to recognize an internal world of good objects as well as bad ones. With her more disturbed patients she noted the concreteness of these internal objects, good or bad. They were conceived by the child as actual physical entities roaming around inside it. She believed that this concreteness is not just explicit in children and disturbed (schizophrenic) adults, but it is also the character of a deep layer of the unconscious in all people. KleinÕs observations led her to the view that oedipal configurations occurred in phantasies at a very early age. It became clear to her that the father particularly was regarded for some time as a very restricted function, called in short-hand ‘‘fatherÕs penis.’’ This occupied mother and took her mentally and physically from the infant. It was thought that at the earliest stages mother was little more than a breast. When she fed, she was ‘‘good breast’’ and when she frustrated she was an evilly intentioned ‘‘bad breast.’’ Likewise the penis inside her was a ‘‘bad penis’’ if it was an obstruction in the infantÕs way to the breast. But it could be a ‘‘good penis’’ if it was felt to protect mother (or the breast) for the infant. The parents as part-objectsbreast and penis were believed by the infant to be in some form of intercourse defined by the infantÕs own phantasies. The bad parents (breast and penis) were INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS dangerous, threatening to destroy each other, and known as the ‘‘combined parent figure.’’ In contrast, the infant in loving mood, could then fantasize in an intercourse of great, benign, and beautiful creativity. KleinÕs point of view put great weight on the internalization of these part-objects that loved or hated the infant. Ordinary steady development and sanity depended on the internalization of the good object. This gives rise to an internal good state of mind. The ego develops a continuity in its feeling of being loved. Conversely when introjection is mostly of bad objects there ensues a state of internal turmoil, disorganization and ultimately fragmentation. The early introjection of a good object/breast results in a benign internal state, and a growth of the ego. The object is drawn into the ego itself or assimilated to become a benign core to the personality. The ego, and the personality, tends therefore to build up from objects that are internalized and assimilated. Bad, evil objects may be internalized and remain unassimilated, constituting a permanent internal threat, often expressed in hypochondriacal complaints. At a stage when the external objects can be perceived in a more realistic way, there is a tendency, through internalizing them as a mixed object, for the internal state to become populated by objects that are a mixture of good and bad. This poses an alarming change for the personality, known as the depressive position. Its characteristic anxiety—guilt—derives from the sense of the internal object now being a spoiled good object, damaged and with the threat of its death. The classical Oedipus complex displays a restricted version of the polarities; the one a good source of all libidinal satisfactions, and the other hated parent, thought to be dangerous, obstructing, and castrating. KleinÕs early descriptions of an internalized punitive object relate to the concept of the superego, notably a harsh one. The variety of forms of this object, in play, dreams and phantasy manifestations, led her to believe that the superego is a large repertoire of objects, only some of which had moral aspects. The primitive experience of separating apart good and bad features of the world, does occur in Freud, notably in ‘‘Die Vereinigung’’ (‘‘Negation’’) (Freud, 1925) where he places the origins of judgment in the narcissistic decision to take in good things and eject bad things. 219 BREASTFEEDING Fairbairn presented a schema in which the ego, itself split, relates to three internal objects—the libidinal, anti-libidinal and ideal objects—to form three paradigm endopsychic structures. Though there is leeway for much variation in these structures, they are rather different from the free world of internal play and drama of KleinÕs internal objects. FreudÕs descriptions of infancy are rooted in the drive theory and are distinct from Melanie KleinÕs conception of the good and bad breast. Good and bad objects are in themselves motivated with good or bad intentions towards the ego. The latter downplays the libido theory and promotes object-relations to the center of metapsychology. ROBERT D. HINSHELWOOD See also: Object; Splitting; Splitting of the object. Bibliography Klein, Melanie. (1932). The psycho-analysis of children. London: Hogarth Press. ———. (1933). The early development of conscience in the child. In Sándor Lorand, (Ed.), Psycho-analysis today (pp. 149–162). New York: Covici-Friede. ———. (1952). Developments in psycho-analysis (Joan Riviere, Ed.). London: Hogarth Press. ———. (1975). Infantile anxiety situations reflected in a work of art and in the creative impulse. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 10 (1929), 436– 443.) ———. (1975). Personification in the play of children. In The writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. 1, pp. 199–209). London: Hogarth. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 10 (1929), 171–182.) BREASTFEEDING Suckling is the action whereby milk is fed to the infant until it is weaned. By extension, the term refers to breastfeeding as well as bottle-feeding. Before an emphasis was placed on the importance of the object and the infantÕs environment, psychoanalysts spoke little of maternal suckling. However, Sigmund Freud, in a text that needs to be viewed in historical context, titled ‘‘A Case of Successful Treatment by Hypnotism,’’ evokes the case of a young woman, ‘‘occasionally hysterical . . . who is willing to feed her infant but behaves 22 0 as if she doesnÕt want to’’ (1892–93a). The dimension of the unconscious conflict is not taken into account here and Freud clings to the idea of will and counterwill. An outline of maternal psychopathology is given, and here the difficulties of breastfeeding are treated by hypnosis. Suckling is not a psychoanalytic concept. In speaking of suckling we cannot forget the physical link associated with the reality of the nutritive relation. The image of the infant at the motherÕs breast has considerable metaphoric and symbolic value; it is an image that makes us nostalgic for a sense of original fulfillment and can be compared with that other, ‘‘final,’’ image of death, as characterized by the iconography of the old man at the breast. The container, the breast, and its content, milk, are both associated with projected fantasies. The milky substance, a liquid that contrasts with the solidity of the breast, is a vehicle of fantasies of fusion and vampirism. Once the infantÕs teeth begin to grow, the fantasies are those of oral sadism and cannibalism. There is an analogy to be made between the breast and the penis, between milk and sperm, one of which nourishes and one of which fecundates, and at the same time an incompatibility because sperm is, in fantasy at least, supposed to spoil milk; thus there is a separation between the sexual and the nutritive. A dichotomy has always existed between the breast as a nourishing object and the breast as an erotic object, a separation that helps avoid the confrontation between an incestuous mother and the importance of maternal libidinal and erotic investment. However, in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), commenting on the ‘‘dream of the Fates (Knödel), Freud wrote that ‘‘at the womanÕs breast love and hunger meet.’’ For the breast satisfies both the alimentary and the sexual impulses: ‘‘To begin with, sexual activity attaches itself to functions serving the purpose of self-preservation and does not become independent of them until later. No one who has seen a baby sinking back satiated from the breast and falling asleep with flushed cheeks and a blissful smile can escape the reflection that this picture persists as a prototype of the expression of sexual satisfaction in later life’’ (1905d). The nipple is a sexual object throughout Freudian metapsychology. The transition from sucking the nipple to sucking is a key moment in the organization of the earliest feelings of autoeroticism and investment of the mouth as an erogenous zone. Freud does not mention (Laplanche, 1997) the erogenous erotic component for the mother during breastINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BREASTFEEDING feeding. For the infant the breast assumes (secondarily) its forbidden erotic value with the organization of the oedipal conflict; initially the infant simply ‘‘is the breast’’ (Freud, 1941f [1938]), during a period of primary identification with the breast and primal fusion. It has become obvious that the object plays a key role in enabling the polarization of the libido into certain zones. This follows their unification when the infant is breastfeeding and the libido experiences a sense of satisfaction, at a time when the mouth that sucks and the nipple that nourishes are inseparable and indistinguishable. The mother ‘‘(moreover) makes a gift to the infant (while she is lavishing her attention on him) of feelings arising from her own sexual life . . . and clearly grasps these as a substitute for a separate sexual object’’ (1905d). Freud returned to this position and developed it in his Outline of Psychoanalysis: ‘‘She is not content to nourish, she cares for the infant and thus awakens in him many other physical sensations, agreeable and disagreeable. Thanks to the care she lavishes, she becomes his first seductress. Through these two relations, the mother acquires unique importance, incomparable, unalterable, and permanent, and becomes for both sexes the object of the first and most powerful of his loves, the prototype of all later amorous relations’’ (1940a [1938]). The role of the object and precocious maternal seduction as it occurs through breastfeeding are questioned by contemporary analysts. Jean Laplanche (1987) has developed the idea that sexuality is implanted in the infant through the initial seduction of the adult, and emphasizes the unconscious sexuality of the seducer. From this follows the possibility of a significant reassessment of the role of the impulses, the role of the object, and anaclisis; he also raises the question of the primal. For Paul Denis the question of mastery is present at the heart of the initial experiences of feeding, but the encounter between the mouth and the nipple, to the extent that it combines kinesthetic and sensory feelings, instinctual excitation and pleasure/ unpleasure, is an essential period during which the activity of the initial representation takes place (the ‘‘pictogram’’ of Piera Aulagnier, 1975). For authors such as Esther Bick, the emphasis is on the presenceabsence of the breast during this primitive stage of undifferentiated autosensuality characterized by the encounter between mouth and nipple. The role of the object remains essential for enabling the consensual union and unification of the libido. The motherÕs container function is experienced as a ‘‘skin’’: ‘‘The INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS optimal object is the nipple in the mouth, together with the motherÕs touch (holding), speech, and familiar odor’’(1968). With respect to bottle or breastfeeding, Freud responds only in terms of privation. In all cases there remains a feeling of ‘‘having sucked too little and for too short a time,’’ the nostalgia for the breast being stronger for the child who has been bottle-fed (1940a [1938]). Melanie Klein (1952), writing about breastand bottle-feeding, returns to the question of the primacy of the object and instinct, the importance of the exterior object and the reality of the breast. For her the breast is the object of intense fantasized projections because it is a primordial object. The cannibalistic oral impulses directed toward the motherÕs breast are especially intense. As for the mother, the fact of feeding her baby has a restorative effect because it terminates the sadistic fantasies with respect to her own mother: ‘‘The nourishing and beneficial milk she dispenses signifies for the unconscious that her sadistic fantasies have not been realized and that their objects have rediscovered their integrity’’(1932). For Donald Winnicott breastfeeding is expanded to the babyÕs environment in the broad sense and to the richness of the experience the mother offers. The quality of maternal holding and handling is essential, for these are both a function of the motherÕs internal conflicts and of her own infantile experiences. The foundations of psychic health depend on this ‘‘facilitating environment.’’ The experience of the survival of the object in the face of the babyÕs attacks seems to her essential and in the end helps her advance the idea of difference ‘‘between the survival of a part of the motherÕs body and the survival of a bottle’’ (1987). Although he is cautious when discussing mothers and does not dismiss the unconscious maternal implications, he emphasizes the importance of the carnal reality of the experience of the breast; in this body-tobody relation, the exchange of glances and the sensual experience are essential to communication. Breastfeeding is a situation that so profoundly involves the motherÕs body and psychic life that it is subjected to the unconscious conflicts that affect the mother and to the fantasies awakened through the encounter between a specific mother and a specific infant. Suckling extends the period of pregnancy and birth and is inseparably a part of the womanÕs sexual life and her life history. Primitive psychic activity is associated with these very first contacts that are always difficult to conceptualize. 221 BRENTANO, FRANZ VON (1838 –1 917) Psychoanalysts who care for infants are conscious of this in their clinical activity and research. Laplanche, Jean. (1987). Nouveaux Fondements pour la psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. The invention of the bottle (1820), followed by the introduction of sterilization (1892–1898), have profoundly altered breastfeeding. Artificial milk eliminates the need for direct recourse to another woman, in the position of wet-nurse, and the babyÕs survival (in reality) no longer depends on the product of the motherÕs body. The transition from motherÕs milk to artificial milk, while it abandons its natural origins, cannot be assimilated to the transition from raw food to cooked food discussed by Lévi-Strauss. But how can social and cultural ideology be made to mesh with unconscious maternal choices? ———. (1997). Le prégénital freudien à la trappe: après l’analyse. Revue française de psychanalyse, 61, 4: 1357– 1369. JOYCELINE SIKSOU See also: Early interactions; Erotogenic zone; Holding; Weaning. Bibliography Bick, Esther. (1968). The experience of the skin in early object relations. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 49, 558–566. Castoriadis-Aulagnier, Piera. (1975). La Violence de l’interprétation. Du pictogramme à l’énoncé. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, ‘‘Le Fil rouge.’’ Delegay-Siksou, Joyceline. (1986). Allaiter: au sein ou au biberon? Nourrir un enfant. Lieux enfance, 6–7, 35–57. Denis, Paul. (1997). Emprise et satisfaction, les deux formants de la pulsion. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1892–93a). A case of successful treatment by hypnotism SE, 1: 115–128. ———. (1900a) The interpretation of dreams. Part I., SE, 4: 1–338; The interpretation of dreams. Part II., SE, 5: 339– 625. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1940a [1938]). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 139–207. ———. (1941f [1938]). Findings, ideas, problems. SE, 23: 299–300. Klein, Melanie. (1952). En observant le comportement des nourrissons. In Joan Riviere (Ed.), Developments in psychoanalysis. London: Hogarth Press ———. (1952). Quelques conclusions théoriques concernant la vie émotionnelle des bébés. In Joan Riviere (Ed.), Developments in psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth Press. 22 2 Winnicott, Donald W. (1987). Babies and their mothers. (Clare Winnicott, Ray Shepherd, and Madeleine Davis, Eds.). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Further Reading Sarlin, Charles N. (1981). The role of breast feeding in psychosexual development and the achievement of the genital phase. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 29, 631–642. BRENTANO, FRANZ VON (1838–1917) Franz von Brentano, a German Dominican philosopher and theologian, was born in Marienberg in 1838 and died in Zürich in 1917. His ideas influenced Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. It was in 1874, the year Brentano published his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Psychology from an empirical standpoint), that the young Sigmund Freud, an eighteen-year old student, wrote to his friend Eduard Silberstein[RB1], ‘‘I, a doctor and atheist empiricist, I have signed up for two courses in philosophy . . . One of the courses—you will be amazed when you hear this—concerns the existence of God; Prof. Brentano, who is teaching the course, is a man, a thinker, and a marvelous philosopher.’’ On March 7, 1875, he added, ‘‘Both of us (me and Paneth) have grown closer to him, we sent him a letter with our objections and he invited us to his home, refuted us, seemed to take an interest in us. . . . Concerning this remarkable man (he is a believer, a teleologist [!] and a Darwinist, and damned intelligent, even brilliant), who in many ways satisfies the requirements of the ideal, I will have much to tell you in person. But I can give you this piece of news now: under BrentanoÕs influence especially (which has had a maturing effect), I have made a decision to sit for the doctorate in philosophy and will study philosophy and zoology.’’ The most detailed report of the visit to Brentano shows how he influenced Freud: ‘‘He totally condemns [HerbartÕs] a priori constructions in psychology and feels that itÕs unforgivable that he never thought of considering spontaneous experience or provoked experience to see if they confirmed his gratuitous INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B R E T O N , A N D R É (1896 –1 966) hypotheses; he claims unhesitatingly to belong to the empirical school, which applies the method of natural science to philosophy and, in particular, to psychology (this is, in fact, the principal advantage of his philosophy, the only thing that makes it bearable for me), and he revealed to us several interesting psychological observations that show the inanity of HerbartÕs speculations. According to him, it is more necessary to submit certain specific problems to more extensive research, in order to achieve definite partial results, than to claim to embrace philosophy as a whole, which is not possible, given that philosophy and psychology are still young sciences, which cannot expect any support, especially from physiology.’’ Aside from the affirmation of empiricism and the primacy of observation and experiment that Freud would never forget, the meeting with the Catholic theologian is the only time that Freud, ‘‘an atheistic Jew,’’ had a momentary metaphysical hesitation. He described the experience as follows: ‘‘Ever since Brentano imposed his God on me with ridiculous facility, through his arguments, I fear being seduced one of these days by proofs in favor of spiritualism, homeopathy, Louise Lateau, etc. . . . ItÕs a fact that his God is nothing but a logical principle and that I have accepted it as such. Yet, we proceed down a slippery slope once we acknowledge the concept of God. It remains to be seen at which point we stumble. Moreover, his God is very strange. . . . It is impossible to refute Brentano before hearing him out, studying him, exploring his thought. Confronted with such a rigorous dialectician, we must strengthen our intellect by addressing his arguments before confronting him directly.’’ FreudÕs connection to philosophy lasted longer than this first contact, and it was Franz von Brentano who suggested to Theodor Gomperz, five years later, that Freud translate the twelfth volume of the Complete Works of John Stuart Mill (1880a), which contained ‘‘On the Emancipation of Women,’’ ‘‘Plato,’’ ‘‘The Social Question,’’ and ‘‘Socialism.’’ ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Breuer, Josef; Hard science and psychoanalysis; Philosophy and psychoanalysis; Self-consciousness; Vienna, University of. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography von Brentano, Franz. (1874) Psychology from an empirical standpoint. Edited by Oskar Kraus, English edition edited by Linda L. McAlister, translated by Antos C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister, with a new introduction by Peter Simons. London, New York: Routledge, 1995. Freud, Sigmund. (1989a) [1871–81, 1910]). The letters of Sigmund Freud to Eduard Silberstein, 1871–1881 (Walter Boehlich, Ed.; Arnold J. Pomerans, Trans.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. BRETON, ANDRÉ (1896–1966) A French poet, the founder and theoretician of the surrealist movement, André Breton was born February 19, 1896, in Tinchebray, France, and died in Paris on September 28, 1966. Until he was four years old, Breton was raised in Brittany by his maternal grandfather. Nostalgia for those early years of astonishment, fear, and surprise never left Breton. In 1907 he entered the Lycée Chaptal in Paris. In 1913 he began studying medicine, published his first verses, and established literary friendships, first with Paul Valéry, followed by Guillaume Apollinaire and Pierre Reverdy. Mobilized in 1915, in July 1916 he asked to be assigned to the armyÕs neuropsychiatric center in Saint-Dizier. This period had a ‘‘decisive influence’’ (Conversations, 1952) on Breton. As a student of medicine, he observed his patients with close attention. He developed a strong interest in psychiatry and in Freud, whose ideas he encountered for the first time in Emmanuel RégisÕs Précis de psychiatrie. As a poet he began to ask questions about literary creation. The discourse of madness contained striking images, how did these come into being? How did madmen and poets develop their language? What was the relationship between subject and object embodied in language? Freud provided a response to these fundamental questions but Breton had access to them only in the form of RégisÕs introduction. As a result his concept of Freudian analysis was distorted. Although Breton understood the role of the libido, the conflict between desire and censure, and the dream work that provides insight into the artistic process, he believed with Régis that the analytic method was a mechanized collection of the subjectÕs verbal outpourings, which he repeated as they popped into his mind, like a ‘‘recording device’’ 223 B R E U E R , J O S E F (1842 –1 925) (Régis). This was a formula Breton was to use in his Surrealist Manifesto: ‘‘We . . . who have turned ourselves into . . . modest recording devices in our art . . .’’ (1924). Transference, the analystÕs suspended attention in the face of the representations supplied by the subject or their interpretation, dream associations, all of this disappeared. Although Breton continued his medical training until 1920, he was not interested in therapy. His meeting with Freud in 1921 had no affect on him (1924). The problems he wanted to resolve were different: ‘‘There is the entire question of language.’’ (1919) With psychoanalysis, Freud provided Breton with a theory of language. ‘‘Those verbal representations that Freud claims are Ômemory traces arising principally from acoustic perceptionsÕ are precisely what constitute the raw material of poetry’’ (1935). The poet as dreamer is the ‘‘receiver of Indirect Contributions’’ supplied by the figurative activity of the preconscious mind, where representations of words and things make contact with one another. He ‘‘yields to the collage’’ of associations (1919). This leads to the creative experiments Breton conducted from 1919 to 1924 (automatic writing, hallucinosis, halfsleep, automatic writing, and others), which found a large number of applications in literature. In the Surrealist Manifesto, Breton condensed the theoretical conclusions he drew from his experiments. This was the founding text of the surrealist movement that did so much to introduce Freudian ideas to France and elsewhere. Although Breton used Hegelian dialectics to criticize Freud (Communicating Vessels, 1932; the republication of 1955 contains three letters from Freud to Breton), he continued to study him (Carnet, 1921, Cahier de la girafe sur la Science des rêves, 1931, Position politique du surréalisme, 1935, Anthology of Black Humor, 1940) and emphasize the importance of his thought. ‘‘Surrealism . . . considers the Freudian critique of ideas . . . to be the first and only one with a basis in fact’’ (1930). NICOLE GEBLESCO See also: Claude, Henri Charles Jules; Literature and psychoanalysis; Surrealism and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Alexandrian, Sarane. (1974). Le surréalisme et le rêve. Paris: Gallimard. 22 4 Bonnet, Marguerite. (1975). La violence du voir. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Breton, Andre. (1988, 1992). Œuvres complètes (M. Bonnet, Ed.). Paris: Gallimard, La Pléiade. Carrouges, Michel. (1950). André Breton et les données fondamentales du surréalisme. Paris: Gallimard. Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1978). Les vases non communicants. N.R.F, 302, 26–45. BREUER, JOSEF (1842–1925) Josef Breuer, an Austrian doctor, was born January 15, 1842, in Vienna, where he died on June 20, 1925. Breuer, the son of a liberal Jewish professor of theology, studied medicine in Vienna and obtained his degree in 1864. He served as an assistant in internal medicine to Theodor Oppolzer, and worked on heat regulation and the physiology of respiration (HeringBreuer reflex); upon becoming a practitioner in 1871, he set up his practice in Vienna. He also conducted research on the function of the inner ear (Mach-Breuer theory of the flow of endolymphatic fluid) and, although he became a specialist in internal medicine in 1874, he returned to his research in 1884. He was the friend and family doctor of several members of the Vienna Teachers College and of Viennese high society. He maintained a correspondence with artists, writers, philosophers, psychologists, and colleagues in his field, and in 1894 was elected a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences. Well versed in philosophy, Breuer was interested in the theory of knowledge and the theoretical foundations of Darwinism (1902 conference, exchange of letters with Franz von Brentano). He was an active participant in discussions on the foundations of politics and ideology, and discussed issues of art, literature, and music. As an assimilated and enlightened Jew, he adopted a kind of pantheism that he derived from Goethe and Gustav Theodor Fechner. His favorite aphorism was SpinozaÕs suum esse conservare (preserve oneÕs being). He was gripped by a form of skepticism and spoke, following William Thackeray, of his ‘‘demon ÔbutÕ,’’ which forced him to question any newly acquired knowledge. Because of his detailed knowledge of the history of ideas and social history, his appreciation of the political conditions of his era, as well as for reasons having to do with his own life, he believed it was nearly impossible for him to undertake a questionable action. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B R E U E R , J O S E F (1842 –1 925) Underlying BreuerÕs research on physiology was the quest for the relation between structure and function, and thus for a form of teleological query. He was particularly interested in regulatory processes in the form of self-control mechanisms. Unlike a number of physiologists in the so-called biophysicalist movement, inspired by Ernst Brücke, Hermann von Helmholtz, and Emil Du Bois-Reymond, Breuer believed in neovitalism. In 1880–1882 Breuer treated a young patient, Bertha Pappenheim (Anna O.), for a nervous cough and a multitude of other hysterical symptoms (mood swings, alterations in states of consciousness, visual disturbances, paralysis and contractions, aphasia). During the many long interviews, doctor and patient saw that some symptoms disappeared when the memory of their first appearance returned and could be reproduced, and the associated affects could be awakened and abreacted. This occurred at specific times of day, during spontaneous auto-hypnotic states. Based on these observations, initially accidental, patient and doctor developed a systematic procedure whereby the individual symptoms were gradually recalled during their appearance in reverse chronological order, until they disappeared for good following a reproduction of the original scene. Sometimes artificial hypnosis was used during therapy if the patient was not in a state of auto-hypnosis. The patient, who at times ‘‘forgot’’ her native language and understood only English, jokingly referred to this therapy as the talking cure, or chimney sweeping. During the therapy, a stay at a clinic near Vienna was required because of the patientÕs heightened risk of suicide. In spite of the apparent and surprising success of the method, certain manifestations remained. These included the temporary loss of her native language and violent neuralgia of the trigeminal nerve, which required morphine treatment, leading to addiction. Because of her symptoms Breuer had his patient admitted for further treatment to Dr. Ludwig BinswangerÕs Bellevue sanatorium in Kreuzlingen in July 1882. She left in October, improved but not fully cured (Histoire de la maladie, in Hirschmüller, A. 1978). She lived until 1888 in Vienna, was treated on several occasions, then moved to Frankfurt, where she had an active life as a writer, social worker, defender of womenÕs rights, and a leader of the movement of Jewish women in Germany (Jensen, E. 1984; Tisseron, Y. 1986; Heubach, H. 1992). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS In 1882 Breuer discussed the case with his colleague Sigmund Freud, fourteen years his junior. Freud tested BreuerÕs method on patients after he began working as a neurologist. Starting from the theories of Jean Martin Charcot, Pierre Janet, August Ferdinand Möbius, Hippolyte Bernheim, and others, they jointly developed a theoretical framework for the operation of the psychic apparatus and for their therapeutic procedure, which they called the ‘‘cathartic method’’ in reference to AristotleÕs ideas about the function of tragedy (catharsis as the purification of the spectatorsÕ emotions). In 1893 they published a preliminary report entitled ‘‘On the Psychic Mechanisms of Hysterical Phenomena’’. This was followed two years later by the Studies on Hysteria, the ‘‘cornerstone of psychoanalysis’’ (Ilse Grubrich-Simitis), establishing the foundations of the field. There was a chapter on theory (Breuer), a chapter on therapy (Freud), and five case histories (Anna O., Emmy von N., Katharina, Lucy R., Elisabeth von R.). Freud continued to develop the theory and technique as they developed the work jointly (defense neuroses, free association). Breuer was not convinced by the exclusive emphasis on sexual factors and Freud saw BreuerÕs caution as a sign of aloofness. In 1895 the distance between the two men increased, resulting in the end of their collaboration. Breuer continued to take an interest in the development of psychoanalytic theory but abandoned cathartic therapy. Freud later proposed the hypothesis that Anna O.Õs treatment had been suddenly interrupted because of a violent erotic transference, accompanied by hysterical pregnancy and childbirth. This version of events, constructed retroactively by Freud and spread by Ernest Jones, among others, cannot withstand historical scrutiny. More recent attempts to show that the description of the case of Anna O. was a ‘‘fraud’’ (Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen) are a form of unsubstantiated polemic. ALBRECHT HIRSCHMÜLLER See also: Anna O., case of; ‘‘Autobiographical Study, An’’; Autosuggestion; Cathartic method; Conversion; Free energy/bound energy; Hypnoid states; Hypnosis; Hysteria; Memory; On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement; Pappenheim, Bertha; Psychic energy; Remembering; Reminiscence. 225 B R I E R L E Y , M A R J O R I E F L O W E R S (189 3 –1984 ) Bibliography Breuer, Josef. (1986). Die krisis des Darwinismus und die teleologie. Vortrag, gehalten am 2.5.1902. Tübingen: Diskord. Ebner-Eschenbach, Marie von; Breuer, Josef. (1969). Ein briefwechsel, 1889–1916. Vienna: Robert A. Kann. Hirschmüller, Albrecht. (1978). Physiologie und psychoanalyse in leben und werk Josef Breuers. Bern-Stuttgart: Hans Huber. Jensen, Ellen M. (1970). ‘‘Anna O: A study of her later life.’’ The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 39, 269–93. ———. (1984). Streifzüge durch das leben von Anna O.Bertha Pappenheim. Ein fall für die psychiatrie. Ein leben für die philanthropie. Dreieich. Pappenheim, Bertha. (1992). Sisyphus. Gegen den Mädchenhandel Galizien: Bertha Pappenheim, die Anna O. In Helga Heubach (Ed.), Freiburg im Breisgau. Le Travail de Sisyphe. (1986). Paris: Des femmes-Antoinette Fouque. BRIERLEY, MARJORIE FLOWERS (1893–1984) Marjorie Flowers Brierley, British psychoanalyst, was born on March 24, 1893, and died on April 21, 1984. Entering University College, London, in 1916, she gained her BSc Hons (first class in psychology) in 1921, and her MB BS in 1928, registering as a medical practitioner in 1929. Concurrently, she trained with the British Psycho-Analytical Society, having personal analysis with John Carl Flugel (1922–1924), and Edward Glover (1925–1927). She was ‘‘passed for practice’’ in October 1929, becoming a full member in 1930, and training analyst, control analyst and lecturer to students in 1933. In 1922 she married William B. Brierley, botany professor at Reading University, formerly husband to Susan Isaacs. Between qualification and the late 1940s she served actively on many committees of the British Society, including the Training Committee and Board and Council, and helped organize the Controversial Discussions of 1943–1944 (King, Pearl, 1991). She read thirteen papers to the Society and published eleven papers, thirty-one book reviews and twentyfour abstracts in the International Journal, and one book. In 1954 her husband retired and they moved to the country, whence she published twenty-six further book reviews and two articles, continuing as assistant editor of the International Journal until 1978. 22 6 Her earliest psychoanalytic publications, two papers on the then-topical subject of female development (1932, 1936), were notable for scholarship and independence; Brierly was, though not aggressive about it, one of those who differed from Freud. Her book, Trends in Psycho-Analysis (1951), contained versions, sometimes revised or expanded, of all her other papers of 1934–1947. These included ‘‘Affects in Theory and Practise,’’ a concise and original review, which aimed to restore affects (which had never lost their importance in psychoanalytic practice) to their consonant place in theory, which had lapsed into disuse after Freud focused more on repressed unconscious and instinct theory. The chapter ‘‘Problems Connected with the Work of Melanie Klein’’ derived from her papers ‘‘A Preparatory Note on Internalised Objects,’’ and ‘‘Internal Objects and Theory,’’ and on contributions Brierley made to the Controversial Discussions. Valuing the great enrichment of KleinÕs new ideas of infantile phantasy and object relationships, she acutely explored problems concerning inter alia precocity, regression, and differences between stages, as well as terminology confusing concept and phantasy conceptually. A later chapter extended this differentiation to describe two independent aspects of psychoanalytic theory, the abstract objective, ‘‘Metapsychology,’’ and the subjective, which she named ‘‘Personology.’’ Later sections explored metapsychology as ‘‘Process Theory,’’ and many other aspects and ramifications of psychoanalytic thinking. John Bowlby described Brierly as ‘‘[p]robably having a better grasp of scientific principles than anyone else’’ (King 1991), regarding her 1937 paper on affects. This paper was considered ‘‘seminal’’ and as ‘‘opening a new era in understanding,’’ when the 1977 International Congress took ‘‘Affect’’ as its main theme. Calm and open-minded, she contributed significantly towards the partial resolution of acrimonious disputes within the British Society prior to and after the Controversial Discussions. During them, her clarifying contributions were much valued by both sides. Her writings are remarkable for concision, clarity, scholarship, intelligence and great intuitive sensitivity. ANNE HAYMAN See also: British Psycho-Analytical Society; Controversial Discussions. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B R I L L , A B R A H A M A R D E N (1874 –1 948) Bibliography Brierley, Marjorie. (1932). Some problems of integration in women. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 13, 433–448. ———. (1936). Specific determinants in feminine development. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 17, 163–180. ———. (1951). Trends in psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth. Hayman, Anne. (1986). What do we mean by phantasy? International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 70, 105–114. King, Pearl H. M., and Steiner, Riccardo. (1991). The FreudKlein controversies 1941–1945. London, New York: Tavistock Publications-Routledge, New Library of Psychoanalysis. BRILL, ABRAHAM ARDEN (1874–1948) The American psychiatrist Abraham Brill was born on October 12, 1874, in Kanczugv, Austria (then Galicia) and died on March 2, 1948, in New York City. His father was a noncommissioned officer in the Austrian Army who served with Maximilian in Mexico. After spending his childhood in Austria, Brill emmigrated to the United States in 1889 at age fifteen, without his family and with almost no money. He worked to support himself through high school and college, graduating from New York University in 1901. He received an MD degree from the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University in 1904. Brill worked as a psychiatrist in the New York State Mental Hospital System at the Central Islip State Hospital under the tutelage of Adolph Meyer and August Hoch. From 1902 to 1907, he traveled in Europe, first to Paris and then, at the suggestion of Frederick Peterson, to Zürich; there he learned about FreudÕs new science, psychoanalysis, from the staff of the Burgholzi Psychiatric Clinic (which included Eugen Bleuler and Carl Jung). He returned to America a year later and accepted a position as assistant physician of mental disease, Bellevue Hospital, which he held until 1911. In 1909 he attended the Clark University Conference, traveling with FreudÕs party from New York. He became the first practicing psychoanalyst in America and interested a small group of New York psychiatrists in psychoanalytic ideas. In 1911, Sigmund Freud urged Ernest Jones to establish the American Psychoanalytic Association (APA) with James Jackson Putnam as president, and Brill as secretary. Brill refused to participate and instead, on February 12, 1911, with fifteen other physicians, founded the New York Psychoanalytic Society, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS several months before the APA was established in May of that year. From that time to the close of the First World War the New York Psychoanalytic Society was kept alive, practically single handedly, by Brill. He was the expositor and public advocate of psychoanalysis par excellence. He spoke at medical, neurological, and psychiatric societies, and to lay groups as well. He lectured to social workers, the New York City Police College, the Education Department of NYU—many of these lectures were reprinted in professional journals and lay publications. During the 1930s he presented a weekly radio broadcast lecture on mental health themes. Of greatest importance for the dissemination and promulgation of psychoanalytic ideas in America were BrillÕs translations. Brill translated into English the major work of Sigmund Freud, some of Carl Gustav JungÕs works, and BleulerÕs Textbook of Psychiatry. His own publications included numerous journal articles and important books, including Psychoanalysis (1921). His The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud was published in 1938. Abraham Arden BrillÕs importance to psychoanalysis was also as a leader of both psychoanalytic and psychiatric institutions. Brill became a member of the APA in 1914. He served as president of the APA in 1919 and 1920 and again from 1929 to 1935. He was president of the New York Psychoanalytic Society from 1911 to 1913 and from 1925 to 1936. His influence on psychoanalysts both in New York and the United States was at its zenith between 1929 to 1936. During this period he played a central role in restricting membership in the New York Society and in the APA to physicians. He defied Freud, who was supportive of lay analysis, because of his concern about ‘‘quackery,’’ medical treatment by poorly trained or unauthorized practitioners. It was BrillÕs conviction that the survival of psychoanalysis in the United States depended on maintaining its medical identity. Brill also played an important role in achieving autonomy for the APA within the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA). These organizational and credential principles were maintained until overturned by the settlement of a lawsuit brought against the IPA, the New York and Columbia Psychoanalytic Institutes, and APA by a group of psychologists in the 1980s. From the years immediately preceding World War II and until his death in 1948, Brill was displaced first by the Americans Bertram Lewin and Lawrence Kubie, and then by the Viennese psychoana227 B R I T I S H P S Y C H O -A N A L Y T I C A L S O C I E T Y lysts who emigrated to New York to escape Nazi persecution. However, he remained a proud and respected figure who more than any other psychoanalyst was responsible for the growth of psychoanalysis in the United States. ARNOLD D. RICHARDS See also: Frink, Horace Westlake; International Psychoanalytic Association; Lay analysis; New York Psychoanalytic Institute; United States. Bibliography Hale, Nathan G., Jr. (1995). The rise and crisis of psychoanalysis in the United States: Freud and the Americans 1917– 1985. New York: Oxford University Press. BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY The London Psycho-Analytical Society, formed in 1913, was composed of thirteen members, only four of whom worked as psychoanalysts, while others agreed with Jung. On February 20, 1919, ten members interested in FreudÕs work agreed to disband that group and to re-form it as the British Psycho-Analytical Society. They decided only to accept as members, those who were interested in and practiced psychoanalysis. The members elected Dr. Ernest Jones as president and decided that members and associate members should be elected. They drew up rules for the Society, and in 1924 the Institute of Psycho-Analysis (IPA) was set up to hold property, to deal with financial and other matters concerning publication. Later the Institute became responsible for the administration of the Clinic and of training activities. The officers of the Society were responsible for the scientific activities of members and were its link with the IPA. In 1926, the London Clinic of Psychoanalysis was established. Members gave one session a day freely to the Clinic, for the next thirty years. It was disclaimed from the National Health Service (NHS) in 1948–49 and it is still an independent clinic. As membership increased, so the committee structure expanded, and after 1946 committees were governed by the ‘‘GentlemanÕs Agreement.’’ In September 1972 the Society was registered as a Charity: No. 264314. By 1920 there were thirty members and associate members of the British Society. During the 1920s several members of the British Society went to Europe for 22 8 analysis with Freud, Hans Sachs, Karl Abraham and Sandor Ferenczi. The approach of these analysts influenced the British approach to psychoanalysis. By 1925 there were fifty-four members of the Society, who came from a number of professional disciplines, among them were psychiatrists, medical practitioners, teachers, graduates and ‘‘gentlemen scholars.’’ In 1927 Melanie Klein became a member of the Society and she brought with her various scientific differences with the Viennese, and especially with Anna Freud. After 1933 the growth of anti-Semitism under Hitler put the lives of Jewish psychoanalysts in danger, first in Germany, and then from 1938 in Austria. Many became refugees, and some of them, including the Freuds, accepted membership of the British Society, to the great enrichment of psychoanalysis in London. Originally, to become a member, associates read a clinical paper to the Society or to a Panel, but since 1975, they have had the option of taking a two-year membership course. In 1925 at the Bad Homburg Congress in Germany, the first Conference of delegates from branch societies took place and agreed that training should be the responsibility of a training committee and not of an individual. In 1926, the British elected their first training committee and formalized their training. The need for medical qualifications was discussed but most members of the Society supported FreudÕs point of view against this requirement. Disagreements in the British Society and criticisms of Melanie KleinÕs theories led to the ‘‘controversial discussions,’’ which were concerned with what kind of psychoanalysis should be taught to students. Following these discussions, Glover resigned from the Society and Anna Freud resigned from the training committee. When Sylvia M. Payne was elected as President in 1944, she suggested a change in the training program in order to include Anna FreudÕs approach to psychoanalysis. Training was divided into Course A, which catered to the majority of the British Society (i.e. the Middle Group and the Kleinians) and Course B, which catered to Anna FreudÕs approach. In order that no one group could dominate the others, it has been agreed that all committees contain representatives of each group. This was not written down in the Society rules, so it was called the ‘‘gentlemenÕs agreement.’’ Groups are now designated as Kleinian, Independent (Rayner, 1991), and Contemporary Freudian. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY These earlier training arrangements were revised in the early 1960s when a separate curriculum committee was set up alongside the training committee. Later in 1973, after much research, a new structure was agreed upon, which allocated aspects of the training process to separate sub-committees, whose chairmen were members of the policy-making education committee. Training takes place primarily in London, although special arrangements have been made for selected students from Scotland and Northern Ireland to be trained as psychoanalysts. Since 1919 the scientific and clinical interests of members have included the role of anxiety, hostility and aggression, the theory of symbolism, character problems, the origin and structure of the superego, problems of psychoanalytic technique, a psychoanalytic theory of psychoses, and the psychoanalysis of children. They also applied psychoanalytic understanding to the arts, educational, and social issues. Interest in the early development of infants and the possibility of analyzing them increased with the move of Klein to London in 1927. Her ideas started to have implications for work with adult patients, which some members considered to be incompatible with FreudÕs approach. KleinÕs critics objected to her use of fantasy, her interpretation of FreudÕs concept of the death instinct, and her concept of internal objects. When Anna Freud and her colleagues arrived in 1938, they joined KleinÕs critics. Between 1942 and 1944 Scientific Meetings were arranged to explore these differences, after which members agreed to differ within the context of the gentlemanÕs agreement (King and Steiner 1991). After the Second World War the scientific life of the Society continued to be characterized by interest in child analysis, psychotic and borderline conditions and the application of psychoanalysis to the arts and social issues. The division into three groups created at times serious disagreements, but properly contained they contributed to the creativity and liveliness on the scientific life of the Society. In the early twenty-first century, the scientific differences between members have decreased, and interest now centers on technique and the ‘‘here and now’’ of the analytic relationship rather than on the elucidation of theoretical issues and concepts. As papers on applied subjects were seldom read at Scientific Meetings, in 1968 a special Section was set up that became known as the ‘‘Applied Section.’’ Through this section and courses of public lectures, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS alongside the Annual Ernest Jones Lecture, links have been made with colleagues from other professional disciplines. During the 1920s, Susan Isaacs did research on the social and intellectual development of young children in the Malting House School, Cambridge (Isaacs 1933). In 1932, Edward Glover carried out and later published research on the way members of the Society worked as psychoanalysts (Glover and Brierley 1940). In 1957, the Research Committee was set up to facilitate applications for membersÕ research. Interest also centers on the conceptualization in statistical terms of the outcome and effectiveness of psychoanalysis. In 1981, the Erich Simenauer Foundation was set up, through the generosity of the late Prof. Simenauer, who was an Honorary Member of the Society, to support and encourage psychoanalytic research work. After Ernest Jones died, his remaining papers were given to the Archives of the Society. They cover his work for the International, as well as for the Society. When Pearl King became honorary archivist, she began to index the Archives on a computer database. This is an ongoing task. The Archives have become an important center for research into the history of psychoanalysis. In 1920, the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis started publication—the first psychoanalytic journal in the English language. A Glossary Committee of Joan Riviere, James and Alix Strachey, and Ernest Jones, worked in collaboration with the Freuds on the task of translating FreudÕs work and concepts from German into English. In 1924, The International Psycho-Analytical Library was started with the Hogarth Press. In 1986, the Institute launched The New Library of Psychoanalysis in cooperation with Tavistock and then Routledge. Following the Second World War, the Society sponsored the translation of FreudÕs complete psychological works into English and their publication in twenty-four volumes as the Standard Edition. James Strachey carried the main responsibility for this great achievement, with the help of Anna Freud (Steiner 1987). A revised Standard Edition is planned; it is to include matter from previously unknown papers, corrections, and a glossary of German words having controversial translations. Professional and public concern with the legitimacy of psychoanalysis as a medical specialty led the British Medical Association in 1927 to set up a committee to investigate it. After meeting for two years, they agreed 229 B R Ü C K E , E R N S T W I L H E L M VON (18 19 –189 2) not to oppose the use of psychoanalysis, by those trained by the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, as a treatment for mental illness. Since then the Society has presented evidence to a number of Royal Commissions. In 1956, on the centenary of FreudÕs birth, the London County Council placed a commemorative plaque on the house where he had lived in Maresfield Gardens, Hampstead. In 1986, following the death of Anna Freud, this house was opened by Princess Alexandra as the home of the Freud Museum. In 1975 David Astor donated the money for a Freud Professorship at University College, London. Initially, the professors were appointed annually, but in 1984 Dr. J. J. Sandler was appointed as the first full-time Freud Professor. The Society built up close links with hospitals in the NHS, especially with the Tavistock Clinic and the Cassel Hospital, which resulted in their facilitating the training of psychoanalysts who were on their staff. The Society also supported the Anna Freud Center in its training of child psychotherapists and child psychoanalysts. Several members of the British Psycho-Analytical Society have held important professional roles in the psychoanalytical world: Ernest Jones, William H. Gillespie, Adam Limentani and Joseph Sandler were presidents of the IPA. The Society has organized four IPA. Congresses: in Oxford in 1929, in London in 1953, in Edinburgh in 1961 and in London in 1975. The Society was responsible to the IPA for the Sponsoring Committees for Australia and Canada, and it has trained candidates from many countries. Isaacs, Susan. (1933). Social development in young children. London: Routledge. King, Pearl H. M., and Steiner, Riccardo. (1991). The FreudKlein controversies 1941–1945. London, New York: Tavistock Publications-Routledge, New Library of Psychoanalysis. Rayner, Eric. (1991). The independent mind in British psychoanalysis. London: Free Association Books. Steiner, Riccardo. (1985). Some thoughts about tradition and change arising from an examination of the British Psycho-Analytical Society’s ‘‘Controversial Discussions,’’ 1943–1944. International Review of Psycho-Analysis, 12, 27–71. BRÜCKE, ERNST WILHELM VON (1819–1892) A German doctor and physiologist, Ernst Wilhelm von Brücke was born June 6, 1819, and died January 7, 1892, in Vienna. The son of a portrait and historical painter, following his motherÕs premature death he was raised by his uncle, the superintendent C. Droysen, in Stralsund. He studied medicine in Berlin and Heidelberg in 1838 and became a doctor of medicine in Berlin in 1842. In 1843 he became an assistant to Johannes Müller at the Museum of Comparative Anatomy and a prosector; in 1846 he also served as a teacher of anatomy at the Academy of Fine Arts in Berlin. Bibliography Brücke completed his degree in physiology in 1844 and was appointed full professor of physiology and general pathology in Königsberg, and professor of physiology and (microscopic) anatomy in Vienna, where he held the chair of physiology for forty years, until his appointment as professor emeritus in 1890. He was ennobled in 1873 and became rector of the University of Vienna in 1879. He was a member of the Academy of Sciences, the Prussian Order of Merit, and the Upper House of Austria, and received numerous decorations and honorary distinctions. As a cofounder of the Physics Society in 1845 (the Berlin and later the German Physics Societies were offshoots of this organization), he was, along with Emil Du Bois-Reymond, Hermann von Helmholtz, and Karl Ludwig, one of the defenders of organic physics, which, in contrast to the then-dominant vitalist tradition, held that all vital manifestations were the result of physico-chemical forces in the organism. Glover, Edward, and Brierley, Marjorie. (1940). An investigation of the technique of psycho-analysis. London: Bailliere, Tindall and Cox. Brücke was the most learned physiologist of his time and helped enrich several areas of natural science. He was active in the physiology of optics, the physiology of Joseph Sandler and Anne Marie Sandler were Presidents of the European Psychoanalytical Federation. Since 1969, every two years the Society has organized the English Speaking Conference for European psychoanalysts. PEARL KING AND RICCARDO STEINER See also: Controversial Discussions; Jones, Ernest; International Journal of Psychoanalysis, The; Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. 23 0 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B R U N , R U D O L F (1885 –1 969) plants, the physiology of digestion, of the blood, the nerves, and the muscles, cellular physiology, biochemistry (the purification of pepsins, which led to our understanding of enzymes), the physiology of speech, and even linguistics. His many publications included the two-volume Vorlesungen über Physiologie (Lessons on Physiology; 1873, 1874). BrückeÕs laboratory was a place where fundamental research on the exact sciences of nature was carried out and he introduced a new methodology to the Vienna school of medicine, which was strongly influenced by his work. Sigmund Freud, who described Brücke as the ‘‘highest authority who has ever had an influence on me,’’ worked in BrückeÕs laboratory between 1876 and 1882. His earliest writings on neurophysiology are based on his work there and BrückeÕs influence is clearly evident in FreudÕs earliest theoretical writings on psychoanalysis. Brücke, who had sponsored Freud for a professorship, referred, in his letter of recommendation, to FreudÕs work on neurology as being ‘‘very important.’’ He also helped Freud obtain the travel stipend that allowed him to work with Charcot in Paris. HELMUT GRÖGER See also: ‘‘Autobiographical Study, An’’; Freud, Ernst; German romanticism and psychoanalysis; Interpretation of Dreams, The; Reversal into the opposite; Science and psychoanalysis; Vienna General Hospital. Bibliography Bernfeld, Siegfried. (1949). Freud’s scientific beginnings. American Imago, 6, 163–196. Brücke, Ernst Wilhelm von. (1873–1874). Vorlesungen über Physiologie. Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller. Jones, Ernest. (1953). Sigmund Freud: Life and work. London: Hogarth Press. Lesky, Erna. (1965). Die Wiener medizinische schule. 19 Jahrhundert. Graz-Köln: Hermann Böhlaus. BRUN, RUDOLF (1885–1969) Rudolf Brun was a Swiss physician, a neurologist, holder of the chair of neurology (1940), and member of the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society. He was born March 15, 1885, in Zurich, where he died on January 14, 1969. Brun was born into a family of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Huguenots. His father was a professor of art history in Zurich. As a young man Brun studied in Zurich, completing his medical studies in Zurich, Geneva, and Algiers. Upon leaving school in 1909, he became an assistant to C. von Monakow (clinical work and brain anatomy) at the Zurich Neurological Institute. He completed his training as a general practitioner at the regional hospital in Glarus in 1911–1912 and studied neurology in London and Paris from 1912 to 1913. Under the influence of August Forel, while Brun was still a student, he began studying the behavior of ants, and his research soon attracted the attention of the scientific community. Between 1918 and 1925 he was head physician at the Zurich Neurological Institute. He was exposed to FreudÕs writings during his studies but it wasnÕt until 1916, during his psychological experiments with animals and humans, that he was willing to accept the theory of drives. After 1925 he had his own practice as a neurologist and psychoanalyst. After the makeover of the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society in 1919 he became an associate then a full member, and shared administrative duties with Philipp Sarasin, with whom he completed a training analysis in 1925–1926. Together with Emil Oberholzer he provoked a break between the Ärztgesellschaft für Psychoanalyse (Medical Society for Psychoanalysis) and the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society, which he returned to in 1947. He never met Freud in person. Brun wrote more than 120 publications on entomology, anatomy and pathology, neurology, and psychoanalysis. In the Allgemeine Neurosenlehre (1942) he established the position of psychoanalysis in biology. For Brun neuroses were the result of conflicts between the primary (sexual and self-preservative) and secondary (social) instincts. Anxiety is the result of libidinal stasis caused by hormonal activity. Actual neuroses, in FreudÕs sense, assumed considerable importance for Brun. Because of his biological orientation, Brun reacted violently to beliefs that were based, according to him, on ‘‘transcendental idealism,’’ such as Daseinanalyse (existential analysis). KASPAR WEBER See also: Schweizerische Ärztegesellschaft für Psychoanalyse; Switzerland (German-speaking). 231 B R U N S W I C K , R U T H M A C K (1897 –1 946) Bibliography Aeschlimann, Jürg. (1890). Rudolf Brun (1885–1969). Leben und werk des zürcher neurologen, psychoanalytikers und entomologen. Zürcher medizingesch. Abhandlung, 144, 1980. Brun, Rudolf. (1926). ‘‘Experimentelle beiträge zur dynamik und ekonomie des triebkonflikts; biologische parallelen zu Freuds trieblehre.’’ Imago, 12, 147–170. ———. (1951). General theory of neuroses; twenty-two lectures on the biology, psychoanalysis and psychohygiene of psychosomatic disorders. (Bernard Miall, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1956). Mein weg zu Freud. Schweizer Zeitschrift für Psycholie, 15, 125–130. Minkowski, Mieczyslaw. (1969). Louis Rodolphe Brun, 1885–1969. Schweizer Archiv. Neurol. Neurochir. Psychiatr., 106, 330–334. BRUNSWICK, RUTH MACK (1897–1946) Ruth Mack Brunswick, a psychoanalyst and psychiatrist, was born in 1897 in Chicago, died January 25, 1946 in New York City. Ruth BrunswickÕs father, Judge Julian Mack, became a famous jurist on the U.S. Circuit Court in New York, and also he was known as a prominent Jewish philanthropist. His only daughter Ruth attended Radcliffe College during World War I, and also graduated from Tufts Medical School. In 1917 she married Dr. Herman Blumgart, who later pursued a successful career as a heart specialist; his brother Leonard had gone to Vienna for a short analysis with Sigmund Freud at the end of World War I. Ruth had completed her psychiatric residency when, at the age of twenty-five, she also went to Freud. Her marriage was already troubled; her husband saw Freud in an unsuccessful effort to salvage the marriage, but Freud evidently decided the relationships was hopeless. Ruth had fallen in love with a man five years younger than herself, Mark Brunswick, at the time a music student. Ruth was still in analysis with Freud in 1924 when Mark as well began to consult Freud. According to Mark, Freud later admitted that it had been a mistake for Freud and Ruth to have discussed MarkÕs case in detail. In the meantime Ruth was teaching at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Training Institute; her specialty was the 23 2 psychoses, an area of study that Freud personally avoided. Ruth and Mark were married at the town hall in Vienna in 1928; it was one of the few weddings Freud ever attended. RuthÕs access to Freud seemed unique; she came to meals at his apartment, visited him in summers, and was on excellent terms with his children. Ruth was considered a member of FreudÕs extended family. Ruth played a special role in mediating between the American analysts and FreudÕs circle in Vienna. She became an important channel through which wealthy American patients arranged to undergo analyses with Freud. In recognition of her special standing, Ruth became one of the few women who received a ring from Freud. She also played a notable part in supervising FreudÕs precarious health. Her own patient in analysis, Dr. Max Schur, became appointed FreudÕs personal physician. Ruth had health problems, though, that her doctors could not diagnose as unquestionably organic. By 1933 or 1934 at the latest she had developed a serious drug problem, and by 1937 she had become an addict. Her failure to overcome her difficulties was the main reason for FreudÕs final disappointment in her. The worst of RuthÕs drug addiction occurred in America; her mother died in 1940, her father in 1943. Ruth and Mark were divorced in 1937, and then— against FreudÕs advice—they re-married in six months. Mark finally divorced her in 1945. RuthÕs death in 1946 was the end-result of a pattern of self-destructive behavior. She had been drinking paregoric the way an alcoholic consumes whiskey. Her health was undermined, and the federal authorities had taken note of her drug-taking. She caught pneumonia, recovered, and then died from the combination of too many opiates and a fall in the bathroom; she had hit her head and fractured her skull. The full tragedy was for many years not publicly known. The cloudy circumstances associated with RuthÕs medical troubles, and the misfortune of her early death, have obscured both her scientific contributions and her immense personal standing with Freud. RuthÕs central contribution to psychoanalytic thinking had to do with her special concern with the childÕs earliest relationship to the mother. In 1929 she was one of the first in print to use the term preoedipal, and Freud himself adopted it two years later. Otto Rank probably deserves the credit for being the earliest to invoke the concept, but Ruth was tactful INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BULIMIA enough to be able to emphasize the importance of the mother in the development of the child, without any revolt on her part against FreudÕs basic ideas. She will also be remembered as the Wolf ManÕs second analyst. In 1926 Freud referred the Wolf Man to Ruth for treatment, paying her a high compliment; he knew that anything she published would become famous in the clinical literature. She wrote an article about the Wolf Man in close collaboration with Freud. She also trained some famous future analysts; she analyzed Muriel Gardiner, Max and Helen Schur, and Robert Fliess, the son of FreudÕs former friend Wilhelm. Her most famous student was Karl Menninger, who saw her later in the United States. Ruth had a special talent for manipulating FreudÕs theoretical concepts, and using them to set forth new ideas of her own. Freud admired her freedom, which helps to account for his partiality toward her. RuthÕs analysis with Freud stretched, with some interruptions, from 1922 until 1939. Unwittingly Freud had helped bring about the dependency that it ideally should have been the task of analysis to dissipate. Mark claimed that Freud had first treated Ruth in too close a way, and then tried to be too distant. To insiders within the analytic movement RuthÕs death was proof that analytic treatment could not be counted on to prevent human misery. It was left to others, such as Rank and Melanie Klein, to go on to make ‘‘pre-oedipal’’ problems the centers of their respective systems of thought. Ruth Mack Brunswick was one of the most important women in FreudÕs immediate circle during the last years of his career; but the tragedy of her life, and the implications it made about her work, has meant that her name is relatively unknown to the general public. PAUL ROAZEN See also: Addiction; ‘‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’’ (Wolf Man); Schur, Max. Bibliography Brunswick, Ruth Mack. (1928). A supplement to FreudÕs history of an infantile neurosis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 9, 439–76. ———. (1929). The analysis of a case of paranoia (delusions of jealously). Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 70, 1– 22; 155–178. ———. (1940). The preoedipal phase of the libido development. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 9, 293–319. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS BULIMIA Bulimia (from the Greek boulima: hunger [limos] of an ox [bous]), a medical term that has entered common usage, refers to an eating disorder characterized by episodes. A bulimic episode (a binge) is defined as a fit of frenzied overeating in which an excessive amount of food is consumed in a short time; this episode involves a sense of loss of control. It can occur several times in one day and can completely overwhelm the subject. Bulimia always entails a major and overwhelming event that is convulsive or ritualized, and violent. There is usually an awareness of the pathological nature of this behavior, combined with fear of an inability to avoid it, pleasure, shame, and self-denigration. In addition to bulimia relating to food, there is a form of bulimia that relates to various consumer items (medicines, pathological buying) and to sex. There are descriptions of bulimic episodes dating from antiquity. Medical dictionaries, particularly in the English language, refer to this disorder from the beginning of the eighteenth century (Blankaart, 1708). Historically, bulimia was predominantly a male disorder and was akin to hyperphagia and gluttony. It was long considered a manifestation of the same order as neurotic symptoms (Janet, 1903); Sigmund Freud referred to it as one of the symptoms of anxiety neurosis and also recorded it as an eating compulsion motivated by a fear of starvation. As a manifestation of orality in the broad sense, bulimia is generally a form of pathological behavior, a passage to the act that is often impulsive and bypasses any mentalization or psychic material. It then has a defensive function in warding off psychotic disorganization or depressive affects. Karl Abraham mentioned it in his work on melancholia and, in Fear of Breakdown (1974), Donald Winnicott described it as a form of defense against the frightening nature of the void. Bulimia is also associated with the addictions (Radó, 1926). In 1945, Otto Fenichel classified it as a ‘‘drugless addiction.’’ Marie-Claire Célérier regards it as a symptom on the boundary between a psychosomatic loss of meaning and a hysterical signifier (1977), while Joyce McDougall describes it in terms of a symptomatic act that substitutes for the undreamt dream. 233 B U L L I T T , W I L L I A M C. (18 91 –196 7) Bulimia is a widespread phenomenon in Western societies that is both on the increase and more out in the open. It has gradually become a syndrome in its own right—bulimia nervosa—with a separate status from anorexia nervosa and obesity. Wermuth and Russell first established the diagnostic criteria for the bulimic syndrome. In addition to bulimic episodes, these include various strategies for controlling weight and a psychiatric co-morbidity that can be severe (thymic disorders and addictions). These criteria reflect the notions of loss of control, chaotic functioning, inadequate mentalization and relationships of dependency (Jeammet, 1991) that are observed in these patients. Contemporary discussions of bulimia refer to a complex, multi-faceted disorder that combines eating binges with a range of strategies for maintaining a normal weight, distortions in cognitive functioning and body-image perception, and emotional disturbances (Vindreau, 1991). In the majority of cases, the origins of the disorder are traced back to adolescence and its physiological and psychodynamic transformations. As of 2004, ninety percent of bulimics are women but the bulimia rate is rising among men. Whereas the incidence of the syndrome is three percent in the general population, it rises to seven percent in some adolescent, student, and high-school groups. The conception of bulimia has developed from a simple compulsive substitution for a repressed sexual drive, into the widely-recognized, contemporary bulimia nervosa. Throughout this development, its definition has closely reflected both sociological and cultural changes and the psychopathological theories that prevailed over time. Above all, both the recourse of acting out through eating behavior, and the perceived need for particular bodily sensations in order to produce a psychic effect (Brusset, 1991), pose questions relating to self-esteem, difficulty in controlling behavior and emotions, narcissistic difficulties, and the quest for identity. CHRISTINE VINDREAU See also: Anorexia nervosa; Self representation. Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1924). A short study of the development of the libido, viewed in the light of mental disorders. Selected papers on Psycho-Analysis (pp. 418–501). London: Hogarth Press. 23 4 Brusset, Bernard. (1991). Psychopathologie de l Õanorexie mentale. Paris: Dunod. Célérier, Marie-Claire. (1977). La boulimie compulsionnelle. Topique, 18, 95–116. Fenichel, Otto. (1945). The psychoanalytic theory of neurosis. New York: W. W. Norton. Freud, Sigmund. (1926d). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. Igoin, Laurence. (1979). La boulimie et son infortune. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Janet, Pierre. (1903). Les Obsessions et la psychasthénie. Paris: Alcan. Jeammet, Phillipe. (1991). Dysrégulations narcissiques et objectales dans la boulimie. In Bernard Brusset and Catherine Couvreur (Eds.), La boulimie (pp. 89–104). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. McDougall, Joyce. (1974). The psyche-soma and the psychoanalytic process. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 1, 437–460. Radó, Sándor. (1926). The psychic effects of intoxicants: an attempt to evolve a psycho-analytical theory of morbid cravings. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 7, 396– 413. Vindreau, Christine. (1991). La boulimie dans la clinique psychiatrique. In Bernard Brusset and Catherine Couvreur (Eds.), La boulimie (pp. 63–79). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Winnicott, Donald W. (1974). Fear of breakdown. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 1, 103–107. BULLITT, WILLIAM C. (1891–1967) William C. Bullitt, an American political leader, was born on January 25, 1891, in Philadelphia and died on February 15, 1967, in Paris. With Freud, he was coauthor of ‘‘Thomas Woodrow Wilson: A Psychological Study’’ (1967), and he helped Freud to immigrate to London. Bullitt was raised in Philadelphia and educated at Yale College in New Haven, Connecticut. He became a prominent figure in American foreign policy. He was a U.S. advisor at the negotiations for the Treaty of Versailles and went to see Lenin on behalf of the U.S. and British delegations. When BullittÕs Russian mission was disavowed, he became bitter toward President Wilson and testified before Senator Henry Cabot LodgeÕs congressional committee; the secretary of state INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B U R G H Ö L Z L I A S Y L U M was then forced to resign, and BullittÕs evidence also helped defeat the entry of the United States into the League of Nations. In 1933 when President Roosevelt extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union, Bullitt became the first U.S. ambassador. Next Bullitt was ambassador to France from 1936 until the German invasion toppled the French Third Republic. Bullitt performed the role of a roving ambassador all over Europe and possessed a unique set of diplomatic contacts. As ambassador to Austria, Bullitt helped Freud escape Vienna in June 1938 after the Nazis moved into Austria, though what role Bullitt played is not entirely clear. The stories about Bullitt are colorful. His role in destroying the political career of Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles during the Second World War ruined BullittÕs standing with Roosevelt. Bullitt then attempted to become elected mayor of Philadelphia but was badly beaten. His early disappointment with the Soviets led him to become one of the first cold-war warriors. Bullitt was impulsive and high-handed, mercurial and impressionable—altogether not easy to work with. His brilliance did not prevent his becoming known as intemperate and unstable, even if he could be charming and debonair. In 1948 Bullitt became a Republican and remained on personal terms with some of the great and mighty. But he ended up as an outsider, a political exile. In 1926 Bullitt published a novel that sold some 150,000 copies. In the late 1920s Bullitt, who had been a patient of FreudÕs, began a collaborative study with Freud on Wilson, who both authors, for different reasons, hated. It has remained a curiosity how Freud and Bullitt came to write such a polemical assault, using psychoanalytic concepts, in their book on Wilson. It is still unknown who wrote which sections. Part of the scholarly problem has stemmed from BullittÕs fascination with intrigue; Freud privately complained about BullittÕs secretiveness shortly after the manuscript was completed. The book on Wilson may be one of the first efforts at psychological history, but it was so partisan as to have damaged the case for using psychology to understand political leaders. PAUL ROAZEN Work discussed: Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twentyeighth President of the United States. A Psychological Study. See also: Politics and psychoanalysis. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Bullitt, William C. (1919). The Bullitt mission to Russia. New York: Huebsch. ———. (1926). It Õs not done. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. ———. (1946). The great globe itself. New York: ScribnerÕs. Freud, Sigmund, and Bullitt, William C. (1967). Thomas Woodrow Wilson: A psychological study. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. BURGHÖLZLI ASYLUM The psychiatric asylum in Burghölzli entered the history of psychoanalysis as a result of the interest shown by Eugen Bleuler and his students (including Carl Gustav Jung) in FreudÕs theories and their possible application to the mental patients at the asylum. By the mid-nineteenth century there were a number of significant problems with this former clinic. Plans for its reconstruction were made between 1860 and 1864 with the help of Wilhelm Griesinger, a professor of internal medicine at the University of Zurich. The actual work took place between 1864 and 1870. On July 4, 1870, work on the Burghölzli was completed. The various medical directors of the Burghölzli left their mark on the institution. The first director, Bernhard von Gudden (1870–1872), Gustav Huguenin (1873–1874), and Eduard Hitzig (1875–1879), had a purely biological orientation. Brain pathology and physiology were the focus of their research. It was August Forel (1879–1898) who brought international attention to the clinic. The Burghölzli then served as a bridge between the dynamic approach taken by French psychiatry and the biological orientation of German psychiatry. ForelÕs celebrated book on hypnotism reflects the importance of the asylum at the time. Bleuler, the director from 1898 to 1927, who had worked with Jung at the Burghölzli, opened the field to psychoanalytic research and its application in an institutional framework. In 1913 he distanced himself from FreudÕs work because of personal conflicts and scientific disagreements. The clinic lost its importance as a center of psychoanalytic research and a vehicle for its dissemination. The Burghölzli would never again generate the level of interest in psychoanalysis shown at that time. 235 BURLINGHAM-ROSENFELD SCHULE The clinic did play a central role in the diffusion of psychoanalysis between 1904 and 1913. It was not only the first clinic in the world where FreudÕs theories were scientifically tested and his therapeutic methods applied to patients, but also an internationally renowned research center for analytical psychology and therapy. For Freud the Burghölzli served to legitimize his work in the face of the often violent polemics against him. Aside from Jung, Adolf Meyer, Abraham Brill, and Emil Oberholzer, a number of FreudÕs students, including Karl Abraham, worked at the Burghölzli. The Burghölzli has become a modern psychiatric clinic with 341 beds and more than 1600 new patients annually (1996). In addition to treating a wide range of conditions, there are ambulatory and semi-ambulatory services for all sectors of psychiatry. It administers its own school of nurses. As a university clinic the Burghölzli has continued to pursue teaching and research activities since its inception. Its research in the field of psychopathology and in the treatment of mental illness has attracted international attention. BERNARD MINDER See also: Bleuler, Paul Eugen; Switzerland (Germanspeaking). Bibliography Bleuler, M. (1951). Geschichte des Burghölzlis und der psychiatrischen universitätsklinik. Zürcher Spitalgeschrift, 2, 377–425. Psychiatrische Universitätsklinik Burghölzli Zürich. (1970). 1870–1970: Hundert Jahre Festschrift (pp. 1–87). BURLINGHAM-ROSENFELD SCHULE. See Hietzing Schule/Burlingham-Rosenfeld School BURLINGHAM-TIFFANY, DOROTHY (1891–1979) Psychoanalyst Dorothy Burlingham was born in New York on October 11, 1891, and died in London on November 19, 1979. She was closely associated with Anna Freud and her personal history is intimately linked to the psychoanalytic movement. 23 6 BurlinghamÕs grandfather, Charles Tiffany, was the founder of the famous jewelry store, Tiffany & Co., and her father was Louis Comfort Tiffany, the celebrated painter and artisan. In 1914 Dorothy wed a surgeon, Robert Burlingham, but their marriage was soon troubled, in great part due to his phobias and episodes of manic-depressive illness. The couple separated in 1921. After moving to Vienna with her four children in 1925, Dorothy began analysis with Theodore Reik. Her life subsequently became entwined with that of the Freuds, as Anna Freud took her children into treatment. In spite of becoming AnnaÕs close friend, Dorothy undertook a second analysis with Sigmund Freud. The situation was loaded with a series of fantastically complex entanglements. Ernst, son of Sophie Halberstadt (FreudÕs daughter, who died in 1920) was best friends with Bob, Dorothy BurlinghamÕs son. Both attended the Hietzing School, which had been founded in 1927 by Anna and Dorothy, together with Eva Rosenfeld, with a view to raising children from their milieu in a ‘‘psychoanalytic’’ fashion. Burlingham fled Vienna upon the Nazi invasion in 1938, and after a short stay in the United States, and following FreudÕs death in London, settled close to Anna Freud near Maresfield Gardens. During the war, Anna and Dorothy founded and managed together the Hampstead War Nurseries, where they undertook historic research which they reported on in Infants Without Families (1943). Their collaboration led them to a groundbreaking description of infantile depression and an important advance in psychoanalytic psychopathology. Their friendship was profound, and DorothyÕs death powerfully affected Anna. She continued to care for her friendÕs children with such emotional investment that it provides an interesting perspective on the mechanism of ‘‘altruistic surrender’’ that she had once described. In addition to her work with Anna Freud, Burlingham wrote several studies of blind children and, in addition, undertook early research on the psychology of identical twins. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Abandonment; Bergasse 19, Wien IX; Freud, Anna; Hampstead Clinic; Latent; Lehrinstitut der Wiener psychoanalystischen Vereinigung. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS B U R R O W , T R I G A N T (1875 –1 950) Bibliography Burlingham, Dorothy. (1952). Twins: A study of three pairs of identical twins. London: Imago Publishing. Burlingham, Michael John. (1989). The last Tiffany: A biography of Dorothy Tiffany Burlingham. New York: Atheneum. Freud, Anna, and Burlingham, Dorothy. (1943). Infants without families. London: G. Allen and Unwin. BURROW, TRIGANT (1875–1950) A forgotten American psychoanalyst and pioneer of group analysis, Trigant Burrow was born in Norfolk, Virginia, on September 17, 1875, and he died on May 25, 1950, in Westport, Connecticut. Burrow was the fourth child of John and Anastasia Burrow; his father was Protestant, his mother, a Catholic. His father was a scientifically-minded wholesale pharmacist. At the beginning of his higher education, Burrow attended Fordham University, where the dogmas of the Catholic church began to lose their significance for him. Following his graduation in 1895, he entered the medical school at the University of Virginia, 1899. One year was spent in post-graduate study of biology, one year touring Europe where he attended the psychiatric clinic in Vienna of Professor WagnerJarureg. Returning to America he spent three years in the study of experimental psychology, for which he received a PhD in 1909 based on his study of the process of attention. This was a subject that he pursued later in his psychoanalytic career when his interest turned back to physiological processes. Burrow began to work with the Swiss psychiatrist Adolf Meyer at the New York State Psychiatric Institute, and was introduced to Freud and Jung who were in America for the Clark University Lectures. Burrow was immediately determined to study psychoanalysis and at the age of thirty-four moved with his family to Zurich for a year’s analysis with Carl Gustav Jung. This involved considerable financial hardship, but he greatly valued his experience there. This was at the time when Freud and Jung were still closely associated. Burrow was proud of the fact that he was the first American-born person to study psychoanalysis in Europe. In 1910, he returned to Baltimore to work with Meyer at Johns Hopkins University. In 1911, he joined INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Ernest Jones and others to found the American Psychoanalytic Association (APA). Between 1911 and 1918, Burrow published eighteen papers on psychoanalysis. His originality is shown in papers written from 1914 onwards. They anticipate much later work in infant development: He writes of the ‘‘preconscious’’ experience of the infant, which remains part of the psyche throughout life. He does not mean Freud’s preconscious, that which is accessible to consciousness, but that which is prior to consciousness, when the infant is at one with the mother. For the infant the mother is the infant’s love subject, not love object, and the preconscious mode is a feeling that goes out of the infant’s primary identification with the mother. In the womb there is a primary physiological unity between infant and mother and a psychological union, a pre-objectless state. These manifest in later life as states of quietude and self-possession. The break in physiological and psychological union with the mother through birth is restored when the infant nourishes at the breast, experiencing a semblance of organic unity, completion and satisfaction. This anticipates much later work, of Margaret Mahler on separate individuation, and Kohut and his selfobject theory. Burrow saw resemblances between his ideas and those of Ferenczi. Burrow’s move into group analysis was preceded by his accepting the challenge of one of his analysands, Clarence Shields, to change places with him. Accepting the role of patient, Burrow was immediately impressed with the nature of his own resistances and an appreciation of the social forces at work in the analytic situation. Soon he extended his study to the group situation where he, his colleagues and pupils entered into an intensive study of group processes. Burrow’s emphasis was on the analysis of the ‘‘here and now’’: ‘‘Group analysis or social analysis is the analysis of the immediate group in the immediate moment.’’ Every member of the group, including the analyst, is both an observer of his own processes and is observed by all the other members of the group. The analyst does not have a privileged position. Throughout his life Burrow thought of himself as being a psychoanalyst and a Freudian. He believed that he was extending the relational aspects that were already present in Freud and in correspondence tried to persuade Freud of the validity of his work with groups. He failed in this and in 1926 Freud wrote: ‘‘As 237 B U R R O W , T R I G A N T (1875 – 1950) far as the group is concerned an analytic influence is impossible.’’ Some of Burrow’s attempts to have his papers published in the Internationale Zeitschrift were blocked by Paul Federn and Sandor Rado. Burrow saw the ‘‘I-persona’’ that is each individual’s self-image as being derived from social influences. From infancy onward, society imposes concepts of what it is to be good and bad and each internalizes these social images and adapts to the demands of society. Thus individuals are divided from the primary organismic unity with society, the world; in group analysis individuals become aware of the strength of the social self-image and can begin to overcome its influence and to reunite with the group as a whole, with the wider society. Between 1925 and 1928, Burrow published a further thirteen papers, nine of which were given to the APA. He tried to persuade his fellow analysts that the neurotic structures of the individual are replicated in the neurotic structures of society: society is hysterical too, has its own elaborate system of defense mechanisms. He was appointed president of the American Psychoanalytic Society in 1925, but continued his critique of psychoanalysts. ‘‘We need to rid ourselves of the idea that the neurotic individual is sick and that the psychopathologists are well. We need to accept a more liberal societal viewpoint that permits us to recognize without protest that the individual neurotic is in many respects not more sick than we ourselves.’’ Burrow insisted that consensual observation is synonymous with scientific method and therefore it is only in the group ‘‘laboratory’’ situation that sexual fantasies, family conflicts, and the social mask become observable. At the annual meeting of the APA in 1925, he said that neurosis is social and that a social neurosis can be met only through a social analysis. In 1933, when the APA reorganized itself, Burrow was asked to resign his membership. He accepted this with dignity and tried to remain on friendly terms with many of his former colleagues. In the last phase of his work his interest turned back to the process of attention. Through physiological research and self-observation he described the process 23 8 by which each individual experiences the tensions of being a member of society: that is, by muscular tension in the ocular and forehead regions, which he called ‘‘ditention.’’ Through training it is possible to identify and to give up this process and to experience ‘‘cotention,’’ an experience that restores the sense of unity with the social. Burrow and his followers formed the Lifwynn Institute (Foundation for laboratory research in analytic and social psychiatry) in Westport, Connecticut, which has carried on his work. Burrow’s psychoanalytic and group analytic work anticipated the findings of much later workers. Sigmund Henrich Foulkes, the founder of group analysis, acknowledges his influence, having read his work in 1926. Many of the techniques of group therapy and of the encounter group movement originate from Burrow and his group laboratory. He wrote seven books and seventy articles, and had this comment: ‘‘Psychoanalysis is not the study of neurosis: it is a neurosis,’’ but for Freud he was a ‘‘muddled bubbler’’ (letter to Sándor Rádo, September 30, 1925). MALCOLM PINES See also: Group analysis; Group psychotherapies. Bibliography Burrow, Trigant. (1927). The group method of analysis. Psychoanalytic Review, 14, 268–280. ———. (1949). The neurosis of man: An introduction to the science of human behaviour. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. ———. (1958). A search for man’s sanity. The selected letters of Trigant Burrow, with biographical notes. New York: Oxford University Press. Syz, Hans. (1963). Reflections on group or phylo-analysis. Acta Psychotherapeutica et Psychosomatica, 2, 37–55. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 1 2 3 one: Karl Abraham (1877–1925), German psychoanalyst and doctor. Abraham was a close collaborator of Freud and founder of the Berliner Psychoanalytische Vereinigung (Berlin Psychoanalytic Society). Public Domain. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. two: Alfred Adler (1870–1937), American psychiatrist and creator of Individual Psychology, a form of psychotherapy . Getty Images. Reproduced by permission. three: Franz Alexander (1891–1964), Hungarian doctor, psychoanalyst, and founder of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute (shown here with A. A. Brill, left). Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. Reproduced by permission. 5 4 four: Didier Anzieu (1923–1999), French psychoanalyst and professor of psychology. Anzieu developed the notion of "skin-ego." Courtesy of the International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis. Reproduced by permission. five: Piera Aulagnier (1923–1990), French physician, psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst. Aulagnier was the founder of the Quatrième groupe. Courtesy of the International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis. Reproduced by permission. six: Robert Bak (1908–1974), Hungarian psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. Bak was president of the New York Psychoanalytic Society from 1957 to 1959. Photo by Ethel Pries. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. Reproduced by permission. seven: Edmund Bergler (1899–1962), Austrian psychoanalyst. Bergler was director of Freud's clinic in Vienna from 1933 to 1938, and the author of The Basic Neurosis. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. Reproduced by permission. 6 7 8 9 eight: Siegfried Bernfeld (1892–1953), Austrian philosopher and psychoanalyst. Freud considered Bernfeld to be one of his most gifted students. Public Domain. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. nine: Grete Lehner Bibring (1899–1977), Austrian doctor and psychoanalyst. Bibring made important contributions to the field of women's psychology, especially in her research on pregnancy and mother-child relationships. Archives, Boston Psychoanalytic Society and Institute (BPSI). Reproduced by permission. ten: Peter Blos, Sr. (1904–1997), German child psychoanalyst and founder of the Association of Child Psychoanalysis. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. Reproduced by permission. eleven: Eugen Bleuler (1857– 1939), Swiss professor of medicine. Bleuler was instrumental in opening the European medical community to psychoanalysis, despite his own tentative acceptance of Freud's work. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. Reproduced by permission. 10 11 twelve: Berta Bornstein (1899–1971), child psychoanalyst. Bornstein was an innovator in the field of child psychoanalysis. Photo by Ina Furst. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. Reproduced by permission. thirteen: Josef Breuer (1842–1925), Austrian physician. Breuer developed the "cathartic method" in collaboration with Freud as a result of Freud’s treatment of "Anna O." © Corbis. Reproduced by permission. fourteen: A. A. (Abraham Arden) Brill (1874–1948), American psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, first practicing psychoanalyst in the United States and one of the founders of the New York Psychoanalytic Society. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. Reproduced by permission. fifteen: Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–1893), French physician. Charcot was the first to use hypnosis to treat hysteria. Public Domain. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. 14 12 13 15 sixteen: Clark University: Group photograph taken during Freud's visit in 1909, his only visit to the United States. Back row from left: A. A. Brill, Ernest Jones, Sandor Ferenczi; Front row from left: Freud, G. Stanley Hall, Carl G. Jung. © Corbis/ Bettmann. Reproduced by permission. seventeen: Clark University Psychological Conference attendees, September 1909. © Corbis. Reproduced by permission. 16 17 18 19 eighteen: Helene Deutsch (1884–1982), American psychoanalyst. Deutsch was the first to write a book on the psychology of women. Archives, Boston Psychoanalytic Society and Institute (BPSI). Reproduced by permission. nineteen: Max Eitingon (1881– 1943), Russian physician, psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst. Eitingon was the founder of the Palestine Psychoanalytic Association in 1934. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. Reproduced by permission. twenty: Erik Erikson (1902–1994), German-born child psychoanalyst famous for his theory of the "Eight Stages of Psychosocial Development.” © Ted Streshinsky/Corbis. Reproduced by permission. twenty-one: Jean Favreau (1919–1993), French psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. Favreau served as head physician of the Centre de consultations et de traitements psychanalytiques (Center for Psychoanalytic Consultations and Treatment) from 1958 to 1989. Courtesy of the International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis. Reproduced by permission. 20 21 22 23 24 25 twenty-two: Sándor Ferenczi (1873– 1933), Hungarian neurologist and psychoanalyst. Ferenczi developed the "active technique" of analysis and pioneered work on the concept of introjection. Public Domain. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. twenty-three: Anna Freud (1895–1982), Freud's youngest child and a psychoanalyst. She was a pioneer in child analysis. Archives of the History of American Psychology. Reproduced by permission. twenty-four: Sigmund Freud (1856– 1939), Austrian physician, psychiatrist, and founder of psychoanalysis. Freud was also a prolific writer, whose work is appreciated for its artistry as well as its content. The Library of Congress. Reproduced by permission. twenty-five: Freud with his father Jakob (1815–1896), January 1865. Photo by Hulton Archive/Getty Images. Reproduced by permission. 26 27 28 twenty-six: Freud and sculptor O. Nemen with bust of Freud, 1931. AP/Wide World Photo. Reproduced by permission. twentyseven: Freud, his wife Martha and their daughter Anna, 1899. The Library of Congress. Reproduced by permission. twenty-eight: Erich Fromm (1900–1980), German psychoanalyst. Fromm, a Marxist, was very interested in connecting Marxism and psychoanalysis. He was also the founder of the Mexican Psychoanalytic Institute. Archive Photos, Inc. Reproduced by permission. C CÄCILIE M., CASE OF ‘‘Frau Cäcilie M.’’ is the pseudonym given by Sigmund Freud to Anna von Lieben (her identity was discovered by Peter Swales [1986]), a patient Freud described only briefly in the Studies on Hysteria (1895d). Born Baronne von Todesco in 1847 into a rich Jewish family living in Vienna, she was treated for several years by a number of celebrated physicians, including Jean Martin Charcot, before being sent to Freud, in 1887 or early 1888, by either Josef Breuer or Rudolf Chrobak. Freud treated Cäcilie M. until November 1893. Although the case receives scant attention in the Studies on Hysteria and in his correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess, it was significant. ‘‘This was shown in the case of another patient, Frau Cäcilie M., whom I got to know far more thoroughly than any of the other patients mentioned in these studies. I collected from her very numerous and convincing proofs of the existence of a psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomenon such as I have put forward above. Personal considerations unfortunately make it impossible for me to give a detailed case history of this patient, though I shall have occasion to refer to it from time to time’’ (1895d, p. 69) Von Lieben had been suffering sporadically from a facial neuralgia when she became FreudÕs patient. In 1925 Freud wrote that she had been sent to him ‘‘because no one knew what to do with her’’ (1925d, p. 18) after thirty years of hysterical disturbances, absences, and pain, which, against a background of depression and feelings of low self-esteem, had led to a serious morphine dependence. She was nine years older than Freud and was fortyone when he met her. Through her mother, born Gomperz, she found herself involved in a family that played an important role in FreudÕs life. Apparently, she met him prior to a trip to Paris, since a letter from Charcot dated September 26, 1888, makes reference to a consultation with the Parisian master, a consultation that does not appear to have been the first: ‘‘I am very grateful to you for the details you have provided concerning the state of Madame de L. Your difficult and extensive analysis of the varied and complex physico-psychic phenomena she presents show that you have grown attached to this interesting person just as we ourselves grew attached during her stay in Paris. I am in complete agreement with you on the method to be followed at this time. Moral treatment must play the principal role and, from the point of view of medication, there is absolutely nothing to say in general. One must naturally act following the indications of the moment. With respect to the diarrhea of which she complains and sometimes lasts two or three weeks, wouldnÕt it be appropriate to see how she responded to a few centigrams of silver nitrate taken internally? . . . But, I repeat, it is on her psyche that we must act, as you perfectly understood and it is in this way that we can be useful in this case. Moreover, compared to what she was before, the Mademoiselle de L. of today is much better in all respects. She is, as she herself recognizes, up to a certain point prepared to struggle for her life, something she was not willing to do previously’’ (de Mijolla, 1988). Because she was difficult to hypnotize, he accompanied her in July 1889 to Nancy to see Hippolyte Bernheim, who failed to obtain the desired results. This setback was part of what led Freud to abandon hypnosis and suggestion, which nonetheless had enabled his patient ‘‘to lead a tolerable existence’’ (1925d, p. 18). 239 CAHIERS CONFRONTATION, LES According to Freud, she presented a ‘‘hysterical psychosis of denial,’’ with broad periods of amnesia regarding the traumatic moments she had lived through. Toward the end of 1889 ‘‘an old memory suddenly broke in upon her clear and tangible and with all the freshness of a new sensation’’ and a ‘‘cathartic cure’’ could be undertaken, not however without ‘‘accompanied by the acutest suffering and the return of all the symptoms she had ever had’’ (1895d, p. 70n). It took three years of ‘‘chimney sweeping’’ to pay back ‘‘the old debts’’ (p. 70n), with alternating periods of irritability, depression, and anxiety. Cäcilie influenced Freud as well; she taught him the mechanism of ‘‘hysterical conversion’’ associated with a process of symbolization. Her trigeminal neuralgia, for example, appeared to be determined by a ‘‘traumatic scene’’ during which her husband had made a remark to her that she re-experienced during treatment, saying ‘‘It was like a slap in the face’’ (1895d, p. 178). She had an intuition of a future state that led her to remark, ‘‘ItÕs a long time since IÕve been frightened of witches at night,’’ the night before she experienced this fear. For Freud, ‘‘On each occasion what was already present as a finished product in the unconscious was beginning to show through indistinctly. This idea, which emerged as a sudden notion, was worked over by the unsuspecting ÔofficialÕ consciousness (to use CharcotÕs term) into a feeling of satisfaction, which swiftly and invariably turned out to be unjustified. Frau Cäcilie, who was a highly intelligent woman, to whom I am indebted, for much help in gaining an understanding of hysterical symptoms, herself pointed out to me that events of this kind may have given rise to superstitions about the danger of being boastful or of anticipating evils’’ (1895d, p. 76n). It is known that Freud saw her as often as twice a day (like Emmy von N.), even during his vacations, which earned her the name of Prima Donna in a letter to Fliess dated July 12, 1892. These two wealthy patients provided the bulk of his income for several months during 1889, but it was for other reasons that he was disappointed when Anna terminated her cure in 1893. On November 27, 1893 he complained in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess ‘‘My head misses the usual overwork since I lost [Cäcilie M.]’’ (letter to Wilhelm Fliess, November 27, 1893, in 1985, p.61). On February 8, 1897, he returned to the subject, ‘‘If you knew . . . [Cäcilie M.], you would not doubt for a moment that only this woman could have been my teacher’’ (1985, p. 229). 24 0 Peter Swales, after a long investigation, has written a fairly complete biography of this patient, who was a member of ViennaÕs aristocracy and an active participant in Jewish intellectual life. It is easy to understand the extent to which she could have influenced Freud, who also saw in her a refutation of the theories of Pierre Janet on the congenital deficiencies of the mental state of hysterics. She died on October 31, 1900, of a heart attack. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Studies on Hysteria. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies in hysteria, SE, 2: 48–106. Freud, Sigmund. (1925d). An autobiographical study, SE, 20: 1–74. Freud, Sigmund, and Fliess, Wilhelm. (1985). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess: 1887-1904 (Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, Ed. and Trans.). Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press. Mijolla, Alain de. (1988). Les lettres de Jean-Martin Charcot à Sigmund Freud, 1886–1893. Le crépuscule d’un dieu. Revue française de psychanalyse, LII, 3, p. 703–726. Swales, Peter. (1986). Freud, his teacher, and the birth of psychoanalysis. In Paul E. Stepansky (Ed.), Freud: Appraisals and reappraisals (pp. 3–82). New Jersey: The Analytic Press, 1986. CAHIERS CONFRONTATION, LES Under the editorial direction of René Major, Les Cahiers Confrontation was the eponymous publication that broadened the audience for the discussions and debates that constituted the well-known series of seminars, Confrontation. In articles that asked probing and provocative questions outside the usual bounds of various disciplines, each issue of the biannual publication (1979-1989), which featured original cover art with drawings by Valério Adami, helped to extend psychoanalytic investigation into the broader realms of culture and contemporary thought. Indeed, Les Cahiers played a precursor role in creating what became known as the ‘‘Confrontation effect’’ that impacted a number of associations and publications of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CANADA analysts, who appealed to related disciplines in pursuing and developing psychoanalytic research. Some themes addressed in Les Cahiers directly related to issues in psychoanalytic practice, theory, or institutions. Examples include LÕEtat cellulaire (The cellular state), Les machines analytiques (Analytic machines), La sexualité masculine (Male sexuality), Les fantômes de la psychanalyse (The ghosts of psychoanalysis), Télépathie (Telepathy), LÕEtat freudien (The Freudian state], LÕInterprétation (Interpretation), and La logique freudienne (Freudian logic). Les Cahiers also examined aspects of art and literature, in articles such as Art et désordre (Art and disorder), America Latina (Latin America), Correspondances (Correspondences), Palimpsestes (Palimpsests), and Déchiffrement (Deciphering). Philosophical issues included Derrida and Aprés le sujet Qui vient (After the subject, who?); religion was the focus of Conversion (Conversion) and La religion en effet (The impact of religion). Articles from these issues were frequently cited in numerous works both in France and abroad, by among others, Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Alan Bass, Jean Baudrillard, Antoine Berman, Maurice Blanchot, Michel de Certeau, Philippe LacoueLabarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, Jean-François Lyotard, Charles Malamoud, Guy Rosolato, René Thom, Maria Torok, Marc-Alain Ouaknin, Serge Viderman, Paul Virilio, Samuel Weber, and influenced the texts of famous writers Julio Cortazar, Carlos Fuentes, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, and Octavio Paz. The publication of Les Cahiers Confrontation marked a fruitful period, during which psychoanalysis opened up to and participated in the important cultural debates of the times. Issues included feminism and phallocentrism, the role of psychoanalytic institutions with their inherent contradictions and aporias, and politics and the putative end of ideology. A variety of issues anticipated questions that would subsequently gather currency, including the return of religion and the contribution of Lacanian thought to rethinking Freudian orthopraxis. Editions Confrontation represented a publishing outcome of Les Cahiers that enabled major communications from the seminars to find their way rapidly into print. Numerous works published under these auspices are still in demand. LÕInanalysé (Un-analyzed) discussed analytic theory in terms of a sort of coded residue of what is unthought and unthought-out in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS established psychoanalysis; contributions to Le corps et le politique (The body and politics) played a role in dissolution of the Ecole freudienne de Paris. Le lien social (Social cohesion) raised issues as to the social nature of analysis. Géopsychanalyse remains famous today for questioning why analysts at an International Psychoanalytical Association congress in New York failed to take a principled stand regarding the role of analysis in human rights violations during the Argentinean military dictatorship (1976-1984). Other publications included Affranchissement (Franking/emancipation) in which, regarding the publication of La carte postale, the fundamental question of the divisibility (or its opposite) of the letter is discussed, as well as Derridian reading of FreudÕs Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The texts that comprise Psychanalyse et apocalypse (Psychoanalysis and apocalypse) appeared in the context of the dissolution of the Ecole Freudienne de Paris and the disintegration of the Lacanian movement. In Les Années brunes (The dark years), German analysts discussed the compromises made in the name of psychoanalysis under the Third Reich. CHANTAL TALAGRAND Bibliography Les Cahiers Confrontation 1-20 (1979–1989). CANADA Although Ernest Jones chose Toronto as the city from which he would undertake his campaign to institutionalize psychoanalysis in North America, Montreal is the city where it got its start in Canada. In 1957 the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) officially recognized the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society (CPS). Although English and French were the societyÕs two official languages, exchanges and teaching activities took place almost exclusively in English until 1969, when the Société Psychanalytique de Montréal (Montreal Psychoanalytic Society) was established. Only after the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society created a French section, along with other English sections, did it institute a training program in French. Mirroring the relationship between Quebec and the remainder of Canada, the Société Psychanalytique de 241 CANADA Montréal and the English-language sections were two isolated entities that continued to question the reasons for their cohabitation. In 1908 Ernest Jones established himself in Canada as a neuropathologist at the Toronto Lunatic Asylum. He remained there until 1913, when he returned to Europe, after having contributed to the foundation of psychoanalysis in the United States. However, no permanent organization was established in Canada as a result of his presence there, and it would take another forty years before psychoanalysis gained a foothold in the country. After being established in Montreal, a large metropolis of psychoanalysis in Canada is the result of a paradox that is as strange as it is revelatory of the unique character of the country: an anti-Franco Spanish refugee, Miguel Prados, formed an alliance with a French-Canadian priest, the Dominican Noël Mailloux. Beginning in the spring of 1945, four interns from the Allan Memorial Institute of McGill University, founded by Dr. Ewen Cameron in 1944 and affiliated with the Royal Victoria Hospital, began meeting at the home of Dr. Prados, who had obtained a position at the Neurological Institute in the early 1940s. There they discussed clinical cases and studied what they referred to as ‘‘Freudian doctrine.’’ In early 1946 they decided to form a group known as the Cercle Psychanalytique de Montréal (Montreal Psychoanalytic Circle). At this time Prados had only undertook a self-analysis and was not affiliated with any psychoanalytic association. In 1948 Father Mailloux, who had founded the Institute of Psychology at the University of Montreal at the same time as Cameron was founding the Allan Memorial Institute, joined the group, which grew considerably from this time on. The number of members grew to forty, with as many guests invited to meetings. From New York they invited Sándor Lorand, Edith Jacobson, Bertrand D. Lewin, Phyllis Greenacre, Rudolph Loewenstein, Rene Spitz, George Gero, Charles Fisher, and Kaufman; from Detroit, Leo Bartemeir and Richard and Editha Sterbas; from Boston, Eduard Lindeman and Edward and Grete Bibring. Although the circle certainly helped to spread psychoanalysis, it did not promote the training of Canadian psychoanalysts. Forced to seek training at institutions in the United States, these candidates had little inclination to return to Canada. In 1948, with the 24 2 help of the Lady Davis Foundation and Father Mailloux, Professor Théo Chentrier, a member of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society), became the first psychoanalyst to immigrate to Canada. He was appointed professor at the University of Montreal and joined the Cercle Psychanalytique, of which he later became an enthusiastic and loyal director. Between 1948 and 1950 the circle was very active and held semimonthly meetings, along with weekly seminars on clinical practice and theory. In 1950 Dr. Eric Wittkower of the British Psychoanalytic Society came to the Allan Memorial Institute. Then in 1951 Georges Zavitzianos, a member of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris, immigrated to Montreal. In the autumn of that same year, Dr. Alastair MacLeod, of the British Psychoanalytic Society, was hired by the psychiatry department of McGill University. Finally, in September 1952 Dr. Bruce Ruddick, who had just completed his training at the New York Institute, returned to Montreal. With the arrival of these four psychoanalysts, all members of organizations recognized by the IPA, members of the circle felt that it was time to seek official status. Since recognition could only be granted to members who belonged to an affiliate group, Théo Chentrier, Alastair MacLeod, Miguel Prados, Bruce Ruddick, Eric Wittkower, and Georges Zavitzianos formed a study group and applied to the IPA, hoping to be recognized at the 1951 congress. As the bylaws required a recommendation from an affiliate group, they turned to the Detroit Psychoanalytic Society, which was familiar with the circle, to obtain recognition as an independent organization and affiliate of the American Psychoanalytic Association (APA). Since the APA had recently discredited the Detroit training program, it was suggested to the study group that they contact the Boston Psychoanalytic Society, which they never did. At the end of September 1951, the group learned that during the congress in Amsterdam, its request had been referred to the office of professional standards of the American Psychoanalytic Association. Although the professional-standards committee may have supported the request, the APAÕs official response was that the time was not right: a member of the group was an analyst but not a physician, and the Canadians were planning to admit lay analysts. Faced with this situation, the study group withdrew its request to the American association and turned to the British Psychoanalytic Society, which granted them INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CANADA membership after no more than a few weeks of deliberation. As a result, in March 1952 the Canadian Society of Psychoanalysts became an affiliate of the British Psychoanalytic Society. Chentrier was the president, and MacLeod the secretary. The response from the APA was immediate. They let it be known that the Marienbad Agreement of the 1936 IPA congress gave them exclusive control over all of North America. The British Psychoanalytic Society replied that since Canada was part of the British empire, it was only fair that it serve as sponsor in this case. The Americans rejected out of hand a compromise that would have involved joint sponsorship from both associations. In July 1952, after lengthy negotiations, the British Psychoanalytic Society indicated that it would not oppose an agreement with the APA if this solution would help to establish in Canada a psychoanalytic society recognized by the IPA. To facilitate negotiations with the Americans, Chentrier, who was not a physician, decided in August 1952 to give up the presidency of the Canadian Society of Psychoanalysts. MacLeod became president, and Ruddick secretary. After being dissolved on October 17, 1953, the society was replaced by the Canadian Society for Psychoanalysis. But more important, in October 1952 Prados proposed dissolving the Montreal Psychoanalytic Circle because he was convinced that the Americans confused it with the Canadian Society of Psychoanalysts, which consisted exclusively of member analysts. These concessions turned out to be pointless because the Americans never granted affiliate status to the Canadian group. On October 17, 1953, the group was officially formed as the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society. In December 1953 the group withdrew its request for membership in the APA and reaffirmed its membership in the British Psychoanalytic Society, which had never been abandoned. Because Canada is bicultural, with equal weight given to French and English, it was decided that the society would officially be bilingual. During the summer of 1953, Dr. Jean-Baptiste Boulanger, his wife Françoise, and Dr. J. P. Labrecque, all of whom were trained by the Société Psychanalytique de Paris, became members of the study group. The following year, Dr. W. Clifford M. Scott, a Canadian psychoanalyst who had become president of the British Psychoanalytic Society; Drs. Hans and Friedl Aufreiter of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society; and André Lussier, who was completing his training at the London Institute, joined the new organization. Initially incorporated in Quebec by the lieutenant-governor of the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS province in 1955, it became incorporated under Canadian federal law on April 3, 1967. And with the sponsorship of the British Psychoanalytic Society, it became officially recognized as a member of the International Psychoanalytic Association on July 31, 1957, during the twentieth IPA congress. The British Psychoanalytic Society also sponsored the Canadian Institute of Psychoanalysis. This professional organization made its initial foray into the professional sphere in 1954 in a university setting, at the Allan Memorial Institute of McGill University (directed by Dr. Ewen Cameron). With the help of Doctor Clifford Scott, agreements were concluded in mid-1954 to initiate a training program identical to that of the British Institute, with three training analysts. After thriving in Britain for a quarter century, Scott, at CameronÕs request, returned to Montreal to run the program. The way was now open for training future analysts. The first students had already begun their training in Montreal, London, Paris, or the United States. Scott helped them complete their training. The other analysts supported this decision, with the exception of Cameron, who had integrated psychoanalysis in his program at the university so it would be under his direct control. When Cameron refused to hire another training analyst, Scott and the other colleagues realized they could avoid his controlling efforts only by forming their own autonomous institute. The training committee of the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society developed and introduced a teaching program in 1958. The first seminar was held on April 4, 1959. On October 1, 1960, members of the society ratified a proposal recommending the creation and incorporation of the Canadian Institute of Psychoanalysis, which was done on March 17, 1961, in Quebec. Jean-Baptiste Boulanger was the first director. The first training program, in 1959, had twelve teachers for thirteen students. Of the thirty-seven candidates trained from 1959 to 1967, eleven were French speakers. Around 1968 and 1969, for cultural as well as geographic reasons, a federal model was used to create different sections within the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society. A French-speaking section was created in Montreal, the Société Psychanalytique de Montréal, and an English-speaking section in Quebec, the CPS Quebec English Branch. In Ontario the Toronto Psychoanalytic Society was formed. Currently, at the start of the twenty-first century, the Canadian Psychoanalytic 243 CANADA Society has approximately four hundred members, seven sections, and three institutes. In addition to those already mentioned, which have had an associated institute since their formation, three sections— the South Western Ontario Psychoanalytic Society (located in London), the Société Psychanalytique de Québec, and the CPS Western Canadian Branch—do not yet have an institute, while the Ottawa Psychoanalytic Society is still in the process of formation, since it does not have the requisite number of training analysts (five). Service agreements have been concluded with the CPS Quebec English Branch so that candidates of the Ottawa Psychoanalytic Society can continue to be trained locally. For the CPS Western Canadian Branch, the national executive committee recently authorized two training analysts from the Seattle Psychoanalytic Society in the United States to work with the Toronto Psychoanalytic Institute to train candidates in Western Canada locally. Candidates of the Société de Québec must complete their training in Montreal, since the Quebec group has only a single training analyst. Candidates of the Western Canadian Branch in Ontario undergo training at the Toronto Institute. The CPS Quebec English Branch consists of analysts from Montreal from various ethnic and cultural backgrounds who concentrated on English language and culture when sections were created in 1969. As of 2002, it consisted of a hundred members. The training program of its institute was, until the first few years of the twenty-first century, much more academic than that of the Société de Psychanalyse de Montréal (SPM). Since 2000, the CPS Quebec English Branch has added European authors such as Piera Aulagnier, Wilfred Bion, and Jacques Lacan to the fourth-year program. Psychoanalysis has also made progress in Toronto. In September 1954, Alan Parkin, who had just completed his training in London, England, arrived in the city. In 1956 he created the Toronto Psychoanalytic Study Circle with a core of eleven psychiatrists with an interest in psychoanalysis. He attempted to establish a psychoanalysis training program at the department of psychiatry of the University of Toronto and obtain recognition for his study group from the Ontario Psychiatric Institute. After two years of activity the circle decided to transform itself into the psychotherapy section of the Ontario Psychiatric Society by opening its doors to all members of that association. The request was ratified on January 23, 1959, and two years later, 24 4 on January 20, 1961, the psychotherapy section held its first scientific congress. In his History of Psychoanalysis in Canada, Parkin comments on the prodigious growth of this section, which in January 1970 had no fewer than ninety-three members. The establishment of psychoanalysis within the context of psychiatry helped determine the medical orientation psychoanalysis assumed in Ontario. This growth continued until psychoanalytic psychologists of the Ontario Psychological Association, with the support of Division 39 of the American Psychological Association, decided, at the end of the 1980s, to found their own organization, the Toronto Contemporary Society, and their own institute, the Toronto Institute for Contemporary Psychoanalysis. Initially, candidates training at the new institute were not physicians; then psychiatrists began to apply to the organization, although it was not a part of the IPA. They were attracted by the diversity of approaches used in its training program and wanted to escape the incessant conflicts between Freudian and Kohutian factions that divided the Toronto Psychoanalytic Society. The Toronto Psychoanalytic Society would likely have split if there had not emerged a third group, the post-Kleinians, whose members were partisans of object-relations theory and followers of Margaret Mahler and Otto Kernberg. Their emergence prevented the complete polarization of the society. Today the Toronto Psychoanalytic Society has approximately 130 members. After the formation of the first three sections of the society and the institute, other sections were created when at least five analysts or training analysts belonging to the same geographic or cultural community submitted a request. In 1972 the Ottawa Psychoanalytic Society was formed, followed by the Ottawa Institute in 1978. Then, also in 1978, the CPS Western Canadian Branch was founded, consisting of members scattered throughout the four western provinces. Donald Watterson, in Vancouver, was the first psychoanalyst to settle in British Colombia, yet there was little growth in psychoanalysis in the province until the end of the twentieth century. Julius Guild settled in Edmonton, Alberta, followed by Perry Segal in 1971 and Hassan Azim in 1973, but as of 1998 there was only one analyst in Calgary and two in Edmonton. Similar numbers were found in Winnipeg and Manitoba. Even though it covers an area that is roughly a third of Canada, the CPS Western Canadian Branch currently has only ten members: six in British Colombia, three in Alberta, and one in Manitoba. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CANADA The Southwestern Ontario Psychoanalytic Society is the sixth section of the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society. It was founded on June 5, 1982, and currently has fourteen members. Formed in 1988, the Société Psychanalytique de Québec (Quebec Psychoanalytic Society), with ten members, is the most recent of the seven sections of the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society. The senior member is Henri Richard, who began practicing after psychoanalytic training in Paris from 1952 to 1959. A few years later he was joined by Noël Montgrain, who had also studied at the Institut de Psychanalyse de Paris (Paris Institute for Psychoanalysis). There is currently no organization in the maritime provinces of eastern Canada. Aside from the cultural and economic centers of Montreal and Toronto, psychoanalysis throughout Canada has grown very slowly. For years oral communication was the primary mode of transmission within the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society. The first generations of analysts were more absorbed with fundamental issues and transmission than in the preparation of written texts. Although a number of practitioners—such as W. Clifford M. Scott, Georges Zavitzianos, Jean-Baptiste Boulanger, Jean-Louis Langlois, Paul Lefebvre, André Lussier, Jean Bossé, Pierre Doucet, Guy Da Silva, and Roger Dufresne—wrote important articles, they spent the majority of their time training future generations of analysts. The ephemeral character of psychoanalytic reviews bears witness to the phenomenon. The first issue of the Revue canadienne de psychanalyse, published in 1954 and sponsored by the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society, was the final one until the reappearance, nearly forty years later in the spring of 1993, of the semiannual bilingual Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis/Revue canadienne de psychanalyse, edited by Eva Lester. Similarly, the Société Psychanalytique de Montréal has, since 1988, published an internal periodical three times a year, the Bulletin de la Société Psychanalytique de Montréal. Julien Bigras, however, was the first to promote written communication within the psychoanalytic community with the review Interprétation, of which he was the founder and editor-inchief from 1967 to 1971. Josette Garon, Jacques Mauger, Lise Monette, and François Peraldi continued his efforts with the publication of Frayages. In the autumn of 1992, Dominique Scarfone published the first issue of Trans, a semiannual, semithematic, interdisciplinary journal. The journal played a key role in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS encouraging the exchange of psychoanalytic ideas and also played an important role in the Montreal psychoanalytic community by organizing annual colloquia open to the public. Despite this success, the editorial committee decided to discontinue publication in the spring of 1999 with the publication of issue ten of the journal. The year 1992 also saw the introduction of the semiannual Filigrane, financed by the publication of Santé mentale au Québec and directed at psychotherapists and professional psychoanalysts whose clinical methods were compatible with psychoanalysis. Patrick J. Mahoney, Jean Imbeault, and Dominique Scarfone are among the first analysts to make significant contributions on an international level to a critical analysis of the psychoanalytic corpus. In Canada, as elsewhere, the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society and its various sections are not the only entities involved in psychoanalysis. Alongside them have always existed unaffiliated psychoanalysts working alone or in small groups. Among the first to practice psychoanalysis outside an institutional context was Michel Dansereau, a doctor who had trained with René Laforgue in Casablanca, Morocco, and was active during the 1950s. Much later were François Peraldi, who arrived in Montreal in 1974, and Mireille Lafortune, who was active during the late 1960s. There also exist many organizations devoted to psychoanalysis. In 1986 François Peraldi established the Réseau des Cartels (Network of Cartels), composed of analysts interested in the work of Jacques Lacan. This network did not survive the loss of its founder, and in 2004 only a single cartel is still active. The Association des Psychanalystes du Québec (Quebec Association of Psychoanalysts), founded in 1967 and having only ten members in 2004, is Lacanian in focus. The Association des Psychothérapeutes Psychanalytique du Québec (Quebec Association of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapists), founded in 1985 and consisting of some 150 members in different regions of Quebec, includes clinicians who make use of psychoanalytic methods. The association organizes colloquia and conferences, to which members of the Société Psychanalytique de Montréal are invited. The Groupe dÕÉtudes Psychanalytiques Interdisciplinaires (Interdisciplinary Psychoanalytic Study Group) consists of some fifteen professors from the Université de Québec at Montreal who teach psychoanalysis while practicing. The Institut Québécois de Psychothérapie (Quebec 245 CANNIBALISTIC Psychotherapy Institute), which has existed since 1992, provides a two-year training program in analytic and systemic psychotherapy. Father Henri Samson, who trained in France and was a contemporary of Father Mailloux, founded the Institut de Psychothérapie de Québec in the 1960s for those who wanted training in analytic psychotherapy. The Groupe Interdisciplinaire Freudien de Recherches et dÕInterventions Cliniques et Culturelles (Interdisciplinary Group for Freudian Research and Clinical and Cultural Interventions), founded by Willy Apollon and cooperating with psychiatrists from the Robert-Giffard Center, has gained a considerable reputation in analytic psychotherapy based on Lacanian principles, especially in its work with psychotic patients. The Cercle Jung de Québec (Quebec Jung Circle), founded in the 1970s by Marcel Gaumont, a Jungian analyst trained at the Jung Institute in Zurich, promotes Jungian psychoanalysis in Canada through public conferences and discussions. André Renaud, a psychoanalyst with the Société Psychanalytique de Québec, established in 1984, and ran until 1996, Étayage (Support), a training program for doctors, psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers who wanted to study analytic psychotherapy. Finally, a group of analytic psychotherapists has also been at work in British Columbia in Western Canada. JACQUES VIGNEAULT Bibliography Cloutier, Yvan. (1988). La naissance de la psychanalyse à Montréal. Philosophiques, 15(1), 221–225. (Reprinted from Frayages, 3 (1987).) Paradis, André. (1988). La naissance de la psychanalyse à Montréal. Revue dÕhistoire de lÕAmérique française, 41(3), 443–446. (Reprinted from Frayages, numéro spécial (1987).) Parkin, Allan. (1987). History of psychoanalysis in Canada. Toronto: Toronto Psychoanalytical Society. Prados, Miguel. (1954). La psychanalyse au Canada. Revue canadienne de psychanalyse, 1, 1–33. Sourkes, Theodore L., and Pinard, Gilbert (Eds.). (1995). Building on a proud past: 50 years of psychiatry at McGill. Montreal: McGill University. Vigneault, Jacques. (1993). Transferts et déplacements: fondements de la psychanalyse en Amérique du Nord. Trans, 3, 223–237. 24 6 CANNIBALISTIC. See Oral-sadistic stage CAPACITY TO BE ALONE This notion made its first appearance in the mid1950s in a paper less than ten pages long (Winnicott, Donald, 1958/1965), yet it would be fair to say that today it informs the thinking, and even more the practice, of every psychoanalyst. To be alone in the presence of someone else—what better way could there be of describing the analytic situation and relationship? WinnicottÕs aim in his paper is stated without preamble. Rather than the fear of being alone or the wish to be alone, both of which are so often described, what interests him is something that makes it possible to for us to love. He describes a solitude understood not as a defensive withdrawal that cuts us off from a hostile world, nor as neglect, abandonment, or even destruction of the self, but rather as a positive experience and, even more than that, as ‘‘a most precious possession’’ (p. 30). This is indeed the discovery here, for the capacity to be alone—with the stress on the word ‘‘capacity,’’ for Winnicott speaks elsewhere of a capacity to dream, and there is surely a link between the two—is not a resigned tolerance of the effective absence or disappearance of the other person. This capacity, paradoxically, is quite compatible with the otherÕs presence. But what is meant by ‘‘presence’’ here? To transform a loss or separation into a departure implying a return—in other words, a ‘‘Fort! Da!’’ is itself no easy thing, and to experience the otherÕs absence as their continued presence within oneself amounts to a further step still. To be able to tell oneself ‘‘I am alone’’ without feeling forsaken—such is the prerequisite for what Winnicott considers an essential achievement: to be assured of a sense of continuity as between oneself and the other person, or, better still, to perceive discontinuity in a permanent bond, or even its rupture, as the very precondition of thatÕs bondÕs survival. As so often in Donald WinnicottÕs work, the seeming simplicity of his assertions conceals an analysis of considerable complexity. This is confirmed if one reads ‘‘The Capacity To Be Alone’’ in conjunction INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS C Á R C A M O , C E L E S E R N E S T O (1903 –1 990) with another, almost contemporary text, ‘‘Primary Maternal Preoccupation’’ (1956/1958), for such a reading makes it clear that the figure of the absent/ present ‘‘other’’ should not be too hastily identified— as it frequently is—with the mother as object. Thus a number of authors, among them François Gantheret, prefer to speak of ‘‘the maternal’’ as an extension of what Winnicott—nonetheless reproached by some for idealizing the mother—meant when he wrote of maternal ‘‘illness’’ or ‘‘madness.’’ In venturing to use such terms, Winnicott is referring to an initial state in which the mother experiences the needs of her infant as her own and treats what is external as if it were internal—a state, in short, that is not far removed from psychosis. It is only a break in this continuum, once it is mastered, that can make it possible for ‘‘bodily needs’’ to be transformed into ‘‘ego needs,’’ and using WinnicottÕs own words, for a psychology to be born from the imaginary working out of physical experience. This imaginary working out Winnicott calls ‘‘ego-relatedness,’’ as opposed to ‘‘idrelationships.’’ First comes ‘‘I am,’’ which is then as it were amplified by ‘‘I am alone’’ (1958/1965, pp. 33–34). I am alone and at the same time I am not alone: not that I maintain the presence of the mother within myself; rather, I have managed to disentangle myself from her ‘‘madness,’’ and no longer feel annihilated if she goes away and if I am no longer of concern to her. It may be that each of us must stand in, to some degree, for a maternal environment susceptible to becoming a realm without borders: an ‘‘imaginary working out,’’ a mental life with its own inflows and outflows—truly, a ‘‘most precious possession.’’ JEAN-BERTRAND PONTALIS See also: ChildrenÕs play; Fort-Da; Good-enough mother. Bibliography Gantheret, François. (1984). LÕimpensable maternel et les fondements maternels du penser. In Incertitude dÕÉros, Paris: Gallimard. Klein, Melanie. (1975). On the sense of loneliness. In Envy and gratitude and other works 1946–1963 (The writings of Melanie Klein, vol. 3). London: Hogarth/Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Original work published 1963) Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1988). De la mère, le maternel. In Perdre de vue, Paris: Gallimard. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Winnicott, Donald W. (1965). The capacity to be alone. In The maturational processes and the facilitating environment, London: Hogarth/Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 39 (1958), 416–20.) ———. (1958). Primary maternal preoccupation. In Collected papers: Through paediatrics to psycho-analysis. London: Tavistock. (Original work published 1956) CÁRCAMO, CELES ERNESTO (1903–1990) An Argentinean physician, psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst, Celes Ernesto Cárcamo was the founder and an honorary member of the Asociación Psicoanalı́tica Argentina (APA) [Psychoanalytic Association of Argentina]. Born August 11, 1903, in La Plata, he died April 7, 1990, in Buenos Aires. CárcamoÕs father, who was Spanish, with a PhD in chemistry and pharmacy, came from a long line of doctors. He was well versed in both science and the humanities and devoted much of his time to literature and journalism. His mother, an Argentinean, was the daughter of large landholders originally from the Basque country of France. Cárcamo had a quiet childhood and discovered FreudÕs Interpretation of Dreams at an early age. He studied medicine as a young man but took courses in philosophy at the state university. He specialized in neuropsychiatry and joined Dr. Mariano R. Castex at the Clı́nicas Hospital, where the latest methods in medicine were practiced. Here, after studying with James Mapelli, a hypnotist and psychotherapist, he soon realized the limitations of hypnosis. Moved by a profound desire to provide therapeutic services, he studied everything available on psychopathology and psychoanalysis, with a focus on their clinical application. Since Argentina had few practicing clinicians at this time—most psychoanalysts being self-taught or theorists—he decided to leave for France. At the recommendation of Marie Bonaparte, he studied at the Institut Psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Institute). He completed his training analysis with Paul Schiff and was supervised by Rudolph Loewenstein and Charles Odier. In February 1939 he was appointed a member of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris. He associated with scientists and writers such as Ernesto Sábato. In Paris his friend Juan Rof Carballo introduced him to Angel Garma, who wanted to settle in Argentina, and to whom he offered support and advice. 247 C A R U S O , I G O R A . (1914 –1 981) Both men arrived in Buenos Aires in 1939 with the intention of settling there. They began to provide training analyses to help establish an affiliate of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA), a project that came to fruition in December 1942. Upon his return to Argentina, Cárcamo had assumed the direction of the department of psychiatry and psychotherapy at the Medical and Surgical Institute of the Durand Hospital Medical School. Here he analyzed some of the pioneers of Brazilian psychoanalysis: Danilo Perestrello and his wife Marialzira, and Alcyon Baer Bahia of Rio de Janeiro, Zaira Bittencourt de Martins from Porto Alegre, and other Latin American analysts. During his tenure as director, the review Revista de psicoanálisis was inaugurated, its first issue appearing in 1943. Cárcamo was the first to teach psychoanalytic technique at the Training Institute. In 1958 he taught the first course in medical psychology at the School of Medicine of the University of Buenos Aires. His writings were collected and published in 1992. Cárcamo was interested in the plumed serpent of the Maya and Aztec religions, the image of the world in aboriginal America, male impotence, female sterility, and the psychoanalytic process. With his wife he translated Anna FreudÕs The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense and Eugene MinkowskiÕs Traité de psychopathologie. His personal prestige was of considerable benefit to the APA, especially during difficult moments in ArgentinaÕs political life. The impact of CárcamoÕs personality, his integrity and lack of prejudice, together with his considerable erudition and wit, had a lasting influence on several generations of clinicians whom he analyzed or monitored. ROBERTO DORIA-MEDINA JR. See also: Argentina. Bibliography Cárcamo, Celes Ernesto. (1948). Quetzalcoatl: le dieu serpent à plumes de la religion maya-aztèque. Revue française de psychanalyse. 12 (1), 101–124. ———. (1984). ‘‘Entrevista a los fundadores, III: Celes E. Cárcamo,’’ Revista de psicoanálisis de la Asociacı́on psicoanalı́tica argentina, 41 (6), 987–1000. ———. (1992). Escritos. Buenos Aires: Kargieman. Doria-Medina, Roberto. (1993). Letter from Buenos Aires: Celes Cárcamo’s writings. Psychoanalytical Books, 4, 585–594. 24 8 Mom, Jorge M., et al. (1982). Asociación psicoanalı́tica argentina 1942–1982. Buenos Aires: A.P.A. CARUSO, IGOR A. (1914–1981) An Austrian psychologist and psychoanalyst, Igor Caruso was born February 4, 1914, in Tiraspol and died June 28, 1981, in Salzburg. Born into a family of Italian aristocrats who had settled in Russia, the young Caruso left home to study psychology in Louvain. He wrote his thesis on the development of ethics in children. The growing importance of Piaget and his followers turned his attention to philosophy and orthodox Russian philosophy, German philosophy, and new French thought. In 1942 Caruso settled in Austria and worked for a while as an assistant for children at the large Steinhof psychiatric hospital in Vienna. Shocked by the NazisÕ experiments in euthanasia, he left the hospital and found work as a psychologist in a small neuropsychiatric clinic under the direction of Alfred Auersberg. Although he was encouraged to join the ‘‘Viennese working group’’ of the Deutsches Reichinstitut für Psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (German State Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy), there is no proof of his participation. Nor is it certain that he underwent his first analysis with August Aichhorn. However, it is likely that he did his training analysis with Viktor Emil Freiherr von Gebsattel, a German psychoanalyst whose philosophical-anthropologicalChristian ideology must have fascinated this Italian nobleman more than AichhornÕs charisma, social commitment, or his work with abandoned adolescents. After the fall of Nazism and the end of the Second World War, Caruso distanced himself from the group formed by the Wiener Psychoanalytische Vereinigung (WPV) [Vienna Psychoanalytic Association], which he found to be too dogmatic. In 1947 he created the Wiener Arbeitskreis für Tiefenpsychologie (Viennese Depth Psychology Study Circle) as a relatively open and autonomous scientific community that rejected any form of strict orthodoxy, even though academic thought was becoming more consistent with orthodox standards. After spending time studying with Carl Gustav Jung, in 1952 Igor Caruso defined his psychoanalytic program in his Existential psychology: from Analysis to Synthesis. Here the term ‘‘psychoanalysis’’ is primarily considered in terms of technique, while Freudian INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CASE HISTORIES theory is expanded in the direction of ‘‘personal psychoanalysis.’’ This fixation on the concept of the ‘‘totality of the person’’ led to a consideration of a dialectic relation between freedom and constraint, and between psychophysical conditioning and the transcendent mind as an expression of a hierarchy of values within which the formation of the highest and most sublimated aspects of the mind could not be reduced to primitive drives or understood from a naturalist point of view. The translation of CarusoÕs book into six languages not only gave Caruso and his followers international recognition, especially in South America, it also led to the formation of other study circles in the largest cities in Austria. A symposium in Brussels in 1954 on personal psychology provided the opportunity for a meeting between Igor Caruso and Jacques Lacan, which was the start of their intellectual friendship and mutual admiration. While CarusoÕs early theoretical ideas were impregnated with Catholic theological concepts, these gradually disappeared from his writings, giving way to a lively discussion of FreudÕs work. In 1957, in Bios, Psyche, Person, a book known to the Vienna study circle, he introduced a theory of symbols within the framework of the Freudian theory of drives and in relation to psychic acts and the interpretation of dreams. During the early sixties, Caruso adopted a kind of Marxist Freudianism, which is apparent in his Soziale Aspekte der Psychoanalyse (Social Aspects of Psychoanalysis), 1962. The emphasis, here and in his subsequent essays on the social dimensions of psychoanalysis, implies an analysis of concrete, material structures of power in the analysis of the ego and superego, and of the analyst as the bearer of ideologies and rationalizations of which he needs to be made aware. In 1962 Caruso also published a series of articles that he wrote in French between 1952 and 1961 with the title Psychanalyse pour la Personne. It contains his program for the reform of psychoanalysis, which must be, according to Caruso: realistic; in search of truth; concrete; world-based; existential; historic; of its time and therefore liberating; and personalistic, the gradual growth of consciousness leading to gradual personalization (‘‘Une analyse de lÕopacité,’’ 1960). A confrontation with the phenomenon of separation and refusal of the death impulse led to his Die Trennung der Liebenden [Love and Separation], published in 1967. Of his written work (approximately two hundred publications excluding his books) this INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS essay has become the most widespread and the most popular. In 1972, Caruso was appointed to the chair of psychology at the University of Salzburg, a remarkable event that reflected the recognition of Caruso and of psychoanalysis in Austria. Following the boom in psychology of the late seventies (the Psychoboom), which affected members of the Salzburg study circle and spurred an interest in Bioenergetik, transactional analysis, Gestalt therapy, and so on, Caruso felt obligated to show his disapproval by leaving the association, which was now psychoanalytical in name only. ‘‘I am an orthodox disciple neither of Freud nor Jung nor Adler. I am not eclectic, or the head of a new school of psychoanalysts,’’ wrote Caruso in Existential Psychology: From Analysis to Synthesis. His existential psychology was a critical attempt that, in spite of its Freudian references, became increasingly less Freudian. After his retirement from the University of Salzburg in 1979, Caruso spent the remainder of his life examining theoretical questions, primarily issues of epistemology and methodology characteristic of a psychoanalysis that was closely related to other fields, especially the social sciences. AUGUST RUHS See also: Austria; Frankl, Viktor Emil; International Federation of Psychoanalytic Societies. Bibliography Caruso, Igor A. (1962). Psychanalyse pour la personne. Paris: Le Seuil. ———. (1964). Existential psychology: from analysis to synthesis (Eva Krapf, Trans.). New York: Herder and Herder. (Original work published 1952). Huber, Wolfgang (1977). Psychoanalyse in Österreich seit 1933. Vienna-Salzburg: Geyer. Parth, Walter (1998). Vergangenheit, die fortwirkt. Texte. Psychoanalyse. Ästhetik. Kulturkritik, II, pp. 61–75. CASE HISTORIES Case histories are a classic form of documentation in psychopathology literature. They range from clinical sketches to highly detailed and extended accounts, as 249 CASE HISTORIES in the Madeleine case, which occupies both volumes of Pierre JanetÕs De lÕangoisse à lÕextase (1926–1928). Psychoanalysis caused the form to drift toward what might more properly be called a ‘‘report on analysis.’’ With a view to publication, analysts elaborate written accounts based on everything they have heard from a patient, in order to reconstitute the sense and significance of the patientÕs psychic and symptomatic functioning, as well as the progressive unfolding of the cure itself in the transference/counter-transference exchange. Sigmund Freud evokes his patients in his early writings (Studies on Hysteria, 1895d), but it is in dealing with the analysis of the Rat Man that he expresses the difficulty of giving an account of an analysis, in a letter to Jung dated June 30, 1909: ‘‘How bungled our reproductions are, how wretchedly we dissect the great art works of psychic nature! Unfortunately this paper in turn is becoming too bulky. It just pours out of me, and even so itÕs inadequate, incomplete and therefore untrue. A wretched business.’’ (1974, p. 238). Reports are difficult to write because where previously the analyst disentangled the elements in the flow of associations, in order to allow the interpretable meaning to organize itself, in the report, the analyst instead must dismantle and take apart in order to reproduce. Between communication in the analysis and the communication of the analysis, the transformation is as radical as that which exists between the logic of primary and secondary processes. The heuristic necessity of the report on the analysis is nevertheless obvious because it is this reflective phase that enables us to focus on any given point of theory, thus breaking not with clinical practice but with the rule of not initially selecting anything in order to afford equally-distributed attention to the associational material. As a transmission of knowledge without a prescriptive target, and relating equally to theory and to clinical practice, the analysis report belongs in the theoretical domain (Laplanche, 1980). The desire to give an account of the analysis derives from the analystÕs counter-transference. The disturbance then becomes the object of thought and the motive for communication and may even remobilize the analystÕs questions about his own non-analyzed past. But the report also has an institutional, more or less codified role and forms a part of exchanges that contribute to progress and recognition. 25 0 Freud stressed the ethical and moral problems posed by the analysis report: ‘‘It is certain that the patients would never have spoken if it had occurred to them that their admissions might possibly be put to scientific uses: and it is equally certain that to ask them themselves for leave to publish their case would be quite unavailing’’ (1905e [1901]). But he nevertheless defends the necessity for it in a letter to Oskar Pfister (June 5, 1910): ‘‘Thus discretion is incompatible with a satisfactory description of an analysis; to describe the latter one would have to be unscrupulous, give away, betray, behave like an artist who buys paints with his wifeÕs house-keeping money or uses the furniture as firewood to warm the studio for his model. Without a trace of that kind of unscrupulousness the job cannot be done’’ (1963, p. 38). The models for dreaming and jokes shed light on the respective methodologies used for the situations of dialogue and transcription (Mijolla-Mellor, 1985). While commenting on the difficulties relative to reports on analysis, Freud highlights the necessity for them and also their power of seduction, commenting that his case histories read ‘‘like novels’’ (as in the case of Katharina, 1895), a fair turning of the tables on someone who never hesitated to see novels as the equivalent of case histories. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: ‘‘A. Z.’’; ‘‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’’ (Wolf Man); Aimée, case of; ‘‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy’’ (Little Hans); Anna O., case of; Cäcilie M., case of; Eckstein, Emma; Elisabeth von R., case of; Emmy von N., case of; ‘‘Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria’’ (Dora/Ida Bauer); Hirschfeld, Elfriede; Katharina, case of; Little Arpåd, the boy pecked by a cock; Lucy R., case of; Mathilde, case of; ‘‘Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis’’ (Rat Man); Richard, case of; Studies on Hysteria. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905e [1901). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. SE, 7: 1–122. ———. (1955a [1907–08]). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis (Rat Man). SE, 10: 151–318. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Joseph. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2. Freud, Sigmund, and Pfister, Oskar. (1963a). In Heinrich Meng and Ernst L. Freud, (Eds.), Psychoanalysis and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CASTRATION COMPLEX faith: The letters of Sigmund Freud and Oskar Pfister (Eric Mosbacher, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. Freud, Sigmund, and Jung, Carl Gustav. (1974a [1906–13]). The Freud/Jung letters: The correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung (William McGuire, Ed.; Ralph Manheim and R. F. C. Hull, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. CASTRATION COMPLEX In psychoanalysis, the word ‘‘castration’’ is associated with several others that define it and that it in turn defines. These include ‘‘anxiety,’’ ‘‘threat,’’ ‘‘symbolic,’’ ‘‘fear,’’ ‘‘terror,’’ ‘‘disavowal,’’ and above all ‘‘complex.’’ Beyond the everyday connotations of the term, the specifically psychoanalytic definition of castration is rooted in the act feared by male children, namely the removal of the penis. The essential connection between ‘‘castration’’ and ‘‘complex’’ derives from the fact that psychoanalysis views the castration complex, in tandem with the Oedipus complex, as the organizing principle of psychosexuality and, more broadly speaking, of mental life in general. The metapsychological position of the castration complex was described relatively late in FreudÕs work, but the word ‘‘castration’’ appeared earlier, linked to various psychoanalytical notions the consideration of which makes it possible to trace his theoretical course chronologically. Castration fantasies, the symbolic aspects of castration, and mythological references to castration all figured in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) and in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901b). In the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), where Freud dealt with sexual aberrations, infantile sexuality, and the metamorphoses of puberty, fear and anxiety concerning castration were evoked several times, and the subject became even more prominent in the later revisions of the book. In 1915, and again in 1920, the set of problems surrounding castration was clearly set in its Oedipal context, and castration was treated as a major theoretical and clinical notion. In ‘‘On the Sexual Theories of Children’’ (1908c), in connection with the evasive answers that parents give to childrenÕs questions as to ‘‘where babies come from’’ and about sexuality in general, Freud noted the coexistence in children (bespeaking a first split in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS mental functioning) of an official version, that of the parents, and a set of firmly believed ‘‘theories.’’ The first such theory was the belief that every human being had a penis. It was the collapse of this belief that would give rise to the castration scenario. It is notable that Freud from the outset took the psychosexual profile of the boy as his model; as a result he was led later to explain female psychosexuality by reference to that model. Meanwhile, already in this paper of 1908, he was pointing out how the clitoris was conceived of as ‘‘a small penis which does not grow any bigger’’ and the female genitalia were viewed as ‘‘a mutilated organ’’ (p. 217). The case history of ‘‘Little Hans’’ (1909b) illustrated and rounded out FreudÕs discussion of the ‘‘sexual theories of children.’’ In FreudÕs eyes, the castration complex was still a sort of psychopathological nucleus, frequently encountered, which had also left ‘‘marked traces behind in myths’’ (p. 8). This nucleus was amplified with a second surge of the castration threat, the moment of seeing, as when Little Hans (aged three and a half) saw that his newborn baby sister had no penis. This observation occasioned an act of disavowal: Little Hans decided that as his sister grew up, her penis would get bigger (p. 11). Only later, however, in a deferred manner with respect to the two phases of the threat of castration, would castration anxiety make its appearance. Note that Freud long used the words ‘‘anxiety’’ and ‘‘terror’’ almost interchangeably with reference to the fear of castration; he eventually drew a clear distinction in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d [1925]), contrasting the ‘‘anxiety as signal’’ that triggered repression with the various terrors characteristic of psychosis. Although FreudÕs account of 1909 did not yet use the term ‘‘phallic,’’ when he introduced the concept of the infantile genital organization in 1923, he claimed universality for it precisely under that heading. In Totem and Taboo (1912–13a), Freud presented the myth that he believed was the basis of human socialization. The threat of castration and the murder of the father were themes present in FreudÕs writings in this vein throughout his work, concluding with Moses and Monotheism (1939a). ‘‘The Taboo of Virginity’’ (1918a) had a similar perspective, though it was concerned with more properly psychological issues. This paper was one of a trio of short works called ‘‘Contributions to the Psychology of Love.’’ In the first, 251 CASTRATION COMPLEX ‘‘A Special Type of Choice of Object Made by Men,’’ the theme of castration was latent throughout, the object-choice under consideration being made from the ‘‘constellation connected with the mother’’ (the mother and the whore ‘‘basically . . . do the same thing’’) (1910h, pp. 169, 171). In the second paper, ‘‘On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love’’ (1912d), Freud described incestuous wishes as giving rise to an equivalent of castration, either in the direct form of male impotence or, indirectly, by means of projection, in the form of the debasement of the love-object. The third text, ‘‘The Taboo of Virginity,’’ dealt explicitly with the castration anxiety precipitated in men by contact with women, universally recognized as a danger to male sexuality, that is to say, as always potentially castrating. In the delusions of Dr. Schreber, castration was an obligatory emasculation, but an acceptable one in that it would afford him access to female ‘‘states of bliss,’’ so much more voluptuous than male ones (1911c, p. 29). With ‘‘On Narcissism’’ (1914c), Freud appeared to reject the castration complex; in point of fact, however, his allusion to castration was part of a refutation of AdlerÕs conception of ‘‘masculine protest’’ (pp. 92–93), while his clear account of the narcissistic hypercathexis of the penis tended on the contrary to reinforce the notions of the castration complex in boys and of penis envy in girls. The metapsychological papers of 1915 contain no reference to the theme of castration. At the same period, however, Freud was at work on his case history of the ‘‘Wolf Man’’ (1918b [1914]), where castration played a prominent role in the ‘‘reconstruction’’ of his patientÕs infantile neurosis. The Wolf Man sought through identification to assume the passive position of his mother during sexual intercourse; he chose the fantasy of anal penetration by his father, implicit in which was a castration fantasy. In this case history Freud opted for several theoretical hypotheses related to castration. These included the definition of femininity; castration as at once feared as a narcissistic injury and desired as a precondition to penetration by the father; repression; erogenous displacement onto the bowel; splitting of processes of thought and ideation; and radical disavowal (Verwerfung, translated by Jacques Lacan as forclusion (‘‘foreclosure’’). All the same, castration as a complex was still not regarded by Freud at this time as an organizing principle of the psyche; he felt simply that as threat, anxiety, or fantasy 25 2 it was sufficiently freighted with meaning to bring about reorganizations of the psyche. In his paper ‘‘On Transformations of Instinct as Exemplified in Anal Erotism’’ (1916–17e), Freud returned to his earlier theoretical options and brought them together, notably with respect to female sexuality and anality. He presented female sexuality as centered on penis envy and on the wish for a child, the two being equivalent. A like set of equivalences obtained in the psyche, ‘‘as an unconscious identity,’’ between feces, penis, gift, and baby—all of them part-objects, all of them small, ‘‘detachable’’ parts of the body (p. 133). In this way Freud came back to the idea of a ‘‘pregenital’’ phase (already mentioned in 1905) predicated on genital castration conceived as anal castration, just as an oral castration could be said to describe separation from the breast. The word ‘‘castration’’ thus came in all cases to indicate the sexual implications— even if they were deferred—of such separations. ‘‘The Infantile Genital Organization’’ (1923e) was presented as an addition to, and a development of the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. The paper stressed the fundamental difference between the pregenital organizations of the libido on the one hand and, on the other, the part played by the infantile genital organization in the two-phase institution of sexuality. The infantile genital phase was characterized by the primacy, in both sexes, of the cathexis of the male genital organ. The evolution of FreudÕs thinking here thus concerned not only the discovery of the anatomical difference between the sexes but also the fact that it was the presence or absence of a penis that gave full meaning to that difference. ‘‘What is present, therefore, is not a primacy of the genitals, but a primacy of the phallus’’ (p.142). The replacement of ‘‘penis’’ by ‘‘phallus’’ here clearly indicated FreudÕs new perspective. Further, and quite logically, he added that ‘‘the castration complex can only be rightly appreciated if its origin in the phase of phallic primacy is also taken into account’’ (p. 144). The sadistic-anal pregenital antithesis between active and passive gave way to the antithesis between phallic and castrated. The sexual polarity between male and female would not coincide with masculine and feminine until puberty. ‘‘The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex’’ (1924d) rehearsed some now familiar arguments, but it did so from the phallic perspective proposed in ‘‘The Infantile Genital Organization.’’ The phallic genital organization of the child succumbed to the threat of castration. This INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CASTRATION COMPLEX threat was conveyed first through what was understood and then through what was seen; when its full effect was felt, the child ‘‘turns away from the Oedipus complex’’ (p. 176). But the object-cathexes thus abandoned were replaced by identifications. The period of latency followed: libidinal tendencies were desexualized and sublimated, and the introjection of paternal authority formed the nucleus of the superego. An important issue nevertheless remained unresolved, that of female sexuality, including its relationships with the Oedipus complex, with the superego, and with latency. Was it also characterized by a phallic organization and a castration complex? Freud maintained that the girl, realizing that a clitoris was not on a par with a penis, accepted castration as an established fact. For her the threat of castration and the superego were thus of lesser significance. A more general threat was that of the loss of love. Penis envy tended to be replaced by the wish to obtain an oedipal child from the father. According to ‘‘Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes’’ (1925j), whereas castration was experienced by boys essentially as a threat, girls looked upon it as a reality to which they were already subject. Either alternative derived directly from the ‘‘primacy of the phallus’’ in both sexes. When the girl observed a boy and his penis, she recognized that she did not have a penis, and wanted to have one. Worse, she might develop a masculinity complex (the wish to be like a man) or, as a further step, disavow reality by ‘‘refusing to accept the fact of being castrated’’ (p. 253). Naturally, the consequences could sometimes be serious, ranging from feelings of unfair treatment to narcissistic injury, from jealousy to the sort of onanistic fantasy described in ‘‘ÔA Child Is Being BeatenÕ’’ (1919e). The mother, in such cases, though the original love object, was blamed for this effective castration. With puberty, however, a powerful wave of repression would bear down upon all sexual activity in girls that was of a ‘‘masculine’’ stamp (clitoridal masturbation), clearing the way for the development of a passive and receptive femininity. Likewise, and at the same time, she would take her father as an object of Oedipal love and transform her penis envy into the wish for a child from him. In short, ‘‘In girls the Oedipus complex is a secondary formation. The operations of the castration complex precede it and prepare for it’’ (1925j, p. 256). For Freud, therefore, the anatomical difference between the sexes was interpreted in the same way by INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS both girls and boys. It is this Freudian account of female sexuality that has been most widely criticized. Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d [1925]) introduced FreudÕs second theory of anxiety: the earlier notion that the affect associated with a repressed idea was converted into anxiety was replaced with a conception of anxiety as an alarm signal that itself triggered repression. Anxiety and the castration complex were both central to this new conceptualization. Revisiting the cases of ‘‘Little Hans’’ and the ‘‘Wolf Man,’’ Freud clearly expressed the view that ‘‘the motive force of repression’’ was anxiety in face of the threat of castration (pp. 107–8). He added that the fear of being devoured, bitten, and so on, as well as animal phobias, and phobias and imaginary fears in general, should also be attributed to castration anxiety, which for its part was the fear of a danger felt to be thoroughly real (Realangst). This theoretical picture explained what the three types of neurosis, hysterical, phobic, and obsessional, had in common: ‘‘in all three the motive force of the egoÕs opposition is, we believe, the fear of castration’’ (p. 122). Furthermore, whether with respect to pregenital forms (experiences of separation from breast or feces) or with respect to more developed forms (social or moral anxiety stoked by the superego), it was invariably the danger of castration that was feared, and distinctly not the danger of death, no representation of which existed in the unconscious. Nor was the ‘‘birth trauma’’ evoked by Otto Rank involved here. The prototype of anxiety was the sucklingÕs state of distress in the absence of its mother; from the economic standpoint, this biological situation implied an increase in the tension created by need. The pivot of anxiety—deferred, relative to that initial distress—was the castration complex. The heir of the castration complex was anxiety vis-à-vis the superego. In women, fear of losing the objectÕs love played the same role as castration anxiety in men (p. 143). FreudÕs paper on ‘‘Fetishism’’ (1927e) broached the issue of the disavowal of female castration. ‘‘Probably no male human being is spared the fright of castration at the sight of a female genital’’ (p. 154). For the fetishist, at the place where the penis ought to be, there was indeed a penis, in the variable (and often vivid) form of a personal fetish whose presence and employment implied a splitting of the ego: one part acknowledged the castration of women while the other disavowed it, in a single, perpetual process that protected the fetishist from the terror of castration. 253 CASTRATION COMPLEX In ‘‘Female Sexuality’’ (1931b) and throughout the New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933a), especially in the lectures entitled ‘‘Femininity’’ and ‘‘Anxiety and Instinctual Life,’’ Freud reasserted the importance of the structuring role of the castration complex. He reiterated his general position as follows: ‘‘The danger of psychical helplessness fits the stage of the egoÕs early immaturity; the danger of loss of an object (or loss of love) fits the lack of self-sufficiency in the first years of childhood; the danger of being castrated fits the phallic stage; and finally fear of the super-ego, which assumes a special position, fits the period of latency’’ (p. 88). The closing pages of ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’’ (1937c) addressed what Freud continued to look upon as an anti-analytical enigma, even, in a sense, a scandal: men would not understand that passive submission to a master does not amount to castration, while women could not admit that they have no penis and that this is their nature. In short, menÕs fear of castration and womenÕs penis envy corresponded to a refusal of femininity (i.e., of castration) by both sexes—a refusal graven in the ‘‘bedrock’’ of the biological (pp. 250–53). In the myriad forms in which it manifested itself in mental life, as interpreted theoretically by Freud, castration was omnipresent, and closely bound up with the Oedipus complex; if female sexuality was something of a stumbling-block for it, the concept was firmly anchored to the difference between the sexes and the difference between the generations. Starting out from empirical observations, such as those in the case history of ‘‘Little Hans,’’ FreudÕs theoretical path led him beyond clinical experience into fundamental questions of epistemology. Castration turned out to be more than the fantasy of a child under threat; embedded in the Oedipus complex and theoedipal situation, this fantasy emerged not only as an organizing principle in the psychic life of the individual but also as prototypical of the ‘‘split’’ which, as distinct from fusion, made possible individuation and the secondary processes (temporality, succession, language, psychical working-out, thought, and so on). In this perspective, Jacques Lacan laid much stress on symbolic castration, making the phallus responsible for the organization of difference, hence for splitting, and hence for the symbolic order, though at the same time he continued to endow this order with the sexual aura specific to the human condition. 25 4 It was precisely this anthropological dimension that would seem to have been misapprehended by most English-language authors. For Melanie Klein, admittedly, the castration fantasy continued to play a predominant role in the development of childhood psychosexuality, but it intervened at a late stage, even though she spoke of an early Oedipus complex. As early as the nineteen-twenties, Sándor Ferenczi and Otto Rank had been critical of the castration complex, while, later on, FreudÕs account of the link between castration and femininity had, not unjustifiably, been questioned. Castration had barely any place in the theoretical and clinical contributions of D. W. Winnicott, whose definition of femininity was highly original; nor did it have much significance for Wilfred Bion, and it had even less for Heinz Kohut, for whom the Oedipus and castration complexes refer merely to late, relative, and contingent events in mental life. Another conceptual difficulty that should not be overlooked is that attending the relations between the castration complex and the death instinct. It is notable that Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g) pays scant attention to the castration complex, whereas Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d [1925]), largely focused on the castration complex, makes no mention of the death instinct. In its role as organizer of mental life, the castration complex sometimes fails, either because it has not been sufficiently developed to be effective, or because it is apparently overwhelmed. In such cases the subject finds himself grappling directly with instinctual disintegration and exposed to the ravages of the destructive instincts. In psychotic functioning, castration anxiety, so far from playing a structuring role, itself constitutes a terror operating in the same mode as archaic fears of dismemberment. The fact is that two different perspectives are present here. While Freud undoubtedly considered that the castration complex played a basic organizing role in mental life as a stage in which the anxieties and distress of an earlier time—even the earliest time—were revived in a deferred manner, he simultaneously looked upon it a stage in the formation of the superego. And it was thanks to the part played by the superego that instinctual renunciations would eventually be effected under the pressure of unconscious feelings of guilt and the need for punishment. Although such instinctual sacrifices were injurious to the individual, they were essential to the ‘‘process of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CASTRATION COMPLEX civilization,’’ that is, to the development of conscience and thought. This process was subject, like the individual, to that instinctual duality which, we must not forget, was based at once upon an antagonism and an inextricable connection between the life and the death instincts. The great lesson of Civilization and Its Discontents was that ‘‘This conflict is set going as soon as men are faced with the task of living together’’ (1930a, p. 132). Living together indeed requires at the very least the symbolic marks of sacrifice (circumcision, for instance), and such marks are planted on the sexual body, thus clearly demonstrating the power of the notion of castration in the various registers of human reality. ———. (1911c [1910]). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (Dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1–82. JEAN COURNUT ———. (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1–122. See also: ‘‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy’’ (Little Hans); Anxiety; Aphanisis; Biological bedrock; Disavowal; Exhibitionism; Fascination; Father complex; Fetishism; Fright; ‘‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (Wolf Man)’’; Identificatory project; Masculine protest (individual psychology); Oedipus complex; Penis envy; Perversion; Phallic mother; Phallic stage; Phobias in children; Phobic neurosis; Primal fantasies; Psychanalyse et Pédiatrie (Psychoanalysis and pediatrics); Psychosexual development; Self-mutilation in children; Sex differentiation; ‘‘Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Difference between the Sexes’’; ‘‘Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence’’; ‘‘Taboo of Virginity, The’’; Unconscious fantasy. ———. (1912d). On the universal tendency to debasement in the sphere of love. (Contributions to the psychology of love II). SE, 11: 177–190. ———. (1912–13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: an introduction. SE, 14: 81–105. ———. (1916–17e). On transformations of instinct as exemplified in anal erotism. SE, 17: 125–133. ———. (1918a). The taboo of virginity (Contributions to the psychology of love III). SE, 11: 191–208. ———. (1919e). A child is being beaten. SE, 17: 175–204. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18. ———. (1923e). The infantile genital organization (an interpolation into the theory of sexuality). SE, 19: 141–145. ———. (1924d). The dissolution of the oedipus complex. SE, 19: 171–179. ———. (1925j). Some psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes. SE, 19: 241–258. ———. (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. ———. (1927e). Fetishism. SE, 21: 147–157. ———. (1930a). Civilization and its discontents. SE21: 57–145. Bibliography Angoisse et complexe de castration (1991). Monographs of the Revue française de psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ———. (1931b). Female sexuality. SE, 21: 221–243. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho–analysis. SE, 22: 83–268. Cournut, Jean. (1997). Épı̂tre aux oedipiens. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4 and 5. ———. (1939a). Moses and monotheism. SE, 23: 1–137. ———. (1901b). The psychopathology of everyday life. SE, 6. Green, André. (1990). Le complexe de castration. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. Lacan, Jacques. (1991). Le Séminaire VIII. Le transfert (1960–61). Paris: Seuil. ———. (1908c). On the sexual theories of children. SE, 9: 205–226. Laplanche, Jean (1980). Problématiques II, Castration, symbolisations. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ———. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10: 1–149. ———. (1910h). A special type of choice of object made by men (Contributions to the psychology of love I). SE, 11: 163–175. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Further Reading Jacobson, Edith. (1976). Female superego formation and female castration conflict. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 45, 525–538. 255 CATASTROPHE THEORY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Horney, Karen. (1924). On the genesis of the castration complex in women. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 5, 50–65. Mayer, Elizabeth Lloyd. (1995). The phallic castration complex and primary femininity: Paired developmental lines toward female gender identity. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 43, 17–38. Rangell, Leo. (1991). Castration. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 39, 3–24. CATASTROPHE THEORY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS The mathematical concept of catastrophe theory was proposed by René Thom in 1968 and was presented in his Structural Stability and Morphogenesis (1972/1989). ThomÕs ‘‘Elementary catastrophes’’ refer to the seven dynamic configurations that a form, being sufficiently stable to be recognized in ordinary space-time, adopts in order to appear, subsist, and change. René Thom introduced his work as follows: This work aims to provide a formal structure that can be used to attack any morphogenetic problem in general. Based on a consideration of the mechanisms at work in embryological development, this formal structure leads to a universal method that can be used to associate any morphological appearance with a local dynamic situation that engenders it, in a way that is independent of the substrate—material or immaterial, living or non-living—that supports it. In this way we introduce the notion of Ôcatastrophe,Õ whose applications range from physics . . . to linguistics . . . and biology. This book provides the first systematic attempt to consider problems of biological control in geometric and topological terms as well as those associated with the structural stability of shapes (1989). The research on which catastrophe theory depends, as undertaken by Alexandre Liapounov (1857–1918), in Russia, on structural stability, and by Henri Poincaré (1854–1912), in France, on qualitative dynamics, has continued (differential topology, dynamic systems, and so on). Structural stability treats shapes and phenomena according to an intrinsic variability that their persistence in time imposes on them, and not as if they remained strictly identical to themselves—‘‘the simple stability’’ that classical science requires. In this way the energy a being expends to persist can be taken into account, and consideration given 25 6 to the stylization of structurally stable shapes, according to a dynamic that is qualitative because it indicates ‘‘state trajectories,’’ possible histories and events, without measuring quantities. Catastrophe theory resolves the following problems: Given a structurally stable dynamic situation dependent on an unknown (or even infinite) number of parameters, it describes all the possible variations and changes in the situation with the help of a finite and minimal number of parameters. If the situation can be represented in conventional space-time, the theory provides for seven kinds of change, the seven elementary catastrophes, depending on at most four parameters. Determining psychic forms, constructing a dynamic that creates them, then making the problems associated with the stability and regulation of these forms intelligible—their possible histories—was the work of Freud. Psychoanalysis is psychic morphodynamics. That a theory addressing conditions of possibility and constraints can serve to make FreudÕs work more intelligible goes without saying. A standard case involves the coexistence of primary narcissism and a primary object relation that one of the catastrophes, the ‘‘cusp,’’ can be used to model. Similarly, one of the aspects of the duality of the life and death drives can be described as the necessary co-presence of structural and simple stabilities. The application of the ‘‘exact sciences,’’ even the geometrization of a part of thermodynamics, to any nonmathematico-physical domain is complex. But René Thom began to work out the epistemological implications of catastrophe theory. In his Semiophysics: a sketch (1988/1990), he developed a phusis of meaning. He shows how these mathematics subvert the Galilean subdivision of the world and respond to AristotleÕs—and FreudÕs—questions by treating form and dynamic together in their subjection to time. He then restores the emergence and instrumental value of these mathematics within the framework of natural philosophy, where, by means of ‘‘pregnance’’—drives according to Freud—signification becomes a process immanent in a vital dynamic. These analyses, which overturn epistemologies in force since the Galilean revolution, provide access to ‘‘laws of nature that are vaster and of greater scope’’ (1914d) than Freud had hoped. MICHÈLE PORTE See also: Dualism; Strata/stratification. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CATHARTIC METHOD Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1914d). On the history of the psychoanalytic movement. SE, 14: 1–66. Porte, Michéle. (1994). La dynamique qualitative en psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Porte, Michéle. (Ed.). (1994). Passion des formes. Dynamique qualitative, sémiophysique et intelligibilité. Á René Thom. Paris: E.N.S. Fontenay-Saint Cloud. Thom, René. (1989). Structural stability and morphogenesis: an outline of a general theory of models. (D. H. Fowler, Trans.). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. (Original work published 1972) ———. (1990). Semiophysics: a sketch. (Vendla Meyer, Trans.). Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., Advanced Book Program. (Original work published 1988) CATASTROPHIC CHANGE The concept of catastrophic change emerged from BionÕs mathematical period in which he expressed interested in physical transformations. When an analysand undergoes a violent psychotic change, for instance, what aspects of him remain invariant through that change, from the pre-catastrophic through the actual catastrophic to the post-catastrophic stage. Invariance in change is a concept Bion borrowed from mathematical set theory. He also relates the invariance in change to differing modes of representing an image, such as in art, where the artist has to represent a threedimensional world on a two-dimensional surface. Bion asserts, ‘‘It should . . . be possible to detect a pattern that remains unaltered in apparently widely differing contexts. It would be useful to isolate and formulate the invariants of that pattern so that it could be communicated’’ (Bion 1970). His basic thesis in this regard is that ‘‘the psychoanalyst should be regarded as transformation of realization (the actual psycho-analytic experience) into an interpretation or series of interpretations’’ (Bion 1965). He invokes the term ‘‘catastrophic’’ to designate a psychic event in an analysand that subverts the order or system of things in the environment and/or in the analysand himself, and this catastrophic change represents either a controlled or uncontrolled regression on the part of the analysand where the emergence of violence is pivotal. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Analysis in the pre-catastrophic stage differs from the post-catastrophic stage insofar as the former is characterized by the analysandÕs being unemotional, theoretical, and not manifesting any evidence of change. In addition, hypochondriacal symptoms are manifested. In the post-catastrophic stage the presence of violation is obvious, it lacks an ideational template, in contrast to the pre-catastrophic stage where ‘‘ideational violence’’ without affect is more in evidence. The analyst must then look, according to Bion, for the invariants in the post-catastrophic stage that correspond as invariants from the pre-catastrophic stage, e.g., hypochondria in the latter may be invariant with paranoid relations with external objects in the former. Returning to the middle stage, catastrophic change, that stage is characterized by the emergence of violence. Bion encloses the phenomenon of pre-, post-, and catastrophic changes as transformation as follows: In terms of the analysand, the transformation is, when a realization takes place, from T (patient) a to T (patient) b. In the analyst, if there is no observed change, the event is inscribes as T (analyst) a and T (analyst) b. In the event of a change, the inscription is: T (pre-catastrophic change) to T (post-catastrophic change). JAMES S. GROTSTEIN See also: Hallucinosis. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1965). Transformations: Change from Learning to Growth, London, Heinemann. ———. (1970). Attention and interpretation, London, Tavistock Publications. CATHARTIC METHOD The so-called ‘‘cathartic method’’ was a treatment for psychiatric disorders developed during 1881–1882 by Joseph Breuer with his patient ‘‘Anna O.’’ The aim was to enable the hypnotized patient to recollect the traumatic event at the root of a particular symptom and thereby eliminate the associated pathogenic memory through ‘‘catharsis.’’ The term was derived from AristotleÕs use of it to describe the emotionally purgative effect of Greek tragedies. 257 CATHARTIC METHOD Reading the case history of Anna O., one sees that the method developed gradually. At first, Breuer limited himself to making use of the patientÕs self-induced hypnotic states in which she would strive to express what she preferred to avoid talking about when normally conscious. Later on, Anna O. began inventing stories around a word or words she heard, at the conclusion of which she awakened serene and improved. After the death of her father, such stories evoked diurnal fears and hallucinations. The cathartic effect, linked to the emotional state that accompanied these fears, required the doctor to listen without actively seeking etiological clues. Anna O. aptly described this procedure, speaking seriously, as a ‘‘talking cure’’, while she referred to it jokingly as ‘‘chimney-sweeping’’ (1895d, p. 30). At this juncture Breuer began to more systematically employ a technique by which, while Anna O. was in a trance, he repeated to her a few words that she herself had muttered while in a selfinduced ‘‘absence.’’ It was probably in August 1881 that the method acquired its definitive form. This was when Anna O., after refusing to drink water and suffering nearhydrophobia during hot weather, remembered the disgust she felt when she happened upon her English lady-companionÕs dog while it was drinking from a water glass. As soon as she described the event, she asked for water and ‘‘thereupon the disturbance vanished, never to return’’ (p. 35) Other examples provided Breuer with evidence that ‘‘in the case of this patient the hysterical phenomena disappeared as soon as the event which had give rise to them was reproduced in her hypnosis’’ (p. 35), and that systematic application of what she called ‘‘chimney sweeping’’ would put an end to one after another of such morbid phenomena. To move the treatment along faster, Breuer began use hypnosis, which he had not regularly employed previously. Freud and Breuer filled out the notion of catharsis with the concept of ‘‘abreaction’’—a quantity of affect that was linked to memory of a traumatic and pathogenic event that could not be evacuated through normal physical and organic processes as required by the ‘‘principle of constancy’’ and so, thus blocked (eingeklemmt), was redirected through somatic channels to become the process at the origin of the pathological symptoms (1893a). decided, in treating Emmy von N., to employ ‘‘the cathartic method of J. Breuer.’’ But failure to regularly induce hypnotic states inclined him by 1892 to give up hypnosis, which his patient Elisabeth von R. disliked. He asked her to lay down and close her eyes but allowed her to move about or open her eyes as she wished, and he experimented with a ‘‘pressure technique’’: ‘‘I placed my hand on the patientÕs forehead or took her head between my hands and said: ÔYou will think of it [a symptom or its origin] under the pressure of my hand. At the moment at which I relax my pressure you will see something in front of you or something will come into your head. Catch hold of it. It will be what we are looking for.—Well, what have you seen or what has occurred to you?’’ (Freud 1895d, p. 110). This procedure ‘‘has scarcely ever left me in the lurch since then,’’ (p. 111) Freud added, claiming that this was the case to such an extent that he told patients that it could not possibly fail but invariably enabled him to ‘‘at last [extract] the information’’ (p. 111). BreuerÕs method little by little thus became an ‘‘analysis of the psyche’’ which prefigured ‘‘psychoanalysis,’’ a term that first appeared in print in 1896. The technique would be developed progressively over the course of a dozen years.By 1907, when Freud undertook analysis of the ‘‘Rat Man,’’ he no longer actively demanded that patients produce material, but asked only that they verbalize what spontaneously came to mind. FreudÕs thesis, according to which trauma at the root of displaced energy towards the soma is invariably sexual in nature, led to a rupture in his relationship with Breuer, but it also determined the future course of psychoanalysis. His explanation of the difficulties that patients experienced during treatment to defend themselves against pathogenic memories would come to be known as ‘‘resistance,’’ while the concept of ‘‘transference’’ would emerge from his understanding of BreuerÕs sudden termination of Anna O., or the time that a patient, upon waking from hypnosis, threw her arms around his neck. Catharsis and abreaction, even while still observed during psychoanalytic treatment, no longer constitute therapeutic aims as in 1895. However, they remain prominent in several psychotherapeutic techniques, such as in ‘‘Primal Scream’’ therapy and certain types of psychodrama. Tired of poor results and of the monotony of hypnotic suggestion, by 1889 Freud appears to have 25 8 ALAIN DE MIJOLLA INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CATHEXIS See also: Dynamic point of view; Economic point of view; First World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis; ‘‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’’; ‘‘Repression’’; Topographical point of view ; ‘‘Unconscious, The’’; Witch of Metapsychology, the. Bibliography Anderson, Ola. (1962). Studies in the prehistory of psychoanalysis. Stockholm: Svenska Bokförlaget. energy, which, neutral in itself, can be added to a qualitatively differentiated erotic or destructive impulse, and augment its total cathexis. . . . It seems a plausible view that this displaceable and neutral energy . . . proceeds from the narcissistic store of libido—that it is desexualized Eros’’ (p. 44). The adherents of ego psychology have made this supposed neutral energy into the energy powering their ‘‘conflict-free ego.’’ PAUL DENIS Chertok Léon; and Saussure, Raymond de. (1973). Naissance du psychanalyste. Paris: Payot. See also: Psychic energy. Freud, Sigmund. (1893a). On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomena: Preliminary communication. SE, 2. Bibliography ———. (1895d). Studies on Hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. Mijolla Alain de. (1982). Aux origines de la pratique psychanalytique. In R. Jaccart (Ed.), Histoire de la psychanalyse. Paris: Hachette. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. CATHEXIS CATHECTIC ENERGY In the most general terms, cathectic energy is the energy attached to various psychic formations. Freud used this expression in two different contexts: one where it clearly designates a libidinal cathexis, and another where by implication the energy in question is of a different nature—neutral or desexualized. In this last, narrower sense, cathectic energy appears in the letter to Wilhelm Fliess of January 1, 1896, as ‘‘free psychic energy,’’ small quantities of energy bound to the phenomena of attention and consciousness. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), cathectic energy is the energy invested in thoughts by the preconscious as opposed to the countervailing ‘‘energy of the unconscious’’: ‘‘[the primary processes] appear whenever ideas are abandoned by the preconscious cathexis, are left to themselves and can become charged with the uninhibited energy from the unconscious which is striving to find an outlet’’ (p. 605). Freud would continue throughout his career to maintain this distinction between the energy whose displacements regulate the processes of thought and fuel cathexis, on the one hand, and the countercathexes of the instinct on the other. As for the origin of this energy, Freud wrote in The Ego and the Id (1923b), for example, that he ‘‘reckoned as though there existed in the mind . . . a displaceable INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A key concept from the economic point of view, ‘‘cathexis’’ refers to the process that attaches psychic energy, essentially libido, to an object, whether this is the representation of a person, body part, or psychic element. Implicit in FreudÕs early works, the idea of cathexis stems directly from the hypothesis of psychic energy. The term first appeared in 1895 in Studies on Hysteria, as well as in ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ (1950c [1895]). It then recurs throughout FreudÕs works. The term is used to designate various psychic impulses in energic terms. As a result, ‘‘cathexis’’ is also used to refer to organizational psychic impulses, the interplay of symptoms and regressions, and the workings of attention and pain. Freud used it to describe major and modulated quantitative phenomena in symptoms and psychic processes. The term also denotes the binding of psychic energy to interconnected representations in the progressive organization of the psyche. Cathexis relates to the affects, where the issue of the quantum of affect becomes paramount (Freud, 1933a [1932]). A feeling not cathected with energy, or loaded with a certain quantity of affect, does not become fixed in memory. Psychic objects and representations are the result of cathexis. Most psychic mechanisms have to be considered from the economic point of view, that is, in terms of cathexis, decathexis, anticathexis, and hypercathexis. The concept 259 CATHEXIS of cathexis thus underpins FreudÕs entire theory of the constitution of the psyche. Everything that takes place in the body or the psyche can be an object of cathexis. Real persons are cathected only through the intermediary of the psychic representations constructed of them. Cathexes are objective when they are directed at individuals with a corresponding existence in the external world and are narcissistic when they have meaning only for the subject. Any stable psychic formation, essentially any psychic formation constituted from a stable cathexis, can in turn become the support for a cathexis added to its constituent cathexis. Every cathexis has an impact on psychic equilibrium because it reduces the quantity of free energy, but the cathexes most constitutive of the psyche are the drive cathexes. Libidinal cathexis of the object of the drive and of the experience of satisfaction obtained in the subjectÕs interaction with that object constitute the most vital internal objects that can support pleasurable ego functioning. The concept of fixation has to be understood in terms of libidinal cathexes that have remained organized around historically determined objects (in the widest sense). Freud used many different metaphors to describe this process. He used military metaphors to describe how troops (psychic energy) occupy (cathect—the literal meaning of ‘‘Besetzung’’) a particular piece of the psychic territory and how some of these troops remain behind to establish a base for a return of forces that have completed the advance. Freud also used metaphors from banking, deploying an analogy between libidinal cathexes and financial investments. With the metaphor of an amoeba, Freud illustrated how narcissistic and objective cathexes are related: the pseudopodia that the amoeba extends toward objects are currents of object cathexis that can be withdrawn back into the subject and turned into narcissistic cathexes. The stronger the narcissistic fixation, the greater the potential for narcissistic regression. the id is the source of libido and thus the origin of libidinal cathexes. Freud also posited a form of free energy that can emanate from the ego and hypercathect a particular psychic element. Via this process, the ego essentially comes to direct cathexes. Such free energy is neutral and displaceable energy belonging to hypercathexis, which plays a part in the economy of attention, perception, and the egoÕs preparation for possible traumas (1940a [1938]). It is Freudian formulations of this kind that formed the basis for ego psychology, which postulates a conflict-free sphere of the ego. The term ‘‘hypercathexis’’ is also used more generally to refer to libidinal intensification of an existing cathexis. In Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (1926d [1925]), Freud addressed the issue of psychic pain caused by substantial cathexis directed at a lost object. Freud outlined how a painful bodily lesion imposes a substantial narcissistic cathexis that tends to ‘‘empty the ego’’ (p. 171). He then identified cathexis as the common element in physical and psychic pain: ‘‘The intense cathexis of longing which is concentrated on the missed or lost object (a cathexis which steadily mounts up because it cannot be appeased) creates the same economic conditions as are created by the cathexis of pain which is concentrated on the injured part of the body’’ (p. 171). PAUL DENIS See also: Anticathexis; Cathectic energy; Decathexis; Defense mechanisms; Economic point of view; Ego boundaries; Free energy/bound energy; Hypercathexis; Libido; Object; Primal repression; Psychic energy; Transference relationship. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1–338; 5: 339–625. ———. (1910i). The psycho-analytic view of psychogenic disturbance of vision. SE, 11: 209–218. ———. (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159–204. ———. (1916–1917a [1915–1917]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15–16. The concept of displacement too is related to that of cathexis. Quantities of cathected libido, or psychic energy, can be displaced onto other supports. These displacements result from the greater or lesser capacity of cathected libido to detach from its early objects and from its ‘‘viscosity’’ (1916–1917a [1915–1917]). ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. Cathected psychic energy is essentially libido. In the context of his structural theory, Freud theorized that ———. (1940a [1938]). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 139–207. 26 0 ———. (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS C É N A C , M I C H E L (1891 –1 965) ———. (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281–387. Should Know about Psychoanalysis). In 1936 he opened a clinic for psychoanalysis with John Leuba. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. In 1943, when the French police arrested Françoise and Eugène Minkowski, their daughter Jeanine took refuge with Michel Cénac. He intervened with the Prefecture of Police and was able to obtain their freedom. During the Occupation, the term ‘‘psychoanalysis’’ appeared only once in the title of a review, ‘‘Psychiatrie et psychanalyse: LÕapport de la psychanalyse à la psychiatre,’’ which he signed and published in March 1943 in Annales médico-psychologiques, even though the content of the article reflected the reticence typical of the French (Mijolla, 1982). In a letter to Ernest Jones written on December 31, 1944, John Leuba writes, ‘‘Borel and Cénac are working as best they can . . . the second with complete probity but a technique that leaves much to be desired.’’ He was the first treasurer, [RB1]after the Liberation, in 1946 and vice president of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris between 1949 and 1951. Rouart, Julien. (1967). Les notions dÕinvestissement et de contre-investissement à travers lÕévolution des idées freudiennes. Revue française de psychanalyse, 31 (2), 193–213. Further Reading Holt, Robert R. (1962). Critical examination: Freud’s concept of bound vs. free cathexis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 10, 475–525. Ornston, Darius. (1985). The invention of ’cathexis’ and Strachey’s strategy. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 12, 391–400. CAUSALITY. See Need for causality CÉNAC, MICHEL (1891–1965) Michel Cénac, a French psychiatrist and psychoanalyst and member of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society), was born June 28, 1891, in Argelès-Gazost (Hautes-Pyrénées), and died in Paris in 1965. He was awarded the Croix de Guerre and the Legion of Honor during the First World War and later studied medicine and psychiatry. An intern at the Asiles de la Seine in 1921, he was a student of Professor Trénel and Henri Claude and later became the head of his clinic. His dissertation, ‘‘Langages crées par les aliénés’’ (The Languages of the Mentally Ill), which he defended in 1928, was primarily devoted to the meaningless jargon often spoken by mentally ill patients. He soon became interested in psychoanalysis and began a training analysis with Rudolph Loewenstein. He was elected a member of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris on November 26, 1929. With Adrien Borel, in 1933 he presented a report on obsession at the VII Conférence des Psychanalystes de Langue Française (Seventh Conference of French-Speaking Psychoanalysts). Preoccupied by the links between medicine and psychoanalysis, in 1934 he published ‘‘Ce que tout médecin doit savoir de la psychanalyse’’ (What Every Doctor INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Together with Jacques Lacan, at the XII Conférence in 1950, he presented a paper entitled ‘‘Introduction théorique aux fonctions de la psychanalyse en criminologie’’ (Theoretical introduction to the use of psychoanalysis in criminology), in which both authors expressed their disagreement with theories that stipulated the existence of a criminal instinct. Very much involved with Sacha Nacht in the origins of the 1953 split, on January 20 he announced his candidacy for president of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris against Jacques Lacan. He lost during the third round of voting. Cénac became the first senior physician of the Centre de Diagnostic et de Traitement Psychanalytique, which was created at the same time as the Institut de Psychanalyse de Paris (Paris Institute for Psychoanalysis) in 1954, and was elected president of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris in 1955. As part of his work at the psychiatric infirmary of the Paris Prefecture of Police, where he became honorary senior physician, Cénac conducted several studies on the value of witnesses (1951), recidivism and antisocial activities (1956), juvenile delinquency (1961), and subjective post-concussional syndromes. JEAN-PIERRE BOURGERON See also: France; Société psychanalytique de Paris et Institut psychanalytique de Paris. 261 CENSORING THE LOVER IN HER Bibliography Borel, Adrien, and Cénac, Michel. (1932). LÕobsession. Revue français de psychanalyse, V (4), 586–648. Cénac, Michel. (Jan.–Feb.–March 1943). Psychiatrie et psychanalyse. LÕapport de la psychanalyse à la psychiatrie,’’ Annales médico-psychologiques, 101 (1), 278–288. Lacan, Jacques, and Cénac, Michel. (1997). A theoretical introduction to the function of psychoanalysis in criminology, May 29, 1950 (Mark Bracher, Russell Grigg, and Robert Samuels, Trans.). Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, 1 (2). (Original work published 1951) Mijolla, Alain de. (1982). France, 1893–1965. in Peter Kutter (Ed.), Psychoanalysis international. A guide to psychoanalysis throughout the world (Vol. I, Europe, 66–113). StuttgartBad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1992. CENSORING THE LOVER IN HER The notion of ‘‘censoring the lover in her’’ was first introduced by Michel Fain, then reworked by Fain and Denise Braunschweig in order to highlight the way in which the mother may modulate her presence for the infant while looking after their bodily needs. When, in the course of caring for the baby, the mother daydreams about her love life with the father of the child, this other experienced as independent of the child induces a relative distance in the relation with the child. This leads the child to create an early (primary) state of triangulation which will be the basis for the future oedipal organization. Censoring the lover in her is therefore the effect of the internal events in the mother, leading the developing child to make room for a third party within the framework of their ‘‘real’’ two-person relationship. For the mother it is also this that enables her to countercathect the erotic feelings caused by the contact with the infant’s body. Her life as a lover thus takes on the value of a protective shield for the psyche of the child, but also for her own psyche because it ‘‘censors’’ a part of the erotic feelings aroused by maternal care. MICHEL ODY AND LAURENT DANON-BOILEAU See also: Fatherhood; Maternal object; Object, change of/ choice of; Parenthood; Protective shield. Bibliography Braunschweig, Denise, and Fain, Michel. (1975). La nuit, le jour. Essai psychanalytique sur le fonctionnement mental. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 26 2 Fain, Michel. (1971). Prélude à la vie fantasmatique. Revue française de psychanalyse, 35 (2–3), 291-364. CENSORSHIP The term censorship in everyday language connotes ideas of blame and repression of faults. This is how it appears in Freud in Studies on Hysteria: ‘‘we are very often astonished,’’ he writes, ‘‘to realize in what a mutilated state all the ideas and scenes emerged which we extracted from the patient by procedure of pressing. Precisely the essential elements of the picture were missing [ . . . ] I will give one or two examples of the way in which a censoring of this kind operates . . .’’ (1895b, p. 281–282). He then shows that what is censored is what appears to the patient to be blameworthy, shameful, and inadmissible. In a letter to Wilhelm Fleiss (December 22, 1897, in 1950a) he compares this psychic work to the censorship that the czarist regime imposed on Russian newspapers at the time: ‘‘Words, sentences and whole paragraphs are blacked out, with the result that the remainder is unintelligible’’ (1950a, p. 240). Although the term appears quite frequently in writings from this first period, its status remains uncertain. Freud seems to be describing the deliberate suppression by patients, in their communication with the doctor, of what they do not wish to reveal to him, as well as the mechanism and effects of unconscious repression (1896b). A second meaning appears when he evokes the censorship which, in dream-work, results in a manifest text being presented as a riddle (Interpretation of Dreams, 1900a). The metapsychological texts of 1915 elaborate on the distinctions outlined in chapter seven of the Interpretation of Dreams. Censorship is in fact defined as that which opposes the return of that which is repressed, at the two successive levels in the passage from the unconscious to the preconscious (the ‘‘antechamber’’) and on to the conscious (the ‘‘drawing-room’’) (1915e). Censorship is thus clearly distinguished from repression: whereas repression rejects a representation and/or an affect into the unconscious, censorship is what prevents it from re-emerging. Freud nevertheless confuses this distinction later when he writes, for example: ‘‘We know the self-observing agency as the ego-censor, the conscience; it is this that exercises the dream-censorship during the night, from which INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CENTRE ALFRED-BINET the repressions of inadmissible wishful impulses proceed’’ (1916–17a, p. 429). With the introduction of the structural theory Freud made a new distinction, with the ego becoming the agent of the censorship under the superego—the merciless supervisor (1923b). Although the notion of censorship continues to be fairly widely used in psychoanalysis to describe resistance to the treatment, it has scarcely received any further elaboration and its global nature may cause it to appear to be somewhat outmoded. ROGER PERRON See also: Censoring the lover in her; Dream; Dream interpretation; Ego; Fantasy; Fantasy (reverie); Fundamental rule; Hysteria; Jokes; Latent; Nightmare; Preconscious, the; Repression; Reverie; Secondary revision; Superego; Wish/yearning. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1895b). On the grounds for detaching a particular syndrome from neurasthenia under the description ‘‘anxiety neurosis.’’ SE, 3: 85–115. ———. (1896b). Further remarks on the neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 157–185. ———. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. ———. (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159–204. ———. (1916–1917a). Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. Parts I & II. SE, 15–16. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ———. (1950a). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173–280. CENTRE ALFRED-BINET The Centre Alfred-Binet (Alfred Binet Center), the department for child and adolescent psychiatry of the Association for Mental Health in Paris, annually receives about two thousand children for consultations and treatment. It is at the center of a group of institutions (Training Club, Foster Home Placement, Adolescent Day Hospital) and operates in coordination with an evening unit (Fondation Lyon) and a specialized homecare unit (Fondation de Rothschild). The system is sector-based, but the center receives 20 percent of its patients from outside of the sector it serves. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Created in 1956 by Serge Lebovici, who was soon joined by René Diatkine, it was the first sector-based center in France for children and adolescents. Breaking with standard practice at the time, the center sought to create essentially outpatient treatment in collaboration with the different institutions in which the children participated. The center was run by psychoanalysts and psychiatrists who were co-opted into the system and who devoted a large part of their time to analysis in an environment of reliable multidisciplinary teams. This fact clearly distinguished this system both from university institutions focused on hospitalization and from a large number of sector services later organized throughout France. In its development, the center came to rely essentially on psychoanalytic experience and use the mediation of other disciplines. Its practice was progressively elaborated under the influence of its creators, Serge Lebovici until 1978 and René Diatkine until 1994. It continues to have considerable influence on the work of the many public and private practitioners of child psychotherapy and psychiatry who trained in its seminars. The training, while deriving some of its ideas from trends in British psychoanalysis, attempts to define the limits and principles of the analystÕs work with children by constantly sorting out what comes from the child and what comes from the environment. The necessity of working with families in a climate of trust without inappropriate therapeutic or educational aims and generally for long periods of time led the psychoanalysts to adopt extensive therapeutic consultation and a broad range of treatments that allow children to remain in their usual surroundings. Practitioners take into account the varied conflicts in the psychic lives of the children and the pressure of their unconscious transfer/counter-transfer fantasies without any special fascination for the origin of these fantasies. This has led to a concept of child development as being dominated by successive and barely foreseeable deferred actions on the part of children in which games occupy a special place with regard to the appearance of new functions. In 2004 nearly five hundred people trained at the Centre Alfred-Binet. In spite of its budgetary restrictions, its evolving practice has enabled it to bring together a group of consultants that benefit parents and children and to organize brief therapy sessions aimed at enlarging the range of activities 263 CENTRE DE CONSULTATIONS ET DE TRAITEMENTS PSYCHANALYTIQUES JEAN-FAVREAU where analysts interact with young children and their families. way to develop the ability to conduct psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy. GÉRARD LUCAS The other analytic treatments practiced at the center were developed there in order to adapt, up to a certain point, to the range of the demand; among these are various forms of psychotherapy, individual and group psychodrama, and group psychoanalysis. But these other forms of treatment derive from the model of psychoanalytic treatment, of which they are thoughtful modifications taking into consideration the method, the frame, and the processes of change, and wherein clarification of the transference remains of central importance. See also: Diatkine, René; Lebovici, Serge Sindel Charles. CENTRE DE CONSULTATIONS ET DE TRAITEMENTS PSYCHANALYTIQUES JEAN-FAVREAU The Centre Jean-Favreau (CCTP) grew out of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris (SPP) and its training institute. The agreement linking it to the Paris Social Services Department (DASS) recognizes its purely psychoanalytic vocation. At the instigation of Sacha Nacht and René Diatkine, the Institut de Psychanalyse created the center in 1954. It was originally a clinic based on a model that the burgeoning psychoanalytic movement created around the time of World War I (it was similar to the Berlin Institute, for example). It provided free treatment to patients who lacked the resources necessary to pay for treatment. Unpaid analysts conducted these treatments, under the supervision of experienced analysts. This system also made it possible to explore the effects of free treatment on the analytic process and to facilitate access for non-physicians. In 1958 an agreement was signed with the Seine prefecture borough authorities. It guaranteed an operating budget for the center, thus testifying to the public authority’s interest in the renewal and use of psychotherapeutic modalities in the field of psychiatry. The center also was to contribute indirectly to training psychiatrists, who, within the framework of the policy of the sector, would then run extra-hospital clinics with a largely psychotherapeutic orientation. The center’s specific role and aims must be seen within this historical context. During a period of great innovation when many institutions were created, integrating psychoanalytic ideas into their treatment perspectives in various ways, the center based its activity around the classic analytic treatment conducted in the course of three or four weekly sessions of forty-five minutes each. This approach derived from the conviction held to this day that psychoanalytic treatment, if implemented correctly, is the most effective treatment, and the belief that psychoanalytic training is the best 26 4 The physicians who—delegated by the president of the PPS—have successively directed the center (Jeanne M. Favreau, Jean Favreau, Jean-Luc Donnet) and their assistants (Robert Barande, Monique Cournut) have thus been able to ensure compatibility between the socio-therapeutic obligations required by the agreement and the ethics of psychoanalytic practice. Some fifty analysts—including some candidates—work in the center in a very part-time fashion. The type of patient and the way the center is run make it particularly interesting from a psychoanalytic and psychiatric point of view, for several reasons. It is a privileged situation wherein to make evaluations and assessments within the consultative framework and to evaluate the types and predictive values of the initial interviews, as well as determining the indications for the various psychoanalytically derived treatments. Its legal status makes it necessary to critically and carefully evaluate the influence of the institutional factors, particularly free sessions, on the therapeutic processes. Of course the optimal analytic situation is one in which the patient pays for the treatment. But it would be inappropriate to establish this principle as a dogma. The availability of free psychoanalytic treatment is not of interest only to patients who lack the necessary resources but, because of the infinite variety of cases seen, it contributes to an ongoing reassessment of the theory of the analytic framework and the constant difficulties surrounding it. Without this in any way taking from its essentially therapeutic aim, the center provides training through its use of consultations for teaching purposes, as well as through participation in the psychodrama sessions. JEAN-LUC DONNET INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CERTAINTY See also: Favreau, Jean Alphonse; Société psychanalytique de Paris et Institut de psychanalyse de Paris. child and parent group psychodrama. Innovations were also constantly introduced in other domains, educational psychology, psychomotricity, and orthophonics for example. CENTRE PSYCHOPÉDAGOGIQUE CLAUDE-BERNARD The question has been raised whether the multiplicity of approaches would not dilute the psychoanalytic idea at the base. On the contrary, it would seem that the conjunction of ‘‘impossible tasks’’ is what makes such an institution rich and dynamic. Named after the Parisian lycée where it was first installed, the Centre psychopédagogique Claude-Bernard was founded in 1946 on the initiative of Juliette FavezBoutonier (quickly succeeded by André Berge) and Georges Mauco. The project came into being during the German Occupation, when these three analysts held informal meetings with Françoise Dolto and Marc Schlumberger. The idea was to create an institution that would enable children, adolescents, and their families to benefit from the discoveries of psychoanalysis in a framework other than hospital consultation. They envisaged a different approach to character disorders, language problems, and intellectual inhibitions. The revolutionary aspects of this project made it quite compatible with the vast plan of social and educational reforms that came into being at the end of the war. Like other centers later created in other cities, this structure had a dual vocation: medical on the one hand, educational and administrative on the other, the managers of both sections being analysts. This dual vocation symbolized the ‘‘crucible’’ in which actors from all sorts of different disciplines worked for the benefit of the children and their families, but this diversity shared a common horizon: analytic comprehension. In 1972 the center became ‘‘medicopsycho-educational’’ (CMPP). The social backdrop has changed completely over the last fifty years. Child psychology and psychoanalysis have seen their domains extended and, most of all, considerably deepened. The CMPP model has been contested, although November 1996 saw ClaudeBernard celebrate its fiftieth anniversary in good health! The Centre had an unquestionable role in the psychoanalytic movement in France. It played a considerable part in spreading psychoanalytic concepts in the domain of education and teaching. In addition, it promoted innovative practices in the psychoanalytic domain: From the very beginning, individual psychotherapy was complemented with the addition of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CLAIRE DOZ-SCHIFF See also: Berge, André; Clark-Williams, Margaret; FavezBoutonier, Juliette; France; Mauco, Georges. CERTAINTY An internal moral conviction resulting from reflection, or subjectively imposed in the form of an intuition or illumination, certainty is an intellectual sentiment that transposes sensory evidence into the realm of thought. Sigmund Freud gave little thought to the concept except when considering its opposite, doubt, or as related to the idea of conviction, which connotes an illusory or mistaken content (delusional conviction). However, dreams are an example of a mental product accompanied by certainty since images, rather than judgments, are involved. Conversely, whenever there is doubt, it is the misrepresentation that underscores the ability of the element in question to convey meaning. It is especially in the area of superstition and knowledge of the paranormal that Freud investigated the notion of certainty. As with paranoid delirium, he sees its origin in a projection of the contents of the unconscious onto the outside world (1901b). This idea was developed in connection with animist thought and later with the category of experience, which included feelings of seeing or experiencing something one has seen or experienced before (déjà-vu and déjà-vécu) (1914a), and feelings of alienation (Entfremdung), or the uncanny (Unheimlichkeit). What is in question in all of these are ‘‘obsolete primal convictions’’ associated with a primal inability to differentiate between the ego and the outside world. FreudÕs analysis of religious feelings—what Romain Rolland refers to as oceanic feelings (1930a [1929])— provided him with an opportunity to question whether certainty is equivalent to an objective perception. These 265 CERTEAU, MICHEL DE (1925 –1986) feelings, he wrote, are ‘‘described as feelings but are apparently complicated processes associated with determinate contents and decisions concerning those contents.’’ The only things that are certain are death and the relation between the mother (certissima [absolutely certain]) and the child, while the father is semper incertus (always uncertain). The fantasy of certainty, which the most skeptical researcher is never without, can thus be associated with this experience of primary and irreplaceable assurance: that of being the motherÕs child. What is certain is irreplaceable. For Freud, the psychoanalyst is prepared ‘‘for the sake of attaining some fragment of objective certainty, to sacrifice everything—the dazzling brilliance of a flawless theory, the exalted consciousness of having achieved a comprehensive view of the universe, the mental calm brought about by the possession of extensive grounds for expedient and ethical action’’ (1941d [1921], pp. 179). This spiritual abstinence is not based on an obsessive predilection for uncertainty but, on the contrary, a desire of anticipated certainty, of possessing fragmentary crumbs of knowledge once and for all (Mijolla-Mellor, S., 1992). The concept of certainty in psychoanalysis appears to be related both to the analysis of illusion associated with desire (Freud); or, more radically, with the destruction of critical thought, the seductive appeal of deviation, where the only possibility is one of repetition (Aulagnier,1984), and to the always partial and painfully won acquisition of partial certainties incorporated in a renewed hypothetical-deductive approach. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Construction-reconstruction; Death and psychoanalysis; Déja-vu; Doubt; Foreclosure; Ideology; Illusion; Paranoia; Pleasure in thinking; Sudden involuntary idea. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (1984). LÕapprenti-historien et le maı̂tre-sorcier. Du discours identifiant au discours délirant. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1901b). The psychopathology of everyday life. SE, 6. ———. (1912–13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ———. (1914a). Fausse reconnaissance (déjà raconté) in psycho-analytic treatment. SE, 13: 201–207. 26 6 ———. (1914d). On the history of the psycho-analytic movement. SE, 14: 1–66. ———. (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 59–145. ———. (1941d [1921]). Psycho-analysis and telepathy. SE, 18: 177–193. Lacan, Jacques. (1945). Le temps logique et lÕassertion de certitude anticipée. Un nouveau sophisme. In Écrits (pp. 197–213). Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1992). Le plaisir de pensée. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France. CERTEAU, MICHEL DE (1925–1986) Michel de Certeau, Jesuit historian—he was a specialist on the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and religion—was born in Chambéry in Savoy on May 17, 1925, and died at the age of sixty on January 13, 1986. He was introduced to psychoanalysis by Louis Beirnaert. He was one of the first members of the École Freudienne de Paris in 1964 and remained a member until it was dissolved by Jacques Lacan in 1980. Between 1963 and 1967 he directed the review Christus, together with François Roustang, introducing psychoanalysis to the magazine. His interest in alterity and the Other led him to study the work of Jean-Joseph Surin, a Jesuit mystic of the seventeenth century who was brought in to exorcize the possessed at Loudun. To understand the mystic priest, Certeau made use of psychoanalysis together with semiotics and ethnology. A historian, like Surin, of impossible speech and the broken subject, Michel de Certeau gave exceptional pertinence to Lacanian concepts. In search of the traces of the absent, attentive to the sites of a Real that was impossible to restore, he anchored historical writing in the relation between the body and language and in the constituent division of the subject between ‘‘outside’’ and ‘‘inside.’’ After 1968 he taught in the Department of Psychoanalysis at the Université de Paris in Vincennes. He later divided his time between the University of California at San Diego and Paris, and was appointed head of research at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in 1984. A tireless investigator of ideas and places, Certeau, in his historical work, demonstrated the fecundity of what Freud referred to as the work of mourning. For INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHANGE him historical writing is the equivalent of the ‘‘tombeau,’’ a literary and musical genre practiced in the seventeenth century, which gave voice to the past in order to bury it, that is, to honor and eliminate it. At a time when the social sciences were deeply influenced by scientism, Michel de Certeau felt that history, like psychoanalysis, was dependent primarily on a hermeneutics of loss. He defined an epistemology of the ‘‘in-between,’’ which hovered between science and fiction, and which studied the memory traces inscribed in a present subject to the ‘‘uncanny familiarity’’ of a past that was always ready to rise up to haunt our actions. FRANÇOIS DOSSE See also: History and psychoanalysis; Religion and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Certeau, Michel de (1970). The Possession at Loudun (Michael B. Smith, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. ———. (1973). LÕabsent de lÕhistoire. Repères, Paris: Mame. ———. (1975). The writing of history (Tom Conley, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. ———. (1982). The mystic fable (Michael B. Smith, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. ———. (1987). Histoire et psychanalyse entre science et fiction. Paris: Gallimard, Folio. CHANGE The psychic changes observable during psychoanalytic treatment involve two distinct processes. First, the therapeutic process applies to symptoms, personality traits, and behaviors amenable to transformation. Second, the psychoanalytic process applies to how the experience created by the analytic setting and the rules of technique is lived out. The articulation of these two processes defines the question of change in psychoanalysis. Without ever acquiring a specific conceptual status, the idea of change has been the focus of continual questioning since the beginning of psychoanalysis. As pointed out by Daniel Widlöcher (1970), it is easily traced in Sigmund FreudÕs work. As early as their INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS preliminary communication of 1893, which served to introduce their Studies on Hysteria (1895d), Freud and Breuer established both the modus operandi of the cathartic treatment of hysteria and the idea that the mechanism of treating the symptom is the reverse of the mechanism of its formation. The recollection of an event and its affective charge spark a process that reverses the pathogenic process brought about by repression. From that point on and indeed throughout the rest of his work, Freud drew on his observation of resistances to change to modify, deepen, and refine his model of change. Three moments mark the beginnings of psychoanalysis: the development of the rules of technique, the shift in focus from trauma theory to the role of fantasy, and the introduction of the concept of change in the form of libidinal development. Here we have an indication of the importance of a model of change to psychoanalysis. FreudÕs discovery of the extent and importance of the transference between 1904 and 1910 introduced a new model of change, which is particularly well explained in his Introductory Lectures on PsychoAnalysis (1916–1917a [1915–1917]). Transference affects the processes of change in several ways. It is an obstacle used by resistance, and it hinders the processes of association and remembering by encouraging repetition through acting out. But it is also a lever for therapeutic transformation, because the patient cathects with the therapist and this reveals features of past attachments and conflicts. Above all, repetition in the transference leads the patient to externalize a conflicted intrapsychic structure and displace it onto the relationship with the analyst. This is the origin of the tripartite therapeutic model of clinical neurosis, transference neurosis, and infantile neurosis. Beginning in the 1920s, growing doubts about the therapeutic effectiveness of psychoanalysis led Freud to make two basic theoretical revisions. First, he introduced the dualism of the life and death instincts to account for the force of the compulsion for repetition as compared with the inertia of libidinal-object choice. The second revision was based on a more diversified analysis of the processes of resistance to change, which allowed Freud, in ‘‘Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety’’ (1926d [1925]), to differentiate the resistances of the id, the ego, and the superego—a distinction made possible by the new structural model but also strengthened the clinical effectiveness of treatment. On this basis Freud constructed a third model, which he 267 CHANGE formulated in a binary manner: ‘‘Where id was, there ego shall be,’’ he wrote in ‘‘New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis’’ (1933a [1932], p. 80). In ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’’ (1937c), Freud offered a more modest version of this formulation, evoking a kind of to-and-fro between ego analysis and id analysis. He was also careful to recall the bases of resistance to change (libidinal viscosity, the repetition compulsion, and also penis envy in women and masculine protest in men). developed around the concepts of interaction, empathy (Ralph Greenson, Heinz Kohut), and ‘‘co-thinking’’ (Widlöcher). Throughout his work, in fact, Freud emphasized the study of resistances. In ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’’ (1937c), he emphasized, ‘‘Instead of an enquiry into how a cure by analysis comes about (a matter which I think has been sufficiently elucidated) the question should be asked of what are the obstacles that stand in the way of such a cure’’ (p. 221). Another theme is the mechanisms of externalization and internalization. Authors here have returned to the model of transference neurosis to show how pathological structures are displaced in the therapeutic relationship. Often abandoning the classical model of neurosis, these authors (including Melanie Klein and her students, as well as object-relations theorists) describe more archaic processes that become amenable to analysis once they are externalized in the transference. Have developments in psychoanalytic thinking since Freud followed through on this recommendation? Probably in part, even though the various theories have focused chiefly on their respective models of change. The development of many different schools of thought after Freud owes a great deal to modifications of technique (though only in close association with the work of interpretation) and, in the final analysis, to theoretical approaches that seek to specify the articulations between a pathological model, a developmental model, and a model of change through treatment. Yet all schools of psychoanalysis have based themselves on theoretical and clinical elements already present in FreudÕs work. Rather than an expression of allegiance, this is a consequence of the fact that FreudÕs theory of change (and the different models successively added to it) covers a very complex reality, of which the various schools have tried to specify a particular portion. It is worth drawing out a few main themes of these schools, though without reviewing the technical and theoretical frameworks of each (which are rarely presented in connection with the processes of change and resistance to change). The first theme concerns the psychoanalystÕs involvement in the process of change. The idea of a neutral therapist, whose ‘‘noninvolvement’’ ensures the necessary capacity for listening and interpretation, has given way to an ever narrower focus on the analystÕs mental efforts and role in change. This trend, already well underway in Sándor FerencziÕs innovations in technique, is evident in studies of the role of counter-transference by Paula Meimann and Heinrich Racker, and is currently being 26 8 Rather different from the foregoing is the narrative or constructivist tendency. This trend includes the otherwise varied approaches of Jacques Lacan, Roy Schafer, and Serge Viderman, all of whom in their respective ways emphasized how the work of interpretation is constructive. A third approach stresses the reparative function of the process of change. Change is expected to affect choices of libidinal objects. This trend develops the Freudian idea of the ‘‘revision of the process’’ by placing considerable emphasis on the emotions and the psychoanalystÕs containing function. Such authors as Michael Balint, Donald Winnicott, and Wilfred R. Bion, very different in other respects, belong to this trend. Other dimensions of change could, of course, be taken into consideration. The most important thing, perhaps, is to identify the reasons for the various divergences on the nature of psychic change and their impact on the activity and future development of the institutions of psychoanalysis. The problem is less one of justifying the existence of several models (which, as noted earlier, has to do with the complexity of the processes involved) than of explaining the reasons for theoretical choices. Clearly, the extension of psychoanalytic treatment to a broader range of cases and the application of psychoanalysis to serious pathologies have had a decisive impact on evolving ideas about change. Will this trend toward disparate models of psychic change continue? If not, what other trend will supplant it? What role will planned research studies, which tend to objectify certain data, play at a time when psychoanalysts are increasingly being held accountable for treatment choices, their effectiveness, and their cost? DANIEL WIDLÖCHER INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHARACTER See also: Adolescent crisis; Autoplastic; Catastrophic change; Cure; Depersonalization; Ego autonomy; Female sexuality; Mutative interpretation; Narcissistic withdrawal; Object, change of/choice of. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1916–1917a [1915–1917]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15–16. ———. (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. ———, & Breuer, Josef. (1893a). On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomina: Preliminary communication. SE, 2: 1–17. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. Widlöcher, Daniel. (1970). Freud et le problème du changement. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. CHANGE PROCESS. See Processes of development CHARACTER Character is a psychological, philosophical, and a literary concept. A distinction needs to be drawn between this concept and the metapsychological aspects of character and its relation to symptoms and neurosis. There are two main ways of defining it, which are interconnected. Concepts of character are designated on the one hand by the metapsychological aspects that are intrinsically connected with developments in theory and, on the other hand, by the distinction between normality and pathology and, specifically, the convergence between character and the major concepts of neurosis, psychosis, and borderline conditions. The concept of character appeared as early as 1900 in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), in connection with the importance of mnemic traces. The role of fixations emerged more clearly in 1905 in Three Essays INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), emphasizing the role of sublimation in character formation; Freud wrote: ‘‘A sub-species of sublimation is to be found in suppression bb reaction-formation’’ (p. 238). He then described various character types associated with the partial drives in ‘‘Character and Anal Erotism’’ (1908b) and ‘‘Some Character-types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work’’ (1916d). It was in 1913, in ‘‘The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis: A Contribution to the Problem of Choice of Neurosis’’ that he most sharply differentiated symptom and character: ‘‘the failure of repression and the return of the repressed—which are peculiar to the mechanism of neurosis—are absent in the formation of character. In the latter, repression either does not come into action or smoothly achieves its aim of replacing the repressed by reaction-formations and sublimations’’ (1913i, p. 323). In 1923, with the introduction of the structural theory, character is located in the ego and the importance of identifications is emphasized: ‘‘an object which was lost has been set up again inside the ego—that is, an object-cathexis has been replaced by an identification. . . . We have come to understand that this kind of substitution has a great share in determining the form taken by the ego and that it makes an essential contribution towards building up what is called its ÔcharacterÕ’’ (1923b, p. 28). Character thus comprises the history of object-choices that have since been abandoned. However, the earliness of these identifications should not allow us to forget that the earliest identifications with the parents are those that influence the constitution of the superego rather than the ego (Lecture 32, New Introductory Lectures on PsychoAnalysis, 1933a). Here the function of character traits as resistance is frequently emphasized: ‘‘we may now add as contributions to the construction of character which are never absent the reaction-formations which the ego acquires—to begin with in making its repressions and later, by a more normal method, when it rejects unwished-for instinctual impulses’’ (p. 91). Freud saw a degree of overlap between character and symptom in spite of their differences and maintained that it was the failure of the defensive function of character that led to repression and neurosis; in ‘‘Analysis terminable and interminable,’’ he demonstrated that: ‘‘the defensive mechanisms, by bringing about an ever more extensive alienation from the external world and a permanent weakening of the ego, 269 CHARACTER pave the way for, and encourage, the outbreak of neurosis’’ (1937c, p. 238). The ‘‘libidinal types’’ (1931a) have been considered a development of character theory. However, these are in fact an attempt by Freud to attribute a key role to the agencies of the structural theory (id, ego, and superego) in a psychoanalytic nosography. The study of character has been continued by various authors but it has been overtaken by the subject of character resistance and the associated problems of technique. Karl Abraham emphasized the importance of fixations, although he cautioned against the notion of a fixed nature as something that is disproved by modifications in character (‘‘A Short Study of the Development of the Libido,’’ 1924/1927). He set out to establish a semiology of psychic material and emphasized the earliness of object relations involved in symptom-formations and character-formation. Wilhelm Reich is known mainly for the modifications in technique that he advocated with patients who presented him with ‘‘character armor.’’ This means avoiding interpreting drive impulses before having interpreted and overcome this resistance, layer by layer. In their demonstration that a large number of muscular reactions are designed to prevent the breakthrough of emotions, excitations, or anxiety, these descriptions are reminiscent of Pierre MartyÕs discussions of rachialgia (1963). In The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis (1945), Otto Fenichel also demonstrated the need to resolve the conflicts between the drives and defenses. Raymond de Saussure considered character as a developmental stage in which the subject has become stuck and not as a type that is established for a lifetime. Jean Bergeret (1976) described character and structure by distinguishing three levels of character: Character, as an emanation from the deep structure in relational life, traces the progress or failure of the structural development; character traits, elements of the fundamental character, are often associated with elements of other forms of character, compensating for deficiencies in fundamental character through adaptive requirements, and can thus appear in a different structure from the one from which they derive. Character pathology, on the other hand, corresponds to the ‘‘borderline’’ economy and its decompensation leads to a deformation of the ego, with the onset of more or less severe forms of splitting. 27 0 Otto KernbergÕs work on character forms part of his studies of borderline functioning. In ‘‘A psychoanalytic classification of character pathology’’ (1970), he proposed a classification of character pathologies with three levels of severity, corresponding to the level of development of the drives, the superego or the ego, or the more or less pathological nature of the character traits. The three levels of severity that he distinguishes are reminiscent of the levels of mentalization in Pierre MartyÕs theory of character neurosis. The issues raised by character traits continue to be of interest to the French psychosomaticians among others. In ‘‘Névrose de caractère et mentalisation’’ (Character neurosis and mentalization) for example, Michel Fain (1997) argued that the disappearance of a character trait indicates a dementalization occurring in an essential depression rather than the resolution of a neurotic process. ROBERT ASSÉO See also: Anal-sadistic stage; Character Analysis; Character formation; Character neurosis; ‘‘Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child’’; Countercathexis; Dependence; Ego; Eroticism, anal; Eroticism, urethral; Failure neurosis; Fate neurosis; I; Identification; Indications and contraindications for psychoanalysis for an adult; Orality; Paranoia; Psychic structure; Psychological types (analytical psychology); Reaction-formation; Sex and Character; Sublimation; Transference neurosis; Transgression. Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1927). A short study of the development of the libido. Selected papers of Karl Abraham. London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1924) Bergeret, Jean. (1976). Personnalités normales et pathologiques: Les structures mentales, le caractère, les symptômes. Revue française de psychanalyse, 40 (2), 351–370. Fain, Michel. (1997). Névrose de caractère et mentalisation. Rev. française de psychosomatique, 11, 7–17. Fenichel, Otto. (1945). The psychoanalytic theory of neurosis. New York: W. W. Norton. ———. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. ———. (1905d).Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1908b). Character and anal erotism. SE, 9: 167– 175. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHARACTER ANALYSIS ———. (1913i). The disposition to obsessional neurosis: A contribution to the problem of choice of neurosis. SE, 12: 311–326. ———. (1916d). Some character-types met with in psychoanalytic work, SE, 14: 309-333. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ———. (1931a). Libidinal types. SE, 21: 215–220. ———. (1933a). New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 22: 1–182. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. Kernberg, Otto. (1970). A psychoanalytic classification of character pathology. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 18, 800–822. Marty, Pierre. (1963). La psychosomatique de lÕadulte. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Reich, Wilhelm. (1945). Character analysis: Principles and technique for psychoanalysts in practice and in training (Theodore P. Wolfe, Trans.). New York: Orgone Institute Press. (Original work published 1933) CHARACTER ANALYSIS In the course of his clinical work in Vienna (1924– 1930) and then in Berlin (1930–1933), Wilhelm Reich worked out his own techniques of psychoanalytic practice that emphasized the analysis of resistances and the structure of the character. He made his techniques public in his book, Character Analysis (1933/ 1945), his richest contribution to psychoanalysis. Character represents a stable, more or less rigid, organization of the libidinal economy of the person; it is at the same time submitted to the pressures of the drives and to social constraints, to gratifying or traumatic experiences, and to the repetitions or defenses that they give rise to: ‘‘Character is in the first place a mechanism of narcissistic protection.’’ The ‘‘character traits’’ that it brings together under the name of ‘‘character armor ’’ correspond to the mechanisms used by the person to deal with the repressed. Reich described two great poles of character, defined by their degree of ‘‘orgasmic potency’’ and the prevalence of various states of the libido: The genital character, the Reichian ideal, is distinguished by an orgasmic potency that reaches a true plenitude, a flexible and free circulation of libidinal energy, and also by modes of relation to the self, to others, and to the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS world, founded on a rational approach that respects the reality principle. The neurotic character, conversely, suffers from a libidinal imbalance that gives primacy to repression and negation or, in other cases, to impulsivity and an inability to master the pressure of unconscious impulses. In addition to these fundamental character types, Reich described ‘‘some well defined forms of character,’’ such as the hysteric character, dominated by ostentation and sexual mobility; the compulsive character, where rigidity, retention, and obsession for order dominate; and the phallic-narcissistic character, structured so as to resist the ‘‘anal and passivehomosexual impulses.’’ For the masochistic character, Reich refers, through several individual examples, to a cultural form marked by guilt and the desire for punishment—in short, the death drive, as the source of the tendency towards such deadly political practices as fascism. ReichÕs broadening of character analysis included a third part called ‘‘On the Psychoanalysis of the Biophysics of Orgone,’’ in which Reich, linking ‘‘physical contact’’ and ‘‘vegetative current,’’ emphasized the role of violent, elementary sensations such as the feeling of ‘‘breakdown’’ and the ‘‘representation of death.’’ He proposed, on this basis, an original interpretation of the ‘‘schizoid disintegration,’’ by which certain symptoms typical of schizophrenia—the ‘‘faraway stare,’’ dissociation of the personality, and catatonia—are presented in a clarifying and suggestive light. By inscribing his researches within a ‘‘language expressive of life,’’ Wilhelm Reich committed himself to a vitalist vision that shall see subsequent and more ample developments. ROGER DADOUN See also: Character; Character formation; Character neurosis; Reich, Wilhelm. Source Citation Reich, Wilhelm. (1945). Character analysis: Principles and technique for psychoanalysts in practice and in training (Theodore P. Wolfe, Trans.). New York: Orgone Institute Press. (Original work published 1933) Bibliography Boadella, David. (1973). Wilhelm Reich, The evolution of his work. Chicago: Henry Regnery. Dadoun, Roger. (1975) Cent fleurs pour Wilhelm Reich. Paris: Payot. 271 CHARACTER FORMATION CHARACTER FORMATION Character is a psychological notion that refers to all the habitual ways of feeling and reacting that distinguish one individual from another. Sigmund Freud had a sustained interest in the question of character formation, since it touches on the major themes that interested him: ‘‘anatomo-physiological destiny,’’ memory traces, and, more generally, the role of acquired traits, as well as the function of sublimation with regard to the ‘‘remains’’ of the pregenital libido. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Freud defined character in relationship to the unconscious: ‘‘What we describe as our ÔcharacterÕ is based on the memory-traces of our impressions; and, moreover, the impressions which have had the greatest effect on us—those of our earliest youth—are precisely the ones which scarcely ever become conscious’’ (pp. 539–540). This definition posits character as a sort of memory, a collection of traces. Five years later, in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), Freud emphasized individual psychic activity: ‘‘What we describe as a personÕs ÔcharacterÕ is built up to a considerable extent from the material of sexual excitations and is composed of instincts that have been fixed since childhood, or constructions achieved by means of sublimation, and of other constructions, employed for effectively holding in check perverse impulses which have been recognized as being unutilizable’’ (pp. 238–239). In 1920, in an addendum to the Three Essays that reiterates material presented in the article ‘‘Character and Anal Erotism’’ (1908b), Freud summarized, ‘‘Obstinacy, thrift and orderliness arise from an exploitation of anal erotism, while ambition is determined by a strong urethral-erotic component’’ (p. 239, n. 1). Character derives from instincts, but not directly, since reaction formations and sublimations intervene. Thus, as Freud noted in ‘‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’’ (1915b), ‘‘The pre-existence of strong ÔbadÕ impulses in infancy is often the actual condition for an unmistakable inclination towards ÔgoodÕ in the adult’’ (p. 282). With the development of the notion of identification, that of character took on additional dimensions. Character formation was understood to be based on the mechanism of identification, that is, unconsciously identifying with character traits derived from objects. According to Freud in The Ego and the Id (1923b), 27 2 when a lost object is reestablished in the ego, thus allowing an identification to replace object cathexis, this ‘‘makes an essential contribution towards building up what is called its ÔcharacterÕ ’’ (p. 28). The notion of character thus evolved in FreudÕs work. The importance Freud attributed to it can be seen in his remarks in ‘‘FreudÕs Psycho-Analytic Procedure’’ (1904a), where he wrote, ‘‘Deep-rooted malformations of character, traits of an actually degenerate constitution, show themselves during treatment as sources of a resistance that can scarcely be overcome’’ (p. 254). However, determining character traits is not easy. In ‘‘Some Character-types Met with in PsychoAnalytic Work’’ (1916d), Freud noted that it is not the character traits that patients see in themselves, nor those attributed to patients by persons close to them, that pose the greatest problem for analysts; rather it is the previously unknown and surprising peculiarities often revealed in the course of analysis. Freud analyzed some of the character types revealed through analysis, including those of subjects who claim for themselves the right to perpetrate injustice because they believe they have been subjected to it themselves, subjects ‘‘wrecked by success’’ (pp. 316 ff), and finally, taking a perspective that changed criminology, ‘‘criminals from a sense of guilt’’ (pp. 332 ff). Karl Abraham (1925/1953–1955) returned to the specific issue of the anal character. A broader, more central notion of character can be found in the work of Wilhelm Reich (1933/1945). The idea of character analysis, and especially that of ‘‘character armor,’’ are linked to his theories of a biological energy that he later named ‘‘orgone energy.’’ Subsequently, these theories became a separate discipline from psychoanalysis, ‘‘bioenergy.’’ Citing the work of Edward Glover and Franz Alexander (who contrasted character neurosis and symptomatic neurosis), Reich reconsidered the known character types (hysterical, obsessional, masochistic, etc.) under the presupposition that the primordial function of any character type is to defend against stimulations from the external world and against repressed internal instincts. The character analysis he developed consists in isolating in the patient the character trait that is the source of greatest resistance and thus rendering it analyzable. His general idea is that the ego forms a character trait by taking over a repressed instinct to use as a defense against another instinct. Thus, character is essentially a mechanism of narcissistic protection— hence the term ‘‘character armor.’’ INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHARACTER NEUROSIS After Reich, character became far more important among psychoanalysts whose work focuses on the ego. In the United States many studies have been published on this topic, notably Heinz HartmannÕs Ego psychology and the problem of adaptation (1939/1958). SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Character. Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1953–1955). Contribution of the theory of the anal character. In Selected papers of Karl Abraham, M.D. (Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. (Original work published 1925) Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1–338; 5: 339–625. ———. (1904a). FreudÕs psycho-analytic procedure. SE, 7: 249. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1908b). Character and anal erotism. SE, 9: 167–175. ———. (1915d). Thoughts for the times on war and death. SE, 14: 273–300. ———. (1916d). Some character-types met with in psychoanalytic work. SE, 14: 309–333. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. Hartmann, Heinz. (1958). Ego psychology and the problem of adaptation. New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1939) Reich, Wilhelm. (1945). Character-analysis: principles and technique for psychoanalysts in practice and in training (Theodore P. Wolfe, Trans.). New York: Orgone Institute Press. (Original work published 1933) Further Reading Lewin, Betram. (ed.) (1966). On Character and Libido Development. Six Essays by Karl Abraham, New York: W. W. Norton & Co.Arlow. Jacob A. (1990). Psychoanalysis and character development. Psychoanalytic Review, 77, 1–10 CHARACTER NEUROSIS The term ‘‘character neurosis’’ did not originate with Freud. It grew out of difficulties in treating character pathologies, distinguished by the great resistance that INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS character opposes to analysis. And its use spread in the wake of Wilhelm ReichÕs work on character analysis beginning in 1928. Sigmund Freud, in lecture 34 of his New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933a [1932]), underscored the often extremely long duration required by character analysis, but, he assured readers, ‘‘it is often successful’’ (p. 156). It was undoubtedly a lack of success with such cases that led Reich to his conception of ‘‘character armor.’’ At the time he was working at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Clinic with impulsive psychopaths. The problems raised by their treatment, he said, required a sharp focus on the structure of the impulsive ego. The difficulties of regression in the transference, the inaccessibility of character fixations to analysis, and the difficulty of investing the analyst except in an idealizing mode (a defense against any erotic or aggressive investment) form the basis for the analysis of character pathologies. In his Vienna seminars between 1922 and 1926, Reich noted that the obstacle to a cure is found in the patientÕs whole character. He advocated a rigorous analysis of the character defenses, layer by layer, before any deep interpretation. Hermann Nunberg (1956), denouncing what he saw as the artificial separation of the analysis of resistance and the analysis of deep contents, had serious disagreements with Reich with regard to the techniques to be implemented. In ‘‘Le traitement psychanalytique du caractère’’ (1928/1982), Sándor Ferenczi argued that the analyst has to reveal how character traits are unconsciously used to resist analysis and has to link them to the corresponding forgotten childhood experiences, in particular, experiences of seduction by an adult, for analysis to progress. This is in keeping with what he called analytic pedagogy, which makes use of his active technique. Following Ferenczi, Michael Balint (1932/1952) emphasized the effects of the fear of excitation, and indeed of pleasure itself, often the result of hyperstimulation of the child by an adult. Later Otto Kernberg, in ‘‘A psychoanalytic classification of character pathology’’ (1970), sought to establish a form of classification based on the increasing severity of pathological manifestations by integrating the various nosographic and metapsychological data (agencies, part instincts). This terminology is reminiscent of Pierre MartyÕs 1980 classification of neuroses as well, poorly, or irregularly mentalized, or even as 273 C H A R C O T , J E A N M A R T I N (1825 –1 893) behavioral neuroses. According to Marty, the same metapsychological elements are paramount: deficiencies in mentalization correspond to deficiencies in object internalization and to acting out, which give rise to behavior disorders. René Diatkine (1966) emphasized the suffering of persons close to the patient; in his view, the ego-syntony of character protects the subject from anxiety. Henri Sauguet (1966) established a gradation between neurotic character (close to the symptomatic neuroses) and character neurosis (close to borderline states or even psychosis). Despite the importance of, and the number of authors who have taken an interest in, character neurosis, in France this notion is obsolescent because the general focus has shifted toward problems of symbol formation and identity construction. The term nevertheless retains some currency among psychosomatically oriented analysts, particularly in France. One area being researched concerns the connections among the structure of the superego, the presence of the ideal ego (in MartyÕs sense), and the quality of mentalization. In ‘‘Névrose de caractère et mentalisation’’ (Character neurosis and mentalization; 1997) Michael Fain emphasized how character defenses play a protective role: ‘‘The disappearance of character traits more often attests to a dementalization taking place in an essential depression than to the resolution of a neurotic process.’’ ROBERT ASSÉO See also: Character. Bibliography Balint, Michael. (1952). Character analysis and new Beginning. In his Primary love and psychoanalytic technique. London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1932) Diatkine, René, (1966). Intervention au 7e séminaire de perfectionnement. Revue française de psychanalyse, 30 (3), pp. 324–344. Fain, Michel. (1997). Névrose de caractère et mentalisation. Revue française de psychosomatique, 11, 7–17. Ferenczi, Sándor. (1982). Le traitement psychanalytique du caractère. In his Œuvres complètes. Vol. 4: Psychanalyse, 1927–1932. Paris: Payot. (Originally published 1928.) Freud, Sigmund. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. Kernberg, Otto F. (1970). A psychoanalytic classification of character pathology. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 18 (4), 800–822. 27 4 Marty, Pierre. (1980). Les mouvements individuels de vie et de mort (Vol. 2: LÕordre psychosomatique). Paris: Payot. Nunberg, Hermann. (1956). Character and neurosis. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 37 (1), 36–45. Reich, Wilhelm. (1945). Character-analysis: principles and technique for psychoanalysts in practice and in training (Theodore P. Wolfe, Trans.). New York: Orgone Institute Press. (Original work published 1933.) Sauguet, Henri. (1966). Caractère et nevrose. Revue française de psychanalyse, 30 (3), 298–307. Further Reading Kernberg, Otto F. (1970). A psychoanalytic classification of character pathology. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 18, 800–822. Nunberg, Henry. (1956). Character and neurosis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 37, 36–45. CHARCOT, JEAN MARTIN (1825–1893) Jean Martin Charcot was born in Paris in 1825, the son of a coach builder, and died of a heart attack near Lake Settons (Nièvre) on August 16, 1893. He was a physician with the Hôpitaux de Paris, a professor of clinical medicine for nervous disorders, and a member of the Académie de Médicine. He was appointed a physician with the Hôpitaux de Paris in 1856, associate professor of medicine in 1860, senior physician at the Salpêtrière in 1862, professor of pathological anatomy in the School of Medicine at the University of Paris in 1872 (succeeding Alfred Vulpian), and in 1882 was appointed to the first chair of neurology, a position created for him at the request of Léon Gambetta, as professor of diseases of the nervous system. He was made a member of the Académie de Médicine in 1873 and the Académie des Sciences in 1883, Charcot had an impressive career and received numerous academic honors, but the accuracy of his theories on hysteria, which he began working on in 1865 after the ‘‘department of epilepsy’’ was placed under his supervision, had begun to be seriously questioned at the time of his death. The work of his student, the neurologist Joseph Babinski; the rise of Pierre JanetÕs dynamic psychology; and especially the success of psychoanalysis all contributed to bringing down a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS C H A R C O T , J E A N M A R T I N (1825 –1 893) theoretical structure that had nurtured these developments at the beginning of the twentieth century. Charcot was an attentive observer, which helped establish methods of neurological description and classification still in use (CharcotÕs disease, CharcotBouchard aneurysm, and so on), and possessed an almost magical talent as a speaker. He attracted a diverse group of personalities to his presentations: his public ‘‘Leçons Cliniques,’’ held on Wednesdays, and his ‘‘Grandes Leçons,’’ held on Fridays. His patients, it was learned after his death, had to some extent been prompted to exhibit to the audience the typical ‘‘hysterical crises’’ that the Master expected of them. He was particularly interested in paralysis, anesthesia, and other symptoms considered to be ‘‘hysterical,’’ and attempted to demonstrate their ‘‘functional’’—rather than anatomical—origin, a belief that contradicted a number of other practitioners, who were proponents of the surgical removal of their patientsÕ ovaries. He succeeded in isolating a clinical entity he referred to as the ‘‘grande hystérie’’ or ‘‘hysteroepilepsy.’’ He described a crisis, or ‘‘attack,’’ as occurring in four successive phases: the epileptiform phase, clonic spasms, emotional ‘‘acting out,’’ and terminal delirium. In addition to these attacks patients exhibited ‘‘stigmata’’ (narrowing of the visual field, anesthesia)— conditions that could only exist if there were some form of ‘‘diathesis,’’ that is, a predisposition to hereditary degeneration. To demonstrate his ideas, Charcot publicly performed hypnosis to provoke or eliminate such symptoms, which proved they were not connected to organic lesions, unlike true neurological disorders. This was a step toward a ‘‘psychological’’ conception of the origin of hysterical symptoms, but Charcot wrote in 1887, ‘‘What I call psychology is the rational physiology of the cerebral cortex.’’ He gave encouragement to the new field with the creation, in 1890, of the Laboratory of Psychology at the hospital, with Pierre Janet as its head. He supported Janet in his work on his dissertation, ‘‘L’État mental des hystériques’’ (The Mental State of Hysterics; 1893), and ensured publication of the work of Sigmund Freud in French medical reviews. FreudÕs work with Charcot at the Salpêtrière contributed greatly to FreudÕs later work and the birth of psychoanalysis. Arriving in Paris on October 13, 1885, with the help of a grant from the School of Medicine INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS of the University of Vienna to study anatomic pathology, he was introduced to hysteria and its ‘‘psychological’’ etiology, which had a decisive influence on his decision to treat patients privately, which he did when he returned to Vienna in the spring of 1886. A month after his arrival in Paris, on November 24, 1885, he wrote to his fiancée, ‘‘Charcot, who is one of the greatest of physicians and a man whose common sense borders on genius, is simply wrecking all my aims and opinions. I sometimes come out of his lectures as from out of Nôtre Dame, with an entirely new idea about perfection. . . . Whether the seed will ever bear fruit, I donÕt know; but what I do know is that no other human being has ever affected me in the same way.’’ Before he left Paris at the end of February 1886, Freud obtained CharcotÕs approval to translate his Leçons cliniques into German. He took with him a number of expressions that proved useful to him later on: ‘‘theory is good, but that doesnÕt prevent its existence,’’ ‘‘in those cases, itÕs always genital,’’ ‘‘the wonderful indifference of hysterics,’’ ‘‘the refusal of the sexual is enormous, like a house.’’ Freud and Charcot maintained their relationship through correspondence, even though the personal comments Freud added to the Poliklinische Vorträge (1892–1894a), his translations of the Leçons du mardi, left a somewhat bittersweet residue (Mijolla). Although Charcot was not interested in the cathartic method Freud had spoken to him about, Freud left the hospital with a draft for an article on hysterical paralysis that took him seven years to complete, but when published in French in the Archives de neurologie (1893c), represented the first ‘‘psychoanalytic’’ approach to the phenomenon. Freud named his first son Jean Martin, and throughout his life kept a reproduction of André BrouilletÕs painting Une leçon clinique à la Salpêtrière. In his homage to Charcot at the time of his death, Freud confirmed his rejection of CharcotÕs theories but at the same time expressed his gratitude: ‘‘He was not a reflective man, not a thinker: he had the nature of an artist—he was, as he himself said, a Ôvisuel,Õ—a man who sees’’ (1893e). In February 1924, at the request of the review Le Disque vert, he wrote, ‘‘Of the many lessons lavished upon me in the past (1885–6) by the great Charcot at the Salpêtrière, two left me with a deep impression: that one should never tire of considering the same phenomena again and again (or of submitting to their effects), and that one should not 275 C H E N T R I E R , T H É O D O R E (1887 –1 965) mind meeting with contradiction on every side provided one has worked sincerely’’ (1924a). (The Psychology of Everyday Life), an extension of his conversations with Paul Jury. The series lasted for nine years. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA ANDRÉ MICHEL See also: Bernheim, Hippolyte; Cäcilie M., case of; See also: Canada. Bibliography Didi-Huberman, Georges. (2003). The invention of hysteria: Charcot and the photographic iconography of the Salpêtrière (Alisa Hartz, Trans.). Cambridge: MIT Press. Bibliography Chentrier, Théodore (1981). Vivre avec soi-même et avec les autres (M. Hoffman, Ed.). Montreal: La Mortagne. Ellenberger, Henri F. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious. The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry. New York: Basic Books. ———. (1984). Un art de vivre (M. Hoffman Ed.). Montreal: La Mortagne. Freud, Sigmund. (1893e). Charcot. SE, 3: 7–23. Chentrier, Théodore and Jury, Paul (1948, April–May). La culpabilité: quelques précisions et quelques questions. Psyché, 18–19. ———. (1924a). Letter to ‘‘Le Disque Vert,’’ SE, 19: 290– 290. Gauchet, Marcel, and Swain, Gladys. (1997). Le Vrai Charcot. Paris: Calmann-Lévy. Mijolla, Alain de. (1988). Les lettres de Jean-Martin Charcot à Sigmund Freud, 1886–1893. Le crépuscule d’un dieu. Revue française de psychanalyse, 52 (3), 703–726. CHENTRIER, THÉODORE (1887–1965) Théodore Chentrier, a French psychoanalyst, was born in Marseille on November 18, 1887, and died in Montreal on July 3, 1965. A fellow student with Charles de Gaulle and Georges Bernanos at the Jesuit school of the Immaculate Conception in Paris, he began his career teaching French and Latin. A man with an inquisitive mind, Chentrier took an interest in homeopathy, morphology, graphology, and psychopedagogy, which he practiced starting in 1927 while working for Professor Laignel-Lavastine and Doctor Vinchon at the Hôpital de la Pitié in Paris. He began his analysis with Rudolph Loewenstein on July 3, 1931, and became a member of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society) in 1933. A friend of Paul Jury, he practiced with him in Paris from 1944 to 1948, the year he left for Quebec. Appointed professor of psychology at the University of Montreal in October 1948, for three years he was president of the Société de Psychanalyse de Montréal (Montreal Society for Psychoanalysis). He developed a widespread reputation from his broadcasts on Radio Canada known as ‘‘Psychologie de la Vie Quotidienne’’ 27 6 CHERTOK, LÉON (TCHERTOK, LEJB) (1911–1991) A French psychiatrist and psychoanalyst of Russian origin, Léon Chertok (Lejb Tchertok) was born October 31, 1911, in Lida (a Byelorussian city near Vilnius, Lithuania) and died July 6, 1991, in Deauville, France. Because of the educational quotas for Jews in Poland, Chertok studied medicine in Prague, where he defended his dissertation in 1938. On his way to America to escape the Nazi invasion, he stopped in France, where war broke out in 1939. He volunteered for the army, was demobilized in 1940, and entered the Resistance, where he worked mostly with the Jewish MOI section (‘‘Main-dÕoeuvre immigrée,’’ which brought together communist and foreign militants). Appointed to head the Mouvement National contre le Racisme (MNCR) [National Movement Against Racism], he founded the clandestine newspaper Combat médical and played an active role in saving Jewish children threatened with deportation. He was awarded the Croix de Guerre. After the war his interest turned to psychiatry and he spent several months at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York City before being made a doctor of medicine in 1948 by the School of Medicine of the University of Paris. Between 1949 and 1963 he served as a resident and then an assistant at the Hospital of Villejuif, where, with Victor Gachkel, he became co-director of the Center of Psychosomatic Medicine, which they had recently created. From 1963 to 1972 he was head INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHICAGO INSTITUTE of the Department of Psychosomatic Medicine at the La Rochefoucauld Psychiatry Institute in Paris, then, from 1972 to 1981, the director of the Déjerine Center for Psychosomatic Medicine, in Paris, where, with Didier Michaux, he started a hypnosis laboratory. The founder and executive secretary of the Société Française de Médicine Psychosomatique, he was also editor-in-chief of the Revue de médecine psychosomatique. In 1948 he began a training analysis with Jacques Lacan, which was concluded in 1953, during the first split in the French psychoanalytic movement. In spite of supervised analyses with both Marc Schlumberger and Maurice Bouvet, Chertok the nonconformist was not admitted to the Société Psychanalytique de Paris; the fact that he made extensive use of hypnosis in his practice, becoming one of the leading specialists in France, certainly did not improve his chances of admission. His practice, and the many articles he wrote about his work, ultimately pushed him further and further from traditional psychoanalysis. Nonetheless, in 1973 he co-authored, with Raymond de Saussure, La Naissance du psychanalyse, de Mesmer à Freud, a historical work on the origins of Freudian psychoanalysis that has become a classic. At the request of Philippe Bassine and A. E. Sherozia, he also organized a symposium on the unconscious held in Tbilisi, Georgia, in October 1979, which was attended by a number of psychoanalysts, including several from France. This was the first official event where psychoanalysis was openly discussed in Soviet Russia. However, hypnosis was ChertokÕs true field of research and the subject of considerable thought. In 1987, toward the end of his life, his work took a new turn when he and Isabelle Stengers began a seminar entitled ‘‘LÕhypnose, problème interdisciplinaire.’’ ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Hypnosis; Suggestion. Bibliography Chertok, Léon. (1966). Hypnosis (D. Graham, Trans.). Oxford, New York: Pergamon Press. (Original work published 1963) ———. (1981). Sense and nonsense in psychotherapy: The challenge of hypnosis (R.H. Ahrenfeldt, Trans.). Oxford, New York: Pergamon Press. (Original work published 1979) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS Chertok, Léon, and Stengers, Isabelle. (1992). A critique of psychoanalytic reason: Hypnosis as a scientific problem from Lavoisier to Lacan (Martha Noel Evans, Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Chertok, Léon, and de Saussure, Raymond. (1979). The therapeutic revolution, from Mesmer to Freud. (R. H. Ahrenfeldt, Trans.). New York: Brunner/Mazel. CHICAGO INSTITUTE FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS The Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, one of the oldest in the United States, has been both a key institution in its own right and a hub for westward expansion of the profession. Founded during the Great Depression, in the 1940s the Institute served as a training and credentialing institute for analysts who then created organizations in other cities, including Topeka, Los Angeles, and Detroit. Although ultimately most closely associated with the classical ego psychology that dominated analysis at mid-century, the Chicago Institute was distinctive for a certain tolerance of divergent points of view. Its founder, Franz Alexander, promoted several unconventional ideas and techniques; Heinz Kohut, after a long career as a purely orthodox analyst, developed his influential self psychology at the institute during the 1970s. Thomas Szasz, who became a iconoclastic critic of psychiatry, originally trained at the Chicago Institute. Organized psychoanalysis in the city dates to establishment of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society in 1931. N. Lionel Blitzsten, the societyÕs first president, was considered the first trained analyst in Chicago and a charming teacher who lacked administrative interests or skills. Establishment of the Chicago Institute fell to the Hungarian analyst Franz Alexander. Alexander, who lectured at the University of Chicago in 1930 but did not receive a warm welcome among psychiatrists there, returned to the city two years later to found and become first director of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis. His objective was to create a training center outside a university setting that could also support research and clinical activities. A charismatic figure originally attached to the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, Alexander became a magnet for other European analysts, especially with the rise of German fascism. Alexander modeled the center on the Berlin Institute, which itself had been founded along 277 CHICAGO INSTITUTE FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS the lines of the great nineteenth-century research institutes designed to encourage intellectual exchange, debate, and collaboration. The Chicago Institute had a brick-and-mortar presence from the beginning and boasted classrooms, a library, and a dining room where staff lunches became an enduring feature, as they had in Berlin. The organizational structure that Alexander established at Chicago was in certain respects unique. He proved able to attract wealthy donors, some among his analysands, and early funding was provided by Alfred K. Stern, an executive with the Julius Rosenwald Fund, a Chicago-based philanthropy, and by the Rockefeller and Macy Foundations. Alexander created a lay board of trustees with fiscal responsibility for the institute, which became a powerful source of funding, especially during the heyday of psychoanalysis. In addition, the institute was staffed by a small group of analysts with lifetime appointments and, in organizational terms, was entirely separate from the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society. This arrangement is thought to have promoted the tolerance for divergent points of view that helped Chicago avoid the splits so common in psychoanalytic institutes in other cities. Alexander directed the Chicago Institute for the best part of a quarter century. As an administrator he was regarded as authoritarian, albeit a benign despot, while he and the analytic staff functioned as an oligarchy. AlexanderÕs research, for which he secured large grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, was a considerable stimulus to psychosomatic medicine, which, although later engulfed by molecular psychiatry and other developments, came to enjoy a high profile by the 1950s. Also involved in research were Thomas M. French, until 1961 the instituteÕs director of research, and the German analyst Therese Benedek, the author of a major text on psychoanalytic supervision and one of a number of prominent female analysts at Chicago. In 1953, Alexander decided to leave the institute and he spent the last phase of his career in Los Angeles, until his death in 1964. To some extent his departure was a consequence of the advancing orthodoxy at Chicago that viewed AlexanderÕs innovative treatment options, such as analysis only three times per week and the concept of a ‘‘corrective emotional experience,’’ as out-of-step with techniques then in vogue. Gerhart Piers effectively succeeded Alexander in 1956, for what became a fifteen-year administration. 27 8 He exercised power much as Alexander had done and used his influence to reengineer the training institute and introduce several other innovations, including a low-fee graduate clinic. He also paid greater attention to therapy for children and adolescents, an area that Alexander had neglected. Piers organized the Child Therapy Training Program for pediatricians, nurses, and social workers and, in 1965, developed a Teacher Education Program. To Heinz Kohut, a recent graduate of the institute, Piers entrusted the task of reorganizing and revamping the curriculum. Kohut, who then worked closely with the forces shaping ego psychology, created a core set of classes with a historical perspective, and went on to teach the two-year theory course himself for many years. As was the case at other institutes, the new curriculum at Chicago paid little attention to the work of Melanie Klein or the British analysts who were then developing object relations theory. Although George Pollock, who succeeded Piers in 1971, became a controversial figure late in his tenure, he was an energetic director who moved the Chicago Institute with a multi-pronged agenda. As a major administrative figure in both the American Psychoanalytic Association and the American Psychiatric Association, he raised the profile of the Chicago Institute through the effective exercise of power, though some thought his actions were based too much on a patronage-like system. In 1973, he engineered authorization from the State of Illinois for the institute to offer a doctoral program in psychoanalysis. The same year, the Annual of Psychoanalysis began publication and became an influential yearly review. Pollock also established the Barr-Harris ChildrenÕs Grief Center, which remains in operation today, to help children cope with the loss of a parent or sibling. Research meetings at the Institute regularly drew renowned analysts as speakers, and although analysis would soon to lose much of its privileged cache to biological psychiatry, Charles B. Strozier wrote (2001), ‘‘I doubt there has been a more lively intellectual atmosphere in the history of psychoanalysis than at the Chicago Institute in the 1970s.’’ While Chicago remained Heinz KohutÕs base throughout his career, his innovative brand of psychoanalysis was not warmly received by either Pollock or many of his colleagues at the institute. However, KohutÕs deemphasis on drive theory and his view that narcissism was a separate developmental path did win INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHILD ANALYSIS adherents—Arnold Goldberg, Charles B. Strozier, and Ernest Wolf at Chicago—and self psychology eventually established itself as a branch movement within psychoanalysis. Kohut died relatively young, at age sixty-seven in 1981, just ten years after publication of his The Analysis of the Self. Although Pollock liberalized the oligarchic character of the instituteÕs staff and was a successful fundraiser through the lay board of directors, he could not stem the effects of a nationwide decline in the popularity of analysis as it ceased to attract large numbers of psychiatrists and patients. In 1988, after Pollock was sued by the son of a patient who claimed that his mother, a wealthy donor to the institute, had been financially exploited, he resigned. Subsequent reorganization in the wake of his acrimonious departure favored greater pluralism and more power extended to the faculty. Both Arnold Goldberg, who became next director in 1989, and Thomas Pappadis, who succeeded him in 1992, brokered policies that further democratized the institute. Jerome Winer, named director in 1998, continued to broaden the focus of the institute while attempting to enhance funding and to further cooperative ventures with universities. As was the case in other cities, the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis survived the recalibration of analysis as a therapy and profession by creating for itself a place within the larger context of mental health practice. While the Chicago Society for Psychoanalysis, still a separate body, is comprised primarily of medically trained analysts, the Chicago Institute serves a broader community with a more inclusive mandate. In the early 2000s, the institute provides training programs for physicians, psychoanalysts, social workers, and other professionals, and offers clinical and community services in a variety of venues for children, adolescents, and adults. JOHN GALBRAITH SIMMONS Bibliography Kavka, J. (1984). Fifty years of psychoanalysis in Chicago: A historical perspective. In G. Pollock and J. Gedo (Eds.), Psychoanalysis: The vital issues (Vol. II, pp. 465–93). New York: International Universities Press. Pollock, George H. (1978). The Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis from 1932 to the present. In J. Quen and E. Carlson (Eds.). American psychoanalysis: Origins and development (pp. 109–26). New York: Brunner/Mazel. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Strozier, Charles B. (2001). Heinz Kohut: The making of a psychoanalyst. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. CHILD ANALYSIS The term child analysis refers to the application of psychoanalytic treatment and concepts to a child with a view to understanding the psychic life and mental development of children. The notion of child analysis first appeared in the work of Melanie Klein, in the sense that she first provided an extensive definition that is both theoretical and practical. The pioneers in the field include Sándor Ferenczi, who contributed still-original ideas on the confusion of tongues between adult and child, as well as his account of the treatment of Little Arpad, and Alfred Adler, one of the first practitioners of child analysis in Vienna. Hermine von Hug-Hellmuth was one of the first child psychoanalysts to use play techniques, but it was only with Klein that the notion of transference and the idea of psychoanalytic treatment for children appeared. This perspective placed her in sharp opposition to Anna Freud, who believed that transference did not really exist for children owing to the parentsÕ place in the childÕs life. In contrast, Klein used the transference for the ‘‘deep’’ interpretation of hate and envy. This controversy left its imprint on the evolution of psychoanalysis in Great Britain and led to the creation of the Independent group, which consistently upheld the importance of childhood development. In relation to adult psychoanalysis, child psychoanalysis occupies an indeterminate position that is both peripheral and central, and that is reflected in debates about the various modes of psychoanalytic training throughout the world. It is peripheral in that not all adult analysts have the inclination or training to work with children, and not all psychoanalytic societies require that their candidates have specific training or even knowledge of the elements of mental development. It is central in that the fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis are summed up in the child: infantile sexuality, transference, the unconscious, resistance, repetition, the drives, and interpretation. The case of Little Hans, described by Sigmund Freud in ‘‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy’’ (1909b) is a good example of this, even though the treatment was essentially based on observations and exchanges 279 CHILDHOOD between Hans and his parents, in a sort of precursor to treatment proper. Freud, Sigmund. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a fiveyear-old boy. SE, 10: 1–149. In this sense, child analysis can be seen as the application of psychoanalysis in all its facets. In fact, it has not been limited to the treatment of neuroses, but has rapidly been extended to various forms of psychosis, autism, mental retardation, childhood psychosomatic disorders, the psychoanalytic observation of infants, and ethnopsychoanalysis. Donald W. Winnicott applied KleinÕs thinking and his own pediatric experience to a psychoanalytic approach to infants and their relational and developmental difficulties, in particular the encroachment of maternal depression on the infantÕs self. From this he derived a model for treating borderline states in adults. Klein, Melanie. (1975). The psycho-analysis of children. In The Writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. 2). London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1932) In France, Sophie Morgenstern is credited with the first psychoanalytic use of a childÕs drawing. In 1958 Jacques Lacan gave an original description of the development of subjectivity in the infant, based on the notion of the mirror stage and using the concepts of privation, frustration, and castration, along with the concepts of the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary. Françoise Dolto contributed a great deal to the popularization of child analysis through her analytic and pedagogical talents, and proposed the notion of the unconscious body image. Serge Lebovici, René Diatkine, Michel Soulé, Roger Misès, and Janine Simon were among the analysts most actively involved with children, through institutions that they created, such as the CMPP. (Consultations médico-psychopédagogiques [Medical and psycho-pedagogical consultations]), as well as through studies on the specific requirements of child analysis, its technique and training. Together with Michel Fain and Léon Kreisler, and working within a perspective close to that of René Spitz, Michel Soulé helped define the field of psychosomatic psychoanalytic work with infants, children, and adolescents. Kreisler, Léon; Fain, Michel; and Soulé, Michel. (1974). LÕenfant et son Corps. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. CHILDHOOD Childhood is not a Freudian concept. A large part of psychoanalytic theory concerns the early years of life and childhood but, in a certain sense, we can say along with Donald Winnicott that ‘‘Freud neglected childhood as a state in itself ’’ (1961). Only after a wrenching period of revision (1895– 1901) could Sigmund Freud come to acknowledge the active role of the child in sexual seduction and to abandon his earlier view of children as innocent victims of the incestuous desires of adults; this reversal, moreover, led him to theorize childhood sexuality for the first time. ‘‘In the beginning,’’ he would later write, ‘‘my statements about infantile sexuality were founded almost exclusively on the findings of analysis in adults which led back into the past. I had no opportunity of direct observations on children. It was therefore a very great triumph when it became possible years later to confirm almost all my inferences by direct observations and the analysis of very young children’’ (1914d). Diatkine, René, and Simon, Janine. (1972). La psychanalyse précoce. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. It was in connection with the treatment of adults that Freud became interested in observing small children. As he wrote apropos of the case of ‘‘Little Hans,’’ ‘‘I have for years encouraged my pupils and friends to collect observations on the sexual life of children, which is normally either skillfully overlooked or deliberately denied’’ (1909b). Freud indeed never abandoned this line of enquiry, as witness his celebrated account of the ‘‘Fort/Da’’ game played with a cotton reel by one of his grandsons, the personal observation of which he used to support his theoretical conclusions. As related in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), the fact that an act provoking unpleasure would be repeated, coupled with clinical findings from his treatment of traumatic neuroses, was what led Freud to formulate the concept of the death instinct. Dolto, Françoise. (1984). LÕimage inconsciente du corps. Paris: Le Seuil. After the publication of the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), the first generation of analysts ANTOINE GUEDENEY See also: Infantile neurosis. Bibliography 28 0 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHILDHOOD began observing and reporting on the behavior of their own children in reference to infantile sexuality, the Oedipus complex, and castration anxiety. Anna Freud shared in this activity (Geissmann and Geissmann, 1992). Soon these analysts were joined by specialists on child behavior who had themselves been analyzed. They began to observe specific populations of disturbed children, such as delinquents, then certain periods of childhood, notably that of the earliest mother-child relations, and finally certain types of problems encountered (feeding, thumb-sucking, attempts at separation, etc.). In so doing they were ‘‘systematically constructing a psychoanalytic psychology of the child, integrating two kinds of data: data based on direct observation and data based on reconstructions with adults’’ (Freud, 1968). It is important to note, along with Anna Freud, that psychoanalysts at first showed considerable reluctance to undertake such direct observation of children. The pioneers were more concerned to underscore the differences between observable behavior and hidden drives than they were to point up the similarities. Their chief aim was still to show that manifest behavior concealed unconscious processes. Anna Freud was initially interested in the defense mechanisms, which became accessible to an observational approach; she then turned her attention to childrenÕs behavior, to what they produced, and, lastly to the childÕs ego. She sought to include a psychology of the ego within the analytic framework, an effort further developed later by her friend Heinz Hartmann, whom she never completely disavowed. On a practical level she created institutions for young children, the first in Vienna in 1924–1925, the last and most complex, which was established after the war in London, being the Hampstead Clinic, an extension of Hampstead Nurseries. At the end of her life she trained child specialists at Hampstead Clinic who worked within the framework of a psychoanalytic psychology of childhood. This work involved treating the child—not only with analysis—to prevent further disturbances, conducting research, and training future specialists in childrenÕs education and pedagogy by applying previously acquired knowledge. During this same period, Melanie Klein also became interested in childhood. She did not base her theories on direct observation, however. Starting from the psychoanalysis of young children, she constructed a detailed picture of the internal world of the young INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS child. She pioneered the use of play in analysis. Like dream interpretation for Freud, the free play of the child was for Klein the royal road to the unconscious and to the fantasy life. In The Psychoanalysis of Children (1932), she argued forcefully that play translated the childÕs fantasies, desires, and lived experience into a symbolic mode. Her technique consisted in analyzing play just as one would analyze dreams and free association in adults, that is, by interpreting fantasies, conflicts, and defenses. The inner world of the young child as she describes it is filled with monsters and demons, and the picture of infantile sexuality she presents is strongly tinged with sadism. In discussing the death drive, she describes an infant whose first act is not simply a gesture of pure love toward the object (breast) but also a sadistic act associated with the action of the drive. Here, as Freud had earlier, Klein challenged a universal human shibboleth: the innocent soul of the child. This was one of the reasons why her work was often poorly received. The direct observation of young children has expanded considerably in recent years, helped in part advances in technology: it is now possible to study newborns and even fetuses. It is interesting to note that, in this way, the significance and the complexity of the mental life of the very young child have been confirmed, along therefore with the intuitions and efforts of psychoanalysts working during the early twentieth century. It is clear that psychoanalysis has renewed our vision and understanding of the world of childhood. However, that world remains highly complex, especially its pathology, and it is important to avoid seeing it in terms of adult behavior. Also, while psychoanalysis has enabled us to better understand that world, we must remember, as Anna Freud remarked at the end of her life, that it does not have the power to eliminate childhood neuroses and turn the child and childhood into that place where we would so much love to find innocence, the mythical innocence of a paradise lost. CLAUDINE GEISSMAN See also: Childhood and Society; ChildrenÕs play; Fort-Da; Klein-Reizes, Melanie; Winnicott, Donald Woods. Bibliography Freud, Anna. (1966). Collected writings. New York: International Universities Press. 281 CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. youth, to complement his description with materials taken from Russian history. ———. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10: 1–149. Revised and expanded in 1963, Childhood and Society is the work of a pioneer who sought to raise psychoanalytic thought to the level of the modern social sciences. Although he did not renounce his early Freudianism, Erikson endeavored to provide a new way of looking at things. When asked what the aims of a normal individual should be, Freud customarily replied with two words that Erikson liked to recall: ‘‘Love and work.’’ Erikson wanted such a maxim to become a psychoanalytic norm. ———. (1914d). On the history of the psycho-analytic movement. SE, 14: 1–66. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. Geissmann, Claudine and Geissmann, Pierre. (1992). A history of child psychoanalysis. New York: Routledge. Klein, Melanie. (1975). The psycho-analysis of children. In The Writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. II). London, Hogarth. (Original work published 1932) Winnicott, Donald. (1965). The theory of infant-parent relationship. In The maturational processes and the facilitating environment. (pp. 17–55). London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1962) PAUL ROAZEN See also: Anthropology and psychoanalysis; Erikson, Erik (Homburger); Ego (ego psychology). Source Citation CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY This book by Erik Erikson, published in 1950, is a classic because it was one of the first to show how Sigmund FreudÕs theory of infantile sexuality could be broadened in the light of fieldwork in cultural anthropology and sociological studies. Erikson studied two American Indian tribes and compared their different ways of socializing children. Based on this work he elaborated his conception of the development of the ego, in which he discerned eight distinct phases that he believed were an aspect of psychology at least as important as the libidinal stages outlined by Freud. Attempting to identify positive, organizing aspects of the psyche, Erikson sought to show how these achievements of the ego continue to change and exert an influence long after the conflicts of early childhood that had so interested Freud. Erikson was particularly interested in problems relating to youth, above all the ways in which psychosocial identity could be a key organizing concept for understanding adolescence. He approached this issue from a cultural-comparatist perspective, with a special focus on the characteristic polarities of American society. He then studied the legendary characteristics of Adolf HitlerÕs childhood to see how the rise of Nazism could be interpreted within the framework of typically German social structures. Lastly, Erikson interpreted what is known about Maxim GorkyÕs 28 2 Erikson, Erik H. (1950). Childhood and society. New York: Norton. Bibliography Friedman, Lawrence J. (1999). Identity’s Architect: A biography of Erik H. Erikson. New York: ScribnerÕs. Paul Roazen. (1976). Erik H. Erikson: The power and limits of a vision. New York: The Free Press. CHILDREN’S PLAY In psychoanalysis, ‘‘childrenÕs play’’ is mental and physical activity which gradually becomes more structured in the course of a childÕs development. This activity bears witness to a psychic capacity for ‘‘concentration’’ within a personal mental sphere of illusion where objects and phenomena in the external world are transformed in accordance with the subjectÕs wishes, so serving the internal world and augmenting pleasure. For Freud (1905d, 1905c, 1908e, 1911b), childrenÕs play, being subject to the pleasure principle, stood opposed to the constraints of critical thought and reality. The opposite of play is not seriousness but reality, even if children like to prop their imaginary objects on visible, tangible ones. Such propping is precisely what distinguishes playing from fantasizing; as the child INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHILDREN’S PLAY grows up, it is left behind. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), Freud told how he observed his oneand-a-half-year-old grandson repeating in an active way—by making a wooden reel attached to a string alternately disappear and reappear—what he had had to experience passively, namely the departure of his mother; the pleasure derived from this game allowed the child to work over the unpleasurable experience of his motherÕs absence. In FreudÕs view, the compulsion to repeat that operated ‘‘beyond the pleasure principle’’ and the childÕs tendency to seek immediate pleasure through play were intimately linked. Today it is felt that play indeed helps the child tolerate the absence of an object, that it implies the cathexis of a representation: the boy with his reel successfully converts absence into nostalgia. Melanie Klein was a closer student of the use of play in child psychoanalysis than of the phenomenon of play per se. Following Hermine Hug-Hellmuth, she devised a technique of play interpretation that treated the ordering of childrenÕs play as equivalent to the adultÕs production of associative material in analysis. She was thus able to apply the Freudian method to very young children, opening the way to child psychoanalysis (Klein, 1955). Donald Woods Winnicott offered an original account of the notion of ‘‘play’’ and incorporated it into psychoanalytic theory. Since play was not subsumed under the sublimation of instincts, Winnicott speculated that a space existed between the mother and her baby: since the mother (or her substitute), motivated by love (or hate) and not by reaction-formations, needed to be able to adapt actively to her babyÕs needs, to be what the baby was capable of finding while also leaving the baby the time to find her, a realm of illusion emerged in which the infant felt omnipotent (the breast being under its magical control); such feelings of omnipotence were necessary if the infant was going gradually to accept the disillusion to come. According to Winnicott, the intermediate area between mother and infant was occupied by ‘‘transitional phenomena’’—groups of functional experiences, as for example thumb-sucking, the holding and sucking of the edge of a blanket, a repeated gesture, or the production of musical sounds (Winnicott, 1974, p. 4)—and it arose between the period of primary creativity and that of objective perception founded on reality-testing. The ‘‘transitional object,’’ created internally though found in the outside world, would be the first tangible sign of the existence INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS of this intermediate zone where the question whether experience was of external or of internal origin simply did not arise. Transitional objects lay ‘‘between me and not-me.’’ There is a direct progression, in the Winnicottian perspective, from transitional phenomena to play, from the childÕs ability to play alone in the presence of another person to the ability to play a game with others—at first with the mother and only later with peers. Until the age of five or six, children play alongside one another rather than with one another, as Anna Freud showed in her discussion of lines of development. Play involves the body, and the pleasure derived from the functioning of the ego in play activity requires that neither excitement nor anxiety be too intense; childrenÕs play is a precarious achievement within the area between subjectivity (not to say hallucination) and objective perception. The capacity for play, once successfully acquired, will endure in every kind of inner experimentation, in the life of the imagination and in adult creativity, although, beginning at the latency period, the individual must become capable of suspending play activity. NORA KURTS See also: Active imagination (analytical psychology); Activity/passivity; Beyond the Pleasure Principle; Breast, good/ bad object; Child analysis; Childhood; ‘‘Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming’’; Creativity; Fantasy (reverie); FortDa; Humor; Illusion; Infant observation (therapeutic); Jokes; Magical thinking; Metaphor; Object a; Visual arts and psychoanalysis; Pleasure/unpleasure principle; PsychoAnalysis of Children, The; Rambert, Madeleine; Richard, case of; Squiggle; Technique with children, psychoanalytic; Transitional object, space; Transitional object; Transitional phenomena; Unconscious fantasy. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905c). Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. SE, 8: 1–236. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1908e). Creative writers and day-dreaming. SE, 9: 141–153. ———. (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12: 213–226. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. 283 CHILE Klein, Melanie. (1955). The psycho-analytic play technique: Its history and significance. In Envy and gratitude and other writings, 1946–1963 (The Writings of Melanie Klein, vol. 3), London: Hogarth/Institute of Psycho-Analysis. Kurts, Nora. (1993). LÕEnfant qui ne savait pas jouer. Psychiatrie de lÕEnfant 36, no. 2, pp. 537–554. Lebovici, Serge, and Diatkine, René. (1962). Fonction et signification du jeu chez lÕenfant. Psychiatrie de lÕEnfant 4, 207–253. Winnicott, Donald W. (1974). Playing and reality. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin. Further Reading Furman, Erna. (1990). Play and work in early childhood. Child Analysis, 1, 60–76. Klein, Melanie. (1929). Personification in the play of children. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 10, 193–204. CHILE The Chilean doctor Germán Greve Schlegel (1869– 1954) was the first to publish on the subject of psychoanalysis in Chile and, in general, in Latin America. His study, Sobre psicologı́a y psicoterapia de ciertos estados angustiosos was presented in Buenos Aires in 1910. Sigmund Freud (1911g, 1914) wrote about the event in the Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse and in his On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement. The true pioneer, however, was Fernando Allende Navarro (1890–1981), the first Chilean psychoanalyst. Born in Concepción, Allende Navarro studied medicine in Belgium and completed his doctorate in Switzerland in 1919. He specialized in neurology and psychiatry, studying with von Monakow, Rorschach, and Veragout. He began his psychoanalytic training in Switzerland and became a member of the Société Suisse de Psychanalyse [Swiss Society for Psychoanalysis] and the Société Psychanalytique de Paris [Paris Psychoanalytic Society]. Upon his return to Chile in 1925, he presented his dissertation—‘‘El Valor de la psicoanálisis en la policlinica: Contribución a la psicologı́a clı́nica’’—at the University of Chile. The consolidation of the psychoanalytic movement began in 1943 with the return of Ignacio Matte-Blanco (1908–1994) and culminated in 1949 during the international congress in Zurich, with the recognition of 28 4 the Asociación Psicoanalı́tica du Chili [Psychoanalytic Association of Chile] by the International Psychoanalytic Association. Matte-Blanco was born in Santiago and studied medicine at the University of Chile. In 1933 he left for London, where he trained in neuropsychiatry at Northumberland House and at Maudsley Hospital. He received his psychoanalytic training at the British Institute. He did his training analysis with Walter Schmideberg and his control analysis with Anna Freud, Melitta Schmideberg, Helen SheehanDare, and James Strachey. In 1940 he went to the United States to work at Johns Hopkins Hospital and, between 1941 and 1943, was assistant professor of psychiatry at Duke University. Upon his return to Chile he trained and analyzed a group of individuals interested in psychiatry and psychoanalysis; these men and women worked under the auspices of the Psychiatric Clinic of the University of Chile. In 1949 he was appointed professor and chair of psychiatry, which gave considerable impetus to the group but was not without complications because of the overlapping roles and responsibilities entailed. The period was characterized by numerous activities and publications and an overall modernization of the field of psychiatry in Chile. It reached its apogee in 1960, during the third Latin American Congress of Psychoanalysis held in Santiago. The groupÕs orientation was toward classical psychoanalysis, but it was open to new developments, many of which were inspired by work in anthropology and philosophy. Matte-Blanco published Lo Psı́quicio y la Naturaleza humana in 1954 and Estudios de psicologı́a dinámica in 1955, books that contained the core ideas he would later develop in Rome and which were published in 1975 in The Unconscious as Infinite Sets: An Essay in Bi-logic and in 1989 in Thinking, Feeling and Being: Clinical Reflections on the Fundamental Antinomy of Human Beings in the World. There was also interest in clinical research, which was reflected in a precocious psychoanalytic investigation of the field of psychosis and perversion, primarily in the work of de Ganzaraı́n and Whiting. This first generation of psychoanalysts included Arturo Prat (1910–1989), Carlos Whiting (1918– 1982), Erika Bondiek, Carlos Nuñez (1918–1983), Ramón Ganzaraı́n, and Hernán Davanzo; they were followed by José Antonio Infante, Otto Kernberg, Ximena Artaza, and Ruth Riesenberg. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHINA Important changes occurred after 1961. Because of operational difficulties and outside influences, the majority of analysts abandoned work in clinical settings and rejected the leadership of Matte-Blanco, focusing instead on the association as an independent institution. Between 1962 and 1971 several well-known members emigrated to Europe or the United States, including Matte-Blanco himself, who settled in Rome in 1966. There followed a general weakening of the movement, although training continued at more or less the same rate. There were exchanges within Latin America, and David Liebermann was called to Buenos Aires on several occasions. The connection to the universities was maintained by Professors Hernán Davanzo, Mario Gomberoff, Omar Arrué, and their staffs. The association itself became increasingly Kleinian. In the eighties there was a sustained development in the psychoanalytic movement in Chile. Several generations of analysts were trained by Artaza, Bondiek, Davanzo, Eva Reichenstein, and Infante, who had returned from Topeka in 1978. Frequent visits by those who had emigrated, including Otto and Paulina Kernberg, Ramón Ganzaraı́n, and Ruth Riesenberg, had an invigorating effect on the profession. Access of this third generation of analysts to training and guidance within the association, together with the associationÕs work with scientific and cultural organizations, led to the growth of a renewed psychoanalytic movement, one that was more pluralist and open to change. A number of psychoanalysts from this period stand out: Mario Gomberoff, Liliana Pauluan, Elena Castro, Omar Arrué, Ramón Florenzano, Jaime Coloma, Eleonora Casaula, Juan Francisco Jordán, and Juan Pablo Jiménez. The Argentinians Horacio Etchegoyen, Jorge Olagaray, and Guillermo Brudny provided significant contributions to the movement. The associationÕs official publication is the Revista chilena de psiconálisis. OMAR ARRUÉ Bibliography Arrué, Omar. (1988). Cuarenta años de psicoanálisis en Chile. Revista chilena de psicoanálisis, 7 (1), 3–5. ———. (1991). Origenes e identidad del movimiento psicoanalı́tico chileno. In E. Casaula, J. Coloma, and J.-F. Jordán (Eds.), Cuarenta años de psicoanálisis en Chile. Santiago: Ananké. Casaula Eleonora, Coloma Jaime, and Jordán, Juan Francisco (Eds.). (1991). Cuarenta años de psicoanálisis en Chile, Santiago: Ananké. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Davanzo, Hernán. (1993). Origenes del psicoanálisis en Chile. Revista chilena de psicoanálisis, 10, 58–65. Whiting, Carlos. (1980). Notas para la historia del psicoanálisis en Chile. Revista chilena de psicoanálisis, 2 (1), 19–26. CHINA Unlike in Japan and Korea, psychoanalysis in China has had a relatively checkered history. FreudÕs ideas achieved some notoriety in the 1920s during a period of significant social and political reform but were otherwise not taken seriously until the 1930s when the first translations began to appear. To this day, only a handful of FreudÕs works have been translated into Chinese. Early translations resulted in some distortions of the original ideas for several reasons. There has been a tendency for translators to directly borrow the Japanese terminology as the two languages share a common writing system in kanji—characters, even though the same characters may mean different things in the two languages. This has produced occasional errors, as, for example, with ChinaÕs initial use of the Japanese term muisiki for ‘‘Unconscious’’, which literally means, in Chinese, ‘‘without consciousness.’’ More systematic distortions were also evident. There was concern in some quarters that FreudÕs theory, which appeared to grant primacy to a freereigning sexuality, could be construed as a threat to the stability of family relations. Some interpretations of the Oedipus complex were desexualised, emphasizing a social component. The female author Yonqin, writing in 1930 about FreudÕs theory of hysteria (and omitting all references to infantile sexuality), stated that the condition arises out of conflict between social pressure and the ‘‘biological instinct for satisfaction and fulfilment.’’ A motive for translating Freud, in one translatorÕs eyes, was to forewarn a general public of the dangers of taking Freud too seriously (Zhang, 1989). By contrast, very serious attempts have been made to rethink the oedipal myth in terms of culturally prevalent myths. In China the myth of Hsueh Jen Keui tells of a soldier of the Tang dynasty who kills his own son in ignorance of the kinship tie, preserving the authority of the father; some commentators have held that this becomes an exemplar of the Confucian ethic of filial piety (Zhang, 1989). 285 CHINA Sometimes translations of psychoanalytic and scientific articles based upon primary sources were written with a clear political purpose. The May Fourth movement of 1919 had heralded a brief renaissance in which there had been increasing call from intellectuals to modernize China and shake off certain feudalistic practices and ‘‘superstitions.’’ Freudian notions of sexual tension in families proved compelling to those calling for social reform. Freudian ideas could be claimed to be useful because of their allegiance to biology, medicine and education. As several commentators have amply documented, psychiatry, as a separate discipline, was in its infancy in China before 1949. There was a home for the mentally ill in Canton which opened in 1898 run by an American missionary doctor. Before that there appears to have been little in the way of psychiatric services. By the time the Communist Party came to power a small number of psychiatric hospitals appeared in the major cities where foreign influence was quite high. The most significant was the Peking Union Medical College which launched the first full-scale academic program in 1932 with new initiatives in teaching and practice involving the disciplines of sociology and social work. However, psychoanalysis as therapy has not easily taken root in China. This is because, it has been argued, there has been no tradition of expressiveness in the doctor-patient relationship and the doctor in a traditional Chinese setting adopts an authoritarian attitude towards patients. Before WWII there had been only one Chinese psychoanalyst, Bingham Dai, who trained under Harry Stack Sullivan and taught psychotherapy at Peking Municipal Psychopathic Hospital (allied to the Peking Union Medical College) from 1935–39. While he was of the view that, but for the Japanese invasion, psychoanalysis might have taken root in China, he downplayed the theoretical importance Freud attached to the instinctual impulses, claiming that Chinese clinicians emphasised interpersonal relations, and gave more attention to helping their patients tackle the problems of being human (Blowers, 2004). One should also note that Chinese typically present psychological problems as somatic complaints and have deeply ingrained philosophical systems of thought for which traditional practices such as worshipping of ancestors and visits to the temple to seek oneÕs fortune serve in times of distress. 28 6 These practices have been understood by Unschuld (1980, cited in Gerlach, 1995) as embodying a ‘‘Medicine of parallels,’’ evolving out of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism in which ‘‘visible and invisible occurrences in the internal and external worlds of the human being (e.g. emotions, internal organs, climatic conditions, elements) are allocated to particular series of parallels and are mutually dependent on each other. Thus the dividing lines between internal and external, mind and body, are removed and a change in one link in the series of parallels will directly affect the others’’ (Gerlach, p. 94). These systems of thought have also been influenced by turbulent political events. After the founding of the PeopleÕs Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the Communist government severed all ties with non-Communist countries. Attention became focused on Russia. In the early part of its first decade, all psychological work in the PRC was based upon Russian psychology and followed PavlovÕs work very closely. When this model proved less than satisfactory for explaining all psychological phenomena, there then followed two very difficult periods in which psychology was criticised and eventually shut down along with many other disciplines in the second of these periods that became known as the ‘‘Proletariat or Cultural Revolution’’. Only since 1978 has psychology emerged with a new agenda, largely free of previous political constraints. During the 1980s visiting psychoanalysts to China (Joseph, 1987) formed the impression that, insofar as psychotherapeutic methods are applied, they are oriented to behavioral therapy or use supportive techniques. They argued, however, that this circumstance maybe connected with traditional Chinese cultural patterns, which discourage both disclosure and communication about oneÕs own feelings and thoughts to strangers and openness to sexual desires. Insightoriented psychotherapies face obstacles both in the traditional pattern of Chinese thought and in conflicts leading to feelings of shame more than guilt. However, there have been substantive changes since the 1980s, both in the doctor-patient relationship and in the status of psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy, in several of ChinaÕs key cities. In spite of there being no analysts in the early years of the PRC, by the 1990s things began to change. The German-Chinese Academy for Psychotherapy (GCAP), comprising German family therapists, behavioral therapists, and psychoanalysts under its president, Margarethe Haass-Wiesegart, initiated a range of training INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHOICE programs covering behavioural, systemic and psychoanalytic trends. From 1997–1999 they began a continuous training program of six-week courses in Kunming, Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, and Chengdu; the curriculum consisted of psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy. The analysts involved in this training were Antje Haag, Margarethe Berger and Alf Gerlach, the latter having first lectured in China in the 1980s. A second program was initiated in 2000 in Shanghai and Hefei. Since 1995 the IPA has also begun reaching out to China, organising a committee for Asia, with China represented by Argentinean-trained Teresa Yuan, of Chinese descent. She began training programs at Beijing Anding Psychiatric Hospital, attended by professionals from universities in Beijing and other Chinese cities. Psychoanalytic psychotherapy has been taught in a variety of psychiatric settings in the above mentioned cities, as well as in Xian, Guangzhou, Nanjing and Hong Kong. Huo Datong, a Chinese analyst trained with a Lacanian orientation in France, recently founded a psychoanalytic center in Chengdu (Yuan, 2000). Although these developments signal a promising outlook for psychoanalytic methods and their application in China, the range and complexity of FreudÕs ideas may not be fully appreciated unless and until translation revisions and translation of more of his works are undertaken, clinical psychology gets more firmly established, and the therapeutic context is expanded to encompass thorough education on a range of treatments and the possibilities of the individual psychotherapeutic scheme. GEOFFREY H. BLOWERS AND TERESA YUAN Bibliography Blowers, G.H. (2004). Bingham Dai, Adolf Storfer, and the tentative beginnings of psychoanalytic culture in China: 1935–1941. Psychoanalysis and History, 6 (1), 93–105. Gerlach, A. (1995) China. In P. Kutter (Ed.) Psychoanalysis International: A guide to Psychoanalysis throughout the world (Vol. 2, pp. 94–102). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Fromman-Holzboog. Joseph, E.D. (1987). Psychiatry and psychoanalysis in the PeopleÕs Republic of China: a transcultural view. In R. Fine (Ed.), Psychoanalysis around the world. New York: Howarth Press. Yuan, T. A. (2000). China in the history of psychoanalysis: a possible fate for psychoanalysis at the dawn of the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OF NEUROSIS millennium. 8th International Meeting of the International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis. Zhang, Jingyuan. (1989). Sigmund Freud and Modern Chinese Literature. Ph.D. dissertation. Cornell University. CHOICE OF NEUROSIS As soon as a unified theory of neurosis had been formulated, the factors that determined the clinical form the neurosis assumed in particular cases had to be specified. The study of the choice of neurosis was concomitant, for Freud, with the development of the general theory of psychoneuroses. The term neurosis, coined in the eighteenth century by Cullen, first referred to a heterogeneous set of illnesses attributed to a crisis of nerves. During the nineteenth century, the classificatory system was revised based on individualization of illnesses as different as exophthalmic goiter (GravesÕ disease) and ParkinsonÕs disease. The idea of consolidating characteristic mental disturbances (the madness of doubt and phobias) and a neurosis (hysteria) within a single framework occurred after the psychological nature of hysteria (‘‘the great neurosis’’) was established at the end of the nineteenth century, by Charcot in Paris and Breuer in Vienna. Freud (CharcotÕs student and BreuerÕs collaborator) and Janet (CharcotÕs student) were responsible for the two principal theoretical constructions that established the unified theory of neurosis. These two constructions differed in their conceptualization of the mechanisms and causes of neurosis, and the two theories also approached the choice of neurosis very differently. For Freud, the explanation of the choice of neurosis evolved directly from the theory of neurosis, initially described in 1896. This is expressed clearly in FreudÕs correspondence with Fliess (especially the letters dated January 1, May 30, and December 6, 1896) and in two articles, ‘‘Heredity and the Etiology of the Neuroses’’ (1896a) and ‘‘Further Remarks on the NeuroPsychoses of Defence’’ (1896b), situated within the framework of the traumatic theory of neuroses: Nothing in the nature of the trauma itself enables us to differentiate the choice of neurosis; the cause must be sought for elsewhere. Initially, Freud referred to a disposition of attitude at the time of the trauma. Sexual incidents passively experienced during childhood predisposed the subject to hysteria, while those in which the child played 287 CHOICE OF NEUROSIS an active role predisposed the subject to obsessive neurosis. This theory was soon abandoned in favor of a chronological approach, and a decade later, Freud repudiated it explicitly. Its replacement, the chronological theory, was based on the principle that the dates of childhood events play a decisive role. Initially, the date of the trauma was considered crucial. But, in a January 1897 letter to Fliess, Freud modified his position and claimed the key moment took place at the time of repression. In a letter of November of that same year, he concluded, ‘‘It is probable, then, that the choice of neurosis (the decision whether hysteria or obsessional neurosis or paranoia emerges) depends on the nature of the wave of development (that is to say, its chronological placing) which enables repression to occur— i.e. which transforms a source of internal pleasure into one of internal disgust’’ (1950a, p. 271). The question was still not fully resolved, however, as Freud noted two years later in his December 9, 1899, letter to Fliess. Meanwhile, the theory of trauma had given way to the theory of libidinal development and intrapsychic conflict. Freud retained the chronological point of view, but what was important to him now was the type of relationship the relevant stage of development allowed one to establish with others: one of autoeroticism or alloeroticism (homo- or heteroeroticism). Curiously, hysteria and obsessional neurosis are lumped together, the second considered a variant of the first. What was important to him at this point was the distinction between them and paranoia, which, unlike hysteria and obsessional neurosis, originates in autoeroticism. The approach that remained the basis for the theory of psychoanalysis and makes use of the concept of point of fixation can be dated to Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d). In the last pages of the work, Freud discusses the role of regression, which, at the time of the conflict, leads the libido to return to an earlier stage, the choice of stage depending on an attraction factor, the tendency to fixation that characterized the earlier development of the libido. The chronological significance was no longer considered proactively (the age of the past event) but retroactively (the return to a particular position). It is within this new conceptual framework that Freud developed the perspectives in ‘‘Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning’’ (1911b) 28 8 and the psychopathological study that concludes the Schreber case (1911c). Moreover, this ‘‘canonical’’ version was used didactically in the twenty-second chapter of the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916–1917a). On the basis of a metaphor (the migration of a people, elements of which are established at different intermediate stages) and a biological model (his own histological work on the embryology of eel gonads), he introduces the concepts of fixation and regression before emphasizing the multiple factors that go into determining a neurosis and the role of ‘‘complemental series.’’ By insisting on the role of intrapsychic conflict, he is led to consider the role of the ego and the defense mechanisms, a consideration he had already developed in ‘‘The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis: A Contribution to the Problem of Choice of Neurosis’’ (1913i). In this last text, Freud describes the chronological factor as dependent on the development of infantile sexuality. But, while providing a now-classic description of the stages of this development, he suggests that the predisposition to the choice of neurosis has as much to do with the libidinal relationship to the object as it does to the ego defense mechanisms associated with each of the steps. He firmly maintains the chronological reference, as long as the development of the ego as well as that of the libido is taken into consideration. This change in the Freudian outlook cannot be understood without reference to the early work of Karl Abraham. In a series of articles published between 1921 and 1925, Abraham made significant contributions to the establishment and refinement of the relation between libidinal development and nosological categories. In 1924 he published ‘‘A Short Study of the Development of the Libido, Viewed in the Light of Mental Disorders,’’ an essay that falls well within the bounds of the Freudian perspective but goes beyond it in its description of the neuroses, proposing a chronological model that explains all aspects of mental pathology. A few years before this, in ‘‘Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality’’ (Ferenczi, 1913/1980), Ferenczi had expanded the hypothesis advanced by Freud according to which the choice of neurosis is determined by the development of the ego and the libido, specifying that development of the ego could be understood with reference to the sense of reality. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS C H O I S Y , M A R Y S E (1 903–1 979) Subsequently, the term ‘‘choice of neurosis’’ disappeared from the vocabulary of Freud and his successors. The term itself had not been very well chosen in the sense that it was not describing choice actively made by the subject but a complex process resulting from a set of determinants. Subsequent interest turned to the comparative determination of neuroses and psychoses. In the field of neuroses the issue then shifted from the causes determining the ‘‘choice’’ of neurosis (or the factors predisposing to it) to the study of structural traits that could be used to distinguish obsession from hysteria. There was less interest in symptoms than in the underlying structure. The distinction was based on a theory of the ego and libido, in keeping with the thinking that inspired it. An especially illustrative example of this type of approach is the work of Jacques Lacan and a number of his students. But these structural models tend to describe the process more than its genesis. At the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first, the psychoanalytic theory of neurosis and choice of neurosis were been approached from two different perspectives. The first, inspired by behaviorism, questions the principle of a neurotic structure and focuses instead on the mechanisms of conditioning that explain the production of the symptom. The second questions the unitary concept of neurosis and, within the framework of recent American nosological classifications, many clinical neuroses have lost their labels and are found scattered among heterogeneous nosological categories, implying the existence of a number of pathogenic explanations. In both cases the question of choice of neurosis never appears, at least not in the terms in which psychoanalysis has traditionally presented it. Thus the concept that had so strongly aroused FreudÕs interest at the beginning of psychoanalysis seems to attract less attention from psychoanalysts a century later. The question may again become relevant if the unified concept of neurosis returns to a prominent place in nosography. DANIEL WIDLÖCHER See also: Constitution; Conversion; Doubt; Libidinal stage; Organic repression; Somatic compliance. Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1949). A short study of the development of the libido, viewed in the light of mental disorders. In Selected papers of Karl Abraham, M.D. (D. Bryan and A. Strachey, Trans.). London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1924) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Ferenczi, Sándor. (1980). Stages in the development of the sense of reality. In First contributions to psychoanalysis. New York: Brunner/Mazel. (Original work published 1913) Freud, Sigmund. (1896a). Heredity and the etiology of the neuroses. SE, 3: 141–156. ———. (1896b). Further remarks on the neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 157–185. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12: 213–226. ———. (1911c). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1–82. ———. (1913i). The disposition to obsessional neurosis: a contribution to the problem of choice of neurosis. SE, 12: 311–326. ———. (1916–17a [1915–17]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. Parts I & II, SE, 15–16. Freud, Sigmund, and Fliess, Wilhelm. (1985c [1887–1904]). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887–1904 (Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, Trans.). London: Belknap/Harvard University Press. CHOISY, MARYSE (1903–1979) Journalist, writer, and founder of the review Psyché, Maryse Choisy was born in Saint-Jean-de-Luz on February 1, 1903, and died in Paris on March 21, 1979. She was an officer of the National Order of Merit, and was awarded a silver medal of Arts, Lettres, et Sciences, and the Lamennais Prize (1967). She was raised in an old château in the Basque country by wealthy aunts. At the end of the First World War, she continued her studies in Cambridge, then entered Girton College and prepared her dissertation on Samkhya philosophy; she also studied yoga. When she was twenty-four—the year was 1927— she had her first contact with psychoanalysis when she sought treatment with Sigmund Freud. At their third meeting she related an anxiety dream that Freud responded to by stating, ‘‘You are an illegitimate child.’’ Incredulous, she nevertheless followed his advice by asking her aunt about her birth. Her illegitimacy was confirmed. That was all she learned of her birth, but she never returned to Berggasse Street. It was another twenty years before she again had any involvement with psychoanalysis. 289 C H O I S Y , M A R Y S E (190 3–197 9) Through her career as a journalist and writer, she became an active participant in the intellectual life of the 1930s. She wrote some thirty books: novels, poems, essays, and personal journalism (she became a journalist with LÕIntransigent in 1925), which brought her fame. Between 1927 and 1931 there appeared Un mois chez les hommes (A month among men; on the monks of Mount Athos), Un mois chez les filles (A month among girls; on prostitution), which caused a scandal upon its publication, LÕAmour dans les prisons (Love in the Prisons), and Un mois chez les députés (A month among parliamentarians). She criticized the Surrealist Manifesto, which she felt was based on a false understanding of FreudÕs concept of the unconscious, and, in Nouvelles littéraires, published her ‘‘Manifeste surridéaliste,’’ in 1927. She married the journalist Maxime Clouzet. In 1932 their daughter Colette was born. There followed Neuf mois, (Nine months), Savoir être maman (How to be a mama), and two books of childrenÕs stories. In 1927 her first novel appeared, entitled C6 H8 (Az03)6 Mon coeur dans une formule (My heart in a formula). She felt she was expressing the aspirations of the younger generation of the time, breaking the habits of a ‘‘generation of pen pushers,’’ ‘‘a generation that was horizontal from five to seven,’’ she described, ‘‘in the twenties, we are a vertical brood.’’ In 1929, following a mystical crisis, she dabbled in various forms of spiritualism until her meeting with Pierre Teilhard de Chardin in 1938, a turning point in her spiritual quest. She converted and, after the Liberation, devoted her efforts to bringing together science, religion, and psychoanalysis. She used psychoanalysis to satisfy her religious ideals, both those of Catholicism and those of a ‘‘meditative’’ and ‘‘orientalist’’ ecumenicalism, through which she affirmed her ‘‘adherence to the ideals of the Roman Catholic church.’’ The review Psyché, founded in 1946, reflects these concerns. Together with Father Leycester King of Oxford, she founded the Association Internationale de Psychothérapie et de Psychologie Catholique (International association of Catholic psychotherapy and psychology). She resumed her analysis, this time with René Laforgue. She felt she was a victim of FreudÕs ‘‘savage’’ analysis, comparing herself to Dora, but she did not question his genius, which reminded her of Einstein. The fact that Laforgue was a dissident and had 29 0 dropped out of the International Psychoanalytic Association encouraged Choisy to begin a second, training analysis with Maurice Bouvet. She considered this an obligation but acknowledged she had made a ‘‘solid negative transference.’’ Un mois chez les filles was about prostitution but Choisy intended to approach it the same way Freud approached neurotics, restoring to them their humanity and avoiding TolstoyÕs moralizing or the aestheticism of Pierre Louÿs and Francis Carco. (The book was rediscovered and published in 1961 in the United States as Psychoanalysis of the Prostitute.) In 1949 Choisy published a study on the ‘‘Métapsychologie du scandale’’ in Psyché, reprinted in her book Le Scandale de lÕamour (The scandal of love). She published four other works popularizing psychoanalysis. Her last book, published in 1978, is volume two of her memoirs, significantly subtitled: Sur le chemin de Dieu on rencontre dÕabord le diable (On the path to God we first meet the devil). Choisy had an adventurous and provocative intellect that she developed through her many publications, and she occupied an important position in the intellectual world of pre-War Paris. But it was only after the Liberation that she became part of the history of psychoanalysis for two complementary reasons: First, her efforts to obtain official recognition of psychoanalysis by the Catholic church and encourage practitioners and researchers to consider positions that were different and sometimes radically distinct, and second, the creation of the review Psyché, which, more than all her other writing, constitutes her ‘‘psychoanalytic oeuvre’’ and explains her renown in the field. JACQUELINE COSNIER See also: France; Psyché. Revue internationale de psychanalyse et des sciences de l’homme (Psyche, an international review of psychoanalysis and human sciences). Bibliography Choisy, Maryse. (1961). Psychoanalysis of the prostitute. New York: Philosophical Library. (Original work published 1928) ———. (1977). Mémoires : sur le chemin de Dieu on rencontre d’abord le Diable. Paris: Émile Paul. Guillemain, Bernard. (1959). Maryse Choisy ou l’Amoureuse Sagesse. Paris: C.A.M.C. Hachette. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRISTIANS CHRISTIANS AND JEWS: A PSYCHOANALYTICAL STUDY Rudolf M. Loewenstein began this work in France during ‘‘the wretched year of 1941’’; he finished it ten years later in the United States and dedicated it to ‘‘the Christians who sacrificed themselves to defend the persecuted Jews’’ (1952). Loewenstein, who would become one of the founders of ego psychology in the United States, was then director of a psychoanalytic journal financed by Marie Bonaparte, with whom he began to discuss aspects of the anti-Semitic environment in France. ‘‘We are in a revolutionary period . . . ,’’ he wrote. ‘‘Blood has not yet been spilled. . . . But the people need to grapple with someone, they need victims. . . . Hence, the Jews.’’ More personal motives also compelled Loewenstein to write Christians and Jews. Born in Russia, he was a citizen of several nations before, having settled in France and identified himself entirely with the French, he suddenly found himself scorned and rejected by his adopted country because he was Jewish. He believed that psychoanalysis could contribute to some better understanding of anti-Semitic attitudes and might even offer a solution. Loewenstein began by reviewing the known causes of anti-Semitism, citing various works and historical documentation. He then offered examples from his experience as an analyst; he believed that therapy represented ‘‘a good opportunity for a kind of experimental study in the incipient and developmental stages of anti-Semitism’’ (p. 30). Citing Leon Pinsker, the Russian physician and author of Auto-Emancipation (1882 [1916]), Loewenstein discussed ‘‘judeophobia’’ as a type of demonophobia, a near-psychosis that incorporates feelings of fear, hatred, and disgust. Certain forms of anti-Semitism represent aspects of paranoia, such as xenophobia, revulsion over circumcision, and projection of self-hatred, while other characteristics, such as religious intolerance and economic rivalry, have an opportunistic appeal. LoewensteinÕs hypothesis, based on Gustave Le BonÕs theory of collective psychology, is that antiSemitic tendencies, latent in individuals, suddenly metamorphose in groups into violent attitudes that spread like an epidemic. HitlerÕs anti-Semitic laws and his persecution of Jews, for example, enabled latent anti-Semitism in individual Germans to manifest itself. The underlying mechanisms rely on irrational and absurd medieval beliefs, such as the putatively INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND JEWS: A PSYCHOANALYTICAL STUDY peculiar anatomy of the Jew (a hidden tail, menstrual periods in males) and his supposedly demonic character (engagement in ritual murder, sexual perversions), as well as modern beliefs (Jewish culpability in starting wars, international financial cabals, Jewish-Masonic conspiracies). Loewenstein also suggested another, more oedipal level to anti-Semitism, as reflected in FreudÕs Moses and Monotheism, viewing the struggle of the early Christians, with their hatred of the old religion, as a means of avoiding the ‘‘return of the repressed’’—the recollection of their own revolt against imposed religion. Finally, Loewenstein questions whether the Jews do not themselves aid in perpetuating anti-Semitic reactions, in a chapter titled ‘‘On ÔJewishÕ Character Traits and Social Structure.’’ Skeptical of Zionism as a political solution because it might provoke anti-Semitism, Loewenstein called for a pedagogical solution. He proposed teaching sacred history in a less anti-Semitic spirit and, always philosophical, he suggested a mutual search for understanding between Christians and Jews for the good of mankind. A courageous book, Christians and Jews, together with works by Imre Hermann (1945) and Ernst Simmel (1946), was among the earliest psychoanalytically-informed works on the subject. It is not a landmark work, however. LoewensteinÕs use of a medical model, with its description of symptoms, etiology, and finally treatment, is inadequate to understand the modern antipathy and negative attitudes toward Jews known as anti-Semitism. MICHELLE MOREAU RICAUD See also: Loewenstein, Rudolf M.; Racism, anti-Semitism and psychoanalysis. Source Citation Loewenstein, Rudolf M. (1952). Christians and Jews; A psychoanalytical study. New York: International Universities Press. Bibliography Hermann, Imre. (1945). Az antiszemitizmus lélektana. (The psychosis of anti-Semitism), Budapest: Bibliotheca. Pinsker, Leon. (1916). Auto-emancipation. New York, Federation of American Zionists. (Original work published 1882) Simmel, Ernst. (1946). Anti-Semitism. A social disease. New York: International Universities Press. 291 CINEMA AND PSYCHOANALYSIS CINEMA AND PSYCHOANALYSIS As contemporaries, cinema and psychoanalysis both reveal, in their own way, mankindÕs complex personality. The interior dramas that psychoanalysis brings to light can be experienced within the ‘‘other scene’’ of cinematic fiction. The similarity of certain terms and the occasional apparent resemblances between the two techniques encourage spontaneous comparisons: During psychoanalysis the subject is confronted with fantasized ‘‘representations’’ and can identity with ‘‘projected’’ characters. And we often speak of ‘‘dream screens.’’ Psychoanalysis as perceived by the cinema, especially by Hollywood, has not escaped a degree of confusion. For, while engaging in one sense with the ‘‘question of lay analysis,’’ American psychoanalytic practice is related to psychiatry. Therefore, in American film productions as well as in critical analyses of those films, there has not always been a clear distinction between psychiatry and psychoanalytic practice. To bring the relation into sharper focus, I will not consider films that depict the world of psychiatry, such as Shock Corridor (Sam Fuller, 1963), Lilith (R. Rossen, 1964), or One Flew Over the CuckooÕs Nest (Milos Forman, 1975). This article will avoid discussion of the serial killer films of the nineteen eighties (Henry, Portrait of a Serial Killer by J. McNaughton, 1985, released in 1990, The Silence of the Lambs by Jonathan Demme, 1991, Seven by D. Fincher, 1995, and others). The term ‘‘psychoanalysis’’ appeared for the first time in Sigmund FreudÕs Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses (1896). Almost simultaneously, on December 28, 1895, the Lumière brothers, inventors of the cinematograph, organized the first paid movie in Paris. The show, twenty minutes long, contained the famous Arrivée du train en gare de La Ciotat and La Sortie de lÕusine Lumière à Lyon. It took the cinema more than twenty years to present psychoanalytic imagery, even in a rudimentary form. In 1919, R. Wiene filmed The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, in which a mad doctor—at least thatÕs what he claims to be—uses hypnosis for evil purposes, just as the diabolical Dr. Mabuse in the film of the same name (Fritz Lang, 1922), released three years later, made use of his hypnotic powers for criminal purposes. On the other hand it took psychoanalysis a number of years before it approached cinema. Münsterberg did write a 1916 essay, Le Cinéma: étude psychologique, but it was only in 1970 that, for the first time, film analysis 29 2 made use of the tools of psychoanalysis (Les Cahiers du cinéma, no. 223). The authors dissected Young Abe Lincoln (John Ford, 1939) and analyzed the importance of the Law (personified by Henry Fonda as Lincoln) and the Oedipus complex it implied. The history of the relation between psychoanalysis and cinema can be subdivided into three major periods. In its earliest manifestations (Caligari and Mabuse), psychoanalysis became, during the thirties, a familiar figure to cinema, although it often assumed the form of caricatured archetypes, which revealed a complete misunderstanding of psychoanalytic reality. It was superficial and incompetent (Carefree, M. Sandrich, 1938, Bringing up Baby, Howard Hawks, 1938), disturbing and ambitious (Mr. Deeds Goes to Town, Frank Capra, 1936), or provided effective, although simpleminded, advice (Blind Alley, King Vidor, 1939). It still had little to do with the behavior of ordinary people. After the Second World War, the references to psychoanalysis (psychiatrists treating shell-shocked soldiers, for example)—at least in terms of explanatory material—made psychoanalysis seem more serious and sympathetic. Its cinematic representation followed this positive evolution. It was the seductive Peterson (Ingrid Bergman) who enabled Ballantyne (Gregory Peck) to remember the traumatic childhood scene that, having been repressed, had led him to believe he was guilty of murder (Spellbound, Alfred Hitchcock, 1945). It is Moss, the G.I. in Home of the Brave (S. Kramer, 1949), who, returning home after the war, is healed of the paralysis that resulted from his inferiority complex. Psychoanalysis, although not yet fully understood, is here better integrated in social life and becomes a ‘‘serious’’ reference. More recently we have seen a return to a more critical position. Dressed to Kill (Brian de Palma, 1980) involves an analyst who is a serial killer of women. The grasping psychoanalyst in Passage à lÕacte (F. Girod, 1997), manipulated by his patient, becomes his assassin with few second thoughts. The psychoanalysts portrayed by Woody Allen are frequently among the funniest characters in his films. Psychoanalysis, neither caricature nor definitive ‘‘knowledge,’’ becomes a subject for the cinema that can be treated objectively and even ridiculed. Even though he allowed himself to be filmed by his close friends (Marie Bonaparte, Mark Brunswick, René Laforgue, Philip Lehrman, see Mijolla, A. de, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CINEMA 1994), Freud was never very interested in the cinema. Arguing that ‘‘he didnÕt feel that a plastic representation of our abstractions worthy of the name could be made,’’ he disavowed his disciples, Karl Abraham and Hanns Sachs, for their collaboration on the script of The Mysteries of a Soul (G. W. Pabst, 1925). He also refused a considerable sum of money offered by Samuel Goldwyn to develop a script on ‘‘famous love affairs.’’ This suspicion of the filmic representation of psychoanalysis continued after the death of its founder. It was primarily FreudÕs daughter who opposed any attempt to make a film about Freud. Fearing Anna FreudÕs hostility, John Huston abandoned the idea of using Marilyn Monroe to play the part of Cecily in Freud, the Secret Passion (1962). Should we attribute to this suspicion the paucity of films about Freud? The few films that do represent Freud show him during the early years of psychoanalysis. The Seven-Percent Solution (H. Ross, 1976) is a comedy in which the founder of psychoanalysis attempts to cure Sherlock Holmes of his cocaine addiction, a wink at FreudÕs own experience. Sogni d Õoro (Nino Moretti, 1981) involves the making of a film entitled ‘‘FreudÕs Mother,’’ in which the fictional relations of Sigmund and Amalia are treated comically. In a more serious vein, Nineteen-Nineteen (H. Brody, 1984) evokes Freud in flashback psychoanalyzing two celebrated patients, the Wolfman and the young woman described in ‘‘a case of female homosexuality’’ (1920a). John HustonÕs Freud (1962) is the only film that seriously and directly confronts the theoretical and practical questions of psychoanalysis through a ‘‘biographical’’ fiction. Like Freud leaving the famous 1921 photograph— cigar in hand, without his glasses—to come to life in Lovesick (M. Brickman, 1983), the image of the fictional psychoanalyst is often a stereotype or caricature: white beard, tiny pince-nez glasses, maybe a strong foreign accent. He becomes the old doctor Brulov in Spellbound (1945) or the disturbing Caligari (1919) or Mabuse (1922), who make use of their knowledge of hypnosis for evil purposes. Nor are they the only ones. The analyst in Nightmare Alley (E. Goulding, 1947) makes use of his patientsÕ confidence to blackmail them. Even though the psychoanalystÕs image in cinema evolves after the Second World War, becoming more reassuring, it still retains an aura of strangeness. The two doctors—even if they are not, strictly speaking, psychoanalysts—who appear in Seventh Heaven (B. Jacquot, 1997), are oddly different from the other INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS characters in the film. The first, and most important, disappears as mysteriously as he appears. In Hollywood films classical Freudian concepts are used: the neurosis of anxiety, the Oedipus complex, the repression of an infantile trauma. In most cases, the model used, at least implicitly, is based on the Studies on Hysteria; the spectacular effects of the catharsis can be used for the purposes of dramatization. Bringing back a repressed memory is sufficient for healing. This occurs in Secret Beyond the Door (Fritz Lang, 1948), in Suddenly, Last Summer (Joseph L. Mankiewicz, 1959), The Snake Pit (Anatol Litvak, 1949), and even, although it is caricatured, in Marnie (Alfred Hitchcock, 1964). Dreams have obviously assumed their place as one of the deus ex machina of cinema, beginning with the dream sequence in Spellbound, designed by Salvador Dali. The analysis of a recurrent dream experienced by one of the characters is used to solve the ‘‘enigma’’ at the heart of the script. Nightmares occur in Pursued (Raoul Walsh, 1949), Lady in the Dark (M. Leisen, 1944), Secret Beyond the Door (1948), and The Three Faces of Eve (N. Johnson, 1957). Then there are the dreams of Freud himself, taken from the Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), which are used in Freud: The Secret Passion (1962). Unraveling these oneiric obsessions resolves the characterÕs neurosis and the story (the film) comes to an end. For the purposes of dramaturgy, psychoanalysis is used by cinema to cure patients and especially to reveal the neuroses of psychoanalysts, their entourage, and society. The Cobweb (Vincente Minelli, 1955) is the model for this type of exposition. In the film Richard Widmark, a psychoanalyst working in an institution, is impotent with his wife, with whom he disagrees. Should we be surprised then that HollywoodÕs celluloid psychoanalysts, psychiatrists especially, rarely engage in any real psychoanalysis—often confused with hypnosis—and that the framework of the psychoanalytic cure is rarely respected? In Spellbound, Dr. Petersen (Ingmar Bergman) is seated next to her patient, the so-called Dr. Edwards (Gregory Peck); the psychoanalyst in Sex and the Single Girl (R. Quine, 1964), played by Natalie Wood, does the same and, as in so many representations, writes down his remarks. In Lady in the Dark (1944), the analystÕs seat is placed behind the couch but the patient is seated. This difficulty in displaying the psychoanalytic frame—the analysand lying on a couch and the psychoanalyst seated behind him in another plane—has been neatly 293 CINEMA AND PSYCHOANALYSIS resolved by H. Brody in Nineteen-Nineteen (1984). Here, two of FreudÕs former patients recall their respective psychoanalysis. When the therapy is shown on screen, the psychoanalyst (Freud), is not in the picture, only his voice is present (Mijolla, A. de, 1994). in the study of the imaginary signifier.’’ Other authors also became interested in the analogy between psychoanalysis and cinema: the importance of sight (Jean-Louis Baudry), the different meanings of the word ‘‘screen’’ (G. Rosolata), the place of the spectator in Persona (N. Brown), fetishism and film noir (M. Ernet). Even today it seems that cinema continues to insist that psychoanalysis is hypnosis (the dramatic effects of which are evident on screen) or catharsis (which facilitates explanatory shortcuts). Nonetheless, its representation has become more subtle and it is now fully integrated in the film. In Seventh Heaven, psychoanalysis is not only part of the script but present on screen as well. White surfaces are used by the heroine to project her traumatic memories. Similarly, F. Girod makes psychoanalysis the background for Passage à l Õacte (1997). Psychoanalysis is given the comic treatment in nearly all of Woody AllenÕs films as well as a few others (A Couch in New York by Chantal Ackerman, 1997). Sometimes the approach is tragicomic, as in Another Woman (Allen, 1988), where a woman begins to question her entire life after eavesdropping on a psychoanalyst at work through a vent in her apartment. However, theory shouldnÕt cause us to overlook the many studies of individual films and directors. Raymond Bellour (1975) provided a psychoanalytic analysis (the murder of the father, the castrating mother) of HitchcockÕs North by Northwest (1959), a film said to be frivolous and entertaining. Minutely dissecting the sequence of the airplane attack, he reveals the importance of sight and its role in the film. Similarly, T. Kuntzel (1975) made use of the Freudian discovery of the presence of the unconscious in dreams to analyze The Most Dangerous Game (E. B. Shoedsack and I. Pichel, 1932). Patrick Lacoste (1990) examines The Mysteries of a Soul (1925) from a strictly psychoanalytical point of view and Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor (1994) analyzes the way the ‘‘anxiety of fiction’’ operates on the spectator of HitchcockÕs films. However, there is no need to see an analyst at work or present a formal psychoanalytic situation for psychoanalysis to be presented on screen. A number of films promote a latent psychoanalytic statement without being explicit. This is the case, for example, with the melodramas of Douglas Sirk, who presents neurotic characters (Written on the Wind, 1956), with many of Ingmar BergmanÕs films (The Silence, 1963, Persona, 1966, Cries and Whispers, 1973, Autumn Sonata, 1978), with Michael PowellÕs Peeping Tom (1960), and any of Tex AveryÕs productions, which use comedy to present neurosis. Throughout the nineteen-eighties American film theory looked at a number of films made between 1945 and 1960 from the point of view of psychoanalysis and feminism. In several analyses that could be described as ‘‘feminist psychoanalysis,’’ Laura Mulvey, Janet Walker, and M. A. Doane attempted to show how the role of women in cinema reflected their role in society. The approach taken by E. Ann Kaplan, which was part of this movement—one that was more sociological than psychoanalytical—emphasized issues of race in society, which the cinema reflected. It is often in films where the elements of psychoanalysis are presented but not spelled out that psychoanalytic concepts appear with the greatest subtlety and relevance. What would Un chien andalou (Luis Buñuel, 1928), that sprawling ninety-minute dream, have been like if the script had provided a psychoanalytic explanation? Probably a poor film, slow and overbearing. But making use of psychoanalytic concepts to examine films from a sociological perspective (feminist or antiracist) was bound to be unsatisfactory as long as these readings involved distortion and reduction; the film and its analysis became a pretext to defend, and in a way that was not always rigorous, questionable intellectual ideas. Psychoanalysis is often a pretext in the service of a discourse; once abandoned, it is seen to be an element inessential to the logical structure of the argument. IsnÕt this the reproach made to cinema whenever it represents psychoanalysis, a filmic representation that is generally incomplete and often a form of caricature? It was only natural that psychoanalysis should take an interest in film, one of many cultural constructs, as Freud did, for example, with drama, beginning with Hamlet. Nonetheless, the theory of cinema did not make use of the tools of psychoanalysis until the early seventies. With reference to the work of Lacan, Christian Metz provided a careful spectatorial analysis, trying to determine ‘‘what contribution Freudian psychoanalysis could . . . provide 29 4 If film often ‘‘fails at’’ representation of the psychoanalytic situation, it is no doubt because ‘‘the unconINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CINEMA CRITICISM scious, like the being of philosophers, rarely makes itself visible’’ (J.-B. Pontalis). Moreover, ‘‘the rhythm of analysis is very different from that of film, and it is quite difficult to provide an accurate representation of the sensation’’ (Mijolla, 1994). A film cannot be judged on the accuracy of its portrayal of psychoanalytic notions—within certain limits, of course—but on the relevance of the use of those notions for the dramatic presentation of its themes. ‘‘From this point of view—[the use of language and the language of images as fundamental Freudian reference points] between psychoanalysis and cinema—is formed a variant of the situation of the analyst as always being between two languages’’ (Lacoste, 1990). More work needs to be done on the complex relationships that are created between psychoanalysis and cinema, beyond the application of psychoanalytic concepts to the art of film. PIERRE-JEAN BOUYER AND SYLVAIN BOUYER See also: American Imago; Cinema (criticism); France; Freud, the Secret Passion; Secrets of a Soul; Psyche, revue internationale de psychanalyse et des sciences de l Õhomme (Psyche, an international review of psychoanalysis and human sciences); Robertson, James; Surrealism and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Bellour, Raymond. (1979). The analysis of film (Constance Penley, Ed.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. Communications. (1975). ‘‘Psychanalyse et cinéma.’’ 23. Lacoste, Patrick. (1990). LÕetrange cas du Pr. M. Psychanalyse à lÕécran. Paris: Gallimard. Metz, Christian. (1979). The imaginary signifier: Psychoanalysis and the cinema (C. Britton et al., Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Mijolla, Alain de. (1999). Freud and the psychoanalytic situation on the screen. In J. Bergstrom (Ed.), Endless night. Cinema and psychoanalysis: Parallel histories (p. 188– 199). Los Angeles and London: University of California Press. (Original work published 1994) Further Reading Gabbard, Glen. (2001). The impact of psychoanalysis on the American cinema. Annual of Psychoanalysis, 29, 237–246. Gabbard, Erin and Gabbard, Glen. (1989). Psychiatry and the cinema. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Greenberg, Harvey R. (1993). Screen memories: Hollywood cinema on the psychoanalytic couch. New York: Columbia University Press. CINEMA CRITICISM The discipline of psychoanalysis and the art of the cinema evolved in parallel at the beginning of the twentieth century. Psychoanalysts soon began interpreting the appeal and meaning of movies. As early as 1916 Hugo Münsterberg wrote The Film: A Psychological Study, in which he suggested that film transforms the external world into the mechanisms of the mind, including memory, imagination, attention, and emotion. Although Freud himself had little interest in the cinema, one of his disciples, Hanns Sachs, served as a consultant to George Wilhelm PabstÕs 1926 classic, Secrets of a Soul. This German expressionist film was the first serious treatment of psychoanalysis in film history, complete with rather sophisticated use of dream symbolism. Since these early interdisciplinary efforts, a whole field of psychoanalytic film criticism has evolved. Systematic studies of movies first appeared in the 1950s in the French periodical, Cahiers du Cinèma. The Cahiers theorists subsequently appropriated Italian semiotics as well as the ideas of the deconstructionist Jacques Derrida and the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. Film scholars influenced by Lacan and Derrida focus on the ‘‘deep structures’’ at work in movies and how meaning is generated in film. LacanÕs most important student in the field of film theory has been Christian Metz, whose work has become standard reading in academic cinema studies programs. The Lacanian approach to film criticism centers on how audiences experience movies. The camera creates a ‘‘gaze’’ or perspective on the events of the filmÕs narrative. A key aspect of the Lacanian discourse is the concept of ‘‘lack,’’ both as the phallocentric key to sexual difference and in the symbolic sense of viewing external reality in terms of absence and presence. These ideas have been appropriated by feminist semioticians like Laura Mulvey, who suggested that the womanÕs body is fetishized because it creates anixiety in men, to whom it represents ‘‘lack,’’ i.e., castration. Moreover, the cinema is viewed as historically serving the interests of patriarchy, privileging the gaze of the male hero, while subordinating the female characters as the object of the gaze. 295 CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS Interpretations of film based on Lacanian ideas have generated a good deal of criticism. Many have objected to the semioticiansÕ methodology as topheavy with theoretical formulations and too dismissive of the actual content of a film. In addition, a number of critics have pointed out that masculinity is regularly undermined in films and that male viewers often will identify with a female character. Moreover, male bodies are often fetishized in the cinema to the same extent as the female body. Psychoanalytic film scholars have taken a number of different approaches that part ways with the Lacanian perspective. Bruce Kawin, Marsha Kinder, and Robert Eberwein, for example, have examined films from the perspective of Freudian dreamwork. Robert B. Ray and Krin and Glen Gabbard have taken a pluralistic approach to psychoanalytic film criticism, suggesting that Lacanian interpretations are reductionist and limiting, and that broadening oneÕs theoretical perspective may be more useful when studying film. GLEN O. GABBARD See also: Cinema and psychoanalysis; Mannoni, DominiqueOctave; Psyché, revue internationale de psychanalyse et des sciences de l’homme (Psyche, an international review of psychoanalysis and human sciences). Bibliography Gabbard, Krin, and Gabbard, Glen O. (1987), Psychiatry and the cinema. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Metz, Christian. (1982). The imaginary signifier. Psychoanalysis and the cinema. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Mulvey, Laura. (1977). Visual pleasure and narrative cinema. In K. Kay, G. Peary (Eds.), Women and the cinema (pp. 412–428). New York: Dutton,. Ray, Robert B. (1985). A certain tendency of the hollywood cinema, 1930–1980. Princeton: Princeton University Press. CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS Between 1928 and 1930, Freud devoted himself exclusively to Civilization and its Discontents—apart from a handful of prefaces and his acceptance speech for the Goethe prize. Dated 1930, the book appeared in December 1929. It was an immediate success, selling twelve thousand copies the first year, with the first German reprint in 1931. The book has remained 29 6 successful over the years, generating a vast amount of commentary. There were translations into English (1930), Spanish (1936), French (1943), Italian (1971), and Portuguese (1974). Freud himself was less expansive about it: during the composition of the text, FreudÕs cancer was painful and required care, and Max Schur became his personal physician in the spring of 1929. The first version of Civilization and its Discontents was written quickly, in July 1929. Freud wrote to Lou Andreas-Salomé on July 28, 1929 : ‘‘Today I wrote the final sentence, the one that concludes the book. . . . ItÕs about culture, feelings of guilt, happiness and other elevated subjects and, it rightly seems to me, quite superfluous, unlike the earlier work, behind which there was always some internal drive. But what is there to do? One canÕt smoke and play cards all day long. . . . During the writing, I rediscovered the most banal truths’’ (1966a [1912–1936]). Freud began with Romain RollandÕs criticisms of The Future of an Illusion (1927c) concerning the ‘‘religious sensation’’ and the ‘‘simple and direct fact of the ÔeternalÕ sensation (which may indeed not be eternal, but simply without any perceptible limits, and oceanic)’’ (letter to Freud, December 27, 1927). He replied to Rolland on July 14, 1929, indicating that his remarks left him little rest. Chapter one opens with a mention of the great man (Rolland) and explains the ‘‘oceanic’’ feeling through the concept of narcissism. Freud then develops the extensive metaphor comparing the unconscious to the archaeologistÕs Rome, which, like the initial ego, supposedly contains everything. It makes evident the preservation of memory traces, as if the various stages of the city since its foundation could exist simultaneously (as in the stratified spaces and multidimensional time of mathematics). Freud concluded that the oceanic feeling may exist as a memory trace, but stated that he would not pursue the investigation of the Mothers, which he mentions without elaborating. Instead, he maintains the supremacy of the religion of the Father. Like Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c), Civilization and its Discontents begins by circling around psychical questions, and claiming that culture is born from the religion of the Father, characteristic of European monotheistic religions. For several chapters Freud provides a fairly commonplace description of our relation to culture. Citing a number of European writers, Freud describes the impossibility of achieving happiness, the ‘‘essence of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CIVILIZATION culture,’’ the ambivalent relationships we entertain with it, and the opposition between culture and sexuality. For someone familiar with FreudÕs work, there is little to learn. But, using a frequent tactic, he outlines a broader scope of understanding before advancing his more incisive hypotheses, which are sketched in terms of the economic, dynamic, and topographical points of view. It is as if Freud were asking why the forms and dynamics of groups that he constructed in Group Psychology were necessary, considering the inhibitions of sexual drives, the alienation that accompanies identification with large groups and the submission it entails. The response was economic: mankindÕs aggressive drives endanger culture. Freud then inserts the economic hypothesis into mental dynamics. Recalling the theory of drives, he suggests that the development of culture illustrates the struggle between Eros and death, the life instinct against the destructive instinct, as it unfolds within the human species. Once the dynamic relation has been established, there remains the problem of identifying mental formations, the correlative topography. The end of the book is devoted to a subtle study of the superego, the moral conscience, remorse, guilt, and the need for punishment. ‘‘I suspect that the reader has the impression that our discussions on the sense of guilt disrupt the framework of this essay . . . This may have spoilt the structure of my paper; but it corresponds faithfully to my intention to represent the sense of guilt as the most important problem in the development of civilization and to show that the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt’’ (p. 134). FreudÕs principal thesis is that the culture of patriarchal religion creates a particular way of working for the superego, which turns its aggression against the ego and expresses itself in the feeling of guilt. This process is unregulated. Once it is triggered, it worsens and becomes aggravated, exhausting not only the aggressive drives but the sexual drives as well. Moreover, ‘‘since civilization obeys an internal erotic impulsion which causes human beings to unite in a closely-knit group, it can only achieve this aim through an everincreasing reinforcement of the sense of guilt’’ (p. 133). Eros itself serves the death drives or aggressive instincts, which culture serves as well. This results in the death-driven and unregulated dynamic of the cultural process. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ITS DISCONTENTS Freud details the ontogenesis of the moral conscience and superego from the primitive social anxiety of the child—loss of the parentsÕ love—to the erection of an internal authority, which does not distinguish between acts and intentions and whose power is reinforced with every rejection of a drive and every real misfortune. He then claims that the origin of the feeling of guilt is the murder of the primal father, who alone is capable of provoking the conflict of ambivalence and generating the superego. In the last chapter Freud returns to the relations between the various terms discussed, while expanding the analogy between the origin of culture and individual development. He returns to the notion of the great man, who is likely to contribute to the development of the superego in a given cultural moment. Noting that psychic processes are sometimes more accessible in the group than the individual, Freud introduces the idea of analyzing the pathology in specific of cultural communities. Just as Group Psychology analyzed the ego, Civilization and its Discontents examines the superego, as distinct from the ego ideal. In both texts, aggression and reality are integrated in a dynamic which links individual and collective psychology. To do this Freud simplified, identifying the death drive with the urge to destruction, and culture with Eros (‘‘civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind’’ (p. 122). This is the text in which Freud best defends and illustrates the analogy, even the identity, between individual and cultural development—the family always serving as the medium of change. MICHÈLE PORTE Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1930a [1929]). Das Unbehagen in der Kultur. Leipzig-Vienna-Zurich, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag; GW, XIV, p. 419–506; Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57–145. Bibliography (1998). Autour du ‘‘Malaise dans la culture’’ de Freud. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Enriquez, Eugéne. (1983). De la horde à lÕetat. Paris: Gallimard. Freud, Sigmund, and Andreas-Salomé, Lou. (1966a [1912– 1936]). Sigmund Freud and Lou Andreas-Salomé: Letters. 297 CIVILIZATION (KULTUR) (William and Elaine Robson-Scott, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. Marcuse, Herbert. (1955). Eros and civilization. Boston: Beacon Press. Vermorel, Henri, and Vermorel, Madeleine. (1993). Sigmund Freud et Romain Rolland : correspondance 1923–1936. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. CIVILIZATION (KULTUR) In Civilization and Its Discontents, Sigmund Freud defines civilization as follows: ‘‘The word ÔcivilizationÕ [Kultur] describes the whole sum of the achievements and regulations which distinguish our lives from those of our animal ancestors and which serve two purposes—namely to protect men against nature and to adjust their mutual relations’’ (1930a, p. 89). In The Future of an Illusion Freud provided a more extended definition of civilization: ‘‘Human civilization, by which I mean all those respects in which human life has raised itself above its animal status and differs from the life of the beasts—and I scorn to distinguish between culture and civilization—presents, as we know, two aspects to the observer. It includes, on the one hand, all the knowledge and capacity that men have acquired in order to control the forces of nature and extract its wealth for the satisfaction of human needs and, on the other hand, all the regulations necessary in order to adjust the relations of men to one another and especially the distribution of the available wealth’’ (1927c, p. 5–6). These definitions, however, leave out many aspects of the concept of civilization that Freud had mentioned in other works, including ‘‘Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness’’ (1908d). These themes include the relationship of civilization to the superego and to sublimation, its consequences for neurosis, the origin of civilization, and the different attitudes of individuals toward civilization, especially as a function of their sex. FreudÕs conflation of civilization and culture here is surprising, especially when we consider that the distinction is clearly present when he discusses the force deployed by civilization (Kultur), on the one hand, and the ‘‘spiritual heritage of culture’’ used to ‘‘reconcile mankind’’ with that civilization, on the other, namely, the ‘‘spiritual heritage of culture’’ (1927c). Le Rider (1993) has pointed out that this opposition between culture and civilization had behind it a 29 8 philosophical tradition of which Freud was a part. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) saw civilization as a ceremonial aspect of culture, and saw culture as achieved by means of a sustained effort (Bildung) and as culminating in the great achievements of art and thought. In a more radical perspective, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844– 1900) saw civilization as subjugation and saw culture, in contrast, as the artistic and intellectual flowering of intact natures. The period between 1920 and 1939 saw the rise and spread of the idea of popular culture and the notion that culture is a means of fulfilling human life (Le Rider, 1993). It is also arguable that Freud rejected this tradition and deliberately ignored the distinction between culture and civilization because of his theory of the birth of civilization and its link with sexuality. His theory might be considered an example of the cunning of civilization, in the dialectical sense in which G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) speaks of the ‘‘cunning of Reason’’ (Mijolla-Mellor, 1992). The cunning lies in the fact that humanity creates civilization by transforming and sublimating individualsÕ instinctual aims and objects and sublimation simultaneously enables individuals to realize those aims and attain those objects in another form. Yet in doing this, humanity consolidates a cultural edifice that weighs upon individuals and imposes restrictions on them by dint of suppression. ‘‘There will be brought home to you with irresistible forces the many developments, repressions, sublimations, and reaction-formations by means of which a child with a quite other innate endowment grows into what we call a normal man, the bearer, and in part the victim, of the civilization that has been so painfully acquired’’ (Freud, 1910a, p. 36). Freud thus found himself once more in thrall to his concept of sublimation, whose shortcomings led him to confuse the coercion of institutionalized education with the process of individual learning (Bildung), a creative force and source of pleasure (intellectual pleasure) for the subject. The dialectic in which the sublimation of one group can become the source of suppression for another group that does not participate in the process of self-education without doubt constitutes a cunning of civilization, whereby a devitalized culture dons the mantle of civilizing norms. Civilization appears as an entity in and of itself, a given for the subject on whom it is imposed: ‘‘The development of civilization appears to us as a peculiar process which mankind undergoes, and in which INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CIVILIZATION (KULTUR) several things strike us as familiar. We may characterize this process with reference to the changes which it brings about in the familiar instinctual dispositions of human beings, to satisfy which is, after all, the economic task of our lives’’ (Freud, 1930a, p. 96). As Freud pointed out in ‘‘Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness’’ (1908d), civilization, by imposing sexual frustration, has a direct effect on the genesis of neuroses. Freud repeatedly claimed that sublimation should not be a norm, since it is possible only for some people: ‘‘Mastering it by sublimation, by deflecting the sexual instinctual forces away from their sexual aim to higher cultural aims, can be achieved by a minority and then only intermittently, and least easily during the period of ardent and vigorous youth’’ (1908d, p. 192). For the others, submission, especially to sexual morality, has negative consequences ranging from neurosis to a degradation of sexual objects (1908d). Of those who sublimate, some are heroes, like Prometheus, whom Freud analyzes in ‘‘The Acquisition and Control of Fire’’ (1932a), or Hercules, about whom he writes, ‘‘The prevention of erotic satisfaction calls up a piece of aggressiveness against the person who has interfered with the satisfaction, and that this aggressiveness has itself to be suppressed in turn. But if this is so, it is after all only the aggressiveness which is transformed into a sense of guilt, by being suppressed and made over to the superego’’ (1930a, p. 138). The process of civilizing is divided among ideals: coercion from the superego, cultural creation, and the resulting admiration from the ego ideal. ‘‘The satisfaction which the ideal offers to the participants in the culture is thus of a narcissistic nature; it rests on their pride in what has already been successfully achieved’’ (Freud, 1927c, p. 13). Here too the civilizing process reveals its unstable nature, for by reinforcing nationalism, the ‘‘narcissism of minor differences,’’ and the cultural ideals of a people, it can become a pretext for a return to the most savage form of struggle: war. Civilization appears as a separate entity, albeit one produced by humankind. It is necessary, though it is always excessive in its demands and premature in its anticipation: ‘‘It is an ineradicable and innate defect of our and every other civilization, that it imposes on children, who are driven by instinct and weak in intellect, decisions which only the mature intelligence of adults can vindicate’’ (Freud, 1927c, p. 51–52). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Alongside the writings in which Freud directly addresses the question of civilization, there are a number of anthropological texts in which, starting from the primitive horde and the murder of the father, he retraces the genesis of the matriarchy, the band of brothers, and the return to patriarchy. Yet these two perspectives are relatively dissociated in FreudÕs work to the extent that his ideas on civilization, with a few digressions to discuss ancient Rome or Louis XIV, the Sun King, in France, are for the most part related to the twentieth century. Abram Kardiner (1977) and Ruth Benedict (1935), writers on culture and psychoanalysis, would later make use of FreudÕs interest in anthropology. FreudÕs views on the genesis of matriarchy, however, are totally dissociated from his writings about women. Women, Freud wrote, ‘‘come into opposition to civilization and display their retarding and restraining influence’’ (1930a, p. 103). Here too the cunning of civilization is on display: Women form the basis of civilization, ‘‘represent[ing] the interests of the family and sexual life.’’ They are betrayed, however, by the fact that men sublimate to their detriment. ‘‘The woman,’’ Freud concludes, ‘‘finds herself forced into the background by the claims of civilization, and she adopts a hostile attitude toward it’’ (1930a, p. 104). SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia; Applied psychoanalysis and the interactions of psychoanalysis; Civilization and its Discontents; ‘‘Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest’’; Cultural transmission; Darwin, Darwinism, and psychoanalysis; Future of an Illusion, The; Incest; Law and psychoanalysis; Marxism and psychoanalysis; Moses and Monotheism; Organic repression; Phylogenetic Fantasy, A: Overview of the Transference Neuroses; Politics and psychoanalysis; Primitive horde; Religion and psychoanalysis; Rolland, Romain Edme PaulEmile; Smell, sense of; Sociology and psychoanalysis, sociopsychoanalysis; Sublimation; Superego; Transgression; ‘‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death.’’ Bibliography Benedict, Ruth. (1935). Patterns of culture. London: Routledge. Freud, Sigmund. (1908d). Civilized sexual morality and modern nervous illness. SE, 9: 181–204. ———. (1910a). Five lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 11: 7–55. 299 ‘‘ C L A I M S OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TO SCIENTIFIC INTEREST’’ ———. (1927c). The future of an illusion. SE, 21: 5–56. ———. (1930a). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 64–145. ———. (1932a). The acquisition and control of fire. SE, 22: 183–193. Kardiner, Abram. (1977). My analysis with Freud. Reminiscences. New York: W. W. Norton. Le Rider, Jacques. (1993). Kultur contre civilisation. Topique, 52, 273–287. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1992). Le plaisir de pensée. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ‘‘CLAIMS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TO SCIENTIFIC INTEREST’’ The Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest was first published in the Italian review Scientia. It was the first of FreudÕs texts to be translated into French, and this translation was by M.W. Horn. ScientiaÕs title page contained some information concerning the publication: it was a bimonthly based in Milan, its subtitle being International Review of Scientific Synthesis. It was co-edited in London and Leipzig, and in Paris by Félix Alcan. Among its contributors between 1912 and 1914 were Alfred Adler, Émile Durckheim, Albert Einstein, Henri Piéron, Henri Poincaré, and Bertrand Russell. ‘‘I have just had to do an unwanted job, a kind of introduction to psycho-analysis for Scientia; I did it, not wishing to refuse in view of the admirable character of that international journal,’’ Freud wrote to Oskar Pfister on March 11, 1913. It was in fact a ‘‘propaganda article,’’ in FreudÕs words to Karl Abraham on September 21, aimed at making a large public more familiar with the advantages and possibilities that psychoanalysis offered to contemporary culture. Presented in German in the review and simultaneously in French in an attached fascicule containing other translations from this resolutely eclectic collection, the first part, Its Interest for Psychology, was thus published in the supplement to volume XIV dated September 1, 1913. The second, Its Interest for the Non-Psychological Sciences, was published in the supplement to the next issue, dated November 1, 1913. For unknown reasons, although World War I no doubt had a large role to play, it remained totally unknown to French psychoanalysts until 1976. The first part is a summary, such as Freud was good at producing, of the psychoanalytic theory of 30 0 parapraxes, dreams and their interpretation, and of the hopes of curing psychopathological affections. But the second part is perhaps the most original because in it Freud develops the spirit of ‘‘conquest’’ (he used the expression in a letter to Jung in 1909) with regard to ‘‘other domains of knowledge,’’ a spirit that motivated him ever since the afflux of students put an end to his splendid isolation. The break with the Jungians further reinforced the necessity of familiarizing researchers with the ‘‘reveals unexpected relations’’ (p. 165) between their subjects and the pathology of mental life" (p. 165). First mentioned were the ‘‘language sciences,’’ a pre-eminence that may easily seem prophetic. Interpretation is the ‘‘translations from an alien method of expression into the one which is familiar to us’’ (p. 176) and the study of dream symbols evokes ‘‘the earliest phases of linguistic development and conceptual construction’’ (p. 176). ‘‘The language of dreams may be looked upon as the method by which unconscious mental activity expresses itself. But the unconscious speaks more than one dialect’’ (p. 177). ‘‘The philosophical interest of psycho-analysis’’ (p. 178) comes next, specifically asserting the existence of an Unconscious that is no longer a mystical hypothesis, and the new implications of this for ‘‘the relation of mind to body’’ (p. 178). But FreudÕs distrust of philosophers found expression in the paragraph where he extols the merits of a psychoanalytic pathography that ‘‘psychography’’ (p. 179) that ‘‘can indicate the subjective and individual motives behind philosophical theories which have ostensibly sprung from impartial logical work’’ (p. 179). It was in terms of its ‘‘biological’’ (p. 179) interest that psychoanalysis attracted the most criticism: the revelation of the importance of the sexual function shocked, mainly because of the light it shed on the forbidden territory of infantile sexuality. It was, however, desirable to establish a junction between the two sciences in order to have a better understanding of the instincts, a point of contact with biology’’ (p. 182) and to shed light on their ‘‘active’’ and ‘‘passive’’ properties in their relations with masculinity and femininity. ‘‘The interest of psycho-analysis from a developmental point of view’’ followed next, organized around the evolution from the psychic life of the child to that of the adult and the discovery that ‘‘in spite of all the later development that occurs in the adult, none INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS C L A P A R È D E , É D O U A R D (1873 –1 940) of the infantile formations perish. All the wishes, instinctual impulses, modes of reaction and attitudes of childhood are still demonstrably present in maturity and in appropriate circumstances emerge once more’’ (p. 184). Moreover, psychoanalysis confirmed the idea that ‘‘Ôontogeny is a repetition of phylogeny’’ (p. 184), which demonstrated its ‘‘interest . . . from the point of view of the history of civilization’’ (p. 184) in relation to deciphering myths, understanding primitive peoples, ancient civilizations and religions. The new hypothesis was that ‘‘the principle function of the mental mechanism is to relieve the individual from the tensions created in him by his needs. One part of this task can be achieved by extracting satisfaction from the external world; and for this purpose it is essential to have control over the real world’’ (p. 186). The study of the neuroses demonstrated the same dynamism and thus enriched anthropological research with its discoveries. ‘‘The interest of psycho-analysis from the point of view of the science of aesthetics’’ (p. 187) is next stressed, opening the door to this form of ‘‘applied psychoanalysis’’ that has been of such importance in the history of psychoanalysis. But Freud cautiously states that ‘‘the motive forces of artists are the same conflicts which drive other people into neurosis and have encouraged society to construct its institutions. Whence it is that the artist derives his creative capacity is not a question for psychology’’ (p. 187). Art ‘‘constitutes a region half-way between a reality which frustrates wishes and the wish-fulfilling world of the imagination—a region in which, as it were, primitive manÕs strivings for omnipotence are still in full force’’ (p. 188). The erotism underlying social relations and the repression required by the cohabitation of human beings are essential psychoanalytic contributions to ‘‘sociology.’’ Hence, also, ‘‘the educational interest’’ (p. 189) of a science that becomes more familiar with the real psychic life of the child and its evolution. ‘‘We grown-up people cannot understand children because we no longer understand our own childhood’’ (p. 189). Teachers learned from the discoveries concerning the ‘‘Oedipus complex, self-love (or ÔnarcissismÕ), the disposition to perversions, anal erotism, [and] sexual curiosity’’ (p. 189). Psychoanalysis ‘‘can also show what precious contributions to the formation of character are made by these asocial and perverse instincts in the child, if they are not subjected to repression but are diverted from their original aims INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS to more valuable ones by the process known as Ôsublimation.Õ Our highest virtues have grown up, as reaction formations and sublimations, out of our worst dispositions’’ (p. 190). ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Anthropology and psychoanalysis; Applied psychoanalysis and the interactions of psychoanalysis; Ego; France; Imago. Zeitschrift für die Anwendung der Psychoanalyse auf die Geisteswissenschaften. ‘‘On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement’’; Psychoanalytic epistemology; Sociology and psychoanalysis, sociology. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1913j). Das Interesse an der Psychoanalyse. Scientia, XIV, p. 240–250, 369–384; GW, VIII: 389– 420; The claims of psycho-analysis to scientific interest. SE, 13: 163–190. CLAPARÈDE, ÉDOUARD (1873–1940) Édouard Claparède, a Swiss physician and psychologist, was born March 24, 1873, in Geneva, where he died September 30, 1940. He was born into a Protestant family that left Languedoc after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes; his father was a pastor. His precocious interest in natural science, the legacy of his childhood admiration for the paternal uncle whose name he bore, would have repercussions on his future career. Claparède did not feel any religious calling and envisaged a future in the sciences. The individual who had the greatest influence on him was his uncle Théodore Flournoy, nineteen years his senior. It was because of him that Claparède developed an interest in psychology. This interest led him to study medicine, which seemed to him ‘‘the best introduction to the study of mankind.’’ He completed his medical studies in Geneva in 1897 after a brief period of study in Leipzig. In 1899 he became a collaborator with Flournoy, who turned over to him the job of running the psychology laboratory in 1904. Together with his uncle, Claparède founded the Archives de psychologie in 1901, where the first French reviews of FreudÕs work appeared, together with that of other psychoanalysts. In 1903 they published Théodore FlournoyÕs review of The Interpretation of Dreams. There were several articles on FreudÕs work, 301 CLARK UNIVERSITY including Über Psychotherpie (‘‘On Psychotherapy’’; 1905) and another on Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens (The Psychopathology of Everyday Life; 1905). It was not long before discussions were underway to make the Archives de psychologie a French-language ‘‘psychoanalytic journal.’’ This effort, undertaken by Carl Gustav Jung, was unsuccessful. But the review did publish work by Jung, Alphons Maeder, Charles Baudouin, Charles Odier, Henri Flournoy, and Raymond de Saussure. Every year critical essays on psychoanalytic works appeared, but the psychoanalysis section disappeared from the review in 1930. In 1912 Claparède founded the Institut JeanJacques Rousseau, where the psychoanalysts Ernst Schneider (1916–1919) and Charles Baudouin began teaching in 1915. When Sabina Spielrein came to Geneva in 1920, she became his assistant. Oskar Pfister dreamed that the institute would become a place where ‘‘teaching psychoanalysts’’ would be trained. But his project never materialized. Aside from his essays in Archives de psychologie, Claparède published ‘‘Quelques mots sur la définition de lÕhystérie’’ (1907), ‘‘De la représentation des personnes inconnues et des lapsus linguae’’ (1914), ‘‘Freud et la psychanalyse’’ (1920), ‘‘Quelques remarques sur le subconscient’’ (1923), ‘‘Freud va avoir quatre-vingt ans’’ (1936). Claparède was not, strictly speaking, a psychoanalyst but he favored the diffusion of psychoanalysis in French-speaking Switzerland and, therefore, in France, and he defended psychoanalysis against its detractors. As Freud wrote to him on May 24, 1908, concerning psychoanalysis: Claparède is ‘‘in some sense a measure of the international growth to which we aspire.’’ MIREILLE CIFALI See also: Archives de psychologie, Les; Institut Claparède; Société psychanalytique de Genève; Subconscious; Switzerland (French-speaking). Bibliography Claparède was responsible for the first French translation of FreudÕs Über Psychoanalyse, Fünf Vorlesungen gehalten zur 20 jährigen Gründungsfeier der Clark University (Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis). The translation was published in the December 1920 and January and February 1921 issues of the Revue de Genève, with the title ‘‘Origine et développement de la psychanalyse.’’ The translator was Yves Le Lay. Claparède added an introduction entitled ‘‘Freud et la psychanalyse.’’ Claparède took part in the Salzburg (1908) and Nuremberg (1910) Congresses. He founded the Cercle Psychanalytique de Genève (Geneva Psychoanalytic Circle) in 1919, of which he became president, but he did not belong to the Société Suisse de Psychanalyse (Swiss Society for Psychoanalysis), created on February 10, 1919. On September 19, 1919, he was invited to join. His correspondence with Freud was published by Carlo Trombetta (1970). He also corresponded with Oskar Pfister. It can be assumed that Claparède underwent a certain amount of psychoanalysis with Pfister between 1915 and 1918. Was he analyzed by Sabina Spielrein during the twenties? We have no confirmation of this and if he did undergo analysis, it would only have been for a short period of time. Freud spoke of him as a dilettante. An eclectic individual, Claparède never wanted to become too deeply involved in psychoanalysis. 30 2 Cifali, Mireille. (1982). ‘‘Entre Genève et Paris: Vienne,’’ Bloc-notes de la psychanalyse, 2, 91–127. ———. (1991). Notes autour de la première traduction française dÕune œuvre de Sigmund Freud. Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse, 4, 291–305. Claparède, Edouard. (1920). Freud et la psychanalyse. Revue de Genève, 6, 850–851. Trombetta, Carlo. (1970). ‘‘Claparède e Freud. Con publicazione di inediti,’’ Orientamenti pedagogici, 17, 6. ———. (1989). Édouard Claparède psicologo. Rome: Armando. Clark University CLARK UNIVERSITY Sigmund Freud’s only visit to the United States was in 1909, when he was invited by G. Stanley Hall, first president of Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, to deliver a series of lectures to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the university. Hall invited twenty-seven other distinguished participants, all of whom received honorary degrees, including the Nobel Laureates in physics Albert Michelson and Ernest Rutherford. But clearly Freud was the most important participant, in HallÕs view; part of the celebration was delayed from July to September, the date Freud requested, so as not to interfere with his private practice. Hall also invited Carl Gustav INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS C L A R K - W I L L I A M S , M A R G A R E T (1910 –1 975) Jung to participate, and Freud asked Sándor Ferenczi to accompany him. The three psychoanalysts thus sojourned from Bremen to New York on the George Washington. They spent a week in New York, welcomed by Abraham Brill, seeing their first movie, visiting Central Park, Chinatown, the Lower East Side, Coney Island, the American Museum of Natural History, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art (Freud especially enjoyed the antiquities). At the Psychiatric Clinic at Columbia University, near Riverside Drive overlooking the Hudson River, Freud experienced an embarrassing incident of urinary incontinence. Worried that he might experience another while on stage at Clark, Jung offered to help by analyzing the incident. Freud produced a dream, but the associations to it apparently became too intimate; when Jung pressed, Freud demurred, saying he could not risk his authority by such disclosures. According to JungÕs account, this began the break between the two of them. See also: Brill, Abraham Arden; Five Lectures on PsychoAnalysis; Jones, Ernest; Putnam, James Jackson; United States. Freud was ecstatic by the invitation and by the prospect of lecturing to a distinguished American audience. After years of working in ‘‘splendid isolation’’ he found himself ‘‘received by the foremost men as an equal. As I stepped on to the platform at Worcester to deliver my Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis it seemed like the realization of some incredible day-dream: psycho-analysis was no longer a product of a delusion, it had become a valuable part of reality. It has not lost ground in America since our visit . . .’’ (Freud, 1925d, p.52). In the audience were William James (he and Freud walked together and James suffered what was probably an angina attack from the heart disease that was to kill him shortly thereafter), Emma Goldman, and many other notables. CLARK-WILLIAMS, MARGARET (1910–1975) To be spontaneous, Freud delivered the five lectures without notes or extensive preparation; he simply talked with Ferenczi shortly before each lecture about the dayÕs topic. Later, Freud changed the text somewhat before publication by ClarkÕs house organ. Intending a general introduction, Freud discussed hysteria, repression and the talking cure, functions and interpretation of dreams, childhood sexuality, and symptoms. One of the great intellectual events of the century, the trip greatly stimulated the growth of psychoanalysis in the United States: the American Psychoanalytic Association was founded in Baltimore just two years later, years earlier than may have been the case otherwise. ROBERT SHILKRET INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Cooper, Martha, & Makay, John J. (1988). Knowledge, power, and FreudÕs Clark Conference lectures. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 74, 416–433. Freud, Sigmund. (1910 [1909]). Five lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 11: 1–56. ———. (1925). An autobiographical study. SE, 20: 1–74. Hale, Nathan G., Jr. (1971). Freud and the Americans: The beginnings of psychoanalysis in the United States, 1876– 1917. New York: Oxford University Press. Rosenzweig, Saul. (1992). Freud, Jung, and Hall the KingMaker: The historic expedition to America (1909). Seattle, WA: Hogrefe & Huber. A psychologist and psychoanalyst who practiced in France, Margaret Clark-Williams was born in the United States in 1910 to a family of prominent academics; she died in 1975. At 21 she went first to France, then to Vienna, where she made her initial contacts in psychoanalytic circles. After a period in the United States with her two children, she returned to France in 1945 and began psychoanalysis with Raymond de Saussure, clinical training with Georges Heuyer, and university studies with Daniel Lagache; she also practiced analysis under the supervision of John Leuba. She subsequently worked as a psychotherapist at the recently opened Centre Claude Bernard. Nothing had prepared ClarkWilliams, a reserved woman of charm and humor, to become the center of a sensational media affair widely reported in the French press. Major articles on the Clark-Williams Trial, as it became known, appeared in Le Figaro, Paris Presse, Combat, Le Monde, and Libération. In March 1950 the official Order of Physicians brought legal action against Clark-Williams for illicit practice of medicine ‘‘due to the fact that she practices psychoanalysis and, therefore, medicine.’’ By French law (lÕOrdonnance du 24 septembre 1945), physicians alone had the right to diagnose and treat illness. However, at the Sorbonne in 1947 Daniel Lagache had 303 C L A U D E , H E N R I C H A R L E S J U L E S (1869 –1946) created a licence (i.e., masterÕs degree) in psychology, and in 1950 the first graduates sought to put their education to practical use in a therapeutic context. Meanwhile, a Gaullist cabinet member and nonmedical psychoanalyst, Georges Mauco, through the intermediary of the Committees of Population and the Family, had created the Centre Claude Bernard, the first psychopedagogical institution in France, in 1945. The Center boasted two distinctive features. It took account of the fact that the role of emotions had theretofore been neglected in favor of cognitive issues, and it brought the psychoanalyst into the consulting room for the initial interviews. In France this represented the first extension of psychoanalysis into social institutions. Clark-WilliamsÕs trial, which began on December 4, 1951, turned quickly to her advantage. Medically trained analysts attested to her competence and, although she was not a physician, they described her as perfectly qualified to practice psychoanalysis. Dr. Leuba went so far as to request that he sit with the defendant since the accused was one of his former students. Arguments quickly centered on the relationship of medicine and psychoanalysis. Clark-WilliamsÕs supporters had no difficulty explaining that, inasmuch as medicine did not officially recognize psychoanalysis, it was in no position to accuse psychoanalysts of practicing medicine illegally. Analysts Georges Parcheminey and André Berge testified that psychoanalysis did not involve treating an illness but resembled an effort to help a person with ‘‘abnormal behavior’’ to adjust. Daniel Lagache and Juliette Favez-Boutonier suggested that ‘‘psychoanalysis is not a medicine but a psychological technique.’’ Jacques Lacan, who did not take part in the trial but became involved at meetings where the issue was debated, offered his view that ‘‘it is difficult for doctors to do without the best psychologists.’’ When the court rendered judgment on March 31, 1952, it ruled to dismiss charges against the defendant. The Order of Physicians appealed and on July 15, 1953, a second verdict found Clark-Williams guilty and imposed the purely symbolic fine of one franc. Contrary to the plaintiffsÕ intentions, the trial served to advance the cause of psychologists and lay psychoanalysis in France. GEORGES SCHOPP 30 4 See also: Berge, André; Bonaparte, Marie Léon; FavezBoutonier, Juliette; France; Lay analysis; Mauco, Georges; Société psychanalytique de Paris et Institut de psychanalyse de Paris. Bibliography Berge, André. (1975). Nécrologie de Margaret Clark Williams. Revue française de psychanalyse, 39 (4), 669–670. Freud, Sigmund. (1926). The question of lay analysis. SE, 20: 183–250. Schopp, Georges. (1990). ‘‘LÕaffaire Clark-Williams ou la question de lÕanalyse laı̈que en France.’’ Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse, 3, 199–239. CLAUDE, HENRI CHARLES JULES (1869–1946) Henri Claude was born in Paris in 1869, where he died in 1946. He was a French physician, psychiatrist, and professor of the chair of mental illness and brain disease at Saint-AnneÕs Hospital. He played a leading role in introducing psychoanalysis in France. An assistant to Professor Fulgence Raymond at the Salpêtrière Hospital, he developed an interest in neuropsychiatry. Although committed to the physiological origin of mental disease, he developed an early interest in psychoanalysis. Although we may laugh, like Sigmund Freud, at his ambivalence, nonetheless he was one of the first to accept Freudian theories and to encourage the practice of psychoanalytic psychotherapy in the hospitals where he worked. He was, for example, receptive to the work of Adolf Schmiergeld and was present at the session of the Société de Neurologie on July 4, 1907, when Schmiergeld, together with P. Provotelle, presented ‘‘La méthode psychoanalytique et les ÔAbwehr-NeuropsychosenÕ de Freud,’’ one of the first serious studies on psychoanalysis in France. In February 1913 he authored a report on the fourth edition of Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens (The psychopathology of everyday life), which concludes: ‘‘In short, this book, whose conception is so uncommon in the French literature (however, in this context, the work of Maeder, 1906, should be mentioned) and which is written in an accessible language, should be better known to psychologists and physicians.’’ When he was appointed the chair at Sainte-Anne in 1922, he apparently removed from his department Eugénie Sokolnicka, the woman Georges Heuyer had INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS C L A U D E , H E N R I C H A R L E S J U L E S (1 869–1 946) put in charge of psychoanalysis during his tenure, to replace her with René Laforgue. Claude commented, ‘‘I ask that this psychoanalytic practice, which is so shocking in some respects, remain strictly within the scope of medicine, and I exclude from these investigations anyone who is not impregnated with the notion of responsibility felt by any physician worthy of the name. . . . The danger is carrying out the risky Freudian transference’’ (1924). From August 2 to 7, 1926, Claude attended the Congrès des Médecins Aliénistes et Neurologistes de France et des Pays de Langue Française, which was held in Geneva. During the congress, at which he presented a report on what was then the focus of his psychiatric work, ‘‘Démence précoce et schizophrénie,’’ his young students René Laforgue, Gilbert Robin, and Adrien Borel, accompanied by Mrs. Laforgue, Raymond and Ariane de Saussure, Angélo Hesnard, and Édouard Pichon created the first Conférence des Psychanalystes de Langue Française (Conference of French-speaking psychoanalysts) on August 1, 1926. After 1931 it was in the lecture hall of the Clinique des Maladies Mentales that these conferences took place. The department of which he was in charge welcomed psychoanalysis, whose therapeutic merits he extolled by publishing, with Laforgue, highly optimistic statistics on rates of recovery. Pierre Mâle became his medical extern in 1920. In 1927 Michel Cénac, one of the doctors who ran the clinic, along with Paul Schiff, Charles-Henri Nodet, Adrien Borel, and many others sought training with Claude. Later, Jean Delay, who was his student in 1939, continued to use psychoanalysis in his own department beginning in 1942. It was Claude who created the first laboratory of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis at the school of medicine at the University of Paris. In December 1931 he appointed Sacha Nacht to be head of the lab. In 1926 Laforgue wrote to Freud, ‘‘I have enclosed the schedule of courses at ClaudeÕs clinic. This will give you an idea of the importance of psychoanalysis in these courses. Starting next year the courses will be given in the main building of the school of medicine.’’ This was the only source of psychoanalytic training in France prior to the creation of the Institut de Psychanalyse in 1934. Departments of psychology offered no training in psychoanalysis since Georges Dumas, who had worked with Claude, was violently opposed to it. As director of the review LÕEncéphale, Claude was a busy editor, publishing a number of articles and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS prefaces, including the preface to Roland DalbiezÕs dissertation ‘‘La Méthode psychanalytique et la Doctrine de Freud,’’ in 1936. But it was a preface he wrote in 1924 that later cast an unfavorable light on his character. Here he wrote ‘‘By agreeing to present to the medical public the book by Messrs. Laforgue and Allendy on Psychanalyses et les névroses, I have not hidden from the authors that it was not my intent to support their opinions . . . Certain investigative procedures which shock the delicacy of intimate sentiments and of certain habitual ways of looking at things, by means of an extremist symbolism, applicable perhaps with subjects of another race, do not strike me as appropriate in a Ôclinique latine.Õ’’ Freud responded to the authors, on June 29, 1924: ‘‘I have received your book. Naturally, I havenÕt yet read it but after ClaudeÕs preface I see that it must be good, for his reservations prove to me that you have not compromised in any way and were not afraid of being contradicted.’’ More serious than these reservations, the presumed eviction of Eugénie Sokolnicka, the threat of his ‘‘patronage’’ to the detriment of FreudÕs during the creation of the Revue française de psychanalyse in 1927, and his attitude throughout the Occupation, when in 1941 he participated in René LaforgueÕs aborted project to create a French section of the Société de Psychothérapie Nazie (Nazi society for psychotherapy), directed by Professor Matthias Göring, diminished any positive elements of his support at a time when just about all French physicians were opposed to psychoanalysis. Yet, André Breton may have said it best when he wrote: ‘‘The essential thing is that I do not suppose there can be much difference for Nadja between the inside of a sanitarium and the outside. There must, unfortunately, be a difference all the same, on account of the grating sound of a key turning in a lock, or the wretched view of the garden, the cheek of the people who question you when you want to be left alone, like Professor Claude at Sainte-Anne, with his dunceÕs forehead and that stubborn expression on his face (ÔYouÕre being persecuted, arenÕt you?Õ No, monsieur. ÔHeÕs lying, last week he told me he was being persecuted.Õ Or ÔYou hear voices, do you? Well, are they voices like mine?Õ No, Monsieur. ÔYou see, he has auditory hallucinations.Õ).’’ ALAIN DE MIJOLLA 305 CLAUSTROPHOBIA See also: Congrès des psychanalystes de langue française des pays romans; Delay, Jean; Disque vert, Le; Ey, Henri; Psychanalyse et les nevroses, La; Revue française de psychanalyse; Sainte-Anne Hospital. Bibliography Claude, Henri. (1913). Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens, par Sigm. Freud, de Vienne (De la psychopathologie de la vie de tous les jours). (4th ed.). Berlin: Lib. S. Karger. ———. (1924, May). Freud et la méthode psychanalytique. Les nouvelles littéraires. Freud, Sigmund. (1977h). Correspondance Freud-Laforgue, préface d’André Bourguignon. Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse, 15, p. 235–314. Laforgue, René; and Allendy, René. (1924). La psychanalyse et les névroses. Paris: Payot. CLAUSTROPHOBIA Benjamin Ball introduced the term ‘‘claustrophobia’’ into the field of psychiatric semiology in 1879. It is derived from the Latin claustrum (enclosed place) and the Greek phobos (fear). Claustrophobia is defined as the fear of enclosed spaces. Faced with the impossibility of escape, the person suffering from claustrophobia fears being suffocated, being crushed, losing consciousness, or losing control of his actions or sphincter muscles. Avoidance techniques are then developed together with counterphobic behavior (being accompanied by another person, carrying a key) or behavioral modifications (opening doors and windows, positioning oneself near an exit). The word is part of psychiatric semiology. Albert Pitres and Emmanuel Régis (1902) classify claustrophobia as a phobia of place, and Pierre Janet as one of the systematic anxieties constituting psychasthenia. Recent British and American clinical practice includes claustrophobia among the simple phobias, often associated with agoraphobia, which predominantly affect women and are rare in children (Freud, A., 1977). For Sigmund Freud claustrophobia is one of the phobias of locomotion, similar to agoraphobia. Its metapsychological status evolved along with the development of his theories of anxiety and the construction of phobias. Freud first considered it as one of the chronic symptoms of neurasthenia (Manuscript B, 1893, in 1950a). Later he distinguished it, along with the other phobias, from the obsessions (‘‘Obsessions 30 6 and Phobias,’’ 1895c), ultimately associating it with anxiety hysteria (1905d). In his early writings, he interpreted claustrophobia as the result of an excess of unused libido. He related it to castration anxiety, produced by the repression of oedipal desire. Here, the emergence of free anxiety was displaced and projected onto the phobic object, in this case an enclosed space. Melanie Klein (1932/1975) believed it involved a projective identification with the dangerous body of the mother, with the anxiety of being enclosed there and castrated by the fatherÕs penis. Bertram D. Lewin (1935) proposed a similar definition of claustrophobia, in which he refers to an unconscious fantasy of return to the maternal breast, accompanied by oral fantasies of being devoured. For Otto Fenichel (1953) the enclosed space that is feared represents the patientÕs body and the sensations the patient is trying to get rid of through projection of excess excitation onto the claustrum. The phobogenic situation mobilizes infantile anxieties, the fear of solitude, and the temptation to masturbate. François Perrier (1956/ 1994) saw claustrophobia as being organized like speech, where, symbolically, a key held in the hand enables one to avoid the anxiety, thus escaping the enclosed world of the mother and making access to the father possible. Some authors explored other aspects of claustrophobia, analyzing its associations with depression (Gehl, R. H., 1965) or agoraphobia (Weiss, E. 1964). LAURENT MULDWORF See also: Phobic neurosis; Phobias in children. Bibliography Birraux, Annie. (1994). Éloge de la phobie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Compton, Allan. (1997). La théorie psychanalytique des phobies. In Peurs et Phobies (p. 33–65). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Gehl, Raymond H. (1965). Dépression et claustrophobie. Revue française de psychanalyse, 29 (2–3), 233–255. Fenichel, Otto. (1953). Respiratory introjection. In The collected papers, first series. New York: W.W. Norton. Freud, Anna. (1977). Fears, anxieties, and phobic phenomena. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 32, 85–90. Freud, Sigmund. (1895c [1894]). Obsessions and phobias: their psychical mechanism and their aetiology. SE, 3: 69–82. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS COCAINE ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1950a [1887-1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173–280. Klein, Melanie. (1975). The psycho-analysis of children. In The Writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. 2). London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1932) Lewin, Bertrand D. (1935). Claustrophobia. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 4, 227–233. Perrier François. (1994). Phobies et hystérie d’angoisse. In Jacques Sédat (Ed.), La Chaussée d’Antin (New rev. ed., p. 300–325). Paris, Albin Michel. (Original work published 1956) Pitres Albert, and Régis, Emmanuel. (1902). Les obsessions et les impulsions. Paris: O. Doin. Weiss, Edoardo. (1964). Agoraphobia in the light of ego psychology. New York, Grune & Stratton. AND PSYCHOANALYSIS opment to form the clinging theory. He conducted wide-ranging investigations, starting with primate biology, through clinical facts supported by neurological data, and through developmental psychological data he examined the relationship of the phenomenology of the clinging syndrome to love, anxiety, shame, and, through ego development, to thinking. He also studied ethnology, culture history, and social psychology. Later ethological researchers (e.g., Harlow and Lawick-Goodall) demonstrated the verisimilitude of HermannÕs theories, while John BowlbyÕs and René SpitzÕs concepts demonstrated them biosocially. Michel Balint integrated the theory into his concept of primary love. HUNGARIAN GROUP See also: Hermann, Imre; Hungary; Hungarian School; Ethology and psychoanalysis. Further Reading Bibliography Asch, Stuart S. (1966). Claustrophobia and depression. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 14, 711–729. Binet, Agnes. (1977). Comportement dÕattachement ou instinct de cramponnement? Psychiatrie de l’enfant, 20, 533–564. Willoughby, Roger. (2001). ’The dungeon of thyself ’: the claustrum as pathological container. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 82, 917–932. ———. (1976). Clinging-searching:contrasting instincts, rel. sadism, masochism,’’ Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 45:5–36. CLINGING INSTINCT ———. (1978). Psychanalyse et logique. Paris: Denoël. Imre Hermann presupposes an instinct manifest in primates and latent in human babies, namely, the drive to cling to the mother, which is frustrated from the outset by the absence of biological endowments, but is present in the form of reflexes (grasping, Moro, heat-orientation) in the early stages of development and in later pathological symptoms (e.g., hair-pulling, nail-biting). Based on the psychoanalytical examination of comparative psychology, Hermann first expounded the theory of the clinging instinct in the study, ‘‘Sich Anklammern und Auf-SucheGehen,’’ in 1936. He described the operation of phylogenic heritage in the mother-child dual union, its integration into the libidinal organization, the relationship of frustrated instinct drives to castration complex, to passively endured separational trauma and active separational drive, to sadism and masochism, to destruction instinct and narcissism. In his book, The Primeval Instincts of Man (1943), he expanded the biosocial model theory of human develINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY Hermann, Imre . (1943). Az ember ösi össztönei. Budapest: Magvetö. OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Nemes, L. (1980). Biographical notes of Professor Imre Hermann, International Review of Psychoanalysis, 7, 1–2. COCAINE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Cocaine is an alkaloid extracted from coca leaves, which has been used in medicine for its analgesic and anesthetic properties. Cocaine dependency is an addiction to this narcotic. The relation between cocaine and psychoanalysis goes back to Freud’s research in which he used the substance as an ophthalmic anesthetic. Cocaine was first used as an anesthetic agent in Vienna in 1884. Freud conducted research into the physiological action of the drug with a view to using it for therapeutic purposes. It was nevertheless his colleague, Carl Köller, who continued this work and to whom we attribute the discovery of the anesthetic properties of cocaine, based on its use in eye surgery. 307 COGNITIVISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Years later Freud described the situation in these terms: ‘‘A side interest, though it was a deep one, had led me in 1884 to obtain from Merck some of what was then the little-known alkaloid cocaine and to study its physiological action. . . . I suggested, however, to my friend Köningstein, the ophthalmologist, that he should investigate the question of how far the anaesthetizing properties of cocaine were applicable in diseases of the eye’’ (1925d, pp. 14–15). Ernest Jones (1953) reports that in 1884 Freud administered injections of cocaine to his friend Ernst von Fleischl in order to wean him off his morphine addiction and to ease his terrible trigeminal neuralgia. One year later he observed that the massive doses of cocaine required by Fleischl had led to chronic intoxication. He thus discovered the toxicity of cocaine, which stood in the way of its being used medically. Coca leaves and cocaine had been used in the Americas as stimulants to fight fatigue and hunger, but their use led to neurochemical and physiological effects as well as severe addiction problems. Psychoanalysis has studied the underlying dynamics and the unconscious fantasies that drive patients to seek out the chemical and physiological effects of cocaine in a compulsive manner. Cocaine addiction is normally difficult to cure. Classification of the pathological structures underlying cocaine addiction seems to suggest that a process of pathological mourning or manicdepressive behavior can be found in many patients. Patients sometimes seek out this toxic substance as a stimulant or an anti-depressant in order to conceal states of depression. Some drug addicts unable to work through their grief develop pathological mourning wherein they identify with the lost dead object(s), thus unconsciously putting their lives in grave danger. Their repeated risk taking allows them to feel as if they are conquering death and are being resuscitated. This fantasied resurrection represents success to these addicts, in whose mental state the psychological notions of danger, death, and suicide do not exist. The psychoanalytic interpretation therefore must direct itself to the uncovering and interpreting of their resurrection fantasies and thus lead them to give up living within a dead object or give up identifying with a dead person. DAVID ROSENFELD See also: Addiction; Alienation; Anorexia nervosa; Borderline conditions; Dependence; Fantasy (reverie); Indications and counterindications for psychoanalysis; Transitional object. 30 8 Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1925d). An autobiographical study. SE, 20: 1–74. Jones, Ernest. (1953). Sigmund Freud. Life and work. London: Hogarth. Rosenfeld, David. (1992). The psychotic aspects of the personality. London-New York: Karnac Books. COGNITIVISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Ever since the 1960s, an important body of thought has developed in reaction to the presumed behaviorism according to which intellectual activity is beyond the grasp of any form of scientific investigation. Cognitivism has marked a return to a scientific approach to mental activity that has materialized in the development of the cognitive sciences. The term refers to those sciences that study systems for representing understanding and the processing of information. Included in the term are certain areas of speculative research (philosophy of mind), artificial intelligence, semantic, syntactic, and lexical models (linguistics), the study of human activities (psychology), and the neuronal basis of those activities (neuroscience). These disciplines do not fall entirely within the field of cognitive science (social psychology or the neurobiology of development, for example). Cognitivism originally developed as an interdisciplinary activity. The work of Jean Piaget on genetic epistemology and the work of Edward Toman on cognitive mapping opened the way in psychology long before Miller, Galanter, and PribramÕs seminal work, Plans and the Structure of Behavior (1960). The term ‘‘artificial intelligence’’ was coined during a seminar by Herbert Simon. The application of the methods of cognitive science to the field of psychopathology is more recent (M. C. Hardy-Baylé, 1996) and is based on work in the philosophy of mind and a renewed interest in phenomenology as well as on expert systems in artificial intelligence (models of paranoid thought, Parry), and especially experimental research (anomalies in the processing of information during schizophrenic states or a slowing down of the decision-making process during depressive states). The development of cognitivism did not fail to arouse suspicion and opposition on the part of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS COLLECTED PAPERS psychoanalysts. Some of their reservations were based on a confusion with so-called cognitive therapies, which in reality have to do with the content of representations (judgment errors) and not the underlying mechanisms. They are based on the use of suggestion, which falls within the domain of behavioral therapy, which in turn draws on behaviorism. More serious reservations involve the fact that cognitivism, which is primarily concerned with understanding, has often neglected the role of affects and has not sufficiently taken into consideration the question of motivation or the role of the body. For their part cognitive science specialists have contested the scientific value of psychoanalytic theories and, until recently, have had little interest in the area of pathology. In fact it is easy to show that Sigmund FreudÕs early work clearly makes use of a cognitive approach (H. K. Pribram, M. Gill, 1968 ), as does chapter seven of the Interpretation of Dreams and a number of later texts. Gradually the emphasis on a dynamic and economic approach shifted the investigation to why rather than how. David Rapaport and, later, Georges Klein resumed the study of thought mechanisms to compare them with experimental results. Their premature deaths and the still strong influence of behaviorism on the psychology of the time explain the delay before psychoanalysts actually got around to confronting these issues directly (P. Holzman, G. Aronson, 1992, D. Widlöcher, 1993). This confrontation appears to have shocked psychoanalysts, to the extent that they were accustomed to question these disciplines in isolation (psychology, linguistics, logic modeling) and not within an interdisciplinary framework. If psychoanalysis is to assume its place within this framework, the terms of its inclusion must be specified. It would be necessary to acknowledge that psychoanalysis is a unique form of communication and not a science. The knowledge gained from it concerns complex objects that other approaches must first break down into more simple objects. Such an exchange can benefit the cognitive sciences by exposing them to an area of mental life that has not been explored by them. Psychoanalysis can benefit by escaping the intellectual isolation of their field. It is less obvious how psychoanalytic treatment, as the investigation of the unconscious, can benefit from a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ON SCHIZOPHRENIA AND RELATED SUBJECTS more analytic knowledge of the complex objects it engages. DANIEL WIDLÖCHER See also: Amnesia; Archetype (analytical psychology); Body; Non-verbal communication; Psychic causality; Psychogenesis/organogenesis. Bibliography Hardy-Baylé, Marie-Christine. (1996). Troubles de l’information et troubles mentaux. In Daniel Widlöcher (Ed.). Traité de psychopathologie (pp. 463–496). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Holzman, Philip, and Aronson, Gerald, (1992). Psychoanalysis and its neighboring sciences: Paradigms and opportunities, Journal of the American Psychoanalytical Association, 40 (1), 63–88. Miller, George A., Galanter, E., and Karl H. Pribram. (1960). Plans and the structure of behavior, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Pribram, Karl H., Gill, Merton M. (1976). Freud’s ‘‘Project’’ reassessed. London: Hutchinson. Widlöcher, Daniel. (1993a). Intentionnalité et psychopathologie, Revue internationale de psychopathologie, 10, 193–224. ———. (1993b). LÕanalyse cognitive du silence en psychanalyse. Quand les mots viennent à manquer, Revue internationale de psychopathologie, 12, 509–528. COLLECTED PAPERS ON SCHIZOPHRENIA AND RELATED SUBJECTS By the time this book was published, Harold F. Searles, M.D., was 47 years old and was already widely regarded as the worldÕs leading authority on the intensive psychotherapy of patients with chronic schizophrenia. His writings on schizophrenia reveal his unparalleled skill in making contact with severely ill patients, and learning from them not only about schizophrenia, but about the human condition in general. (‘‘Research in schizophrenia has its greatest potential value in the fact that the schizophrenic shows us in a sharply etched form that which is so obscured, by years of progressive adaptation to adult interpersonal living, in human beings in general.’’) He consistently avoids the temptation to view the patient as the sole repository of psychopathology within the patient-analyst dyad. Thus, he continually focuses not only on the patientÕs 309 COLLECTED PAPERS ON SCHIZOPHRENIA AND RELATED SUBJECTS transference to the analyst, but equally on the analystÕs countertransference to the patient. His many original contributions to the topic of countertransference are among his most significant and widely recognized accomplishments—for example, in discussing dependency conflicts over his regressive dependency needs and omnipotent fantasies, and the role of these countertransference feelings in both motivating the analyst to treat schizophrenic patients, and also in interfering in the psychotherapeutic work. SearlesÕs papers are unusual for the candor with which he presents his own thoughts and feelings to the reader. For example, in exploring the role of defenses against grief and separation anxiety in the patientÕs manifest vindictiveness, he writes of a woman who fled her therapy with him to avoid facing her grief over an early loss. Searles adds, ‘‘My belief now is that I, too, contributed to the dissolution of the therapy, on the basis of my own anxiety about grief from my early life—an area which, at the time, I had not yet explored at all thoroughly in my analysis.’’ Another quality which pervades SearlesÕs contributions is his deep and abiding interest in unconscious processes, including those in patient and analyst. He thus remains more faithful to FreudÕs work than many analysts in the United States. Searles believes that conflicts over love rather than conflicts over hatred and rejection are more basic in the development of schizophrenia. He contends that the schizophrenic illness represents the patientÕs ‘‘loving sacrifice of his very individuality for the welfare of a mother who is loved genuinely, altruistically, and with . . . wholehearted adoration.’’ He further maintains that this genuine love, which is mutual, can be difficult to recognize because the patient and mother are unconsciously afraid of their love for each other. He traces this conflict back to the motherÕs own childhood experiences, which have led her to believe that her love is destructive. Searles emphasizes the role of symbiotic relatedness between analyst and schizophrenic patient. He believes the treatment of these patients is so prolonged partly because both patient and analyst fear and resist this symbiotic stage of the transference and countertransference. Because of the fluctuating role reversals in this phase of treatment, the analyst must be relatively accepting not only of omnipotent feelings that accompany being in the role of an infantÕs mother, but also accepting of the infantile dependency feelings that result 31 0 from being in the converse role of the infant. Anticipating Kohut, Searles wrote as early as 1958 of the analystÕs difficulty in tolerating the patientÕs adoration: ‘‘It requires a sounder sense of self-esteem to be exposed to the patientÕs genuine admiration, of this degree of intensity, than to face his contempt towards oneself. ‘‘Driving the other person crazy’’ includes reciprocal efforts to do so between parent and child, as well as between analyst and patient. Lack of integration in one person tends to have an emotionally disintegrating impact on the other person. Motives for driving another person crazy, which are largely unconscious, can include a wish to destroy that person psychologically; a wish to externalize oneÕs own craziness in the other person; a childÕs wish that the parentÕs covert craziness would become obvious enough that others would validate the childÕs perceptions and share the burden of caring for this parent; a wish to individuate or help the other person individuate, which may be experienced by both parent and child as a wish to drive the other person crazy; and finally, Searles especially emphasizes the wish to attain a deeply gratifying symbiotic mode of relatedness with the other person. He notes that an important unconscious motive in the analystÕs choice of profession may be the presence of reaction formations to unconscious wishes to drive other people crazy. He speculates that the irrational ‘‘schizophrenogenic mother’’ concept appeals to analysts who are striving to deny their own regressive urges toward symbiotic relatedness. SearlesÕs influence on psychoanalysis and psychotherapy worldwide has been immense. His genius at discerning and describing unconscious processes in patient and analyst has profoundly enriched our understanding of a wide range of psychopathology, and has made invaluable contributions to the understanding and use of countertransference. RICHARD M. WAUGAMAN See also: Counter-transference; Mutual analysis; Negative therapeutic reaction; Schizophrenia. Source Citation Searles, Harold F. (1965). Collected papers on schizophrenia and related subjects. New York: International University Press. Bibliography Langs, Robert, and Searles, Harold F. (1980). Intrapsychic and interpersonal dimensions of treatment. New York: Jason Aronson. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS COLLECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY Searles, Harold F. (1960). The nonhuman environment in normal development and schizophrenia. New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1979). Countertransference and related subjects, New York: International University Press. ———. (1986). My work with borderline patients, Northvale, NJ: Aronson. COLLECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY Collective psychology, or human psychological behavior within communities, has been a subject of study in the Bible and among the ancient Greeks, hence since the origins of Western culture. In the nineteenth century, new fields of investigation opened up: schools of anthropology in Great Britain, folk psychology in Germany, and sociology in France. Sigmund FreudÕs predecessors and contemporaries within these schools of thought were his favorite interlocutors. From the outset, Freud collaborated in his works on individual and collective psychology (see his letters to Wilhelm Fliess dated December 6, 1896; January 24, 1897; and May 31, 1897 [1950a]). This form of debate, if not actual borrowing, between psychoanalysis and collective psychology continued throughout FreudÕs work. A vivid and systematic picture thus emerges in which Totem and Taboo (1912–1913a) formed the basis for the Schreber case (1911c) and anticipated ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ (1914c); in which Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c) is a response to Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g) and paves the way for The Ego and the Id (1923b); and in which The Future of an Illusion (1927c) and Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]) led Freud to develop and elaborate, between 1923 and 1927, his structural theory (the castration complex, the superego, and the theory of anxiety) in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (1926d [1925]). Some other works also relate to FreudÕs first topography: Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905c), a contribution to the study of central European Jewish culture; ‘‘Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices’’ (1907b), the first major analogy between individual and collective psychology; and ‘‘ÔCivilizedÕ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness’’ (1908d), in which Freud proposes that society reduce cultural sexual repression as a collective INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS prophylaxis for neurosis. Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays (1939a [1937–1939], one of FreudÕs last works, brought together and explained the themes developed on collective psychology and went on to analyze Jewish and Christian monotheistic cultures. Finally, there is FreudÕs work between 1930 and 1932 on U.S. President Thomas Woodrow Wilson (1966). The nexus between individual and collective psychology is the family, as the origin of the Oedipus complex and of totemism, which connects the transference neuroses with collective manifestations. Previously Freud had investigated more localized analogies of the connection between individual and group, such as analogies between the observances and rituals of obsessive neurotics and those of religion. From Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c) on, he proclaimed collective psychology to be part of psychoanalysis and established his metapsychology on this basis. He discussed the libidinal dynamics of the formation and stabilization of groups in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c) and explained the economic point of view in The Future of an Illusion (1927c) and Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]), where he related the economic point of view to hatred and fear. The topography characteristic of groups consists of reduced and simplified forms of the individual psychic agencies of the ego, ego ideal, and superego, as a result of the identifying ties that groups impose: ‘‘A primary group of this kind is a number of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego’’ (1921c, p. 116). Depending on the form of authority and its degree of symbolic elaboration, these reductions are more or less extreme— hence the importance of the great man, capable of representing the ideal at the highest level of elaboration. There are three paradigmatic groups: the horde, the matriarchy, and the totemic clan (in political science, they correspond to rule by one person, by a few, and by all). They differ according to type of representative of the ideal, which ranges from the flesh-andblood leader to such symbolic forms as the totem and the stated ideal, which substitute for the leader after the greater or lesser elaboration of his murder. Freud created or developed some core concepts in the course of this research: primal ambivalence, narcissism, the Oedipus complex (1912–1913a); identifications, the ego ideal, aim-inhibited drives, sublimation 311 C O L L E C T I V E U N C O N S C I O U S (A N A L Y T I C A L P S Y C H O L O G Y ) (1921c); the superego and guilt feelings, dereliction and its consequences, the conflict between Eros and Thanatos (1927c, 1930a); and splitting of the ego, constructions in analysis (1939a). Criticisms have abounded, impeding work on almost half of the body of FreudÕs work. FreudÕs method of analogy (between individual and collective psychic processes) has not been accepted, nor has his dynamic method. FreudÕs explicit Lamarckism concerning the transmission of mnemic traces in groups has been rejected. Freud has been criticized for a narrow view of religion that ignores its cultural contributions by considering it as a collective neurosis or delusion. Finally, although Freud considered matriarchy at an early stage (1911f), he neglected other similar figures of identification. ———. (1911c [1910]). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1–82. ———. (1911f). ‘‘Great is Diana of the Ephesians.’’ SE, 12: 342–344. ———. (1912–1913a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ———. (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. ———. (1927c). The future of an illusion. SE, 21: 1–56. Two further qualifications were formulated by Freud himself: collective psychic processes have to be understood in isolation from any form of therapeutic activity; the analysis of these processes requires the analyst to be separated from groups, especially groups to which the subject belongs, which is difficult to achieve. Psychoanalysis has made a clear contribution to anthropology, yet collective psychology has mainly been used with small groups in clinical practice. The metapsychological, sociological, and political dimensions of FreudÕs work have yet to be turned to account. MICHÈLE PORTE See also: Alienation; Anthropology and psychoanalysis; Christians and Jews: A Psychoanalytical Study; Civilization and Its Discontents; ‘‘Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest’’; ‘‘Dreams and myths’’; Ego ideal; Fascination; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; Identification; Le Bon, Gustave; Narcissism of minor differences; Otherness; Racism, anti-Semitism, and psychoanalysis; Schiff, Paul; Totem and Taboo. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1961). Experiences in groups. London: Tavistock Publications. Freud, Sigmund. (1905c). Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. SE, 8: 1–236. ———. (1907b). Obsessive actions and religious practices. SE, 9: 115–127. ———. (1908d). ‘‘Civilized’’ sexual morality and modern nervous illness. SE, 9: 177–204. 31 2 ———. (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57–145. ———. (1939a [1934–1938]). Moses and monotheism: Three essays. SE, 23: 1–137. ———. (1950a). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173–280. Freud, Sigmund, Bullitt, William C. (1966b [1930–1932]). Thomas Woodrow Wilson, twenty-eighth president of the United States: A psychological study. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Gillibert, Jean. (1985). Le psychodrame de la psychanalyse. Paris: Champ Vallon. Kaës, René, & Anzieu, Didier. (1976). Chronique d Õun groupe, le groupe du ‘‘Paradis perdu’’: Observation et commentaires. Paris: Dunod. Porte, Michèle. (1998). Pulsions et politique: Une relecture de l Õévénement psychique collectif à partir de lÕœuvre de Freud. Paris: Harmattan. Further Reading Scheidlinger, Stuart. (1990). Internalization of group psychology: the group within. Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 18, 494–504. Tuttman, Saul. (1991). Psychoanalytic group theory and therapy: essays in honor of Saul Scheidlinger. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) The ‘‘collective unconscious’’ is the part of the collective psyche that is unconscious, the other parts being INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) consciousness of the perceptible world and consciousness itself. The collective unconscious is different from and in addition to the personal unconscious in that it is a stratum of reality that ‘‘does not derive from personal experience and is not a personal acquisition but is inborn . . . universal . . . [and] more or less the same everywhere and in all individuals.’’ (Jung, 1934 [1948]). The term collective unconscious was first introduced by Carl Gustav Jung in 1916 in a talk to the Zurich School for Analytical Psychology entitled ‘‘Uber das Unbewesste und seine Inhalte.’’ The German manuscript for this talk was not found until 1961, after JungÕs death. The earliest written appearance of the term was found in the French translation of the Zurich talk published in 1916 in the Archives de Psychologies (Jung, 1916). JungÕs notion of the collective unconscious ranges from a passive repository that records the history of all human reactions to the world to an active substratum that is the ground out of which all reality emerges. The components of the collective unconscious were first said by Jung to be primordial or ancestral images and later archetypes that manifest in consciousness through images, strong affects, and behavioral patterns. When the energies of the collective unconscious break through into consciousness, consciousness itself is altered, and reactions vary from insanity to a significant reordering of major attitudes. The notion of the collective unconscious first came to Jung from a dream he had in 1909 on board a ship returning from the United States with Freud. The dream depicted a house that had a cellar below the normal cellar and below that a repository of prehistoric pottery, bones, and skulls. ‘‘I thought, of course, that he [Freud] would accept the cellars below this cellar [i.e., the personal unconscious], but the dreams [during the writing of his first book, from 1910 to 1912] were preparing me for the contrary’’ (McGuire, 1989). In fact, Freud acknowledged primordial ancestral patterns but regarded them as simply inheritable traits (Lamarckianism) posited in each individual (the biogenetic law). For Freud such experiences were phylogenetic recapitulations unrelated to a transcendent structure such as the collective unconscious, but for Jung they arise anew from the collective unconscious in each person in each instance just as they did in oneÕs ancestors. By 1925 Jung had theorized that the collective unconscious and the external world are opposites between which lies the observing ego which accesses INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the collective unconscious through the anima or animus and the world through the persona. The personal unconscious of Freud is regarded as the shadow of the ego. This schema remained unchanged for Jung. JungÕs collective unconscious can be seen as a variation within the tradition of philosophical idealism. It shares characteristics with the Apeiron of Anaximander, the One of Parmenides, and the Forms of Plato. It also calls to mind the Pleroma of the Gnostics, the Categories of Emmanuel Kant, and the Will of Arthur Schopenhauer. What justifies JungÕs notion as psychology and not philosophy is his insistence that the collective unconscious is an empirical fact attested to by the common experiences of humankind over many ages and cultures. JungÕs proof is phenomenological, and he avoids claiming a priori truths whether or not he believes they exist. In spite of his avoidance of ontological affirmations, Jung often appears to suggest that the collective unconscious is a metaphysical reality, which invites less sophisticated analysts to engage in ideological thinking and inflated claims to transcendent knowledge. In his review of JungÕs autobiography, Winnicott says that the positing of a collective unconscious results from JungÕs split psyche and ‘‘was part of his attempt to deal with his lack of contact with what could now be called the unconscious-accordingto-Freud.’’ (Winnicott, 1964) With this criticism, Winnicott dismissed JungÕs and perhaps all efforts to speculate about and derive heuristic guidelines consonant with an ultimate ground against which lie subjectivity, consciousness, and the very mystery of life. As Jung points out, the alternative is a void (Jung, 1948). DAVID I. TRÉSAN See also: Amplification; (analytical psychology); Animaanimus (analytical psychology); Archetype (analytical psychology); Desoille, Robert; Event; Midlife crisis; psychology of the unconscious; Numinous (analytical psychology); Shadow (analytical psychology); Transference (analytical psychology). Bibliography Jung, Carl Gustav. (1916). The structure of the unconscious, Coll. works, vol. VII, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ———. (1931–34). The practical use of dream analysis. Coll. Works, vol. VIII, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 313 C O L L È G E DE PSYCHANALYSTES ———. (1934 [1948]). A review of the complex theory. Coll. works, vol. VIII, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ———. (1947 [1954]). On the nature of the psyche, Coll. works, vol. VIII, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ——— (1948). On the conception of psychic energy and the nature of dreams. Zurich: Rascher Verlag. McGuire, William. (1989). C.G. Jung, Analytical psychology, Notes of the seminar given in 1925. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Winnicott, Donald W. (1963). Memories, dreams, reflections. By C.G. Jung. London, Collins & Routledge, 1963. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 45, 450–455. licensing, and finally the question of social issues and anti-Semitism, the offshoot of a conference devoted to Rudolf BinionÕs psychohistorical work on Hitler held on June 18, 1992, caused further friction within the organization. This led to a series of group and individual resignations from the Collège and engendered a climate of crisis, culminating in the dissolution of the organization in June 1994. JACQUES SEDAT See also: France. Bibliography Geahchan, Dominique. (1986). Temps et Désir du psychanalyste. Paris: InterÉditions. COLLÈGE DE PSYCHANALYSTES The Collège de Psychanalystes was founded on November 3, 1980, by a group of psychoanalysts (roughly thirty) from different backgrounds upon the initiative of Dominique Geahchan (1925–1983), François Roustang, Jacques Sédat, Conrad Stein, and Serge Viderman, who drafted the by-laws. There were no founding members. The organizationÕs goal, beyond that of existing analytic institutions, was to consider the role of psychoanalysis in society and defend the analytic approach against the risks of governmental regulation or the shifts in practice arising from mental health coverage. Membership was simple, and involved only approval by a majority of the members. This removed any problems associated with qualifications, which, along with training, were relegated to the various psychoanalytic organizations. Its originality lies in the way it enabled analysts from different organizations and with different backgrounds (members of the International Psychoanalytic Association, its critics, Lacanians) to work together on issues of psychoanalysis and society. The Collège at times had more than a hundred members, including both French and a handful of Canadian members. Beginning in November 1981 it began publishing a review, Psychanalystes, at the request of its first president, Dominique Geahchan, who was also cofounder of Confrontation with René Major in 1974, and a member of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris. The review remained in print until March 1994; a total of forty-eight issues on the role of psychoanalysis in society were published. Problems arose, however, over the question of membership, which gradually evolved into a form of 31 4 COLLOQUE SUR L’INCONSCIENT The Colloque sur lÕinconscient, organized by Henri Ey and devoted to the problems associated with the concept of the unconscious, took place at the end of October 1960, at the Bonneval Psychiatric Hospital, Bonneval, France. The proceedings, published in an octavo volume of more than four hundred pages in 1966, remains one of the most important works on psychopathology of the second half of the twentieth century. Previous colloquia at Bonneval include ‘‘Neurologie et Psychiatrie’’ in 1943, organized by Julian de Ajuriaguerra and Henri Hécaen, and ‘‘La Psychogenèse des Névroses et des Psychoses’’ in 1946, organized by Lucien Bonnafé, Sven Follin, Jacques Lacan, and Julien Rouart. The first part of the book discusses the associations between the unconscious and the drives, and includes papers by Serge Lebovici and René Diatkine and by François Perrier. Part 2 covers the unconscious and language, and contains papers by Jean Laplanche and Serge Leclaire and by Conrad Stein. In the discussion Maurice Merleau-Ponty introduced his books The Visible and the Invisible and The Prose of the World, and Jacques Lacan, who has an article in the book. Just seven years after the Rome Congress (1953), he positively and polemically laid out his ideas on the central role of language in the formation of the subject (self) and the structuring of the unconscious. Part 3 includes articles on interrelations between our understanding of neurobiology and the question of the unconscious, with a paper by Claude Blanc and another by Catherine G. Lairy. There follows discussion by Paul Guiraud, René Angelergues, Maurice Dongier, Eugène Minkowski, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS COLOMBIA Jean Hyppolite, and André Green. Part 4 covers the role of the unconscious in psychiatric problems and includes articles by Henri Ey, S. Follin, and André Green, followed by discussion by Jean Hyppolite, Eugène Minkowski, and Jean Laplanche. Part 5, on the unconscious and sociology, contains papers by Henri Lefèbvre and by Conrad Stein. The last part of the book concerns the relations between the unconscious and philosophical thought, and includes articles by Alphonse dÕWaelhens, Georges Lantéri-Laura, and Paul Ricoeur. According to the participants, the published texts accurately reflect the content of the actual proceedings. The event provided an opportunity to compare two different concepts of psychoanalysis and to discuss connections among mental pathology, the unconscious, the role of society, brain activity, and some epistemological issues. Although dated, none of the articles in the collection have lost any of their relevance. GEORGES LANTÉRI-LAURA See also: Ey, Henri; France; Lacan, Jacques-Marie Émile. Bibliography Ey, Henri (Ed.). (1966). LÕInconscient, 6e Colloque de Bonneval, 1960. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. COLOMBIA The history of the Colombian Psychoanalytic Society and Institute has been influenced by the scientific cultural currents of the rest of the world, especially France, England, the United States, Argentina, and Chile. Between 1922 and 1940, some physicians and other non-physicians traveled to Europe and around Latin America, getting direct contact with Freud or being psychoanalyzed. After the Second World War, three physicians arrived from France and Chile: Drs. José Francisco Socarras (1906–1995), Arturo Lizarazo (1915–1992), and (from Venezuela) Herman Quijada, born in 1915. By that time eight more physicians had gone to Argentina to be trained in psychoanalysis, while others went to the United States and France. The three immigrants begun to conduct studies of Freud, Numberg, and Klein, beginning analytical supervisions that differed from personal analysis. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Between 1948 and 1950, a prestigious Argentine analyst, Dr. Arnaldo Rascovsky, visited Bogotá and edited the bylaws to be followed for the formation of a Study Group recognized by the IPA. On May 6, 1956, the Study Group was officially founded and was recognized by the IPA a year later, being sponsored by France and Chile. In 1959, an Associate Member of the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association, Dr. Carlos Plata, arrived to Bogotá who elaborated the Group bylaws. In 1960, Angel and Betty Garma visited Colombia and held a series of seminars as well as individual and collective supervisions, and later in 1961 the Society was recognized by the IPA. In 1962 a conflict arose between the two pioneers of psychoanalysis in Colombia, which appeared to be political-ideological and ended with the resignation of Arturo Lizarazo, but he left the Colombian Psychoanalytic Association to found his own Study Group, now recognized by by the IPA, which is led by M. Gonzalez, J.A. Marquez and R. De Zubirı́a. Also the ‘‘Sigmund Freud Psychoanalytic Group I.P.A.’’ is led by G. Arcila and B. Alvarez. In Colombia there are other psychoanalytic Groups in Cali, Medellin, and Bogotá, with some leaders (O. Espinosa, A. Villar) trained at the Colombian Psychoanalytic Society, but the groups are not recognized by the IPA. Since 1976, the Review of the Colombian Psychoanalytic Society (Revista de la Sociedad Colombiana de Psicoanálisis) has appeared, with 21 volumes, four numbers each year, and there is also a ‘‘Boletin’’ published monthly. As of 2002, the Society had four honorary members, 33 full members, 57 associate members. The Institute has 15 training analysts, 10 professors, 14 candidates; there have been 19 graduating classes from 1959–1996. The Institute requires eight semesters (four years training) with two hours daily and two individual supervisions weekly. Freud is the main author studied, but others are reviewed, especially from France, England, the United States, and Argentina, with a multi-theoretical frame of reference. There are members of the Society working in the cities of Cali and Buoaramanga. Various members of the Colombian Psychoanalytic Society have participated in the COPAL, FEPAL, and IPA boards. Several theoretical and technical contributions have been published, mainly in the Journal and in books. The 315 COMBINED PARENT FIGURE practice has increased daily, and some analysts are professors at different universities. Psychoanalysis has been admitted at the National Academy of Medicine and is generally well accepted by Colombian society, as well as in scientific reviews and daily journals. Among other wellknown contemporary analysts are G. Ballesteros, E. Gómez, E. Laverde, A. Sánchez, I. Villarreal, and L. Yamı́n. GUILLERMO SÁNCHEZ MEDINA Bibliography Brainsky, Simon. (1984). Manual de psicologia y psicopatologia dinámica fundamentos de psicoanálisis. Bogotá: Ed. Pluma. Carvajal, Guillermo. (1993). Adolecer: La aventura de una metamorfosis. Una visión psicoanalitica de la adolescencia Bogotá: Printing Service Network. González Velásquez, Mario. (1993). La cohesión del self. Bogotá: Ed. Guadalupe Ltda. Plata Mújica, Carlos. (1989), Metapsicologia y Técnica Psicoanalitica. Bogotá: Ed. Tercer Mundo Editores. Sánchez Medina, Guillermo. (1994). Técnica y clinica psicoanalitica. Bogotá: Ed. Centro Profesional Gráico Ltda. Later in development the infant experiences the parents in more realistic ways, and gains reassurance from the evidence of their survival. At the same time the infant may internalize one or other parent (or perhaps both) to keep them safe. Another primitive response is to mobilize genital feelings of a loving kind, in order to mitigate the violence in himself and perceived in the parental figure. The latter, eroticizing defense may result later in precocious and perverse sexuality. With the onset of the depressive position, the parents are more realistically appreciated and their relationship can slowly be tolerated as a creative one in its own right. Internalization of a creative parental couple is an important basis of new developments. Tolerating the parents internally in intercourse is an achievement that allows creativity and intellectual curiosity to develop freely. In KleinÕs view those later phantasies and investigations which Freud described are emotionally colored by the preceding phantasies of the combined parent figure. COMBINED PARENT FIGURE Doubt has been shed on the capacity for infants to have such detailed phantasies and, it is argued, they are to be regarded as subsequent elaborations at a later stage of development when three-person situations can be conceived. ROBERT D. HINSHELWOOD The combined parent figure is an early and primitive version of Freud’s concept of the primal scene. Those phantasies however were believed to supervene at a later stage of development. See also: Breast, good/bad object; Imago; Object, change of/choice of; Oedipus complex, early; Phallic mother; Primal scene. ———. (1991). Psicoanálisis, ayer, hoy y mariana. Bogotá: Ed. Gaviota. In the powerful phantasies of the early Oedipus complex the infant has terrifying experiences of the parents engaged in a particularly violent and dangerous kind of intercourse (Klein, 1928/1975). Melanie Klein discovered in the panics and night terrors of childhood the persisting of the infant’s phantasies of the parents in intercourse. These have a violent tone that matches the violence the infant feels towards the parents at the sense of exclusion. These phantasies are of pre-genital kinds. For instance the parents may be experienced as mutually feeding each other, which then, in response to the child’s hatred, come to be phantasies of the parents devouring each other (Klein, 1929). The imagined mutual destruction is usually extremely worrying for the child, and exclusion may be replaced by a helplessness. 31 6 Bibliography Britton, Ron, Feldman, Michael, and OÕShaughnessy, Edna. (1989). The Oedipus complex today. London: Karnac Books. Klein, Melanie. (1975). Early stages of the Oedipus conflict. In The writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. 1, 186–198). (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 9 (1928), 167–180.) ———. (1929). Infantile anxiety situations reflected in a work of art and in the creative impulse. In The writings of Melanie Klein (Vol.1, p. 210–218). London: Hogarth. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis,10 (1929), 436–443.) ———. (1975). The psycho-analysis of children. In The writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. 2). London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1932) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS COMPENSATORY STRUCTURES COMPENSATION (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) See also: Animus-Anima (analytical psychology); Interpretation of dreams (analytical psychology); Projection and ‘‘participation mystique’’ (analytical psychology). Compensation (transcendent function) finds its origins in the delineation of dynamics of the complex. Bibliography In 1907 Carl Gustav Jung notes the pathogenic complex posses a quantum of libido which grants it a degree of autonomy that is opposed to conscious will. Though this dynamic has a pathological cast, it conveys the essence of what Jung termed compensation; namely, the capacity of the unconscious to influence consciousness. Jung noted the ego identifies with a preferred set of adaptive strategies, and thus tends to restrict the range of adaptive response and hamper individuation. In ‘‘The Importance of the Unconscious in Psychopathology’’ (1914), he introduced the idea, saying, ‘‘the principal function of the unconscious is to effect a compensation and to produce a balance. All extreme conscious tendencies are softened and toned down through a counter-impulse in the unconscious.’’ (1914a). This assertion ascribes a different role to unconscious dynamics, i.e. one that is purposive and intelligent, and not restricted solely to wishing. In 1917, Jung expanded his notion of an intelligent unconscious further when he asserted the existence of a ‘‘supraordinate unconscious’’ as a common human inheritance, viewed as the source of compensatory activity. Later, Jung referred to compensation as ‘‘an inherent self regulation in the psychic apparatus.’’ JungÕs assertion of an intelligent unconscious culminated in his concept of the self (1928a), understood as the personalityÕs central organizing agency that instigated and guided individuation. Paired with the concept of the self, compensation was seen as the core process in realizing selfhood. Given this core value, Jung sought a means to maximize its efficiency and benefits. He termed this means the ‘‘transcendent function,’’ described as a joining of the opposing tendencies of conscious and unconscious that would produce a synthesis in the form of a ‘‘uniting symbol’’ in order to release compensatory contents of the unconscious. Jung, noted the transcendent function facilitated a transition from one attitude to another and held the person skilled with understanding of conscious and unconscious interaction and its symbolic products could accelerate individuation. PETER MUDD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Jung, Carl Gustav. (1907). The psychology of Dementia præcox. Coll. works, vol. III, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ———. (1914a). On the importance of the unconscious in psychopathology. Coll. works, vol. III, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ———. (1917–18–26–43). The psychology of the unconscious processes. Coll. works, vol. VII: London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. ———. (1928a [1935]). The relations between the ego and the unconscious. Coll. works, vol. VII, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ———. (1928b [1948]). On psychic energy. Coll. works, vol. VIII, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ———. (1928c [1948]). General aspects of dream psychology. Coll. works, vol. VIII, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ———. (1928d [1948]). Instinct and the inconscious. Coll. works, vol. VIII, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. COMPENSATORY STRUCTURES Compensatory structures are complex psychological configurations that are an integral part of the overall self or the personality of an individual. As their name indicates, they compensate for certain primary structural deficits in the self, and they do this by activating another structure. Thus, when the mirroring pole, the idealizing pole, or the pole of twinship/alter ego of the self are deficient or underdeveloped, one of the other three becomes the dominant force in the functioning of the self of the person in question. The deficiencies come from the developmental failures of early childhood concerning self-object experiences, and thus the selfÕs development. Compensatory structures derive from more optimal self-object relations. They are different from defensive structures, which serve merely to protect the self from any further wound. Compensatory structures go beyond this to become more or less independent of any protective purpose and thus intervene in a gratifying, vitalizing way: they become the selfÕs main way of orientating itself. Thus, they transcend the fragility of the original 317 COMPLEMENTAL SERIES structural deficiency, which then becomes resistant to any analytical intervention. Compensatory structures make up for the deficit, whereas defensive structures cover it over. Though defensive structures can and must be analyzed to reach into and make up for the structural deficit that they protects, compensatory structures cannot and must not be analyzed in an attempt to bring to light the underlying deficiency. In The Restoration of the Self, Kohut says that a successful analysis is one that enables a compensatory structure to be fully developed and consolidated. One neither can nor should try to determine or direct the course of such an analysis, insofar as the development of the self remains a multi-potential process that draws on and chooses from the stock of available self-objects. Instead of deciding that all defenses should be analyzed, it might well be that analytical activity is not indicated for the compensatory structure. ARNOLD GOLDBERG See also: Self; Self-object. returned to this question, apropos of trauma, in the last part of Moses and Monotheism (1939a [1934–38]): ‘‘In this way we reach the concept of a sliding Ôcomplemental seriesÕ as it is called, in which two factors converge in fulfilling an aetiological requirement. A less of one factor is balanced by a more of the other’’ (p. 73). The concept of ‘‘complemental series’’ thus appears in FreudÕs work in relation to two key themes, neuroses and traumas, a fact that underscores its importance. It would be interesting to look at this concept from the standpoint of FreudÕs renunciation of his neurotica in 1896, that is to say, the change he introduced in the etiology of the neuroses from the theory of a real trauma to that of an imagined trauma. As we know, Sigmund Freud may never have abandoned the theory of the real trauma, and there is a sense in which the concept of ‘‘complemental series’’ testifies to the very real effort he made to reconcile internal and external factors and thus transcend the opposition between external reality and psychic reality. In a way the complemental series foreshadows our more modern and still debated polyfactorial model of pathological etiology. BERNARD GOLSE Bibliography Kohut, Heinz. (1977). The restoration of the self. New York: International Universities Press. COMPLEMENTAL SERIES In The Language of Psychoanalysis, Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis give the following definition of complemental series: ‘‘Term used by Freud in order to account for the aetiology of neurosis without making a hard-and-fast choice between exogenous and endogenous factors. For Freud these two kinds of factors are actually complementary—the weaker the one, the stronger the other—so that any group of cases can in theory be distributed along a scale with the two types of factors varying in inverse ratio. Only at the two extremities of such a serial arrangement would it be possible to find instances where only one kind of factor is present’’ (1967). The concept is most clearly explained by Freud in the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916–17a [1915–17], p. 347 and note). The endogenous factor corresponds to the fixation points specific to each person (and determined by that personÕs hereditary constitution and childhood experience), while the exogenous factor corresponds to frustration. Freud 31 8 See also: Constitution; Internal/external reality; Psychic causality; Psychogenesis/organogenesis. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1916–17a [1915–17]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15–16. ———. (1939a [1934–38]). Moses and monotheism: three essays. SE, 23: 1–137. COMPLEX A complex is a group of partially or totally unconscious psychic content (representations, memories, fantasies, affects, and so on), which constitutes a more or less organized whole, such that the activation of one of its components leads to the activation of others. Freud did not coin the term ‘‘complex.’’ At the end of the nineteenth century, it was occasionally used in psychiatry to designate a collection of ideas belonging to a subject. Freud used it in this sense in 1892 in a sketch written in preparation for his ‘‘Preliminary Communication.’’ He wrote that in hysteria, ‘‘the content of consciousness easily becomes temporarily dissociated and certain complexes of ideas which are not INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS COMPLEX associatively connected easily fly apart’’ (1940–41 [1892], p. 149). Shortly after, he used the term again in Studies on Hysteria (1895d), specifically in the case of Emmy von N. Josef Breuer, coauthor of the Studies, wrote, ‘‘It is almost always a question of complexes of ideas, of recollections of external events and trains of thought of the subjectÕs own. It may sometimes happen that every one of the individual ideas comprised in such a complex of ideas is thought of consciously, and that what is exiled from consciousness is only the particular combination of them’’ (1895d, p. 215n). In the ensuing years, the idea that at the heart of a neurosis there was a collection of ideas and affects specific to the subject and organized around a traumatic sexual experience became central to the development of psychoanalysis—even though subsequently Freud rarely used the term ‘‘complex’’ to designate such a set of ideas. He did add an essential modification to the previous psychiatric conception in positing that, for the most part, such a collection is made up of unconscious processes and remains unconscious itself. In 1906 he explicitly discussed the term ‘‘complex’’ for the first time in an article on ‘‘Psycho-Analysis and the Establishment of Facts in Legal Proceedings’’ (1906c). He paid homage to Eugen Bleuler, and more particularly to Carl Gustav Jung, whom he had just met, and praised the method of ‘‘word association,’’ which was developed by Wilhelm M. Wundt and practiced by Jung. This experimental method consisted of giving a subject a series of ‘‘stimulus words’’ and asking the subject to react as quickly as possible. The time that it takes the person to respond and the nature of their response are assumed to indicate a ‘‘complex.’’ Freud, in this work, defined a complex as ‘‘ideational content’’ charged with affect (p. 104). From then on, he used the term frequently to designate the ‘‘nuclear complex of neurosis,’’ that is, ‘‘the father complex’’ (1909d, p. 208n; p. 200ff.), which he designated as the ‘‘Oedipus complex’’ starting in 1910 (1910h, p. 171). Similarly, he began to speak of the ‘‘castration complex’’ (1909b, p. 8). After he split with Jung, Freud withdrew the praise that that he previously bestowed upon him. Thus he wrote, in his History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement (1914d), that the ‘‘theory of complexes’’ proposed by Jung did not actually attain the status of a theory and had not ‘‘proved capable of easy incorporation into the context of psycho-analytic theory’’ (p. 29), even INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS though the term itself had become common in psychoanalytic usage. In other words, Freud adopted the term to give meaning to his own metapsychological constructions, but rejected the theory of Jung himself. The following points should be emphasized: 1. There is an obvious difference between the popular use of the term ‘‘complex’’ in contemporary culture and its more specific usage in the psychoanalytic literature. In this regard, what Freud described in 1914 remains the same today: ‘‘None of the other terms coined by psycho-analysis for its own needs has achieved such widespread popularity or been so misapplied to the detriment of the construction of clearer concepts’’ (1914d, pp. 29–30). In contemporary psychoanalytic writings, the term is hardly ever encountered anymore except in two closely connected situations: references to the Oedipus complex and the castration complex. 2. As surprising as it may seem, there has been scarcely any coherent theoretical reflection on the notion of the ‘‘complex’’ as such, except insofar as it is related to other terms used to designate an organized set of mental processes and activities (‘‘structure’’ and ‘‘system,’’ for example). The difficulty arises from the need to distinguish and yet coordinate two different levels. The first describes the structure of the psyche as being the same, at least in its broad outlines, in every human being; such features would be, at least in theory, constitutive of the psyche itself (this is the case with the Oedipus complex and its corollary, the castration complex). The other level is that of individual variations, that is, the particularities of such a fundamental structure taken as a function of personal history, of imagos, of the play of identification, etc. The study of such particularities is the very object of psychoanalytic treatment. But the temptation to group complexes into ‘‘families’’ led over time to the proliferation of ‘‘new complexes,’’ generally named after mythological figures. There was the ‘‘Electra complex,’’ the supposed feminine version of the Oedipus complex; the ‘‘Jocasta complex,’’ which designated the maternal counter-Oedipus; and even the ‘‘Ajase complex,’’ which referred to the guilt that is linked in Japanese culture to the desire to kill the mother (Kosawa, 1931/1954). Thus there is a danger of falling into a purely descriptive typology in which the coherence of 319 C O M P L E X (A N A L Y T I C A L P S Y C H O L O G Y ) the Freudian metapsychology disappears and its explanatory power is lost. But in fact, not one of these proposed complexes has survived. 3. Insofar as it relates to a fundamental structure, a complex is in itself not characteristic of this or that neurosis. Only its functionally disruptive manifestations and fixations can rise to the level of pathology. In the definitions given above, a complex is ‘‘a group of ideas.’’ Josef Breuer correctly noted that these ideas could be or could become conscious, but that what is ‘‘exiled from consciousness’’ is their ‘‘particular combination.’’ However, we cannot remain at the level of ideas in the strict sense: memory traces, fantasies (at every level, from conscious to unconscious), and imagos, for example, all enter into this ‘‘combination.’’ Moreover, what accounts for the effect of the complex is its quota of affect, and also its drive force. Thus, the study of an individual complex in the treatment leads to a topological consideration of all the related defenses and the retroactive reworkings that combined to set up a functional structure of this kind. ROGER PERRON See also: Compensation (analytical psychology); Complex (analytical psychology); Ego (analytical psychology); Femininity; Nuclear complex; Oedipus complex; Oedipus complex, early; Projection and ‘‘participation mystique’’ (analytical psychology); Psychology of Dementia praecox; Word association. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1906c). Psycho-analysis and the establishment of facts in legal proceedings. SE, 9: 97–114. ———. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10: 1–149. ———. (1909d). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151–318. ———. (1910h). A special type of choice of object made by men. SE, 11: 163–175. ———. (1914d). On the history of the psycho-analytic movement. SE, 14: 1–66. ———. (1940–41 [1892]). Sketches for the ‘‘Preliminary Communication’’ of 1893. SE, 1: 147–154. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on Hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. Kosawa, Heisaku. (1954). Two kinds of guilt feelings: the Ajase complex. Japanese Journal of Psychoanalysis, 11. (Original work published 1931) 32 0 COMPLEX (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) A complex is the more- or less-repressed standardization of emotionally strong conflictual experiences. When these experiences are triggered, either by certain themes (such as new pieces of information), or emotions (in which case they are called ‘‘constellations’’), the complex produces a reaction, such that the individual perceives the situation in terms of the complex (with a distortion of perception), and responds with an emotional overreaction, which mobilizes the processes of stereotyped defense. Carl Gustav Jung developed his concept of the complex at the same time as he was engaged in his experiments with association. It is within this context that the concept appeared for the first time, in 1904, in an essay called ‘‘Experimentelle Untersuchungen über Assoziationen Gesunder’’ (‘‘The associations of normal subjects,’’ with Franz Riklin). But he had already used the term, without any particular specificity, in his thesis of 1902. When, at the turn of the century, Jung and Riklin eagerly turned to research on association in order to construct typologies, they studied what they considered normal disturbances of experience. They showed that a test subject could not uniformly form associations with ideas that were attached to highly emotionally-charged experiences and personal difficulties. They went on to hypothesize that such complexes might constitute the background of consciousness, and that in any neurosis of psychical origin, there would be a complex characterized by a particularly strong emotional charge. Later, in 1907, Jung established that any event charged with affect gives rise to a complex and reinforces those that are already in place. Complexes act from the unconscious and can at any moment either inhibit, or on the contrary, activate conscious behavior. They reveal conflicts, but are also defined by Jung as crucial hot points of psychic life. In 1934, Jung summarized his theory of complexes and emphasized that, even outside of the effects of any individual constellation, complexes involve the active forces that determine the interests of everyone and thus serve as the basis for the symbol formation. This conception of complexes, which he continued to develop afterwards, led him to emphasize their creative effects. From a therapeutic perspective, this is an important aspect of his psychology and his clinical work. From it INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS COMPROMISE FORMATION he developed the idea of promoting creative development through the integration of complexes. This idea plays a large role in many of the techniques developed by the Jungian school. Finally, it is from this insight that Jung came to see archetypes at the heart of complexes. The experiments in association, as well as the concepts of the complex-ego, of the symbol and the archetype, imagination and emotion, and transference and counter-transference, all refer to JungÕs idea that the complex is caused by the painful confrontation of the individual with the ‘‘necessity to adapt.’’ Thus the very concept of complexes takes on an even more dynamic dimension: each one appears as an effect of the condensation and generalization of experiences that might, at any moment, be associated by analogy with a new piece of information or emotion. This is why the concept takes on decisive importance for understanding what is at play in the transference and the counter-transference. VERENA KAST See also: Castration complex; Dead mother complex; ‘‘On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement’’; Libidinal development; Ethnopsychoanalysis; Identification; Imago; Masculine protest (analytical psychology); Penis envy; Phallus; Primal fantasies; Primitive horde; Psychanalyse et Pédiatrie (psychoanalysis and pediatrics); Psychoanalysis of Fire, The; Repression; Sexual differences;Structural theories; Word association; Word-Presentation. Bibliography Jung, Carl Gustav. (1902). On the psychology and the pathology of the so-called occult phenomena. In Coll. works, vol. I. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957. ———. (1904). The associations of normal subjects. In Coll. works, vol. II. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. ———. (1907). The psychology of dementia præcox. In Coll. works, vol. III. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ———. (1934 [1948]). A review of the complex theory. In Coll. works, vol. VIII. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Kast, Verena. (1992). The Dynamics of Symbols: Fundamentals of Jungian Psychotherapy. (Susan A. Schwarz, Trans.). New York: Fromm International Publishing Corporation. unconscious and ordinarily repressed and strives towards satisfaction—that is, wish-fulfillment—while the other, belonging probably to the conscious ego, is disapproving and repressive. The outcome of this conflict is a compromise-formation (the dream or the symptom) in which both trends have found an incomplete expression’’ (Freud, 1923a, p. 242). This definition was given by Freud in an encyclopedia article called ‘‘Psycho-Analysis.’’ In it he refers to both a dynamic process (the drive/defense conflict) and to its result. The term ‘‘compromise’’ emphasizes that it is a partial satisfaction that is achieved (as the mechanism of the daydream illustrates), which, within the general framework of the theory of symptom formation differentiates this concept from similar notions such as substitutive formations and reaction formations. The term first appeared in 1896 in ‘‘Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defense’’ in relation to the mechanisms of obsessional neurosis: obsessive representations and compulsive acts are ‘‘what become conscious as obsessional ideas and affects, and take the place of the pathogenic memories as far as the conscious life is concerned. . . . [They] are structures in the nature of a compromise between the repressed idea and the repressing ones’’ (p. 170). It was later extended by Freud beyond obsessional neurosis to the entire dynamics of the psyche as a major component of the process of symptom formation (1916–17a, Lecture 23), and then reconceived within the structural theory. It was this new formulation that was taken up again in Moses and Monotheism (1939a). Is every compromise formation a return of the repressed? Or could we say that compromise formation could result from other defensive mechanisms, such as negation and even disavowal? This question wasnÕt explicitly raised by Freud, but it could be posed in light of modern work. See also: Contradiction; Fantasy, formula of; Flight into illness; Parapraxis; Psychopathology of Everyday Life, The; Reaction-formation; Substitutive-formation; Symbolism; Symptom-formation. Bibliography COMPROMISE FORMATION Freud, Sigmund. (1896b). Further remarks on the neuropsychoses of defence. SE, 3: 157–185. In dreams, just as in symptoms formation, ‘‘we find a struggle between two trends, of which one is ———. (1916–17a). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis, parts I and II. SE, 15–16. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 321 COMPULSION ———. (1939a). Moses and monotheism: Three essays. SE, 23: 1–137. ———. (1923a). Two encyclopaedia articles: psycho-analysis and the libido theory. SE, 18: 233–259. COMPULSION Compulsion is a mental pressure of internal origin compelling the subject to think, act, or react in accordance with specific modalities that do not coincide with his habitual patterns of thought. Freud used the German term Zwang to describe this concept. In an article written in French in 1894 (‘‘Obsessions et phobies’’), Freud used an equivalent term, obsession. The word ‘‘compulsion,’’ attested in French as early as 1298, is derived from the Latin compulsio and originally signified a ‘‘constraint, a legal summons, or formal notice to pay.’’ ‘‘Constraint’’ is somewhat older (twelfth century) and has the same legal connotation found in the expression ‘‘physical constraint.’’ As for the term ‘‘obsession,’’ which appeared later, its origin is both religious (possession) and military (siege). All three terms were used in the early literature on psychoanalysis to take into account the corresponding complex phenomenon: compulsion emphasized the internal origins of the phenomenon, constraint its immediate effect, and obsession described one of the most symptomatic consequences in the subjectÕs life. For Freud the German term Zwang is one of a series of analogous terms like drive, urge, or thrust, used to signify that the mental forces governing the human mind must be treated in the same way as other natural forces, even though their origin and meaning are radically different. The word was used in medical research in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century, and was first defined by Karl Friedrich Westphal in 1877. At the time the term corresponded to the way in which members of the Berlin Group (1840–1846), represented by Hermann von Helmholtz, approached the investigation of mental phenomena, first subjecting them to rigorous scientific observation, as they would any other phenomenon. The term appeared in 1894 when Freud addressed what he referred to as the ‘‘psychoneuroses of defense’’ in a discussion of obsessional representations, to differentiate them from hysterical or phobic manifestations. Freud explains that the compulsive representation results from a ‘‘poor connection,’’ whereby an affect arising from a repressed representation attaches itself to 32 2 another representation (1894a). As in hysteria the repressed representation is of a sexual origin, but the compulsive representation is completely dissociated from it. In the Studies on Hysteria (1895d), Freud speaks of a ‘‘compulsion to associate.’’ And on September 25, 1895, in his ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ (1950a [1895]), he uses the term ‘‘compulsion’’ to refer to the impression produced by ‘‘hyperinvested representations’’ such as those that occur during hysteria, even referring to ‘‘hysterical obsession.’’ The occurrence of these representations produces effects ‘‘that it is impossible to suppress or understand,’’ the subject being completely aware of the strangeness of the situation. During this same period, he refers to compulsive affects (Zwangsaffekte). In a letter to Wilhelm Fliess dated December 6, 1896, the term ‘‘compulsion’’ characterizes the return of the memory of a satisfying sexual experience, regardless of the clinical presentation in question. Finally, it is compulsion that pushes all human beings toward incest (letter to Fliess dated October 15, 1897, and An Outline of Psychoanalysis, 1940a [1938]). The concept followed two separate paths in its evolution. Faithful to his initial intentions, Freud pursued his investigation of compulsion in obsessional neurosis, especially in his analysis of the ‘‘Rat Man’’ (1909d). The most symptomatic compulsion of this patient was the ‘‘rat torture,’’ together with its obvious connotation of anal sadism. But the analysis revealed many others, such as the compulsion to protect his lady friend, ‘‘which can signify nothing other than a reaction to the contrary, and therefore hostile, tendency.’’ He also refers to ‘‘two-stage compulsive acts,’’ where the first is cancelled by the second, and points out the ambivalence. This simultaneity of internal compulsion and the struggle against what it entails is characteristic of compulsive neurosis and is what causes the unrelenting and exhausting struggle; it is this that led Pierre Janet to speak of ‘‘psychasthenia.’’ Subsequently, Freud made compulsion a key element of his metapsychology. It refers to what is ineradicable and insurmountable in the drive, the thing that must always be confronted. If it werenÕt for the possibility of change, this would not be unlike the idea of some inevitable destiny or hopeless determinism. For Freud, compulsion has the following characteristics: its dystonic quality with respect to the behavior or customary activities of the subject, the conviction of a disastrous outcome if it is not obeyed, and the promise of actual relief if it is allowed to proceed unrestricted. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CONCEPT The notion of compulsion was adopted by FreudÕs early disciples, especially Alfred Adler, who saw in it a reaction to a feeling of inferiority (1907). Melanie Klein attributes it to the activity of partial primary objects, as do Donald Winnicott and Wilfred Bion. Jacques Lacan considered compulsion an ‘‘object-cause of desire,’’ which he formulated in terms of an ‘‘object a.’’ For Jean Laplanche compulsion is the effect of ‘‘messages of enigmatic origin.’’ These are accompanied by the progressive objectification of the foundations of the compulsion, and an increasingly greater effort at translating them into objects or representations. Concepts that are similar to compulsion in the Freudian lexicon include pressure (Drang), introduced by Freud in 1915 in the Metapsychology (1915c), which is the equivalent for each drive of what compulsion is in the totality of mental life. Similarly, an urge is the irrepressible fulfillment of an act during a moment of paroxysm, whereas the compulsion implies an internal obstacle to its fulfillment. The Freudian idea of a constant and insistent force associated with certain thoughts is not without its drawbacks. It does reflect the speech of certain patients, especially during obsessional neurosis or cases of mental automatism (Gaëtan de Clérambault). But by emphasizing the element shared by all forms of internal compulsion, as Freud does in the Outline, the concept is sometimes used to justify exclusively medicinal or behaviorist approaches to treatment. The initial Freudian idea is, however, quite different. It attempts to reestablish the relational conditions that give rise to compulsion, to restore it to the internal setting in which it first took shape. GÉRARD BONNET See also: Bulimia; Change; Development of Psycho-Analysis; Dipsomania; Excitation; Negative transference; Negative, work of the; ‘‘Notes Upon a Case of Obsessinal Neurosis (Rat Man); Obsessional neurosis; Obsession; Pleasure/ unpleasure principle; ‘‘Remembering Repeating and Working-Through’’; Repetition compulsion; Resistance. Bibliography Adler, Alfred. (1974). La pulsion dÕagression dans la vie et dans la névrose. Revue française de psychanalyse, 38 (2–3), 417–426. (Original work published 1908) Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence, SE, 3: 45–61. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Further Reading Busch, Fred. (1989). The compulsion to repeat in action: a developmental perspective. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 70, 535–544. Kubie, Lawrence S. (1939). A critical analysis of the concept of a repetition compulsion. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 20, 390–402. Loewald, Hans W. (1971). Some considerations on repetition and repetition compulsion. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 52, 59–66. COMPULSIVE NEUROSIS. See Obsessional neurosis CONCEPT For Wilfred Bion, conception is the result of coupling a pre-conception, an innate a priori idea, and a realization, elements of the real that are provided by external-sensory or internal-emotional experience. The concept is derived from conception through abstraction and generalization. Language and the attribution of a name to a concept unite preconception and realization, preventing any loss of experience in the process. In BionÕs grid conception appears in row E, below the pre-conceptions (row D). The transition from D to E occurs when a pre-conception (for example, the infantÕs innate expectation of the breast) encounters a negative realization (absence of the real breast). In a key article on the theory of thought, presented during the International Congress of Psychoanalysis held in Edinburgh in 1961, Bion appears to contradict himself when discussing his theory of conceptions. In one paragraph he says that the union of the preconception (innate expectation of the breast) with the realization (‘‘the breast itself ’’) gives rise to a conception, associated with an experience of satisfaction. In the following paragraph he writes that it is only when the pre-conception is joined with frustration that a conception (thought) is produced. There is a problem with BionÕs first statement. For if there is no internal object because that object has not been thought, it is difficult to justify how the ‘‘breast itself’’ could make contact with the pre-conception. BionÕs second statement leads us to believe that the sensation of hunger (emotion), combined with the frustration (absence of the breast), will create the conception of ‘‘no breast,’’ a ‘‘non-object,’’ which then, through 323 CONDEMNING JUDGMENT contact with the mother and the intervention of the container-contained mechanism, #$, will be able to become a ‘‘good breast.’’ The presence of two innate pre-conceptions, present at the start of life: ‘‘bad’’ and ‘‘good’’ breasts, which are coupled with the realizations concerning the ‘‘absent breast’’ and the nourishing breast also need to be recognized. This will be the basis of the first internal object. Additionally, it is the infantÕs constitution, which enables him or her to tolerate the frustration of hunger, of the ‘‘absent breast,’’ while preventing it from becoming prematurely the ‘‘bad breast’’ whose fate is then to be evacuated in the same way as feces, tears, et cetera (beta-elements). Bion considers the concept a conception that has been assigned a name. The concept signifies a growth of the abstraction that enables us to expand the generalization of psychoanalytic theories, which, as a whole are judged to be too descriptive, too concrete. Concepts can be articulated in a deductive scientific system that functions like an Ars combinatoria . PEDRO LUZES See also: Grid; Breast, good/bad object; Preconception; Realization; Thought. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred. (1962a). Learning from experience. London: Heinemann; New York: Basic Books. ———. (1967). A theory of thinking. In Second thoughts. London: Heinemann. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 43, 4–5.) ———. (1963). Elements of psycho-analysis. London: Heinemann. CONDEMNING JUDGMENT. See Judgment of condemnation CONDENSATION Condensation, along with displacement, is an essential process in dream work and more generally in primaryprocess thinking. We tend to view it as a way of attributing, to a person or representative object, characteristics and properties that, from the point of view of latent thoughts, belong to other persons or objects. In reality, if we go by FreudÕs text in The Interpretation of 32 4 Dreams (1900a), condensation, like displacement, does not proceed directly by modifying the content of a representation. All dreams are made up of latent dream thoughts, each of which corresponds to one or several chains of associations, with each link being initially charged with a psychic intensity. Dream work consists in changing the location of these fragmentary intensities without either increasing or reducing their global value. In displacement, one assigns to link A in a chain of associations the intensity initially associated with link B. Condensation, in contrast, operates by bringing intensities together. When two chains of association intersect, it assigns to the common link the sum of the intensities of the two intersecting chains. This nevertheless indirectly alters the representation because, in the manifest content of the dream, a link will not figure if it does not retain an intensity. By displacing the intensities of several chains to their common link, condensation makes it possible to represent all of the chains by a single link. Hence, there is an economy of means that contributes to censorship. As a result, when one link takes the place of several chains, this makes it more difficult to read through to the wish corresponding to those chains. Condensation thus has an indirect effect on the figural content of representations. It does not create chimeras that bring together in one element the attributes of others. Nor does it engage in metonymy, in which one of the links represents one or several chains of association. It is a process that operates by displacing intensity, but when the intensity of several chains is brought to bear on their common link, condensation seeks to represent them all. When explaining the effect of condensation, Freud used the metaphor of italics. A representative link whose intensity has been reinforced by condensation has a status comparable to that of a word in italics in a text. This metaphor calls for two remarks. First, the intensity added to a fragment of a representation through condensation makes it possible, like italics, to stress the importance of the representation. This added intensity indicates at the manifest level that the representation stands for the different latent chains intersecting at the link. Second, typographical emphasis warps the texture of a text and invites us to look for links other than those offered by successive statements. Typographical emphasis is an invitation to abandon linearity and search for the dreamerÕs associations. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CONFLICT The notion of intensity is complex. The term indicates the psychic interest of a particular idea. But we may well ask whether this interest should not be extended to the affect associated with each chain of associations or the instinct that determines each association. Although Freud studied condensation particularly in relation to dreams, especially in The Interpretation of Dreams, he also describes the effect of this process in other manifestations of primary-process thinking, such as jokes, forgetting names, slips of the tongue, and symptoms. In these latter domains, however, it is sometimes quite difficult to distinguish between condensation and overdetermination. In both cases, as the result of a transformation, a representation substitutes for more elaborate thought content. Both processes seem to proceed by increasing intensity, that is, by economic modification, and this results in the reorganization of the thought content. But whereas condensation can be viewed as a sum of intensities relative to forces acting in the same direction, overdetermination appears more as an appropriation of content by heterogeneous if not antagonistic forces. In fact, the content of an overdetermined representation acts as a fulcrum for opposing logics and conflicting systems (such as the preconscious and the unconscious). A thought content (or representation) resulting from the interaction of forces pushing for the fulfillment of an unconscious wish and forces opposing it (the censor) is a good example of overdetermination but not of condensation, since the censor is not part of the latent dream thoughts. However, as soon as the signifying element begins to represent conflict (as in the case of a symptom), the difference between condensation and overdetermination is more difficult to establish. CONFLICT In psychoanalysis, the notion of conflict generally refers to intrapsychic conflict in which antagonistic forces are pitted against each other. The idea is central to psychoanalytic doctrine: It is no exaggeration to say that in light of the importance given to infantile sexuality and the unconscious, conflict is basic to the structuring of the psychic armature; further, it can be said that Sigmund Freud devoted his entire life to elaborating a theory of conflict. Freud takes a cautious approach in his early work. He remains close to a psychology of consciousness at the beginning of his theory of repression, when he evokes, in the patient under the influence of a wish, the surging forth of ‘‘contrasting representations’’ and ‘‘irreconcilable ideas’’ that are so painful that, by an effort of ‘‘counter-will’’ the patient decides ‘‘to forget the thing’’ (1941b [1892], Notice III). From the outset, then, he posits the idea of a fundamental conflict between wishes and what opposes them. When Freud later unreservedly states that this process—repression—is essentially unconscious, that perspective, as much as the role of sexuality in wishes, becomes the basis for his parting of ways with Josef Breuer and for his ongoing opposition to such thinkers as Pierre Janet. From that point on, it is possible to follow the stages in his elaboration of a general theory of conflict:  as their name indicates, the neuropsychoses of defense (hysteria, obsessional neurosis, phobia) can be attributed to the conflict between wishes and obstacles to their fulfillment;  this struggle is expressed in compromise formations in which the wish is blocked and, at the same time, finds fulfillment in disguised forms: This is the return of the repressed, in the form of symptoms, dreams, slips of the tongue, parapraxes, and so forth, and all these socially and morally acceptable substitutive formations nevertheless produce an occult satisfaction of desire, thus providing and outlet for accumulated psychic energy;  it is thus important to distinguish manifest conflict, as it appears in the complaints of the patient and those around him or her, in symptomatology, and so on, from latent conflict, which only the work of psychoanalysis can bring to light; LAURENT DANON-BOILEAU See also: Dream; Dream work; Identification; Jokes; Metaphor; Primary process/secondary process; Representability; Slips of the tongue; Unconscious formations; Unconscious, the; Work (as a psychoanalytical notion). Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1–338; 5: 339–625. ———. (1905c). Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. SE, 8: 1–236. ———. (1916–1917a [1915-17]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15: 9–239; 16: 243–463. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 325 CONFLICT  the source of conflict is always to be sought in psychosexuality. Such, at least, is the position that Freud vigorously affirms in the first part of his work. However, the status of aggression posed a problem and would remain a troublesome point‘‘’’ in his theory. He returned to the issue, without finding a satisfactory solution, with his second theory of the instincts and the introduction of the ‘‘death instinct,’’ in his attempt to find what might lie ‘‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’’ (1920g) and by reframing questions related to sadism and masochism (for example, in ‘‘The Economic Problem of Masochism’’ [1924c]) and the like;  the theorization of the neuropsychoses of defense explicitly posits the existence of psychopathological states that do not follow this schema in that they are not produced by a conflict between the instincts and the defenses: perversions (‘‘the neuroses are the negative form of perversion,’’ Freud writes in ‘‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’’ [1905d, p. 238]) and actual neuroses, in which the symptom is produced by a direct flow of libidinal energy into the somatic functions, without passing through psychical working over (this latter category was taken up and extensively developed in modern studies of psychosomatic disorders). However, these distinctions, which seem to originate in a somewhat overly rigorous psychoanalytic nosography, were challenged by FreudÕs successors;  an important watershed occurred around 1910 with regard to two connected areas, when Freud began to envisage conflicts between the ‘‘two principles of mental functioning,’’ the pleasure principle and the reality principle (‘‘Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning’’ [1911b]), and the opposition between narcissistic cathexes and object cathexes (‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ [1914c]);  at the same time, FreudÕs theorization of the Oedipus complex (explicitly designated by that name for the first time in 1910, although the idea is present much earlier) brought to light the idea of conflicting identifications (first and foremost, between paternal and maternal identifications);  from this point on, the stages in libidinal development having been established, different developmental and structural levels of psychic conflict can be distinguished. In the case of orality, 32 6 biting/not biting the breast; according to Karl Abraham, this ambivalent phase is preceded by a preambivalent phase. In the anal phase, expulsion/retention; this is where the sadistic/ masochistic and active/passive oppositions are imbricated. The phallic phase is characterized by the oppositions between phallic/castrated and masculine/feminine as well as by the principal form of conflict that places desire in opposition to prohibition. As is clear from this brief summary, conflict in Freudian thought often takes the form of pairs of opposites. There is more at issue here than merely situating conflicts in the activation of the erogenous zones. When there is conflict, it involves the putting into play of object relations (for example, in the case of anality, in the oppositions between satisfying/disappointing or giving/refusing). The love/hate opposition, which Melanie Klein posits as fundamental (working within the perspective inaugurated in FreudÕs second theory of the instincts) has since undergone extensive elaboration. Finally, at the most basic level of all, the opposition between being/nonbeing should no doubt be added; its importance is apparent in the study of psychoses. Conflict can pit the instincts themselves against one another. In his early work Freud places the sexual instinct in opposition to the instinct for self-preservation; in his second theory, he opposes the life instinct to the death instinct. Moreover, clinical practice suggests that instincts may be conflictual in themselves: It has been observed that in certain anxiety states instinctual satisfaction is fantasized as a cataclysmic explosion that would annihilate all the subjectÕs vital energy in a single instant and cause death. We should also recall the forms of conflict in which different agencies within the psychic apparatus are in opposition: the conscious and the unconscious in FreudÕs early theory, or the Id, the Ego, and the Superego in his later work. In all the above forms, conflict is considered in terms of its intrapsychic workings. However, it is clear we should also consider its articulation with interpersonal conflicts and, beyond that, the problem of conflicts between the individual and society, which Freud himself addressed several times, notably in Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego (1921c) and Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a). ROGER PERRON INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CONFRONTATION See also: Allergy; Ambivalence; ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’’; Beyond the Pleasure Principle; Compromise formation; Defense; Defense mechanisms; Doubt; Drive/instinct; Dualism; Dynamic point of view, the; Ego autonomy; Hysteria; Oedipus complex; Neutrality/ Benevolent neutrality; Nuclear complex; Prohibition; Psychotic potential; Reaction-formation; Splitting; Symptom-formation; Transference hatred. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 45–61. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 130–243. ———. (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12: 218–226. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: an introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. ———. (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155–170. ———. (1930a). Civilization and its discontents, SE, 21: 57–145. ———. (1941b [1892]). Sketches for the ÔPreliminary commmunicationÕ of 1893, (B) ÔIII.Õ SE, 1: 149–150. Further Reading Brenner, Charles. (1982). The mind in conflict. New York: International Universities Press. Frank, George. (1996). Conflict and deficit: two theories or one? Psychoanalytical Psychology, 13, 567–570. Smith, Henry. (2003). Conceptions of conflict in psychoanalytic theory and practice. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 72, 49–96. CONFRONTATION The seminar known as Confrontation, designed to foster discussion and overcome intellectual isolation engendered by institutional divisions in French psychoanalysis, was created by René Major and Dominique Geahchan in 1973. It represented an effort to develop a non-sectarian forum for discussion and debate among analysts and to bring psychoanalysis into contact with related disciplines. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS At the time, four psychoanalytic institutions were operating in France. The Société Psychanalytique de Paris (SPP) and training institute was the first to be founded and the progenitor of the others; there was also the Association Psychanalytique de France (APF). Members of that organization helped Jacques Lacan to establish the École Freudienne de Paris in 1964 while a schism in that group had led five years later to the founding of what was known as the Quatrième Groupe. The various splits had precipitated considerable resentment amongst French analysts, especially after the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) pointedly refused to recognize Lacan or Françoise Dolto as training analysts. The resulting climate of divisiveness favored dogmatism. Major and Geahchan belonged to the Paris society; the former was director of the training institute. Attendees at the first seminar brought Wladimir Granoff, Serge Leclaire, and François Perrier before institute members, including Nicolas Abraham, Denise Braunschweig, Alain de Mijolla, Jacques Mynard, Michel Neyraut, Catherine Parat, Maria Torok, Serge Viderman; analysts from the three other groups also attended. Subsequent meetings took place at the Maison de la Chimie and at the Maison des Polytechniciens. Thus there developed an extensive exchange of ideas, after years of relative isolation, among analysts such as Piera Aulagnier, Jean Clavreul, Jean Laplanche, Maud and Octave Mannoni, Michèle Montrelay, JeanBertrand Pontalis, Elisabeth Roudinesco, François Roustang, Moustapha Safouan, Conrad Stein, and Nathalie Zaltzman. Dialogue also took the form of meetings with philosophers, mathematicians, historians, and linguists—among them Jean Baudrillard, Catherine Clément, Jacques Derrida, Serge Doubrovsky, Luce Irigaray, Sarah Kofman, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean Claude Milner, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Jean Petitot. By 1975 these seminars became a site of intellectual exchange that considered psychoanalysis in relation to literature, politics, law, and religions through investigations of little-studied themes. Well-known analysts attended these meetings, regardless of their institutional affiliation, in an atmosphere of openness that encouraged debate on the merits of the various idioms that were then developing what might be more broadly construed as the language of psychoanalysis. The seminars also led to various publications under the imprints of Éditions Confrontation and Éditions Aubier Montaigne. 327 ‘‘ C O N F U S I O N OF TONGUES BETWEEN ADULTS AND THE C H I L D ’’ Memorable seminars included one that, for the first time in France, brought to light the situation of psychoanalysis in Argentina and Brazil during a period of dictatorship and human rights abuse. Another concerned The Post Card, re-igniting the dispute initiated by LacanÕs ‘‘Seminar on ÔThe Purloined LetterÕ’’ and DerridaÕs interpretation of it. An Anglo-French meeting debated the relationship of psychoanalysis and deconstructionism, analytic philosophy, and feminism; it brought together Hélène Cixous, Jacques Derrida, Antoinette Fouque, Serge Leclaire, and Juliet Mitchell. Another seminar, in Italy with Armando Bauleo, concerned politics and society. Neither an institute nor training program vis-à-vis clinical practice, the Confrontation seminars realized in embryonic form FreudÕs hope, expressed in The Question of Lay Analysis, for new post-graduate institutions that would enable analysts to acquire a broader base of knowledge for understanding science and culture. The seminars ended in May 1983, with the death of Dominique Geahchan. In a larger context, Confrontation was a first step toward a broader forum for analytic thought outside of conventional institutes. At the Collège International de Philosophie, René Major directed a colloquium on ‘‘Lacan and the Philosophers’’ in 1990. In 1997, after a similar meeting held upon publication of Helena Besserman ViannaÕs book on Brazil, Major called for an international conference. This became the first Estates General of Psychoanalysis, held at the Sorbonne in the year 2000, with representative from thirty-three countries and the ultimate aim of creating a European-based institute of advanced studies in psychoanalysis. CHANTAL TALAGRAND See also: Cahiers Confrontation, Les. Bibliography Major, René. (1991). Lacan avec Derrida. Paris: Éditions Mentha. Besserman Vianna, Helena. (1995). NÕen parlez à personne. La psychanalyse face à la dictature et à la torture. Paris: Éditions lÕHarmattan. Collège International de Philosophie. (1991). Lacan avec les philosophes. Paris: Editions Albin Michel. 32 8 ‘‘CONFUSION OF TONGUES BETWEEN ADULTS AND THE CHILD’’ Sándor FerencziÕs original title for this article, prepared for the Wiesbaden Congress (September, 1932) was ‘‘The Passions of Adults and their Influence on the Development of the Character and the Sexuality of the Child.’’ The change in the name of the article is indicative of FerencziÕs new perception of the problem of traumatism; for the first time he established a clear distinction between the language and motivation (desire for tenderness, security, basic love, ‘‘passive object-love’’) of childhood and the reasons for passionate language in some adults, when they are seducers, desirous of genital excitation and a domination through violence. Recalling the central Freudian thesis of the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), Ferenczi expounded most eloquently in this text the notion of the hypnotizing and the terrorizing effects of suffering, which, because they are passionate punishments coming from the adult, allow the child to feel even more attached to that person: ‘‘The same anxiety, however, if it reaches a certain maximum, compels them to subordinate themselves like automata to the will of the aggressor, to divine each one of his desires and to gratify these; completely oblivious of themselves they identify themselves with the aggressor. Through the identification, or let us say, introjection of the aggressor, he disappears as part of the external reality, and becomes intra- instead of extra-psychic’’ (1932/1955, p. 162). This is how Ferenczi describes the introjection of the adultÕs guilt by children, followed by confusion, loss of confidence in their own perceptions, and fragmentation of the personality, particularly devastating when the traumatic shock has been incestuous. In this text he created his daunting metaphor for posttraumatic precocious maturity: ‘‘The precocious maturity of the fruit that was injured by a bird or insect’’ (p. 165). The conclusions he came to on the basis of this pathological model had a bearing also on the practice of analysis; while they were not very well received at the time, some have turned out to be quite pertinent. A good number of these notions, articulated in his Clinical Journal, have influenced other prominent psychoanalysts, including Sacha Nacht in France; Michael Balint, his student and friend, in Great Britain; and Harold Searles and his students, Elizabeth Severn, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS C O N G R È S Clara Thompson, Sándor Lorand, and Sándor Radó, in the United States. PIERRE SABOURIN See also: Childhood; Ferenczi, Sándor; General theory of seduction; Neurotica; Passion; Primal fantasies; Psychic casuality; Real trauma; Relaxation principle and neocatharsis; Seduction scenes; Seduction; Sexual trauma; Tenderness; Trauma. Source Citation Ferenczi, Sándor. (1955). Confusion of tongues between adults and the child. In Final contributions to the problems and methods of psychoanalysis (, p. 156–67). London, Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1932). Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. Sabourin, Pierre. (1982). Préface. In Sándor Ferenczi, Oeuvres completes (Vol. 4). Paris: Payot. CONGRÈS DES PSYCHANALYSTES DE LANGUE FRANÇAISE DES PAYS ROMANS On July 19, 1926, Freud mailed René Laforgue a little card announcing the first in a series of meetings. It read, ‘‘Dear Master, Gathered together on the occasion of the Geneva psychiatric congress, the members of our little Paris group and our Swiss friends send you our best wishes. The beautiful countryside allows us to rest from complicated discussions concerning schizophrenia, the superego, and the id.’’ Signatures: René Laforgue, Dr Robin, Mme Laforgue, Raymond de Saussure, Angélo Hesnard, Ariane de Saussure, Édouard Pichon, Adrien Borel.These meetings are still held regularly today; only their name has changed over the years. The Congrès des psychanalystes de langue française des pays romans (Congress of Psychiatrists and Neurologists of France and French-Speaking Countries [also called ‘‘Congress of Alienists and Neurologists of France and French-Speaking Countries’’]) was held in Geneva from August 2 to 7, 1926. The congress was organized around a paper by Henri Claude, ‘‘Dementia praecox and Schizophrenia.’’ ClaudeÕs students came to listen to their ‘‘leader.’’ In this very psychiatric atmosphere, without anyone being aware of the preparations for the innovation, ClaudeÕs followers, by associating with their Swiss colleagues—then more enthusiastic than the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DES PSYCHANALYSTES DE L A N G U E F R A N Ç A I S E DES PAYS ROMANS French about psychoanalysis—held the first Conference of French-Speaking Psychoanalysts on Sunday, August 1, 1926. They also founded the Linguistic Commission for the Unification of French Psychoanalytic Vocabulary. In the morning session, presided over by Raymond de Saussure (of Geneva), René Laforgue (of Paris) presented a paper titled ‘‘Schizophrénie et schizonoı̈a’’ (Schizophrenia and schizonoia; 1926). The afternoon session, presided over by A. Hesnard, was devoted to a paper by Charles Odier (of Geneva) titled ‘‘Contribution à lÕétude du surmoi et du phénomène moral’’ (A contribution to the study of the superego and the phenomenon of morality; 1927). Édouard Pichon, the new secretary, stated, ‘‘It has been decided to hold the conference every year in the same city as the Congress of Psychiatrists and on the eve of the opening of that congress.’’ This plan was followed for the second conference, held in Blois, France, on July 27, 1927. The conference focused on Charles OdierÕs paper ‘‘La névrose obsessionnelle’’ (Obsessional neurosis; 1927). And it opened up to physicians other than psychiatrists. The third meeting, now separate from the Congress of Psychiatrists, was held in Paris in July 1928 on the subject of ‘‘psychoanalytic technique.’’ Thereafter, conferences were held in the amphitheater of the mental health clinic of SaintAnneÕs Hospital, thus facilitating a mandatory show of reverence for the resident master Henri Claude. In the conference two cliques formed. On one side were the ‘‘orthodox’’ Freudians, grouped around Marie Bonaparte and including Eugénie Sokolnicka, Rudolph Loewenstein, and two Swiss members, Raymond de Saussure and Charles Odier. On the other side were the partisans of a ‘‘French psychoanalysis,’’ associated with the medical and institutional hierarchy. They had Édouard Pichon as their bellicose herald, along with Angélo Hesnard, René Allendy, Georges Parcheminey, Henri Codet, and later René Laforgue. One of the themes of the latter group was a distinction between a suspect psychoanalytic doctrine and a method whose success was undeniable but whose mode of application needed to be adapted to French sensitivities. An example of this distinction is President René AllendyÕs address on the occasion of the sixth Conference of French-Speaking Psychoanalysts on October 30, 1931: ‘‘Psychoanalysis is not just some kind of a theory. It has a more precious and less debatable claim to fame: it has cured morbid states that hitherto resisted all therapeutic treatments.’’ As a result 329 C O N G R È S DES PSYCHANALYSTES DE L A N G U E F R A N Ç A I S E DES PAYS ROMANS of the distinction, later meetings saw the presentation of two distinct papers, one theoretical and one clinical. This dichotomy was maintained until 1960, when, on the occasion of the twenty-first Congress of Romance-Language Psychoanalysts in Rome, the congress bureau, encouraged by a suggestion from Nicola Perotti, decided to abolish the distinction. The success of the conference and an abundance of contributions on the subject of ‘‘conversion hysteria’’ (including those by Georges Parcheminey and Blanche Jouve-Reverchon) led in 1931 to the sixth conference being held, for the first time, over a two-day period. It was also the first conference to receive a good-will telegram from Max Eitingon, president of the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA). This custom was regularly maintained by Ernest Jones and continued after the war until it was replaced in 1974, during the presidency of Serge Lebovici, by a representative of the IPA attending the conferences. The eighth conference, on ‘‘genetic psychology and psychoanalysis,’’ brought Jean Piaget and Raymond de Saussure face to face in December 1933. Among the speakers we find, for the first time, the name of then thirty-two-year-old Jacques Lacan. There were no conferences in 1932 and 1934, but two were held in 1933. There followed the mystery of two ‘‘ninth’’ conferences, this figure being applied both to the conference held in Paris on February 2, 1935, on Paul SchiffÕs paper ‘‘Les paranoı̈as et la psychanalyse’’ (Paranoia and psychoanalysis; 1935), and to the conference held in Nyons on April 10 and 11, 1936. The tenth conference, in reality the eleventh, was held in Paris on February 21 and 22, 1938. Sacha Nacht delivered a paper titled ‘‘Le masochisme: étude historique, clinique, psychogénique et thérapeutique’’ (Masochism: an historical, clinical, psychogenetic, prophylactic, and therapeutic study; 1938). Rudolph Loewenstein, speaking on ‘‘LÕorigine du masochisme et la théorie des pulsions’’ (The origin of masochism and the theory of the instincts; 1938), opposed his former analyst on the notion of a death instinct, which Nacht rejected. This was the last conference of Frenchspeaking psychoanalysts before the Second World War. The conferences, which were just as political as they were theoretical or clinical, were not held for the duration of the war. Their resumption after ten years marked the renewal of psychoanalysis in both France and Europe. This eleventh conference, held in Brussels between 33 0 May 14 and 17, 1948, was organized around Sacha NachtÕs paper ‘‘Les manifestations cliniques de lÕagressivité et leur rôle dans le traitement psychanalytique’’ (Clinical manifestations of aggression and their role in psycho-analytic treatment; 1948) and Jacques LacanÕs paper ‘‘LÕagressivité en psychanalyse’’ (Aggression in psychoanalysis; 1948). The following year, at the twelfth conference held in Paris, John Leuba and H. G. Van des Walls dealt with narcissism. This conference was distinguished most of all by the presence of Melanie Klein, who, however, failed to make converts among French psychoanalysts. Relations with neighboring countries improved, and on October 16, 1951, the conference changed its name to the Conference of Romance-Language Psychoanalysts, an extension attributed to Jacques Lacan. The conference thus made official its increasingly close collaboration with Belgian, Spanish, Italian, and Swiss societies of psychoanalysis. In 1953 a sixteenth special conference was held in Rome. The division of the Société psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society) (SPP) in June divided the conference into two parts. In one, the members of the society listened to Emilio Servadio, Francis Pasche, René Spitz (who came from New York), Serge Lebovici, and René Diatkine. They then departed, and members of the new Société française de psychanalyse (French Society of Psychoanalysis) entered to listen to Jacques LacanÕs paper ‘‘Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse’’ (The function and field of language in psychoanalysis). Jealously simmering in the Paris Psychoanalytic Society tore the two rival societies apart for more than a decade, and the following conferences of Frenchspeaking psychoanalysts fit into the general strategy of the two societiesÕ struggle for influence. Yet the conferences were also the scene of original theoretical elaborations marking the evolution and deepening of the psychoanalytic thinking of members of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society. This can be seen from a sample of papers presented at the conferences: Sacha Nacht and Serge Lebovici, ‘‘Indications et contre-indications de la psychanalyse chez lÕadulte’’ (Indications and contraindications for psychoanalysis for adults; 1954); René Diatkine and Jean Favreau, ‘‘Le caractère névrotique’’ (The neurotic character; 1956); Francis Pasche, ‘‘Le génie de Freud’’ (The genius of Freud; 1957); Béla Grunberger, ‘‘Essai sur la situation analytique et le processus de guérison’’ (The analytic situation and the process of healing; 1956); Sacha Nacht and Paul-Claude INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS C O N G R È S I N T E R N A T I O N A L Racamier, ‘‘La théorie psychanalytique du délire’’ (The psychoanalytic theory of delusions; 1958); Maurice Bouvet, ‘‘Dépersonnalisation et relations dÕobjet’’ (Depersonalization and object relations; 1960); P. Bofill and P. Folch-Mateu, ‘‘Problèmes cliniques et techniques du contre-transfert’’ (Clinical and technical problems with counter-transference; 1963); Michel Fain and Christian David, ‘‘Aspects fonctionnels de la vie onirique’’ (Functional aspects of dream life; 1962); Angel Garma, ‘‘LÕintégration psychosomatique dans le traitement psychanalytique des maladies organiques’’ (Psychosomatic integration in the psychoanalytic treatment of organic illnesses); Michel Gressot, ‘‘Psychanalyse et psychothérapie: leur commensalisme’’ (Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy: their compatibility; 1963); René Held, ‘‘Rapport clinique sur les psychothérapies dÕinspiration psychanalytique freudienne’’ (Clinical report on psychotherapies inspired by Freudian psychoanalysis; 1963); Franco Fornari, ‘‘La psychanalyse de la guerre’’ (The psychoanalysis of war; 1964); Evelyne Kestemberg and Jean Kestemberg, ‘‘Contribution à la perspective génétique en psychanalyse’’ (Contribution to the genetic perspective in psychoanalysis; 1965); Rudolph Loewenstein, ‘‘Rapports sur la psychologie psychanalytique de H. Hartman, E. Kris, et Rudolf Loewenstein’’ (Report on the psychoanalytic psychology of H. Hartmann, E. Kris and Rudolf Loewenstein; 1965); Olivier Flournoy, ‘‘Du symptôme au discours’’ (From symptom to discourse; 1967); André Green, ‘‘LÕaffect’’ (The affects; 1970); and to end this list, Didier Anzieu (of the Association psychanalytique de France [French Psychoanalytic Association]), the first such contributor since the split in 1953), ‘‘Eléments dÕune théorie de lÕinterprétation’’ (Elements of a theory of interpretation; 1970). In 1955 the conferences became known as congresses. In 1956 Pierre Luquet was appointed permanent secretary for the congresses, a position he occupied for thirty-three years until 1989, when he was replaced by Augustin Jeanneau, assisted by Pearl Lombard. He handled the arrival and departure of societies from neighboring countries, administrative matters concerning their participation, relations with the French Psychoanalytic Association, and relations with the European Federation for Psychoanalysis, created in 1966. In addition, he negotiated publication of the first large annual volumes of congress proceedings. The locale of the congresses alternated between Paris and a neighboring country. This international character is reflected in its changes of name to Congress of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DE L ’ H Y P N O T I S M E E X P É R I M E N T A L ET SCIENTIFIQUE, PREMIER French-Speaking psychoanalysts from Romance-language countries and then to French-speaking psychoanalysts. The days of didactic reports gave way to much more audacious presentations of clinical and theoretical research, as shown by the few examples mentioned. Moreover, the choice of subjects and contributors traces the history of psychoanalysis in France, including the tensions and alliances that characterized the division of the French psychoanalytic movement in relation to the International Psychoanalytical Association. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Belgium; France; Revue française de psychanalyse; Société psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris. Bibliography Mijolla, Alain de. (1991). Le congrès des psychanalystes de langue française des pays romans: quelques éléments dÕhistoire. Revue française de psychanalyse, 55 (1), 7–36. CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DE L’HYPNOTISME EXPÉRIMENTAL ET SCIENTIFIQUE, PREMIER Organized by Doctor Edgar Bérillon, founder and director of the Revue de lÕhypnotisme, the Premier congrès international de lÕhypnotisme expérimental et scientifique (First international congress on scientific and experimental hypnotism) was held at the city hospital in Paris on August 12, 1889, and chaired by Doctor Victor Dumontpallier. The discussions were heated, especially between those who maintained the existence of a link between hypnosis and hysteria (École de la Salpêtrière) and those who saw it as a form of suggestion that could be therapeutically useful (École de Nancy). There were further disagreements between Gilles de la Tourette (École de la Salpêtrière), who felt the power of suggestion of the hypnotist presented no danger to society, since the patient would resist any orders that challenged his morality, and the lawyer Jules Liégois, who feared the consequences of such behavior. Additionally, some participants felt that hypnosis in public should be banned and hypnosis placed under medical supervision (Ladame, de Genève), and those who held a more liberal position (Joseph Delboeuf, de Liège), who believed that hypnosis should be practiced freely, although responsibly, 331 CONSCIOUS PROCESSES further claiming that a medical degree was not alone sufficient (given the level of medical education at the time) to ensure competence in the area of hypnosis. The proceedings of the congress were sent to all active members. These included ‘‘Dr. Sigmund Freud, doctor, Vienna.’’ Early in his career Freud made use of hypnotic suggestion. He spent several weeks in Nancy to perfect his technique with Ambroise Auguste Liebeault and Hippolyte Bernheim. Freud left directly from Nancy to attend two congresses in Paris—the first on physiological psychology (August 5–10), the second on hypnotism (August 8–12). If it is true, as Ernest Jones noted, that Freud left Paris the evening of August 9, he could not have been present for the controversy between Ladame and Delboeuf during the second congress. Although he may have not been present for the discussions, he would have been able to read the various presentations in the published proceedings. FRANÇOIS DUYCKAERTS See also: Bernheim, Hippolyte; Delboeuf, Joseph Rémi Léopold; Hypnosis. Bibliography Bérillon, Edgar. (1889). Premier Congrès international de l’hypnotisme expérimental et thérapeutique. Paris: Doin. Duyckaerts, François. (1990). Delbœuf-Ladame: un conflit paradigmatique. Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse, 3, 25–37. Freud, Sigmund. (1925d [1924]). An autobiographical study. SE, 20: 3–70. Jones, Ernest. (1953). Sigmund Freud: Life and work. London: Hogarth Press. CONSCIOUS PROCESSES Conscious processes comprise all phenomena, organized in time, linked to the individualÕs intuitive and immediate knowledge of his own mental life. If, as Freud stressed, ‘‘in the Y-systems memory and the quality that characterizes consciousness are mutually exclusive’’ (1900a, p. 540), consciousness is thus indissolubly linked to perception and to the qualitative changes brought about by the Pcs.-Cs. system, on the one hand with respect to the outside world, by means of the sense organs, and on the other with 33 2 respect to the most superficial as to the deepest layers of the psyche. This system responds to the perception of pleasure and unpleasure, releases of which thus ‘‘automatically regulate’’—at all levels, including the conscious one—‘‘the course of cathectic processes’’ (p. 574). ‘‘But it is quite possible that consciousness of these [perceived] qualities may introduce in addition a second and more discriminating regulation, which is even able to oppose the former one, and which perfects the efficiency of the apparatus by enabling it, in contradiction to its original plan, to cathect and work over even what is associated with the release of unpleasure’’ (p. 616). ‘‘Thought-processes are in themselves without quality, except for the pleasurable and unpleasurable excitations which accompany them, and which, in view of their possible disturbing effect upon thinking, must be kept within bounds. In order that thoughtprocesses may acquire quality, they are associated in human beings with verbal memories, whose residues of quality are sufficient to draw the attention of consciousness to them and to endow the process of thinking with a new cathexis from consciousness’’ (p. 617). By virtue of the qualities thus acquired by the Pcs. system, now governed by secondary processes, ‘‘consciousness, which had hitherto been a sense organ for perceptions alone, also became a sense organ for a portion of our thought-processes’’ (p. 574), whereas feelings for their part pass directly from the unconscious into consciousness. Hence it is thanks to the mediation of word-presentations that ‘‘internal thoughtprocesses are made into perceptions,’’ which is to say that they ‘‘are actually perceived—as if they came from without—and are consequently held to be true’’ (1923b, p. 23). Such a hypercathexis of thought, which enables it to pass into consciousness, should be seen as analogous to what occurs at the level of the perception of the outside world thanks to the part played by attention, which Freud is just as insistent upon, and which is reinforced by the function of the Cs. systemÕs protective shield against stimuli (1920g, p. 28). Whereas the sense organs process only a minimal proportion of external stimuli, ‘‘cathectic innervations are sent out and withdrawn in rapid periodic impulses from within into the completely pervious system Pcpt.-Cs. . . . It is as though the unconscious stretches out feelers, through the medium of the system Pcpt.-Cs., towards the external world and hastily withdraws them as soon as they have sampled the excitations coming from INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CONSCIOUSNESS it’’—a process that in FreudÕs view ‘‘lies at the bottom of the origin of the concept of time’’ (1925a, p. 231). A subtle dialectic may be observed here between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, a dialectic that facilitates the gradual institution and development of the functions of consciousness—attention, judgment, memory, and thought—in parallel with the shift from free energy to bound energy. Over and above spontaneous conscious processes, it behooves psychoanalysis to offer an account of the processes involved in the passage into the conscious that occurs during treatment, among them displacement; the mastery of excitation; the transference of the analysandÕs internal objects onto the analyst (for later return to the former); the transformation of unconscious traces into ideational representations; and working-through, meaning the transition from the spontaneous work of the psyche to an uninterrupted working-out activity, during the treatment, within and by means of the Pcpt.-Cs. system. Upon all of this is predicated the possibility of the past being effectively transformed into memory, and repetition into meaning; it is worth noting, however, that today the main concern would seem to be less the acknowledgment of transferred content than the work of transformation itself. ‘‘essence’’ of mental life. Rather, consciousness has a fugitive quality and does not ‘‘form unbroken sequences which are complete in themselves’’ (p. 157). ‘‘The psychical, whatever its nature may be, is in itself unconscious and probably similar in kind to all the other natural processes of which we have obtained knowledge’’ (1940b [1938], p. 283). Freud stressed, however, that consciousness still plays an importance role; indeed, it is ‘‘the one light which illuminates our path and leads us through the darkness of mental life’’ (p. 286). The work of psychoanalysis, as Freud saw it, is ‘‘translating unconscious processes into conscious ones, and thus filling in the gaps in conscious perception’’ (p. 286). Consciousness is the qualitative perception of information arising both from the external world and from the internal world: an external world that is unknowable in itself and to which we have access only via subjective elements collected by our sense organs and an internal world that consists of unconscious mental processes and that we are aware of solely through sensations of pleasure/unpleasure and revived memories. According to Freud, ‘‘A personÕs own body, and above all its surface, is a place from which both external and internal perceptions may spring’’ (1923b, p. 25). RAYMOND CAHN See also: Consciousness; Introspection; Preconscious, the; Process; Signifier/signified. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4 ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ———. (1925a [1924]). A note upon the ‘‘Mystic WritingPad.’’ SE, 19: 225–232. CONSCIOUSNESS In psychology, consciousness is the subjectÕs immediate apprehension of mental activity. Although Freud thought that conscious processes are ‘‘the same as the consciousness of the philosophers and of everyday opinion’’ and ‘‘a fact without parallel, which defies all explanation or description’’ (1940a [1938], pp. 159, 157), he argued that they could not be considered the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS From the beginning Freud treated consciousness and perception as indissolubly linked, indeed, so much so that throughout his work he deemed them to constitute a single structure, the perceptionconsciousness system. Freud also drew a distinction, within nonconscious phenomena, between latent states susceptible of becoming conscious at any moment and repressed psychic processes inaccessible to consciousness. This led him to differentiate the unconscious system proper from a preconscious system, cut off from consciousness by censorship but also controlling access to consciousness. In this sense, the preconscious and the conscious are very close: both are governed by secondary processes and both draw on a bound form of psychic energy. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Freud spoke of the preconsciousconscious system, and in ‘‘The Unconscious’’ (1915e), he described the preconscious as ‘‘conscious knowledge’’ (p. 167), even though it provides access to unconscious contents and processes, provided that they have been transformed. 333 CONSTANCY From his earliest writings on, Freud saw the link between consciousness and the ego as very close. And although by 1920 Freud viewed the ego as in large part unconscious in its defensive activities, he continued to attach consciousness to it as both the ‘‘nucleus’’ and the ‘‘surface of the mental apparatus’’ (1923b, p. 19). CONSTANCY. See Principle of constancy By the early twenty-first century, the problem of perception had become increasingly complex. FreudÕs near conflation of perception and consciousness, which required him to postulate that perceptual phenomena and the laying down of memory traces are incompatible, has come in for serious reconsideration. It is worth noting, though, that Freud himself, in his last years, was given pause on this issue by the problem of fetishism, apropos of which it was apparent that perceptions and mnemic traces could be caught up in one and the same conflict. This line of thinking has led to a reevaluation of all psychopathologies where disavowal and splitting predominate, such as borderline conditions, and more generally, to a review of all states involving the relationship between perception and hallucination (see Donald W. WinnicottÕs notions of the subjective object and of transitionality [1953]). Constitution is all the characteristics and tendencies, both somatic and psychic, that an individual brings into life at the time of birth. It is those parts of the individual that are innate, inherited, or genetically determined. Classically, it stands in opposition to all that is accidental, things acquired in the course of life. Certain doctrinal trends in the field of psychopathology rely on the notion of constitution in order to define personality types that are predisposed to specific psychiatric affections, particularly psychosis. RAYMOND CAHN See also: Agency; Censorship; Conscious processes; Ego; Metapsychology; Mnemic trace/memory trace; ‘‘Note upon the ÔMystic Writing Pad,Õ A’’; Perception-consciousness (Pcpt.-Cs.); Preconscious, the; Psychic apparatus; Psychoanalytic treatment; Topographical point of view; ‘‘Unconscious, The.’’ Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. ———. (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 166–204. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 12–59. ———. (1940a [1938]). An outline of psychoanalysis. SE, 23: 139–207. ———. (1940b [1938]). Some elementary lessons in psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 279–286. Winnicott, Donald W. (1953). Transitional objects and transitional phenomena: A study of the first not-me possession. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 34, 89–97. 33 4 CONSTITUTION The notion of a constitutional factor is FreudÕs, and he elaborated the theory in two distinct periods. Before 1905, he conflated it with hereditary disposition, referring to a general and universal condition in the pathogenic determinism of all affections, particularly neurotic affections. In the etiology of these affections, the hereditary disposition is associated with specific causes of a sexual nature in accordance with the rules of a complemental series. Thus, ‘‘the same specific causes acting on a healthy individual produce no manifest pathological effect, whereas in a predisposed person their action causes the neurosis to come to light, whose development will be proportionate in intensity and extent to the degree of the hereditary precondition’’ (1896a, p. 147). After 1905, the Freudian conception of constitution became inseparable from the sexual doctrine resulting from his identification of infantile sexuality in all human beings. In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), Freud traces the origin of infantile sexuality to component instincts that are perverse because they seek satisfaction independently of each other and thus define, for all individuals, a ‘‘polymorphously perverse disposition’’ (1905d, p. 191). ‘‘The conclusion now presents itself to us that there is indeed something innate lying behind the perversions but that it is something innate in everyone, though as a disposition it may vary in its intensity and may be increased by the influences of actual life’’ (1905d, p. 171). Sexual constitution thus came to replace general hereditary disposition. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CONSTRUCTION DE In lecture twenty-three of Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916–17a), entitled ‘‘The Paths to the Formation of Symptoms,’’ Freud enriched the notion of sexual constitution with that of fixation of the libido. These fixations represent the individualÕs constitutional past toward which the libido regresses as a result of the repression imposed on it by the neurosis. According to Freud, these fixations are partly the traces of the phylogenetic heritage. CLAUDE SMADJA See also: Bisexuality; Character; Heredity of acquired characters; ‘‘Heredity and the Etiology of the Neuroses’’; Instinct; Intergenerational; Phylogenesis; Prehistory; Primal fantasies; Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1896a). Heredity and the aetiology of the neuroses. SE, 3: 141–156. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1906a). My views on the part played by sexuality in the aetiology of the neuroses. SE, 7: 269–279. ———. (1916–17a). Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. Parts I & II. SE, 15–16. CONSTRAINT. See Obsessional neurosis CONSTRUCTION DE L’ESPACE ANALYTIQUE (LA-) [CONSTRUCTING THE ANALYTICAL SPACE] This work has had and continues to have great importance for French psychoanalysis. It sheds an original light on a central question in FreudÕs work, that of constructions in analysis. Serge Viderman proposes to extend this notion very broadly and make it the basis of a metapsychological line of thought. He draws a distinction between the certainties we may derive from reconstructing a past INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS L ’ E S P A C E A N A L Y T I Q U E ( L A - ) [C O N S T R U C T I N G THE ANALYTICAL SPACE] lost to repression and the uncertainty that must always attend constructions of the original nucleus. But he adds that ‘‘any thoroughgoing interpretation does not reconstruct the subject’s history, rather, it invents a story’’ (p. 27). Much more than a discovery or a recovery, what is involved here is conjecture: to reconstruct a history is in fact to construct it. A metaphor nevertheless illustrates moments of certainty that occur in analysis: ‘‘Imagine two lighthouses turning in opposite directions with their beams crossing periodically. It is when transference and counter-transference intersect that the moments of greatest brilliance occur. Privileged moments when the truth of interpretation shines through’’ (p. 52). Viderman keeps his distance from his contemporary Jacques Lacan, specifically writing: ‘‘The unconscious is structured as a language only because language structures it,’’ as well as from certain psychoanalytical clichés, especially ‘‘listening with the third ear.’’ In a sense, Viderman’s theory is built on the whole question of historical reality in analysis, a debate that began in 1897 when Freud declared that he no longer believed in his neurotica. For Viderman, ‘‘the historic illusion of psychoanalysis is still the trauma theory—fons and origo of pathogenesis—an infantile disorder of psychoanalysis that we may never have recovered from’’ (1970). Starting from the analysis of the counter-transference, he centers his theoretical approach to the analytic treatment on the analyst’s ability to construct—or rather to invent, based on what he hears, and on what he knows about analysis from his own analytic experience and theoretical knowledge. The work of analysis, as he presents it, consists in trying to link the unknowable aspect of the instinct with the idea that denotes the instinct, an idea that, in turn, suffers the effect of interpretation, of what the analyst says about it. VidermanÕs book closes with this thought: ‘‘Hegel had a presentiment that we would have to fabricate truth’’ (p. 344). SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Construction-reconstruction; ‘‘Constructions in Analysis’’ ‘‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (Wolf Man)’’; Historical truth; History and psychoanalysis; Memories; Memory; Primal scene; Viderman, Serge. 335 CONSTRUCTION/RECONSTRUCTION Source Citation Viderman, Serge. (1970). La construction de lÕespace analytique. Paris: Denoël. Bibliography Revue française de psychanalyse. (March–June 1974). Constructions et reconstructions. Á propos de La construction de l’espace analytique. 38, (2–3). Further Reading Casement, Patrick. (1990). Further learning from the patient. The analytic space and process. London/New York: Tavistock/Routledge. Poland, Warren S. (1992). From analytic surface to analytic space. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 40, 381–404. CONSTRUCTION/RECONSTRUCTION Constructions are conjectures that the analyst couches in the form of stories concerning a part of the analysandÕs childhood history and bases on previous partial interpretations. A construction is meant to compensate for absent or insufficient memory, but it may itself stimulate recollection. Freud spoke of construction in connection with the ‘‘Rat Man’’ (1909d) and, more specifically, in connection with the Rat ManÕs wish for his fatherÕs death, with the circumstances, and approximate date of its emergence. He also spoke of it in relation to the punishment the patient’s father apparently inflicted on him for a reason connected with masturbation. This childhood scene, or rather the motherÕs account of it, was recalled as a result of a construction. But it was in the case of the ‘‘Wolf Man,’’ apropos of the authenticity of the primal scene, that the notion of construction really came to the fore. Freud emphasized in this connection that if primal scenes were simply fantasies, they would never become the basis for recovered memories. But since these dreams that frequently confirmed the self-same content were in his view ‘‘absolutely equivalent to a recollection,’’ a patient’s conviction of a scene’s reality was ‘‘in no respect inferior to one based on recollection.’’ Indeed, scenes ‘‘which date from such an early period and exhibit a similar content, and which further lay claim to such an extraordinary significance for the history of the case, 33 6 are as a rule not reproduced as recollections, but have to be divined—constructed—gradually and laboriously from an aggregate of indications’’ (1918b [1914], p. 51). The issue came up once more in Freud’s discussion of a young homosexual woman, where he expressed the view that the analyst’s reconstruction of the origins of a patient’s disorder belongs to the beginning of an analysis, before the analysand takes charge him or herself (1920a, p. 152). Only in FreudÕs late paper on ‘‘constructions in analysis’’ (1937d) does he deal with the matter fully. Here again he stressed the preliminary nature of the analystÕs work of construction in the two-step process of analysis, arguing that ‘‘the work of analysis consists of two different portions, that it is carried out in two separate localities, that it involves two people, to each of whom a distinct task is assigned’’ (1937d, p. 258). The analystÕs job is to divine or rather to reconstruct what has been forgotten, based on clues that have escaped from oblivion. This work precedes that of the analysand, but this does not mean that ‘‘the whole of it must be completed before the next piece of work can be begun’’ (1937d, p. 260). In fact, "both kinds of work are carried on side by side, the one kind being always a little ahead and the other following upon it’’ (p. 260). The patientÕs work thus consists in accepting or refusing to accept the analyst’s constructions, confirming them or failing to confirm them by means of recollections. This is far removed from certain later deviations in analytic practice that promote the idea that the analyst be silent. Here we see a kind of practice that takes risks. Freud distinguishes the different meanings of the analysandÕs ‘‘Yes’’ and ‘‘No’’ and notes that although the ‘‘Yes’’ has no value unless it is followed by indirect confirmations, reciprocally the ‘‘No’’ can mean the incompleteness but not necessarily the inaccuracy of the construction. He goes even further, noting that ‘‘the false construction drops out, as if it had never been made; and, indeed, we often get an impression as though, to borrow the words of Polonius, our bait of falsehood had taken a carp of truth’’ (1937d, p. 262). The epistemological status of constructions is illuminated by means of two analogies. The first is a comparison to the archeologistÕs ‘‘work of construction, or, if it is preferred, of reconstruction.’’ The analyst and the archaeologist, Freud writes, ‘‘have an indisputed INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ‘‘ C O N S T R U C T I O N S right to reconstruct by means of supplementing and combining the surviving remains’’ (1937d, p. 259). The first, however, ‘‘works under better conditions and has more material at his command to assist him since what he is dealing with is not something destroyed but something that is still alive’’ (p. 259). The second analogy is more unexpected and in Freud’s discussion it follows an image of destruction, that of psychotic anxiety bound to an inaccessible memory of a terrifying event that actually happened. Freud suggests a parallel between constructions in analysis and delusions: ‘‘The delusions of patients appear to me to be the equivalents of the constructions which we build up in the course of an analytic treatment—attempts at explanations and cure, though it is true that these, under the conditions of the psychosis, can do no more than replace the fragment of reality that is being disavowed in the present by another fragment that had already been disavowed in the remote past’’ (1937d, p. 268). The distinct nature of truth in psychoanalysis is thus suggested by the notion of construction/ reconstruction. In 1937 Freud regretted that construction had not been the subject of as much later work as interpretation. It has been explored since, however, particularly in the work of Serge Viderman (1970), who developed the question of levels of certitude in relation to the deformations caused by repression, and adopted the notion from Hegel and Freud of a truth that must be constructed and not merely found. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Amnesia; Anticipatory ideas; Archeology (metaphor); Autohistorization; Bernfeld, Siegfried; Construction de lÕespace analytique (La-) [Constructing the analytic space]; Family romance; ‘‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’’ (Wolf Man); Historical truth; Historical reality; Intergenerational; Interpretation; Lifting of amnesia; Memories; Memory. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1909d). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151–318. ———. (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1–122. ———. (1920a). The psychogenesis of a case of homosexuality in a woman. SE, 18: 145–172. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN ANALYSIS’’ ———. (1937d). Constructions in analysis. SE, 23: 255– 269. Viderman, Serge. (1970). La Construction de l’espace analytique. Paris: Denoël. ‘‘CONSTRUCTIONS IN ANALYSIS’’ FreudÕs ‘‘Constructions in Analysis’’ was written in 1937 and appeared in print at the end of the year. It appears that Freud wrote this technical article in response to criticisms of the interpretations offered by analysts to their patients. The article begins with the question of evaluating the ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no’’ of the patient in response to an interpretation and with a justification of a technique intended to take into account the defensive value of negation. The goal of analysis is to expose repressed elements and enable the person to experience reactions that are commensurate with their level of maturity and to restore a more accurate image of a forgotten past. To achieve this the analyst has recourse to various signs and indicators: fragmentary and distorted memories that arise in dreams, ideas alluding to repressed elements, and the repetition in transference of repressed affects. Analysis proceeds on two levels—manifest and latent. The analystÕs job is to use the indications provided by the patient to construct what has been forgotten and communicate it at an opportune moment. Unlike the work of the archeologist, psychoanalysis benefits from the fact that mental formations are not completely destroyed; however, the work of interpretation is more complex and preliminary since it also relies on the motivations of the analyst. Construction covers an entire period of the analysandÕs forgotten prehistory, while interpretation involves only a particular aspect of the analytic material. But how can its validity be evaluated? An incorrect construction, if it is isolated, does not cause any damage or provoke a reaction from the patient. The risk of suggestion is negligible however. The patientÕs reactions to a construction are important indicators. The ‘‘yes’’ is equivocal and only has value when additional confirmation becomes available. The ‘‘no’’ only informs us about the incomplete nature of the construction. Indirect modes of response such as ‘‘I never thought of that’’ indicate that the analyst has touched an unconscious idea and are more reliable, but these are more a question of interpretation than construction. Equally valuable are the associations 337 CONSULTATION and parapraxes that corroborate the construction; as is the case with a negative therapeutic reaction, a correct construction results in an aggravation of the clinical state. However, constructions are only suppositions that await confirmation. When the construction is correct the patient will have a sense of conviction; even though the memory may not have been recalled, the construction will have the same therapeutic effect. Occasionally, a construction leads to very clear memories in the vicinity of what was constructed. Defensive displacement contributes to the quasi-hallucinatory quality of such recollections. Based on the foregoing, it is possible that even in psychosis hallucinations are a return of forgotten events (seen or heard) from the first years of life, which have been distorted or subjected to other forms of defensive activity such as displacement. Thus, the upward pressure during psychosis would involve both desire and the repressed, distorted as in dreams. Delusions would also be constructions containing ‘‘a kernel of historical truth,’’ denied originally and drawing their strength of conviction from their infantile source. The analysand, like the hysterical patient, suffers from reminiscences. Basically, the compelling force of the analystÕs construction is similar to the delusion: the restoration of a piece of lived history. More generally, humanityÕs beliefs are inaccessible to criticism since they contain an element of historical truth concerning a forgotten primitive past. Although considered a technical article, FreudÕs essay later helped elevate the term ‘‘construction’’ to the rank of a psychoanalytic concept. The emphasis is on repetition and the relationship between conviction and historical truth. Memory traces become more important than desire or fantasy, which leads to rich possibilities for the treatment of psychotic delirium. A dialectic process can be identified between the rediscovered past and the construction as a creation associated with the treatment. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1937d). Konstruktionen in der Analyse. Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, 23: 459–469; G.W., 16: 43–56; Constructions in analysis. SE, 23: 257–269. Bibliography Fédida, Pierre. (1978). LÕidentité. LÕéconomie du théorique. Autour du texte sur ‘‘les constructions dans lÕanalyse.’’ Psychanalyse à l’Université, 3 (11), 437–444. Katan, Maurits. (1969). The link between FreudÕs work on aphasia, fetishism and constructions in analysis. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 50 (4), 547–553. Kofman, Sarah. (1983). Un métier impossible. Lecture de construction en analyse. Paris: Galilée. Pasche, Francis. (1988). Travail de construction ou, si lÕon préfère, de reconstruction, S. Freud, in Third Symposium of the European Federation of Psychoanalysis, Stockholm, 1988, on ‘‘Construction and Reconstruction.’’Bulletin de la Fédération européenne de psychanalyse, 31, 19–31. Viderman, Serge. (1970). La construction de lÕespace analytique. Paris: Denoël. CONSULTATION. See Initial interview(s) CONTACT AND PSYCHOANALYSIS CHRISTIAN SEULIN Josef Breuer was known in Vienna as the ‘‘man with hands of gold’’ because he ‘‘made contact’’ in a friendly, non-objectifying way with his patients. It was with him that Bertha Pappenheim invented the psychoanalytic method. Sigmund Freud began as BreuerÕs student and Breuer sent him patients and ‘‘monitored’’ the evolution of their treatment. When Freud began to distance himself, the shift from chair to couch was gradually promoted: ‘‘DonÕt touch me! Keep quiet!’’ as Emmy von N. said. See also: Construction de l’espace analytique, La (Constructing the analytical space); Construction/reconstruction; ‘‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’’ (Wolf Man); Historical reality; Interpretation. In Totem and Taboo (1912–13a), a festival of ‘‘touching,’’ die Berührung, appears more than seventy times in sixty pages in Part II, entitled ‘‘Taboo and Emotional Ambivalence.’’ In Laplanche and PontalisÕs The Language of Psycho-Analysis, however, the word 33 8 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS C O N T A C T -B A R R I E R does not appear. In chapter 3 of Totem and Taboo, ‘‘Animism, Magic, and the Omnipotence of Thoughts,’’ Freud refers to FrazerÕs distinction between magic based on similarity—we destroy a statue representing the being whose death we desire—and magic based on contiguity—we spread grease on the weapon that produced the wound (1912–13a, pp. 81–83). Roman Jakobson (1963) pointed out that the very essence of speech, the Freudian holy of holies, is directly bound up with Totem and Taboo: metaphor and metonymy are at work in FreudÕs dream analysis as they are in FrazerÕs magic. ‘‘The two principles of association—similarity [Ähnlichkeit] and contiguity [Kontiguität]—are both included in the more comprehensive concept of ÔcontactÕ,’’ Freud writes. ‘‘Association by contiguity is contact in the literal sense, association by similarity is contact in the metaphorical sense [im übertragenen Sinne]. The use of the same word for the two kinds of relation is no doubt accounted for by some identity in the psychical processes concerned which we have not yet grasped’’ (1912–13a, p. 85). The realm of touching permeates these writings of FreudÕs. It takes in touching that is prescribed, essential from the very beginning of life, beneficial, soothing, healing. And it also includes proscribed touching, the touch of evil, the touch that kills. The realm of touch is par excellence a social realm. But how does contact differ from touch? Touch is objectifying, it manipulates the body or objects. Contact is emotional; it establishes a relationship with a living being. By promoting ‘‘benevolent neutrality’’ in place of freundlich and Wohlwollen (to amicably desire what is Good and Gratifying for the other), analysts have distorted the Freudian message in a very particular way. To say ‘‘IÕm listening’’ is to acknowledge the existence of the patient; to say ‘‘I understand’’ is to emphasize the reality of his or her thoughts, which the ‘‘haptonomy’’ of Franz Veldman (1998) describes as ‘‘existential affirmation’’ and ‘‘rational confirmation’’ of existence. But without real emotional contact, it is impossible to help a human being develop his or her sense of ‘‘basic security,’’ affective confirmation being essential to the growth of every individual. In VelmanÕs terms, it is the mobilization of ‘‘philia’’ that ‘‘unveils the Good of the other, recognizes him in the Good he can be.’’ Some have said that recognizing the other is the Supreme Good, ‘‘because where love awakens, the self, that INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS somber despot, dies’’ (Giordano Bruno, cited in 1911c [1910]). BERNARD THIS See also: Anna O., case of; Emmy von N., case of; Neutrality/benevolent neutrality; Taboo; Tenderness; Totem and Taboo. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1911c [1910]). Notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia. SE, 12: 9–79. ———. (1912–1913a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. Jakobson, Roman. (1963). Essais de linguistique générale. Paris: Minuit. Veldman, Franz. (1998).Haptonomie, science de lÕaffectivité (7th ed.). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. CONTACT-BARRIER Bion first used the term ‘‘contact-barrier,’’ which he borrows from Freud, in Learning from Experience (1962, p.17): I shall now transfer all that I have said about the establishment of conscious and unconscious and a barrier between them to a supposed entity, that I designate a Ôcontact-barrierÕ; Freud used this term to describe the neurophysiological entity subsequently known as a synapse. In conformity with this my statement that the man has to ÔdreamÕ a current emotional experience whether it occurs in sleep or in walking life is reformulated thus: The manÕs alpha-function whether in sleeping or waking transforms the senseimpressions related to an emotional experience, into alpha-elements, which cohere as they proliferate to form the contact-barrier. This contact-barrier, thus continuously in process of formation, marks the point of contact and separation between conscious and unconscious elements and originates the distinction between them. The nature of the contact barrier will depend on the nature of the supply of alpha-elements and on the manner of their relationship to each other. This contact-barrier, like a number of other concepts in psychoanalysis, can be seen as a structural concept, an area between conscious and unconscious, or as a function, a constant transformation of betainto alpha-elements. It would result in what Freud saw as a permeable repressive barrier, in which the 339 CONTAINER-CONTAINED conscious and unconscious are in constant symbolic communication. Bion also compares it to a continuous dream in interaction with conscious rational experience. An alpha-element contact-barrier gives emotional meaning, and resonance in communication with an external object, where the contact-barrier may be transformed into an impermeable beta-screen, and the internal communication between the conscious and unconscious is blocked. HANNA SEGAL See also: Alpha-elements; Beta-elements; Beta-screen; LoveHate-Knowledge (L/H/K links); Physical pain/psychic pain; Psychosomatic limit/boundary; ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology, A’’. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1962). Learning from experience. London: Heinemann; New York: Basic Books. ———. (1963). Elements of psycho-analysis. London: Heinemann. CONTAINER-CONTAINED In Elements of Psycho-Analysis (1963), W. R. Bion writes that psychoanalytic theories contain a twofold defect: ‘‘on the one hand, description of empirical data is unsatisfactory as it is manifestly what is described in conversational English as a ÔtheoryÕ about what took place rather than a factual account of it and, on the other, the theory of what took place cannot satisfy the criteria applied to a theory as that term is employed to describe the systems used in rigorous scientific investigation’’ (p. 1). elements of psychoanalysis need to be capable of representing the realization that they were originally used to describe and of being articulated like letters with other similar elements and, having been articulated, to be capable of forming a scientific deductive system. BionÕs first element, represented as $#, can be defined as a dynamic relationship between the container and the contained, deriving from KleinÕs concept of projective identification. To become a psychic object, the projected element has to encounter a container, or a thinking function. The intrusive projected element is thereby associated with a masculine symbolism, and the containing receptive element with a feminine symbolism. This therefore establishes a model that represents the transference-countertransference dynamics between patient and analyst, without any starting assumptions as to the qualities that may emerge there. Wilfred Bion thus returns to his original hypothesis, which relates to finding an element that can simultaneously define a realization in the treatment and the original realization relating to the patientÕs psychic life, past memories and the intense, even pathological, mechanisms of projective identification that can be associated with these. For him, the $# element also represents the apparatus of thought in which certain aspects can carry out an $ (or #) function for other # (or $) aspects. Psychic growth therefore results from the integration of this mechanism when projective identification is operating normally. In the treatment of psychotic patients, the violence of the projective mechanisms hinders the $# ‘‘interlocking,’’ which then creates a sense of dislocation. It is therefore necessary to ‘‘formulate an abstraction, to represent the realization that existing theories purport to describe’’ (pp. 1–2). As elements in psychoanalysis, these abstractions operate like alphabetical letters in the formation of words: through many different combinations, they offer the analyst an infinite number of possible adaptations and interpretations for understanding the vicissitudes of the transference through thought and, of course, through words. W. R. Bion locates the container/contained dimension in the vertical axis of his grid. It represents the positive growth of thought; this element operates through its F part that is equivalent to the preconception, which is immersed in the M part that corresponds to realization and gives access to meaning. It only finally becomes operative if, through the integration of the container-contained element, the subject tolerates a primary bisexuality, with the beginnings of triangulation that accompany it. By contrast, the classical model of psychoanalytic theory, like the ideogram in relation to the word, ultimately allows of only one possible form of thought. JEAN-CLAUDE GUILLAUME Insofar as the analytic situation establishes the conditions for a new realization in the transference, the 34 0 See also: Alpha function; Arrogance; Concept; Hallucinosis; Internal object; Psychic envelope; Psychotic panic; Realization; Relations (commensalism, symbiosis, parasitism); INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CONTRADICTION Psychoanalytic setting; Selected fact; Skin; Thoughtthinking apparatus. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1963). Elements of psycho-analysis. London: Heinemann. CONTRADICTION In its primary meaning, contradiction is the act of contradicting, of opposing oneself to someone by saying the opposite of whatever he or she says. The term is used in mathematics and philosophy. In mathematical logic, a contradiction is a statement whose truth function has only one value: false. In philosophy it is the relation that exists between the affirmation and the negation of a proposition. A term that embodies incompatible (contrary or contradictory) elements is also called a contradiction. Contradicting the fears and feelings of a patient under hypnosis was the first therapeutic intervention that Freud described in his early article on ‘‘A Case of Successful Treatment by Hypnotism’’ (1892–93a). He showed that the etiology of the symptom depended on ‘‘antithetic ideas’’ (p. 121) opposed to the individualÕs intentions. The formal element in the etiology was thus contradiction, which also applied to repression: ‘‘For these patients whom I analysed had enjoyed good mental health up to the moment at which an occurrence of incompatibility took place in their ideational life—that is to say, until their ego was faced with an experience, an idea or a feeling which aroused such a distressing affect that the subject decided to forget about it because he had no confidence in his power to resolve the contradiction between that incompatible idea and his ego by means of thought-activity’’ (Freud 1894a, p. 47). The Interpretation of Dreams and the ‘‘first topography’’ increased the places in FreudÕs theory where contradictory oppositions could be found within a single agency, between agencies, or between psychical reality and external reality. As early as 1900, Freud noted that ‘‘Thoughts which are mutually contradictory make no attempt to do away with each other, but persist side by side. They often combine to form condensations, just as though there were no contradiction between them, or arrive at compromises such as our conscious thoughts would never tolerate, but such as are often INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS admitted in our actions’’ (1900a, p. 596). The absence of contradiction, Widerspruchslosigkeit, at first an attribute of the primary process, later became a feature of the unconscious: The nucleus of the Ucs. consists . . . of wishful impulses. These instinctual impulses are co-ordinate with one another, exist side by side without being influenced by one another, and are exempt from mutual contradiction. When two wishful impulses whose aims must appear to us incompatible become simultaneously active, the two impulses do not diminish each other or cancel each other out, but combine to form an intermediate aim, a compromise. There are in this system no negation, no doubt, no degrees of certainty: all this is only introduced by the work of the censorship between the Ucs. and the Pcs. Negation is a substitute, at a higher level, for repression’’ (Freud, 1915e, pp.186–187). Freud used similar language apropos of the id, adding that ‘‘The logical laws of thought do not apply to the id, and this is true above all of the law of contradiction’’ (1933a [1932], p. 73). Ambivalence is the final dynamic factor necessary for understanding the ubiquity of contradiction in the expression of psychic processes. Thus, all products of the unconscious—dreams, slips, jokes, symptoms—simply disregard ‘‘the category of contraries and contradictories. . . . Dreams feel themselves at liberty, moreover, to represent any element by its wishful contrary; so that there is no way of deciding, at first glance, whether any element that admits of a contrary is present in the dream-thoughts as a positive or as a negative’’ (Freud, 1900a, p. 318). Freud compared these psychic creations to the antithetical meanings of primal words (1910e), which he again analyzed in his study of taboos (1912–1913), and then in his essay on ‘‘The Uncanny’’ (1919h). The term ‘‘compromise formation,’’ a feature of all defenses, demonstrates the extension of contradiction across the whole of mental life. Contradiction intersects with negation and with the formal referential binary true/false. But Freud was especially interested in dynamic processes that allow contradictory mental positions to be maintained simultaneously. In addition to those already mentioned, he also referred to negation linked to repression, disavowal, splitting, and repudiation (or foreclosure, in Lacanian terms). Thus the contradiction between wish and reality 341 ‘‘ C O N T R I B U T I O N S TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF L O V E ’’ is systematic in relation to the difference between the sexes. The notion of contradiction implies the formal expression of an opposition and its relation to truth. Mathematicians such as Kurt Gödel have shown that its domain of relevance is restricted. Structuralist linguists have distinguished oppositions based on contraries from those based on exclusion. Contradiction would appear to be a very rudimentary formal instrument for investigating psychic conflicts. Freud did not rely much on it, preferring the more dynamic terms ‘‘opposite’’ and ‘‘contrary.’’ MICHÈLE PORTE See also: Dream; Dream work; Illusion; Interpretation of Dreams, The; ‘‘Negation’’; Primary process/secondary process; Reversal into the opposite; Sense/nonsense; Unconscious, the; ‘‘Unconscious, The’’. and for that reason are more exciting. The lover of this type proposes to save the woman he desires, though he readily accepts the presence of his rival. Freud explains this behavior by reference to the Oedipus complex (a term he used for the first time in the same year, 1910, that this article was published). What is involved here is a desire to steal the mother from the father, or at least share her with him. The mother has first been compared to a prostitute when, at puberty, the boy was obliged to acknowledge, after the idealization of childhood, that she too has had sexual relations. Thenceforward he feels he must save her from degradation. This pattern, Freud adds, is repetitive, because it can only result in disappointment. ‘‘Contributions to the Psychology of Love’’ is the title given collectively to three articles by Sigmund Freud: ‘‘A Special Type of Choice of Object Made by Men,’’ published in 1910; ‘‘On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love,’’ published in 1912; and ‘‘The Taboo of Virginity,’’ published in 1918. It was Freud himself who, believing they formed a whole, decided to publish them under a single title. In ‘‘On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love,’’ Freud discusses male impotence. This problem arises for the most part from an ‘‘incestuous fixation on mother or sister’’ (p. 180). Freud distinguishes two ‘‘currents’’ in erotic life: the ‘‘affectionate’’ and the ‘‘sensual.’’ The affectionate current is the older, as it was directed towards the infantÕs earliest caretakers, that is, towards the primary object-choice, typically the mother. The sensual current reaches its acme during puberty but, coming into conflict with the oedipal prohibition, turns to other objects, while often remaining fixated to the first. It ‘‘can happen that the whole of a young manÕs sensuality becomes tied to incestuous objects in the unconscious, or to put it another way, becomes fixated to unconscious incestuous phantasies. The result is then total impotence’’ (p. 182). But, Freud wonders, why is this relatively uncommon? His answer is that in many cases where the same factors are at work the upshot is sexual relations unaccompanied by pleasure. For the two currents to combine and produce complete satisfaction is unusual, and the solution that consists in directing each current to a different woman is very frequent. But, Freud adds, it is no doubt in the very nature of the instinct to remain ever unsatisfied in the choice of object. The gain, perhaps, is to be found in the processes of sublimation, the motor of the development of civilization. In ‘‘A Special Type of Choice of Object Made by Men,’’ Freud considers men who are interested only in women over whose affections they must compete with another man; women who by virtue of their sexual life have something of the prostitute about them In ‘‘The Taboo of Virginity,’’ the last of this set of three papers, Freud returns to some of the ideas concerning women briefly referred to in the previous article. He cites ethnologists according to whom, in certain so-called primitive peoples, a person other Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1892–93a). A case of successful treatment by hypnotism. SE, 1: 115–128. ———. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams; Part I. SE, 4: 1–338; Part II. SE, 5: 339–625. ———. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 41–61. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. ———. (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159–204. ‘‘CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE’’ 34 2 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS C O N T R O V E R S I A L D I S C U S S I O N S ( A N N A F R E U D -M E L A N I E K L E I N ) than the husband deflowers the fiancée. This practice, according to Freud, is followed in order to protect the husband from danger. He then examines a number of causes for fear in this connection. The bleeding that results from the loss of virginity is associated with physical wounds and death. In a number of socalled primitives, all of sexual life is wrapped in taboos. The woman is feared because of the assumed loss of virility that occurs through physical contact with her and this activates the fear of castration, especially as a result of her first sexual intercourse. But these general considerations are inadequate in FreudÕs view. The analysis of female frigidity, he argues, leads us to consider such other factors as the Oedipus complex, penis envy, the desire to obtain a child from the father as reparation, and hostility towards any man who appears as a poor substitute for the true object of this ancient desire. Thus the husband who avoids deflowering his wife acts thus because he fears losing his penis and, like Holofernes, his life. ROGER PERRON See also: Castration complex; Love; Oedipus complex; Sexuality; Taboo of virginity; Tenderness. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1910h). Über einen besonderen Typus der Objektwahl beim Manne (Beiträge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens I). Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, 2: 389–97; GW, VIII: 66–77; A special type of choice of object made by men. SE, 11: 165–175. ———. (1912d). Über die allgemeinste Erniedrigung des Liebeslebens (Beiträge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens II). Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, 4: 40–50; GW, VIII: 78–91; On the universal tendency to debasement in the sphere of love. SE, 11: 179–190. ———. (1918a [1917]). Das Tabu der Virginität (Beiträge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens III). Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre, Leipzig-Vienna: Vierte Folge, p. 229–251; GW, XII: 159–180; The taboo of virginity. SE, 11: 193–208. CONTROL CASE. See Supervised analysis INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CONTROVERSIAL DISCUSSIONS (ANNA FREUD-MELANIE KLEIN) The title, Controversial Discussions, refers to the protracted discussions between Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, their followers and members of the indigenous group of British analysts which took place in the British PsychoAnalytical Society between 1941 and 1946. The Discussions involved scientific, educational, and administrative problems and had the aim of deciding whether the new views concerning child development and psychoanalytic technique to treat both children and adults proposed by Klein and her followers: Susan Isaacs, Paula Heimann, Joan Riviere, and others, were compatible with the classical view of psychoanalysis as understood by Anna Freud and her Viennese and Berliner colleagues: Willie Hoffer, Kate Friedlander, Barbara Lantos, Dorothy Burlingham, and others, or whether Klein should be expelled from the psychoanalytical community. The indigenous group of British psychoanalysts, composed of Ernest Jones, Sylvia Payne, James Strachey, Ella Sharpe, Marjorie Brierley, and others, tried to mediate between the two contenders and to reach a compromise which in the end managed to hold the British PsychoAnalytical Society together and led to the formation of three groups: the so called Freudians, the so-called Kleinians and the so-called Independents. The Controversial Discussions were at the same time the peak and the symptom of longstanding tensions and disagreements between the British way of looking at psychoanalysis, mainly but not exclusively influenced by Klein, and that represented by the Continental analysts, gathered mainly around Freud and his daughter Anna. Those disagreements had already expressed themselves in the late twenties and the late thirties. The tensions and divergences exploded when Freud and his family had to emigrate to London as a result of the Nazi persecutions and, after FreudÕs death in London, Anna and many Continental analysts decided to stay in England. One should consider the various factors which contributed to the Controversial Discussions: longstanding personal rivalries, the difficult situation of Klein, whose daughter, Melitta Schmideberg, was in analysis with Edward Glover. Schmideberg became, together with Glover, one of KleinÕs fiercest critics, joining the group of Anna Freud. Also significant were the ‘‘prima 343 CONVENIENCE, DREAM OF donna’’ types of personalities of both Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, the objective tensions created by the war, the difficulties of mourning FreudÕs death for Anna and her group in those circumstances, but also the cultural background of the indigenous members of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, which allowed the debate to take place without it degenerating into a catastrophic ending. In order to defend their views, the Kleinians were required to present four papers to an ad hoc committee of the British Psycho-Analytical Society made up of Edward Glover, Marjorie Brierley, and James Strachey, and chaired by Ernest Jones. The first paper was that of Susan Isaacs, ‘‘On the Nature and Function of Unconscious Phantasy’’ on January 27, 1943. Paula Heimann then read her paper on June 23, ‘‘Some Aspects of the Role of Introjection and Projection in Early Development.’’ A third paper was given on December 17, 1943, by Isaacs and Heimann, called ‘‘On Regression.’’ Finally, on March 1, 1944, Klein read her paper ‘‘The Emotional Life and the Ego Development of the Infant with Special Reference to the Depressive Position.’’ Also very important were the papers on technique which were written by Anna Freud, Klein, Sylvia Payne, Ella Sharpe, and Marjorie Brierley, to illustrate different approaches to the handling of the transference and the way to interpret the defenses of the patients. The Controversial Discussions are now considered one of the most important documents of the history of psychoanalysis (King and Steiner, 1992). Indeed, they allow the study in vivo of the conscious and unconscious complexities of the emotional, personal, cultural, institutional, and political tensions of what on the surface appeared to be only a scientific disagreement between different ways of approaching the study of psychic development. Hayman, Anne. (1989). What do we mean by phantasy? International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 70, 105–114. King, Pearl H.M., and Steiner, Riccardo. (1991). The FreudKlein controversies 1941–1945. London and New York: Tavistock Publications-Routledge, New Library of Psychoanalysis. Steiner, Riccardo. (1985). Some thoughts about tradition and change arising from an examination of the British Psycho-Analytical SocietyÕs ‘‘Controversial Discussions’’, 1943–1944, International Review of Psycho-Analysis, 12, 27–71. CONVENIENCE, DREAM OF The ‘‘dream of convenience’’ is a dream described by Freud as fulfilling two of a dreamÕs essential functions: satisfying a wish and safeguarding sleep. He first mentioned this type of dream in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess dated March 4, 1894 (letter 22): A young doctor (Josef BreuerÕs nephew) is awakened early one morning so that he can go to work at his hospital ward. However, he immediately falls back to sleep and, in his dream, has ‘‘a hallucination of a notice-board over a hospital bed with [his] name on it’’ (p. 213); in the dream the thought comes to him that he does not need to wake up, since he is already in the hospital. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Freud twice referred to ‘‘Herr PepiÕs dream’’: in chapter 3, where he discussed the fulfillment of wishes in dreams, and in chapter 5, where he mentioned the dreamÕs role as ‘‘guardian of sleep’’ (p. 233). In chapter 3 he gave other examples of what he explicitly called ‘‘dreams of convenience’’: for example, dreaming that he is drinking saves the dreamer the trouble of having to wake up to quench his thirst. Bibliography Freud did not especially develop a theory of this type of dream, which only represents a specific type of wish-fulfillment in dreams. In his last mention of this topic in ‘‘An Outline of Psycho-Analysis’’ (1940a), he illustrated this theme by again citing the case of the doctor who can continue to sleep by dreaming that he is already at the hospital, and two other dreams that fulfill wishes, one involving hunger and the other sexual desire. He reminded readers that dreams are in fact compromise formations (between renunciation and satisfaction). Grosskurth, Phyllis. (1986). Melanie Klein. Her world and work. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Clinical practice often provides examples of dreams of convenience. Their interpretation cannot be limited RICCARDO STEINER See also: British Psycho-Analytical Society; Freud, Anna; Glover, Edward; Isaacs-Sutherland, Susan; Jones, Ernest; Klein-Reizes, Melanie; Psychoanalytical Treatment of Children; Transference in children. 34 4 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CONVERSION to ‘‘decoding’’ the meaning only within a particular category of dreams, because the dream involves the entire dynamic theory (conflicts between the instincts and the defenses). ROGER PERRON See also: Dream. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. ———. (1940a [1938]). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE 23: 139–207. ———. (1950c [1887–1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173–280. CONVERSION The term ‘‘conversion’’ and its definition appear for the first time in an 1894 article by Freud titled ‘‘The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense.’’ ‘‘In hysteria the incompatible idea rendered innocuous by its sum of excitation being transformed into something somatic, for this I should like to propose the name of conversion . . . . By this means the ego succeeds in freeing itself from the contradiction [with which it is confronted]; but instead, it has burdened itself with a mnemic symbol which finds a lodgement in consciousness, like a sort of parasite, either in the form of an unresolvable motor innervation or as a constantly recurring hallucinatory sensation’’ (1894a, p. 49). In the Freudian terminology of the time, an ‘‘irreconcilable’’ idea is a desire that is incompatible with the subjectÕs moral ideals and consequently condemned and most often rendered unconscious. Consequently, the concept is, from the beginning, located along the three axes that will structure all Freudian metapsychology: dynamic through the reference to ‘‘contradiction,’’ which will later be theorized as ‘‘conflict’’; topographical through the reference to the unconscious, which is still only allusive but will quickly assume major importance; and economic through the idea of a displacement of the energy (this will later become the libido) of the mind to the body. From this Freud draws a therapeutic conclusion: ‘‘BreuerÕs cathartic method lies in leading back the excitation in this way from the somatic to the psychical INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS sphere deliberately, and in then forcibly bringing about a settlement of the contradiction by means of thought-activity and a discharge of the excitation by talking’’ (1894a, p. 50). Freud initially considered the mechanisms of conversion to be specific to hysteria, unlike the other defensive psychoneuroses (obsessions and phobias). There would be a predisposition to hysteria for reasons he believes are probably constitutional, through what he refers to as ‘‘somatic compliance’’ in the Dora case (1905e). However, the ‘‘choice of neurosis,’’ a problem to which he often returned, here finds only its modalities of realization; to these fundamental conditions must be added ‘‘trigger factors’’ rooted in personal history (childhood traumas such as early ‘‘seduction’’ experiences, that is, sexual assaults initiated by adults). This is FreudÕs position during the first period of his career. Later, in 1915, he distinguished ‘‘conversion hysteria,’’ which used this mechanism to produce symptoms, from ‘‘anxiety hysteria,’’ dominated by phobic mechanisms but without being accompanied by any conversion phenomena (1915d). He also acknowledged that minor conversion phenomena can be found in situations other than so-called conversion hysteria (1916–17a). It is important to remember that Freud quickly established the necessity of distinguishing psychoneuroses—to which hysteria belongs—from actual neuroses (neurasthenia, anxiety neurosis, hypochondria), whose source is not found in infantile conflicts but in current disturbances of the sexual function (1898a). In such cases the accumulation of sexual excitation that has not been released or has been released by unsatisfactory means (coitus interruptus, masturbation, and so on) is reflected in anxiety and somatic symptoms (these views were modified in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 1926d), but without the symbolic dimension inherent in conversion phenomena. While the notion ‘‘actual neurosis’’ went into a long decline, modern work in psychosomatic medicine has given it new currency. It is used to describe somatic disturbances, often serious, that appear to arise from a form of interaction between mind and body where energy ‘‘passes directly’’ from the mind to somatic functions without symbolic mediation, that is, without ‘‘mentalization’’ of the psychoneuroses (Marty, 1980). ROGER PERRON 345 COPROPHILIA See also: Cäcilie M., case of; Elisabeth von R., case of; ‘‘Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria’’ (Dora/ Ida Bauer); Hysteria; Hysterical paralysis; Innervation; Katharina, case of; Neurosis; Psychosomatic; Psychosomatic limit/boundary; Psychogenic blindness; Repression; Somatic compliance; Stammering; Studies on Hysteria; Sum of excitation; Symptom; Tics. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 45–61. ———. (1905e). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria (Dora/Ida Bauer). SE, 7: 7–122. ———. (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 146–158. ———. (1916–17a). Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 15–16. Marty, Pierre. (1980). Les mouvements individuels de vie et de mort (Vol. II, LÕOrdre psychosomatique). Paris: Payot. COPROPHILIA The term ‘‘coprophilia’’ is used to describe a predilection for fecal and related matters. On January 4, 1898, Freud wrote to Wilhelm Fliess: ‘‘Today I am sending you No. 2 of the ‘‘dreckological’’ reports . . .’’ (1985, p. 291). In creating this neologism from the German word Drek, meaning mud, filth, excrement, he was, according to Max Schur (1975), testifying to the abundant amount of anal material in his self-analysis at the time. Food can remind children of excrement: ‘‘He protests loudly—in the form of overcompensation—the successful overcoming of his coprophiliac inclinations,’’ Freud explained to his pupils (Wiener Psychoanalystiche Verinigung,1962–1975, p. 177). Repression of an olfactive coprophilic pleasure can determine the choice of a fetish (Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 1905d). In the same vein, on February, 24, 1910, he wrote to Karl Abraham: ‘‘I regard coprophilic olfactory pleasure as being the chief factor in most cases of foot and shoe fetishism’’ (1965a, p. 87). He later indicated, in his article On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love (1912d), that when man changed to the erect position he raised his smelling organ above ground level. It was then that ‘‘the coprophilic instinctual components [ . . . ] proved incompatible with our aesthetic standards of culture’’ (p. 189). Reflecting in the same article on sexual 34 6 impotence of a psychic origin, he stated: ‘‘The excremental is all too intimately and inseparably bound up with the sexual; the position of the genitals—inter urinas et faeces—remains the decisive and unchangeable factor’’ (p. 189). Coprophilia takes on an entirely different meaning in the light of work on mourning and the notion of loss. Reflecting on the subject of mourning, Karl Abraham (1924) detected in certain rites the link between loss and attachment to the content of the intestines. Given the specific features of the two opposite pleasures of anal eroticism, retention and expulsion, he distinguished the same opposition in the sadistic instincts. There would then be a link between the expulsion of the anal object and the melancholy that results from the expulsion of a person. Psychoanalysis thus facilitated the establishment of a link between melancholy, obsessional neuroses, and coprophilia. Abraham went on to write: ‘‘The coprophagic instinct seems to me to conceal a symbolism that is typical of melancholy’’ (1924, p. 444). The motion of introjection can then be considered as a psychic mechanism that is of central importance for melancholics. DOMINIQUE J. ARNOUX See also: Anality; Eroticism, anal; Feces; Melancholia; Anal-sadistic stage. Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1924). Melancholia and obsessional neurosis. In Selected papers of Karl Abraham (pp. 422–432). London: Hogarth. Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1912d). On the universal tendency to debasement in the sphere of love. SE, 11: 177–190. Freud, Sigmund, and Abraham, Karl. (1965a). A psychoanalytic dialogue: The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham: 1907–1926. (Hilda C. Abraham and Ernst L. Freud, Eds.; Bernard Marsh and Hilda C. Abraham, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. Freud, Sigmund, and Fliess, Wilhelm. (1985c). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess: 1887–1904. (Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, Ed. and Trans.). Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap/Harvard University Press. Schur, Max. (1972). Freud: Living and dying. New York: International Universities Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS C O R R A O , F R A N C E S C O (1922 –1 994) Wiener Psychoanalystiche Verinigung. (1962–1975). Minutes 72, Scientific Meeting on March 10, 1909. In Herman Nunberg and Ernst Federn (Eds.), Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (Volume II: 1908–1910) (M. Nunberg, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press. Further Reading Hollós and Les trois cases blanches, a drama by Alain Didier-Weill. Le Coq-HéronÕs editorial committee has also formed a translation group. To date it has translated volume four of the Oeuvres complètes of Sándor Ferenczi and his Journal clinique, the Freud-Ferenczi correspondence, and Carl SpittelerÕs Imago. Karpman, B. (1948). Coprophilia: a collective review. Psychoanalytic Review, 35, 253–272. Tarachow, Stanley. (1966). Coprophagia and allied phenomena. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 14, 685–699. See also: Ferenczi, Sándor. CORRAO, FRANCESCO (1922–1994) COQ-HÉRON, LE The review Le Coq-Héron includes essays on psychoanalysis, education, and the social sciences in general. It is published four to six times a year and there are several special issues for the presentation of ‘‘working documents.’’ The print run is between eight hundred and two thousand. The review was founded in 1969 by a group from the Centre Étienne-Marcel to make available to researchers at the center texts that were inaccessible (original articles or translations from English, German, Spanish, or Hungarian) and thereby promote dialogue among scholars. After three private issues were distributed within the center, the review went public. Supported by the Centre National des Lettres, it maintained its special relationship with the Centre Étienne-Marcel. By June 2001, 165 issues had been published. The review is characterized by the fact that its editorial committee includes analysts from various schools who work together in a collegial environment. Participating in the review does not require that they abandon their differences or convictions, and the editorial committee tries to ensure that all psychoanalytic orientations are represented. To this end the reviewÕs bylaws stipulate that if even one of the editors wants an article published, it must be published, the other editors having the right to include their comments and criticisms. The review has published articles by well-known authors (Freud, Ferenczi, Dolto, Balint, Lacan, Mannoni, Mahler, Hermann) as well as lesser known or even unknown authors in psychoanalysis and related fields. It has also published several full-length books including Mes adieux à la maison jaune by István INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY JUDITH DUPONT OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Francesco Corrao was an Italian physician, psychoanalyst, president of the Società Psicoanalitica Italiana (SPI) [Italian Psychoanalytic Society] from 1969 to 1974, and founder of psychoanalytic centers in Rome and Palermo. He was born in Palermo on December 14, 1922, and died in Rome on April 23, 1994. Corrao studied medicine but was also interested in philosophy, especially epistemology and Greek thought. He studied psychoanalysis with Alessandra Wolf Stomersee, Princess of Lampedusa, who, after her marriage, moved to Palermo during the late thirties. It was Corrao, a member of the SPI from 1952 and a training analyst at the institute founded by Nicola Perrotti, who was entrusted with the task of bringing psychoanalysis to Sicily when Lampedusa settled in Rome. Introduced by Lampedusa to the work of Melanie Klein, Corrao became interested in her ideas as expressed in the work of Wilfred Bion, especially their application to the psychoanalysis of group activities. Convinced of BionÕs importance, he had him translated into Italian and worked to introduce his ideas in Italy, organizing seminars in Rome during the seventies. In 1969, colleagues and students met with Corrao in Rome, forming the ‘‘Pollaiolo’’ circle to train members in analysis. The Pollaiolo circle published a review entitled Gruppo e Funzione Analitica, which has recently been replaced by Koinos. CorraoÕs writings have been collected into a volume entitled Modelli psicoanalitici: Mito, Passione, Memoria. He devoted much time to the institutional renewal of the SPI, introducing new bylaws (1974) while he was president and creating regional centers 347 COUNTER-IDENTIFICATION for psychoanalysis, including one in Palermo (1976), where he organized the annual scientific seminars, Colloquia of Palermo. of such an identification remains one of the fruitful moments of the treatment. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA ANNA MARIA ACCERBONI See also: Italy. Bibliography Corrao, F. (1992). Modelli psicoanalitici. Mito passione memoria. Laterza: Roma-Bari. COUNTER-IDENTIFICATION The term ‘‘counter-identification’’ has two different uses. For English-speaking authors, it refers to an analystÕs unconscious identification with his or her patient and thus designates a counter-transferential attitude. For certain French authors, it designates the subjectÕs adoption of character traits, drive tendencies, or of defensive modes that are opposite to those of an object that the subject fears or with which he refuses to identify. The first meaning is generally recognized by Anglophone authors. Robert Fliess defined it specifically as an irregularity in the counter-transference that must become a topic of the analystÕs self-analysis if it is to be overcome. Such a distortion of empathy results in a part of the analystÕs ego identifying with a part of the patientÕs ego, causing the analyst to no longer observe the patient with the necessary analytic attitude. In consequence, the analyst might fail to recognize psychotic factors in the patient (Fliess, 1953). León Grinberg similarly described a ‘‘projective counter-identification’’ as ‘‘the result of an excessive projective identification that is not consciously perceived by the analyst, who consequently is ÔledÕ by it. Thus the analyst conducts himself as if he had actually and concretely acquired, by assimilation, the features that were projected onto him’’ (Grinberg, 1962). The other, less common meaning of the term characterizes the claims of certain patients who try to organize their lives opposite to those of their parents or intensely invested objects from their early childhood. A statement such as ‘‘I just donÕt want to be like them’’ indicates a tactic that belongs to the domain of consciousness. This tactic is most often an attempt at negating an unconscious identification. The analysis 34 8 See also: Counter-transference; Identification; Transference in children. Bibliography Fliess, Robert. (1953). Countertransference and counteridentification. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association. 1, 268–284. Grinberg, León. (1962). On a specific aspect of countertransference due to the patientÕs projective identification. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis. 43, 436–440. Mijolla, Alain de. (1987). Unconscious identification fantasies and family prehistory. International Journal of Psychoanalysis. 1, 397–403. COUNTER-INVESTMENT. See Anticathexis COUNTER-OEDIPUS The term ‘‘counter-Oedipus’’ generally designates the complete set of parental displays of the fatherÕs or motherÕs own oedipal conflict. Thus in these displays we can expect to find themes of incest and murder. In numerous passages Freud discussed how parents replay their infantile Oedipus complex in the present, yet he never used the term ‘‘counter-Oedipus’’ to refer to these displays. In 1979 Francis Pasche, returning to themes in FreudÕs article ‘‘The Acquisition and Control of Fire’’ (1932a), analyzed the relationship of Zeus, Prometheus, and humankind in terms of a positive counter-Oedipus and a negative counter-Oedipus: Zeus, the ‘‘father of the gods,’’ subdued and mistreated Prometheus even though he belonged to a later generation. Prometheus, who revolted against Zeus, played a paternal role in relation to humankind. In this perspective, the father is ambivalent toward the son when he is confronted with homosexual desires (as illustrated by Alain FineÕs myth of Laius the pedophile [1993]) and the desire to murder (Laius tried to kill Oedipus twice, once by exposure on INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS COUNTER-TRANSFERENCE Cithaeron and then again later when he met him at the crossroads). Jacques Bril (1989) revealed the theme of murder of the son in ChristÕs passion. In fathersÕ relationships with daughters, we frequently encounter actual incest and tyrannical jealousy, as when fathers prohibit their daughters from having any sexual life. Although we find the same fundamental themes of incest and murder in the counter-Oedipus of the mother, they are envisioned differently. In the motherÕs relationship with a daughter, primary homosexuality, long-term alienating bonds, and motherdaughter rivalry become important. In the motherÕs relationship with a son, the incestuous dimension of the childÕs penis comes to the fore. Additionally, whether the child be a boy or a girl, murder fantasies cause the mother to be anxious during pregnancy. The notion of the counter-Oedipus thus brings together an extremely varied set of clinical facts and theoretical elements. Though it is a convenient term current in France, it still awaits full theoretical development. A task for the future is to relate the counterOedipus to transgenerational phenomena. ROGER PERRON See also: Adoption; Complex; Devereux, Georges (born György Dobo); Relaxation principle and neo-catharsis. Bibliography Bril, Jacques. (1989). LÕaffaire Hildebrand, ou le meurtre du fils. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Fine, Alain. (1993). Laios pédophile et infanticide. Revue française de psychanalyse, 57 (2), 515–524. Freud, Sigmund. (1932a). The acquisition and control of fire. SE, 22: 183–193. Pasche, François. (1979). Le ‘‘Prométhée’’ dÕEschyle, ou les Avatars du contre-œdipe paternal. Revue française de psychanalyse, 43 (3), 401–407.2 COUNTERPHOBIC We speak of counterphobic objects or phenomena when the person seeks out one or more external objects or phenomena, whether consciously or unconsciously, to escape from the manifestations of anxiety linked to his or her phobias. The specificity of the counterphobic phenomenon appears to be linked not to the nature of the object INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS used, but rather to the function that object assumes within the personÕs psychic economy. In the phobic situation, anxiety is focused on an ‘‘external object’’ (which may be an object, a person, or a situation). In these conditions, the counterphobic object is that object whose link or relationship to the phobic object is sufficiently well established within the personÕs psychic economy that its presence can neutralize the anxiety associated with the phobic object. Given the extreme heterogeneity of phobic phenomena, this perspective means that we need not attempt to make a clear distinction between the counterphobic object and the various types of objects described in other contexts that enable the person to escape from manifestations of anxiety (psychotic object, transitional object, fetish object, etc.). FRANCIS DROSSART See also: Claustrophobia; ‘‘Lines of Advance in PsychoAnalytic Therapy’’; Neurotic defenses; Object; Phobia of commiting impulsive acts; Phobias in children; Phobic neurosis; Prepsychosis; Symptom-formation. Bibliography Diatkine, René, and Éric Valentin. Les phobies de lÕenfant et quelques autres formes dÕanxiété infantile. In Nouveau Traité de psychiatrie de lÕenfant et de lÕadolescent. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985. Freud, Sigmund (1909). Some general remarks on hysterical attacks. SE, 9: 229–234. Freud, Sigmund (1928). Fetishism. SE 21: 147–157. Geissmann, Claudine and Pierre. LÕEnfant et sa Psychose. Paris: Dunod, 1984. Winnicott, Donald W. (1953). Transitional objects and transitional phenomena, a study of the first not-me possession. Coll. papers, through paediatrics to psycho-analysis (pp. 229–242). (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 34 (1951), 89–97.) COUNTER-TRANSFERENCE Counter-transference refers to the analystÕs unconscious reactions to the transference of the patient, including the feelings projected onto the analyst by the patient. Sigmund Freud introduced the concept at the Nuremberg congress of the International Association of 349 COUNTER-TRANSFERENCE Psychoanalysis in 1910: ‘‘We have become aware of the Ôcounter-transferenceÕ, which arises in [the analyst] as a result of the patientÕs influence on his unconscious feelings, and we are almost inclined to insist that he shall recognize this counter-transference in himself and overcome it’’ (Freud, 1910d, p. 144–145). He spoke of it again in a letter to Ludwig Binswanger dated February 20, 1913: ‘‘The problem of counter-transference . . . is—technically—among the most intricate in psychoanalysis. Theoretically I believe it is much easier to solve. What we give to the patient should, however, be a spontaneous affect, but measured out consciously at all times, to a greater or lesser extent according to need. In certain circumstances a great deal, but never oneÕs own unconscious. I would look upon that as the formula. One must, therefore, always recognise oneÕs counter-transference and overcome it, for not till then is one free oneself ’’ (letter 86f, p.112). He made reference to it again in ‘‘Observations on Transference-Love’’ (1915a [1914]): ‘‘For the doctor the phenomenon [the patientÕs falling in love with successive analysts] signifies a valuable piece of enlightenment and a useful warning against any tendency to a counter-transference which may be present in his own mind’’ (p. 160). In spite of these references, the notion of countertransference remains ambiguous in FreudÕs work. What are the analystÕs unconscious feelings? Can the analyst merely master the counter-transference or must he or she overcome it, which would imply a working-through? These three texts sowed the seeds of a theoretical and technical debate that developed after FreudÕs death. The conceptual tools needed for a theorization and explication of the counter-transference were introduced by Melanie Klein (1946) with her discovery of projective identification. This made it possible to understand how the patient could act upon the analystÕs psyche by projecting a part of his or her own psyche onto the analyst. Thus the counter-transference no longer appeared to be just the sum of the analystÕs blind spots, but instead became a way of perceiving certain aspects of the patientÕs communication— primitive communication in particular. Melanie Klein did not use the term counter-transference very often, thought it could be said that her entire technique is founded on the concept. It was her student Paula Heimann who, at the 1949 International Psychoanalytical Association conference 35 0 in Zurich, first made counter-transference a genuine tool for perceiving certain aspects of the patientÕs communication: ‘‘My thesis is that the analyst’s emotional response to his patient within the analytic situation represents one of the most important tools for his work. The analyst’s counter-transference is an instrument of research into the patient’s unconscious’’ (1950, p. 81). From this point on, the concept became an object of increasing interest, most notably in relation to developing research in the fields of child analysis and the psychoses. The definition of counter-transference remains controversial insofar as it is understood either strictly as a response to the unconscious processes that the patientÕs transference produces in the analyst or more globally as the part played within the framework of the treatment by the analystÕs personality. In analytic work, this concept is used in two different ways: on the one hand, as a defensive position on the part of the analyst, who must take care to remain as much as possible a projective surface, a mirror, for the patientÕs transference, and on the other, as a position in which the personality of the analyst, most notably his or her emotions, is engaged in the transferential/countertransferential dynamic on the basis of a more threedimensional conception of the transference. For the analyst, then, it is a matter of working through the counter-transferential experience in order to distinguish between the patientÕs projections and his or her own internal objects and see the common elements that might serve to guide the interpretation. This concept carries two potential pitfalls. On the one hand there is a possibility of psychologizing the analytic relation to the extent that it could be considered more in terms of personal interaction than in terms of a transferential repetition of unconscious scenarios (Fédida, 1986). On the other is the possibility of forgetting that while counter-transference can be a guide for understanding and the most faithful of servants, it can also be the harshest of masters (Segal, 1981). CLAUDINE GEISSMANN See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence; Balint group; Boundary violations; Case histories/description; Collected Papers on Schizophrenia and Related Subjects; Complex (analytical psychology); Development of Psycho-Analysis; Elasticity; Empathy; Ethnopsychoanalysis; Fourth analysis; Heimann, Paula; Initial interview(s); INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ‘ ‘C R E A T I V E W R I T E R S Interpretation; Listening; Mutual analysis; Neutrality/ benevolent neutrality; Nonverbal communication; Object relations theory; Projective identification; Psychoanalyst; Psychoanalytic treatment; Racker, Heinrich; Self-analysis; Silence; Supervised analysis (control case); Therapeutic alliance; Training analysis; Training of the psychoanalyst; Transference; Transference and Countertransference. Bibliography Fédida, Pierre. (1986Le contre-transfert en question. Psychanalyse à lÕUniversité, XI (41), 19–21. Freud, Sigmund. (1910d). The future prospects of psychoanalytic therapy. SE, 11: 139–151. ———. (1915a [1914]). Observations on transference-love (Further recommendations on the technique of psychoanalysis III). SE, 12: 157–171. Freud, Sigmund, and Binswanger, Ludwig. (2003). The Sigmund Freud-Ludwig Binswanger correspondence: 1908– 1938 (Arnold J. Pomerans, Trans.; Gerhard Fichtner, Ed.). New York: Other Press. Heimann, Paula. (1950). On countertransference. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 31, 81–84. Klein, Melanie. (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 27, 99–110. Segal, Hanna. (1981). Countertransference. In The work of Hanna Segal. New York: Jason Aronson. Further Reading Gabbard, Glen O. (1995). Countertransference: the emerging common ground. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 76, 475–486. Greenberg, Jay R. (1991). Countertransference and reality. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 1, 52–73. Jacobs, Theodore. (1999). Countertransference past and present:a review of the concept. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 80, 575–594. Levine, Howard. (1997). The capacity for countertransference. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 17, 44–68. Ogden, Thomas H. (1995). Aliveness and deadness of the transference and countertransference. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 76, 695–710.Smith, Henry. (2000). Countertransference, conflictual listening and the analytic object. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 48, 95–128. Steiner, John. (1994). Patient–centered and analyst–centered interpretations: Some implications of containment and countertransference. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 14, 406–422.4 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND DAY-DREAMING’’ ‘‘CREATIVE WRITERS AND DAY-DREAMING’’ In 1908 Sigmund Freud presented a talk entitled ‘‘Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming’’ at the publisher Hugo HellerÕs offices. This was an important article in which Freud responded to the questions introduced in ‘‘Psychopathic Characters on the Stage’’ (1942a [1905]). It is contemporary with the ‘‘Gradiva’’ essay (1907) and was to be continued in numerous texts that discussed artistic creation, such as ‘‘The Uncanny’’ (1919h) and ‘‘Dostoyevsky and Parricide (1928b [1927]). The condensed and theoretical nature of FreudÕs statements here summarize ideas he was to present elsewhere in his work. He begins with an idea that Donald Winnicott would later take up concerning the link between childhood games and creation—in this case, literary creation. The game is defined as a ‘‘daydream’’ and extends into adolescence in ‘‘fantasies.’’ Both belong to the more general category of fantasy activity, which is itself the result of unsatisfied desires. The link with literary creation takes place through popular literature, whose heroes are always victorious after they have undergone various trials. The pleasure of reading is defined as essentially narcissistic. The hero is always His Majesty the Ego and the ‘‘psychological’’ novel differs from the adventure novel only in that the ego is split into ‘‘partial egos’’ that are represented by the various heroes in conflict. The social novel, however, makes the ego an outside observer. The novelistÕs literary capacity is supported through the echoes that real events or folkloric sources awaken in his or her childhood memory. The creator allows the reader to participate in his fantasy world through the formal techniques he exercises, which provide a source of pleasure. This frees a deeper source, enabling the reader to ‘‘enjoy his fantasies without scruple and without shame.’’ Even though, as Freud himself acknowledges, the origin of this creative ability remains mysterious, this dense text introduces several new paths for discovery and reminds us of popular literatureÕs importance in understanding the pleasure of reading. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Applied psychoanalysis and the interaction of psychoanalysis; Creativity; Literary and artistic creation; Fantasy (reverie); Reverie; Sublimation. 351 CREATIVITY Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1908e [1907]). Der Dichter und das Phantasieren. Neue Revue, 1, 716–724; Creative writers and daydreaming. SE, 9: 143–153. CREATIVITY The term ‘‘creativity’’ is not used by Sigmund Freud but the concept is Freudian if we understand it to mean the creative imagination embodied in fantasies or daydreams. These may or may not receive further elaboration and be transformed into a work of art, regardless of its specific nature. However, it is primarily Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott who are responsible for establishing the concept as an active attitude of the ego with respect to its objects. As early as the Studies on Hysteria (1895d), Freud realized that the world of fantasy (Anna OÕs private theater) can take the place of the real world, and this includes the researcher captivated by his subject. In discussing humor (1905c), Freud also emphasized the freedom of the intellect in the face of highly constrained situations. Literary creation (1908e [1907]) appeared to Freud as an extension of childrenÕs daydreams, situations in which the fantasy is affirmed in the face of the empire of reality, without, however, leading the subject to misinterpret it as happens in delusional states. It is precisely this ability, whose origin remains mysterious, to turn fantasies into a reality inscribed in a work of art and therefore something that can be shared with others, that constitutes creativity, regardless of the field of endeavor. Freud was especially interested in literary (Dostoyevsky, Hoffmann, Jensen) and artistic creation (Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo). Melanie Klein (1929) had a very different outlook on creativity, which she saw as an impulse experienced by the infant to repair the object that had been initially split into good and bad and attacked during the paranoid phase. The creative function is therefore initially curative but goes hand in hand with the representation of a unified object. In this sense the creative function constitutes a reconstitution of the ego and the object, which having been simultaneously destroyed, subsist in an empty or mutilated state. Donald Winnicott (1971) gave the fullest extension to the concept of creativity by emphasizing its function as an attitude in the face of outside reality and not necessarily successful or recognized creative work. He 35 2 contrasted creativity and submission to the outside world but, unlike Freud, emphasized the fact that fantasy life could diverge from the creative attitude. Fantasizing is not living but can, on the contrary, as Freud noted with respect to hysterics, isolate the individual from life; it will never serve as an object of communication. For Winnicott, while creativity is related to dreaming and living, it is not really a part of our fantasy life. The experience of self can only be achieved through that physical and mental creative activity whose model is game playing. Creativity is not the creative capacity but something universal, inherent in the very fact of living. In the case where the individual submits to outside reality to the point of losing himself in it (false self), his creativity disappears and remains hidden without however being destroyed. It is in this way deprived of contact with the experience of life. ‘‘The creative impulse,’’ Winnicott writes, ‘‘is present as much in the moment-by-moment living of a backward child who is enjoying breathing as it is in the inspiration of an architect who suddenly knows what it is that he wishes to construct’’ (1982, p. 69). The concept of creativity is much closer to the question of activity than to the production of a work of art. This aspect is only sketched out by Freud but was theorized by Winnicott for whom the concept is associated with considerations of the ego and non-ego and the transitional space that serves as an ‘‘outlet’’ for primary narcissism. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Literary and artistic creation; ‘‘Creative Writers and Day-dreaming’’; Fantasy; Heroic Identification; Repetition; Reverie; Sachs, Hanns; Sublimation. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905c). Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. SE, 8: 1–236. ———. (1908e [1907]). Creative writers and day-dreaming. SE, 9: 143–153. Klein, Melanie. (1975). Infantile anxiety situations reflected in a work of art and in the creative impulse. In The Writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. 1). London: Hogarth. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 10, (1929) 436–443.) Winnicott, Donald. (1982). Playing and reality. London: Routledge. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CRIMINOLOGY Further Reading Nagera, Humberto. (1967). The concepts of structure and structuralization: psychoanalytic usage and implications for a theory of learning and creativity. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 22, 77–102. Niederland, William. G. (1976). Psychoanalytic approaches to artistic creativity. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 45, 185–212. CRIMINOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Criminology is the ‘‘scientific’’ study of criminal behavior. Part of its mandate is to look for the causes of criminality. A distinction is made between general criminology, which coordinates and compares results from different criminological ‘‘sciences,’’ and clinical criminology, which is an interdisciplinary approach to the individual criminal (Pinatel, 1975). Criminalistics is the set of methods and scientific means used by law enforcement to search for criminals and establish their guilt. It is customary to trace the origins of criminology to Cesare Lombroso (1836–1909), trained in medicine at Pavia and Padua, a volunteer in the Piedmontese army for seven years. A physician of Jewish origin, Lombroso became famous with the publication of LÕUomo Delinquente (Criminal man) in 1876. His countryman Enrico Ferri, a professor of law and sociology, was the author of Criminal Sociology (1917) and Raffaele Garofalo wrote Criminologia (1881), from which the term derives. Lombroso is notorious for his theory of ‘‘the born criminal,’’ based on the search for an ‘‘atavistic’’ factor in criminality (in fact part of a larger naturalistic quest for the origins of crime that ranged from the occipital lobe to a supposed ‘‘criminal chromosome’’). It is too often forgotten, however, that he founded the comparative approach to large numbers and introduced the study of criminalsÕ writings. Historians of criminology put the true beginnings of the discipline almost a century before Lombroso. His genius lay in his ability to combine phrenology, anthropology, legal medicine and proto-psychiatry under the aegis of Darwinism (Mucchielli and Lantéri-Laura, 1994). Sigmund Freud, who made no secret of his aversion to criminals, was silent about the work of his contemporaries in that area and singularly cautious when it came to applying psychoanalysis to criminology. In June 1906 he was invited to give a talk to Professor INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS LöfflerÕs students on the possible application of psychoanalysis to the ‘‘establishment of facts in legal proceedings’’ (1906c, p. 103). He directed his comments to future judges and lawyers, providing advice about the ‘‘interest in a new method of investigation, the aim of which is to compel the accused person himself to establish his own guilt or innocence by objective signs’’ (1906c, p. 103). This text has given rise to considerable misunderstandings, which have been discussed by François Sauvagnat (1992). Freud cautioned his audience about a considerable obstacle: the judge was likely to be misled by neurotics, who were liable to behave as if they were guilty. He gave free rein to his skepticism, taking but a few sentences to discuss the psychoanalytic method as having no practical application in legal matters given the risk of error entailed. In ‘‘Criminals from a Sense of Guilt’’ (in 1916d, pp. 332–33), Freud goes a step further, based on his experience in treating subjects who had committed some minor offense during therapy: ‘‘He was suffering from an oppressive feeling of guilt, of which he did not know the origin, and after he had committed a misdeed this oppression was mitigated. His sense of guilt was at least attached to something’’ (p. 332). The origin of this obscure feeling of guilt was the Oedipus complex, with its implications of criminal intent: ‘‘killing the father and having sexual relations with the mother’’ (p. 333). Freud hypothesized that this could clarify our understanding of some criminals but he was careful to exclude those who did not have such feelings, those who were without moral inhibitions, and those who rationalized their struggle against society. It would have been easy to make use of the Oedipus complex to account for criminal acts, especially partricide. In 1931, Freud was asked by Joseph Hupka, a professor of law at the University of Vienna, to provide testimony during a review of the trial of Philipp Halsmann, accused of having killed his father. In examining both possibilities, guilt or innocence, Freud steered a careful course between a defense of psychoanalysis and his ethical reservations concerning its use; he again exercised considerable caution, writing, ‘‘because it is always present, the Oedipus complex is not suited to provide a decision on the question of guilt’’ (1931d, p. 252). Apropos of his rare allusions to the relationship between psychoanalysis and criminology, it must be said that FreudÕs prudence has proved salutary. It was 353 CRUELTY subsequently evident that an overly hasty application of psychoanalysis can mechanically alter the role of fantasy, or generalize unconscious feelings of guilt, or even sustain the illusion that psychoanalysis might one day conquer the world of law. Sándor Ferenczi must be mentioned here, not only for his hope of contributing to the development of a psychoanalysis of crime, but also for the richness of his theoretical and clinical ideas, which served as the foundations of a psychoanalytic understanding of victimhood, especially in his accounts of identification with the aggressor and introjection of the aggressor, who ‘‘disappears as external reality and becomes intrapsychic.’’ DANIEL ZAGURY See also: Act, passage to the; Acting out/acting in; Aimée, case of; Alexander, Franz Gabriel; Cénac, Michel; Ellenberger, Henri Frédéric; Guilt, unconscious sense of; Lacan, Jacques-Marie Émile; Lagache, Daniel; Law and psychoanalysis; Parricide/murder of the father; Schiff, Paul. Bibliography Balier, Claude. (1988). Psychanalyse des comportements violents. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Ferri, Enrico. (1967). Criminal sociology (Joseph I. Kelly and John Lisle, Trans.). New York: Agathon. (Original work published 1917) Freud, Sigmund. (1906c). Psycho-analysis and the establishment of facts in legal proceedings. SE, 9: 97–114. ———. (1916d). Some character-types met with in psychoanalytic work. SE, 14: 309–333. ———. (1931d). The expert opinion in the Halsmann case. SE, 21: 251–253. Garofalo, Raffaele. (1891). Criminologia. Turin: Fratelli Bocca. Lacan, Jacques. (1975). Motifs du crime paranoı̈aque: le crime des sœurs Papin. In De la psychose paranoı̈aque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité. Paris: Le Seuil. (Original work published 1933) Lantéri-Laura, Georges. (1994). Recherches psychiatriques: Vol. 1. Sur le langage. Paris: Sciences en situation. Legendre, Pierre. (1989). Le crime du caporal Lortie, traité sur le père. Paris: Fayard. Mucchieli, Laurent. (1994). Histoire de la criminologie française. Paris: LÕHarmattan. 35 4 Pinatel, J. (1975). Traité de droit pénal et de criminologie (Vol 3: Criminologie, 3rd ed). Paris: Dalloz. Reik, Theodor. (1973). Le besoin d’avouer: psychanalyse du crime et du châtiment. Paris: Payot. Sauvagnat, François (Ed.). (1992). Les coordonnées historiques de la distinction acting-out / passage à l’acte. In Le souci de l’être : Le soin en psychiatrie. Paris: GRAPP-Le Seuil. Zagury, Daniel. (1996). Entre psychose et perversion narcissique, une clinique de l’horreur: les tueurs en série. LÕÉvolution psychiatrique, 59 (1). Further Reading Goldberg, Arnold. (2003). Addendum to Freud’s ‘‘Criminals from a sense of guilt.’’ Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 72, 465–468. CRUELTY Cruelty is a multi-faceted concept in FreudÕs work. It can relate to actions and motivations but also to agencies, events, or destiny. When Dora (1905e [1901]) abruptly terminated her analysis, Freud mentioned the young girlÕs ‘‘cruel impulses and revengeful motives’’ (p. 120), which, through Freud in the transference, were directed at Herr K. and through him at her father. This text, written in 1901, contains an implicit question as to whether these impulses originate from the drives or the ego, but also as to the type of person associated with these impulses: in fleeing the transference, did Dora intend to be cruel towards Freud? An ‘‘instinct of cruelty’’ appears in the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d). In this work, Freud relates it to male sexuality: the man has a tendency to subjugate in order to overcome ‘‘the resistance of the sexual object’’ (p. 158) and satisfy his sexual urges. Freud states: ‘‘There is an intimate connection between cruelty and the sexual instinct’’ (p. 159). Along with scopophilia and exhibitionism, cruelty is classified as a partial or component drive. Whether active or passive, it also stems from the drive for mastery. Whereas this drive is exerted through the ‘‘apparatus for obtaining mastery’’ (p. 159), connected with the musculature, it is the skin, as the ‘‘erotogenic zone par excellence’’ (p. 169) that constitutes ‘‘one of the erotogenic roots of the passive instinct of cruelty’’ (p. 193). Freud also refers to Jean-Jacques RousseauÕs memories of being beaten, which he goes on to discuss further in ‘‘A Child is Being Beaten’’ (1919e). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CRUELTY Like mastery, cruelty involves the use of the object simply as a means of satisfaction. In this sense, it differs from the ‘‘sadism proper’’ (1924c, p. 163) that results from the binding of the drive for cruelty with the sexual drive towards the object. Whereas the drive for cruelty, like the drive for mastery, is characterized by indifference on the part of the subject to the feelings experienced by the object of satisfaction, considered as a part-object, sadism involves a pleasure derived from the objectÕs suffering. Describing sadism in Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915c) as ‘‘the exercise of violence or power upon some other person as object’’ (p. 127), having also described the drive for cruelty in this way ten years earlier, Freud added: ‘‘the sadistic child takes no notice of whether or not it inflicts pain, nor is it part of its purpose to do so’’ (1915c, p. 128). Thus, strictly speaking, the small child is cruel but not sadistic. This becomes possible only after he has discovered the total object and his ambivalence towards it. In the same year (1915b), Freud specifically related cruelty to egotism. Intrinsically neither good nor bad, the drives acquire these qualities with regard to the necessary process of civilization. But the child is able to renounce drive gratification because of his need to be loved by his libidinal object. However, the object still remains an unloved and sometimes hated stranger as a direct result of its otherness. Egoistic and cruel impulses resurface and are directed at the object, particularly if the object is generally designated as an enemy. Wounded by these attacks, the object becomes even more frightening. After the introduction of the death drive in 1920, the drive for cruelty gave way to the ‘‘destructive drive,’’ understood as an external deflection of the death drive (1923b) and described as aggressive when directed at objects. If it is taken up by the ego, the ego itself becomes cruel or sadistic. The ego then risks not only losing the objectÕs love but also being subjected to the reprimands of the superego. This agency, which equates with moral conscience, can demonstrate an extreme cruelty, according to the need for aggression aroused by present and past frustrations. Rebellious by nature towards what is nevertheless the necessary process of civilization, the human being is always able to display a ‘‘cruel aggressiveness’’ (1930a, p. 111) if circumstances lend themselves to this. Melanie Klein substantially developed this concept of cruelty on the part of the superego. In the context of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the controversy that pitted her against Anna Freud, she drew attention to the extreme severity of the infantile (or early) superego, even where the parents are conciliatory (1927). The harshness of the agency is proportional to the aggression felt by the child as a result of the frustrations experienced during weaning and toilet training. Thus a cruel superego, ‘‘something which bites, devours and cuts’’ (1928, p. 187) is the outcome of the oralsadistic and anal-sadistic drives. Taking up FreudÕs hypothesis concerning the necessary external projection of the death drive, to which the effects of pre-oedipal frustrations are added, Melanie Klein described an extremely cruel child who ‘‘attacks its motherÕs breast’’ (1933, p. 253), ‘‘thinks of sucking out and eating up the inside of its motherÕs body’’ (p. 254) and attacks its object with excrements that are ‘‘regarded as burning and corroding substances’’ (p. 253). This intense hostility both from the object and toward it is the product of the deflection of the death drive and past frustrations but also of fears of reprisal for the hostility towards the hated object, ultimately of the influence of the early superego. Thus, ‘‘the small child becomes dominated by the fear of suffering unimaginable cruel attacks, both from its real objects and from its super-ego’’ (p. 251). Although the oedipal phase is influenced by the earlier stages, these destructive rages are tempered with pity and some reparative impulses emerge. Donald Winnicott (1955/1975) has clearly demonstrated the process of transition from a ‘‘pre-ruth era’’ in which the little child can inadvertently or unintentionally display aggression, since ‘‘if destruction be part of the aim in the id impulse, then destruction is only incidental to id satisfaction’’ (p. 210), to a subsequent stage when the child is concerned about his object. He then has worries about it and is able to feel compassion or potentially creative reparative wishes, which prevents him from remaining cruel toward his object. Of course, these drives are primitive and potentially cruel toward the object. Throughout his life, the subject will have to find compromises between the claims of the narcissistic pole of his drives and the intensity of his love for the object. However, the objectÕs tolerance of the subjectÕs drive-based egoism varies. In fact, some parents and spouses are better able than others to tolerate narcissistic egocentrism in their child or partner and are accordingly less vulnerable to their ‘‘cruelty’’. ANNETTE FRÉJAVILLE 355 CRYPTOMNESIA See also: Mastery, instinct for; Object; Pair of opposites; Reaction-formation; Sadism; Sadomasochism; Superego; Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality; Violence, instinct of. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1905e). Fragment of an analysis of a case of Hysteria. SE, 7: 1–122. ———. (1915b). Thoughts for the times on war and death. SE, 14: 273–300. ———. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109–140. ———. (1919e). ‘‘A child is being beaten’’: a contribution to the study of the origin of sexual perversions. SE, 17: 175– 204. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ———. (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155–170. ———. (1930a). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57–145. Klein, Melanie. (1927). Criminal tendencies in normal children. In Love, guilt and reparation and other works 1921– 1945. The writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. 1, pp. 170–185). London: Hogarth,. ———. (1928). Early stages of the Oedipus conflict. Love, guilt and reparation and other works 1921–1945. The writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. 1, pp. 186–198). London: Hogarth. ———. (1933). The early development of conscience in the child. In Love, guilt and reparation and other works 1921– 1945. The writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. 1, pp. 248–267). London: Hogarth,. Winnicott, Donald W. (1975). Aggression in relation to emotional development. In through paediatrics to psychoanalysis (pp. 204–218). London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1955) CRYPTOMNESIA Cryptomnesia is a memory that has been forgotten and then returns without being recognized as such by the subject, who believes it is something new and original. In general, the memory returns in the form of an idea or intuition, but reappearances in the form of actions have also been included. 35 6 The word was first used by the Geneva-based psychiatrist Théodore Flournoy in From India to the Planet Mars: A Case of Multiple Personality with Imaginary Languages (1901/1994), his book about the case of the spiritualist medium Catherine-Élise Müller, who used the name Hélène Smith. It thus comes out of an attempt at a rational approach to spiritualist phenomena that showed a delusional character: ‘‘In the communications or messages provided by mediums, the first (but not the only) question that arises is always whether, where spiritualists see the influence of disembodied spirits or some other supranormal cause, one is not simply dealing with cryptomnesia, with latent memories on the part of the medium that come out, sometimes greatly disfigured by a subliminal work of imagination or reasoning, as so often happens in our ordinary dreams.’’ In his thesis, ‘‘On the Psychology and Pathology of So-Called Occult Phenomena’’ (1902), and an article, ‘‘Cryptomnesia’’ (1905), Carl Gustav Jung expressed his belief that he had isolated this phenomenon in NietzscheÕs Zarathustra. Cryptomnesia was the object of a few studies or mentions until around 1920 (Géza Dukes, Sándor Ferenczi, Wilhelm Stekel). Thereafter, it was seldom mentioned in the psychoanalytic literature and was even rarer in the psychological and psychiatric literature. The notionÕs interest remains marked by the particular use Sigmund Freud made of it, from 1919, by linking it to the issue of the originality of his inventions. Entering into the category of forgetting, cryptomnesia indexes it with a univocal meaning, that of tempering a claim to the originality of an idea. In an article signed ‘‘F.’’ and titled ‘‘Note on the Prehistory of the Technique of Analysis’’ (1920), Freud acknowledged that a text by Ludwig Börne, ’Die Kunst in drei Tagen ein Original-Schriftsteller zu werden (How to become an original writer in three days; 1823), had served as a precursor to the technique of free association. Freud also mentioned his cryptomnesia with regard to Josef Popper-Lynkeus, Empedocles, and Wilhelm Fliess, and interpreted Georg GroddeckÕs statements along these lines. It is known that he was sometimes reluctant to refer to himself as the inventor of psychoanalysis, invoking the contributions of Josef Breuer, and that in addition, in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901), he made himself vulnerable to a claim of priority on the part of his friend Fliess by accusing himself of harboring the unconscious wish to INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CULTURAL TRANSMISSION steal the idea of bisexuality from him. No doubt we should see in this problematic, to which Freud linked the meaning of cryptomnesia, the characteristic difficulty the man of science has in taking personal responsibility for a discovery that shakes the foundations of the very rationality he identifies himself with. Invoking cryptomnesia in this context arguably means maintaining the fiction of a subject-supposed-to-know guaranteeing that the knowledge was already there before the creator invented it. ERIK PORGE See also: Amnesia; ‘‘Autobiographical Study, An’’; Flournoy, Théodore; Forgetting; Free association; Memories; Memory; Mnemic trace/memory trace; Repression. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1920). A note on the prehistory of the technique of analysis. SE 18: 263–265. ———. (1923). Josef Popper-Lynkeus and the theory of dreams. SE 19: 259–263. Flournoy, Theodore. (1994). From India to the planet Mars: A case of multiple personality with imaginary languages. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1901) Jung, Carl Gustav. (1902). On the psychology and pathology of so-called occult phenomena. Coll. works, Vol. 1, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ———. (1905). Cryptomnesia. Coll. works, Vol. 1, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; United States Bollingen Foundation. Trosman, Harry. (1969). The cryptomnesic fragment in the discovery of free association. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 17 (2), 489–510. CULTURAL HEREDITY. See Cultural transmission CULTURAL TRANSMISSION The term ‘‘cultural transmission’’ does not appear in Sigmund FreudÕs work, but the idea is implicit in such notions as cultural heritage and phylogenetic inheritance. Freud believed that the (since abandoned) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS biological precept, according to which ‘‘ontogenesis recapitulates phylogenesis,’’ could be applied to human psychic development. The notion of cultural transmission refers to the possibility that the acquisitions of an individual or of a culture can be transmitted to descendents and form the basis of cultural development. Freud addressed the topic for the first time in Totem and Taboo (1912–13a), where he advanced the hypothesis that the feeling of guilt over the murder of the primal father had persisted over the centuries and still affected generations that could know nothing directly about it. In FreudÕs later works, the main mechanism of transmission was said to be identification, which ensconced the lost object in the ego, as described in ‘‘Mourning and Melancholia’’ (1916–17g [1915]), and finally produced an alteration in the ego that gave rise to the superego, as described in The Ego and the Id (1923b). In the New Introductory Lectures (1933 [1932]) Freud observed that the superego could be viewed as the outcome of successful identification with the parental agency, and as the natural and legitimate heir to the Oedipus complex. As the bearer of tradition, the superego was a true agent of cultural transmission from one generation to the next. In Moses and Monotheism (1939a [1934–38]) Freud returned to the idea of an archaic heritage and compared such inherited acquired characteristics to instincts in animals—an inheritance on par with symbolism. After Freud, the idea of phylogenetic transmission was seemingly relegated to the background, as an explanation of last resort, and the emphasis shifted toward a detailed and expanded study of identifications. The point of departure for this was FreudÕs remark in the New Introductory Lectures, in which he observed that the childÕs superego was not formed in the image of the real or imaginary parents, but instead modeled on the parentsÕ superego. The main focus soon moved beyond direct parental and intergenerational identifications to more distant identifications, such as those with grandparents, ancestors, or mythical characters in family history, who re-emerge amid the descendents as a kind of actualization of family prehistory. The theme of the intergenerational (or transgenerational) appears in psychotherapeutic work with families, children, and adolescents, and sometimes gives the impression that this sphere of 357 CULTURE observation is being invaded by the study of archaic identifications. The other area where this theme comes to the fore is work with survivors or descendents of survivors of the Holocaust or other genocides, such as those committed by Latin American dictatorships. In these two areas, the importance of secrets, the unspoken, or ancestral crimes that the family has decided to bury, is much in evidence. In the case of the survivors of genocide, there is an attempt to make the traumatic situation disappear by denying it representation. But the buried material reappears two or three generations later, as a ghost that occupies the place where the concealment of important aspects of the ancestorÕs life has produced a ‘‘blank’’ in the descendantÕs psyche. In such cases, we speak of ‘‘alienating identifications.’’ A particular aspect of this type of intergenerational transmission was studied by Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok (1972/1978), in relation to the problem of grief. We thus see that a number of ideas are related: in FreudÕs work we encountered identification, phylogenetic heritage, and intergenerational process; in other authors, the notions of transgenerational transmission, ‘‘fantasies of identification’’ (de Mijolla, 1986), and ‘‘alienating identifications.’’ In summary, we may say that the concept of phylogenetic heritage has gradually been reconsidered, to the benefit of more detailed study of the mechanisms of possible transmission, notably identification, the core of the issue. The uncovering of alienating factors in the subjectÕs prehistory, factors that can go back several generations, has come to the fore, replacing the ideas of ‘‘family romance’’ and ‘‘mythical descent,’’ so well known to us since Freud. But emphasis on the intergenerational may push analytic work in the direction of applied psychoanalysis, so distancing it from a deeper understanding of the configurations and processes of the analytic situation, which is the prime locus of psychoanalytic discovery. This danger may even be exploited by the ever-renewed faces of resistance to psychoanalysis. MADELEINE BARANGER See also: Intergenerational; Ontogenesis. Bibliography Abraham, Nicolas, and Torok, Maria. (1968). The shell and the kernel: Renewals of psychoanalysis. Ed. and trans. 35 8 Nicholas Rand. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. Freud, Sigmund. (1912–13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ———. (1916–17g [1915]). Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14: 237–258. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. ———. (1939a [1934–38]). Moses and monotheism: Three essays. SE, 23: 139–207. Kaës, René; Faimberg, Haydée; Enriquez, Micheline, et al. (1993). Transmission de la vie psychique entre générations. Paris: Dunod. Mijolla, Alain de. (1986). Les Visiteurs du Moi, fantasmes dÕidentification (2nd ed.). Paris: Les Belles Lettres. CULTURE. See Civilization (Kultur) CURE Freud clearly stated that ‘‘the aim of the treatment will never be anything else but the practical recovery of the patient’’ (1904a, p. 253). He also declared that ‘‘Psycho-analysis was born out of medical necessity. It sprang from the need for bringing help to neurotic patients, who had found no relief through rest-cures, through the arts of hydropathy or through electricity’’ (1919g, p. 259). Many of the arguments that divide psychoanalysts on the problem of the ‘‘cure’’ arise from their different conceptions they have of the termÕs meaning. The medical model leads to the idea that the cure is a matter of the disappearance of symptoms or lesions, or even of a restitutio ad integrum (restoration of health) that would actually be impossible in the mental field. Hypnosis and suggestion made disorders disappear as if by magic, but only temporarily, which is why Freud abandoned these techniques. He was more concerned with deeper causes and, from the time of Studies on Hysteria, he limited his own influence: ‘‘[Y]ou will be able too convince yourself that much will be gained if we succeed in transforming your hysterical misery into common unhappiness. With a mental life that has INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CURE been restored to health, you will be better armed against that unhappiness’’ (1895d, p. 305). In the analysis of ‘‘Little Hans,’’ he insisted that ‘‘a psychoanalysis is not an impartial scientific investigation, but a therapeutic measure. Its essence is not to prove anything, but merely to alter something’’ (1909b, p. 104). Thus the objective is ‘‘change,’’ giving the patient a capacity to mobilize his defenses differently and more effectively to manage both the external and internal conflicts that the cure cannot prevent from returning. In a note to The Ego and the Id, Freud wrote that ‘‘analysis does not set out to make pathological reactions impossible, but to give the patientÕs ego freedom to decide one way or the other’’ (1923b, p. 50n). It is necessary to remove all obstacles to the attainment of this goal, and that is the work of the treatment: the unconscious must ‘‘convey itself into the preconscious’’ (1900a, p. 610); treatment involves ‘‘overcoming the internal resistances’’ (1905a, p. 267); analysis ‘‘replaces repression by condemnation’’ (1909b, p. 145); the patient must ‘‘make the advance from the pleasure principle to the reality principle’’ (1919b, p. 312); and ‘‘the aim of the treatment is to remove the patientÕs resistances and to pass his repressions in review and thus to bring about the most far reaching unification and strengthening of his ego, to enable him to save the mental energy which he is expending upon internal conflicts, to make the best of him that his inherited capacities will allow and so to make him as efficient and as capable of enjoyment as possible’’ (1923a, p. 251). From this perspective, ‘‘partial or complete sublimation’’ represents, as Freud wrote to James Jackson Putnam in a letter of May 14, 1911, ‘‘the goal of [psychoanalytic] therapy and the way in which it serves every form of higher development’’ (1971a, p. 121). Freud never concealed the pedagogic aspect of such a program. He insisted on several occasions that psychoanalysis was a kind of ‘‘after-education’’ (1916–17a, p. 451; 1940a, p. 175), even though he also maintained that the psychoanalyst must not fall into the role of an educator. Similarly, he often spoke out, right up to the end of his life, against the idea that a ‘‘schematic normality’’ could define the end of the treatment, adding that ‘‘The business of analysis is to secure the best possible psychological conditions for the functions of the ego; with that it has discharged its task’’ (1937a, p. 250). A growing awareness of the death drive and the repetition compulsion led Freud to reconsider the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS secondary gain from illness as an obstacle to the cure and to reexamine the role of the ‘‘negative therapeutic reaction.’’ The latter, which satisfies unconscious guilt feelings and the need for punishment in the neurotic (through masochism), represents one of the most important obstacles to the satisfactory progress of a psychoanalytic treatment. FreudÕs continuing efforts to describe and analyze the negative therapeutic reaction shows that he persisted in looking for this, in the sense of ‘‘change,’’ despite his later pessimistic remarks. Other analysts broadened the concept of cure, even if certain remarks by Jacques Lacan seemed to devalue it. On February 5, 1957, after a lecture by Georges Favez on ‘‘The Encounter with the Analyst,’’ Lacan expressed with the utmost clarity an idea that has since been greatly distorted by both his adversaries and partisans. He began by arguing against the idea that ‘‘if the measure of a therapeutic analysis is defined by its achieving the aim of producing a cure, that would mean that a therapeutic analysis is always something rather limited. All the same,’’ he went on, ‘‘cure always seems to be a happy side effect—as I have said, to the scandal of certain ears—but the aim of analysis is not cure. Freud said the same thing himself, namely, that making cure the aim of analysis—making it nothing more than a means towards a specific end—leads to something like a short circuit that could only falsify the analysis. Thus analysis has another aim’’ (1958, p. 309). Lacan made these remarks were within the context of an argument that pitted him against the idea of ‘‘therapeutic analysis’’ and against the aim of ‘‘cure’’— defined by Sacha Nacht as the ‘‘disappearance of fear and the possibility of loving and being loved’’ (1960)—as extolled by the Psychoanalytic Institute of Paris. His remarks aimed at a ‘‘pure psychoanalysis’’ that Lacan associated with training analysis. In any case, LacanÕs remarks can be compared to a formulation of FreudÕs that is similar only if we neglect the fact that it involves the question of symptomatic suffering and not ‘‘cure.’’ However, as stated at the outset, everything depends on how one understands the term: ‘‘The removal of the symptoms of the illness is not specifically aimed at, but is achieved, as it were, as a by-product if the analysis is properly carried through’’ (1923a, p. 251). ALAIN DE MIJOLLA 359 CZECH REPUBLIC See also: ‘‘Analysis Terminable and InterminableÕÕ; Analyzability; Archetype (analytical psychology); Change; Ego; Memory; Negative therapeutic reaction; Transference neurosis; Psychoanalytic treatment; Resolution of the transference; Termination of treatment; Therapeutic alliance. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4 & 5: 1–751. ———. (1904a). FreudÕs psycho-analytic procedure. SE, 7: 247–254. ———. (1905a). On psychotherapy. SE, 7: 255–268. ———. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10: 1–149. ———. (1916–17a). Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 15 & 16: 1–496. ———. (1919b). Some character-types met with in psychoanalytic work. SE, 14: 309–333. ———. (1919g). Preface to ReikÕs ritual: psycho-analytic studies. SE, 17: 257–263. ———. (1923a). Two encyclopaedia articles. SE, 18: 235– 259. ———. (1923d). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. ———. (1940a). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 139–207. Freud, Sigmund, et al. (1971a), James Jackson Putnam and psychoanalysis. Letters between Putnam and Sigmund Freud, Ernest Jones, William James, Sándor Ferenczi, and Morton Prince, 1877–1917 (NathanG. Hale, Ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Freud, Sigmund, and Josef Breuer. (1895d). Studies in hysteria. SE, 2. Lacan, Jacques. (1958). Intervention, in G. Favez: ÔLe rendez-vous avec le psychanalyste.Õ La Psychanalyse, 4, 305–314. Further Reading Abend, Sander. (1979). Unconscious fantasy and theories of cure. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 27, 579–596. Eagle, Morris. (1993). Enactments, transference, and symptomatic cure: a case history. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 3, 93–110. 36 0 Eissler, Kurt R. (1963). Notes on the psychoanalytic concept of cure. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 18, 424–463. Kohut, Heinz. (Arnold.Goldberg, ed.) (1984). How does analysis cure? Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press. CZECH REPUBLIC The first pioneer of psychoanalysis in the Czech lands was Jaroslav Stuchlik (1890–1967), the Czech psychiatrist. He studied medicine in Switzerland, where he met with Eugen Bleuler and Carl Gustav Jung. At the end of the First World War, he was the first Czech to visit FreudÕs seminars in Vienna. He surrounded himself with a group of young physicians in Slovakia (Kaschau) in the 1920s. Another group, consisting of Russian physicians, originated in Prague around the Russian emigré Nikolaj I. Osipov (1877–1934, who lived in Prague from 1921 until his death and founded the Russian Psychoanalytical Association with Drosnez, Tryto, and Viroubov. Osipov lectured in psychoanalytic psychiatry at Charles University in Prague. Nicolaj Osipov and Jaroslav Stuchlik, along with Eugen Windholz, formerly of the group in Kaschau, initiated the idea of the commemorative plaque that was installed on FreudÕs home in Freiberg on October 25, 1931. Anna Freud took part in the celebration and Sigmund Freud, at that time 75 years old, sent a letter of greeting to participants. In connection with this event the first Czech Yearbook of Psychoanalysis (1932) appeared, edited by Windholz. Windholz (1903–1986), a Slovak Jew, was the first in the Czechoslovakian history to receive a proper psychoanalytical training. He started his analysis with Dr. Wolfe in the Berlin Psychoanalytical Institute where he spent few weeks in 1930. Then he continued his training in Prague with Frances Deri, a German analyst, who was the first émigré from Germany, followed by Heinrich and Yela Loewenfeld, Steff Bornstein. Hanna Heilborn, Annie Reich, and Elisabeth Gero-Heymann. The Prague Psychoanalytical Study Group was established in 1933, led by Frances Deri until 1935, when she moved to Los Angeles and, after that, by Otto Fenichel, who trained and taught in Prague until 1938 as an emissary of the Viennese Psychoanalytical Society which was affiliated with the Prague Group officially at the Lucerne Congress in 1934. Among the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS CZECH REPUBLIC analysts from Vienna who traveled to Prague on weekends to present lectures were E. Bibring, R. Waelder, R. Spitz, P. Federn, E. Kris, and A. Aichhorn. Among the pupils were Emmanuel Windholz, Jan Frank, a Slovak psychiatrist and neurologist, Richard Karpe, a Czech pediatrician, Theodor N. Dosuzkov, a Russian émigré, neurologist and psychiatrist, and Otta Brief and Theresa Bondy. The Czech Study Group was officially recognized by the 14th IPA Congress in Marienbad in 1936. The Munich treaty in 1938 had disastrous consequences for the psychoanalytic movement: Czechoslovakia was occupied by Hitler in March 1939. During the years 1938–1939, a majority of the Czech Study Group emigrated to the United States (Windholz to San Francisco, Frank to New York, Karpe to Hartford, Connecticut), some died in concentration camps, and the only member to survive the German occupation was Theodor Dosuzkov (1899– 1982). He had been trained by Annie Reich and Fenichel supervised him. During the war he went on with his psychoanalytic work illegally, surrounding himself with a small group that played a significant role in the postwar development of psychoanalysis in Czechoslovakia. The Society for the Study of Psychoanalysis was reestabilished in Prague in 1946. It had to be dissolved officially at the beginning of the 1950s, after the Communist putsch, but it continued illegally a further 40 years (1950–1989). The training in psychoanalysis went on secretly. Theodor Dosuzkov and his pupils Otakar Kuera, Ladislas Haas (emigrated in 1965 to London), and M. Benová were direct members of the IPA, and had some private contacts with analysts INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS abroad. In the 1960s the younger generation of analysts started to train candidates: P. Tautermann, A. Sizková. In the early 1980s, descendants of Dosuzkov and others established the new group and the Psychoanalytic Institute. Since 1987, the Czech Group has been visited by several important European and American psychoanalysts. An important step was made at the 26th IPA Congress in Rome in 1969: V. Fischelová, Jiri Kocourek, Vaclav Mikota, M. Šebek, and B. Vacková were recognized as the direct and associate members of the IPA. The Czech Group became a Study Group of the IPA at the 38th Congress in Amsterdam in 1983. The official journal of the Czech Study Group, Psychoanalyticky sbornik, has been published since 1989. MICHAEL ŠEBEK Bibliography Fischer, Eugenia. (1992). Czechoslovakia. In P. Kutter (Ed.), Psychoanalysis international, a guide to psychoanalysis throughout the world, vol. 1, Europe (pp. 34–49). StuttgartBad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 34–49. Fischer, René. (1975). Zur Geschichte der psychoanalytischen Bewegung in der Tschechoslowakei. Psyche, 29, 12. Šebek, Michael. (1992). La psychanalyse, les psychanalystes et la période stalinienne de lÕaprès-guerre. La situation tchécoslovaque. Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse, 5, 553–568. Šebek, Michael. (1993). Psychoanalysis in Czechoslovakia. Psychoanalytic Review, 80 (3), 433–439. 361 D DALBIEZ, ROLAND (1893–1976) Roland Dalbiez, a French philosopher, was born in Paris on June 23, 1893, and died in Rennes on March 14, 1976. He is best known for his Psychoanalytic Method and the Doctrine of Freud, a philosophical critique of psychoanalysis published in 1936. Dalbiez was born into an aristocratic Christian family (his father was a general in the army and his mother a Churchill) and entered the French naval academy in 1911. He was a naval officer during the First World War. After contracting pleurisy he was forced to abandon the military and turned to philosophy, graduating in 1921 and receiving his doctorate in 1936. He spent his entire career as a professor in the literature department of the University of Rennes. His research involved the boundaries between biology and metaphysics. Together with Professor Rémy Collin of the University of Nancy, he founded Cahiers de philosophie de la nature (The philosophy of nature), and published several studies on the theory of evolution. In the early 1930s he was part of the circle of people around Jacques Maritain, the neo-Thomist philosopher, where he met Emmanuel Mounier and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It was Maritain who encouraged Dalbiez to write about Freud. His research was so extensive that it turned into a dissertation. He defended his dissertation at the Sorbonne and it was published the same year by Desclée de Brouwer, as La Méthode Psychanalytique et la Doctrine Freudienne (Psychoanalytic method and freudian theory). There were two volumes: The first included an account of Freud’s ideas and the second a discussion. There was a preface by Henri Claude. Claude introduced Dalbiez as a student who had become personally acquainted with the psychoanalytic method through his study, together with several psychiatrists, of various cases over a period of years. Dalbiez insists on the fact that his judgment is not only based on what he has read but also on what he has seen. ‘‘On a number of points, books leave us with a feeling of uncertainty, but the facts are convincing.’’ (p. 8) The main thrust of his dissertation is that while Freudianism is wrong for many reasons—exaggeration, eccentricity, dogmatism—the method is excellent and fruitful. Dalbiez essentially reproaches Freud for lacking philosophic rigor and behaving ‘‘as if he were unaware of the idea of proof.’’ His principal merit is to have emphasized the primacy of the unconscious in mental life. Dalbiez’s friend Édouard Pichon provided a detailed review of the book in the Revue Française de Psychanalyse in 1936. He presents the work as ‘‘a milestone in psychoanalysis in France’’ and feels that the philosopher from Rennes will ‘‘convince even the most reluctant of philosophers that the psychoanalytic method represents a definite advance, something real and durable in the field of psychology.’’ He fully accepted the distinction made by Dalbiez between Freudian doctrine, ‘‘about which we are free to accept what we wish,’’ and method. Moreover, he claims to be the origin of this idea. At the beginning of the Second World War, Henri Ey also published an article entitled ‘‘Réflexions sur la Valeur Scientifique et Morale de la Psychanalyse (à propos de la Thèse de Roland Dalbiez),’’ which represented his first important statement about psychoanalysis. The impact of Dalbiez’s work on philosophy was less significant than it was in the analytic community. 363 DANGER There was no mention of the book in philosophical reviews of the time and, as Dalbiez himself notes, the book aroused considerable hostility at the Sorbonne. It was only gradually that it became an important work on the application of philosophy to psychoanalysis, primarily through the efforts of Paul Ricoeur, who was a student of Dalbiez. His book, especially the distinction he made between theory and method, was the source of considerable misunderstanding. See also: Philosophy and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Codet, Henri. (1936). La méthode psychanalytique et la doctrine freudienne, compte rendu. L’Évolution psychiatrique, 3, 92–96. Dalbiez, Roland. (1972). Psychoanalytical method and the doctrine of Freud. (T. F. Lindsay, Trans.) Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press. (Original work published 1936) Ey, Henri. (1939). Réflexions sur la valeur scientifique et morale de la psychanalyse: à propos de la thèse de Roland Dalbiez. Encéphale, 34, 189–220. Pichon, Édouard. (1936). De Freud à Dalbiez. Revue Française de Psychanalyse, 9, 4, 559–588. DANGER As with many concepts a tentative definition of danger is based on its use in ordinary language: it signifies either a situation or set of circumstances that compromise the security or existence of a person or thing. Aside from the past or present, it can include future situations, that is, threats or risks having a high probability of realization. This definition likewise concerns threats to the operation of the mind. The term ‘‘danger’’ appeared for the first time in Freud’s writings in an article entitled ‘‘On the Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under the Description ÔAnxiety Neurosis’’’ (1895b [1894]). Freud used it to define an external situation likely to provoke emotional and structural reactions. The danger forces the psychic apparatus to ensure the stability of its organization by implementing defensive measures intended to avoid a catastrophic disturbance (psychic trauma). There are two dimensions to the concept: (1) In terms of clinical treatment and theory, it implies the 36 4 existence of two spaces, an external space with its own reality and an internal space that is part of what Freud named psychic reality (related to the later concept of reality-testing). (2) It entails the need to consider temporal differences, quantitative aspects, and specific effects. ‘‘Danger’’ refers to a situation that may have been accidental or contingent, consciously experienced, or unconscious. This picture was later refined in Freud’s work, but it retained its initial features. Situations involving danger came to be viewed as more internalized and more specific: the dangers of separation and objectloss, of castration, of uncontrollable drives, of threats from an internal object. With the development of the second theory of anxiety, the concept of danger became more ambiguous, almost completely identified with the anxiety that signaled its presence. However, it is essential to distinguish clearly between the affects of anxiety (Angst), fright (Schreck), and fear (Furcht), each of which reflects a specific relationship to danger. The notion of danger still has to be used with caution, especially in view of the inevitable and necessary evolution of psychoanalytic language, which now emphasizes psychic envelopes, the therapeutic setting, or a topography of ‘‘interfaces’’ rather than the older metapsychological models. There is also a risk of confusion with concepts from cognitive psychology and neurobiology (such as the concept of ‘‘stress,’’ for example). CLAUDE BARROIS See also: Animistic thought; Annihilation anxiety; Anxiety; Castration complex; Darwin, Darwinism, and Psychoanalysis; Ego; Ego function; Envy; Fright; Id; Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety; Negative transference New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis; Fear; Projection; Suicidal behavior; Symptom-formation; ‘‘Uncanny, The’’. Bibliography Dayan, Maurice. (1985). Inconscient et réalité. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1895b [1894]). On the grounds for detaching a particular syndrome from neurasthenia under the description ‘‘Anxiety Neurosis.’’ SE, 3: 85–115. Laplanche, Jean. (1980–87). Problématiques. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DARK CONTINENT DARK CONTINENT In The Question of Lay Analysis (1926e), Freud wrote, ‘‘We know less about the sexual life of little girls than of boys. But we need not feel ashamed of this distinction; after all, the sexual life of adult women is a ‘dark continent’ for psychology’’ (p. 212). The evocative phrase dark continent connotes a geographic space that is murky and deep, one that defies understanding. Freud borrowed the expression from the African explorer John Rowlands Stanley’s description of the exploration of a dark forest—virgin, hostile, impenetrable. By using this phrase and comparing the adult woman’s sexual life to an unknown continent, Freud indicates both his embarrassment as well as his explorer’s curiosity. He also emphasizes the obscure and incomplete nature of the clinical material on the sexual life of girls and women for the psychoanalyst. His metaphor for the female sex turns it into an unrepresentable enigma, expressing the castration anxiety of the man who approaches it. For although he insists on the central idea constituting his theory of female sexuality—namely, the primitive masculinity of the little girl, who is a little man before she changes objects and wishes to acquire a child from her father—Freud does have doubts about his theory. If we consider his statements about female sexuality, a theory that was never really explained in a comprehensive manner, we see that Freud is close to being his most severe critic. In 1923, the year his most specific statements about female sexuality appeared, he presented, in ‘‘Infantile Genital Organization,’’ his thesis of the primacy of the phallus: ‘‘For both sexes, only one genital, namely the male one comes into account. What is present, therefore, is not a primacy of the genitals, but a primacy of the phallus.’’ He immediately adds, ‘‘Unfortunately we can describe this state of things only as it affects the male child; the corresponding processes in the little girl are not known to us’’ (1923e, p. 142). However, Freud himself attempts to illuminate the darkness of the continent. For he discovers that for the little girl, the mother, who first provides care for the child, is the object of an especially intense and long-lasting cathexis. This archaic bond between mother and daughter, which psychoanalytic theory would later describe as one of primary homosexuality, is compared by Freud to Minoan-Mycenaean civilization, which had been hidden for so long by Athenian INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS civilization. Freud also insists on the function of the phallus for the woman. The phallus—not to be confused with the penis—is understood to represent the paternal function and the capacity for symbolization in all human beings. These ideas were further developed by Jacques Lacan and his school. In Freud’s writing on femininity, a rigorous, sometimes even dogmatic, conceptualization always shares space with a sense of perplexity. But the invisibility of the female sex, its internal nature, a multiplicity of theories have been offered. Research by Freud’s disciples, such as Ernest Jones and Karen Horney, exposed new fields of exploration that are rich and heteroclite. Female psychoanalysts deepened the investigation of the female Oedipus and the young girl’s relationship to the phallic phase (Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel). Following Lacan, important work was done (Michèle Montrelay) on the ‘‘other’’ jouissance, which functions centrifugally in women, unlike the centripetal jouissance found in men. Influenced by the philosopher Jacques Derrida, there has also been important work on the feminine and the unrepresentable (Luce Irigaray). Finally, analysis of the female Oedipus resumed and was seen to consist of two phases (maternal object and paternal object, sensoriality and language) that constitute the basis of female bisexuality (Julia Kristeva). JULIA KRISTEVA See also: Activity/passivity; Aphanisis; Bisexuality; Castration complex; Feminine masochism; Feminine sexuality; Femininity; Feminism and psychoanalysis; Homosexuality; Masculinity/femininity; Object, change of/choice of; Oedipal complex; Phallic mother; Phallic stage; Psychology of Women The. A Psychoanalytic Interpretation; Sexual identity; Sexuation, formulas of; ‘‘Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes’’; Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Bibliography Chasseguet-Smirgel, Janine; Luquet-Parat, Catherine J.; Grunberger, Béla; et al. (1970). Female sexuality: new psychoanalytic views. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Original work published 1964) Freud, Sigmund. (1923e). The infantile genital organization (an interpolation into the theory of sexuality). SE, 19: 141–145. ———. (1926e). The question of lay analysis. SE, 20: 183–250. 365 DARWIN, DARWINISM, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Irigaray, Luce. (1985). Speculum of the other woman (G. C. Gill, Trans.). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Original work published 1974) Kristeva, Julia. (2000). The sense and non-sense of revolt (J. Herman, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press. (Original work published 1996) Montrelay, Michèle. (1977). L’ombre et le nom. Sur la féminité. Paris: Editions de Minuit. DARWIN, DARWINISM, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS In 1859, when Charles Darwin published The Origin of Species, Sigmund Freud was three years old. As a young student and later, during his early years as a dedicated scientific researcher, Freud greatly admired Darwin, who had gained considerable popularity throughout Europe. In his Autobiographical Study, Freud would recall that ‘‘Darwin’s doctrine, then in vogue, was a powerful attraction, since it promised to provide an extraordinary thrust to understanding the universe’’ (1925d). From then on Darwin joined Hannibal in Freud’s personal pantheon and he dreamed of becoming his equal. In ‘‘A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis,’’ he described the three wounds inflicted on humanity’s pride: when Copernicus established that the earth was not the center of the universe, when Darwin proved that mankind developed in an unbroken line from other animal species, and when he, Freud, showed that man did not have control over the most important aspects of his own mental processes (1917a). Freud cites Darwin at least twenty times in his published writings. It is possible, however, to identify three ‘‘Darwins’’ in Freud’s work: The first Darwin is the Darwin of The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872), referred to by Freud in the Studies on Hysteria (1895d), where Darwin is cited in connection with Emmy von N. and Elisabeth von R. Freud writes that Emmy von N.’s symptoms remind him ‘‘of one of the principles laid claim to by Darwin to explain the expression of the emotions—the principle of the overflow of excitation.’’ In describing Elisabeth von R., Freud emphasizes the symbolic meaning of her symptoms, which, he writes, ‘‘are part of the Ôexpression of the emotional movements,’ as Darwin has taught.’’ Consisting ‘‘originally of acts that are well-motivated and appropriate,’’ 36 6 civilization has reduced and symbolically transposed the expressions into language. This sort of reference occurs several times, especially in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (1926d), where the affects are ‘‘reproductions of earlier events of vital importance, possibly preindividual.’’ Adaptation is involved since ‘‘anxiety must fulfill the biologically essential function of reacting to a state of danger.’’ We can, therefore, consider the theory of anxiety presented in this work to be of Darwinian origin. Emotion (anxiety) is adaptive in two ways, for it prepares the animal for danger not just by mobilizing energy but also by aiding adjustment based on the nature of the threat (signal anxiety). However—and this too is taken from Darwin—under certain conditions the excess excitation can become disorganizing and nonadaptive. The second Darwin is the Darwin of The Origin of Species (1859). This is the influence that is most often noted. It is used to support Freud’s views when he postulates a correspondence between phylogenesis (humanity’s evolution since its origins) and ontogenesis (the individual development of the child of today). Freud refers to Ernest Haeckel’s hypothesis according to which ontogenesis repeats phylogenesis. Freud writes, ‘‘Important biological analogies have enabled us to acknowledge that individual psychic evolution repeats, in abbreviated form, the evolution of humanity’’ (1910c). In ‘‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’’ (1918b), he writes, ‘‘The phylogenetic schemas that the child possesses at birth . . . are the precipitates of the history of human civilization . . . this instinctive heritage would constitute the core of the unconscious.’’ This idea is central to Totem and Taboo (1912–13a), where it is used to establish the universality of primal fantasies, the Oedipus complex, and more generally the processes of development and human mentation. It occurs again in ‘‘A Phylogenetic Fantasy: Overview of the Transference Neuroses’’ (1985 [1915]), where the ‘‘prehistoric fantasy’’ (the expression is Freud’s) is used to establish a correspondence between three kinds of time: the time of the assumed succession of psychopathologies, that of phylogenesis, and that of ontogenesis. Freud’s views were sharply criticized, even within psychoanalysis, for a variety of reasons, among them the questionable nature of the anthropological data on INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DAY’S RESIDUES which they were based and the impossibility of accepting Haeckel’s hypothesis. ———. (1926d). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. It is worth noting that in these texts (especially in the ‘‘Overview’’) Freud is more Lamarckian than Darwinian: it is essential to his theory that individual traits be transmissible by incorporation into the genetic heritage. Freud never abandoned this postulate in spite of the discredit that befell Lamarck’s ideas. ———. (1987 [1915]). A phylogenetic fantasy: Overview of the transference neuroses. (Axel Hoffer and Peter T. Hoffer, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. The third and final Darwin is the Darwin of The Descent of Man (1871), a work that postulated a process of continuous evolution from animal to man and distinguished stages within human evolution, that is, a temporal sequence that was also a form of progress, a hierarchy ranging from the most primitive forms to the most noble: lower animals, higher animals, the ‘‘savage,’’ civilized man. Darwin distinguished between ‘‘inferior’’ human races and ‘‘superior’’ races, even superior nations (such as Great Britain). Like many others at the time, Freud accepted these ideas and used them to support his views on the progress of civilization through the difficult, but necessary, repression of instinctual drives, a repression that made necessary the phenomenon of sublimation, which directed these energies to more ‘‘noble’’ ends. This notion of the evolution of civilizations remains a source of continued interest. However, we can obviously no longer adhere to the idea of a hierarchy of values among human ‘‘races’’ that would ‘‘naturally’’ follow from the process of evolution as described by Darwin. And we know only too well what excesses and crimes ‘‘social Darwinism’’ can lead to. Nor is it any longer possible to postulate, as Freud once did, an equivalence between prehistoric humanity, or ‘‘primitive peoples’’ of today, and the child. ROGER PERRON See also: Brentano, Franz von; Heredity of acquired characters; Primitive horde; Phylogenesis; Totem, totemism; Totem and Taboo; Vienna, University of. Bibliography Buican, Denis. (1987). Darwin et le darwinisme. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1910c). Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood. SE, 11: 57–137. ———. (1918b). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 7–122. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Ritvo, Lucile B. (1990). Darwin’s influence on Freud: a tale of two sciences. New Haven: Yale University Press. Thuillier, Pierre. (1981). Darwin and co. Brussels: Complexe. DAY’S RESIDUES According to Freud’s theory of dreams, day’s residues are memory traces left by the events and psychic processes of the waking state; they are used as raw material by the dream-work that serves the wishes of the dreamer. This idea is much in evidence in Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), and is consonant with his basic thesis that all dreams are wish-fulfillments. With the help of the relaxation of the defenses that sleep allows, unsatisfied wishes of waking life work their way to a fulfillment that is described as ‘‘hallucinatory,’’ because though invested with an illusory reality, it is cut off from both perception and motricity. This permeability of the censorship permits explicit daytime wishes to be represented in dreams. It may still oppose their expression in an overly crude form. However, the distorting mechanisms characteristic of the primary processes then come into play: condensation, displacement, and putting into images, or ‘‘representability.’’ The mechanism of displacement lets the dream-work use the day’s residues for the purpose of wish-fulfillment by producing innocent-seeming representations: whence the dreamer’s impression, upon awakening, of details that are trivial, if not meaningless. An acceptable meaning may emerge, however, when secondary revision comes into play, giving the dream an intelligible ‘‘facade’’ and thus in fact perfecting the distortion. The day’s residues, perhaps in combination with sensory impressions occurring during sleep, constitute the ‘‘raw material’’ that will be reworked by the dream. Here Freud used the metaphor of work performed in the construction industry: daytime thoughts and the work to which they were subjected played the role of the contractor, while the unconscious wish was 367 DEAD MOTHER COMPLEX comparable to the capitalist who finances the operation (furnishing its plan and the power for it). Freud extended and rounded out this account in ‘‘A Metaphysical Supplement to the Theory of Dreams’’ (1916–1917f [1915]), notably from a topographical angle. He argued that the day’s residues are part of the preconscious, but receive the full cathexis necessary for the dream-work from the unconscious. He returned to this group of hypotheses in the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916–1917 [1915– 1917]). Thereafter, the question of day’s residues was paid scant attention by Freud, but inasmuch as the notion has a bearing on perception, memory, reality testing, hallucination, and other issues, it remains central. Meanwhile, psychoanalytic technique and practice continue to make use of it on a daily basis. ROGER PERRON See also: Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva’’; Dream; Irma’s injection, dream of; Latent; Manifest; Secondary revision. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5: 1–625. ———. (1916–1917f [1915]). A metaphysical supplement to the theory of dreams. SE, 14: 217–235. ———. (1916–1917a [1915–1917]). Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE: 15–16. Further Reading Langs, Robert J. (1971). Day residues, recall residues, dreams: reality and the psyche. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 19, 499–523. Luborsky, Lester, and Shevrin, Howard. (1956). Dreams and day–residues: a study of the Poetzl observation. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 20, 135–148. DEAD MOTHER COMPLEX The complex of the dead mother was described by André Green in 1980. Evidence of it emerges during the transference, so it is often not identifiable when analysis is first requested. It is manifested especially by a ‘‘transference depression,’’ a repetition of an infantile 36 8 depression that is often not capable of being recalled. The essential characteristic of this depression is that it occurs in the presence of an object that itself is absorbed in mourning. The causes of this mourning can be many, and are not admitted by the maternal object. They are therefore, for the most part, hypothetically deduced through the analysis, with more or less certainty. The main observable consequence on the level of the counter-transference is insight into a cold, hard, unfeeling kernel at the heart of the transference. This is the result of a brutal maternal decathexis that the child is unable to understand and that turns his psychic world upside down. After vain attempts at reparation, feelings of impotence became dominant. Complex defenses are then set up which associate a mirrorrepresentation of the disinvestment in the maternal object with an unconscious identification with the dead mother. The result of this is the psychic murder of the object, which takes place without any hatred. The maternal affliction prohibits any aggressive expression, which would risk augmenting the maternal detachment. On the one hand, the pattern of object relations is punctured, while on the other, peripheral cathexes are clung to at the edge of this hole. Silent destructiveness does not allow the subject to reestablish an object relation capable of overcoming the conflict and opening the way to connections that would strengthen it, or else definitive adjustments serve only as a shield that prevents access to the kernel of the conflict. The only thing that endures is a dull psychic pain, characterized especially by an incapacity to cathect closely with any object having anything to do with affects. Hatred is as impossible as love, and it is impossible to receive without feeling obliged to give back, so as not to owe anything, even masochistic pleasure. The dead mother is omnipresent, but without being represented, and seems to have seized the subject, making him captive of his mourning for her. This clinical picture develops against the background of the child’s inability to grasp the reasons for it. Important measures of infantile depression are the loss of meaning, and the feeling of inability to repair the mourned object, to awaken the lost desire. Sometimes significant rationalizations displace the source of the conflict onto the external world, the mother’s desire becoming inaccessible compared to what the child believes he has observed. The child then blames a failure of subjective omnipotence in relationships, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DEATH leading, by compensation, to a reinforcement of omnipotence in areas less directly connected with the primary object. An oedipal analysis of pregenital fixations and unconscious guilt is of no use in finding a way to move past this situation, insofar as analysis is not centered on the configuration of the complex of the dead mother. For the mother is not directly identifiable in the discourse of the patient. She only appears to the extent that the analytic situation succeeds in drawing out evidence of her silent presence without being able to find her in this absence where even indirect signs of her existence are missing. Repression has erased the memory trace of her touch, of contact with her, and of the child’s cathexis with her before the occurrence of his mourning for her, which put a sudden end to this forgotten relation. This is a repression that returns to bury her alive, even demolishing everything, including a tomb, that would mark her past existence. Winnicottian holding has collapsed in this situation, because the object has been encysted, with no trace of it left. The identification has been with the vacuum left behind by the disinvestment. The absence of all meaningful reference points cannot be too strongly emphasized. Since the modification of the maternal attitude seemed to be inexplicable, it led in turn to all sorts of questions which arouse a feeling of guilt, and these in turn are aggravated by secondary defenses and displaced onto elements that have been annexed for that purpose. In effect, attempts to block problems not governed by repression of this untenable situation prompt some significant reactions. Their purposes are: (1) To keep the ego alive through secondary hatred of the object, by the frenetic, but unquenchable, search for pleasures, or through the headlong search for a possible meaning to the displacements that have been made; (2) To reanimate the dead mother, interest her, distract her, seduce her, give her back the taste for life, breathing into her by any means possible, including the most artificial, a joy of being alive; and (3) To compete with the object of mourning in a precocious triangulation. The dead mother complex, as a powerful and intense element, naturally draws to it other components of psychic life, and is closely tied to its most important systems. Consequently the fantasy of the primal scene attempts to make intelligible the competitive relations with the hypothetical object of sudden mourning, and to reawaken the pain of being deINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS cathected, by highlighting whatever recalls the primal scene, and often in an apocalyptic way, through projective identification. The catastrophe thus envelops and retaliates against the maternal object, which shifts between indifference and terror. It is frequently the case that the father is the object of a precocious investment in an Oedipus complex that is rushed into for this very occasion, but lacking in its normal attributes. This variant complex brings with it not so much castration anxiety, but a feeling of impotent rage and paralysis, helpless against the violence that follows action against a supposed rival. The result is often an intensified feeling of emptiness, repeating and amplifying the most deleterious effects at the heart of the conflict. On the bases of these clinical observations, André Green hypothesized a destiny of the primary object as a framing structure for the ego, hiding the negative hallucination of the mother. The dead mother complex demonstrates the failure of this process, forcing its representations into a painful vacuity, and obstructing their capacity to bind together in any preconscious thought pattern. The dead mother complex opposes a ‘‘hot’’ castration anxiety, linked to the vicissitudes of object relations, which can be threatened with corporal mutilation, to a ‘‘cold’’ anxiety, which is linked with losses suffered on the narcissistic level (negative hallucination, flat psychosis, dull mourning), resulting in the clinical treatment of negativity. ANDRÉ GREEN See also: France; Intergenerational; Oedipus complex, early; Transference depression; Work (as a psychoanalytic notion). Bibliography Green, André. (2001). The dead mother. In his Life narcissism/death narcissism (Andrew Weller, Trans.). London, New York: Free Associations Books. Kohon, Gregorio. (Ed.). (1999). The dead mother. The work of André Green. London, New York: Routledge. DEATH AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Our own death cannot be represented, which is obvious since it would require a self-observing consciousness that disappears with death and therefore cannot perceive the death. Any anticipation of our own death as nothingness is therefore impossible. For 369 DEATH AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Freud, this philosophical evidence was reflected in his remarks that ‘‘our unconscious . . . does not believe in its own death; it behaves as if it were immortal’’ (1915b, p. 296) and ‘‘it is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so we can perceive that we are in fact still present as spectators’’ (1915b, p. 289). These two propositions should not be confused. The second is a logical statement, since in the absence of existence there is no consciousness, while the first refers to the make-up of the unconscious system and especially the fact that it ignores time and its passage, and more radically, negation. The inability to represent one’s own death does not imply that we fail to suffer about the certainty of death. Anxiety about death occupies a central place in our lives, and ultimately it is this that superego anxiety and castration anxiety refer to. Moreover, death is represented in dreams and symbols. Departures and muteness, or the ability to hide from others are oneiric representations of death. Among the typical dream types Freud mentions in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) is the dream of the death of loved ones. Perception about the death of the other is a central element in obsessive neurotics. Freud wrote, ‘‘these neurotics need the help of the possibility of death chiefly in order that it may act as a solution of conflicts they have left unsolved’’ (1909d, p. 236). By suppressing an element of indecision, death would allow resolution, but death, and the possibility of escaping it through superstitious magical activities, is associated with their unconscious hatred in the conflict of ambivalence. The idea of death offers a solution in obsessive neurosis, but it is also, for everyone, a value that, by establishing a contrast, exalts the value of life. Freud demonstrates this in relation to transience (1916a [1915]), but he also emphasizes it in relation to the risk of death: ‘‘Life is impoverished, it loses in interest, when the highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may not be risked’’ (1915b, p. 290). Beyond the impossible representation of one’s own demise, there is the question of death as enigma, similar to birth, as the end mirrors the beginning. Freud questions primitive man’s attitude to death (1912– 1913a) by distinguishing between the triumph before the corpse of the enemy and the pain experienced in the loss of a loved one. Certainly, in these cases identification could lead primitive man to also consider his own death. But Freud introduced an additional idea, 37 0 that of the ambivalence that would lead to suffering and relief, and considered it to be the root not of the representation of death but of the fact that the disturbance caused by it might have led men to think: ‘‘What released the spirit of enquiry in man was not the intellectual enigma, and not every death, but the conflict of feeling at the death of loved yet alien and hated persons’’ (1915b, 293). As for children, Freud also felt that the origin of the activity, if not of thought, at least of research, was found in the desire for affection (preserving the love of one’s parents without sharing it with younger siblings). In contrast he does not appear to have considered that for children the representation of death and, in particular, their own death, might have constituted an enigma and encouragement for reflection. ‘‘Children’’, he wrote, ‘‘know nothing of the horrors of corruption, of freezing in the ice-cold grave, of the terrors of eternal nothingness—ideas which grown-up people find it so hard to tolerate, as is proved by all the myths of a future life’’ (1900a, p. 254). On the contrary, we can consider that the theories, or myths, that the child creates to explain the origin of life also treat its end, and that both preoccupations are inseparable. These theories raise the question of the causality of death. We know that the adult, rather than seeing death as an inevitable destiny, will consider the immediate causes, or even look for those responsible (1915b). The child, in a similar position, does not hesitate to make death the result of murder. For here the relationship to death retains its original form, that is, the impulse to kill repressed by an important moral injunction, ‘‘Thou shalt not kill.’’ However, there is one area where this impulse can be given free rein: literary fiction, which provides the pleasure of remaining alive and the certainty that we have not killed anyone. ‘‘In the realm of fiction we find the plurality of lives which we need’’ (1915b, p. 291). The fact that so-called ‘‘crime’’ writing has always enjoyed such success attests, as surely as the existence of a moral imperative, to the existence and persistence of this impulse to murder and the enigma contained in this return to death, here couched in playful terms (Mijolla-Mellor, 1995). SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Beyond the Pleasure Principle; Castration complex; Certainty; Death instinct (Thanatos); Estrangement; ‘‘Mourning and Melancholia’’; ‘‘On Transience’’; INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS D E A T H I N S T I N C T (T H A N A T O S ) Phantom; Suicidal behavior; Suicide; ‘‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’’; ‘‘Uncanny, The’’. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams, part I. SE, 4–5. ———. (1912–1913a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ———. (1915b). Thoughts for the times on war and death. SE, 14: 273–300. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1995). Meurtre familier. Approche psychanalytique d’Agatha Christie. Paris: Dunod. M’Uzan, Michel de. (1977). De l’art à la mort. Paris: Gallimard. Further Reading Laplanche, Jean. (1976). Life and death in psychoanalysis (Jeffrey Mehlman, Trans.). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. DEATH DRIVE. See Death instinct (Thanatos) DEATH INSTINCT (THANATOS) to the life drive: ‘‘The opposition between the ego or death instincts and the sexual or life instincts would then cease to hold and the compulsion to repeat would no longer possess the importance we have ascribed to it’’ (p. 44). The death instinct was Freud’s attempt to explain this repetition compulsion that overrides the pleasure principle, whether in post-traumatic dreams, certain compulsive children’s games (such as the ‘‘fort-da’’ game), or indeed in analysands’ resistances to the treatment (the transference). He observed that ‘‘the aim of all life is death,’’ ‘‘inanimate things existed before living ones’’ and that ‘‘everything living dies for internal reasons’’ (p. 38). Drawing on August Weismann’s differentiation of soma from germ-plasma, Freud went on to draw ‘‘a sharp distinction between egoinstincts, which we equated with death instincts, and sexual instincts, which we equated with life instincts’’ (pp. 52–53). He thus continued to adhere to the dualistic concept of the drives: ‘‘even more definitely dualistic than before—now that we describe the opposition as being not between ego instincts and sexual instincts but between life instincts and death instincts’’ (p. 53). Freud found support for his arguments in Fechner’s stability principle: ‘‘The dominating tendency of mental life . . . is the effort the reduce, to keep constant or to remove internal tension due to stimuli . . . a tendency which finds expression in the pleasure principle; and our recognition of this fact is one of our strongest reasons for believing in the existence of death instincts’’ (p. 55–56). The death instinct or death drive is the force that makes living creatures strive for an inorganic state. It does not appear in isolation; its effect becomes apparent, in particular through the repetition compulsions, when a part of it is connected with Eros. Its tendency to return living creatures to the earlier inorganic state is a component of all the drives. In this combined form, its main impetus is toward dissolution, unbinding, and dissociation. In its pure form, silent within the psychic apparatus, it is subjugated by the libido to some extent and thus deflected to the outside world through the musculature in the drive for destruction and mastery or the will to power: this is sadism proper; the part that remains ‘‘inside’’ is primary erogenous masochism. In 1924, Freud drew a clear distinction between three principles: ‘‘The Nirvana principle [Barbara Low’s term], belonging as it does to the death instinct, has undergone a modification in living organisms through which it has become the pleasure principle . . . the pleasure principle represents the demands of the libido; and the modification of the latter principle, the reality principle, represents the influence of the external world’’ (1924c, p. 160). Although Freud recognized the speculative nature of his final drive theory, he continued to adhere to it throughout the rest of his work. Having put forward, particularly in ‘‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes’’ (1915c), a dualism in which the sexual drives conflict with the ego drives, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), Freud introduced the concept of the death drive as a negative term in opposition The source of the death drive lies in the cathexis of bodily zones that can generate afferent excitations for the psyche then; this certainly involves tension in the musculature determined by a biological urge. Its locus is in the id, then later under the influence of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 371 D E A T H I N S T I N C T (T H A N A T O S ) the ego, as well as in the superego, where it functions to restrict libidinization. In melancholia, ‘‘a pure culture of the death instinct’’ (1923b, p. 53) governs the superego, such that the ego can impel the subject towards death. The energy of this urge is fairly resistant to shaping, diversion, or displacement and it manifests in subtle but powerful ways. The operation of this almost invisible energy has been described as a ‘‘work of the negative’’ (André Green). Its object is the implementing organ—the musculature—that enables the aim to be fulfilled. Paradoxically, the libido, subject to restraint by the destrudo (Edoardo Weiss’s term), and leading to primary masochism and sadism, is the object of the death drive here. According to Freud’s descriptions, its goal is dissociation, regression, or even dissolution. While leading organic life back to an inorganic state is the final stage, ‘‘the purpose of the death drive is to fulfil as far as is possible a disobjectalising function by means of unbinding’’ (Green, p. 85). It is therefore an entropic process in the strict sense. After explaining the notion of the death instinct in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud returned to it a number of times in his later works. He mentioned it in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c) as the source of aggression and hostility between people and in ‘‘The Libido Theory’’ (1923a), and then developed the theory in The Ego and the Id (1923b), especially in the chapters on ‘‘the two classes of instincts’’ and ‘‘the dependent relationships of the ego.’’ In this work, he connected his new drive theory with the structural theory that he had just expounded. Then, following a dispute with Fritz Wittels, who jumped to a hasty conclusion concerning a connection between the death of Freud’s daughter Sophie (January 1920) and the emergence of the concept of the death drive (a claim that is still being debated today— cf. Grubrich-Simitis), Freud returned to this concept in ‘‘The Economic Problem of Masochism’’ (1924c), in which he posited primary masochism both as evidence and as a vestige of the conjunction between the death drive and Eros. He thus elucidated the negative therapeutic reaction and the concept of unconscious guilt and indicated that ‘‘moral masochism becomes a classical piece of evidence for the existence of fusion of instinct. Its danger lies in the fact that it originates from the death instinct and corresponds to the part of 37 2 that instinct which has escaped being turned outwards as an instinct of destruction’’ (p. 170). In his short article on ‘‘Negation’’ (1925h), Freud explained: ‘‘Affirmation—as a substitute for uniting— belongs to Eros; negation—the successor to expulsion—belongs to the instinct of destruction’’ (p. 239). He returned to this subject in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]), in his letter to Albert Einstein (1933b [1932]) and finally in the thirty-second of the New Introductory Lectures (1933a [1932]), in which he discussed anxiety in connection with the life of the drives. For Melanie Klein, a firm advocate of the existence of the death drive, psychic conflict is never a conflict between the ego and the drives but always between the life drive and the death drive. Anxiety is the immediate response to the endopsychic perception of the death drive. For Jacques Lacan, the death drive as something beyond the pleasure principle forms the best startingpoint for introducing his concept of the ‘‘Real,’’ in connection with the Imaginary and the Symbolic. He links to this the lethal dimension inherent in desire and jouissance and makes the death drive ‘‘the necessary condition for the natural phenomenon of the instinct in entropy to be taken up at the level of the person, so that it may take on the value of an oriented instinct and is significant for the system insofar as the latter as a whole is situated in an ethical dimension’’ (1959– 1960/1992, p. 204). Toward the end of his life, Freud recognized that ‘‘the dualistic theory according to which an instinct of death or of destruction or aggression claims equal rights as a partner with Eros as manifested in the libido, has found little sympathy and has not really been accepted even among psychoanalysts’’ (1937, p. 244). Its detractors include authors such as Michel Fain (1971), who regard the concept of the death drive as the result of Freud’s speculations on matters that could for the most part be explained without it—for example by the mechanism of ‘‘reversal into its opposite’’ (1915c, p. 126). Others have objected to the theory of the death drive either because this would mean that psychic conflict, the cornerstone of psychoanalysis, could no longer be the expression of lived experience alone, since the death drive is ‘‘evidently innate, intrapsychic from the outset, and not secondarily internalized’’ (Nacht), or because ‘‘this drive restricts the field in which conflicts can be elaborated both internally and externally; it introduces a fatalism into INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DECATHEXIS the gradual progression of the treatment and brings out the negative therapeutic reaction instead of a relational problem between analyst and analysand’’ (Nicolaidis). Yet others have taken more interest in Freud’s methodology and are surprised at the ‘‘quality of a foreign body—within psychoanalytic theory—that characterizes the conflict between Eros and the death drive [which] emerges here from the use of dialectical procedures in which Freud is not well versed’’ (Denis). By contrast, other authors, such as Melanie Klein, Jacques Lacan, and André Green, consider this concept of the death drive as further evidence of Freud’s scientific rigor, as he demonstrates his willingness to rework his previous drive theory to take account of clinical facts and hypotheses that do not accord with it. Furthermore, studies based on the treatment of psychotic subjects, particularly by post-Kleinians, seem to have reinforced the theory of the prevalence of the death drive in the psychic apparatus of these patients, as something that constantly tears at the fabric of their representations and undermines their attempts to establish an apparatus for thinking thoughts (Wilfred Bion). ———. (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19, 155–170. ———. (1925h). Negation. SE, 19, 233–239. ———. (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21, 57–145. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22, 1–182. ———. (1933b [1932]). Why war? (Einstein and Freud). SE, 22, 195–215. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23, 209–253. Green, André. (1999). The death drive, negative narcissism and the disobjectalising function. In The work of the negative (pp. 81–88) (A. Weller, Trans.). London: Free Association Books. Grubrich-Simitis, Ilse. (1996). Back to Freud’s texts. Making silent documents speak (Philip Slotkin, Trans.). New Haven: Yale University Press. (Original work published 1993) Lacan, Jacques. (1992). The seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book VII. The ethics of psychoanalysis (J.-A. Miller, Ed., and D. Porter, Trans.). London: Routledge. (Original work published 1959–1960) PIERRE DELION Nacht, Sacha. (1938). Le Masochisme, Étude historique, clinique, psychogénique et thérapeutique. Paris: Denoël. See also: Alienation; Anxiety; Drive/instinct; Ego and the Id, The; Envy; Envy and Gratitude; Eros; Freud: Living and Dying; Life instinct (Eros); Masochism; Narcissistic neurosis; Negative, work of the; Negative therapeutic reaction; Negative transference; Nirvana; Orgasm; Phobic neurosis; Pictogram; Projective identification; Racism, antisemitism, and psychoanalysis; Repetition compulsion; Sadism; Self-hatred; Trauma; ‘‘Why War?’’ Nicolaı̈dis, Nicos. (1993). La Force perceptive de la représentation de la pulsion. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Bibliography Feldman, Michael. (2000). Some views on the manifestation of death instinct in clinical. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81, 53–66. Denis, Paul. (1997). Emprise et satisfaction, les deux formants de la pulsion. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Fain, Michel. (1971). Prélude à la vie fantasmatique. Revue Française de Psychanalyse, 35, 2–3, 291–364. Freud, Sigmund. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14, 109–140. Further Reading Eissler, Kurt R. (1971) Death drive, ambivalence, and narcissism. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 26, 25–78. Grotstein, James. (2000). Some considerations of hate & reconsideration of death instinct. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 20, 462–480. Segal, Hanna. (1993). On the clinical usefulness of the concept of death instinct. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 74, 55–62. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18, 1–64. ———. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18, 65–143. ———. (1923a). The libido theory. SE, 18, 255–259. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19, 1–66. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DECATHEXIS Decathexis describes both the action and the result of withdrawing psychic energy—usually libido—away 373 DEFENSE from where it had been attached to a psychic formation, a bodily phenomenon, or an object. The idea of decathexis, or withdrawal of cathexis, is linked to the notion of psychic energy and occurs very early on in Freud’s work, although the term itself or its equivalents are not explicitly used. As early as ‘‘The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence’’ (1894a), Freud outlines certain mechanisms for repressing representations when he writes that we have ‘‘an approximate fulfilment of the task if the ego succeeds in turning this powerful idea into a weak one, in robbing it of the affect—the sum of excitation—with which it is loaded’’ (1894a, p. 48). In fact the notion of decathexis first appears as a means of repression in his work on the paranoia of Justice Schreber: ‘‘It is quite possible that a detachment of the libido is the essential and regular mechanism of every repression’’ (1911c [1910], p. 71). But the important role eventually attributed to energy in the very constitution of the psyche would make decathexis a central notion, independent of the mechanism of repression. The nature of decathected mental structures or objects, the more or less massive modalities of the decathexis, and the fate of the withdrawn energy, all would have serious consequences. As Freud writes: ‘‘the liberated libido will be kept in suspension within his mind, and will there give rise to tensions and color his mood’’ (1911c [1910], p. 72), until it finds another attachment. In the case of paranoia it will hypercathect the ego. In ‘‘Mourning and Melancholia’’ (1916–17f [1915]), Freud studied the progressive withdrawal of cathexis from the lost object, this being necessary for the reality of loss to be finally acceptable. PAUL DENIS See also: Boredom; Cathexis; Counter-investment; Dead mother complex; Dismantling; Fusion/defusion of the instincts. Repression; Sleep/wakefulness; Transference depression. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3 : 41–61. ———. (1911c [1910]). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1–82. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: an introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. 37 4 ———. (1915e). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1–82. ———. (1916–17f [1915]). A metapsychological supplement to the theory of dreams. SE, 14: 217–235. Rouart, Julien. (1967). Les notions d’investissement et de contre-investissement à travers l’évolution des idées freudiennes. Colloque de la Société psychanalytique de Paris, Paris, 1965. Revue Française de Psychanalyse, 31, (2), 193–213. DEFENSE The term ‘‘defense’’ refers to all the techniques deployed by the ego in conflicts that have the potential to lead to neurosis. In the sense in which Freud first used the term, defenses are unconscious because they stem from a conflict between the drive and the ego or between a perception or representation (memory, fantasy, etc.) and moral imperatives. The function of the defenses is thus to support and maintain a state of psychic stability by avoiding anxiety and unpleasure. The concept of defense was broadened somewhat when Freud attributed an important role to the reality principle and to the superego. Melanie Klein then formed the more radical view that the defenses exist within an archaic ego. In his letter to Wilhelm Fliess dated May 21, 1894, and concerning his interpretation of the neuroses, Freud introduced the concept of defense in connection with the notion of psychic conflict: ‘‘What is warded off is always sexuality’’ (1985c [1887–1904], p. 75). In reference to the emergence of anxiety, he argued that sexual tension turned into anxiety when it was not psychically elaborated and thereby transformed into affect. Freud attributed this phenomenon to, among other things, a repression of psychic sexuality, that is, to a defense. In his letter to Fliess dated May 30, 1896, he linked repression with defense by emphasizing, ‘‘Surplus of sexuality alone is not enough to cause repression; the cooperation of defense is necessary’’ (p. 188). In ‘‘Further Remarks on the Neuro-psychoses of Defence’’ (1896b), Freud deepened his analysis of defense as arising from the conflict between the drive and the ego, the conscious agent of repression. Freud considered the defense as the ‘‘nuclear point’’ (p. 162) in the psychic mechanism of the neuroses. With regard to how symptoms arise, he detailed more clearly how INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DEFENSE the unconscious psychic mechanism of defense resulted from the conflict of a representation with moral imperatives. In ‘‘Repression’’ (1915d), Freud emphasized that the mechanism of defense ‘‘cannot arise until a sharp cleavage has occurred between conscious and unconscious mental activity—that the essence of repression lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious’’ (p. 147). Much later (1926d), Freud observed that after he had abandoned the term ‘‘defensive process’’ for thirty years and replaced it with the term ‘‘repression’’ (without clearly explaining the possible connection between these two concepts) (p. 163), there were ‘‘good enough grounds for re-introducing the old concept of defence’’ (p. 164). In fact, Freud had never entirely abandoned the term, since he discussed the denial of castration (albeit initially without using the term ‘‘denial’’ [Verleugnung]) in relation to children’s theories of sexuality (1908c) and little Hans (1909b). Freud discussed denial more explicitly with regard to fetishism (1927e), a concept that plays a pivotal role in his work, and in his paper on negation (1925h), which he defined as representing ‘‘a kind of intellectual acceptance of the repressed, while at the same time what is essential to the repression persists’’ (p. 236). Thus, ‘‘the content of a repressed image or idea can make its way into consciousness, on condition that it is negated’’ (p. 235). Freud also discussed sublimation, a concept that was already present in ‘‘Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood’’ (1910c) and that reappeared in The Ego and the Id (1923b) in connection with the ego energy, which Freud stipulated as involving ‘‘a desexualisation—a kind of sublimation’’ (p. 30). These distinctions, which predate Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (1926d), were later probably instrumental in Freud’s ascribing a more important function to this ‘‘old concept of defence’’ and restricting the role of repression, to the extent that he suggested making defense ‘‘a general designation for all the techniques which the ego makes use of in conflicts which may lead to a neurosis, while we retain the word Ôrepression’ for the special method of defence which the line of approach taken by our investigations made us better acquainted with in the first instance’’ (p. 163). In furthering her father’s work, Anna Freud sought to develop a theory that would demonstrate how the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS three agencies of the structural theory functioned. In particular, she described how the ego becomes ‘‘suspicious’’ in the face of the onslaught of the drives and ‘‘proceeds to counter-attack and to invade the territory of the id. Its purpose is to put the instincts permanently out of action by means of appropriate defensive measures, designed to secure its own boundaries’’ (1936, p. 8). Thus, Anna Freud’s account of psychic functioning attributes some force to the adaptive functions of the ego. Her works were often quoted by the ego-psychology movement that formed in the 1950s in the United States. Within the ego-psychology movement, Heinz Hartmann developed his theory of the ego in connection with the problem of adaptation, which he described in terms of the development of a ‘‘conflictfree ego sphere’’ (1958, p. 3 ) or autonomous ego. In this movement, psychic functioning in general is considered in terms of defense and its quest for equilibrium. Along similar lines, René Spitz, who located the first defense in the emergence of the second organizer (the so-called eight-month or stranger anxiety), explained that these defenses initially ‘‘serve primarily adaptation rather than defense in the strict sense of the term’’ (p. 164). It is when the object is established and ideation starts that their function changes. With the fusion of the aggressive and libidinal drives, some defense mechanisms, in particular identification, ‘‘acquire the function that they will serve in the adult’’ (p. 164). When Anna Freud was publishing her first psychoanalytic works, Melanie Klein, while breaking with Freudian orthodoxy by asserting that the agencies of the psyche begin functioning much earlier, introduced a perspective that restored to anxiety and psychic conflict a fundamental role in psychic functioning. Drawing on Freud’s second theory of the drives, she attributed a central role to the death drive and the conflicts between love and hatred. She thus developed her ideas on early defense mechanisms that were already present, in her view, in the earliest months of life during the paranoid-schizoid position. The concept of defense, as it has developed and been used since Freud, has become somewhat common in both clinical psychology and psychoanalysis. There it refers either to a relatively conscious behavior that rejects psychic reality (a definition that makes the 375 DEFENSE MECHANISMS concept more akin to the concept of resistance) or to a psychic impulse that seeks to avoid anxiety and unpleasure in the quest to adapt and achieve a state of equilibrium. As a result, the function of defense as a mechanism necessary for psychic growth is often overlooked. Spitz, René A., in collaboration with W. Godfrey Cobliner. (1965). The first year of life: A psychoanalytic study of normal and deviant development of object relations. New York: International Universities Press. ELSA SCHMID-KITSIKIS Blum, Harold, (Ed.). (1987). Defense and Resistance: Historical Perspectives and Current Concepts, New York: International Universities Press. See also: Actual neurosis/defense neurosis; Autistic defenses; Conflict; Defense mechanisms; Ego; Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, The; Manic defenses; Narcissistic defenses; Negation; Neurotic defenses; Paranoid-schizoid position; Psychoneurosis (or neuro-psychosis) of defense; Psychotic defenses; Repression; ‘‘Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence, The.’’ Bibliography Freud, Anna. (1936). The ego and the mechanisms of defense. New York: International Universities Press. Freud, Sigmund. (1896b). Further remarks on the neuropsychoses of defence. SE, 3, 157–185. ———. (1908c). On the sexual theories of children. SE, 9, 205–226. ———. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10, 1–149. ———. (1910c). Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood. SE, 11, 57–137. ———. (1915d). Repression. SE, 14, 141–158. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19, 1–66. ———. (1925h). Negation. SE, 19, 233–239. ———. (1926d). Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety. SE, 20, 75–172. ———. (1927e). Fetishism. SE, 21, 147–157. ———. (1985c [1887–1904]). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887–1904 (Jeffrey M. Masson, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985. Hartmann, Heinz. (1958). Ego psychology and the problem of adaptation. New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1939) Klein, Melanie. (1975). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. (pp. 1–24) In The writings of Melanie Klein. London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1946) Le Guen, Claude; Anargyros-Klinger, Annie; Bauduin, Andrée; et al. (1986). Le refoulement (les défenses). Revue Française de Psychanalyse, 50, 1, 23–370. 37 6 Further Reading Brenner, Charles. (1981). Defense and defense mechanisms. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 50, 557–569. Gray, Paul. (1994). The ego and the analysis of defense. Northvale, NJ: Aronson Inc. Loewald, Hans. (1952). The problem of defense; the neurotic interpretation of reality. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 33, 444–449. DEFENSE MECHANISMS Defense mechanisms are psychic processes that are generally attributed to the organized ego. They organize and maintain optimal psychic conditions in a way that helps the subject’s ego both to confront and avoid anxiety and psychic disturbance. They are therefore among the attempts to work through psychic conflict but if they are deployed in an excessive or inappropriate way they can compromise psychic growth. There is no clear distinction in Sigmund Freud’s work between a defense and a defense mechanism, (the latter referring to the unconscious processes by which the defense operates). The concept of defense first appeared in his article ‘‘The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence’’ (1894a) and was next discussed in ‘‘Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence’’ (1896b) and ‘‘The Aetiology of Hysteria’’ (1896c). Finally, in the text entitled ‘‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’’ (1915c), turning against the self and reversal into the opposite were identified as defense mechanisms, in addition to repression and sublimation. For Freud, the concept of defense refers to the ego’s attempts at psychic transformation in response to representations and affects that are painful, intolerable, or unacceptable. He abandoned the concept of defense for a period in favor of the concept of repression. He then reintroduced it in ‘‘Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality’’ (1922b [1921]). Freud INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DEFERRED ACTION ascribed a defensive significance to introjection (or identification) and projection by terming them all ‘‘neurotic mechanisms.’’ Then in an addendum to Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d [1925]), he reconsidered this concept in relation to that of repression, suggesting that: ‘‘It will be an undoubted advantage, I think, to revert to the old concept of Ôdefence,’ provided we employ it explicitly as a general designation for all the techniques which the ego makes use of in conflicts which may lead to a neurosis, while we retain the word Ôrepression’ for the special method of defense which the line of approach taken by our investigations made us better acquainted with in the first instance’’ (p. 163). Freud added that: ‘‘further investigations may show that there is an intimate connection between special forms of defense and particular illnesses, as, for instance, between repression and hysteria’’ (p. 164). By this he meant, more specifically, that the ego protects itself against the tendency towards conflict by means of a counter-cathexis. It was this counter-cathexis that came to represent the supreme essence of the defense mechanisms. This idea was taken up by Heinz Hartmann (1950) in the context of his theory of the autonomous functions of the ego. He argued that once the energy of the counter-cathexis had been withdrawn from the tendency that caused the conflict, it was neutralized. For him, the autonomous processes (organization, cathexis, delay) can be the precursors of defense mechanisms. In general, neurotic defense mechanisms constitute an exaggeration or a distortion of regulating and adaptive mechanisms. With strong support from the ego-psychology movement in her studies on ego functions, Anna Freud listed and described the ego’s defense mechanisms. For her, ‘‘every vicissitude to which the instincts are liable has its origin in some ego-activity. Were it not for the intervention of the ego or of those external forces which the ego represents, every instinct would know only one fate—that of gratification’’ (1937, p. 47). To the nine defense mechanisms that she identified: ‘‘regression, repression, reaction-formation, isolation, undoing, projection, introjection, turning against the self and reversal,’’ she suggested that, ‘‘we must add a tenth, which pertains rather to the study of the normal than to that of neurosis: sublimation, or displacement of instinctual aims’’ (p. 47). Finally, for adherents of the Kleinian school, the defense mechanisms take a different form in a strucINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS tured ego from the one they assume in a primitive, unstructured ego (or an undifferentiated id-ego). The defenses become modes of mental functioning. For Susan Isaacs (1948), all mental mechanisms are linked to fantasies, such as devouring, absorbing, or rejecting. Melanie Klein herself (1952, 1958) principally identified the following primitive defenses: splitting, idealization, projective identification and manic defenses. The terms ‘‘defense’’ and ‘‘defense mechanism’’ are still used interchangeably today, which suggests a degree of confusion between a descriptive approach to the concept of defense and an approach based on the analysis of psychic adaptations from an economic viewpoint. ELSA SCHMID-KITSIKIS See also: Defense. Bibliography Benassy, Maurice. (1969). Le moi et ses mécanismes de défense: Étude théorique. In La théorie psychanalytique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Anna. (1936). The ego and the mechanisms of defence. New York: International Universities Press. Freud, Sigmund. (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. Hartmann, Heinz. (1950). Comments on the psychoanalytic theory of the ego. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 5, 74–96. Isaacs, Susan. (1952). On the nature and function of phantasy. In M. Klein, P. Heimann, S. Isaacs and J. Riviere (Eds.), Developments in psycho-analysis (p. 67–121). (Reprinted from International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 29 (1948), 73–97.) Klein, Melanie. (1952). Some theoretical conclusions regarding the emotional life of the infant. In Envy and gratitude and other works, 1946–1963 (pp. 61–93). London: Hogarth, 1975. ———. (1958). On the development of mental functioning. In Envy and gratitude and other works, 1946–1963. (pp. 236–246). London: Hogarth, 1975. DEFERRED ACTION This notion is important to any understanding of the psychoanalytic conception of time. It implies a complex and reciprocal relationship between a significant 377 DEFERRED ACTION event and its later reinvestment with meaning, a reinvestment that lends it a new psychic efficacy. It was the French reading and translation of Freud that brought out the import of ‘‘nachträglich’’ and ‘‘Nachträglichkeit,’’ terms which had not hitherto been consistently translated into either French or English. The index of Freud’s Gesammelte Werke has no entry for either nachträglich or Nachträglichkeit, and perusal of the indexes of the works of Freud’s chief successors garners similarly negative results. It was Jacques Lacan who first drew attention to this notion, defining it in a precise if narrow way (1953, p. 48). Lacan did not consider the broader implications of the concept of Nachträglichkeit in Freud’s work, concerning himself solely with its occurrence in connection with the ‘‘Wolf Man’’ case (1918b [1914]) and ignoring its use in the 1895–1900 period. It fell to Jean-Bertrand Pontalis and Jean Laplanche to point up the overall importance of the concept, first in ‘‘Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality’’ (1964) and then in The Language of Psycho-Analysis (1967). First let us consider Freud’s view. He used the terms ‘‘nachträglich’’ and ‘‘Nachträglichkeit’’ over a good part of his working life—from the period, in fact, of his correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess, through The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), ‘‘Little Hans’’ (1909b), the ‘‘Wolf Man’’ case, and even well beyond. It is thus possible to trace the development of this idea in the general context of his work. It never achieved sufficient conceptual substance, however, for Freud to dedicate an entire paper to it. The earliest development of the notion may be seen in Freud’s letters to Fliess. The adjective ‘‘nachträglich,’’ part of German common usage, is employed by Freud in several ways. In the first place, it has the simple meaning of ‘‘additional’’ or ‘‘secondary’’; and hence, in a temporal sense, of ‘‘later.’’ A second use implies movement from past time in the direction of the future, while a third implies the opposite, a movement from the future towards the past. The second use, meaning movement from past to future, is very much bound up with the seduction theory: it implies that something is deposited in the individual that will be reactivated later, thus becoming active only at a ‘‘second moment.’’ It is in this regard that the notion of Nachträglichkeit is closely correlated with another constant of Freudian thought, the idea that there are always two moments in the constitution of a psychic 37 8 trauma: that of the event which leaves its trace and that of the event’s later revival by an internal factor. It is thus easy to understand how the idea of afterwardsness emerged in parallel with the seduction theory, even if it survived the abandonment of that theory. It should be pointed out that for Freud the seduction theory did not contradict a determinism according to which the past governs the present. Freud never thought that the temporal direction could be reversed. The analogy of a time-bomb serves well here: the initial memory is like a time-bomb set off by a delayed-action mechanism; there is no suggestion of retroactivity. On the other hand, there are a number of passages in Freud where the inverse process occurs, where things are perceived on the first occasion, then understood retroactively. Such passages are relatively few, however. The fact is that whenever Freud had a choice between a deterministic account proceeding from the past towards the future and a retrospective or hermeneutic conception proceeding from the present in the direction of the past, he almost invariably opted for the former. Thus in his letter to Fliess of October 3, 1897, after recounting an episode in his self-analysis, he makes the following comment: ‘‘A severe critic might say of all this that it was retrogressively phantasied and not progressively determined. Experimenta cruces would have to decide against him’’ (SE 3, p. 263). So things are not simple. As much as we might wish to find in Freud a dual—perhaps even a contradictory—application of the concept of Nachträglichkeit, what we actually find is a highly deterministic one. Much the same goes for Freud’s theoretical confrontation with Carl Jung: in defending his view of the reality of the ‘‘real’’ primal scene, Freud made a number of concessions but never wavered in his conviction that what comes before determines what comes after. The Freudian idea of Nachträglichkeit may by no means be conflated with the Jungian notion of Zurückphantasieren (retrospective fantasizing). To what extent can the concept of afterwardsness enable us to transcend the alternative between, on the one hand, a determinist view that places the entire burden of psychic causality on events of the remotest past, and, on the other hand, a so-called hermeneutic, or even narrativist, approach that reverses the arrow of time, so to speak, and focuses on ‘‘resignifications,’’ or reinvestments with meaning, effected afterwards, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DEFERRED ACTION whether in life or during psychoanalytic treatment? When things are framed in this way, it seems impossible to resolve the polarity between childhood events, events pure and simple, and the moment when they are retrieved as meaning, within a history. Yet a way out of this cul-de-sac presents itself if we consider that the childhood event is itself pregnant with meaning— not on the psychophysiological level, but on the level of the interhuman relationship. Even if all our attention is focused on the retroactive temporal direction, it cannot be overlooked that when someone reinterprets their past, that past can never be strictly factual, cannot be a concrete, untransformed ‘‘given.’’ On the contrary, it must contain in immanent fashion something earlier still: a message from the other. A purely hermeneutic approach, meaning that each person interprets their past on the basis of their present, is therefore untenable, for, already deposited in the past, is something that cries out to be deciphered, namely a message from the other person. Instead of considering only the bipolar temporal vector connecting the child with the adult that the child has become, we need to add a third term, external to the subject, which is the message emanating from the other adult, a message which is imposed on the child and which the child must translate. Indeed it is the idea of ‘‘translation’’ so understood that may be expected to cast a new light on the Freudian concept of Nachträglichkeit. JEAN LAPLANCHE See also: Adolescence; Deferred action and trauma; General theory of seduction; Incompleteness; Infantile, the; Latency period; ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology, A’’; Proton-Pseudos; Puberty; Repression; Seduction scenes; Trauma. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. ———. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10. ———. (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17. ———. (1950a [1887–1902]). The origins of psycho-analysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, drafts and notes. (Marie Bonaparte et al., Ed., Eric Mosbacher and James Strachey, Trans.) London: Imago, 1954; partial revised tr. in SE, 3. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND TRAUMA Lacan, Jacques. (2004). The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis. In Écrits: A selection. (Bruce Fink, Héloı̈se Fink, and Russell Grigg, Trans.) New York: Norton. (Original work published 1953) Laplanche, Jean. (1976). Life and death in psychoanalysis. (Jeffrey Mehlman, Trans.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. (Original work published 1970) ———. (1998). Temporalité et traduction. In Le Primat de l’autre. Paris: Flammarion. Laplanche, Jean. (1999). Notes on afterwardsness. In Essays on otherness. (John Fletcher, Ed., and Luke Thurston, Philip Slotkin, and Leslie Hill, Trans.) London, New York: Routledge. (Original work published 1998) Laplanche, Jean, and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1968 [1964]). Fantasy and the origins of sexuality. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 49, 1–18. Laplanche, Jean, and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1974 [1967]). The language of psycho-analysis. (Donald NicholsonSmith, Trans.) London: Hogarth/Institute of Psycho-Analysis; New York: Norton. DEFERRED ACTION AND TRAUMA Freud called upon the notions of deferred action and of trauma to account for how time and causality are organized in a mental life that he conceived of as permeated by sexuality. He argued that an impression inconsequential on its face but unintegrated into the flow of life by reason of its sexual character left mnemic traces that could be reactivated by later events in the history of the individual. Only then, retroactively, would it acquire a meaning capable of affecting psychic organization. In his earliest thinking, Freud observed that certain childhood experiences left mnemic traces of an active albeit unconscious nature. These operated like internal ‘‘foreign bodies,’’ and getting rid of them required that they be made conscious and ‘‘abreacted’’ (discharged by being revealed to the analyst). Such traces were always related to a seduction in early childhood that had not been fully comprehended at the time. Freud quickly abandoned this theory and replaced it with that of ‘‘deferred action’’ (Nachträglichkeit), according to which the child first receives impressions that have an exciting effect, but not a traumatic one, for the child is still sexually undeveloped. When a particular experience occurring after puberty recalls 379 DEFERRED ACTION AND TRAUMA the earlier one by virtue of some resemblance, the individual reinterprets the early event, which thus acquires a force that it never had initially. Before long, however, Freud discovered infantile sexuality and could then no longer ground deferred action in a sexual life that developed in two phases. He therefore stipulated that all childhood experiences left a residue, a mnemic trace, which cried out to be reinterpreted and would be reinterpreted at a later time. This residue or trace always had a sexual character. Freud developed this theory in his account of the ‘‘wolf man’’ case (1918b [1914]). As a two-year-old child, the patient had witnessed his parents engaged in sex without experiencing anything more than an impression of strangeness; only at the age of four did he construct his primal-scene fantasy as a way of accounting for the original perception. The theory of deferred action is one of the keys to Freud’s metapsychological system. It effectively addresses both the sexual nature of repressed memories and the manner in which time and memory work within the psyche. In Freud’s view, our past—our whole past from birth on—is responsible for what we later become, but there is a sense, too, in which what we become alters what we once were: the present transforms, translates, remolds a past that is still present in us. The individual has contact with the past at every instant of life, but is unable to apprehend that past, which is forever emerging only to be retranslated instantly into other terms. The notion of deferred action must not, however, be confused with a cognitivist view of how memories are transformed. The cognitivist view sees memories as being reorganized and simplified in natural ways, like material objects moving away from an observer, for example. For psychoanalysis, each moment lived by an individual, if it has a sexual aspect, is experienced as enigmatic, as bearing a residue that poses a question. Such a moment may resonate with a past event with nothing special about it, save for an ever so slightly unsatisfactory and unexplained dimension, which the psyche now remobilizes as desire. Like the unconscious, and like desire, deferred action is capable of utterly disrupting an individual’s spontaneously created idea of himself in relation to the outside world and to other people. For one, it explodes the notion of causality: not only is the indi38 0 vidual unable to relate his actions in life to his conscious will, not only is he always disappointed when he obtains what he thought he wanted, because his desire is never satisfied thereby, but also he can never succeed in explaining the present in terms of the past. What went before is never past: it is always present, always ungraspable, always needing to be worked through. Deferred action is usually associated with trauma. The sight of cruelty can thus be traumatic if it reactivates an infantile sadistic occurrence dating from an early time when cruelty was not disturbing. Likewise, a rape may be traumatic if it revives an infantile sexual wish that was left pending and never erased. Deferred action is also closely tied to repression. If certain later experiences and wishes need to be repressed, it is because at the moment of their occurrence they acquire a strength out of proportion to the circumstances, for they are reinforced by the power of hitherto unassimilated past experiences. The representation of the object of desire then has to be repressed, because, between the first and the second experience, regulatory and prohibitory superstructures have been set up. Psychoanalysts are divided on how much importance to give to the idea of deferred action. For some, this mechanism comes into play only during a second phase. They believe that some early infantile experiences are traumatizing in themselves and require the deployment of mechanisms more radical than repression, such as splitting or foreclosure. Analysts with this view strive to elicit the memory of such experiences by means of the regression that the analytic situation allows. Pioneers of this approach include Sándor Ferenczi, Wilfred R. Bion, and Donald W. Winnicott. In contrast, some consider this orientation a simplification of psychoanalysis. In this school of thought, psychical trauma of any kind should not be treated as a quasi-physical event of external origin, imposed by reality. In their eyes, such a trauma is inseparable from deferred action, which they place at the center of a mental life shot through with and determined by sexuality. What the young child seeks, but cannot obtain, is the mother, and later the father—not in respect of what they give, but in respect of what they withhold, what they hide, namely their unconscious wishes. The disparity in sexual maturity between the child and the adult means that whatever the child receives (nourishINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS D É J À V U ment, caresses, rebukes) is received in a way that is enigmatic, and hence disturbing, to some degree. The fact is that for the adult, the child is not just a child but also the object whereby the adult gratifies his or her desire. Hence the enigmatic quality to what is given to the child. It was Jacques Lacan who first reasserted the importance of Freud’s concept of deferred action, and Jean Laplanche made it a key concept in his theoretical work. ODILE LESOURNE See also: Deferred action/afterwardness; Sexual trauma; Trauma Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17, 1–122. ———. (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1, 281–387. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1893a). On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomena: Preliminary communication. SE, 2, 1–17. Lacan, Jacques. (2002). The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis. In his Écrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Héloı̈se Fink, and Russell Grigg, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1956) Laplanche, Jean (1989). New foundations for psychoanalysis (David Macey, Trans.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Original work published 1987) DEFUSION. See Fusion/defusion DEFUSION OF INSTINCT. See Fusion/defusion of Instinct DÉJÀ VU Déjà vu refers to a state wherein a person feels certain (cognitive judgment) that he or she has previously seen or experienced something that is actually being encountered for the first time. Sigmund Freud believed INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the feeling corresponded to the memory of an unconscious daydream. The term first appeared in a French translation of the Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901b) as part of the discussion of the superstition that can be associated with this mysterious feeling. Freud quotes certain ‘‘psychologists,’’ without specifying who they are. The concept falls squarely within the framework of the paramnesia extensively described by psychiatrists in France, primarily Wigan (1844) and Valentin Magnan (1893), who described systematic delirium accompanied by the illusion of doppelgängers, J. Capgras (1923), who described the illusion of doppelgangers, and Pierre Janet (1905), who described cases of false recognition. Freud discusses the concept in terms of the psychopathology of everyday life (errors, slips) by removing it from the context of psychosis and by supporting it with his own self-analysis (‘‘rapid sensations of déjà vu that I myself experienced’’). He returned to it again, but within the context of therapy, in his ‘‘Fausse reconnaissance (déjà raconté) in Psycho-Analytic Treatment’’ (1914a), referring to a central example of the analysis of the Wolf Man. He then provided a partial summary of authors who had discussed the issue, separating them into ‘‘believers’’ (who thought that déjà vu was proof of a previous existence), among whom he includes Pythagoras, and ‘‘nonbelievers,’’ who regard such events as false memories (Wigan, 1860). Freud himself assumes a different position (which he acknowledges sharing with Joseph Grasset, 1904) by believing in the reality of the representative content, but associating this with the reactivation of an older unconscious impression. He returned to the question again in terms of self-analysis at the end of his life in ‘‘A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis’’ (1936a). Déjà vu is one of the ‘‘uncanny feelings’’ that, for Freud, play the role of hallucinations, which become more frequent and systematic during certain mental disturbances. This is the most convincing example of breaching the boundary between the normal and the pathological addressed by Freud. It involves a dissociative type of change experienced by the subject in his or her perception of things or himself. Reality appears distant, like a dream or a shadow, and it is at this point that false recognition occurs. Along with this displacement of the perceived object from the present into the past, there is a confused feeling of expectation 381 D E L A Y , J E A N (190 7 –1987 ) or foreknowledge, whereby the subject is simultaneously projected into the future. For Freud this involves the replacement of some part of reality by a repressed desire (1901b). In the example cited here, a young girl replaces the perception of her wish to have seen her brother die with the sensation of having already experienced the situation (a trip to the countryside to visit some young girls whose brother is seriously ill). The topographic displacement (unconscious/conscious) is also spatio-temporal, for the memory involves the house and the girls’ dresses but not the brother’s illness. In ‘‘A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis,’’ the same phenomenon is reversed since the reality of the Acropolis dissolves within the feeling of disbelief Freud experiences. Here, doubt replaces certainty; doubt is awakened by the reality of the perception but contaminates perception at the same time. The concept of déjà vu must be compared with other analogous terms in analysis, such as déjà vécu (already experienced) and déjà raconté (already communicated). According to Freud, this paramnesia can be explained as a confusion between the intention to communicate and its realization. As with the doubt in his dream, these forms of paramnesia refer to specifically significant facts, such as the hallucination of the severed finger that the Wolf Man is convinced he has already told Freud about, when, in fact, he had only mentioned the existence of the small knife carried by his uncle. Generally speaking, paramnesia leads to a reflection on the process of remembering during therapy and on the patient’s illusion of having ‘‘always known’’ the repressed content revealed by interpretation (‘‘Remembering, Repeating, Working-through’’). ‘‘It is by this means,’’ Freud writes, ‘‘that the problem of analysis is resolved’’ (1914g). Déjà vu touches on the whole question of forgetting as a dissociation of memory, as well as on the question of true and false from the psychoanalytic point of view. The false recognition of Norbert Harnold (‘‘Is it a Ôreal’ ghost?’’) is the true recognition of the originally invested object displaced within the context of archeology in Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva’’ (1907a [1906j]). SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Certainty; Estrangement; Illusion. 38 2 Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1901b). The psychopathology of everyday life. SE, 6. ———. (1907a [1906j]). Delusions and dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva.’’ SE, 9: 1–95. ———. (1914a). Fausse reconnaissance (‘‘déjà raconté’’) in psycho-analytic treatment. SE, 13: 199–207. ———. (1914g). Remembering, repeating, workingthrough (Further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis II). SE, 12: 147–156. ———. (1936a). A disturbance of memory on the Acropolis (an open letter to Romain Rolland on the occasion of his seventieth birthday). SE, 22, 239–248. DELAY, JEAN (1907–1987) Jean Delay was a psychiatrist and writer, a professor of medicine in Paris, and a member of the Académie française and the Académie de médecine. He was born on November 14, 1907, in Bayonne and died on May 29, 1987, in Paris. He was the only son of Maurice Delay, a surgeon who went to Bayonne to practice and ultimately became mayor, and Berthe Mihura, a musician, mystic, and cultured woman from an old Basque family. Delay obtained his baccalaureate degree when he was only fourteen and a half, and had to obtain permission from Léon Bérard, minister of education, to attend medical school. He was less than sixteen when he left for Paris to study medicine, and he remained a precocious student throughout his life. He excelled as an extern at the hospital but soon discovered that he had little interest in surgery and enrolled in the university’s literature department. Georges Dumas, who held the chair of psychopathology at the Sorbonne, introduced Delay to psychiatry. In 1928 Delay was an intern, the youngest doctor in the Paris hospital system, and in 1939 he joined the staff of the Sainte-Anne Hospital, where he worked with Henri Claude and Maxime Laignel-Lavastine. After the Germans deported Joseph Lévy-Valensi, Delay became head of the psychiatry department. He served as an expert adviser at the Nuremberg trials, where he examined Rudolf Hess and Julius Streicher. In 1946, when he was only 38 years old, Delay was appointed to the chair of mental illness and brain diseases and later held the Charcot chair until 1970, when he retired. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS D E L B O E U F , J O S E P H R É M I L É O P O L D (1831 –1 896) After defending his doctoral dissertation in literature, entitled ‘‘Dissolutions de la mémoire’’ (1942), which was influenced by the work of Pierre Janet, he became part of the great tradition of French psychopathology through such publications as Les dérèglements de l’humeur (1946) and Études de psychologie médicale (1953). Upon the departure of Henri Piéron, he became director of the Institut de Psychololgie at the University of Paris. Delay was chair of the first International Congress in Psychiatry held in Paris in 1950 and was elected member of the Académie de médicine in 1955. His neurological training is reflected in his dissertation on tactile agnosia and other work published in this area. He coined the term ‘‘neuroleptic’’ and introduced the use of reserpine into psychiatry. His interests extended to the use of antidepressants, and he completed his research on mescaline by studying LSD and psilocybin, which he referred to as ‘‘oneirogenics.’’ He was also involved in the discovery of Largactil, used in psychopharmacology. In 1960 he chaired the first Congrès de médicine psychosomatique (Congress of Psychosomatic Medicine). Édouard Pichon introduced him to psychoanalysis before the Second World War during a brief training analysis. Delay retained a nuanced, nondoctrinaire attitude toward Sigmund Freud’s work. During the Occupation, the psychoanalysts John Leuba, Georges Parcheminey, Jacques Lacan, and Marc Schlumberger worked in his department; after the war Jacques Lacan and André Green had a psychoanalytic practice there. His department also hosted Jacques Lacan’s Wednesday seminars (from November 18, 1953, to November 20, 1963) and Friday seminars, until it was decided that they were no longer appropriate. He remained suspicious of the ‘‘quacks of the unconscious’’ and what he considered poorly managed psychoanalysis. Delay was elected to the Académie française in 1959. Throughout his life Delay maintained a literary career, his work initially being published under the pseudonym Jean Faurel (La cité grise [1946], Les reposantes [1947], Les Hommes sans nom [1948]). His twovolume work on André Gide, The Youth of André Gide (originally published in 1956–1957), soon became famous. Jacques Lacan, in ‘‘Jeunesse de Gide, ou la lettre et le désir’’ (1966), wrote, ‘‘Jean Delay extends this ambiguity by locating the effect within the soul, at the very place where the message is formed.’’ He also worked on a historical reconstruction of his mother’s INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS family in the four volumes of Avant-mémoire (1979– 1986). In a final homage to Delay at the Académie française, Jean Dutourd wrote, ‘‘In the case of Jean Delay, who knew everything, who had explored medicine’s most hidden pathways, the philosophy of the past, and even madness, we do not have the feeling we are talking with a contemporary but with one of those immense gluttons for knowledge who made the Quattrocento and the sixteenth century so amazing. Nor was he contemporary in his behavior. In his courtesy, his refinement, and his kindness, he was the kind of gentleman one might have found in Balthazar Castiglione, and an Ôhonest man’ as well.’’ CLAUDE DELAY See also: France; Narco-analysis; Sainte-Anne Hospital. Bibliography Delay, Jean. (1946). Les dérèglements de l’humeur. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Delay, Jean. (1947). Les reposantes. Paris: Gallimard. Delay, Jean. (1953). Études de psychologie médicale. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Delay, Jean. (1956). Aspects de la psychiatrie moderne. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Delay, Jean. (1960). Discours de réception à l’Académie française. Paris: Gallimard. Delay, Jean. (1963). The youth of André Gide (June Guicharnaud, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Abridged.) Delay, Jean. (1971–1986). Avant-mémoire. Paris: Gallimard. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Jeunesse de Gide, ou la lettre et le désir. In his Écrits. Paris: Seuil. DELBOEUF, JOSEPH RÉMI LÉOPOLD (1831–1896) Joseph Delboeuf was a Belgian psychologist and hypnotherapist. He was born in Liège on September 30, 1831, and died in Bonn on August 13, 1896. He was a professor at the University of Ghent from 1863 to 1866 (philosophy), and after 1866 taught at the University of Liège (Latin, Greek, and psychology). Signs of Delboeuf ’s influence can be found in many places in Sigmund Freud’s work, at least until 1900. The most significant include: 383 D E L G A D O , H O N O R I O (18 92 –196 9) 1. Delboeuf treated a woman traumatized by the death of her son. He eliminated her symptoms, which resembled the terrible conditions of his death, by having her relive those experiences several times. Delboeuf explained ‘‘how the magnetizer assists in the healing process. He places the subject in a state where the evil has manifested itself and through speech combats that same, recurring evil.’’ Freud discussed this hypothesis extensively in ‘‘On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena’’ (1893a) and in the Studies on Hysteria (1895d). 2. Looking back on his therapy with Emmy von N., Freud doubted for the first time the value of claims by Bernheim and the ‘‘perspicacious’’ Delboeuf. He questioned whether Bernheim was correct in continuing to claim that ‘‘suggestion is everything,’’ and Delboeuf for having claimed that ‘‘that being so, there is no such thing as hypnotism.’’ Unable to resolve these issues, he abandoned theory and turned to practice, finally showing preference for the analytic and genetic method, which was in fact that of Delboeuf. 3. Delboeuf ’s Le Sommeil et les Rêves [Sleep and Dreams] (1885) and Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) have several traits in common. Delboeuf ’s work opens with the famous dream of the lizards and the Asplenium, an intriguing dream from several points of view and one that led the psychologist to articulate his conception of memory and remembrance, whose meaning he attempted to grasp through the randomness of free association. In the Interpretation of Dreams two of Delboeuf ’s concepts are treated favorably: ‘‘forced rapprochement’’ (to account for the tendency of dreams to merge) and ‘‘cliché’’ to explain the presence of verbal expressions in certain dreams. Having decided to use his own dreams for hermeneutic purposes, Freud acknowledges that he had to overcome [conquer] his initial reticence. He remarks that he overcame his resistance by subjecting it to a process expressed by Delboeuf, whom he quotes: ‘‘every psychologist must acknowledge even his weaknesses if he feels he can shed light on a problem by doing so’’ (Freud, 1900a; Delboeuf, 1885, p. 30). FRANÇOIS DUYCKAERTS 38 4 See also: Congrès international de l’hypnotisme expérimental et scientifique, First; Disque vert, Le; Hypnosis; Suggestion. Bibliography Delboeuf, Joseph. (1885). Le Sommeil et les rêves. Paris: Félix Alcan; Le Sommeil et les rêves et autres textes. Paris: Fayard, 1993. ———. (1889). Le Magnétisme animal. Á propos d’une visite à l’École de Nancy. Paris: Félix Alcan. Duyckaerts, François. (1993). ‘‘Les références de Freud à Delbœuf.’’ Revue Internationale de Psychanalyse, 6, 231–250. Freud, Sigmund. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2. ———. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. DELGADO, HONORIO (1892–1969) A Peruvian psychiatrist and philosopher, Honorio Delgado was born in Arequipa on September 26, 1892, and died in Lima on November 20, 1969. Delgado studied natural science at the University of San Agustı́n in Arequipa before becoming a surgeon (1918) and a doctor of medicine (1920) at the University of San Marcos in Lima. A self-taught psychiatrist (formal training then being unavailable), Delgado was a precocious and enthusiastic proselytizer for psychoanalysis in Peru and Latin America between 1915 and 1927. His first publication on psychoanalysis appeared in 1915 when he was only twenty-three years old. Published in El Commercio, it was a commentary on Sigmund Freud’s ‘‘The Claims of Psycho-analysis to Scientific Interest,’’ which appeared in 1913 in Scientia, which Delgado read on a regular basis. In 1922 he traveled to Europe to attend the Berlin congress but his ship was delayed and he missed the presentations. In 1927 he traveled to Innsbruck for the annual congress. He published the first work in Spanish on psychoanalysis, entitled La Psychanalyse (1919). Between 1919 and 1934 he corresponded with Freud, whom he met in Weimar in 1922 and visited in Semmering in 1927. In 1918, together with Hermilio Valdizán, he founded Revista de psiquiatrı́a y disciplinas conexas (Review of Psychiatry and Related Disciplines), which adopted a favorable position regarding psychoanalysis. In 1921 he INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DELUSION published ‘‘Der Liebesreiz der Augen’’ (The Amorous Attraction of the Eyes) in Imago. In 1926, with the collaboration of several eminent Peruvian intellectuals, he edited a special issue of Mercurio Peruano devoted to Freud. That same year he also published a biography of Freud, which Freud annotated extensively throughout their correspondence. Freud took an active interest in Delgado’s publications, and the way he responded to his eclectic approach to psychoanalysis, which was in several respects related to the ideas of Alfred Adler and Carl Gustav Jung, should not come as a surprise. After 1930 Delgado held the country’s only chair in psychiatry and became a fierce adversary of psychoanalysis, paradoxically citing in his support the references to him made by Freud in a 1923 note added to ‘‘On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement’’ (1914d) and in an article written in English in 1924, ‘‘A Short Account of Psycho-analysis’’ (1924f [1923]). While still a young man Delgado had identified with Freud’s initial period of isolation. There exists a letter, collectively written by Ernest Jones, Hanns Sachs, and Oskar Pfister, congratulating Delgado for his Pionierarbeit. His later rejection of psychoanalysis appears to have arisen from his growing popularity and a refusal—which he never concealed—to accept some of the fundamental premises of psychoanalysis, coupled with his increasingly strong attachment to Catholicism. In spite of his productivity as a writer, his lack of clinical experience is obvious (he had no personal experience of psychoanalysis aside from his own self-analysis). His early work contains little of lasting value and there is an obvious difference in quality with his later work in psychiatry, influenced by the phenomenology of Karl Jaspers. His correspondence, however, contains numerous insights into Freud’s ideas about creating an institutional structure as well as Freud’s tendency to pardon some of Delgado’s theoretical errors, for which he would certainly have been less indulgent in other circumstances. His letters contain no more than mild rebukes to Delgado for his sympathy toward Adler (with whom he corresponded) and Jung. ÁLVARO REY DE CASTRO See also: Revista de psiquiatrı́a y disciplinas conexas; Peru. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Ellenberger, H. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry. New York: Basic Books. Mariátegui, Javier. (1989). Freud y el psicoanálisis. Lima: University Cayetano Heredia. Rey de Castro, Álvaro. (1983). Correspondance Sigmund Freud–Honorio Delgado. Revue Internationale d’Histoire de la Psychanalyse, 6, 1993. ———. (1991). Freud y Honorio Delgado: una aproximación psicoanalı́tica a la prehistoria del psicoanálisis peruano y sus escuelas. El múltiple interés del psicoanálisis–77 años después, Talleres de artes gráficas espino, 203–237. ———. (1993). Lettres de Sigmund Freud à Honorio Delgado, 1919–1934. Revue Internationale d’Histoire de la Psychanalyse, 6, 401–428. DELUSION The first essential feature that defines a delusion is that it concerns something that appears to be external to the subject. It is thereby distinguished from obsessive ideas and idées fixes. More precisely, wecan say that in a delusion, an internal experience appears in theperceptual field. Delusion therefore concerns reality as a whole, which distinguishes it from phobia, where the distortion of reality is more circumscribed, because projection manages to localize conflict, and keep the rest of the subject’s mental life intact. In delusion, conversely,the whole of reality is affected, and indeed the delusion, for the subject, is the whole of reality. In this sense, delusion represents a critical risk. Sigmund Freud speaks accordingly of a necessary restoration of the object (1924e), whether it is a matter of the high level of libidinal or narcissistic tension evidentin extreme cases, or a fundamental questioning of identity and relationswith others that is at stake. Delusion is therefore something other than error. Being delusional remains compatible with an accurate apprehension of reality. We can even consider the delusional individual as deprived of the freedom to establisha flexible relationship between reality and truth, as Paul-Claude Racamierhas said. From this general perspective, we can differentiate the two main modalities for the expression of delusions. In one, this involves a disturbance of consciousness, whose heightened character can have different 385 DELUSIONS AND DREAMS IN J E N S E N ’ S ‘ ‘G R A D I V A ’’ causes: a consciousness that is captive and agonized; or a delirium tremens, which externalizes metabolic disturbances in the form of images; or the dream-like upheaval of acute psychotic delusions; or the psychedelic intoxication of hallucinogens. In the other mode, the same reversal of reality can express the refusal that occurs during hallucinatory confusions that seek to isolate a repressed complex, and keep it in a shadowy, hysterical state. There are occasions, however, when acute delirious moments are experienced in isolation, as in the ‘‘primordial delusional fact’’ described by Jacques Moreau de Tours, or the ‘‘primary delusional experience’’ described by Karl Jaspers, where the strange and uncanny appears, sometimes in the form of illuminating moments in which a perception takes on a revelatory quality,or a moment of questioning emerges without yielding any sense. These seem to be direct confrontations between unconscious fantasy and reality, like a topographical short-circuit that requires a return of the preconscious from the exterior world, within the delusion of interpretation. In yet another dynamic of delusion, less sharp in its temporal unfolding,the dominant issue concerns the limit between inside and outside. During moments of mental automatism, thought grows heavy with the weight of words that have lost their meaning. The schizophrenic seeks in hallucination to exteriorize an internal life that is invasive and does not seem to belong to him. Chronic delusions, in the French systems of classification, or in Kraepelin’s paraphrenias, are more likely to create delusions that are simultaneously persecutory and protective, sometimes to the point of allowing a reconstruction of the entire world (Schreber, 1903). Passion also, with its affective power to dominate, can provide material for delusions, along other lines. The paranoiac projection of homosexual impulses can turn into delusions of persecution, jealousy, or erotomania, depending on whether it is the subject or the object of the fantasized investment that is affected by the delusional force. However, emphasis should be placed on the narcissistic demand, the lack of an object, and the shortcoming, within the primary homosexual relation, that eroticization compromises and which the delusion of persecution maintains as both present and distant (Jenneau, 1990). In other cases it is the superego that returns in the ‘‘delusion of reference,’’ where the shame and guilt of voyeurism blend together in projection (Kretschmer, 1927). 38 6 One sees in this brief description that delusion cannot be explained simply in terms of a certain way of treating instinctual life at the expense of reality. One also has to take into account the patient’s need to express conflict, in a single-minded way, within this reality. It is the causality of delusion that remains the foremost question, even within radically different accounts. See also: Aimée, case of; Amentia; Certainty; ‘‘Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest’’; Constructionreconstruction; ‘‘Constructions in Analysis’’; Erotomania; Hypochondria; Illusion; Infantile omnipotence; ‘‘Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams’’; Need for causality; Negative hallucination; ‘‘Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis (Dementia paranoides)’’; ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’; Paranoia; Paranoid psychosis; Persecution; Projection; Psychoanalytical nosography; Psychoses, chronic and delusional; Psychotic defenses; Psychotic potential; Superego. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1924e). The loss of reality in neurosis and psychosis. SE, 19, 180–187. Jaspers, Karl. (1913). Allgemeine psychopathologie. Berlin: Springer. Jenneau, Augustin. (1990). Les délires non psychotiques. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Kretschmer, Ernst. (1963). Paranoı̈a et sensibilité. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. (Original work published 1927) Schreber, Daniel Paul. (1988). Memoirs of my nervous illness. (I. Macalpine, R. Hunter, Trans.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1903) Further Reading Robbins, Michael. (2002). The language of schizophrenia and the world of delusion. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 83, 383–406. Shengold, Leonard. (1995). Delusions of everyday life. New Haven: Yale University Press. DELUSIONS AND DREAMS IN JENSEN’S ‘‘GRADIVA’’ Freud wrote this essay in the summer of 1906, seemingly to please Carl Gustav Jung, who had called to his attention a short story by the German writer INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DEMAND Wilhelm Jensen that was of interest because a dream served as its point of departure. good psychoanalyst, cautiously bringing to consciousness what Norbert forgot through repression. In his essay Freud first minimally summarized and commented on the story. It is the story of Norbert Hanold, a young archeologist obsessed with his work for whom women do not exist. Visiting a museum, he is struck by the beauty of a bas-relief of young Roman woman, very light on her feet, whom he baptized ‘‘Gradiva’’ (she who walks). He purchases a reproduction, which he hangs on the wall of his workroom. Gradually his mind is invaded by the enigma of this young woman. One night he dreams that he is in Pompeii in August 79 c.e., just before the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius. There he meets Gradiva and wants to warn her of the terrible danger that is about to occur, but he is powerless to rescue her. After waking, he is overcome by the desire to meet Gradiva. He leaves for Pompeii, where he meets a young woman, very much alive, whom he takes for Gradiva. In the course of the meetings that follow, he organizes his mania, stalking and interpreting signs (Gradiva appears at noon, the ghost hour, and the like). ‘‘Gradiva’’ seeks to cure him by gradually revealing her identity to him. Through this adventure, Norbert finally sees ‘‘Gradiva’’ for who she really is: his neighbor and childhood friend Zoe Bertgang (‘‘Bertgang’’ is the German equivalent of ‘‘Gradiva’’), who also traveled to Pompeii. For years he had not seen her and had no desire to see her, but, in love without knowing it, he had displaced his love on the young woman of the bas-relief, Gradiva. Happily, the mania yields to reality, and Norbert is cured. Freud’s essay was published in May 1907. Four months later, in September, in the course of a trip to Rome, he went to see the bas-relief representing ‘‘Gradiva’’ at the museum of the Vatican, the same bas-relief that had inspired Jensen’s tale. Just like Norbert, Freud bought a copy of it and hung it in his office, at the foot of the divan. He left it there until he left Vienna, and took it with him to London in 1938. Frequently citing his Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud suggested in his comments that dreams ‘‘invented’’ by a writer can be analyzed by the same method as real ones. He meticulously analyzed the two dreams figuring in Jensen’s story, linking them to residues of daytime occurrences. He thus demonstrated that dreams were substitute wish fulfillments and established that they constitute a return of the repressed. The source of Norbert Hanold’s mania is his repression of his sexuality, which caused him to forget Zoe Bertgang, so as to keep him from recognizing her (anticipating his later views, Freud called such phenomena ‘‘negative hallucinations’’). Freud, Sigmund. (1900). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4, 1–338; 5, 339–625. The dream and the mania that makes the dream real function by condensation and displacement, by way of images. The correct proposition—I, Norbert, am living in the same time and place as Zoe—is removed to Pompeii in the year 79. Zoe treats Norbert in the manner of a Regarding demand, we can say that 1) it arises only from speech; 2) it is addressed to someone; 3) it is nevertheless only implicit; 4) it is related to a need for love, but also to desire; 5) it does not need to be sustained by any real object. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ROGER PERRON See also: Anxiety dream; Applied psychoanalysis and the interaction of psychoanalysis; Archeology, the metaphor of; Fantasy; Literary and artistic creation; Negative hallucination; Passion. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1907a [1906]). Der Wahn und die Träume in W. Jensens Gradiva, Leipzig-Wien, Hugo Heller; G.W., 7, 29–122; Le Délire et les Rêves dans la ‘‘Gradiva’’ de W. Jensen, trad. J. Bellemin-Noël, Paris, Gallimard, coll. ‘‘Connaissance de l’inconscient,’’ dir. J.-B. Pontalis, 1986; Delusions and dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva.’’ SE, 9, 1–95. Bibliography Engelman, Edmund. (1976), Bergasse 19, Sigmund Freud’s home and offices, Vienna, 1938: The photographs of Edmund Engelman. New York: Basic Books. DEMAND The concept of demand is not Freudian. It was developed by Jacques Lacan, who linked it with need and desire (Lacan, 1966, 1991). Demand is identifiable by the five clinical traits that constitute it, by the status that it gives the object, by its function in relation to the Other, and finally by its topological register. 387 DEMAND The object of demand is what is lacking in the unconscious Other, and thus it is only a fantasmic object. Its function is to satisfy the drive and to make the demand of the subject and the demand of the Other coincide. Although it is tied to both the symbolic and the real, the register of demand is primarily imaginary, and thus most closely related to the body. Before outlining more recent perspectives on demand, we must return to what Lacan said about it in relation to oral, anal, and genital regions of the body that serve as the sources of demand. The oral demand calls for an inverse response, such that the other’s answer to the imperative ‘‘feed me’’ is ‘‘let yourself be fed.’’ This inversion becomes a source of discord or even of destructive urges. To whom is the demand addressed? To the Other, and not the mother. It is addressed to the Other that separates the demand from a desire. And that desire, in turn, deprives the demand of its satisfaction. Thus the demand becomes a non-demand. The dream of the ‘‘beautiful butcher’s wife,’’ as reported by Freud, is a perfect example of this. What is the object of her desire to define? It is a cannibalistic object. This desire is directed towards the nourishing body, an organic unconscious object through which the demand’s relation to the Other can be sexualized. This libidinization, ‘‘which is nothing but surplus,’’ deprives the need of its gratification. The function of desire, which sustains all demand, is in turn maintained in it and thus preserved. Desire can be recognized in the field of speech by the negation with which it originates: this, and not that! The original oral relation between the mother and her child is constantly fed by a kind of hostility in which each one is convinced, at the imaginary level, of being ‘‘bawled out’’ by the other. Donald Winnicott (1974) emphasizes moreover that the object is so good, so exciting—that it bites. Consultations with mothers and children always show this. At the anal stage, need reigns supreme; but while demand sets out to restrain need, desire wants to expel it. The one is entrusted with satisfying it, while the other is determined to control it. In the end, this control is legitimated only by turning need into a gift expected by an other, who is always primordially the mother. The oblation of this exonerating gift is metonymic. In order to evacuate the gift of symbolic desire, the one who gives it (child, student, or citizen, for example) could well adopt the slogan ‘‘everything for 38 8 the other’’ in reference to the one who expects it (the mother, the teacher, or an authority figure)—this is true enough in the voting booth, at any rate. Such a gift is not produced by the one who gives it: someone else is the producer, someone who is able to wait for it only as long as the giver is suffering. It is not that the gift is necessarily painful in itself; the reaction of the one who receives it is the determining factor in that respect. So that her expectations will not be in vain, the mother eroticizes her relation with the child. She makes the child a sexual partner, involved in a fantasy in which he becomes the imaginary phallic object. In the end, the child will have been forced to do the only thing it was able to do. This was how the sadomasochistic economy was described by Freud, who took the symbolic equivalence of penis, feces, and child as his starting point. How do we recognize an obsessional neurosis? By a declared conflict between demand and desire, satisfaction and discipline, need and legitimacy, gift and exoneration. The outcome of this conflict can only be a resignation to suffering. The characteristic ‘‘it could have been worse’’ attitude alludes to the masochistic jouissance that the obsessional derives from it, while ‘‘You had that coming’’ sums up the sadistic expectation of the other, who is without doubt the father— when it comes to need, he’s always too much. At the genital stage, demand seeks out a real partner. A repressed demand returns in the field of sexuality, and it will be satisfied only by a real engagement—one the subject wants to wait for, since he or she intends to bring it about. Thus the demand is based on the primacy of a sexual desire that is certainly sustained by a need, but that emphasizes a real lack in the other. Far from realizing desire, this lack constantly renews it. ‘‘The subject does not know what he desires most,’’ either from the other or in terms of his own lack. From then on, the ‘‘something else’’ that originates from this lack of knowledge is related to a desire that is deceived. It is deceived if it believes itself to be lacking only the other, the missing half that is but a shadow from the past. Taking the concept of transitivism as their point of departure, Gabriel Balbo and Jean Bergès (1996) have reconceptualized the analysis of demand. For them, demand cannot be conceived independently of the infant’s identification with the discourse that the mother expresses in response the baby’s cries, smiles, gurgling, and gestures. There is a double division at work here. The mother’s own discourse, which she puts in the mouth of her child, divides the mother into INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DEMENTIA a bodily, experienced real demand in contrast to what she expresses. The child is also divided from its own real demand by identifying with whatever part of that demand the mother expresses. This double division, with its consequent double repression, has an organizing influence on the ego, the status of the object, body image, the infant’s jubilation at its own specular image, and the I. All processes of identification must be rethought in these terms, while at the same time demand and identification are also the origin of no less a dualism than that of life and death. Such an analysis allows one to rethink the demand for an analysis, the preliminary interviews, the analytic contract, the direction and conduct of the treatment, and ultimately the transference. This reconceptualization reaches the very core of the discursive framework, and the analysis of dreams as well as the patient’s speech is determined by it. GABRIEL BALBO See also: Graph of Desire; Metonymy; Neurosis; Object a; Other, the; Subject of the unconscious; Symbolic, the (Lacan); Topology; Unary trait; Wish/yearning. Bibliography Balbo, Gabriel and Bergès, Jean. (1996). L’Enfant et la psychanalyse. Paris: Masson. Lacan, Jacques. (1966 [2002]). Écrits. Paris: Seuil. Écrits: A selection. (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. ———.(1991). Le Séminaire-livre VIII, le transfert (1960– 61). Paris: Seuil. Winnicott, Donald W. (1974). The fear of breakdown. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 1. Reprinted in Psychoanalytic explorations. (1989). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. DEMENTIA Dementia has been defined in two very different ways. The first definition, which came into use in the nineteenth century with the establishment of a nosographic framework for the psychoses, culminated in the concept of dementia praecox in the work of Emil Kraepelin. The second definition concerns altered states in memory and ideation following injury to the brain. The word dementia, which first appeared in a psychiatric sense in Philippe Pinel’s work contrasting INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS mania and dementia, underwent changes in meaning during the nineteenth century. In 1911 Eugen Bleuler, in his discussion of the concept of schizophrenia, centered around dissociation or splitting (Spaltung), proposed bringing together the old notion of ‘‘vesanic dementia’’ (the culmination of psychotic development) and Kraepelin’s three forms of dementia praecox: hebephrenic, catatonic, and paranoid. Sigmund Freud approved of Kraepelin’s approach but he criticized the term dementia praecox, as well as the term schizophrenia. This despite the fact that he felt it important to distinguish between the two, writing, in ‘‘Psycho-Analytical Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)’’ (1911 c[1910]): ‘‘. . . we shall hope later on to find clues which will enable us to trace back the differences between the two disorders (as regards both the form they take and the course they run) to corresponding differences in the patients’ dispositional fixations’’ (p. 62). In reality, he continued to use both terms indiscriminately. He focused his study of the psychoses on paranoia in the essay cited above. After ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction,’’ (1914) he proposed to distinguish among the neuroses, the psychoses, and the perversions. In Freudian theory, dementia praecox consists of a withdrawal of object libido onto the ego through regression and fixation. Freud later went on to specify its linguistic characteristics (words are subjected to the primary process) and its functioning (reality testing is no longer operant; verbal delusions are an attempt at healing), but essentially it was Freud’s successors who developed a psychoanalytic theory of the psychoses. In current usage, the term dementia refers to erosion of the intelligence caused by many different kinds of damage to the brain: degenerative dementias (dominated by Alzheimer’s disease), vascular diseases, infectious diseases, toxic conditions, or metabolic disorders. Clinical treatment of dementia from a psychoanalytic perspective runs up against problems of theoretical elaboration. Psychoanalysis has limited applications for these conditions and is used mainly in the early stages of illness. The goal is to limit the breakdown of identity for a certain time. The gradual erosion of the capacity for symbolization and the work of representation owing to memory loss, the weakening of repression and the breaking through of the protective shield, and the instinctual flooding that ensues, has led to reliance on a therapeutic approach focusing 389 DENIAL on the reconstitutive function of the affects as the basis for mental activity, since, as Michèle Grosclaude suggested in Le Statut de l’affect dans la psychothérapie des démences (The status of the affects in the psychotherapy of dementia; 1997), verbal therapies are among the first to be affected by the degenerative process. Denial, projective delusions, and heightened anxiety are all typical of these conditions. Berlin. Unfortunately he turned out to be psychically ill, and all that survives of his brief stay in Denmark are the reports of the scandal caused by his behavior. Reich was to come to Denmark anyway in May 1933, but as a political refugee. He was only granted six months’ asylum, which was not extended, as he was suspected of practicing psychoanalysis without the requisite work permit. RICHARD UHL Reich nonetheless remained in touch with a circle of disciples in Denmark during his ensuing stays in Sweden and Norway. Another influence came from Oskar Pfister, who enjoyed a certain popularity among prominent theologians and teachers. He gave a series of much-attended talks in Copenhagen in 1936. See also: Ego; Infantile psychosis; Infantile schizophrenia; Narcissism, secondary; Organic psychoses; Paranoid psychosis; Paraphrenia; ‘‘Psycho-Analytic Notes on Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)’’; Schizophrenia; ‘‘Unconscious, The’’ Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1911c [1910]). Psycho-analytical notes on autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12, 9–82. ———. (1914). On narcissism: an introduction. SE, 14, 73– 102. ———. (1915). The unconscious. SE, 14, 166–204. Grosclaude, Michèle. (1997). Le Statut de l’affect dans la psychothérapie des démences. Psychothérapie des démences. Montrouge, France: John Libbey Eurotext. DENIAL. See Disavowal DENMARK After World War I, psychoanalysis was diffused among artists and pedagogues, but the discipline was condescendingly dismissed by the leading university professors in philosophy, psychology, and psychiatry. After hearing a speech by Ernest Jones in 1926, though, the psychologist Sigurd Næsgaard became the first Dane to undertake a serious study of Freud. In February 1933, Wilhelm Reich gave a speech in Copenhagen and the IPA was requested to allow him to come to Denmark as a training analyst; the answer, however, was negative. Instead the Danes were offered Jenö Hárnik from the Institute of Psychoanalysis in 39 0 From 1930 on, a series of more or less short-lived psychoanalytic societies were founded in Denmark, all marked by their respective founders and leaders. The most important was the group that surrounded Sigurd Næsgaard, who in the public eye was largely identified with Danish psychoanalysis. Another group was led by P. C. Petersen, who had a background in dairy production, and it represented especially the inspiration of Pfister. A third group arose around Reich’s Danish pupils, led by the physicians J. H. Leunbach and T. Philipson; these were known in particular for their work in the movement for sexual reform. The person with the greatest influence on the establishment of psychoanalysis in Denmark was Sigurd Næsgaard (1883–1956). He started as a teacher and then completed a university degree in philosophy and psychology. He had strong roots in the Danish high school movement, and considered general education, education reform, and sexual freedom his most important goals. As a psychoanalyst he was self-taught. His large authorship is characterized by a popularizing tendency and a predilection for pat and quick-witted interpretations. He is known for his analyses of a number of the important cultural figures of his time, among others the painter Asger Jorn. Some of the leading Danish IPA analysts after World War II also started their analytic careers on his couch. The Danish-Norwegian Psychoanalytic Society that was founded at the IPA congress in 1934 had only one member with a Danish address, the Hungarian Georg Gerö, a pupil of Reich who had been educated at the Institute of Psychoanalysis in Berlin. Under pressure INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DEPENDENCE from the IPA, Gerö broke with Reich around 1937. The only known work of his in Denmark today is his training analysis of the psychiatrist Poul Færgeman. Gerö emigrated to the United States at the beginning of World War II. Færgeman (1912–67) left for the United States in 1946 to terminate the training analysis he had started with Gerö in Denmark. He later became a member of the New York Psychoanalytic Society, but returned to Denmark in 1960 and joined the Danish society. He is best known for his work with psychogenic psychoses (Færgeman, 1963). Because of his premature death he was not to have the influence on Danish psychoanalysis to which he seemed entitled. After the war, Næsgaard and Petersen each established new societies. Both sought admission to the IPA, but since neither had had IPA-accredited training, they were unsuccessful. Instead, the initiative slid to another group. The Swedish analyst Nils Nielsen, member of the IPA, came to Denmark in 1949 with a view towards starting a number of training analyses and founding a psychoanalytic society. The Danish psychiatrists Thorkil Vanggaard and Erik Bjerg Hansen, who had received accredited psychoanalytic training in New York and Vienna, respectively, later joined Nielsen. Their Danish Psychoanalytic Society attained status as a study group under the IPA in 1953 and obtained full IPA membership in 1957. The society hosted the international IPA congresses in 1959 and 1967. The accession of members was low, as was the level of activity throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Thorkil Vanggaard (1910–1998)) was the strong leader of the Danish Psychoanalytic Society in the years following World War II. He received his psychoanalytic training in New York with Robert Bak as his training analyst. His psychoanalytic authorship is not prolific, but a fairly original theory of the phallus as a meditating symbol in connection with the transfer of authority from master to pupil merits mention (Vanggaard, 1972). He was vice president of the IPA from 1967 to 1969, but then began to move away from psychoanalysis and left the psychoanalytic society in 1984. He is known to the Danish public rather for his highly controversial position on gender roles and incest than as a psychoanalyst. Not till 1980 was the increasing general interest in psychoanalysis reflected in the number of members. Among the Danish public, psychoanalysis has mainly INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS been represented by psychologists, researchers and writers with no analytical training (e.g., Andkjær Olsen and Køppe, 1988). In the 1990s the Danish Psychoanalytic Society had around 30 full members, of whom more than one third are from the southern part of Sweden, having chosen to belong to the Danish society due to the fact that Copenhagen is closer than Stockholm. There is no institute, and the society depends greatly on its collaboration with the other Scandinavian societies, who among other things have cooperated since 1978 on the publication of the Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review (in English). Among the societies that do not belong to the IPA are the Group Analytic Institute (established with the support of the British group analysts Colin James and Malcolm Pines) and the Psychoanalytic Circle (Lacanian). OLE ANDKJÆR OLSEN Bibliography Andkjær Olsen, Ole, and Køppe, Simo. (1988). Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis. New York: New York University Press. Færgeman, Poul. (1963). Psychogenic psychoses. London: Butterworths. Reimer, Jensen, and Paikin, Henning. (1980). On psychoanalysis in Denmark. Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review, 3, 103–16. Paikin, Henning. (1992). Denmark. In P. Kutter (Ed.), Psychoanalysis international. A guide to psychoanalysis throughout the world (Vol. 1, Europe). Cannstatt: Frommannn-Holzboog. Vanggaard, Thorkil. (1972). Phallos. New York: International Universities Press. DEPENDENCE The term ‘‘dependence’’ is part of contemporary language; it is frequently used in the field of psychopathology but more for descriptive convenience than to specify a precise relational modality concerning the subjection of a subject to an object. Sigmund Freud used the term infrequently but made reference to it in his discussion of the pleasure principle: ‘‘It will be rightly objected that an organization which was a slave 391 DEPENDENCE to the pleasure principle and neglected the reality of the external world could not maintain itself alive for the shortest time, so that it could not have come into existence at all. The employment of a fiction like this is, however, justified when one considers that the infant—provided one includes with it the care it receives from its mother—does almost realize a psychical system of this kind’’ (1911b). Serge Lebovici (1991) remarked that the human being’s original state of dependence is a fundamental postulate of Freudian theory; it is the baby’s Hilflosigkeit, or helplessness (détresse or désaide in French). As Michael Balint (1968) remarked, the notion of ‘‘oral dependence’’ appeared in the work of Otto Fenichel in 1945. Fenichel describes oral character traits, especially a disguised dependent need, created by reaction-formation, manifest in attitudes and behaviors of independence and rebellion. Franz Alexander used this idea to describe ulcerous subjects who indicate their condition by the conflict between the desire to maintain a state of infantile dependence and the affirmation of independence of the adult ego. Melanie Klein showed no interest in the concept, but her students Paula Heimann and Joan Riviere, in Developments in Psychoanalysis, refer to the infant’s total dependence on the mother at the beginning of life. The concept becomes central in the thought of Donald Winnicott (1963), who emphasizes that the baby, who is dependent on the care of those around him, is subject to a ‘‘dual dependency,’’ which will become simple dependency as soon as he or she becomes aware of it. This is part of a normal process for every human being, so that not every state of dependence later found to exist can be reduced to it. Yet this inaugural kernel, which is characterized by a sense of powerlessness (as well as the narcissistic omnipotence associated with it), is the basis of subsequently-observed states of mental dependence and defects in the separationindividuation process. Adolescence especially is a period of reactualization and the heightened revival of feelings of dependence and infantile helplessness. Philippe Jeammet (1989), who considers dependence to be characteristic of this period, has developed the concept within a metapsychological perspective that cannot be easily summarized. According to this conception, the adolescent shows himself to be clinically dependent whenever he feels that his object needs threaten his autonomy and narcissistic equilibrium. 39 2 Some authors have examined dependence in the treatment of borderline states, following Winnicott, who emphasized the danger of underestimating the transference dependence in this type of case as part of the counter-transference risks of his interpretation. He, like Balint, cautions against an overly systematic interpretation of transference dependence, introducing the risk of reinforcing the dependence—especially oral dependence—of the patient on the analyst, and the latter’s omnipotence. Otto Kernberg, working with narcissistic patients, describes their inability to depend on the analyst from the beginning of therapy, which can be compared to the fear of ‘‘giving in to dependence’’ described by Masud Khan. In contemporary psychiatric clinics there has been a recategorization and clinical reassessment of dependence. The term is no longer only applied to drug addiction, alcohol or tobacco dependence, and so on, but tends to define a biological-psychologicalbehavioral syndrome that is very broad and includes those states as well as pharmacodependence. The concept of ‘‘addiction,’’ which is very similar to that of dependence, is an indication of this broadening. Thus the pathological behaviors in which an act of incorporation (often but not exclusively through use of a toxic object) allows the subject to relieve the internal tension by short-circuiting a threatening mental condition are grouped under the term ‘‘addiction.’’ These include alcoholic and drug-related behavior, bulimia (and anorexia), as well as addictions that do not involve the ingestion of a product (games of chance, shopping sprees, sexual addiction), and even relational dependence. BÉNÉDICTE BONNET-VIDON See also: Addiction; Helplessness. Bibliography Balint, Michael. (1968). The basic fault. Therapeutic aspects of regression. London: Tavistock Publications. Freud, Sigmund. (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12, 218–226. Jeammet, Phillippe. (1989). Psychopathologie des troubles des conduites alimentaires à l’adolescence. Confrontations psychiatriques, 31, 177–202. Lebovici, Serge. (1991). La dépendance du nouveau-né. (pp. 29–39). In C. Dechamp-Le Roux (Ed.), Figures de la dépendance, autour d’Albert Memmi, colloque de Cerisy-laSalle. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DEPERSONALIZATION Winnicott, Donald W. (1965). The maturational processes and the facilitating environment; studies in the theory of emotional development. New York: International Universities Press. Further Reading Coen, Stanley. (1992). The misuse of persons: analyzing pathological dependency. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press. Searles, Harold. (1955). Dependency processes in the psychotherapy of schizophrenia. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 3, 19–66. Winnicott, Donald W. (1963). Dependence in infant care, child care, and the psychoanalytic setting. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 44, 339–344. DEPERSONALIZATION The term ‘‘depersonalization’’ refers to the appearance of subjective impressions of change affecting the person or the surrounding world. Their intensity varies, ranging from a simple feeling of dizziness to painful feelings of physical transformation, from the fleeting feeling of estrangement to the impression that the world has become unrecognizable, dead, or uninhabited. Moments of depersonalization can occur during the customary development of any individual or within overtly pathological clinical settings. The concept of depersonalization is not directly present in the work of Sigmund Freud. In ‘‘Psychoanalytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides)’’ (1911c [1910]), the elements of depersonalization perceptible in the subject’s memory—themes of physical transformation, nerves of voluptuousness, the ‘‘hastily improvised men’’—are not treated as such by Freud. Similarly the themes of depersonalization found in the Wolf Man—the ‘‘veil’’ that is torn during successive washings—are not referred to as such even though they are analyzed in depth (1918b [1914]). It is possible that it was only after the development of his concept of narcissism and the reorganization of the concept of the ego it contained that Freud became aware of depersonalization, in ‘‘The Uncanny’’ (1919h) and later in ‘‘A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis’’ (1936a). In both cases it is through feelings affecting the perception of the outside world that the topic is addressed, that is through the question of ‘‘derealization,’’ which can be considered the result of a type of depersonalization. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Paul Schilder was one of the first authors to take an interest in depersonalization. He saw it as a function of the libido’s withdrawal of cathexis from the image of the body. Paul Federn believed it corresponded to an alteration of the distribution of narcissistic libido throughout the body and its boundaries. Hermann Nunberg associated it with the loss of a significant object. Clarence Oberdorf emphasized the polymorphism of the clinical situations in which it could be observed and Andrew Peto investigated the role of the precocious loss of introjection. Maurice Bouvet, in an important study entitled ‘‘Dépersonalisation et relation d’objet,’’ demonstrated the similarity of structure between states of depersonalization in their various clinical forms and treated ‘‘depersonalization as a state of weakened ego structure.’’ He insisted on the importance of a ‘‘rapprochement’’ with the object, that is a decrease in the creation of psychic distance to the object, whereby the object returns to the position it held in the subject’s unconscious fantasies. He also pointed out the character of the object relation that made it a narcissistic object since ‘‘the maintenance of the ego structure . . . depends on its unconditional and absolute possession.’’ Bouvet also noted the importance of the conflict between the need to introject the object and the fear of this introjection. PAUL DENIS See also: Boredom; Bouvet, Maurice Charles Marie Germain; Ego boundaries; Ego feeling; Estrangement; Face-to-face situation; Disintegration, feelings of, (anxieties); Rosenfeld, Herbert Alexander; Self-consciousness; Tomasi di Palma Lampedusa-Wolff Stomersee, Alexandra. Bibliography Bouvet, Maurice. (1967). Œuvres psychanalytiques. I: La Relation d’objet: névrose obsessionnelle, dépersonnalisation. Paris: Payot. Denis, Paul. (1981). J’aime pas être un autre. L’inquiétante étrangeté chez l’enfant. Revue française de psychanalyse, 65, 3. Freud, Sigmund. (1919h). The uncanny. SE, 17: 217 –256. ———. (1936a). A disturbance of memory on the Acropolis. SE, 22: 239–248. Stewart, Walter A. (1964). Depersonalization. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 12, 171–186. 393 DEPRESSION Further Reading Jacobson, Edith. (1959). Depersonalization. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 7, 581–610. Renik, Owen. (1978). The role of attention in depersonalization. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 47, 588–605. Rosenfeld, Herbert. (1947). Analysis of a schizophrenic state with depersonalization. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 28, 130–139. DEPRESSION Depression is a mood disorder, understood from the psychoanalytical viewpoint as resulting from an intrapsychic conflict that stems from the ego’s difficulties in integrating aggressive drives that are experienced as too dangerous for the preservation of libidinally cathected objects. These aggressive drives turn against the subject via the superego, which becomes too strict and demanding. Depressive manifestations are frequent in other clinical entities where the conflicts are essentially intrapsychic, such as the psychoneuroses. Karl Abraham (1912/1989) was one of the first psychoanalytical authors to concern himself with depressed patients and to describe the extent of the ambivalence of their drives. Narcissism is another characteristic of the depressive personality, which that Freud emphasized in ‘‘Mourning and Melancholia’’ (1916–17g [1915]). Subsequently, Abraham (1924/ 1927) described the pregenital underpinning of this ambivalence, given the importance of oral fixations in these patients. Freud compared the psychological mechanisms of melancholia with those of mourning, which constitutes a depressive state in the normal person. The essential difference is the narcissism of the melancholic, whose intolerance of experiences of loss lead him to the oral incorporation of the lost object into the ego, where it is attacked by the superego. Conversely, the person in mourning finds himself faced with the painful difficulty of detaching the libido cathected onto the lost object so as to recathect it onto objects in the external world. However, the major problem raised by Freud’s descriptions of the dynamics of melancholia is that he does not specify the variations in the psychological mechanisms corresponding to the different degrees of depressive states. Melanie Klein (1940) developed the comparison with mourning in her description of the depressive 39 4 position. For her, the capacity to work through one’s mourning will depend on the possibility of resolving the reactivation of the conflict proper to the depressive position that the conflict causes, i.e., the feeling of losing good internal objects. Klein, like Freud, is imprecise when it comes to the different problematics of depression. However, clinical analysis shows a whole series of levels of severity in this problematic between the working through of the mourning process (or during the integration of the depressive position) and the peak of this process, which Klein described as ‘‘a melancholia in statu nascendi’’ (Palacio Espasa). These depressive forms of conflict can be defined by reference to the predominant form of the fantasies expressing the experiences of the loss of the object of libidinal cathexis, and by the quality of the types of anxiety experienced by the ego. When fantasies of the catastrophic and irreparable destruction of the object predominate, given that the subject has very little confidence in his libidinal capacities, feelings of guilt become intolerable and feelings of sadness are massively denied. The ego can only resort to archaic mechanisms of defense: splitting, denial, projective identification, idealization, etc.—the mechanisms proper to schizo-paranoid functioning or to the dynamics of extreme melancholia, with confusion between the ego and the object attacked (the ‘‘parapsychotic’’ depressive conflict proper to borderline or psychotic structures). When fantasies of severe and barely reparable damage or death of the objects take the upper hand, the ego will be confronted with intense feelings of guilt and sadness. The significant repression of the aggressive drives towards the object (an aggressiveness that reinforces the severity of the superego) will make it possible for the negative affects to be partially denied. The ego will succeed in keeping the conflict interiorized but at the cost of diverse inhibitions in the functions of the ego. Thus, the symbolic possibilities of the individual are limited, but are not qualitatively affected. This very narrow form of repression is often insufficient, and the ego also has to resort to maniacal defenses or to defenses of a melancholic type, which then determine the clinical manifestations of mood disturbances. When feelings of abandonment and rejection prevail—i.e., when the experiences of loss are above all fantasies such as the loss of the object’s love— depressive conflict will take a ‘‘paraneurotic form.’’ INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DEPRESSIVE POSITION The feelings of sadness are often conscious, for guilt is less intense and can equally easily become conscious. The ego’s greater confidence in its libidinal capacities gives these subjects a profusion of fantasies of reparation that will counteract the damage done to the object, damage that is fantasized as resulting from their own aggressiveness. These fantasies underlie many of the neurotic mechanisms of defense, especially those of an obsessional kind, for example retroactive cancelling, reaction formation, etc. Under their influence, repression authorizes a greater possibility of symbolic expression, which distinguishes neurotic repression from the massive repression of the depressive type. Such a libidinal predominance changes the nature of what is repressed, for the counter-cathexis does not operate on aggressiveness alone, but also on the libidinal fantasies of an incestuous nature. This contributes to the sexual differentiation of parental objects, bringing into operation the conflict occasioned by triangulation and the Oedipus complex. FRANCISCO PALACIO ESPASA See also: Abandonment; Acute psychoses; Adolescent crisis; Anaclisis/anaclitic; Anxiety; Dead mother complex; Depressive position; Essential depression; Guilt, unconscious sense of; Identification; Internal object; Lost object; Manic defenses; Mania; Melancholia; Mourning; ‘‘Mourning and Melancholia’’; Psychoanalytical nosography; Self-punishment; Suicide; Superego; Transference depression. Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1927). The process of introjection in melancholia: two stages of the oral phase of the libido. In Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey (Trans.). Selected papers of Karl Abraham, M.D. (pp. 442–452). London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1924) ———. (1927). Notes on the psycho-analytical investigation and treatment of manic-depressive insanity and allied conditions. In Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey (Trans.), Selected papers of Karl Abraham, M.D. (pp. 137–156). London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-analysis. (Original work published 1911) Freud, Sigmund. (1916–17g [1915]). Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14: 237–258. Klein, Melanie. (1940). Mourning and its relation to manicdepressive states. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 21, 125–153. Palacio Espasa, Francisco. (1993). La Pratique psychothérapique avec l’enfant. Paris: Bayard. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DEPRESSIVE POSITION A developmental stage in the first year allows the infant to begin to integrate his objects, which become mixed and take on both good and bad aspects. Particularly when the objects that attract ambivalent emotions are internalized, it creates a deeply troubling internal world, dominated by various forms of guilt feelings, sadness and reparative attempts to deal with them. (Melanie Klein, 1935). Melanie Klein derived her notion of internal objects from the work that Abraham and Freud had done on the internalization of objects through oral incorporation in melancholia (Freud, 1917 [1915], Abraham, 1924). Abraham described symptoms which vividly expressed the movement of ‘‘loved objects’’ into and out of the body. Klein (1935, 1940) viewed aggression from the earliest stages as producing a particularly problematic internal object. Freud described the internalization of the loved one as a response to its loss, when there was a particular heightened degree of ambivalence towards that person. In other words when a loved object, towards whom a lot of aggression is felt, is then lost, a persisting depression rather than normal mourning occurs. Klein discovered that this process also occurred with an internal object that was damaged (by the aggression) or, indeed, a dead internal object. It is this internal sense of damage and death which is the core experience of clinical depression, and was Klein’s addition to Freud and Abraham’s work on depression. However, the depressive position (in contrast to depression) is a normal enough process. In this case, aggression, while internalizing loved objects, leads to restorative efforts towards the object internally, or in a symbolized and sublimated (and externalized) form. In turn, fears about the state of the internal object are always aroused by the loss of, or harm to, loved external objects. Because of the love for a damaged or dead internal object the experience is extremely painful, and this anxiety of the depressive position has an internal reference point, known as guilt. During development the harshness of guilt is at first very severe, and is felt to be the retaliation of the damaged object inside—a phantasy that is in line with Freud’s description of guilt arising from the superego. As a result the developing infant may have great difficulty in accepting these 395 DEPRESSIVE POSITION feelings, and therefore hesitates to enter the depressive position. Crucially, the infant is anxious that its own badness and aggression will overwhelm its capacity for love. In this sense it is an intensely ‘‘moral’’ position, and indeed presupposes the struggle between love and hate as an inherent morality. Klein and her followers found themselves in possession of the difficult notion of ‘‘internal objects.’’ This term refers to phantasies about the contents of the self, and especially the concrete contents of the body. This idea developed Abraham’s work on introjection and projection of objects which he found were phantasies of incorporation or expulsion of physical objects from the body (food and excreta). In Klein’s theory these objects are animate, and are motivated with good or bad intentions towards the ego, as if quite real homunculi were resident inside the person. The developmental step—crucially the recognition that the loved person is also hated and attacked (at least in phantasy)—may be avoided for the time being by various specific defenses. Firstly, the infant may revert to more paranoid-schizoid states—the paranoid defense. Then the confluence of love and hate are prevented by continued splitting of good from bad objects. Manic defenses are characteristic in the depressive position. Then, the importance of the loved object (and therefore its condition) is denied. As a result no serious guilt or dependence on the object is felt if it has been rendered so unimportant. Alternatively if, and when, the guilt can be tolerated the ego is driven to seek methods of reparation for the damage done in phantasy or reality. In this case the harshness of the guilt, and the superego-like quality of the internal object becomes softened, and elements of forgiveness can develop. The coming together of good and bad objects, and of the impulses of love and hate, mark the onset of a new respect for the reality of external people. Crucially, absence can begin to be tolerated without it being marked by a ‘‘bad object.’’ But the beginning of a transformation in many aspects of mental life and development are ushered in (Hinshelwood, 1994). No final solution to the depressive position problem is found, and the attempt to deal with aggression against objects that are also loved and depended upon is a slowly evolving thread all through life. 39 6 In many respects this developmental voyage based on object-relations supplants the progress through Freud’s libidinal phases. The achievement of reality testing (secondary process) is a comparable moment in development to that of the depressive position. Guilt is conceptualized in a slightly different way by Freud, as deriving from the strict superego (the only internal object that Freud attends to—Freud, 1923), and this contrasts with guilt from a damaged internal object in the theory of the depressive position. For classical psychoanalysts, the notion of the depressive position and its place in the development of the infant, disregards the classical descriptions of the libidinal phases. In addition the early onset—in the first six months of life—is argued to be improbably early, for such a sophisticated set of emotional reactions. The integration that Melanie Klein described is then attributed to an age of two or three years when the mature Oedipus complex arrives. However, for many non-Kleinian analysts a developmental scheme based on object-relations is compatible and complementary to the libidinal phases. ROBERT D. HINSHELWOOD See also: Alpha function; Ambivalence; Anaclitic depression; Archaic; Depression; Emotion; Fragmentation; Imago; Infant development; Infantile psychosis; Learning from Experience; Manic defenses; Melancholia; Neurosis; Oedipus complex, early; Paranoid position; Paranoidschizoid position; Psychoanalytic Treatment of Children; Reparation; Selected fact; Splitting of the object; Symbolic equation; Thought-thinking apparatus. Bibliography Heimann, P. (1942). Sublimation and its relation to processes of internalization. International Journal of PsychoAnalysis, 23, 8–17. Isaacs Susan. (1940). Temper tantrums in early childhood and their relation to internal objects. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 21, 280–293. Republished in S. Isaacs (1948), Childhood and after. London: Routledge. Klein, Melanie (1935). A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states. International Journal of PsychoAnalysis, 16, 145–174. Reprinted in The writings of Melanie Klein, vol. I. (1975). London: Hogarth, 262–289. ———. (1940). Mourning and its relation to manic-depressive states. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 21, 125–153. Reprinted in The writings of Melanie Klein, vol. I. (1975). London: Hogarth, 344–369. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DEPRIVATION DEPRIVATION Psychoanalytically, deprivation is the reduced fulfillment of a desire or need that is felt to be essential. Sigmund Freud (1927c) considered deprivation the result of the frustration of a drive that could not be satisfied because of a prohibition, and he was particularly interested in sexual deprivation. Later, psychoanalysis focused on the maternal deprivation caused either by the final or temporary absence of the mother or by her difficulty in providing primary care for the infant—a deprivation likely to have irreversible effects on the child’s development. For the infant, deprivation, as the result of an intrapsychic process related to needs or desires, assumes various forms. It is modulated by the reaction of the primary object, the mother, as well as the moment when the deprivation is produced, its duration, or even the attitude of mother substitutes. The importance given to reality and its traumas compared to the reality of the representational world forms the basis of the differences among psychoanalytic theories. For example, psychoanalysts have studied the effects of ‘‘quantitative deprivation,’’ when the infant must confront the physical absence of the primary maternal object from birth, a condition known as hospitalism (Spitz, 1945), or after the establishment of a bond, a condition known as anaclitic depression (Spitz, 1946), which includes the phases of fright, despair, and separation. During these three phases, the infant is primarily searching for the lost anaclitic object, then, overcome with despair, enters into a situation of more or less pronounced denial, depending on the level of structuration of the internal object and the duration of separation. This process involves directing diffuse but unbearable aggressive impulses against the self, hatred of the incorporated internal object, and deprivation of the maternal breast accompanied by deprivation of the (oral) apparatus that would enable the infant to use it. Sometimes there is also a deprivation of all creative ability and the dissolution of the integrative process together with the inhibition or dissociation of impulses (Winnicott, 1984). ‘‘Qualitative deprivation’’ has also been described, and occurs when the infant is presented with an object that prevents him from experiencing his impulses in an acceptable form because they are uncontrolled. This object does not assume the contradictory role of ensuring the satisfaction of the infant’s needs and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS pushing him toward autonomy and does not understand his signals or his thoughts. Operating behaviors and idealizing systems dominate this form of motherchild relationship (Kreisler., 1992) to prevent transient personal difficulties, struggles, and traumas from becoming mental pathologies, especially depressive and schizophrenic. Forms of ‘‘mixed deprivation’’ are also known, where the interruption of maternal care and inadequate support are the basis of narcissistic collapse and weakness during the process of separationindividuation. The effects of affective deprivation (Bowlby, 1951) have been studied among infants placed in institutions, hospitals, or foster homes (Winnicott, 1984), and in the context of family life. This has led to observation of depression and borderline and antisocial pathologies such as psychosis. Françoise Dolto has described the sudden and long-lasting dissociation found to exist following early hospitalization or repeated changes of care providers—without any possible reparation of the image of the body or the subject. The infant can regress to a state in which his vital needs are satisfied in a context where subtle, verbal, mimetic, or motor exchanges no longer take place. Having become autistic, the child’s impulses no longer have an outlet and result in teratological symbolization through hallucination. Léon Kreisler has studied depression (blank and empty) during periods of qualitative deprivation, especially their development on the psychosomatic level. Other authors have ascribed important narcissistic pathologies (feelings of emptiness, captive selfimage, lack of confidence), along with the intolerance to frustration that provokes the transition to action, which is manifested during adolescence. Donald Winnicott has studied the dynamics of the antisocial act and the accompanying feeling of hopeful suffering. ‘‘In fact,’’ he writes, ‘‘deprivation does not deform the organization of the ego as in psychosis but pushes the infant to force the context to recognize the deprivation and . . . the antisocial act manifests itself when the infant begins to create an object relationship and invest a person.’’ GRAZIA MARIA FAVA VIZZIELLO See also: Abandonment; Anaclisis/anaclitic; Analytic psychodrama; Breakdown; Developmental disorders; 397 DESEXUALIZATION Frustration; Hospitalism; Maternal care; Self-mutilation in children; Stranger; Transference depression. Bibliography Bowlby, John. (1951). Maternal care and mental health. Geneva: WHO Monographs. Kreisler, Léon. (1992). La prospettiva psicosomatica nella psicopatologia del lattante. In Fava, V.G., and Stern, D. (Eds.), Modèles psychothérapiques au premier âge. Paris: Masson. Spitz, René (1945). Hospitalism: an inquiry into the genesis of psychiatric conditions in early childhood. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1, 53–74. Spitz, René. (1946). Anaclitic depression. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 2, 313–342. Winnicott, Donald W. (1984). Deprivation and delinquency. London: The Winnicott Trust. Further Reading Shengold, Leonard. (1989). Soul murder: the effects of childhood abuse and deprivation. New Haven: Yale University Press. Wilson, N. (2002). Depression and its relation to light deprivation. Psychoanalytic Review, 89, 557–568. Winnicott, Donald. (1984). Deprivation and delinquency. London: Tavistock. DESEXUALIZATION ‘‘Desexualization’’ may be most easily understood through a discussion of its antonym, ‘‘sexualization’’ (Freud, 1905d). From an analytic point of view, sexualization is a response on the one hand to the endogenous imperatives of the sexual instinct and on the other to the exogenous imperatives of the encounter with the object and its otherness. The sex drive comes into play at the boundary of the biological body and the psyche, tracing signs of its libidinal energy on the body. The body then becomes ‘‘erogenous,’’ and bears the stamp of pleasure and unpleasure it experiences from encounters between a bodily source and a complementary object, the prime example of which is the encounter of mouth and breast. The object, which is partial but complementary to the instinctual source, is present-absent as soon as mental life begins. Through its presence it participates in the experience of pleasure; its frustrating absence 39 8 will push the mental subject toward the initial hallucinatory experience, which, interacting with perception, will constitute the basic of ideation. Sexualization and objectification are coexistent and coalescent. Sexualization is both a manifestation and an effect of the sexual impulse that libidinally cathects the object in a way that is both quantitative and qualitative, as reflected in the strength and the emotional form of the objectcathexis. In Freud’s first theory of the instincts, sexualization is subservient to and anaclitically dependent on the self-preservation that governs biological and mental life. Because of the paths taken by the object-libido, sexualization operates not only with respect to the object, but also with respect to the ego in the shape of the withdrawal of narcissistic libido. We may thus assume the existence of a desexualization of the object that goes hand in hand with the sexualization of the ego, and conversely. If, for Freud, the sexual and the infantile are constitutive of the unconscious, it is strictly because of repression that they are preserved on this underlying level and separated from the conscious one. On the conscious level, the sexualizing activity of the psyche is not systematically apparent; signs of anticathexis and reaction formation may be discerned in manifest psychic contents that are desexualized while their latent inscriptions in the unconscious remain sexual. The gamut of psychic formations, including not only symptoms, be they hysterical, obsessive, or phobic, but also dreams, parapraxes, and slips, may appear to be ‘‘desexualized’’ yet betray, as compromise formations, latent sexual aspects that are accessible through free association. Childhood phobias are a case in point. The fear of a wild or domestic animal appears in the conscious mind as the repercussion of a traumatic event, associated with a concrete experience, but in fact it may be the transposed expression of, say, a guilty unconscious wish to have sexual relations with one’s mother. In that case it will also express a fear of castration by the father, which is experienced as the prohibition of that wish. Desexualization can thus be viewed as a conscious mental process that leaves repressed sexualization intact in the unconscious. Whence the importance of the preconscious as a meeting ground, a place where desexualization—characterized by the repression of sexual impulses—and resexualization—arising from the return of repressed ideas attached to infantile sexINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS D E S O I L L E , R O B E R T (1890 –1 966) ual activities and aroused during analysis by free association—can come together. The Freudian concept of sublimation can help us understand the process of desexualization. It indicates a change of aim and object, which become social rather than sexual, and a shift from the pleasure principle to the reality principle. The sublimation of sexual impulses is associated with their plasticity; desexualization is in a way the precondition of access to socialization. Another psychic process, idealization, accounts for the transformation of the object, which, brought to perfection thanks to narcissistic projection, then becomes a model for identification. The second theory of the instincts, and the second topography of the psychic apparatus that resulted from it, round out our understanding of the phenomena of desexualization. What is often called the great turning point of 1920 led Freud to rethink his instinct theory, taking into account a realm ‘‘beyond the pleasure principle’’ which he described in terms precisely consistent with the Nirvana principle, one of the basic tendencies of the psyche underpinning the compulsion to repeat and the push for a return to the inert and inanimate. Alongside the sexual instincts, therefore, and indeed predating them, another category of instincts, the death instincts, now needed to be considered. This meant that a tendency to non-sexualization and to deobjectification was present from the beginning of the development of the mind, a tendency that could serve as a focal point for desexualization now conceived as a return to the inert and the inanimate, as a kind of paradoxical desire for non-desire. The Freudian conception of primal masochism proposes a fundamental psychic structure involving the coalescence of sexual and death instincts. Masochism is fundamentally the organizer of autoeroticism as it is of narcissism, and it is at once the motor and consequence of instinctual fusion. As a sexualizing factor it may be a ‘‘guardian of life,’’ but it can also be lethal, fostering desexualization and leaving the field open, as it were, to the death instinct. The work of melancholy that is present, more or less, in every depressive situation, includes the effects of desexualization and deobjectification: the tendency to suicide represents the most extreme form of the desire for non-desire and the victory of the death forces characteristic of this ultimate form of desexualization. The notions of sublimation and idealization were also changed and refined by Freud’s new conceptualization of instinctual dualism and of the functioning of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the mind. Processes of identification, and more specifically primary identification, now presupposed a desexualization that can facilitate the transmutation of object-cathexes into the new instinctual vicissitudes implied by sublimation and idealization. Although in the analytic literature the term ‘‘desexualization’’ later received more systematic treatment by Heinz Hartmann in the context of the ‘‘desexualized ego,’’ as applied to adaptation to the social environment, it still seems important to distinguish clearly between a neurotic kind of desexualization characterized by repression of the sexual impulses, or by their sublimation and the idealization of the object, from a psychotic process engendered by the leveling effects of the death instinct on the sexual instincts. In sum, as a result of the stimulation they represent relative to instinctual defusion, the psychic phenomena of desexualization are most clearly bound up, specifically, with the processes of unbinding, decathexis, and deobjectification; they also have a dialectical relationship with processes of identification. MARC BONNET See also: Ego and the Id, The; Ego autonomy; ‘‘On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement’’; Self, the; Sublimation; Superego. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 125–245. ———. (1920g). Dr. Anton von Freund. SE, 18: 267 seq. ———. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 12–59. Hartmann, Heinz. (1964). Essays on ego psychology. New York, International Universities Press. (Original work published 1939) Further Reading Goldberg, Arnold. (1993). Sexualization and desexualization. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 62, 383–399. DESOILLE, ROBERT (1890–1966) Robert Desoille, a French engineer, psychotherapist, and creator of the concept of the ‘‘directed daydream,’’ was born on May 29, 1890, in Besançon, France, and 399 DESTRUDO died on October 10, 1966, in Paris. Born into a family of military officers, Desoille studied engineering as a young man. In 1923 E. Caslant initiated him into an experimental technique of mental imaging, which he felt had psychoanalytic applications. He worked out his theory over the course of seven volumes. In Exploration de l’Affectivité Subconsciente par la Méthode du Rêve-éveillé [Exploration of subconscious emotions using directed daydreams] (1938), he studied the relationship between symbolism, invention, and memory, demonstrating the advantages of his method for exploring sublimation. He built on the work of Pierre Janet, Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung, and Roland Dalbiez. In Le Rêve-éveillé en Psychothérapie (The directed daydream in psychotherapy; 1945), he made reference to Jung’s collective unconscious. For him, the psyche consists of two poles: the Freudian id and the self, which consists of the limit of what sublimation can obtain. The conscious ego shifts between the id and the self as a possible representation. In the directed daydream, transference is expressed and resolved. In Théorie et Pratique du Rêve-éveillé Dirigé (Theory and practice of the directed daydream; 1961), Desoille moved toward a ‘‘rational psychotherapy’’ and developed a Pavlovian conception of neurosis. Through the directed daydream, he held, poorly adapted reflexes are dissolved and new dynamic stereotypes are formed, initially in the imagination. Upon its appearance a number of authors—including Charles Baudouin, Gaston Bachelard, Juliette Favez-Boutonier, Françoise Dolto, and Daniel Lagache—took an interest in Desoille’s work. Moreover, it has continued to generate commentary and further analysis since its introduction. ———. (1961). Théorie et pratique du rêve-éveillé-dirigé. Geneva: Mont-Blanc. ———. (1971). Marie-Clotilde. Une psychothérapie par le rêve-éveillé-dirigé: un cas de névrose obsessionnelle. Paris: Payot. ———. (1973). Entretiens sur le rêve-éveillé-dirigé en psychothérapie. Paris: Payot. DESTRUDO The Freudian concept of ‘‘destrudo’’ is one of a group of concepts that appeared fleetingly in Sigmund Freud’s work and subsequently disappeared, although it is not always easy to identify the reasons for their disappearance. In the present case the situation is clearer since from an energy perspective Freud has always refused to postulate a ‘‘destrudo,’’ that is, an energy specifically associated with the death drive, even though the term makes its appearance in The Ego and the Id (1923b). Freud did not want to associate the duality of the drives with a duality of energies, since for him there was no energy dualism, but with a kind of energy monism, that of the libido. He subsequently abandoned use of the term ‘‘destrudo,’’ which would have risked implying the existence of an energy dualism. On several occasions Jean Laplanche has returned to this problem of terminology (1970, 1986). Destrudo does not appear in Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis’s The Language of Psychoanalysis. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Ego and the Id, The; Death instinct (Thanatos); Libido; Weiss, Edoardo. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 12–59. JACQUES LAUNAY See also: Directed daydream (R. Desoille); Fantasy. Bibliography Desoille, Robert. (1938). Exploration de l’affectivité subconsciente par la méthode du rêve-éveillé: sublimation et acquisitions psychologiques. Paris: J. L. d’Artrey. ———. (1945). Le rêve-éveillé en psychothérapie: essai sur la fonction de régulation de l’inconscient collectif. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. 40 0 Laplanche, Jean. (1970). Vie et mort en psychanalyse. Paris: Flammarion. ———. (1986). La pulsion de mort dans la théorie de la pulsion sexuelle.La Pulsion de mort (pp. 11–26). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. DETERMINISM The most general meaning of ‘‘determinism,’’ one applicable in most contexts, is the condition of being INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DETERMINISM determined. If we understand determinateness to be a qualification of an object, determinism sees this determinateness initially as identification of the object (by several processes) and then as a causal response to a request for an explanation of why. All scientific or theoretical research thus necessarily presupposes determinism, but not in the sense of merely naming or the other operations of contemporary language, since the conditions for the initial application of language are not determinant. The meaning customarily given to determinism is determination, through the principle of causality, of the objective conditions for a phenomenon to occur. Initially, the concept of determinism (Determinismus) arose within German theological and moral thinking, where it served narrow requirements related to predestination and was used to provide dogmatic answers; it did not have an objective theoretical meaning as such. Then in nineteenth-century scientific positivism, the ‘‘condition of determination’’ became associated with an empirical or descriptive principle of causality based on the primacy of observation, and not on explanation in the strict sense. Subsequently, for experimental science, determinism came to be considered a condition for the conduct of science itself, that is, as the epistemological principle of scientific knowledge. In this way determinism became normative. For example, physiological determinism claims to decide between the normal and the pathological in medicine, as shown by Georges Canguilhem. Determinism, without being explicitly referred to, has been the ideal of mechanics since the seventeenth century. Projected onto objects made to satisfy the demand for causality, determinism ended up requiring that all phenomena satisfy the principle of ontological objectivity assumed in nature. Quantum physics, however, led to a retrenchment of this principle of establishing the conditions of determination, at least on the microphysical scale. Chaos theory has accentuated this point of view. In the sphere of the psyche, when Sigmund Freud attempted to explain dreams by psychoanalysis, he assumed a notion of psychic determinism in his theory of intentionality. He thus shifted the doctrine of causality in the direction of a theory of intentionality that assumed the existence of a subjective causality beyond or alongside objective causality, as shown by Pierre-Henri Castel in his introduction to Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams. Determinism essentially informs all theoretical or scientific research. So how can we explain the fact that INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS modern philosophical thought, at least since Kant and Fichte, is so strongly opposed to it? Natural determinism, after serving as the principle of Spinoza’s immanent metaphysics, has come to dominate science. This domination reveals that the term has undergone both a confinement and an unwarranted extension in twentieth-century thinking. The confinement of the term to natural science constrains philosophers of freedom from examining the conditions that determine what they say. In the nonclassical sciences, confinement of the term to well-behaved natural sciences subjects intellectuals to indeterminacy complexes that seriously inhibit their theoretical inventiveness and subjects them to denigration. Freudian psychoanalysis, for example, is denigrated by positivist psychology and the various forms of psychological, organicist, and physicalist reductionism. As a result, Freudian psychoanalysis continues to search for an epistemological legitimacy based on theoretical models of the natural sciences, as was shown by Paul-Laurent Assoun. In physics, Max Planck and Werner Heisenberg created a quantum physics that was indeterminate from the point of view of classical determinism (as formulated by Pierre Simon Laplace). Because they were under the ideological spell of the old determinism, they could not completely accept their own discoveries as good science. There were two reasons for this situation: first, the concept of determinism arose not in the minimalist causal sense given above but in a theological sense, and second, ever since classical mechanics, the degree of determination that scientific objectivism has achieved has delimited the meaning and norm of determinism. Because they exclude identity and assume the differential nature of the symbolic, the status of the psyche and, even more so, the structuralist approach to the subject as taken by Jacques Lacan show that objective legality and causality could not serve as paradigms for everything we talk about. This is especially so for the unconscious, which, although ‘‘structured like a language,’’ is not structured as a determining cause. A robust determinism must renounce naturalist metaphysics, which has continued to control its principles. A new philosophy of ‘‘determined’’ freedom can be developed without indeterminism. Freud’s determined freedom led Jean-Paul Sartre, probably wrongly, to reject the Freudian unconscious and to confront a ‘‘natural determinism’’. All of Freud’s efforts, contrary to Jung’s, clearly attempted to establish a paradoxical materialism that went beyond 401 DETSKI DOM philosophical idealism and the old materialisms, dialectic or otherwise. DOMINIQUE AUFFRET See also: Instinct; Neurosis, choice of the; Psychic causality; Psychogenesis/organogenesis; Psychopathology of Everyday Life, The; Complementary series. Bibliography Assoun, Paul-Laurent. (1981). Introduction à l’épistémologie freudienne. Paris: Payot. Castel, Pierre-Henri. (1998). Introduction à ‘‘L’interprétation du rêve’’ de Freud. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Canguilhem, Georges. (1989). The normal and the pathological (Carolyn R. Fawcett, Trans.). New York: Zone Books. Kojève, Alexandre. (1990). L’idée du déterminisme dans la physique classique et dans la physique moderne. Paris: Hachette. (Original work published 1932.) Koyré, Alexandre. (1957). From the closed world to the infinite universe. New York: Harper. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Écrits. Paris: Seuil. DETSKI DOM The Detski Dom (Children’s Home, also known as the Solidarity International Experimental Home) was a kind of boarding school and experimental laboratory designed to help model the future ‘‘new man,’’ the builder of communism. It opened in August 1921 in the center of Moscow and shared with the Psychoanalytic Institute the magnificent former home of Stepan Ryabushinsky. Though Ivan Ermakov, president of the Psychoanalytic Society and Institute, was officially responsible for the home, Vera Schmidt ran day-to-day operations. During a period filled with revolutionary ideas, in the broadest sense of the term, an attempt was made to merge Freudianism and Marxism. For many of Ermakov’s friends this involved using psychoanalysis, ‘‘a powerful method of liberating man from his old reductive shackles,’’ to create individuals who conformed to the ideals of the new society. At this time the new discipline of ‘‘pedology’’ was established. Vera Schmidt ran the home on a theoretical, as well as practical, level. For Schmidt, an adept of Freud, early childhood was a critical period in the formation and evolution of the future adult. Accordingly, 40 2 children were admitted to the home between two and four years of age. Initially, the twenty-four residents were cared for by fifty-one staff members. The children lived there permanently, parents visiting only periodically. The residents came from various social backgrounds. They included Schmidt’s son Volik (mistakenly referred to in some publications as Alik). After 1925 residents included many children of party bureaucrats, government officials, the Komintern, and even the youngest of Stalin’s two sons, Vassili. High-ranking visitors and inspectors found the environment pleasant; the staff calm, attentive, and considerate; the children clean and properly dressed; the rapport with teachers good; and the physical and psychological state of the children healthy. Moreover, in spite of external unrest, the home was well financed. Contributors included the State Department of Finance, the Union of Manual and Intellectual Workers of Germany (from which the name Solidarity International was derived), and some of the children’s families. Otto Schmidt, Vera’s husband and publisher of The Library of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, allocated a portion of the profits from the publishing house to the home. Vera Schmidt organized periodic meetings of the teachers, who kept daily logs with detailed observations and prepared personal reports, diagrams, and graphs detailing the evolution of each child. Staff organized wake-up activities: drawing, découpage, modeling with clay, educational games. One of the purposes of the study was to examine infantile sexuality as well as various forms of impulse display. Professional psychotherapists, including Sabina Spielrein, treated the children. Though Vera Schmidt did not have any psychoanalytic training, her publications on the experiment and the methods used at the home (which she herself translated into German) attracted high regard even from Anna Freud in Vienna, according to some sources. In early 1923 the Schmidts went to Vienna, where they met Sigmund Freud, Otto Rank, Karl Abraham, and other analysts. Although the trip was successful (the Russian Psychoanalytic Society became a member of the International Psychoanalytic Association), back in Moscow the situation deteriorated for the home. The staff, with Vera Schmidt at its head, continued to request psychoanalytic training. United until then, the staff began to argue among themselves. In mid-1923 the number of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS D E U T I C K E , F R A N Z (1850 –1 919) residents fell from twenty-four to twelve, and the staff was reduced to no more than eighteen members. The Solidarity International Experimental Home had to confront serious financial problems (exacerbated by the fact that assistance from Germany ceased). Moreover, the institution began receiving unfavorable publicity in the local press. In late 1923 and early 1924 a struggle broke out about the future of the Home. Several committees were dissolved and wild rumors circulated, most of which were based on an incorrect understanding of childhood sexuality. Aron Zalkind, the father of pedology and a Marxist-Freudian defector, wrote in 1926, ‘‘The sexual must be subjected to the class principle.’’ Ideological resistance grew, and the home became its first victim, followed by psychoanalysis and pedology. Having become a nursery school, the institution had assumed an elitist character. On August 14, 1925, the Narkompros (Ministry of Public Education) ordered the experimental home closed. Later, during the 1930s, the house on Malaya-Nikitskaya Street became the personal residence of Maxime Gorky. Today the magnificent building houses the Gorky museum. IRINA MANSON See also: Marxism and psychoanalysis; Pedagogy and psychoanalysis; Russia/USSR, Schmidt, Vera Federovna. Bibliography Etkind, Alexander. (1997). Eros of the Impossible: The History of Psychoanalysis in Russia (Noah Rubins and Maria Rubins, Trans.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Palmier, Jean-Michel. (1982). La psychanalyse en Union soviétique. In Roland Jaccard (Ed.) Histoire de la psychanalyse (Vol. 2). Paris: Hachette. DEUTICKE, FRANZ (1850–1919) Franz Deuticke, a Viennese publisher, was born on September 9, 1850, and died on July 2, 1919. In 1878 he and Stanislaw Töplitz took over the Viennese bookstore of Karl Czermak, together with the modest publishing house that was part of it. After Töplitz’s departure in 1886, he became the sole owner of the Franz Deuticke Company. Using the funds from the bookstore, the company devoted its first years mostly to publishing books on medicine and the natural INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS sciences. Among the authors published were several professors from Sigmund Freud’s university, including Theodore Meynert, Salomon Stricker, Max Kassowitz, and Heinrich Obersteiner. After having published a series of manuals and monographs in medicine and the natural sciences, Deuticke expanded his list between 1880 and 1890 to include scientific reviews and periodicals such as Zentralblatt für Physiologie, Jahrbücher für Psychiatrie, and Monatsschrift für Kinderheilkunde. Around this time he also became interested in the young science of economics. After the turn of the century, Deuticke further broadened his publishing list to include scholarly books, law books, and psychoanalytic works. Freud’s first contacts with Deuticke took place within the context of his own translation projects: the translation of Jean Martin Charcot’s Nouvelles conférences sur les maladies du système nerveux (Neue Vorlesungen über die Krankheiten des Nervensystems [1886]), which appeared in 1886 and was included in volume one of the translation of the Conférences policliniques (Poliklinischen Vorträgen [1894]), the translation of Hippolyte Bernheim’s La suggestion et son effet thérapeutique (Die Suggestion und ihre Heilwirkung [1888]) and Bernheim’s Nouvelles études sur l’hypnotisme, la suggestion et la psychothérapie (Neue Studien über Hypnotismus, Suggestion und Psychotherapie [1892]). In 1891 Freud also entrusted the young and enterprising publishing house with his first monograph, Zur Auffassung der Aphasien (On Aphasia: A Critical Study, 1891). Until the outbreak of the First World War, Deuticke was, with rare exceptions, Freud’s most important publisher, and his company can rightly be considered the first publisher of psychoanalysis. In 1895 Deuticke also published Studien über Hysterie (Studies on Hysteria, 1895), written in collaboration with Josef Breuer, and in 1900, Die Traumdeutung (The Interpretation of Dreams). On Freud’s recommendation Deuticke also published some of Freud’s scientist friends, such as Wilhelm Fliess, and later a number of psychoanalytic authors, such as Carl Gustav Jung. The company even took the risk of publishing the first psychoanalytic periodical: Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen (1904–1914). To promote the new science, Freud became editor of the first series of works on psychoanalysis: Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde (Writings on applied psychology). 403 D E U T S C H , F E L I X (1884 – 1964) At the start of the First World War, Hugo Heller positioned himself to be a publisher devoted to Freudian psychoanalysis, while Franz Deuticke Company, then run by Franz’s son Hans, increasingly became a forum for publications by dissident psychoanalysts. After the war Deuticke published both Jung and, after his break with Freud, Otto Rank. LYDIA MARINELLI See also: Heller, Hugo Imago. Zeitschrift für die Anwendung der Psychoanalyse; Interpretation of Dreams, The; Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse. Felix grew increasingly confident within analysis, and back in Boston he attracted a number of devoted disciples. He also taught at the Smith College of Social Work. He was attracted by clinical possibilities other than strict analysis, and he hoped to be able to make a science of technique. He published articles on psychosomatic medicine, and Applied Psychoanalysis, on the objectives of psychotherapy. Deutsch was one of the creators of psychosomatic medicine, and a leader in exploring new techniques of psychotherapy. He was also, for the period in 1923 when Freud first contracted cancer of the jaw, his personal physician. Bibliography PAUL ROAZEN Grubrich-Simitis, Ilse. (1996). Back to Freud’s texts: Making silent documents speak (Philip Slotkin, Trans.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Original work published 1993) See also: Deutsch-Rosenbach, Helene; Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung. Hall, Murray G. (1985). Österreichische Verlagsgeschichte, 1918–1938. Vienna: H. Böhlau. Bibliography Deutsch, Felix. (1949). Applied psychoanalysis: Selected objectives of psychotherapy. New York: Grune and Stratton. DEUTSCH, FELIX (1884–1964) Felix Deutsch, psychoanalyst and physician, was born in 1884 in Vienna, and died on 1964 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Deutsch was educated at the University of Vienna. His family was Jewish and he developed firm Zionist convictions. In 1908 he became a doctor; internal medicine was always his specialty. Felix Deutsch met his future wife Helene, also a psychoanalyst, in Munich in 1911. Within a year they were married, and they remained married fifty-two years. Deutsch had an artistic personality; he painted and composed, and was an excellent piano player. His musicality played a role in a contribution to psychotherapy that he made in America. He found he learned a lot about patients by provoking associations through repeating words, since tone had such meaning for him. As a therapist he learned to use his natural directness, and childlike inquisitiveness, to become an excellent interviewer. Helene and their son moved to Boston in September 1935, and Felix joined them in early 1936. Between the fall of 1939 and the spring of 1941 Felix accepted an invitation to be the first professor of psychosomatic medicine at Washington University in St. Louis. 40 4 DEUTSCH-ROSENBACH, HELENE (1884–1982) Helene Deutsch, psychoanalyst and physician, was born October 9, 1884 in Przemysl, Poland, and died March 29, 1982 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Helene was the daughter of Jewish parents, but she grew up a Polish nationalist. Although formal schooling was impossible in Poland for a woman, private tutoring enabled her to enroll at the University of Vienna in 1907. From the outset she was interested in a psychiatric career. She received her medical degree from the University of Vienna in 1913. As early as 1898 she was involved with a much older man who was a Social Democratic leader, Herman Lieberman. He was married, however, and a divorce in those days was politically out of the question. While spending a year in Munich in 1910–11, studying with Emil Kraepelin, Helene finally broke off with Lieberman, who since 1907 had been a deputy from Poland in the Parliament at Vienna. In Munich she had met her future husband Felix Deutsch, and they were married in 1912. Women could not then hold clinical psychiatric appointments at the University of Vienna, but Professor Julius Wagner Ritter von Jauregg had INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS D E U T S C H - R O S E N B A C H , H E L E N E (1884 –1 982) made a great impression on her. Once World War One broke out physicians were needed by the Austrian military, and Helene found new and welcome responsibilities thrust upon her. She functioned as one of Wagner-Jauregg’s assistants, a post to which as a woman she could not formally be appointed. In the fall of 1918 Deutsch left Wagner-Jauregg’s clinic in order to undertake a personal analysis with Freud, which lasted about a year. While for some, particularly Freud’s exceptionally talented male pupils, he could be a burden to their independent development, Deutsch found that Freud released her most creative talents. She could write as Freud’s adherent and at the same time fulfill her own needs for self-expression. She was not a mere imitator of Freud’s, but within his system of thought she was able to express her own individual outlook. The 1920s proved to be Deutsch’s most creative period; she emerged as one of the most successful teachers in the history of psychoanalysis. In 1924 she became the first to head the new Vienna Psychoanalytic Training Institute, which meant that between 1924 and 1935 (when she left for Boston, MA) she had to assess all who came to Vienna for instruction in analysis. She was much sought after both as a training analyst and a supervisor; her seminars were remarkable experiences for students, and her classes were remembered as spectacles. In Vienna Deutsch’s case load became two-thirds American, and in 1930 she visited the United States to attend the First International Congress of Mental Hygiene. She was already looking around for a new position. One problem was the future possibilities of her husband Felix, an internist who had also been Freud’s personal physician when he first contracted cancer in 1923. It turned out that Boston was the best place for the family, because a new psychoanalytic training institute was being founded there, and at the same time Dr. Stanley Cobb was creating a psychiatric department at the Massachusetts General Hospital. Cobb was interested in psychosomatic medicine, Felix’s special field, so Cobb was eager to attract them both. Helene came over in the fall of 1935 with their son, and Felix arrived in Boston in early 1936. Helene’s stylishness, combined with the force of her personality, allowed her to attain a unique status in Boston. Many of the analysts involved in setting up the Boston institute had been her students abroad at a time when she was already one of Freud’s favorites. In 1925 Helene Deutsch became the first analyst to publish a book on the psychology of women. The INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS interest that she and Karen Horney showed in this subject prompted Freud, who did not like being left behind, to write a number of articles on women himself. Deutsch’s insistence on the importance of maternity made her a pioneer. At the end of World War II, she published her twovolume Psychology of Women (1944–45). She was especially interested in the conflict between maternal and erotic feelings in women, and she was acutely aware of how much she herself had missed in both realms. She felt that, in human terms, she had paid dearly for her professional commitment. Deutsch placed much emphasis, meanwhile, on the real conflicts of young women. Her works are heavy with the kind of cases one might expect never to see dealt with by a psychoanalyst. It was her view that in order to understand pathological behavior one must first have a clear idea of what normal behavior was like. For Deutsch, the fact that women had a more intense inner life meant that they were a unique source of human potential. Her best-known clinical concept was that of the ‘‘asif ’’ personality, a notion that allowed her to spotlight the origin of women’s particular ability to identify with others. Her theories also helped her better understand her own ties to Freud and Lieberman. In Deutsch’s view, the crucial danger created by female masochism was that of victimhood, though the threat was potentially offset by the countervailing force of a healthy self-esteem. Horney criticized Deutsch’s view of women, charging that she had fallen prey to biological reductionism through her neglect of social factors. Deutsch felt secure enough, however, to reply only in the most elliptical way. After all, she had held the fort in Vienna in the wartime, and her students had included the most notable among those of Freud’s students who had remained loyal. In 1973 Helene Deutsch published a set of memoirs, Confrontations with Myself, which constitutes an important testimonial to the history of Vienna and of the beginnings of psychoanalysis. PAUL ROAZEN See also: Maternal care. Bibliography Deutsch, Helene. (1944–45). The psychology of women, Vols. 1 and 2. New York: Grune and Stratton. 405 DEUTSCHES INSITUT F Ü R PSYCHOLOGISCHE FORSCHUNG. . . ———. (1967). Neuroses and character types. New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1973). Confrontations with myself. New York: W.W. Norton. ———. (1992). The therapeutic process, the self, and female psychology. (Paul Roazen Ed.) New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. ———. (1994). Psychanalyse des fonctions sexuelles de la femme. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. DEUTSCHES INSITUT FÜR PSYCHOLOGISCHE FORSCHUNG UND PSYCHOTHERAPIE (GÖRING INSTITUTE) The Deutsches Institut für Psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (German Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy) in Berlin was the first independent institution for training in, research on, and practice in psychotherapy. It represented a significant realization of the aims of medical and nonmedical psychotherapists in Germany, an ethical capitulation to the threats and opportunities presented by the Nazi regime, and a controversial continuity of professional development into the postwar period. The institute was founded in 1936 as a registered association under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior. Its founding came about as a result of the desire of a number of psychotherapists in the German General Medical Society for Psychotherapy under Matthias Heinrich Göring to functionally unite the various schools of psychotherapy in an organization independent of the control of university psychiatrists and Nazi health activists, as well as the aim of the Nazi party and government to destroy the ‘‘Jewish’’ German Psychoanalytic Society without disposing of the practical benefits of psychoanalysis. Although officially dedicated to the creation of a Neue Deutsche Seelenheilkunde (New German Psychotherapy) in line with Nazi ideals and Germanic tradition, the so-called Göring Institute functioned more significantly as a locus for the development and application of generally short-term psychotherapeutic techniques in service to state, society, military, and business in Nazi Germany. The institute was initially funded by the psychotherapists themselves, but in 1939 the German Labor Front assumed formal supervision over the institute and poured a great deal of money into its operations. This support was increasingly supplemen40 6 ted by money from the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) and from German industry and business. Individual psychotherapists and psychoanalysts also worked under the aegis of the SS (Schutzstaffel) and the Wehrmacht (German Army). In 1942 the institute became a member of the Reich Research Council, which, under the leadership of Herman Göring, was to mobilize science for the war effort. In 1944 followed the creation of the Reichinstitut für Psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie im Reichsforschungsrat (Reich Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy in the Reich Research Council), the final organizational manifestation of the Göring Institute. The institute came to an end in May 1945 with the end of the Second World War. Psychoanalysts at the institute were prominent in the outpatient clinic inherited from the German Psychoanalytic Society. In teaching, training, and practice, the Jungians, Adlerians, and Freudians maintained a degree independence from each other. Most of the Freudians, out of a combination of preference and position at the institute, adopted a neo-Freudian emphasis on social adjustment and short-term therapy. Gerhard Scheunert was Göring’s first choice to head the clinic because of his expertise in short-term methods. The ‘‘neo-analysis’’ of Harald SchultzHencke was also influential. Many German analysts of the postwar period practiced and/or trained at the Göring Institute. Some, like Harald Schultz-Hencke, Felix Boehm, and Carl Müller-Braunschweig, were heavily criticized after the war for their involvement with a Nazi-sponsored entity. Of all the groups at the institute, the psychoanalysts had the most political difficulty under Nazism because of their identification with Freud, a Jew. In 1938, as a protective measure in the wake of the November pogrom, their group was designated simply as ‘‘Work Group A.’’ With the arrest of outpatient director John Rittmeister in 1942, this group was formally dissolved and the psychoanalysts’ activities at the institute were further camouflaged. GEOFFREY COCKS See also: Germany Allegemeine Ällegemeine Ärztliche Gesellschaft für Psychotherapie; Berliner Psychoanalytische Poliklinik; France, Göring, Matthias Heinrich; Laforgue, René; Second World War; Müller-Braunschweig, Carl; Rittmeister, John Friedrich Karl; SchultzHencke, Harald Julius Alfred Carl-Ludwig. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES Bibliography Cocks, Geoffrey. (1997). Psychotherapy in the Third Reich: The Göring Institute (2nd edition). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Lockot, Regine. (1985). Erinnern und Durcharbeiten: zur Geschichte der Psychoanalyse und Psychotherapie im Nationalsozialismus. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, THE In this book, conceived in 1922 and published in 1924, Sándor Ferenczi and Otto Rank were reacting against the practical fallout (transference and resistances in psychoanalytic treatment) from Freud’s ideas on repetition compulsion and analysis of the ego. According to the authors, the psychoanalytic movement gave in to a desire to claim to ‘‘know too much’’ and thus was diverted from its earliest ‘‘active’’ orientations. Psychoanalysts had developed incorrect technical precepts and were clinging to rigid or obsolete rules with regard to the transference. The authors argued that the psychoanalyst’s role is to ‘‘condition the unity of the process,’’ to act as a catalyst for the transference, and to encourage repetition by partly playing the role of the parental imagos. In this way, unconscious memory traces can finally be felt by the patient, transformed into ‘‘actual memories’’ (remembering/remembrance/recollection), and interpreted upon dissolution of the transference. It is lived experience that carries conviction, the true source of knowledge and the guarantee of therapeutic ‘‘effectiveness.’’ However, the analyst’s ‘‘desire to learn and to teach,’’ they held, led to errors in technique such as ‘‘fanaticism of interpretation’’ or seeking to confirm knowledge. By situating resistance on the side of the transference and the patient’s narcissism, analysts increase the patient’s unconscious guilt, masking their own difficulties in integrating negative transference and their narcissistic countertransference. The future of the discipline, the authors said, depended on the ‘‘elimination of intellectual resistances.’’ ‘‘Training analysis is in no way different from therapeutic analysis’’ and should not be reserved for medical doctors. Family physicians could be given special training (including hypnosis, provided it was better understood) that would contribute to mass INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS prophylaxis for psychiatric conditions. The authors emphasized therapeutic use of repetition in the transference, whereas Freud saw it above all as an obstacle to the process, since for him interpretation was the privileged therapeutic tool. This marked the beginnings of a schism. Rank broke with the Committee. Ferenczi replaced his ‘‘active’’ method—based on an increase in tensions—with a principle of ‘‘laissez-faire’’ or ‘‘relaxation,’’ which Freud opposed after 1930. This book introduced ideas and controversies that were taken up by later authors (Michael Balint, Donald W. Winnicott, Harold F. Searles, Jacques Lacan): the therapeutic use of object relations and regression; the analyst’s ‘‘discretion’’ (caution in interpretation); the analyst’s resistances and the role of countertransference; interest in training for physicians; and the risks inherent in ‘‘training’’ analysis. CORINNE DAUBIGNY See also: Active technique; Counter-transference; Ferenczi, Sándor; Rank (Rosenfeld), Otto; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Training analysis; Training of the psychoanalyst. Source Citation Ferenczi, Sandor, and Rank, Otto. (1925). The development of psychoanalysis (Caroline Newton, Trans). New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Pub. (Original work published 1924) Bibliography Balint, Michael. (1968). The basic fault: therapeutic aspects of regression. London: Tavistock. Ferenczi, Sándor. (1968). Thalassa: a theory of genitality (Henry Alden Bunker, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1924) Ferenczi, Sándor. (1926). Contra-indications to ‘‘active’’ psychoanalytical technique. In Further contributions to the theory and technique of psycho-analysis (J. Rickman, Comp. and J. I. Suttie, et al., Trans.). London: Hogarth. Freud, Sigmund. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES. See Processes of development 407 DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS  Symptomatic disorders of early childhood (disorders relating to sleeping, eating, and psychosomatic disorders such as infantile asthma): without excluding possible organic etiologies, these disorders should always be considered as the causes and effects of dysfunctions in the family structure and can, in serious cases, jeopardize the life of the baby.  Disorders in psychological development resulting from dysfunctions of the motor or sensory systems that may be congenital or may have developed prematurely (epilepsy, cardiopathies, cerebral motor infirmities, blindness or amblyopia, deafness, etc.).  Disorders with a neurotic structure (hysterical or obsessional functioning, states of anxiety): here we must distinguish between the ‘‘normal’’ infantile neurosis, resulting from the oedipal drama, and childhood neuroses that call for specific interventions. Many cases present a more localized symptomatology, to be considered in the context of neurotic organization: persistent bedwetting, eating disorders, language problems and problems with fine motor skills, intellectual inhibitions (which can be mistaken for mild or moderate mental handicaps), academic phobias or failure, etc.  Borderline states and psychopathic structures (Misès, 1990). Perverse structures are rare in children; in adolescents and adults they indicate serious disorders in the processes of identification and must be understood in the light of the subject’s history.  Finally, many disorders in children can be understood in terms of deprivation or serious alterations in the environment, primarily in the family (premature separation from the mother, alcoholism and/or sexual aggression by the father, maltreatment); even in the absence of a pathological condition in the parents, problems relating to adoption or medically assisted procreation may justify the intervention of a psychoanalyst. In all these cases, even more than those previously mentioned, it is the whole family, over and above the individual subject, that needs to receive care. The term ‘‘developmental disorders’’ describes alterations in the normal process of development and any functional structures resulting from those alterations. As early as Studies on Hysteria (1895d), Freud conceived of psychoneuroses as functional structures that had been altered by factors having a premature effect on the normal processes of psychogenesis. He thus developed a theory of the etiology of hysteria whereby psychic trauma (a sexual aggression) occurred at an early age but did not take full effect until puberty (1894a and 1896b). He also attributed a similar etiology to obsessional neurosis (1895c). After 1897 he admitted that the causative moment of a neurosis could equally well derive from fantasies or from real events, and he maintained throughout his work that the pathological structure thus constituted was explicable in terms of fixations and regressions. Three major clinical texts illustrate this thesis: Little Hans (1919b), The Rat Man (1919d), and The Wolf Man (1918b [1914]). Beginning in about 1908, he extended this system to the psychoses—which he considered to be narcissistic neuroses—despite certain theoretical difficulties, as witnessed by his conversations with Jung. After Freud, psychoanalytical thinking spread particularly to the field of psychiatry and especially to infant and child psychiatry, which it contributed to creating. It would take a major comprehensive study to review the developmental disorders that psychoanalysis can envisage treating with one or another of its specific modes of action (whether a classic analysis, face-to-face psychotherapy, or psychoanalytic psychodrama), or with other modes of action (psychiatric, educational) guided by a psychoanalytical approach to the disorder. A classification of these developmental disorders is presented in Traité de psychiatrie de l’enfant et de l’adolescent (Treatise on child and adolescent psychiatry), edited by Serge Lebovici, René Diatkine, and Michel Soulé (1995), and the following is based on its main sections:  Disorders resulting from disturbances in the early mother-child relationship: these disorders (particularly in cases of infantile autism or psychosis) from the pre-oedipal period affect the very foundations of personal identity and the development of a distinct, autonomous, and permanent Self. 40 8 In this entire field, but no doubt more so in cases that strike us by their severity (infantile autism, for instance), there are controversies and polemics that INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS D E V E R E U X , G E O R G E S (1908 –1 985) oppose psychoanalysts (and those who speak in their name, sometimes making outrageous claims) and organicists intent on ignoring the specifically psychic and relational dimensions of the issue in question. Reconstructing the subject’s past remains one of the major pathways in the psychoanalytic approach to disorders. Dysfunctions in the present structure of a given person are analyzed with reference to the developmental stages of that structure and by referring to a model of normal development. The practice of analyzing children has greatly contributed to defining such developmental models. It is worth noting in this regard that some authors (André Green) criticize the use in certain developmental models of an ad hoc ‘‘fictitious baby’’ and stress structure (synchronic organization) rather than history (diachronic). ROGER PERRON See also: Abandonment; Adolescent crisis; Autism; Autistic capsule/nucleus; Deprivation; Identity; Infantile psychosis; Prematureness; Prepsychosis; Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Bibliography Freud Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 41–61. ———. (1895c). Obsessions and phobias: Their psychical mechanism and their aetiology. SE, 3: 69–82. ———. (1896b). Further remarks on the neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 157–185. dispersed according to Mohave funeral rites in Parker, Arizona. Dobo assumed the name Georges Devereux in 1932, the same year he converted to Catholicism. He spent his childhood and adolescence in Lugos (Transylvania), his birthplace, which was annexed by Romania in 1919. He was the youngest of three children; the eldest committed suicide during adolescence. Devereux’s family was well off and cultivated, polyglot, and riven with conflicts. His pro-German mother systematically objected to the pro-French sentiments of the rest of the family. Devereux displayed considerable musical talent as a child, both as a pianist and composer, and he wrote poetry. He left Bavaria for Paris in 1926, frequented Parisian literary circles, and formed friendships with a number of famous individuals among them, including Klaus Mann. In 1927 he published poems and essays, written in German, in French avant-garde journals like Eugène Ionesco’s Transitions. He oscillated between lifestyles and professions: bookseller, writer, physicist, chemist, mathematician, sociologist, ethnologist. In Paris during the early thirties, he studied with Marcel Mauss and Lucien LévyBruhl, and then with Alfred Kroeber at the University of California, Berkeley. From there he left on his first expedition to live among the Mohave Indians, to whom he remained emotionally and scientifically attached. The following year he traveled to the high plateaus of Indochina to study the Sedang Moi (1933–1935). DEVEREUX, GEORGES (1908–1985) His experiences in the field led him to psychoanalysis and transcultural psychiatry in 1938. Ethnopyschoanalysis and ethnopsychiatry developed in response to the cultural relativism of the time. Devereux was in Paris at the end of the Second World War, where he served in the U.S. navy, and began his own psychoanalysis with Marc Schlumberger. After returning to the United States, he worked with Karl Menninger at the Menninger Clinic at the University of Kansas at Topeka, from 1946 to 1953. Indian veterans suffering from traumatic neuroses were his patients. He practiced psychoanalysis and became a member, in 1952, of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) and the Philadelphia and New York Psychoanalytic Societies. He taught at Temple University in Philadelphia. Georges Devereux, an ethnopsychoanalyst, was born György Dobo on September 13, 1908, in Transylvania, Hungary, and died in Paris in 1985. His ashes were Devereux returned to Paris in 1963. He became a member of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris in 1964, and taught ethnopsychiatry and psychoanalysis Lebovici, Serge, Diatkine, René, and Soulé, Michel. (1995). Nouveau traité de psychiatrie de l’enfant et de l’adolescent. Second edition. Paris: P.U.F. Misès, Roger. (1990). Les Pathologies limites de l’enfance. Paris: P.U.F. Further Reading Tyson, Phyllis & Tyson, Robert. (1990). Psychoanalytic theories of development: An integration. New Haven/London: Yale University Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 409 D I A T K I N E , R E N É (1918 –1 997) at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales and, occasionally, at Oxford University. Devereux’s published works comprise more than four hundred contributions. His articles, reports, and monographs range from a detailed descriptive approach to the psychopathology and therapeutic practices of the Mohave and Sedang peoples, to the psychoanalytic interpretation of Greek mythology, to considerations of the mental disturbances of Western societies, and the methodological difficulties in the social sciences. He was in contact with American anthropologists, including Margaret Mead and Ralph Linton, but never abandoned his analytic approach. He introduced methodological concepts such as ‘‘complementarity’’ and ‘‘transculturalism’’ and opened new fields of investigation by integrating psychoanalytic, psychiatric, ethnological, and mythological explanations. SIMONE VALENTIN See also: Basic Problems of Ethnopsychiatry. Bibliography Devereux, Georges. (1953). Cultural factors in psychoanalytic therapy. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 1, 4, 629–655. ———. (1970). Essais d’ethnopsychiatrie générale Paris, Gallimard,. ———. (1985). Ethnopsychanalyse complémentariste. Paris, Flammarion. (Original work published 1972) ———. (1978). L’ethnopsychiatrie. Ethnopsychiatrica 1, 1, 7–13. Devereux, Georges; and Simon, Bennett. (1976). Dreams in Greek tragedy. An ethno-psychoanalytical study. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press. Hook, R. (Ed.) (1979). Fantasy and symbol; studies in anthropological interpretation, essay in honor of George Devereux. London: Academic Press. DIATKINE, RENÉ (1918–1997) René Diatkine, a French psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, was born on April 6, 1918, in Paris, where he died on November 2, 1997. He was born into a Russian Jewish family (from the region of Vitebsk) that emigrated to France during the early part of the twentieth century. He began studying medicine in 1939 and continued through World War II, during which he was 41 0 mobilized twice. When not on active duty, he lived in Marseille, where he established his first significant professional contacts, most notably with Rudolph Loewenstein. In 1946, as soon as the war was over, Diatkine became a physician and trained in psychiatry and psychoanalysis in Paris, where he settled permanently. He worked as an intern, then as a senior psychiatrist at the children’s hospital Hôpital Necker des enfants malades in Professor Georges Heuyer’s department. During this period he met Julian de Ajuriaguerra, with whom he opened a practice to treat language and motor disturbances. He and Ajuriaguerra also worked together to open a center for observing children, where they collaborated with language educators and psychomotor and language trainers. At the same time, Diatkine began his analytic training, undergoing analysis with Jacques Lacan. He became an associate member of the Société psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society) on June 26, 1951, and a full member on July 1, 1952, after having resumed analysis with Sacha Nacht. He participated in the critical dialogue that expanded the field of French psychiatry, which until then had been restricted to asylums. It was at this time that Diatkine established what were to become the key interests of an extremely active career. In 1958, together with Serge Lebovici and Rosine Crémieux, he established the journal La psychiatrie de l’enfant (Psychiatry of the child). That same year, with Serge Lebovici, Philippe Paumelle, and others, he founded the Association de santé mentale (Mental Health Association) in Paris. There in 1963 he helped establish the Centre Alfred-Binet, a psychoanalytic institution for children. In 1972 Diatkine, together with Julian de Ajuriaguerra and Serge Lebovici, founded a children’s line as part of the series Le fil rouge, published by Presses universitaires de France. In Geneva and Paris, Diatkine helped develop a system of adult care for schizophrenic patients. In Geneva he was appointed associate professor in 1972, then part-time professor, and finally honorary professor in 1991. He continued to lead seminars until 1995. In addition to his institutional commitments, Diatkine was active in the Paris Psychoanalytic Society. In 1953 he became director of the Centre de consultations et de traitements psychanalytiques (Center for INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DIFFERENCES Psychoanalytic Consultation and Treatment) of the new Institut de Psychanalyse in Paris. That same year he participated in supervisory committees of the International Psychoanalytical Association, working to spread the use of psychoanalysis in Spain and Portugal. In 1964, under the auspices of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, he instituted the annual Deauville Colloquium, known after his death as the René Diatkine Colloquium. In 1968 he was president of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society and remained active in its teaching committees and candidate training programs. In 1982, with Marie Bonnafé, he founded Actions culturelles contre les exclusions et les ségrégations (Cultural Activities to Counter Exclusion and Segregation), a unique organization providing access to books to children and parents living in marginalized or poor communities. That same year Diatkine created Les cahiers du Centre Alfred-Binet (Journal of the Alfred Binet Center). Diatkine wrote extensively: his list of publications includes more than four hundred titles. From the 1950s he progressively developed his ideas. Since then his approach was recognized as highly different, even though his work was still influenced by contemporary neuropsychology, especially the research of Julian de Ajuriaguerra. His work helped establish foundations for a new form of child psychoanalysis. His book La psychanalyse précoce (Precocious psychoanalysis; 1972), written in collaboration with Janine Simon, remains an important text on child psychoanalysis. In it he developed his notion of the role of primal fantasies. Several of his studies were significant for the evolution of French psychoanalytic thought after World War II: ‘‘Étude des fantasmes chez l’enfant’’ (Fantasies in children), in collaboration with Serge Lebovici (1954), ‘‘Aggresivité et fantasmes d’agression’’ (Aggression and aggression fantasies; 1964), ‘‘Rêve, illusion et connaissance’’ (Dreams: illusion and understanding; 1974), ‘‘Introduction à une discussion sur le concept d’objet en psychanalyse’’ (Introduction to a discussion of the object in psychoanalysis; 1989). While maintaining his individual practice, Diatkine developed original techniques for expanding the application of psychoanalysis: individual psychodrama, collaboration with teams of multidisciplinary caregivers, techniques of language reeducation, field work, coordinated programs involving teachers and librarians. He explained how links between the norINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS mal and the pathological could be used to escape overly rigid classifications, questioned the ‘‘ravages of fate,’’ and worked to reestablish the historical continuity that dissolves during a difficult adolescence. Emphasizing latent mental potential, he insisted on the possibility of psychic reorganization, and transmitting, rather than teaching, the richness and discipline of psychoanalytic thought; he fought against reductionism. FLORENCE QUARTIER-FRINGS Notion developed: Prepsychosis. See also: Aggressiveness/aggression; Centre Alfred-Binet; Centre de consultations et de traitements psychanalytiques Jean-Favreau; Character neurosis; Child psychoanalysis; France; Indications and contraindications for psychoanalysis for an adult; Maternal reverie, capacity for; Société psychanalytique de Paris et Institut de psychanalyse de Paris; Stammering; Technique with children, psychoanalytic. Bibliography Aguirre Omar, José-Maria, and Guimon Ugartechea, José. (1994). Vie et œuvre de Julian de Ajuriaguerra. Paris: Masson. Bonnafé, Marie. (1994). Les livres c’est bon pour les bébés. Paris: Calmann-Lévy. Diatkine, René. (1964). Agressivité et fantasmes d’agression. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ———. (1974). Rêve, illusion et connaissance. Revue française de psychanalyse, 38 (5–6), 769–820. ———. (1989). Introduction à une discussion sur le concept d’objet en psychanalyse. Revue française de psychanalyse, 53 (4), 1037–1043. Diatkine, René, and Simon, Janine. (1972). La psychanalyse précoce. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Lebovici, Serge, and Diatkine, René. (1954). Étude des fantasmes chez l’enfant. Revue française de psychanalyse, 18 (1), 108–155. Lebovici, Serge, Diatkine, René, and Soulé, Michel. (1985). Traité de psychiatrie de l’enfant et de l’adolescent. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Quartier-Frings, Florence. (1997). René Diatkine. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. DIFFERENCES. See Narcissism of minor differences 411 DIPSOMANIA DIPSOMANIA acts (drinking, whether or not associated with dromomania) are central to the obsession. The term ‘‘dipsomania’’ was used in clinical psychiatry. It is not a psychoanalytic term but was used on occasion by Sigmund Freud and other psychoanalysts. The classic definition of ‘‘dipsomania’’ is that of Valentin Magnan (1893): Preceded by a vague feeling of malaise and a burning sensation in the throat, dipsomania is a sudden need to drink that is irresistible, despite a short and intense struggle. The crisis lasts from one day to two weeks and consists of a rapid and massive ingestion of alcohol or whatever other strong, excitatory liquid happens to be at hand, whether or not it is fit for consumption. It involves solitary alcohol abuse, with loss of all other interests. These crises recur at indeterminate intervals, separated by periods when the subject is generally sober and may even manifest repugnance for alcohol and intense remorse over his or her conduct. These recurring attacks may be associated with wandering tendencies (dromomania) or suicidal impulses. Although ‘‘dipsomania’’ means compulsive thirst, the use of the term is reserved for the compulsive intake of alcoholic beverages. In a letter of January 11, 1897, Freud cited the case of ‘‘a man of genius’’ who ‘‘had attacks of the severest dipsomania from his fiftieth year onwards’’ and who was ‘‘a pervert and consequently healthy’’ until that point (1950a [1887–1902], p. 240). The man’s crises were heralded by catarrh, hoarseness, and diarrhea (‘‘the oral sexual system’’), all of which represented bodily ‘‘reproduction of his own passive experiences’’ and brought together desensitization, repetition, and mastery. Freud compared this substitution of compulsive drinking for the sexual instinct to the substitution that culminates in the passion for gambling. In this letter to Fliess, Freud outlined an intergenerational psychopathology. During the same period he published, in succession, ‘‘Heredity and the aetiology of the neuroses’’ (1896a) and ‘‘Sexuality in the aetiology of the neuroses’’ (1898a). The term was introduced by Dr. C. W. Hufeland in 1819 in his preface to Trunksucht (Dipsomania), a study of the phenomenon by C. von Bruhl–Cramer. Even as early as 1817 the Italian physician Salvatori had identified a ‘‘furor to drink.’’ All of these authors contrast dipsomania and chronic alcoholism. Freud alluded to dipsomania in his correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess (Freud to Fliess, January 11, 1897, and ‘‘Draft K’’) and in his ‘‘Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence’’ (1896b). He saw dipsomania as a secondary symptom of a defense against an obsessive thought that forms when the compulsion is displaced from that thought onto the motor impulses directed against the thought. In more exact terms, the compulsion, emanating from the ego, is mobilized against the affects linked to the obsession, as a measure of protection against and desensitization to suffering induced by these affects and as a means of obtaining pleasure. This need for alcohol is a substitute for an associated repressed sexual activity of an autoerotic kind, namely masturbation, which Freud, in a letter to Fliess dated December 22, 1897, calls ‘‘the one major habit, the Ôprimal addiction’ ’’ (1950a [1887–1902], p. 272). The drunken stupor represents both a desensitization of the ego to painful affects and the pleasure of active mastery of experiences of passivity. Motor 41 2 There is little elaboration of this notion in Freud’s subsequent writings. However, in considering epileptic fits and pathological gambling as they relate to (autoerotic) sexuality and death in ‘‘Dostoevsky and Parricide’’ (1928b), Freud provided, without designating them as such, insights into the alcoholic’s crises: ‘‘He never rested until he had lost everything’’ (p. 191). ‘‘The irresistible nature of the temptation, the solemn resolutions, which are nevertheless invariably broken, never to do it again, the stupefying pleasure and the bad conscience which tells the subject that he is ruining himself (committing suicide)—all these elements remain unaltered in the process of substitution’’ (p. 193). In this essay Freud proposes the hypothesis of an abnormal mechanism of discharge of the instincts, posited organically, that operates both in histolytic or toxic brain disease and in cases of inadequate control over the psychic economy when energy levels reach a certain threshold. This mechanism is closely related to the sexual processes, understood as ‘‘fundamentally of toxic origin’’ (p. 180), and enables the ego to ‘‘get rid by somatic means of amounts of excitation which it cannot deal with psychically’’ (p. 181). The meaning and intentionality of such crises (drunkenness, coma, or deep sleep) are well known: Such ‘‘deathlike’’ (p. 182) states express an identification with a dead person, in either reality or fantasy, the latter being more significant (boys, in their fantasies, usually wish for the death of the father). The dipsomania crisis, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DIPSOMANIA preceded by an aura of supreme happiness, liberation, and triumph, has a punitive value: the subject is dead, like the person the subject wished dead. This is similar to the situation of the brothers of the primitive horde and relates to totemic ritual. In the view of Otto Juliusburger (1913), dipsomaniacs who seek out the company of ‘‘lower-class’’ drunks in this way demonstrate their subjection to sadomasochistic instincts. Edward Glover (1932) compared dipsomania to an obsessive ceremonial (less obvious in solitary drinkers) and saw it as an ‘‘artificial’’ manic-depressive syndrome (with more direct sadism and a less severe oral fixation). Similarly, Otto Fenichel (1945) saw a link between pathologically impulsive characters and ‘‘the ego’s morbid syntonic impulses,’’ expressed on the economic and dynamic levels as manic-depressive disorders characterized by alternating acts and remorse. These impulses are seen as (futile) attempts to master old experiences through repetition and active dramatization, to master guilt, depression, and anxiety. John W. Higgins (1953) and William J. Browne (1965) emphasize the passage from thought to motor action, a return to the mother, an incorporation of the mother’s breast, and denial of passivity. For Charles Melman (1976), aversion therapies that seek to create new boundaries are actually aggravating factors in dipsomania. In an observation based on just two interviews, Jean-Paul Descombey (1992) relates the case of a young dipsomaniac who engages in a repetitive ritual of a ‘‘tournament of grand dukes’’ with his various brothers and sisters, begun from when he discovered the body of his dead mother; autoerotism and the death instinct are condensed in the subject’s comment ‘‘I must finish myself off.’’ The notions of somalcoholosis (P. Fouquet, 1955) and alcoholism (Edmund Jellinek) are synonymous with dipsomania. Alcoholepsy, or alcoholic seizures (P. Fouquet, 1970) is a critical episode in a chronic alcoholic; associated forms of dromo-dipsomania have been described. Bulimic behaviors, which are comparable to dipsomania, are sometimes associated with it. Alimentary orgasm (Sándor Radó, 1933), which has a euphoric pharmacogenic effect, is provoked by the ego, which thus rediscovers its broadest narcissistic dimension. The relative dearth of studies of dipsomania is explained by the fact that dipsomaniacs are often approached only in single interviews in hospital INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS emergency rooms, where they tend to end up; there is rarely any follow-up. Nevertheless, as a particular form of alcohol abuse, dipsomania is of interest in that it involves a kind of epitome and condensation of various aspects of alcoholism: a compulsion for repetition; a short-circuiting of psychical working through by acting out an undeclared depressive state; the problematic interplay of desensitization and attempted mastery; and autoerotism and selfdestructive, potentially lethal actions. There are two possible dangers here: overdistinguishing dipsomania from other forms of alcoholism and, alternatively, failing to perceive its specificity. The same is true for transitory alcohol abuse and drunkenness in ‘‘normal’’ subjects, which are insufficient in and of themselves to account for alcohol addiction, whether or not dipsomania is present. A dynamic approach must go beyond organicist views, which attempt to link dipsomania to manic-depressive psychosis or epilepsy, and take into account the connections suggested in clinical practice. Finally, Freud, in ‘‘Dostoevsky and parricide’’ (1928b), though he does not explicitly cite alcoholism (from which Dostoyevski himself was not immune), nevertheless proposes a toxicity-based theory of sexuality and the neuropsychoses (Descombey, 1994). JEAN-PAUL DESCOMBEY See also: Addiction; Alcoholism. Bibliography Browne, William J. (1965). The alcoholic bout as an acting out. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 34, 420–437. Descombey, Jean-Paul. (1992). Alcoolisme: dépression ou addiction? Information Psychiatrique, 68, (4), 338–345. ———. (1994). Précis d’alcoologie clinique. Paris: Dunod. Fenichel, Otto. (1945). The psychoanalytic theory of neurosis. New York: Norton. Freud, Sigmund. (1896b). Further remarks on the neuropsychoses of defence. SE, 3: 162–185. ———. (1928b). Dostoevsky and parricide. SE, 21: 177–196. ———. (1950a [1887–1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173–280. Glover, Edward. (1932). On the aetiology of drug addiction. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 13, 298–328. 413 DIRECT ANALYSIS Magnan, Valentin. (1893). Leçons cliniques sur les maladies mentales: état mental du dipsomane (2nd ed.). Paris: L. Bataille. Mijolla, Alain de, and Shentoub, Salem A. (1973). Pour une psychanalyse de l’alcoolisme. Paris: Payot. Radó, Sándor. (1926). The psychic effects of intoxication: attempts at a psychoanalytic theory of drug addiction. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 7, 16. DIRECT ANALYSIS Direct analysis is a therapeutic technique developed by John Rosen for the treatment of schizophrenics. Rosen began from the basic postulate that serious pathologies have their origins in inadequate or poor maternal care. As the result of such care, the patient is psychically a baby and must be treated as such, with unconditional love from a caregiver. This lead Rosen in some cases to assume the nearly continuous care of a single patient for several weeks, and sometimes several months, while actively trying to shake up or pierce the patient’s defensive shell through socalled ‘‘direct’’ interventions (including violent physical contact). Rosen’s position was appealing because of its optimistic slant (its assumption that if the therapist does not know where he is going, the patient’s unconscious would), because of the courage and sacrifice required of the therapist (whose personal life was thereby relegated to the background), and without doubt because of the generous but obviously simplistic nature of the etiological theory involved. At its most extreme, Rosen’s technique is not so very different from that proposed by Sándor Ferenczi before Freud convinced him to abandon it. Yet on a theoretical level, Rosen’s theory obviously misinterprets the central role of conflict in psychic pathology, and on a practical level, his technique ignores the obvious risks of uncontrolled countertransference. ROGER PERRON See also: Schizophrenia. DIRECTED DAYDREAM (R. DESOILLE) The notion of the directed daydream refers to a product of the imagination, an expression of a waking oneiric state, used in the 1930s by Robert Desoille for therapeutic purposes; he later gave it the name directed daydream (or directed waking dream). The directed daydream is an active mobilization of the imagination in a relaxed setting by means of suggestions of climbing and descending, for the purpose of exploring ‘‘subconscious affectivity’’ and gaining access to the ‘‘superior part of the mind that is not exclusively colored by instinct.’’ Imaginary space appears in this context as a metaphor for mental space. The approach’s theoretical development extends from Freudian sublimation (1938) to a Pavlovian conception of the search for new, dynamic stereotypes (1961), by way of a Jungian mobilization of archetypes (1945). At the beginning of the 1970s, practitioners of the directed daydream technique in the Groupe International du Rêve Eveillé en Psychanalyse (GIREP; International group of the directed daydream in psychoanalysis) integrated the Freudian unconscious into their practice and theory. This gave rise to an analytical practice known as the ‘‘directed daydream in psychoanalysis.’’ This involved allowing images to form as spontaneously as possible, creating an imaginary space based on the idea of moving or traveling, describing to the analyst the scenes that unfold, and having the patient describe his associated feelings. Treatment comprised two inseparable and interactive elements: producing the directed daydream and putting it into words, and the associative work of exploring its meaning in relation to memories, nocturnal dreams, and fantasies; constructions and interpretations operated on a metaphorical level. Psychoanalytic in its reference to the unconscious and to various Freudian and postFreudian concepts, this treatment is distinctive in terms of its procedures and its view of the therapeutic relationship, according to which the dynamics of the directed dream treatment imply analysis of the transference. Among the approach’s main theoretical orientations are the following:  Bibliography Rosen, John. (1953). Direct analysis. New York: Grune and Stratton. 41 4 Nicole Fabre, for whom the space of the directed daydream, a joint creation, facilitates the expression of old problem areas and partakes of sublimation in the Freudian sense. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DISAVOWAL  Roger Dufour, who emphasizes the specular function of the directed daydream: the patient works on the relationship between speech, the body, and the Imaginary—a relationship that is basic to mental dynamics.  Gilbert Maurey, who locates the directed daydream at the metaphorical boundary between the Imaginary and the Symbolic as a mediator for access to the unconscious, the treatment being worked out in terms of the Real-SymbolicImaginary triad.  Jacques Launay, who emphasizes the role of movement in the imaginary space and its ability to invigorate the primary process.  Jean Guilhot and Marie-Aimee Guilhot, who describe the directed daydream as an instrument for change through the visualization of reparative or innovative experiences within an analytic and transpersonal perspective. JACQUES LAUNAY See also: Desoille, Robert. Bibliography Dufour, Roger. (1978). Écouter le rêve. Le Rêve-éveillé-dirigé analytique. Écoute et repères de l’Inconscient. Poésie et mythe en psychanalyse. Paris: Robert Laffont. Fabre, Nicole. (1985). Les voies et les fins d’une analyse R.E.D. Le Rêve-éveillé-analytique. Toulouse, France: Privat. Guilhot, Jean, and Marie-Aimée Guilhot. (1987). Analyse, activation et action thérapeutique. Vers un intégralisme analytique et prospectif. Paris: E. S. F. Launay, Jacques. (1983). Le Rêve-éveillé et l’Inconscient. La Serrure et le Songe. Paris: Economia. Maurey, Gilbert. (1995). Le Rêve-éveillé en psychanalyse. De l’imaginaire à l’Inconscient. Paris: E. S. F. DISAVOWAL The term ‘‘disavowal’’ (Verleugnung), often translated as ‘‘denial,’’ denotes a mental act that consists in rejecting the reality of a perception on account of its potentially traumatic associations. The notion of disavowal made its appearance rather late in Freud’s work. For years he was content to describe the little boy’s refusal to recognize the absence of a penis in a little girl, as observed in clinical practice, without employing a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS specific term. Thus, in his ‘‘On the Sexual Theories of Children’’ (1908c) and in the case history of ‘‘Little Hans’’ (1909b), he noted the phenomenon and described it in terms of a rejection of perceptual evidence. Little boys, he argued, do not doubt ‘‘that a genital like [their] own is to be attributed to everyone [they] know. . . . This conviction is energetically maintained by boys, is obstinately defended against the contradictions which soon result from observation, and is only abandoned after severe internal struggles (the castration complex).’’ The period concerned, lasting approximately from three to five years of age, Freud dubs the ‘‘phallic stage’’ in view of the narcissistic hypercathexis of the idea of the penis by which it is usually characterized—especially in the little boy, who finds it unthinkable that anyone worthy of respect should be without a penis, least of all his mother. The little girl cannot similarly reject the perception of her own lack of a penis. However, in certain young girls, Freud notes ‘‘the hope of some day obtaining a penis in spite of everything and so becoming like a man may persist to an incredibly late age and may become a motive for strange and otherwise unaccountable actions.’’ Freud’s first reference to the term was in the ‘‘Wolf Man’’ case history (1918b [1914]; see also 1914a), where he conceived of disavowal as operating between at least two regions of the ego which invalidated one another. Thus one region might accept the symbolic character of castration and sexual difference while the other embraced the all-or-nothing logic of the phallic structure, and everything proceeded as though the two spheres had no influence upon each other at all. Beginning with the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916–17a), Freud began systematically using the verb verleugnen to refer to the mental act of rejecting a perception as inconceivable—which James Strachey translated as ‘‘to disavow.’’ The noun form—die Verleugnung (disavowal)—was not used to designate the metapsychological concept until a little later (1925h). It was mainly in his late work, in ‘‘A Short Account of Psychoanalysis’’ (1940a [1938]) and ‘‘The Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense’’ (1940e [1938]), that Freud sought to anchor the specificity of disavowal by situating it within the particular topography of the split ego. In ‘‘The Infantile Genital Organization’’ (1923e), Freud reasserted that only the male organ played a 415 DISAVOWAL significant role in the mind of the child of either sex around three years of age. The child could understand the absence of a penis only as the result of castration. It was therefore the manner in which the initial disavowal was overcome that determined the castration complex to which the individual would become subject. Returning to this crucial question in ‘‘Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes’’ (1925j), Freud presented castration as a result of a ‘‘deferred action,’’ the threatening nature of the possible absence of the penis assuming its full mental force only after a more or less extended period of disavowal. Freud also noted that the persistence of such disavowal beyond the phallic period, into adolescence and adulthood, could lead to a form of mental illness: ‘‘The process I would like to describe as denial [Verleugnung] . . . appears to be neither rare nor very dangerous for the mental life of the child, but in adults it could lead to psychosis.’’ Moreover, Freud had published two observations of young men in whom denial of the lack of a penis appeared to determine the outbreak of psychotic symptoms (1914a). The first was the famous ‘‘Wolf Man,’’ whom Freud claimed had ‘‘dismissed’’ [verwarf—see ‘‘Foreclosure’’] the ‘‘reality [sic] of castration,’’ that he ‘‘refused to know anything about it, in the sense of repressing it. He did not actually pass judgment as to whether it existed or not, [castration] but effectively it did not.’’ This rejection, as inconceivable, of the possible absence of the penis was what triggered the patient’s returning hallucination of a severed little finger. For Freud, then, the psychotic ego disavowed perceptual reality in a way somewhat akin to the way a neurotic repressed certain instinctual demands. But Freud subsequently went on to broaden his clinical work on disavowal well beyond the realm of psychosis. In ‘‘Fetishism’’ (1927e) he reported a case of two young men each of whom denied the death of his father. However, Freud notes, neither of them developed a psychosis, even though a ‘‘a piece of reality which was undoubtedly important has been disavowed [verleugnet], just as the unwelcome fact of women’s castration is disavowed in fetishists.’’ He then returned to the notion of the splitting of the ego (already discussed in the Wolf Man case history), presenting it as the topographical corollary of 41 6 the mechanism of disavowal: the possible juxtaposition in the psyche of at least two incompatible mental attitudes that appeared to have no influence on one another. It was no longer a question, therefore, of treating disavowal as the disavowal ‘‘of ’’ something but rather as a mutual disavowal, a disjunction ‘‘between’’ two discrete realms of the split ego. Similar disavowals were common, Freud noted, and not merely among fetishists. In his later works Freud maintained that disavowal was present to varying degrees in psychosis, perversion, and very possibly too in all normal subjects. He offered an instance from his personal experience in a public letter to Romain Rolland (‘‘A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis,’’ 1936a, p. 245). It was also in his paper on ‘‘Fetishism’’ that Freud showed that disavowal, unlike repression, did not erase the idea or perception in question but only its meaning; this was why he rejected the term ‘‘scotomization’’ proposed by René Laforgue (1927e, pp. 153– 54). Disavowal was in fact a suspension of the function of judgment, of that same attributing judgment he felt was decisive in the formation of the ego. As a consequence of his methodological concern more clearly to distinguish disavowal and repression, he ended by suggesting that repression treated the affect as disavowal treated the idea, which may be taken to mean that repression no more eliminates the affect (it is only displaced) than disavowal erases the idea (whose meaning alone remains obscure). This having been said, it is important to recognize that all the clinical illustrations of disavowal supplied by Freud over a thirty-year period are based on two canonical illustrations: the disavowal of women’s lack of a penis and the disavowal of the death of the father. Disavowal is thus always a disavowal of absence, which is why it is so important in the process of symbolization. In fact, Freud specifies as a prerequisite of symbolization the ability to represent the object to oneself as something that can be absent: an object, he says, can only be symbolized in absentia. The disavowal (of absence) therefore constitutes a fundamental obstacle to the very process of constructing psychic reality, and in this it is quite distinct from negation, which operates as the starting point of the (preconscious) mental recognition of something: disavowal and negation are radically different in their logical functions. Disavowal, as opposed to negation, is a narcissistic expedient whereby the individual seeks to avoid INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DISCHARGE acknowledging absences or shortcomings of key parental figures (castration of the mother, death of the father). In practice, however, it transpires that persistent disavowal hardly allows the subject to overcome the traumatic burden of the representations in question; indeed the potential latent virulence of these representations appears rather to be made permanent by the invalidation of possible symbolic links. Moreover, whatever suffering disavowal and splitting may spare the subject’s consciousness is generally proportionately visited upon those around him. In the treatment of patients afflicted by enduring disavowal, everything suggests that they want to leave the responsibility of thinking what is for them unthinkable, of integrating what they cannot integrate, up to the ‘‘other’’ member in the therapeutic relationship. This occurs primarily through the mechanism of projective identification, which requires considerable psychic expenditure on the part of that other person, often within a very painful experiential realm. This kind of detour through the mental economy of the therapist is seemingly a necessary but not sufficient condition for the subject’s successful integration of such elements into a symbolic interplay thanks to which the pleasure principle can again become effective. Jacques Lacan in his seminar on ‘‘Object Relations’’ (1956–1957), talks about disavowal (he uses the French ‘‘démenti’’) as a fundamental mechanism of the so-called perverse structure, with its characteristic manner of treating castration: simultaneously rejecting and accepting it. He employs the term ‘‘foreclosure’’ to refer to the mechanism of symbolic denial, which he feels is a key factor in psychosis. BERNARD PENOT See also: Fetishism; Negative, work of the; Repudiation. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a fiveyear-old boy (‘‘Little Hans’’). SE, 10: 5–147. ———. (1914a). Fausse reconnaissance (‘‘déjà raconté’’) in psychoanalytic treatment. SE, 13: 201–207. ———. (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1–122. ———. (1925j). Some psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes. SE, 19: 241–258. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ———. (1927e). Fetishism. SE, 21: 147–157. ———. (1936a). A disturbance of memory on the Acropolis. SE, 22: 239–248. ———. (1940e [1938]). Splitting of the ego in the process of defence. SE, 23: 271–278. Lacan, Jacques. (1956–1957). Le séminaire-livre IV, la relation d’objet. Paris: Le Seuil. DISCHARGE An economic term borrowed from a physicalist epistemological model, ‘‘discharge’’ was used by Sigmund Freud in his theorization of how the psychic apparatus deals with excitation. The notion of discharge thus refers to an outward release of the energy produced in the psychic apparatus by excitations, whether these are external or internal in origin. By virtue of its economic orientation, this notion is part of the metapsychological approach and speaks to the quantitative dimension in Freud’s model. Freud discussed discharge when he described the pleasure/ unpleasure principle: the pleasure of discharge, the unpleasure of retention. We should recall that according to Freud, the source of the instinct is a state of excitation in the body and its aim is to eliminate this excitation. Obviously, the concept of discharge implies as a corollary the notion of tension, or charge. Pleasure and unpleasure probably depend less upon an exact level of tension than upon the rhythm of variation in tension. The principle of pleasure/unpleasure is thus considered a particular case of Gustav Fechner’s ‘‘tendency toward stability,’’ that ‘‘tendency’’ becoming in this instance the ‘‘principle of consistency.’’ Consistency is said to be achieved by means of the discharge of the energy already present, but also by the avoidance of factors that might increase the quantity of excitation. The principle of consistency is indeed basic to Freud’s economic theory and is closely linked with the pleasure principle. The psychic apparatus, in this view, also tends to cancel out excitations or reduce them to a minimum, and Freud, following Barbara Low, called this the ‘‘Nirvana principle,’’ which works in tandem with the principle of inertia. It is in this realm that the forces of Thanatos lurk; moroever, it was in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), where the death instinct is introduced, that Freud explicitly formulated the principle of consistency and related it to the Nirvana principle. 417 DISINTEGRATION, FEELINGS OF (ANXIETIES) Discharge can be total or partial; it can be appropriate or it can contribute to psychopathological, even psychodramatic disorders. The notion thus appears in Freud’s discussions of ‘‘abreaction’’ or ‘‘acting-out,’’ when there is insufficient regulation of excitation by the psychic apparatus. Another possibility is discharge into the body, which suggests the mysterious leap from the psychic to the somatic, the notion of somatic compliance, and the phenomenon of conversion. Freud also mentioned the pathogenic role of defective discharge in considering the model of actual neurosis, and in presenting the hypothesis of the damming up of the libido to explain the phenomenon of hypochondria. Still in the context of discharge, the soma as an internal safety-valve has been viewed as a way of handling tensions that cannot be worked through or that are too massive—in short, a kind of somatic ‘‘acting-in.’’ ALAIN FINE See also: Cathartic method; Emotion; Excitation; Free energy/bound energy; Fusion/defusion of Instincts; Pleasure/unpleasure principle; Primary process/secondary process; Principle of constancy; Psychic energy; Quantitative/qualitative; Reality principle; Repression; Thought; Trauma; Unpleasure; Working through. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1914c). On narcissism: an introduction. SE, 14, 67–102. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18, 1–64. ———. (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20, 75–172. Marty, Pierre, et al. (1968) Le cas Dora et le point de vue psychosomatique. Revue française de psychanalyse, 32, 4. DISINTEGRATION, FEELINGS OF (ANXIETIES) The expressions feelings of disintegration and disintegration anxieties refer to a feeling of extreme anxiety that the personality is ‘‘falling to pieces’’ or disintegrating into elements that are no longer connected together. This serious form of depersonalization has been described in the psychoses, particularly schizophrenia. It has been mainly evoked, however, with regard to the earliest stages of the infant’s development and their consequences. 41 8 Following Melanie Klein’s description of the schizoid-paranoid position in ‘‘Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms’’ (1946), the notion of fragmentation appeared in theoretical descriptions and psychoanalytic clinical practice to characterize the anxieties inherent in that position. Under the influence of the death drive, and introjected in the form of the persecutory breast or penis, archaic defenses produce a major splitting of the self considered in terms of bad internal objects. This defensive mechanism is accompanied by feelings of destruction, annihilation, or fragmentation of the ego that have been interpreted by some as a precursor to castration anxiety. Linked to deprivation, privation, and frustration, only the introjection of a good object can restore the cohesion of such a fragmented self, by creating a path toward the depressive position. These psychopathological notions have been taken up by Kleinian authors such as Donald Winnicott, although in his case greater importance is granted to the environment, particularly the mother. Esther Bick returned to the notion of fragmentation through her observations of infants, and Wilfred R. Bion makes it a constant, to varying degrees, of the psychotic part of all personalities, with the ever-active threat of ‘‘catastrophic change.’’ Pierre Marty describes another form of fragmentation in his work on ‘‘essential depression,’’ and Heinz Kohut views it as one of the main elements in the pathologies of the self. Jacques Lacan, meanwhile, reverses the Kleinian positions by viewing the archaic anxieties of the ‘‘fragmented body’’ as the consequence of castration, which is by definition inscribed within the real from the beginning. See also: Anxiety; Breast, good/bad object; Castration complex; Essential depression; Foreclosure; Fragmentation; Paranoid-schizoid position; Privation; Psychotic part of the personality; Schizophrenia. Bibliography Klein, Melanie. (1975). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. reprinted 1975 in: The writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. 3, 1946–1963, p. 1-24). London: Hogarth. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 27: (1946), 99– 110.) Kohut, Heinz. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press. Lacan, Jacques. (1962-63). Le séminaire-Livre X: L’angoisse. Unpublished. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DISMANTLING DISINTEGRATION PRODUCTS A psychoanalytical theory founded on the development of the Self postulates a stage of development at which its integration is achieved. This stage is characterized by a subjective feeling of continuity in time and space, and simultaneously by an ease of communication between body and mind. Before one reaches this stage, there is the psychological equivalent of separate zones of operation, characterized by distinct zones of pleasure and activity. A return to this previous stage of disparate activity amounts to a form of disintegration: any integration already achieved is undone. This disintegration is manifested by the emergence of isolated activities that are non-communicative and unlinked and involve isolated parts of the body, pleasure felt in one isolated zone, and an isolated ideational preoccupation. This can take various forms: hallucinatory thoughts, repetitive motor activity and/or hypochondriacal ruminations. This phenomenon can assume alarming dimensions, but it can easily be overcome by means of a rapid reintegration brought about by a connection, described as a Self-object relation, which serves to restore this temporarily lost state of cohesion. From this point of view, the appearance and disappearance of psychotic symptomatology can be explained by the shift from an integrated Self to the emergence of products of disintegration. The particular cause of this regressive movement is some form of narcissistic wound: in other words, it stems from wounds to the Self that are serious enough to produce a downward spiral involving fragmentation. The appearance of products of disintegration in the course of psychological treatment is considered to be the result of the loss of a Self-object, which is the equivalent of a break in the Self/Self-object relation—a break which is in turn experienced as a narcissistic wound. ARNOLD GOLDBERG See also: Fragmentation; Self-object. Bibliography Kohut, Heinz. (1977). The restoration of the self. New York: International Universities Press. DISMANTLING The term dismantling, introduced by Donald Meltzer, refers to a very primitive defense mechanism involving INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS dissociation of the perceptual apparatus ‘‘by a passive process that allows the various senses, specific and general, internal and external, to attach to whatever object is most stimulating at the moment’’ (Meltzer, 1975/1991)—for example, a light, a sound, or an odor. Meltzer used this term for the first time in a paper delivered at a meeting of the British Psychoanalytical Society in June 1969, ‘‘The Origins of the Fetishistic Plaything of Sexual Perversions’’ later published in his second book, Sexual States of Mind (1973, pp. 107–113). He took the idea of the dismantled object from the psychoanalytic treatment of children who had suffered from early infantile autism. He defines dismantling as ‘‘the most primitive working of obsessional mechanisms’’ (p. 108). Unlike the splitting processes described by Melanie Klein, which make use of the sadistic drives, dismantling, which is reversible at any time, instead relies on a relaxation of the attention function. The author invented this term with reference to the notion of ‘‘consensual validation’’ defined by Harry Stack Sullivan, which is very close to Wilfred R. Bion’s idea of the ‘‘common sense.’’ Meltzer’s proposed idea involves a dissolution of such constructions, leading to the creation of a multitude of unisensory objects. He emphasizes that the implementation of such a defense mechanism suppresses genuine relational experiences and thus their introjection. In the first publication, he hypothesizes that dismantling is also seen in sexual perversions where the exciting objects (fetishes) are ‘‘dismantled objects’’ used in their purely sensorial aspect. The notion of dismantling is then taken up in greater detail in Meltzer’s 1975 book Explorations in Autism, where he shows the massive use of this defense mechanism in autism proper, explaining the stereotypes of sensory autostimulation under the influence of the repetition compulsion. He demonstrates a more complex use of this phenomenon in postautistic obsessionality and in obsessional states in general. Meltzer argues that dismantling, which is beyond consensuality or within its dissolution, does not belong to the spectrum of projective identification but rather belongs within the notion of ‘‘adhesive identity’’ positing a two-dimensional space, proposed by Esther Bick (1975). Some French authors (J. Bégoin, 1994; D. Ribas, 1994; D. Maldavsky, 1995) have compared dismantling to decathexis in the Freudian sense, and it is indeed possible to do so: The former can be considered as a very primitive form of the latter. Dismantling also 419 DISORGANIZATION seems to be at work in the self-soothing behaviors described by Claude Smadja (1993) and Gérard Szwec (1993). These authors compare this mechanism with the abnormal, destructive primary masochism that Benno Rosenberg (1991) describes as ‘‘centered around excitement in and of itself . . . and the gradual abandonment of the object.’’ Frances Tustin also shares this view in Autistic States in Children (1981), in which is described an autosensuality, differentiated from autoerotism, in autistic maneuvers and its exacerbation into self-directed sadism in certain cases. GENEVIÈVE HAAG See also: Autism; Autistic defenses. Bibliography Bégoin, Jean. L’être, l’espace et le temps: les travaux de D. Meltzer sur l’autisme (1975). In Roger Perron and Denys Ribas (Eds.), Autismes de l’enfance (pp. 91–114). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Bick, Esther. (1986). Further considerations on the functioning of skin in early object relations: Findings from infant observation integrated into child and adult analysis. British Journal of Psychotherapy. 2, 292–299. Meltzer, Donald. (1990). Sexual States of Mind. Perthshire, Scotland: Clunie Press. (Original work published 1973) Maldavsky, David. (1995). A propos du noyau autistique précoce chez l’homme aux loups. Journal de la Psychanalyse de l’enfant, 17, 125–142. Meltzer, Donald, et al. (1991). Explorations in Autism. Perthshire, Scotland: Clunie Press. (Original work published 1975) ———. (1973). Sexual states of mind. Perthshire, Scotland: Clunie Press. Ribas, Denys. (1994) Repérages métapsychologiques dans l’autisme infantile. In Roger Perron and Denys Ribas (Eds.), Autismes de l’enfance (pp. 129–147). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Rosenberg, Benno. (1991). Masochisme mortifère et masochisme gardien de la vie. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Smadja, Claude. (1993). Á propos des procédés autocalmants du Moi. Revue française de psychosomatique. 4, 9–26. Szwec, Gérard. (1993). Les procédés autocalmants par la recherche répétitive de l’excitation (les galériens volontaires). Revue française de psychosomatique 4, 27–51. Tustin, Frances. (1981). Autistic states in children. London: Routledge. 42 0 DISORGANIZATION The concept of disorganization is not specifically Freudian. It is part of a semantic field that constitutes one of the contemporary currents of psychoanalysis, namely the psychosomatic economy of Pierre Marty. It refers to a set of mental transformations, which at each step cause the psychic apparatus to lose its structures of meaning and reduce its capacity for impulse expression. We find similar concepts in Freud, primarily in his work on actual and traumatic neurosis. In 1894, in Manuscript E on anxiety (1950a), and in 1895, in his article, ‘‘Detaching a Syndrome of Anxiety Neurosis from Neurasthenia’’ (1895b), he created a new classificatory entity, anxiety neurosis, for which he provided a clinical description and formulated a psychological hypothesis. His hypothesis involves a breakdown in the connection between somatic sexual excitation and ‘‘thing representations’’ in the unconscious. The first anxiety theory postulates the accumulation of somatic sexual excitation. Among the psychic obstacles to somatopsychic communication, Freud gives three possible mechanisms: repression, the difference between somatic sexuality and psychic sexuality, and degradation (of the libido). This last mechanism can be compared to the concept of disorganization. In 1920, in his essay, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), Freud developed his economic hypotheses concerning traumatic neurosis. He states that, faced with the traumatic irruption, ‘‘Cathectic energy is summoned from all sides to provide sufficiently high cathexes of energy in the environs of the breach. An Ôanticathexis’ on a grand scale is set up, for whose benefit all the other psychical systems are impoverished, so that the remaining psychical functions are extensively paralysed or reduced’’ (p. 30). Since Freud we have come to understand actual neurosis as one of the modalities of traumatic neurosis, and its psychoanalytic study is a major component of the analysis of psychosomatic behavior. In 1967, in an article titled ‘‘Régression et instinct de mort: Hypothèses à propos de l’observation psychosomatique,’’ Marty systematically described for the first time the two major processes of somatization: the path of regression and the path of progressive disorganization. While the process of somatization through regression culminates in reversible ‘‘crises,’’ the process of somatization through progressive disorganization INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DISPLACEMENT leads to progressive illnesses that can result in death. This last process is supported, according to Marty, by the action of the death instinct and is generally accompanied by depression and an externalized mode of existence. In Les mouvements individuels de vie et de mort in 1976 and in L’ordre psychosomatique in 1980, Marty situated the concept of disorganization within the general framework of his theory of individual evolution, which refers to the counter-evolutionary movement caused by the precedence of the death drive over the life drive. This apparent precedence is generated by a traumatic context that has an impact on what is generally the psychic organization of character. The process of disorganization is generally made possible by the lack of points of fixation capable of serving as psychic and somatic obstacles. Consequently, the concept of disorganization is distinct from that of regression, with its points of fixation, or attachment. CLAUDE SMADJA See also: Disintegration, feelings of, (anxieties); Essential depression; Mentalization; Psychogenesis/organogenesis; Psychosomatic; Regression; Traumatic neurosis. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1895b). Detaching a syndrome of anxiety neurosis from neurasthenia. SE, 3: 0–115. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle.SE, 18: 7–64. ———. (1950a [1887–SE, 1: 173–280. Marty, Pierre. (1967) Régression et instinct de mort: Hypothèses à propos de l’observation psychosomatique. Revue française de psychanalyse, 30, (5–6), pp. 1113–1126. ———. (1976). Les Mouvements individuels de vie et de mort, vol. I, Essai d’économie psychosomatique. Paris: Payot, ‘‘Sciences de l’homme.’’ ———. (1980). Les Mouvements individuels de vie et de mort, vol. II, L’Ordre psychosomatique. Paris: Payot, ‘‘Sciences de l’homme.’’ DISPLACEMENT For Freud, displacement (a primary process) means the transference of physical intensities (1900a, p. 306) along an ‘‘associative path,’’ so that strongly cathected ideas have their charge displaced onto other, less INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS strongly cathected ones. This process is active in the formation of hysterical or obsessional symptoms, in the dream work, in the production of jokes, and in the transference. Between 1887 and 1902 the concept of displacement appeared several times in Freud’s writings (in Drafts K and M in his correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess, in the ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ [1950c (1895)], and in The Interpretation of Dreams [1900a]). It was introduced in connection with his clinical work, apropos of the analysis of neurotic symptoms and paranoia. In Draft M (1950a), Freud described the types of displacement that result in compromiseformations. He distinguished ‘‘Displacement by association: hysteria.; Displacement by (conceptual) similarity: obsessional neurosis (characteristic of the place at which the defence occurs, and perhaps also of the time).; Causal displacement: paranoia’’ (p. 252). In addition, in his search for a model of psychic functioning still informed by the scientific thinking and medical research of the time, Freud noted: ‘‘Hysterical repression evidently takes place with the help of symbol-formation, of displacements on to other neurones. We might think, then, that the riddle resides only in the mechanism of this displacement, and that there is nothing to be explained about repression itself ’’ (1950c [1895], p. 352). Displacement, at work to a pathological degree in hysteria, ‘‘is thus probably a primary process, since it can easily be demonstrated in dreams’’ (Ibid., p. 353). It was in fact Freud’s analysis of the dream work that led him to discover the importance of displacement. He noted in The Interpretation of Dreams that: a) ‘‘The consequence of the displacement is that the dream-content no longer resembles the core of the dream-thoughts and . . . the dream gives no more than a distortion of the dream-wish which exists in the unconscious’’ (p. 308); b) Dream distortion can be ‘‘traced . . . back to the censorship which is exercised by one psychical agency in the mind over another. . . . dream-displacement comes about through the influence of the same censorship’’ (p. 308); and c) ‘‘[A] transference and displacement of psychical intensities occurs in the process of dream-formation’’ (pp. 307–308). The notion of displacement did not see much further development. In his various revisions to his theories on dreams, Freud focused more on the 421 DISPLACEMENT OF THE TRANSFERENCE separation of images from the affects that had been attached to them, on the vicissitudes of these affects (displacement, conservation, metamorphosis), and on the fate of images (stripped of affect) in relation to the ‘‘sensory intensity of the image presented’’ (1900a, p. 306, n. 1). But it was above all in the process of refining the analysis of the transference during treatment and its different manifestations—lateral, indirect, and direct transference (Freud, 1915a; Sandór Ferenczi, 1909/1994; Michel Neyraut, 1974)—that the notion of displacement was expanded. It was further explored, too, by such authors as Jacques Lacan (1957/ 2002; 1958/2002) and Guy Rosolato (1969) who took as their starting point the work of linguists (Ullmann, 1952; Jakobson and Halle, 1956) on the relationship between signifier and signified, and on metonymy (displacement by contiguity) and metaphor (displacement by substitution). Displacement is often linked to substitution. Not infrequently, this link is made without an adequate distinction being drawn in temporal terms between substitution where there is an immediate exchange based on the disavowal of one of the two poles involved (perceptual, hallucinatory, or conceptual substitutions), and substitution where deferred action comes into play. ———. (1915a). Observations on transference love (Further recommendations on the technique of psychoanalysis III). SE, 12: 157–71. ———. (1950a [1887-1902]), Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173–280. ———. (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 295–391. ———. (1985c [1887-1904]). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887–1904( Jeffrey M. Masson, Ed. and Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press. Jakobson, Roman, and Halle, Morris. (1956). Fundamentals of language (4th ed.). The Hague, New York: Mouton. Lacan, Jacques. (2002). The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud. In Écrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1957) ———. (2002). The signification of the phallus. In Écrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1958 Neyraut, Michel. (1974). Le transfert. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Rosolato, Guy. (1969). Essais sur le symbolique. Paris: Gallimard. Ullmann, Stephen. (1952). Précis de sémantique française. Bern: Francke. ELSA SCHMIDT-KITSIKIS See also: Actual neurosis/defense neurosis; Amphimixia/ amphimixis; ‘‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy (little Hans)’’; Cathexis; Day’s residues; Defense mechanisms; Dream symbolism; Dream work; Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, The; Forgetting; Hysteria; Interpretation of dreams; Interpretation of Dreams, The; Jokes; Latent; Masculinity/femininity; Metonymy; Myths; Neurotic defenses; Obsessional neurosis; Overdetermination; Phobias in children; Primary process/ secondary process; ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology, A’’; Signifier/signified; ‘‘Splitting of the Ego in the Processes of Defence, The’’; Substitutive formation; Symbolization, process of; Symptom-formation; Unconscious, the. DISPLACEMENT OF THE TRANSFERENCE Ferenczi, Sándor. (1909). Introjection and transference. In Final contribution to the problems and methods of psychoanalysis Michael Balint (Ed.). London: Karnac Books. Displacement of the transference, also called lateral transference, is a defense in which transference is directed away from the analyst to a third party or an activity that both conceals and represents undesirable aspects of the transference. The idea of displacement of the transference originated in Freud’s technical writings. In ‘‘On beginning the treatment’’ (1913), Freud cautioned analysts about sessions that were too infrequent, which allowed the analysis to wander down side paths, and about patients who discussed their treatment with close friends every day, which would cause a ‘‘leak’’ in the analysis and the transference. In ‘‘Remembering, repeating, and working-through’’ (1914), he also said that the patient’s transference is revealed ‘‘not only in his personal attitude to his doctor but also in every other activity and relationship which may occupy his life at the time’’ (p. 151). Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part 1, SE, 4: 1–338; Part 2, SE, 5: 339–625. Later, other authors (for example, Daniel Lagache and Michel Neyraut) mentioned displacement of the Bibliography 42 2 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DISQUE VERT, LE transference when discussing transference, usually speaking of it as resistance of a sort. Not until the work of Alain Gibeault and Evelyne Kestemberg (1981) was a positive role attributed to it. For these authors, the displacement of the transference prevents only the awareness of the transference, not the analysand’s unconscious cathexis in the analysis and with the analyst. In the analysand, the external object nevertheless maintains a symbolic link with the analyst and really represents the internal-object relation resulting from the repetition of an infantile experience. These authors nevertheless recognize that the displacement of the transference, even if it is sometimes useful (notably in cases of character neurosis, where it moderates the direct confrontation with an archaic imago that is too threatening), may also interrupt the analytic process if it becomes too fixed and impervious to interpretations. In the work of François Duparc, the displacement of the transference has been linked to analysands’ difficulties in representing traumatic experiences in their histories and in connecting the affects mobilized by treatment to sufficiently elaborated representations. Thus the displacement of the transference could be considered as a less apparent aspect of negative transference, that is, of the invisible transference that Freud complains about in ‘‘Analysis terminable and interminable’’ (1937) in connection with his analysis of Sándor Ferenczi. Lateralization of the transference would be a primary defense and counter-cathexis of a nonrepresentable or not yet represented experience. By means of a displacement of the transference, the patient might be trying to protect the analyst from a violent discharge in the transference, which the analyst could not bear without a traumatizing countertransferential reaction. One can describe a range of transferences, according to their greater or lesser lateral aim: the direct transference, which in the case of traumatic material induces disturbing and strange counter-transferential experiences; transference on a model, which is more protective because the model is the inert part of the transference that limits the involvement of nonrepresentable experiences; and finally displacement of the transference, which aims at protecting both the patient and the analyst from a traumatic outbreak. FRANÇOIS DUPARC See also: Counter-transference; Negative therapeutic reaction; Transference. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Duparc, François. (1988). Transfert latéral, transfert du négatif. Revue française de psychanalyse, 52 (4), 887–898. Freud, Sigmund. (1913). On beginning the treatment (further recommendations on technique of psycho-analysis I). SE, 12: 121–144. ———. (1914). Remembering, repeating, and workingthrough (further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis II). SE, 12: 145–156. ———. (1937). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. Gibeault, Alain, and Kestemberg, Evelyne. (1981). Le personnage tiers. Cahiers du Centre pour la psychanalyse et la psychothérapie, 3, 1–84. DISQUE VERT, LE In 1924 Le Disque vert, a Belgian review founded and directed by the poet and writer Frédéric Van Ermengen, known as Franz Hellens (1881–1972), published a special issue devoted to ‘‘Freud et la psychanalyse,’’ confirming Sigmund Freud’s belief that ‘‘interest in psychoanalysis has spread to writers in France.’’ (1925d) It is significant that at this time very few of Freud’s writings were accessible in French. A message from Freud, dated February 26, 1924, introduced the issue: ‘‘Of the many lessons lavished upon me in the past (1885–1886) by the great Charcot at the Salpêtrière [1885–1888], two left me with a deep impression: that one should never tire of considering the same phenomena again and again (or of submitting to their effects), and that one should not mind meeting with contradiction on every side provided one has worked sincerely.’’ There were approximately forty-five contributors to the special issue, all with different opinions, positive and negative, about psychoanalysis, providing an important overview of the attitudes toward psychoanalysis in France. Among the contributors were writers (M. Arland, R. Fernandez, V. Larbaud, H. R. Lenormand, J. Rivière, Philippe Soupault, René Crevel, Henri Michaux), psychoanalysts (Angélo Hesnard, René Laforgue, René Allendy), psychiatrists and psychologists (E. Claparède, L. Lapicque, Y. Le Lay). According to Edmond Jaloux, many writers were hostile to Freud’s theories because ‘‘they saw in them an attack on the classical conception of human 423 DISTRESS personality.’’ For Jacques de Lacretelle, although some subscribed to the new field, many could not, ‘‘because its ideas take place in a field that is almost new to them, one they are only beginning to make use of: the unconscious.’’ Louis Lapicque, who then held the chair of general psychology at the Sorbonne, had no hesitations: ‘‘I have to admit that the ideas of the Viennese professor, although they were sufficiently amusing for me to acquaint myself with them superficially, did not seem to be scientific material and I do not feel capable of discussing them seriously.’’ Étienne Rabaud, professor of biology at the Sorbonne, had a similar opinion: ‘‘Within being unaware of Freudianism, I haven’t taken the time to make a serious study of it; my limited examination has not left me with a desire to continue.’’ Georges Dwelshauvers, director of the laboratory of experimental psychology in Catalonia, suspected fraud: ‘‘He has been inspired by the clinics of Charcot and his school, and the work, so rich in written material, of doctors Raymond and Pierre Janet. He is their student and continues their tradition. And do we know who the real author of psychoanalysis was? It was J. Delboeuf, the psychologist from Liege.’’ The partisans remained undecided. Professor Henri Claude, head physician at the Clinique des Maladies Mentales at the Sainte-Anne Hospital, the first and only hospital that employed psychoanalysts, wrote, ‘‘It is mostly psychologists and writers who have been discussing Freud’s work and that of his followers, faithful or dissident, and who, leaving the primitive framework of medicine, have decided to criticize the extension of the doctrine, especially the theory of pansexual symbolism, to all manifestations of intellectual activity. In place of these glosses, we would have preferred reliable personal research, free of prejudice, imbued with the spirit of scientific observation.’’ He added, and René Allendy was in agreement, ‘‘I feel, like Adler and Stekel, that we should not lead those unfamiliar with psychoanalysis to believe that Freudian pansexualism is all there is to the field.’’ ‘‘Pansexualism’’ and ‘‘symbolism’’ were signs of Freudianism’s disgrace, even though, as Edmond Jaloux so reassuringly remarked, ‘‘there are few repressed individuals in France.’’ Angélo Hesnard indicated the prevailing pessimism of the time: ‘‘Current French opinion about Freud remains inconclusive . . . It will never be 42 4 favorable to him for, whatever he may think—and in spite of his work with Charcot—the Master of Vienna has remained, in his work, quite remote from French attitudes. And in the extreme and naı̈ve way it confuses facts and theory, doctrine and method, psychoanalysis will never convince anyone except those who have the courage and scientific probity to experiment with it themselves and adapt it to the French mind.’’ Along with Édouard Claparède, Albert Thibaudet, a writer, who had already written a positive article in April 1921 in the Nouvelle Revue française, was more optimistic. He wrote, ‘‘I only want to say that I see Freud as a man who has entered a long corridor, filled with disorder, with poorly catalogued, poorly lit, poorly interpreted objects, but which holds treasures for the museums of the future and for the literature of today.’’ André Gide, on June 19, 1924, wrote, after closing the copy of Le Disque vert he had been reading in the train that carried him to Cuverville, ‘‘Oh, how annoying Freud is; it seems to me that we managed quite well without him in discovering his America! . . . What he adds, most of all, is his audacity, or, more exactly, he relieves us of a certain false and tiresome modesty. But there is so much that is absurd in this imbecile of genius!’’ ALAIN DE MIJOLLA Source Citation Le Disque vert (1924). Freud et la psychanalyse, 2nd year, June 1924. Bibliography Gide, André. (1953). The Journals of André Gide. (Justin O’Brien, Trans.) New York: Knopf. Mijolla, Alain de. (1984). Quelques avatars de la psychanalyse en France. Lecture du Disque Vert (June 1924). L’Évolution psychiatrique, 49, 3, 773–795. DISTRESS. See Helplessness ‘‘DISTURBANCE OF MEMORY ON THE ACROPOLIS, A’’ Sigmund Freud had begun corresponding with Romain Rolland in 1923, and this open letter is the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ‘‘ D I S T U R B A N C E acme (and indeed the end) of their exchange. In it, Freud relates a personal experience dating from his first visit to Athens, in 1904. He had climbed the Acropolis in company with his brother Alexander, who was ten years his younger—the same age, in fact, as Rolland—and in front of the Parthenon he was overtaken by a feeling of strangeness, of a sense that ‘‘this is too good to be true.’’ In 1904 Freud was bringing his relationship with Wilhelm Fliess to a close in an atmosphere of conflict. A transference to Fliess had provided him with the support needed for his original self-analysis, and it was not until 1936, relying now on a transference to Rolland, that he was able to analyze this episode. The few pages of the letter here under consideration are a self-analytical summary of an entire lifetime, and they retrace the path followed by Freud’s whole work, with two Frenchmen standing for the beginning and end points respectively: at the beginning, Charcot (suggested by Freud’s use of several French psychiatric terms of the period); and, at the end, Romain Rolland. The letter resembles an analytic session, with Freud addressing an alter ego to whom he seems to have lent his pen, thus handing off the role of analyst (Kanzer, Mark, 1969). Oedipal themes are in evidence: guilt about having surpassed the father and conquered the mother (Athens, after Paris and Rome) by producing a work of whose value Freud was well aware. The feeling of strangeness (or ‘‘derealization’’) might stem from the emergence of unconscious material (or ‘‘sensations’’) split off as a result of the trauma experienced by Freud at the age of two, when his young brother Julius died. Here Freud’s letter mirrors Rolland’s evocation—in his Voyage Within, which he began writing right after his visit to Freud in 1924—of the death of his sister Madeleine when he was five, and the long mourning of his mother that followed. Freud’s letter is also a response (itself deferred) to his French friend concerning the inner reality of that oceanic feeling whose existence in himself Freud had at first denied (in Civilization and Its Discontents [1930a], p. 65); here he stresses the feeling’s traumatic aspect— perceived only when there is no longer a split between the two levels of mental functioning involved. Feelings of strangeness also arise from the gulf separating Freud’s integration into German culture (the Acropolis being associated with the cult of antiquity of the Goethe years) and the sotto voce reference to the destroyed temple in Jerusalem, a foundation of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OF MEMORY ON THE A C R O P O L I S , A’ ’ Freud’s Jewishness; the first title given this letter, namely ‘‘Unglaube [disbelief or incredulity] auf de Akropolis,’’ is certainly evocative of Freud’s identity as an atheist Jew, and suggests a kind of Spinozist collusion with his churchless Christian correspondent. But if the hallowed nature of the site (see Freud, 1927c) harks back to religion—the chief topic of the Freud-Rolland correspondence—in a more secular sense it summons up the origins of sublimation as a latent theme of the dialogue between these two great creators. The Erlebnis, Freud’s experience of the Acropolis, bespoke the rush of emotion that assailed him on this high place as his life’s work was just getting under way; by 1936 Freud could look back in tranquility on the road behind him. To his correspondent, likewise well on in years and nearing the end, Freud sends a message that is also a meditation on death—and on immortality. Embedded within it is the fantasy that he might climb up to the Acropolis accompanied by a winner of the Nobel Prize—a distinction which Freud, discreetly, had not abandoned hope of attaining himself. The resolution of Freud’s transference to Romain Rolland would free up a vital energy sufficient to inspirit a cluster of last writings developing many of the themes touched upon in this open letter. HENRI VERMOREL See also: Déjà-vu; Depersonalization; Disavowal; Freud, Jakob Kolloman (or Kelemen or Kallamon); Freud, Sigmund (siblings); Illusion; Memory; Oceanic feeling; Rolland, Romain Edme Paul-Émile; ‘‘Uncanny, The.’’ Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1936a). Brief an Romain Rolland: Eine Erinnerungsstörung auf der Akropolis. In Almanach der Psychoanalyse 1937, Vienna: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, pp. 9–21; GW, 16, 250–57; A disturbance of memory on the Acropolis: An open letter to Romain Rolland on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. SE, 22: 239–48. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1927c). The future of an illusion. SE, 21, 1–56. ———. (1930a). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21, 57–145. Kanzer, Mark. (1969). Sigmund and Alexander Freud on the Acropolis. American Imago, 26, 324–54. 425 DOCUMENTS ET D É B A T S Parat, Catherine. (1988). Dynamique du sacré. Lyon: Cesura. Vermorel, Henri and Vermorel, Madeleine. (1993). Sigmund Freud et Romain Rolland. Correspondance 1923–1936. (Alain de Mijolla, Ed.). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. DOCUMENTS ET DÉBATS The Association psychanalytique de France (APF), or French Psychoanalytic Association, has, since it was formed in 1964, published a Bulletin intérieur; this name was retained until 1970, when it became Documents et Débats (Documents and Debates). Originally its purpose was to publish reports of internal discussions and the annual general meeting. Editorial responsibilities initially belonged to a committee presided over by Jean Laplanche, who entrusted JeanLouis Lang, vice president, with the role of editor. Looking through past issues of the review provides an illuminating survey of the world of publishing; the quality of the paper, print, and typography make for pleasant reading. The cover design has changed over the years—from Bordeaux red to dark green, from carmine red to light gray, the color of the present volume, which is devoted to Gradiva. In 1991, with Raoul Moury as president, Documents et Débats underwent its latest design overhaul. Organization of the magazine is unique. The editor changes whenever a new board is elected. The editor accepts but does not suggest material for publication. Distribution is restricted exclusively to members and analysts undergoing training. The review serves a unifying role in a profession that tends to isolate analysts: the text is edited in Lyon and printed in Paris; editors have come from Bordeaux, Lyon, Nantes, and Paris. Issues appear on a regular basis and mark the progress of the association. Every year an issue is devoted to the publication of official documents, reports of the annual meeting, national and international reunions at which association members have participated ex officio. A second issue publishes the texts of papers given throughout the year as part of the biannual meetings and scientific get-togethers. There have also been special issues devoted to the work of individual colleagues at the time of their death. There have been homages to Daniel Lagache (1975), Angelo Bejarano (1981), Georges Favez (1982), and Victor Smirnoff (1995). Occasionally, 42 6 special issues have been proposed on particular topics—‘‘La psychanalyse en société’’ (Psychoanalysis in Society) (1985), ‘‘APF and IPA’’ (1987), ‘‘A.P.F. au passé-présent’’ (The A.P.F. in the Past and in the Present) (1988), ‘‘La formation’’ (Training) (1990)— introducing discussion within the association. However, in spite of the number of requests, it appears that this method of exchange is not necessarily the most appropriate or the most popular. Psychoanalysts in the APF have often helped found psychoanalytic journals. The list of their editorial contributions is long and includes Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse (New Review of Psychoanalysis), Psychanalyse à l’université (Psychoanalysis in the University), L’Écrit du temps (The Writing of Time), La Revue internationale de psychopathologie (International Review of Psychopathology), L’Inactuel, Le Journal de la psychanalyse de l’enfant (The Journal of Child Psychoanalysis), Le Fait de l’analyse (The Fact of Analysis), and Libres Cahiers pour la psychanalyse (Psychoanalytic Notebooks). These publications have created forms of discussion and research outside the APF that have strengthened the identity of Documents et Débats. The bulletin remains the vehicle for disseminating information about the association and promotes the circulation of texts among members to solicit and support scientific research. In this way Documents et Débats contributes to maintaining a serious dialogue that any association worthy of the name must have. JEAN-YVES TAMET See also: Association psychanalytique de France. DOLTO-MARETTE, FRANÇOISE (1908–1988) Françoise Dolto-Marette, a French psychoanalyst, was born in Paris on November 6, 1908, and she died there on August 28, 1988. Dolto’s Enfances (Childhoods; 1986) and Autoportrait d’une psychanalyste (Selfportrait of a woman psychoanalyst; 1989) tell the story of how a little girl born into a middle-class family at the turn of the twentieth century became a doctor and psychoanalyst. The two books recount the traumatic loss of a beloved nanny when she was a few months old; the death at the front on July 10, 1916, of her INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS D O L T O - M A R E T T E , F R A N Ç O I S E (1908 –1 988) uncle Pierre, who was her godfather and whom she thought of as her ‘‘fiancé’’; and the death of her older sister, Jacqueline, when she was eleven. At her first communion, her mother asked her to pray to save her sister, who contracted bone cancer at the age of eighteen. ‘‘I would never have become a psychoanalyst,’’ she wrote, ‘‘were it not for this grief that upset the whole family. I think I would have become a doctor in any case, because I had wanted to since I was eight, but I would not have become an analyst if my sister had not died and if I had not experienced my mother’s pathological mourning, my father’s suffering and bewilderment, and the pain of my brother Pierre, the oldest of the boys.’’ René Laforgue, her analyst, noted a ‘‘family neurosis’’ extending across the generations in her family. Part of this family neurosis was a ‘‘myth of the savior’’: Dolto’s paternal grandfather died while rescuing five women in a railway fire, and her maternal grandfather, a prisoner in 1870, was ‘‘saved by his sister disguised as a peasant girl.’’ Dolto began her analysis with Laforgue in 1931, and he subsequently encouraged her to get involved in child analysis, at which she was very gifted, according to Sophie Morgenstern. Her supervisors were Heinz Hartmann, Angel Garma, Rudolph Löwenstein, René Spitz, John Leuba, and Morgenstern. She was elected to membership in the Société psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society) on June 20, 1939, about the time of the publication of her thesis in medicine, Psychanalyse et pédiatrie (Psychoanalysis and pediatrics; 1971b). At the Hôpital Trousseau, Dolto worked for a short time in Jenny Aubry’s pediatric ward. Then after Édouard Pichon’s death, she took over and ran his consultancy from 1940 to 1978. She ran the consultancy in innovative ways and independently of the psychiatry ward, and she opened it to analysts wishing to train in child analysis. Numerous participants can attest to the quality of her input and to what they learned by watching her work with children and their parents. She was the first analyst to modify the therapeutic setting by bringing in ‘‘witnesses’’ who rarely contributed, one of them taking notes and the others playing a role analogous to that of a Greek chorus. Here she began accepting infant patients, which was most unusual at the time. At offices in Paris she engaged in the same sort of practice with children from the Antony nursery and state foster homes. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS In tandem with these activities, she started a Tuesday-evening study seminar on children’s drawings and, on two Thursdays per month, a seminar in child analysis for psychoanalysts and therapists. She led the seminar for nearly fifteen years. During its last years, the seminar brought together as many as several hundred participants. At the time of the first split in the French psychoanalytic movement, Dolto—along with Jacques Lacan, Daniel Lagache, and Juliette Favez-Boutonier— founded the Société française de psychanalyse (French Society of Psychoanalysis) in 1953. For the 1960 congress on female sexuality in Amsterdam, she wrote ‘‘La libido génitale et son destin féminin’’ (Genital libido and its vicissitudes in women; 1996b). From 1947 she published numerous articles in the socialist journal La revue de l’union des femmes françaises, and later in Les études carmélitaines, Psyché, and the journal of the École des parents (Parents’ school). She worked at the Centre Étienne-Marcel from its inception and published in Le coq-héron, and in 1971 published Dominique: the analysis of an adolescent, a case history of the treatment of a ‘‘retarded’’ patient. In 1964 she was a follower of Jacques Lacan during the creation of the École freudienne de Paris. At that time the International Psychoanalytical Association excommunicated the Lacanians, forbidding them to teach and train analysts. On August 2, 1962, Serge Lebovici, addressing the executive committee of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Edinburgh, demanded that they separate ‘‘the wheat from the chaff ’’ and accused Dolto of being what she was, neither a Kleinian nor a follower of Anna Freud. In Dolto’s case, the reasons for the excommunication still have not been clearly explained. One can only conclude that a great injustice was committed. Her radio programs, beginning in 1976 and listened to by parents all over France, established her as an analyst in touch with society and actively engaged in the cause of children. The list of her contributions is extensive: her work with the deaf, her active support of the Neuville schools, her long preface to Maud Mannoni’s book, Le Premier rendez-vous avec le psychanalyste, her decisive influence in the training of educators and childcare workers, her contributions in support of children’s rights. She also actively participated in numerous colloquia and meetings: Naı̂tre et ensuite (Birth and Afterwards), within the framework of the Groupe de recherche et d’étude du nouveau-né 427 D O L T O - M A R E T T E , F R A N Ç O I S E (19 08 –198 8) (Group for the Research and Study of Newborns), and the Bordeaux conference Enfants et souffrance (Children and suffering). These many innovative experiments have given her an original and incontrovertible place in the history of relations between psychoanalysis and society. Her concepts of the ‘‘unconscious body image,’’ female libido, and ‘‘symbolic castration,’’ debated by the psychoanalytic community, were, for her students, ‘‘valuable tools that were indispensable in the clinical treatment of very young children or patients in great distress.’’ They were the fruit of a life devoted to ‘‘hearing’’ the needs of infants when they are still incapable of speech but can expresses themselves in their own ways. The creation of a welcome facility for little ones accompanied by their parents (founded in January 1978), later the Maison verte de Paris (which opened in January 1979), attests to the efforts of Dolto and her collaborators at the Centre Étienne-Marcel—Pierre Benoı̂t, Colette Langignon, and Bernard This—to promote, together with Marie-Noëlle Rebois, MarieHélène Malandrin, Nelba Nasio, Claude This, and all those who came later, the prevention of early childhood emotional disturbances. This innovation by a group of analysts and educators, recognized by the Fondation de France (Foundation of France), led to many other welcome facilities in France and other countries. A three-volume collection of Dolto’s radio programs, Lorsque l’enfant paraı̂t (When the child appears; 1990), first appeared in 1977, 1978, and 1979. Her other publications include The Jesus of psychoanalysis: a Freudian interpretation of the Gospel (1979); in 1981, La difficulté de vivre (The difficulty of living; 1995), Au jeu du désir (The play of desire), and Les évangiles et la foi au risque de la psychanalyse (The Gospel and faith in the light of psychoanalysis; 1996a); in 1982, Séminaire de psychanalyse d’enfants (Seminar on child analysis); in 1984, L’image inconsciente du corps (The unconscious body image); in 1985, La cause des enfants (The cause of children) and Solitude (1987b); in 1987, Tout est langage (Everything is language; 2002), L’enfant du miroir (The child of the mirror), and Dialogues québecois (Quebec dialogues); and in 1992, Inconscient et destin (The unconscious and fate) and Quand les parents se séparent (When parents separate). Many aspects of Dolto’s career show that this clinician and internationally renowned psychoanalyst sought to make her ideas accessible to all. After her death on August 25, 1988, 42 8 many of her contributions were published, and the Association archives et documentation Françoise Dolto was established in Paris in 1990. BERNARD THIS Works discussed: Flower Doll: Essays in Child Psychotherapy; Psychanalyse et Pédiatrie (psychoanalysis and pediatrics). See also: Armand Trousseau Children’s Hospital; Child psychoanalysis; École freudienne de Paris; France; Psychanalyse, La; Puberty; Société française de pscyhanalyse; Technique with children, psychoanalytic. Bibliography Dolto, Françoise. (1971a). Dominique: the analysis of an adolescent. New York: Outerbridge and Lazard. ———. (1971b). Psychanalyse et pédiatrie. Paris: Seuil. (Originally published 1939) ———. (1981). Au jeu du désir: essais clinique. Paris: Seuil. ———. (1982). Séminaire de psychanalyse d’enfants. Paris: Seuil. ———. (1984). L’image inconsciente du corps. Paris: Seuil. ———. (1985). La cause des enfants. Paris: R. Laffont. ———. (1986). Enfances. Paris: Seuil. ———. (1987a). Dialogues québecois. Paris: Editions du Seuil. ———. (1987b). Solitude. Paris: Vertiges du Nord. ———. (1989). Autoportrait d’une psychanalyste. Paris: Seuil. ———. (1990). Lorsque l’enfant paraı̂t. Paris: Seuil. (Originally published 1977–1979) ———. (1992). Inconscient et destins. Paris: Seuil. ———. (1995). La difficulté de vivre. Paris: Gallimard. (Originally published 1981) ———. (1996a). Les évangiles et la foi au risque de la psychanalyse. Paris: Gallimard. ———. (1996b). La libido génitale et son destin féminin. In her Sexualité féminine. La libido génitale et son destin féminin. Paris: Gallimard. (Originally published 1964) Dolto, Françoise, and Angelino, Inès. (1988). Quand les parents se séparent. Paris: Seuil. Dolto, Françoise; Baldy Moulinier, Claude; Guillerault, Gérard; and Kouki, Elisabeth. (2002). Tout est langage. Paris: Gallimard. (Originally published 1987) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS D O O L I T T L E - A L D I N G T O N , H I L D A (H. D. ), (1886 –1 961) Dolto, Françoise, and Nasio, Juan-David. (1987). L’enfant du miroir. Paris: Rivages. Dolto, Françoise, and Sévérin, Gérard. (1979). The Jesus of psychoanalysis: a Freudian interpretation of the Gospel. (Helen R. Lane, Trans.) Garden City, NY: Doubleday. (Original work published 1977) DON JUAN AND THE DOUBLE In 1914 and 1922, Otto Rank published two essays in German in Imago: The Double and Don Juan. Rank was inspired to write The Double after seeing a film by H. H. Ewer, The Student of Prague, and a presentation of Mozart’s Don Giovanni led him to write Don Juan. As the author himself noted, ‘‘In both texts, there is a question of problems going back to the most remote origins of mankind, which continue to have a profound influence on art.’’ These problems are ‘‘the relationship between individuals and their own ego and the threat of its complete destruction by death.’’ Rank was a particularly prolific writer with an extensive knowledge of literature and anthropology, as shown by these two essays and alluded to in his belief that ‘‘the creative artist is, from the psychological point of view, the extension of the hero of prehistoric humanity.’’ In The Double he explores the theme of the double in literature as a kind of shadow, reflection, portrait, twin, or even duplication of mental life resulting from amnesia or manipulation (as in Robert Louis Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde). Rank examines various possibilities, including the terrible consequences if the shadow is lost and the independent double persecutes the ego. Sigmund Freud in his essay ‘‘The Uncanny’’ (1919h) noted that Rank had succeeded in explaining the surprising evolution of the theme of the double. ‘‘For the Ôdouble’ was originally an insurance against the destruction of the ego, an Ôenergetic denial of the power of death,’ ’’ but, Freud adds, ‘‘such ideas have sprung from the soil of unbounded self-love, from the primary narcissism which dominates the mind of the child and of primitive man. But when this stage has been surmounted, the Ôdouble’ reverses its aspect. From having been an assurance of immortality, it becomes the uncanny [unheimlich] harbinger of death’’ (1919h, p. 235). Referring to the myth of Narcissus and to the narcissistic hero Dorian Gray in Oscar Wilde’s The Picture INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS of Dorian Gray, Rank notes that the hero’s misfortune follows from his disposition to narcissism, which turns him into the prisoner of his double. The double then becomes a rival in sexual love or appears in superstitious belief as a terrifying messenger of death, a devil, or an anti-ego, destroying rather than replacing the ego. The essay on Don Juan (1922/1975) is also related to the theme of the double. Rank asserts that it is impossible to consider the legend of Don Juan solely in Freud’s sense and explain it by the father complex (p. 86). Rank shows that the division of the personality into the master Don Juan and the valet Leporello is a ‘‘necessary part of the artistic presentation of the hero himself ’’ (p. 50), for ‘‘[b]y inhibiting the will of his master, whose thirst for action he continually keeps in check with uncanny irony, he is characterized as the critical-ironic part of the ego’’ (p. 59). Starting from the idea of ‘‘avenging death’’ Rank also develops interesting perspectives on cannibalism. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Double, ‘‘‘Uncanny,’ The.’’ the; Rank (Rosenfeld), Otto; Source Citation Rank, Otto. (1971). The double: a psychoanalytic study (Harry Tucker Jr., Trans.). Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. (Original work published 1914) Rank, Otto. (1975). The Don Juan legend (David G. Winter, Trans.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1922) Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1919h). The uncanny. SE, 17: 217–256. Lieberman, E. James. (1985). Acts of will: the life and work of Otto Rank. New York: Free Press. DOOLITTLE-ALDINGTON, HILDA (H.D.), (1886–1961) The American poet Hilda Doolittle was born on September 10, 1886, in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, and died in Zurich in September 1961. From her analysis with Freud during 1933–1934 she left a diary, a written homage to Freud: Tribute to Freud, (1944), which represents a precious account of their warm and positive analytic relationship. 429 D O O L I T T L E -A L D I N G T O N , H I L D A (H. D. ), (1886 –1 961) The only daughter of four children, her father was Charles Leander Doolittle, a professor of astronomy who, in 1897, began teaching at the University of Pennsylvania. There Hilda discovered her calling as a poet, encouraged by her relationship with Ezra Pound, who at age 20, just a year older than she, had just been appointed instructor. Although her father forbade her to carry on a relationship with Pound, who would soon be expelled for immorality, Hilda kept up a correspondence with him that in 1911 brought her to Europe, where she would spend the rest of her life. She went initially to England with Frances Gregg, with whom she had a homosexual liaison, and soon met Richard Aldington, a poet six years younger than herself. H.D. published her first poems in 1913, and married Aldington the same year. The couple lost their first daughter in 1915, but a second daughter, named Perdita in memory of the first, was born on March 31, 1919. Hilda’s favorite brother, Gilbert, was killed in France in 1918, and her father, seriously affected by the news, died a year later. In 1919, H.D.’s marriage ended, as did her brief but intense friendship with D. H. Lawrence. When H.D. had suffered post-partum depression after the birth of her daughter, she owed her recovery to Bryher (Winifred Ellerman), an energetic novelist and poet who became her companion and took her and Perdita to live in Greece. While living in Corfu, H.D. suffered an episode of depersonalization, an experience that held no particular interest for Havelock Ellis, who was in some measure attracted to her. She also had a hallucinatory vision of ‘‘writing on the wall’’ that Freud characterized as a ‘‘dangerous symptom’’ when she told him about it. This vision may explain the mild and tender positive countertransference behavior that Freud adopted toward her. Bryher, who had been analyzed by Hanns Sachs, acquainted H.D with psychoanalysis. An initial effort at analysis with Mary Chadwick in the spring in 1931 was a failure, but it led H.D. to begin treatment in Berlin with Sachs, who subsequently introduced her to Freud. By then well-known for her imagist verse, H.D. sought analysis to remedy a sense of sterility in her writing. Freud had read some of her work, including Palimpseste, before their first meeting on Wednesday, March 1, 1933. In the diary she kept of her analysis (in 43 0 spite of his disapproval—he viewed it as resistance), she described him as ‘‘like a curator in a museum . . .; he is like D. H. Lawrence, grown old but matured and with astute perception. His hands are sensitive and frail’’ (1974, p 116). From the beginning of treatment Freud brought her to see his collection of antiquities and showed her a small statue of Athena: ‘‘This is my favorite,’’ he remarked (p. 118). ‘‘You are the only person to have ever entered this room and looked at the objects before looking at me.’’ This first session set the tone of an analysis in which Freud quickly interpreted that ‘‘not only did I want to be a boy but I wanted to be a hero’’ (p. 120). His interventions made him into ‘‘the grandfather godfather, god-the-father’’ (p. 120). He told her at one point, ‘‘I was thinking about what you said, about its not being worthwhile to love an old man of seventy-seven,’’ and H.D. wrote, ‘‘I had said no such thing and told him so. He smiled his ironical crooked smile. I said, ÔI did not say it was not worthwhile. I said I was afraid.’ But he confused me. He said, ÔIn analysis, the person is dead after the analysis is over—as dead as your father’’’ (p. 141). Freud also confided in her that ‘‘I do not like being the mother in transference—it always surprises and shocks me a little. I feel so very masculine’’ (pp. 146– 147). H.D.’s mother had traveled with her and Aldington when they were lovers, and later lived with her in Europe for long periods in the 1920s before her death in 1927; Freud viewed her as the root cause of H.D.’s confusion and homosexuality. After three months of analysis, H.D. left Vienna on June 15, 1933. When she returned at the end of October, to remain until December 1, she was concerned about the rise of Nazism; she immediately perceived the danger that it posed for ‘‘the Professor.’’ Once again, describing in unparalleled fashion during the next five weeks of exceptional sessions, she sketched a poetical and moving portrait. She did so without concessions; attracted by the strange and bizarre, by astrology and belief in paranormal phenomena, she sometimes confronted the convictions of an old man. For his part, Freud hoped to introduce into her mental universe the father figure and finally succeeded. ‘‘We have gone into deep matters,’’ he told her after one session (p. 177); after another, he said, ‘‘Today we have tunneled very deep.’’ (p. 18). H.D. had further sessions in 1936 and 1937, rather more as psychotherapy, with Walter Schmideberg. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ‘ ‘D O S T O Y E V S K Y Until his death she never failed to send Freud gardenias for his birthday. In 1944 she wrote her memoir, first entitled Writing on the Wall , which appeared in 1956 as Tribute to the World. Soon after World War II, H.D. turned toward spirituality and underwent a severe mental breakdown and deep depression. Moving to Switzerland in the late 1940s, H.D. enjoyed a productive and successful career in the last years of her life, publishing several books of poems, memoirs, and short stories that brought her considerable attention in literary circles in the United States. A hip fracture in 1960 left her handicapped until her death on September 27, 1961. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Literature and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Appignanesi, Lisa, Forrester, John. (1992). Freud’s women. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Doolittle, Hilda. (1974). Tribute to Freud. Boston: David R. Godine. Holland, Norman N. (1973). ‘‘Freud and H.D.’’ International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 50, 309–315. Reprinted in Freud as we knew him. (pp. 449–462). (Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek, Ed.). Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Friedman, Susan Stanford. (2002). Analysing Freud: letters of HD, Bryher and their circle. New York: New Directions. DORA. See ‘‘Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria’’ (Dora/Ida Bauer) ‘‘DOSTOYEVSKY AND PARRICIDE’’ Freud distinguished Dostoyevsky the writer, Dostoyevsky the neurotic, Dostoyevsky the moralist, and Dostoyevsky the sinner. Freud regarded Dostoyevsky the writer as unassailable, placing his work alongside Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex and Shakespeare’s Hamlet. The moralist Freud dismissed, for Dostoyevsky confined himself to being the sinner, subject to the czar and God, even while he oscillated between faith INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PARRICIDE’’ and atheism. Sadistic toward the outside world where small things were concerned, and toward himself where large things were concerned, Dostoyevsky finally appeared to be a masochist, ‘‘that is to say the mildest, kindliest, most helpful person possible’’ (p. 179). But for Freud there is more: Dostoyevsky’s projections into his characters—violent, egocentric, criminal—bear witness to his identification with them. The sexual attack on the young girl as related to Strakov, would support this view, as would Dostoyevsky’s passion for gambling. Dostoyevsky’s impulsive character interfered with his neurosis, and as a result, his ego lost its unity, a condition that expressed itself in his so-called epilepsy. This condition was, however, no more than a symptom of his neurosis, hystero-epilepsy, a serious form of hysteria. Freud pointed out the memory difficulties associated with such epilepsy and the limited understanding of the disease at the time. Dostoyevsky’s affliction appears to have been a case of the ancient morbus sacer (sacred illness) or a clinical variant. Its link with psychic life does not interfere with ‘‘complete mental development and, if anything, an excessive and as a rule insufficiently controlled emotional life’’ (p. 180), characteristic of Dostoyevsky’s mental functioning. The mechanism of his abnormal instinctual discharge, organically preconditioned, was made available to his neurosis, and through somatic means, it eliminated any excitation not psychically contained. For Freud, Dostoyevsky’s first, slight attacks harked back to childhood and did not assume a true epileptic form until after the traumatic event of the murder of his father by Russian peasants. Psychoanalysis showed that this was the keystone of Dostoyevsky’s neurosis, and the parricide of the Karamazovs reflects this. Dostoyevsky’s anxieties about death, which he experienced in his youth, together with his states of lethargic sleep, would indicate that Dostoyevsky identified with the dead or with someone whose death he desired, and may have triggered a mechanism of self-punishment. Freud then returns to his hypothesis about the murder of the father in the primitive horde, humanity’s primal crime, which is reproduced in fantasy in every individual: the little boy, in his ambivalent relationship to his father (fear of castration or tenderness), must renounce his desire to possess the mother and eliminate the father, but a sense of unconscious guilt 431 D O S U Z K O V , T H E O D O R (18 99 –198 2) remains. In Dostoyevsky, a strong bisexual disposition conditioned and reinforced his neurosis, intensifying his defense against a ‘‘remarkably harsh’’ father. Thus the relationship between Dostoyevsky and the paternal object was transformed into a relationship between the ego and the superego. Once the murder of his father had given a sense of reality to such repressed desires, epilepsy followed. Source Citation The atmosphere indicates the liberation experienced, whereas the punitive dimension is confirmed in jail, where Dostoyevsky’s crises do not disappear but at least no longer weaken him, in spite of the injustice of the punishment: the czar has replaced the father. Dostoyevsky took this one step farther: the epileptic is the parricide—the culmination of his identification with common, political, and religious criminals—but the gambling debt, satisfying the need for self-punishment, enables him to write and succeed as a novelist. Green, André. (1992). Le double double: Ceci et cela. In his La déliaison: Psychanalyse, anthropologie et littérature (pp. 299–311). Paris: Belles Lettres. Curiously, at the end of this article on Dostoyevsky, Freud also analyzed Stefan Zweig’s short story ‘‘Twenty-four Hours in the Life of a Woman.’’ Freud sees this short story as the fantasy of a young man (also a gambler), in which his mother initiates him into sexual life to protect him from masturbation, a compulsion Freud assumed to be present in Dostoyevsky. Freud spent two years (1926–1928) reluctantly writing this article on ‘‘the cursed Russian,’’ whom he claimed not to have liked. His work led to discussions with Theodor Reik and Stefan Zweig. The article did not cause much of a stir when it was published, and the question of epilepsy failed to generate interest. Freud’s ambivalence toward the writer’s ‘‘pathological nature’’ attests to a certain rivalry with Dostoyevsky over the latter’s exploration of the unconscious, but may also indicate Freud’s parricidal wishes toward Jean Martin Charcot, the father of hystero-epilepsy, wishes quite different from Dostoyevsky’s epilepsy. Freud’s interpretation of the onset of Dostoyevsky’s crisis remains questionable, as does his interpretation of the father’s ‘‘murder.’’ At the time (1928), Dostoyevsky’s past was still largely unknown. MARIE-THÉRÈSE NEYRAUT-SUTTERMAN See also: Self-punishment; ‘‘Creative Writers and DayDreaming’’; Literary and artistic creation; Parricide; Zweig, Stefan. 43 2 Freud, Sigmund. (1928b). Dostoyevsky and parricide. SE, 21, 173–196. Bibliography Drouilly, Jean. (1977). Freud et Dostoı̈ewski. Évolution psychiatrique, 42, 1, 127–140. Marinov, Vladimir. (1990). Figures du crime chez Dostoı̈ewski. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Neyraut-Sutterman, Marie-Thérèse. (1970). Parricide et épilepsie: À propos d’un article de Freud sur Dostoı̈ewski. Revue Française de Psychanalyse, 34, 4, 635–652. Tellenbach, Hubertus. (1976). Phénoménologie de l’intrication entre épilepsie et changement de la personnalité à l’exemple du prince Myichkine de Dostoı̈ewski. Psychanalyse à l’Université, 1, 2, 341–354. DOSUZKOV, THEODOR (1899–1982) Theodor Dosuzkov, a physician and practicing psychoanalyst, was born on January 25, 1899, in Baku, then Russia, and died in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on January 19, 1982. He was the only child of a jurist aristocrat father and a Jewish mother. The October 1917 revolution surprised the family in Saint Petersburg. They fled before the Red Army and finally arrived at Novorossiisk in 1919. There Theodor Dosuzkov took his baccalaureate and met his future wife, with whom he left the country in 1920 bound for Prague via Constantinople. The Prague government was offering grants to Russian students. He studied medicine from 1921 to 1927 and then worked in the university neurology clinic, specializing in neurology and psychiatry. Through a circle of Russian intellectuals he met Nicolai Ossipov, who awakened his lifelong interest in psychoanalysis. When Ossipov died in 1934, Dosuzkov inherited his library and his correspondence with Freud. Internal intrigues prevented Dosuzkov from winning a university appointment. Disappointed, he left the university clinic and opened his own clinic in 1934 and practiced as a neurologist and psychoanalyst. He finished his psychoanalytic training in Prague with Annie Reich and then with Otto Fenichel. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DOUBLE BIND Dosuzkov survived the German occupation of Czechoslovakia from 1939 to 1945, during which he continued to teach and practice psychoanalysis in secret as the only properly trained psychoanalyst in all of Czechoslovakia. Subsequently, he received the professional and moral support of his students in 1946. He then reestablished the Society for the Study of Psychoanalysis, resumed contact with colleagues in other countries, and was appointed training analyst by the International Psychoanalytic Association. From 1946 to 1948 Dosuzkov and his students engaged in intense scientific and therapeutic activity. In 1947 and 1948 Dosuzkov published articles in the Annales de psychanalyse (Annals of psychoanalysis), but the 1949 volume never appeared because of the putsch in 1948. Dosuzkov had to go underground again. In 1968, during the Prague Spring, he was finally able to work openly for a short time. Dosuzkov’s interests and scientific activity are important in the study of neuroses and in applied psychoanalysis. Dosuzkov forged the notion of scoptophobia as a fourth psychoneurosis and worked on other phobias, which he interpreted in relation to urethral erotism. He also wrote works popularizing psychoanalysis. His work had an immense influence on the introduction of psychoanalysis in Czechoslovakia. He was an indefatigable proponent of psychoanalysis among specialists and to the general public. He was recognized as a representative of the discipline, defending its viewpoints with fervor, even during politically disturbed periods. He was also important for his scientific contributions. As a student of Fenichel, Dosuzkov took an interest in the psychology of the instincts. Owing to his work, psychoanalysis has survived in Czechoslovakia to the present day. He died in an accident in a railway yard closed to traffic. The circumstances surrounding his death have never been explained. EUGÉNIE FISCHER AND RENÉ FISCHER See also: Czech Republic. Bibliography Dosuzkov, Theodor. (1965). Skoptophobie: die vierte Übertragungsneurose. Psyche, 19, 537–546. ———. (1965). Über die drei Haupttypen des neurotischen Stotterns. Acta XIII Congressus therapia vocis et loquelam, Vienna. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ———. (1969). Zur Frage der Dysmorphophobie. Psyche, 23, 683–699. ———. (1975). Idrosophobia: A form of pregenital conversion. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 64, 253–265. ———. (1979). Skoptophobie bei männlichen und weiblichen Patienten. Psyche, 33, 620–633. DOUBLE BIND Gregory Bateson coined the term double bind in 1956. In trying to understand the characteristic effects of communication in schizophrenics’ families, Bateson and his collaborators identified a specific constraining interaction, the paradoxical injunction that they called the double bind. The double bind fits into one of the three types of paradox, the pragmatic paradox. The effects of the paradox in human interactions were first described by Gregory Bateson, Don D. Jackson, Jay Haley, and John H. Weakland in a document entitled Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia, published in 1956. Bateson and his collaborators were looking for sequences of interpersonal experience that could lead to a type of behavior that would justify the diagnosis of schizophrenia. This is one of the typical cases constructed by Paul Watzlawick from real clinical facts: A mother buys two neckties for her little boy, one green and one blue. The next day the child is in a hurry to sport the green necktie. The mother: ‘‘So you don’t like the blue tie I gave you?’’ The next day the boy puts on the blue tie and draws the symmetrical response: ‘‘So you don’t like the green tie I gave you?’’ So, on the third day, the child tries to find a compromise solution in order to satisfy his mother’s two demands: he puts on the two ties together. And his mother comments: ‘‘You poor boy, you’re out of your mind. You’re going to drive me crazy.’’ This paradoxical injunction, where the double bind mechanism is particularly obvious, clearly shows the annihilating effects on the person at the receiving end. Antonio J. Ferreira (1960) described one particular form of double bind, the split double bind, observed in the families of young delinquents. The expression ‘‘prescribe the symptom’’ was first introduced in Bateson’s group’s work on family therapy in schizophrenia. The group showed the paradoxical nature of this technique: the therapeutic double constraint. From a structural point of view, a therapeutic double constraint is the mirror image of a pathogenic double con433 DOUBLE, THE straint. The therapist formulates an injunction of such a structure that it reinforces the behavior that the patient expects to see disappear. A patient presenting persistent headaches (in-depth medical examinations revealed nothing) transmitted the following message through her symptoms and her earlier relations with doctors: ‘‘Help me but I won’t let you help me.’’ The therapist understood that given the history of physicians’ ‘‘failures,’’ any allusion to the help that psychotherapy could provide would predestine the treatment to fail. The patient therefore had to face the fact that her state was incurable. All that the therapist could do was help her learn to live with her pains. In the nineteen-seventies the notion of paradox was introduced into clinical and theoretical psychoanalysis from several different directions, largely due to Didier Anzieu’s article on Transfert paradoxal (Paradoxical transfer) (1975) and Paul-Claude Racamier’s work on humor and madness (1973), and later on schizophrenics’ paradoxes (Congress of Romance-Language Psychoanalysts, 1978). JEAN-PIERRE CAILLOT See also: Paradox; Schizophrenia; System/systemic. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1975). Le transfert paradoxal. Nouvelle revue de Psychanalyse, 12, 49–72. Bateson, Gregory; Jackson, Don D.; Haley, Jay; and Weakland, John (1956). Toward a theory of schizophrenia. Behavioral Science, 1, 251–254. Ferreira, Antonio J. (1980). Double lien et délinquance. Changements systémiques en thérapie familiale. Paris: E.S.F. (Original work published 1960) Racamier, Paul-Claude (1992). Le génie des origines. Psychanalyse et psychoses. Paris: Payot. Watzlawick, Paul; Beavin, Janet Helmick; and Jackson, Don D. (1967). Pragmatics of human communication. New York: W.W. Norton. DOUBLE, THE The double refers to a representation of the ego that can assume various forms (shadow, reflection, portrait, double, twin) that is found in primitive animism as a narcissistic extension and guarantee of immortality, but which, with the withdrawal of narcissism, 43 4 becomes a foreshadowing of death, a source of criticism and persecution. The figure of the double dates back to primitive civilizations, as shown in legend, but it is also found throughout literature. It was Otto Rank who in his essay on the double (1914) was the first to develop this idea in psychoanalysis, and Sigmund Freud quotes him at length in ‘‘The Uncanny’’ (1919). However, the idea of the doubling of consciousness is present in his first texts on hysteria (1893, 1895), and the unconscious itself is introduced by Freud as a second consciousness capable of producing dreams, parapraxes, and so on. The theme of the double is taken up by Freud and integrated in his concept of the uncanny. ‘‘The Ôuncanny’ is that form of terror that leads back to something long known to us, once very familiar’’ (1919), but has become terrifying because it corresponds to something repressed that has returned. ‘‘The double,’’ Freud wrote citing Heinrich Heine, ‘‘has become an image of terror, just as, after the collapse of their religion, the gods turned into demons.’’ (1910). Rank’s study of the double has two aspects: anthropological and psychopathological, the latter being approached through literature and the personality of authors. For anthropology, the double is omnipresent as a representation of the soul and therefore a guarantor of survival. It also helps us understand the nature of sacrifice, such as the cannibalistic incorporation of the son by the father (Chronos) because the son has drawn to himself the father’s image or shadow. The double is similarly the origin of certain taboos, and Rank notes the evolution between the narcissistic claim of immortality and the acceptance of the genetic continuity of parents through their children, which is at the origin of totemism. ‘‘It is no longer the double itself (the shadow) that continues to live but the spirit of a dead elder who is reborn in the embryo’’ (Rank, 1914). In literature (E.T.A. Hoffmann, Edgar Allen Poe, Guy de Maupassant, Alfred de Musset, Fyodor Dostoevsky), Rank points out the description of a paranoid state revolving around the persecution of the ego by its double and compares these imaginary creations to their authors’ symptoms, through which the theme of the double reveals a psychopathological dimension (epilepsy, splitting of the personality). Similarly, Freud noted that an older form of narcissism that has been overcome can continue to have an effect by changing into a ‘‘moral conscience’’ susceptible of being split off INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DOUBT from the ego, as seen, for example, in delusions of being watched. The double is also found, although on a different plane, in real or imagined twins and, more generally, in twin brothers. The paradox of identity versus alterity arises here together with—in the case of the doubles of myth who are not brothers (Achilles and Patroclus, Orestes and Pylades)—the narcissistic foundations of friendship. This can be contrasted with the tragic destiny of Narcissus, who drowned while looking at his own reflection. The theme of the double appears, therefore, to be susceptible to very broad interpretation, similar to the primal narcissism from which it originated. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Don Juan and the Double; ‘‘‘Uncanny,’ The’’. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund (1919h). The Uncanny. SE, 17: 217–256. Rank, Otto (1914). The double: A psychoanalytic study. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1971. (1992). Topique, 49. DOUBT The distinction between doubt as an instrument of rational thought and pathological doubt was known to philosophers (Descartes, Spinoza) long before Freud, and had long been studied as a symptom or syndrome in psychiatry. Théodule Ribot defined doubt as ‘‘a conflict between two tendencies in thought, incompatible and antagonistic, without any possible reconciliation, into a succession of positive and negative judgments about the same subject that does not culminate in a conclusion’’ (1925). In his study on obsessional neurosis, Freud noted that ‘‘[a]nother mental need . . . obsessional neurotics . . . is the need for uncertainty in their life, or for doubt’’ (1909d, p. 232). Freud first discussed doubt in his work on dreams where he saw it as a mark of resistance and an indication to the analyst of the significance of the repressed element to which it related. But for the most part Freud considered doubt in the context of obsessional neurosis, where it applied to events that had already occurred, and could be seen above all as an expression INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS of ambivalence, a repudiation of the instinct for mastery as sublimated into an instinct for knowledge (1913i, p. 324). The etiology of doubt as a symptom is analyzed at length in the case history of the ‘‘Rat Man’’ (1909d). Freud summarized it in a letter of April 21, 1918, to Lou Andreas-Salomé: ‘‘The tendency to doubt arises not from any occasion for doubt, but is the continuation of the powerful ambivalent tendencies in the pregenital phase, which from then on become attached to every pair of opposites that present themselves’’ (1966/ 1972, p. 77). Obsessional thought, however, to characterize it more accurately, has three somewhat different aspects: uncertainty, hesitation, and doubt. Uncertainty can be viewed as that voluntary blurring of references, which underpins the aversion for watches, for example. Doubt, for its part, is an internal perception of indecision, which just like hesitation is associated with the volitional sphere, whereas uncertainty belongs to the cognitive and doubt to the affective. These three aspects do not necessarily function simultaneously, as witness the fact that we can be certain yet unable to decide on action; at the same time, action can overcome hesitation in the absence of the slightest certainty about the reasonableness of that decision. The essence of wisdom would be to achieve certainty before abandoning hesitation—the precise attribute obsessionals find it so hard to adopt (Mijolla-Mellor, 1992). Apropos of the Rat Man, Freud mentions the ‘‘predilection for uncertainty’’ of obsessional neurotics who turn their thoughts to ‘‘those subjects upon which all mankind are uncertain and upon which our knowledge and judgments must necessarily remain open to doubt’’ (1909d, p. 232–33). This tendency extends to easily accessible knowledge, seemingly as a form of protection against the risk of knowing. In fact the obsessive neutralizes any idea, any decision, by evoking its opposite. Thus hesitation and the predilection for uncertainty constitute the cognitive aspect of the impossibility of choosing, an attitude that serves to delay action indefinitely. The obsessive is paralyzed by ambivalence, immobilized by two instinctual impulses directed at the same object. What is the source of this ambivalence? Since it is too general a concept to determine the ‘‘choice of neurosis,’’ Freud offered a hypothesis based on constitutional factors: ‘‘The sadistic components of love have, 435 DREAM from constitutional causes, been exceptionally strongly developed.’’ And in terms of individual history, these ‘‘have consequently undergone a premature and all too thorough suppression’’ (1909d, p. 240). Serge Leclaire (1971) has made significant contributions to our understanding of the nature of doubt in the obsessive individual, which he sums up rather laconically as ‘‘He doubts because he knows.’’ SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Certainty; Intellectualization; Mahler, Gustav (meeting with Sigmund Freud); ‘‘Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis’’ (Rat Man); Obsession; Obsessional neurosis. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1909d). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151–318. ———. (1913i). The disposition to obsessional neurosis: a contribution to the problem of choice of neurosis. SE, 12: 311–326. Freud, Sigmund, and Andreas-Salomé, Lou. (1972). Sigmund Freud and Lou Andreas-Salomé; letters. (Ernst Pfeiffer, Ed. and William and Elaine Robson-Scott, Trans.). New York: Harcourt Brace. (Original work published 1966) radical departure for he claimed that hysterical symptoms were the expression of ‘‘conflicts,’’ and that dreams were the product of a ‘‘dream work.’’ In both cases there was no weakening of psychic activity but quite the opposite, an intense activity driven by the opposition between wishes and psychic defense mechanisms. The radical nature of Freud’s position was illuminated by his divergence from Josef Breuer, who saw hysteria as the product of ‘‘hypnoid states’’ brought on by a weakening of organizing mental activity and a concomitant decrease in what Pierre Janet called ‘‘mental tension’’ (Freud and Breuer, 1895d). Freud conceived his theory of dreams very early. His exposure to the work of Charcot and later to that of Bernheim was undoubtedly a contributing factor. In 1892 he noted that many dreams ‘‘spin out further associations which have been rejected or broken off during the day. I have based on this fact the theory of Ôhysterical counter-will’ which embraces a good number of hysterical symptoms’’ (1892-94a, p. 138). (‘‘Counter-will,’’ meaning an opposition to the satisfaction of desire for moral reasons, was a conceptual forerunner of repression.) The ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ (1950c [1895]) introduced a number of ideas about dreams that were later expanded and refined. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1992). Le Plaisir de pensée. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Between 1897 and 1900 Freud, with moral support from his correspondent Wilhelm Fliess, conducted the self-analysis that gave birth to psychoanalysis. For the most part, that self-analysis drew on Freud’s own dreams (Anzieu, 1975/1984), and in due course those same dreams supplied a large portion of the material of The Interpretation of Dreams. DREAM Freud’s dream theory may be summarized as follows: Janet, Pierre. (1909). Les Névroses. Paris: Flammarion. Leclaire, Serge. (1971). Démasquer le reel. Paris: Le Seuil, ‘‘Champ freudien.’’ The dream, guardian of sleep, provides disguised satisfaction for wishes that are repressed while we are awake; dream interpretation is the ‘‘royal road that leads to knowledge of the unconscious in psychic life.’’ Such, in highly condensed form, is Freud’s theory as set forth in the founding work of psychoanalysis, The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). As Freud himself pointed out, this was a revolutionary thesis. The only scientists interested in dreams during the late nineteenth century were psychologists looking for ‘‘elements’’ of mental activity or psychiatrists interested in hysteria and hypnosis. All of them saw dreams as nothing more than degraded products of a weak and thus dissociated psyche. Freud’s approach was a 43 6 1. The dream expresses a wish unsatisfied during the waking state, whether because of a conscious objection or, more frequently, because of repression, in which case the wish is unrecognized. During sleep, the psychic apparatus finds its natural tendency, which is to reduce tension, that is, to experience pleasure. The dream, like hysterical symptoms, slips, parapraxes, and so on, is a sign of the return of the repressed. Freud went further still, claiming that every dream was the fulfillment of a wish, which obviously invites an objection about unpleasurable dreams and anxiety dreams. On several occasions Freud rebutted this objection, continuing to analyze such dreams INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DREAM until he isolated a wish behind distress or anxiety, which he claimed were merely expressions of resistance and conflict. Truth to tell, his argument was not always persuasive. On the basis of necessarily fragmentary material, it sometimes gave an impression of the ad hoc. Freud was able to overcome this difficulty only much later, when he introduced the repetition compulsion that lay ‘‘beyond the pleasure principle’’ (1920g). 2. Two circumstances favor this return of the repressed. The first is the inhibition of perception and motricity during sleep, protecting the dreamer against the dangers of actual satisfaction. This results in a ‘‘topographical regression,’’ that is, the excitation flows back unto the psyche and reinforces the dream-work. The second circumstance is that sleep weakens the censorship. 3. A measure of censorship remains, however, and often allows satisfaction of a disguised kind only. This is the function of the ‘‘dream-work.’’ This work employs the mechanisms of condensation and displacement (primary processes) before proceeding to generate images (representability). Then, by means of secondary revision, the ‘‘dream façade’’ is improved to provide a plausible meaning; i.e., the manifest content of the dream, which is quite different from the underlying meaning, that of the ‘‘latent dreamthoughts.’’ The dream work is a form of thinking, but its rules are very different from those that prevail in the logical thought of the waking state: dreams know nothing of contradiction. 4. The dream thus provides an outlet for libidinal pressure. It is the ‘‘guardian of sleep’’ since, without its intervention, the pressure would awaken the dreamer. 5. The dream’s raw materials are ‘‘day’s residues’’ (events, thoughts, or affects from the recent past) and physical sensations that occur during sleep. But its ‘‘real’’ content is reactivated infantile memories, especially those of an oedipal kind: the dream is a regression to an infantile state. These tenets underpin dream interpretation, whose aim is to render meaningful elements in the dream’s manifest content (to restore their latent meaning), on the basis of the dreamer’s associations. Freud insisted that any ‘‘key to dreams,’’ that is, any list of symbolic INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS equivalents of supposedly general value, be excluded. He did, however, recognize some universal ‘‘symbols,’’ transmitted by culture, and some ‘‘typical dreams’’ to be met with in many dreamers (dreams of nudity, for example). ROGER PERRON See also: Action-(re)presentation; Agency; Alpha function; Anticathexis/counter-cathexis; Beta-elements; Beyond the Pleasure Principle; Breton, André; Censorship; Certainty; ‘‘Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest’’; Compromise formation; Condensation; Contradiction; Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva’’; Subject’s desire; Directed daydream (R. Desoille); Displacement; Dream and Myth; Dream interpretation; Dream’s navel, the; Convenience, dream of; Nakedness, dream of; ‘‘Dream of the Wise Baby;’’ Dream screen; Dream symbolism; Dream work; Ego ideal; Ego states; Forgetting; Formations of the unconscious; Functional phenomenon; Hypocritical dream; Hysteria; Infantile, the; Inferiority, feeling of; Interpretation of Dreams, The; Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis; Isakower phenomenon, Jokes; Latent; Latent dream thoughts; Letter, the; Logic(s); Manifest; Metaphor; ‘‘Metapsychologic Supplement to the Theory of Dreams’’; Metonymy; Mnemic trace/memory trace; Mourning, dream of; Myth; Myth of the Birth of the Hero, The; Narcissistic withdrawal; New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis; Nightmare; Night terrors; Oedipus complex; On Dreams; Overdetermination; Primal scene; Primary process/secondary process; ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology, A’’; Psychic reality; Psychic temporality; Psychoanalysis of Dreams; Punishment, dream of; Purposive idea; Reality testing; Regression; Repetition; Repetitive dreams; Representability; Representation of affect; Reversal into the opposite; Reverie; Schiller and psychoanalysis; Screen memory; Secondary revision; Secret; Self-state dream; Somnambulism; Substitutive formation; Surrealism and psychoanalysis; Telepathy; Thing-presentation; Thought; time; Training analysis; Trauma; Typical dreams; Unconscious, the; Wish/yearning; Wish fulfillment; Wish, hallucinatory satisfaction of a; Work (as a psychoanalytical notion). Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1984). The group and the unconscious. (Benjamin Kilborne, Trans.). London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1975) Diatkine, René. (1974). Rêve, illusion et connaissance. (Rapport). Réponse aux interventions. 1107–1108. Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse, 38 (5–6), 769–820. P.L.R. Congrès XXXIV ‘‘Le rêve.’’ Madrid, 1974. 437 DREAM INTERPRETATION  ———. (1892–94a). Preface and footnotes to the translation of Charcot’s ‘‘Tuesday Lectures.’’ SE 1: 129–144. The driving force of the dream, unconscious wishes, are rooted in childhood, notably in oedipal conflicts.  ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. The ‘‘dream material’’ is supplied by ‘‘day’s residues’’—usually recent events of waking life.  The dream work transforms this material by means of the primary processes of condensation, displacement, and visual representation, followed on occasion by a secondary elaboration that perfects the ‘‘dream façade.’’  Having once transformed into the ‘‘manifest content of the dream,’’ the ‘‘latent dream-thoughts,’’ now unrecognizable, are able to cross the barrier of censorship.  The scenes thus created have, for the dreamer, all the characteristics of reality; they are hallucinatory in nature.  The logic governing the dreamwork is very different from that of waking life, and the dream’s manifest content is often incoherent, filled with bizarre or absurd elements. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The Interpretation of Dreams. SE, 4–5. ———. (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281–387. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1981). Frontiers in psychoanalysis: between the dream and psychic pain. (Catherine Cullen and Philip Cullen, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Original work published 1977) Further Reading Blum, Harold P. (2000). The writing and interpretation of dreams. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 17, 651–666. Lansky, Melvin R. (Ed. ). (1992). Essential papers on dreams. New York: New York University Press. Lewin, Betram. (1955). Dream psychology and the analytic situation. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 24, 169–199. Reiser, Morton. (1997). The art and science of dream interpretation: Isakower revisited. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 45. Solms, Mark. (1995). New findings on the neurological organization of dreaming: Implications for psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 64, 43–67. DREAM INTERPRETATION The procedure of dream interpretation is based on the theory of the dream’s functions and of the dreamwork outlined in Freud’s great work The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). This book was based in large part on Freud’s own self-analysis of 1896–1897, in which dream interpretation played a leading role (Anzieu, 1975). For Freud, dream interpretation is based on several basic principles:  Every dream represents a wish as fulfilled. Thanks to a relative relaxation of censorship in sleep, a dream expresses repressed desires whose satisfaction is forbidden during the waking state. The conflicts involved may be expressed in unpleasant or anxiety-provoking dreams, however. 43 8 Interpretation relies on these principles, but it also needs the dreamer’s associations. He or she is therefore asked to associate as freely as possible, to elicit details of the day’s residues used in the dreamwork, to explicate the displacements and condensations, and to understand the choice of the visual images that make up the manifest content. In this way the thoughts latent beneath that manifest contest, the wishes and conflicts underlying the dream, can be unearthed. Special attention should be paid to bizarre or absurd details, for these indicate points where the dream’s work of distortion has been less effective. At the same time, however, Freud cautioned against concentrating on the latent and ignoring the manifest content (1916–17f). For Freud, the interpretation of dreams was the ‘‘via regia,’’ the royal road leading to the unconscious. On several occasions in The Interpretation of Dreams, he noted that the procedure should be carried to the extreme, yet the examples he provided could hardly be said to adhere to this recommendation—presumably because these are for the most part his own dreams, and he may have been reluctant to expose the most intimate aspects of his personal life. It is in any case doubtful that such an exhaustion of meaning is conceivable or even desirable. Dream interpretation may well be the royal road to the unconscious, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DREAM-LIKE MEMORY but the unconscious is inexhaustible. Nor is it desirable for either patient or analyst to claim that the moment has arrived when there is nothing more to be said. Finally, there are two points that need underscoring:  Waking interpretation never deals directly with the dream but rather with a dream narrative, that is, a verbal summary of mainly visual images produced in the waking state. The result is often an over-elaboration of the ‘‘material’’ offered for interpretation (Diatkine, 1974).  During an analysis, some dreams are responses to and echoes of an earlier session or a preparation for a future session. Every such dream bears the stamp of the transference, and this must not be overlooked. ROGER PERRON See also: Anagogic interpretation; Anticipatory ideas; ‘‘Autobiographical Study, An’’; ‘‘Constructions in Analysis’’; Demand; Doubt; Dream; Five Lectures on PsychoAnalysis; ‘‘Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria’’ (Dora/Ida Bauer); Free association; Freud’s Self-Analysis; ‘‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’’ (Wolf Man); Hermeneutics; Interpretation; Irma’s injection, dream of; Secrets of a Soul; Over-interpretation; Psychoanalytic Treatment of Children; Self-analysis; Sudden involuntary idea. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1986). Freud’s self-analysis (Peter Graham, Trans.). London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psychoanalysis. (Original work published 1975) Diatkine, René. (1974). Rêve, illusion et connaissance. (Rapport). Réponse aux interventions pp. 1107–1108. Revue Française de Psychanalyse. 38 (5–6), 769–820. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams, Parts I and II. SE, 4–5. ———. (1916–1917f). A metapsychological supplement to the theory of dreams. SE, 14: 217–235. Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1981). Frontiers in psychoanalysis: between the dream and psychic pain (Catherine Cullen and Philip Cullen, Trans.). London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Original work published 1977) DREAM, LATENT CONTENT OF THE. See Latent INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DREAM-LIKE MEMORY Psychic reality is the subject of psychoanalysis. It is important to distinguish psychic from external reality, which we perceive through our senses. Wilfred R. Bion refers to psychic reality as O. In his 1970 work Attention and Interpretation he focused attention on the necessity for analysts to actively disengage from anything that might saturate their minds with sense data or elements rooted in sensorial data, in order to free the mind for psychic reality as much as possible. However, this psychic reality has no sensorial qualities as such, even though it must use sensorial forms to represent itself: anxiety has no color, no taste, no smell. He therefore suggested that analysts be ‘‘without memory or desire’’ because memory and desire are linked to sensorial elements and if analyst’s minds remain attached to these elements they are no longer available to receive the unknown, the mystery, that is, to be in contact with O. Bion distinguished, however, between two forms of memory: ‘‘recalled memory’’ which corresponds to the usual conception of memory, what we know in advance, what we can remember consciously about an event or a person, about the patient who comes for the session, for example; and the ‘‘dreamlike memory’’ that springs into the analyst’s mind in the course of the session, without any conscious effort at recollection. This second type of memory is the form that psychic reality takes in order to be representable in the here and now of the session. It has nothing to do with remembering events from the past: ‘‘Recalled memory saturates the psychoanalyst’s preconceptions and obscures the goals to the single point where clarity of judgment coincides with the field where it is exercised: the ongoing session [. . .]. Dream-like memory is the memory of psychic reality and is the stuff of analysis’’ (Bion, Wilfred R., 1970, p. 70). Wilfred R. Bion went a step further when he declared that the aim of analysis is not only a knowledge of O but ‘‘becoming O,’’ insofar as psychic reality cannot be known but only ‘‘be been.’’ He therefore asks analysts not only to be without desire, without memory, but also without knowledge, in order to promote in so far as possible this ‘‘becoming O’’ that he calls ‘‘evolution.’’ DIDIER HOUZEL 439 DREAM, MANIFEST CONTENT OF THE See also: Attention; Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht; Transformations. almost mad adult changes the child, so to speak, into a psychiatrist [. . .]. It is unbelievable how much we can still learn from our Ôwise children,’ the neurotics.’’ Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1970). Attention and interpretation. London: Tavistock Publications. Grinberg, León, Sor, Dario, and Tabak de Bianchedi, Elizabeth. (1991). New introduction to the work of Bion. Northvale, NJ-London: Jason Aronson, 1993. Symington, Joan, and Symington, Neville. (1996). The clinical thinking of Wilfred Bion. London: Routledge. DREAM, MANIFEST CONTENT OF THE. See Manifest ‘‘DREAM OF THE WISE BABY, THE’’ ‘‘The Dream of the Wise Baby’’ is a one-page text that Ferenczi wrote in 1923. It is a description of a typical adult dream, not a fantasy or a myth, regardless of any analogy with the episode of Jesus teaching the doctors of the Law. It recounts a very young child, a neonate, a baby with glasses, who is teaching adults. Although Freud makes no mention of it in the final edition of The Interpretation of Dreams in 1926, he does write: ‘‘Dreams are so closely related to linguistic expression that Ferenczi has truly remarked that every tongue has its own dream-language. It is impossible as a rule to translate a dream into a foreign language and this is equally true, I fancy, of a book such as the present one.’’ A footnote to Ferenczi’s text introduces the notion of children’s ‘‘effective knowledge’’ [tatsächliches Wissen] of adult sexuality. If the dream is repeated often it illustrates what Ferenczi was later to call the ‘‘traumatolytic function of the dream’’ more than a sensual reminiscence that the infant may have enjoyed when at the breast. This knowledge poses a question: Is it a knowledge that is linked to a visual or auditory perception, to an autoerotic excitation, or to an intuition in relation with a primal fantasy? The answer was clear for Ferenczi: It is a knowledge that is linked to facts and to prematuration consequent to trauma, thus to an experience of suffering. In ‘‘Confusion of Tongues’’ (1933/1955) he wrote: ‘‘The fear of the uninhibited, 44 0 PIERRE SABOURIN See also: ‘‘Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child’’; Infantile sexual curiosity. Source Citation Ferenczi, Sándor. (1923). Der traum vom ‘‘gelehrten Säugling.’’ Internationale Zeitschrift für ärztliche Psychoanalyse, IX, 70. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sándor. (1955). Confusion of tongues between adults and the child. The language of tenderness and of passion. In Final contributions to the problems and methods of psycho-analysis (pp. 156–167). London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1933 [1932]) Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Parts I and II. SE, 4–5. DREAM SCREEN It was Bertram D. Lewin, in his article ‘‘Sleep, the Mouth and the Dream Screen,’’ who proposed calling upon ‘‘an old familiar conception of Freud’s—the oral libido—to elucidate certain manifestations associated with sleep’’ (1946, p. 419). ‘‘The dream screen, as I define it,’’ wrote Lewin, ‘‘is the surface on which a dream appears to be projected. It is the blank background, present in the dream though not necessarily seen, and the visually perceived action of ordinary manifest dream contents takes place on it or before it. Theoretically it may be part of the latent or the manifest content, but this distinction is academic. The dream screen is not often noted or mentioned by the analytic patient, and in the practical business of dream interpretation, the analyst is not concerned with it’’ (p. 420). In developing his argument Lewin referred to the Isakower phenomenon, recalling that psychoanalyst Otto ‘‘Isakower interprets the large masses, that approach beginning sleepers, as breasts’’ (p. 421). Lewin expanded on this insight as follows: ‘‘When one falls asleep, the breast is taken into one’s perceptual world: it flattens out or approaches flatness, and when one wakes up it disappears, reversing the events of its INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DREAM SYMBOLISM entrance. A dream appears to be projected on this flattened breast—the dream screen—provided, that is, that the dream is visual; for if there is no visual content the dream screen would be blank, and the manifest content would consist solely of impressions from other fields of perception’’ (p. 421). At the end of his article, Lewin offered this summary: ‘‘The baby’s first sleep is without visual dream content. It follows oral satiety. Later hypnagogic events preceding sleep represent an incorporation of the breast (Isakower), those that follow occasionally may show the breast departing. The breast is represented in sleep by the dream screen. The dream screen also represents the fulfillment of the wish to sleep’’ (p. 433). Today, over and above the attempt to link sleep and oral libido, the notion of the dream screen should no doubt be viewed in conjunction with the idea of the introjection of ‘‘containers,’’ and with Didier Anzieu’s discussion of the ‘‘skin ego,’’ with his concepts of the skin as a ‘‘projective’’ or ‘‘writing surface’’ (1985, p. 40), and even with his view of the dream’s function as a film or pellicle. At all events, the dream screen is an aspect of the dream-work which operates as a ‘‘non-process,’’ and which as such calls for no specific interpretation. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Cinema and psychoanalysis; Dream; Dream work; Isakower phenomenon, Negative hallucination; Skin-ego; Sleep/wakefulness. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1989). The skin ego. (Chris Turner, Trans.). New Haven and London: Yale University Press. (Orignal work published 1985) Lewin, Bertram D. (1949). Sleep, the mouth and the dream screen. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 15, (4), 419–34. DREAM SYMBOLISM In the context of psychoanalysis, the idea of symbolism in dreams should be understood in three ways: (1) as pertaining to relatively constant and universal correspondences between the symbol and what it symbolizes within a given culture (and in the view of some, no doubt, within all cultures); (2) as pertaining to symbol/ symbolized correspondences specific to a given dreamer and a given dream; and (3) as pertaining to the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS processes of symbolization that give rise to the aforementioned correspondences. In Chapter 6 of his Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Freud devoted a section to ‘‘Representation by Symbols in Dreams.’’ Anyone who read only this section, however, would have a completely mistaken view of the Freudian approach to the interpretation of dreams. For what Freud dealt with here, in essence, were correspondences of the first kind defined above, that is to say representations (to be met with especially in ‘‘typical dreams’’) whose meanings seemed so invariable from one dreamer to the next that they could be taken as read, even without reference to the subject’s associations. For example, any long or pointed object, any weapon (but also a hat) stood for the penis, and hollow objects for the vagina or, more generally, a woman’s body; similarly, going up a staircase or flying represented sexual excitement, erection or coitus, coming out of a tunnel meant birth, a tooth being pulled related to masturbation, and so on. Nor were these equivalences exclusive to dreams, for they occurred widely too in stories, myths, and folklore, a fact tending to confirm their universal validity. Verbal connections were very common in this context. In the case of masturbation, for instance, vulgar locutions in German embodied a similar symbolism: ‘‘Sich einen ausreissen,’’ literally ‘‘to pull oneself out,’’ meant to masturbate (pp. 348n, 388), and so on. The sheer profusion of examples given by Freud in this section might suggest to an incautious reader that The Interpretation of Dreams is nothing but another ‘‘dream-book’’; in reality, of course, the entire work is a protest against the ‘‘decoding’’ approach to dream interpretation. Indeed Freud repeatedly stresses that, even if an initial interpretation may be based on a sort of apriori table of correspondences, a symbol is always modulated by the mental activity of the particular dreamer. For symbols ‘‘frequently have more than one or even several meanings, and, as with Chinese script, the correct interpretation can only be arrived at on each occasion from the context.’’ (p. 353). Beyond the very first or ‘‘symbolic’’ reading, therefore, it was essential, in Freud’s view, to draw out the dreamer’s associations. The dream work is the task of inserting into each dream the wish which lies at its origin, without offending the conscious mind. Representations in dreams are constructed in the two phases of this transformation: the primary-process phase (condensation, displacement, considerations of representability) and the phase of the 441 DREAM WORK secondary revision which completes the transformation by giving consistency and an acceptable meaning to the manifest text of the dream. The meaning of a given representation can therefore as a general rule be established solely by working in reverse, by de-condensation, so to speak, by re-placing what has been displaced, and so on, on the basis of the associations of the dreamer and the intervention of the analyst. Processes of symbolization organize the dreamwork. Consequently, the whole of The Interpretation of Dreams, indeed all Freud’s writings on dreams, may be considered to have them as their subject; beyond that, these processes constitute the very core of Freud’s metapsychology (Gibeault, 1989). Works on dreams since Freud have been extremely numerous, dealing notably with the issue of the articulation between ‘‘general symbols’’ and ‘‘individual symbols.’’ Ernest Jones (1916/1920) was one of the first to take up this discussion. ROGER PERRON See also: Dream; Interpretation of Dreams, The; Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis; Symbol; Symbolism; Translation. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. Gibeault, Alain. (1989). Destins de la symbolization. Revue française de psychanalyse, 49 (3), 1493–1617. Jones, Ernest. (1920). The theory of symbolism. In Papers on psychoanalysis. New York: W. Wood. (Original work published 1916) Pasche, Francis. (1960). Le symbole personnel. In À partir de Freud. Paris: Payot. DREAM WORK Freud introduced the notion of ‘‘dream work’’ to clearly emphasize that the dream is not the result, as was generally thought to be the case, of a weakened state of mental activity producing incoherent fragments, but, on the contrary, the outcome of very complex psychic work. This was the notion that was articulated in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), based on a fundamental hypothesis: the dream represents a fulfillment 44 2 of desires that are repressed in waking life, but this realization is typically disguised so as to pass through censorship during sleep. The ‘‘dream work’’ is responsible for this disguise. The ‘‘materials’’ used in this process are essentially of two types: residues of the day, that is to say ‘‘mnemonic traces’’ of events, thoughts, affects, etc., of waking life (usually recent), and bodily sensations during sleep (hunger, thirst, pain, etc., but particularly erotic excitation). The source of the dream, however, is to be found in conflicts and wishes of childhood—oedipal conflicts prominent among them . The dream work proceeds in two phases. The first phase is that of the primary processes: ‘‘condensation,’’ resulting in compressing into a single image disparate, even contradictory material (events, personages, representations, affects, etc.); ‘‘displacement,’’ whereby an affectively neutral representation is substituted for another, and finally visual imagery is primarily the mode of representation for thoughts, affects, and sensation. There is the passage into images itself, or ‘‘representability’’: the dream is made up of essentially visual sensorial images. Condensation and displacement use a stock of easily available images, which are residues of the day. The first phase of the dream produces the manifest content, which is the unrecognizable translation of the ‘‘latent thoughts’’ that can be made conscious through analysis. However, the manifest content has to be subjected to a secondary revision upon awakening in order to create a superficial coherence in the remembered and repeated dream. It is significant that while Freud described these primary and secondary processes as the two phases of the dream work, he also considered them as the two processes governing mental activity: the ‘‘primary processes,’’ characterized by the free flowing of an unbound energy; and ‘‘secondary processes,’’ dominated by rational intellectual activity and bound energy. Consequently, there is a wide chasm between the primary and secondary processes that can be revealed by dissection of the dream work (Neyraut, 1978, 1997). ROGER PERRON See also: Cinema and psychoanalysis; Dream; Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious; ‘‘Mourning and Melancholia’’; Neurotic defenses; Representability, work of; Symptomformation; Work (as a psychoanalytical notion). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DREAM’S NAVEL Bibliography Grinstein, Alexander, (1968). On Sigmund Freud’s dreams. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Neyraut, Michel. (1978). Les logique de l’Inconscient. Paris: Hachette. ‘‘DREAMS AND MYTHS’’ This essay is an exercise in applied psychoanalysis: reference can be made to introduction to the ‘‘Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis’’ written by Sigmund Freud in the first edition of Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva’’ (1907a [1906]), as well as to Freud’s essay ‘‘Creative Writers and Day-dreaming’’ (1908e [1907]). Abraham’s essay can be compared to Franz Riklin’s ‘‘Réalisation de désir et de symbolisme dans le conte’’ (Desire and symbolism in tales; 1908). Abraham compared collective myths with dreams and located the following similarities: both make use of symbolic imagery; both are the products of human fantasy aimed at the fulfillment of wishes; both are subject to censorship and the same defense mechanisms: ‘‘Myths are what survives of the psychic life of peoples; dreams are individual myths,’’ he wrote. This same theme was subsequently discussed by Otto Rank, Theodor Reik, and Géza Róheim before interest in it faded. JOHANNES CREMERIUS See also: Abraham, Karl; Applied psychoanalysis and the interaction of psychoanalysis; Dream; Myth; Mythology and psychoanalysis; Primitive. Source Citation Abraham, Karl. (1949). Dreams and myths: a study in race psychology. In Selected papers of Karl Abraham, M.D.. (Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis. (Original work published 1909) interpreted dream which has to be left obscure; this is because we become aware during the work of interpretation that at that point there is a tangle of dream-thoughts which cannot be unraveled and which moreover adds nothing to our knowledge of the content of the dream. This is the dream’s navel, the spot where it reaches down into the unknown’’ (p. 525). This careful formulation seems to contradict Freud’s whole approach to analyzing dreams, which is to take the analysis as far as possible. As he later wrote when discussing the Wolf Man’s dream, ‘‘It is always a strict law of dream interpretation that an explanation must be found for every detail’’ (1918b, p. 42n). It is therefore unsurprising that Freud, rather than accept ‘‘the unknown’’ as a barrier, should wonder whether a given patient’s resistance indicated failure stemming from the inadequacy of the analyst or of the analytic method themselves. In ‘‘Notes on Dream Interpretation’’ (1925i) he returned to the issue, pondering ‘‘the limits to the possibility of interpretation of the interpretable’’ (p. 127). There he stressed, ‘‘Those dreams best fulfil their function [to satisfy a wish in spite of the ego] about which one knows nothing after waking’’ (p. 128) or that are quite simply forgotten. They therefore appear to be uninterpretable. All the same, ‘‘it sometimes happens, too, that after months or years of analytic labour, one returns to a dream which at the beginning of the treatment seemed meaningless and incomprehensible but which is now, in the light of knowledge obtained in the meantime, completely elucidated’’ (p. 129). ROGER PERRON See also: Analyzability; Incompleteness; Over-interpretation; Real, the (Lacan); Surrealism and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Dadoun, Roger. (1972). Les ombilics du rêve. Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse, 5, 239–254. Further Reading Wangh, Martin. (1954). Day residue in dream and myth. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 2, 446–452. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1–338; 5: 339–625. ———. (1918b). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1–122. DREAM’S NAVEL ———. (1925i). Some additional notes on dream interpretation as a whole. SE, 19: 123–138. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Freud wrote, ‘‘There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly Rosolato, Guy. (1978). La relation d’inconnu. Paris: Gallimard. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 443 D R I V E /I N S T I N C T DRIVE/INSTINCT ‘‘The whole flux of our mental life and everything that finds expression in our thoughts are derivations and representatives of the multifarious instincts [drives] that are innate in our physical constitution’’ (Freud, 1932c, p. 221). ‘‘[T]he ‘‘instinct [drive]’’ appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body’’ (Freud, 1915c, pp. 121–122). The German verb Treiben generally means ‘‘to set into motion’’; its earliest meaning was ‘‘to drive cattle.’’ The verb was also used to refer to getting plants to grow, to stamp metal, to drill a mineshaft, to practice languages, to do business, to spend money, to act up— German uses Treiben for each of these. Likewise to propel someone into flight, to push someone to the limit, or to feel pressured to do this or that. The noun Trieb shows the same range of force and diversity. Sprout, shoot, or offshoot, for plants; impulse, tendency, penchant, inclination, and instinct for animals and humans—these are all described by the word Trieb, which also becomes pejorative when someone gives in to his or her appetites. Triebleben means ‘‘instinctual life,’’ and Triebhaft means ‘‘instinctive.’’ In physics, Trieb means ‘‘motor force,’’ and it appears in a number of compounds such as Triebfeder, ‘‘mainspring,’’ Triebkraft, ‘‘driving force.’’ Triebstoff, literally ‘‘driving stuff,’’ means ‘‘fuel.’’ Although James Strachey chose to translate Trieb by ‘‘instinct,’’ the English word ‘‘drive,’’ like its German counterpart, is in everyday use. It involves the inherent principle of change and activity in living beings. From a dynamic point of view, it is very similar to the ancient Greek concept of physis. In 1780, Schiller wrote about Trieb in an essay that was well known to Freud and included the passage, ‘‘The animal drives awaken and expand the intellectual drives.’’ Freud often quoted Schiller’s poem ‘‘Die Weltweisen’’ when referring to ‘‘the influence of the two most powerful motive forces—hunger and love’’ (1899a, p. 316). Freud coined more than forty-five expressions based on the word Trieb, such as Triebkonflikt, Strachey’s ‘‘instinctual conflict.’’ Further, he qualified drives in 44 4 myriad ways, including the sexual drives, the ego-drives, the drive for self-preservation, the aggressive drives, the drive for power, the drive for mastery, the destructive drive, the life-drive, the death-drive, the drive for knowledge, and the social drive. This list does not even include the classification of the partial drives. Nor does it refer to the theory of the drives, Freud’s Trieblehre. Finally, Trieb designates either the dynamics underlying a specific mental dynamic, in which case Freud spoke of a drive or drives manifested in ‘‘instinctual impulses’’ (1915c, p. 124); or, alternatively, it designates an overarching dynamic, in which case he referred to the drive or to the life-drive and the death-drive. Language provides us with a constant aspect of the meaning of ‘‘drive’’: the motor principle inherent in living organisms that underlies, in the last instance, all their actions. A drive is activity. As soon as the concept of libido was introduced, in 1894, as psychical sexual excitation, a rough sketch of the sexual drive became necessary so that the ‘‘concept of the mechanism of anxiety neurosis can be made clearer’’ (Freud, 1895b [1894], p. 108). At first, the sexual drive belonged to the conceptual level. It signified a relatively continuous change of phase and location that transformed the energy of the organic sexual processes into psychical sexual energy, or libido. The sexual drive refers to this transition and its dynamic; it is the conceptual referent of the libido. Three constants soon appeared. Drive and theory: ‘‘drive’’ is a fundamental concept, necessary for the dynamic understanding of psychical processes. It is inferred from its effects, just like magnetic or gravitational fields in physics. Drive and biology: the theory of the drive is the part of psychoanalytic theory that, since it is founded on somatic processes, borders on biology (Brown-Séquard’s experiments of 1899 were not unknown to Freud). Drive, sexuality, and libido: Freud’s entire work is concerned with the sexual drive. Regardless of the structural oppositions into which it is introduced, it remains the preeminent dynamic referent of human mental life, and as such, is expressed as libido. Though Freud was later to sharpen and to elaborate it, the concept of the drive was transgressive as early as 1894, and in at least three different senses: 1. It highlighted the importance of sexuality in human mental life. 2. It subverted the body/mind dualism. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DRIVE/INSTINCT 3. And by so doing, it reestablished, in the manner of Aristotle and contemporary mathematicians and physicists, the primacy of the dynamic factor in the realization of stable and individuated forms. Freud distinguished three successive ‘‘steps’’ in the theory of the drives: an ‘‘extension of the concept of sexuality,’’ ‘‘the hypothesis of narcissism,’’ and the ‘‘assertion of the regressive character of [drives]’’ (1920g, p. 59). We can trace these steps in his major works: first, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d); next, ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ (1914c) and the metapsychological papers of 1915, published in 1924; and finally, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g). The first step dissected the sexual drive into component partial drives and emphasized the importance of infantile sexuality. The second step generated new psychic formations of larger dimensions, beyond the basic level, such as the ego and narcissism. At this stage, a difficulty developed regarding the drive’s dualism; nevertheless, the drive, its pressure, and its psychical representatives were clearly defined. The third step established the life-drive and the death-drive, a dualism of vast proportions under which all of mental life and all matter was now subsumed. At each step, Freud expanded the drive’s domain without abandoning previous knowledge or more limited perspectives. Freud’s ‘‘thorough study of the . . . essential characters of the sexual [drive] and . . . the course of its development’’ (1905d, p. 173), took him far beyond both language and tradition, and on the basis of this research he founded the dynamics of psychoanalysis. The theory of the drives was so crucial that Freud—in contrast to his practice with his other fundamental works— continually revised the Three Essays as the theory evolved, until the edition of 1924, which introduced such concepts as the phallic stage and primary masochism. Nevertheless, the elements constituting the theory of psychoanalysis could have been taken as established as early as 1905, if we can rely on Freud’s recollection in 1924: ‘‘They are: emphasis on instinctual life (affectivity), on mental dynamics, on the fact that even the apparently most obscure and arbitrary mental phenomena invariably have a meaning and a causation, the theory of psychical conflict and of the pathogenic nature of repression, the view that symptoms are substitutive satisfactions, the recognition of the etiological importance of sexual life, and in particular of the beginnings of infantile sexuality’’ (1924f, p. 198). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS These factors depend on the theory elaborated in the Three Essays, as the order of their enumeration indicates. The sexual drive was first dissociated from its ‘‘natural’’ object, an adult of the opposite sex, and then broken down into partial drives that appear in infancy, the oral drive, the anal-sadistic drive, and so on. They are defined by their source, which is a bodily erogenous zone; their aim, which is the cessation of their excitation through discharge; and their object, which is the most variable factor. The possible paths that they can take are diverse: foreplay in adult sexual activity; repression and symptomatic expression in the neuroses; fixation and exclusivity in the perversions; and finally all the defensive formations—reactionformation, inhibition as to their aim, sublimation, and so on. Thus the diversity of adult sexuality is clarified by its ‘‘polymorphously perverse’’ infantile development—and the opposition between the normal and the pathological is eliminated. The two stages in the constitution of human sexuality, first early childhood and then puberty, explain the ‘‘damming up’’ of the drive’s energy and the psychical development of the individual by the establishment of defenses at the expense of the sexual drives. ‘‘The simplest and likeliest assumption as to the nature of the instincts would seem to be that in itself an instinct is without quality, and, so far as mental life is concerned, is only to be regarded as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work’’ (1905d, p. 168). The variability and plasticity of the drive’s dynamics are essential to this work, since it views the development of the person and of culture on the course of drive development. Regarding the enlargement of the concept of sexuality, Freud wrote: ‘‘These facts could be met by drawing a contrast between the sexual instincts [drives] and ego instincts [drives] (instincts [drives] of self-preservation) which was in line with the popular saying that hunger and love make the world go round: libido was the manifestation of the force of love in the same sense as was hunger of the self-preservative [drive]. The nature of the ego instincts remained for the time being undefined and, like all the other characteristics of the ego, inaccessible to analysis’’ (1923a [1922], p. 255). As one component of psychic conflict, the drives of the ego were therefore indispensable. Proceeding with the investigation of the drives in 1911 with the Schreber case, Freud at first saw himself as ‘‘defenseless,’’ because the concept of libidinal investment in the ego seemed to undo the dualism of 445 D R I V E /I N S T I N C T the drive. ‘‘Thus the instincts [drives] of self-preservation were also of a libidinal nature: they were sexual instincts [drives] which, instead of external objects, had taken the subject’s own ego as an object. . . . The libido of the self-preservative instincts was now described as narcissistic libido and it was recognized that a high degree of this self-love constituted the primary and normal state of things. The earlier formula laid down for the transference neuroses consequently required to be modified, though not corrected. It was better, instead of speaking of a conflict between sexual instincts and ego instincts, to speak of a conflict between object-libido and ego-libido, or, since the nature of these instincts [drives] was the same, between the object cathexes and the ego’’ (1923a [1922], p. 257). From 1914 to 1920, there is no longer a dualism of the drive. The continuous and constant pressure of the drive—along with the pleasure principle—was sufficient to generate the psychic dynamics as well as the diversity of psychical formations (by means of anticathexis and primal repression). ‘‘By the pressure [Drang] of an instinct [drive] we understand its motor factor, the amount of force or the measure of the demand for work which it represents. The character of exercising pressure is common to all instincts [drives]; it is in fact their very essence’’ (1915c, p. 122). In universalizing the drive as a potential state underlying the psyche, Freud also accounted for the way in which drives manifest themselves: They are the workings of the drive in the unconscious, and the twofold determination of its representatives revealed by repression: ideas and quota of affect. Dissatisfied with this situation, which is monist at the dynamic level and dualist in the effects it brings about (though such a dualism is common in any qualitative dynamics), Freud hypothesized: ‘‘On the ground of far-reaching consideration of the processes which go to make up life and which lead to death, it becomes probable that we should recognize the existence of two classes of [drives], corresponding to the contrary processes of construction and dissolution in the organism’’ (1923a, p. 258). In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), he constructed a space in which the substrate is inert matter plus living substance, on which the two types of dynamics act. One refers to pure stability: the death-drives. The other refers to a continuity and to a flexible stability in living beings that continue to exist: the life-drives, or Eros. This space accommodated a 44 6 psychical apparatus that was enlarged to include the id, ego, and superego, in which the fundamental drives appeared as libido, as destructiveness and masochism; or even, as Freud put it: ‘‘For the opposition between the two classes of instincts we may put the polarity of love and hate’’ (1923b, p. 42). From that point on, this model of the dynamics and space of the drive was sufficient. But the theory of the life-drives and death-drives still included propositions too diverse to fit within this model. Several factors remained to be accommodated: the necessity of constructing a space of sufficient dimensions to accommodate all the psychical processes; the fundamental idea of the plurality of the dynamics of psychical work; and finally the necessity of introducing, at the dynamic level, the stability, and even the stabilization, that constitutes, via the ‘‘fixation’’ of a drive, the essence of symptoms and the constraint of repetition. Thus the death-drive includes, among other things, the ‘‘instinctual’’ aspect of the drive. Even though this distinction between drive and instinct is obscured in English by Strachey’s translation, the death-drive integrates the ‘‘conservative’’ and ‘‘regressive’’ nature of instinct. Moreover, this model emphasizes the essential role of the repression of destructive drives in cultural development; it explains the process of the internalization of aggression in the superego; and it explains the origin and the dangers of guilt feelings. The prevailing qualitative dynamics recognizes what could be called, borrowing a term from the mathematician Seifert, the ‘‘fiber spaces’’ in drives. These include the dynamics out of which the actual forms of the drive develop. From this point of view, it is obvious that any psychoanalytic concept depends, in the final instance, on the theory of the drives. Thus it is consistent that the first ontogenesis of the purified ego appeared in ‘‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes.’’ Moreover, it was necessary that this paper opened the metapsychology and preceded the essays on repression, the unconscious, dreams, and mourning and melancholia. Likewise, it was necessary to propose the theory of lifedrives and death-drives in order to construct the second topography. The pleasure principle itself depends on the death-drive. The constant updating of the Three Essays makes it obvious that the theory of the drive is at the basis of the entire theoretical edifice. What is missing in the theory of the drives is a dimension that would accommodate all of psychical dynamics and economics—for example, reality, to INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DRIVE/INSTINCT which Freud conceded an economic and dynamic status that he continually returned to during the years 1923–1925. He reevaluated its role in the constitution of the neuroses and psychoses, and then he reworked the theory of anxiety, and described a realistic anxiety (Realangst). The transgressive features of the drive, listed above, indicate the ways in which it has been critiqued. The accusation of pansexualism is easy to refute: ‘‘. . . it is a mistake to accuse psycho-analysis of Ôpan-sexualism’ and to allege that it drives all mental occurrences from sexuality and traces them all back to it. On the contrary, psycho-analysis has from the very first distinguished the sexual instincts [drives] from others which it has provisionally termed Ôego-instincts [drives]’ . . . and even the neuroses it has traced back not to sexuality alone but to the conflict between the sexual impulses and the ego’’ (1923a, pp. 251–252). In the field of psychoanalysis, it is far more common to reproach Freud for his ‘‘biologism,’’ his supposed emphasis on biology as opposed to the unconscious or language. And thus idealism and the mind/body dualism are reintroduced. The primacy of dynamics, which places psychoanalysis within the larger tradition of scientific modernism (along with thermodynamics, theories of dynamic systems, and qualitative dynamics), has run into several difficulties. First of all, Treib does not have an etymological correspondent except ‘‘drive’’ where the pressure disappears after fixed discharge. Instinct has the same problem, as was demonstrated by Agnès Oppenheimer in her studies of the British ‘‘object-relations school.’’ Without an adequate term, the concept of das Dynamische is not communicated. Another obstacle was noted by Freud in 1910: ‘‘The most striking distinction between the erotic life of antiquity and our own no doubt lies in the fact that the ancients laid the stress upon the [drive] itself, whereas we emphasize its object. The ancients glorified the [drive] and were prepared on its account to honour even an inferior object; while we despise the activity [of the drive] in itself and find excuses for it only in the merits of the object’’ (1905d, p. 149). Language, culture, and the various dominant epistemologies (for example pragmatism, empiricism, positivism, and structuralism), by privileging object relations, mask the dynamic point of view. Conversely, Ferenczi delved into the dynamics of the drive audaciously in his Thalassa (1924). Having the term pulsion at their disposal as a translation for Trieb from 1910 on, French-speaking analysts—such INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS as Jean Laplanche, Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, and André Green—were able to preserve the meaning of the concept and to develop it. Freud admitted his difficulties with the theory of the drives. In fact, dynamic science remains to this day extremely difficult, and the theory of the drives is a work in progress. According to Freud, even the sexual drives, which are the most well known, are still obscure, thanks to their interchangeability. Sublimation remained a difficult concept after Freud (S. de Mijolla-Mellor, 1992), and research on this topic today is still centered on the themes that he discovered. However much we may accept the Freudian point of view, there is still the death-drive. ‘‘A queer [drive] indeed, directed to the destruction of its own organic home!’’ (1933a [1932], pp. 105–106) If all the demands included in the life-drives and death-drives are admissible (Porte, 1994), a theory of the drives exploiting the facts of qualitative dynamics would distribute them differently. Nothing obliges us to restrict the number of dynamics, and we could suppose the existence of ‘‘fast’’ and ‘‘slow’’ dynamics (Kubie, 1960). Fear would count among the basic affects, along with love and hate, for ‘‘It is like a prolongation in the mental sphere of the dilemma of Ôeat or be eaten’ which dominates the organic animate world’’ (1933a [1932], p. 111). Elaborating for Einstein ‘‘a portion of the theory of the [drives],’’ Freud noted, ‘‘It may perhaps seem to you as though our theories are a kind of mythology and, in the present case, not even an agreeable one. But does not every science come in the end to a kind of mythology like this? Cannot the same be said to-day of your own Physics?’’ (1933b [1932], p. 211). Thus it is in the sense that every science worthy of the name constructs a mythology, and then controls its expansion, that Freud can speak of ‘‘Our mythological theory of [drives]’’ (p. 212). MICHÈLE PORTE See also: Activity/passivity; Aggressive instinct/aggressive drive; Anaclisis/anaclictic; Beyond the Pleasure Principle; Binding/unbinding of the instincts; Compulsion; Cruelty; Drive, subject of the; Dualism; Economic point of view; Ego functions; Ethnology and psychoanalysis; Eros; Erotogenic zone; Fixation; Fusion/defusion of instincts; Id; Instinct; ‘‘Instincts and Their Vicisssitudes’’; Instinctual impulse; Instinctual representative (representative of the drive); Look/gaze; Knowledge, instinct for; Mastery, instinct for; New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis; Object; ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’; 447 DUALISM Outline of Psycho-Analysis An; Pair of opposites; Principle of constancy; Prohibition; Reversal (into the opposite); Sublimation; Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality; Turning around upon the subject’s own self; Turning around; Voyeurism. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1920g) Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1923b) The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ———. (1915c) Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109–140. ———. (1932c) My contact with Josef Popper-Lynkeus. SE, 22: 219–224. ———. (1933a [1932]) New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 22: 1–182. ———. (1895b [1894]) On the grounds for detaching a particular syndrome from neurasthenia under the description ‘‘Anxiety Neurosis.’’ SE, 3: 85–115. ———. (1899a) Screen memories. SE, 3: 299–322. ———. (1924f) A short account of psycho-analysis. SE, 19: 189–209. ———. (1923a [1922]) Two encyclopaedia articles: Psychoanalysis and the libido theory, SE, 18: 235–259. Freud, Sigmund and Einstein, Albert. (1933b [1932]) Why war?. SE, 22: 195–215. Kubie, Lawrence S. Practical and theoretical aspects of psychoanalysis. New York: Praeger, 1960. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1992). Le plaisir de pensée. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Oppenheimer, Agnès. (1996). Kohut et la psychologie du self. Presses Universitaires de France. Porte, Michèle (Ed.). (1994). Passion des formes. Dynamique qualitative, sémiophysique et intelligibilité. À René Thom. Paris: E.N.S. Fontenay-Saint Cloud. Further Reading Kernberg, Otto. (2001). Object relations, affects, and drives: toward a new synthesis. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 21, 604–619. DUALISM In the history of religion, dualism refers to the eighteenth-century doctrines that see God and the devil as 44 8 two first principles, irreducible and coeternal. Christian Wolff (1734/1968) classified dogmatic philosophies into dualistic systems, which separated the soul from the body as distinct substances, and monistic systems, both groups being distinct from skepticism. In anthropology, epistemology, and ethics, a theory is dualistic when two irreducible principles can serve as a foundation for the theory. From ‘‘A case of successful treatment by hypnotism’’ (1892–1893) to his last works, Sigmund Freud envisioned mental processes as resulting from underlying conflicts, fed by opposing forces: ‘‘Psychoanalysis early became aware that all mental occurrences must be regarded as built on the basis of an interplay of the forces of the elementary instincts’’ (1923a). In the first topographic subsystem, these forces arise from the sexual instincts in conflict with the ego, or self-preservation, instincts. Later Freud (1914c) said that they arise from the object libido in conflict with the ego libido, as well as from the pressure of the drives. In the second topographic subsystem (after 1920), they arise from the life and death drives. These forces structure the form and dynamics of the mental processes. Although Freud emphasized the existence of two types of drives in his dualistic approach, he avoids the word ‘‘dualism.’’ Originating in the body, effecting the association of body and mind, and causing physical changes (conversion) or other types of modifications (other defenses), the drives create a dualistic dynamic, though this is not sufficient for saying that psychoanalytic theory is dualistic. As Freud’s research evolved, the essential polarities and the role of instinctual dualism changed as well. When studying the transference neuroses, Freud postulated an ‘‘opposition between the Ôsexual impulses’ directed toward the object and other impulses that we can only identify imperfectly and temporarily designate with the name Ôego instincts’ ’’ Freud noted the concordance with the opposition between hunger and love. He added, ‘‘In the forefront of these instincts, we must recognize the instincts that serve for the preservation of the individual’’ (1920g). In the first topographic subsystem, these forces arising from instincts were like vectors applied to quasi points (unconscious representations). In this way they resembled the structures of classical physics (Freud, 1899a). Freud’s introduction, between 1911 and 1915, of narcissism, of the ego as agency, of transference (rather than phenomenological transfer), and of a series of correlative INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS D U B A L , G E O R G E (1909 –1 993) terms of considerable scope shows his dissatisfaction with the former dynamic system. Freud then insisted that antagonistic forces account for morphogenesis, stabilization, and the evolution (in modern terms, structural stability) of large irreducible structures such as the ego, the ego ideal, and certain identifications. Fechner and his hypotheses of stability were of use to Freud. Contemporary dynamicists provide more refined instruments for plumbing the depths of Freudian drive dualism while respecting its preconditions. After a period of confusion when Freud replaced the dynamics of conflict with the opposition between object libido and ego, together with the pressure of the drive, Freud proposed the dualism of the life and death drives. A chiasma was introduced, since the sex drive, a disturbing toxic force in the first topographic subsystem, was now integrated in the life drive (germen), while the ego instincts (soma) were partially integrated in the death drive. The difficulty that this chiasma creates can be resolved by assuming that the new dualism, which is more comprehensive, resolves conflicts between tendencies with different degrees of stability. The ego affects its own immediate stability by conflicting with the expression of sexuality, which forces the ego to change. The sexual drive is directed, in the last instance, at the longterm structural stability of the species. See also: Ambivalence; Beyond the Pleasure Principle; Demand; Destrudo; Ego-instinct; Fusion/defusion of instincts; Libido; Life instinct (Eros); Monism; Psychology of Women. The, A Psychoanalytic Interpretation, The; Psychosomatic limit/boundary. Drive dualism correlates with a number of conflicts. These include the polarities of mental life: the economic polarity of pleasure and unpleasure, the reality polarities of the ego and the outside world, the biological polarities of activity and passivity. This last pair introduces the polarities around which the contrasts between the sexes develop: active/passive, phallic/nonphallic, masculine/ feminine. In ambivalence there is movement between love and hate, and ultimately between the life and death drives; or between the pleasure principle and the reality (formerly constancy) principle, and ultimately between the life and death drives. Laplanche, Jean. (1970). Vie et mort en psychanalyse. Paris: Flammarion. The dualism of the life and death drives has often been rejected or poorly understood. It has been interpreted in an exclusively realist sense (Melanie Klein and the Paris school of psychosomatics) even though there was also a theoretical component. The repetition compulsion and death drive have been unilaterally interpreted as nondynamic structural formalisms. Freud’s requirements for drive theory involve dynamically accounting for the simple stability that repetition implies (for example, in symptoms) while taking into account the structural stability (always deviating in the same way) that the majority of mental structures implement. ‘‘But,’’ according to Freud (1920g), ‘‘in no region of psychology were we groping more in the dark [than in the case of the drives].’’ Only Gustav INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS MICHÈLE PORTE Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1892–1893). A case of successful treatment by hypnotism. SE, 1: 115–128. ———. (1899a). Screen memories. SE, 3: 299–322. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: an introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1923). The libido theory. SE, 18: 255–259. Wolff, Christian. (1968). Psychologia rationalis. Hildesheim, Germany: Olms. (Originally published 1734) DUBAL, GEORGE (1909–1993) George Dubal, Swiss psychoanalyst and doctor of theology, was born in Geneva on September 18, 1909, and died there on March 9, 1993. He received a Protestant education. Upon finishing secondary school, he commenced university studies at Eugène Pittard’s laboratory, then successively attended the universities of Strasbourg, Geneva, and Paris. He took part in the new-schools movement in French-speaking Switzerland and took a very early interest in psychoanalytic thinking. At the age of sixteen he experimented with the Jungian method of free association. ‘‘This method,’’ he wrote in his memoires, ‘‘enabled me to save a comrade from suicide.’’ He discovered the psychoanalytic experience from one of the first Swiss psychoanalysts, Dr. Gustave Richard of Neuchâtel. He joined Richard, Marguerite Bosseret, and William Perret in creating ‘‘new schools’’ to forward educational reform. Dr. Richard entrusted one of his sons to him for psychotherapy. During this 449 D U G A U T I E Z , M A U R I C E (1 893 –19 60) period Dubal met Charles Baudouin, one of the pioneers of psychoanalysis in Geneva. He went on to become his friend and collaborator. A course of several months spent working in Préfargier Hospital introduced him to the treatment of psychotics. He then encountered Charles Odier, with whom he undertook psychoanalysis. In 1933 he corresponded with Freud on the subject of the libido. He wrote, ‘‘In accordance with the concept of general relativity, Freud responded to me that he had no major objection to making a distinction between a general libido and a particular libido.’’ In 1935 he married a psychoanalysis buff who wrote various works under the name of Rosette Dubal, among them La psychanalyse du diable (Psychoanalyzing the devil) in 1953. Dubal and his wife were both committed to social change and collaborated closely in integrating into social change a psychoanalytic point of view. His psychoanalytic work within the framework of the cure and preventive work outside this context were of equal importance to George Dubal. In fact, like Sándor Ferenczi or Wilhelm Reich, he struggled for the inclusion of psychoanalytic considerations in education and cultural policy. Before World War II, if we can trust his memories, he was the only practicing psychoanalyst in Lyons, where he became the friend and collaborator of Dr. A. Réquet, head of the Vinatier Clinic. He claims to have introduced psychoanalytic thought to members of the Esprit Group under Frutiger, the president. He also gathered around him friends from the Philosophical Society to discuss the influence of psychoanalysis on philosophical thought. His pedagogical need to reach the general public spurred him on to write a hundred or so pamphlets on psychoanalysis, some of which were published. In 1953 he made the acquaintance of Marie Bonaparte and John Leuba, who invited him to attend the 15th Conference of French-Speaking Psychoanalysts in Paris and to react to the theory of the instincts propounded by Maurice Bénassy. Two years earlier he had published in the Revue française de psychanalyse (French review of psychoanalysis) a much-appreciated paper titled ‘‘La psychanalyse existentielle de Sartre (Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis). As early as 1947 in his book Psychanalyse et connaissance (Psychoanalysis and Knowledge) he had analyzed the limits of a phenomenological approach and criticized the finalism of a theory of the instincts as reflected in psychoanalytic practice. During the events of May 1968, when protests by students at the Sorbonne became violent and led to protests at universities across France and strikes by 45 0 French workers, George Dubal defended the students and called into question the relationship between knowledge and power, sparing neither psychoanalysts nor the societies that shelter them. Like some of his Zurich colleagues, he did not share the ideology of those who, as he wrote in his memoires, ‘‘try to put their patients in the party line with respect to power,’’ to the detriment of respect for the individual. In the French-speaking Swiss psychoanalytic community, in his practice, as a committed author writing in the journal Construire (Building) and the review Vivre (Living), and in his conferences at the Artimon, George Dubal was a creative individual who defied all forms of man’s indoctrination and stultification of man. MARIO CIFALI See also: Switzerland (French-speaking). Bibliography Dubal, George. (1947). Psychanalyse et connaissance: L’évolution des psychothérapies et la psychanalyse; Le problème de l’instinct; Le problème de la connaissance. Geneva, Switzerland: Éditions du Mont-Blanc. Dubal, George. (1960). Moi et les autres: applications de la psychanalyse à la pédagogie et à la pensée dialectique. Neuchâtel, Switzerland: Éditions Delachaux et Niestlé. DUGAUTIEZ, MAURICE (1893–1960) Maurice Dugautiez, a Belgian civil engineer and psychoanalyst, was born near Tournay in 1893 and died in Brussels in 1960. He was born and reared in a middleclass, provincial environment where nothing predisposed him to be a pioneer of psychoanalysis in Belgium except perhaps a passionate curiosity about psychic life. He was an autodidact and initially very enthusiastic about hypnotism and suggestion. He gave many lectures in a socialist politico-cultural forum, which were later printed in the review Le pédagogue (The teacher). During this period, in 1933, he met Fernand Lechat in the course of one of these seminars. The two men became progressively aware of their common interest in psychoanalysis and contacted Édouard Pichon, then president of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, who encouraged them to do a training analysis with Dr. Ernst Hoffman, a Viennese refugee in Belgium. After the silence of World War II, contact was reestablished with Paris in 1945. Dugautiez and Lechat were invited INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DYNAMIC POINT as special students to attend the courses of the Paris Psychoanalytic Institute, and by 1946 Dugautiez was a full member of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society. In 1947 Dugautiez and Lechat founded the Belgian Association of Psychoanalysts, where they began to train and supervise candidate psychoanalysts. As the result of intense gassing in World War I, Dugautiez’s health was fragile and forced him to take a less active role. The responsibility of directing seminars and editing the Bulletin de l’Association des psychanalystes de Belgique (Bulletin of the Belgian Association of Psychoanalysts) thus fell to Lechat. Dugautiez, who was more of a clinician than a theorist, continued to train Belgian psychoanalysts until the end of his life. DANIEL LUMINET See also: Belgium Bibliography Dugautiez, Maurice. (1953). J. Leuba n’est plus. Bulletin de l’Association des psychanalystes de Belgique, 15. Dugautiez, Maurice. (1953). Réflexions sur l’article ‘‘Les tendances de la psychanalyse à New York’’ du Pr. Reding. Bulletin de l’Association des psychanalystes de Belgique, 16. OF VIEW Freud later put forward the idea that, in addition to the defenses that work against but within the conflict, the psyche can implement defense processes that no longer aim at organizing the means to process the conflict but at preventing the conflict itself from appearing. Thus, in addition to repression, which nevertheless retained a generic value in his mind, Freud and many of his successors described forms of projection, denial, even splitting and foreclosure, that attack the very possibility of the existence of a mental conflict by trying to expel from the psyche the existence of one of the components of the conflict. However, it is also one of the fundamental characteristics of Freud’s thinking, as well as that of his principal successors, to simultaneously affirm that in spite of the intensity of the expelling forces that can come to bear on conflicts and their mental representatives, the psyche keeps a trace of what it has tried to expel from itself in this way. That which is expelled tends to come back, in one form or another, often in negative form. Therefore the analysis of mental dynamics must also focus on the measures implemented in order to face up to the internal or external return of what it has sought to remove from representation. RENÉ ROUSSILLON DYNAMIC POINT OF VIEW Alongside the topographical and economic points of view, the dynamic point of view is one of the three major axes of metapsychology. It studies the way in which the forces that run through the mental apparatus come into conflict, combine, and influence each other. See also: Conflict; Metapsychology; Repression; Resistance; Wish fulfillment. The model for mental dynamics was present in Freud’s thought from the beginning: it is a direct extrapolation from the dynamic theory of physics in the nineteenth century. It is based on the idea that the mind, with different forces running through it, is the seat of conflict between them. In order to decrease or eliminate the displeasure occasioned by these conflicts, the mental apparatus uses different mechanisms, repression being the prototype. By means of repression the mental apparatus changes the topographical location of the ideational representatives of the instincts. It thus protects itself from the painful or displeasing aspects of its conflicting desires by making some of them or some of their aspects unconscious. The analysis of the dynamics of how mental conflicts are processed is thus an essential component in the practice of psychoanalysis and in metapsychology, which attempts to describe them. Freud, Anna. (1936). The ego and the mechanisms of sefence. London: Hogarth, 1937. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141–158. Green, André. (1993). Analité primaire dans la relation anale. La Névrose obsessionnelle. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Le Guen, Claude, et al.(1986). Le refoulement (les defenses). Revue française de psychanalyse, 50 (1), 23–370. Rosolato, Guy. (1988). Le négatif, figures et modalités. Paris: Dunod. Further Reading Meissner, William W. (1999). Dynamic principle in psychoalysis. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 22, 2–84. 451 E EARLY INTERACTIONS The notion of early interactions between the child and its environment first appeared during the 1970s and has since become widely accepted. The further development of the concept corresponds very closely with the spread of knowledge concerning what is now referred to as the psychology, psychopathology, and psychiatry of the baby (or nursing infant). The concept was put forward by developmental psychologists and is generally contested by psychoanalysts insofar as it refers more to the field of interpersonal relations than to intrapsychic problems in the strict sense of the term. Psychoanalysts prefer to speak of ‘‘interrelations,’’ a term they use in reference to the constitution of the child’s imagos and the progressive establishment of its mental representations (of self, object, and object relations). However, the term early interactions is now very widely used. It is based on a new vision of the nursing infant, a vision that first appeared toward the end of World War II. Although before that time babies were very largely considered by professionals to be eminently passive beings engaged almost exclusively in oral and digestive functions, they slowly came to be described as being much more active in the relationship and already having an intensely social orientation. They were recognized as having many skills, particularly the personal capacity to engage a relationship with its caregiving adult or, on the contrary, to withdraw from this relationship. Infants use some of these skills spontaneously in their daily lives while others, on the contrary, remain potential, as if in abeyance or on reserve, being manifest only in experimental situations (free motricity, early imitation). It is this notion of active skills and relational reciprocity (in spite of the indisputable dissymmetry between the psychic organization of very young infants and adults) that gave rise to the concept of an interaction. From being seen as a passive consumer, the baby increasingly came to be considered as an evolving human being. This shift in focus can probably be linked on the one hand to adult guilt feelings with regard to children at the end of the last world war and, on the other, to intensified research into the earliest stages of psychic development as a result of the exacerbating urgency of our quest for origins. In reality the concept of early interactions covers different levels of facts. Five different levels are classically distinguished in a baby’s interactive system: biological interactions, ethological interactions, whether instinctual or behavioral, affective or emotional interactions, fantasy interactions and, lastly, the so-called symbolic interactions. Early interactions really only related to the first four levels, the last one being more concerned with children who have already acquired the use of language. Biological interactions come into play very largely during intra-uterine life and are generally referred to as ‘‘feto-maternal interactions.’’ They continue to a lesser degree after birth, particularly in the form of breast-feeding. Behavioral interactions facilitate the various postural adjustments (in his own day Henri Wallon spoke about the ‘‘stimulating dialogue’’ between the mother and child), as well as the attunement of a certain number of biological rhythms (for example, regulating the contractions of the muscle cells in the mother’s mammary glands with the rhythms of the baby’s crying). They require no humoral mediators. 453 E C K S T E I N , E M M A (1 865 –19 24) Affective and emotional interactions enable both the mother (or, indeed, the father for that matter) and the child to harmonize their emotional state with that of the other. The main mechanism coming into play seems to be the process of affective attunement described by Daniel N. Stern. The level of fantasy interactions has been the subject of the liveliest debates with psychoanalysts insofar as they contest the very idea of the action of fantasies and stress the fundamental dissymmetry in the organization of psychic processes in the adult and the child. The process of affective attunement also appears here as the best current candidate for the role of messenger in these fantasy interactions, a study of which is obviously essential with regard to inter- and transgenerational transmission. In fact this level of fantasy interactions poses the whole question of its role in relation to the complex mechanisms of identification and projective identification. In Anglo-Saxon countries the study of early interactions continues to be very largely the domain of developmental psychologists (T. B. Brazelton, A. J. Sameroff, R. N. Emde), whereas in other countries, particularly in France, a whole research trend came into being in the wake of Serge Lebovici’s (1983) work, mainly in an effort to integrate this concept of early interactions into the data of classic psychoanalytic metapsychology. The following are the main questions currently raised by the concept of early interactions: Can the different types of interactions between the baby and its environment be considered as first forms or precursors of future object relations? How is the change effected from the interpersonal level to the intrapsychic level? What is the role of these interactions in the child’s relation to intersubjectivity? Is there not a danger that the question of interactions will lead to a sort of metapsychology of presence to the detriment of the role of absence and the excluded middle? BERNARD GOLSE See also: Infant observation; Infant observation (direct); Lack of differentiation; Lebovici, Serge Sindel Charles; Tenderness. Bibliography Lamour, Martine, and Lebovici, Serge (1989). Les interactions du nourrisson avec ses partenaires. Encyclopédie 45 4 medico-chirurgicale (Vol. Psychiatrie). Paris: E.M.-C., fasc. 37-190-B-60. Lebovici, Serge. (1983). Le nourrisson, la mère et le psychanalyste. Paris: Le Centurion. Sameroff, Arnold J., and Emde, Robert N. (1989). Relationship disturbances in early childhood. A developmental approach. New York: Basic Books. Stern, Daniel N. (1985). The interpersonal world of the infant. A view from psychoanalysis and developmental psychology. New York: Basic Books. Stevenson-Hinde, J., and Simpson, M. J. A. (1981). Mothers’ characteristics, interactions, and infants’ characteristics. Child Development, 52, 1246–1254. ECKSTEIN, EMMA (1865–1924) Between 1892 and 1893 Emma Eckstein was one Sigmund Freud’s most important patients and, for a short period of time around 1897, became a psychoanalyst herself. She was born on January 28, 1865, in Vienna and died on July 30, 1924. Eckstein belonged to a family that the Freuds were friendly with. One of her brothers, Frederick, was a Sanskrit specialist; another, Gustav, was a leading member of Karl Kautsky’s Austrian socialist party. Aside from some cryptic passages concerning her (1937c), Freud never published her case history. In his Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), Freud presented her phobia of stores in the chapter ‘‘Hysterical Proton Pseudos,’’ but the manuscript was never published during Freud’s lifetime. In early 1895, finding that analysis could not eliminate Eckstein’s compulsion for masturbation, which resulted in dysmenorrhea and stomach pains, Freud turned to Wilhelm Fliess for help. Fliess, basing his thinking on his theory of a ‘‘nasal reflex neurosis,’’ operated on her nasal concha but left fifty centimeters of gauze inside her nose. The error was repaired by Professor Rozanes in Vienna, but Fliess felt he had been wronged because Freud had called in another physician to attend to Eckstein’s problem. Freud attributed the accident to Eckstein’s hysteria (1985, letter 56 et seq.), but she remained disfigured. Freud resumed his analysis of her and provided some improvement, and this motivated her to become a psychoanalyst in 1897. In December Eckstein confirmed that she had been seduced by her father (1985, letter 150), which Freud had doubted as late as September of that year. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS É C O L E Freud continued his relationship with Eckstein. He was furious to learn that Eckstein, during an operation for a myoma, had undergone a hysterectomy. He refused to resume analysis in November 1905. Meanwhile, Eckstein had published a small book on the sexual education of children (1904), in which she does not mention Freud. She seems to return to a theory of ancillary seduction, and she viewed infantile sexuality from a constitutional point of view: sucking and masturbation. From this time on a relapse forced her to take to her bed, where she remained until her death nineteen years later. BERTRAND VICHYN See also: Irma’s injection, dream of. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1986). Freud’s Self-Analysis (Peter Graham, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis. Eckstein, Emma. (1904). Die Sexualfrage in der Erziehung des Kindes. Leipzig, Germany: Modernes Verlagsbureau, Curt Wigand. Freud, Sigmund. (1895). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281–387. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. ———. (1985). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887–1904 (Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press. ———. (1987). A phylogenetic fantasy: Overview of the transference neuroses (Axel Hoffer and Peter T. Hoffer, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Masson, Jeffrey Moussaieff. (1984). The assault on truth. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. Schur, Max. (1972). Freud: Living and dying. New York: International Universities Press. ÉCOLE DE LA CAUSE FREUDIENNE After the failure of the negotiations between the Société française de psychanalyse (French Society for Psychoanalysis) and the International Psychoanalytical Association over whether to recognize Jacques Lacan as a training analyst, two groups were founded. One was the Association psychanalytique de France INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DE LA CAUSE FREUDIENNE (French Psychoanalytic Association), which was founded on May 26, 1964, and became a member of the International Psychoanalytical Association even though it included a number of Lacanians. The other was the École française de psychanalyse (French School of Psychoanalysis), founded by Jacques Lacan on June 21, 1964. The school was renamed the École freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris) when its bylaws were filed with the police on September 24 of the same year. Lacan dissolved this school by a letter dated January 5, 1980, though its legal dissolution was not voted on until September 27, 1980. Then on February 21, 1980, with his ‘‘letter to the thousand,’’ which was a call to follow him, Lacan founded the Freudian cause, which he entrusted to Solange Faladé, Charles Melman, and Jacques-Alain Miller to direct. Following much discord and many departures, including the resignations of Faladé and Melman, Lacan established, as his base, the École de la Cause freudienne (ECF, School of the Freudian Cause). Its statutes were modified on September 24, 1993. The ECF is the largest and most important Lacanian association in France. It has international connections with a number of other schools through the Association mondial de la psychanalyse (World Association of Psychoanalysis), founded in Paris in 1992. The ECF is represented by Jacques-Alain Miller, Lacan’s son-in-law and literary executor, and is led by a directorate of five members (who serve terms of two years and are responsible for its administration) and a council (which guides its orientation). The school has two levels of membership: member analyst of the school, a permanent title, and analyst of the school, a temporary title. These titles are holdovers from the old École Freudienne de Paris. Also, a practicing analyst can declare his or her practice within the school without the school certifying it. The Association de la Cause freudienne (Association of the Freudian Cause) was founded on November 1, 1992, to gather the fifteen regional associations of the ECF, most of which publish a journal or bulletin. Through the Association mondial de la psychanalyse and the Association de la fondation du champ freudienne (Association for the Foundation of the Freudian Field), founded by Lacan in 1979 and directed by his daughter Judith Miller, the Lacanian movement has an official presence in twenty-six foreign countries (and an especially important presence in 455 É C O L E E X P É R I M E N T A L E DE BONNEUIL Latin America). Two organizations have split off from the ECF: the École de psychanalyse Sigmund Freud (The Sigmund Freud School of Psychoanalysis), which was founded in May 1994 and which revived the experiment of the pass (See Daniel Lagache, ‘‘On the Experiment of the Pass’’ [1973]), and the Forums du champ lacanian (Forums of the Lacanian Field), which was founded in May 1999 by three former presidents of the ECF. The ECF publishes a semiannual journal, Cause freudienne, and a monthly newsletter. JACQUES SÉDAT See also: École Freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris); France; Lacan, Jacques-Marie Émile; Movement lacanien français. ÉCOLE EXPÉRIMENTALE DE BONNEUIL The École expérimentale de Bonneuil (Experimental school of Bonneuil) was founded on September 12, 1969 under the leadership of Maud Mannoni. In his seminar, Jacques Lacan had asked analysts to take a somewhat closer interest in what went on in hospitals, in the belief that analytic discourse could be used to subvert the workings of these structures. In this context, Maud Mannoni began an institutional experiment at the Institut médico-pédagogique (Medical training institute) in Thiais, France. This experiment enabled her to produce Le Psychiatre, son ‘‘fou’’ et la psychanalyse (The psychiatrist, his ‘‘madman’’ and psychoanalysis; 1970), exposing the ways in which psychoanalysis betrays its vocation by participating in the institutional order. Her earlier works were The Backward Child and His Mother: A Psychoanalytic Study (1964/1972), in which she showed that in seeking to treat the symptom the patient’s needs were denied, and The Child, His ‘‘Illness,’’ and the Others (1967/ 1970), where she showed that the vision of the ‘‘sick person’’ is warped by one’s preconceptions. Mannoni’s encounter with the anti-psychiatrists confirmed her ideas: They, too, were rebelling against any ideology based on ‘‘managing’’ madness, and were returning to Sigmund Freud’s suggestion that for the patient, delusions are an attempt at reconstruction. This break with medical thinking occasioned a focus on the idea of segregation that was operative in the 45 6 traditional psychoanalytic institution and entailed grouping patients into broad categories in psychiatric clinical work. This principle of nonsegregation that presided over the opening of the Bonneuil facility was made concrete in its ideal mode of operation: One third of the children were autistic or psychotic children, one third were mentally deficient or emotionally disturbed, and one third were suffering from neuroses of varying degrees of severity. This mode of operation made it possible to maintain a mix of symptomatologies that opened up dynamic perspectives, underscoring by this very fact the negative consequences of segregation for the subject, even when segregation was given a new guise and sanctioned by medicine under the name ‘‘mental illness.’’ That term implies as an alternative a hypothetical ‘‘mental health,’’ which has no place in a psychoanalytic perspective. The fundamental notion of ‘‘breaking out’’ is situated within this ethos of nonsegregation. A place that is open to the outside rather than a self-enclosed institution cut off from the world (an organism created by normative forces acting against the emergence of foreclosed alternatives, to whose detriment this normativity has been maintained), the École expérimentale de Bonneuil was accredited as an outpatient hospital with nighttime intake facilities on March 17, 1975, with a capacity of twenty-six children, ages six to eighteen. Daily practice at Bonneuil is based on a psychoanalytic approach. Theory allows for the work of retrospective interpretation that examines individual pathways and institutional avatars. This constant back-and-forth movement between theory and praxis—in particular in the numerous work groups—characterizes the analyst’s place in the institution. That place is thus a paradoxical one: Practice is not what establishes analysts in their role, but it is what determines their specific place in this setting and the journey they will make with these troubled children. Cooking, running errands, working alongside artisans or farmers, completing schoolwork, and taking workshops—these activities are seen as so many mediations that make it possible to escape from an imaginary situation in which relations between adult and child are built without reference to any third party. The other possibility created is that the children can become the agents in a story that at some point converges with their own. What makes this legible is the putting into place of a framework, not in the sense of institutional rules, but rather a structure that INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS É C O L E provides a sense of bearings and facilitates questioning, to guarantee that work will be ongoing. On March 12, 1980, an experimental family placement service was established for patients from eighteen to twentyfive years old. Since September 1, 1995, family placement has existed for patients older than twenty-five. MICHEL POLO See also: Infantile psychosis; Infantile schizophrenia; Mannoni-Van der Spoel, Maud; Technique with children, psychoanalytic. Bibliography Mannoni, Maud. (1972). The backward child and his mother: a psychoanalytic study. (A. M. Sheridan Smith, Trans.). New York: Pantheon Books. (Original work published 1964) ———. (1970). The child, his ‘‘illness,’’ and the others. New York: Pantheon Books. (Original work published 1967) ———. (1970). Le psychiatre, son ‘‘fou’’ et la psychanalyse. Paris: Seuil. ÉCOLE FREUDIENNE DE PARIS (FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF PARIS) On June 21, 1964, Jacques Lacan founded the École française de psychanalyse (EFP, French School of Psychoanalysis), which, without changing its initials, was quickly renamed the École freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris). The meeting to found the new school was held in the home of François Perrier, the same place where the Quatrième Groupe (the Fourth Group, an offshoot of the EFP) would be founded in 1969. The gathering was attended by about fifty members of the Société française de psychanalyse (SFP, French Psychoanalytic Society), which would not formally be dissolved until January 1965. Lacan chose the word ‘‘school’’ in reference to the ancient schools of philosophy: ‘‘certain places of refuge, indeed bases of operation against what might already be called the discontents of civilization’’ (Lacan, 1964/1990, p. 104). The School’s ‘‘Founding Act’’ was completely different from that of any other psychoanalytic institution. Lacan announced the School’s project in a solemn tone: Its task would be ‘‘a labor which, in the field opened up by Freud, restores the cutting edge of his discovery’’ (p. 97). In order to do this, he made new distinctions in the field of psychoanalysis by creating three divisions, the direction of which he personally INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FREUDIENNE DE PARIS (FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF PARIS) undertook: the division for ‘‘pure psychoanalysis . . . which is and is nothing but . . . the training analysis’’ (p. 98), the division for ‘‘applied psychoanalysis, which means therapeutic and clinical medicine’’ (p. 99), and the division for ‘‘taking inventory of the Freudian field,’’ which would ‘‘undertake to publish those principles from which analytic practice is to receive its [scientific status]’’ (p. 99). Such a distinction between pure and didactic psychoanalysis on the one hand and the therapeutic field on the other could logically only lead to a recourse to science in order to legitimize psychoanalysis. Thus in the ‘‘Founding Act’’ the idealization of science that would later lead to the matheme was already on the horizon. It had already lead Lacan in 1955 to imagine the ‘‘recognition of psychoanalysis, as either a profession or a science’’ on the basis of a ‘‘principle’’ (Lacan, 1966, p. 325). The School recognized three categories of members, which did not in any way correspond to the traditional forms of membership in a psychoanalytic society. The rank of Analyst of the School (AE) was initially held by those who had been full members of the SFP, their task was the ‘‘doctrinal elaboration of training analysis.’’ To become an AE, one had to make a request to the ‘‘jury of approval.’’ The Analyst Member of the School (AME) were directly named, without a personal solicitation, by a ‘‘jury of reception’’ that guaranteed their ‘‘professional ability’’ based on the ‘‘approval of their training analyst, the advice of their supervisor or supervisors, and accounts of the candidate’s practice.’’ It was specified that, ‘‘in regard to the psychoanalytic treatments undertaken under his or her direction, the analyst is only authorized by him- or herself ’’ (Annuaire EFP 1977). This sentence contributed to serious misunderstandings when its second half was taken to be a formula by which one could become an analyst, while in context it is clear that it is only a matter of being authorized in the session. The third category is that of the practicing analyst (A.P.), who declared their practice to the EFP without being sanctioned by it. Finally, it was also possible to be a member of the School without being an analyst by participating in its work and research. The first board of directors that led the EFP was made up of Piera Aulagnier, Jean Clavreul, Jacques Lacan, Serge Leclaire, François Perrier, Guy Rosolato, and Jean-Paul Valabrega. Each of them left the board successively, and some of them left the School altogether, with the exception of Jean Clavreul, who was a 457 ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW member of the last board of directors to be formed (1967), and Lacan, president of the 1967 board, with Solage Faladé as vice-president, Éric Laurent as secretary and administrator of cartels, Jacques-Alain Miller as administrator of cartels, Charles Melman and Christian Simatos—longtime secretary of the School—as administrators of teaching, Claude Conté and Irène Roublef as administrators of publication, and René Bailly as assistant treasurer. The EFP was officially established as a non-profit organization when its first set of bylaws, which were very concise, were filed on September 24, 1964. The members of the corporate board were lay people, friends of Lacan’s. In 1969, in an effort to have the School recognized as a state-approved agency, more detailed bylaws were filed by Solange Faladé, but in 1970, the Council of State turned down the School’s application. During its fifteen years of existence, the EFP went through a series of institutional crises over policies and theoretical issues. On December 1, 1965, François Perrier resigned from the board of directors over the question of training, and on March 31, 1967, he proposed the formation of a ‘‘college of analysts’’ focused on the clinic. Jacques Lacan responded with his ‘‘Proposition of October 9, 1967, on the Psychoanalyst of the School’’ in which he suggested his procedure of ‘‘the pass.’’ This proposal led to the 1968 departure of Guy Rosolato, who rejoined the Psychoanalytic Association of France (AFP). The first split within the Lacanian movement itself soon followed, with the departures of Piera Aulagnier, François Perrier, and Jean-Paul Valabrega during discussions on the pass at the Lutetia Assizes during January 1969. They took with them about twenty members of the School. The departures of such eminent members caused disruptions within the School. Bit by bit, a rift developed between the EFP and the Department of the Freudian Field at Vincennes, which was founded by Serge Leclaire in 1968 and taken over by Jacques Lacan and Jacques-Alain Miller at the end of 1970. This rift led to an implied division between the EFP’s clinical analysts and the young analysts at Vincennes, whose academic training in psychoanalysis set them apart. This younger group became the vehicle for the logical orientation of Lacan’s later career, especially after the founding of the journal Ornicar? by Jacques-Alain Miller in 1975. The Deauville Assizes on the experiment of the pass, held in January 1978, gave ample evidence of the failure of what Lacan had hoped would be 45 8 the primary institutional procedure of the School. It was also at this time that Lacan began to suffer from serious neurological problems (progressive aphasia). In the end, the EFP collapsed on legal grounds. An extraordinary general assembly convened on September 30, 1979, to expand the corporate board from seventeen to twenty-five members and to elect a new board. But on January 5, 1980, in a letter addressed to the members of the School and read at his seminar, Lacan announced the dissolution of the School. This letter prompted Michèle Montrelay and twenty-seven other members to file a lawsuit claiming irregularities in the September meeting. A provisional administrator was named by the Paris municipal court on January 25, 1980. In 1980, three extraordinary general assemblies met without attaining a statutory majority until finally, on September 27, the dissolution of the EFP was passed. When it was founded in June 1964, the EFP included about 100 members. In January 1980, membership stood at more than 600, a number that testifies to the vitality of French Lacanianism in that era. JACQUES SÉDAT See also: École de la Cause freudienne; France; Italy; Lacan, Jacques-Marie Émile; Mouvement lacanien français; Ornicar?; Pass, the; Splits in psychoanalysis; Training analysis. Bibliography Dorgeuille, Claude. (1981). La Seconde Mort de Jacques Lacan. Paris: Actualité freudienne. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Écrits. Paris: Seuil. ———. (1990). Founding act. In Television: A challenge to the psychoanalytic establishment (Joan Copjec, Ed.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1964) ———. (1995). Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School (Russell Grigg, Trans.). Analysis, 6, 1–13. (Original work published 1968) Roudinesco, Élisabeth. (1997). Jacques Lacan (Barbara Bray, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press. (Original work published 1993) ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW Along with the topographical and dynamic points of view, the economic point of view is one of the three main axes of metapsychology. It deals with psychic INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS É C R I T S events in terms of the intensity of the forces that run through them and animate them. This concept was present in Freud’s early thinking and appears in his first metapsychological formulations. It then assumed increasing importance during the evolution of his theoretical thinking and his conception of psychopathology. It is based on the hypothesis, much criticized in recent times, that the mental apparatus is invested with forces that are specific to it (instincts) and which can vary in intensity, either "constitutionally", or as a result of reinforcements linked to the vicissitudes of development (particularly trauma). These primary forces can oppose each other, combine together, and form complex amalgamations and alliances with each other. The economic point of view is an attempt to describe this interplay of forces and the resulting intensities. After 1920, the economic approach assumed increasing importance in Freud’s thinking because of the clinical difficulties encountered in non-neurotic cases. The metapsychological notions that Freud then developed attributed a centrally determinant role to the economic point of view in the genesis and maintenance of pathological conditions and their different structures. In the same way that the concept of instincts is criticized by certain psychoanalysts who prefer more contemporary concepts that focus on information, representation, or signifiers (Widlöcher, D., 1997), the economic point of view has also elicited certain theoretical reservations. However, it is difficult to see how to modify this aspect of metapsychology, which is directly linked to the question of instincts, without seriously jeopardizing the whole of the corpus. Moreover, clinical work makes us sensitive to variations in instinctual intensity and investment which would be difficult to explain without recourse to the economic point of view and the binding and unbinding of instincts. RENÉ ROUSSILLON See also: Cathexis; Discharge; Excitation; Fusion/defusion; Libido; Pleasure/unpleasure principle; Primary process/secondary process; Principle of consistency; ‘‘Project for a scientific psychology, A’’; Protective shield, breaking through the; Psychic energy; Quantitative/qualitative; Repression; Sum of excitation; Trauma; Traumatic neurosis. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. ———. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 141-158; ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64; Green, André. (1995). La causalité psychique. Entre nature et culture. Paris: Odile Jacob. Widlöcher, Daniel. (1997). Les nouvelles cartes de la psychanalyse. Paris: Odile Jacob. Further Reading Lustman, Seymour L. (1968). The economic point of view and defense. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 23, 189– 203. Meissner, William W. (1995). The economic principle in psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 18, 197–292. ÉCRITS Until the publication of his Écrits (Writings), Jacques Lacan’s only published book was his doctoral thesis in medicine, De la psychose paranoı̈aque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité (On paranoid psychosis in its relations with personality; 1932), written from a psychiatric, rather than psychoanalytic, perspective. In the 1960s Lacan was asked by several of his students and by his friend François Wahl, of the publishing house Seuil, to collect his writings in a single volume. The considerable success of De l’interprétation, essai sur Freud (Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation), by Paul Ricœur, in 1965 and then that of Les mots et les choses (The Order of Things), by Michel Foucault, in 1966 prompted him to prepare a collection of his articles. He omitted all his work from before the war, notably his article ‘‘La vie mentale’’ (Mental life; 1938) from volume eight of the Encyclopédie française (the alternate title of which, ‘‘The Family Complexes in the Formation of the Individual,’’ only appeared on the cover of an off-print). He did, however, make an exception for a text written in 1936 for Marienbad, where he delivered his lost lecture on the mirror stage to the congress of the International Psychoanalytic Association. 459 E D E R , D A V I D M O N T A G U E (1 866 –19 36) In the collection, he slightly modified his articles, often without any indication of the changes. He introduced the book with a recollection of his medical and psychiatric origins, ‘‘De nos antécedents’’(On my antecedents), and preceded ‘‘Discours de Rome’’ (Rome discourse) of 1953 with a brief text that indicated the consequences of this discourse for the psychoanalysis of the future, ‘‘Du sujet enfin en question’’ (On the subject who is finally in question). Écrits was published in the third trimester of 1966 by Seuil. The book very quickly achieved critical acclaim and was widely reviewed and debated in the press. It included a ‘‘Classified Index of the Major Concepts’’ by Jacques-Alain Miller. This index introduced a logical dimension to Lacanism that was emphasized from 1975 on. In the introduction to the index Miller wrote, ‘‘According to my conception of these Écrits, it is to our benefit to study them as forming a system. . . . For my own part, not needing to concern myself with the efficacy of the theory in [the clinic], I will encourage the reader by proposing that there is no outer limit to the expansion of formalization in the field of discourse’’ (pp. 358–359). A measure of the influence of Écrits is that it has been translated in to numerous languages. Moreover, it was followed by a sequel, Autres Écrits, published in June 2001. In that volume Jacques-Alain Miller collected nearly all of Lacan’s articles from before 1939, such as ‘‘Les complexes familiaux dans la vie de l’individu’’ (Family complexes in the formation of the individual; 1938). Also included are the version of the ‘‘Discours de Rome’’ (Rome discourse) circulated in the proceedings of the IPA congress (1953) and all the texts that appeared after the publication of Écrits up to that of ‘‘L’étourdit’’ (Stunned; 1972), Lacan’s last published article. JACQUES SÉDAT See also: École freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris); France; Lacan, Jaques-Marie Émile; Structuralism and psycho- analysis. Source Citation Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Écrits. Paris: Le Seuil. Schriften. Olten, Switzerland: Walter-Verlag, 1973–1980. Écrits: A Selection. (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: Norton, 2004. 46 0 Bibliography Dor, Joël. (1994). Nouvelle bibliographie des travaux de Jacques Lacan. Paris: Éditions et Publications de l’École Lacanienne. Lacan, Jacques. (1938). La vie mentale. Encyclopédie française, Vol. 8. ———. (1973). L’étourdit. Scilicet, 4, 5–52. ———. (2001). Autres écrits (Jacques-Alain Miller, Ed.). Paris: Éditions du Seuil. Roudinesco, Elisabeth. (1990). Jacques Lacan & Co.: A History of Psychoanalysis in France, 1925–1985 (Jeffrey Mehlman, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. EDER, DAVID MONTAGUE (1866–1936) David Montague Eder, an English psychoanalyst, was born in August 1866 in London, where he died on March 30, 1936. He studied medicine in London, opened a practice as a general practitioner and, with Clara Grant, started the first school clinic as a result of his interest in education. He met Ernest Jones in 1904, but it was his enthusiasm that stemmed from his reading ‘‘Little Hans’’ in 1909 that led him to psychoanalysis. In 1911 he gave the first psychoanalytic conference in Great Britain, which scandalized members of the British Medical Association. After becoming an analyst in 1912, he met Jung and translated two of his works into English: Diagnostiche Assoziationsstudien (Diagnostic Association Studies) and Versuch einer Darstellung der psychoanalytischen Theorie (The Theory of Psychoanalysis). In 1913 he traveled to Vienna to be analyzed by Freud, who sent him to Viktor Tausk. Eder was successively analyzed by Tausk, by Jones, and, after an attempt with Karl Abraham, by Sándor Ferenczi, with whom he shared the illusion of the ‘‘perfectly analyzed analyst.’’ Eder also introduced the work of Alfred Binet and Théodore Simon in Great Britain. Eder was involved in a number of political and social issues. He argued against the unfairness of the Mental Deficiency Bill. Associated with Zionist literary and political circles through his Jewish family (he was a cousin of the writer Israel Zangwill and a friend of D. H. Lawrence; his wife, Edith, was the sister of the analyst Barbara Low), he embraced the Zionist cause. In 1915 Eder joined the army as a doctor and was stationed in Malta, then at a neurological clinic in London. He published a book about his experiences entitled War-shock (1917), which focused on wartime neuroses INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EGO and their treatment. In 1920, while living in Palestine, he worked with Chaim Weizmann, Israel’s first president, and led seminars in analysis (with Dorian Faigenbaum). This represented the first appearance of analysis in Israel prior to the arrival of Max Eitingon. He later became an elected representative of the Zionist Executive in Palestine and served from 1921 to 1927. Eder distanced himself from Jung’s ideas. In 1923 he joined the British Psychoanalytic Society, where he held numerous positions: first as secretary, then as director of the Institute of Psychoanalysis and director of the London Clinic of Psychoanalysis. In 1932 he was elected president of the medical section of the British Psychological Society. He was the first to use psychoanalysis to treat a case of stuttering, which is described in ‘‘Das Stottern eine Psychoneurose und seine Behandlung durch die Psychoanalyse’’ (Stuttering: a psychoneurosis and its treatment through psychoanalysis; 1913). His theoretical works comprise some thirty articles, covering subjects that include dreams and resistance (1930), the psychological problems of eugenics and birth control, the economy and future of the superego (1929), the father’s animosity toward the son, and Jewish rituals (1933). This ‘‘political pugilist’’ and ‘‘liberator by vocation’’ (as Edward Glover described him) was also a passionate advocate of psychoanalysis, which he introduced into schools and prisons. Sigmund Freud confided to Barbara Low that he represented ‘‘a rare blend of intrepid courage and an absolute love of truth, together with tolerance and a great capacity to love.’’ MICHELLE MOREAU RICAUD See also: Great Britain; Israel; Low, Barbara Bibliography Eder, David. (1913). Das Stottern: eine Psychoneurose und seine Behandlung durch die Psychoanalyse. Internationale Zeitschrift für ärztliche Psychoanalyse, 1. ———. (1917). War shock. London: W. Heineman. ———. (1929). On the economics and the future of the super-ego. International Journal of Psycho-analysis, 10, 249–255. ———. (1930). Dreams—as resistance. International Journal of Psycho-analysis, 11, 40–47. ———. (1933). The Jewish phylacteries and other Jewish ritual observances. International Journal of Psycho-analysis, 14, 341–375. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Glover, Edward. (1945). Eder as a psychoanalyst. In Joseph Burton Hobman (Ed.), David Eder: Memoirs of a modern pioneer. London: Victor Gollancz. Hobman, Joseph Burton (Ed.). (1945). David Eder: Memoirs of a modern pioneer. London: Victor Gollancz. EGO The notion of das Ich (literally ‘‘the I’’) was present in Freud’s thought from the earliest days of psychoanalysis, but over the years it underwent serious theoretical modifications, often connected to advances in clinical practice. The term had long designated the self-conscious person as a whole, but in 1923 Freud assigned it the role of an agency of the mental apparatus with a mediating and regulatory function vis-à-vis the id, the superego, and external reality. He would always, however, allow a measure of ambiguity to persist with respect to the two meanings, and it was only after his death that they were disentangled and promoted separately in contradistinction to one another. With the stress placed by the proponents of ego psychology on the ego’s adaptative functions, the notion tended to be upstaged by the ‘‘self,’’ the ‘‘I,’’ or the ‘‘subject.’’ To begin with, then, Freud tended to employ ‘‘das Ich’’ in a sense akin to that of the philosophers, that is to say as a synonym for ‘‘conscious person.’’ Only later did he reserve the term for a portion of the mental personality, in accordance with his constant concern to distinguish analysis from synthesis. But the German word remained ambiguous, along with its use in Freud’s writing, and its translation into other languages inevitably occasioned problems and debates. The choice of ‘‘ego’’ by the translators of the Standard Edition has been challenged, by Bruno Bettelheim among others: ‘‘To mistranslate Ich as Ôego’ is to transform it into jargon that no longer conveys the personal commitment we make when we say ÔI’ or Ôme’’’ (Bettelheim, p. 53). As for the early French psychoanalysts, they hesitated between ‘‘ego’’ and ‘‘le Moi’’ before plumping for this last term in preference to either ‘‘ego’’ or ‘‘Je.’’ Very early on in his thinking, contemporary research on ‘‘split personality,’’ that is to say, on the dissociation of consciousness, along with his own use of hypnosis, led Freud to place the ego qua consciousness in the position of an active judge in the conflicts underlying psychopathological symptoms. In his article on ‘‘The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence’’ (1894a), he 461 EGO emphasized the ‘‘task which the ego, in its defensive attitude, sets itself of treating the incompatible idea as Ônon arrivée’’’ (p. 48). The following year, he described the ego at length in biological terms, in the ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology,’’ (1950a [1895]), as a group of neurones designed to control primary processes and avoid unpleasure: ‘‘the ego is to be defined as the totality of the psi cathexes at the given time’’ (p. 323). As thus characterized, the ego was no longer synonymous with the whole person: Its future role as a psychical agency was foreshadowed, and it was already responsible for regulating energy flows, a task that would to fall to it more and more clearly in the psychological context. Freud’s ‘‘first topography,’’ founded on the distinctions between the Conscious, the Preconscious, and the Unconscious, made no essential appeal to the ego, which makes its appearance in The Interpretation of Dreams mainly as the bearer of the wish for sleep or else as a key actor at the center of the masquerade in which, as censor, it itself cloaks unconscious wishes: ‘‘Dreams are completely egoistic. Whenever my own ego does not appear in the content of the dream, but only some extraneous person, I may safely assume that my own ego lies concealed, by identification, behind this other person; I can insert my ego into the context. On other occasions, when my ego does appear in the dream, the situation in which it occurs may teach me that some other person lies concealed, by identification, behind my ego. In that case, the dream should warn me to transfer on to myself, when I am interpreting the dream, the concealed common element attached to this other person. There are also dreams in which my ego appears along with other people who, when the identification is resolved, are revealed once again as my ego. These identifications should then make it possible for me to bring into contact with my ego certain ideas whose acceptance has been forbidden by the censorship. Thus my ego may be represented in a dream several times over, now directly and now through identification with extraneous persons’’ (1900a, pp. 322–23). The ‘‘my ego’’ here stood for ‘‘the representation of myself’’ in the sense of identity. This early link made by Freud between the ego and processes of identification is noteworthy. Over the next fifteen years Freud developed the notion, not so much in topographical terms, for in that sense the ego remained within the PreconsciousConscious system, but in dynamic and economic 46 2 terms, especially with respect to its role in the regulation of pleasure/unpleasure. The notion of ‘‘ego instincts,’’ also known as ‘‘self-preservative instincts,’’ as distinct from the ‘‘sexual instincts,’’ was introduced by Freud as early as 1910; he observed that the two classes of instincts ‘‘have in general the same organs and systems of organs at their disposal’’ (1910i, pp. 215–16). Even if, not long before, he had ironized on ‘‘His Majesty the Ego, the hero alike of every daydream and of every story’’ (1908e, p. 150), Freud now deemed external reality one of the constraints that the ego was obliged to confront. In ‘‘Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning,’’ he drew a distinction between a ‘‘pleasure ego,’’ related to the infant’s attempts to achieve a hallucinatory satisfaction of its wishes, and a ‘‘reality ego’’ developed over time in response to life’s failure to supply satisfaction: ‘‘Just as the pleasure-ego can do nothing but wish, work for a yield of pleasure, and avoid unpleasure, so the reality-ego need do nothing but strive for what is useful and guard itself against damage’’ (1911b, p. 223). The ego was thus being presented more and more as an essential working part in the regulation of a complex mental system. In the same year of 1911, the problem of psychotic patients led Freud, stimulated in this regard by Jung’s research on the issue, to complete his first reflections on narcissism and identification, begun in his study of Leonardo da Vinci the year before. In his ‘‘PsychoAnalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia,’’ he argued that dementias, especially schizophrenic dementia, should be seen as involving ‘‘the detachment of libido’’ from the external world and its ‘‘regression on to the ego’’ (p. 76), in memory of that time when ‘‘a person’s only sexual object [was] his own ego’’ (p. 72). In ‘‘The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest,’’ he offered this summary of his view of the nature of the neuroses: ‘‘The primal conflict which leads to neuroses is one between the sexual instincts and those which maintain the ego. The neuroses represent a more or less partial overpowering of the ego by sexuality after the ego’s attempts at suppressing sexuality have failed’’ (1913j, p. 181). Alfred Adler’s theories were doubtless not without their influence, too, on the questions Freud was asking himself at this time, even if he felt that Adler underestimated the importance of unconscious processes, and wrote to Jung on March 3, 1911: ‘‘I would never have expected a psychoanalyst to be so taken in by the ego. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EGO In reality the ego is like the clown in the circus, who is always putting in his oar to make the audience think that whatever happens is his doing’’ (Freud/Jung Letters, p. 400). We know that Freud would modify this view later, but for now he kept the emphasis on the socius: ‘‘psycho-analysis has fully demonstrated the part played by social conditions and requirements in the causation of neurosis. The forces which, operating from the ego, bring about the restriction and repression of instinct owe their existence essentially to compliance with the demands of civilization’’ (1913j, p. 188). this was what distanced Freud from the theories of Jung, who had just parted company with him—it was essential not to confuse ‘‘homage to a high ego ideal’’ with the sublimation of the libidinal instincts (p. 94). In the first case repression was reinforced, according to Freud, whereas in the second sublimated instinctual satisfaction made repression unnecessary. As for the ‘‘special psychical agency which performs the task of seeing that narcissistic satisfaction from the ego ideal is ensured and which, with this end in view, constantly watches the actual ego and measures it by that ideal’’ (p. 95), this was clearly the adumbration of the future superego. In 1912 Freud could still describe the ego as synonymous with the mental personality as a whole, as he did in a letter to Ludwig Binswanger of July 4, 1912: "I have long suspected that not only the repressed but also the dominant aspect of our life, the essence of the ego, is unconscious though not inaccessible to the conscious" (1992 [1908-38], p. 90). But his paper ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ (1914b) marked the turning-point which endowed the ego with a new significance in theory as in practice: ‘‘Thus we form the idea of there being an original libidinal cathexis of the ego, from which some is later given off to objects, but which fundamentally persists and is related to the object-cathexes much as the body of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out. . . . We see also, broadly speaking, an antithesis between egolibido and object-libido’’ (pp. 75–76). Another observation of Freud’s raised an issue which has never since ceased being debated, that of the genesis of the ego: ‘‘we are bound to suppose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual from the start; the ego has to be developed’’ (pp. 76–77). The distinction between ego instincts and sexual instincts was preserved, even if Freud stressed that ‘‘the hypothesis of separate ego-instincts and sexual instincts (that is to say, the libido theory) rests scarcely at all upon a psychological basis, but derives its principal support from biology’’ (p. 79). In this same text another idea too was introduced into the theory of analysis, that of the ideal ego against which the actual ego is measured: ‘‘Repression . . . proceeds from the self-respect of the ego. . . . This ideal ego [Idealich] is now the target of the selflove which was enjoyed in childhood by the actual ego. The subject’s narcissism makes its appearance displaced on to this new ideal ego [Dieses neue ideale Ich] which, like the infantile ego, finds itself possessed of every perfection’’ (pp. 93–94). At the same time—and In 1915 Freud added the following observation to the third edition of his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality: ‘‘In contrast to object-libido, we also describe ego-libido as Ônarcissistic’ libido. . . . Narcissistic or ego-libido seems to be the great reservoir from which the object-cathexes are sent out and into which they are withdrawn once more; the narcissistic libidinal cathexis of the ego is the original state of things, realized in earliest childhood, and is merely covered by the later extrusions of libido, but in essentials persists behind them’’ (1905d, p. 218). In this perspective, progression from auto-erotism to genital heterosexuality could include a moment characterized by a narcissistic or even a homosexual object-choice. In the Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Freud went on to evoke a possible view of the ego’s strength which was destined to have not a little influence on the postFreudian theory of psychoanalytic technique: ‘‘A person only falls ill of a neurosis if his ego has lost the capacity to allocate his libido in some way. The stronger his ego, the easier will it be for it to carry out that task. Any weakening of his ego from whatever cause must have the same effect as an excessive increase in the claims of the libido and will thus make it possible for him to fall ill of a neurosis’’ (1916–17a [1915–17], p. 387). The suggestion that a weak ego needed ‘‘strengthening’’ gained considerable currency among analysts after the Second World War, along with the idea of the therapeutic alliance which it was felt should be achieved between the therapist and the healthy part of the patient’s ego. Both Melanie Klein and Jacques Lacan, each in their own way, contested this approach. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS During the 1915–1920 period, Freud’s theory of the ego underwent many refinements as his metapsychological papers and summarizing lectures of introduction to psychoanalysis continued to synthesize his 463 EGO thought. But it would be a mistake to overlook the fact that in a good number of his theoretical speculations the coexistence of old and new ideas was still quite possible, and that contradictions often appear if Freud’s formulations are placed side by side. Thus in 1918, on the point of unveiling a completely new view of the ego, Freud could still write: ‘‘the neurotic patient presents us with a torn mind, divided by resistances. As we analyze it and remove the resistances, it grows together; the great unity which we call his ego fits into itself all the instinctual impulses which before had been split off and held apart from it. The psychosynthesis is thus achieved during analytic treatment without our intervention, automatically and inevitably. We have created the conditions for it by breaking up the symptoms into their elements and by removing the resistances’’ (1919a [1918], p. 161). It would not be long, however, before the said ‘‘great unity’’ was dismantled. His reflections on schizophrenia led Freud to create the class of ‘‘narcissistic neuroses.’’ Those on melancholia brought forth the category of ‘‘narcissistic identification,’’ meaning the identification of the ego with a lost object: ‘‘Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency, as though it were an object, the forsaken object. In this way an object-loss was transformed into an ego-loss and the conflict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the critical activity of the ego and the ego as transformed by identification’’ (1917e [1915], p. 249). It was from this time, too, that identification took on an ever greater significance in Freud’s account of the ego’s genesis and development. It was said, after all, to be the earliest mode of objectcathexis. And identification was invoked by Freud, in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c), as the bond that structures all social organization. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, however, was the text that contained the first hint of Freud’s abandoning the psychical apparatus as described in 1900: ‘‘it is certain that much of the ego is itself unconscious, and notably what we may describe as its nucleus’’ (1920g, p. 19). Furthermore, the introduction of the death instinct in the same work rendered obsolete Freud’s earlier distinction between ego instincts and sexual instincts, for both self-preservation and the relief of tension due to unpleasure now fell within the remit of a death instinct which the ego appeared to serve, whether in its inhibiting and repressive functions or in resistances, observed 46 4 during treatment, that were linked to the repetition compulsion. Three years later, in The Ego and the Id (1923b), the ego finally achieved the status of an important agency in the description of the mental personality. The starting point of this work was the assertion that ‘‘A part of the ego, too—and Heaven knows how important a part—may be Ucs., undoubtedly is Ucs.’’ (p. 18). The old account based on the Cs./Pcs./Ucs. schema was discarded, these substantives to be confined henceforward to a solely adjectival use denoting properties, but the processes described earlier to explain ‘‘coming to consciousness’’ remained valid: unconscious thing-presentations still had to be brought into connection with word-presentations in order to become conscious (see ‘‘The Unconscious’’ [1915e]). The ego was now described as wearing a ‘‘cap of hearing,’’ the origin of perception and of the memory traces that perpetuated it. The Ego and the Id views the ego primarily as a surface differentiation of the id under the influence of the external world; it conveys the demands of the external world to the instinctual agency of the id, with which it remains in permanent contact at its base. As a messenger of reality, the ego replaces the reign of the pleasure principle by that of the reality principle, imposing the constraints of the social environment. It is the agent of the repression (or the sublimation) of the instincts, of the censorship of dreams, and the cause of resistances to the treatment, and it manages object-cathexes and controls motility. All these responsibilities do not preclude a certain passivity of the ego. Recalling the tale of Itzig, who does not know where he is going, and says ‘‘Ask my horse!’’, Freud writes: ‘‘Thus in its relation to the id it is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse; with this difference, that the rider tries to do so with his own strength while the ego uses borrowed forces. The analogy may be carried a little further. Often a rider, if he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to guide it where it wants to go; so in the same way the ego is in the habit of transforming the id’s will into action as if it were its own’’ (p. 25). But ‘‘The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface’’ (p. 26). This idea was elaborated by Freud in a note added to the English translation of The Ego and the Id published in 1927: ‘‘the ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EGO springing from the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body, besides, as we have seen above, representing the superficies of the mental apparatus’’ (p. 26n). (Here it is possible to discern the origins of the ‘‘skin-ego’’ described by Didier Anzieu in 1985 [Anzieu, 1989]). The ego derives energy from narcissistic libido, and in this connection Freud evokes the possibility of a libido (even an Eros) that is ‘‘desexualized’’ or ‘‘sublimated,’’ ‘‘displaceable and neutral’’—and, one can only suppose, not easily reconcilable with the theses of ego psychology on an autonomous and conflictless ego. At all events, according to Freud, ‘‘The narcissism of the ego is . . . a secondary one, which has been withdrawn from objects’’ (pp. 44–46). The importance of processes of identification is much emphasized in The Ego and the Id. Identification is the basis of the earliest object-cathexes and retains this function first in the form of incorporation and later as identification proper. (As early as 1909 Sándor Ferenczi had described the growth of the ego in terms of introjection.) But the fate of object-cathexes is that they must be abandoned in the course of a person’s history, and Freud concludes in this connection that the mechanism of melancholia is universally applicable. Thanks to narcissistic identification, the abandoned object is perpetuated within the ego, which seeks on this basis to make itself loved by the id: ‘‘I am so like the object’’ (p. 30). Freud is thus able to frame the following proposition, so often misread since: ‘‘It may be that this identification is the sole condition under which the id can give up its objects. At any rate the process, especially in the early phases of development, is a very frequent one, and it makes it possible to suppose that the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and that it contains the history of those object-choices’’ (p. 29). As we shall see, the restriction here, that only the ‘‘character’’ of the ego and not the ego as a whole is involved in this process, would often be overlooked subsequently; all the same, Freud’s evocation of the succession—even the contradictory coexistence—of object identifications in the case of ‘‘multiple personalities’’ (pp. 30– 31) shows just how much the ego remains the seat of identifications for him. We should note lastly in this context that the Other, as object, made its definitive entrance into psychoanalytic theory in The Ego and the Id, opening the way to the discussion of ‘‘object relations’’ that was to have a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS greater and greater effect on practice in the future. And, along with the Other, the past, tradition, and intergenerational transmission, or in other words the ego’s primal identifications with the two parents, which were also placed at the origin of the other agency described, the superego. The distinction between individual and ego is nevertheless very clearly drawn: ‘‘We shall now look upon an individual as a psychical id, unknown and unconscious, upon whose surface rests the ego, developed from its nucleus the Pcpt. [perception-consciousness] system. If we make an effort to represent this pictorially, we may add that the ego does not completely envelop the id, but only does to the extent to which the system Pcpt. forms its [the ego’s] surface, more or less as the germinal disc rests upon the ovum. The ego is not sharply separated from the id; its lower portion merges into it’’ (p. 24). As we know, each of the hypotheses set forth in The Ego and the Id was subject to theoretical developments, often divergent ones, in later years. Freud himself never ceased working on them, as when, in ‘‘Neurosis and Psychosis,’’ he offered a ‘‘simple formula. . . which deals with what is perhaps the most important genetic difference between a neurosis and a psychosis: neurosis is the result of a conflict between the ego and its id, whereas psychosis is the analogous outcome of a similar disturbance between the ego and the external world’’ (p. 149). Or when, in ‘‘The Economic Problem of Masochism,’’ he clarified the point that ‘‘the function of the ego is to unite and to reconcile the claims of the three agencies which it serves; and we may add that in doing so it also possesses in the super-ego a model which it can strive to follow’’ (1924c, p. 167). Again, in ‘‘Negation,’’ Freud recalled that ‘‘the original pleasure-ego wants to introject into itself everything that is good and to eject from itself everything that is bad. What is bad, what is alien to the ego and what is external are, to begin with, identical’’; and also that ‘‘The other sort of decision made by the function of judgement—as to the real existence of something of which there is a presentation (reality-testing)—is a concern of the definitive reality-ego, which develops out of the initial pleasure-ego. It is now no longer a question of whether what has been perceived (a thing) shall be taken into the ego or not, but of whether something which is in the ego as a presentation can be rediscovered in perception (reality) as well’’ (1925h, p. 237). 465 EGO In Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, Freud would underscore the ego’s functions in the regulation of the instincts, giving back to the idea of ‘‘defense mechanisms’’ a place that had long been usurped by the notion of ‘‘repression.’’ He also modified his theory of anxiety, assigning it a source in the ego, which, when confronted by danger, triggered anxiety as a signal and so mobilized defensive processes: ‘‘whereas I formerly believed that anxiety invariably arose automatically by an economic process, my present conception of anxiety as a signal given by the ego in order to affect the pleasure-unpleasure agency does away with the necessity of considering the economic factor.’’ It was probable, Freud added, that ‘‘the earliest repressions as well as most of the later ones are motivated by an ego-anxiety of this sort in regard to particular processes in the id’’ (1926d [1925], p. 140). The question of the ego was raised directly or indirectly, and new considerations on the subject were adduced, throughout Freud’s later work. The notion of ‘‘disavowal’’ (1927e) and the study of perversions, even more than the descriptions in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]) and An Outline of PsychoAnalysis (1940a [1938]), were what led Freud to his last great formulation concerning the ego—that on the ‘‘splitting of the ego’’: Faced by a conflict between the instinctual demand for masturbatory pleasure and the apprehension of the reality of the threat of castration, the child embraces two contradictory positions simultaneously, ‘‘at the price of a rift in the ego which never heals but which increases as time goes on. The two contrary reactions to the conflict persist as the centre-point of a splitting of the ego. The whole process seems so strange to us because we take for granted the synthetic nature of the processes of the ego. But we are clearly at fault in this. The synthetic function of the ego, though it is of such extraordinary importance, is subject to particular conditions and is liable to a whole number of disturbances’’ (1940e [1938], p. 276). On the clinical plane, the ego’s role was defined by Freud in the conclusion to the twenty-third of the New Introductory Lectures—a passage that has caused a very great deal of ink to flow, especially in France. The ‘‘therapeutic efforts of psycho-analysis,’’ Freud writes, are ‘‘to strengthen the ego, to make it more independent of the super-ego, to widen its field of perception and enlarge its organization, so that it can appropriate fresh portions of the id. Where id was, there ego shall be. It is a work of culture—not unlike the draining of 46 6 the Zuider Zee’’ (1933a [1932], p. 80). Freud returned to the matter in ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’’: ‘‘As is well known, the analytic situation consists in our allying ourselves with the ego of the person under treatment, in order to subdue portions of his id which are uncontrolled—that is to say to include them in the synthesis of his ego. The fact that a co-operation of this kind habitually fails in the case of psychotics affords us a first solid footing for our judgement. The ego, if we are to be able to make such a pact with it, must be a normal one. But a normal ego of this sort is, like normality in general, an ideal fiction. The abnormal ego, which is unserviceable for our purposes, is unfortunately no fiction. Every normal person, in fact, is only normal on the average. His ego approximates to that of the psychotic in some part or other and to a greater or lesser extent; and the degree of its remoteness from one end of the series and of its proximity to the other will furnish us with a provisional measure of what we have so indefinitely termed an Ôalteration of the ego’’’ (1937c, p. 235). Anna Freud, in The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, published in 1936, was the first to revisit and round out her father’s hypotheses. This was the start of a series of studies by Anna Freud centered on the psychology of the ego, sometimes to the detriment of the interpretation of unconscious fantasies. In 1939, Heinz Hartmann laid the groundwork of what the psychoanalytical migration to the United States would develop into ego psychology thanks to the work of Ernst Kris, Rudolph Loewenstein, David Rapaport, Paul Federn, and so many others. So influential was ego psychology that for a time this theoretical orientation appeared to constitute the most thoroughgoing expression of Freudian orthodoxy. In point of fact, Hartmann’s idea of the ‘‘autonomy’’ of the ego, which he proposed as early as 1939, was in contradiction with Freud’s views on the origins of this mental agency, which for him could never be anything but conflicted, bound up as it was with the relations between instinctual demands and the requirements of external reality. According to Hartmann, certain functions of the ego developed independently of the id and were essentially in the service of the individual’s adaptation to the environment; the socialization factor was also underlined by Erik Erikson (1950). The notion of ‘‘primary narcissism’’ and that of a gradual development of the ego and its object relationships then became the subject of lively debate, notably with the Kleinian analysts. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EGO For Melanie Klein, the ego and its object relationships existed from birth, as witness the early split between good and bad objects or the mechanisms of projection and projective identification, which manifested themselves right away. Klein’s use of the term ‘‘self ’’ should also be noted; her students and followers called upon it more and more, feeling that it helped distance them from the over-‘‘mechanistic’’ account of the ego put forward by the American school. Things were not so simple, however, for the Americans too adopted the idea of a self—Heinz Kohut even invented a ‘‘self psychology’’—and some of them sought to give identity priority over the haze in which Freud had ultimately left the definition of the ego as distinct from the notion of the person. In a parallel development, the stress placed on ‘‘object relationships’’ by AngloSaxon authors (W. R. D. Fairbairn, Margaret Mahler, Otto Kernberg) or French ones (Maurice Bouvet) shifted theoretical and above all clinical interest away from the state of an ego in need of cure and onto the vicissitudes of the pregenital and genital relations established by a subject who repeated these in the transference. In France, there was no sarcasm too biting for Jacques Lacan when it came to the proponents of ego psychology, and he based himself on his theory of organization by language to place the ego resolutely in the realm of the Imaginary. His notion of the ‘‘mirror phase,’’ first proposed in 1936, was intended to account for the constitution, by means of specular identification, not of the ego but rather of an ‘‘I’’ which foreshadowed the significance assumed later in his theory by the ‘‘subject’’ (Lacan, 1977 [1949]). He nonetheless devoted his 1954–55 Seminar to ‘‘The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis’’ (Lacan, 1993 [1981]). Piera Aulagnier, for her part, abandoned the notion of the ego in favor of a concept of the ‘‘I’’ different from Lacan’s. Present-day psychoanalysis is clearly more interested in synthetic approaches to the individual and the individual’s relationship to others than in the ego as the frontier agency to which Freud accorded so much importance, as described above. No doubt the considerable extension of the psychoanalytic approach to psychotic patients has contributed to this tendency to globalize the person and be less attentive to an ego conceived as ‘‘weak’’ or ‘‘in pieces.’’ There can be no doubt, either, that the emphasis placed on the adaptive functions of the ego has in the eyes of many amounted INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS to a bastardization of psychoanalysis favoring more and more ‘‘psychotherapeutic’’ or even political goals, and thus running counter to the liberation that Freud’s discoveries imply. At all events, it is vital to keep in mind what clinical and therapeutic issues underlie and determine such theoretical divergences, namely adaptation to reality, the interpretation of unconscious fantasies, social adjustment, autonomy/disalienation, and so on. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Binding/unbinding of the instincts; Cathectic energy; Defense mechanisms; Depersonalization; Ego and the Id, The; Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, The; Ego alterations; Ego (analytical psychology); Ego autonomy; Ego boundaries; Ego (ego psychology); Ego feeling; Ego functions; Ego ideal; Ego ideal/ideal ego; Egoinstinct; Ego interests; Ego-libido/object-libido; Ego Psychology and Psychosis; Ego psychology; Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation; Ego-syntonic; Federn, Paul; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; Hartmann, Heinz; I; Id; Identification; Identity; Infantile omnipotence; Kris, Ernst; Loewenstein, Rudolph M.; Megalomania; Narcissism; New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis; ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’; Outline of Psychoanalysis, An; Passion; Perception-consciousness (Pcpt.-Cs.); Pleasure ego/reality ego; Primary identification; ; Psychoanalytic treatment; Purified-pleasure-ego; Structuralism and psychoanalysis; Self (analytical psychology); Self-hatred; Self-image; Self-preservation; Skin-ego; ‘‘Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence, The’’; Superego; Therapeutic alliance; Tube-ego. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1989 [1985]). The skin ego. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Bettelheim, Bruno. (1983). Freud and man’s soul. New York: Knopf. Erikson, Erik H. (1950). Childhood and society. New York: Norton. Freud, Anna. The ego and the mechanisms of defence. (1937 [1936]). London: Hogarth. Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3. ———. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7. ———. (1908e). Creative writers and day-dreaming. SE, 12. 467 EGO, ALTERATION OF THE ———. (1910i). The psycho-analytic view of psychogenic disturbances of vision. SE, 11. ———. (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12. ———. (1911c). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia. (Dementia paranoides). SE, 12. ———. (1913j). The claims of psycho-analysis to scientific interest. SE, 13. ———. (1914b). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14. ———. (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14. Freud, Sigmund, and Ludwig Binswanger. (1992 [1908– 38]). The Sigmund Freud-Ludwig Binswanger correspondence (Gerhard Fichtner, Ed.; Arnold J. Pomerans, Trans.). New York: Other Press, 2003. Hartmann, Heinz. (1939). Essays on ego psychology. New York: International Universities Press, 1964. Lacan, Jacques. (1993). The ego in freud’s theory and in the technique of psychoanalysis: 1954–1955. (Sylvana Tomaselli, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1981) Lacan, Jacques. (2004). The mirror stage as formative of the function of the i. In Écrits: A Selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1949) ———. (1916–17a [1915–17]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15–16. ———. (1917e [1915]). Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14. ———. (1919a [1918]). Lines of advance in psycho-analytic therapy. SE, 17. Further Reading Busch, Fred. (1995). The ego at the center of clinical technique. Northvale, NJ: Aronson Inc. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18. Gray, Paul. (1994). The ego and the analysis of defense. Northvale, NJ: Aronson Inc. ———. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18. Marcus, Eric. (1999). Modern ego psychology. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 47, 843–872. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19. Opatow, Barry. (1993). On the drive-rootedness of psychoanalytic ego psychology. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 74, 437–458. ———. (1924b). Neurosis and psychosis. SE, 19. ———. (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19. ———. (1925h). Negation. SE, 19. ———. (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20. ———. (1927e). Fetishism. SE, 21. Orgel, Shelley. (1995). K. R. Eissler’s "Effect of structure ego on analytic technique.". Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 64, 551–570. Pine, Fred. (1990). Drive, ego, object, and self. New York: Basic Books. Wallerstein, Robert. (2002). The growth and transformation of American ego psychology. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 50, 135–170. ———. (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23. ———. (1940a [1938]). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23. ———. (1940e [1938]). Splitting of the ego in the process of defence. SE, 23. ———. (1950a [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1. Freud, Sigmund, and Jung, Car. (1974a [1906–13]). The Freud/Jung letters (William McGuire, Ed.; Ralph Mannheim and R. F. C. Hull, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 46 8 EGO, ALTERATION OF THE The term ‘‘alteration of the ego’’ refers to changes that the ego undergoes as a function of age or as a result of neurotic or psychotic injuries with which it must deal. This idea was evoked several times in Freud’s work. Though it was referred to in ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ (1914c), the mention was brief, for Freud had not as yet taken up the ego as an object of investigation. This was during the period when he went so far as to compare the ego to ‘‘a clown in the circus’’ (1914d, p. 53). Once the important part played by the ego in the unconscious was recognized, the function of defense took on great significance as the origin of alterations of the ego (1937c). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EGO (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) Later, with the advent of ego psychology, whether that of Heinz Hartmann or that of Paul Federn, the concept of ‘‘alteration of the ego’’ came fully into its own. In the first place, these changes were seen to constitute a continual mental process, extending from the primordial form of sucking at the breast to the most complex forms of scientific thinking. This process may be observed most clearly at turning points in life, as for example during the transition from childhood to adolescence or from adolescence to adulthood. Similarly, even though the change is far slower and more subtle, there is certainly a difference between the ego of the adult and that of the individual in old age. On another level, the ego can be modified as a consequence of neurotic or psychotic disturbances. In the case of neurosis, the mechanisms of defense become so significant that the ego is obliged to transform itself, even though such transformation is never so far-reaching as it is when a psychotic process comes into play. The critical difference between these two kinds of alteration is that in neurosis there is no apparent splitting of the ego, whereas in the case of psychosis such splitting is evident. A split ego, obviously, is an altered ego. In a highly cathected narcissistic ego, transformations are harder to observe, save perhaps a certain behavioral rigidity. It is when the ego collapses under strong pressures that alterations occur. Alterations of the ego, it should be noted, are an aspect of the normal psychology, as well as of the pathology, of the ego. ERNST FEDERN See also: Ego; Ego psychology. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1986). Some alterations of the ego which make analyses interminable. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 68, 9–19. Freud, Sigmund. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. ———. (1914d). On the history of the psycho-analytic movement. SE, 14: 1–66. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. EGO (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) Carl Gustav Jung proposed the following definition of the ego: ‘‘By ego I understand a complex of ideas INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS which constitutes the centre of my field of consciousness and appears to possess a high degree of continuity and identity. Hence I also speak of an ego-complex’’ (Jung, 1921, p. 425). Jung actually conceives the ego-complex (or complex of the ego; Ichkomplex) as both a content and a condition of consciousness, which is definitive because, he writes, ‘‘a psychic element is conscious to me only in so far as it is related to my ego-complex’’ (p. 425). The restriction of the ego to the field of consciousness is particularly significant for Jung and the development of his analytical psychology because in his diagnostic studies of associations in 1904 he had already been able to demonstrate unconscious complexes affecting the conscious mind and capable of causing disturbances in ego functioning. It was this work that had formed the basis for his agreement with Freud and his psychoanalytic theories. However, following his break with Freud in 1913, Jung embarked on a clearer elaboration of his own psychological theories. His personal experience had led him to emphasize the extremely important role of a firm anchoring of the conscious viewpoint in the ego because, as he explained, the ego not only has to manage the conflicts with the external world but also to confront intrapsychic material that manifests and operates from the unconscious. His entire interest was henceforth directed at investigating the contents of the unconscious. This led him to the following discovery: To the extent that the ego approaches unconscious material in a way that is both receptive and critical, it becomes clear that an organizational element is at work there, such that dreams, for example, can be considered to interrelate with a meaningful process of transformation. This suggested the obvious hypothesis that it is not only our conscious ego that possesses a capacity for organization, initiative and purpose: It is in fact the development of our personality in its entirety, including our potential for consciousness, that is ‘‘directed’’ by a center operating in the unconscious. To distinguish it from the ego, Jung called this center the ‘‘Self.’’ To the definition of the ego-complex quoted above, he therefore added the following point: ‘‘But inasmuch as the ego is only the centre of my field of consciousness, it is not identical with the totality of my psyche. . . . I therefore distinguish between the ego 469 EGO AND THE ID, THE and the self, since the ego is only the subject of my consciousness, while the self is the subject of my total psyche, which also includes the unconscious’’ (p. 425). Jung devoted himself principally to the interaction between the ego and the unconscious and to the question of discovering how the ego can gain experience of a Self that is subordinate to it. He demonstrated that this is a task that belongs to the individuation process in the second half of life, which presupposes and requires the existence of a strong enough ego that can allow itself to be substantially influenced by the Self without thereby succumbing to a loss of boundaries that would be pathological if not psychotic. Something that Jung did not undertake to explain at great length was the question of knowing how it is that the Self, as a guiding agency of psychic development, stimulates and guides an appropriate maturation of the ego, and it is principally his successors who have worked on this (Neumann, 1963/1973; Fordham, 1969). MARIO JACOBY See also: Animus-anima; Collective unconscious (analytical psychology); Compensation (analytical psychology); Ego; Numinous (analytical psychology); Self (analytical psychology); Shadow (analytical psychology). Bibliography Fordham, Michael. (1969). Children as individuals. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Jacoby, Mario. (1990). Individuation and Narcissism: The Psychology of the Self in Jung and Kohut (Myron Gubitz, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge. (Original work published 1985) ———. (1904–1906). Experimental researches. Coll. Works, Vol. II. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ———. (1921). Psychological types. Coll. Works, Vol. VI. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Neumann, Erich. (1973). The child: structure and dynamics of the nascent personality (Ralph Manheim, Trans.). London: Hodder and Stoughton. (Original work published 1963) EGO AND THE ID, THE Published in German in 1923, The Ego and the Id was the work in which Freud sought to summarize in the most explicit manner the far-reaching metapsychological revisions he made to his theory in the 1920s. The 47 0 text begins by recalling the basic distinctions of the topographical theory: distinctions among the conscious, the preconscious (descriptively unconscious but susceptible of becoming conscious), and the dynamic unconscious (the repressed, which can become conscious only by penetrating the barrier of repression, for example, by means of the psychoanalytic method). In this work Freud emphasized that the resistances of the ego, as encountered in the work of analysis, were themselves in part unconscious. So even if the conscious-unconscious opposition was still an essential point of reference, the unconscious could no longer be considered a psychic agency. Freud thus had to revisit the whole topographical system of his theory. Freud concerns himself first with the characteristics of the ego, its relationships with the perceptionconsciousness system and with language, which underpin the possibility of material becoming conscious. Sense perceptions are immediately conscious; thought processes become conscious through their links with the auditory traces of verbal residues (or word presentations), which endow those processes with a perceptual dimension. Internal perceptions, more deeply seated and elemental than external ones, derive from the pleasure-unpleasure series of sensations and become conscious directly, without any recourse to words, by projecting themselves onto the surface of the body. The crucial point in Freud’s argument concerns feelings. Analytic experience reveals that feelings may occasionally become conscious solely because the ego refuses to discharge them. This idea leads to the paradoxical notion of ‘‘unconscious feelings’’ (notably, the feeling of guilt). The ego thus emerges as an agency derived essentially from the body: Linked to perception and to the body envelope, it is sometimes described as ‘‘a surface entity,’’ but also as ‘‘the projection of a surface’’ (1923b, p. 26). Freud’s rejection of the unconscious as a system led him to include in the mental apparatus the id, which is far more extensive and less organized than just the repressed. He described the id as the great ‘‘reservoir’’ of the instincts, which originate in the somatic realm and express themselves there as dynamic impulses seeking discharge solely in accord with the dictates of the pleasure principle. The ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the influence of the external world: ‘‘For the ego, perception plays the part INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EGO which in the id falls to instinct’’ (1923b, p. 25). Freud compares the relationship of the ego to the id to that of a rider to his mount: Often the rider’s energy is insufficient for him to do more than lead the horse where it wants to go. To his structural theory Freud also introduced a third agency, reflecting the fact that the ‘‘highest’’ mental activity, notably that of the moral conscience, may be unconscious. The superego (or ideal ego), as evoked several years earlier in On Narcissism: An Introduction (1914c), is the outcome of a differentiation within the ego; the formative mechanism is narcissistic identification with a lost object (1917e [1915], pp. 241, 249– 251). Internalization of the object in the ego facilitates replacing the instinctual cathexis of the object with a change in the ego that renders it similar to the object and thus capable of pleasing the id and being narcissistically cathected. The establishment of the superego depends on a mechanism of this sort: Obliged to renounce the cathexes characteristic of the Oedipus complex, the child redirects them onto the ego while identifying with the parents, at once desired and feared. The postoedipal superego, though essentially paternal in character, forms on the basis of two identifications (maternal and paternal), combined in one way or another. These secondary identifications (secondary, that is, to the instinctual cathexes that they replace) continue to reinforce a set of primary object identifications whose point was ‘‘to be [like] the other’’ rather than to ‘‘have’’ the other. This web of identifications, reflecting the child’s long dependency on the parents, gives a permanent character to the infant’s relation to primordial objects and the dual protective and punitive significance of that relation. By treating the superego as a mental agency that ‘‘dominates’’ the ego, Freud accentuated the idea that the superego is just as immune as the id to a complete appropriation by the ego. The tension between the ego and the superego manifests itself as a sense of guilt. The largely unconscious nature of the superego sheds light on negative therapeutic reactions, which, according to Freud, express a need for punishment (an unconscious feeling of guilt) that is satisfied by illness and suffering. The superego is the agency whereby the heritage of civilization, which individuals must reappropriate for themselves, is transmitted. Here Freud recalled the thesis of Totem and Taboo (1912–1913a) concerning the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE ID, THE genesis of guilt and of the social bond created by the killing of the primal father, a thesis with profound implications for religion. The superego, projected and writ large, is the seed from which all religion springs. The topography of psychic agencies thus outlined was inseparable from Freud’s new conception of instinctual dualism. According to this conception, first set forth in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), Eros encompasses the instincts for self-preservative and sex (the conflict between them no longer being considered primary), whereas the death instincts express a primary self-destructiveness mediated by sadism, which redirects the death instincts outward in a partial fusion with erotic impulses. The essential characteristic of these two groups of instincts is their conservatism: The life instincts aim to preserve life by binding life with ever vaster wholes; the death instincts strive for a return to an inanimate state by unbinding and reducing tension to zero (the Nirvana principle). Life presents itself as an unending struggle between the two kinds of instincts, always more or less blended or fused. But the process of identification, a consequence of the desexualization and transformation of cathexes into narcissistic libido, is accompanied by a diffusion that may ultimately result in the superego’s becoming ‘‘a pure culture of the death instinct’’ (1923b, p. 53), as in melancholia. The same circumstances also enable the ego to sublimate the instincts, in conformity with the requirements of the ideal: The ego, with its ‘‘free’’ (narcissistic) energy, can transform love into hate (paranoia) or hate into love (homosexuality) (1923b, pp. 43–44). In concluding The Ego and the Id, Freud attempts to sum up the ‘‘dependent relationships’’ of the ego, which has to serve three masters at the same time. As can be seen in the clinical aspects of the sense of guilt, the superego draws sustenance from the renunciations it requires, becoming more severe as aggression is displaced and turned against the ego. With respect to the id, the ego seeks to satisfy instinctual demands while simultaneously seeking to subject them to its will. And as for the external world, the ego is linked to it by being anchored in perception and by the workings of the reality principle, which constrains its use of judgment. Three dangers and three types of anxiety are correlated with these three masters of the ego: moral anxiety (arising from conscience), neurotic anxiety (arising 471 EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENCE, THE from instincts), and realistic anxiety (arising from the reality principle). Freud emphasized the fact that the fear of death, seemingly so real, in fact derives from ‘‘moral’’ anxiety, itself the result of castration anxiety and of loss of love. to create what she called a ‘‘psychoanalytical psychology.’’ At the same time the schoolteaching career that she embarked upon before becoming a psychoanalyst would seem to be the origin of the pedagogical cast of her written work and her practice as a child analyst. The Ego and the Id is a difficult text, not least because it is extremely concise as a result of its synthesizing ambitions. Freud himself was less than satisfied with it. The work was a recapitulation of ideas advanced by Freud since the completion of his metapsychology, and more particularly since Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), but its implications would emerge only gradually with the appearance of later articles, most notably ‘‘The economic problem of masochism’’ (1924c), where Freud assessed the consequences of the repetition compulsion and the death instinct on the concept of the pleasure principle. The frame of reference of The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence is Freud’s second topography (structural theory). The subject of the book is the defenses developed by the individual ego in order to confront or avoid the conflicts provoked by the id in its relations with the ego and the superego. Anna Freud approaches psychoanalytic technique and theory, along with defensive formations, from the specific perspective of the observation of the ego through the mental conflicts in which it is involved. Thus the ego in its relations with the id and with the outside world—relations which may be the source of unpleasure or of feelings of fear—is analyzed in the light of its avoidance mechanisms (the various forms of negation), in the light of its aggressive or altruistic strategies. Special significance is assigned to the phenomena of puberty and to the defense mechanisms triggered by the re-emergence of sexuality at that time. JEAN-LUC DONNET See also: Ego; Id; Superego; Topographical point of view. Source Citation EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENCE, THE Anna Freud considers it the analyst’s task, ‘‘in relation to the ego, to explore its contents, its boundaries, and its functions, and to trace the history of its dependence on the outside world, the id, and the superego; and, in relation to the id, to give an account of the instincts, i.e. of the id contents, and to follow them through the transformations which they undergo’’ (p. 5). The fact is that when id derivatives make incursions into consciousness, the ego is prone to ‘‘counterattack’’ by deploying defense mechanisms (p. 7). But while the analyst is aided by the tendency of id derivatives to surface, at the same time no help is to be obtained by analyzing the ego’s defenses, for these can be reconstructed only by reference to the effects they produce in the patient’s associations. According to Anna Freud, the analysis of resistance to transference and the analysis of the compulsion to repeat need to be refined by analysis of the resistances of the ego. The purpose of these various psychoanalytical procedures is to bring into consciousness the ego’s unconscious defenses, which are liable to strengthen the patient’s hostility toward the analyst. This work was first published in Vienna in 1936 and in English translation in London the following year, two years before Sigmund Freud’s death. The whole of Anna Freud’s work was marked by her clearly stated desire to win scientific status for psychoanalysis. With this in mind, she sought to integrate analysis into psychology, Anna Freud subjects the ego’s defenses to meticulous scrutiny and inventories their varieties on the basis of Freud’s descriptions. The list is as follows: regression, repression, reaction-formation, isolation, undoing, projection, introjection, turning against the self, and reversal into the opposite. To these Anna Freud, Sigmund. (1923b). Das Ich und das Es, Leipzig-WienZürich, Internationaler psychoanalytischer Verlag; G.W., XIII, 237–289; The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1912–1913a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1– 161. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. ———. (1916-17g [1915]). Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14: 237–258. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155–170. 47 2 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EGO AUTONOMY Freud adds a tenth defense mechanism, namely sublimation or the displacement of instinctual aims. Anna Freud’s work, and in particular the book with which we are here concerned, has directly nourished a line of thinking that might be called a ‘‘psychoanalysis of consciousness,’’ and that has achieved its greatest success in the United States thanks to the proponents of ego psychology (Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, 1964); most importantly, however, it has indirectly made possible a psychological use of the findings of Freudian psychoanalysis in a number of areas, among them the field of what is known as ‘‘psychoanalytical pedagogy’’ and that of so-called personality testing. ELSA SCHMID-KITSIKIS See also: Defense; Ego. Source Citation Freud, Anna. (1937). The ego and the mechanisms of defence (Cecil Baines, Trans.). London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1936) Bibliography Hartmann, Heinz, Kris, Ernst, and Loewenstein, Rudolf M. (1964). Papers on psychoanalytic psychology. New York: International Universities Press. Moll, Jeanne. (1989). La pédagogie psychanalytique. Origine et histoire. Paris: Dunod. Sandler, Joseph. (1985). The analysis of defense: the ego and the mechanisms of defense revisited. New York: International Universities Press. EGO AUTONOMY Heinz Hartmann introduced the concepts of primary and secondary ego autonomy in 1939, and elaborated on them in later writings (Hartmann, 1964). Within the framework of his description lies a conflict-free sphere of the ego. The notion of ‘‘ego autonomy’’ implies that the ego and the id derive from a common matrix where certain ego precursors prefigure functions destined to develop autonomously, independently of the instincts and their vicissitudes. Primary and secondary autonomy involve two sets of hypotheses, which together constitute the conflict-free ego sphere. Hartmann replaced Freud’s view that the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ego grows out of the id with the hypothesis that both ego and id are derived from a common undifferentiated medium. Related concepts are change of function, neutralization, automatization, and ego interests. Hartmann focused especially on the autonomy of specific ego functions, and stressed that ego autonomy is relative, since both primary and secondarily autonomous components can be drawn into conflict. Prior to Hartmann, psychoanalytic theory held that all psychic mechanisms and processes result from the effects of the influence of life experience on the instinctual drives. In primary autonomy, Hartmann identified constitutional factors influencing ego development in addition to instinctual drives and external reality. The ego apparatuses of perception, object comprehension, intention, thinking, and language capacity are all congenital, and are influenced by maturation and learning. But they are neither derived from conflict, nor are they developmentally dependent on conflict. Even so, these structures of primary autonomy can become caught up in conflict, resulting in inhibition of their functioning. This formulation took some of the explanatory burden off the concept of sublimation. In secondary autonomy, behaviors and attitudes which are initially associated with a conflict between drive manifestations and defenses can become detached from their sources. This takes place through a change of function, made possible by a de-sexualization and a de-aggressivization of the associated mental energy. The degree of secondary autonomy is defined by how resistant the trend is to regressive re-instinctualization. More generally, both the stability of secondarily autonomous functions and ego strength can be defined by the capacity of the various ego functions to withstand regression in the face of a focal conflict. Insufficient secondary autonomy interferes with the ability to bind id strivings, and increases vulnerability to ego regression. Neutralization is seen as the basis for secondary autonomy of ego interests, habits and skills, while ego interests include sets of ego functions that mostly entail secondary autonomy. They encompass what Freud called the ego instincts. Two ego interests in conflict are an example of an intrasystemic conflict. Secondary autonomy is seen to be established through the structure-building process called automatization, 473 EGO BOUNDARIES by means of the change of function via neutralization. Automatisms are ego apparatuses, somatic and preconscious, that are adaptive themselves, or are utilized by adaptive mechanisms. Federn employed the term ego to refer to a person’s ongoing bodily and psychic experience, the ‘‘I,’’ the self, one’s identity. This phenomenological description can be contrasted with that of the ego in Freud’s structural model. David Rapaport (1951/1967; 1957/1967) saw a reciprocal relationship between the ego’s autonomy from the drives on the one hand, and from the environment on the other. Autonomy from the drives is insured by the reality-related autonomous apparatuses, and from the environment by the endogenous drives. Victor Tausk (1919/1933), in his paper on the ‘‘influencing machine,’’ first utilized the concept of the regressive loss of ego boundaries as a symptom of schizophrenia. Paul Federn (1926/1952; 1928) viewed ego boundaries as a key element in all ego functioning and postulated a boundary between the ego and the external world, which is subject to perception. He further extended the boundary concept by identifying an internal boundary between the ego and the unconscious, open to introspection. Hartmann’s formulations of ego autonomy have been highly influential in psychoanalysis. Most of his contributions stand, but serious questions have subsequently been raised about the scientific status and validity of energy transformations, which are part of the neutralization-deneutralization hypothesis. MARVIN S. HURVICH See also: Ego; Ego (ego psychology). Bibliography Bellak, Leopold; Hurvich, Marvin; and Gediman, Helen. (1973). Ego functions in schizophrenics, neurotics and normals. A systematic study of conceptual, diagnostic and therapeutic aspects. New York: Wiley. Hartmann, Heinz. (1939). Essays on ego psychology. New York: International Universities Press, 1964. ———. (1939). Ego psychology and the problem of adaptation. New York: International Universities Press, 1958. Hartmann, Heinz, Kris, Ernst, and Loewenstein, Rudolph M. (1964). Papers on psychoanalytic psychology. New York: International Universities Press. Rapaport, David. (1967). The autonomy of ego. In M. Gill (Ed.), The collected papers of David Rapaport (p. 357–367). New York: Basic Books. (Original work published 1951) ———. (1967). The theory of ego autonomy: A generalization. In M. Gill (Ed.), The collected papers of David Rapaport (p. 722–744). New York: Basic Books. (Original work published 1957) In agreement with Freud, Federn understood the earliest differentiation between external and internal to result from body movements. Such a distinction eventually results in the establishment of dynamic (continually expanding and contracting) ego boundaries. Federn’s concept of ego boundary is closely associated with his other key concepts of ego feeling, ego state, and ego cathexis. Both ego boundary and ego feeling require for their maintenance an ego cathexis, which may be a blend of three kinds: libidinal, destructive, and self-preservative. When the inner boundary is critically weakened or lost, the return of repressed ego states falsifies reality and can result in delusions and hallucinations. When the cathexis of the outer boundary is weakened or lost, the sense of reality is disturbed, and external objects are discerned as unknown, strange, and unreal. Federn utilized his concepts of ego boundaries and sense of reality to clarify such phenomena as estrangement, depersonalization, delusions, hallucinations, dream experience, and drug effects. Edith Jacobson (1954) has employed ego boundaries in psychoanalytic conceptualizations of the boundary between self and object representations. A remaining challenge is to work out the relationships among inner, outer, and self-object boundaries. MARVIN S. HURVICH EGO BOUNDARIES Ego boundaries, a key concept in the theory of Paul Federn, form a necessary basis for distinguishing real from not real. Federn saw it as a kind of sense organ that differentiates what is part of the ego at a given moment from all other psychic elements. 47 4 See also: Ego; Ego psychology. Bibliography Bergmann, Martin S. (1963). The place of Paul Federn’s ego psychology in psychoanalytic metapsychology. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 11, 97–116. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EGO (EGO PSYCHOLOGY) Federn, Paul. (1928). Narcissism in the structure of the ego. International Journal of Psycho-analysis, 9, 401–419. See also: Ego; Ego (ego psychology). ———. (1952). Ego psychology and the psychoses. New York: Basic Books. (Original work published 1926.) Bibliography Jacobson, Edith. (1954). The self and the object world: Vicissitudes of their infantile cathexes and their influence on ideational and affective development. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 9, 75–127. Tausk, Viktor. (1933). On the origin of the ‘‘influencing machine’’ in schizophrenia. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 2, 519–556. (Original work published 1919) EGO, DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE A conception of the ego as a decisive agency of the mind was the point of departure of psychoanalytical ego psychology, which teaches that the ego may have a normal development (the approximate meaning of ‘‘normal’’ being ‘‘socially adapted’’). According to Heinz Hartmann, adaptation is an essential task of the ego, one performed in a conflict-free, autonomous dimension of the ego distinct from the dimension of the ego dominated by the instincts. But this independent domain of the ego is liable to suffer many sorts of damage, whether at the beginning of life or later on. The most recent research on infancy has shown that one of the causes of such damage is a lack of adequate bonds with the mother or mother substitute. Genetic causes no doubt also play a part, but in this area the state of our knowledge is still rudimentary. Apart from bonds with the mother or mother substitute, there are particular social conditions that can inflict severe damage on the ego, damage that in some cases is irreparable. The later in life that these injuries occur, the easier it is for the ego to repair them with dispatch. But if instinctual forces have inflicted added damage, then the ego may not prevail, because the libido is too weak or a destructive instinct is too powerful. According to Paul Federn, damage of this kind may be sustained as a result of an early breakdown of ego boundaries. Where these boundaries are not well developed, they may at any time be overwhelmed by the destructive instinct, and death or suicide may ensue. Both these eventualities are possible in the course of childhood. In adolescence and adulthood, suicide is always the result of injuries to the ego; in old age, however, these considerations no longer apply. ERNST FEDERN INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Weiss, Edoardo. (1951). Paul Federn’s scientific contributions: In commemoration. International Journal of Psychoanalysis 32 (4), 1–8. ———. (1952). Introduction to Paul Federn’s ego psychology and the psychoses. New York: Basic Books. ———. (1966). Paul Federn: the theory of the psychoses. In Franz Alexander, Samuel Eisenstein, and Martin Grotjahn (Eds.), Psychoanalytic Pioneers. New York: Basic Books. EGO (EGO PSYCHOLOGY) The theories of the ego grouped under the rubric of ‘‘ego psychology’’ originated in Vienna before the Second World War and were developed in the United States by virtue of the migration of their chief proponents, namely Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, and Rudolf Loewenstein. To these names must be added those of Paul Federn, of Hermann Nunberg, and of a good many other authors who helped give wide currency to conceptions of the ego that were destined to attract violent criticism, in France, from Jacques Lacan. The substantival ‘‘das Ich’’ was so common in German (as was its equivalent in various other languages), that Freud, in the early part of his career, when he was actively searching for the new, paid it little mind. To begin with, Freud took the ego to be an indivisible unity, largely coextensive with the body, and therefore with consciousness. As Goethe had written, ‘‘To produce in oneself a new and better ego, thus to construct oneself as permanent, to live in oneself and create’’ (‘‘Ein neues besseres Ich in uns erzeugen, uns so ewig bilden, in uns fortleben und schaffen’’). In 1914, however, Freud would write that the ego may at times ‘‘play the ludicrous part of the clown in a circus’’ (1914d, p. 53). We may say, in other words, that from the historical point of view psychoanalysis did not undertake an investigation of the ego before the First World War: Psychoanalysis was the science of the unconscious, whereas for Freud the ego belonged to the realm of consciousness. The notion of the ego is very hard to circumscribe and it has a different meaning for each psychological theory, so here we shall confine ourselves to the psychoanalytic sense. The translation of the term into languages other than 475 EGO (EGO PSYCHOLOGY) German further complicates the issue. The great confusion in English stems from the use of the Latin ‘‘ego’’ rather than the English ‘‘self ’’ or ‘‘me.’’ In French there is ambiguity too, between ‘‘le je’’ and ‘‘le Moi.’’ Freud believed that the ego developed like a skin over the unconscious (or, in his later accounts, over the id) and that it was not present from birth. The phenomenon of narcissistic cathexis led him to conclude that the ego was in part unconscious. The Unconscious/Preconscious/Conscious scheme thus came to seem inadequate, and Freud spent fifteen years working out a new subdivision of the mind into id, ego, and superego—‘‘agencies’’ that his followers treated as structures. This was an error, for structures are static, whereas agencies are dynamic. The origin of the ego became an essential issue for psychoanalysis, and has been responsible in part for the latter growth of research into early childhood. Historically speaking, after Freud’s death the notion of the ego eventually became the central preoccupation of psychoanalysis, to the detriment of the id. One reason for this was the increase of ego disturbances as compared with neurotic complaints, at least among analytic patients. Such disturbances were seen as the cause of perversions and other human behavioral problems. Certainly, the aphorism ‘‘Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach, in meiner Brust’’ (‘‘Two souls reside, alas, in my breast’’) had long been familiar, but it had engaged no clinical application. Further research into the psychology of the ego was undertaken in Freud’s wake, first by Anna Freud—who indeed began during her father’s lifetime—and then by Heinz Hartmann and Paul Federn. According to Freud, the formation of the ego was a process that grew out of the bonds established with the mother or mother-substitute. Those bonds could in fact be looked upon as subject-object relationships, after the fashion of the English school. From its beginnings, the ego was the agency of the mind whose task it was to address the realities of life. Only thanks to the love and continual care of the mother or mothersubstitute could adaptation to reality be achieved. Freud felt that this normally occurred during the third year of life, when the child’s ego was ready to adapt itself also, beyond the family circle, to the outside world as represented by the kindergarten. The ego’s development did not stop at this point, however, but continued into adulthood, continually exposing the ego to innumerable dangers which 47 6 orientated it in this way or that. Genetic factors surely played a major role, even if this could not as yet be proved. Anna Freud emphasized that its development in childhood shaped the most important portion of the ego. Only when this development was arrested or when it regressed was therapeutic intervention called for. In summary, the ego may be described as that agency which protects the id and which must come to terms with the demands of the superego. It represents in large part the individual’s social environment, although it is also strongly determined in its development by familial factors. A lack of love and acknowledgment during the first years of life may have two kinds of consequences: an autonomous ego may develop which is concerned only with itself, which is narcissistically cathected, and which is capable of achieving remarkable successes in reality without making genuine contact with other individuals or with society; alternatively, the ego may wither, failing either to fashion links with the outside world or to draw satisfaction from within. Between these two extremes every imaginable intermediate situation—or ‘‘ego state’’—may be met with. But such ego states also depend on an outside world with the capacity to transform the ego-ideal into an ideal ego which, as early as the third year of life, allies itself with the superego to form an agency of great power in the life of the individual. Thus the earliest object relationships produce distinct character types: an ego strong in its narcissism but socially ill-adapted; an ego that is weak, and undeveloped in all respects; or an ego that is bound to a strong superego and thus able to assert itself in the world. This last type is represented by highly religious individuals and probably constitutes the commonest form of human life. The psychoanalytic psychology of the ego was inaugurated in 1923 with the publication of Freud’s major work The Ego and the Id (1923b). For Freud, the ego was intimately linked to the body, thus ensuring the basic unity of the human being. Assuming that everyone knew what the ego was, he offered no definition and confined himself to describing its functions. In 1929 Hermann Nunberg developed the notion of the ego’s synthetic function. Whereas Freud thought that after an analysis synthesis occurred spontaneously, Nunberg showed that it was in fact the work of the ego, whose essential task was to bring together the various tendencies of the human individual and place INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EGO FEELING them in the service of social life. Nunberg felt that the higher functions dependent on the ego, such as artistic and scientific activity, were in fact governed by it; Freud for his part thought they remained under the influence of the id, like a horseman on his mount. world. An accurate English translation of Ich would have been ‘‘self’’; the use of the Latin ‘‘ego’’ turned Ichpsychologie into ‘‘ego psychology—into something both strange and foreign-sounding. And ‘‘self,’’ meanwhile, was translated into German as the Selbst. In 1930, Anna Freud published a book dealing with other ego functions, notably the defenses. She argued that a set of human behaviors arose from the need to fend off danger, and that responsibility here fell to the ego. One of the most important defense mechanisms was identification with the aggressor as a way of conjuring away threats, but of course this ploy was not always successful. Repression, forgetting, and the splitting of the ego were other defensive tactics. The positive ego functions were synthesis and identification with the ideal ego. Paul Federn’s approach here was very different to Hartmann’s. Drawing on his experience of analyzing a schizophrenic artist as early as 1905, as well as on his observations of other mental patients, and of himself, Federn concluded that the ego was the feeling of ‘‘Ich bin Ich selbst,’’—‘‘I am I myself,’’ the sense of self-identity in time in space. He thus posed the question not in terms of the function but rather in terms of the essence of the ego. After Freud’s death, Heinz Hartmann expanded some ideas that he had presented earlier, proposing that the ego’s most significant function was adaptation, made possible by virtue of the ego’s two forms: on the one hand, the ego ruled by the instincts, and on the other, an ego free of conflict, which Hartmann called the self. For Hartmann the ego was entirely defined by its functions. He also held that a conflictfree ego was present from birth. Aberrant human behavior was in large measure the result of a failure to adapt to social conditions. This outcome occurred quite independently of the instincts, and it also had constitutional determinants. The ‘‘autonomous’’ ego could be overwhelmed by the aggressive instinct, which was the path to psychosis. See also: Adaptation; Alterations of the ego; Cathectic energy; Ego; Ego autonomy; Ego boundaries; Ego feeling; Ego Functions; Ego interests; Ego psychology; Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation; Ego states; Egosyntonic; Federn, Paul; Hartmann, Heinz; Identity; Kris, Ernst; Loewenstein, Rudolf M; Psychosexual development; Self; Self psychology; Self-image; Self-representation; Stage (or phase); United States. This account was defining for psychoanalytic ego psychology after the Second World War. It brought psychoanalysis back towards academic psychology, as also closer to individual psychology. It tended to make it more compatible with sociology and opened the way for it to become a natural science. It supplied the foundation for a psychoanalytic sociology that would trace the development of the social ego from infancy to old age, an approach pioneered in Erik Erikson’s book Childhood and Society (1950). This conception of the ego also constituted a link to behavioral studies and relied on the observations of Jean Piaget, whose work on the development of intelligence in children buttresses the notion of an ‘‘autonomous ego.’’ Finally, Hartmann’s ego psychology led eventually to the psychology of the self developed by Heinz Kohut. Hartmann’s approach was in part the result of the transplantation of psychoanalysis to the English-speaking INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ERNST FEDERN Bibliography Erikson, Erik H. (1950). Childhood and society. New York: Norton.z Federn, Paul. (1926). Ego-psychology and the psychoses (E. Weiss, Ed.). New York: Basic Books, 1952. Freud, Anna. (1936). The ego and the mechanisms of defence. (Cecil Baines, Trans.). London: Hogarth, 1937. Freud, Sigmund. (1914d). On the history of the psychoanalytic movement. SE, 14: 1–66. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. Nunberg, Hermann. (1930). The synthetic function of the ego. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 7. EGO FEELING Ego feeling is central to Paul Federn’s ego psychology, together with ego boundary and ego state. It is one’s experience of one’s own bodily and mental existence, a phenomenological description of a connected psychic sensation, and involves the experience of space, time, and causality as an entity. It is the experiential aspect of the ego boundary, the feeling by which the person is able to sense what is ego 477 EGO FUNCTIONS and what is non-ego, and thus, what is real and not real. Paul Schilder also focused on the phenomenology of ego experience, especially in depersonalization and the experience of time. Federn (1926/1952) affirms a connection between his conception of ego feeling and Schilder’s (1923/1953) concept of body schema. For Federn, ego feeling is the simplest but also the most extensive psychic state present in the personality. Through a process of egotization, bodily and psychic elements attain ego feeling and inclusion within the ego boundary. He described bodily ego feeling (motor and sensory memories pertaining to one’s person), mental ego feeling (reflecting inner perceptions), and superego feeling (the superego being an ego state with its own boundaries). Federn demonstrated how interrelationships among these different ego feelings change in different states of consciousness, such as in a normal awake state, in falling asleep and waking up, in dreams, in fainting, in ecstasy, in regression, and in the major psychopathological conditions. An ego feeling pervades one’s whole being while one is awake. But under conditions of fatigue, sleep, illness, and psychosis, the ego feeling is prone to serious restrictions. Ego feeling is intact when the ego is cathected, and is absent when there is no cathexis. Repression results in a depletion of ego cathexis. Disturbances in ego feeling reflects changes in ego cathexis and may result in severe anxiety and other mental symptoms, especially feelings of estrangement and depersonalization. Depersonalization involves de-egotization and is related to a fixation in the development of ego feeling. Mental ego feeling is experienced as located inside the bodily ego during waking. In sleep, bodily ego feeling is the first to vanish, then superego feeling, while mental ego feeling remains the longest. There is an absence of ego feeling during states of dreamless sleep. The formulation of the concept of ego feeling is one of Paul Federn’s most original and valuable contributions, and presents a challenge to psychoanalytic theorists to utilize its potential. MARVIN S. HURVICH See also: Ego; Ego (ego psychology). Bibliography Bergmann, Martin S. (1963). The place of Paul Federn’s ego psychology in psychoanalytic metapsychology. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 11, 97–116. 47 8 Federn, Paul. (1952). Ego psychology and the psychoses. New York: Basic Books. (Original work published 1926) Pao, Ping-Nie. (1975). The place of Federn’s ego psychology in a contemporary theory of schizophrenia. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 2, 467–480. Schilder, Paul. (1953). Medical psychology (David Rapaport, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1924) Weiss, Edoardo. (1960). The structure and dynamics of the human mind. New York: Grune and Stratton. EGO FUNCTIONS Sigmund Freud, and later Anna Freud, assigned to the ego tasks that involve the management of instincts and defenses against them. Some of their successors, among them Robert Waelder (1936), treated these tasks as ‘‘functions’’ that the ego was expected to fulfill. Thus such functions as integration, synthesis, and so on, were eventually distinguished. According to Heinz Hartmann, the ego should be evaluated according to how it performs these functions. It is hard to say what the primitive function of the ego might have been, but, historically speaking, selfpreservation is not only a function of the ego but also an instinct in its own right, originating in the ego—in short, an ego instinct. Freud first presented the concept of an ego instinct in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), where he also developed his theory of the death instinct. Briefly, the instinct for self-preservation can be subdivided into positive tendencies governed by the libido or Eros and negative tendencies subject to the death instinct. This account of the functions of the ego, which Freud himself always considered to be only a speculative hypothesis, was never accepted by more than a handful of analysts, even among those who granted the existence of aggressive and destructive instincts. In the psychoanalytical ego psychology of 2005, these issues have ceased to carry much weight. The ego described in terms of its functions is no longer envisaged in the same way. True, Anglo-American psychoanalysis recognizes the notion of the death instinct, but the Anglo-American use of it is somewhat different from Freud’s. One essential function of the ego, according to Freud, is to synthesize all the impulses and energies of body and mind. This synthesis depends entirely on the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EGO IDEAL strength of the two psychic forces of the libido and the destructive, or death, instinct. To begin with, Freud (1930a, p. 117) had adopted Friedrich Schiller’s antithesis of love and hunger, with love being equivalent to the libido and hunger standing for the self-preservation instinct. During the 1920s Freud replaced this idea by postulating the ego’s synthetic function. Another important ego function was defense and the signaling of danger. Danger might come from within (from the id), from without (from reality), or even from the superego. Against these threats the ego could defend itself in a variety of ways, depending on the individual. Among the ego’s defensive functions were identification with the aggressor, forgetting, disavowal, and repression. Recognition, reflection, and above all action were also ego functions, yet the ego could feel pain, as in states of mourning or joy, and thus serve as vector of the emotions. The body ego, as the locus where instinctual impulses are discharged, was liable to come under the sway of the instincts, which could lead to brief depressions or to chronic mental illness. Freud held that as a general rule the ego was the dominant mental agency, so long as it was functioning normally. Ego malfunction, in contrast, led to deep anxiety, and the weaker the ego the greater the anxiety. For this reason infantile anxiety was a normal state, whereas in adults it was a signal of danger. Its absence—loss of the feeling of anxiety—constituted a serious mental disturbance. Enumeration of the ego’s functions pointed up the importance of the ego as an agency. Because it brought so many functions together, the ego was central to treatment and the nucleus of resistance. Freud recognized the ego as a major obstacle to psychoanalysis. After Freud’s death, ego psychology underwent considerable development, partly to the detriment of id psychology. This was a deviation in that when Freud set out on his research program, he was interested exclusively in unconscious mental life, in the depths of the mind, in a cauldron of energies that fulfilled no specific functions. Yet such energies are capable of modifying the ego in important ways, whether for good or for evil. ERNST FEDERN See also: Ego; Ego (ego psychology). Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ———. (1930a). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57–145. Hartmann, Heinz. (1956). The ego concept in Freud’s work. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 37, 425–438. ———. (1958). Ego psychology and the problem of adaptation (David Rapaport, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1939) ———. (1964). Essays on ego psychology. New York: International Universities Press. Waelder, Robert. (1936). The principle of multiple function: observations on over-determination. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 5, 45–62. EGO IDEAL The concept of the ego ideal appeared for the first time in Sigmund Freud’s ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ (1914c). The ego ideal takes the place of the narcissism lost during childhood and promises the possible realization of narcissism in the future. Freud’s concept of the ego ideal provided support for other, earlier concepts, such as moral conscience, censorship, and selfesteem, and made possible an original understanding of the formation of a mass movement and its relationship to a leader (1921c). The ego ideal and superego, together with the ideal ego, form a group of agencies that should be clearly distinguished, even though Freud sometimes used the first two interchangeably. Freud introduced the superego in The Ego and the Id (1923b). It enabled him to distinguish the normative aspect of the psyche (the superego) from the motivational aspect directed toward a goal (the ego ideal). Originally, however, the two aspects were present in the ego ideal, which was also not differentiated from the ideal ego. This lack of differentiation reappeared in New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933a [1932]), where the ego ideal became a function of the superego. The ego ideal is formed when the child, through the crucial influence of parents, educators, and others in the environment, is forced to abandon its infantile narcissism. This is made possible by the formation of this substitute, the ego ideal, which leaves open the possibility that in the future the child will be able to rejoin ego and ideal. This development of the child’s ego ideal, here conflated with the superego, occurs through the child’s identification with the parents or, more precisely, with the parents’ superego. In The Ego and the Id (1923b), Freud 479 EGO IDEAL indicates that the superego develops from identification with the paternal model. For identification to take place, the erotic component has to be sublimated. As a result, it no longer has the strength to bind the destructive component of the psyche. All of this creates a libidinal split. Consequently, the superego becomes harsh, even selfdestructive. Out of this arises a feeling of unconscious guilt, and in melancholia the child finds the same ego ideal, dissociated from the ego, raging against it. The ego ideal demands that the subject make changes to achieve the ideal, but the existence of the ego ideal does not mean that the subject has succeeded in achieving this goal. ‘‘A man who has exchanged his narcissism for homage to a high ego ideal has not necessarily on that account succeeded in sublimating his libidinal instincts’’ (1914c, p. 94). Thus, the idealist may refuse to see reality, including that of his own libidinal experience, even though he has not sublimated anything, in the sense of modifying the goal and object of the drive. being subjected to whatever represents this now collective ego ideal. The consequences are well known. ‘‘The criticism exercised by that agency [the ego ideal] is silent; everything that the object does and asks for is right and blameless. Conscience has no application to anything that is done for the sake of the object; in the blindness of love remorselessness is carried to the pitch of crime. The whole situation can be completely summarized in a formula: The object has been put in the place of the ego ideal’’ (1921c, p. 113). Daniel Lagache (1961), in discussing the structure of the personality, identified the notion of ‘‘heroic identification,’’ the narcissistic ideal of omnipotence, which allowed him to explain certain aspects of criminal behavior. Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985) identified various possible outcomes for the ego ideal, perverse as well as creative. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR To the extent that the ego ideal is conflated with the superego, it includes the moral conscience, which continuously compares the actual ego with the ego ideal. Similarly, dream censorship and repression can be associated with the ego ideal. In fact, the ego ideal comprises all the restrictions to which the ego must submit to conform with the image detached from its own narcissism and projected before it. The ego ideal is not only a critic; when something in the ego coincides with the ego ideal, it can also produce a sensation of triumph, in which self-esteem is enhanced. See also: Alienation; Character neurosis; Collective psychology; Heroic self; Ego ideal/ideal ego; Narcissistic transference; Self-image; Shame. When the ego ideal is replaced by an idealized object, the ego ideal can be short-circuited in inciting the ego. ‘‘It is even obvious in many forms of lovechoice,’’ Freud wrote, ‘‘that the object serves as a substitute for some unattained ego ideal of our own’’ (1921c, p. 112). This notion led Piera Aulagnier (1979) to develop the concept of alienation, where the relationship is libidinal in nature since it involves another subject, an object (gambling or drugs, for example), or even an activity (sports, work). Freud, Sigmund. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. With the concept of the ego ideal, Freud considerably enriched the understanding of group psychology. Starting from an analysis of the relation between hypnotizer and hypnotist, he defined the group as ‘‘a number of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego’’ (1921c, p. 116). All in the group are then collectively capable of 48 0 Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (1979). Les destins du plaisir: Aliénation, amour, passion. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Chasseguet-Smirgel, Janine. (1985). The ego ideal: A psychoanalytic essay on the malady of the ideal (Paul Barrows, Trans.). London: Free Association Books. (Original work published 1975) ———. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. Lagache, Daniel. (1961). La psychanalyse et la structure de la personnalité. Psychanalyse, 6, 5–54. Further Reading Blos, Peter. (1974). The genealogy of the ego ideal. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 29, 43–88. Deutsch, Helene. (1964). Some clinical considerations of the ego ideal. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 12, 512–516. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EGO IDENTITY Milrod, David. (1990). The ego ideal. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 45, 43–60. Rosenfeld, Herbert. (1962). The superego and the ego-ideal. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 43, 258–263. Sandler, Joseph. et al. (1963). The ego ideal and the ideal self. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 18, 139–158. Schafer, Roy. (1967). Ideals, the ego ideal, and the ideal self. Psychological Issues, 18, 129–174. EGO IDEAL/IDEAL EGO The two notions of ideal ego and ego ideal might seem to be used interchangeably by Freud. However, their first appearance in ‘‘On Narcissism’’ (1914c) showed them to be different insofar as the ideal ego is taken to be the recipient of the self-love that the ego enjoyed in infancy. The distinction is between reality and an idealization of that reality, enforced by the fact that from infancy on, that reality seems forever lost. The ego ideal, on the other hand, is a dynamic notion: The person, as Freud wrote, seeks to regain the narcissistic perfection of its infancy under the new form of the ego ideal, which is deferred as a goal to be attained in the future. Thus the ideal ego could be seen as the nostalgic survival of a lost narcissism, while the ego ideal appears to be the dynamic formation that sustains ambitions towards progress. The ideal ego is a modification of infantile narcissism and the omnipotence that accompanies it. What differentiates it from the ego ideal is that in the case of the latter, the ego only obtains the self-esteem that it yearns for by obeying the injunctions arising from what Freud later called the superego. On the other hand, the ideal ego is not completely equivalent with the ego since omnipotence is lost with infantile narcissism. Such omnipotence is only partially regained in daydreams and fantasies that make the person a hero and victor. The difference here is that the ego ideal, which is closely related to the superego, is not formed on the basis of an illusory omnipotence, but modeled after that of the parents, and more precisely after the superego and its ideals. The ideal ego thus appears to be a way of short-circuiting the work that the ego ideal requires by assuming that its goals, or any others that might be still higher, have already been attained. Hermann Nunberg defined the ideal ego as the combination of the ego and the id. This agency is the outcome of omnipotent narcissism and is manifested as INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS pathology. Daniel Lagache (1961) developed the implications of this notion of the ideal ego, notably in terms of delinquency. The ideal ego appears in contrast to the superego and is linked to the primary identification with another being who is invested with omnipotence, as is the case with the infant’s identification with the phallic mother. Lagache emphasizes that in adolescence ‘‘the ideal ego is reinvested or its investment is strengthened, often by new identifications with eminent people. The adolescent identifies him- or herself anew with the ideal ego and strives by this means to separate from the superego and the ego ideal’’ (Lagache, pp. 227–28). Lacan took up Lagache’s analysis of the concept in these terms: ‘‘In a subject’s relation to the other as an authority, the ego-ideal, obeying the law to please, leads the subject to displease himself as the price of obeying the commandment; the ideal ego, at the risk of displeasing, triumphs only by displeasing in spite of the commandment’’ (1966, p. 671). For Lacan, the ideal ego is a narcissistic formation linked to the mirror stage. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Graph of Desire; Identification; Imaginary; Imaginary identification/symbolic identification; L and R schemas; Law of the father; Optical schema; Self-image; Unary trait. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1914c). On Narcissism: An Introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Écrits. Paris: Seuil. ———. (2004). Écrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. Lagache, Daniel. (1961). La psychanalyse et la structure de la personnalité. In Oeuvres IV, 1956–1962. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982. Nunberg, Hermann. Principles of psychoanalysis. New York: International Universities Press, 1955. EGO IDENTITY It is too easy to see a patient only as a group of symptoms. Rather, according to Erik Erikson, the main issue is to determine whether it is a question of a person having a neurosis, or of the neurosis ‘‘having’’ the person. He insisted on the need to see fears and anxieties as two very different things: The former 481 EGO-INSTINCTS apprehensions focus on realistic responses to dangers, whereas the latter, provoked by dysfunction in the internal controls, magnify obstacles without providing the means to surmount them. Adaptive responses that are appropriate to reality are all too likely to be discounted if one understands the ego as being essentially a collection of defenses against the internal drives. The key, according to Erikson, is to seek in the ego the organizational capacities that create the strength necessary for reconciling discontinuities and ambiguities. Like Sigmund Freud, Erikson envisioned an unconscious ego. But like other post-Freudians, he emphasized that the ego has a unifying function and ensures coherent behavior and conduct. The ego does not only have a negative function, that of avoiding anxiety; it plays as well the positive role of ensuring efficient functioning. The ego’s defenses are not necessarily pathogenic: Some are adaptive, while others are the source of maladaptations. It is true that anxiety and feelings of guilt can disrupt adaptation. Moreover, the external environment has its own inherent deficiencies. But in attempting to measure the strength of the ego, Erikson did not limit himself to the earlier psychoanalytic norm and seek, in a personality, only that which is denied or cut off. Rather, he was interested in measuring the limit that the individual’s ego is capable of unifying. Early in his work Erikson called this identity ‘‘ego identity’’ after the model of Freud’s ‘‘ego ideal.’’ As a subsystem of the ego, identity’s task is to choose and integrate self-representations derived from childhood psychosocial crises. Too often, in the history of psychoanalysis, there has been a tendency to forget that on the clinical level, the ego was posited as an enduring agent of selection and integration that plays a central role in the sound functioning of the personality. This inner ‘‘synthesizer,’’ which silently organizes a coherent experience and guides action, is precisely what is so often lacking in present-day patients. By contrast, the patients of the earliest psychoanalyses were for the most part suffering from inhibitions that prevented them from being what they were, or what they believed themselves to be. PAUL ROAZEN See also: Erikson, Erik Homberger; Identity. Bibliography Erikson, Erik H. (1950). Childhood and society. New York: W. W. Norton. ———. (1959). Identity and the life cycle. New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1968). Identity: Youth and crisis. New York: W. W. Norton. Roazen, Paul. (1976). Erik H. Erikson: The power and limits of a vision. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson. The ego protects the person’s indivisibility, and everything that underlies the strength of the ego adds to its identity. If Freud understood identity as being in part acquired, this was due to the very particular types of patients he had treated. EGO-INSTINCTS For Erikson, identity is what maintains in the individual inner solidarity with the ideals and aspirations of social groups. The ego has a general balancing function: It puts things in perspective and prepares them in view of possible action. The strength of the ego, as Erikson conceived it, explains the difference between the feeling of being whole and the feeling of being fragmented. In the best of cases, it enables the individual to understand that the feeling of being at one with oneself comes through growth and development. In Freud’s first theory of the instincts (or drives), the ego-instincts were contrasted with the sexual ones. In psychic conflict, a portion of instinctual energy is placed at the service of the ego. But even though their aim is the self-preservation and the self-affirmation of the individual, the ego-instincts nevertheless provide anaclitic support to the sexual drive. Freud later replaced this first opposition by another, that between the life instinct and the death instinct, assigning both the ego-instincts and the sexual instincts to Eros (the life instinct). In addition to a feeling of continuity, according to Erikson, every individual needs a sense of novelty, obtained only through the leeway inherent in an assured identity. By ‘‘leeway,’’ he meant maintaining in our experience a centrality, an evident self that, alone, enables us to make fully aware choices. The term appeared first in the Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society for March 10, 1910, where it was stated that reaction was made up of the ‘‘vicissitudes of the ego instincts,’’ and soon after in Freud’s ‘‘The Psycho-Analytic View of Psychogenic Disturbance of Vision’’ (1910i): ‘‘From the point of view of our 48 2 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EGO-INSTINCTS attempted explanation, a quite specially important part is played by the undeniable opposition between the [instincts] which subserve sexuality, the attainment of sexual pleasure, and those other [instincts] which have as their aim the self-preservation of the individual—the ego-[instincts]’’ (p. 214). Freud stated the idea more clearly apropos of the Schreber case: ‘‘We regard the [instinct] as being the concept on the frontier-line between the somatic and the mental, and see in it the psychical representative of organic forces. Further, we accept the popular distinction between ego-[instinct] and a sexual [instinct]; for such a distinction seems to agree with the biological conception that the individual has a double orientation, aiming on the one hand at self-preservation and on the other at the preservation of the species’’ (1911c [1910], p. 74). The sources of the ego-instinct are excitations emanating from the great organic functions, such as nutrition and vision, that ensure the continuation of life. The ego-instinct is thus quickly obliged to take the reality principle into account, and this consideration gives rise to the idea of a reality-ego that ‘‘need do nothing but strive for what is useful and guard itself against damage’’ (1911b, p. 223). Thanks to Freud’s researches into narcissism, the notion that instinctual pressure was a kind of energy (earlier described as ‘‘interest’’), led to the idea that egolibido, or narcissistic libido, was the ‘‘great reservoir’’ from which object-cathexis is sent out and into which it may be withdrawn. The object of the ego-instincts is at first the object of need (food), and later anything that can contribute not only to strengthening the ego’s own operations, but also to inhibiting the primary process by the binding of ideas. Thus, secondarily, the ego becomes the object of libidinal cathexis. Its aim is selfpreservation and the self-affirmation of the individual. In 1915, Freud, showed that ‘‘only primal [instincts]—those which cannot be further dissected—can lay claim to importance’’ (1915c, p. 124). He then distinguished between two classes of primal instincts: ‘‘the ego, or self-preservative, [instincts] and the sexual [instincts]’’ (p. 124). The sexual instincts are at first ‘‘attached to the [instincts] of self-preservation, from which they only gradually become separated; in their choice of object, too, they follow the paths that are indicated to them by the ego-instincts’’ (p. 126). In ‘‘A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis’’ (1917a [1916]), Freud drew a parallel between the libido, as the force of the sexual drives, and hunger and the will to power as the power of the ego-instincts. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS He then derived a certain category of neuroses from the conflict between the ego-instincts and the sexual instincts. Since the introduction of narcissism in 1914, however, he had contrasted two types of libido connected with the sexual drives, one type that was directed towards the object and the other that was directed towards the ego. The opposition between object-libido and ego-libido eventually replaced the distinction between ego-instincts and sexual instincts and paved the way for Freud’s final theory of the instincts. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), where Freud formulated his theory of the death instinct, he wrote: ‘‘The upshot of our enquiry so far has been the drawing of a sharp distinction between the Ôegoinstincts’ and the sexual instincts, and the view that the former exercise pressure towards death and the latter towards a prolongation of life. But this conclusion is bound to be unsatisfactory in many respects even to ourselves’’ (1920g, p. 44). In Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]), Freud elaborated on the antithesis between egoinstincts and the object-instincts (p. 117). Then, in ‘‘The Dissection of the Psychical Personality,’’ the thirty-first lecture of the New Introductory Lectures (1933a [1932]), he specifically named the ego-instincts as a resisting force, insofar as they repelled and repressed the claims of sexual life (p. 57). In the thirtysecond lecture, ‘‘Anxiety and Instinctual Life,’’ he attributed to the ego-instincts the same qualities as to the sexual instincts, apart from hunger and thirst, which were ‘‘inflexible, admit of no delay, [and] are imperative’’ (p. 97). Though Freud continued to contrast ego-instincts and sexual instincts until 1920, the dualism between the life and death instincts inevitably relegated the ego-instincts to a subsidiary note. But some ambiguity remained, however, in Freud’s second topography (or ‘‘structural theory’’), for in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), he subsumed the ego-instincts under the death instinct while still maintaining that they were at least partly libidinal in character. PIERRE DELION See also: Amae, concept of; ‘‘Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest’’; Drive/instinct; Ego; Ego autonomy; Ego-libido/object-libido; Hatred; Need for causality; Psychogenic blindness; Regression; Schiller and psychoanalysis; Self-preservation; Suicide. 483 EGO INTERESTS Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1910i). The psycho-analytic view of psychogenic disturbance of vision. SE, 11: 209–218. ———. (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12: 213–226. ———. (1911c [1910]). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (Dementia paranoids). SE, 12: 1–82. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: an introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. ———. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109–140. ———. (1917a [1916]). A difficulty in the path of psychoanalysis. SE, 17: 135–144. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1– 64. ———. (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57–145. ——— (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. Nunberg, Hermann, and Federn, Ernst. (1962–1975). Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. New York: International Universities Press. Further Reading Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth, and Bethelard, Faith. (1999). The hidden history of the ego instincts. Psychoanalytic Review, 86, 823–852. Even if it is rare, Freud’s use of ‘‘ego interests’’ demonstrates that in his work he by no means neglected to take the ego into account. It is true, however, that Freud long concentrated his attention on the depths of the unconscious part of the mind, as shown by the epigraph he chose for The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a): ‘‘Flectere si nequeo Superos, Acheronta movebo’’ (‘‘If I cannot move the Higher Powers, I will move the Infernal Regions’’), from the Aeneid (7.312). He thus declined to attend to the ‘‘higher world’’ of which the ego was an integral part. He nevertheless acknowledged that exploring the depths of the psyche represents a threat to the ego, that it is in the ego’s interest to recognize nothing beyond the conscious realm. But if this interest becomes too strong, overwhelming the functions that the ego is responsible for in company with the id and the superego, then behavioral problems will likely arise. Otherwise stated, it is in the ego’s interest to establish a working balance with the id and the superego, but if for whatever reason the ego is so strongly cathected that it no longer heeds either the id or the superego—a state known as ‘‘narcissism’’—then there will occur disturbances of the kind that characterize what are now called ‘‘borderline cases,’’ disturbances that Freud considered unsuitable for psychoanalytic treatment. With these considerations as his starting point, Heinz Hartmann brought to the fore a particular group of tendencies of the ego—the ‘‘ego interests’’— embracing several disparate behaviors such as egoism, the pursuit of the ‘‘useful,’’ that is, of wealth, prestige, or power, but also that of intellectual acquisition. EGO INTERESTS The notion of ego interests points up a distinction between what serves the ego and what may harm it or place it in danger, as for example the pressures of the id, the commands of the superego, or simply love of an external object. Freud used the term at least twice in his writings, once in the twenty-sixth Introductory Lecture, ‘‘The libido theory and narcissism’’ (1916–1917a, p. 414) and again in the paper ‘‘Analysis terminable and interminable’’ (1937c). In both contexts, Freud used the concept of the ego to mean an autonomous agency of mental life that makes no secret of its interests and can defend itself against the id and the superego. This defense can go as far as a refusal of all analysis, thus putting the treatment in jeopardy. In such cases one is confronted by resistance from the ego. 48 4 ERNST FEDERN See also: Ego; Ego (ego psychology). Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900). The interpretation of dreams (Parts 1–2). SE, 4: 1–338; 5: 339–625. ———. (1916–1917a). Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis (Parts 1–3). SE, 15: 9–239; 16: 243–463. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. EGO-LIBIDO/OBJECT-LIBIDO In ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction,’’ Freud introduced a major modification in psychoanalytic theory, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS E G O -L I B I D O /O B J E C T - L I B I D O particularly in libido theory, by making a distinction between two forms of libidinal cathexis: ego-directed and object-directed. It was Carl Gustav Jung’s studies on psychosis that led Freud to deepen and develop his own theory of the libido, which had hitherto been regarded solely as the energic expression of the outwardly-directed sexual drives, leading to a break with his former student. At a period when there was a clear theoretical distinction between the sexual drives and the self-preservative drives, the case of the psychotic, cut off from reality and withdrawn into the self, seemed to substantiate the view (held by Jung) that the libido could be separated from sexuality and therefore had to be considered as a form of energy that was close to Henri Bergson’s concept of élan vital. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), Freud commented that agreeing with ‘‘innovators like Jung who, making a hasty judgement, have used the word Ôlibido’ to mean instinctual force in general’’ gives too much credence to ‘‘critics who have suspected from the first that psycho-analysis explains everything by sexuality’’ (p. 52). He then gave a response in theoretical terms in ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ by suggesting that the libido initially cathected the ego, which he called ‘‘primary narcissism’’ and that it was only at a second stage that it was directed at the external world and towards the objects targeted by the drives: ‘‘Thus we form the idea of there being an original libidinal cathexis of the ego from which some is later given off to objects, but which fundamentally persists and is related to the object cathexes, much as the body of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out . . . We see also . . . an antithesis between ego-libido and object-libido’’ (1914c, pp. 75–76). In the same work, he went on to explain: ‘‘I should like at this point expressly to admit that the hypothesis of separate ego-instincts and sexual instincts (that is to say, the libido theory) rests scarcely at all upon a psychological basis, but derives its principal support from biology’’ (p. 79). In the years that followed, Freud refined his description of this ego-libido that was soon to be called ‘‘narcissistic libido’’ by theorizing that it was possible for it to be turned back from an objectal current on to an ego that had itself become a love object: ‘‘secondary narcissism.’’ He also drew a distinction between the repression in the transference neuroses, consisting in withdrawal of libido from consciousness and involving ‘‘the dissociation of the thing and word representaINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS tions’’ from repression in the narcissistic neuroses, ‘‘which consists in the withdrawal of libido from the unconscious thing representations, which is of course a far deeper disturbance’’ (1965, p. 206; letter to Karl Abraham dated December 21, 1914). From Beyond the Pleasure Principle onwards, the emphasis shifted from the conflict between egodirected and object-directed libidinal drives to the conflict within the ego between Thanatos and Eros, as the concept that then subsumes the life drives in a constant attempt at cohesion (1920g). Having assigned to the ego the role of ‘‘the great reservoir from which the object-cathexes are sent out and into which they are withdrawn once more’’ (p. 218) in a 1915 addendum to the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), Freud later modified this proposition in his elaboration of the structural theory and wrote: ‘‘we must recognize the id as the great reservoir of libido’’ (1923b, p. 30, n. 1) and: ‘‘At the very beginning, all the libido is accumulated in the id, while the ego is still in process of formation or is still feeble. The id sends part of this libido out into erotic object-cathexes, whereupon the ego, now grown stronger, tries to get hold of this object-libido and to force itself on the id as a love-object. The narcissism of the ego is thus a secondary one, which has been withdrawn from objects’’ (p. 46). It is this secondary ‘‘ego narcissism’’ that is observed in psychotic states and narcissistic neuroses (dementia praecox, paranoia, melancholia, as Freud specified in his article ‘‘The Libido Theory’’ [1923a], written for the Encyclopaedia Britannica), in which the subject withdraws his libidinal cathexes from objects. Should the metaphor of the ‘‘accumulators’’ found in the controversial book Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twenty-Eighth President of the United States: A Psychological Study (1966 [1938]) be attributed to Freud? This text certainly states: ‘‘We have noted that the libido of the child charges five accumulators. Narcissism, passivity to the mother, passivity to the father, activity toward the mother and activity toward the father, and begins to discharge itself by way of these desires. A conflict between these different currents of the libido produces the Oedipus complex of the little boy’’ (p. 39). The theoretical uncertainties relating to the sources of the libido and consequently to the validity of the opposition between the self-preservative ‘‘ego drives’’ 485 EGO PSYCHOLOGY and the narcissistic ego-libido, a point on which Freud and Jung diverged, have led to a certain amount of debate and criticism, especially among Englishlanguage authors such as Heinz Hartmann, Rudolph Loewenstein, Michael Balint, and Heinz Kohut. This debate has given rise to most of the post-Freudian theories concerning narcissism and the distinction to be drawn between the ‘‘ego’’ and the ‘‘self.’’ ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Libido. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1923a). Encyclopedia article: The libido theory. SE, 18: 255–259. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. Freud, Sigmund, and Abraham, Karl. (1965). A PsychoAnalytic Dialogue: The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham 1907–1926. (Hilda C. Abraham and Ernst L. Freud, Eds.; Bernard Marsh and Hilda C. Abraham, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. Freud, Sigmund, and Bullitt, William C. (1966b [1938]). Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twenty-eighth President of the United States. A Psychological Study. London-New York: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1967. Laplanche, Jean, and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1974). The Language of Psycho-Analysis (Donald Nicholson-Smith, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1967) EGO PSYCHOLOGY Publication of The Ego and the Id (1923b), where Freud initially described the tripartite model of id, ego, and superego as the key macrostructures of the mind, ushered ego psychology into psychoanalytic theory. Precursors can be found in Freud’s earlier publications: the ‘‘Project’’ of 1895; The Interpretation of Dreams; the metapsychological papers of 1915 on instincts, repression, and the unconscious; and the works on narcissism, mourning, and group psychology. 48 6 Freud’s book on anxiety (1926d) elaborated the structural theory of ego psychology and played a key role in its evolution. Its new model for symptom formation saw symptoms as arising from compromises among conflicts of the id, ego, and superego. This new formulation of the workings of the mental sphere was introduced as a revision Freud’s topographic model, an earlier theory centered on the relationship of mental contents to consciousness. For Freud, the antagonism between what is dynamically unconscious and what is conscious, and the significance of this difference for psychopathology, is fundamental to psychoanalysis. But he came to realize that both the repressed and repressing forces, as well as the sense of guilt, are unconscious—a clinically significant factor that he wanted to highlight. Freud saw that to enhance theoretical clarity and more accurately conceptualize the data from clinical psychoanalytic work, he needed a new framework for the mind. In the inner workings of the theory, the id, which includes much of what had been the dynamic unconscious in the topographic model, operates as a primary process and is the major repository of psychic energy, the instincts, and a significant portion of what has been repressed, except for the unconscious aspects of the ego and the superego. The id seeks satisfaction of basic needs and wishes. The superego, in contrast, issues moral directives, self-reproach, and selfpunishment and establishes values and ideals. Freud saw the ego as a coherent set of mental functions and a distillation of abandoned object cathexes. It represents reality, curbs impulses, and seeks the best compromise among the claims of the id, the superego, and the external environment. Freud’s concept of the ego has many different aspects and functions. Delineating these aspects and functions constituted a major task for psychoanalytic theorists for the following half century and beyond. Anna Freud’s (1936/ 1966) depiction and organization of the major mechanisms of defense emphasized the defensive aspects of the ego. She stated the principle that id, ego, and superego derivatives merited equal attention from the psychoanalyst. Hartmann’s (1939/1964) notion that primary and secondary ego are autonomous delineated the ego as a substructure of the mind defined by its functions: broadly, its defensive, autonomous, and synthetic functions and their interrelations. Therapy in the topographic model centers on making the unconscious conscious, and uncovering INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EGO-PSYCHOLOGY universal-drive-related fantasies related to the various psychosexual stages of development. Therapy in ego psychology seeks to increase the scope of the ego at the expense of that of the id and, as a clinical correlate, to understand how the subject uniquely deals with danger and inner conflicts, encompassing id impulses, superego responses, and defensive, adaptive, and integrative ego solutions. Another technical implication of ego psychology is that the therapist should pay close attention to the organization and detail of conscious content while listening for its unconscious substrate. The emphasis on defense also brought into focus the issue of character resistance, systematically developed by Wilhelm Reich. Exploring character resistance later became an aspect of ego-psychology technique. Increasing knowledge of ego development and its relation to early object relations played a key role in the evolution of psychoanalytic ego psychology. Current psychoanalytic approaches derived from ego psychology are Jacob A. Arlow’s delineation of the unconscious fantasy, Charles Brenner’s focus on conflict and compromise formation, and Paul Gray’s development of close monitoring of the defensive process. Otto Kernberg has provided an integration of ego psychology and object-relations theory. MARVIN S. HURVICH Bibliography Arlow, Jacob, and Brenner, Charles. (1964). Psychoanalytic concepts and the structural theory. New York: International Universities Press. Freud, Anna. (1966). The ego and the mechanisms of defence (Rev. ed.). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1936) Freud, Sigmund. (1923). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ———. (1926). Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. Hartmann, Heinz. (1964). Essays on ego psychology. New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1939) Further Reading Holt, Robert R. (1975). The past and future of ego psychology. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 44:550–576. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE PSYCHOSES Kris, Ernst. (1951). Ego psychology and interpretation in psychoanalytic therapy. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 20, 15–30. Wallerstein, Robert. (2002). The growth and transformation of American ego psychology. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 50, 135–170. EGO-PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PSYCHOSES Ego-Psychology and the Psychoses consists of Edoardo Weiss’s compilation of sixteen of Paul Federn’s papers on ego psychology, his primary field. Federn (1871– 1950), a member of Freud’s inner circle, was one of the first psychoanalysts to treat psychotics. His psychoanalytic understanding was influenced by a phenomenological focus, his definition of the ego was experiential, and his major concepts were ego feelings, ego boundaries and ego states. As he understood it, in schizophrenia the ego is too weak to sustain the dominance of advanced ego states essential for mature functioning, due to overly-strong fixations on primitive ego states. Federn saw the prodromal phase of psychosis as beginning with a loss of ego cathexis, while Freud (1911c [1910]) emphasized the withdrawal of object cathexis. Federn supported his position by the observation that psychotics may maintain object interest in the presence of feelings of estrangement. Part of the difference in their respective formulations lay in the fact that Freud was attempting to explain the rapid appearance of delusions following a traumatic disappointment, while Federn focused on the incremental development of delusional ideas. Federn recognized that psychotics were capable of strong transferences, which rendered them analyzable, but he also emphasized the challenge presented by the psychotic’s mal-developed ego, idiosyncratic understanding of reality, and excessive, pathological narcissism. Federn held that these factors require a different application of psychoanalytic knowledge than the approach developed for the neurotic. His detailed treatment recommendations for psychotics were based on the implications of ego weaknesses. Regarding the understanding of the treatment of psychoses, Federn’s concept of ego feelings preceded later interest in the sense of self, his view of faulty ego cathexis anticipated deficit theories of schizophrenia, and his work on the outer ego boundary shed light on contemporary con487 EGO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF ADAPTATION cerns with narcissistic object relations. His phenomenological insights and the problems with which he grappled have been of more lasting value than some of his detailed theoretical formulations. MARVIN HURVICH See also: Ego alterations; Ego; Ego (Ego psychology); Ego feeling; Federn, Paul. Source Citation Federn, Paul. (1952). Ego psychology and the psychoses. (Edoardo Weiss, Ed.). New York: Basic Books. Bibliography Bergmann, Martin S. (1963). The place of Paul Federn’s ego psychology in psychoanalytic metapsychology. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 11, 97– 116. Freud, Sigmund. (1911c [1910]). Psychoanalytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia. SE, 12: 3– 82. London: Hogarth Press. Pao, Ping-Nie. (1979). Schizophrenic disorders: Theory and treatment from a psychodynamic point of view. New York: International Universities Press. Weiss, Edoardo. (1966). Paul Federn: The theory of the psychoses. In F. Alexander, S. Eisenstein and M. Grotjan (Eds.), Psychoanalytic pioneers (pp. 142–159). New York: Basic Books. EGO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF ADAPTATION This work by Heinz Hartmann, some one hundred pages long, was presented to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1937, then published in book form in 1939. David Rapaport’s English translation appeared in 1958. The ideas presented by Hartmann were already well known by then in the United States thanks to the German version, although in Europe, because of the Second World War, they gained wide currency only in the 1950s. With these nine chapters, Hartmann extended Freudian psychoanalysis to the entire field of the psychology of consciousness, and in so doing brought aspects of modern ego psychology into that field for the first time. As his starting point, he took the idea that the ego was determined by its functions, thus 48 8 avoiding the question of its essence. According to Hartmann, the ego had many conflict-free functions whose basic task was adaptation to the external world. The ego and the id had emerged originally from a common matrix; obliged to define the boundaries between them, they created a zone of conflict whose essential raison d’être was defense. Simultaneously, a conflict-free zone developed that was dedicated fundamentally to adaptation to the outside world, and which included the body. In this way psychoanalytic research was opened up to somatic and social phenomena and to all scientific disciplines concerned with these areas: primarily, the study of behavior, academic psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Although adaptation has features in common with defense, it is a function of a completely different order. It is the part played by resistance, above all, which distinguishes the two. The hypothesis of a conflict-free ego implies an autonomous status for that agency within a psychoanalytical psychology of the ego on a par with other human sciences. ERNST FEDERN See also: Adaptation; Defense mechanisms; Ego; Ego autonomy; Ego (ego psychology); Ego psychology; Desexualization; Hartmann, Heinz; Internal/external reality; United States. Source Citation Hartmann, Heinz. (1958). Ego psychology and the problem of adaptation (David Rapaport, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1939) EGO STATES An ego state is a coherent organization of cathected mental contents and related affects that are experienced as within the ego boundary at a given point in time. Federn’s (1926/1952) concept of ego states is related to Schilder’s (1930/1951) discussion of varieties of conscious experience and to David Rapaport’s (1951/1954) view of states of consciousness. Federn’s use of the construct ego state underscores mental content. Ego states are correlated with particular ego boundaries, and the current contents included within a given INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EGO-SYNTONIC boundary will determine a particular ego state. Conversely, given ego states include particular qualities of ego experience. Ego states range from developmentally primitive to advanced. Any ego state may be repressed, and thus de-egotized. When a conflicting idea is repressed, the ego state in which it is found will also be repressed. For a repressed memory to become emotionally meaningful, there must be recall of the whole ego state in which it is embedded. A repeatedly cathected ego state may become dominant, and when this ego state is repressed, a fixation point is created. Fixations are associated with highly rigid ego boundaries. Activation of a particular ego state will result when there is a regression to that fixation point. Manifest dream elements may primarily signify, in addition to unconscious fantasies, repressed ego states. The very concept of pathological fixations implies the notion of a number of repressed ego states. The unconscious segment of the ego consists of all repressed ego states. An active ego state reflects how one is presently experiencing oneself. Ego states succeed one another, but a person may also experience different ego states at the same time. Even so, in most cases, one is aware of only one ego state at a given time. In ego states characterized by fatigue, sleep, illness, and psychosis, the ego feeling is often seriously restricted. In general, the greater the mental disturbance, the more the person’s functioning is limited by current ego states. Such a person is unable to do in one ego state what he can do in another. Regression to earlier ego states is one of the main pathological features of psychosis. Schilder, Paul. (1951). Studies concerning the psychology and symptomatology of general paresis. In David Rapaport (Ed.), Organization and pathology of thought. New York: Columbia University Press. (Original work published 1930) Weiss, Edoardo. (1960). The structure and dynamics of the human mind. New York: Grune and Stratton. EGO-SYNTONIC The notion of ego syntony plays an important part in psychoanalytic ego psychology. The implication of the term is that the ego represses only those tendencies with which it is at odds, that is, with which it is incompatible. Freud used the term only once, in the encyclopedia article ‘‘Psycho-Analysis,’’ which first appeared in Max Marcuse’s Handwörterbuch der Sexualwissenschaft (Manual of sexual sciences). ‘‘Since these impulses are not ego-syntonic,’’ he wrote, ‘‘the ego has repressed them’’ (1923a, p. 246). Obviously, compatibility between the ego and the id must vary according to the individual and also as a function of cultural and social affiliation. Sexual relations, for example, were long condemned by the Catholic Church unless their purpose was procreation. This position has gradually changed, but it is worth recalling that as recently as a hundred years ago Protestant circles subscribed to the same idea. In Asian societies attitudes towards sexuality are very different, although there too change is under way. Federn, Paul. (1952). Ego-psychology and the psychoses (Edoardo Weiss, Ed.). New York: Basic Books. (Original work published 1926) If much of sexuality is rejected by the ego of Westerners, this is not to say that other instinctual tendencies are likewise ‘‘ego-dystonic,’’ and therefore repressed. In many aspects of aggression one can also see wide individual differences, depending not only on social position but also on historical period. In fact, if one considers the course of history from a psychological point of view, it is reasonable to say that up until the end of the Second World War most men experienced a resort to violence, even to killing, as perfectly ego-syntonic. In countries where the death penalty is still in use, as in the United States, inflicting this sanction on criminals is generally ego-syntonic, whereas in other countries this attitude has changed radically within the ego, and capital punishment is condemned by most people. Rapaport, David. (1954). The autonomy of ego. In Robert P. Knight and C. R. Friedman (Eds.), Psychoanalytic psychiatry and psychology. New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1951) In the psychotherapy of present-day individuals, the therapist thus needs to bear in mind the historical trend for the ego to repress destructive impulses when it encounters them. Indeed, it is possible that sexual MARVIN S. HURVICH See also: Ego; Ego (ego psychology). Bibliography Bergmann, Martin S. (1963). The place of Paul Federn’s ego psychology in psychoanalytic metapsychology. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 11, 97–116. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 489 EINFALL impulses will become fully ego-syntonic, even as the ego rejects destructive wishes. In short, what is egosyntonic and what is ego-dystonic must be determined in a historical, cultural, and social context. ERNST FEDERN See also: Ego; Ego (ego psychology). Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1923a). Psycho-analysis. SE, 18: 234–254. EINFALL. See Sudden involuntary idea EISSLER, KURT ROBERT (1908–1999) Physician and psychoanalyst Kurt Robert Eissler was born in Vienna on June 2, 1908, and died in New York on February 17, 1999. Eissler was a Freud scholar of distinction, one of the most accomplished psychoanalysts of his generation, and a prolific and original writer. He was immensely learned, and a captivating and engaging speaker whose somewhat wry but engaging sense of humor augmented the liveliness with which he enriched discussion. His interests were wide ranging. The arts always appealed to him: His knowledge of them was extensive and he spoke and wrote of them with learning and wisdom. His book on Leonardo da Vinci (1962) was followed by his two-volume psychoanalytic study of Goethe (1963), and he made important contributions to the study of Hamlet (1953, 1968) and Freud’s approach to literature (1968). He wrote about ageing and death, and his book, The Psychiatrist and the Dying Patient (1966), is of permanent value. In all, he wrote twelve books and nearly one hundred papers, among which his studies of psychoanalytic technique attracted wide attention. His writings cast light on many subjects, of which schizophrenia, dream analysis, female sexual development, memory and lightning calculation, psychological factors in hypertension, esophageal spasm, psychology of jealousy, body image disturbances, and suicide will serve as more or less typical random examples. Eissler studied psychology at the University of Vienna. He took his Ph.D. in 1934 and his M.D. in 49 0 1937. After training at the Viennese Psychoanalytic Institute, he joined the Viennese Psychoanalytic Society. There he became an assistant to August Aichhorn, a pioneer in the study and treatment of adolescent delinquency, whose Wayward Youth became a classic text. Following the Anschluss in 1938, Eissler left for Chicago and obtained the diploma of the American Board of Psychiatry. During the Second World War, in 1943, he became a captain in the US Army Medical Corps, specializing in neuro-psychiatry. That autumn, his brother Erik was killed in a concentration camp, though it was only later that Eissler learned of his fate. He moved to New York when the war ended, and set up in private practice. In 1949, he edited Searchlights on Delinquency, dedicated to his old teacher Aichhorn. In 1952, he was one of the founders of the Sigmund Freud Archives, deposited in the Library of Congress, Washington, DC, and it was as its tireless secretary that he collected so many invaluable documents about, by, or related to Freud and his associates. In this unending task he was greatly helped by Anna Freud, in the context of a warm relationship of mutual esteem. He had known her from Viennese days, and she found his friendship a great comfort. He established the Anna Freud Foundation in the United States, also in 1952, thus facilitating tax-free donations for the benefit of the Hampstead Child Therapy Course in London, and the associated clinic she had just set up. He strongly supported the work of what quickly became the world’s leading center for child analytic training and for child analytic research. Anna Freud was secure in the knowledge that the Freud Archives were in safe hands, and that Eissler’s devotion to all that her father stood for was absolute. She was grateful, too, for the invaluable assistance that he gave to Ernest Jones in his extensive three-volume biography of Freud, and to the help he gave to James Strachey in preparing the standard edition of Freud’s psychological works. Eissler was actively and deeply concerned about the growing flood of uninformed Freud criticism and the publicity it attracted. In particular, he objected to the misinterpretation of the early seduction theory. While Freud never denied that seduction in childhood had serious consequences for development, he was obliged to abandon his views of its role in the etiology of hysteria. Certainly, he would have hated the ‘‘recovered memory syndrome.’’ All this is well known to serious INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS E I S S L E R - S E L K E , R U T H (1906 –1 989) students of psychoanalysis, but Eissler brought to the bare facts an erudition that cast fresh light on the entire issue. An unexpectedly bitter dispute over his successor to the Archives, stemming from allegations that Freud had suppressed the truth about his early seduction theory, achieved wide publicity, while Eissler’s refutation of the charges failed to be given due weight. Some other criticisms of Freud sprang from misunderstandings within the profession, and these were subject to Eissler’s searching scrutiny. Again, this did not always attract the attention it deserved. Eissler could not be said to be optimistic, either about psychoanalysis in particular or civilization in general. The Fall of Man (1975) makes melancholy reading. But, when reaffirming his pessimism during conversation, he would often add: ‘‘You have to go on fighting.’’ He was certainly no idolater of Freud or Anna Freud, but vigorously defended those principles without which, he felt, psychoanalysis would cease to be psychoanalysis. He was sometimes accused of imposing undue restrictions on access to the Freud Archives. Peter Gay, for example, in his biography of Freud (1988), after praising Eissler for his diligence in historical research, accused him of ‘‘an addiction to secrecy’’ (p. 784) in making a great deal of Freud’s correspondence unavailable to scholars. That view is widespread, and Eissler (1993) felt obliged to defend the policy pursued by the Archives—a policy, he argued, seriously misrepresented. It was not, he said a matter of secrecy, but of making material available only to scholars and translators who were committed to accuracy: He pointed to the mischief already done by misreadings (not necessarily wilful) of Freud’s difficult script, and pointed to the ‘‘glaring inaccuracies’’ in some translations previously published. It is a matter of some importance to read Gay’s charges (p. 784f) and Eissler’s reply (1993, pp. 202f, 212f) in full, in view of the widespread misunderstandings of the position then taken by the Freud Archives. Eissler retained to the end an old-world charm and the courtesy and consideration of a Viennese gentleman. His stimulating observations were matched by a lively interest in the activities and opinions of his visitors, and his warm hospitality was a delight to those who knew him. His wife Ruth, for many years an editor of The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, died in 1989. CLIFFORD YORKE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS See also: Eissler-Selke, Ruth; Lehrinstitut der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung; Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood; New York Psychoanalytic Institute; Pankejeff Sergueı̈; Sigmund Freud Archives; Tausk, Viktor; War neurosis. Bibliography Eissler, Kurt R., (Ed.) (1949). Searchlights on delinquency: New psychoanalytic studies. New York: International Universities Press. Eissler, Kurt R. (1953). On Hamlet. Samiksa: 7: 85–202. ———. (1955). The psychiatrist and the dying patient. New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1962). Leonardo da Vinci. Psychoanalytic notes on the enigma. New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1963). Goethe: A psychoanalytic study 1775–1786. Two vols. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. ———. (1968). Freud’s approach to literature — explaining and understanding. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 23, 141–77. ———. (1968). Fortinbras and Hamlet. American Imago: 25, 199–223. ———. (1975). The fall of man. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 30, 589–646. ———. (1993). Three instances of injustice. New York: International Universities Press. Gay, Peter (1988). Freud: A life for our time. London and Melbourne: Dent. EISSLER-SELKE, RUTH (1906–1989) A physician and psychoanalyst, Ruth Eissler-Selke was born February 21, 1906, in Odessa and died October 7, 1989, in New York. She was born into a Jewish family, her father being the director of a German bank and then a grain exporter. After moving several times and attending schools in Odessa, Hamburg, and Danzig, Eissler-Selke completed her studies in 1925 in Freiburg-im-Briesgau. She studied medicine at the University of Freiburg, graduating in 1930. She specialized in psychiatry and, following graduation, practiced in Heidelberg and Stuttgart. Her dissertation, which she defended at the University of Heidelberg in 1932, was entitled ‘‘Medical Histories of Six Cases: The Contribution of Social Hygiene to the Question of Alcoholism and Tuberculosis.’’ 491 E I T I N G O N , M A X (188 1 –1943 ) After Hitler came to power, Eissler-Selke went into exile in 1933 in Vienna and worked at the psychiatric hospital in Rosenhügel. In December 1933, she requested admission to the training institute of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society and began an analysis with Theodor Reik. After Reik’s emigration to the Netherlands, she turned to Richard Sterba for her analysis. She was accepted as a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1937. While in Vienna she met Kurt R. Eissler, a doctor, philosopher, and later a psychoanalyst. They were married in 1936. In March 1938, Kurt and Ruth Eissler emigrated to the United States and settled in Chicago. She became a member and training analyst of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society and worked as a child psychiatrist at the Michael Reese Hospital. During the Second World War, she was a consulting physician in an institution for young delinquent women in Chicago. In 1948 she and her husband moved to New York and she became a member of, and training analyst with, the New York Psychoanalytic Society. From 1951 to 1957 she was secretary, then vice president of the International Psychoanalytic Association and, from 1950 to 1958, one of the editors of The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, an annual publication founded in 1945 by Anna Freud, Heinz Hartmann, and Ernst Kris. Aside from her teaching activities and psychoanalytic publications, she wrote poetry and a novel (unpublished), as well as several short stories. In 1976, to celebrate her seventieth birthday, a collection of her poems in German was published in New York. ELKE MÜHLLEITNER See also: Eissler, Kurt Robert. Bibliography Eissler-Selke, Ruth. (1946). About the historical truth in a case of delusion. Psychoanalytic Review, 33, 442–459. ———. (1949). Observations in a home for delinquent girls. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 3–4, 449–460. ———. (1976). Gezeiten: Gedichte in deutscher Sprache. New York: Abaris Books. Eissler-Selke, Ruth, Blitzstein, N. Lionel, and Eissler, Kurt R. (1950). Emergence of hidden ego tendencies during dream analysis. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 31, 12–17. 49 2 Mühlleitner, Elke. (1992). Biographisches Lexikon der Psychoanalyse (Die Mitglieder der Psychologischen MittwochGesellschaft und der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung 1902–1938). Tübingen: Diskord. EITINGON, MAX (1881–1943) Max Eitingon, a medical doctor, was born in Mohilev, Russia, in 1881 and died in Jerusalem on July 3, 1943. He was cofounder and presidentof the Berlin Psychoanalytic Polyclinic (1920–1933), director and patron of the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag (1921– 1930), president of the International Psychoanalytic Association (1927–1933), founder and president of the International Training Committee (1925–1943), and founder of the Palestine Psychoanalytic Society (1934) and of the Psychoanalytic Institute of Israel. Eitingon was born into an orthodox Jewish family. His father, Chaim Eitingon, had a large successful fur business, with a store in New York City. Max was the last of his four children (the others where Esther, Fanny, and Vladimir). Around 1893, when he was twelve, the family moved to Leipzig, Germany, where Chaim became a generous patron to the Jewish community, financing the construction of a hospital and a synagogue. In 1929 he was ruined by the stock market crash and died in Leipzig in 1932. Educational problems, most likely associated with his stuttering, prevented Max from taking classes at the local high school, and he became a student in a private school that had a curriculum based on the study of modern languages. He learned to speak ten languages and later was able to take medical notes in several languages and dialects. However, because he did not have an opportunity to take his baccalaureate exams, he was not allowed to enroll in medical school and had to obtain a degree equivalent to the baccalaureate. He studied at various universities in Halle, Heidelberg, and Marburg, where Hermann Cohen, a specialist in Judaism, taught. After this educational odyssey he began his medical studies in 1902 at the University of Leipzig. Eitingon completed everything but his dissertation when he left to become an intern at the Burghölzli Clinic in Zurich. Eugen Bleuler, head of the clinic, sent Eitingon to Freud with a patient because he wanted to discover what a psychiatrist could learn from a psychoanalyst. The ‘‘Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society’’ note the presence of ‘‘Mr. Eitingon, of Bleuler’s clinic, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS E I T I N G O N , M A X (1881 –1 943) as guest’’ at the Wednesday evening meetings of January 23 and 30, 1907. Eitingon was the first doctor from the Burghölzli Clinic to meet Freud. He served as an intermediary between Freud and psychiatry, but also asked to see him privately as a patient. Between 1908 and 1909 he underwent a five-week analysis during evening walks with Freud, a somewhat unusual venue for psychoanalysis. This was Freud’s first training analysis. We can assume that Eitingon discussed with Freud his relationship with his father and his inhibition about working. Presented these difficulties of Eitington’s, Freud, who was very indulgent in his countertransference, appears to have been inclined to make Eitingon a ‘‘doctor of psychoanalysis.’’ Eitingon, with the help of Carl Jung, finally managed to complete his dissertation: ‘‘Effect of an epileptic attack on mental associations.’’ He settled in Berlin, where his father’s fortune provided him with a life of comfort and ease among the intellectual and artistic elite of the city. On April 20, 1913, he married Mirra Jacovleina Raigorodsky, an actress from the Moscow Art Theater. During this period he had some time to help Karl Abraham introduce psychoanalysis to Berlin. During the First World War, Eitingon became an Austrian citizen and joined the army as a physician. He was sent to Prague, Kassa, Iglo, and Miskolc (his birthplace), where he recommended Sándor Ferenczi as an expert for a military trial. In the hospitals Mirra worked with him as a volunteer nurse. He successfully treated cases of war trauma with hypnosis and was decorated several times for his work. He attended meetings of the Budapest Psychoanalytic Association, worked with Ferenczi on a psychoanalytic clinic, and attended the 1918 psychoanalytic congress. At the end of the war, faced with an unstable political climate in Hungary, Eitingon left for Berlin, where he began his lifelong commitment to psychoanalysis. He had become a close friend of Freud in 1910 and remained his confidant during difficult times. In Freud’s words, he was the ‘‘first messenger [of psychoanalysis] to approach a solitary man [Freud].’’ With Ferenczi he played the role of a supportive disciple throughout the war years. A reliable individual, he was in a sense an administrator of the Freudian enterprise, resolving any problems that arose in the various local psychoanalytic societies (Zurich, for example). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS He replaced Anton von Freund as a member of the Secret Committee (of Freud’s supporters) and continued his work in introducing psychoanalysis. In 1920 he took over work that had been done in Budapest and succeeded in creating a polyclinic in Berlin, whose construction he entrusted to Freud’s son, Ernst, an architect. He financed the polyclinic out of his personal fortune and ran it with the help of Karl Abraham and Ernst Simmel until the rise of National-Socialism in 1933. The polyclinic was the first center in the world for treating patients with the Freudian psychoanalytic method and the first training institute for young analysts. The clinic trained candidates from all over the world to address the mental and social problems of postwar Europe. The curriculum lasted two years, then three, and comprised three separate tracks: theory, personal analysis, and supervised analysis. After the death of his father, a cerebral thrombosis left him paralyzed in the left arm. On June 13, 1933, Eitingon presented Ferenczi’s funeral elegy in Budapest. Ruined, handicapped, and no longer able to bear the persecution in Berlin, he left Germany, on Freud’s advice, in September 1933. Because of his Zionist sympathies, he decided to emigrate to Palestine. He settled in Jerusalem, on Balfour Street, and there founded the Palestine Psychoanalytic Association (1934). In spite of Freud’s support, he failed to obtain a chair in psychoanalysis at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In 1938 he was involved in a court case in Paris (the ‘‘Plevitskaya affair’’) and suspected of being a Soviet spy. Vladimir Nabokov used this episode for the short story ‘‘The Assistant Producer.’’ Marie Bonaparte and René Laforgue testified on Eitingon’s behalf. Despite the French government’s official acknowledgement of ‘‘strategic error,’’ he was again accused of being a spy, this time posthumously, in the United States in 1988. A new controversy followed, but Eitingon’s reputation was cleared (Moreau Ricaud, 1992). Eitingon was the author of some thirty articles, including ‘‘Genie, Talent und Psychoanalyse’’ (1912), ‘‘Gott und Vater’’ (1914), ‘‘Ein Fall von Verlesen’’ (1915), and twelve reports to various international psychoanalytic congresses, from Berlin 1922 to Paris 1938. MICHELLE MOREAU RICAUD 493 ELASTICITY See also: Berliner Psychoanalytiche Polyklinik; Berliner Psychoanaltisches Institut; Germany; International Psychoanalytic Association; Internationale Zeitschrift für (ärztliche) Psychoanalyse; Israel; Lay analysis; ‘‘Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy’’; Secret Committee; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Training analysis. Bibliography Draper, Theodore. (1988, April 14). The mystery of Max Eitingon. New York Review of Books, 35 (6), 32–43. Eitingon, Max. (1912). Genie, Talent und Psychoanalyse. Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, 2, 539–540. Eitingon, Max. (1914). Gott und Vater. Imago, 3, 90–93. ———. (1915). Ein Fall von Verlesen. Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, 3, 349–350. ———. (1922). Zur psychoanalytischen Bewegung. Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, 8, 103–106. ———. (1923). Report of the Berlin Psychoanalytical Polyclinic. Bulletin of the International Psychoanalytical Association, 4, 254. Moreau Ricaud, Michelle. (1992). Max Eitingon (1881– 1943) et la politique. Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse, 5, 55–69. ELASTICITY ‘‘The Elasticity of the Psychoanalytic Technique’’ is the title of a paper that Sándor Ferenczi gave to the Budapest Psychoanalytic Society, and which was first published in 1928. In essence he described the procedure he had introduced in his paper on the ‘‘contra-indications of the active technique’’ (1926), in which he recommended using relaxation to reduce tension in certain difficult cases. In two other articles from the same period (‘‘Family Adaptation to the Child’’ and ‘‘The Problem of the End of Analysis’’) he dealt with difficulties in the educational environment. The question became one of how far the idea of elasticity could be taken. In 1967, Michael Balint would write on Ferenczi’s problem, ‘‘His earlier experiences had familiarized him with two models: one was the classic technique with its objective and benevolent passivity, and apparently imperturbable and unlimited patience; the other was the active technique with its well-directed interventions founded on attentive observation and empathy.’’ In the 1928 paper, Ferenczi developed the technical importance of tact in deciding on the right moment to 49 4 communicate to the patient any conjectures the analyst may have made, ‘‘based essentially on the dissection of our own Self.’’ He stressed the notion of modesty, which should be ‘‘the expression of the acceptance of the limits to our knowledge,’’ and to this end he preferred from the beginning of treatment to adopt a rather pessimistic attitude, in order to avoid creating enthusiastic confidence in the future patient, a confidence that often camouflaged ‘‘a healthy dose of distrust.’’ Nothing could be more harmful, he continued, ‘‘than the attitude of a schoolmaster or an authoritarian doctor.’’ He thus spoke of Einfühlung (feeling-with, empathy) as of a rule, from which he deduced the necessity, for the analyst, of developing ‘‘a rigorous control of his own narcissism and intense vigilance with regard to his own affective reactions.’’ Analysts would have to ‘‘guess when the patient’s esthetic sentiments have been offended by our own attitude’’ and, supporting this displeasure, behave like those little ‘‘culbutos’’ (small figures with lead ballast in their base that always return to a vertical position). Ferenczi proposed ‘‘a perpetual oscillation between feelingwith, self-observation and judgment activity.’’ He concluded this reflection on the countertransference with a ‘‘metapsychology of the technique,’’ denouncing the ‘‘fanaticism of interpretation as an infantile disease of analysis’’ because, in order for patients to become free of all emotional binds, they must ‘‘abandon, at least provisionally, all sorts of superegos, including that of the analyst.’’ This position borders on ‘‘a demand for elasticity in the analysts themselves,’’ a ‘‘metapsychology of the analysts.’’ This then makes it absolutely essential to comply with the second rule of psychoanalysis, already problematic at the time, that analysts must themselves be analyzed. PIERRE SABOURIN See also: Active technique; Ferenczi, Sándor; Tact; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic. Bibliography Balint, Michael. (1967). Introduction. In Sándor Ferenczi, Oeuvres complètes (Vol. 4). Paris: Payot, 1982. Ferenczi, Sándor. (1926). Contre-indications de la technique active. In his Oeuvres complètes (Vol. 3, pp. 389–428). Paris, Payot. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ELISABETH ———. (1926). Le problème de l’affirmation du déplaisir. In his Oeuvres complètes (Vol. 3, pp. 389–428). Paris: Payot ———. (1928). The elasticity of psycho-analytic technique. In M. S. Bergmann and F. R. Hartman (Eds.), The evolution of psychoanalytic technique. New York: Basic Books. ELEMENTI DI PSICOANALISI Published by Ulrico Hoepli (Milan, Italy) in 1931, Edoardo Weiss’s work was the first complete and accurate exposé of psychoanalysis in Italy. Freud spoke approvingly of the work of his Italian disciple when he wrote in his preface that the book recommended itself to anyone who was able to appreciate the ‘‘seriousness of a scientific effort,’’ the ‘‘honesty of the researcher,’’ and the ‘‘skills of the teacher.’’ Some chapters were translated into German in the Psychoanalytische Bewegung. A second edition appeared in 1932, and a third in 1936. The most recent edition was published in 1985. The book is based on five lectures given by Weiss in Trieste, Italy, at the initiative of the local medical association in the spring of 1930. He covered the following subjects: (1) the nature of psychoanalysis and the concept of the id and unconscious inhibition, (2) symbolism, (3) the origin of the superego and social and religious sentiments, (4) drive theory, (5) psychic systems. In an appendix Weiss added a glossary of basic psychoanalytic vocabulary in Italian, with approximately ninety terms accompanied by their German equivalent. This small dictionary was the first, and for a long time the only, instrument of its kind available in Italy. Although Weiss attempted to summarize Freud’s thought, he did not simply reproduce it passively. He introduced a conceptual neologism, the ‘‘inhibitory id,’’ to refer to the oldest part of the superego and the feeling of unconscious guilt that accompanies it. The problem of unconscious guilt appears clearly in the fourth lecture, where he describes Freud’s death impulse and refers to Ernst Federn’s statement concerning the intermediate character of the life and death drive. The Elementi was a qualitative leap over the handful of works on psychoanalysis available in Italy until then, works that were often badly informed and tendentious. Therein lies its historical importance. ANNA MARIA ACCERBONI See also: Italy; Weiss, Edoardo. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS VON R. , C A S E OF Source Citation Weiss, Edoardo. (1931). Elementi di psicoanalisi. Milan: Ulrico Hoepli. Bibliography Accerboni, Anna Maria. (1985). Un’opera che si raccomanda da sé. In Edoardo Weiss, Elementi di psicoanalisi. Pordenone, Italy: Studio Tesi. ELISABETH VON R., CASE OF ‘‘Fräulein Elisabeth von R.’’ is the pseudonym Freud gave to Ilona Weiss, a young woman of Hungarian origin, whose case is described in the Studies on Hysteria (1895d) and whom he treated in the fall of 1892 and July 1893. The third daughter in a well-to-do Hungarian family, Elisabeth von R. was twenty-four years old when Freud treated her in the autumn of 1892 for pains in her legs and difficulties walking, problems she had been experiencing for two years. He confirmed the diagnosis of hysteria that had been made and noted that ‘‘if one pressed or pinched the hyperalgesic skin and muscles of her legs, her face assumed a peculiar expression, which was one of pleasure rather than pain. She cried out—and I could not help thinking that it was as though she was having a voluptuous tickling sensation—her face flushed, she threw back her head and shut her eyes and her body bent backwards’’ (1895d, p. 137). After an initial period of four weeks during which he prescribed electrical treatments, he suggested to her the use of a cathartic cure that ‘‘turned out, however, to be one of the hardest that I had ever undertaken’’ (1895d, p. 138). Resistant to hypnosis, the patient stretched out with her eyes closed but was able to move, open her eyes, and sit up. Freud then applied his ‘‘concentration technique,’’ the same one he was using on another patient of his at the time, Miss Lucy R. It was this that persuaded Freud that she was hiding a secret, but her initial remarks had no effect in spite of their dramatic nature. Her family history was characterized by heart disease and the death of her father, whom she deeply loved, for whom she ‘‘took the place of a son and a friend with whom he could exchange thoughts’’ (1895d, p. 140). Freud understood that her illness had begun with pains in her legs, which first occurred while she was caring for her sick father, even 495 ELISABETH VON R. , C A S E OF though she was not aware of them until two years after his death. The sickness and death of her sister, who was also afflicted with heart disease aggravated by pregnancy, followed by a quarrel between her brothersin-law, had coincided with the two years of the development of her illness. the young woman’s mother, who confirmed that she had suspected as much. The treatment concluded in July 1893 with the appeal to the mother for assistance. This was to have repercussions later on, since the daughter rebelled and refused to see Freud again because he had betrayed her secret. During this period of the treatment, she repeated to Freud that she was not doing better in spite of her confession and Freud remarked that ‘‘when she looked at me as she said this with a sly look of satisfaction at my discomfiture, I could not help being reminded of old Herr von R.’s judgment about his favorite daughter— that she was often Ôcheeky’ and Ôill-behaved’’’ (1895d, p. 141). Freud, confident in his treatment, notes with pleasure: ‘‘In the spring of 1894 I heard that she was going to a private ball for which I was able to get an invitation, and I did not allow the opportunity to escape me of seeing my former patient whirl past in a lively dance’’ (1895d, p. 160). When he prepared the case study for the Studies on Hysteria, he learned from Wilhelm Fliess (to whom he had given it to read) on July 14, 1894, that she had just gotten engaged. An improvement occurred when she herself provided the source of her hysterical conversion: Her pains began at the spot on her thigh where, every morning, her father placed his inflamed leg so she could change his bandages. From then on ‘‘her painful legs began to Ôjoin in the conversation’ during our analyses’’ (1895d, p. 141), a period of abreaction when, Freud writes, ‘‘I sometimes followed the spontaneous fluctuations in her condition; and I sometimes followed my own estimate of the situation when I considered that I had not completely exhausted some portion of the story of her illness’’ (1895d, p. 149). He then experimented with the phenomenon that would soon modify his conception of psychotherapy: ‘‘In the course of this difficult work I began to attach a deeper significance to the resistance offered by the patient in the reproduction of her memories and to make a careful collection of the occasions on which it was particularly marked’’ (1895d, p. 154). It was on her account that he used publicly for the first time (this information is found six months later in Draft H, dated January 24, 1895, in 1950a) a key theoretical concept: ‘‘it can be shown with likelihood that complete conversion also occurs, and that in it the incompatible idea has in fact been Ôrepressed’ [verdrängt], as only an idea of very slight intensity can be.’’ In the spring of 1893 a sharp pain reoccurred when she heard, in a room adjacent to Freud’s office, her brother-in-law who had come to pick her up. This enabled Freud to track down her ‘‘secret’’—she had fallen in love with her brother-in-law. She had grown closer to him as a result of her sister’s illness, and upon her death was unable to repress the thought that he was now free. In spite of his patient’s denials, Freud insists on, and goes so far as to solicit the testimony of 49 6 Elisabeth von R., if we are to believe her daughter’s revelations, told the story somewhat differently. ‘‘She described Freud as Ôjust a young, bearded nerve specialist they sent me to. He had tried ‘‘to persuade me that I was in love with my brother-in-law, but that wasn’t really so.’’ Yet, her daughter adds, Freud’s account of her mother’s family history was substantially correct, and her mother’s marriage was happy.’’ (Gay, p. 72). It was in this context that Freud wrote, ‘‘This was my first complete analysis of a hysteria. It allowed me for the first time, with the help of a method that I would later use as a technique, to eliminate psychic material in layers, which I like to compare to the technique of unearthing a buried city’’ (1895d, p. 139). Yet the treatment is less important historically for the spectacular discovery of the ‘‘love secret’’ that is revealed than because it demonstrates to Freud the mechanism of conversion, his link to a father with whom he identifies without yet drawing the relevant conclusions, and the resistance he must overcome through belief in his method, in order to eliminate, beyond the relative freedom of association he allows his patient, through speech, layer by layer, the psychic material that blocks the return of repressed memories. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Cathartic method; Erotogeneity; Phlyogenesis; Resistance; Studies on Hysteria. Bibliography Ellenberger, Henri F. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry. New York: Basic Books. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS E L L E N B E R G E R , H E N R I F R É D É R I C (1905 –1 993) Freud, Sigmund. (1950a [1887–1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173–280. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. Gay, Peter. (1988). Freud: A life for our time. LondonMelbourne: Dent. ELLENBERGER, HENRI FRÉDÉRIC (1905–1993) Henri Frédéric Ellenberger, physician, psychiatrist, and historian of psychoanalysis, was born in Nanolo, Rhodesia, on November 6, 1905, and died in Montreal on May 1, 1993. He was born into a family of Swiss protestants. His father, Victor Ellenberger, a naturalist and anthropologist, was a member of the Société des missions évangéliques de Paris (Society of Evangelical Missions of Paris), and his mother, Évangéline Christol, was the daughter of a pastor. Ellenberger completed his medical studies in Strasbourg, France, and it was there that he was introduced to historical research. He moved to Paris to specialize in psychiatry and, after being appointed a resident in psychiatry, worked at the Sainte-Anne Hospital alongside Henri Ey. In November 1930 he married Esther von Bachst, a Russian émigrée with a passion for zoology, and they had four children. Ellenberger settled in Poitiers, but because he was not a naturalized French citizen, in 1941 he emigrated to Switzerland . He worked as a psychiatrist at the Breitenau Hospital in Schaffhausen and was part of the Jung Circle in Zurich, through which he met Carl Gustav Jung. In 1950 he began a training analysis with Oskar Pfister, who was then seventy-seven years old. In 1952 he traveled to the United States, met Karl Menninger, and was appointed professor at the Menninger School of Psychiatry in Topeka, Kansas. In 1953 he encountered immigration problems, and in 1959 he moved to Montreal, where he became a professor of criminology at McGill University. In 1962 he began the historical research that resulted in the publication of The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry in 1970 . In contrast with the oral tradition of the history of psychoanalysis and Ernest Jones’s biography of Sigmund Freud, and in spite of the paucity of documentation, Ellenberger’s work provided a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS detailed history of the theories and practices that, since antiquity, made use of the forces of what would come to be theoretically designated as the unconscious. Ellenberger traced the ‘‘dynamic’’ tradition in psychiatry back to Franz Mesmer. In this tradition he placed Jean Martin Charcot, Pierre Janet, Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, and Carl Gustav Jung. Ellenberger wanted to show that the hagiographies of Freud were mistaken: Freud did not receive some heavenly illumination. Rather, his theories are only one link, albeit an important one, in a tradition that included sorcerers, shamans, the Catholic confession, Alfred Schopenhauer, and Gustav Fechner. After learning about Ola Andersson’s discovery of the true story of Emmy von N., which Ellenberger published, he continued working as a historian of psychoanalysis, intent on removing the doubts and omissions that littered a historiography divided between worship and calumny. His position has been judged by a number of psychoanalysts as unfavorable to Freud and psychoanalysis, for it served as a point of departure for several openly hostile research efforts. Although his attitude was seen as largely negative, especially in Freudian circles, where his work received a poor reception, he remained a dedicated researcher, conscious of establishing the first principles of a psychiatric historiography that stood in marked contrast to a cult of hero worship. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Anna O., case of; Emmy von N., case of; Moservon Sulzer-Wart, Fanny Louise; Pappenheim, Bertha. Bibliography Ellenberger, Henri Frédéric. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry. New York: Basic Books. ———. (1972). L’histoire d’Anna O.: étude critique avec documents nouveaux. Évolution psychiatrique, 37 (4), 693– 717. ———. (1977). L’histoire d’Emmy von N. Évolution psychiatrique, 42 (3/1), 519–540. Micale, Mark S. (1993). Henri Ellenberger and the origin of European psychiatric historiography. In Henri Ellenberger, Beyond the unconscious: essays of Henry F. Ellenberger in the history of psychiatry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1993. Roudinesco, E. (1994). Présentation. In Henri F. Ellenberger, Histoire de la découverte de l’inconscient. Paris: Fayard. 497 E M B I R I K O S , A N D R E A S (19 01 –197 5) EMBIRIKOS, ANDREAS (1901–1975) Andreas Embirikos, a poet and psychoanalyst, was born on September 2, 1901, in Braı̈la, Romania, and died in 1975 in Athens. His father’s family was originally from the island of Andros. His mother was born in Russia. He had three brothers. Shortly after his birth, the family settled on the island of Syros, then in Athens, where Embirikos completed his secondary education and enrolled at the University of Athens to study philosophy. Between 1926 and 1931 he lived in Paris. Interested in psychoanalysis, he underwent analysis with René Laforgue and made contact with the surrealists. He became friends with André Breton. After his return to Athens in 1931, he worked for a while as director in the shipping company that belonged to his father, but he soon left his position to devote his life to poetry and psychoanalysis. Embirikos, the first psychoanalyst in Greece, was actively involved in psychoanalysis from 1935 until the end of 1950. In 1947 he was one of the founding members of the first psychoanalytic group in Greece and in 1950 was made a member of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society. His friends referred to Embirikos as ‘‘brilliant and unlike anyone else.’’ One might assume that he combined the glory of the poet with the perseverance of the psychoanalyst, but this was not the case. In 1951, believing he was under the threat of a lawsuit for practicing therapy without a medical license, Embirikos closed his psychoanalytic practice. He had been badly treated by the police at the end of the civil war and now believed he had become a target of the medical establishment. He left for Paris. Kourias, Eri, and Kourias, Georges. (1984). Un cas de pratique psychanalytique relié à une errance hyperréaliste: La psychanalyse et la Grèce. Athens: Société d’études de la culture néohellénique et de l’éducation. Revue Hartis. (1985). A series of articles dedicated to Andréas Embirikos. 17–18. Tzavaras, Athanase. (1981). Andréas Embirikos et la psychanalyse. Bulletin de la Société d’études de la culture néohellénique et de l’éducation, 5. Zavitzianos, Georges. (1981). Andréas Embirikos, psychoanalyst. Le mot, 20. EMDEN, JAN EGBERT GUSTAAF VAN (1868–1950) Jan van Emden, Dutch physician and psychoanalyst, was born in Paramaribo, Surinam, on August 5, 1868, and died in the Hague on March 23, 1950, aged 82. He was trained as a medical doctor at the University of Leiden and received his degree in 1896 for his dissertation ‘‘Bijdragen tot de kennis van het bloed’’ (Contributions to knowledge of the blood). Van Emden met Freud in 1910 when the latter was vacationing in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, and they subsequently became good friends. During the First World War van Emden functioned as intermediary between Freud and Ernest Jones, who was instrumental in introducing psychoanalysis in England, and also arranged for Anna Freud’s return to Vienna. ANNA POTAMIANOU In 1912, after a short training with Freud, van Emden established himself in the Hague as one of the first practicing psychoanalysts there. He was a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society from 1911 to 1914. One of the founders of the Nederlandsche vereeniging voor psycho-analysise (Dutch society for psychoanalysis) in 1917, he was chairman from 1919– 1929. In 1934 he became president after the split of the society and the founding of the Vereeniging van psychoanalytici in Nederland (New Dutch society of psychoanalysis). Embirikos, Andréas. (1950). Un cas de névrose obsessionnelle avec éjaculations précoces. Revue française de psychanalyse. Van Emden’s contributions to psychoanalysis are modest. He was a regular participant in the Congresses of the International Psychoanalytical Association, at which he presented four papers (in 1913, 1918, 1924, and 1925). As a member of the Dutch society for psy- Two years later Embirikos returned to Greece to devote himself to his poetry. He was a prolific poet and produced work of high quality. His poetry was a broad erotic fresco with occasional references to psychoanalysis. His only psychoanalytic publication appeared in 1950: ‘‘Un cas de névrose obsessionnelle avec éjaculations précoces.’’ Embirikos married twice. He died at the age of seventy-four from lung cancer. See also: Greece. Bibliography 49 8 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EMMY choanalysis, he gave a number of presentations. He translated two works of Freud into Dutch: Five Lectures on Psycho-analysis and Thoughts for the Times on War and Death. JAAP BAR AND CHRISTIEN BRINKGREVE See also: Netherlands. Bibliography Brinkgreve, Christien. (1984). Psychoanalyse in Nederland: een vestigingsstrijd. Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers. Van Emden, Jan. (1912a). Over psycho-analyse. Leiden, Netherlands: Van Doesburgh. (Translation of Sigmund Freud, Five lectures on psycho-analysis.) ———. (1912b). Selbstbestrafung wegen abortus. Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, 3, 647. ———. (1917). Beschouwingen over oorlog en dood. Leiden, Netherlands: Van Doesburgh. (Translation of Sigmund Freud, Thoughts for the times on war and death.) ———. (1925). Zur Bedeutung der Spinne in Symbolik und Folklore. Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, 11, 512–513. EMMA, CASE OF. See Eckstein, Emma EMMY VON N., CASE OF Frau Emmy von N. was the pseudonym given by Sigmund Freud in the Studies on Hysteria to his patient Fanny Moser, who was born Fanny Sulzer-Wart in 1848 and died in 1925. In her autobiography her daughter Mentona speaks of ‘‘the famous professor that [her] mother went to see in Vienna’’ (referring to either Josef Breuer or Rudolf Chrobak), who soon referred the patient to ‘‘his first assistant,’’ Doctor Sigmund Freud. ‘‘He was small and thin, his hair was blue-black, large black eyes, he looked timid and very young. He made a profound impression on me.’’ (in Ellenberger, Henri F., 1977). On May 1, 1889, during her first visit, Freud described his meeting with this forty-year old woman, which would have made her seven years younger than Freud: ‘‘This lady, when I first saw her, was lying on a sofa with her head resting on a leather cushion. She still looked young and had finely-cut features, full of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS VON N. , C A S E OF character. Her face bore a strained and painful expression, her eyelids were drawn together and her eyes cast down; there was a heavy frown on her forehead and the naso-labial folds were deep. She spoke in a low voice as though with difficulty and her speech was from time to time subject to spastic interruption amounting to a stammer.’’ He also noted the clicking sound she made with her tongue when upset. This intelligent but very anxious patient provided him, without his awareness, with a premonitory indication of the future therapeutic framework when she cried out: ‘‘Keep still!—Don’t say anything!—Don’t touch me!’’ She made use of this incantatory remark on several occasions, whenever she was frightened by some particularly terrifying memory, but Freud, after ten days of therapy, decided to eliminate it through the use of suggestion, which he succeeded in doing. His treatment was consistent with customary practice, which consisted in her case of a stay at a clinic, separated from her two daughters, with whom she did not get along. Freud prescribed warm baths and massages twice a day. The patient was completely accessible to hypnosis and, in this state, recounted the origin of the delusional fears and visual hallucinations (rats, frogs) from which she suffered, retracing them to her childhood. ‘‘My therapy consists in wiping away these pictures, so that she is no longer able to see them before her. To give support to my suggestion I stroked her several times over the eyes.’’ The systematic pursuit of her memories enabled Freud to state that the case of Emmy von N. was the first in which he had employed the ‘‘cathartic method.’’ One day, when she was irritated, the patient also made a remark whose practical consequences Freud did not fail to draw. She asked him to stop interrupting her with questions and to allow her to speak freely. At the time Freud still played the role of the grand magician, the antithesis of the future psychoanalytic attitude, and his authority was necessary to erase the patient’s pathogenic memories through the process of suggestion. It is interesting to note that there exists an 1894 note Freud added to the case history—this still a year before the dream of the injection given to Irma—in which he indicates that he wrote down his own dreams and traced them back to two factors: ‘‘(1) to the necessity for working out any ideas which I had only dwelt upon cursorily during the day—which had only been 499 EMOTION touched upon and not finally dealt with; and (2) to the compulsion to link together any ideas that might be present in the same state of consciousness. The senseless and contradictory character of the dreams could be traced back to the uncontrolled ascendancy of this latter factor.’’ Although here is evident a clear glimpse of clinical intuitions that, in retrospect, appear anticipatory, at this point Freud’s therapy continues to be a blend of such ‘‘purgative retellings’’ and electrotherapy. Freud’s notes stop on June 20 and Emmy von N. apparently left, quite improved, for her château in Switzerland. Freud visited her on July 18, traveling along the road to Nancy, where he was to meet Hippolyte Bernheim. In January 1890 Emmy had a relapse. She went to see Breuer, complaining of nervous disturbances from which her daughter was suffering and blaming Freud and Chrobak. She was so agitated that they had her admitted to a sanatorium, from which she ended up escaping with the help of a woman friend. No doubt she came to represent one of the cases Freud referred to later to explain why he abandoned hypnosis: ‘‘On one occasion a severe condition in a woman, which I had entirely got rid of by a short hypnotic treatment, returned unchanged after the patient had, through no action on my part, got annoyed with me; after a reconciliation, I removed the trouble again and far more thoroughly; yet it returned once more after she had fallen foul of me a second time.’’ (1916–17a [1915–17]) In May 1890, the anniversary of his first therapy, she came back to see Freud for additional therapy, which lasted eight weeks—until July. She felt better but suffered from mental confusion, ‘‘storms in her head,’’ and insomnia, and the clicking tic and stammering had reappeared. Freud analyzed the origin of the return of these symptoms and again succeeded in eliminating them. In the spring of 1891 Freud saw Emmy von N. at her home, where he stayed for several days to help resolve the problems she was having with her older daughter. She was feeling better but Freud resumed the therapy to eliminate her phobia of train travel. Because she claimed to be less docile than before, that is less attached to him, he reestablished his authority and his position through his little drama of being a hypnotist, which he exposed with such candor that it is obvious he was entirely unaware of his unconscious motives. 50 0 In an addendum that dates from 1924, Freud reports that, several years after this last visit, he met a doctor with whom she had behaved as she had with him: easy to hypnotize in the beginning then irritable and subject to relapses: ‘‘It was a genuine instance of the Ôcompulsion to repeat.’’’ He added that around 1920 her elder daughter had written him to request a report, because she wanted to initiate a lawsuit against this ‘‘cruel tyrant’’ who had chased away her two children. It has become fashionable to question Freud’s diagnoses, and the case of Emmy von N. is no exception: melancholia, schizophrenia, nervous tics, the neurosis of a rich and idle woman, according to the various reports. Although Anna O. alone was successfully treated and managed to create an exemplary life for herself, Henri F. Ellenberger has remarked that it was Emmy’s daughter, Mentona Moser, who benefited from the intellectual and social emancipation her mother never achieved. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Andersson, Ola; Cathartic method; Ellenberger, Henri Frédéric; Free association; Moser-von SultzerWart, Fanny Louise; Psychoanalytic treatment; Studies on Hysteria. Bibliography Andersson, Ola. (1962). Studies in the prehistory of psychoanalysis. Stockholm: Svenska Bokförlaget. Ellenberger, Henri F. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry. New York: Basic Books. ———. (1977). The story of ‘‘Emmy von N.’’: A critical study with new documents. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. Freud, Sigmund. (1916–17a [1915–17]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. Parts I & II, SE, 15-16. Micale, Mark S. (Ed.). (1993). Beyond the unconscious. Essays of Henri F. Ellenberger in the History of Psychiatry.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. EMOTION The word emotion is derived from the Latin emovere, ‘‘to set in motion.’’ It initially referred to the idea of physical movement and then assumed a figurative meaning associated with mental movement. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EMPATHY The term is infrequently used in psychoanalysis, where the term affect, derived from German Affekt, is preferred. Sigmund Freud, however, in a text written in French in 1895, used the expression ‘‘état émotif ’’ (‘‘emotive state’’) to designate what was translated in the German editions as Affekt. It is with the theoretical developments associated with Kleinian psychoanalysis that the term emotion reappeared. The reasons for the change are significant. Freudian metapsychology is centered on the study of the mental apparatus, which is considered, if not as an isolated entity, at least as one that can be isolate. In the Freudian model the mental apparatus is charged with drives, whose effects—affect and representation— are observable. Affect corresponds to the quantitative aspects, and mental representations correspond to the qualitative aspects of the drives. Positive affects accompany the satisfaction of drives, negative affects accompany the state of tension within the mental apparatus (pleasure/unpleasure principle). The object of satisfaction, that is, the object that triggers the discharge of the impulse, is contingent, vicarious. For Daniel Widlöcher, the affect refers to internal regulatory functions of the mental apparatus: a discharge of impulses and signals intended to provide information to the mental apparatus, as Freud suggested in his second theory of anxiety, and that emotion adds a third reference, that of communication with the external object, ‘‘a modality of expression intended to inform others of a particular situation, laden with value for the subject.’’ It should come as no surprise therefore that the theories assigning greater importance to object relations have given a central place to the concept of emotion. Compared to affect, it contains levels of additional complexity, because it is a means of communicative exchange between self and other, through its behavioral (especially facial) expressions, which have been extensively studied by specialists in development and cognitive function, and because it refers to nuanced qualitative aspects rather than simply quantitative aspects combined with a positive or negative valence. Melanie Klein insisted on the extreme nature of the baby’s emotions at the start of its extra-uterine existence, associated with love and hate relations directed at the (partial) object in what she called the ‘‘paranoid-schizoid position.’’ Later, when the infant achieves the ‘‘depressive position,’’ emotions become more nuanced, hate is tinged with guilt, love with ambivalence. Wilfred Bion gave the concept of emoINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS tion an essential role in his description of the intrapsychic world as a world of relations between internal or interiorized objects. For Bion the links between internal objects are emotional links, just as the links between the subject and its external objects are emotional in nature. He chose three types of emotional links: these correspond to love relations (L link = love), hate relations (H link = hatred), and knowledge relations (K link = knowledge). The first two, L and H, are emotional links; these are unstable and associated with splitting. The K link is the psychoanalytic link par excellence and has the advantage of stability. It does indeed involve an emotional link, in the sense that it corresponds to an emotion associated with uncertainty and the tension experienced in the face of the unknown in anticipation of meaning. Psychoanalytic therapy develops K links. DIDIER HOUZEL See also: Concept; Darwin, Darwinism, and psychoanalysis; Shame; Links, attacks on; Love-Hate-Knowledge (L/H/K links); Memories; Paranoid-schizoid position; Quota of affect; Unconscious as Infinite Sets: An Essay in Bi-Logic, The. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred. R. (1962). A theory of thinking. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XLIII, 4–5; in Second Thoughts, London: Heinemann, 1967. Freud, Sigmund. (1895c [1894]). Obsessions and phobias: their psychical mechanism and their aetiology. SE, 3: 69–82. Klein, Melanie. (1952). Quelques conclusions théoriques au sujet de la vie émotionnelle des bébés. In M. Klein, P. Heimann, S. Isaacs, and J. Riviere (Eds.), Developments in psychoanalysis (pp. 187–253). London: Hogarth Press. Widlöcher, Daniel. (1992). De l’émotion primaire à l’affect différencié. In P. Mazet and S. Lebovici (Eds.) Émotions et Affects chez le bébé et ses partenaires (pp. 45–55). Paris: Eshel. EMPATHY Empathy is the capacity for concrete representation of another person’s mental state, including the accompanying emotions. The English term is a translation of 501 EMPTY FORTRESS, THE the German word Einfühlung, coined in 1873 by the German philosopher Robert Vischer. Vischer used it to refer to a modality of aesthetic sensibility. In contrast to the theory that categorized objective qualities inherent in the object as beautiful, Vischer described the subjective nature of an experience where beauty resulted from the projection of human sensibilities onto natural objects. Theodor Lipps (1851–1914), a philosopher who taught in Munich, gave empathy a broader, psychological range, attributing to this form of intuition access to knowledge of another’s subjectivity. It is in this sense, and most likely from reading Lipps, that Sigmund Freud used the term, which was still uncommon at the time. Freud used the term in a number of his essays. He used it for the first time in Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905) in relation to the economic explanation of the pleasure associated with humor. He returned to it several times to refer to a form of intuitive understanding of others essential to psychoanalytic communication. For Freud, however, the term had no specific psychoanalytic meaning but rather a general psychological meaning, moreover, one that was still poorly understood. This is likely one reason that James Strachey did not feel the need to propose a single English translation; the other reason being that the term empathy, which had already been proposed in 1909 by the psychologist Edward Bradford Titchener and taken up by Ernest Jones, did not generate much enthusiasm from Strachey. In France the term emphatie come back into use following the publication of the translation of Freud’s works under the direction of Jean Laplanche. This resulted in the misunderstanding of a precise concept for Freud, in particular, in his correspondence with Sándor Ferenczi. The concept did not become important until 1960, when Ralph Greenson studied it, no doubt influenced by the interest in countertransference that occurred after the work of Heinrich Racker and Paula Heimann. Since then a number of studies have emphasized the importance of the concept for communication during analysis. There have been some reservations arising from what was felt to be the somewhat obscure and slightly irrational nature of the phenomenon. Other authors (Buie, 1981; Widlöcher, 1993) have tried to specify the psychological mechanisms operating in this complex form of intuitive understanding, specifically emphasizing the role of identification and inference. 50 2 From the metapsychological perspective, the debate continues between those who assign empathy a decisive role in the discovery of the unconscious and the therapeutic activity of the psychoanalyst (Heinz Kohut) and those who deny that empathy can play a role in identifying the unconscious. DANIEL WIDLÖCHER See also: Counter-identification; Counter-transference; Elasticity; Greenson, Ralph; Identification; Kohut, Heinz; Lebovici, Serge Sindel Charles; Projective identification; Self, the. Bibliography Buie, Dan H. (1981). Empathy: Its nature and limitation. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 29, 281–307. Freud, Sigmund. (1905). Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. SE, 8: 1–236. Greenson, Ralph R. (1960). Empathy and its vicissitudes. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 41, 418–424. Widlöcher, Daniel. (1993). L’analyse cognitive du silence en psychanalyse: Quand les mots viennent à manquer. Revue internationale de psychopathologie, 12, 509–528. Further Reading Kohut, Heinz. (1959). Introspection, Empathy, and psychoanalysis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 7, 459–483. Orange, Donna. (2002). There is no outside: Empathy and authenticity in psychoanalytic process. Psychoanalytical Psychology, 19, 686–700. Pigman, George W. (1995). Freud and the history of empathy. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 76, 237–256. Schwaber, Evelyn. (1981). Empathy: A mode of analytic listening. Psychoanalytical Inquiry, 1, 357–392. Shapiro, Theodore. (1981). Empathy: A critical reevaluation. Psychoanalytical Inquiry, 1, 423–448. Shaughnessy, Patrick. (1995). Empathy, working alliance: Mistranslation of Freud’s "einfuhling". Psychoanalytical Psychology, 12, 221–232. EMPTY FORTRESS, THE The saga of The Empty Fortress began in 1952. Two years earlier, in his book Love Is Not Enough, Bruno INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EMPTY FORTRESS, THE Bettelheim had reported his first findings concerning the disturbed children in the school he had directed in Chicago since 1944. That book had captured the interest of thousands of Americans. The popularization of psychoanalysis was in full bloom in the United States, and psychiatric research was very much in fashion. High hopes seemed in order: Americans had defeated Hitler; surely they could overcome madness. There was no shortage of research funding, and in 1956, ahead of Anna Freud’s Hampstead Nurseries, Bettelheim received a five-year Ford Foundation grant of $342,500 to finance his study of autism. The Empty Fortress is based in part on the reports that Bettelheim submitted to the Ford Foundation each year. It was hardly automatic that autistic children were referred to Bettelheim’s Orthogenic School, which was run like a family home and where diagnostic labels and psychiatric drugs were forbidden. ‘‘If you give them drugs,’’ Bettelheim wrote, the children ‘‘cannot believe that you really want them to be the way they would like to be. If you manipulate their bodies like that, how could they fail to think that you also want to manipulate their minds?’’ (personal communication, 1980). After a great deal of discussion with his colleagues, in 1950–1951 Bettelheim finally received a few ‘‘children who don’t speak’’ (as their playmates would call them), children whose pathology Margaret Mahler distinguished from other forms of infantile psychosis at the 1951 Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Amsterdam. The first sentence of Bettelheim’s book sums up his credo: ‘‘Much of modern psychology seeks to know about others; too much of it, in my opinion, without an equal commitment to knowing the self. But I believe that knowing the other—which is different from knowing about the other—can only be a function of knowing oneself’’ (p. 3). This was the foundation on which he trained (sometimes very roughly) the educators in his school. The sentiment also illustrates the secret of Bettelheim’s remarkable clinical intuition. While observing the wolf-child–like behavior of little Anna, Bettelheim writes, he was struck by the parallel between his own experience of concentration camps and his therapeutic work (pp. 7–8). Anna had been born in Poland during the Second World War to Jewish parents who did not get along but were obliged to live together, holed up in an earthen cellar and afraid to make the slightest sound. By the age of ten, the little girl, now mute, had almost killed her young brother several times. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS No treatment facility would keep her more than a few hours; even a psychiatric hospital had been unable to cope with her for more than a month. In her eyes Bettelheim recognized a terror that he himself could never forget—the terror of someone placed in an environment that seeks to destroy him without his knowing why or whether he will ever escape. Bettelheim had been evoking this ‘‘extreme situation’’ since his article on Buchenwald (1943). In The Empty Fortress he defined it, for the first time, as a situation ‘‘when we ourselves respond to an external danger—real or imagined—with inner maneuvers that actually debilitate us further’’ (p. 77). Later he added that in the face of an extreme situation, the individual rejects his normal personality because his ordinary reactions are now liable to place his life in danger (1980, pp. 11, 116). Convinced that, however senseless little Anna’s actions might seem, they in fact had meaning, Bettelheim studied her symptoms closely enough to be able to make the striking claim that he was describing autism as if from the subject’s point of view. Traditionally, autistic subjects are characterized in terms of their shortcomings. In The Empty Fortress, by contrast, the children are alive and active, and each of their gestures is understood as an attempt to reduce their suffering. The three case histories that Bettelheim recounted in detail, those of Laurie, Marcia, and Joey (the ‘‘boy-machine’’ who could not move or even say hello without first ‘‘plugging himself in’’ with an imaginary cord to an equally imaginary wall-socket), make such a powerful impression on readers that they often forget the first part of the book, ‘‘The world of encounter,’’ in which Bettelheim gives an account of the birth and decline of the self. The first hundred or so pages of the book, permeated with notions of the ‘‘self psychology’’ then being developed by Heinz Kohut, are nevertheless the strongest ever written by Bettelheim on mental illness. They even prompted Donald Winnicott to make the following somewhat ruffled remark: ‘‘I find him difficult to read simply because he says everything and there is nothing to be said that one could be certain has not been said by him. But I must read him because he can be exactly right, or more nearly right than other writers. This applies especially to his opening chapters in The Empty Fortress’’ (1989, p. 246n). This book made Bettelheim famous worldwide; it also defined him narrowly as a specialist of autism. He was partly responsible for this, for he inflated his suc503 ENCOPRESIS cess rate to help quiet his behaviorist opponents. His overriding priority was to give voice to the mental suffering of his patients and remind the medical world of the respect it owed to such suffering. The Empty Fortress was in effect a clinical sourcebook, and it had a decisive effect on the evolution of institutional attitudes towards autism. NINA SUTTON See also: Autism; Bettelheim, Bruno; Infantile schizophrenia; Technique with children, psychoanalytic. Source Citation Bettelheim, Bruno. (1967). The empty fortress: Infantile autism and the birth of the self. New York: Free Press. Bibliography Bettelheim, Bruno. (1943). Individual and mass behavior in extreme situations. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 38, 417–452. ———. (1950). Love is not enough. New York: Free Press. ———. (1980). Surviving and other essays. New York: Vintage. Lyons, Tom Wallace. (1979). The pelican and after: A novel about emotional disturbance. Richmond, VA: Prescott, Durrell and Co. Mahler, Margaret S. (1952). On child psychosis and schizophrenia: Autistic and symbiotic infantile psychoses. In R. Eissler et al. (Eds.), Psychoanalytic study of the child (Vol. 7). New York: International Universities Press. Winnicott, Donald W. (1989). Psycho-analytic explorations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ENCOPRESIS Encopresis is the name for problems with control of the anal sphincter after the age when such control is normally acquired (two or three years). The condition may be primary or secondary after a period of continence, and is characterized by bowel movements, usually during the daytime, under socially unacceptable conditions and excluding true incontinence, as produced by organic disorders of the sphincter or its related nerve structures. The term, used in clinical pediatric psychiatry, was introduced by Siegfried Weissenberg in 1926. 50 4 A clearer understanding of this symptom can be achieved by considering it in relation to the erotogenicity of the anal zone (Freud, 1905d), with its various components, including excitation of the mucous membranes and the pleasures derived from expulsion and muscular control. Michel Soulé views the erotization of retention as the central phenomenon. Nonrenunciation of these instinctual satisfactions is rooted in the individual’s conflictual relations with the people surrounding him during the period of toilet training—that is, the anal-sadistic stage, which is focused on issues of possession, on mastery of one’s own body, and of others. The child’s stools are cathected as a part of his or her own body and as representing internal objects; the subject refuses to give them up for exchange and instead saves them, often owing to a deficiency in symbolization that impedes the displacement of interest onto other objects. Anxiety plays a role, sometimes manifesting itself as a genuine defecation phobia with archaic contents, such as the destruction of internal objects, or the destruction of links, often in connection with the traumatic effects upon the child of intrusive parental fantasies or existential events involving loss. Symptoms of encopresis can also arise from an inadequate cathexis of the body on the part of a child subject to some forms of deprivation. The secondary gains are proportionate to the involvement of the child’s entourage: maintaining regressive ties to the mother; feelings of omnipotence; masochistic gratification. The failure of repression and the nonestablishment of reaction-formations attest to the resistance of pregenital fixations to oedipal resolution —the definitive aim of toilet training, according to Anna Freud. Although encopresis can have a bearing on all types of psychopathology in the child, ranging from psychosis or perversion to quasi-normality, Bertrand Cramer has noted that the majority of cases involve neurosis. GÉRARD SCHMIT See also: Anality; Coprophilia; Eroticism, anal; Gift; Infantile neurosis; Libidinal stage; Mastery; Pregenital; Psychosexual development. Bibliography Cramer, Bertrand, et al. (1983). Trente-six encoprétiques en thérapie. Psychiatrie de l’enfant, 26, 2, 309–410. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ENCOUNTER Freud, Anna. (1965). Normality and pathology in childhood: assessments of development. New York: International Universities Press. Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 130–243. Soulé, Michel, et al. (1995). Les troubles de la defecation. In S. Lebovici, R. Diatkine, and M. Soulé (Eds.), Nouveau traité de psychiatrie de l’enfant et de l’adolescent (Vol. 4, pp. 2679–2700). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Weissenberg, Siegfried. (1926). Über Enkopresis. Zeitung der Kinderpsychiatrie, 1, 69. ENCOUNTER The word encounter designates the coming together of two elements, fortuitous or not, that are going to have an impact on each other. This notion is central to the theories of Piera Aulagnier, as it correlates to potentiality (psychotic potentiality). ‘‘To live is to experience in a continuous way what results from the situation of encounter,’’ she wrote in 1975 (p. 2). The notion of encounter in the wider sense of the word for psychoanalysis concerns everything that has the character of an event, when it seems as if it is not predetermined. Nevertheless, Freud had demonstrated that an event has no sense and meaning, except as a part of a preexisting structure. Therefore the event never has a purely objective meaning, even if it results from an encounter that comes from the outside. Such an event has, in fact, already been shaped by the psyche according to mnemonic traces anterior to the encounter. Piera Aulagnier, however, accorded the notion of encounter a more fundamental meaning, that of a permanent rapport established between the body and the psyche, or between the subject’s psyche and that of the mother. The relation between the psyche and the world is born at the time of the primordial event of the encounter. Aulagnier opted to situate the inaugural encounter at the beginnings of the rapport between the mouth and the breast, a prototype of what she called the ‘‘complementary object-zone’’ (1975/2001, p. 19). ‘‘At the moment when the mouth meets the breast it meets and swallows a first mouthful of the world’’ (p. 15). The representation that the psyche has of itself will be a function of further encounters, either the encounter of the psyche with the body, on the one hand, or with the productions of the maternal psyche on the other. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Nevertheless, every encounter confronts psychic activity with an overload of information, up to the point where whatever was unrecognized returns to refute the representation (for example, the frustration of the real breast being missing, when a presence of the breast has been hallucinated). This shows why the notion of encounter has been a useful one: It is opposed, in fact, to representations of the mother/infant relation in terms of fusion or dyad. Piera Auglagnier, on the contrary, affirmed that in the two psychic spaces, that of the mother and of the child, ‘‘the same object, the same experience of encounter will be inscribed by using two forms of writing and two heterogeneous relational schemata’’ (1975/ 2001, p. 15). The notion of the ‘‘encounter’’ is also a necessary complement of ‘‘potentiality’’, since it is precisely on the occasion of the encounter that potentiality can be actualized. In this context it is close to the notion of the event, when the latter is thought of as a triggering cause. However, in the context of psychosis, Aulagnier proposed a more specific definition of encounter: ‘‘The passage from a potential state of identificatory conflict to one that is manifest can result from an encounter that takes place long after childhood is past; an encounter between the subject and another, to whom is imputed the same power, which in childhood was exerted by actors in a reality scene of such a nature that it was not internalized at the time’’ (1984). It is evident that the notion of encounter allows Aulagnier to avoid any overly strict determinism, one that would isolate a particular moment, in the subject or family environment, to account for its later psychic destiny. In one of her last writings, dating from 1990, and so liable to serve as a conclusion, she remarked: ‘‘The essence of the relation of cause and effect in the psyche . . . is that it is the effect alone that can make a cause of the event. Now this effect is not fixed once and for all; it is itself the effect of an encounter, to be recalled, renegotiated, reinterpreted by future experiences. Only over the course of a long and arduous work of reinterpretation of lived experiences and past traces can a current experience reactualize things, or the I transform its past—to make of it the source and cause of its present’’ (1992 [1990]). SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR 505 E N R I Q U E Z - J O L Y , M I C H E L I N E (1 931 –19 87) See also: Alienation; L’Apprenti-historien et le Maı̂tre-sorcier. Du discours identifiant au discours délirant [Apprentice historian and the master sorcerer, the]; Ideational representation; Pictogram; Primal, the; Psychotic potential. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (1984). L’Apprenti-historien et le Maı̂tresorcier. Du discours identifiant au discours délirant. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ———. (1992 [1990]). Voies d’entrée dans la psychose. Topique, 49. 7–29. ———. (2001). Violence of Interpretation: From Pictogram to Statement. (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). East Sussex Philadelphia: Brunner-Routledge. (Original work published 1975). Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1998). Penser la psychose. Une lecture de l’oeuvre de Piera Aulagnier. Paris: Dunod. ENRIQUEZ-JOLY, MICHELINE (1931–1987) Micheline Enriquez, a French psychoanalyst, was born on September 11, 1931, in Châlons-sur-Marne and died in an automobile accident on October 18, 1987, in Vaux-le-Pénil. She spent her childhood and adolescence in Sézanne, where she attended grammar school and high school. She passed her baccalaureate degree in modern literature. In 1949 Enriquez went to Paris to study at the Institut de psychologie (Institute of Psychology), where she obtained diplomas in applied psychology, psychopedagogy, and psychopathology, and at the Sorbonne, where she obtained a certificate in social psychology. She also studied Russian at the École des langues orientales (School of Oriental Languages) and took courses at the Institut d’études politiques de Paris (Paris Institute of Political Studies). After working with Professor Jean Maisonneuve (social psychology) on the process of affinity and evaluating training activities, she was appointed a psychologist at the mental health clinic of Paris Medical School (under Professor Jean Delay of the Centre psychiatrique Sainte-Anne). She worked with Professors Pierre Pichot, Thérèse Lampérière, and J. Perse, with whom she wrote a study on hysteria. She also worked at the Versailles Hospital. She underwent her training analysis with Serge Leclaire of the Société française de psychanalyse (French Society for Psychoanalysis) before the 1964 split that led Jacques Lacan to found the École freudi50 6 enne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris). Her monitor was Piera Aulagnier. She joined the École freudienne at the time of its creation but, at the time of a second split, participated in the creation of the Quatrième groupe, Organisation psychanalytique de langue française (Fourth Group, Francophone Psychoanalytic Organization) in 1969. She served as secretary for analysis and secretary for research before becoming vice president in 1985 and president in 1986. She underwent a second analysis with Serge Viderman. For several years she was responsible for teaching projective techniques at the Institut de Psychologie (Institute for Psychology) at the University of Paris. Enriquez wrote a number of articles in the review Topique and in the Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse. She was awarded the Maurice Bouvet Prize in psychoanalysis in 1978 for three of her articles: ‘‘D’un corps à l’autre: réflexions sur le masochisme’’ (1971), ‘‘Fantasmes paranoı̈aques: différence des sexes, homosexualité, loi du père’’ (1974), ‘‘Analyse possible ou impossible’’ (1977a). She contributed an article to Comment l ’interprétation vient au psychanalyste (1977b) and, in 1984, published Aux carrefours de la haine. Her last published work, ‘‘L’enveloppe de mémoire et ses trous’’ (1987), appeared shortly after her death. Two of her essays, ‘‘Le délire en héritage’’ and ‘‘Incidence du délire parental sur la mémoire des descendants,’’ a transcription completed the day before her death, were published in 1993. As shown by the case studies she wrote, her work is based on her analytic practice and reflects on violence, lethal withdrawal of cathexis, the desire for historical and psychic reality, suffering, and the conditions for harmonious treatment, which, while not excluding the expression of negative affects, can mobilize life impulses and stimulate thought in analyst and analysand alike. Enriquez provided new insights into paranoia, masochism, and what she referred to, after the Marquis de Sade, as apathy. She showed that paranoiacs and masochists eroticize suffering and hatred, and she found in paranoia and masochism the mechanisms of their object choices. Those who are apathetic reject affect and hatred to distance themselves from others in order to survive. She insisted on the need for the child, when confronted by delusional speech from one of its parents, to negotiate the violence imposed to avoid repeating it. She stressed the importance of a common memory between analyst and analysand, a condition INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ENURESIS for remembering to be fruitful and for access to history. For Enriquez, everything that fell within the sphere of love and reciprocity was capable of struggling against the spread of evil that resulted in anger against the self or others. Enriquez has been referred to as one of the most highly esteemed psychoanalysts in France, where her clinical work and theoretical contributions were highly regarded, independently of her institutional associations. She was a member, since its foundation, of the Association internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse (International Association of the History of Psychoanalysis). Issue no. 42 of Topique, ‘‘Mémoire et réalité’’ (1988), was dedicated to her memory. Her work has been translated into English, Spanish (she is well known in Argentina), Italian, and Greek. Her influence in Brazil continues to remain strong. EUGÈNE ENRIQUEZ See also: Intergenerational; Pain; Psychic envelopes; Quatrième groupe (O.P.L.F.), Fourth group; Secret. Bibliography Enriquez, Micheline. (1971). D’un corps à l’autre: Réflexions sur le masochisme. Topique, 7–8, 85–118. ———. (1974). Fantasmes paranoı̈aques: Différence des sexes, homosexualité, loi du père. Topique, 13, 23–58. ———. (1977a). Analyse possible ou impossible. Topique, 18, 49–62. ———. (1977b). Libres pensées. In Robert Barande (Ed.), Comment l’interprétation vient au psychanalyste (pp. 95– 104). Paris: Aubier Montaigne. ———. (1980). Du corps de souffrance au corps en souffrance. Topique, 26, 5–27. ———. (1984). Aux carrefours de la haine: Paranoı̈a, masochisme, apathie. Paris: Éditions de l’Épi. ———. (1987). L’enveloppe de mémoire et ses trous. In Didier Anzieu et al. (Eds.), Les enveloppes psychiques. Paris: Dunod. ———. (1993a). Le délire en héritage. In René Kaës et al. (Eds.), Transmission de la vie psychique entre générations. Paris: Dunod. ———. (1993b). Incidence du délire parental sur la mémoire des descendants. In René Kaës et al. (Eds.), Transmission de la vie psychique entre générations. Paris: Dunod. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ENURESIS Enuresis is incomplete, or total lack of, bladder control in children past the age of four to five years, when bladder control is normally achieved. It is considered primary when a child has never been consistently dry. In secondary nocturnal enuresis, bedwetting begins after a period of adequate bladder control and suggests regression due to such traumatic factors as separation, loss, or illness. Enuresis is distinguished from genuine organic urinary incontinence. Enuretic urination, as a rule, is nocturnal and involuntary. It may be also associated with daytime events. As a disorder that attracts the interest of a number of medical specialists, enuresis has spawned a variety of hypotheses concerning its etiology. The deep sleep of the enuretic child has been implicated, though without evidence of any unusual sleeping habits, save increased resistance to specific waking stimuli. The bladder capacity of the enuretic child is usually normal, although in some cases an immature bladder has been demonstrated, and this can cause a nocturnal surge in bladder pressure. In a few cases, disorders (or delayed maturation) of circadian rhythms due to secretion of antidiuretic hormones may disrupt, or delay the development of, the normal relationship between diurnal and nocturnal production of urine, and this can produce functional nocturnal polyuria. Finally, studies of families and twins have established a genetic component. Although psychological and environmental factors have often been investigated, a specific psychological profile for enuresis has not yet emerged. Complicating matters is that relevant factors differ according to whether the symptom is an isolated one or forms part of a more complex clinical picture and a definite psychopathology. Freud emphasized the libidinal dimension of primary enuresis. Beginning with the case of Dora (1905e [1901]), he interpreted enuresis as a substitute for genital gratification, noting consistent links between enuresis and fire, a theme that he discovered in dreams as representative of frightening, aggressive, or erotic drives. As the gratification of an organic need, Freud suggested, urination counts as one of the autoerotic and infantile pleasures; the infant renounces it only with reluctance under the pressure of toilet training (1916–1917a [1915–1917]). Even if this classical conception must be viewed today in connection with other considerations, psychotherapy of enuretic children often demonstrates the 507 ENVY relevance of Freudian intuition. Gérard Schmidt and Michel Soulé (1985) stress the significance of primary enuresis in the libidinal economy of the enuretic child, together with various direct instinctual gratifications that indicate continued and persistent eroticization of urination. Gains in controlling secondary enuresis are correlated with reactions of the child’s caregivers and the availability of other means of gratification. The study of the psychological factors involved in enuresis must take into account several factors implicated in successful toilet training: (1) the gradual maturation of control over the somatic functions, with individual inborn variations; (2) the affective investment in excretory functions in different stages of libidinal development; and (3) interactions with the environment, ranging from the child’s privileged relationship with its mother to familial and social customs concerning the child’s acquisition of sphincter control. GERARD SCHMIDT See also: Eroticism, urethral; Institut Max-Kassowitz. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905e [1901]). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. SE, 7: 1–122. ———. (1916–1917a [1915–1917]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15–16. Kreisler, Léon. (1977). Enurésie. In Encyclopédie médico-chirugicale (Vol. Pédiatrie, fasc. 4101-G-95). Paris: Encyclopédie medico-chirurgicale. Schmit, Gérard, and Soulé, Michel. (1985). L’énurésie infantile. In Serge Lebovici, René Diatkine, and Michel Soulé (Eds.), Nouveau traité de psychiatrie de l’enfant et l’adolescent (pp. 1751–1770). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Further Reading upon, parts of the object felt to be good. It attacks aspects of the libido—love, constructiveness, integration—simply because of their life-giving characteristics. This notion first appears in Envy and Gratitude (Klein, 1957). Freud was uncertain about the clinical usefulness of the concept of the death instinct. Klein found ways of showing its clinical relevance, especially in her work with children. The primary destructive force, the death instinct, aims at destroying the ego. Freud (1926) recognized that the ego needs to escape this very early experience of threat, and that it can do so by projecting the death instinct outwards. Thus the ego contrives to see the danger to itself as coming from external objects. This danger may then coincide, he thought, with some real external threat. As Klein (1932) added, the external object may be a harsh critical parent (then internalized as a persecuting superego). Then the external enemy can be attacked, as can other aspects of the death instinct turned against an external object. In both these processes of establishing outwardly directed impulses, the libido may fuse to some degree with the death instinct. Later and in contrast with the above, Klein described a very different manifestation of death instinct: primary envy. In this instance the destructive force is directed against an external object that is not a threat but a good object, typically the mother’s breast, which feeds and comforts. To the external good object is attributed a wish for life and a wish to preserve life in the ego. In this case, the good object represents a part of the libido projected into an external object. And it is attacked there by impulses derived from the death instinct now turned away from the ego itself. The death instinct, directed against those (libidinal) parts of the ego concerned with the wish to live, remains a destructive force against them when they are projected. Klein’s view is a generalization and extension of Freud’s notion of penis envy. ENVY Klein developed the idea of the death instinct in terms of relations to the object and to the self. Rosenfeld (1971) described states in which the ego is dominated by aspects of the death instinct. Since Freud’s theory of the death instinct was never fully accepted, Klein’s idea of envy was also contentious (Joffe, 1969). Envy represents a primary kind of evil, and it is difficult often to accept such a state in an innocent infant. Envy is a primitive force in the personality that is opposed to, and therefore mounts destructive attacks Others have attributed aggression in infancy and childhood to frustration of libidinal impulses. Wilfred Blum, Harold P. (1970). Maternal psychopathology and nocturnal enuresis. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 39, 609–619. Calef, Victor, Weinshel, Ed, et al. (1980). Enuresis: A functional equivalent of a fetish. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 61, 295–306. 50 8 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ENVY Bion described paroxysms of aggression arising in infants when an infant’s insistent projection meets an uncontaining mother frightened by the infant’s fear of death. Here the anger of frustration can appear much like envy. ROBERT D. HINSHELWOOD See also: Envy and Gratitude; Links, attacks on; Logic(s); Narcissistic neurosis; Oral-sadistic stage; Primary object. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1926). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. Joffe, Walter. (1969). A critical review of the envy concept. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 50, 533–545. Klein, Melanie. (1932). The psycho-analysis of children. London: Hogarth. ———. (1957). Envy and gratitude: A study of unconscious forces. London: Hogarth Press. Rosenfeld, Herbert. (1971). A clinical approach to the psycho-analytic theory of the life and death instincts: An investigation into the aggressive aspects of narcissism. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 52, 169–178. Segal, Hanna. (1993). Review of A dictionary of Kleinian thought. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 74, 417–419. ENVY AND GRATITUDE Envy and gratitude is the last of Melanie Klein’s major contributions to psychoanalytic theory. She presented a paper, ‘‘A study of envy and gratitude,’’ at the Geneva International Congress of Psycho-Analysis in 1955. This was later expanded into a short book for publication in 1957. From her first publications Melanie Klein reported that a major source of anxiety from the beginning of life is destructiveness. At first she was interested in aggression and the paranoid cycles of fear and violence as the origins of anxiety (Klein, 1929a). Later she understood anxiety in terms of damage to internal objects (the depressive state), which then gave rise to guilt (Klein, 1935). Still later she understood selfdirected aggression, in the form of splitting and fragmentation of the ego itself, to arise from the death instinct (Klein, 1946). The ego, as it begins to develop, protects itself from its inherent self-destruction by an INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND GRATITUDE immediate projection onto an external object of that destructiveness toward the life-affirming side of the ego (Klein, 1932). Finally, in 1957 she developed a new understanding. Envy projects onto an external object the affirmation of life and attacks it there. Envy, which Klein referred to as ‘‘primary envy,’’ is an attack on life itself in the form of an external object that represents the wish to keep the ego alive and hence on which the ego is utterly dependent. Those attacks are achieved, in fantasy, by the very earliest methods available to the infant: orally scooping out the good object, the mother’s breast. She believed that primary envy is the process underlying other forms of envy, including penis envy. The consequence for the infant is that it has difficulty in finding a good object in the external world that, when introjected, can be definitely and stably good to the ego. However, there is also the libido, and in its earliest form, it too relates to the external source of life in a powerful surge of feeling that Klein later called ‘‘gratitude.’’ Envy, however, causes trouble and leaves potentially disturbing traces in the later personality. For this reason, Klein and her colleagues subsequently concentrated on envy. Klein regarded envy as such an early and primary mode of defense against the selfdestruction of the death instinct as to be a constitutional, or innate, reaction. With this stand she called down great criticism on herself. The death instinct was always contentious; Freud regarded it as silent. A primary source of aggression against objects was held by many to be unnecessary, as frustration of libido was a sufficient source and explanation. And many, perhaps most, analysts found it impossible to conceive of a bounded ego operating in relation to a clearly defined external object. Throughout her career Klein had had to confront disbelief of her observations on violence and aggression in children. To postulate innate violence as the first force preoccupying the infant redoubled that disbelief. The publication of these contentious ideas came, ironically, at a time when Klein might have felt satisfied that her psychoanalytic work was becoming appreciated. After the controversial discussions with Anna Freud in the early 1940s, the group of her close associates and colleagues had been reduced to a handful, with a number of students. By 1952 her views had 509 EPISTEMOLOGY survived, and her papers from the controversial discussions were published in book form. Her ideas had also developed enormously with experimental work on the psychoanalysis of schizophrenia. Colleagues marked her seventieth birthday with a festschrift containing the papers of fifteen contributors apart from herself (Klein et al., 1955). At this moment of success her new book on envy (1957) brought more setbacks. The pace of her ideas had gone so fast that many followers became increasingly reserved about their support. Paula Heimann (1962) and Donald Winnicott (1965) made a distinct break from Klein at this time. In contrast, those who remained loyal to Klein fervently embraced the idea of envy. From then to the present (2004), allegiance to the concept of envy has been a kind of badge of membership in the Klein group within the British Psycho-Analytical Society. Because of these group allegiances, the concept has been seriously studied only by Klein’s followers. ROBERT D. HINSHELWOOD See also: Envy; Klein-Reizes, Melanie. Source Citation Melanie Klein. (1957). Envy and gratitude: A study of unconscious forces. London: Hogarth Press. Reprint: (1975). The writings of Melanie Klein, Vol. 3: Envy and gratitude and other works, 1946–1963 (pp. 176–235). London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. Bibliography Heimann, Paula. (1962). Contribution to the discussion of ‘‘The curative factors in psycho-analysis.’’ International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 43, 228–231. Klein, Melanie. (1929a). Infantile anxiety situations reflected in a work of art and in the creative impulse. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 10, 436–443. ———. (1957). Envy and gratitude: A study of unconscious forces. London: Hogarth Press. ———. (1975). The Writings of Melanie Klein. London: Hogarth. Klein, Melanie, Heimann, Paula, and Money-Kyrle, Roger. (1955). New directions in psycho-analysis. London: Tavistock Publications. Winnicott, Donald W. (1965). The maturational processes and the facilitating environment: studies in the theory of emotional development. London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. EPISTEMOLOGY. See Psychoanalytic epistemology ERIKSON, ERIK HOMBURGER (1902–1994) Erik Homburger Erikson, American psychoanalyst, was born on June 15, 1902 in Frankfurt-am-Main, and died on May 12, 1994, on Cape Cod, Massachusetts. Erikson was the son of a Danish mother and unknown father. His step-father was a German pediatrician in Karlsruhe, and after Erikson left home his mother and step-father, both Jewish, moved to Palestine. In Vienna, Anna Freud became Erikson’s analyst in 1927, and he graduated as a child analyst from the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute in 1933. Artistically inclined, Erikson said that he was first attracted to Freud’s ideas by the magnificence of his German prose. He entered Freud’s circle in the summer of 1927, when he was working as a painter of children’s portraits without any firm professional goals. An old school friend was at that time the director of a small progressive school in Vienna run by Dorothy Burlingham and Eva Rosenfeld, both close friends of Anna Freud. ———. (1935). A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states. International Journal of PsychoAnalysis, 16, 145–174. Most of the children at the school were in psychoanalytic treatment, and a number of the parents were undergoing analysis. Erikson was hired to paint the portraits of the four Burlingham children. After a brief period as a tutor, Erikson was asked whether he would consider becoming a child analyst—a profession he had not heard of before. ———. (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 27, 99–110. By the end of 1933 Erikson had settled in Boston, Massachusetts. He worked in private practice as a ———. (1929b). Personification in the play of children. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 10, 171–182. ———. (1932). The psycho-analysis of children. London: Hogarth. 51 0 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EROS child analyst, the first male in that field. He also was associated with the Harvard Psychological Clinic under Henry A. Murray, and did research at Yale. In 1939 Erikson became an American citizen, changing his name from his step-father’s Homburger to the selfcreated Erikson. Later he moved to Berkeley, California where he became one of the founders of the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society. After a 1951 loyalty oath controversy at the height of the McCarthy period, Erikson resigned from the University of California and moved to the Austin Riggs Center in western Massachusetts. In 1960 he accepted a prestigious university professorship at Harvard College. Always uncomfortable in academic life, since he himself was without any formal training aside from being an analyst, Erikson retired from Harvard in the early 1970s to return to California where he worked at the Mt. Zion Department of Psychiatry in San Francisco. In 1987 he returned to Cambridge, Massachusetts. where an Erikson Center was established under Harvard’s auspices. Erikson’s final days were spent at a nursing home at Harwich on Cape Cod, near Cotuit where he and his wife Joan had long had a summer home. Erikson’s Childhood and Society first came out in 1950, and was reprinted more than any of his other books. Young Man Luther (1958) was a study in psychoanalysis and history, as Erikson treated Luther as an innovative psychologist whose Christian teachings complemented those of classical analysis. While Identity and the Life Cycle (1959) was a collection of his papers on ego psychology. Insight and Responsibility (1964) was a set of papers on the ethical implications of psychoanalytic insight. Gandhi’s Truth (1969), a prize-winning book, sought the origins of militant non-violence in Gandhi’s life. Erikson also gave the 1973 Jefferson Lectures in the Humanities, which appeared as Dimensions of a New Identity (1974). Life History and the Historical Moment (1975) was another collection of essays, and so was A Way of Looking at Things (1987). Erikson used his concept of ego identity in order to move psychoanalytic theory away from Feud’s libido approach; Erickson saw society as a constructive source of ego strength. Erikson also developed the notion of psychohistory as part of his effort to bring psychoanalysis into the modern social sciences. PAUL ROAZEN INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Work discussed: Childhood and Society. Notion developed: Ego identity. See also: Burlingham-Rosenfeld/Hietzing Schule; Ego (ego psychology); Identity; Principle of identity preservation; Psychobiography; Psychohistory; United States. Bibliography Erikson, Erik H. (1950). Childhood and Society. New York: W. W. Norton. ———. (1958). Young Man Luther. New York: W. W. Norton. ———. (1959). Identity and the Life Cycle. New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1964). Insight and Responsibility. New York: W. W. Norton, 256 p. ———. (1969). Gandhi’s Truth. New York: W. W. Norton. EROS In ancient Greece the word Eros referred to love and the god of love. In his final theory of the drives, Sigmund Freud made Eros a fundamental concept referring to the life instincts (narcissism and object libido), whose goals were the preservation, binding, and union of the organism into increasingly larger units. Eros the unifier is opposed to, and yet was blended into, the death instinct, an antagonistic force leading to the destruction, disintegration, and dissolution of everything that exists. ‘‘In this way the libido of our sexual instincts would coincide with the Eros of the poets and philosophers which holds all living things together’’ (Freud, 1920g, p. 50). The term Eros, understood as a life instinct antagonistic to the death instinct, appeared for the first time in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), where Freud used it to establish a dynamic polarity that would define a new instinctual dualism. Freud wrote, ‘‘Our speculations have suggested that Eros operates from the beginning of life and appears as a Ôlife instinct’ in opposition to the Ôdeath instinct’ which was brought into being by the coming to life of inorganic substance. These speculations seek to solve the riddle of life by supposing that these two instincts were struggling with each other from the very first’’ (p. 61). In this essay Freud refers to the doctrine of the Greek physician and philosopher Empedocles of Agrigento 511 EROS (c. 490–430 B.C.E.), for whom the production of all things results from the interplay of two forces, Love and Discord, conceived of as the impersonal forces of attraction and repulsion. Yet Freud’s theoretical innovation is more than the pure speculations of philosophy, biology, or physics. Revision of his concepts was called for by his experience in psychoanalytic practice. He posited within the organism a primal masochism derived from the action of the death instinct to account for certain clinical problems: ambivalence in affective life, nightmares associated with traumatic neurosis, masochism, and negative therapeutic reactions. Freud’s uses of the term Eros (86 of 88 occurrences, according to Guttman’s Concordance) is contemporary with his final theory of the instincts developed after 1920. The word itself, with its multiple meanings, enabled Freud to combine many things that he had previously separated and contrasted: love between the sexes, self-love, love for one’s parents or children, ‘‘friendship and love among mankind in general,’’ ‘‘devotion to concrete objects and abstract ideas,’’ and partial sexual drives (component instincts). This expanded concept of love led Freud to evoke, on several occasions (1920g, 1921c, 1924c, 1925e [1924]), ‘‘the all-inclusive and all-preserving Eros of Plato’s Symposium’’ (1925e, p. 218). Although the concept of Eros, properly speaking, emerged late in Freud’s work, this did not prevent him from claiming that all his earlier discoveries about sexuality can be seen in terms of Eros. Psychoanalysis showed that sexuality did not conceal ‘‘impulsion towards a union of the two sexes or towards producing a pleasurable sensation in the genitals’’ (1925e, p. 218), and that sexuality was thus different from genitality. Though the term Eros does not appear in the original texts, two notes, one from 1925 in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) and the other from 1920 in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), reinforce the use of ‘‘Eros’’ as a synonym for ‘‘sexual’’ in the discovery of psychoanalysis: ‘‘The situation would be different if Ôsexual’ was being used by my critics in the sense in which it is now commonly employed in psychoanalysts—in the sense of ÔEros’’’ (1900a, note 1925, p. 161). Freud even justified his failure to use the word earlier: ‘‘Anyone who considers sex as something mortifying and humiliating to human nature is at liberty to make use of the more genteel expressions ÔEros’ 51 2 and Ôerotic.’ I might have done so myself from the first and thus spared myself much opposition. But I did not want to, for I like to avoid concessions to faintheartedness. One can never tell where that road may lead one; one gives way first in words, then little by little in substance too’’ (1921c, p. 91). Occurrences of the terms ‘‘Eros’’ (after 1920) and ‘‘eroticism’’ (after 1894) overlap in Freud’s writings without ever leaving the field of sexuality. Freud early on recognized the erotic character of repressed representations that lie at the heart of neurotic symptoms. He cites ‘‘the case of a girl, who blamed herself because, while she was nursing her sick father, she had thought about a young man who made a slight erotic impression on her’’ (1894a, p. 48), and who is then constrained to treat this unwanted representation of a sexual nature as if it had ‘‘never occurred.’’ Freud conceived mental conflict as a moral conflict in which the troublemaker Eros stirs up trouble in the form of a symptom. He saw sexuality as a trauma that goes far beyond the well-known scenes of sexual seduction. Eros forces the ego to defend itself and thus participates in the division and fragmentation of the psyche. Repressed erotic representations later return in the form of symptoms or compromise formations that substitute for sexual activity or ‘‘precipitates of earlier experiences in the sphere of love’’ (1910a, p. 51). Such instances of deferred or aborted love are remote from sexual attraction and genital activity. Sexuality exists from infancy, is fundamentally perverse and polymorphous, and consists of a bundle of partial sexual drives that seek satisfaction independently of one another, in autoerotic fashion. The oral drive, for example, is seen as a mouth that kisses itself. The 1920 footnote in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality retroactively referring to Eros (1905d, p. 266n) serves Freud’s theoretical interests: to recognize infantile sexuality as something distinct from genitality, to emphasize the diphasic nature of sexual life, and to provide the concept of the drives with a mythical status, infantile in appearance and dominated by an ongoing and insatiable quest. Here Eros appears to conflict with the ego’s instinct for self-preservation. The Oedipus complex determines the outcome of this conflict through the possibilities it offers for orienting the libido toward a sexual object (one that is no longer only sexual) by means of the phallus. The Oedipus complex is responsible for ensuring that the subject becomes satisfied in love after the reorganization at puberty, when the partial INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EROS drives (component instincts) are enlisted in the service of an organized genital apparatus. Failing this, the subject will fall ill unless an alternative object is found through sublimation. Eros is not only a cause of symptoms but can also become the means for their relief. The theoretical model of Eros as healer is beautifully illustrated in Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva’’ (1907a [1906]). Love was also at the center of the psychoanalytic experiment from the time of its initial discovery via transference. In the middle period of the development of psychoanalysis (1912–1915), the homage to love in Delusions and Dreams would butt up against its limitations in a theory of transference, which shows love to support resistance to remembering, and hence to analysis. Moreover, Freud discovered in cases of sexual impotence of psychological origin that a conflict exists between the ‘‘affectionate current’’ and the ‘‘sexual current’’: ‘‘Where they love they do not desire, and where they desire they cannot love’’ (1912d, p. 183). This text anticipates Freud’s comments in ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ (1914c). In this text, Freud saw the narcissistic libido as conflicting with erotic love of the object: Narcissus versus Eros. The ego claims a place among the sexual objects, and the selfpreservation instincts have a libidinal nature. What distinguishes Eros is its link with objects: ‘‘A strong egoism is a protection against falling ill, but in the last resort we must begin to love in order not to fall ill, and we are bound to fall ill, if, in consequence of frustration, we are unable to love’’ (1914c, p. 85). Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1920g) overturned these earlier constructions. The theory of a death instinct, which worked in silence, forced Freud to combine the ego instincts and sexual instincts directed at objects, grouping them under the umbrella of a single force whose goal was union: Eros. Such an Eros is no longer a troublemaker, a divisive agent that disturbs the mental apparatus. It is the power of creation, of reproduction; it makes existence possible and postpones the return to an inorganic state. When discussing the lifepreserving sexual instincts (object libido and ego), Freud explicitly refers to the myth of Eros recounted by Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium. But the life and death instincts rarely come into play in isolation: They form various amalgams in which each attempts to make use of the other’s strength to its own advantage. Freud shows that moral masochism, for example, ‘‘becomes a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS classical piece of evidence for the existence of fusion of instinct. Its danger lies in the fact that it originates from the death instinct and corresponds to the part of that instinct which has escaped being turned outwards as an instinct of destruction. But since, on the other hand, it has the significance of an erotic component, even the subject’s destruction of himself cannot take place without libidinal satisfaction’’ (1924a). In Freud’s last work, it is as if the scandal of the discovery of sexuality was displaced in favor of the theoretical innovation of the death instinct. Eros as the embodiment of Aristophanes’ myth or Empedocles’ theories appears to get the better of Eros as the embodiment of desire, an Eros whose birth is given in the myth recounted by Diotima in The Symposium. Jacques Lacan distances, without completely separating, love and desire (Eros). Love is the mirage in which desire is caught. The phallus is the fulcrum between the object that gives rise to desire and the part of the subject, minus language, that is forever lost. ‘‘Therefore, to love is to give what one does not have, and we can only love by acting as if we don’t have, even if we do’’ (Lacan, 1991). ROLAND GORI See also: Animus-Anima (analytical psychology); Beyond the Pleasure Principle; Binding/unbinding of the instincts; Civilization and Its Discontents; Drive/instinct; Genital love; German romanticism and psychoanalysis; Libido; Life instinct (Eros); Marcuse, Herbert; Myth; Sexuality. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 41–61. ———. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1– 338; 5: 339–625. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1907a [1906]). Delusions and dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva.’’ SE, 9: 1–95. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. 513 EROTICISM, ANAL ———. (1924a). Letter to Le Disque Vert. SE, 19: 290–290. ———. (1924b [1923]). Neurosis and psychosis. SE, 19: 147–153. ———. (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155–170. ———. (1925e [1924]). The resistances to psycho-analysis. SE, 19: 211–222. Guttman, Samuel A. (1984). The concordance to ‘‘The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud’’ (2nd ed.). New York: International Universities Press. Lacan, Jacques. (1991). Le séminaire. Book 8: Le transfert. Paris: Seuil. EROTICISM, ANAL The term anal eroticism is defined as sexual pleasure predominantly linked to the excitation of the anal sphincter and the functions of excretion in infancy. In his correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess, Freud observed that sexually-based emotional discharges originating in the anal region, like those in the mouth and throat, had ceased by the time the normal person reached adulthood (letter of November 14, 1897, 1950a). He continued, ‘‘the memory of [stimulation] will produce by deferred action . . . not a release of libido but of an unpleasure’’ (p. 269). In January of 1898, he sent his friend a summary of his ‘‘Drekkologie’’ (1985c [1887–1904], p. 291), a neologism that he coined during his self-analysis to designate the science of filth. In his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), Freud described how the child’s sexual activity could be anaclitically supported by the anal zone: sexual activity in the infant is propped up by another physiological function, namely defecation; this occurred in accordance with Freud’s general conception of anaclitic erogenous zones. There were, in his view, three erogenous zones that could thus prop up physiological functions: oral, anal, and genital. Freud noted that to a certain degree the excitability linked to these zones could remain connected to genitality throughout life. The human sexual drive was thus a highly complex mechanism, produced by the contributions of numerous components, of partial drives. One of those components was anal eroticism, which defines one of the pregenital organizations of the libido. Freud wrote that ‘‘The playing of a sexual part 51 4 by the mucous membrane of the anus is by no means limited to intercourse between men: preference for it is in no way characteristic of inverted feeling’’ (1905d, p. 152). He thus initiated all the psychoanalytic research that would later define the role of anal masturbation in relation to the constitution of the ego in both men and women. In ‘‘Character and Anal Erotism’’ (1908b), Freud described a specifically anal character. As with all other elements of eroticism, a part of the excitation contributes to sexuality while another part was diverted from sexual aims and directed towards other ends by the process of sublimation. He recognized the traits of the anal character (orderliness, parsimony, and obstinacy) as the results of the sublimation of anal eroticism. In particular, the way of handling money merges with psychic interest in excrement, the product of the anal zone. Freud suggested in a letter to Sándor Ferenczi that anal eroticism might have the same relation to hypochondria as sadism did to obsessional neurosis. In ‘‘The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis’’ (1913i), he suggested that the passive current of sexuality was fed by anal eroticism, while activity coincided with sadism. The accentuation of anal eroticism during the pregenital stage of organization could predispose a man, in the genital stage, to homosexuality. Within the framework of a discussion of stages of the libido, anal eroticism was at the center of the dialogue between Freud and Karl Abraham. Their common research led to Freud to write, among other essays, ‘‘Mourning and Melancholia’’ (1916–1917g [1915]). One of melancholia’s striking characteristics derives from an anal eroticism which is torn from its connections and regressively transformed. For Freud, the regression connected with this illness allowed him to discover the importance of anal eroticism and its involvement with relationship to the object, whether this was expressed in terms of retention or expulsion. Freud’s writings on narcissism and object relations were clarified by this insight. In his article ‘‘On Transformations of Instinct as Exemplified in Anal Erotism’’ (1917c), he hypothesized that defecation provided the infant with its first opportunity to choose between a narcissistic attitude and one of object-love. Stubbornness and obstinacy came from the narcissistic persistence of anal eroticism. The stool was the object of a loss that gave rise to feelings of ambivalence. Toilet INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EROTICISM, ORAL training supplied a model for object relations, for the ego latched on to this experience, which would color its future relationships. Later Freud theorized, in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a), that ‘‘Anal erotism . . . succumbs in the first instance to the Ôorganic repression’ which paved the way to civilization’’ (p. 100n). Anal eroticism and its links with introjection and projection were studied clinically by Karl Abraham. According to him, each of the two early stages of psychosexual development, the oral and the anal, included a substage. The ambivalence arising during the second, oral-sadistic substage of the oral stage was reinforced during the immediately following analsadistic substage (Abraham, 1924/1949). Freud later (1933a [1932]) adopted Abraham’s substages, characterizing the first as destructive and the second as possessive and conservative with respect to the object. The work of Abraham and Freud made it possible to understand how ‘‘the fear of becoming poor . . . is derived from anal erotism’’ (1917e, p. 252). This idea inspired Melanie Klein (1935) when she conceptualized the tendencies to idealize and denigrate of the object, and also the manic defenses related to such regressive states that would eventually define her notion of a paranoid-schizoid position. Ernest Jones (1918), for his part, took up the connections between anal erotism and the capacity for concentration as the origin of thought. Leonard Shengold (1985) asserted that an excess of control prevented anal erotism from being manifested. This excess was dehumanizing because of links that forced narcissism and anal erotism into a deobjectalizing regression. Note that anal eroticism should be seen in relationship with the mastery of the ego functions and with the mastery wielded over the object as separate from the subject. André Green (1993/1999) has considered the importance of primary anality for subjectivation and its influence on the object relation. DOMINIQUE J. ARNOUX See also: Anality; Castration complex; Character formation; Coprophilia; Erotogenicity; Feces; Gift; Libidinal stage; Mastery; Money in the psychoanalytic treatment; ‘‘Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis’’ (Rat Man); Pregenital; Psychosexual development; Stage (or phase); Symbolization, process of. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1949). A short study of the development of the libido, viewed in the light of mental disorders. In Selected papers of Karl Abraham (pp. 418–501). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1924) Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1913i). The disposition to obsessional neurosis: A contribution to the problem of choice of neurosis. SE, 12: 311–326. ———. (1916–1917g [1915]). Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14: 237–258. ———. (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57–145. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. ———. (1985c [1887–1904]). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887–1904 (Jeffery M. Masson, Ed. and Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press. Green, André. (1999). The work of the negative (Andrew Weller, Trans.). London: Free Association. (Original work published 1993) Jones, Ernest. (1948). Anal-erotic character traits. In Papers on psycho-analysis (5th ed.). Boston: Beacon Press. (Original work published 1918) Klein, Melanie. (1935). A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states. In The writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. 1, pp. 262–289). (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 16, (1935) 145–174.) Shengold, Leonard. (1985). Defensive anality and anal narcissism. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 66, 47–74. EROTICISM, ORAL Sexual pleasure that is linked predominantly to the excitation of the oral cavity and the lips, first experienced through an infant’s feeding, is defined as oral eroticism. Freud spoke of the ‘‘oral sexual system’’ as early as his letters to Wilhelm Fliess (letter of January 3, 1897, in 1950a, p. 222). Sucking was from then on considered as a sexual activity, and the lips, together with the surrounding area, as the oral erogenous zone. The sexual drive acquires an autonomy vis à vis the vital functions (nutrition) which support it, and satisfies itself in autoerotic fashion. Freud remarked that this 515 EROTICISM, URETHRAL excitability may remain, to a certain degree, linked to genitality. The human sexual drive can appear therefore as a highly complex montage, born of the confluence of numerous factors, some of which are drives known as ‘‘partial,’’ which at the beginning were independent. One of the components of the pregenital organization of the libido, consequently, issued directly from oral erotism. In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), Freud distinguished between two pregenital phases: the oral or cannibal phase and the anal-sadistic phase. He added: ‘‘[During the oral phase] the sexual aim consists in the incorporation of the object—the prototype of a process which, in the form of identification, is later to play such an important psychological part’’ (p. 198). This constituted, therefore, a way of relating to the object (note of 1915). In his article, ‘‘Mourning and Melancholia,’’ (1916– 1917g) Freud described identification as a ‘‘preliminary stage of object-choice, that it is the first way—and one that is expressed in an ambivalent fashion—in which the ego picks out an object’’ (p. 249). It would like to incorporate the object, and that by way of devouring it. Therefore in the phase of the oral organization of the libido, the loving attachment to the object still coincides with the annihilation of the latter, as Freud affirmed in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g). Melanie Klein would later connect an oral fixation, in both sexes, to sucking the father’s penis, with the exacerbated phase of sadism. DOMINIQUE J. ARNOUX See also: Anal-sadistic stage; Anorexia nervosa; Basic Neurosis, The-oral regression and psychic masochism; Breastfeeding; Bulimia; Depression; Dream screen; Drive, partial; Erotogenicity; Libidinal stage; Melancholy; Oedipus complex, early; Orality; Pregenital; Psychosexual development; Stammering; Sucking (oral stage) Transitional object; Transitional object, space; Weaning. Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1924). The process of introjection in melancholia: Two stages of the oral phase of the libido. In Selected papers in psychoanalysis. (Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press. ———. (1924). Melancholy and obsessional neurosis: Two stages of the anal-sadistic phase of the libido. In Selected papers in psychoanalysis (Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press. Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1916–1917g). Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14: 237–258. In ‘‘The Economic Problem of Masochism,’’ (1924c) he emphasized that the existence of masochism is expressed erogenously, in all phases of libido development; erogenous masochism often changes its psychic dress. So, ‘‘The fear of being eaten up by the totem animal (the father) originates from the primitive oral organization’’ (p. 165). ———. (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155–170. Karl Abraham, in ‘‘A Short Study of the Development of the Ego, Based on an Analysis of Mental Problems’’ (1924), said that sadistic drives always have a special affinity with anal eroticism, rather than oral eroticism. ———. (1950a). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173– 280. In terms of relation to the object—the mother— from the point of view of the child, never gave enough milk; it is ‘‘as though they had never sucked long enough at their mother’s breast,’’ said Freud in his article, ‘‘Female Sexuality’’ (1931b, p. 234). Taking up the conclusions of Karl Abraham of 1924, Freud conceived of two stages in the oral phase, one pre-ambivalent regarding the breast, the second oral-sadistic; linked to the development of dentition and characterized by the appearance of ambivalence, which will be intensified in the following phase, that of anal-sadism (1933a). 51 6 ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1931b). Female sexuality. SE, 21: 221–243. ———. (1933a). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. Klein, Melanie. (1932). The psychoanalysis of children. London: Hogarth. EROTICISM, URETHRAL Urethral eroticism is characterized by pleasure associated with micturition (or urination). In ‘‘Character and Anal Erotism’’ (1908b), Freud wrote, ‘‘We ought in general to consider whether other charactercomplexes, too, do not exhibit a connection with the excitations of particular erotogenic zones. At present I only know of the intense Ôburning’ ambition of people INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EROTOGENIC MASOCHISM who earlier suffered from enuresis’’ (p. 175). In ‘‘Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria’’ (1905e [1901], p. 74), Freud emphasized the pleasure and erotic significance of micturition and considered enuresis as equivalent to masturbation. In his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), he specified that urethral eroticism occurs more particularly in the ‘‘second phase of infantile masturbation,’’ the phallic phase. In ‘‘Character and Anal Erotism’’ (1908b), Freud returned to the idea that enuresis is the source of intense ambition. The character traits that persist are either the unchanged continued primal drives or their sublimation, or reaction formations that conflict with primal drives. Freud emphasized the connections between urethral eroticism and ambition in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]) and between fire and genital eroticism in ‘‘The Acquisition and Control of Fire’’ (1932a). In ‘‘The Narcissistic Evaluation of Excretory Processes in Dreams and Neurosis’’ (1949), Karl Abraham later pursued a similar line of thought when he noted that subjects inclined to urethral eroticism have a sense of unlimited power, believing that they can create or destroy any object. In ‘‘Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict’’ (1928), Melanie Klein emphasized a specifically urethral form of sadism in which fantasies contribute to difficulties of sexual potency in men and unconsciously help attribute a cruel role to the penis. DOMINIQUE J. ARNOUX See also: Enuresis (bedwetting); Oedipus complex, early; Wish for a baby. Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1949). The narcissistic evaluation of excretory processes in dreams and neurosis. In Selected papers of Karl Abraham, M.D. (Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey, Trans). London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis. (Original work published 1920) Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1905e [1901]). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. SE, 7: 1–122. ———. (1908b). Character and anal erotism. SE, 9: 167– 175. ———. (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57–145. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ———. (1932a [1931]). The acquisition and control of fire. SE, 22: 183–193. Klein, Melanie. (1928). Early stages of the Oedipus conflict. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 9, 167–180. Further Reading Bass, Alan. (1994). Aspects of urethrality in women. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 63, 491–517. EROTOGENIC MASOCHISM Erotogenic masochism is the primary, biological, and constitutional masochism that results from libidinal excitation, which provides the physiological basis. It is the psychic superstructure that supports the other forms of masochism, feminine and moral, that Freud described along with it in ‘‘The Economic Problem of Masochism’’ (1924c). In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d) Freud noted that ‘‘it may well be that nothing of considerable importance can occur in the organism without contributing some component to the excitation of the sexual instinct’’ (pp. 204–205). Earlier, he had specified that in the case of pain, in particular, a quantitative factor was added to the qualitative factor characteristic of the erotogenic zones. Freud explained in ‘‘The Economic Problem of Masochism’’ that erotogenic masochism, as ‘‘pleasure in pain,’’ subverts the pleasure principle, which would otherwise tend toward the zero excitation characteristics of the Nirvana principle and would be ‘‘entirely in the service of the death instincts’’ (p. 160). He further elaborated that the portion of the death instinct that the libido has not diverted outward toward objects remains inside the organism and ‘‘with the help of the accompanying sexual excitation . . . becomes libidinally bound there. It is in this portion that we have come to recognize the original, erotogenic masochism’’ (pp. 163–64). It is thus vestigial evidence of the earliest fusion of the instincts, which, by a kind of assimilation, binds the essential core of the death instinct that continually threatens the individual’s existence. According to Freud in this essay, erotogenic masochism is present in all of the developmental phases of the libido: the oral stage, as manifested in the ‘‘fear of being eaten up by the totem-animal (father)’’ (p. 165); 517 EROTOGENIC ZONE the anal-sadistic stage, especially with the erotogenic role of the buttocks (the wish to be beaten by the father); the phallic stage, as shown by the traces of (disavowed) castration in masochistic fantasies; and finally the genital stage, in ‘‘characteristically female’’ situations, namely, ‘‘being castrated, or copulated with, or giving birth to a baby’’ (p. 162). It can be noted that in this libidinal sequence, Freud mentioned only the father as the object of masochistic desire, including during the oral stage, when this is manifested in the form of a defense—the fear of being devoured—whereas it is the wish to be beaten that is used as an example for the following stage. This attests to Freud’s difficulty in conceptualizing early relations, including masochistic ones, with the mother. However, the fact that he was dealing with early developmental stages is not what caused the difficulty, as he did not hesitate at the time, in 1924, to posit erotogenic masochism as being primary in psychic life. Melanie Klein did not concur with this explanation, which construed anxieties about being devoured in terms of an erotogenic masochism that would cause the subject to wish for them. Given her emphasis on projection onto an object, conceived as present almost from the outset—and despite both her taste for the archaic and her agreement with the second theory of the instincts—she theorized them as anxieties about retaliation for oral sadism, in a view that is thus closer to secondary masochism, the existence of which, moreover, Freud recognized. DENYS RIBAS See also: Masochism. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155–170. EROTOGENIC ZONE Any part of the body susceptible of becoming excited, of being a seat of pleasure, is an erotogenic zone. Freud nevertheless used the term to refer primarily to a num51 8 ber of specific areas, notably, the genitals, mouth, and anus. These zones he saw as locations of particular instincts known as ‘‘component instincts.’’ In neurosis, on his account, nongenital erotogenic zones come to function as substitutes for the genitals. The idea of erotogenic zones was inseparable from the theory of libidinal stages, each of which, at a certain age, is fixed upon a particular zone. Freud found support in the work of the pediatrician S. Lindner for his assertion that the child pursues the kind of sucking that develops anaclitically from feeding at the breast, for the pleasure obtained from excitation of the oral erotogenic zone. ‘‘The child’s lips, in our view, behave like an erotogenic zone, and no doubt stimulation by the warm flow of milk is the cause of the pleasurable sensation’’ (1905d, p. 181). Sexual activity centered on an erotogenic zone rests first on its utility for self-preservation but is subsequently repeated independently of that function. Erotogenic zones are thus seen as the source of the sexual instinct, its place of origin, and (for the appropriate instinct) its place of residence. Freud nevertheless broadened his definition of an erotogenic zone well beyond its original link with a bodily function, noting that ‘‘any other part of the skin or mucous membrane can take over the functions of an erotogenic zone, and must therefore have some aptitude in that direction’’ (1905d, p. 183). An area may be affected by chance as the child explores the body and discovers its potential for pleasure through an association with the simultaneous pleasure of sucking. For the adult who represses the sexual nature of the genitals, this opens up the regressive possibility of instating any part of the body as an erotogenic zone. In this case, hysterogenic zones present the same characteristics as erotogenic ones. How is pleasure produced at the level of the erotogenic zone? The pressure of the need for satisfaction, which is of central origin, is projected outward, stimulating a peripheral erotogenic zone, whose manipulation, in a manner analogous to sucking on the breast, relieves the feelings aroused and so generates satisfaction. The erotogenic zone may also be stimulated directly, in which case it by itself creates a need, which, to be satisfied, calls for further stimulation of the zone in question. Each particular erotogenic zone (the mouth, anus, genital organs) is wedded to a habitual stimulation INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EROTOGENICITY that will vary according to the life stage reached. Like the labial zone before it, the anal zone is eroticized by means of an anaclitic dependence on a corresponding bodily function, in this case excretion. The genital zone (the penis in the case of a boy, the clitoris in that of a girl) first becomes erotogenic through an anaclitic relationship with the function of micturition, the first sexual excitation of this zone constituting the point of departure for a normal sexual life. Freud (1908b) associated specific character types with adult fixations on the erotogenic nature of this or that zone. The sexual life of early childhood is not confined to the stimulation of erotogenic zones, for so-called component instincts can emerge independently of those zones. The instinct to see and be seen, even though it is not autoerotic in nature and calls for an outside object, may turn the eye into the equivalent of an erotogenic zone. Likewise, the cruelty component of the sexual instinct, which seems at first even more independent of the erotogenic zones, is in fact linked to the instinct for mastery and to the musculature. By contrast, the skin of the buttocks, because of the chastisements it so often receives, can easily become an erotogenic zone and the site of passive masochistic pleasure. With the introduction of narcissism, Freud added an important dimension to the theory of erotogenic zones by joining it with the ego-libido: ‘‘We can decide to regard erotogenicity as a general characteristic of all organs and may then speak of an increase or decrease of it in a particular part of the body. For every such change in the erotogenicity of the organs there might then be a parallel change of libidinal cathexis in the ego’’ (1914c, p. 84). The withdrawal of libido into the ego and the libido’s cathexis of organs, as erotogenic zones now become painful and sensitive, may be thought to underlie hypochondria, and in such cases of hypochondria, health can be restored only by redeploying libido to objects external to the subject’s own body. The erotism aroused in these zones is essentially polymorphous in the young child. Save in the case of perversion, the child’s erotism is later unified under the primacy of the genital zone, but the fate of this infantile sexuality varies: repressions, reaction-formations, and sublimations come into play as ways of dealing with the excitations emanating from the erotogenic zones, excitations that are normally unusable, or largely unusable, for the adult. In such cases, the instinctual object of the drive is often modified. Sándor Ferenczi (1916) showed, for instance, that an interest in money was founded on INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the anal erotogenic zone and the possibility of establishing a symbolic link between feces and money. In this light, and in view of the potentially infinite number of transformations of instincts deriving from the erotogenic zones, it is fair to say that any form of human activity might be attributable to erotogenic sources. The psychoanalytic theory of the erotogenic zones appears to fall under the rubric of autoerotism, for it is the component instincts, independent of these zones, that are said to be directed straight at the object. Yet, as has often been pointed out, it would seem impossible to dissociate the emergence of these multiple erotogenic zones from pleasure-generating encounters with the object, especially in the context of maternal care. It is worth mentioning that theorists since Freud have considered other erotogenic zones, such as those that affect the functions of respiration and hearing. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Anaclisis/anaclitic; Anality; Anal-sadistic stage; Autoeroticism; Body image; Breastfeeding; Character formation; Cruelty; Drive/instinct; Erotogenicity; Eroticism, oral; Exhibitionism; Feminine sexuality; Libidinal stage; Libido; Masochism; Masturbation; Maternal; Object, choice of/change of; Oedipus complex; Orality; Organization; Organ pleasure; Pictogram; Pregenital; Primary object; Psychosexual development; Sexuality; Skin; Stage; Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sándor (1916). Stages in the development of the sense of reality. In his Contributions to psycho-analysis. Boston: Richard Badger. Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1908b). Character and anal erotism. SE, 9: 167– 175. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. EROTOGENICITY The term erotogenicity designates the capacity of any part of the body, whether muco-cutaneous surfaces or internal organs, to become the site of sexual excitation. Rarely used by Freud, the term first appeared in ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction.’’ (1914c) Freud 519 EROTOGENICITY wrote: ‘‘Let us now, taking any part of the body, describe its activity of sending sexually exciting stimuli to the mind as its ‘‘erotogenicity,’’ and let us further reflect that the considerations on which our theory of sexuality was based have long accustomed us to the notion that certain other parts of the body—the ‘‘erotogenic’’ zones—may act as substitutes for the genitals and behave analogously to them. We have then only one more step to take. We can decide to regard erotogenicity as a general characteristic of all organs and may then speak of an increase or decrease of it in a particular part of the body. For every such change in the erotogenicity of the organs there might then be a parallel change of libidinal cathexis in the ego’’ (p. 84). This term erotogenicity, or erogeneity, appeared contemporaneously with a conceptual change whereby Freud partitioned the libido (into the ego libido and narcissistic libido), this being indispensable in order to explain the processes at work in the psychoses, the ‘‘actual neuroses’’ (particularly hypochondria), and love life. This energetic and quantitative meaning of erogenicity is directly linked to the concepts of libido, ego, and object. It would thus modify though not replace the qualitative conception of the erogenous zones from which it derived and which were previously defined as the sources of the autoerotic component instincts (partial drives). Freud very early recognized the sexual excitability (Erregbarkeit) of certain parts of the body apart from the genital zones, in the strict sense, and referred to these as erogenous zones. This expression is derived from Charcot’s hysterogenic zones, a term used to designate ‘‘more or less delimited regions of the body, on which pressure or merely rubbing determines, more or less rapidly, the phenomenon of the aura, which is sometimes succeeded, if we continue to apply pressure, by an hysterical attack. These points, or rather these surfaces, also have the property of being the seat of permanent sensitivity.’’ (Charcot, 1890). When speaking of the case of Elisabeth von R. in Studies on Hysteria, Freud extended the meaning of hysterogenic zone by giving it its full value as a corporal inscription of a mnemic trace and describing the sexual pleasure within the conversion symptom. Elisabeth von R’s pains always started from a particular point on the right thigh and the analysis revealed that her father used to rest his leg there when she was caring for him. Freud states: "In this way she gave me the explanation that I needed of the emergence of what was an atypical 52 0 hysterogenic zone" (1895d, 148). The notion of hysterogenic zone came to be modified between Charcot and Freud because it now meant a place with a sexual ‘‘stimulability’’ (Reizbarkeit) that was determined by the subject’s history and not by anatomy. The equivalence between erogeneity and hysterogeneity is clearly defined in two of Freud’s letters to Wilhelm Fliess, one dated December 6, 1896, in which the term erogenous zone appears for the first time, the other dated November 14, 1897, in which he wrote: ‘‘I have often suspected that something organic played a part in repression; I have told you before that it is a question of the attitude adopted to former sexual zones. . . . We must suppose that in infancy sexual release is not so much localized as it becomes later, so that zones which are later abandoned (and possibly the whole surface of the body) stimulate to some extent the production of something that is analogous to the later release of sexuality’’ (p. 232). These sexual zones that are abandoned in the course of development constitute infantile sexuality proper, and are recathected in perversions and neuroses. In Three Essays Freud shows that through the action of displacement and condensation these erogenous zones ‘‘then behave exactly like the genitals (1905d, p. 183) and produce the symptoms that are conceived of as substitutes for sexual satisfaction. The paradigm is that of hysteria: ‘‘erotogenic and hysterogenic zones show the same characteristics’’ (1905d, p. 184). He then goes on to describe the development phases of infantile sexual organization (oral, anal, and phallic). The erogenous zones are the source of the component sexual impulses that seek autoerotic satisfaction until they are subordinated to and take part in genital activity. Freud’s model for the excitation of the erogenous zones is based on the erection, including the tension (unpleasure) it mobilizes, and the demand for discharge (pleasure) that it prescribes. The fact that certain parts of the body are predestined to be erogenous is explained by the Freudian concept of anaclisis. The term is used to designate the relationship of leaning and implication that exists between the sexual instincts and the needs of self-preservation. For example, Freud postulates for the oral instinct that, ‘‘the satisfaction of the erotogenic zone is associated, in the first instance, with the satisfaction of the need for nourishment’’ (1905d, p. 181). Without recanting on this theory of erogenous zones as presented above, Freud modified his concepINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EROTOMANIA tion of erogeneity in 1914 toward an energy-based and quantitative model where the hysteria paradigm is replaced by that of hypochondria. It was now the whole body that behaved like a male genital organ. The distribution of the libido and its capacity to go beyond the frontiers of narcissism conditioned suffering and love equally. Inhibition, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d) describes the relationship between the ego-function of an organ and erogeneity: ‘‘It has been discovered as a general fact that the ego-function of an organ is impaired if its erotogenicity—its sexual significance—is increased. It behaves, if I may be allowed a rather absurd analogy, like a maid-servant who refuses to go on cooking because her master has started a love-affair with her’’ (pp. 89–90). Freud gives other examples of inhibitions following a risk of conflict between the ego and the superego, as when profit and success are prohibited and when failure satisfies a need for self-punishment. Thus, in the second theory of the instincts erogeneity is equivalent to a libidinal satisfaction that can be accomplished up to and including self-punishment and self-destruction as in, for example, moral masochism. child’s body by another. The mother who caresses her child’s dimple with her finger inscribes a difference there, a flaw, a point of focus, an erogenous center: ‘‘What makes the erotogenic inscription possible is the fact that the caressing finger is itself, for the mother, an erotogenic zone. This finger, in its essential libidinal value, can be called a ‘‘letter-holder’’ or inscriber to the extent that, as an erotogenic zone of the mother, a letter fixes into its flesh the interbal of an exquisite difference’’ (p. 50). ROLAND GORI See also: Erotogenic zone; Fetishism; Hypochondria; Inhibition; Libidinal development; Organ pleasure. Bibliography Charcot, Jean Martin. (1890). Oeuvres complètes. Leçons sur les maladies du système nerveux. Paris: Progrès Médicale. Freud, Sigmund. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48– 106. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. The Freudian notion that erogenous activity is anaclitic in relation to the satisfaction of the fundamental needs of self-preservation favored the theoretical illusion of a progressive organization of instinctual stages with maturation being almost biologically determined. This conceptual model compromises the importance of the Other and its constitutive intervention in infantile sexuality. By referring to anaclisis in another sense, the choice of love object being based on the model of the mother who feeds or the father who protects, Freud’s 1914 text introduces another perspective, but not without some hesitation and aporia. ———. (1914d). On the history of the psycho-analytic movement. SE, 14: 1–66. Jacques Lacan (1964-1966) developed a theoretical model that denies the genetic point of view of instinctual stages and its ‘‘naturally’’ programmed organization. He writes: ‘‘There is no relation of engendering between one component instinct and the next,’’ and states: ‘‘The passage from the oral instinct to the anal is not produced by a process of maturation but by means of the intervention of something that has nothing to do with instincts—by the intervention, the reversal, of the demand of the Other.’’ EROTOMANIA Serge Leclaire (1968) demonstrated that erogeneity depends closely on the ‘‘sexual value’’ projected onto the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ———. (1926d). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Position de l’Inconsuent. Écrits. Paris: Seuil. (Original work published 1964) Leclaire, Serge. (1999). Psychoanalyzing: on the order of the unconscious and the practice of the letter. (Peggy Kamuf, Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. (Original work published 1968) Erotomania, the ‘‘delusion of being loved,’’ is a morbid fascination that is clinically classified as a form of delusion, accompanied by insistent demands and jealousy. Emil Kraepelin associates it with the paranoid psychoses and Sigmund Freud interprets it psychoanalytically (1911c [1910]). For Freud the inverse projection of erotomania serves as a defensive function against latent homosexuality: Another element is chosen for contradiction in erotomania, which remains totally unintelligible on 521 ERYTHROPHOBIA (FEAR OF BLUSHING) any other view: ÔI do not love him—I love her.’ And in obedience to the same need for projection, the proposition is transformed into: ÔI observe that she loves me.’ ÔI do not love him—I love her, because SHE LOVES ME.’ Many cases of erotomania might give an impression that they could be satisfactorily explained as being exaggerated or distorted heterosexual fixations, if our attention were not attracted by the circumstance that these infatuations invariably begin, not with any internal perception of loving, but with an external perception of being loved. But in this form of paranoia the intermediate proposition ÔI love her’ can also become conscious, because the contradiction between it and the original proposition is not a diametrical one, not so irreconcilable as that between love and hate: it is, after all, possible to love her as well as him. It can thus come about that the proposition which has been substituted by projection (Ôshe loves me’) may make way again for the Ôbasic language’ proposition ÔI love her’ (1911c [1910], pp. 63–64). The initial core can be traced back to the narcissistic root through idealization (projection of the subject’s ideal ego), split personality, and double bind situations. In 1920 Gatian de Clérambault defined his conception of erotomanic delusion in a letter to the Société Clinique de Médecine Mentale (Clinical society of mental medicine) as the ‘‘coexistence of two delusions: persecution and erotomania.’’ In 1921 he isolated ‘‘pure erotomania’’ within the context of emotional delusion. This emotional syndrome, which is generated by feelings of pride, desire, and hope, revolves around a ‘‘fundamental postulate’’: ‘‘It is the object that began and that loves the most or that loves alone.’’ This revelation, generally found in women, initiates the phase of hope. A number of topics are derived from this, for example, the belief that ‘‘the object cannot experience happiness without being loved.’’ From then on their protection, their efforts at closeness, and indirect manifestations of their love are combined with paradoxical behavior patterns. Interpreted as hardships and especially as demonstrations of love, they appear as persecutory during the stages of spite and bitterness that are part of a chronic, persistent development. The associated erotomania is a fluid entity, an expression of a paranoid, a schizophrenic psychiatric condition. In spite of our clinical (found in DSM IV) and psychopathological understanding, there have been few 52 2 therapeutic advances for such patients, who are often intrusive and consequently rarely succeed in attracting attention for very long. MICHEL DEMANGEAT See also: Delusion; Mathilde, case of; Paranoia; Passion; Persecution; ‘‘Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)’’; Psychoses, chronic and delusional. Bibliography Demangeat, Michel. (1999). Historisation et structure dans les névroses passionnelles. Bordeaux: Cahiers de Trait. Freud, Sigmund. (1911c [1910]). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1–82. Clérambault, Gatian de, and Brousseau, Albert. (1987). Coexistence de deux délires: Persécution et érotomanie (présentation de malades). In Œuvres psychiatriques (p. 323). Paris: Frénésie. (Reprinted from Bulletin de la Société clinique de médecine mentale Dec. 1920.) Perrier, François. (1967). L’érotomanie. In P. AulagnierSpairani et al., Le Désir et la Perversion (p. 129–162). Paris: Le Seuil. Rosolato, Guy. (1980). Clérambault et les délires passionnels. Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse, 21, 199–213. ERYTHROPHOBIA (FEAR OF BLUSHING) Erythrophobia or ereuthrophobia describes a pathological fear of blushing in public. In the Minutes of the Psychoanalytical Society of Vienna (Nunberg and Federn, 1962–75) the session of February 3, 1909, was devoted to ‘‘A case of compulsive blushing’’ presented by Alfred Adler in the presence of Freud, Paul Federn, Max Graf, Edouard Hitschmann, Albert Joachim, Otto Rank, Isidor Sadger, and Fritz Wittels. According to Freud, we cannot classify this state among the sexual neuroses because it is situated somewhere between anxiety hysteria and paranoia. These two assertions are to be found in the comments he made after Adler’s conference: ‘‘Erythrophobia consists of being ashamed for unconscious reasons [. . .]. The first thing these patients were ashamed of was usually masturbation; more generally, the secret of their precocious knowledge with regard to sexuality.’’ INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ESSENTIAL DEPRESSION And: ‘‘Neuroses cannot be expressed with a single current but only by a pair of opposites which are shame and rage in this case. Only the coexistence of these active and passive current explains the case of erythrophobia: it is the meeting of these two currents that produces the attack.’’ Ernest Jones, for his part, distinguished between ‘‘ereuthrophobia,’’ the fear of blushing, and ‘‘erythrophobia’’ or fear of the color red (1913). BERNARD GOLSE Marty, this abrasion of libidinal bonds and impression of fragmentation constitute the very definition of the death instinct (it should be recalled that Marty envisions the death instinct as a deficiency of individual movements of life without the opposing destructive charge carried by the death instinct as theorized by Sigmund Freud). However, adds Marty, ‘‘although essential depressives thus seem always to carry phenomena of death within themselves, the libido seems to be extinguished only when life is extinguished, except in certain rare cases.’’ In such cases, he contends, the ego ceases to exist as an agency within the psychic apparatus. See also: Phobias in children; Phobic neurosis. Bibliography Jones, Ernest. (1913). Pathology of morbid anxiety. Papers on Psychoanalysis. London: Bailliere, Tindall & Cox, 1918. Nunberg, Hermann; and Federn, Ernst. (1962–75). Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. New York: International Universities Press. ESSENTIAL DEPRESSION The notion of essential depression was introduced by Pierre Marty in his 1966 article ‘‘La dépression essentielle,’’ shortly after the notion of ‘‘operative thought,’’ and it became a clinical construct in the treatment of psychosomatic disorders. The term essential depression emerged after ‘‘depression without an object’’ and is a more appropriate name than the latter because the phenomenon it describes constitutes the very essence of depression. Essential depression involves a reduction in the level of both object-libido and narcissistic libido, without any positive economic counterpart, and thus without any libidinal connection at the relational level; this distinguishes it from other depressions of the neurotic or even psychotic type. This specificity of the relational mode with the investigator, an analogue for the overall relational mode, indicatesa diagnosis of this type of depression, which can be difficult to detect. Everything seems to take place without visible emotion, flattening any underlying drama or internal conflict. This absence of any nameable affect is comparable to the hypothesis of alexithymia: We find something like an erasure of the dynamic capacities of the basic mental functions across the entire spectrum—the absence of any vital link gives the impression of a functional breakdown. According to INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Marty subsequently introduced this clinical construct into his work as a pivotal notion, along with ‘‘operative thought’’—all within the framework of ‘‘disorganization’’ that is part of his model of the somatization process. His most extensive account is found in Les mouvements individuels de vie et de mort. Vol. 2: L’Ordre psychosomatique (Individual movements of life and death. Vol. 2: The psychosomatic order; 1980), where he emphasizes one of the main signs of essential depression: The disappearance of unconscious feelings of guilt in an ego that only poorly fulfills its roles of linking, distribution, and defense. He once again underscores the fragility of the preconscious at this stage. The deficit of this symptom is thus situated within the psyche, and somatic disturbances are the result within a system that is defensive and yet disorganizing in response to trauma. He theorizes that this phase is preceded by an automatic, diffuse anxiety that is related to anxiety neurosis, which for its part cannot be understood as an alarm signal that should trigger the mental defenses. In the first volume of Les mouvements individuels de vie et de mort, subtitled Essai d’économie psychosomatique (Essay on psychosomatic economy; 1976), Marty hypothesizes that the passage into essential depression occurs through depletion of the ‘‘anxiety apparatus’’ at the expense of psychic functioning. ALAIN FINE See also: Character neurosis; Depression; Disintegration, feelings of, (anxieties); Disorganization; Mentalization; Negative, work of the; Operational thinking; Psychosomatic. Bibliography Marty, Pierre. (1966). La dépression essentielle. Revue française de psychanalyse, 30, 5–6. 523 ESTRANGEMENT ———. (1976). Les mouvements individuels de vie et de mort. Vol. 1: Essai d’économie psychosomatique. Paris: Payot. ———. (1980). Les mouvements individuels de vie et de mort. Vol. 2: L’Ordre psychosomatique. Paris: Payot. ESTRANGEMENT The term estrangement connotes an idea of novelty or even bizarreness. Freud, in his essay ‘‘The Uncanny’’ (1919h), added an additional meaning when he emphasized that this feeling, an experience close to a sensation, is at its peak when it is triggered by the reappearance of a familiar object that has been forgotten or repressed for a long time. The feeling of estrangement can be compared to the phenomena of déjà vu or déjà vécu (previously lived). Although the concept is developed in The psychopathology of everyday life (Freud, 1901), it is referred to as such only in his short essay ‘‘A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis’’ (Freud, 1936a). The concept of estrangement has been extensively described in classical psychiatry, which views it as a delusion associated with the inability to recognize a known object or person. Pierre Janet considered estrangement to be a disturbance of the reality function and a breakdown in the process of mental synthesis. Freud, however, distinguished such phenomena (which he also studied) from those described in the literature, where uncertainty about the nature of objects (living or dead, human or automata) is voluntarily maintained to create in the reader a feeling of anxiety, a sense of the uncanny. Starting from Friedrich Schelling’s idea that the feeling of estrangement arises from exposure to something that is revealed but should have remained hidden, Freud went on to stress the return of the repressed. In terms of symptoms, the feeling of estrangement appears as an anxiety that something is about to be revealed. It can be seen as a form of transgression, like crossing to the other side of an imaginary line without knowing how or why one got there. This transgression is not only prohibited by the superego but is associated with the subject’s identity and simultaneously concerns the limit between internal and external, the limits among past, present, and future, and the limit between life and death. The feeling of estrangement is associated with a mysterious imaginary time before life, which is therefore 52 4 unrecognizable and yet insists on revealing its familiarity. Freud had already developed these ideas in Totem and Taboo (1912–1913a). There he wrote that what is felt as strange in the outside world initially belonged to the self and was then projected to the exterior. The nonself, the object of perception, is only recognizable through this process of projection (an animist conception of the world). This feeling of estrangement is also related to the dialectic between the strange and the familiar among the dead, who are not completely separated from the living but rather continue to hover around them (the taboo against the dead). The psychoanalytic feeling of estrangement arises from a sudden confrontation between a perception of the outside world and repressed primitive internal perceptions. These internal perceptions are not apprehended as such and appear in the subject’s mental space only after having been projected onto the outside world. Consequently, they are bound to the objects that support them. This crossing of a limit, whether it involves the before or after, the animate or inanimate, the internal or external, is always associated with the death drive, whose final goal is the initial state—an expression of the inertia of organic life. In ‘‘A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis’’ (1936a), Freud, deepening and restricting the feeling of estrangement, saw it essentially as a defense mechanism that attempts to distance something from the ego (depersonalization) or include something external (false recognition, déjà vu, previously narrated). The oedipal explanation of Freud’s disturbance of memory (guilt for surpassing his father, realization of his desire to escape his family) does not cover all there is to estrangement. The feeling of estrangement, which is so difficult to grasp, is an inherent part of psychoanalysis itself when it attempts to revivify repressed contents. It is associated with what Freud defined in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g) as the demonic, which characterizes the repetition compulsion. To a considerable extent, it has the characteristics of a drive, yet it is hostile to the pleasure principle. In a sense, estrangement, in its unconscious dimension, may impose limits on our understanding, like an iceberg, which remains largely submerged. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ETHICS See also: Certainty; Déjà vu; Depersonalization; ‘‘Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis, A’’; Double, the; Premonitory dream; Ego; German romanticism and psychoanalysis; Illusion; Phantom; Repetition; Secret; Self-consciousness; Telepathy; ‘‘‘Uncanny, The’’’. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1901b). The psychopathology of everyday life. SE, 6. ———. (1912–1913a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ———. (1919h). The uncanny. SE, 17: 217–256. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1936a). A disturbance of memory on the Acropolis. SE, 22: 239–248. ETHICS Ethics concerns mores: human moral attitudes in general and, more specifically, rules of behavior and their justifications. This system of rules attributes values to behaviors by judging them to be good or bad according to their intrinsic moral qualities or their concrete social consequences. For Freud, ethics takes up where totemism and taboos leave off, and constitutes the basis of all religion. esteem of the superego. For Freud, the symptoms of the transference neuroses were substitutes for the remains of old loves that were forbidden by morality. The reign of ‘‘civilized morality’’ begins when the drives are renounced. This forms the basis of religion and culture. Yet when individuals renounce the drives, they are deprived of the sexual and aggressive satisfactions demanded by the id, and so run the risk of neurosis. This traditional conception of ethics is emphasized when the German word Ethik is translated as morals or morality. In what Angélo Hesnard calls ‘‘the morbid universe of guilt,’’ the unconscious feelings of guilt that cause neurotic symptoms do not relate to the material reality of the patient’s actions. Neurotic patients are guilty only of their secret intentions. The psychic reality of the forbidden and repressed wishes of ‘‘the child that is in man’’ (Freud, 1910a [1909], p. 36) is accessible to us by dream interpretation and is realized in the course of analytic treatment in the love/hate relationship of the transference. And yet, by reawakening the demons banished by morality, does not psychoanalysis run the risk of destroying the very foundations of culture, which always demands sacrifices of the individual? As early as the Studies on Hysteria (1895a), Freud analyzed hysterical conversion symptoms as the result of a conflict between patients’ erotic thoughts and moral ideals. The adjective ‘‘ethical,’’ ethisch in German, appeared for the first time in 1898 in ‘‘Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses.’’ In that essay, Freud raised the question of whether physicians have the right to intrude into the sexual lives of their patients and whether their ‘‘ethical duty’’ might not be ‘‘to keep away from the whole business of sex’’ (p. 264). This question leads to another conception of ethics, one that is specific to psychoanalysis. The ethics of psychoanalysis is a consequence of how its practice implements its method and rules. Psychoanalysis does not aim to make the individual adapted to his or her environment. In other words, it does not serve the good; rather, it seeks the truth. When Freud recommended that physicians not give in to the amorous advances of their patients, he was giving voice less to traditional morality than to a psychoanalytic ethics conceived in terms of the requirements of a praxis founded on a method. The patient, by engaging in transference love, aggravated by a resistance to remembering, aims to reduce the analyst to a lover. The analyst is ethically bound not to respond, because he does not mistake the transference for true love. He wants to frustrate the analysand’s love so that it can be analyzed. Otherwise, the analyst would become allied with the resistance. Here moral motives converge with psychoanalytic technique. The notion of ethics in Freud’s work refers primarily to those moral ideals in the name of which individuals renounce any instinctual impulses that are irreconcilable with the narcissistic ideals of the ego. These ideals are based on images of loved objects and the This psychoanalytic notion of ethics serves philosophical, religious, and moral causes. In Moses and Monotheism (1939a), Freud showed that ethics originates in ‘‘a sense of guilt felt on account of a suppressed hostility to God’’ (p. 134). Using Judaism, he In Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]), Freud noted, ‘‘The cultural super-ego has developed its ideals and set up its demands. Among the latter, those which deal with the relations of human beings are comprised under the heading of ethics’’ (p. 142). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 525 ETHNOPSYCHOANALYSIS returned to the myth of the murder of the father that he developed in Totem and Taboo (1912–1913a). Freud argued that people have always known that at one time they had a primitive father (which in religion becomes the godhead) and that they put him to death. The resulting ‘‘nostalgia for the father’’ reflected an insatiable need to appease a sense of guilt by changing the father’s prohibitions into ethical obligations. When sons ingest the dead father’s body, they come to identify with someone whom they simultaneously love and hate. Thus, the dead father becomes the superego, demanding self-sacrifice. When the subject obeys the superego and renounces his sexual and aggressive impulses, he can both hate and love the parental authority within himself. Freud revealed the role that masochism and narcissism play when the drives are reined in by ethics. A subject who suffers by sacrificing his or her desires to the supposed demands of the Other feels loved and chosen by this Other while unconsciously reproaching the Other for sadism. Jacques Lacan discussed how the death drive functions in the dialectic between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. He began by declaring the prohibition of incest to be the only universal law. All other rules of morality are merely historical and cultural variations of this law. Desire for the mother can never be satisfied, even after the murder of the deterring father, because acting out incest would cause the social order to collapse. For this reason, the ‘‘naturalist liberation’’ of pleasure fails (Lacan, p. 4), jouissance remains forbidden, and the prohibition is reinforced by the work of mourning. The human condition is tragic because the more the subject renounces pleasure, the more his superego demands greater sacrifices. Nevertheless, the superego is necessary to produce the economy of pleasure and to introduce desire into the world of symbolic mediation. In the character of Antigone, Lacan found an incarnation of a ‘‘pure and simple desire for death’’ (p. 282). This ‘‘raw,’’ ‘‘inflexible’’ ‘‘kid’’ (pp. 250, 263) opposes the ethics of the good, represented by Creon. With her sacrifice, Antigone becomes the pure and simple relation between being human and ‘‘the break introduced by the presence of language in the human life’’ (p. 279). The result is that ‘‘when an analysis is carried through to its end the subject will encounter the limit in which the problematic of desire is raised’’ (p. 300). 52 6 Jacques Lacan emphasized the human subject’s debt to language in becoming human and thus proposed a psychoanalytic ethic that did not concern itself with happiness and the good. The idealization of the figure of Antigone produced a Hegelian imperative to ‘‘pure action’’ that could conceivably be added to or substituted for traditional ethico-religious ideals. What Patrick Guyomard refers to as ‘‘the enjoyment of the tragic’’ must give way to the specific requirements of psychoanalytic work, a work of mourning that, according to Conrad Stein, leads to a ‘‘crossing of the tragic.’’ Thus the ethics of psychoanalysis is a consequence of its specific method. ROLAND GORI See also: Boundary violations; Criminology and psychoanalysis; Judgment of condemnation; Kantianism and psychoanalysis; Seminar, Lacan’s; Transgression; Truth. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1898a). Sexuality in the aetiology of the neuroses. SE, 3: 259–285. ———. (1910a [1909]). Five lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 11: 7–55. ———. (1912–1913a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ———. (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57–145. ———. (1939a). Moses and monotheism: Three essays. SE, 23: 1–137. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895a). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. Guyomard, Patrick. (1992). La jouissance du tragique: Antigone, Lacan et le désir de l’analyste. Paris: Aubier. Lacan, Jacques. (1997). The seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book 7: The ethics of psychoanalysis (1959–1960) (Dennis Porter, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1986) Stein, Conrad. (1995). La traversée du tragique en psychanalyse. Études freudiennes, 35, 33–48. ETHNOPSYCHOANALYSIS Ethnopsychoanalysis is a form of psychotherapy that makes use of two complementary fields of knowledge: psychoanalysis and anthropology. Early in his career INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ETHOLOGY Sigmund Freud was careful to test the cultural diversity of his principal psychoanalytic concepts. The Oedipus complex, shortly after its introduction, was at the heart of the controversy between universalism and culturalism, and even today the question remains unresolved. Bronislaw Malinowski (1927) was one of the first anthropologists to take an interest in the relation between the psyche and culture through an analysis of the Oedipus complex among the Trobriand islanders, a matrilineal society. After Malinowski, the question was investigated by Géza Roheim and especially Georges Devereux (1970/1980, 1972), who further refined the relation between psychoanalysis and anthropology. Devereux postulated two fundamentals: psychic universality, toward which every human being tends, and cultural encoding, which is the effect of a culture on the content of the mind. Devereux held that researchers should focus on particulars without speculating about an abstract universal, which cannot be known a priori but was frequently inferred. Ethnopsychoanalysis is based on the methodological principle of complementarity, which ‘‘does not exclude any method, any valid theory, but coordinates them’’ (Devereux, 1972). It is pointless to forcibly and exclusively integrate certain human phenomena into the field of psychoanalysis or anthropology. Human phenomena, Devereux asserted, are so specific that they require a two-pronged multidisciplinary approach that can neither be fused together nor carried out simultaneously. In France and the United States, Devereux developed a theory of ethnopsychoanalysis based on the methodological principle of complementarity. Later in France, Tobie Nathan (1986) provided practical methods for its application, methods that are still being developed. Some parameters, however, appear to be well established (Moro, 1998): the need for a group of therapists in some cases, the importance of the patient’s native tongue and the need to make a transition to the patient’s language, the need to start from the patient’s cultural representations, the need to construct intermediate spaces halfway between culture and psyche that enable the individual to speak more freely and creatively, the need to modify of the duration of sessions (longer sessions designed to comply with the cultural temporality of the patient), and so on. Finally, to encourage discussion, Western therapists must learn to look beyond the Western worldview and to modify their system of reference. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS In this context it is important to implement, in addition to the mechanics for analyzing transference and affective countertransference, a specific method for analyzing the therapist’s ‘‘cultural countertransference.’’ In concrete terms, at the end of each interview, the group of therapists should attempt to elucidate the countertransference of each therapist by discussing the affects they have experienced, implicit elements, and theories that led them to believe certain things (inferences), and by planning activities (interventions) at the individual and cultural levels. Ethnopsychoanalysis, which integrates the mental and cultural dimension of human dysfunctionality, is not a specific method, strictly speaking. Rather, it involves creating a complex cross-cultural psychotherapeutic setting that allows therapists to step outside of their own cultures and recognize the cultural differences of emigrant patients. MARIE-ROSE MORO See also: Anthropology and psychoanalysis; Balint-Székely-Kóvacs, Alice; Basic Problems of Ethnopsychiatry; ‘‘Claims to Scientific Interest’’; Devereux, Georges Incest; Individual; Individuation; Malinowski, Bronislaw Kaspar; Mead, Margaret; Morgenthaler, Fritz; Myth of origins; Róheim, Géza; Transcultural. Bibliography Devereux, Georges. (1972). Ethnopsychanalyse complémentariste. Paris: Flammarion, 1985. ———. (1980). Basic problems of ethnopsychiatry (Basia Miller Gulati, and George Devereux, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1970) Malinowski, Bronislaw. (1927). Sex and repression in savage society. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Moro, Marie-Rose. (1998). Psychothérapie transculturelle des enfants de migrants. Paris: Dunod. Nathan, Tobie. (1986). La folie des autres: traité d’ethnopsychiatrie clinique. Paris: Dunod. ETHOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Ethology is a biology of behavior. It has developed a nomenclature for describing the behavior of all living things in their natural environment using an approach that is naturalistic, experimental, and comparative. It 527 É T U D E S F R E U D I E N N E S describes the structure of a behavioral sequence, its immediate causes, its adaptive benefits (its function), and its origin in the evolutionary development of the species and the biological development of the individual. Ethology has established itself as an observational method in some of the existing social sciences, including genetics, ethoecology, ethoneurology, ethosociology, etholinguistics, and ethopsychoanalysis. the unconscious to give shape to the drive and thereby fashion the words and gestures (Cosnier, 1984) that act on the other. Interestingly, Jacques Lacan invoked ethology as early as 1936. His study of such phenomena as animal behavior in front of a mirror and the ‘‘dance’’ of sticklebacks enabled him to develop the fundamental concepts of the mirror stage and the interaction of the Real and the Imaginary in humans. After World War II, René Spitz, faced with the behavioral pathology of abandoned children, following the work of Anna Freud, studied the genesis of object-relationships and the construction of the ego within a Freudian perspective. Strongly influenced by Konrad Lorenz and the then-new theory of cybernetics, he observed and manipulated the ‘‘eyes-nose-mouth’’ stimulus signal that triggers the suckling’s motor smile. He subsequently developed the concept of ego organizers and showed how the child’s mastery of the headshake, meaning ‘‘No,’’ marks the behavioral emergence of the process of symbolization. The psychoanalytic development an ethological anthropology allows us to situate man in the living world by emphasizing how the emergence of symbols and signs has created a specifically human, historicized world. In 1958, John Bowlby, then president of the British Psycho-Analytic Society, described the effects of a lack of maternal care. These findings showed an ‘‘astonishing convergence’’ (Zazzo, 1974) with the Harlows’ experiments on Rhesus monkeys, which demonstrated that the affective relationship between a mother and her infant was built not on nutritional needs but rather on a primary need for sensory exchange. At the Twenty-First International Congress of Psychoanalysis in Copenhagen (1959), a stimulating debate was initiated. Some psychoanalysts felt that experiments on imprinting, epigenesis, stimulus-signals, synaptic facilitation, and the behavioral ontogenesis that constructs human ties buttressed the Freudian concept of drives. Others, however, felt that these ran counter to Freudian theory, since the idea of attachment as a primary bond contradicted that of an anaclitic relationship to drives. They also felt that direct observation added nothing to clear pictures of subject’s mental world that could be obtained from a historical approach. In contemporary ethnopsychoanalysis, the ethological method is used to observe the structuring of the primary bond and to evaluate it in terms of life events and cultural pressures with, as a base-line, the observation of the ‘‘strange situation’’ (Ainsworth et al., 1978). The three levels of interaction distinguish the body, the affect, and the fantasy (Lebovici, 1991), which, as ‘‘psychic representative of the drive’’ (Freud), enables 52 8 BORIS CYRULNIK See also: Clinging instinct; Imaginary; Instinct; Primary need. Bibliography Ainsworth, Mary D. Salter, Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., and Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. Bowlby, John. (1958). The nature of the child’s tie to his mother. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 39, 350–373. Cosnier, Jacques. (1984). La psychanalyse, le langage et la communication. Psychothérapies. 4 (4), 215–222 Harlow, Harry. (1958). La nature de l’amour. Le psychologue américain, 13, 673–685. Lebovici, Serge. (1991). La dépendance du nouveau-né. In Catherine Dechamp–Le Roux (Ed.), Figures de la dépendance, autour d’Albert Memmi (pp. 29–39). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Spitz, René A. (1957). No and yes: On the genesis of human communication. New York: International Universities Press. ÉTUDES FREUDIENNES Études Freudiennes is a journal launched in 1969 by Conrad Stein, with Lucio Covello as recording secretary and Julien Bigras as Canadian correspondent (Stein was the French correspondent for the Canadian journal Interprétation). Its birth resulted from a schism in the editorial board of L’inconscient, on which Stein was a key figure, along with Piera Aulagnier-Spairani (editor in chief) and Jean Clavreul. According to their INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EUROPEAN PSYCHOANALYTICAL FEDERATION last editorial (no. 8, October 1968), ‘‘The editors have not been able to agree about the orientation appropriate for a review of psychoanalysis, nor on the part they would like it to play.’’ The first issue of Études Freudiennes, ‘‘Du côte du psychanalyste’’ (with the psychoanalyst), came out in November 1969. The first issue of Topique, ‘‘La formation du psychanalyst’’ (training the analyst), came out at the same time, with an announcement by Piera Aulagnier of the creation of a new psychoanalytic association: the Quatrième groupe, Organisation psychanalytique de langue française (Fourth Group, Francophone Psychoanalytic Organization). Stein’s orientation is apparent in his short introduction to ‘‘Le patient inconnu’’ (The unknown patient) by Theodor Reik. He presents this text as being about ‘‘a kind of truth, unconnected with any school, about psychoanalysis.’’ This sums up what became the spirit of the journal. Études Freudiennes is open to all tendencies in Freudian psychoanalysis, as long as authors show a serious commitment to psychoanalysis, are creative, and write well. It takes up questions relating to the training of psychoanalysts, their course of studies, and their supervision (nos. 1–2 and 31). Other areas of focus are the history of ideas (Sigmund Freud, Sándor Ferenczi, Jacques Lacan), the history of concepts (interpretation, femininity, transference love), and the practice of psychoanalysis in relation to its principles and the exigencies inherent in Freudian methodology. From May 1982 (nos. 19–20) to September 1987 (no. 29), each issue gave rise to ‘‘study days,’’ when articles were discussed in the presence of their authors. Another special feature of Études Freudiennes has been the ongoing scientific debates, parallel to the published essays, in which experienced psychoanalysts associated with the review since its beginnings have encounters with younger colleagues invited to expound their points of view independently of ties to any organization and without fear of censure. This feature has added to its reputation in France and abroad, where some numbers have been translated (Italy, Germany, Brazil). With a history of more than thirty years, Études Freudiennes has encountered its share of obstacles. Yet its flexibility in matters relating to the mind has helped it to overcome them. DANIÈLE BRUN INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS See also: France. Bibliography Bataille, Laurence. (1985). D’une pratique. Études Freudiennes, 25, 7–30. Bauchau, Henry. (1984). La connivence des temps. Études Freudiennes, 23, 9–20. Perrier, François. (1994). Thanatol. In his La chaussée d’Antin (pp. 537–568). Paris: Albin Michel. (Originally published 1974) Reik, Theodor. (1969). Le patient inconnu. Études Freudiennes, 1–2, 7–38. Stein, Conrad. (1994). La traversée du tragique en psychanalyse. Études Freudiennes, 35, 33–48. Trilling, Jacques. (1973). James Joyce ou l’écriture matricide. Études Freudiennes, 7–8, 7–70. EUROPEAN PSYCHOANALYTICAL FEDERATION The European Psychoanalytical Federation (EPF) is a scientific organization that consolidates all the European psychoanalytic societies affiliated with the International Psychoanalytic Association. In 2002 there were approximately 3,900 individual members in twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen different languages. It comprises twenty-five societies and three study groups (the Romanian Group, Belgrade Group, and Polish Group). A study group is the first level of integration of a psychoanalytic body within the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA), followed by a provisional society and finally a member society. The EPF was founded in 1966 by Raymond de Saussure, a well-known member of the Société suisse de psychanalyse (Swiss Society for Psychoanalysis), with Evelyne Kestemberg as secretary. The idea of a European psychoanalytic organization was first discussed at a series of European conferences on training, which had been organized every two years from 1960. The need for guidelines for psychoanalytic training in Europe contributed greatly to the creation of a European organization similar to the American Psychoanalytic Association, which had a unified training policy. However, the European societies, concerned about their autonomy and independence in training matters, refused to accept this initial proposal and preferred the 529 E V E N L Y -S U S P E N D E D A T T E N T I O N model of a federation of independent societies. The EPF is administered by an executive board, composed of an executive committee of seven members (president, president-elect, two vice presidents, secretary, treasurer, newsletter editor) and the presidents of the member societies and study groups. The EPF has always served as a clearinghouse and forum for psychoanalytic societies in Europe. In this sense its function is essentially scientific, unlike the International Psychoanalytic Association, which also serves as a political entity in that it establishes common standards for training and practice for all member psychoanalysts. In its bylaws, the EPF has set forth six major goals: to promote the development of psychoanalysis; to maintain and improve the standards for practice, training, and teaching; to promote psychoanalytic research and distribute information about the theory and practice of psychoanalysis; to improve communication among psychoanalysts by means of various publications, newsletters, scientific conferences, and other meetings; to create a discussion space for scientific fields related to psychoanalysis and other subjects of concern to psychoanalysts; to promote contacts between psychoanalysis and other disciplines. Although initially the EPF limited itself to organizing an annual conference on training and to publishing an annual twenty-page bulletin, in 2004 it organized more than ten annual or biannual scientific gatherings: colloquia and conferences on training and on child and adolescent analysis, a large conference open to all members and candidates, a clinical seminar for members, a scientific symposium on a controversial theoretical issue, a seminar and summer university in Eastern Europe for Eastern Europeans, a clinical seminar for Europeans and North Americans. As of 2004, was the Bulletin de la Fédération européenne de psychanalyse (120 pages) is now (in 2004) published semiannually in the three official languages of the EPF (German, English, and French) and includes papers presented at the various conferences held throughout Europe. These papers reflect contemporary psychoanalytic dialogue and the problems encountered in the various European psychoanalytic societies. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the EPF is at a point where it will have to define its role inside and outside the world of analysis. European psychoanalytic societies need to address a range of issues, including the professional status of the psychoanalyst 53 0 (psychoanalyst or psychotherapist), the development of psychoanalysis in Eastern Europe, evaluation of the various methods of training, the difficulties associated with the many languages in Europe and the EPF’s relation to diverse cultures and psychoanalytic traditions, and finally, the role of the EPF in light of the restructuring of the International Psychoanalytic Association, which, as an association of individual members, is evolving toward more adequate representation of the societies themselves. By providing a forum for discussing these issues, the EPF has agreed to promote a European psychoanalytic identity that allows for differences among European psychoanalysts while enabling them to focus on a limited number of scientific, ethical, and democratic values that reflect the Freudian tradition. ALAIN GIBEAULT Bibliography Diatkine, Gilbert, and Gibeault, Alain. (1996). Le statut du psychothérapeute et/ou du psychanalyste. Bulletin de la Fédération européenne de psychanalyse. 46, 119–141. Gibeault, Alain. (1996). Réalité psychique et réalité externe dans le processus psychanalytique: 3e Conférence de la FEP sur l’analyse d’enfant et d’adolescent, Amsterdam, 1996. Bulletin de la Fédération européenne de psychanalyse. 47, 65–70. ———. (1997). La Fédération européenne a trente ans: Passé, présent, avenir. Psychanalyse en Europe, 49. Groen-Prakken, Han. (1986). Une organisation psychanalytique européenne: Le quand, le comment et le pourquoi: un aperçu historique de la fondation et du développement de la F.E.P. Psychanalyse en Europe, 26–27, 11–65. ———. (1997). Vers une Fédération européenne de psychanalyse: Le développement du mouvement psychanalytique en Europe centrale et de l’Est, 1987–1996. Psychanalyse en Europe, 48 (1), 5–25. EVENLY-SUSPENDED ATTENTION Evenly-suspended attention describes the necessary state of the analyst’s mind when listening to the patient during a psychoanalytic session. It is the mirror image of the method of free association required of the patient. Freud set forth the notion of free-floating attention in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) in connection with the secondary revision of the dream and the attiINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS E V E N L Y -S U S P E N D E D A T T E N T I O N tude the interpreter must take: ‘‘For the purposes of our interpretation it remains an essential rule invariably to leave out of account the ostensible continuity of a dream as being of suspect origin, and to follow the same path back to the material of the dream-thoughts, no matter whether the dream itself is clear or confused’’ (p. 500). His technical prescription is found in ‘‘Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psycho-Analysis’’ (1912e): ‘‘[I]t rejects the use of any special expedient (even that of taking notes). It consists simply in not directing one’s notice to anything in particular and in maintaining the same Ôevenly-suspended attention’ (as I have called it) in the face of all that one hears . . . . It will be seen that the rule of giving equal notice to everything is the necessary counterpart to the demand made on the patient that he should communicate everything that occurs to him without criticism or selection. If the doctor behaves otherwise, he is throwing away most of the advantage which results from the patient’s obeying the Ôfundamental rule of psychoanalysis.’ The rule for the doctor may be expressed: ÔHe should withhold all conscious influences from his capacity to attend, and give himself over completely to his Ôunconscious memory.’ The doctor must put himself in a position to make use of everything he is told for the purposes of interpretation and of recognizing the concealed unconscious material without substituting a censorship of his own for the selection that the patient has forgone’’ (pp. 111–12). The psychoanalyst must be able to interpret everything he hears in order to discover everything that the unconscious disguises, and this without substituting his own censorship for the selectivity the patient has renounced. In his 1923 encyclopedia article ‘‘Psycho-Analysis,’’ Freud returned to the topic: ‘‘Experience soon showed that the attitude which the analytic physician could most advantageously adopt was to surrender himself to his own unconscious mental activity, in a state of evenly suspended attention, to avoid so far as possible reflection and the construction of conscious expectations, not to try to fix anything that he heard particularly in his memory, and by these means to catch the drift of the patient’s unconscious with his own unconscious’’ (p. 239). Two years later, in a letter to Ludwig Binswanger dated February 22, 1925, he tempered the somewhat excessive aspect of this description: ‘‘In a more systematic formulation, unconscious must be replaced with preconscious’’ (2003, p. 179). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Some authors (notably James Strachey in the Standard Edition) have proposed as alternatives the terms evenly-suspended or evenly-hovering attention (in French, both attention également flottante and attention flottante are used). This prescribed attitude for the analyst has been considered one of the constitutive elements of the analytic setting. Associated with ‘‘neutrality,’’ it has also been compared with Theodor Reik’s notion of ‘‘listening with the third ear.’’ Since it requires that the analyst suspend judgment and eliminate his or her internal resistances and all personal censorship, it is clear that only prior analysis of the analyst can ensure that this state is maintained. In this special state, identifications and projections must be able to float freely, but some authors have emphasized the risk of falling asleep if the analyst is too intent on conforming to it (Fenichel, 1941). This observation has incited other authors to see in free-floating attention a state of self-hypnosis parallel to that triggered in the patient by the analytic setting (François Roustang). Contrary to the passivity and static aspect suggested by this description, Joseph Sandler has argued that the dynamic back-and-forth between this state and the return to a countertransferential analysis of what is perceived are conducive to ‘‘free-floating responsiveness’’ in the analyst (Sandler 1976, 1993). ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Framework of the psychoanalytic treatment; Free association; Fundamental rule; Psychoanalytic treatment; ‘‘Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psycho-Analysis.’’ Bibliography Freud, Sigmund, and Binswanger, Ludwig. (2003). The Sigmund Freud-Ludwig Binswanger correspondence 1908– 1938. (Arnold Pomerans, Trans.). New York: The Other Press. Fenichel, Otto. (1941) Problems of psychoanalytic technique. (David Brunswick, Trans.). New York: The Psychoanalytic Quarterly. Ornstein, Paul H. (1967). Selected problems in learning how to analyze. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 48, 448. Sandler, Joseph. (1976). Counter-transference and roleresponsiveness. International Review of Psycho-Analysis 3, 43–47. 531 É V O L U T I O N P S Y C H I A T R I Q U E ( L’ -) ( D E V E L O P M E N T S IN PSYCHIATRY) ———. (1993). On communication from patient to analyst: not everything is projective identification. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 74, 1097–1108. ÉVOLUTION PSYCHIATRIQUE (L’-) (DEVELOPMENTS IN PSYCHIATRY) Before becoming the title of the review first published in 1929, with chief editors Henri Codet and Eugène Minkowski contributing to the first issues, L’Évolution psychiatrique was already the title of a collective work in two volumes (1925 and 1927), directed by Angélo Hesnard and René Laforgue. In 1930 a study group was formed around the nucleus of collaborators in the review. This group contained no fewer than seven of the founding members of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society in 1926, but it did not seek to institutionalize psychoanalysis. Psychiatry was constantly evolving thanks to new acquisitions, including psychoanalysis which, although it appeared to be the most innovative, was not the only one, and the members of the group wanted their discipline, which was still stuck in declining alienism, to evolve. The philosophical ideas of the time would also contribute to this movement. The name chosen was an obvious indication of the influence of Henri Bergson and his Évolution Créatrice (Creative evolution; 1907). L’Évolution psychiatrique (EP) would present the work of Eugène Minkowski, who published the first French-language volume of phenomenological psychopathology, Le Temps vécu (Time lived; 1934), and also Ludwig Binswanger, Karl Jaspers, and Viktor von Gebsatell. In 1934, Henri Ey used the review to present Eugen Bleuler’s ideas on the group of schizophrenic psychoses (1911), an application of the nascent psychoanalysis to Emil Kraepelin’s dementia praecox. Jacques Lacan’s thesis, De la psychose paranoı̈aque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité (Paranoid psychosis and its relations to the personality; 1932) is another example of this psychoanalytic rereading of Kraepelin’s entities that was to renew psychiatry. After the war, the exchanges between Ey and Lacan were milestones in the life of the society, which had interrupted its activity during the German occupation of France and suspended the publication of the review between 1940 and 1947. On the occasion of the Journées de Bonneval, Ey brought 53 2 together psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, and philosophers, and their debates on the psychogenesis of neuroses and psychoses (1946), schizophrenia (1958), and lastly the unconscious (1960), would go down in history. In 1950, L’Évolution psychiatrique organized the first World Congress on Psychiatry in Paris, the presence of Anna Freud and Melanie Klein testifying to the importance attached to psychoanalysis. And in 1956 the centenary of Freud’s birth was marked by an issue devoted to his work. In 1955, the publication, under the direction of Ey, of the Traité de psychiatrie (Treatise on Psychiatry) in the Encyclopédie médico-chirurgicale (Medical and surgical encyclopedia) written by one hundred and thirty-two authors, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts and almost all of the members of L’Évolution psychiatrique, marked a major moment in the history of the society. The unity in diversity thus realized was shattered soon afterwards, when psychiatry was recognized as a medical specialty distinct from neurology. The distinction was influenced by various factors: schisms in Freudian France, progress in psychopharmacology, different ‘‘anti-psychiatries,’’ the success of behaviorism and cognitivism, and the appearance of the ‘‘neurosciences.’’ The Seventh World Congress on Psychiatry, held in Vienna in 1984, could have declared psychoanalysis dead. For a quarter of a century the astonishing increase in the number of psychiatrists in France caused a multiplication in the number of societies with one approach and made L’Évolution psychiatrique the only place where phenomenologists, structuralists, biologists, psychotherapists, cognitivists, and analysts from different schools could confront each other’s views. It is therefore not surprising that when psychiatrists again felt the need to reflect together on recent progress in their discipline, L’Évolution psychiatrique played an essential role in the creation of the French Federation for Psychiatry (1992). JEAN GARRABÉ See also: France; Hesnard, Angélo Louis Marie; Laforgue, René. Bibliography Ey, Henri. (1955). Traité de psychiatrie clinique et thérapeutique, Paris: E.M.-C. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EXCITATION EXAMINATION DREAMS In examination dreams, which Freud considered to be ‘‘typical dreams,’’ the dreamer sees himself back at school taking an examination. Freud mentions this type of dream several times in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). The dreamer is embarrassed to see himself as an adult among much younger fellow students and obliged to retake an examination that he already passed a long time ago. ‘‘It would seem, then, that anxious examination dreams (which, as has been confirmed over and over again, appear when the dreamer has some responsible activity ahead of him next day and is afraid there may be a fiasco)’’ (1900a, p. 274). The meaning of the dream would be: ‘‘Don’t be afraid of tomorrow! Just think how anxious you were before your Matriculation, and yet nothing happened to you’’ (1900a, p. 274). The interpretation can nevertheless prove to be more complex: In Chapter 6, Freud recounts one of his own dreams, an ‘‘absurd dream about a dead father’’ (1900a, p. 435), which is marked by uncertainty about the dates of his own birth and his father’s death. Freud analyzes the uneasiness about filiation and hostility to the father (who in this dream admits to having been arrested for drunkenness) by associating it with his memory of having been a slow medical student: ‘‘In my circle of acquaintances I was regarded as an idler and it was doubted whether I should ever get through’’ (1900a, p. 450). It is therefore about an oedipal issue (particularly from the point of view of rivalry with the father). Freud never returned to examination dreams, and the theme seems to have received little attention outside of the United States. However, these dreams are encountered frequently in clinical practice. ROGER PERRON See also: Dream. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Parts I and II. SE, 4–5: 1–625. Further Reading Kafka, Ernest. (1979). On examination dreams. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 48, 426–447. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Ostow, Mortimer. (1995). The examination dream revisited: A clinical note. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 50, 418– 424. Renik, Owen. (1981). Typical examination dreams; superego dreams; traumatic dreams. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 50, 159–189. EXCITATION Excitation is a term borrowed from the lexicon of commonplace words derived from the Vulgar Latin excitatio: ‘‘the action of exciting’’; it is used notably in physics and physiology. Sigmund Freud, and other psychoanalysts after him, expanded this term for use in metapsychology, particularly the economic dimensions of that approach. In this usage, the word carries with it the connotations of the Latin excitare: ‘‘to awaken, wake up, push, or stimulate at the level of the psychic apparatus.’’ This psychic apparatus, the fictional representation of metapsychological topography, appears as the locus of reception, transformation, and capacity for adequate discharge of excitation. Even before his analytic period per se, Freud in ‘‘The Psycho-Neuroses of Defence’’ (1894a) envisaged the sum of excitation as a quantum of affect that is spread over the memory traces of representations. It is in this light that, for want of a connection with affect, he posits an ‘‘abreaction’’ caused by the excess of excitation. It is also necessary that endogenous excitations reach a certain threshold in order to become mental excitations. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) he conjectures that ‘‘during certain psychical processes the systems may be traversed in a temporal sequence determined by excitation’’ Excitation may be external in origin, in the form of a stimulus coming from the object or the environment, and the problem becomes the manner in which it is handled, bound, and evacuated. Here Freud advances the concept of the ‘‘protective shield’’ that serves to protect against an overflow of excitation, which he views as being traumatic. Envisioning trauma as a ‘‘breaking through of the protective shield’’ is one of the perspectives he offers. But overflow can also originate internally. In cases where sound psychic defensive systems are lacking—above all, a failure of defense through repression, which would prevent satisfaction and discharge toward the outside—the result is the mental symptom as a sign and 533 EXCITATION substitute for an instinctual satisfaction that has not taken place, like a foreign body that keeps producing phenomena of excitation and reaction in the (mental) tissue in which it is implanted. Excitation is thus also included in the register of the pulsional system. Instinct, a borderline concept between the psychic and the somatic, is posited as an excitation for the psyche. It is found in connection with the terms drive, aim, and source.  Drive: driving factor, the measure of the amount of impulse toward a particular action or end.  Aim: a satisfaction that is only attainable through successfully suppressing the very cause of the initial excitation. Following Freud, we could say that the psychic apparatus serves the intention of mastering and eliminating quantities of excitation, whether this excitation arrives from without or within.  Source: any somatic process in an organ or part of the body whose excitation is represented in mental life by the instincts. The raw material of psychic disturbances is posited as being inherent in this register of excitation of somatic origin; here we find the physiological notion of excitation. This excitation must undergo a process of mental work to enter into the pulsional system, or indeed must transform its quantum of energy into mental energy. If this transformation does not occur, somatic sexual excitation, for example, ostensibly remains in that form and does not turn into psychosexual excitation; this is the Freudian approach to the concept of ‘‘actual (or defense) neurosis,’’ advanced relatively early on. This approach requires levels of discharge rather than repression as the constituents of its symptoms. Beyond a certain threshold of excitation, Freud evokes the notion of ‘‘libidinal coexcitation,’’ which ostensibly disappears over time; this is supposedly the point from which fixation begins. Thus the instincts, in contrast to stimulus or external excitation, never act as a force of momentary impact, but rather as an ongoing force. Thus too, the final goal of mental activity—the tendency to obtain pleasure and to avoid unpleasure—can be envisioned, in economic terms, as an effort to master the masses of excitation that reside in the psychic apparatus. level—the true ‘‘vicissitude’’ of the instincts, a process that is above all discernible in the structures of hysteria. Jean-Paul Valabrega takes up this notion of discharge through conversion in approaching psychosomatic phenomena, while other authors invoke the idea of a return of excitation to its earliest source, the somatic level, in the absence of successful mentalization. In the view of Pierre Marty, the flow of the excitations from the instincts and the drives, essentially aggressive and erotic, constitutes the central problem in somatization. He contends that in the absence of sound regulation by the psychic apparatus and thus of the possibility for adaptation, the excess or deficit of excitation causes a trauma that can become the point of departure for the process of somatization. Finally, following the introduction of the death instinct in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), Freud somewhat reconsiders excitation within the framework of the life and death instincts. The force and the flow (or retention) of excitation are reexamined, in light of the principles of constancy and inertia that he had already developed but further elaborates here. It should be recalled that, for Freud, although the animistic process is automatically regulated by the pleasureunpleasure principle, the economic viewpoint accepts that the mental representatives of the instincts are invested with determined quantities of energy and that the psychic apparatus tends to maintain at the lowest possible level the sum total of excitations it carries. But the very essence of instinctual functioning is also envisioned: the tendency toward inertia under the influence of the death instinct. Repetition compulsion (the instinct’s instinct, according to Francis Pasche) is arguably a way to deal with the surplus of excitation that is not bound to the instinct as the result of post-traumatic defusion. Freud’s example of the repetition of traumatic dreams provides an illustration of this. In this view, the aim of repetition compulsion is the extinction of traumatic excitation through exhaustion—and this to the point of inertia, the aim of the death instinct. This posited aim enables Freud to propose a notion drawn from the philosophy of the Far East: the nirvana principle, whose aim is total discharge—a quasimetaphysical and existential approach that transcends the metapsychological economic register. This principle takes to its extremes and goes beyond another of Freud’s principles, the principle of constancy. The concept of conversion brings with it the enigma of the leap from mental excitation to the somatic 53 4 ALAIN FINE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EXPERIENCE See also: Anxiety; Conversion; Discharge; Erotogenic masochism; Erotogenic zone; Facilitation; Helplessness; Pain; Psychic envelopes; Libido; Mania; Mastery; Skinego; Nirvana; Object; Pleasure/unpleasure principle; Principle of constancy; Primal repression; Protective shield; Protective shield, breaking through the; Quantitative/qualitative; Quota of affect; Reciprocal paths of influence (libidinal coexcitation); Regression; Sleep/ wakefulness; Sum of excitation; Trauma; Wish, hallucinatory satisfaction of a. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The psycho-neuroses of defence. SE, 3: 45–61. ———. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4: 1–338; Part II, SE, 5: 339–625. ———. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 117–140. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 7–64. EXHIBITIONISM ‘‘Exhibitionism’’ commonly denotes a sexual perversion in which satisfaction is linked to the displaying of one’s genital parts. Psychoanalysis broadens this notion by acknowledging many early manifestations of this tendency in the sexual life of the child. Freud showed how infantile sexuality, prior to the establishment of the genital functions, was governed by the interplay of various component instincts which manifest themselves most often as pairs of opposites and each of which is linked to a particular erotogenic zone. In this context exhibitionism is one of the elements of instinctual life, making its appearance in conjunction with its opposite, namely pleasure in looking, both being related to the eye as the relevant erotogenic zone. Seen in this light, exhibitionism as a perversion in the adult bespeaks regression to an earlier fixation of the libido. It was chiefly in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, including the notes added to this work over its successive editions, that Freud outlined his conception of exhibitionism: ‘‘exhibitionists, . . . if I may trust the findings of several analyses, exhibit their own genitals in order to obtain a reciprocal view of the genitals of the other person.’’ A note added in 1920 elaborates: ‘‘Under analysis, these perversions . . . reveal a surprising variety of motives and determinants. The compulsion to exhibit, for instance, is also closely dependent INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OF SATISFACTION on the castration complex; it is a means of constantly insisting upon the integrity of the subject’s own (male) genitals and it reiterates his infantile satisfaction at the absence of a penis in those of women’’ (p. 157 and n.). The anxiety aroused by the perception of this real lack of the penis in women—in the mother, for example— led Freud to describe how, by the mechanism of disavowal, such a perception could be so thoroughly denied that an object, a fetish, could come to stand for the absent penis and ‘‘become the chosen object determining the achievement of sexual pleasure’’ (Green, 1990). For Guy Rosolato (1967), ‘‘fetishism is at the heart of all perversion in that it disavows the difference between the sexes’’; it must therefore, and a fortiori, be central to exhibitionism. Let us note, lastly, that exhibitionism as a manifestation of childhood sexuality is a common phenomenon and a part of sexual play. The desire to show off the genitals is linked to the needs for reassurance and knowledge. Child psychologists underline the importance of such play, though they insist that it should be confined to children of the same age, generally within a group where the curiosity is shared. DELPHINE SCHILTON See also: ‘‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes’’; Perversion; Scoptophilia/scopophilia; Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality; Turning around; Turning around upon the subject’s own self. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. Green, André. (1990). Le Complexe de castration. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Lebovici, Serge, Diatkine, René, and Soulé, Michel. (1985). Traité de psychiatrie de l’enfant et de l’adolescent. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Rosolato, Guy. (1967). Étude des perversions sexuelles à partir du fétichisme. In Piera Aulagnier-Spairani, et al., Le désir et la perversion (pp. 9–52). Paris: Seuil. EXPERIENCE OF SATISFACTION In The Language of Psychoanalysis, Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis gave the following definition of ‘‘experience of satisfaction’’: ‘‘Type of primal experience postulated by Freud, consisting in the resolution, 535 EXPERIENCE OF SATISFACTION thanks to an external intervention, of an internal tension occasioned in the suckling by need. The image of the satisfying object subsequently takes on a special value in the construction of the subject’s desire. This image may be recathected in the absence of the real object (hallucinatory satisfaction of the wish). And it will always guide the later search for the satisfying object’’ (1967/1973, p. 156). The concept of the experience of satisfaction—real or hallucinatory—is obviously a cornerstone in Sigmund Freud’s metapsychological construction in that it raises the issue of the mnemic registration of the encounter with the object and in that it tries to articulate the problematic of the assuagement of need and the fulfillment of desire. Freud evoked the experience of satisfaction as early as the ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ (1950c [1895]): ‘‘The residues of the two kinds of experiences [of pain and of satisfaction] which we have been discussing are affects and wishful states are affects and wishful states. These have in common the fact that they both involve a raising of Qé tension in Y—brought about in the case of an affect by sudden release and in that of a wish by summation’’ (pp. 321–322). Freud also referred to this concept several times in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), after which it faded somewhat before reappearing in ‘‘Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning’’ (1911b): ‘‘It was only the non-occurrence of the expected satisfaction, and the disappointment experienced, that led to the abandonment of this attempt at satisfaction by means of hallucination. Instead of it, the psychical apparatus had to decide to form a conception of the real circumstances in the external world and to endeavour to make a real alteration in them. A new principle of mental functioning was thus introduced’’ (p. 219). He returned to the concept yet again in ‘‘Negation’’ (1925h) in an attempt to link together the experience of satisfaction, on the one hand, and the reality principle, on the other: ‘‘[I]t is evident that a precondition for the setting up of reality testing is that objects shall have been lost that once brought real satisfaction’’ (p. 238). In other words, not only does the experience of satisfaction serve as a bridge between need and desire, it is also the basis for reality testing, which is set in motion by the absence of the real object and by insufficient compensation for that absence through the reactivation of memory traces. 53 6 The discussion of the experience of satisfaction thus raises the whole question of primitive hallucination, which Freud, as we know, deemed crucial to the emergence of the infant’s very first mental representations. Initially, the experience of satisfaction is linked to the baby’s fundamental immaturity—that is, its state of helplessness, its primary and fundamental powerlessness (Hilflosigkeit). Incapable on its own of affecting the tension produced by endogenous excitations, the infant must rely on intervention by an outside person. (Guy Rosolato would later interpret this as being the germ of the differentiation between the realm of need and that of sexual difference and autoerotism.) Satisfaction thus comes to be associated with the image of the outside object that has relieved tensions, and when these reappear, there is an active recathexis of the image of the object. Should this recathexis be overly intense, it is liable to produce the same ‘‘indication of reality’’ as the perception itself (hence the possible confusion between the real and hallucinated object, a confusion that is at the heart of the dynamics of desire). According to Laplanche and Pontalis, ‘‘the wish, though it originates with a search for actual satisfaction, is constituted on the model of the primitive hallucination’’ (p. 156). The formation of the ego is what puts an end to this confusion between hallucination and perception by means of its inhibiting role, which prevents an overly intense recathexis of the image of the satisfying object. Involved here are the notions of ‘‘thought identity’’ and ‘‘perceptual identity,’’ which Freud introduced as early as The Interpretation of Dreams: what the subject seeks through the direct path of hallucination (thought identity) is invariably something identical to the perception formerly associated with the satisfaction of a need (perceptual identity). Recent work has attempted to distinguish between the experience of satisfaction and the experience of instinctual gratification, conceived as being broader. In reality, the main discussions have focused more on the nature of primitive hallucination than on the experience of satisfaction itself. Or rather, what is debated is the place of primitive hallucination in the process of the emergence of thought. Some authors have continued to place the absence of the object at the center of this process, while others have emphasized the presence of the object and its relationship with the subject or future subject. Clearly, the experiINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EXTROVERSION/INTROVERSION (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) ence of satisfaction is what links these two approaches, the first of which is characteristic of classical psychoanalysts and the second of so-called developmental psychoanalysts, who in particular want to introduce attachment theory into their thinking (John Bowlby). The absence and presence of the object appear in fact to be fundamentally inseparable, and it is undoubtedly in the experience of satisfaction that the dynamic interactions of need and desire, and even of demand, are most tightly enmeshed. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Infantile omnipotence; Pain; Pleasure/unpleasure principle; ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’; Symbolization, process of; Wish, hallucinatory satisfaction of a. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5: 1–635. ———. (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12: 213–226. within and to mastering the internal danger before it has become an external one’’ (p. 235). Freud was describing the ego’s capacity for internalization, but was adopting a phylogenetic perspective: ‘‘[I]n the course of man’s development from a primitive state to a civilized one his aggressiveness undergoes a very considerable degree of internalization or turning inwards; if so, his internal conflicts would certainly be the proper equivalent for the external struggles which have then ceased’’ (p. 244). His essential concern here was to argue for the dualism of instincts and to suggest that the death drive is equal in importance to Eros. It was Anna Freud who introduced the clinical perspective in Normality and Pathology in Childhood, Assessments of Development (1965/1980). In evaluating pathology in terms of the type of anxiety and conflict experienced by the child, she distinguished internalized external conflicts, which correspond to anxieties linked to fear of object-loss and feelings of guilt, from conflict she described as ‘‘truly internal’’ (p. 133). The latter derives from the relationship between the id and the ego and their conflicting aims. According to her, only analysis can give access to this type of conflict. ———. (1925h). Negation. SE, 19: 233–239. ———. (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281–287. Laplanche, Jean, and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1973). The language of psycho-analysis (Donald Nicholson-Smith, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1967) Rosolato, Guy. (1964). La différence des sexes. Essais sur le symbolique. Paris: Gallimard, 1969. DELPHINE SCHILTON See also: Character neurosis; Group psychotherapies; Identification; Internal object; Word-presentation. Bibliography Freud, Anna. (1980). Normality and pathology in childhood, assessments of development. New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1965) Freud, Sigmund. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–53. EXTERNALIZATION-INTERNALIZATION The terms externalization and internalization refer to a specific psychic modality of externalizing and internalizing the object. In general, externalization and internalization do not bear on aspects of the object, but rather on the relationships and conflicts that are inherent in the object and that it maintains with other objects. Therefore, if a given aspect of the object is internalized or externalized, a relationship is internalized or externalized. In ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’’ (1937c), Freud noted that ‘‘the ego grows accustomed to removing the scene of the fight from outside to INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS EXTROVERSION/INTROVERSION (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) Extroversion and introversion are, for Carl Gustav Jung, two typical attitudes of the personality. These terms describe and distinguish two directions of energy within consciousness that attract the individual toward, on the one hand, the external world and its objects, and on the other hand, the internal world and its images. This typological distinction is to be understood as a function of the unconscious dynamics particular to each person. It is not intended to group 537 E Y , H E N R I (19 00 –197 7) together specific and superficial traits of individuals in a characterological way. The terms extroversion and introversion were first used in 1913 at the Fourth International Congress of Psychoanalysis in Munich, the occasion of the last meeting between Sigmund Freud and Jung and of their irrevocable rupture. At the time, the terms corresponded to personal concerns: At issue, for Jung, was understanding the conflicts dividing the psychoanalytic movement. This was the thrust of his lecture entitled ‘‘The Question of the Psychological Types,’’ which he concluded by opposing Alfred Adler’s theory, which he termed introverted, to Freud’s theory, supposedly extroverted, in that the one was centered around a subjective wish (for power), while the other was centered around a sexual quest (for the object). But, beyond this contrast, the importance that Jung attached to the typology illustrates one of his main intellectual choices: the relativization of all theories, including his own. Extroversion and introversion coexisted in each person, according to Jung, but in different modes. In the normal subject, both were available to consciousness and came into play in alternation to meet the dual necessities of internal adaptation (the unconscious) and external adaptation (outer reality). Type— whether extroverted or introverted—was defined by the relative predominance of one or the other of the two attitudes in the realm of consciousness, the other attitude being partially relegated to the unconscious, where it acted in a compensatory unconscious mode. Finally, in pathological personalities, a single attitude predominated systematically and chronically; the opposing attitude was inaccessible to consciousness, and the compensatory role of the unconscious was manifested only in the form of symptoms. Extroversion and introversion are in keeping with Jung’s conception of, and practical approach to, the unconscious and with Jungian practices. In this perspective, the unconscious is not solely pathogenic, but also has the potential to create balance, in particular though its compensatory role: it can bring into conscious awareness thoughts, tendencies, and impulses that consciousness neglects or rejects. Dreams, symbols, and parapraxes—also in addition to symptoms— serve as vectors of these unconscious compensations. Extroversion and introversion cannot be conceived without four functions that are their modes of expres53 8 sion: thought, feeling, intuition, and sensation. It is important not to confuse a particular feeling, thought, sensation, or intuition with the function that mobilizes it. The former are contents of different values, while the latter is an operating system that makes it possible to utilize the corresponding content. Jung situates these four functions in systems of oppositions. He especially emphasizes the dynamic relation between the privileged function, which partakes of the power of consciousness, and the inferior function, which, by virtue of the fact that it is relegated to the unconscious, is less differentiated, but also contains a strong potential for change. The integration of this inferior function into consciousness is one of the paths to individuation. Among criticisms of these Jungian views, the most vehement are directed less at the categories of extroversion and introversion than at the functions, their division into rational-irrational pairs, their number, and the nature of their opposition. Admittedly, the typology of attitudes proposed by Jung and his theory of the functions could be further refined, but, far from having been conceived after the fashion of a personality test, they provide the stimulus for conceptualizing and dealing with the workings of the psyche as a system that is structurally complex, dynamic, and ever-evolving. MARIE-LAURE GRIVET-SHILLITO See also: Jung, Carl Gustav; Midlife crisis; Psychological types (analytical psychology). Bibliography Hillman, James. (1971). The Feeling Function, in Lectures on Jung’s Typology. Zürich: Spring. Jung, Carl Gustav. (1921). Psychological Types. Collected Works, 6. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Samuels, Andrew. (1985). Jung and the Post-Jungians. London and Boston: Routledge. Franz, Marie-Louise von. (1971). The Inferior Function, in Lectures on Jung’s Typology. Zürich: Spring. EY, HENRI (1900–1977) Henri Ey, a French psychiatrist and philosopher, was born on August 10, 1900, and died on November 9, 1977, in Banyuls-dels-Aspres, in the Pyrénées-Orientales region of France. After completing his secondary educaINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS E Y , H E N R I (1900 –1 977) tion in Sorège, Ey began studying medicine in Toulouse. He was accepted as an intern at the Asiles de la Seine in 1925 and completed his studies in Paris, where he also studied philosophy at the Sorbonne and attended classes by Pierre Janet at the Collège de France. During this period he became friendly with several other interns, in particular, Jacques Lacan, Pierre Mâle, and Julien Rouart. In 1931, while working at the Clinique des maladies mentales (Mental Health Clinic) at Sainte-Anne Hospital, Ey, a senior psychiatrist under Professor Henri Claude, met the first French psychoanalysts invited to practice there: René Laforgue, René Allendy, and Éduouard Pichon. These men were among the founders of the Société psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society). Together with Eugène Minkowski, they were among the first contributors to the jounnal L’évolution psychiatrique (Psychiatric evolution), launched in 1925 and published since then by the group of the same name that it gave birth to. The reference to L’évolution créatrice (Creative Evolution) by Henri Bergson, who critiqued Freud’s first publications from a philosophical point of view, helps explain the genealogy of ideas. During the war and occupation L’évolution psychiatrique suspended activity, but afterward Ey succeeded Minkowski as manager and editorin-chief of the journal. Ey spent most of his career working in hospitals. In 1931 he was appointed as doctor of psychiatry, his first and only position, at Bonneval Psychiatric Hospital (today the Henri Ey Hospital), where he remained until his retirement in 1970. The only interruption occurred when he was mobilized as an army doctor during the war, from 1939 to 1940, and at liberation. Ey’s theoretical work was devoted to applying to the study of mental disorders the ideas of the English neurologist Hughlings Jackson, who was himself inspired by the organicism of the philosopher Herbert Spencer (1820–1903). In organicism (not to be confused with ‘‘organicism’’ in the medical sense), psychic life is characterized by its hierarchical organization, the development of individual functions, their ontogenesis (which reflects the order of their appearance among the species), and phylogenesis. This approach influenced the neurological work of Sigmund Freud, whose On Aphasia: A Critical Study (1953) is nothing more than the application of Jackson’s principles to aphasia. In 1938 Ey published, together with Julien Rouart, the Essai d’application des principes de Jackson à une conception dynamique de la INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS neuropsychiatrie (The application of Jackson’s principles to a dynamic conception of neuropsychiatry), though Rouart distanced himself from the ideas expressed in the monograph when it was reissued in 1975. One of Ey’s last psychoanalytic essays to appear before the four years of silence that ensued under the occupation was his ‘‘Réflexions sur la valeur scientifique et morale de la psychanalyse’’ (Reflections on the scientific and moral value of pyschoanalysis; 1939). The essay was a response to ideas that Roland Dalbiez had expressed in 1936 in La méthode psychanalytique et la doctrine freudienne (Psychoanalytic method and Freudian theory). Ey’s article was a brilliant measured attack against psychoanalysis as it existed in France, and the conclusion provides a clear overview of a position he never wavered from: ‘‘By attempting to reduce psychoanalysis to its exact limits and by showing that it operates within a zone of indeterminacy greater than Mr. Dalbiez appears to be aware of, we have attempted to be somewhat more relaxed in our criticism of the ideology that has crystallized around a major discovery—Freud’s exploration of the unconscious.’’ Throughout his life Ey expressed the same reservations, but these reservations did not prevent him from organizing meetings and discussions that were among the most exhilarating in the history of psychoanalysis in France. Ey organized a number of famous conferences at Bonneval. Two of the best known are the third, ‘‘Le problème de la psychogenèse des névroses et des psychoses’’ (The problem of the psychogenesis of neuroses and psychoses; 1946), with contributions from Jacques Lacan, who discussed the organodynamism of his friend Julien Rouart, and the sixth, ‘‘L’inconscient’’ (The unconscious; 1960), the text of which was published in 1966 after considerable revision. Ey had little doubt that psychoanalysis was part of the medical science of psychiatry. It was with this in mind that he organized the first Congrès mondial de psychiatrie (World Congress of Psychiatry), which was chaired by Jean Delay in Paris in 1950. The participants included several of leading names in psychoanalysis at the time: Franz G. Alexander, Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, Jacques Lacan. The congress was so successful that the organizing association transformed itself into the World Psychiatric Association, whose first executive secretary, until 1966, was Ey. In 1955 Ey edited the first edition of the Traité de psychiatrie (Treatise on psychiatry) in the Encyclopédie 539 E Y , H E N R I (19 00 –197 7) médico-chirurgicale (Medical-surgical encyclopedia). He assigned several chapters to some of the best known analysts of the time, especially those working on neuroses and psychoanalytic theory and practice. Jacques Lacan wrote the chapter ‘‘Variantes de la curetype’’ (Treatment alternatives). See also: Colloque sur l’inconscient; Dalbiez, Roland; France; Évolution psychiatrique (L’-); Ontogenesis; Phenomenology and psychoanalysis; Pscyhogenesis/organogenesis. In 1960 Ey published, with Paul Bernard and Charles Brisset, the Manuel de psychiatrie (Manual of psychiatry), which went through six French editions and numerous translations. The manual introduced medical doctors to an approach to psychiatry that transcended the mechanical, linear model that arose out of medical organicism at the end of the nineteenth century. Ey strongly opposed abandoning the ethical dimension of medicine in the treatment of mental patients, which, in his view, was happening in the antipsychiatric movement and could be found as well in the misuse of psychiatry for purposes of political repression. Bibliography At the end of his professional life, Ey returned to his home in Catalonia, France, but remained active. There he wrote the Traité des hallucinations (Treatise on hallucinations; 1973), in which he devotes an important chapter to the psychodynamic study of hallucinations and, in an organodynamic approach to psychosis, introduces the concept of the ‘‘psychic body.’’ JEAN GARRABÉ 54 0 Bonnafé, Lucien; Ey, Henri; Follin, Sven; Lacan, Jacques; and Rouart, Julien. (1950). Le problème de la psychogenèse des névroses et des psychoses. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. Ey, Henri. (1939). Réflexions sur la valeur scientifique et morale de la psychanalyse: à propos de la thèse de Roland Dalbiez. Encéphale, 34 (4), 189–220. ———. (1966). L’inconscient: VIe colloque de Bonneval, 1960. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. ———. (1973). Traité des hallucinations. Paris: Masson. ———. (1975). Des idées de Jackson à un modèle organodynamique en psychiatrie. Toulouse, France: Privat. Ey, Henri; Bernard, Paul; and Brisset, Charles. (1960). Manuel de psychiatrie. Paris: Masson. Ey, Henri, and Rouart, Julien. (1938). Essai d’application des principes de Jackson à une conception dynamique de la neuropsychiatrie. Paris: Doin. Freud, Sigmund. (1953). On aphasia: A critical study (E. Stengel, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1891) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F FACE-TO-FACE SITUATION The expression face-to-face situation is used to describe the sitting arrangement in psychotherapy, as opposed to psychoanalysis where the patient is on the couch facing away from the psychoanalyst. Sigmund Freud’s prescription is clear as early as 1904 when he wrote, in ‘‘Freud’s Psycho-Analytic Procedure,’’ ‘‘Without exerting any other kind of influence he [the analyst] has them [patients] lie down in a comfortable attitude on a sofa, while he himself sits on a chair behind them outside their field of vision’’ (p. 250). He was even more explicit in 1913 when he wrote, in ‘‘On Beginning the Treatment (Technique of Psycho-Analysis),’’ ‘‘I must say a word about a certain ceremonial which concerns the position in which the treatment is carried out. I hold to the plan of getting the patient to lie on a sofa while I sit behind him out of his sight. This arrangement has a historical basis; it is the remnant of the hypnotic method out of which psycho-analysis was evolved. But it deserves to be maintained for many reasons. The first is a personal motive, but one which others may share with me. I cannot put up with being stared at by other people for eight hours a day (or more). Since, while I am listening to the patient, I, too, give myself over to the current of my unconscious thoughts, I do not wish my expressions of face to give the patient material for interpretations or to influence him in what he tells me. The patient usually regards being made to adopt this position as a hardship and rebels against it, especially if the instinct for looking (scopophilia) plays an important part in his neurosis. I insist on this procedure, however, for its purpose and result are to prevent the transference from mingling with the patient’s associations imperceptibly, to isolate the transference and to allow it to come forward in due course sharply defined as a resistance’’ (pp. 133–134). The patient’s obligation to lie down, according to the fundamental rule, is the second of the two main conditions of treatment that Freud expressed to the Rat Man, who quickly attempted to transgress it (Freud, 1909). Sixteen years later, Freud returned to this issue with Smiley Blanton, as the latter’s Diary of My Analysis with Freud (1971) reveals: ‘‘The position is only a matter of convenience, but one point remains essential: The analysand must not see the analyst’s face. If it were otherwise, the analyst’s expression would influence him.’’ In The Fabric of Affect in the Psychoanalytic Discourse, André Green writes: ‘‘Analytic speech is speech delivered lying down . . . addressed to a hidden partner’’ (1999 [1973], pp. 232–233). The broadening of the types of cases in which psychoanalytic treatment has been deemed possible (psychosis, drug addiction, borderline personality disorders, behavioral disorders, and so on) has modified this previously inflexible rule and led to proposals that certain treatments take place face-to-face, known as ‘‘psychoanalytically inspired psychotherapies’’ (Held). Such therapies have been seen as a means of controlling the narcissistic regression to which the reclining position on the couch is conducive, along with the feelings of depersonalization, overwhelming anxiety states, or mechanisms of defensive rigidification it can entail. A more rational verbalization is thus encouraged; only psychotics are truly uninhibited in communicating their delusional fantasies in face-to-face situations. Better mastery over terrifying impulses to destroy the object can be achieved because of the 541 FACILITATION constant possibility of seeing that the object—here represented by the therapist via the transference—is still present and intact (which at times necessitates, on the part of the therapist, a no less effective mastery over his or her own countertransferential anxieties). The visual gaze intervenes less often as a satisfaction of voyeuristic or exhibitionistic drives than as a testament to the vigilance and security felt by a patient who does not have to fantasize the presence, behind him or her, of an invisible power who sits in judgment and can at any time, without warning, unleash punishment or destruction. The making or avoidance of eye contact is a harder burden for the therapist to bear than for the patient, as Freud noted; behind their elaboration, the crudest countertransferential affects are liable at any time to manifest themselves in body language, facial expressions, or a change in attitude that patients unfailingly perceive and interpret. Can psychoanalytic treatment, in the full sense of the term, take place in the face-to-face situation? Opinion is divided on this issue, although the majority of authors believe that the blocking of fantasies and the difficulty of developing a transference neurosis within a face-to-face situation make it unlikely that an authentic psychoanalytic process can be established. Certain practitioners begin treatment of difficult cases with a period of face-to-face interaction, or insert into classical treatment an interval of face-to-face interaction, which may vary in length, when excessive anxiety makes it dangerous to proceed with treatment within a strictly defined psychoanalytic setting. Such an approach can also be put forward with patients who return to see a psychoanalyst after having finished with classical analysis—a situation that is now increasingly in demand—and, in these cases, must address the often excessive length of treatment and the maintenance of an idealized transference (whether positive or negative) that has been insufficiently analyzed. In current practice, it is increasingly common for psychoanalysts to interact with patients face-to-face, particularly when only temporary support is required or because a current life event—a trauma, for example—calls for a type of help that remains on the surface of the psychic processes, ‘‘at the level of the ego,’’ to use an accepted phrase. In the face-to-face situation, where all the parameters of a permanent erotic-aggressive confrontation seem to converge to produce a pure and simple repeti54 2 tion of a patient’s archaic relational modalities, it is above all important that the psychoanalyst’s listening and physical perception of verbal and intraverbal reality, beyond any reductive fantasmatic project, bring the patient a progressive and profound refutation of their life-sustaining certainty that ‘‘nothing can change’’ and that he or she would run tremendous risks by giving up habitual defenses. See also: Analytical psychology; Psychoanalytic treatment; Psychotherapy. Bibliography Blanton, Smiley. (1971). Diary of my analysis with Freud. New York: Hawthorn. Brusset, Bernard. (1991 May–June). L’or et le cuivre. La psychothérapie peut-elle être et rester psychanalytique? Revue française de psychanalyse, 55 (3). Freud, Sigmund. (1904a [1903]). Freud’s psycho-analytic procedure. SE, 7: 247–254. ———. (1909d). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151–318. ——— (1913c). On beginning the treatment (Further recommendations on technique of psycho-analysis I). SE, 12: 121–144. Green, André. (1999 [1973]). The fabric of affect in the psychoanalytic discourse. London and New York: Routledge. Held, René. (1964–1965) Rapport clinique sur les psychothérapies d’inspiration psychanalytique freudienne. Revue française de psychanalyse, 28(special number). Weissman, Stephen M. (1977). Face to face: The role of vision and the smiling response. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 32, 421–450. FACILITATION Facilitation refers to the repeated passage of an excitation along the same pathway; this brings about a gradual and permanent decrease in resistance to this progression, and thus this channel develops into the preferred pathway for future excitations. This term was used very early by Sigmund Freud (1888r, 1892g, 1893k). In the first article, Freud contrasts ‘‘facilitation and inhibition’’ to ‘‘reflex’’ and, in the two other articles, he separates ‘‘facilitation’’ and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FACKEL (DIE-) ‘‘inhibition’’ as the two modes of reflex transmission. The maximal usage of the term, as defined above, is found in Freud’s 1895 ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology,’’ with its neurological model of mental functioning. Josef Breuer, in the Studies on Hysteria (1895), mentions the ‘‘attentional facilitation’’ invoked by Sigmund Exner (1894), who was dealing with the problem of energy and considered attentional facilitation to be pathological. In the ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology,’’ Freud reworked the same notion differently to describe learning operations at the level of the ‘‘w neurons’’and the memory, which tends to establish a type of operations similar to those of the system governed by the principle of inertia. In this text, facilitation is conceived as a sort of double of the process of cathexis, the other important element in the management of bound energy. Subsequently, Freud all but abandoned the term facilitation, which he uses only three times in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), where he opposes it to ‘‘resistance,’’ and a final time in ‘‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’’ (1920g), where facilitation is defined as a ‘‘permanent trace of the excitation’’ (p. 26) obtained through a decrease in the resistance against the progression of excitation. BERTRAND VICHYN See also: Binding/unbinding of the instincts; Hypercathexis; ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’; Psi system; Signifier; Signifying chain. Bibliography Breuer, Josef, and Sigmund Freud (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. Exner, Sigmund. (1894). Entwurf zu einer physiologischen Erklärung der psychischen Erscheinungen. Vienna. Freud, Sigmund. (1888r). Rezension von: Phisalix, [CésaireAuguste], Sur les nerfs craniens d’un embryon humain de trente-deux jours (Compt. rend. CIV, 4, p. 241). In: Zbl. Physiol., Bd. 1, S. 268. ———. (1892g). Rezension von: Sternberg, [Maximilian], Hemmung, Ermüdung und Bahnung der Sehnenreflexe im Rückenmark (Wiener Akad. Sitzber. Juni 1891). In: Zbl. Physiol., Bd. 5, S. 859f. ———. (1893k). Rezension von: Sternberg, M[aximilian], Über die Beziehungen der Sehnenreflexe zum Muskeltonus INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (Wiener Akad. Sitzber. Juni 1891). In: Zbl. Physiol., Bd. 6, S. 24. ———. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4: 1–338; Part II, SE, 5: 339–625. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 7–64. ———. (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281–387. FACKEL (DIE-) A Viennese satirical review published by Karl Kraus, Die Fackel (The Torch) played an important role in the intellectual life of the early twentieth century. From April 1899 until February 1936, it appeared three times a month, then at least once every four months. Kraus published it by himself and was the only writer on the review’s staff after 1911. His primary target was the press and its promoters, who were the servants of the moneyed classes. Krauss was in favor of sexual freedom and an ethic of right-speech. Because of his antimilitarist position during the First World War, the publication was censored. A number of Kraus’s articles and aphorisms have been collected in anthologies. Sigmund Freud, who was already a reader of the publication in 1903, is quoted in it for the first time in 1905 with reference to his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. In 1906 Die Fackel sided with Freud when he was accused of plagiarism by Wilhelm Fliess. Freud wanted to ‘‘join forces with Kraus,’’ who showed an appreciation for Freud even though believing that art is more important than science and expressing reservations about the interpretation of dreams. The tone changed in 1910 after Fritz Wittels, who had been a prolific contributor to the publication, presented a paper at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society entitled ‘‘The Neurosis of the Torch,’’ in which he caricatures Kraus’s aversion to the Neue Freie Presse as an expression of a desire to kill his father. Kraus then sharpened his barbs against psychoanalysis in aphorisms such as, ‘‘Psychoanalysis is a mental disease for which it assumes it is the therapy’’ (no. 376, June 1913). ERIK PORGE See also: Austria, Wittels, Fritz (Sigfried). 543 FAILURE NEUROSIS Source Citation Die Fackel. (H. Fischer, Ed.). Munich: Kösel Verlag, 1968– 1973, nos. 1–922, 39 vols. Bibliography Kaufholz-Messmer, Eliane. (1975). Karl Kraus. Paris: Editions de l’Herne. Kraus, Karl. (1985). Pro domo et mundo. Paris: Gérard Lebovici. ———. (1986). La nuit venue. Paris: Gérard Lebovici. Nunberg, Hermann, and Federn, Ernst (Eds.). (1962–1975). Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. New York: International Universities Press. Waldvogel, A. (1990). Karl Kraus und die Psychoanalyse: eine historisch-dokumentarische Untersuchung. Psyche: Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und ihre Anwendungen, 44(5), 412–444. FAILURE NEUROSIS The nosographical category of failure neurosis was created and applied mainly in France, as a result of René Laforgue’s writings. It is defined in his book Psychopathologie de l’échec (The psychopathology of failure; 1941): ‘‘We thus speak of the failure of an individual’s emotional life or social activity[. . .]. The person derives from the affective failure itself the strength and the voluptuousness that transforms the unhappiness into happiness.’’. He used the concept in L’echec de Baudelaire (The defeat of baudelaire; 1931), and in chapter eleven of Clinique psychanalytique (Clinical aspects of psychoanalysis; 1936/1984) he described it as a specific nosographical category. He was then criticized by Edward Glover in 1939 for following the current trend among French psychoanalysts of isolating multiple clinical syndromes without putting much effort into systematizing them into general categories. Although the chapters devoted to Napoleon and Hitler disappeared mysteriously during the troubled period of the Second World War, his book, which appeared in 1941, took Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Robespierre as examples in order to review and develop the psychopathological variations that clinicians encounter. Laforgue also pointed to Freud’s treatment of the subject: ‘‘Freud was the first to speak of this syndrome in a short article on Those Wrecked 54 4 by Success but he did not accord to the question all the importance it deserved.’’ Freud did indeed describe this ‘‘character-type’’ among the causes of resistance to the symptom analysis (1916d). Taking the examples of Lady Macbeth and Rebecca West, a character in Ibsen’s Rosmersholm, he showed how guilt linked to the possible realization of forbidden desires could lead to a failure as soon as the consciously desired goal was achieved in reality. Laforgue continued this oedipal theme, elaborating it from the notion of the superego (which he called the superI). Because of his work on ‘‘family neurosis’’ (another syndrome that has since been forgotten), he considered the family environment important. Failure as ‘‘fear of success’’ translates psychically into inhibitions, depression, even delusions, or physically into clumsiness or accidents of varying degrees, perhaps even fatal. These disorders can correspond to punishment for transgressing a prohibition (appearing after a significant success) or the impossibility of successfully completing a task required by the ego ideal. Other forms have been linked to survivor guilt after the death of a highly cathected object or a catastrophic experience (the Holocaust, for example). These states are usually accompanied by a depressed tone but, as Roy Schafer pointed out, we must be careful not to see all these subjects as ‘‘masochists’’ because this description would imply a sexualization of suffering, which is not always present. The notion of ‘‘fate neurosis,’’ which is quite vague, somewhat clouded the issue of the failure syndrome, which suffered further decline after the Liberation, during the debates around The Psychopathology of Failure, first published in 1941 and reprinted in 1944 despite the fact that it was rejected by Matthias Göring, from whom Laforgue had requested a translation. Certain considerations, like ‘‘this love of suffering, whether it translates as persecution or worrying about money, is one of the characteristic aspects of the Jewish psychism, as it developed in the ghettoes’’ (1941, p. 42), helped discredit this theory, and since 1945 it has received only rare and brief mention in psychoanalytic literature, being generally associated with studies of adolescence (Mâle; Weil). ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Laforgue, René; Neurosis; Psychopathologie de l’échec (Psychopathology of failure). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F A I R B A I R N , W I L L I A M R O N A L D D O D D S (1889 –1 964) Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1916d). Some character-types met with in psycho-analytic work. SE, 14: 309–333. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. Glover, Edward. (1939). Review of Clinical aspects of psychoanalysis, by René Laforgue, Hogarth and Inst. Psycho-Anal., London, 1938. International Journal of PsychoAnalysis, 20, 196–197. Laforgue, René. (1941). Psychopathologie de l’échec. Marseille: Les Cahiers du Sud. Laforgue, René. (1984). Clinical aspects of psycho-analysis (Joan Hall, Trans.). New York: Da Capo. (Original work published 1936) Mâle, Pierre. (1971). Quelques aspects de la psychopathologie et de la psychothérapie à l’adolescence. Confrontations psychiatriques, 7, 103–124. Schafer, Roy. (1988). Those wrecked by success. In Robert A. Glick and Donald I. Meyers (Eds.), Masochism: Contemporary psychoanalytic perspective (pp. 81–92). Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. Weil, Annemarie P. (1978). Maturational variations and genetic-dynamic issues. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 26, 461–491. FAIRBAIRN, WILLIAM RONALD DODDS (1889–1964) British physician and psychoanalyst William Ronald Dodds Fairbairn was born in Edinburgh on August 11, 1889, and died there on December 31, 1964. Ronald Fairbairn was the only child of middle-class parents with strict Protestant morals and strong academic traditions in Scotland. He studied moral philosophy at Edinburgh University, and divinity and Hellenistic Greek at Edinburgh, Kiel, Strasbourg and Manchester. Fairbairn made the decision to study medicine and psychotherapy after serving in the First World War. As a medical student he started analysis with E. H. Connell, and shortly after qualifying began thirty years of working with war neuroses. Despite being without the requisite formal training, he began psychoanalytic work in 1925 and obtained his MD in 1927. In 1926 he married and began a family; he started his clinical writing soon after. From 1927 to 1935 he was a lecturer in psychology at Edinburgh University, his special subject being adolescence, and held a post at the Clinic for INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Children and Juveniles where he treated the delinquent and sexually abused. He was introduced to the British Psycho-Analytical Society by both Ernest Jones and Edward Glover, who admired his thinking and intellectual rigor. Fairbairn was elected as associate member of the British PsychoAnalytical Society after presenting a paper to the Society in 1931. He became a full member in 1938. During the Second World War he held a post in the Emergency Medical Service, and later a government post, while beginning to publish his most important contributions. Isolated from the conflicts in the British Psycho-Analytical Society, he was able to develop his original and independent ideas, and towards the end of his life was increasingly recognized. Fairbairn’s first wife died in 1952, and he remarried in 1959. Fairbairn’s principal contributions can be found in his book Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality (1952), and his article ‘‘An Object Relation Theory of the Personality’’ (1954). Several of these contributions are outlined below. Fairbairn moved from a biological model to a psychological one, in which the early unitary ego is genetically geared towards object relationships. Energy is inseparable from structure in this model, and ‘‘drive’’ is seen as the struggle for integration, individuation and recognition within a human environment. He described a theory of development based on a maturational sequence of relationships throughout life, from infantile dependence to ‘‘mature dependence.’’ To this he added a theory of endopsychic structure and its development, in which the ego, as it becomes attached to different (ideal, exciting, rejecting) aspects of mother, internalizes them and splits (this is the ‘‘schizoid condition,’’ inevitable and basic). The ego divides into a ‘‘central’’ ego, partly conscious and available for real relationships; a ‘‘libidinal’’ ego; and an ‘‘antilibidinal’’ (‘‘internal saboteur’’) ego, both unconscious. The central ego also internalizes what Fairbairn called the ‘‘ideal object,’’ and in order to earn its approbation develops the ‘‘moral defense’’ of guilt; it is the central ego, operating in the ‘‘real world’’ and also in touch with inner structures, that can mediate between them and lead to the opening up of the inner world to reality. Fairbairn also developed a theory of psychopathology based on real environmental failure, in which the infant internalizes and identifies with the bad aspects 545 FALSE SELF of its parent(s), and represses the relationships, together with memory, fantasy, and attached affect. The type and severity of psychopathology depends on the degree of splitting and repression required, the defenses against it, and the amount of remaining central ego available for external relationships. Here there are implications for psychoanalytic technique, particularly in the understanding of repetition compulsion. One of the most important founders of objectrelations theory, Fairbairn left work that has been increasingly influential, both in the United Kingdom and internationally. Those particularly influenced include members of the British Independent Group, attachment theorists, self-psychologists, and intersubjective theorists. JENNIFER JOHNS Notions developed: Antilibidinal ego; Quasi-independence/transitional stage. See also: Breast, good/bad object; Great Britain; Libido; Object relations theory; Self (true/false). Bibliography Fairbairn, Ronald. (1952). Psychoanalytic studies of the personality. London: Tavistock Publications. ———. (1994). From instinct to self: Selected papers of W. R. D. Fairbairn: Vol. 1, Clinical and theoretical papers. (David Scharff and Ellinor Fairbairn Birtles, Eds.). New Jersey: Jason Aronson. ———. (1994). From instinct to self: Selected papers of W. R. D. Fairbairn: Vol. 2, Applications and early contributions. (David Scharff and Ellinor Fairbairn Birtles, Eds.). New Jersey: Jason Aronson. Greenberg, Stephen, and Mitchell, Jay. (1983). Object relations in psychoanalytic theory. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press. Grotstein, James, and Rinsley, Donald (Eds.). (1994). Fairbairn and the origins of object relations. London: Free Association Press and New York: The Guilford Press. Sutherland, John. (1989). Fairbairn’s journey into the interior. London: Free Association Press. FALSE SELF The false self, in Donald Winnicott’s developmental schema, refers to certain types of false personalities that develop as the result of early and repeated environmental 54 6 failure, with the result that the true self-potential is not realized, but hidden. This idea appears in many papers and is fully presented in ‘‘The theory of infantparent relationship’’ (Winnicott, 1965c). From 1945 onward Winnicott described the infant’s development. In the earliest object relationships the infant is most of the time unintegrated and absolutely dependent, requiring at first the mother’s totally reliable and empathic response (primary maternal preoccupation). Later the infant accepts her gradual but tolerable failures in provision (good enough mothering) and proceeds to ego integration and relative dependence. ‘‘Not good enough mothers,’’ those who are unable to satisfy the excited infant’s needs or who demand an inappropriately integrated response from an infant unable to give it, Winnicott describes as impinging and traumatizing. When repeated traumas occur very early in development, the infant experiences extreme dread or primitive agony, and psychosis may result. To such a mother, who fails to meet the infant’s gesture and substitutes one of her own, the older and more integrated infant responds in a compliant fashion. In this way the infant may develop a false self that builds up a set of relationships based on compliance or even imitation, the potential true self being unrealized and hidden. Winnicott described five degrees of false self. In the extreme case, the true self is completely hidden, and the false self appears authentic and is frequently successful, though failing in intimate relationships. In nearly normal cases, the false self is bound by the ordinary restraints necessary for social adaptation. Winnicott emphasizes a particular type of false self in which intellectual activity is dissociated from psychosomatic existence. Winnicott is elusive in style, because he writes from an object-related point of view. In this viewpoint, the undifferentiated infant ego exists from the beginning in a relationship without knowing it, because the sense of self and other does not yet exist. Winnicott’s developmental approach, of which the concept of a false self is one aspect, differs from those of Freud and Klein. He does not directly address instincts in themselves, for instance, since his focus is on the developing and dynamic relationship between what will become the individual and the environment in which that individual will grow. His theory parallels but also differs from that of Fairbairn. On Fairbain’s theory, environmental failure and lack of early intimacy must result in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FAMILY defensive splitting, schizoid mechanisms being the most basic. From there, there are many subsequent possibilities in terms of character development and psychopathology. Winnicott held that one can ameliorate false-self organizations of personality only by facilitating regression in analysis. JENNIFER JOHNS See also: As if personality; Internal object; Lie; Normality; Self (true/false); Splitting. Bibliography Winnicott, Donald W. (1945). Primitive emotional development. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 26. (Reprinted in his Collected papers: through paediatrics to psycho-analysis [1958].) ———. (1958). Psychosis and child care. In his Collected papers: through paediatrics to psycho-Analysis (pp. 219– 228). London: Tavistock Publications. (Original work published 1952) ———. (1965a). Ego distortion in terms of true and false self. In his Maturational processes and the facilitating environment (pp. 140–152). London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Original work published 1962) ———. (1965b). Ego-integration in child development. In his Maturational processes and the facilitating environment (pp. 56–63). (Original work published 1962) ———. (1965c). The theory of infant-parent relationship. In his Maturational processes and the facilitating environment (pp. 17–55). London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Original work published 1960) ———. (1975). Through paediatrics to psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of PsychoAnalysis. ———. (1989). Development of the theme of the mother’s unconscious as discovered in psycho-analytic practice. In his Psychoanalytic explorations (pp. 247–250). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. FAMILY Family is usually defined as a group of persons related by marriage or blood ties, or even by adoption—and also by the family bond. Psychoanalysis contains an implicit concept of family. It emphasizes the functions of each family member and the prescriptions and prohibitions governing the relationships between them, which influence conflicts, fantasies, and the psychic agencies. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS The family is a unit that consists of something more than a series of individuals; it is a group to which they belong and that provides support with its rules, which are as obscure and powerful as those of the unconscious and that thus ensure the family’s coherence and cohesion. The family has many purposes: providing for its members’ material and psychic needs and conceiving and developing the child until his accession as a subject. Each parent transmits a legacy that the child will have to negotiate in connection with its wishes. The family also has a function in terms of play, creating the space and time for leisure and reverie. Before Freud, doctors took little interest in the family. The patient was studied in the present, without reference to childhood history, to the context in which he had developed, or to his father or mother, except to identify any hereditary predispositions that would reinforce the prevailing hypothesis concerning degeneration in mental patients. Freud raised the family to a preeminent position. However, after he quickly abandoned the seduction theory, the family headed by a seducer changed its status from a real entity to a theoretical fantasy. Freud still addressed the family as a real entity in the form of the primal horde (1912–1913a), with the authoritarian father put to death by his sons who were excluded from sharing the women. Freud subsequently returned to this hypothesis as to the origin of culture. For example, his group psychology (1921c) helped to explain family psychology. It may even be that he envisaged the functioning of the group and the crowd as an archaic family dominated by a leader (father) at whom his subjects direct their (ego) ideal cathexes. This model bears a curious resemblance to the family of ancient Rome, in which the father was the uncontested leader around whom the life of the household revolved. There are some revealing exceptions to this lack of interest in the real family, for instance, the account that the child’s father gives to Freud in the analysis of ‘‘Little Hans’’ (1909b). It was not unusual at the time for a single analyst to treat different members of the same family. As the real family receded from the picture, the representations of the parents gained ground, particularly through the increased interest in object relations. The shifting importance of the family relates to developments in the theory of trauma. However, the real problem is discovering not whether the original theory of trauma was definitively abandoned by Freud but whether it was given anything 547 FAMILY COMPLEX other than a factual status. It would then not simply be the presence of the object or the primary maternal care that contributed to introjections but the parent’s subjectivity, desires, fantasies, and affects—in other words, the force of his unconscious desire, which orients the child’s ideals by proposing an ideal that reinforces his self-esteem when he experiences it as an important part of himself and which awakens the life of the drives by seducing him. The analytic theory of the family is based on this model. It addresses the way in which the reciprocal cathexes between its members are managed and mobilized. Donald Winnicott explained this unconscious functioning as a productive network of interrelated fantasies giving rise to a generative illusion on the part of the mother and her child, whose attuned psyches are connected by primary narcissistic identifications. This generates the concept of the bond: An object relationship would be inconceivable without its counterpart, in other words, without the cathexis that the external object creates of the former and applies to him (Eiguer, 1987). Furthermore, the concept of the bond is complicated by the dual nature of filiation. The family romance (Freud, 1909c [1908]) is a fantasy in which the child gives himself another origin by imagining himself to be adopted or illegitimate. While assuaging his oedipal anxieties, he seeks, by inventing better or prestigious parents for himself, to preserve the previous idealization of his own parents. However, in giving himself other parents (or one other) than his own, he acknowledges an essential dimension of filiation: The parental roles are not equivalent to the procreative functions—they can even be independent of these. In matrilineal cultures in particular, the father’s role of strict educator reverts to an uncle who is related to the mother. Although Freud’s discovery relates to a set of fantasies, this nevertheless accords with the idea of an underlying imago-based structure. The transgenerational figure of the ancestor ultimately evokes this spiritual fatherhood in the other of the father, the fourth family member. ALBERTO EIGUER See also: Collective psychology; Intergenerational; Law of the Father; Psychoanalytic family therapy; Secret; Sociology and psychoanalysis, sociopsychoanalysis. 54 8 Bibliography Eiguer, Alberto. (1987). La Parenté fantasmatique. Paris: Dunod. Freud, Sigmund. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a fiveyear-old boy. SE, 10: 1–149. ———. (1909c [1908]) Family romances. SE, 9: 235–241. ———. (1912–1913a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ———. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. Laforgue, René. (1936). La névrose familiale (IXe Conférence des psychanalystes de langue française). Revue française de psychanalyse, 9 (4), 327–359. Winnicott, Donald W. (1965). The maturational processes and the facilitating environment. London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psychoanalysis. FAMILY COMPLEX. See Imago FAMILY ROMANCE The family romance is a conscious fantasy, later repressed, in which a child imagines that their birth parents are not actual but adoptive parents, or that their birth was the outcome of maternal infidelity. Typically, the fantasy parents are of noble lineage, or at least of a higher social class than the real parents. The family romance (Freud, 1909c[1908]) differs from children’s sexual theories in that it does not address general questions about the origins of life but rather the question, ‘‘Who am I?’’—where ‘‘I’’ denotes not an agency of the mind (or ego) but the result of an effort to place oneself in a history, and hence the attempt to form the basis of a knowledge. The family romance fantasy has several possible aims and sources: revenge against frustrating parents; rivalry with the parent of the same sex; separation from idealized parents by means of their transformation into fantasy parents; and the elimination of brothers and sisters for competitive or incestuous purposes. The family romance is built on the basis of the child’s intuitive knowledge of their parents’ emotions, although the parents may believe these perfectly conINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F A N O N , F R A N T Z (1925 –1 961) cealed (see Freud, Totem and Taboo [1912–1913a]; also, apropos of the paranoid’s intuitiveness, ‘‘Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality’’ [1922b [1921]]). Other intellectual capacities are necessary for the creation of a family romance, notably the ability to compare and to relativize. The fantasy may thus be considered the result of a basic psychological attainment, that of the right to doubt—here, to doubt the absolute aspect of parental figures (‘‘Pater semper incertus est’’). The family romance is, in fact, linked to the unconscious of the parents. For the father, there can be only one true father, his own, that of the ‘‘primal horde’’; while the mother associates her child psychologically, particularly her first-born, with her own oedipal attachments (Mijolla). This first childhood romance is often maintained in daydreams well beyond puberty. Its influence is also discernible in the pleasure novel-readers derive by identifying with different fictional characters. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Cultural transmission; Family; Fantasy; Heroic self, the; Imposter; Latency period; Myth of the Birth of the Hero; Myth of the hero; Mythology and psychoanalysis; Substitute/substitutive formation. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1909c [1908]). Family romances. SE, 9: 235–241. ———. (1912–13a]). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ———. (1922b [1921]). Neurotic mechanisms in jealousy, paranoia and homosexuality, SE, 18: 221–232. Mijolla, Alain de. (1987). Unconscious identification, fantasies and family prehistory. International Journal of Psychoanalysis , 68, 397–403. Further Reading Corbett, Ken. (2001). Nontraditional family romance. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 70, 599–624. Greenacre, Phyllis. (1958). The family romance of the artist. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 13, 9–36. FAMILY THERAPY. See Psychoanalytic family therapy INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FANON, FRANTZ (1925–1961) Frantz Fanon was born on July 20, 1925, in Fort-deFrance on the Caribbean island of Martinique and died on December 6, 1961, in Washington, D.C. He is best known for his work in fighting against colonization. Fanon was the son of a native Martiniquan father (the descendant of slaves and a member of the island’s middle-class community), and a French (Alsace) mother (herself the daughter of a mixed marriage). Between 1939 and 1943 he studied at the Lycée Schoelcher, where he was taught by Aimé César, a poet who helped destroy the image of the African created by European colonization. In 1943, then a young man, Fanon became a dissident and agitated against representatives of the Vichy regime in the Antilles. He traveled to the island of Dominica to rally the free French forces in the Caribbean. In 1944 he fought on the European front. Wounded near the Swiss border, he received a citation for his courage, signed by Colonel Raoul Salan, whom he would later fight against in Algeria. After receiving his baccalaureate at the special session of March 1946, he went to Lyon, France, to study medicine (1946–1951). After a brief stay in Martinique at the end of 1951, he returned to Lyon to specialize in psychiatry under the direction of Professor Tosquelles. There he met Octave Mannoni. The two men became friends, but Fanon was highly critical of Mannoni’s Psychologie de la Colonisation (Psychology of colonization). He became a psychiatrist in June 1953. In 1954 he was appointed to a post in Blida, Algeria. He saw patients during the day and, at night, participated in the struggle for Algerian independence. He was expelled from Algeria in January 1957. At the end of the summer of 1958, Fanon settled in Tunis to resume his double life. He died in 1961 from leukemia. He developed an interest in psychoanalysis fairly early in his career; he speaks of it in his first book, Black Skin, White Masks (1967a), published when he was twenty-seven. His attitude is that of a colonized subject who, disappointed by racism, grows skeptical of European universalism. Yet he began this work with the following statement: ‘‘Only a psychoanalytic interpretation of the black problem can reveal the emotional anomalies responsible for the resulting complexes.’’ Fanon saw Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, and Carl Gustav Jung as more or less the same. His form of psychoanalysis is more of a social therapy based on liberation than of a talking cure. 549 FANTASY His ideas, as represented in his books—Studies in a Dying Colonialism (1965a), The Wretched of the Earth (1965a), and Toward the African Revolution (1967b)— can be summarized as follows: There is a specific pathology associated with colonization. The core of the emotional disturbances affecting black people is an inferiority complex, in the Adlerian sense. The Oedipus complex does not occur in families from the Antilles. The unconscious, as described by Jung, is collective. Analysis of the social-historical development of the individual must take precedence over any other approach. Freud, Jung, and Adler were not thinking about black people when they formulated their theories. He rejected the idea of determinism, believing that humankind was abandoned to its own fate. He was unable to overcome his resistance to psychoanalysis at the time of his premature death at the age of thirty-six. GUILLAUME SURÉNA See also: Martinique; North African countries. Bibliography Cherki, Alice. (2000). Frantz Fanon, portrait. Paris: Seuil. Fanon, Frantz. (1965a). Studies in a dying colonialism (Haakon Chevalier, Trans.). New York: Monthly Review Press. (Original work published 1958) ———. (1965b). The wretched of the earth (Constance Farrington, Trans.). New York: Grove Press. (Original work published 1961) ———. (1967a). Black skin, white masks (Charles Lam Markmann, Trans.). New York: Grove Press. (Original work published 1952) ———. (1967b). Toward the African revolution: Political essays (Haakon Chevalier, Trans.). New York: Grove Press. (Original work published 1964) FANTASY A fantasy is a product of the imagination in the form of a script in the theatrical or cinematic sense and deployed in support of a wish-fulfillment. It may be a conscious creation, a daydream created by the subject to procure an imaginary satisfaction that is erotic, aggressive, self-flattering, or self-aggrandizing in nature. This wish-fulfilling function likens the daydream, or reverie, to night dreams, but it may also be com55 0 pared to symptoms or behavior with similar aims. It must therefore be supposed that all these manifestations have a common origin, namely unconscious fantasy. The term Phantasie was part of everyday language, where it signified ‘‘fancy,’’ ‘‘imagination.’’ It appeared very early in Freud’s writings, notably in the Studies on Hysteria (1895d), where he noted the frequency of daydreams among hysterics. However, the word soon took on a more precise meaning and the concept was expanded centrally in the burgeoning science of psychoanalysis. In a letter dated May 2, 1897, to Wilhelm Fliess, Freud wrote, ‘‘I have gained a sure inkling of the structure of hysteria. Everything goes back to the reproduction of scenes. Some can be obtained directly, others always by way of fantasies set up in front of them. The fantasies stem from things that have been heard but understood subsequently, and all their material is of course genuine.’’ (p. 239). Later, in Draft M (May 25, 1897), we find this: ‘‘Fantasies arise from an unconscious combination of things experienced and heard, according to certain tendencies. These tendencies are toward making inaccessible the memory from which symptoms have emerged or might emerge. . . . As a result of the construction of fantasies like this (in periods of excitation), the mnemic symptoms cease’’ (1985a [1887–1904], p. 247). Already, then, at this early moment, Freud posited unconscious fantasy as the source of the symptom, of the dream (soon to be elaborated on in The Interpretation of Dreams,1900a), of daydreams, parapraxes, and so on. But the claim that ‘‘all [this] material is of course genuine’’ was significantly revised. On September 21, 1897, he famously announced to Fliess, ‘‘I no longer believe in my neurotica’’ (p. 264)—that is, in an etiology for hysteria attributable in all cases to a trauma actually experienced during childhood. This is not to say that Freud now abandoned his seduction theory. But in the wake of a sudden disillusionment, he entered a long period leading to his recognition that the traumatic event was never recorded exactly per se, and never endured in unmodified form but, quite to the contrary, was subject to incessant reworking after the fact. From that moment, indeed, Freud was convinced that ‘‘there are no Ôindications of reality’ in the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between truth and fiction that has been cathected with affect’’ (p. 264); or in other words between historical (or event-defined) reality and fantasy. It was possible, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FANTASY then, that in some cases the hysterical symptom was the product of ‘‘pure fantasy’’; seduction nevertheless existed, especially in view of the fact that a child might read this connotation into ‘‘innocent’’ events. The birth of the psychoanalytical concept of fantasy may thus be dated 1897; in Freud’s self-analysis, its advent coincides with that of the Oedipus complex. As Freud wrote to Fliess on October 15, 1897, ‘‘I have found, in my own case too, [the phenomenon of] being in love with my mother and jealous of my father, and I now consider it a universal event in early childhood’’ (p. 272). This twin birth was acknowledged by Freud a quarter of a century later in An Autobiographical Study (1925d): ‘‘When, however, I was at last obliged to recognize that these scenes of seduction had never taken place, and that they were only phantasies which my patients had made up or which I myself had perhaps forced upon them, I was for some time completely at a loss. . . . When I had pulled myself together, I was able to draw the right conclusions from my discovery: namely, that the neurotic symptoms were not related directly to actual events but to wishful phantasies, and that as far as the neurosis was concerned psychical reality was of more importance than material reality. . . . I had in fact stumbled for the first time upon the Oedipus complex’’ (p. 34). There are references to fantasy throughout Freud’s work, especially prior to the major theoretical revision of the 1920s. In his paper on ‘‘Screen Memories’’ (1899a), he revealed the role of adolescent fantasies in the work of reconstructing childhood memories. The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), based on the idea of the dream as a wish-fulfillment, was itself a study of nighttime expressions of fantasy, while Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva’’ (1907a) and ‘‘Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming’’ (1908e) were centered on the eruptions of fantasy during waking life. ‘‘Hysterical Phantasies and their Relation to Bisexuality’’ (1908a) was a reconsideration, ten years after its initial formulation, of the theory of symptom production through fantasy. In spite of its title, ‘‘On the Sexual Theories of Children’’ (1908c) also examined the role of fantasy: certain ‘‘theories’’ were constructed by the child to explain the mysteries of sexuality, conception, and birth, but they were in effect also imaginary productions similar to reveries. In the ‘‘Wolf Man’’ case history (1918b [1914]), Freud, returning at length to the problem of the relationship between event-defined ‘‘historical reality’’ and fantasy creation, ended by INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS re-embracing the notion of ‘‘phylogenetically’’ transmitted primal fantasies, previously discussed in Totem and Taboo (1912–1913a). Of special importance too is the essay ‘‘ÔA Child is Being Beaten’’’ (1919e), where Freud analyzed the genesis and structure of a particular fantasy in which erotic pleasure was tied to the evocation of punishment experienced by a (different) child. The notion of fantasy nevertheless remained rather vague in Freud’s work. It presented a number of problems for him, especially that of the relationship between fantasy and representation. More generally, there was the question of the role played by fantasy in mentation. For Freud, the instinct was the living source of all mental activity, as he clearly asserted in The Interpretation of Dreams. The dream was a wishfulfillment, but the dual action of primary processes and secondary revision could bring about transpositions and distortions that permitted the latent thoughts of the dream to cross over into the dream’s manifest content, to transform from unconscious fantasies into explicit images better able to break through the barrier of the censorship. In Chapter 7 of The Interpretation, Freud extended this model to psychic work as a whole in order to account for the transition from fantasy to mental representation, which were closely akin because of their common origin. The result, paradoxically, was that the difference between them was clearly pointed up: whereas the fantasy was an internal formation, created without reference to reality, mental representations drew their very substance from their relationship with the outside world. In ‘‘Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning’’ (1911b), Freud reiterated that fantasy served the pleasure principle exclusively, while mental representation, though it might transpose fantasy, answered strictly by the reality principle. Both the close kinship and the basic difference between fantasy and mental representation are easy to discern in Freud’s account of hallucinatory wish-fulfillment, where he describes that founding moment when the infant obtains satisfaction by hallucinating the real, but absent, agent of satisfaction, and then, since the need remains, begins to ‘‘represent’’ that absence (the representation of the object arises from its very absence). W. R. Bion was a leader among those authors who have sought to thus develop a theory of mental activity designed to illuminate the relationship between fantasy and representation. 551 FANTASY The fact remains that back in 1897 Freud ran into a difficulty that continued to occupy him for the rest of his life and is still a crucial question for psychoanalysis in the twenty-first century: If instinctual forces are indeed the live source of wishes or fantasies, which mediate them, how can the forms of those wishes be explained, and more specifically how is it that typical forms, seemingly derived from a common matrix, occur very widely among people whose history and psychic make-up vary considerably? Freud posed this question repeatedly in his account of the ‘‘Wolf Man’’ (1918b [1914]), where he offered a meticulous, albeit hypothetical reconstruction of events that took place in his patient’s life between the ages of eighteen months and four years old in order to explain his subsequent pathology. Yet Freud continued to feel that such an explanation, based on a person’s real history, left something to be desired. He consequently appealed to an even earlier ‘‘historical reality’’—that of the human species as a whole: ‘‘It seems to me quite possible that all the things that are told to us today in analysis as phantasy . . . were once real occurrences in the primaeval times of the human family, and that children in their phantasies are simply filling in the gaps in individual truth with prehistoric truth’’ (1916–1917a, p. 371). This echoed the ‘‘fiction’’ Freud had developed in Totem and Taboo (1912–1913a) according to which, at the time of the ‘‘primal horde,’’ the sons killed their father and committed incest with their mother; ever since, the unconscious memory of that primal drama has left its stamp on every human being. It is not unreasonable to have reservations about this speculation. Nevertheless, clinical psychoanalysis has verified the role of ‘‘fantasies’’ that can be qualified as ‘‘primal,’’ however one regards their historicity, in that they are the basis of every individual fantasy. Freud mentioned three varieties: ‘‘I call such fantasies—of the observation of sexual intercourse between the parents, of seduction, of castration, and others— Ôprimal fantasies’’’ (1915f, p. 269). But this enumeration should not be looked upon as definitive; it should no doubt include the fantasy of a return to the mother’s breast (for further discussion of primal fantasies, see Laplanche and Pontalis). Among post-Freudian developments, Melanie Klein’s contribution is the most important. Continuing the line of enquiry that Freud opened up in ‘‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes’’ (1915c) and reorganized after 1920 by introducing the life and death 55 2 instincts, Klein assigned a leading role to the play of fantasy in the mental life of young children; indeed, she even seemed to make the apprehension of reality subordinate to fantasy in the context of a battle royal between love and hate that aroused massive anxiety. The beginning of mental life was envisaged by Klein as the scene of a tragedy played out by fantasies of invasion, cannibalism, deadly attacks on the breast and by the breast, explosion, laceration, and so forth. This approach was further advanced by some of Klein’s followers, notably Donald Meltzer. Significant theoretical support was supplied by Susan Isaacs in her paper ‘‘On the Nature and Function of Phantasy’’ (1948). A very different approach was taken by Jacques Lacan, who compared fantasy to freezing the frame of a moving picture. In contrast to the Kleinian view, the emphasis here was on the defensive function of fantasies, which sought to ‘‘freeze’’ the evocation of violent scenes, and first and foremost those responsible for castration anxiety. For Lacan, the neurotic fantasy was an attempt, always fruitless, to respond to the enigma of the desire of the other. However varied individual expressions of fantasy themes might be, the aim of analysis was always to circumscribe the typical basic fantasy of each analysand, its place and role in the symbolic structure that determined that analysand’s particular mode of gratification (jouissance). Michèle Perron-Borelli (1997) has taken an entirely different tack, providing a general overview of fantasy in the context of an original theoretical reformulation of the problem. Noting that every fantasy is centered on a representation of action, whether active in nature (e.g., seducing) or passive (being seduced), she defines fantasy in terms of a three-part structure comprised of an agent, an action, and an object of the action. This structure is analogous, for Perron-Borelli, to the basic grammatical subject/verb/object pattern; this is no accident, perhaps, if one accepts that language reflects the development of thought itself, and its origins in fantasy. All fantasy activity, therefore, and indeed all thought, may be conceived of as a system of transformations of this basic structure by a variety of means: changing of places by the subject and the object relative to the action (change from activity to passivity or vice versa), the replacement of the object or the subject, the assumption by the subject of the viewpoint of an outside observer; and so on. In this view, the subject comes into being and develops by virtue of these transformations themselves. At a deeper level, the startingINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FANTASY, FORMULA point is sought in a ‘‘primal fantasy matrix’’ in the autoerotic life of the infant. ROGER PERRON See also: Act/action; Adolescent crisis; Amnesia; Anxiety; Archaic mother; Autism; Body image; Castration complex; Combined parental figure; Creativity; Depression; Family; Fantasy, formula of; Fantasy (reverie); Graph of Desire; Group analysis; Idea/representation; Identification; Identification fantasies; Internal/external reality; Internal object; Masochism; Myth of origins; Mythology and psychoanalysis; Need for causality; Neurotica; Object a; Oedipus complex, early; Perversion; Phallic woman; Pregnancy, fantasy of; Primal fantasies; Primal scene; Primal, the; Projective identification; Real trauma; Reparation; Rescue fantasies; Reverie; Screen memory; Seduction scenes; Symptom-formation; Unconscious fantasy; ‘‘Vagina dentata,’’ fantasy of. OF ———. (1925d [1924]). An autobiographical study. SE, 20: 1–74. ———. (1985c [1887–1904]). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887–1904 (Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, Ed. and Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap/ Harvard University Press. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Joseph. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. Isaacs, Susan. (1948). On the nature and function of phantasy. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 29, 73–97. Laplanche, Jean, and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1968). Fantasy and the origins of sexuality. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 49, 1ff. (Original work published 1964) Perron-Borelli, Michèle. (1997). Dynamique du fantasme. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Perron-Borelli, Michèle, and Perron, Roger. (1997). Fantasme, Action, Pensée. Algiers: Éditions de la Société algérienne de psychologie. Bibliography Fain, Michel. (1971). Prélude à la vie fantasmatique. Revue française de psychanalyse 35 (2–3), 291–364. Further Reading Freud, Sigmund. (1899a). Screen memories. SE, 3: 299–322. Hayman, Arlene. (1989). What do we mean by a ‘‘phantasy’’? International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 70, 105–114. ———. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. ———. (1907a). Delusions and dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva.’’ SE, 9: 1–95. ———. (1908a). Hysterical phantasies and their relation to bisexuality. SE, 9: 156–166. Sandler, Joseph, and Sandler, Anne–Marie. (1994). Phantasy and its transformations: A contemporary Freudian view. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 75, 387–394. Shapiro, Theodore. (1990). Unconscious fantasy: Introduction. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 38, 39–46. ———. (1908c). On the sexual theories of children. SE, 9: 205–226. ———. (1908e). Creative writers and day-dreaming. SE, 9: 141–153. ———. (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12: 213–226. FANTASY, FORMULA OF ———. (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1–122. In his early seminars, especially Object Relations (1956–57), Jacques Lacan primarily conceived of fantasy as deriving from psychic projection that screened a more painful image. He compared it to a freezeframe, where an immobile image is often used to conceal the traumatic image that will come next. Thus he first conceived of fantasy as a defensive structure designed to protect against the perception of ‘‘lack’’ in the maternal other, thus of castration. A study of the different forms of the fantasmatic defense allow for a better understanding of psychical structures. ———. (1919e). ‘‘A child is being beaten’’: A contribution to the study of the origin of sexual perversions. SE, 17: 175–204. Following leads found in Freud’s writings—especially ‘‘The Wolf Man’’ (1918b [1914]) and ‘‘A Child is Being Beaten’’ (1919e)—Lacan questioned the ———. (1912–13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ———. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109–140. ———. (1915f). A case of paranoia running counter to the psycho-analytic theory of the disease. SE, 14: 261–272. ———. (1916–17a). Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 15–16. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 553 FANTASY (REVERIE) relation between the fantasy and fixation on perceptual traces. He also addressed the larger question of memory. He determined that fantasy need not be radically opposed to memory. Instead, he suggested that fantasy might rework memory depending on the pressure of unconscious desire and the defensive strategies of the subject. Thus Lacan stressed that fantasy fundamentally worked to transform memories of real events. In particular, he emphasized that the subject is always represented in fantasy, as in the dream, in a more or less obvious way. In fact, the fantasy stages a certain relation and mode of interaction between the subject and the object of desire. Thus conceived, fantasy is a complex structure, a kind of scenario, as opposed to the simple hallucination of an object. Lacan proposed a general formula for it: S/} a. Here the diamond, }, formalizes the specific relation that the subject of the unconscious, S/, which is ‘‘divided’’ by its relation to the realm of signifiers, maintains with the object ‘‘little a,’’ the ‘‘lost’’ object, the ‘‘detached’’ remainder of the first operation of symbolization by the parental other. The famous list of Freudian ‘‘detachable’’ objects (breast, feces, penis, baby), to which Lacan added the voice, the gaze, and the phoneme, all constitute object-causes of desire (objects a) that are not representable as such. The subject will spend all his or her life searching for various imaginary and concrete intermediary objects to take their place in the realization of desire. In April 1961, in his seminar on the Transference, Lacan tried to define the various types of fantasies: The hysteric aspires to a master. The obsessional’s fantasy involves an indefinite metonymic substitution. And the pervert’s fantasy seeks to radicalize the subject/other split, so that it can be enjoyed; this fantasy tends to take the form a}S/. In his fundamental text, ‘‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious’’ (1960), Lacan tried to place fantasy in the genesis of the psychic apparatus by locating it within his ‘‘graph of desire.’’ The major difficulty here is that the object of the drive, the object of physiological need, and the object of narcissistic love/hate maintain with each other a relation of fundamental and irreducible heterogeneity. For Lacan, the psychoanalytic treatment must locate the subject’s more or less unconscious 55 4 ‘‘fundamental fantasy.’’ At the same time the subject’s particular mode of enjoyment is exposed, and freed as much as possible from the desire of the Other, in relation to which the fantasy is always a compromise formation. The objective of any treatment is always to produce a change in the subject’s defensive processes, to remove obstacles in order to allow the subject access to his or her own enjoyment. Lacan fully recognized the power of the image in fantasy, but he insisted on the fact that its functional value derives from the place that it comes to occupy in the larger symbolic structure. In other words, its value derives from the fact that the image in question (a representation of something unconscious) must be able to play its role as a signifier. On this point, Lacan launched an unceasing attack on (primarily Kleinian) currents in psychoanalysis that tended to consider the fantasy as a production of images that were assumed to be symbols in their own right. He devoted an entire year of his seminar (The Logic of Fantasy, 1966–67) to unraveling the theoretical implications of the inscription of fantasy in the unconscious signifying structure. Most notably, he insisted that fantasy would perform the essential function of ‘‘knotting’’ the psychical registers of the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real—and thus of constituting what Freud called ‘‘psychic reality.’’ BERNARD PENOT See also: Fantasy. Bibliography Lacan, Jacques. (1991). Le Séminaire-Livre VIII, Le Transfert. (1960–61). Paris: Seuil. ———. 1994. Le Séminaire-Livre IV, La Relation d’objet. (1956–57). Paris: Seuil. ———. (2002). Écrits: A selection. (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. ———. Unpublished. Le Séminaire-Livre XIV, La Logic du fantasme. (1966–1967). FANTASY (REVERIE) The term reverie refers to an imaginary representation created to help realize a desire. The term Phantasie was used by Freud to designate such mental activity collectively, whether conscious or unconscious. In French INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FASCINATION the term fantasme prevailed in psychoanalytic use, for it was felt that the term fantaisie was too marked by current usage, where it connotes the idea of capriciousness or gratuitousness. However, following Daniel Lagache (1964), the term fantaisie came to refer to imaginary conscious or preconscious creations, without ignoring their continuity with the unconscious fantasies they reflect. Daydreams, which everyone experiences, are the clearest examples of conscious or preconscious reveries. In general they explicitly satisfy a desire, providing some form of imaginary satisfaction, whether it be erotic, aggressive, ambitious, self-aggrandizing, or uplifting. It is not even unusual for people to visualize painful or humiliating experiences to their own advantage. In all these cases the narcissistic dimension of the process is obvious. There are references to such daydreams in the Studies on Hysteria (1895d), primarily in the case study of Anna O., written by Josef Breuer. Freud wrote about daydreams in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). For example, when analyzing his dream about the ‘‘botanical monograph,’’ he relates a daydream during which he imagines that, afflicted by glaucoma, he travels incognito to Berlin for an operation and experiences considerable pleasure in listening to the surgeon extol the anesthetic qualities of cocaine (thus being compensated for the pain Freud experienced through being too late to be recognized as the one who discovered its properties). The ‘‘fantasies (Phantasien), or daydreams, are the immediate predecessors of hysterical symptoms. . . . Like dreams they are wishfulfillments; like dreams they are based in large part on our infantile experiences; like dreams they enjoy a certain relaxation of the censorship for their creations.’’ According to Freud, a daydream is initially the expression of an unconscious fantasy; then, it is used as available material among the latent thoughts used by dreams. However, as he noted, there is an essential difference between night dreams and daydreams: the first is hallucinatory, the second is not, and the person remains more or less clearly aware that his daydream is a an escape from a reality that is not completely suspended. This distinction can be blurred or even disappear entirely. Freud analyzes this phenomenon in his detailed commentary on Wilhelm Jensen’s Gradiva (1907a). In the same period, in ‘‘Creative Writers and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Daydreaming’’ (1908e [1907]), he discusses the function of daydreaming in the genesis of the literary work, and later, in ‘‘Family Romances’’ (1909c [1908]), he foresees the situation where daydreams are used by the child to avoid the oedipal conflict by imagining himself to be adopted, to be really the child of a king and queen. Robert Desoille (1961) developed an original method of psychotherapy based on the development and analysis of the patient’s daydreams during therapy. For some patients and under certain circumstances, analytic psychodrama can create scenarios that are related to daydreams. ROGER PERRON See also: ‘‘Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming’’; Creativity; Ego ideal; Family romance; Fantasy; Phylogenetic Fantasy, A: Overview of the Transference Neuroses; Psychoanalysis of Fire, The; Reverie; Unconscious fantasy. Bibliography Anargyros-Klinger, Annie; Reiss-Schimmel, Ilana; Wainrib, Steve. (1998). Création, psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Desoille, Robert. (1961). Théorie et Pratique du Rêve-éveillédirigé. Geneva: Le Mont-Blanc. Lagache, Daniel. (1964). Fantaisie, réalité, vérité. Revue française de psychanalyse, 28 (4), 515–538. FASCINATION Fascination commonly refers to the act of fascinating or of being fascinated. To fascinate is to immobilize by the power of the gaze; as well as to charm, enchant, dazzle, or even attract or capture someone else’s gaze. In psychoanalysis the concept was used by Sigmund Freud to refer to the bondage of love. He used this term to refer to the paralysis of critical faculties, the dependence, docile submission, and credulity that occur when in love, which he compared to what occurs in the relationship between hypnotist and hypnotized. The term appears for the first time in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c). Fascination, or love bondage, is the term Freud uses to describe the most extreme developments of being in love. It is possible that he borrowed the term from Gustave Le Bon, whom he quotes and who had noted, 555 FATE NEUROSIS in Psychologie des Foules, that the individual in a crowd arrives at a particular state that approximates the fascination of the hypnotized for the hypnotist. Although the first occurrence of the term fascination appears to date from 1921, what Freud describes is the result of earlier considerations that quickly led him to associate being in love with the hypnotic state. Already in 1890, in his article ‘‘Psychical, or Mental, Treatment,’’ (1890a) referring to the docility, obedience, and credulity of the hypnotized individual, he had noted that in a situation of this type ‘‘subjection on the part of one person towards another has only one parallel, though a complete one—namely in certain love-relationships where there is extreme devotion.’’ In 1910, in a note added to Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), he again points out this connection. In 1918, in ‘‘The Taboo of Virginity,’’ (1918a) he discusses the question of ‘‘sexual bondage,’’ the expression used by Richard von Krafft-Ebing to define the state of subjugation, dependence, and loss of will experienced during the course of a sexual relationship. In 1921, what he describes with the term fascination is, therefore, not new, any more than the concordance he establishes between this state and that of hypnosis: the same paralysis of critical faculties, the same docility, the same submission toward the loved object or the hypnotist. These findings open the way to the problem of the imaginary relationship of the self to the loved Other or the authority figure, and lead one to believe that fascination is essential to the constitution of the ego—a thesis put forward by Jacques Lacan. The function of the gaze is central to fascination, so it is surprising that the term doesn’t appear in the 1922 article on ‘‘Medusa’s Head’’ (1940c). The phenomenon is similar to the paralysis (of thought, judgment, and the body) caused, in the myth, by the encounter with the Gorgon. Here mortal hypnotic fascination reaches its apogee. The power of the gaze is the bearer and vector of the ‘‘omnipotence of thought,’’ like the phenomenon of the ‘‘evil eye’’ Freud had analyzed in 1919 in ‘‘The ÔUncanny’’’ (1919h). It is also surprising that although, in 1916, he presents the goddess Baubo as a representation of castration, or interprets the Medusa’s head, along with Sándor Ferenczi, as a representation of the female genital organs and more specifically the mother, he never explicitly raises the question of fascination and what can cause it, namely, the sight of the 55 6 female genitals and the representation of castration they bring to mind. CATHERINE DESPRATS-PÉQUIGNOT See also: Idealization; Numinous (analytical psychology); Qu’estce que la suggestion? Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1890a). Psychical (or mental) treatment. SE, 7: 281–302. ———. (1905a). On psychotherapy. SE, 7: 255–268. ———. (1918a). The taboo of virginity. SE, 11: 191–208. ———. (1919h). The ‘‘uncanny.’’ SE, 17: 217–256. ———. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. ———. (1940c). Medusa’s head. SE, 18: 273–274. Lacan, Jacques. (1975). Le Séminaire-Livre I, Les Écrits techniques de Freud (1954–1955). Paris: Le Seuil. Le Bon, Gustave. (1995). The crowd / Gustave Le Bon. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publications. (Original work published 1895) FATE NEUROSIS Helene Deutsch developed the notion of ‘‘fate neurosis’’ on the basis of the notion of ‘‘compulsion of destiny’’ (Schicksalszwang), which Freud mentioned at the end of the third chapter of Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g, p. 23). In that work Freud described the following trait in nonneurotic people: ‘‘The impression they give is of being pursued by a malignant fate or possessed by some Ôdaemonic’ power; but psychoanalysis has always taken the view that their fate is for the most part arranged by themselves and determined by early infantile influences. . . . Thus we have come across people all of whose human relationships have the same outcome: such as the benefactor who is abandoned in anger after a time by each of his protégés, however much they may otherwise differ from one another . . . or the man whose friendships all end in betrayal by his friend; . . . or again, the lover each of whose love affairs with a woman passes through the same phases and reaches the same conclusion’’ (pp. 21–22). Helene Deutsch developed this clinical description beginning in 1930 in her paper ‘‘Hysterical Fate INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FATHER (NAME Neurosis’’ (1965), in which she presented a case involving a such neurosis. Hysterical fate neurosis, she explained, ‘‘is a form of suffering imposed on the ego apparently by the outer world with a recurrent regularity. The real motive of this fate lies, as we have seen, in a constant, insoluble, inner conflict’’ (p. 27). She linked the neurosis to a lack of control over an anxiety-inducing childhood situation that arose during the genital phase. The term hysterical fate neurosis then came to be used in a broader sense to describe individuals who lack neurotic symptoms but whose history is marked by repeated painful experiences. Although some English-speaking writers have referred to this notion briefly, most psychoanalysts have moved away from a ‘‘psychopathology of fate’’ that could not be more clearly defined in metapsychological terms, despite the efforts of such authors as Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis. In the entry on fate neurosis in their Language of Psychoanalysis (1967/ 1974), they attempted to give it a more precise meaning and to distinguish it from ‘‘character neurosis,’’ noting that the experiences characteristic of fate neurosis had to be ‘‘repeated despite their unpleasant character,’’ had to ‘‘unfold according to an unchanging scenario,’’ and had to ‘‘appear to be governed by an external fate, whose victim the subject feels himself—with seeming justification—to be’’ (p. 161). Nevertheless, the notion of fate neurosis continues to be invoked, essentially for descriptive purposes, because it implies a holistic view of the individual, whose past, present, and future are more than a simple succession of random events. OF) Further Reading Kaplan, Donald M. (1984). Helene Deutsch’s Ôhysterical fate neurosis’ revisited. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 53, 240–266. FATHER COMPLEX The expression father complex was used by Sigmund Freud in the period 1910–1913 to designate feelings of guilt and of castration anxiety relating to the father, and therefore to the Oedipus complex. The expression first appears in the article ‘‘The Future Prospects of Psycho-Analytic Therapy’’ (1910d), when Freud wrote that ‘‘in male patients the most important resistances in the treatment seem to be derived from the father complex and to express themselves in fear of the father, in defiance of the father and in disbelief of the father’’ (p. 144). He attributed specifically to Carl Gustav Jung the coinage of the term complex, and in the same year he used it in developing the expression ‘‘Oedipus complex,’’ which was at this time nearly synonymous with ‘‘father complex.’’ The expression was hardly ever used by Freud again, except in Totem and Taboo (1912–13a), where it took on a more specific meaning. Here, in essence, it referred to the guilt and castration anxiety experienced by the son in the ‘‘primitive horde’’ after the murder of the father, which in turn led to the repression of incestuous wishes toward the mother. Transmitted from generation to generation, this complex explains the permanence and universality of the Oedipus complex. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA The expression father complex has almost entirely disappeared from usage in contemporary psychoanalysis. See also: Beyond the Pleasure Principle; Character neurosis; Deutsch-Rosenbach, Helene; Neurosis. ROGER PERRON Bibliography See also: Oedipus complex. Deutsch, Helene. (1965). Hysterical fate neurosis. In her Neuroses and character types (pp. 14–28). New York: International Universities Press. (Originally published 1930) Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. Laplanche, Jean, and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1974). The language of psycho-analysis (Donald Nicholson-Smith, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1967) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Freud, Sigmund. (1910d). The future prospects of psychoanalytic therapy. SE, 11: 139–151. ———. (1912–13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. FATHER (NAME OF). See Name-of-the-Father 557 FATHERHOOD FATHERHOOD Fatherhood has been described as the cause and fulfillment of the father’s creative, protective, and organizing power in his child. As a physical and symbolic bond between generations, fatherhood implies the authority of the father over the child, expressed through the transmission of the name. The sons use this aspect of paternity in the construction of their own individual and social identities, and in their respect for the law. Fatherhood is the basis of all thought. Discovering in his self-analysis, through his dreams, that fatherhood satisfied both his desire for immortality, through his children, as well as his ambivalence toward his own dead father, Sigmund Freud fathered psychoanalysis when he published The Interpretation of Dreams, and established that the desire of Oedipus to sleep with his mother and kill his father is universal. Fatherhood is an organizing system indissociable from the Oedipus complex. It links the law to desire and to castration. It structures and restrains sexuality, through the father, who is simultaneously loved, protective, and feared. It condenses conflicts of ambivalence and the castration anxiety. Fatherhood induces repression and prompts progress: It is an inevitable and indestructible origin and obstacle that unites the scattered ego, while showing how to overcome ambivalence through identification with the father. Its dynamic potential is anchored in the father-mother-child triangle it structures, not in the person of the father who supports the paternal function. Hans (1909b), in the throes of an oedipal crisis at four years of age, introjects the cultural treasure linked to fatherhood into the mythical power of language and knowledge. He is ignorant of the procreative function: Paternity, as the hidden cause for the production of children, confutes childhood trust, obstructs independent thought, and betrays the subject’s expectation of protection. A child affected by nostalgia for the father will displace it onto God. Fatherhood was considered to have had a phylogenetic origin, recapitulated by ontogenesis (1912–13a). Having murdered the violent and jealous primal father, the sons discover the symbolic paternity of the father in the work of mourning, made up of ambivalence, guilt, and idealization. Retrospective obedience and the renunciation of the father’s omnipotence are at the origin of the social contract and the law. For Freud fatherhood also occupies a central place in the subject’s genital organization through the father com55 8 plex. Linked to death and sexuality, which it transcends, and serving as an atemporal and structuring reference point, it channels through its incarnated generating power the diphasic sexual development of the child-become-adolescent, opening him up to the effects of Nachträglichkeit, sublimation, and the wish to become a father in his turn. Identification is the prototype of this operation; first, the human subject constitutes itself through ‘‘primal’’ identification with the "father of personal prehistory’’ (1923b), an incorporation of paternity that includes the mother. Fatherhood then, logically, enables the subject’s separation from the mother and authorizes relations of generation, dramatized as arising from a primal triangle, with differentiated parental imagos. Secondly, the oedipal crisis ends, with the installation of the impersonal superego. The bond with the father is essential for a daughter (1933a). Involved in an intense pregenital relation to her mother, she enters late into the Oedipus complex, turning her outwardly directed libido inwards. She displaces her love onto her father, from whom she wants a child-penis. Her major anxiety, that of being no longer loved, often keeps her dependent on her bond with the father. As a mother she offers fatherhood to the man who is substituting for her father, if she has transcended her own claim to the phallus. The bond of fatherhood is connected for the child with the desire that links the mother to the father. Paternity exerts itself when the child induces a ‘‘foreigner’’ (1939a) who is the father to adoption. For Jacques Lacan, a failure of this metaphorizing recognition is responsible for the foreclosure of the Name-of-theFather, which leads to psychosis. Melanie Klein prefigured the oedipal complex through the nipple-object guiding the child’s access to the breast, a paternity incarnated at the very heart of maternity. Fatherhood can be considered as a development when becoming a father leads to psychic restructuring. ANN AUBERT-GODARD See also: Abandonment; Adolescence; Animus-Anima; Bisexuality; Castration complex; Counter-Oedipus; Criminology and psychoanalysis; ‘‘Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis, A’’; ‘‘Dostoevsky and Parricide’’; Erotogenic masochism; Ethics; Family; Family romance; Father complex; Freud, Jakob Kolloman (or Keleman or INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F A V E Z - B O U T O N I E R , J U L I E T T E (1903 –1 994) Kallamon); Future of an Illusion, The; Homosexuality; Idealization; Identification; Infantile neurosis; Law and psychoanalysis; Law of the father; Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood; Myth of origins; Myth of the Birth of the Hero; Neurotica; Object; Object, change of/ choice of; Oedipus complex; Otherness; Parenthood; Parricide, murder of the father; Penis envy; Pregnancy, fantasy of; Primal scene; Primary identification; Primitive horde; Scenes of seduction; ‘‘Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes’’; Superego; Totem and Taboo; Totem/totemism; Wish for a baby. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I. SE, 4: 1–338; Part II. SE, 5: 339–625. ———. (1912–13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. ———. (1939a ). Moses and monotheism: three essays. SE, 23: 1–137. Lacan, Jacques (1958). The signification of the phallus. In Alan Sheridan (Trans.), Écrits: a selection (pp. 281–291). New York: Tavistock Publications. FAVEZ-BOUTONIER, JULIETTE (1903–1994) A psychoanalyst and teacher, Juliette Favez-Boutonier was born near Grasse, France, in 1903, and died in Paris on April 13, 1994. The daughter of teachers in the Alpes-Maritimes, to which she returned nearly every year until her death, Favez-Boutonier studied in Grasse and Nice. She later traveled to Paris to study philosophy at the Sorbonne, for a while with Léon Brunschvicg. In 1926 she was one of the first women ever to take the state doctoral exam in philosophy. She was only twenty-three at the time. She taught at schools in Chartres and Dijon, while studying medicine, which was a required preparation for anyone who wanted to practice psychology at the time. In 1930 she wrote to Sigmund Freud, who responded personally on April 11 that ‘‘philosophical problems and their formulation were so foreign to him that he didn’t know what to say.’’ In 1938 she wrote her doctoral dissertation on ambivalence (La notion d’ambivalence); the text was reprinted in 1972. In 1935 she obtained a job in Paris teaching INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS philosophy and it is here that she met Daniel Lagache and began analysis with René Laforgue, with whom she remained friends for many years. During the Occupation, Laforgue entrusted Favez-Boutonier with the Freud letters he had preserved. At this time she met with members of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris (SPP, Paris Psychoanalytic Society) who had remained in Paris. John Leuba wrote to Ernest Jones on December 31, 1944, the day after the Liberation, that new analysts were now beginning to appear, including ‘‘Mlle Boutonier, a gifted physician and philosopher with a sound technique; she was monitored by me and I can confirm that she will be one of the first recruits.’’ For Favez-Boutonier the relations between psychoanalysis and philosophy were complex and, in 1985, for the reprint of the memorable session held January 25, 1955, by the Société Française de Philosophie (French Philosophy Society), Juliette Favez-Boutonier wrote about her experience writing her thesis. Her thesis director was Gaston Bachelard, who was using psychoanalysis as a therapeutic method as well as a philosophy. She had said after the publication of her thesis that she was the first to explore Freudian psychoanalysis in a noncritical way, and she was grateful to Bachelard who allowed her to express her experience in psychoanalysis within her interest for psychology and philosophy. Her thesis, Anxiety, was published in 1945 by Presses Universitaires de France and, in 1947, was awarded the Prix Paul Pelliot ‘‘Junior.’’ The ‘‘Senior’’ prize went to Henri Wallon. While working for the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) she presented several papers to the SPP and was elected a member in 1946. Having trained in clinical psychopathology at the Sainte-Anne Hospital with Georges Heuyer, she was put in charge of the Centre Psychopédagogique ClaudeBernard, which had been created by Georges Mauco. She was soon replaced by André Berge, for that same year she was appointed professor in the humanities department at the University of Strasbourg. Close to the circle of analysts around René Laforgue, she participated in meetings and contributed to Psyché, the review founded by Marie Choisy in 1946. She argued in favor of ‘‘assistant psychologists,’’ participated in the Section des Psychanalystes d’Enfants, and tried to promote the creation of psychoanalytic groups throughout the country, especially in Strasbourg. This led to a conflict with those who were 559 F A V E Z , G E O R G E S (1 901 –19 81) setting up the future Institut de Psychanalyse de Paris (Paris Institute for Psychoanalysis). In 1952 she married Georges Favez, one of the future presidents of the Association Psychanalytique de France (French Psychoanalytic Association). She intervened on behalf of Mrs. Clark-Williams during her trial in 1951–1952, believing that ‘‘psychoanalysis was a psychological technique.’’ This position, joined to her opposition to what she referred to as the ‘‘dictatorship’’ of Sacha Nacht, grouped her with Daniel Lagache and Françoise Dolto at the beginning of the 1953 split in the French psychoanalytic establishment and subsequent creation of the Société Française de Psychanalyse (French Society for Psychoanalysis), of which she would become the first vice president. For ten years she shared the trials and tribulations of the Society in its attempts to join the International Psychoanalytic Association, and was president during its dissolution following the second split in 1964. Along with her membership activities, she had her own practice and taught psychoanalysis. However, some of her most important work was done within the French school system. She was appointed a professor at the Sorbonne in 1955, where she held the chair of general psychology. Didier Anzieu succeeded her at the University of Strasbourg. Although she encouraged work on group psychology, her own interest was clinical psychology, basing many of her ideas on the subject on those of Daniel Lagache. She appointed Laforgue the head of her laboratory in 1958. Along with Jacques Gagey, Claude Prévost, and Pierre Fédida, she was recognized as a ‘‘clinical psychologist’’ in 1968 after helping with the creation of the department ‘‘des Sciences Humaines Cliniques,’’ which was opened at the University of Paris VII. Favez-Boutonier’s long life and career were characterized by an intellectual depth and richness that drew from the wellsprings of philosophy and psychoanalysis, which helped to enrich her clinical work in psychology and psychopathology. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Association psychanalytique de France; Centre psychopédagogique Claude-Bernard; France; Société française de psychanalyse. Bibliography Boutonier, Juliette. (1945) L’Angoisse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 56 0 ———. (1955). Séance du 25 janvier 1955 de la Société française de philosophie. In F. Pasche (Ed.), Métapsychologie et Philosophie, Paris: Les Belles Lettres. FAVEZ, GEORGES (1901–1981) Georges Favez, a Swiss psychoanalyst, was born on February 15, 1901, in Lausanne, Switzerland, and died on February 15, 1981, in Paris. His family ran a gourmet food store. He had an older sister, who was unmarried when she died, and from his first marriage he had a daughter whose three children Favez adored. After studying in Leipzig and Strasbourg, Favez wrote his theology dissertation on Luther and worked as a country pastor in a free evangelical church rather than in the national church of the canton of Vaud. In 1936 he resumed his studies in Geneva at the Institut de l’éducation (Institute of Education), then under the supervision of Edouard Claparède, but he failed to sit for the final exam, which he felt he did not need for his future career as a teacher and psychotherapist. From 1936 to 1938 Favez stayed in Paris with Georges Heuyer. In 1940 he was analyzed by Heinz Hartmann in Lausanne. Shortly after the war broke out, Favez was mobilized, and his analyst went into hiding and later emigrated to the United States. Favez divided his time among his psychoanalytic practice, the Office médico-pédagogique (Medical-Pedagogical Office), and the Maison d’éducation de jeunes délinquents (Home for the Education of Young Delinquents) in Vennes, Switzerland. During the first Congrès des aliénistes et neurologistes de langue française (Congress of Francophone Psychiatrists and Neurologists), held in Lausanne in 1946, Juliette Boutonier, André Berge, and Georges Mauco visited the first Centre psychopédagogique français (French Psychopedagogical Center) at the Lycée Claude-Bernard in Paris in preparation for its opening. It was at this time that Favez met Boutonier, who became his wife in 1952. He began making frequent trips to Paris as a consultant and colleague at the Claude-Bernard center. He commuted regularly between Lausanne and Paris, and underwent analysis with Sacha Nacht. He was elected a member of the Société psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society) in 1948. After his (third) marriage in 1952 to Boutonier, he settled permanently in Paris, on rue Descartes. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F A V R E A U , J E A N A L P H O N S E (1919 –1 993) At this time, at the home of either Favez or Françoise Dolto, Favez, together with Daniel and Marianne Lagache and Juliette Favez-Boutonier, formed the Société française de psychanalyse (SFP, French Society for Psychoanalysis). Jacques Lacan joined shortly after its formation. In 1964 the society split into two groups: the École freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris), under the supervision of Jacques Lacan, and the Association psychanalytique de France (APF, French Psychoanalytic Association), presided over by Daniel Lagache. Favez was one of the most active partisans for the association. Favez devoted a great deal of his energy to the Association psychanalytique de France. He was soon elected secretary of the selection committee (formerly the training committee), a position he held for many years, and was president in 1966–1967. He was convinced that the association had a role to play in the French psychoanalytic landscape. In 1966 he began to issue a semiannual newsletter, which published the psychoanalytic talks of the APF and reports of association activity. He was actively engaged in the activities of teaching and transmission and helped train many APF students. He also did much to popularize psychoanalysis. For example, after the war he had a program on Radio-Lausanne and gave many talks during the Journées des centres psychopédagogiques (Festival of Psychopedagogic Centers) and at SFP and APF events. In 1971 and 1974 he published two articles that are still considered important: ‘‘L’illusion et la désillusion dans la cure psychanalytique’’ and ‘‘La résistance dans l’analyse.’’ A number of his articles are collected in Être psychanalyste (1976). Those who knew Favez remarked on his intelligence, depth, and intellectual clarity. In his work he constantly emphasized the framework of psychoanalytic therapy and the psychoanalyst’s thoroughness and resolve. He loved Bach and Mozart, had a wonderful sense of humor, and enjoyed lively discussion. He was, according to Didier Anzieu, a man who lived well. Firmly rooted in clinical practice, he liked to quote Charles Ferdinand Ramuz: ‘‘We die making claims about ideas before having made claims to things.’’ He died in Paris on February 15, 1981, the day of his eightieth birthday. In 1982 the APF journal Documents et débats devoted issue number twenty to Favez’s memory. It INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS included articles by Jean-Claude Lavie, René Henny, André Bourguignon, and François Gantheret, together with a biography by Didier Anzieu. BERNARD GOLSE See also: As if personality; Internal object; Normality; Self (true/false); Splitting. Bibliography Favez, Georges. (1971). L’illusion et la désillusion dans la cure psychanalytique. Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse, 4, 43–54. (Reprinted in his Être psychanalyste [1976]) ———. (1974). La résistance dans l’analyse. Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse, 10, 193–199. (Reprinted in his Être psychanalyste [1976]) ———. (1976). Être psychanalyste. Paris: Dunod. FAVREAU, JEAN ALPHONSE (1919–1993) Jean Alphonse Favreau, French psychoanalyst and psychiatrist, was born on February 5, 1919, in Bordeaux, France, and died on May 30, 1993, in Saint-Léger-auxBois, France. Favreau belonged to a Catholic family that originally came from Guadeloupe. His father, an obstetrician, became a professor of obstetrics at the Catholic medical faculty in Lille, France, where Jean Favreau began his medical training in 1938. His studies were interrupted by the Second World War. Demobilized in 1940, he finished his studies in medicine in Bordeaux and later in Paris. In Lille he had met Jeanne-Marie Lejenne, whom he married in 1947. A physician herself, she became a psychoanalyst in 1957 and died in 1988. They had six children. Through the lectures (published in the Journal de Médecine de Bordeaux, June 1913) and books of Angélo Hesnard owned by his father, Favreau learned of Sigmund Freud’s theories and was won over. In 1945 he embarked upon what would become a threeyear analysis with John Lueba. In 1948, under the supervision of Sacha Nacht and Marc Schlumberger, he began the analysis of his first patients. These cases, taken in the context of his hospital practice, he did for free, which he justified in terms of the poverty and somewhat utopian climate that prevailed in the postwar period. Viewing free practice as a way of experimenting with possibilities for treatment under a different political and economic regime, he focused his 561 FEAR research on the effect of free treatment on the development and resolution of the psychoanalytic process. This spirit persisted in the orientation and management of the Centre de consultations et de traitements psychanalytiques (Center for Psychoanalytic Consultations and Treatment), which was founded by Sacha Nacht in 1954 and where Favreau served as head physician beginning in 1958. His prior institutional experience dated from 1948, when, with Pierre Mâle, he helped create a hospital service for children aged six to ten years that allowed psychoanalysts to treat not just children but also their families. In this context he gained work experience consulting with families and supervising the psychotherapeutic treatment of children. He worked in a similar capacity at the Centre de consultations et de traitements psychanalytiques until his death, although he was succeeded as director by Jean-Luc Donnet in 1989. Favreau’s work bears the imprint of his practice, since clinical experience remained at the heart of his theoretical contributions. Working from cases of adult analysands, he sought to elucidate the ‘‘fantastic’’ and metapsychological genesis of the psyche and its successive alterations. The birth of the psyche is traumatic, he believed. Hence the object of psychoanalysis is human nature, not psychopathology. He illustrated this point in a report on the psychoanalytic treatment of an alcoholic patient emphasizing process rather than results. This focus on process was an important consideration for him. He also focused on those aspects of the development of human sexuality that are most often passed over in silence because they are subjected to intense repression and give rise to shameful feelings that wound the subject’s narcissism, aspects such as anal sexuality and our animal nature in general. In this regard, he, together with his wife, contributed an article titled ‘‘Considérations sur les anomalies du comportement sexuel chez l’animal’’ (Considerations on Anomalies in Sexual Behavior in Animals; 1964) to a book on animal psychiatry. He was guided in his theoretical work by Freudian metapsychology and granted considerable economic importance to the idea of après-coup (deferred action). Favreau transmitted his knowledge of psychoanalysis to younger analysts through supervision groups and seminars. The oral mode of communication was well suited to his thought because it is closer than writing to the experience of treatment and the emergence of the unconscious. In his work one thus finds a 56 2 greater concentration on practical aspects of psychoanalysis (such as indications for treatment, the psychoanalytic process, and the training of psychoanalysts) than on purely theoretical issues. Nevertheless, his contributions to child psychoanalysis and the study of children’s emotional problems remain remarkably relevant and sound. He constantly insisted that the basis of theory is the drives and language, and he ascribed a determining role to the dialectical relationship among anxiety, suffering, and pleasure. Favreau published twenty-two articles, many of them written collaboratively or given in the form of interviews—yet another indication of his personable style. MARIE-THÉRÈSE MONTAGNIER See also: France; Société psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris. Bibliography Favreau, D. (1990). Le désir d’enfant dans l’imaginaire de l’enseignement. Études psychothérapiques, 1 (new series), 115–124. Favreau, Jean. (1964). Considérations sur les anomalies du comportement sexuel chez l’animal. In Abel Brion and Henri Ey (Eds.), Psychiatrie animale (pp. 265–281). Paris: Desclée, De Brouwer. ———. (1972). La formation des psychanalystes. Études freudiennes, 5–6, 51–72. Mâle, Pierre, and Favreau, Jean. (1959). Aspects actuels de la clinique et de la thérapeutique des troubles affectifs de l’enfant. Psychiatrie de l’enfant, 2 (1), 148–195. Ruyer, Danièle. (1991). Psychanalyse et idéal thérapeutique (interview with Jean Favreau). Revue Française de Psychanalyse, 55 (2), 501–509. Troisier, Hélène, and Favreau, Jean. (1990). Plaisir et jouissance: chemins et détours (interview with Jean Favreau). Revue française de psychanalyse, 54 (1), 189–196. FEAR The term fear, whose metapsychological status remains uncertain, was used by Freud, in contrast to anxiety, to refer to the reaction to some real danger. In several works Freud discussed the semantic relationship between the terms Angst (anxiety), Furcht (apprehension, fear), and Schreck (fright). For Freud the distinction between anxiety and fear relates primarily to its INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FEAR object, a distinction found in his earliest writings. In an article from 1895, which discusses the distinguishing characteristics of phobias and obsessions, he differentiates phobias ‘‘according to the object of the fear,’’ while anxiety refers to the emotional state experienced by the subject, without reference to a specific object (1895c [1894]). Similarly, in 1916, in his Introduction to Psychoanalysis (1916–1917a [1915–1917]), Freud, referring to the use of these terms in popular speech, indicated that ‘‘anxiety is related to a state with no direct allusion to an object, while in fear the person’s attention is precisely focused on the object.’’ In 1920, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), Freud emphasized the difference between fear and anxiety in terms of their relation to danger: Anxiety is a state characterized by the expectation and preparation for a danger, ‘‘even if unknown,’’ while fear implies a determinate object. In Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (1926d [1925]), he further insisted on the association of anxiety with a state of expectancy and the use of the term fear—‘‘in keeping with current usage’’—to represent the situation when anxiety has found an object. We see that the term fear is quoted with reference primarily to contemporary language. According to Catherine Cyssau, fear has no means of representation and its object does not conform to the criteria for repression. Although the status of anxiety, as an affect, occurs early in the development of Freudian theory, fear is more uncertain and seems to fall mostly within the context of behavioral description. Moreover, the opposition between fear and anxiety is hardly ever mentioned in Freud’s later writings, especially in the New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933a [1932]), where the theory of anxiety is again discussed. In fact, another concept appeared in 1916 in Freud’s writings, that of ‘‘Realangst,’’ which can be translated as ‘‘realistic anxiety’’ or ‘‘anxiety in the face of a real danger,’’ and which is contrasted with neurotic anxiety or the anxiety of desire. In the Introduction to Psychoanalysis, Freud emphasized the rational and comprehensive nature of realistic anxiety, triggered by the perception of an external danger, that is, under conditions that can give rise to fear. From then on the fundamental question, to which he would frequently return, was that of the conditions required for the emergence of anxiety, a signal triggered by an external or internal danger. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS In post-Freudian work the concept of fear is essentially used to characterize certain infantile manifestations of anxiety. Anna Freud, in particular, insisted on the structural differentiation between archaic, or primitive, fears and the phobias. It is important to remember that the ‘‘fear of the stranger’s face,’’ which, as described by René Spitz, arises in the infant when it is between six and eight months old, raises the question of determining if this reaction should be interpreted as a realistic anxiety responding to an external danger—the face perceived as unknown—or if it is an expression of unpleasure and the internal threat caused by the absence of the maternal object. Fright, or Schreck, which is associated in several Freudian texts with traumatic neurosis, corresponds to the effects of a danger for which the subject ‘‘is not prepared by an earlier state of anxiety’’ (1916–1917a [1915–1917]). Freud goes on to say that anxiety contains ‘‘something that protects against fright’’ (1920g). Roger Dorey has remarked that Freud, in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), described, in contrast to the ‘‘primary experience of satisfaction,’’ an ‘‘experience of fright whose origin is external’’ and which leaves behind a painful memory trace that the primitive psychic apparatus tries to avoid. This flight before the memory of the present pain, is, according to Freud, the ‘‘model and first example of psychic repression.’’ Thus, the prototype of fright is nothing but the experience of object loss, an experience that submerges the primitive psychic apparatus in excitations it is unable to control. For Dorey this ‘‘painful memory image’’ of the absent object forms a representation that contributes to the formation of the primal unconscious. CLAUDE BURSZTEJN See also: ‘‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy’’ (Little Hans); Annihilation anxiety; Anxiety; Castration complex; Claustrophobia; ‘‘Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child ’’; Danger; Drive/instinct; Erythrophobia (fear of blushing); Fright; Guilt, feeling of; Incest; Paranoid position; Phobia of commiting impulsive acts; Phobias in children; Stranger, fear of. Bibliography Cyssau, Catherine. (1997). La peur et les phobies: des névroses d’angoisse à l’hystérie d’angoisse. In A. Fine, A. Le Guen, A. Oppenheimer (Eds.), Peurs et phobies. Paris: P.U.F. 563 FECES Dorey, Roger. (1988). Le Désir de savoir. Paris: Denoël. Freud, Sigmund. (1895a [1894]). (1916–1917a [1915– 1917]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis (Parts I and II). SE, 15–16. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1– 64. FECES In a letter of December 22, 1897, Sigmund Freud wrote to Wilhelm Fleiss: ‘‘[B]irth, miscarriage, and menstruation are all connected with the lavatory via the word Abort (Abortus)’’ (p. 240). In German this word does effectively carry these different meanings. Freud was to further develop these reflections in his ‘‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’’ (1905d), where he describes the phases of libidinal development from birth onward. The retention of fecal matter initially corresponds with an intention to use it for masturbatory purposes. The whole meaning of the anal zone is thus reflected in the fact that ‘‘few neurotics are to be found without their special scatological practices, ceremonies, and so on, which they carefully keep secret’’ (p. 187). or else retains them for purposes of auto-erotic satisfaction and later as a means of asserting his own will’’ (p. 130). The love object that must be renounced (the mother of childhood), the lost object, will be identified by the Unconscious with feces, the body’s most intimate product, which must necessarily be relinquished; this marks the onset of the dynamics of loss, mourning, and melancholia. Returning to the connection between feces and money in ‘‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’’ (1918b [1914]), Freud emphasizes that an interest in money is libidinal rather than rational in character, and that it thus relates back to excremental pleasure. The various terms in the sequence filth = money = gift = child = penis are thus treated as synonyms and represented by shared symbols. In his ‘‘New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis’’ (1933a), Freud completed his views: According to infantile theories of sexuality, the child is born from the intestine as a piece of feces; defecation is the model for the act of being born. ‘‘A great part of anal erotism is thus carried over into a cathexis of the penis’’ (p. 101), he writes. DOMINIQUE J. ARNOUX However, another link, that between fecal matter and money, emerged in listening to the discourse of obsessive patients; this link is expressed in one of the traits of the anal character, avarice. Freud writes in ‘‘Dreams in Folklore’’ (1958 [1911]): ‘‘How old this connection between excrement and Gold is can be seen from an observation by Jeremias: gold, according to ancient oriental mythology, is the excrement of hell’’ (p. 187). See also: Alpha function; Autism; Beta-elements; Castration complex; Coprophilia; Partial drive; Pregnancy, fantasy of; Stammering; Symbolism; Unconcscious concept. Based on these associations, Freud establishes a symbolic equation that he phrases as follows: ‘‘[I]n the products of the unconscious—spontaneous ideas, phantasies, and symptoms—the concepts faeces (money, gift), baby and penis are ill-distinguished from one another and are easily interchangeable’’ (p. 128). When the child perceives that woman does not have a penis, the latter is conceived as being detachable and is thus analogous to excrement when it is separated from the body. In the same text, Freud underscores the importance of this equivalence in terms of the object: ‘‘Defaecation affords the first occasion on which the child must decide between a narcissistic and an object-loving attitude. He either parts obediently with his faeces, Ôsacrifices’ them to his love, ———. (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1-122. 56 4 Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 130-243. ———. (1916-1917e). On transformations of instinct as exemplified by anal erotism. SE, 17: 125-133. ———. (1933a). New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 22: 1-182. Freud, Sigmund, and Oppenheim, David. (1911). Dreams in folklore. SE, 12: 175-204. FECHNER, GUSTAV THEODOR (1801–1887) Gustav Fechner, German physician, physicist, and philosopher, was born on April 19, 1801, in Gross-Sächen, Prussia, and died in Leipzig on November 18, 1887. Freud admired Fechner as the pioneer of psychophysics and a founder of scientific and experimental psyINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F E D E R A C I Ó N P S I C O A N A L Í T I C A chology. Together with his boyhood friend Eduard Silberstein, Freud attended Fechner’s lectures in Leipzig in 1874. Fechner studied medicine at the University of Leipzig. While still a student, he began writing articles (under the pseudonym Dr. Mises) that satirized contemporary science, and he did not become a practicing physician after receiving his degree. Instead, he turned his interest to physics and mathematics. His research demonstrating the validity of Ohm’s laws in relation to a galvanic current led to his appointment as professor of physics in 1834. About 1839 Fechner was forced to leave his academic post due to an eye ailment that he attributed to exhausting research in optics. In his diary, which has been preserved at the University of Leipzig, Fechner described his experiences while ill and the existential crisis and depression that followed. In the wake of his illness, Fechner developed his interest in sensation, the relation of mind to body, and panpsychism. ‘‘The great G. T. Fechner,’’ as Freud called him, was appointed professor of philosophy and anthropology in 1843. In the course of this second creative period, he set out the foundations of psychophysics, such as the Fechner-Weber law, by which he is remembered as a founder of experimental psychology. His two-volume Elemente der Psychophysik was published in 1860. Fechner’s ambitions extended beyond experimental research. He hoped to organize psychophysics and metaphysics in a way that united philosophy and the human sciences. Major works toward fulfilling this aim include his 1848 article on the pleasure principle and Einige Ideen zur Schöpfungs- und Entwicklungsgeschichte des Organismen (Certain ideas on the creation and development of organisms; 1873). In this latter work Fechner offers the ‘‘principle of constancy’’ to explain how a progressively ordered and structured system can evolve from a disorganized state, a notion that suggests Freud’s famous formula, ‘‘Where id was there ego shall be.’’ (In this sense Fechner was also a precursor of the theory of the ego’s self-organization [see, for example, Prigogine and Glansdorff].) Although Fechner’s works inspired Freud when he conceived his concepts of the pleasure principle and the death instinct (Nitzschke), a systematic study tends to demonstrate that they were separated by fundamental differences in outlook. BERND NITZSCHKE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DE A M É R I C A L A T I N A See also: Alpha function; Autism; Beta-elements; Castration complex; Coprophilia; Partial drive; Pregnancy, fantasy of; Stammering; Symbolism; Unconscious concept. Bibliography Fechner, Gustav Theodor. (1848). Über das lustpinzip des handelns. Zeitschrift für philosophie und philosophische kritik, 19, 1–30; 163–194. ———. (1860). Elemente der psychophysik. Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel. ———. (1873). Einige ideen zur schöpfungs- und entwicklungsgeschichte der organismen. Leipzig: Bretkopf und Härtel. Lowrie, Walter (Ed.). (1946). Religion of a scientist: selections from Gustav Theodor Fechner. New York: Pantheon. Nitzschke, Bernd. (1989). Freud et Herbert Silberer: Hypothèses concernant le destinataire d’une lettre de Freud de 1922. Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse, 2, 267–277. Prigogine, Ilya, and Glandsdorf, P. (1973). L’écart à l’équilibre interprété comme une source d’ordre structure dissipatives. Bulletin de la classe des sciences, 59, 672–702. FEDERACIÓN PSICOANALÍTICA DE AMÉRICA LATINA Formerly known as the Coordinating Committee of Psychoanalytic Organizations of Latin America (COPAL), the Federación psicoanalı́tica de América latina (FePAL; Psychoanalytic Federation of Latin America) brings together the Latin American psychoanalytic societies recognized by the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA). FePAL’s objectives are as follows: to stimulate the expansion of member societies and the development of the psychoanalytic movement throughout Latin America within the framework of the IPA’s established rules and stated goals, without prejudice to the autonomy of the organizations in the federation; to represent the common interests of member societies and their associates before the IPA; to create a forum for scientific exchange through publications, congresses, and meetings, among other activities; to facilitate scholarly exchanges among member organizations, the establishment of teaching programs, and training criteria in the various institutes; to encourage the 565 F E D E R A C I Ó N P S I C O A N A L Í T I C A DE A M É R I C A L A T I N A spread of psychoanalysis in Latin America; and to develop and offer advice and assistance to the psychoanalytic movement in areas where there is no member organization. The Third Latin American Psychoanalytic Congress (the two preceding congresses were held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and São Paulo, Brazil) was held in Santiago, Chile, in 1960, under the aegis of the Chilean Psychoanalytic Association. Ignacio Matte-Blanco was president of the organizing committee. At the administrative meeting, the decision was made to establish a Coordinating Committee of Psychoanalytic Organizations of Latin America (COPAL), presided over by Arnaldo Rascovsky—a veritable impresario for the idea of bringing Latin America’s psychoanalysts together as an association. COPAL was provisionally made up of the representatives of the societies or groups present at the meeting: for Bogotá (Colombia), Carlos Plata Mújica; for Mexico City, Avelino González; for Montevideo (Uruguay), Willy Baranger; for Porto Alegre (Brazil), Cyro Martins; for Rio de Janeiro (Brazil; Sociedade Brasileira de Rio de Janeiro), Fabio Leito Lobo; for São Paulo, Darcy de Mendoça; for Santiago, Carlos Whiting D’Andurrain; and for Buenos Aires, Arnaldo Rascovsky. COPAL acted as a pressure group before the IPA and succeeded in gaining representation on the IPA’s steering committee. Léon Grinberg was the first Latin American representative to sit on the steering committee, followed by Avelino González, from Mexico, and later Luiz Dahleim, from Brazil. They were in turn succeeded by Carlos Plata, from Colombia; David Liberman, from Argentina; and Paulo Grimaldi, from Brazil. Later, this trend toward authorizing Latin American participation on the committee stabilized, and Angel Garma was elected honorary vice president of the IPA. Latin America’s active political presence in psychoanalysis worldwide led to the granting of two vice presidencies for that continent. Thanks to the active intervention of this group, led initially by COPAL and later by FePAL, Latin America has obtained three vice presidencies on the IPA’s governing board. The first IPA congress in Latin America was held in Buenos Aires in 1989; the second was held in Santiago in 1999. During the 1960s and 1970s, through the efforts of teaching analysts who traveled to various regions to disseminate psychoanalytic knowledge, COPAL was extremely effective in promoting the scientific devel56 6 opment of the discipline, particularly in areas where the discipline was not yet well developed. The exercise of political power brought internal frictions to COPAL , and at the International Congress of Psychoanalysis held in New York in 1979, a meeting between the organization’s governing authorities and its delegates led to the resignation of a number of dignitaries, not without expressions of tensions, attitudes, and demonstrations that became extremely subjective in the case of some participants. This institutional crisis led to a new organization with participation of the societies, established groups, and groups-in-formation. An assembly of delegates was convened in Rio de Janeiro on June 6, 1980; the delegates approved the statutes of a new organization called the Federación psicoanalı́tica de América latina (FePAL), charged with the scientific development of Latin American psychoanalysis and organization of its congresses and exchanges between various regions. Primacy was given to democratic participation, and an order of succession to leadership of FePAL was established and has been respected ever since. Since its inception, FePAL has organized ten congresses; it serves as the umbrella organization for psychoanalysis throughout Latin America. The successive presidents of COPAL were: Arnaldo Rascovky, Marie Langer, Santiago Ramirez, Carlos Plata Mújica, David Zimmermann, Willy Baranger, Darcy M. Uchoa, and Fernando Cesarman. FePAL’s successive presidents include: Joel Zac, Fernando Cesarman, Néstor Goldstein, Victor Aiza, Fábio Antonio Herrmann, Eustachio Portella Nunes, Alberto Pereda, Saul Peña, Alejandro Tamez Morales, Guillermo Carvajal, and Cláudio Laks Eizirik (1998–2000). As of 2004, the federation included twenty-seven societies and study groups. New realities and the need for a more flexible and representative structure that would benefit from a more active participation by the presidents of member organizations have prompted debate on the reform of FePAL’s statutes. The congress held in September 2000 in Gramado, in the state of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil) was organized around the theme of ‘‘Psychoanalysis and Culture: Between the Couch and the Community.’’ The pre-congress teaching workshops held in conjunction with the congress and focusing on ‘‘Children and Adolescents,’’ ‘‘Myths,’’ and ‘‘OCAL’’ attracted increased participation. At a meeting in February 2000 in Manaus (Brazil) there was a new edition of the Clinical Meetings of FePALINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F E D E R N , P A U L (1871 –1 950) NAIPAG to mark the opportunity for Latin American and North American psychoanalysts to come together to discuss their clinical material and to share and compare their experiences. The federation is in negotiation with the European Psychoanalytical Federation (EPF) to resume and establish regularity in the scheduling of FePAL-EPF Clinical Meetings. FePAL’s Boletı́n (Bulletin) is published every six months; the Revista Latinoamericana de Psicoanálisis (Latin American revue of psychoanalysis) was restructured in keeping with the format and policies of the main international psychoanalytic journals. FePAL offers societies and study groups the possibility of an annual scientific exchange with invited participants from other Latin American institutions, and is considering an exchange program with analysts in other regions. In 1998, FEPAL held its XXII congress in Cartagena de las Indias, Colombia, whose title was Cumbre Psicoanalitica Latino-Americana (Latin American Psychoanalytic Summit), under the presidency of Guillermo Carvajal. Several international authors gave lectures. In 2000, its XXIII Congress was in Gramado, Brazil, about Psicanálise e Cultura: Entre o Divã e a Comunidade (Psychoanalysis and Culture: Between the Couch and the Community), under the presidency of Cláudio Laks Eizirik. This was an extremely well attended congress, where the leading authors of the analytic field were present, and psychoanalytic research and the history of psychoanalysis in Latin America, were formally included in the program, as well as joint discussions with outstanding members of Latin American culture. The XXIV Congress was in Montevideo, in 2002, under the presidency of Marcelo Viñar, having as main theme Permanencias y Cambios en la Experiencia Psicoanalı́tica (What is permanent and what changes in the psychoanalytic experience). This Congress privileged small groups discussions, was also very well attended and introduced sending previously all papers by disc to all those registered, so that there were no formal presentations, but immediate discussions among the participants. In 2004, the XXV Congress was held in Guadalajara, Mexico, under the presidency of Serápio Marcano, with the main theme Psicoanálisis en Latinoamerica Hoy: Teoria y Práctica en tiempos de Crisis (Psychoanalysis in Latin America Today: Theory and Practice in a Period of Crisis). Several clinical meetings were organized, in recent years, with North American colleagues, which stimulated fruitful exchanges. In recent congresses, from INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Fepal as well in those organized by the European Federation, and the North American institutions, there are invited members from the other two regions, which indicates a growing interchange. Fepal holds its administrative meetings regularly, publishes its Revista Latino-Americana de Psicanálise (Latin American Journal of Psychoanalysis), and has an ongoing scientific program of exchanges among its component societies. In spite of difficult social and economic conditions in most countries of Latin America, psychoanalysts and candidates affiliated to FEPAL keep a continuous and passionate interest and commitment with psychoanalysis and contribute to its development both as a theory and a clinical practice. In the next IPA Congress to be held in Rio de Janeiro, in July, 2005, the first one in Brazil, the second Latin American will become the IPA president, Cláudio Laks Eizirik, following the pioneer role of Horacio Etchegoyen, in 1993. Beyond these activities, another dimension should be taken into account: FePAL provides a forum for meetings and joint reflection on psychoanalytic theory and clinical practice in the specific context of the particular cultures of the countries it represents and within the framework of a broader Latin American identity, with all the challenges currently posed by that condition. CLÁUDIO LAKS EIZIRIK Bibliography Eizirik, Cláudio Laks. (1998). Porqué Fe.P.A.L.? Boletin informativo de la Fe.P.A.L. (2nd semester). Sanchez-Medina, Guillermo. (1998). Sesenta años de psicoanálisis en Latinoamérica. Homepage Federación psicoanalı́tica de América latina. FEDERN, PAUL (1871–1950) Paul Federn, an Austrian physician and psychoanalyst, was born in Vienna on October 13, 1871, and died in New York on May 4, 1950. The son of a famous Viennese doctor and nephew of a celebrated Prague rabbi, Federn was raised in a family with a longstanding liberal tradition. After receiving his medical diploma in 1895, he interned in general medicine with Hermann Nothnagel, who introduced him to the works of Sigmund Freud. 567 F E D E R N , P A U L (1871 –1 950) Deeply influenced by Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams, in 1904 he devoted himself to psychoanalysis and, with Alfred Adler, Wilhelm Stekel, and Rudolf Reitler, became one of Freud’s early disciples. Federn was as interested in the analysis of social phenomena as he was in prevention and treatment of disease. In Zur Psychologie der Revolution: die Vaterlose Gesellschaft (On the psychology of revolution: the fatherless society; 1919), he analyzed the challenge to authority by the postwar generation as unconscious parricide aimed at creating a ‘‘fatherless society.’’ In line with his interest in applying psychoanalysis to public health, in 1926 he published, together with Heinrich Meng, Das psychoanalytische Volksbuch (Popular psychoanalysis). Of the Viennese disciples, Federn worked longest with Freud and was highly esteemed by him. He was such a loyal supporter of Freud that he was referred to as the ‘‘Apostle Paul’’ of the psychoanalytic movement. His position within the Psychoanalytic Society continued to grow over the years. In 1922 he helped Eduard Hitschmann and Helene Deutsch establish the Vienna Ambulatorium, and during the 1930s he was one of the coeditors of the Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse and editor of Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Pädagogik. But the most important source of official recognition came from Freud himself, who, in 1924, made him, along with Anna Freud, his official representative and vice president of the Vienna Society, a position he held until 1938. After emigrating to America in 1938, Federn settled in New York. Though he got recognition for his medical diploma (which he received before 1914), it was not until 1946 that he was officially recognized as a training analyst at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. He committed suicide after the recurrence of what he felt was an incurable cancer. In addition to ego psychology, Federn was interested in the therapy of psychosis. Even his earliest writings, devoted to the sources of sadism and masochism and typical dream sensations (1914), manifest his interest in the nature and function of the ego, along with considerations of narcissism. The results of Federn’s research took time to come to fruition, since his ideas about the ego required a long period of gestation. In 1926 his important essay ‘‘Some Variations in Ego-Feeling’’ appeared, followed in 1928 by ‘‘Narcissism in the Structure of the Ego,’’ 56 8 and in 1929 by ‘‘Das Ich als Subjekt und Objekt im Narzissmus’’ (The ego as subject and object in narcissism). His phenomenological description of the ego as experience coinciding with ‘‘ego feeling’’ diverged considerably from Freud’s structural approach. Although his conclusions were far removed from Freud’s, out of loyalty Federn preferred to downplay his own theoretical contributions, such as ‘‘ego feeling,’’ the ‘‘sense of reality,’’ the ‘‘limits’’ and ‘‘states’’ of the ego, ‘‘ego cathexis,’’ the ‘‘median’’ nature of narcissism, and the death drive. For although Freud had a great deal of respect for Federn, he did not value Federn’s theoretical proposals very highly. In his studies of schizophrenic patients, Federn came to the conclusion that, far from being excessively cathected with libido, their egos possessed inadequate cathectic energy. On Federn’s hypothesis, contrary to the hypotheses of Freud and Karl Abraham, it was an absence rather than an excess of narcissistic libido that determined the psychotic’s problems with the object. As a result, Federn’s approach to treating psychotics, described in ‘‘The Analysis of Psychotics’’ (1934) and other important texts he wrote while in America, involved supporting the patient’s efforts at integration by trying to prevent the emergence of the repressed and by strengthening the patient’s defenses. According to Federn, transference in psychosis should not be interpreted. He felt that it was important to avoid negative transference and to help the psychotic confront problems by means of female support figures. Although the response to Federn’s ego psychology was limited, he had several illustrious followers, including Edoardo Weiss and Hermann Nunberg, along with a small group of American analysts such as Bertram D. Lewin, I. Peter Glauber, and Martin Bergmann. In psychiatry the influence of his ideas is obvious. His ideas also served as a foundation for the transactional analysis of Eric Berne, who refers to the theory of ‘‘ego states.’’ Weiss was responsible for the posthumous publication of Federn’s writings, Ego Psychology and the Psychoses (1952), a book that contributed greatly to spreading the ideas of one of the earliest and most faithful pioneers of psychoanalysis. ANNA MARIA ACCERBONI Work discussed: Ego Psychology and the Psychoses. Notions developed: Ego boundaries; Ego, damage inflicted on the; Ego feeling; Ego stages. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F É D I D A , P I E R R E (1934 –2 002) See also: Ego (ego psychology); Lehrinstitut der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung; Marxism and psychoanalysis; Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung. Bibliography Federn, Ernst. (1972). Thirty-five years with Freud. Journal of Clinical Psychology, suppl. 32, 18–34. Federn, Paul. (1914). On dreams of flying. In Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek (Ed.), The first freudians (pp. 121–128). New York: Jason Aronson. ———. (1919). Zur psychologie der revolution: die vaterlose gesellschaft. Vienna: Anzengruber-Verlag. ———. (1926). Some variations in ego-feeling. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 7, 434–444. ———. (1928). Narcissism in the structure of the ego. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 9, 401–419. ———. (1934). The analysis of psychotics. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 15, 209–214. ———. (1952). Ego-psychology and the psychoses (Edoardo Weiss, Ed.). New York: Basic Books. Federn, Paul, and Meng, Heinrich. (1926). Das psychoanalytische volksbuch (2 vols.). Stuttgart: Hippocrates. Pao, Ping-Nie. (1975). The place of Federn’s ego psychology in a contemporary theory of schizophrenia. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 2, 467–480. Weiss, Edoardo. (1951). Paul Federn’s scientific contributions: in commemoration. International Journal of PsychoAnalysis, 32 (4), 1–8. ———. (1966). Paul Federn: The theory of the psychoses. In Franz Alexander, Samuel Eisenstein, and Martin Grotjahn (Eds.), Psychoanalytic pioneers (pp. 142–159). New York: Basic Books. FÉDIDA, PIERRE (1934–2002) The French psychoanalyst Pierre Fédida was born in Lyon, France, on October 30, 1934, and died in Paris on November 1, 2002. He was a full member and president of the Association psychanalytique de France (French Psychoanalytic Association), a member of the International Psychoanalytical Association, and cofounder, with Daniel Widlöcher, of the Revue International de psychopathologie (International journal of psychopathology). He passed the concours d’agrégation, a prestigious teacher-qualifying exam, in philosophy, and in 1962 he was appointed to a university-level teaching position. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS He began his clinical training in psychiatry and neuropsychiatry at the age of twenty-three, notably at the Bellevue Sanatorium in Kreuzlingen, Switzerland, with Professor Ludwig Biswanger and in Münsterlinger, Switzerland, with Professor Roland Kuhn. His thinking on the treatment of psychotics was thus stamped with a distinctive phenomenological orientation that remained with him throughout his career. All his psychoanalytic training (both individual analysis and professional training) took place under the Association psychanalytique de France, where he enrolled as a student in the 1960s and entered into analysis with Georges Favez. Although his background in phenomenological philosophy initially concerned some, he quickly established himself in the eyes of professionals as a very astute clinician with an exceptional mastery of the theory of treatment. After he became a training analyst, he was elected president of the Association psychanalytique de France in 1988 and undertook significant statutory reforms. Notably, he expanded the cadre of training analysts to include all tenured members of the association. He then played an active role in the European Federation of Psychoanalysis and the International Psychoanalytical Association, where, from 2000, he was responsible for contacts with psychologists, psychiatrists, and other psychoanalytic schools throughout Europe. Concurrent with these developments, in 1966 he became senior assistant in clinical psychology at the Sorbonne with Juliette Favez-Boutonier. This led to his participation in the events that revolutionized the French university system in May 1968, with Jean Laplanche and others soon joining in. Fédida taught at the Université de Paris VII from 1969 to 2002, and at the university he founded the Laboratoire de psychopathologie fondamentale et psychanalyse (Laboratory of basic psychopathology and psychoanalysis). Within the university’s research and training program in human clinical sciences, which he helped establish, he served in many scientific and administrative capacities, including that of program director. From the outset he brought a perspective transcending disciplines to his teaching, aiming to critique and bring together the main approaches in psychopathology, whether phenomenological, biological, or psychoanalytic. This open approach led him to establish a research laboratory in 1989 and an advanced degree program in basic psychopathology in 1990, 569 FEES which he wanted to link with biology and then to the Centre d’études du vivant (Life studies center) at the Université de Paris VII (where he also served as vice president from 1987 to 1989). He also traveled widely to universities abroad, where he established a solid network of relationships, especially in Brazil and other Latin American countries. Fédida wrote a substantial number of works: 320 publications on a wide variety of subjects. In addition to ten to twelve articles each year from 1962, he penned such major works as Corps du Vide et Espace de Séance (The body of the void and the space of the session; 1977); L’Absence (Absence; 1978), Crise et Contre-Transfert (Crisis and counter-transference; 1992), Le Site de L’Étranger (The site of the alien; 1995), and Les Bienfaits de la Dépression (The benefits of depression; 2001). These works have been translated into many languages. Unifying themes of his work are the concealed, the stranger within, and enigmatic knowledge of the self. A man of dialogue conscious of his own charisma, Fédida fashioned an atypical discourse combining psychoanalysis, psychopathology, philosophy, literature, architecture, and art history. His writings present a complex blend of scientific rigor, human openness, and confidence in diversity. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Association psychanalytique de France; Countertransference; Favez-Boutonier, Juliette; Groddeck, Georg Walther; Intergenerational. Bibliography Fédida, Pierre. (1977). Corps du vide et espace de séance. Paris: J.-P. Delarge. ———. (1978). L’absence. Paris: Gallimard. ———. (1992). Crise et contre-transfert. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ———. (1995). Le site de l’étranger. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ———. (2000). Par où commence le corps humain: Retour sur la régression. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ———. (2001). Des bienfaits de la dépression: Éloge de la psychothérapie. Paris: Odile Jacob. Fédida, Pierre, and Guyotat, Jean (Eds.). (1986). Mémoires et transferts. Paris: Écho-Centurion. 57 0 FEES. See Money and psychoanalytic treatment FEMALE SEXUALITY Freud’s observations on female sexuality were made between 1923 and 1933, late in his career. They cannot be understood without reference to his thesis of the primacy of the phallus, according to which, for both sexes, ‘‘only one genital’’—the male one—played a structuring role (1923e, p. 142). Structurally speaking, the phallic phase defined the girl as much as the boy, but the girl’s embrace of the phallic—at once real (experienced directly), imaginary (fantasized in an oscillation between power and impotence), and symbolic (thought-cathexis)—was centered on the clitoris. Even though the Freudian theorization of the girl’s psychosexual development toward femininity took as its sole basis the psychosexuality of the boy, Freud continually emphasized the differences between the sexes in this regard, and hence too the specificity of the female Oedipus complex. Penis envy and the castration complex play the major, organizing roles that made access to femininity possible. As Freud wrote in ‘‘Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes,’’ little girls ‘‘notice the penis of a brother or playmate, strikingly visible and of large proportions, at once recognize it as the superior counterpart of their own small and inconspicuous organ, and from that time forward fall a victim to envy for the penis’’ (1925j, p. 252). This injury, at once phallic and narcissistic, was experienced to begin with as a personal punishment, then accepted as part of a broader truth: women do not have them. That the mother should have omitted to ‘‘give her a proper penis’’ (1931b, p. 234) constituted the main motive, specific to the little girl, for transferring her affections to the father. This reversal was more a flight from the mother than a choice of the father as object. It was this disillusionment, coupled with the depreciation of the mother contingent upon the discovery that she was castrated, that occasioned the abandonment of the relationship with the mother as object. The renunciation of phallic activity (clitoral masturbation) allowed passivity to come to the fore: ‘‘The transition to the father-object is accomplished with the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FEMALE SEXUALITY help of the passive trends in so far as they have survived the catastrophe. The path to the development of femininity now lies open to the girl’’ (p. 239). The girl placed all her hopes on her father, waiting for him to give her the penis that her mother had ‘‘refused’’ her. The feminine attitude would be reached only if an equivalence was established between penis and child and the wish for a penis transformed into the wish for a child. What Freud had discovered in 1931 was that for the little girl the mother as dispenser of the earliest bodily care is the object of a particularly intense and long-lasting archaic cathexis. He compared this first bond between mother and daughter to the MinoanMycenaean civilization so long obscured from view by the civilization of Athens: ‘‘Our insight into this early, pre-Oedipus, phase in girls comes to us as a surprise, like the discovery, in another field, of the Minoan-Mycenaean civilization behind the civilization of Greece’’ (p. 226). He immediately pointed up the ambivalence of this earliest bond: primary homosexuality, the idea of which was to be further developed by Freud’s successors, was built upon the amorous or tender current in mother-infant coexcitation, which was nevertheless not devoid of aggressiveness. Attachment and hostility toward the mother were differently inflected depending on whether they related to the oral or the anal phase. During the oral phase, after the withdrawal of the breast, they arose in response to the little girl’s fears of being devoured, poisoned or killed by her mother. During the anal phase, the pleasure associated with various maternal manipulations was related to the intrusive anal mother (described by Ruth Mack Brunswick as arousing the girl’s aggressiveness). His discovery of a primal coexcitation sensorily uniting daughter and mother, and of the dramatic rift that ensued between the two female members of this initial dyad, supplied Freud with much support for his conclusion that the mental bisexuality of women was more marked than that of men. The subsequent route to femininity was a long one, marked by the detachment from the pre-oedipal mother and calling for both a change in the erogenous zone cathected (the shift from clitoris to vagina), and a change of object. Taking the father as love-object is thus seen as a second phase in the little girl’s mental development, so that it is possible to speak of a two-phase oedipal period for women (Jeanne Lampl-de Groot, Julia Kristeva). Freud went so far as to say that he saw no dissolution of the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Oedipus complex in the female. Whereas in the boy the complex succumbed to the threat of castration, it would have no end in the case of women and would manifest itself as such in both the need for motherhood and in the character of ‘‘females as social beings’’ (p. 230). In addition to the path leading to the choice of the father as object, Freud evoked two other possible routes: the young woman might turn away from sexuality into neurosis (inhibition), or she might refuse to renounce the phallus and develop a masculinity complex. Freud’s phallocentric account, which he took up again in the New Introductory Lectures on PsychoAnalysis (1933a [1932]), has been widely criticized. In the first place, a number of psychoanalysts, among them Karen Horney, Ernest Jones, Melanie Klein, and Helene Deutsch, have in particular contested the claim that penis envy is a primary given rather than a construction developed or used in a secondary way in response to primitive wishes. At the same time feminists have castigated Freud for incorporating his own phallocratic and bourgeois prejudices into his theory. But it must not be forgotten that Freud’s theorizing here addresses the Unconscious, so that only criticisms doing likewise have relevance (André, 1994). Furthermore it is essential to bear in mind that according to Freud the phallic organization in fantasy is based on the ‘‘infantile’’ genital organization, and that the primacy of the phallus, for the girl as for the boy, is deemed an aspect of the child’s development and can in no way be conflated with the adult genital organization. Last, and most important, the idea of phallic primacy must be understood as the primacy of a symbolic dimension, not an organic one. In his Écrits (1966), Jacques Lacan describes the dynamics of a human psyche, dependent on language, which necessarily embraces both the male and the female speaking subject. Even though the ‘‘detachability’’ of the penis inevitably makes it the ‘‘signifier of the lack,’’ and hence the symbol of the signifying function itself, men and women nevertheless relate to it differently. Recent psychoanalytical research has paid particular attention to the exploration of this difference, and notably to the ‘‘strangeness of the phallus’’ for the female (Kristeva). JULIA KRISTEVA See also: Feminine masochism; Femininity; Femininity, rejection of; Feminism and psychoanalysis; Gender identity; Infantile sexual curiosity; Masculinity/femininity; Oedipus complex; Penis envy; Phallic woman; Psy571 FEMININE MASOCHISM chosexual development; Sexual differences; Sexuality; Sexualization; Wish for a baby. Bibliography André, Jacques. (1994). Sur la sexualité féminine. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1923e). The infantile genital organization. SE, 19: 141–145. ———. (1925j). Some psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes. SE, 19: 241–258. ———. (1931b). Female sexuality. SE, 21: 221–243. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. Kristeva, Julia. (2000). The sense and non-sense of revolt (Jeanine Herman, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. (Original work published 1996) Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Ecrits. Paris: Seuil. Further Reading Chodorow, Nancy. (1994). Femininities, masculities, sexualities. Freud and beyond. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky. Deutsch, Helene. (1946). The psychology of women: I. Girlhood. II. Motherhood. London: Research Books Ltd. Gilmore, Karen. (1998). Cloacal anxiety in female development. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 46, 443–470. Horney, Karen. (1973). Feminine psychology. New York: W. W. Norton. Kleeman, James A. (1976). Freud’s view on early female sexuality in the light of direct child observations. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 24, 3–28. Silverman, Doris K. (2003). Theorizing in the shadow of Foucault: Facets of female sexuality. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 13, 243–258. of masochistic men, who obtain sexual satisfaction primarily through masturbation. Behind such men’s need for punishment and humiliation (which form a transition with moral masochism by way of guilt) there is an infantile staging of a ‘‘characteristically female situation’’ that signifies ‘‘being castrated, or copulated with, or giving birth to a baby’’ (p. 162). In Freud’s view, the passivity of masochism is linked to femininity, and the active nature of sadism to virility, as he wrote in New Introductory Lectures on PsychoAnalysis (1933a [1932]). He first described this connection between active/passive and masculine/feminine in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d). However, in 1933, taking bisexuality into consideration, he relativized this opposition and stressed the role of the instinctual aim: ‘‘to achieve a passive aim may call for a large amount of activity’’ (p. 115). He also acknowledged that the social repression of aggressiveness in women could lead to secondary masochistic impulses, ‘‘which succeed . . . in binding erotically the destructive trends which have been diverted inwards’’ (p. 116). Freud’s discomfort on the issue of woman’s sexuality is apparent in his description of feminine masochism in men, even though his 1924 essay rehabilitates masochism as a form of protection in the individual against the death instinct and as a factor in the organization of the ego. Yet we can deduce from his thinking that he thought that a woman’s intimate acquaintance with passivity, and thus her capacity for masochism, also play a part in her strength, and not just in her weakness stemming from her need for love. Masochism is part of the intensity of her sexual pleasure, but also of the strength of her love as a woman and mother. DENYS RIBAS See also: Masochism Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. FEMININE MASOCHISM Feminine masochism, ‘‘an expression of the feminine being nature’’ (p. 161), is one of the three forms of masochism described by Sigmund Freud in ‘‘The Economic Problem of Masochism’’ (1924c), along with moral masochism and primary, erotogenic masochism. Based ‘‘entirely . . . on the primary, erotogenic masochism’’ (p. 162), feminine masochism, according to Freud, is clinically accessible through the fantasies 57 2 ———. (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155–170. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. Further Reading Bernstein, Isidore. (1983). Masochistic pathology and feminine development. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 31, 467–486. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FEMININITY Blum, Harold P. (1976). Masochism, the ego ideal, and the psychology of women. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 24, 157–192. Bonaparte, Marie. (1935). Passivity, masochism and femininity. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 16, 325–333. Deutsch, Helene. (1930). The significance of masochism in the mental life of women. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 11, 48–60. Horney, Karen. (1935). The problem of feminine masochism. Psychoanalytic Review, 22, 241–257. FEMININITY Freud refused to put forward a definition of femininity: ‘‘In conformity with its peculiar nature, psychoanalysis does not try to describe what a woman is . . . but sets about enquiring how she comes into being’’ (1933a [1932], p. 116). He posits a primary bisexuality as the starting point for this process. In Freud’s view, the genesis of femininity differs from the genesis of masculinity because its linearity is interrupted. In the pre-oedipal phase, the girl’s libido, instead of taking the opposite-sex parent as its object, as the boy does, is directed at the mother as object. This period is difficult to investigate because of the ‘‘inexorable repression’’ (1931b, p. 226) that overshadows it. Therefore, the development of girls’ sexuality is studied in an indirect way based on the process that the boy undergoes. In the early stages a similar path is traced: ‘‘the little girl is a little man’’ (1933a, p. 118), with the clitoris being interpreted in the phallic phase as a miniature penis. Then there are two shifts in perspective, shifts in which there is an explicit moral imperative. The girl has the duty of turning from the mother to the father (1939a [1934–1938]): the zone of sensitivity moves from the clitoris to the vagina, and there is a change of object to the father. Reconversion is made possible by the differential impact of the castration complex on boys and girls. In boys, the castration complex puts an end to the Oedipus complex. But for girls, the castration complex makes the Oedipus complex possible. The girl sees her mother as castrated, while her love is ‘‘directed to her phallic mother’’ (1939a, p. 126). This gives rise to a penis envy that later radiates beyond the desired object to imbue the woman’s psychic life with envy and jealousy. The girl then chooses INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the father as object because he possesses the envied organ, and this new libidinal orientation is superimposed on the orientation of the mother as object, without replacing it entirely. The woman often transfers her early relationship with her mother onto her male partner. The need to anticipate from someone else what the woman once wanted to possess herself makes her dependent in a way that leads both to masochism (with the castigation she receives relating to her position in coitus) and to narcissism (which is expressed in her greater need to be loved than to love). Presenting another perspective in ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ (1914c), Freud stated that following puberty, women, ‘‘especially if they grow up with good looks, develop a certain self-contentment’’ that exercises ‘‘a great attraction for those who have renounced part of their own narcissism’’ (p. 89). Although the texts that present a synthetic view of femininity are focused on lack, Freud’s incursions into mythology and literature emphasize something beyond the phallic stage in girls. This something is a place in the female body characterized by its internal nature (the ‘‘jewel-case’’) or by disorientation, as in the sense of the uncanny. The woman then appears not as an externally definable form but as a ‘‘hollow space’’ (1916–1917a [1915–1917], p. 156) that can receive what penetrates it. The spatial disorientation is coupled with a temporal disorientation, in which the representation of femininity becomes confused with the notion of birth linked with the fear of death, as if the third of the Fates had come to embody a femininity that governed all of destiny. Freud’s study of femininity thus diverges into a theoretical synthesis derived from phallic logic and a representation of femininity that mythologizes woman as a place—whether of birth or death—where the processes of life are played out for every human being. The idea of taking a foreign element into the self appears as the crossroads where the representations of psychoanalysis intersect with those of female sexuality. When Freud noted how the transference configuration enabled a repressed element to be taken in, he usually gave an example—Elisabeth in Studies on Hysteria (1895d) or Irma with her dream about the injection— of a patient struggling against accepting a proposed solution or repressed representation (1900a). Recourse to these terms had a clear impact on the paper ‘‘Negation’’ (1925h), because acceptance into the ego enabled repression to be effectively lifted. 573 FEMININITY Freud noted the conjunction between such acceptance and the outcome of female sexuality in ‘‘On the Sexual Theories of Children’’ (1908c), where he referred, in connection with the mother representation, to the discovery of the ‘‘cavity which receives the penis’’ (p. 218). In the moment of affirmation associated with the lifting of repression, the psychic apparatus has to receive the repressed element just as the female ‘‘hollow space’’ has to receive the penis. This correlation reappears in ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’’ (1937c), where Freud describes the man’s refusal to accept the cure from the psychoanalyst as his rejection of femininity. Does a refusal of this kind arise from the fear of losing masculinity or the fear of invasion occasioned by opening the self as a ‘‘hollow space’’? Two different definitions of femininity clash at this juncture. Post-Freudian psychoanalysis both extended and revised Freud’s lines of approach to femininity. The phallic primacy attributed to both sexes became a matter of dispute. Karen Horney asserted that the girl discovers vaginal sensations early on. As a result, recourse to the penis takes on a defensive significance. Ernest Jones did not consider woman as a form of failed man, and he related female anxiety not to castration anxiety but to aphanisis anxiety, the fear of losing her internal sensitivity. Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel challenged the passive concept of the vagina. She saw the vaginal aim of incorporation as conferring a capacity for mastery, as with anality. Conrad Stein sought to define a specifically feminine outcome by positing ‘‘castration as a negation of femininity.’’ He argued that insofar as masculinity carries a ‘‘symbolic representation of itself,’’ it is a guardian of identity. In contrast, the female pole, situated close to being, is governed by a tendency toward ‘‘destruction of the self ’s identity,’’ which, when it gives rise to anxiety, ‘‘is negated by the act of regarding woman only as a castrated being.’’ The risk of destruction to which the woman is exposed leads to a focus in the analysis on the dimension of invasion (André; Schaeffer). Is there a fundamental difference between masculine protest and feminine protest organized around a receptive hollow space? In accordance with some of Michèle Montrelay’s theories, François Perrier emphasized the girl’s relationship with her mother, in which her fantasy involvement does not involve risking a part of herself but diving in head first. To reduce the risk of 57 4 being sucked in, the girl appeals to the male organ, on which she confers investigative properties. Penis envy is thus governed not by rejection of femininity but by the girl’s desire to orient herself in this space. Wladimir Granoff examined the tendency for theory to construct femininity in negative terms. He regards femininity as a defense that resembles the child’s decision to prefer the father to the mother. In this view, thought needs to turn away from femininity to construct an intellectualized universe. This turning away resembles the son-in-law’s prohibition against turning toward his mother-in-law in Freud’s analysis and is related to Freud’s invitation to explore, beyond classical Greek culture, cultures that have been repressed by ‘‘turning from the mother to the father’’ (1939a, p. 114). Because the female genital opening is feared as a place of absence, pubic hair has been ascribed the function of a veil, though it can equally well belong to fantasies surrounding fertility and growth, reminiscent of Demeter (Schneider). Marcel Detienne’s observation concerning the dual character of the founding sites of Greek culture—‘‘Eleusis is the counterpart of Athens’’—can be used to inform the study of femininity. Freud’s Moses and Monotheism (1939a [1934– 1938]), drawing on Aeschylus’s Eumenides, belongs in the mythical tradition that began with the founding of Athens. Accordingly, it pays tribute to Athena, a virgin born without a mother. It might well be appropriate to unearth those underworld entities that Athena proposes at the end of the tragedy, to lead ‘‘Into the earth/ The cavern timeless as the tomb.’’ MONIQUE SCHNEIDER See also: Activity/passivity; Castration complex; Dark continent; Female sexuality; Feminine masochism; Femininity, rejection of; Feminism and psychoanalysis; Gender identity; Masculinity/femininity; New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis; Object, change of/choice of; Penis envy; Psychology of Women. A Psychoanalytic Interpretation, The; Sexual differences; ‘‘Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes.’’ Bibliography André, Jacques. (1995). Sur la sexualité féminine. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Chasseguet-Smirgel, Janine. (1970). Feminine guilt and the Oedipus complex. In her Female sexuality (pp. 94–134). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FEMININITY, REJECTION Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Originally published 1964) Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1–338; 5: 339–625. ———. (1908c). On the sexual theories of children. SE, 9: 205–226. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: an introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. ———. (1916–1917a [1915–1917]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15–16. ———. (1925h). Negation. SE, 19: 233–239. ———. (1931b). Female sexuality. SE, 21: 221–243. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. ———. (1939a [1934–1938]). Moses and monotheism: Three essays. SE, 23: 1–137. Freud Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. Granoff, Wladimir. (1976). La pensée et le féminin. Paris: Minuit. Horney, Karen. (1967). Feminine psychology. New York: W. W. Norton. Jones, Ernest. (1950). Early development of female sexuality. In his Papers on psycho-analysis. London: Bailliere, Tindall and Cox. Montrelay, Michèle. (1978). Inquiry into femininity. M/F, 1, 83–102. Schaeffer, Jacqueline. (1997). Le refus du féminin. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Schneider, Monique. (1992). La part de l’ombre: Approche d’un trauma féminin. Paris: Aubier. Stein, Conrad. (1977). La castration comme négation de la féminité. In his La mort d’Œdipe (pp. 155–183). Paris: Denoël. OF Richards, Arlene K. (1996). Primary femininity and female genital anxiety. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 44(S), 261–282. Stoller, Robert J. (1976). Primary femininity. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 24, 59–78. FEMININITY, REJECTION OF Rejection of femininity refers to a man’s rejection of the feminine elements inherent in his constitutional bisexuality. The concept first appeared in Freud’s article ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’’ (1937c), where he introduced it in his discussion of the ‘‘bedrock’’ beyond which analytic work cannot continue. It also formed a part of his ongoing argument against the term proposed by Alfred Adler, ‘‘masculine protest.’’ This bedrock, which takes the form of penis envy in women, appears in men as a rejection of femininity. Specifically, what the man rejects is a passive position towards another man. The question of the exact nature of this rejected femininity is taken up again when Freud specifies what it is that the man is defending himself against: ‘‘He refuses to subject himself to a father-substitute . . . and consequently he refuses to accept his recovery from the doctor’’ (1937c, p. 252). The notion of ‘‘acceptance’’ (Annahme) is related to femininity, but without reference to the phallic organization. It refers to the act by which the vagina, as ‘‘cavity,’’ ‘‘receives the penis’’ (1908c, p. 218). Thus the rejection of femininity might be viewed as the refusal of inner space (as representative of mental space as a whole) to admit a foreign body. Jacqueline Schaeffer (1997) has spoken in this connection of anxiety about a femininity perceived as the ‘‘penetration of the ego and the body by a stranger, the agent of an incursion that feeds the constant pressure of the drive.’’ MONIQUE SCHNEIDER Further Reading See also: Femininity. Dahl, Kirsten. (2002). In her mother’s voice: reflections on femininity and the superego. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 57, 3–26. Bibliography Kulish, Nancy. (2000). Primary femininity: Clinical advances and theoretical ambiguities. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 48, 1355–1380. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Freud, Sigmund. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. ———. (1908c). On the sexual theories of children. SE, 9: 205–226. 575 FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Schaeffer, Jacqueline. (1997). Le refus du feminine. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Schneider, Monique. (1992). La part de l’ombre. Approche d’un trauma féminin. Paris: Aubier. FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Freud’s discovery of the unconscious is centrally linked to the study of female sexuality. In listening to the hysterics, Freud gave them a voice and attributed a meaning to what they said. As Juliet Mitchell noted, feminist movements have tended to equate what Freud said about the hysterics and his other female patients as prescriptions for patriarchal domination of women rather than understanding his writings as an analysis of women’s position in patriarchal societies. Feminist movements, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, were hostile to psychoanalysis, as they viewed it as a major factor in the oppression of women. The issues that feminists challenged in psychoanalysis centered on Freud’s formulations of the differentiation between the sexes, in terms of the association of masculinity with activity and femininity with passivity; Freud’s emphasis on the existence of penis envy in women; female masochism; and the emphasis on the role of the father as opposed to feminists’ reassessment of the mother-daughter relationship. Simone de Beauvoir’s La deuxieme sexe (1949) and Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (1963) both viewed psychoanalysis as regarding women as inferior and as defining them only with reference to men. Then in the 1970s another wave of feminist writings, such as Kate Millet’s Sexual Politics (1970), Shulamith Firestone’s The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution (1970) and Germaine Greer’s The Female Eunuch (1970), called for changes in society that would help to eliminate sexual inequality. Mitchell’s Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1972) was a marker in the recovery of psychoanalysis, by explaining its revolutionary understanding of women. From a very early stage, psychoanalysis maintained that the psychic reality of sex had to be distinguished from the anatomical reality, that there was no one-toone correlation between biology and psychology. Men and women are not physically or socially ‘‘made’’ as male or female but become such. Initially, however, Freud assumed a symmetry in the development of what he called the Oedipus 57 6 complex. It was only in an essay written in 1925 that Freud distinguished between the psychosexual history of boys and girls and recognized the importance of the pre-oedipal phase in which boys and girls love the mother, and both have to relinquish her in favor of the father (1925j). The girl has to move from loving her mother to loving her father, whereas the boy gives up his mother with the understanding that he will later have a woman of his own. In this model, boys identify with their fathers as their masculine identity is established. The little boy learns his role as the heir of his father. The little girl, on the other hand, has to identify with her mother while at the same time abandoning her as a love object and turning to her father instead. For Freud this turning away from the mother is based on frustration and the disappointment that she cannot satisfy her mother, and is accompanied by hostility. The importance of the ‘‘pre-oedipal’’ relationship with the mother has been more fully discussed since Freud’s time. More recently interest in the nature of female identity can be found in the works of Ethel Person, Irene Fast, and Jessica Benjamin in the United States, as well as in the works of Janine ChasseguetSmirgel, Catherine J. Luquet-Parat, Maria Torok, and Joyce McDougall in France. In the 1920s a controversy took place over the perception of femininity. If for Freud libido is identical in the two sexes, for the English School, feminine libido is specific. Karen Horney and Ernest Jones participated in a series of interchanges and opposed Freud’s views by putting forward a ‘‘positive’’ view of female sexuality, not linked to an idea of a lack. For Jones, femininity’s development is linked to instinctual constitution. In debate with him, Freud asserted that Jones profoundly misunderstood the fundamental nature of sexuality and that Jones had returned to a biological reductionism. Mitchell has pointed out that the Freud-Jones controversy shifted from the question of what distinguished the sexes to what each sex has that is specific to it alone. Developments in psychoanalytic theory in England, with the school of object relations, led to an emphasis on the mother-child dyad, and on motherhood. Psychoanalytic work from an early stage concentrated on primitive states in infancy, and progressively attention was paid to the impact of these primitive states on transference. Melanie Klein’s theory carried on Freud’s shift in the emphasis from the father to the mother and the mother’s importance for children of both INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FEMINISM sexes. For her, the relationship of the child to the mother’s body shaped subsequent emotional life. Particularly, the relationship to the breast is crucial in the child’s early experiences. Klein’s concepts of introjective and projective identification are metaphors for the bodily processes of taking in and expelling. According to Klein, the little girl believes her mother’ s body contains everything that is desirable, including the father’s penis. As a consequence the little girl is filled with hatred towards her mother and wishes to attack and rob the inside of her body. She is then filled with a persecutory anxiety of "having the inside of her body robbed and destroyed." In 1928 Klein argued that it was the deprivation of the breast rather than the discovery of the lack of penis that turned the little girl away from the mother towards the father. Later she downplayed the child’s original envy of the breast and wrote about an essentially heterosexual drive in little girls. Klein’s views on this early relationship between mother and baby had an impact on some of the early writings on femininity in the British society, such as the work of Joan Riviere and Sylvia Payne. Progressively psychoanalysts from all the groups in the British Society, inspired by the works of Klein, Donald Winnicott, Marjorie Brierly and Wilfred Bion, have emphasised the connection between primary affective development and object relations. One can trace these themes throughout the writings of Marion Burgner and Rose Edcumbe, Egle Laufer, Dinora Pines, Dana Breen, Joan Raphael-Leff, and Rosine Perelberg. In a more recent collection presenting work of the three schools of psychoanalysis in the British Psycho-Analytical Society, Raphael-Leff and Perelberg stress the primitive tie to the mother and its manifestations in transference and countertransference. American feminists have perceived psychoanalysis as reproducing patriarchal inequalities. Nancy Chodorow is one of the most well-known writers in the United States on the relationship between psychoanalysis and feminism. The Reproduction of Mothering; Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (1978) introduced the work of Winnicott, W. Ronald Fairbairn, and Harry Guntrip to American readers. Chodorow emphasizes the development of the self in relation to others, stressing the pre-oedipal relationship between mother and child. She views the function of mothering as creating an asymmetrical relationship between boys and girls. The girl has more permeable boundaries in the relationship with the other because INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS of having been mothered by someone of the same gender. Girls are themselves, therefore, more committed to mothering. Boys, in contrast, develop a sense of self in opposition to the mother and establish more rigid boundaries. The masculine sense of self is more separate. Jean Baker Miller and Carol Gilligan, from the interpersonal school of analysis, emphasize women’s attributes of relatedness, empathy and nurturance which are viewed as devalued in the male-dominated culture. These interpersonal theoreticians stress cultural emphases on different attributes for men and women and are less concentrated on the internal world of unconscious phantasies and internal object relationships. Jessica Benjamin in Bonds of Love (1988) sees both boys and girls as looking to the father for confirmation of themselves. While the boy’s identity is confirmed by the father, the girl in contrast has her identification with the father’s power denied, and he becomes the object of her ideal ego. This prevents her from having a ‘‘desire of her own,’’ and her longing for the father becomes tinged with masochism. Issues of power and submission are located in the sphere of relationships. Chodorow has argued that what all these authors have in common, in spite of their differences, is the emphasis on the qualities of the ‘‘self in relation’’ (or denial of relation). She suggests that this view radically breaks with an essentialist view of gender and moves towards a view that perceives masculinity and femininity in a contingent, relationally constructed context. These schools, however, end up by constructing a more fixed view of femininity and masculinity than Freud, who basically indicated that there is a fluidity between masculinity and femininity in both men and women. These views can be contrasted with the major trends in French theories on psychoanalysis and feminism, where there is an emphasis on unconscious fantasies and desire and an attempt to find a language to express the feminine. Among the French psychoanalysts in particular there is a view that the discovery of the unconscious in itself reveals the precariousness of identity in the forces of fantasy and desire. This is the radical perspective that psychoanalysis can offer to feminism. The impact of Jacques Lacan’s work pervades the numerous writings, from those who accept basic tenets of Freudian theory to those who, like Julia Kristeva, Helene Cixous, Michele Montrelay, Sarah 577 F E N I C H E L , O T T O (1897 – 1946) Kofman, and Luce Irigaray, remained highly critical of psychoanalytic assumptions. Lacan pointed out that the distinction between penis and phallus is fundamental to Freud’s differentiation between biological and psychic reality. The phallus exists outside anatomical reality and is the signifier of the mother’s desire. Joël Dor has suggested that the central question of the Oedipus complex thus becomes ‘‘to be or not to be the phallus,’’ i.e. to be or not to be the object of the mother’s desire. The role of the father also becomes symbolic—he represents the impossibility of being the object of mother’s desire. The phallus, unlike the penis, is possessed by nobody (male or female) and represents the combination of both sexes. Chasseguet-Smirgel, McDougall, Torok, LuquetParat, Monique Cournut-Janin, and Jacqueline Schaeffer have all argued from a position inside psychoanalysis. Chasseguet-Smirgel indicated her perception that the little girl is aware of the existence of the vagina virtually from the beginning, although she also suggests that this ‘‘knowledge’’ may be held unconsciously, so that the little girl both knows and does not know. In her various works, ‘‘penis envy’’ is understood as having a defensive function. For many of the French feminist writers the body is the locus of femininity, and numerous writings attempt to capture its rhythms (such as Luce Irigaray’s Ce sexe qui n’en est pas un). In her book Speculum (1974), Irigaray perceives psychoanalysis as unaware of the historical and philosophical determinants of its own discourse and unable to analyse its own unconscious fantasies. Furthermore, being a product of patriarchal society, it cannot analyse what it owes to the mother. She consistently puts forward the view that women in patriarchy have no identity as women. She also emphasises the relationship of the little girl to the mother’s body. The girl, says Irigaray, ‘‘has the mother, in some sense, in her skin, in the humidity of the mucous membranes, in the intimacy of her most intimate parts, in the mystery of her relation to gestation, birth and to her sexual identity.’’ Kristeva relates psychic repression to the actual structures of language, and describes the pre-oedipal stage as a play of bodily rhythms and pre-linguistic exchanges between infant and mother. Kristeva refers to what Plato, in Timaeus, called the chora as the site of the undifferentiated bodily space the mother and the 57 8 child share. Within the Oedipus complex it is the symbolic that is dominant; the domain of unified texts, cultural representations, and knowledge. This distinction between the semiotic and the symbolic is retrospective, as it is only through the symbolic that one has access to the semiotic. For Kristeva, subjectivity is founded on a constitutive repression of the maternal, the chora, the semiotic, and the abject (liminal states, like pregnancy). Kristeva has been accused of reducing women to the maternal function, but she is also seen as providing a deepening in the understanding of the pre-oedipal. In these French feminist writings, there is a profound search for the multiplicity which characterizes femininity (as opposed to masculinity), which may be expressed in a language which itself attempts to capture the feminine. In a paradoxical way one may be referred back to Freud’s thinking about hysteria. The symptoms of the first patient of psychoanalysis, Anna O., included mutism, paralysis, ‘‘time-missing,’’ and gaps in memory: all expressing interruptions in the domain of a reality which is being denied. Psychoanalysis indicates that sexuality is only created through division and discontinuity, although femininity is the side that both represents, and tends to be represented as, the negative (of masculinity). ROSINE JOZEF PERELBERG See also: Cinema and psychoanalysis; Femininity; Boundary violations; Psyche. Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und iher Anwendungen. Bibliography Mitchell, Juliet. (1974). Psychoanalysis and feminism. Hardsmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books. Raphael-Leff, Joan, and Perelberg, Rosine Jozef (Eds.) (1997). Female experience: Three generations of British women psychoanalysts on work with women. London: Routledge. Wright, Elizabeth. (1992). Feminism and psychoanalysis: A critical dictionary. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. FENICHEL, OTTO (1897–1946) Otto Fenichel, an Austrian physician and psychoanalyst, was born in Vienna on December 2, 1897, and died in Los Angeles on January 22, 1946. He was born into a family of Viennese Jewish lawyers. As a student he took INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F E R E N C Z I , S Á N D O R (1873 –1 933) part in the Viennese youth movement that had coalesced around Siegfried Bernfeld. He took an interest in cultural and educational reform and was especially interested in information about sexuality and its scientific study. Released from serving in the military, he began, after the winter of 1915/1916, to attend Sigmund Freud’s presentations at the University of Vienna, and after 1918 he participated in discussions held by the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. In February 1919 he organized, at the university, a Viennese Seminar on Sexology, a working group to study psychoanalysis and sexual matters. In 1920, while still a student, he was accepted as a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society after his talk on sexual problems in youth movements. He received his medical degree in 1921. Fenichel began an analysis in Vienna with Paul Federn and continued, after moving to Berlin, with Sándor Radó. In 1926 he became a teacher at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute and that same year organized a seminar on child psychoanalysis, an open forum on the problems of clinical and applied psychoanalysis. He was a member of the German Psychoanalytic Society from 1926 to 1934. After 1932 some members of the seminar began discussing psychoanalytic issues from a Marxist perspective. Fenichel had to flee to Oslo, Norway, in 1933. There he became secretary of the Dansk-Norsk Psykoanalytisk Forening (DanishNorwegian Psychoanalytical Society). In Norway, in the spring of 1934, he continued the meetings on Marxist psychoanalysis, writing clandestine circular letters that he sent to his colleagues in exile. By 1945 he had written 119 such letters. In 1935 he moved to the Czechoslovak city of Prague, where he ran the Prager Arbeitsgemeinschaft (Prague Study Society), which was associated with the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. After the introduction of National Socialism in Vienna and the dissolution of the Prague group, in the spring of 1938 Fenichel and his family left for Los Angeles. There he joined the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Study Group. In 1942 he helped found the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society and in 1944 became vice president. After 1939 he was an editor of the Psychoanalytic Quarterly. In the summer of 1945 he began studying psychiatry to obtain his California license at the Cedars of Lebanon Hospital in Los Angeles. The focus of his interest, which he shared with Siegfried Bernfeld, Wilhelm Reich, Erich Fromm, and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS others, lie in the development of a form of psychoanalysis that provided sociological explanations and was capable of making contributions to politics. His most important work, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, appeared in 1945 and became a key source for analytic training. One of Fenichel’s most important contributions to psychoanalysis, overlooked until 1998, has been his circular letters, which have shown him to be an important historiographer of the psychoanalytic movement. ELKE MÜHLLEITNER Work discussed: Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, The. See also: Addiction; American Imago; Asthma; Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut; Boredom; Bulimia; Claustrophobia; Czech Republic; Dependence; Dipsomania; Evenly-suspended attention; Germany; Indications and contraindications for psychoanalysis for an adult; Lehrinstitut de Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung; Narcissism of minor differences; ‘‘Neurasthenia and ÔAnxiety Neurosis’’’; Norway; Oedipus complex, early; Politics and psychoanalysis; Stammering; Tics; Transference relationship; Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung; Second World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis; United States. Bibliography Fenichel, Otto. (1945). The psychoanalytic theory of neuroses. New York: W. W. Norton. ———. (1953–1954). The collected papers of Otto Fenichel. New York: W. W. Norton. ———. (1998). 119 Rundbriefe (1934–1945) (2 vols.). Frankfurt am Main: Stroemfeld. Mühlleitner, Elke. (1992). Biographisches lexikon der psychoanalyse: die Mitglieder der psychologischen MittwochGesellschaft und der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung, 1902–1938. Tübingen, Germany: Diskord. FEPAL. See Federacion psicoanalitica de America Latina FERENCZI, SÁNDOR (1873–1933) A Hungarian neurologist and psychoanalyst, Sándor Ferenczi was born in Miskolc on July 7, 1873, and died in Budapest on May 22, 1933. He was the eighth of eleven children of Baruch Fraenkel (who changed his 579 F E R E N C Z I , S Á N D O R (1 873 –19 33) name to Bernát Ferenczi), a bookseller, printer, and ticket agent, and Róza Eibenschütz, both of whom were Jews from Galicia, Poland. His father died when he was fifteen. After studying at the Protestant school in his home town, Ferenczi went to Vienna to study medicine, obtaining his diploma in 1894. He became interested in psychology while still a student. Ferenczi first practiced medicine at the Rókus Hospital in Budapest and then specialized in neurology at the Szent Erzsébet (Saint Elizabeth) Hospital. After 1899 he contributed to the medical journal Gyógyászat (Therapeutics). These early articles demonstrate Ferenczi’s interest in clinical medicine and psychology. Ferenczi read Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams shortly after its appearance but was not impressed by the work. A few years later, after he adopted Carl Gustav Jung’s association test, he became more receptive to Freud’s ideas, and on February 2, 1908, together with another Hungarian doctor, he made his first visit to Freud. This was the beginning of a close friendship between the two men that lasted until Ferenczi’s death. In 1908 they began their correspondence (comprising approximately one thousand four hundred letters), an exchange that had a profound effect on the history of psychoanalysis. At the first psychoanalytic meeting, which took place in Salzburg on April 27, 1908, Ferenczi presented the paper ‘‘Psychoanalysis and Pedagogy,’’ the first psychoanalytic work devoted to the subject. Because many of his friends were writers and artists, Ferenczi played an active role in the cultural life of Budapest, which was being swept at this time by currents of modernism. The Freudian ideas for which he became the spokesman were well received by his writer friends but rejected by most medical doctors. To help introduce psychoanalysis to Hungary, Ferenczi gave a number of talks. He gradually became Freud’s closest disciple and spent a number of summer vacations with the Freud family, often traveling with Freud. In 1909, when Freud visited Clark University in the United States, Ferenczi accompanied him (along with Jung) and helped prepare his presentations. In 1909 Ferenczi published ‘‘Introjection et transfert’’ (Introjection and transference; 1990a), his first theoretical work. In 1910, following a suggestion by Freud, he proposed the creation of the International Psychoanalytical Association with Jung as president, and in 1913 founded the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Association 58 0 with István Hollós (a psychiatrist), Lajos Lévy (a doctor), Sándor Radó (a medical student), and Hugo Ignotus (whose real name was Hugo Veigelsberg and who was the editor-in-chief of the avant-garde literary review Nyugat [The Occident]). That same year Ernest Jones began analysis with Ferenczi. After experiencing a series of personal problems in 1911 (his interminable hesitation between Gizella Pálos, a married woman and his mistress since 1905, and Elma, her eldest daughter), Ferenczi asked Freud to analyze him. The analysis took place in three parts, one in 1914 and the other two in 1916. The analysis was cut short by the First World War, but also by Freud’s reluctance to get involved in matters he feared, not without reason, would have negative repercussions on their relationship. In the end Ferenczi married Gizella in 1919 without ever completely forgiving Freud for having influenced his decision. In 1916 Ferenczi undertook the analysis of Géza Roheim and Melanie Klein and played a key role in discovering their talent. September 1918 marked the highpoint of psychoanalysis in Hungary. The Fifth International Congress took place at the Academy of Sciences in Budapest, with participation of representatives from the government, who were interested in psychoanalytic work on war neuroses. During the congress, Ferenczi was elected president of the International Psychoanalytical Association. A few months later, because of political and social events in Hungary, which was then independent of Austria, Ernest Jones succeeded him as president. The following year, during the short-lived Hungarian Commune, Ferenczi obtained a chair in psychoanalysis at the university. This was taken from him when the right-wing government under Miklós Horthy came to power. In 1920 he was also expelled from the Hungarian medical association. After 1919 Ferenczi devoted himself exclusively to the care of his patients and the development of the psychoanalytic movement. In 1925, with Vilma Kovács, one of his analysands and students, he worked out the methods of a system of training, and in 1931 he founded a psychoanalytic clinic, with himself as director. At the same time he continued his research and theoretical work, which focused primarily on technique. In 1924 Ferenczi and Otto Rank published Entwicklungsziele der Psychoanalyse (The development of psychoanalysis [1925]). The book was criticized, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F E R E N C Z I , S Á N D O R (1873 –1 933) principally by Karl Abraham and Ernest Jones, and then by Freud. When Rank broke with Freud, Ferenczi reaffirmed his commitment to Freud and published an article criticizing Rank’s work. In 1924 he published Thalassa (1963), a work highly regarded by Freud for its use of Lamarckian ideas. In 1926 and 1927 Ferenczi spent six months in the United States giving lectures and training candidates, not all of whom were doctors. His position in favor of lay analysis alienated a large part of the American psychoanalytic community, which was committed to limiting psychoanalytic practice to medical doctors. Ferenczi’s technical experiments between 1918 and 1932, which were conducted to make psychoanalysis accessible to patients who showed signs of pregenital disturbances, created dissension between him and Freud. The conflict embittered his final years and affected the entire psychoanalytic community. He gave his last lecture, ‘‘Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child’’ (1949), in 1932 at the Wiesbaden Congress. Already suffering from pernicious anemia, he died on May 22, 1933, in Budapest. Ferenczi made an important contribution to psychoanalytic theory and technique. On the theoretical level, he introduced the concept of introjection, was the first to focus on object relations, and developed theories of trauma and regression. In Thalassa he presented a number of fertile hypotheses on the ontogenesis and phylogenesis of genitality, or a sex life. Above all, Ferenczi thought of himself as a doctor and held that it was not up to the patient to present himself as analyzable but up to the analyst to find suitable techniques for healing his patients. He successively developed several therapeutic techniques: 1. He developed the so-called active technique, whereby the analysand is asked to do whatever will promote free associations or to refrain from doing whatever might impede them. 2. To help mediate the authoritarian nature of the active method, he developed the technique of elasticity and permissiveness. Here, pushing tolerance of regression to its extremes, he allowed the traumatized patient to experience his symptoms anew. 3. He developed what is known as mutual analysis—an attempt doomed to failure and quickly abandoned—which was intended to spare INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS traumatized patients the consequences of misunderstanding and blind spots on the part of the analyst. Ferenczi occupies an important place in the development of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic theory and played an important role in propagating psychoanalytic ideas and contributing to the understanding and global awareness of psychoanalysis. His disagreement with Freud during the last years of his life, as well as the uneasiness caused by the almost superhuman demands he made on the analyst, have relegated his work to obscurity for nearly fifty years. However, on closer examination of the history of the twentieth century, the relevance of his ideas becomes obvious. Owing to the efforts of Michael Balint, who edited Ferenczi’s collected works, and the appearance in 1988 of his Clinical Diary, a unique document in the field of psychoanalysis, the value of his ideas has been recognized wherever psychoanalysis is practiced. EVA BRABANT-GERÖ Works discussed: ‘‘Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child’’; ‘‘Development of Psycho-Analysis’’; ‘‘Dream of the Wise Baby, The’’; ‘‘Introjection and transference’’; Thalassa. A Theory of Genitality. Notions developed: Active technique; Amphimixia/ amphimixis; Elasticity; Introjection; Mutual analysis; Relaxation principle and neo-catharsis; Tact. See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence; ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’’; Anticipatory ideas; Autoplastic; Benign/malignant regression; Boredom; Boundary violations; Character neurosis; Clark University; Criminology and psychoanalysis; Erotogenic zone; Homosexuality; Hungarian School; Hungary; Identification; International Psychoanalytic Association; Knowledge, instinct for; Lie; Negative hallucination; Neutrality/benevolent neutrality; Nudity, dream of; Choice of neurosis; Occultism; Omnipotence of thought; Orgasm; Passion; Pleasure in thinking; Primary love; Psychic causality; Psychoanalytic filiations; Real trauma; Secret Committee; Seduction scenes; Splitting of the ego; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Telepathy; Tenderness; Termination of treatment; Tics; Training analysis; Transference; Transference depression; Wish, satisfactory hallucination of a. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sándor. (1949). Confusion of tongues between adults and the child. International Journal of PsychoAnalysis, 30, 225–230. 581 FETISHISM ———. (1963). Thalassa: A theory of genitality (Henry Alden Bunker, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1924) ———. (1974). Les fantasmes provoqués. In his Oeuvres complètes. Psychanalyse (Vol. 3). Paris: Payot. (Original work published 1924) ———. (1988). The clinical diary of Sándor Ferenczi (Michael Balint and Nicola Zarday Jackson, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. (1990a). Introjection et transfert. In his Oeuvres complètes. Psychanalyse (Vol. 1). Paris: Payot. (Original work published 1909) ———. (1990b). Le développement du sens de la réalité et ses stades. In his Oeuvres complètes. Psychanalyse (Vol. 2, pp. 51–64). Paris: Payot. (Original work published 1913) ———. (1996). Le traumatisme psychique. In his Oeuvres complètes. Psychanalyse (Vol. 4, pp. 82–97). Paris: Payot. (Original work published 1932) Ferenczi, Sándor, and Rank, Otto. (1925). The development of psychoanalysis (Caroline Newton, Trans.). New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co. (Original work published 1924) FETISHISM Fetishism first interested psychoanalysts as a sexual perversion, in the strict sense. The term referred to a man’s compulsive use of an inherently nonsexual object as an essential condition for maintaining potency and achieving pleasure when having sexual relations with a person of the opposite sex. This view emphasizes that perversion, as originally understood, was viewed as a strictly masculine phenomenon. Freud presented his thinking on the subject in three texts, which represented his changing ideas on the subject: Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), ‘‘Fetishism’’ (1927e), and ‘‘The Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense’’ (1940e [1938]). The views expressed in those essays are as relevant in the early twenty-first century as when they were first written. In all observed cases, the fetish, in the fetishist’s unconscious fantasy, is a substitute for a woman’s ‘‘penis.’’ It ‘‘completes’’ the woman by making her phallic. Consequently, the woman’s genital organs lose any erogenous quality, in the eyes of the fetishist, erogeneity being completely transferred to the fetish. The fetish becomes the source of excitement, an idealized object capable of providing sexual pleasure to the fetishist. 58 2 The psychopathological behavior of the fetishist can be considered exacerbation of a universal anxiety. Freud saw in this perversion one of the clearest demonstrations of the difficulty that some men (perhaps all men) experience in accepting the differences of the sexes. It has become clear that the most important factor behind this perversion is castration anxiety experienced to an extreme degree. Fetishism arises entirely from defensive measures unconsciously adopted to reject castration and eliminate it from the field of possibility. Only a part of the man believes that a woman does not have a penis. So as far as the fetishist is concerned, castration is still possible under these circumstances. But if both sexes are equipped with a penis, castration cannot occur in this world. It thus becomes essential to remedy this unacceptable reality by attributing a penis to the woman at any cost. Creating such a reality is the primary function of the fetish in the unconscious imagination of the fetishist. The fetishist must then shelter his fragile mental apparatus from the return of disturbing sexual perceptions. He does so by choosing as a fetish an object that is always available, like a high-heel shoe. One fetishist is quoted as saying, ‘‘Every time I am in the presence of a naked woman, I imagine a high-heel shoe; I couldn’t tell what a vagina looks like.’’ As Freud demonstrated, the fetish makes the woman ‘‘acceptable’’ as an object of sexual love. Freud considered fetishism important because this pathological structure can be used to observe the workings of two important defense mechanisms that had been partially ignored until then: splitting and denial. Fetishism enabled Freud clearly to identify the mechanism of splitting for the first time, that is, splitting of the thinking ego (to be distinguished from the splitting of the object representation). The fetishist demonstrates that he can accommodate two clearly contradictory conceptions of a woman within himself: a conscious affirmation (‘‘The woman does not have a penis’’) and an unconscious fetishistic affirmation (‘‘The woman has a penis’’). The first is unimportant in the mental representations of the fetishist. These two modes of thought operate in parallel and have no effect on one another. The second mode of thought, a defense mechanism, denies castration, the lack of a penis, the crucial difference between the sexes. Most authors see splitting as arising to ensure the continuity of the denial, though it may be that splitting and continuity of denial occur simultaneously. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FINLAND Since splitting and denial are observed in psychosis, some see fetishism as a protection against an otherwise threatening psychosis. Fetishism is also thought to protect against homosexuality. We should not conclude, however, that the fetishist is homosexual. In terms of his own feelings of identity and his own self-representations at all levels of thought, he sees himself as a man, a man in relation to a woman, except that the woman in this case also has a penis, according to the man’s unconscious imagination. This is a major difference with the transvestite, who sees himself as a woman, in this case, a woman with a penis. Overall, in spite of the exceptions encountered, the transvestite is much closer to homosexuality than the fetishist. Rare cases of fetishism alternating with homosexuality have been observed, however. See also: Castration complex; Coprophilia; Disavowal; Phallic mother; Phallic woman; Psychotic defenses; ‘‘Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence, The.’’ It follows from the above that fetishism is a sign of narcissistic pathology, with mental operations functioning at a very archaic level, primarily through the extensive use of primitive identification (which some authors refer to as ‘‘narcissistic identification’’ or ‘‘projective identification’’). This assertion is based on the fact that by endowing the woman (the mother, in the unconscious) with a penis, the fetishist preserves his own sexual organ by identifying with the mother. In doing so, the fetishist exhibits considerable narcissistic vulnerability regarding the integrity of his physical image. Lussier, André. (1983). Les déviations du désir: Étude sur le fétichisme. Revue Française de Psychanalyse, 47 (1), 19–142. Although opinions are divided, it seems justified to view the mechanism and structure of fetishism as resulting from a massive regression following the oedipal stage. The oedipal conflict was traumatic and results in significant regression to all levels of pregenitality, accompanied by strong anal and oral components. These components are manifest in an anxiety of disintegration, which is very noticeable during psychoanalysis. Another school of thought suggests viewing fetishism as essentially determined by pregenital conflicts. Psychoanalytic work in the 1990s has shown that the fetish can also take on, in most cases, several other functions in varying proportions. These secondary functions include protection against trauma and depression, release from the outward expression of hostility and contempt while expressing them secretly, relief from psychosomatic symptoms, control over separation anxiety. As a partial delusion, fetishism protects the subject from the delusion. And finally, fetishism provides access to the maternal breast and full possession of the idealized mother. ANDRÉ LUSSIER INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1927e). Fetishism. SE, 21: 147–157. ———. (1940e [1938]). Splitting of the ego in the process of defence. SE, 23: 271–278. Gillespie, William H. (1964). The psychoanalytic theory of sexual deviation with special reference to fetishism. In Ismond Rosen (Ed.), The pathology and treatment of sexual deviation (pp. 123–145). London: Oxford University Press. Rosolato, Guy. (1967). Étude des perversions sexuelles à partir du fétichisme. In Guy Rosolato, Piera Aulagnier-Spairani, Jean Clavreul, François Perrier, and Jean-Paul Valabrega (Eds.), Le désir et la perversion (pp. 9–52). Paris: Seuil. Further Reading Bak, Robert. (1953). Fetishism. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 1, 285–298. Greenacre, Phyllis. (1960). Further notes on fetishism. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 15, 191–207. ———. (1969). The fetish and the transitional object. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 24,144–164. Nersessian, Edward. (1998). A cat as fetish: A contribution to the theory of fetishism. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 79, 713–726. Renik, Owen. (1992). Use of the analyst as a fetish. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 61, 542–563. FILIATIONS. See Psychoanalytic filiations FILM. See Cinema criticism; Cinema and Psychoanalysis FINLAND Psychoanalysis was practically nonexistent in Finland until it experienced rapid growth during the 1960s. 583 FINLAND The first Finnish psychoanalyst, Yrjö Kulovesi (1887–1943), underwent analysis with Eduard Hitschmann in Vienna in 1924, then with Paul Federn in 1925. He became a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1931 and in 1934 went on to found, together with the Swedish psychoanalyst Alfhild Tamm, the Finno-Swedish Psychoanalytic Society, which was dissolved in 1943 after Kulovesi’s death. A training analyst, he wrote several articles and an introduction to psychoanalysis, published in 1933. A number of Finnish psychoanalysts emigrated to Sweden during the 1940s. After the war most of them were members of the Swedish Psychoanalytic Society. They included Stig Björk, Pentti Ikonen, Tapio Nousiainen, and Veikko Tähkä. A few years later Mikael Enckell, Reijo Holmström, Eero Rechardt, Matti Tuovinen, and Gunvor Vuoristo also traveled to Sweden for training in analysis. During this same period, three other psychoanalysts underwent similar training in Switzerland: Henrik Carpelan in Geneva, and LeenaMaija Jokipaltio and Lars-Johan Schalin in Zurich. The biggest problem at the time was the shortage of psychoanalysts in Finland. Psychoanalysts trained abroad needed certification from the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) to work as training analysts in Finland. In 1964 Björk and Tähkä, trained in Sweden and members of the Swedish Psychoanalytic Society since the mid-1950s, formed a study group and became recognized as training analysts. The group, approved by an IPA committee presided over by Donald Winnicott and composed of members from Denmark, Sweden, and Great Britain, was formally recognized in 1967 as a provisional society and became an IPA affiliate in Rome in 1969. By 1974 there were already twenty-six candidates in training. Winnicott was the first honorary member of the Finnish Psychoanalytic Society. At the end of the 1950s, a psychotherapeutic organization, Therapeia, was founded, its methods inspired by existential analysis. Academic resistance to psychoanalysis was less severe in Finland than in the other Nordic countries. The majority of Finnish psychoanalysts were psychiatrists. Tähkä, a professor of psychiatry at the University of Turku, twice visited the Austin Riggs Center in the United States for two years each time. The use of American ego psychology at the center led him to follow in this tradition, which is obvious from his book on psychoanalytic therapy (1970). Tähkä was most interested in research on alcoholism and schizophre58 4 nia. Kalle Achté was a professor of psychiatry and senior psychiatrist at the University of Helsinki. He conducted research on persecution and projection as defense mechanisms. Rechardt worked on psychosomatic illnesses and the evolution of ego psychology toward self psychology. Yrjö Alanen, like Tähkä, studied the role of family factors in schizophrenia and applied psychoanalytic therapy in a family context. Tuovinen, a psychiatrist and lawyer, did psychoanalytic research on delinquent behavior and in particular analyzed aggression as a form of parental murder and suicide. Mikael Enckell, another important Finnish psychoanalyst, wrote several works on the Jewish question, the novelist Marcel Proust, the poet Friedrich Hölderlin, the filmmaker Luchino Visconti, and his own father, the poet Rabbe Enckell. Finnish psychoanalysis was generally associated with ego psychology. Carpelan, trained in Geneva, is one of the few Finnish analysts to have a Kleinian orientation. He was president of the Finnish Group Therapy Association. The traditional theoretical training period for psychoanalysts in Finland was extended from three years to four. The fourth year of training is devoted to the study of the relationship between psychoanalysis and the other sciences and of the theoretical and technical aspects of psychotherapy. During the 1980s the Finnish Psychoanalytic Society (Suomen Psykoanalyytinen Yhdisytts) underwent a period of rapid growth. In 2004 it had as many members as the Swedish Psychoanalytic Society. In the early 1980s it began offering training in child analysis, and in 1983 four candidates entered the program. In 1983 the Finnish Psychoanalytic Society had twentytwo full members, fifty-four associate members, and twenty-seven candidates. In 1993 there were fortyeight full members, ninety associates, and thirty-seven candidates. During the late 1980s, several translations of Freud’s work were published in Finland. PER MAGNUS JOHANSSON Bibliography Ihanus, Juhani. (1994). Vietit vai Henki. Helsinki, Finland: Yliopistopaino. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FIRST WORLD WAR: THE EFFECT Kulovesi, Yrjö. (1933). Psykoanalyysi. Helsinki, Finland: Otava. Laine, Aira, Parland, Helena, and Roos, Esa. (1997). Pssykoanalyysin, uranuurtajat Suomessa. Kemijärvi, Finland: Suomen Psykoanalyyttinen Yhdistys R.Y. Tähkä, Veikko. (1970). Psykoterapian perusteet: psykoanalyyttisen teorian pohjalta. Porvoo, Finland: Söderström. FIRST WORLD WAR: THE EFFECT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOANALYSIS In July 1914 Sigmund Freud was more preoccupied with Carl Gustav Jung’s resignation (‘‘Finally, we are rid of Jung, that crazy brute, and his acolytes!’’ he wrote to Karl Abraham on July 26) than the war that Austria, following the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, had declared against Serbia. ‘‘This may be the first time in thirty years that I feel Austrian,’’ he added. He was so unaffected that he allowed his daughter Anna to leave for Great Britain at the beginning of the month. The real problem was organizing the international congress that was supposed to take place that fall in Dresden, but that ultimately took place four years later in Budapest. The general conflict let loose in August disturbed this sense of calm. Freud’s sons weren’t mobilized at the start of the war, and the progress of German troops made him hope for an early victory. ‘‘My heart would be with the combatants if I didn’t know that England finds itself on the wrong side,’’ Freud wrote on August 2, preoccupied with Anna’s repatriation through Gibraltar and Genoa, which took place at the end of the month with the help of Ernest Jones (‘‘he is obviously our Ôenemy’’’). Martin Freud joined the artillery: ‘‘According to his letter,’’ his father wrote, ‘‘he didn’t want to lose the opportunity to cross the Russian border without changing his religion.’’ Karl Abraham wrote to Freud on August 29, 1914, ‘‘The news is excellent now, isn’t it? The German troops are barely one hundred kilometers from Paris, Belgium has been liquidated, and England is on its last legs. Russia isn’t doing much better.’’ On September 13 he added, ‘‘During the next few days, we hope to have favorable news of the fighting along the Marne. If this ends well, France’s fate will be pretty much sealed, that is, securing fortified positions in the southeast will be only a matter of days.’’ The principal concern appears to have been the publication of Zeitschrift and Imago with the help of Otto Rank, while Sándor Ferenczi traveled to Vienna at INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the end of September for an analysis with Freud. Freud had begun writing the ‘‘Wolfman,’’ which was published in 1918, but his morale was shaken by the announcement on October 17 of the death of Emanuel, his half-brother, after falling from a train, and then by the global expansion of the war on November 2. On December 24, 1914, he wrote to Jones, ‘‘I have no illusions and realize that the expansion of our science has now been interrupted, that we are heading toward a bad period, and that all we can hope for is to maintain the embers in a few hearths, while waiting for a more favorable wind to help us build it up into a blaze. What Jung and Adler have left of the movement is now crumbling because of the dissension among nations. The Verein is no more tenable than anything having an international dimension. Our reviews will soon cease publication; we may manage to continue the Zeitschrift. . . . The future of the cause, which is so dear to you, does not bother me, naturally, but the immediate future, the only one I can take an interest in, appears desperately dark and I wouldn’t cast a stone at the rat abandoning the ship.’’ Because he had fewer patients, he had more time, and so announced, ‘‘I am again going to try to put whatever I can contribute into a summary.’’ These were the twelve essays on metapsychology that were to occupy Freud throughout 1915 not only as a necessary synthesis at a time of upheaval but as an essential next step in developing his ideas. This followed the publication of ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ at the beginning of the year, which shook the foundations of psychoanalytic theory by questioning the opposition between ‘‘libidinal drives’’ and ‘‘selfpreservation drives.’’ The essay on melancholia was the subject of extensive correspondence with Karl Abraham, which allowed Freud to stress the fact that in the future any psychoanalytic explanation of an ‘‘affect can only be provided through its mechanism, considered from a dynamic, topological, and economic point of view’’ (letter of May 15, 1915). On that same day he wrote, ‘‘My work is taking shape. I have completed five essays: the one on Instincts and their Vicissitudes, which is of course somewhat dry but essential as an introduction, and will be justified in the following articles, then Repression, the Unconscious, A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams, and Mourning and Melancholy. The first four will be published in the Zeitschrift series currently underway; I will keep the rest for myself. If the war lasts long 585 FIRST WORLD WAR: THE EFFECT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOANALYSIS enough, I hope to be able to combine about a dozen similar essays and publish them, in calmer times, to the uncomprehending public, with the title Preliminary Essays on Metapsychology. I feel that, overall, this represents progress. Same genre and same level as section VII of the Interpretation of Dreams.’’ In 1915 he also published ‘‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’’ (1915b), the first in-depth essay on violence, hatred, and the illusion of primal kindness, an essay that provides perspective for the future conceptualization of the death drive. On July 30, 1915, he wrote to Lou Andreas-Salomé, ‘‘It is impossible to say when we will be able to meet, we, the scattered members of an apolitical community, nor, when the moment arrives, will we know the extent to which we have been corrupted by politics.’’ Ernst Freud fought in Galicia, Martin was slightly wounded, most of Freud’s followers were mobilized except for Hanns Sachs who had been deferred for nearsightedness, and meetings of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society became increasingly less frequent. The fall of 1915 was a busy one. Freud gave a series of lectures that, after being continued during the winter of 1916–1917, formed the basis for the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916–1917a). In December Rainer Maria Rilke visited Freud and unsuccessful efforts were made to obtain the Nobel Prize for him. In January 1916 Freud’s isolation increased with the departure of Otto Rank for Krakow. The year 1916 was relatively quiet for psychoanalysis, other than Freud’s sixtieth birthday in May. Like the rest of the population, Freud had grown weary of the incessant slaughter, the lies, the cold and hunger. The first generation of psychoanalysts were scattered across enemy territory but, being for the most part mobilized in the medical corps, they largely escaped death. The first really good news came in 1918 when Freud discovered Ernst Simmel’s book Névroses de guerre et Traumatisme psychique. ‘‘Here for the first time, a German doctor, who relates unequivocally and without condescension to psychoanalysis, who has made use of his position to advocate for the treatment of war neuroses, provides examples to prove it, and shows himself to be completely honest regarding the question of sexual etiology. True, he has not followed psychoanalysis on every point, supports the cathartic point of view, makes use of hypnosis, a method that cannot fail to mask the resistance and strength of the sexual drives; but he alleges with reason the need for 58 6 prompt results and the imperatives of sequential efforts. I think that with a year of training he would be a good analyst.’’ Freud went on to write to Simmel, ‘‘few writings by psychoanalytic novices who I do not know personally have given me as much satisfaction as your article’’ (February 20, 1918). The time had come to organize a new congress, the first since the Munich congress of 1913. Planned to take place in Breslau, it was ultimately held in Budapest, a city that assumed considerable importance for Freud, primarily because Anton von Freund, one of his analysands, provided material and financial support to the cause of psychoanalysis. ‘‘We are going to become materially powerful, we will be able to maintain and develop our publications, have influence; our current poverty is coming to an end. The man to whom we owe all this is not only rich, he is also well intentioned, highly intelligent, and very interested in psychoanalysis. . . . From now on Budapest is going to become the center of our movement.’’ The Fifth International Congress on Psychoanalysis was held in Budapest on September 28 and 29, 1918, and Freud spoke on ‘‘Wege der psychoanalytischen Therape’’ (The paths of psychoanalytic therapy)—an essay that was to have considerable influence on the evolution of the psychoanalytic movement in the next few years. He planned the extension of psychoanalysis for social purposes, the need to blend the copper of suggestion with the pure gold of psychoanalysis, and introduced the idea of providing free treatment for the poor, which was to lead, two years later, to the creation of the Berlin Polyclinic and the Psychoanalytic Institute, which was needed to train psychoanalysts for the growing number of patients. The congress was a success, especially because the increasing problems introduced by war neuroses attracted the attention of the government authorities to the benefits of employing psychoanalytic methods. One month later a revolution broke out in the Hungarian Republic. Béla Kun’s revolutionary government appointed Ferenczi ‘‘professor of psychoanalysis’’ on May 12, 1919; he then assumed direction of the Batizfalvy Sanatorium (from the end of March to the beginning of August 1919). The armistice on November 11, 1918 provided considerable relief, but Freud was worried about Martin, because he had not heard from him. At the end of the year, he learned that he was a prisoner in Italy and wouldn’t be released until October 1919. From Great Britain, Jones wrote on December 21, 1918, ‘‘In INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FIVE LECTURES Germany and America there has been much progress of late. Here, psychoanalysis has awakened general interest in every circle and it is even being taught in medical schools; the younger generation is impatient to learn more about it.’’ He went on to say that he was preparing to ‘‘hunt down the Ôremaining Jungians’’’ and establish the new British Psycho-Analytical Society and create the International Journal of Psychoanalysis. On April 18, 1919, Freud was able to confirm, ‘‘I am still standing and in no way hold myself responsible for the world’s absurdity. Psychoanalysis is flourishing, I am delighted to learn, on all sides, and I hope that the science will provide consolation to you as well.’’ ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Germany; Great Britain; Hungary; International Psychoanalytic Association; ‘‘Lines of Advance in Psychoanalytic Therapy’’; New York Psychoanalytic Institute; Simmel, Ernst. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund and Abraham, Karl. (1965a). A psychoanalytic dialogue: The letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham, 1907–1926. (Hilda C. Abraham and Ernst L. Freud, Eds. and Bernard Marsh and Hilda C. Abraham, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. Freud, Sigmund, and Jones, Ernest. (1993). The complete correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Ernest Jones, 1908– 1939. (R. A. Paskauskas, Ed.). London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Gay, Peter. (1988). Freud: A life for our time. LondonMelbourne: Dent. FIVE LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS Freud delivered his Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis in September 1909 at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts. He had been invited by Stanford Hall in honor of the university’s twentieth anniversary. He was accompanied by Carl Gustav Jung, Sándor Ferenczi, and Ernest Jones. Upon their arrival in New York, he was welcomed by Abraham Arden Brill. These lectures were a key moment for the recognition and dissemination of psychoanalysis on an international level. Freud delivered these five lectures in German, without notes, and wrote them up later. The text was published in English in the American Journal of Psychology in 1910. The work went through INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS eight editions in German, and it was translated into ten languages. In the course of these lectures, Freud first revealed Josef Breuer’s role in the discovery of psychoanalysis. Freud recapitulated the case of a young girl (Anna O.) who was suffering from conversion hysteria and whom Breuer had treated. Freud described how catharsis (remembering traumatic events and their attendant affects under hypnosis) suppressed Anna’s symptoms. But he quickly abandoned this technique. Research on hysteria being carried out at the same time by Jean Martin Charcot and Pierre Janet, in Paris, and Hippolyte Bernheim, in Nancy, allowed Freud to confirm his own theory. He discerned that a symptom is a disguised form of conflict between the conscious and the unconscious, provoked by incompatible desires, and he discovered the phenomena of resistance and repression. Next Freud explained the basis for psychoanalytic technique: free association and the interpretation of slips of the tongue and, in particular, dreams, which he called ‘‘the royal road to knowledge of the unconscious.’’ Making use of free association, the analyst identifies the latent content hidden behind dreams’ manifest content (the actualization of hidden repressed desires) and the processes of condensation and displacement that are an obstacle to understanding the repressed desires. Freud then approached the central issues of infantile sexuality, the Oedipus complex, and the sexual origins of neurosis. He showed the existence of transference by noting that in the relationship with the analyst, the patient relives old affects and repressed desires that have become unconscious and are returned to consciousness under the influence of transference. Finally, Freud refuted objections against psychoanalysis stemming from the fear that the liberation of repressed desires might endanger morality and social life. He believed that psychoanalysis, by bringing these desires back into consciousness, enabled people to accept and master them—or better yet, sublimate them. These five lectures, written in a simple, lively style and filled with anecdotes, describe the origins of psychoanalysis and the trajectory of Freud’s thinking up until the end of 1909. MAÏTÉ KLAHR AND CLAUDIE MILLOT See also: Clark University. 587 FIXATION Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1910a [1909]). Five lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 11: 7–55. Bibliography Jones, Ernest. (1953–1957). Sigmund Freud: Life and work. London: Hogarth. FIXATION The notion of fixation involves a certain mode of connection that a drive has with its ideational representatives (its objects) as a function of a primitive phase of the subject’s sexual organization. This mode of connection is characterized, at the economic level, by the withdrawal from general circulation of more or less significant quantities of libido. On the dynamic level it is marked by the absence of mobility of the drive in question. On the topographical level, the connection is inscribed in the unconscious. In Freud’s work, the idea of fixation is theoretically associated with four other notions: traumatism, regression, repression, and predisposition. These form the successive stages of Freud’s elaboration of the concept of fixation. The notion of fixation first appeared in a context, which would later turn up again, that is associated with Freud’s first work on the psychoneuroses of defense around the time of the Studies on Hysteria (1895d): ‘‘The traumatic neuroses give a clear indication that a fixation to the moment of the traumatic accident lies at their root’’ (1916–17a, p. 274). The fixation to the trauma accounts for the neurotic disorder and for the patient’s inability to master the affect contained in the traumatic events. Thus the first version of fixation is dominated by the economic dimension. The notion of fixation next appeared in the Three Essays (1905d): ‘‘[W]e propose to describe the lagging behind of a part trend at an earlier stage as a fixation— a fixation, that is, of the [drive]. . . . [T]he portions which have proceeded further may also easily return retrogressively to one of these earlier stages—what we describe as regression’’ (p. 340). In the Freudian conception of infantile sexuality, the sexual function develops according to a graduated rhythm. A partial drive may either pursue a development that achieves the ability to organize freely circulating energy under the aegis of the oedipal genital 58 8 structures, or stop at some point along the way, lagging behind by fixing upon an earlier stage of sexual development or a primitive object of satisfaction. In clinical work, perversions, just like neurotic symptoms, are evidence of libidinal vestiges from the past. Fixation appeared in a third context in regard to the case of Daniel Paul Schreber: ‘‘The libidinal current in question then behaves in relation to later psychological structures like one belonging to the system of the unconscious, like one that is repressed’’ (1911c, p. 66). For Freud, in fact, the psychical representatives of component drives are made the object of a fixation that then falls under repression. Similarly, in the formation of symptoms the return of the repressed goes back to the very point of fixation to which the libido has regressed. Finally, the notion of fixation is associated, in Freud’s teaching, with that of sexual constitution insofar as it brings together the various ways in which the different components of the libido are inscribed in the early stages of its development. Fixation thus represents predisposition as a factor in the etiology of neuroses. The notion of fixation can be found in other currents of psychoanalytic thought, particularly in that of Pierre Marty, whose work represents an original contribution to the concept. For him, the fixationregression system forms the basis of any functional organization and has a field of influence that stretches from mental to somatic functions. In the course of any psychosomatic disturbance, the presence of fixations, whether psychical or somatic, constitute the stopping points of a counter-developmental current, points from which a psychosomatic reorganization can take place. According to this point of view, the fixationregression system represents the set of defensive capacities in the development of each individual. CLAUDE SMADJA See also: Cathexis; Choice of neurosis; Constitution; Disorganization; Ego states; Libidinal development; Psychic causality; Psychic temporality; Psychosomatic; Regression; Repression; Self-object; Stage (or phase); Traumatic neurosis. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F L I E S S , W I L H E L M (1858 –1 928) ———. (1911c). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a Case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1–82. ———. (1916–17a). Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 15–16. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d) Studies in hysteria. SE, 2. Further Reading Greenacre, Phyllis. (1960). Regression and fixation. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 8, 703–723. Nagera, Humberto. (1964). On arrest in development, fixation, and regression. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 19, 222–239. FLIESS, WILHELM (1858–1928) Wilhelm Fliess, a German physician, was born October 24, 1858, in Arnswalde (Markbrandebourg) and died in Berlin on October 13, 1928. He came from a family of Sephardic Jews. His mother observed the orthodox rituals, a tradition her son did not follow. He had a brother who was stillborn and a sister, Clara, a year younger, who died of pneumonia when Wilhelm was twenty. His father was in the grain business and committed suicide when Wilhelm was nineteen years old. He never spoke of this suicide, neither to Freud—to whom he related a different version of the father’s death—nor to his own children, who didn’t discover the truth until after their own father’s death. Fliess studied medicine in Berlin; in 1883 he opened a practice as a general practitioner and then as an otorhinolaryngologist. The number of patients grew along with his fame. He traveled a great deal, most importantly to Paris, in 1886, a year before meeting Freud, whose lectures he attended in Vienna. This was the start of their friendship, which resulted in a lengthy correspondence from 1887 to 1902, reaching its peak in 1899. Fliess married a Viennese woman from among the circle of Josef Breuer’s patients named Ida Bondy, and together they had several children: Robert (1895) who became a well-known psychoanalyst after his emigration to the United States, Pauline (1898), Conrad (1899), and a stillborn daughter in 1902. Freud was treated by Fliess and was his enthusiastic collaborator; the two men met approximately once a year. Fliess initially thought there was a correlation between the genital organs and the nose, based on the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS principle of what he called the reflex nasal neurosis. In May 1895, when his wife was pregnant with their first child, he had a revelation of the theory of periods as a solution to the question of when conception occurred and the determination of the sex of the child. From that moment on he began constructing his system, postulating a cosmic harmony governed by the solar cycles, measured in days and years, between personal, family, and social events, but also affected by the animal and plant kingdoms. All vital events are determined by two periods, a male period of twenty-three days, and a female period of twenty-eight days, which are transmitted from generation to generation, from mother to child. Added to this bisexual periodicity was the idea of bilateralism, which represents the imprint of the simultaneity of the two periods on the body, the left hand bearing the positive and negative qualities of the opposite sex. Freud was interested in several aspects of the theory but doubted the cohesion of the three features (biperiodicity, bisexuality, and bilateralism) that were essential for Fliess and its predictive nature, which Fliess viewed as a rejection. He experienced this as a kind of persecution and in 1900 began distancing himself from his friend although Freud was not fully aware of it. Their final break occurred in 1906. At the same time as the appearance of his major work on the theory of periods, The Course of Life, Fliess wrote a scathing pamphlet, ‘‘Pour ma propre cause,’’ in which he accused Freud of having served as an intermediary in the plagiarism of his work by two young Viennese authors, Hermann Swoboda and Otto Weininger, who each had appropriated half of his ideas. After breaking with his friend, Freud destroyed all his letters from Fliess and developed a theory of paranoia based on these experiences, which he also applied to Daniel Paul Schreber. Having done so, he failed to take into account the fact that his friend’s delusion had first appeared in 1895 and he had encouraged it even as he took comfort in it. It was almost a reversal of the accusation of plagiarism to the extent that Fliess copied nature through his unshaken conviction that the determination of periods mimics natural cycles. Ignorance and the censorship of the relations between Freud and Fliess have contributed to a fabricated version of Freud’s self-analysis as the mythic origin of psychoanalysis, which projects a later schema of standard analytic therapy onto the original discovery. Fliess was not the analyst of Freud’s unconscious 589 FLIGHT INTO ILLNESS desires, but he represented a kind of precursor of the subject assumed to have knowledge of biology, and in doing so helped combine Freud’s desire to be an analyst with a future science (that both men would divide between them). After his break with Freud, Fliess continued to devote himself to his medical practice, caring for several analysts (Alix Strachey and Karl Abraham among them), and writing numerous articles, always on the same subjects, which were anthologized in books. With Ivan Block and Ernst Haeckel, he was a member of the Berlin Medical Society for the Sexual Sciences and Eugenics. He died of intestinal cancer on October 13, 1928. He was eulogized as a great doctor from Berlin. ERIK PORGE See also: Bisexuality; Eckstein, Emma; Fackel (Die-); Freud: Living and Dying; Freud’s Self-Analysis; Germany; Irma’s injection, dream of; On Dreams; ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology, A’’; Self-analysis; Sex and Character; Splits in psychoanalysis; Swoboda, Hermann; Weininger, Otto. Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1991). Six lettres inédites à W. Fliess. A. Buffel, E. Porge. Littoral, 31–32, 247–257. Fliess, Wilhelm. (1977). Les Relations entre le nez et les organes génitaux féminins présentées selon leurs significations biologiques (P. Ach and J. Guir, Trans.). Paris: Le Seuil. (Original work published 1897) Freud, Sigmund. (1985c). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887–1904. (J. M. Masson, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press. Sulloway, Franck. (1979). Freud: The biologist of the mind. New York: Basic Books. unconscious wish-fulfillment and another portion to the mental structure reacting against the wish’’ (1900a, p. 569). The concept of gain through illness helps clarify the concept of flight into illness. In a note on the Dora case, added in 1923, Freud mentioned that ‘‘The motive for being ill is, of course, invariably the gaining of some advantage’’ and, further on, ‘‘In the first place, falling ill involves a saving of physical effort; it emerges as being economically the most convenient solution where there is a mental conflict’’ (1905e, p. 43). Thus, in the case of an hysterical attack, the flight into illness might serve what Freud calls the ‘‘primary gain.’’ Aside from the hysterical crisis, Freud noted in 1926 that there are cases in which neurosis is the most harmless solution to a conflict and, from a social point of view, represents the most advantageous solution. For the neurotic, flight into illness is a favorable avoidance of an unsatisfactory reality, a form of self-defense in the struggle to survive. Freud also noted, along the same lines, the desire to remain ill. Insights associated with flight into illness also operate outside the framework of neurosis and neurotic conflict. As early as 1894 Freud wrote: ‘‘One is therefore justified in saying that the ego has fended off the incompatible idea through a flight into psychosis’’ (1894a, p. 59). In the contemporary context, some authors consider somatic symptoms to be a system of defense and resolution, an avoidance in the face of tension of all kinds. ALAIN FINE See also: ‘‘Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria’’ (Dora/Ida Bauer); Gain (primary and secondary); Somatic compliance. Bibliography FLIGHT INTO ILLNESS The Freudian notion of a ‘‘flight into illness’’ should be understood in terms of symptom formation and the primary and secondary gains of illness. The symptom is regarded here as a secondary defense against unconscious conflict, having value as a compromise between a wish and a defense. Early in his work, Freud discussed this kind of symptom in terms of a psychological conflict, leading to repression and followed by compromise formation: ‘‘one portion of the symptom corresponds to the 59 0 Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. ———. (1905e [1901]). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. SE, 7: 1–122. ———. (1926d). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. FLOURNOY, HENRI (1886–1955) Henri Flournoy, a Swiss medical doctor and psychiatrist, was born on March 28, 1886, in Geneva, where INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F L O U R N O Y , T H É O D O R E (1854 –1 920) he died on May 6, 1955. He was the son of Théodore Flournoy. One of his sisters, Ariane, married Raymond de Saussure. His son, Olivier, became a psychoanalyst in Geneva. Flournoy studied medicine in Geneva and then took internships in Berne, Warburg, Munich, and Baltimore (at Johns Hopkins University). During the Balkan War, from 1912 to 1913, he served as a Red Cross doctor. A man of insatiable curiosity from an early age, he developed an interest in heraldry, to which he became a devoted amateur. In 1920 he became a privatdocent and lecturer in psychopathology at the University of Geneva. He was president of the Société genevoise de prophylaxie mentale (Geneva Society for Mental Prophylaxis) and of the Conseil de surveillance des aliénés (Supervisory Board for Mental Illness) for the canton of Geneva. In 1922 he opened a psychiatric and psychoanalytic practice in Geneva. There were four phases to his psychoanalytic training: an initial series of twenty-six sessions with Carl Gustav Jung, a six-month analysis with Johan Van Ophuijsen in the Netherlands, a threemonth analysis with Sigmund Freud in Vienna, and a final six-month analysis with Hermann Nunberg, also in Vienna. As a psychoanalyst, Flournoy contributed to the development of the young Swiss Society for Psychoanalysis and to the acceptance of psychoanalysis in Switzerland. In addition to his many articles, in 1949 he published Erreurs et dignité de la pensée humaine. OLIVIER FLOURNOY See also: Flournoy, Théodore; France; Société psychanalytique de Genéve; Switzerland (French-speaking); Switzerland (German-speaking). Bibliography Flournoy, Henri. (1920). Dreams on the symbolism of water and fire. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 1 (3), 245–255 ———. (1922). Çiva androgyne: contribution à l’étude psychanalytique des principaux symboles et attributs d’une divinité hindoue. Archives de psychologie, 18. ———. (1932). Le caractère scientifique de la psychanalyse. Revue française de psychanalyse, 5 (2), 190–200. ———. (1949). Erreurs et dignité de la pensée humaine. Paris: Le Mont-Blanc. He was a close friend of Charles Odier, Raymond de Saussure, and Princess Marie Bonaparte and played an important role in the Swiss Society for Psychoanalysis. He was an active, though unofficial, participant in establishing the acts of incorporation of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society. In 1933 he presided at the eighth Conférence des psychanalystes de langue française (Conference of Francophone Psychoanalysts). FLOURNOY, THÉODORE (1854–1920) He worked intermittently after 1939, many foreign patients (mostly from the League of Nations) having left Switzerland and local demand having fallen off because of the war climate. As a result, Flournoy concentrated increasingly on psychotherapy. Interested in philosophy and religion, Théodore Flournoy spent time in Germany to familiarize himself with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, whose work he later taught at the university. After becoming a medical doctor, he was appointed a professor of physiological psychology at the University of Geneva in 1891. He was appointed an expert for providing women who intended to have abortions with advice consistent with current legal requirements. Flournoy expended considerable energy in demonstrating that mental distress is a sufficient, more than sufficient, justification for abortion and advocated legalizing it. This contributed greatly to his celebrity, or notoriety, well beyond the borders of Switzerland. It was also the origin of an extensive correspondence with various medical, psychological, and legal publications. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A medical doctor and professor of physiological psychology at the University of Geneva, Théodore Flournoy was born in Geneva on August 15, 1854, and died, also in Geneva, on November 5, 1920. He was the son of Alexandre Flournoy and Caroline Claparède, sister of the naturalist Édouard Claparède. His studies of the medium Hélène Smith were turned into a book, Des Indes à la planète Mars, which caused a considerable sensation in psychological and parapsychological circles in Europe and the United States. In it he described the phenomenon of ‘‘cryptamnesia,’’ forgotten memories that reappear without being recognized by the subject, who believes they are new. These memories disappear because of their 591 FLOWER DOLLS: ESSAYS IN CHILD PSYCHOTHERAPY association with childhood sexual emotions. These involve a ‘‘subliminal process capable of achieving a degree of complexity and extent comparable to the work of composition and reflection in the thinker or novelist.’’ They are ‘‘reminiscences or momentary returns to earlier phases, which have long since been forgotten and which, normally, should have been absorbed during the individual’s development instead of recurring in strange forms.’’ Cryptamnesia is unconscious. ‘‘The unconscious possesses a marvelous ability for dramatization, personification, and psychological proliferation; it is endowed with a creative imagination.’’ Flournoy went on to claim that ‘‘The unconscious, [is a] submerged sphere from which our instinct for physical and moral preservation confusedly arise, our feelings about sex, about spiritual and physical shame, everything that is most obscure and the least rational in the individual.’’ Concerning dreams, he wrote ‘‘By rising up from our hidden source, by throwing light on the intrinsic nature of our unconscious emotions, by revealing our ulterior motives and the instinctive slope of our associations of ideas, the dream is often an instructive probe into the unknown layers that support our ordinary personality.’’ Flournoy used these hypotheses to explain the supranormal or parapsychological phenomena he studied. They helped compensate for the obscurity and misery of everyday life, attempted to realize sexual desires arising from a forgotten childhood, and served as defenses against internal threats of madness. Freud was writing about the process of infantile amnesia at the same time, and it is clear just how close Flournoy’s claims were to Freud’s position. However, unlike Freud, Flournoy does not mention repression or the return of the repressed—the concept that enabled Freud to conceive of a dynamic therapy—but limited himself to cryptamnesia, locating the path to consciousness in subliminal activity. Like his friends William James and Frederick Myers, Flournoy did not treat patients; these men were observers—though that did not prevent them from proposing hypotheses for acting on and modifying phenomena. Concerning the principle of parallelism, Flournoy’s aims were diametrically opposite those of Freud. Both men excluded transcendence from their investigations, but Flournoy did so in the hope of discovering it, free of human taint, while Freud tried to eliminate it, 59 2 especially in postulating the existence of erogenous zones at the start of life and the death instinct at the end, hoping to see the reign of science govern the study of the mind. In 1901 Flournoy, with his cousin Édouard Claparède, founded Les Archives de psychologie, a review that was later taken over by Jean Piaget. He corresponded with Ferdinand de Saussure, whom he knew personally, along with other well-known linguists. His son Henri and his grandson Olivier became psychoanalysts. His daughter, Ariane, married psychoanalyst Raymond de Saussure. OLIVIER FLOURNOY See also: Archives de psychologie, Les; Claparede, Édouard; Cryptomnesia; Flournoy, Henri; Psychology of the Unconscious, The. Bibliography Flournoy, Olivier. (1986). Théodore et Léopold: de Théodore Flournoy à la psychanalyse. Neuchâtel: La Baconnière. Flournoy, Théodore. (1890). Métaphysique et psychologie. Geneva: Georg. ———. (1900). Des Indes à la planète Mars. Paris: Le Seuil. ———. (1902). Nouvelles observations sur un cas de somnambulisme avec glossolalie. Les archives de psychologie, I. ———. (1911). Esprits et médiums. Geneva: Kundig and Fischbacher. FLOWER DOLLS: ESSAYS IN CHILD PSYCHOTHERAPY In an article that appeared in the Revue française de psychanalyse in 1949, ‘‘Cure psychanalytique à l’aide de la poupée-fleur’’ (A Psychoanalytic Cure with the Help of a Flower Doll), Françoise Dolto described her experience with this green doll—which is often referred to as a marguerite doll—in the treatment of a child named Bernadette. At the age of five Bernadette was already suffering from anorexia nervosa. She was vomiting up her meals and spoke in a monotone. She dragged her left leg and her hand was folded back over her forearm, the consequence of a hemiplegia. She played with toys that she constantly punished. In the course of the seventh session, she began to speak about the monkey inside her INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F L Ü G E L , J O H N C A R L (1884 –1 955) that said bad things, and then hammered her tummy with her fists to make the monkey come out. Françoise Dolto noticed the child’s interest in flowers, particularly marguerites. When her mother said that the little girl liked neither her animals nor her dolls, Dolto responded: ‘‘Perhaps she’d like a flower doll?’’ Bernadette responded, ‘‘Oh, yes, yes, a flower doll!’’ Her mother was asked to make a faceless doll with no hands out of green material and to crown it with a marguerite. In the eighth session, Bernadette came with her flower doll, which she had named Rosine. She said she was horrible and naughty. ‘‘Do you know why she’s so naughty?’’ Bernadette whispered into the analyst’s ear: ‘‘For her being naughty means being nice because she has an arm and a leg that don’t work. Her way of being nice is hurting others. She’s not naughty, but she’s ill. You’re going to treat her!’’ And the doll stayed with the analyst while the little girl went away quite happy. When Bernadette arrived for her ninth session, she came with a teddy bear dressed as a human doll, and she looked after it tenderly so that it wasn’t too hot. From the day she left the flower doll for treatment, Bernadette had changed at home. ‘‘I treated her every day, you know,’’ Explained Dolto. Then Bernadette spoke quietly to her doll, listened to her answer, made her dance on the table, and suddenly cried out in a modulated voice: ‘‘She’s cured, her arm and legs work very well! You looked after her very well.’’ Then she thrust forward her folded-back hand, like a sort of claw. ‘‘She’s a wolf girl, so when she loves she scratches! Because the wolf girl is very fond of you she’s going to show you how strong she is!’’ She began to dig her nails into the analyst’s skin, saying: ‘‘Don’t be afraid, she has to see blood because she loves you.’’ From that session onward, Bernadette used her good right hand to stroke the other hand, and she began to create many objects with clay, and her behavior changed. Dolto theorized that the flower doll was the support for the girl’s narcissistic affects, which were wounded during the oral stage. Afflicted with serious somatic disorders, this sick little girl’s oral, then anal, aggression turned against herself, then projected itself into this human and plant form without a head, a form that was unable to speak and not responsible for its actions. Bernadette used it for her treatment, which gave Dolto the idea of using it with other children and adults. BERNARD THIS INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Source Citation Dolto, Françoise. (1949). Cure psychanalytique à l’aide de la poupée-fleur. Revue française de psychanalyse, 13 (1), 53– 69. ———. (1950). Á propos des poupées-fleurs (deuxième partie). Revue française de psychanalyse, 14 (1), 19–41. ———. (1998). Flower dolls: Essays in child psychotherapy. (John Howe, Trans.). London: Marion Boyars. FLÜGEL, JOHN CARL (1884–1955) The English psychoanalyst John Carl Flügel was born on June 13, 1884, in London, where he died on August 17, 1955. An honorary fellow of the British Psychological Society and an honorary member of the Indian Psychological Association, he was president of the Programme Committee of the International Congress on Mental Health in 1948 and president of the psychology section of the British Medical Association in 1950. His father was German and his mother English, and the family had close ties with France; John Carl grew up learning all three languages. Because of a congenital malformation of his feet, he did not follow a normal school program, and he attended Oxford University when he was only seventeen. He studied philosophy and grew interested in hypnotism, becoming a member of Frederick W. H. Myers’s famous Society for Psychical Research. He obtained a doctorate in philosophy at Oxford and a doctorate of science from the University of London, where he taught as an auxiliary professor from 1929 to 1944 in the experimental psychology laboratory. In 1913 he married Ingeborg Klingberg, who also became a psychoanalyst and with whom he had a daughter. Flügel was an active member of the British Psychological Society: he was honorary secretary from 1911 to 1920, honorary librarian from 1911 to 1932, and president from 1932 to 1935. During the First World War he made a number of important psychological contributions to the society. After undergoing psychoanalysis with Ernest Jones, the two became friends, and Flügel became involved in the refounding of the British Psycho-Analytical Society in 1919. He also served as secretary of the International Psychoanalytic Association from 1919 to 1924. With John Rickman, Douglas Bryan, and Ernest Jones, he helped create the International Journal of Psychoanalysis in 1920, and with Ernest Jones and Joan Riviere, he helped translate 593 F L U S S , G I S E L A (185 9 –?) Sigmund Freud’s Vorlesungen (Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis; 1916–1917a [1915–1917]). ———. (1930b). The psychology of clothes. London: Hogarth Press. His knowledge of biology, experimental psychology, and philosophy, and his involvement in psychoanalysis enabled him to produce a considerable number of literary works, although these works are rarely read in the early twenty-first century. Ernest Jones wrote to Freud, ‘‘Flügel is certainly not predisposed to self-sacrifice, but what he does, he does very well and he is our best report writer. In non-medical circles he is of inestimable value and always uses his influence for the PAS [Psycho-Analytical Society]’’ (April 10, 1922). He wrote many books and articles, including The Psycho-Analytic Study of the Family (1921), which was the third volume (but the first English contribution) in the then recently created International Psycho-Analytical Library of Hogarth Press; ‘‘Psychoanalysis: Its Status and Promise’’ (1930a); The Psychology of Clothes (1930b); and Man, Morals, and Society (1945). ———. (1945). Man, morals, and society. New York: International Universities Press. Upon Flügel’s death, Ernest Jones wrote of his ‘‘good nature, kindness, humor, and fondness for an exceptionally large circle of good friends.’’ Jones was less charitable, however, in a letter to Freud dated December 7, 1921: ‘‘Flügel has excellent written English and is intelligent, but he has two weaknesses. He is somewhat egotistic and the only thing he enjoys is doing his own work, not helping others; and he has not overcome a strong reaction to a sadistic complex that has paralyzed his efforts to criticize or disagree in any way, with very rare exceptions. He is thereby inhibited when he is asked to carry out any work of this sort (the same holds true for the correction of the American translation of the Vorlesungen), and he returned the manuscript almost in the same condition as it was. A mixture of laziness and inhibition. But he has to work with the tools available to him and I am trying to find out what interests him most and what is most suitable for him (which is to say, not much).’’ ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Great Britain. Bibliography Flügel, John Carl. (1921). The psycho-analytic study of the family. London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. ———. (1930a). Psychoanalysis: Its status and promise. In Carl Murchison (Ed.), Psychologies of 1930. Worcester, MA: Clark University Press. 59 4 Freud, Sigmund, and Jones, Ernest. (1993 [1908–1939]). The complete correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Ernest Jones, 1908–1939. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jones, Ernest. (1956). J. C. Flügel. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 37, 193–197. FLUSS, GISELA (1859–?) Gisela Fluss, born on September 26, 1859, was the daughter of Ignaz and Eleonora Fluss, a family friendly with Jakob and Amalia Freud after the Freuds left Freiberg, Moravia. She was the sister of Emil Fluss, who became a friend and correspondent of Freud during his adolescence. She is known as Freud’s first ‘‘love experience.’’ The date of her death is not known. Gisela met Freud when he was staying with the family in 1871. Gisela appears to have been associated with the romantic infatuation that had gripped the fifteen-year old Freud—Gisela was only twelve—during his return to his birthplace, an infatuation that Freud cryptically referred to in ‘‘Screen Memories’’ (1899a). When he was again in Freiberg the following year, Freud mentioned Gisela in letters describing his vacation written to his friend Eduard Silberstein (1989a [1871–1881, 1910]). On August 17, 1872, he wrote, ‘‘So let me just say that I took a fancy to the eldest, by the name of Gisela, who leaves tomorrow, and that her absence will give me back a sense of security about my behavior that I have not had up to now.’’ On September 4 he again wrote to Silberstein: ‘‘I have soothed all my turbulent thoughts and only flinch slightly when her mother mentions Gisela’s name at table. The affection appeared like a beautiful spring day, and only the nonsensical Hamlet in me, my diffidence stood in the way of my finding it a refreshing pleasure to converse with the half-naı̈ve, half-cultured young lady.’’ In fact, these letters show that the young Freud harbored greater enthusiasm for Eleonora, Gisela’s mother, ‘‘a woman none of her children can completely equal.’’ In the letter of September 4, Freud went on to write, ‘‘She [the mother] can never have been beautiful, but a witty, jaunty fire must always have sparkled in her eyes, as it does now. Gisela’s beauty, too, is wild, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FORECLOSURE I might say Thracian: the aquiline nose, the long black hair, and the firm lips come from the mother, the dark complexion and the sometimes indifferent expression from the father.’’ Allusions to Gisela appeared in letters from 1873 and 1874 but disappeared after Gisela told Freud’s sisters, in 1875, of a trip to Italy. Her engagement in 1874 and her being called an ichthyosaur by students among themselves remain in dispute. It is known, however, that on February 27, 1881, in Vienna, she married a businessman from Presbourg (near Bratislava) by the name of Emil Popper. There is some mystery about her reappearance in Freud’s report of his November 18, 1907, session with the Rat Man, when, instead of the name of his patient, Freud wrote her name ‘‘Dame Gisela’’ (1955a [1907– 1908]). He added three exclamation points after this slip, which was never analyzed by Freud and has remained unexplained. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Silberstein, Eduard. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1899a). Screen memories. SE, 3: 299–322. ———. (1955a [1907–1908]). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151–318. ———. (1989a [1871–1881, 1910]). The letters of Sigmund Freud to Eduard Silberstein, 1871–1881 (Arnold J. Pomerans, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1990. FORECLOSURE Jacques Lacan used the French word forclusion (foreclosure) to translated the German term Verwerfung, previously rendered in French as rejet (repudiation). Sigmund Freud had introduced the term along with negation (Verneinung) and repression (Verdrängung) as a defense mechanism. Foreclosure is a primordial defense because it does not act on a signifier that is already inscribed within the chain of signifiers, but rather, it rejects the inscription itself. Foreclosure is thus antithetical to Bejahung (affirmation). This operation of repudiation especially affects highly meaningful signifiers such as the Name-of-the-Father, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the guarantor of castration. Lacan viewed the foreclosure of this signifier as the characteristic mechanism of psychosis. In ‘‘On a Question Prior to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis’’ (Écrits), he wrote: ‘‘I will thus take Verwerfung to be foreclosure of the signifier. At the point at which the Name-of-the-Father is summoned— and we shall see how—a pure and simple hole may answer in the Other; due to the lack of the metaphoric effect, this hole will give rise to a corresponding hole in the place of phallic signification’’ (p. 191). To paraphrase, let us say that when the subject calls upon the Father to guarantee the law that situates both the subject and his desire in the Other, he encounters only an echo in a void that triggers a cascade of delusional metaphors. These readily become organized around the fantasmatic presence of an authority who is suspected of having intrusive or criminal intentions; it is as if the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father made present in the Real a malevolent authority desiring to commit sexual abuse or homicide. Why does foreclosure come about? One explanation is that the child has been exposed to a mother who has refused to recognize the law, either because it does not situate her in accordance with her desires, or because it compels her to separate herself from its product. It may also happen that the real father reveals himself to be incapable of inscribing himself into a symbolic lineage, and consequently invalidates it (cf. Schreber’s father in ‘‘Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia [Dementia Paranoides],’’ 1911c). But not infrequently, skipping a generation, the child of a psychotic couple may validate the Name-of-the-Father on its own, based on what he finds in language and verifies with the help of substitute parent figures. Could specific forms of foreclosure be responsible for the division of the psychoses into paranoia and schizophrenia? Nothing points to this conclusion, even if paranoia is an attempt at a cure through the designation of a real, albeit a persecutory father. This designation turns the signifier into a sign of certain truth. Many have asked whether psychoanalytic treatment can repair a foreclosure. Case histories do not provide any clear answers. Let us recall that Schreber, for his part, found a kind of stabilizing by accepting emasculation as being ‘‘consonant with the Order of Things’’ (p. 48); by becoming a woman, he could attract the divine presence that 595 FORGETTING safeguarded him. Equally interesting are studies of borderline cases. It seems that the latter more likely result from a denial or annulment of the Name-of-theFather, with a predictable failure of the law, but without producing the reshapings of the real (its fragmentation or its investment by a persecutory figure) that are characteristic of foreclosure. CHARLES MELMAN See also: Autism; Castration complex; Parade of the signifier; Disavowal; Infantile neurosis; Law of the father; Linguistics and psychoanalysis; Negative, work of the; Negation; Neurosis; Psychoses, chronic and delusional; Psychotic defenses; Real, the (Lacan); Repudiation; Splitting; Topology. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a) Obsessions and phobias: Their psychical mechanism and their aetiology. SE, 3, 69–82. ———. (1911c) Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12, 1–82. Lacan, Jacques. (2004). On a question prior to any possible treatment of psychosis. Écrits: A Selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1955–56) FORGETTING In The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901b), Freud discussed forgetting under the rubric of psychosis. The typical example is awareness of having forgotten a proper noun (a name, for example). Like amnesia (where one is unaware that one has forgotten), forgetting is the result of repression. The forgotten name inhabits the preconscious and quickly returns to consciousness. It is attracted by an unconscious mental complex that primarily operates by displacement. The concept of forgetting in general is present in Freud’s earliest works on the theory of neuroses (1894a, 1895b, 1896a). But in ‘‘The Psychical Mechanism of Forgetfulness’’ (1898b) and The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Freud considered forgetting, like slips of the tongue, to be a parapraxis symptomatic of ongoing repression. To demonstrate the existence of the unconscious, Freud uses the example of forgetting because it was one way of talking about repression before 1900. Forgetting appears in his first theory of neuroses, which explains hysteria as a traumatic 59 6 infantile sexual seduction that has to be rejected and repressed because the child finds it unacceptable. Forgetting is associated with a painful sense of awareness (the ‘‘name on the tip of the tongue’’), while repression is most often unconscious. Forgetting is associated with the psychology of consciousness and the preconscious, while repression is associated with the metapsychology of the unconscious, like memory traces. As a form of parapraxis, forgetting combines partial failure with partial success and must be distinguished from the customary psychological form of forgetting, a successful act of repression. The dreamer who has forgotten his dream tries to reconstruct it, but in doing so, constructs it anew: ‘‘It is indeed possible that while trying to retell it, we fill in the blanks created by forgetting using new material arbitrarily chosen’’ (Freud, 1900a). We cannot completely remember what is forgotten, and so we prefer to construct likely hypotheses, capable of introducing conviction about what was forgotten (Freud, 1937d). The person who has forgotten a name, by concentrating on it, only reinforces the ongoing repression. To remember, Freud tells us, we need to abandon the willful attempt to control what initially appears to be a cognitive disturbance, a shortcoming, and give in to the associations that come to mind. Freud provides an autobiographical example: Forgetting the name of the painter Signorelli during a conversation, he seeks memories, ideas, and words similar to the name. These bring to his mind other paintings with the sensory acuity typical of a screen memory (an early memory used as a screen for a later event), along with the names of other Italian painters (Botticelli, Boltraffio). The value that Freud attributed to the forgotten name had been transferred to neighboring elements, through displacement, as is the case with a mnemonic symbol, which is also a form of metonymy. ‘‘Botticelli’’ is a metonym of Signorelli, ‘‘Botticelli’’ and ‘‘Boltraffio’’ are metonyms of BosniaHerzegovina, which Freud was visiting when he forgot Signorelli’s name and which is related to the castration complex involved in this forgetting, since Freud attributes to the Turks in Bosnia-Herzegovina a strong attraction to sexuality and a considerable castration anxiety. ‘‘Boltraffio’’ was a metonym of Trafoi, an Italian city where Freud learned of the suicide of one of his patients, which triggered his thoughts on ‘‘death and sexuality.’’ The sentence ‘‘Herr, was ist da zu INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FORMATIONS sagen? (Sir, what is there to say)’’ reported to Freud by his interlocutor as reflecting the Turks’ attitude toward the inevitability of death, evoked their attitude toward sexuality (‘‘You know very well, Lord, if that fails, then life has no value’’), the source of psychic conflict and repression behind his act of forgetting. The representation of death Freud associated with that of castration (the Turkish sentences imply that a life without sexuality is worth no more than death). Moreover, Herr, present in Herzegovina, refers to Signor (Lord), to the father figure, and to Herz, the heart, an organ likely to grow sick and cause death. Forgetting the name of Signorelli is thus associated with an oedipal dimension that Freud had discovered through his self-analysis: his repression of sexuality, his attraction for his mother, his rivalry with his father, and his ambivalent identification with his father caught up in a desire for parricide and a fear of losing his father. Freud analyzed two levels at the same time, the psychology of consciousness and the preconscious and the metapsychology of the unconscious. He thus provided an example of the psychoanalytic method, although repression is not associated with the name ‘‘Signorelli’’ so much as the unconscious complex he represents. The names substituted for the forgotten name are composed of verbal memory traces and other proper nouns. They are substituted for the forgotten name through a process that acts on the phonemic material of words (the signifier) through association, metonymy, homology, as well as translation from one language to another, metaphor, and polysemy (Herr has multiple meanings, as does Herz). In the process of forgetting the name, displacement is metonymy, and condensation is metaphor. Forgetting, like remembering, belongs more to the phenomenology of consciousness than to the metapsychology of the unconscious. As a specific form of parapraxis, it also signifies repression according to popular convention. Because it occurs in the preconscious and is attracted by the unconscious, forgetting and the rediscovery of the forgotten are similar to what occurs when the subject clearly formulates for himself something he had always known. There have been few developments in psychoanalysis concerning the preconscious ego. As a result, it is easier to formulate psychoanalytic approaches that emphasize the cognitive causality of forgetting. FRANÇOIS RICHARD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS See also: Amnesia; Cryptomnesia; Déjà-vu; Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva’’; Formations of the unconscious; Memory; Moses and Monotheism; Mythology and psychoanalysis; Slips of the tongue; ‘‘Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through’’; Reminiscence; Repression; Psychopathology of Everyday Life The. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 41–61. ———. (1895b). On the grounds for detaching a particular syndrome from neurasthenia under the description ‘‘anxiety neurosis.’’ SE, 3: 85–115. ———. (1896a). Heredity and the aetiology of the neuroses. SE, 3: 141–156. ———. (1898b). The psychical mechanism of forgetfulness. SE, 3: 287–297. ———. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1– 338; 5: 339–625. ———. (1901b). The psychopathology of everyday life. SE, 6. ———. (1937d). Constructions in analysis. SE, 23: 255–269. Further Reading Bach, Sheldon. (2001). On being forgotten and forgetting one’s self. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 70, 739–756. FORMATIONS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS Dreams, the forgetting of words and names, slips of the tongue, parapraxes in general, and jokes are all examples of formations of the unconscious, the forms by which the unconscious expresses itself. The Formations of the Unconscious is also the title of Jacques Lacan’s fifth seminar, given in 1957–1958. The expression also establishes, as a distinct group, different symptoms that were all discussed by Freud in his earliest works. These formations of the unconscious are, in fact, symptoms, insofar as they are an expression and fulfillment of an unconscious wish. In psychoanalysis, they constitute the royal road to the unconscious. But knowledge of the unconscious can only be hypothesized, because ‘‘it is only as something conscious that we know it, after it has undergone transformation or translation into something conscious’’ (Freud, 1915e, p. 166). By proposing a generic expression for the symptomatic elements that Freud listed, Lacan emphasized that as ‘‘overdetermined’’ and ‘‘structurally iden597 F O R N A R I , F R A N C O (1 921 –19 85) tical’’ elements, they are ‘‘only conceivable, strictly speaking, within the structure of language’’ (Lacan, 2004a/1958, p. 260). Freud isolated two principle mechanisms at work in the process of unconscious formations: condensation and displacement. Lacan suggested redefining these mechanisms as ‘‘the two aspects of the signifier’s effect upon the signified’’ (Lacan, 2004b/1957, p. 152), namely metaphor and metonymy, terms that had been analyzed by the linguist Roman Jakobson. The notion of formations of the unconscious is related to Freud’s ideas of substitute formation, the return of the repressed, and symptom-formation. ALAIN VANIER See also: Graph of Desire; Metaphor; Object a; Overinterpretation; Seminar, Lacan’s; Splitting of the subject; Subject of the unconscious; Substitutive formation. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1–338; 5: 339–625. ———. (1901b). The psychopathology of everyday life. SE, 6. ———. (1905c). Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. SE, 8: 1–236. ———. (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159–204. Lacan, Jacques. (1998). Le séminaire. Book 5: Les formations de l’inconscient, 1957–1958. Paris: Seuil. ———. (2002a). The direction of the treatment and the principles of its power. In his Écrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans., pp. 215–270). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1958) ———. (2002b). The instance of the letter in the unconscious, or reason since Freud. In his Écrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans., pp. 138–168). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1957) FORNARI, FRANCO (1921–1985) Franco Fornari, an Italian surgeon, psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst, was born in Rivergaro, Piacenza, on April 18, 1921, and died in Milan on May 20, 1985. A student and analysand of Cesare Musatti, Fornari went on to become president of the Società psicoanalitica Italiana (Italian Psychoanalytic Society) and director 59 8 of the Psychology Institute of the Department of Literature and Philosophy at the State University of Milan. Fornari introduced the ideas of Melanie Klein to Italy. In his early writings, to treat schizophrenia and depression he advocated deepening our understanding of the primal psychotic dimension by examining the mental development of the child’s affective life. He also studied group dynamics and social conflict, his research on these subjects appearing in an essay titled Nuovi orientamenti nella psicoanalisi (New directions in psychoanalysis; 1966). Fornari’s Kleinian convictions are most apparent in his wartime research, which gave rise to several interesting psychological studies, including The Psychoanalysis of War (1974). In this work Fornari located the anxieties and psychotic fantasies that govern the behavior of individuals in groups, and he revealed the ensuing loss of responsibility in various social and political situations. War, he said, arises from the external projection of an internal danger and the negation of death in the face of an alleged external persecutory entity, and these forces make the individual destroy to survive. Fornari then investigated the theme of sensuality in relation to affective symbolization. In Genitalità e cultura (Genitality and culture; 1975), he examined the notion of perversion, determining that culture is the antithesis not of sensuality but of pregenitality, which arises from a lack of infantile symbolization and from destructive impulses dominating in one’s behavior. He subsequently proposed an evolutionary reading of libidinal development. Though elements of symbolization are already present in Genitalità e cultura, Fornari directly studied this topic in Simbolo e codice (Symbol and code; 1976), I fondamenti di una teoria psicoanalitica del linguaggio (Foundations of a psychoanalytic theory of language; 1979) and Codice vivente (Living codes; 1981). In these essays Fornari reexamined psychoanalytic theory in cognitive terms, establishing the foundation for a psychoanalytic anthropology that could also be of use to nonpsychoanalysts. He resolved the relation between body and mind by positing a code that preserves and transmits information in both directions between body and mind. Such a code, which he called the ‘‘living code,’’ is assumed in the programming of affects, which in fact is driven by one’s erotic materiality and parental bonds. Fornari developed a ‘‘coinemic’’ theory, in which the minimum unit of affective meaning is the ‘‘coineme.’’ Fornari saw this living code as an INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FORT-DA instrument and methodology that could be used to apply psychoanalysis to a broad range of cultural phenomena: speech, images, behavior. In La riscoperta dell’anima (The rediscovery of the soul; 1984), Fornari attempted to understand the human effort to rediscover the primal symbiotic unity with one’s mother. And in Affetti e cancro (Affects and cancer; 1985) he investigated the role that psychoanalysis could play in treating incurable diseases. GIANCARLO GRAMAGLIA See also: Italy. Bibliography Fornari, Franco. (1966). Nuovi orientamenti della psicoanalisi. Milan: Feltrinelli. ———. (1974). The psychoanalysis of war (Alenka Pfeifer, Trans.). Garden City, NY: Anchor Press. (Original work published 1970) ———. (1975). Genitalità e cultura. Milan: Feltrinelli. ———. (1976). Simbolo e codice: dal processo psicoanalitico all’analisi istituzionale. Milan: Feltrinelli. ———. (1979). I fondamenti di una teoria psicoanalitica del linguaggio. Torino: Boringhieri, 1979. ———. (1981). Il codice vivente: femminilità e maternità nei sogni delle madri in gravidanza. Torino: Boringhieri, 1981. ———. (1984). La riscoperta dell’anima. Bari: Laterza. ———. (1985). Affetti e cancro. Milan: Cortina. FORT-DA ‘‘Fort!’’ and ‘‘Da!’’ are exclamations that Sigmund Freud heard his grandson Ernst utter while playing. This pair of words—meaning ‘‘Gone!’’ and ‘‘There!’’— has become shorthand for repetition in early childhood, and for the primary processes that such behavior mobilizes. In psychoanalysis, allusions to fort/da refer to the second chapter of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where in a few celebrated pages Freud described and interpreted a game played by the little Ernst at the age of eighteen months. At the time, Freud was tackling the thorny problem of the compulsion to repeat in traumatic neurosis, and this digression into normal childhood experience was in fact meant to help contextualize the question. Ernst was a ‘‘good little boy,’’ INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS manifested no particular symptoms, was rather calm by disposition, and ‘‘never cried when his mother left him for a few hours.’’ But he ‘‘had an occasional disturbing habit of taking any small objects he could get hold of and throwing them away from him into a corner, under the bed. . . . As he did this he gave vent to a loud, long-drawn-out Ôo-o-o-o,’ accompanied by an expression of interest and satisfaction. His mother and the writer of the present account were agreed in thinking that this was not a mere interjection but represented the German word Ôfort.’’’ Freud interpreted this behavior as a way of obtaining satisfaction by causing things to be ‘‘gone.’’ A short time later he observed the child playing with a reel that had a piece of string tied around it: He would toss the reel away from him to where it could no longer be seen, before pulling it back into view and hailing its reappearance with a gleeful ‘‘Da!’’ (‘‘There!’’). Freud also noticed that the boy would utter his ‘‘o-o-o-o’’ sound with reference to himself—notably when, by crouching down below a mirror, he made his image ‘‘gone.’’ Freud stresses the fact that the fort part of the game was much of the time sufficient unto itself, and was ‘‘repeated untiringly’’ by the child (1920g, pp. 14–15). This observation leads to a number of fundamental questions: Are we confronted here by a method of mastering a painful experience by reproducing it oneself in an active manner, as children so often do, for example when playing frightening games? Or is the child literally taking revenge for the treatment visited upon him by redirecting it onto the other, or onto himself? In the end, the answer is not of any great consequence, for the real problem is the contradiction, which here is seen to arise very early, between the compulsion to repeat and the pleasure principle. How is it that satisfaction is to be derived from repeating actions that have been sources of unpleasurable feelings? The great interest of this discussion of Freud’s is that it sums up and condenses his subsequent exploration of the issue of the repetition compulsion. This very early children’s game shows this compulsion to be one of the fundamental processes of the psyche, with two enigmatic aspects, one making manifest ‘‘mysterious masochistic trends’’ that resist all attempts at analysis (p. 14), the other revealing an irreducible primordial violence that takes an especially virulent form, according to Freud’s account, when little Ernst, at thirty months, throws aside a toy and unequivocally identifies it with his absent father who has been ‘‘sent to the front’’ (p. 16). 599 F O U L K E S ( F U C H S ) , S I E G M U N D H E I N R I C H (1 898 –19 76) The fort/da game has inspired very many authors who have seen it as the embodiment of the institution of fundamental structures of the infantile psyche, though their emphasis varies according to tendency or school. Thus Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott both drew a number of lessons from it as they sought to cast light on the origins of the child’s mental life and develop play techniques for use in child therapy. For Jacques Lacan, the game expressed the child’s accession to the symbolic order, and the purpose of making something appear and disappear was to replace it with elementary signifiers. Jean Laplanche, for his part, sees this play as the first attempt to respond to the adult’s enigmatic messages. was beneficial to Ernst, for, even though he was not free from feelings of jealousy upon the arrival of a new sibling, he was well able to cope with the death of his mother a short time later. This was not to say, however, as Freud had noted in discussing ‘‘dreams of the death of persons of whom the dreamer is fond’’ (1900a, pp. 248ff), that once the subject reaches adulthood, and becomes aware of the true meaning of death, they will not be assailed in a deferred way by the guilt-driven anxiety that is to be seen in so many neuroses. It must be noted that Freud’s original discussion actually focused in turn on first one and then another game, each dominant at a different moment. The first, at eighteen months, is based on fort, on throwing the object far away, with the accompanying ‘‘o’’ sound, and it indicates the pleasure obtained from making the other disappear, or making oneself disappear, a pleasure that makes it possible to tolerate absence and reflects the violence that absence implies; this game endures, for it is still available when, at thirty months, Ernst is gratified by his father’s going off to war. The second game is founded on disappearance and reappearance, and shows a quite different kind of pleasure, that felt by the child when he sees what he had thought gone forever return from the void, and thus discovers the possibility of permanence, of continuity—the necessary basis for introjection and the working out not only of the symbolic order but also of the imaginary one. As much as the first game, if it is associated with nothing else, is governed by death-dealing repetition, the second, by contrast, is connected to a constructive repetition and partakes of a process of binding and transformation. See also: Beyond the Pleasure Principle; Childhood; Death instinct (Thanatos); Infant observation (direct); L and R schemas; Lost object; Metaphor; Object a; Symbolic, the (Lacan); Symbolization, process of; Word-presentation. It is thus the fort game that is the more problematical, in that the subject obtains from the disappearance of the other or of himself an unconscious gratification which runs counter to the most fundamental prohibitions. In view of his belief in the omnipotence of thoughts, the child cannot conceive of death or disappearance otherwise than as the outcome of a wish; he can form an idea of these concepts solely through seeing and losing sight of objects, so he links these to the deployment of visual desire, thereby transforming trauma into pleasure, albeit a forbidden pleasure. In his account of fort/da play, Freud hints that the game 60 0 GÉRARD BONNET Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4: 1–338; Part II, SE, 5: 339–625. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. FOULKES (FUCHS), SIEGMUND HEINRICH (1898–1976) Physician and psychoanalyst Siegmund Heinrich Foulkes was born on September 1898 in Karlsruhe, Germany, and died on July 8, 1976 in London. He was the youngest child of a comfortably-off, assimilated Jewish family (the Fuchs). After service in the telephone and telegraph section of the German army in World War I, he studied medicine at Heidelberg, qualifying at Frankfurt. Foulkes soon determined to become a psychoanalyst but first spent two significant years as an assistant to the neurologist Kurt Goldstein. The work centered on rehabilitation of brain-damaged soldiers from World War I, who were intensively studied neurologically and with methods derived from Gestalt psychology by Adhemar Gelb. Goldstein’s holistic approach to the function of the central nervous system later influenced Foulkes’s concept of the group: as a whole where each person represents a nodal point in the group’s network, analogous to the function of the neurone in the cortical network of the central nervous system. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FOUR DISCOURSES In 1928 Foulkes went to Vienna for psychoanalytic training and postgraduate psychiatry. His analyst was Helene Deutsch and his supervisors Eduard Hitschmann and Herman Nunberg. Paul Schilder was also a significant influence. His close friend was Robert Waelder. In 1930 Foulkes returned to Frankfurt as director of the outpatient clinic of the newly founded Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute directed by Karl Landauer. Erich Fromm and Frieda Fromm-Reichman were colleagues. There were fruitful exchanges in Frankfurt between psychoanalysts and sociologists, as both the Psychoanalytic Institute and the Sociological Research Institute (led by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer) shared the same building. Foulkes developed a close friendship with the sociologist Norbert Elias whose theories were influential in his later group analytic theories. During this time he also became acquainted with the American analyst Trigant Burrow’s writings on group analysis. Foulkes emigrated to England in 1933. After psychoanalytic practice in London he moved to the provincial town of Exeter, where he first began group psychotherapy. He further developed group work in the British Army, notably at Northfield Military Hospital where he collaborated with Thomas Forest Main, Harold Bridger and others. Foulkes was the principal architect in transforming the hospital to a therapeutic community. Wilfred Bion and John Richman had preceded him in their short experiment in group work. In 1948 Foulkes published his Northfield experiences in his first book where he laid down the bases of group analytic theory and practice. His principal contributions, as described in his book Therapeutic Group Analysis (1964) are the Matrix and the therapeutic power of mirroring. The Matrix is the hypothetical basis of all group transactions that provides the group’s capacity for containment and holding. Mirroring and resonance are the group’s specific therapeutic factors. The value of communication is a vital therapeutic factor as well: the ability to translate the language of symptoms into articulate, exchangeable communications. The therapist’s main contribution is to facilitate this process. Foulkes valuably emphasizes the therapist’s responsibility to be the ‘‘dynamic administrator,’’ organizing and protecting the group situation, as well as his responsibilities as group conductor. Foulkes died during a seminar he was leading for his senior colleagues. MALCOLM PINES See also: Great Britain; Group analysis; Group psychotherapy; Sigmund Freud Institute; Tavistock Clinic. Bibliography Foulkes, Siegmund Heinrich. (1964). Therapeutic group analysis. New York: International Universities Press. FOUR DISCOURSES After the war Foulkes was a training analyst for the Anna Freud Group in the British Psychoanalytic Society and Consultant Psychotherapist at the Maudsley Hospital where he taught generations of psychiatrists the rudiments of both individual and group psychotherapy. With James Anthony he founded the Group Analytic Society and later collaborated in forming the Institute of Group Analysis, both in London. In his seminar ‘‘The Other Side of Psychoanalysis,’’ Jacques Lacan introduced four types of discourses. The discourses are the discourse of the master, the discourse of the hysteric, the discourse of the university, and the discourse of the analyst. They represent a matrix in which everything comes in fours. The discourses too are made up of four elements: S1, the master signifier; S2, knowledge; a, surplus enjoyment; and S/, the subject. Their positions above and below the bar on either side of the diagram represent four different values or functions: the agent, the other, the production, and truth. Foulkes’s approach is that of ‘‘psychoanalysis by the group’’—developing the group members’ therapeutic capacities as co-therapists to each other, in contrast to the approaches of Wilfred Bion and Henry Ezriel’s ‘‘psychoanalysis of the group,’’ or Franz Alexander and Alexander Wolf ’s ‘‘psychoanalysis in the group.’’ In this fourfold structure, manipulating the minimal signifying chain, S1fiS2, is both necessary and sufficient to represent the subject, S/, in relation to both the big Other (the unconscious) and the small other (the object a as the object cause of desire) (Fig. 1). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 601 FOURTH ANALYSIS FIGURE 1 Discourse of the master Discourse of the university S1 S2 S2 S a S1 a S Their positions are: Discourse of the hysteric S S1 a S2 agent other truth production Discourse of the analyst a S2 S S1 In each discourse, the agent addresses an other, and the truth that the discourse seeks is attained through a certain production. Insofar as there is a connection between S1 and S2, between the master-signifier and knowledge—a connection that depends on the essential mediation of speech—the subject is separated from the production of the discourse, and this results in a discourse that is always inadequate. In this case an unbridgeable gap separates the subject S/ and the object a. If we take the discourse of the master as the starting point, the four terms generate each of the other discourses by making four successive ninety-degree turns in a clockwise direction. As each term takes the place of the agent, it assumes the dominant position and gives meaning and value to the discourse it generates. S1, the master-signifier, in the dominant position gives rise to discourse of the master. S2, knowledge, in that position produces discourse of the university. S/, the subject, as agent leads to discourse of the hysteric. In this case, the symptomatic signifier affects and marks the subject so that the subject’s body displays the symptom and speaks metaphorically in the place of the repressed signifier. And finally, a, the object of desire, in the dominant position produces discourse of the analyst. But it is not because analysis is the ‘‘science of desire’’ that the analyst has direct access to the object a. If the analyst can assume the place of the agent and thus to know something about the patient’s desire, it is only because the analyst is not duped into believing the agent’s discourse. Something of the truth of the patient’s desire has a chance to emerge within the framework of the treatment through the transference and by means of interpretation. 60 2 These four different social bonds constitute what Lacan claims is an essential support for communication. The four discourses go beyond speech, but ‘‘without going beyond language’s actual effects’’ (Lacan, 1998, p. 93). In the 1960s Lacan theorized the four discourses on the basis of a minute study of the social field that each discourse both reveals and conceals, because he wanted to ensure the transmission of psychoanalysis. He certainly knew that the discourses of the master and the university had existed for a much longer time. He credited Freud with having discovered the discourse of the hysteric, but argued that Freud had not known how to define the discourse of the analyst. So Lacan attempted to establish this discourse by defining its occurrence and its effects and by positing its limits so that analysis could be developed in a community and be taught in the community on both the theoretical and clinical levels. Lacan considered the discourse of the analyst to be one of his original contributions to psychoanalysis. JOËL DOR See also: Matheme; Philosophy and psychoanalysis; Seminar, Lacan’s. Bibliography Lacan, Jacques. (1970). Radiophonie. Scilicet, 2–3, 55–99. ———. (1991). Le séminaire, livre XVII: L’envers de la psychanalyse (1969–1970). Paris: Seuil. ———. (1998). On feminine sexuality, the limits of love and knowledge: The seminar, book XX, encore 1972–1973 (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. FOURTH ANALYSIS ‘‘Fourth analysis’’ (l’analyse quatrième), a contribution of the French Fourth Group, or OPLF (FrenchLanguage Psychoanalytical Organization), is a new approach to the part of analytic training traditionally known in psychoanalytic societies as ‘‘control’’ or ‘‘supervised’’ analysis. ‘‘Thus fourth analysis is in the first place a theory of the control analysis and of the conditions of supervision — a theory never outlined until now — that takes into account the entire group of figures and persons involved in it, as well as their visible and hidden interactions’’ (Topique, 1983). The INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FOURTH ANALYSIS term ‘‘fourth’’ refers not only to the Fourth Group itself, but also to the number of protagonists, namely, the analysand, the analyst, the analyst’s analyst, and the analyst who carries out the fourth analysis. The term fourth analysis did not appear in the Fourth Group’s ‘‘Principles and Modalities of Functioning’’ (or ‘‘Blue Book’’ [1969]), even though the idea of a ‘‘multireferential’’ analysis effectively prefigured it. Such a multi-referential analysis, it was felt, was an adequate characterization of a key moment of analytic training, always assuring that training was not to be reduced to some kind of academic ‘‘curriculum.’’ ‘‘Indeed, as soon as the candidate takes on his or her first patient, it is no longer the didactic contract, but also the clinical experience, with all its unknowns, that regulates the relation of the subject to the unconscious. Thus the patient, who is only spoken of indirectly, confronts three analysts with the partiality (in both senses) of their knowledge: the novice, who is striving towards mastery, but also the supervisor and the didactician’’ (Topique, 1969). It is notable that these were still the very terms that the Fourth Group would later question, specifically the term supervisor, which is replaced by fourth analyst, and didactician, which would become ‘‘the analyst of the analyst’’. Stress on the multi-referential serves in the first place to highlight and to clarify the harmful effects specific to this plurality when it is not recognized as such. For example, playing the didactician and the supervisor off against each other, or making what one expects from the patient dependent on what one might want to hear or on what one thinks the supervisor wants to hear. Hence the formula that gave birth to the term fourth analysis: ‘‘There are three chairs and a fourth unconscious, which language does not express fully in known dialects’’ (Topique, 1969). At the same time, the multi-referentiality specific to fourth analysis is not limited to it, which leads to the necessity of organizing ‘‘interanalytic sessions’’ with other analysts of the Fourth Group and possibly analysts from other societies. ‘‘The exemplary character of this four-term situation does not exhaust the diversity of third-party references. The candidate must be able, according to his or her own analytical, theoretical, and clinical progress, to organize in due course debates of variable lengths with other analysts’’ (Topique, 1969). In the supplement to the ‘‘Blue Book’’ produced by the Fourth Group’s 1970 congress, dedicated INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS mainly to the notion of the ‘‘didactic effect,’’ the term fourth analysis is defined as follows: ‘‘The discipline of fourth analysis based on multi-referentiality implies access to the conditions that make the didactic affect possible: not just some regulatory mechanism designed to facilitate experimentation, scholarship, or initiation, but what may be called a topography. . . . To become an analyst is to gain access to this tetradimensionality of Freudian training as a process’’ (Topique, 1971). This points up the important idea that the didactic effect is constructed in a dialectical movement made possible by the shift from a dual relation to a fourfold one. The risk of a major alienation, that is, alienation in knowledge, can thus be counteracted and the didactic effect is defined as never being the direct consequence of the transmission of knowledge. In 1979, Jean-Paul Valabrega, who had participated in drafting the ‘‘Blue Book’’ in 1969 and 1970, undertook a more thoroughgoing theorization of fourth analysis (Valabrega, 1979), which he defined as a ‘‘theory of supervision.’’ He set out ‘‘to better delimit the Ôanalytic material’ itself and above all to prevent its potential loss, to insure as much as possible against its unintended erasure’’ (Topique, 1983). The principle of the fourth analysis has not been modified further. On the other hand, it has been integrated into the greater aim of emphasizing the crucial consideration of the transference and countertransference. The work being carried out on the analysis of the analyst on the basis of fourth analysis allows for, or at least contributes to, a limitation of countertransferential effects in the treatment, notably the deafness towards the analysand that comes about when listening to oneself and not the other overwhelms the analyst’s psychic space. To reopen and to reinstitute, without ever taking as given what must be perceived as a process, is in fact the ideal not only of analytic training, but also of analytic practice, including that of established analysts. The existence, and even the necessity, of interanalytic sessions that bring several analysts face to face around a trainee constitutes a test of each one’s clinical practice; and, at least in principle, it represents an abiding recommendation for every analyst after his or her accreditation. Fourth analysis and interactive sessions, by virtue of their very stringency, are an effective response to what Freud (1937c) said in ‘‘Analysis 603 ‘‘ F R A G M E N T OF AN ANALYSIS OF A CASE OF H Y S T E R I A ’’ (D O R A / I D A B A U E R ) Terminable and Interminable’’ about the necessity of the analyst’s putting his or her own analysis to work. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: France; Supervised analysis (control case); Training the psychoanalyst. Bibliography (1969). La formation du psychanalyste. Topique, 1. (1971). Travaux récents. Topique, 6. (1983). Les historiens et leurs versions. Topique, 32. (1986). Constructions de l’identité. Topique, 38. Valabrega, Jean-Paul. (1994). La formation du psychanalyste. Paris: Payot. ‘‘FRAGMENT OF AN ANALYSIS OF A CASE OF HYSTERIA’’ (DORA/IDA BAUER) Freud’s case history for Ida Bauer, alias Dora (1905), covers approximately seventy hours of treatment. The eighteen-year-old adolescent was forced to go to Freud by her father, Philip Bauer, who was allegedly most concerned by her fainting spells and recent suicide note. Her presenting symptoms included dysponoea, tussis, nervosa, aphonia, depression, and hysterical unsociability. Combining anamnestic data, reconstruction, and an extensive analysis of two dreams, Freud portrays his patient as a young child observing the primal scene and falling sick from related masturbation. Her subsequent psychic disorder was directly related to her father’s liaison with Frau K. (Peppina Zellenka). Philip denied the liaison and, in his own version of Dora’s analysis, wanted Freud ‘‘to talk Dora out’’ of her belief. Furthermore, Dora had been traumatized twice by Herr K. (Hans Zellenka). Until therapy she had kept the first traumatic occasion to herself, and the second was denied by Hans, who, with his wife and Philip, accused Dora of fabrication. Mrs. Bauer’s ‘‘housewife psychosis’’ and self-absorption further increased Dora’s alienation and desperation. Freud attempted to demonstrate to Dora that her reproaches toward her adulterous father were selfreproaches, rooted in her unacknowledged love for Hans, who continued to solicit her. Surprisingly, Freud also wanted Dora to stop resisting and to accept Hans, for it ‘‘would have been the only possible solution for all 60 4 parties concerned.’’ Dora, however, abruptly terminated treatment—an action Freud considered as another manifestation of her vengeance. Freud pointed out two other shortcomings of his handling of the case: he neglected Dora’s transference, and he overlooked Dora’s homosexual strivings, found at her deepest unconscious level. Freud’s case history was an organizing clinical experience for him and for the psychoanalytic movement and stands as a paradigmatic record of both psychoanalysis and contemporary culture. It is Freud’s longest text on a female patient and also one of Freud’s memorable trilogy including The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) and Three Essays on Sexuality (1905d). It is the first of Freud’s great analytic cases and the first involving an adolescent. Ernest Jones called the case ‘‘a model for students of psychoanalysis,’’ and for Erik Erikson, it was ‘‘the classical analysis of the structure and the genesis of a hysteria.’’ Other critics have described the case as a canonical specimen of conversion hysteria, as Freud’s most graphic demonstration of psychosomatics, and as the case of Freud’s most discussed in psychiatry and psychoanalysis as well as in sociology, anthropology, history, and literary criticism. Granted, Freud’s various theoretical discoveries in the Dora case, from a practical point of view, must be reevaluated. Freud either downplayed or entirely disregarded Dora’s triple burden of being a woman, a Jew, and an adolescent victimized by two pairs of adults. In his quest to genetically reconstruct the psychic truth, Freud dismissed Dora’s concern about current historical truth and her need to validate her experience. The case lacks indispensable desiderata of psychoanalysis in that there is virtually no interpretation involving transference and in that indoctrination and forced association replace free association. Even as a case of therapy, Freud’s treatment of Dora was disastrous. By bullying his patient and even wanting her to return to the middle-aged adulterous pedophile who twice traumatized her, Freud subjected her to a third, iatrogenic trauma. There are further indications of Freud’s counter-transferential perturbation: he lied twice and misdated the case twice in his prefatory remarks; he repeatedly errs about Dora’s age and refers to her at different developmental levels (‘‘girl,’’ ‘‘child,’’ ‘‘woman,’’ ‘‘female person,’’ ‘‘lady’’); he confusedly traces Dora’s coughing and aphonia to ages eight and twelve; he attributes to Dora an adult-like love of Hans during her ‘‘first years’’ in Merano, Italy (she was there from age six to age seventeen); and he grossly INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FRAGMENTATION misinterprets Dora’s silence as agreement when he mistakenly tells her that at age seventeen (she was really fifteen), she was committed to her traumatizing seducer, much like her mother at the age of seventeen. According to his own words, he wrote up the case ‘‘during the two weeks immediately following’’ termination; his correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess contains explicit statements that he was writing the case history between January 10 and 24, a two-week period in 1901. The implications of the duration of Freud’s composition have gone completely unnoticed. When Dora decided to quit therapy two weeks before she actually did, Freud irritably charged that she was reacting like a maid who gives a two-week notice before leaving her employer. But Freud himself unconsciously behaved immaturely during his composition of the case, which partially took on the character of an acting out, or better yet, a writing out. His two weeks of writing up the case was a way of dismissing it and of trying to rid himself of Dora. As a follow-up to Dora’s treatment, Freud proceeded to write up her case history. Pertinently, Freud never considered Dora’s bisexuality and transference together; his defensive typographic separation of these two dynamics enabled him to ward off any notion of maternal transference. However, far from dissolving his countransference toward Dora, Freud re-enacted it with the reader, whom he tried to seduce into agreement. PATRICK MAHONY See also: Acting out/acting in; Adolescence; Bauer, Ida; Cruelty; Flight into illness; Free association; Hysteria; Identification; Latent dream thoughts; Oedipus complex; Psychoanalytic treatment; Resolution of the translation. Secret; Somatic compliance. Source Citation Laurent, Éric (1986). Lectures de Dora. In Fondation du champ freudien, Rencontre internationale, Hystérie et obsession (pp. 29–42). Paris: Navarin. Mahony, Patrick. (1996). Freud’s Dora: A historical, textual, and psychoanalytic study. New Haven: Yale University Press. FRAGMENTATION Fragmentation describes a state of the self that is the opposite of cohesion. It is a diagnostic sign. This notion appeared in Heinz Kohut’s 1968 article ‘‘The Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders.’’ A sign of the narcissistic personality, as compared with the neuroses, fragmentation triggers disintegration anxiety, a counterpart of castration anxiety. The fragmentation corresponding to the autoerotic stage is total in psychosis, in contrast to the narcissistic personality, in which the self is cohesive. In narcissism, transient fragmentation is seen during analysis and during certain periods when the self is vulnerable, such as adolescence. This notion was developed throughout Kohut’s work, becoming one of the four fundamental concepts of self psychology set forth in ‘‘Remarks about the Formation of the Self ’’ (1974). To Kohut, narcissistic pathology tends to be progressively reduced to variations in the state of the self, which is fragmented at the preoedipal and oedipal levels. Fragmentation of the self triggers an intensification of the drives, which are redefined as products of the disintegration of the self in the service of its restoration. Fluctuations in the state of the self are important clinical data for diagnosis and treatment, but the drives become secondary to the self. Freud, Sigmund. (1905e). Bruchstück einer Hysterie-Analyse. Mschr. Psychiat. Neurol., XVIII, p. 285310, 408–467; G.W., V, p. 161–286; Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. SE, 7: 1–122. AGNÈS OPPENHEIMER Bibiography See also: Disintegration, products of; Schizophrenia; Self, the. Erikson, Erik H. (1964). Insight and responsibility. New York: W. W. Norton. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1–338; 5: 339–625. Jennings, Jerry. (1986). The revival of ‘‘Dora’’: Advances in psychoanalytic theory and technique. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 34, 607–634. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Kohut, Heinz (1968). The psychoanalytic treatment of narcissistic personality disorders. In The search for the self (Vol. 1). New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1971).The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press. 605 FRAMEWORK OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT ———. (1974). Remarks about the formation of the self. In The search for the self (Vol. 2). New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1977). The restoration of the self. New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1984). How does analysis cure? Chicago: University of Chicago Press. FRAMEWORK OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT The ‘‘frame of psychoanalytic treatment’’ refers to the formal and contractual means necessary for establishing the situation that characterizes psychoanalysis compared to other forms of psychotherapy. Although the frame has been at the heart of psychoanalytic practice ever since its origins, considerations of its structure and function are more recent, dating from the Second World War. One of the first to investigate this frame was José Bleger in an article entitled ‘‘Psychoanalysis of the Psychoanalytic Frame’’ (Bleger, 1967). This frame was gradually developed by Freud for what were often circumstantial or personal reasons, but he eventually developed a set of uniform recommendations consistent with the theoretical and practical modalities of treatment. As early as 1904 he described his ‘‘psychotherapeutic method’’: ‘‘Without exerting any other kind of influence, he invites them to lie down in a comfortable attitude on a sofa, while he himself sits on a chair behind them outside their field of vision. He does not even ask them to close their eyes, and avoids touching them in any way, as well as any other procedure which might be reminiscent of hypnosis. The session thus proceeds like a conversation between two people equally awake, but one of whom is spared every muscular exertion and every distracting sensory impression which might divert his attention from his own mental activity’’ (1904a, p. 250). Nine years later he provided additional details such as frequency and duration of the sessions and method of payment—parameters that were as important for proper treatment as the mutual obligations of free association or the prohibition to act out on the part of the analysand and free-floating attention or the rule of abstinence on the part of the analyst (1913c). The restrictions imposed by the treatment setting apply to both parties, even if its contractual nature is 60 6 often overlooked in order to emphasize the pseudopower attributed to the psychoanalyst by virtue of the patient’s masochism. The frame appears to function as the representative of the incest prohibition in the analytic situation, a prohibition that in fact favors expression and analysis. The frame can be considered an ‘‘excluded middle’’ that hovers over the protagonists during the session, reminding them that every ‘‘dualistic’’ relationship is illusory, even during moments of the most intense regression. Opinions vary regarding these interpretations since the elements that characterize the frame are rich with symbolization. José Bleger (1967) distinguishes the frame within the psychoanalytic situation as a ‘‘nonprocess’’ consisting of ‘‘constants within whose bounds the process takes place’’ (p. 511), and he locates its origin in the ‘‘most primitive fusion with the mother’s body’’ (p. 518). He subdivides the frame into two elements: the frame proposed by the analyst and accepted by the patient, and the frame formed by projections of the patient’s most primitive symbiotic associations. It is with this last point that the concepts of ‘‘containercontained,’’ the analyst’s alpha function (Wilfred Bion), and Donald Winnicott’s ‘‘setting’’ are associated. For Winnicott, the analyst ‘‘expresses’’ his love for the patient by his reflected interest and his hatred by his observance of the rites of payment and scheduling (Winnicott, 1958). According to Jean-Luc Donnet, ‘‘the frame is both protection and threat, just as its symbolization is forced and liberating’’ (1973). Jean Laplanche, with his image of the psychoanalyst’s ‘‘tub,’’ describes a ‘‘double-wall setting’’ wherein the outside wall, ‘‘purely legalistic and formal’’ but contractual, is necessary to preserve the inner wall, which is subject to the uncertainties of the analytic process and is needed for sexual issues and the transference neurosis to manifest themselves (Laplanche, 1987). The arrangement of the frame for psychotic patients or as a function of what Lacan and his students refer to as the temporal scansion of the session introduces the question of its relationship with the establishment and ongoing coherence of a psychoanalytic process. There are a number of parameters involved and each of them raises the question of its role and importance in managing the situation: the number and duration of sessions (four sessions of fifty minutes at a minimum according to official American guidelines, three of forty-five minutes for French members of the International Psychoanalytic INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FRANCE Association, shorter for others, longer for Freud), distribution throughout the week (frequent sessions, sometimes several a day for patients who live far away), payment (cash or check), accepting third-party payment or not, problems associated with days off, with vacations, with changes to the ritual (moving, for example), the intrusion of the telephone, contact during, or outside, the session (Sándor Ferenczi’s ‘‘active technique’’ or ‘‘mutual analysis,’’ Michael Balint’s or Donald Winnicott’s physical holding), and so on. FRANCE Rigid attitudes on one side, transgressive relativism on the other, reference to the paternal prohibition against incest versus a conception of the frame as a womb implying a total return to a primal state, a setting for hypnosis or a condition for workingthrough—the conditions associated with the unique nature of psychoanalytic treatment possess a nonalienating value only because they are based on a contract that circumscribes them and that can at any moment be torn up by either of its cosignatories. In France, Jean Martin Charcot’s legacy gave rise to bitter disputes on the nature of the mind, and Pierre Janet’s theories were widely accepted in medical and philosophical circles. These two factors explain the poor reception given to Freud’s ideas for many years. The article that Freud called ‘‘the first article on psychoanalysis written in France,’’ by Doctor René Morichau-Beauchant, professor of medicine in Poitiers, appeared as late as November 14, 1911, in La gazette des hôpitaux civils et militaires. In 1913 a French translation of Freud’s essay ‘‘The claims of psychoanalysis to scientific interest’’ in the Italian journal Scientia went unnoticed. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence; Initial interview(s); Face-to-face situation; Free association; ‘‘Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy’’; Money and psychoanalytic treatment; Neutrality, benevolent neutrality; Psychoanalytic treatment. Bibliography Bleger, José. (1967). Psychoanalysis of the psycho-analytic frame. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 48 (4), 511–519. Donnet, Jean-Luc. (1973). Le divan bien tempéré. Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse, 8, 23–49. Freud, Sigmund. (1904a). Freud’s psycho-analytic procedure. SE, 7: 247–254. ———. (1913c). On beginning the treatment (Further recommendations on technique of psycho-analysis I). SE, 12: 121–144. Laplanche, Jean. (1989). New foundations for psychoanalysis (David Macey, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. (Original work published in 1987) Winnicott, Donald W. (1958). Collected papers: Through paediatrics to psycho-analysis. London: Tavistock Publications. Further Reading Busch, Fred. (1995). Beginning analytic treatment: Establishing an analytic frame. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 43, 449–468. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Freud spent several months, from October 1885 to February 1886, studying in Paris with Jean Martin Charcot at the Salpêtrière Hospital. This experience greatly determined his orientation toward psychopathology. In his article ‘‘Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses,’’ published in French in 1896 in the Revue neurologique, the word psychoanalysis appeared for the first time. In 1914 Professor Emmanuel Régis and his assistant Angelo Hesnard, a naval doctor in Bordeaux, wrote the first book on psychoanalysis, La psychanalyse des névroses et des psychoses, but the First World War cut short further interest in the field. It was not until December 1920 that the Revue de Genève and Éditions Payot published a French translation of Freud’s essay ‘‘On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement’’ (1914). With Freud’s support, Eugénie Sokolnicka, a Polish psychiatrist who had settled in France, began analyzing young psychiatrists working at the Clinique des maladies mentales at the Sainte-Anne Hospital under the direction of Professor Henri Claude. Psychoanalysis became fashionable in France around 1921: In October 1921 André Breton traveled to Vienna to meet Freud, the ‘‘greatest psychologist of our time.’’ Henri-René Lenormand’s play ‘‘Le mangeur de rêves’’ (1921) turned out to be a success. And the Belgian journal Le disque vert published a special issue in 1924 titled ‘‘Freud et la psychanalyse’’ (Freud and psychoanalysis). Though the medical profession remained overtly hostile to psychoanalysis, a number of young psychiatrists interested in psychoanalysis, including René Allendy, Angélo Hesnard, René Laforgue, and Eugène 607 FRANCE Minkowski, decided to launch a journal that was clearly psychoanalytic in orientation. The first volume of Évolution psychiatrique appeared in 1925, followed by a second in 1927. In 1930 the journal founders formed a learned society of the same name, which was still in existence in 2005. In July 1926 these psychiatrists, along with Raymond and Ariane de Saussure, Édouard Pichon, and Adrien Borel, organized the Conférence des psychanalystes de langue française (Conference of French-Speaking Psychoanalysts) in Lausanne, the origin of the Congrès des psychanalystes de langues romanes (Congress of Romance Language Psychoanalysts) and the Congrès des psychanalystes de langue française (Congress of French-Speaking Psychoanalysts), which take place annually. On November 4, 1926, the Société psychanalytique de Paris (SPP; Paris Psychoanalytic Society) was formed under the guidance and with the assistance of Princess Marie Bonaparte, Napoleon’s greatgrand-niece, who was being analyzed by Freud and who later become close friends with him. Her circle included Eugénie Sokolnicka, Angélo Hesnard, René Allendy, Adrien Borel, René Laforgue, Georges Parcheminey, Édouard Pichon, and Rudolf Loewenstein. (The last was a Polish Jewish émigré who, after training at the Berlin Institute, settled in France, where he became the first and best known teaching analyst. He was naturalized in 1930.) Also in her circle were a number of French-speaking Swiss analysts. They included Charles Odier, Henri Flournoy, and Raymond de Saussure (the son of the linguist), all of whom made important contributions to the growth of the new society. The first issue of the Revue française de psychanalyse appeared on June 25, 1927, and on January 10, 1934, the Institut de psychanalyse was created and remained active until 1940. The development of psychoanalysis encountered some difficulties, however, notably with the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) and because of Freud himself. The French welcomed Freud’s ‘‘psychoanalytic method’’ but in general rejected Freudian ‘‘doctrine,’’ to paraphrase the title of a critical essay by Roland Dalbiez published in 1936. Because of this tendency, Marie Bonaparte played a crucial role. She was not a physician, and by being jealously faithful to Freud, she prevented psychoanalysis in France from falling completely under the sway of institutional psychiatry (Mijolla, 1988b). She also began translating Freud’s writings intermittently until 1988, when a 60 8 team led by Jean Laplanche began a new translation of Freud’s complete works (Mijolla, 1991). During the 1936 international IPA congress in Marienbad, Czech Republic, the young Jacques Lacan presented a paper titled ‘‘Le stade du miroir’’ (The mirror stage, or phase). He became a member of the Société psychanalytique de Paris in December 1938, nine years after Sacha Nacht (October 1929) and eighteen months after Daniel Lagache (July 1937), his future rivals, both of whom, like Lacan, were analyzed by Rudolf Loewenstein. Though there were few truly innovative French presentations aside from Lacan’s paper, many presentations helped spread Freudian theory and technique, which was for the most part based on the work of Sándor Ferenczi. The recommendations made by René Laforgue (on scotoma, schizonoia, and family neurosis) went unanswered, as did the many articles and essays by Angélo Hesnard, Édouard Pichon, and René Allendy. Freud received assistance in emigrating from Austria from U.S. Ambassador William C. Bullitt and Marie Bonaparte, who paid the ‘‘departure tax’’ demanded by the Nazis and saved his antiquities collection. Following his departure from Vienna, Freud stayed in Paris on June 5, 1938, while waiting to embark for London. Because of Nazi persecutions, Jewish psychoanalysts had begun to leave Germany in 1933, usually passing through Switzerland or France. They included René Spitz and Heinz Hartmann. They too received help from Marie Bonaparte, as well as from Anne Berman (Bonaparte’s secretary), René Laforgue, and Paul Schiff. On June 13, 1940, the day before Hitler’s troops entered Paris, Sophie Morgenstern, one of the first child analysts, committed suicide. The Société psychanalytique de Paris and the Institut de psychanalyse closed their doors, and the Revue française de psychanalyse ceased publication. There was no overtly psychoanalytic activity in France during the four years of German occupation. Rudolf Loewenstein succeeded in leaving for America, where he settled for good. Marie Bonaparte went into exile in Cape Town, South Africa. Sacha Nacht, who worked with the Free French forces, barely escaped deportation. Daniel Lagache continued teaching in Clermont-Ferrand, where the University of Strasbourg had temporarily reestablished itself. Paul Schiff joined the troops that would later liberate Italy and France, while Jacques Lacan, Françoise Dolto, Marc Schlumberger, and John Leuba INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FRANCE continued their activities in Paris. Only René Laforgue attempted, from 1940 to 1942, to create a French section at the Göring Institute, but his efforts were in vain. His subservient attitude toward the occupation authorities resulted in his exclusion from the Société psychanalytique de Paris following liberation (Mijolla, 1988a). After 1945 psychoanalytic activity resumed in France. A number of new figures appeared on the scene: Maurice Bouvet, Serge Lebovici, René Held, Maurice Bénassy, Francis Pasche. On July 25, 1946, the annual Congrès des psychanalystes de langue française (Congress of French-Speaking Psychoanalysts) resumed in Montreux, Switzerland. In November, Maryse Choissy founded the Centre d’étude des sciences de l’homme (Social Sciences Study Center) and launched the journal Psyché, both of which were influenced by the Catholicism of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. That same year the Centre psychopédagogique Claude-Bernard (Claude Bernard Psychopedagogical Center) was created, with Georges Mauco as nonmedical director. Juliette Boutonier was the medical director, but she turned the position over to André Berge in order to replace Daniel Lagache at the University of Strasbourg. Lagache had been appointed to a position at the Sorbonne, where he created a degree program in psychology. In 1948 a new publisher, Presses universitaires de France, began publishing the Revue française de psychanalyse. The Cold War began, and the Communist journal La nouvelle critique published an article in 1949 referring to psychoanalysis as a ‘‘reactionary ideology.’’ The article, written by four psychoanalysts, one of whom was Serge Lebovici, reinforced the criticisms made by Georges Politzer before the war. Years later, between 1973 and 1977, Lebovici was the first French psychoanalyst to be made president of the International Psychoanalytical Association. The success of psychoanalysis continued to attract candidates and presented the problem of training them. Moreover, a suit brought against Margaret Clark-Williams between 1950 and 1952, a psychoanalyst but not a medical doctor, for illegally practicing medicine, though concluded in her favor, exposed the collective responsibility of the psychoanalytic community and the need to establish criteria for practice. After three years of violent debate, flip-flopping alliances, and maneuvering between the three French INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS leaders who acquired their positions after the war, the decision to create a new Institut de psychanalyse caused a split in the Société psychanalytique de Paris. None of the three were especially interested in making the institutions democratic, and they waged a kind of open warfare with one another that would leave scars on the psychoanalytic community in France for years to come. Aside from their personal ambitions, they had opposing ideas about the theory, practice, and institutional organization of psychoanalysis. Sacha Nacht wanted to remain faithful to the norms of the International Psychoanalytical Association and aligned with medical education. Daniel Lagache favored academic training. The third, Jacques Lacan, developed original theories and methods of therapy, and the latter, especially his ‘‘variable-length sessions,’’ did not comply with international standards. On June 16, 1953, a motion of no confidence was passed against Jacques Lacan, then president of the Société psychanalytique de Paris. Daniel Lagache, Juliette Favez-Boutonier, and Françoise Dolto then announced that they would be leaving the society to form the Société française de psychanalyse (SFP; French Society for Psychoanalysis). Lacan joined them and was followed by nearly half the students, who were behind the split. But the defectors, in their desire to create an institute free of Sacha Nacht’s authority, had overlooked the fact that they would be excluded from the International Psychoanalytical Association and would have to undergo a lengthy period of scrutiny by the international community before they could prove their ability to train new analysts (Mijolla, 1996). In September 1953, the sixteenth Conférence des psychanalystes de langues romanes took place and, at the end of the SPP meeting, Lacan presented to the members of his new society, the Société française de psychanalyse, his ‘‘Discours de Rome’’ on the function of language in psychoanalysis. The Institut de psychanalyse de Paris (Paris Institute for Psychoanalysis) was officially established on June 1, 1954. Sacha Nacht remained the director until 1962, when Serge Lebovici replaced him. Through the Centre de diagnostic et de traitements psychanalytiques (Center for Diagnostics and Psychoanalytic Treatment), run by Michel Cénac and René Diatkine, Nacht was to become, for nearly thirty years, the symbol of traditional psychoanalysis in France, to the detriment of the Société scientifique, which did not 609 FRANCE return to its former prestige until 1986. To strengthen its image, the Twentieth International Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association was held in Paris in 1957. The IPA had met there once before, in 1938, and would meet in Paris again in 1973. Around this time new directions in psychoanalysis were explored. For example, in Paris in 1958 Philippe Paumelle, Serge Lebovici, and René Diatkine created the Association de santé mentale (Mental Health Association), which provided doctors and social workers with training in psychoanalysis. Also established that year were the Groupe Lyonnais, the first regional branch of the Société psychanalytique de Paris, and the Séminaire de perfectionnement, an annual meeting for psychoanalysts working throughout France, similar to the Journées provinciales run by the Société française de psychanalyse. The rivalry that developed between the two societies promoted the growth of theoretical developments as well as new institutional forms. The work of Maurice Bouvet is a case in point. Through his writing, Bouvet attempted to counteract the growing interest in the ideas of Jacques Lacan. Unfortunately, he died at the early age of forty-nine in 1960. In 1962 an annual prize in psychoanalysis was created in his name. There were a number of psychoanalysts for children working in France at this time. In the Société psychanalytique de Paris there were Serge Lebovici, René Diatkine, Roger Misès, Michel Soulé, Pierre Mâle, Jean Favreau, Ilse Barande, and Pierre Bourdier. In the Société française de psychanalyse there were Jenny Aubry, Françoise Dolto, Maud Mannoni, and Victor Smirnoff. In the field of psychosomatics were JeanPaul Valabrega (SFP) and the team formed around Pierre Marty: Michel Fain, Michel de M’Uzan, and Christian David (all SPP members). David went on to found the Institut de psychosomatique (Institute of Psychosomatics). Those working in psychodrama and group psychoanalysis included Jean and Evelyne Kestemberg, Jean Gillibert, and Robert Barande (SPP), and Didier Anzieu, Angélo Bejarano, René Kaës, André Missenard, and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (SFP). Primary representatives in the field of psychogenesis and the treatment of psychosis were Sacha Nacht and Paul-Claude Racamier of the SPP, and Jean-Louis Lang, Serge Leclaire, François Perrier, and Guy Rosolato of the SFP. Worthy of note is that there was a certain coolness in France toward Melanie Klein’s theories, which remained relatively unknown until the 61 0 1970s, following the work of James Gammil, Jean Begoin, and Florence Begoin-Guignard. Jacques Lacan became increasingly important in French psychoanalysis and as a leader of young analysts. He published articles in La psychanalyse, the SFP review created in 1955 (the eighth and last number appeared in 1964), and in 1953 began giving his famous seminars. The increasingly well-attended sessions were held every Wednesday from 12 noon to 3 p.m., initially at the Sainte-Anne Hospital, then at the École normale supérieure, and finally at the Paris law school. On November 7, 1955, in Vienna, he introduced his call for a ‘‘return to Freud,’’ which met with tremendous success. Interest in the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss and structuralism during the 1960s contributed to the dissemination of a conception of psychoanalysis unrelated to psychology and without any therapeutic aims (in 1957 Lacan had spoken of ‘‘excessive healing’’). The impact of Lacan’s ideas can be judged from the October 1960 Sixth Colloque de Bonneval, organized by Henri Ey on the unconscious. In the presence of Jean Hyppolite, Maurice MerleauPonty, Eugène Minkowski, Henri Lefebvre, and Paul Ricoeur, members of the two societies confronted one another. In that setting the work of a number of hitherto unknown psychoanalysts came to light: André Green and Conrad Stein of the Société psychanalytique de Paris, and Jean Laplanche, Serge Leclaire, and François Perrier of the Société française de psychanalyse. Lacan’s success guaranteed him a role within the Société française de psychanalyse that did not always sit well with his colleagues, especially since his theoretical development, together with the unusual nature of his personal practice, made him persona non grata within the traditional international psychoanalytic community. There were increasing conflicts within the SFP over Lacan, and these grew worse as the conditions for the society’s readmission to the Institut de psychosomatique were communicated to him in 1961 during the twenty-second international congress in Edinburgh, just as it received the status of a study group. The SFP was asked to adhere to the guidelines for didactic analysis and training (four sessions of forty-five minutes per week and a year of therapy after the beginning of supervised therapy). Everyone knew that Lacan would never accept these requirements. In spite of diplomatic efforts by the three-member group within the SFP known as the ‘‘troika’’—Wladimir INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FRANCE Granoff, Serge Leclaire, and François Perrier—the situation grew worse until several members of the SFP, including some of Lacan’s former analysts, urged that he, along with Françoise Dolto, be removed from the list of teaching analysts, a decision that was ratified in November 1963. This led to a split within the SFP. One group of members formed the Association psychanalytique de France (French Psychoanalytic Association), which chose Daniel Lagache as its first president and was accredited by the Institut de psychosomatique on July 28, 1965, during the twenty-fourth international congress in Amsterdam. On June 21, 1964, Lacan founded the École Freudienne de Paris (EFP; Freudian School of Paris), which, over a period of sixteen years, became one of the leading forces in the French psychoanalytic movement. Organized into groups known as ‘‘cartels,’’ it published an annual list of members. This did not mean that the organization recognized them as psychoanalysts, for according to Lacan, ‘‘The psychoanalyst’s authority can only come from himself.’’ Since the school was intent on making a difference within the psychoanalytic community, some members were designated ‘‘EFP analysts,’’ and on October 9, 1967, Lacan instituted a test to enable members to obtain the title. As a result of this action, Piera Aulagnier, François Perrier, and Jean-Paul Valabrega quit the École Freudienne de Paris in January 1969 to create the Quatrième groupe, Organisation psychanalytique de langue française (The Fourth Group, or Francophone Psychoanalytic Organization). (Piera Aulagnier, in 1967, founded, together with Jean Clavreul and Conrad Stein, the journal L’inconscient, of which only eight issues were published.) This group introduced new criteria of membership admission and methods of training: ‘‘the fourth analysis.’’ Lacan’s claim that ‘‘the unconscious is structured like a language’’ helped rally to the cause of psychoanalysis Marxists like Louis Althusser and several priests, including the Jesuit Louis Beirnaert. Subsequently, the French Communist Party and the Catholic clergy, both of which had been hostile to Lacan, softened their position. More significantly, Lacan won over to his cause the French intelligentsia, along with a number of foreign students, thereby mobilizing the forces for a media campaign unique in the field of psychoanalysis. The ground for Lacan’s success had already been prepared, as Serge Moscovici showed in his dissertation, ‘‘La psychanalyse: Son image et son public’’ INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (Psychoanalysis: its image and public), completed in 1961. In 1958 Jean-Paul Sartre worked on the screenplay for the first film about Freud. Freud: The Secret Passion, directed by John Huston, appeared in movie theaters in 1962. Between December 1962 and July 1963, Marthe Robert presented a series of radio broadcasts titled The Psychoanalytic Revolution: The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud. The literature on psychoanalysis began to grow. The Presses universitaires de France published Freud’s letters to Wilhelm Fliess and Ernest Jones’s biography of Freud in its series Bibliothèque de psychanalyse (Library of Psychoanalysis), edited by Daniel Lagache and later Jean Laplanche. In 1961 Gérard Mendel founded the series Science de l’homme (Science of Man) at Éditions Payot. This was followed, in 1964, by the series Le champ Freudien (The Freudian Field), edited by Jacques Lacan, then by Jacques-Alain Miller, at Éditions du Seuil, and in 1973 by L’espace analytique (The Analytic Space), edited by Maud Mannoni and Patrick Guyomard at Denoël. This last press published memoirs about Vienna and the early years of psychoanalysis in its series Freud et son temps (Freud and His Time), edited by Jacqueline Rousseau-Dujardin. Gallimard launched the series Connaissance de l’inconscient (Knowledge of the Unconscious), edited by Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, as well as the journal Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse, which appeared in the spring of 1970 (it ceased publication in the fall of 1994 with number 50). Laplanche and Pontalis were also the authors of the celebrated Language of psychoanalysis, first published in 1967. A number of academic journals were launched at this time: Cahiers pour l’analyse in 1966, Scilicet in 1968, Topique and Études freudiennes in 1969, Ornicar? in 1975, Confrontation in 1979, and L’écrit du temps in 1982. In 1965 Paul Ricoeur published De l’interprétation: Essai sur Freud, an example of what was most attractive about psychoanalysis to philosophers and academics. Jacques Lacan’s Écrits appeared at the end of 1966 as part of the series Le champ freudien, published by Éditions du Seuil. The book achieved considerable success with the public in spite of the difficulty of the author’s style and ideas. As the popularity and longevity of Lacan’s seminars show, the École Freudienne de Paris and Lacanian thought in general began to occupy an increasingly prominent place in French psychoanalytic circles. Lacan’s ideas soon spread around the world, especially in South America. 611 FRANCE The student movements of May 1968 were attracted to a Marxist version of Freud inspired by Herbert Marcuse and Wilhelm Reich. In October of that year the school reforms led to the creation of a department of psychoanalysis at the University of Paris VIII in Vincennes by Serge Leclaire and Jacques-Alain Miller, Lacan’s son-in-law, and a department of clinical social science at the University of Paris VII. In October 1968 Gérard Mendel, the founder of socio-psychoanalysis, published La révolte contre le père (A revolt against the father), an explanation of the student protests. At the opposite end of the spectrum, in 1969 there appeared L’univers contestationnaire (The universe of conflict) by Béla Grunberger and Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel, writing under the pseudonym André Stéphane. Opposition to psychoanalysis arose with the publication in 1969 in Les temps modernes of ‘‘L’homme au magnétophone’’ (The man with a tape recorder), with a commentary by Jean-Paul Sartre. Its publication led Jean-Bertrand Pontalis to resign from the journal’s editorial board. In 1972, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari published Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, and Pierre Debray-Ritzen published La scholastique freudienne, a caricature of past, present, and future criticisms of psychoanalysis in France. In the 1970s the French psychoanalytic movement split into mutually exclusive factions. In 1974 René Major and Dominique Geahchan created the group Confrontation, which claimed to be independent of the various psychoanalytic societies but over time grew closer to the Lacanians. They organized animated discussions led by Serge Leclaire (1977) and representatives of the French feminist movement, led by Antoinette Fouque (1979). Although theoretical and clinical advances continued to be made in the Société française de psychanalyse and the Association psychanalytique de France, as well as the Quatrième groupe, public and media attention focused on Jacques Lacan and his students. With age, Lacan’s health and productivity declined. Jacques-Alain Miller undertook the publication of an ‘‘official’’ transcript of Lacan’s seminars (often contested by Miller’s adversaries) and assumed a guiding role in managing the École Freudienne de Paris, which displeased Lacan’s older students. In the face of all this dissension, Lacan, by now quite ill, ordered his school dissolved on January 5, 1980. This led to a court trial and the division of his followers into mutually hostile groups. In his letter to the thousand, Lacan announced, on February 21, 1980, the foundation of 61 2 the Cause Freudienne. Shortly thereafter Jacques-Alain Miller founded the École de la cause Freudienne. In the years that followed the school developed an international reputation and became especially well established in South America. Jacques Lacan died on September 9, 1981. In November 1980 Dominique Geahchan helped create the Collège de psychanalystes (Council of Psychoanalysts), which, despite its name, was not a training organization. It ceased functioning in June 1994. Following the dissolution of the École Freudienne de Paris, several new groups came into existence: in 1982 the Cercle Freudien (Freudian Circle) and the Association Freudienne internationale (International Freudian Association); in 1983 the Cartels constituants de l’analyse Freudienne (Constituent Cartels for Freudian Analysis), the Convention psychanalytique (Psychoanalytic Convention), and the Mouvement du coût Freudien (Freudian Cost Movement) the École Lacanienne de psychanalyse (Lacanian School of Psychoanalysis); and in 1986 the Séminaires psychanalytiques de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Seminars). Also in 1982 the Centre de formation et de recherches psychanalytiques (Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research) formed around Octave and Maud Mannoni. Its dissolution in 1994 led to the creation, in 1995, of the Espace analytique (Analytic Space), of which Maud Mannoni was president until her death in 1998, and the Société de psychanalyse Freudienne (Freudian Society for Psychoanalysis), under the direction of Patrick Guyomard. Many of these associations were subject to internal dissension and disappeared (at least in their initial form) during the 1990s. In France and elsewhere in the world, a crisis followed as a result of the excessive enthusiasm—in particular, excessive psychiatry and excessive ideology— generated by an idealized image of psychoanalysis. This enthusiasm was clearly associated with the personality and fame of Jacques Lacan. Subsequently, psychiatrists began to focus on the neurosciences. On another front, renewed enthusiasm for philosophy and religion led to a decline in interest in Freudian theory in the universities. Within the field of psychoanalysis, interactions over the years among the various psychoanalytic groups, which the first meetings of Confrontation had in its time attempted to establish, began to overcome the violent splits of the past. The Société psychanalytique de Paris continued to assert its authority as the chief French psychoanalytic INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FRANCE institution, partly through the increased readership of the Revue française de psychanalyse at a time when a number of publications ceased publication, many because of poor sales. In fact, the association came to be viewed as akin to a public institution by 1997. Around this time André Green became internationally well known for his writings on the ‘‘dead mother,’’ ‘‘the narcissism of death,’’ and ‘‘the negative,’’ and Joyce McDougall became well known, especially in North America, for her work on the concept of normalcy and addiction. Although less well known, Conrad Stein, following the publication of his L’enfant imaginaire (The imaginary child; 1971) and the organization of a number of conferences through Études Freudiennes (Freudian Studies), continued his research on Freud and his criticism of the institutionalization of psychoanalysis. Some APF members too made important contributions to the field. Worthy of mention are Guy Rosolato’s work on the symbolic order and sacrifice, generalized seduction, and deferred action (a topic proposed by Jean Laplanche after a detailed reading of Freud); the theoretical work and fiction of JeanBertrand Pontalis; Daniel Widlöcher’s work on change; and Didier Anzieu’s research on Freud’s self-analysis, the ‘‘skin ego,’’ psychodrama, and group analysis, a field also investigated by René Kaës. Through the publication of La violence de l’interprétation: Du pictogramme à l’énoncé (The Violence of Interpretation: From Pictogram to Statement; 1975), Piera Aulagnier’s work provided original theoretical material for understanding and treating psychosis (Mijolla-Mellor, 1998). Although somewhat less synthetic, the work of Octave and Maud Mannoni broadened the scope of psychoanalytic research, especially in the area of child psychoanalysis, a field greatly influenced by the work of Serge Lebovici, René Diatkine, and Michel Soulé. Françoise Dolto had a considerable impact on psychoanalysis in France through her original and provocative ideas, some of which generated considerable controversy. Her radio presentations and the creation of the Maisons vertes, psychoanalytic facilities for children, brought her considerable public recognition in France, and her books have remained successful. A number of other authors—Béla Grunberger, Michel Fain, Jean Bergeret, Jean Guillaumin, Jean-Paul Valabrega, Serge Leclaire, François Perrier—made important contributions to specifically French psychoanalysis, which has been characterized by a tendency INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS toward clinically based theorizations and is generally less empirical than the work of Anglo-American authors. In particular, Lacanian psychoanalysts have emphasized the importance of language and are probably closer to postwar French philosophy than any other branch of psychoanalysis. They have been influenced by thinkers as diverse as Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida (who included psychoanalysis in the curriculum when he created the Collège de philosophie in 1983). Psychoanalysts in France remain unlicensed in spite of several attempts by the government to institute licensing. Although psychoanalysts have managed to obtain a number of rights as private practitioners through psychoanalytic associations, it is as accredited psychologists that they are authorized to practice psychotherapy and analysis. The attempt in December 1989 by Serge Lebovici, then head of the Association pour une instance, to create a professional body consolidating all psychoanalysts in France was rebuffed by associations that were members of the International Psychoanalytical Association. These organizations had no desire to merge with the numerous practitioners operating in the Lacanian tradition, because they felt that training requirements in this tradition were inadequate. There has been considerable interest in the history of psychoanalysis as well. In June 1985 the Association internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse (International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis) was created. In 1984 this association merged with the Société internationale d’histoire de la psychiatrie (International Society for the History of Psychiatry), created in 1982, to became the Société internationale d’histoire de la psychiatrie et de la psychanalyse. In 1991, encouraged by Joseph Sandler, the International Psychoanalytical Association formed an Archives and History Committee within its organization. French developments in psychoanalysis have also expanded and exerted influence outside the country. One sign of this is the election, in 1999, of Daniel Widlöcher as president of the International Psychoanalytical Association and of Alain Gibeault as secretary general, both of whom are French. Although no other French theoretician has achieved Jacques Lacan’s global recognition or, like Lacan, has created schools and institutions, the body of theoretical and clinical research in French is considerable. In spite of the often irreconcilable differences within the French psychoanalytic 613 FRANCO DA R O C H A , F R A N C I S C O (1864 –1 933) community, this work has continued to enrich the development of psychoanalysis throughout the world. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA Bibliography Mijolla, Alain de. (1982). La psychanalyse en France, 1893– 1965. In Roland Jaccard (Ed.), Histoire de la psychanalyse (Vol. 2, pp. 9–105). Paris: Hachette. ———. (1984). Quelques avatars de la psychanalyse en France. Évolution psychiatrique, 49 (3), 773–795. ———. (1985). Pulsion d’investigation, fantasmes d’identification et roman familial. Topique, 34, 33–59. ———. (1988a). Psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts in France between 1939 and 1945. International Forum of Psychoanalysis, 12, 136–156, 2003. ———. (1988b). Quelques aperçus sur le rôle de la princesse Marie Bonaparte dans la création de la Société psychanalytique de Paris. Revue française de psychanalyse, 52 (5): 1197–1214. ———. (1991). L’édition en français des œuvres de Freud avant 1940: Autour de quelques documents nouveaux. Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse, 4, 209– 270. ———. (1992). France, 1893–1965. In Peter Kutter (Ed.), Psychoanalysis international: a guide to psychoanalysis throughout the world, Vol. 1: Europe (pp. 66–113). Stuttgart, Germany: Frommann-Holzboog. ———. (1996). La scission de la Société psychanalytique de Paris en 1953: quelques notes pour un rappel historique. Cliniques méditerranéennes, 49/50, 9–30. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1998). Penser la psychose: Une lecture de l’œuvre de Piera Aulagnier. Paris: Dunod. Roudinesco, Élisabeth. (1990). Jacques Lacan & Co.: A history of psychoanalysis in France, 1925–1985 (Jeffrey Mehlman, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published in two vols., 1982, 1986.) monly considered to be the first Brazilian psychiatrist. Upon his return to São Paulo in 1893, Franco da Rocha was named hospital practitioner at the Hospicio dos Alienados (a mental hospital created by a state law in September 1848); prior to his arrival, only general practitioners had worked at the facility, and there was no specialization in the treatment of psychiatric patients. Franco da Rocha was thus a pioneering psychiatrist and the first specialist to work in a public institution in São Paulo. In 1896 he was named head physician and director of the Hospicio dos Alienados. That same year he succeeded in establishing an agricultural colony for nearly eighty patients in Sorocaba. This pioneering experiment in the field of work therapy was intended to serve as a pilot for a far more ambitious project: a welfare institution for the mentally ill near São Paulo. Franco da Rocha received government approval for this project and chose as the site a plantation near the railway center of Juquery, the name by which this large psychiatric hospital was first known. Completed in 1902 and since renamed after its founder, the hospital is, as of 2005, still in operation, and many generations of psychiatrists have been trained there. Franco da Rocha served as director of the institution until his retirement in 1923. Franco da Rocha began his teaching activities in the faculty of medicine of São Paulo in 1913. In 1918 he became that institution’s first professor of clinical neuropsychiatry. In his courses, he made the earliest presentations on psychoanalytic doctrine in Brazil. His inaugural lecture in 1919 dealt with Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. Transcribed and published in the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo on March 20, 1919, under the title ‘‘Do delı́rio em geral’’ (On delusions in general), it marked the beginning of the dissemination of Freudian thought in São Paulo. Francisco Franco da Rocha, Brazilian physician and psychiatrist, was born on August 1864 in Amparo, in the state of São Paulo, Brazil, and died there on April 8, 1933. In 1920 Da Rocha published O pansexualismo na doutrina de Freud (Pansexualism in the doctrine of Freud), a popular scientific work that was well received by the general public but that provoked a discreet negative reaction in medical circles. In 1930, on the advice of Durval Marcondes, he published a second edition of this book in which he eliminated the word pansexualism. Franco da Rocha received his medical degree from the national faculty of medicine of Rio de Janeiro in 1890; he was a student of Teixeira Brandao, com- According to Marcondes’s unpublished biography of Franco da Rocha, ‘‘In the presentations he made at this institution, he included a Freudian approach to FRANCO DA ROCHA, FRANCISCO (1864–1933) 61 4 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FREE ASSOCIATION mental illness, which at the time was something new for us. This was the beginning, in the scientific circles of São Paulo, of the move from an exclusively descriptive and organicist psychiatry toward a psychiatry that was also becoming descriptive and psychodynamic.’’ Although he was a specialist in Freudian doctrine, Franco da Rocha came into contact with it relatively late in his career and was thus unable to incorporate it into his clinical work. FABIO HERRMANN AND ROBERTO YUTAKA SAGAWA See also: Brazil. Bibliography Briquet, Raul. (1934). Franco da Rocha e a psicanálise: memórias do Hospital Franco da Rocha. São Paulo, Brazil. Franco da Rocha, Francisco. (1928). A psicologia de Freud. Revista brasileira de psicanálise, 1: 1. ———. (1930). A doutrina de Freud (2nd ed.). São Paulo, Brazil: Companhia Nacional. Perestrello, Marialzira. (1992a). A psicanálise no Brasil: encontros psicanálise. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Imago. ———. (1992b). Histoire de la psychanalyse au Brésil des origines à 1937. Frénésie, 2 (10), 283–304. Sagawa, Roberto Yutaka. (1996). A construção local da psicanálise. Marı́lia, Brazil: Interior-Psicanálise. During the Second World War, Frankl was arrested in September 1942 and spent nearly three years in several concentration camps, including a brief stay at Auschwitz, at Dachau (where he encountered Bruno Bettelheim), and at Thereisienstadt. Frankl’s parents, brother, and wife died in the camps. While a prisoner, Frankl drafted a manuscript that was later published as The Doctor and the Soul. After being liberated in 1945, he wrote Ein Psycholog erlebt das Konzentrationslager, which sold over a million copies when it was published in 1947. Translated in English as Man’s Search for Meaning, Frankl drew on his concentration camp experience to develop the theory of ‘‘logotherapy,’’ where logos signifies the will to discover meaning in one’s existence. After the war Frankly was appointed professor of psychiatry at the Vienna Neurological Policlinic. A psychotherapist, he lectured throughout the world and held numerous visiting professorships. In 1970 the first Institute of Logotherapy was founded at the United States International University at San Diego, California. Subsequently, a number of independent institutes were founded and as of 2005 operate in more than 25 countries, including the Viktor Frankl Institute in Vienna. Frankl wrote over thirty books, which have been translated into more than twenty-five languages. ‘‘The meaning of your life,’’ Frankl once explained, ‘‘is to help others find the meaning of theirs.’’ JACQUES SÉDAT FRANKL, VIKTOR EMIL (1905–1997) Viktor Emil Frankl, Austrian physician, psychoanalyst, philosopher, and professor of neurology and psychiatry at the University of Vienna Medical School, was born on March 26, 1905, in Vienna, where he died of heart disease on September 2, 1997. Frankl was a twelfth-generation descendant of Rabbi Judah Loew, the Maharal of Prague who created the Golem, Yossele, to save Jews from the blood libel. At sixteen, while still a student at the lycée, Viktor sent Freud a text concerning ‘‘the origin of the mimic movements of affirmation and negation’’ (Frankl, 1997, p. 48), which in 1924 was published in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis. But Frankl would turn away from psychoanalytic formulations in favor of the work of Igor Caruso, humanistic psychology, and existential analysis, of which he was a founder. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS See also: Austria; Caruso, Igor. Bibliography Frankl, Viktor. (1972). Man’s search for meaning: An introduction to logotherapy. Boston: Beacon Press. ———. (1997). Recollections: An autobiography. New York: Plenum Press. FREE ASSOCIATION Free association (considered the ‘‘fundamental rule’’) is the method used in psychoanalytic treatment. In free association the patient says whatever comes to mind without exercising any selectivity or censorship. It is based on Freud’s deterministic concept of psychic phenomena: ‘‘We start, as you see, on the assumption, which he does not share in the least, that these 615 FREE ASSOCIATION spontaneous thoughts will not be arbitrarily chosen but will be determined by their relation to his secret— to his Ôcomplex’—and may, as it were, be regarded as derivatives of that complex’’ (1906c, p. 108–109). The origin of this new method of therapy can be dated from Emmy von N’s irritation with Freud for interrupting her when she spoke. The method was not codified until later and would become the keystone of the technique of psychoanalytic treatment. There is no mention of this in the Studies on Hysteria. At that time a pressure on the forehead was intended to bring forth an idea or an image with the help of which the cathartic method could be exercised. The first mention of the fact that redirecting the patient’s attention can allow connections to emerge between a forgotten word and repressed ideas appears in the analysis of the forgetting of ‘‘Signorelli’s’’ name (1898b). But it is in the chapter on ‘‘The Method of Interpreting Dreams’’ (1900a) that the process is described in detail: ‘‘We . . . tell him that the success of the psycho-analysis depends on his noticing and reporting whatever comes into his head and not being misled, for instance, into suppressing an idea because it stikes him as unimportant or irrelevant or because it seems to him meaningless’’ (p. 101). The technique was used in the analysis of Dora and Freud specifies that he managed to ‘‘the pure metal of valuable unconscious thoughts can be extracted from the raw material of the patient’s associations’’ (1905e, p. 112). For example, ‘‘It is a rule of psycho-analytic technique that an internal connection which is still undisclosed will announce its presence by means of a contiguity—a temporal proximity of associations; just as in writing, if Ôa’ and Ôb’ are put side by side, it means that the syllable Ôab’ is to be formed out of them (p. 39) . . . in a line of association, ambiguous words . . . act like a point at a junction (p. 65n) . . . I am in the habit of regarding associations such as this, which bring forward something that agrees with the content of an assertion of mine, as a confirmation from the unconscious of what I have said (p. 57) . . . [the unwillingness on Dora’s part to follow the rules of dream-interpretation] coupled with the hesitancy and meagreness of her associations with the jewel-case, showed me that we were here dealing with material which had been very intensely repressed’’ (p. 69n). It is in ‘‘On Beginning the Treatment’’ (1913c) that Freud made these ideas explicit: ‘‘One more thing before you start. What you tell me must differ in one 61 6 respect from an ordinary conversation. Ordinarily you rightly try to keep a connecting thread running through your remarks and you exclude any intrusive ideas that may occur to you and any side-issues, so as not to wander too far from the point. But in this case you must proceed differently. You will notice that as you relate things various thoughts will occur to you which you would like to put aside on the ground of certain criticisms and objections. You will be tempted to say to yourself that this or that is irrelevant here, or is quite up important, or nonsensical, so that there is no need to say it. You must never give in to these criticisms, but must say it in spite of them—indeed, you must say it precisely because you feel an aversion to doing so. Later on you will find out and learn to understand the reason for this injunction, which is really the only one you have to follow. So say whatever goes through your mind. Act as though, for instance, you were a traveler sitting next to the window of a railway carriage and describing to someone inside the carriage the changing views which you see outside. Finally, never forget that you have promised to be absolutely honest, and never leave anything out because, for some reason or other, it is unpleasant to tell it’’ (p. 135). This method of free association was often confused with the association experiments involving stimulus words that Eugen Bleuler and Carl Gustav Jung were doing at the same time at the Burghölzli clinic. Even though he referred to the method in ‘‘Psycho-Analysis and Establishment of Facts in Legal Proceedings’’ (1906c), Freud was careful to differentiate his own work from it and, on February 26, 1908, referred to this technique as a ‘‘coarse method, to which psychoanalysis is far superior’’ (Nunberg and Federn, 1962– 1975, p. 335). But for years commentators, especially in France, have attributed its use to him. In 1920, in ‘‘A Note on the Prehistory of the Technique of Analysis,’’ Freud recognized the ‘‘cryptamnesia’’ that led to his claiming to be the inventor of a method, a description of which he had read when he was fourteen in a text by Ludwig Börne, entitled, ‘‘The Art of Becoming an Original Writer in Three Days.’’ In it he stated that the best way for the writer to banish inhibitions and censorship was to write down everything that came to mind for a period of three days. Once again we see how an isolated idea that circulates in the popular mind is inadequate on its own and what developments are needed for it to be integrated INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F R E E E N E R G Y /B O U N D E N E R G Y within a body of thought that transcends it. The method of free association, by freeing speech in its search for a hidden truth, has become the principal method of producing the material for analysis, even if, through overproduction, the freedom it offers sometimes becomes a form of resistance to any form of interpretation. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Active imagination (analytical psychology); Complex; Evenly-suspended attention; Framework of the psychoanalytic cure; Hermeneutics; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Sudden involuntary idea; Word association (analytic psychology). Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1906c). Psycho-analysis and the establishment of facts in legal proceedings. SE, 9: 103–114. Nunberg Hermann, and Federn, Ernst. (1962–1975). Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. New York: International Universities Press FREE ENERGY/BOUND ENERGY Freud regarded energy as a capacity with two modes of functioning: that of free energy, in which energy proceeds towards an immediate and total discharge, and that of bound energy, in which it is blocked and accumulates. Freud used the concept of energy in his theory in an attempt to explain a point of transition between the ‘‘quantity’’ of energy and the ‘‘quality’’ of the representation. To this end, he addressed the question of energy in the ‘‘Project’’ (1950a; Laplanche and Pontalis, 1967/ 1974; Laplanche, 1976) in a far more radical way than Josef Breuer had done. There he described ‘‘primary process’’ as an energic state of disorganization that the ego on its emergence seeks to regulate during the ‘‘secondary process’’ by managing the energy according to the constancy principle. As concerns energy, however, the distinction clearly does not always work perfectly for Freud because in this text he only used this term twice and without the qualification ‘‘bound’’ or ‘‘free.’’ Although Freud’s idea of energy used the inevitably sexual encounter between the child and the adult as a metaphor here, unfortunately he combined this with INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS a genetic perspective in which primary-process disorganization precedes the organization that characterizes the secondary process. Accordingly, this hierarchical Jacksonian perspective prevented him from the outset from fully conceiving of the primary process as the result of the absorption of adult sexuality into the child’s psychic apparatus. It should also be noted that with its excessively cutand-dried oppositions, the dynamics posited by Freud are no more satisfactory in relation to the matter of life. In Freud’s concept of the child, he has no chance of survival, whether this is in terms of an excessively organized or an excessively withdrawn system. The latter perspective very clearly leads to the theory of narcissism, while the former leads to the conceptualization of the death drive. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Freud reattributed the role of binding to the preconscious. It is also here that the expression ‘‘cathecting energy’’ appears, described as ‘‘mobile and capable of discharge’’ (p. 597), which conflicts with the theories of the ‘‘Project,’’ in which cathexis had been conceived as a way of producing bound states. In fact, this concerns an energy in search of representations and, furthermore, an ‘‘object.’’ The cathexis of energy is next conceived (1915d) as an approach to the unconscious and its decrease (decathexis) is attributed to repression. In ‘‘The Unconscious’’ (1915e), Freud stated that Breuer had distinguished between ‘‘two different states of energy in mental life; one in which energy is tonically Ôbound’ and the other in which it is freely mobile’’ (p. 188). In fact, Breuer (1895d) had superimposed on psychic states two types of energy that accorded with the knowledge of the time but which Freud had gone on to use in a much more imaginative way. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), still unaware of a further distortion, Freud also attributed the idea to Breuer by maintaining that he had established the distinction between ‘‘two kinds of cathexis of the psychical systems or their elements—a freely flowing cathexis that presses on towards discharge and a quiescent cathexis’’ (p. 31). Freud thus established the foundation for his theory of a death drive that unbinds and an Eros that binds. This could be considered as a diluted view of sexuality, simultaneously binding and unbinding, which he had encountered from his first analyses. The main impetus for this development may be the 617 FREE-FLOATING ATTENTION theory of narcissism in which Freud had exalted the theme of happiness found in love of the external object, a theme that had already appeared in embryonic form in the ‘‘Project,’’ with its Jacksonian perspective of a possible transition from unbinding to binding. FREUD, ALEXANDER GOTTHOLD EFRAIM. See In conclusion, Freud did not succeed in resolving the question of free energy or framing it in dialectic terms because it simultaneously applied to both conscious (1933a [1932]) and unconscious functioning. The theoretical problem arises, in terms of the conscious, from the perception that leaves no trace and, in terms of the unconscious, from the primary process. If free energy cannot be specific, the solution would be to remove the distinction between free and bound energy because this adventitious hypothesis, since Breuer’s proposition, has confused energy and state. In fact, a system that possesses what can be (wrongly) described as a disordered state can operate with the same energy as an ordered system. Psychoanalyst and pioneer in child analysis, Anna Freud was born on December 3, 1895, in Vienna, and died on October 9, 1982, in London. BERTRAND VICHYN See also: Psychic energy. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5: 1–625. Freud, Sigmund (siblings) FREUD, ANNA (1895–1982) Anna Freud was Sigmund and Martha Freud’s third daughter and sixth and last child. When she was a year old, Martha’s sister Minna joined the family. The two women had carefully defined roles, but a warm and affectionate Catholic nursemaid, Josefine Cihlarz, to whom Anna felt very close, took a very active part in the upbringing of the three youngest children. The children were treated leniently but firmly: disciplined behavior and punctuality were emphasized and expected. Anna Freud displayed these traits throughout her life. Her love of animals may, in part, have reflected Josefine’s influence. She started elementary school at six, and at ten entered the Salka Goldman Cottage Lyceum for girls. She read widely and wrote poetry. Her remarkable memory was a major asset at school and throughout her life; later, as a psychoanalyst, she never forgot the details of any case reported to her, and could make telling use of them in clinical discussion. ———. (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141–158. ———. (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159–204. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1933a). New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 22: 1–182. ———. (1950a). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173– 280. Freud Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. Laplanche, Jean. (1976). Life and death in psychoanalysis (Jeffrey Mehlman, Trans.). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Laplanche, Jean, and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1974). The Language of Psycho-Analysis (Donald Nicholson-Smith, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1967) FREE-FLOATING ATTENTION. See Evenlysuspended attention 61 8 She was on holiday in England when war broke out in 1914. Now an enemy alien, she managed to return to Austria with the Ambassador and his entourage, traveling by an adventurous route. She trained as an elementary school teacher at the Lyceum, and her industry and rare intelligence ensured her appointment to the teaching staff. She was always a wonderful teacher, but her interest in psychoanalysis was evident in early adolescence. She became Librarian of the Viennese Psychoanalytic Association, and was analyzed by her father—unthinkable perhaps nowadays, but not such a rare event at this time. She read her first paper (on beating fantasies) to the Association in 1922, and was thereby granted membership. Her teaching experience served her well as a pioneer in child analysis. Melanie Klein was already analyzing children in Berlin; but the two leaders in the field used children’s play differently in their techniINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F R E U D , A N N A (1895 –1 982) ques. Anna Freud disputed Klein’s belief that play was the child’s equivalent of free association in adults, but this was only one of many later differences. Klein went to England in 1927 and became a powerful influence in the British Society. Disparities of view between the Viennese and British Societies became pronounced, initially on the basis of child analytic practice. Anna Freud’s new ideas, charm, and lifelong capacity for winning collaborators quickly secured her a large following. Her seminars in Vienna attracted colleagues from Prague and Budapest. A wide range of disorders were treated and discussed, but Anna Freud’s attention to normal development matched her interest in pathology. She believed it was impossible to understand the one without the other. She applied her growing knowledge to the field of education and gave lectures to teachers and parents. With her friend and colleague Dorothy Burlingham, she set up what she called ‘‘a cross between a crèche and a nursery school,’’ financed by the wealthy psychoanalyst Edith Jackson, for the poorest children in Vienna who were given both bodily and psychological care. These experiences fuelled Anna Freud’s interest in the psychological consequences and concomitants of physical illness and laid a foundation for her interest in pediatric practice. Her work with adults fostered her need to know more about psychiatry and she attended, on a regular basis, ward-rounds at the University’s Psychiatric Clinic, headed by Wagner-Jauregg, the Nobel Prize winner, and staffed by Paul Schilder and Heinz Hartmann. She retained this interest for the rest of her life. Earlier publications were followed by her first book in 1936, appearing one year later in English as The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence. This major work was the first to distinguish between recognized defenses against instinctual drive derivatives and defenses against painful affects, newly observed and described by her. The Nazis annexed Austria in 1938, and Princess Marie Bonaparte and Ernest Jones together secured safe transfer to London for the Freud family and a number of associates. Freud, Anna, and other psychoanalysts were admitted to the British PsychoAnalytical Society. Though well received, clinical and theoretical differences between the two groups were INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS pronounced and culminated in a series of controversial discussions between 1941 and 1945. The disagreements were beyond resolution, and two parallel training courses were set up in recognition of this fact. Freud died in 1939 from the cancer of the jaw that had plagued him for fourteen years, and Anna Freud was his devoted nurse. She continued to support the principles behind his psychoanalytic thinking, but she had a highly original mind and never followed him slavishly. After the outbreak of war, the predicament of children made homeless through bombing led her to establish, with Dorothy Burlingham, the Hampstead War Nurseries. Careful observations and meticulous records, made with the help of staff who rarely left the premises, vastly increased existing knowledge of child development and problems of residential care. The findings are collected by Anna and Dorothy in Young Children In Wartime (1942) and Infants Without Families (1944). In 1947 Anna Freud founded a course in child analysis, and in 1952 established the Hampstead Child Therapy Clinic. With these unequalled facilities clinical research expanded substantially. In this Anna Freud’s charm and authority served her unsurpassed capacity to draw staff and students into the work and make substantial contributions. She herself continued to publish major papers, but her most important book was Normality and Pathology of Childhood (1965). Her writing continued apace, with major contributions to psychoanalytic diagnosis and to clinical and theoretical understanding of a wide range of developmental problems and disturbances. Her work in the fields of education, pediatrics, and family law (Beyond the Best Interests of the Child), in which she collaborated with Professors Albert J. Solnit and Joseph Goldstein from Yale University, won her wide recognition within those disciplines. She received many honors and was appointed Commander of the British Empire (CBE) in 1967. Of her many honorary degrees, she was especially proud of the MD from the University of Vienna (1975) and the PhD from the Goethe Institute in Frankfurt (1981) where, half a century earlier, her father had been awarded the Goethe prize for literature. By this time Anna Freud was seriously ill with an advanced anemia of old age, but her mind remained clear and active throughout the slow physical deterioration that led to her death. Her ashes were 619 F R E U D - B E R N A Y S , M A R T H A (1861 – 1951) placed next to her father’s at Golders Green crematorium in London. CLIFFORD YORKE Work discussed: Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, The. See also: Abandonment; Adaptation; Adolescent crisis; Altruism; Andreas-Salomé, Louise (Lou); Austria; Berggasse 19, Wien IX; British Psycho-Analytical Society; Burlingham-Rosenfeld/Hietzing Schule; BurlinghamTiffany, Dorothy; Childhood; Children’s play; Child psychoanalysis; Controversial Discussions; Defense; Ego (ego psychology); Externalization-internalization; First World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis; Freud-Bernays, Martha; Freud Museum; Freud, the Secret Passion; Lay analysis; Gesammelte Schriften; Gesammelte Werke; Gestapo; Goethe (prize); Great Britain; Hampstead Clinic; Hogarth Press; Identification with the aggressor; Imago. Zeitschrift für die Anwendung der Psychoanalyse auf die Geisteswissenschaften; Infantile neurosis; Lehrinstitut der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung; Masochism; Negative transference; Neutrality/ benevolent neutrality; Phobias in children; Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, The; Second World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis; Sigmund Freud Archives; Sigmund Freud Copyrights Limited; Sigmund Freud Museum; Splits in psychoanalysis; Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud; Telepathy; Transference in children; Unconscious fantasy; Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung. Bibliography Freud, Anna. (1936). Collected writings. New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1968). Acting out. International Journal of PsychoAnalysis, 49. ———. (1977). Fears, anxieties, and phobic phenomena. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 32, 85–90. ———. (1979). Personal memories of Ernest Jones. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 60, 285-287. ———. (1980). Introduction. In Sigmund Freud: The analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. ———. (1981). Insight. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 36, 241–250. Goldstein, Joseph; Freud, Anna; and Solnit, Albert J. (1973). Beyond the best interests of the child. New York: The Free Press. 62 0 FREUD-BERNAYS, MARTHA (1861–1951) Martha Bernays was born on July 26, 1861, the second daughter of Berman Bernays (1826–1879), a merchant, and his wife Emmeline (née Philipp, 1930– 1910). Isaac Bernays, Martha’s paternal grandfather, was Chief Rabbi of Hamburg, and Berman continued the religious tradition. Emmeline Bernays was intelligent, resolute, well-educated, and shared Berman’s Jewish orthodoxy. Martha obeyed her with true devotion. Berman moved to Vienna in 1869 as secretary to a well-known economist. Emmeline loved Hamburg and disliked the move. On December 9, 1879, Berman died suddenly of a heart attack. Martha became an intelligent young woman without intellectual pretensions, svelte, attractively pale, and gracious, and she had a warm personality that brought many male admirers. Freud met Martha in April 1882; though previously uninvolved with women, he quickly fell in love. His great passion (it was nothing less) was more slowly returned by Martha, but with unwavering steadfastness, and they were soon engaged. The betrothal was secret at first, since Freud was without the means to support a wife. The engagement is well documented by Ernest Jones (1953), who was privileged to read, in their entirety, the love letters that almost daily passed between them. Jones declared that the vast set of letters ‘‘would be a not unworthy contribution to the great love literature of the world.’’ During the engagement (1882–1886) Freud was at times despairing, both because of his poverty and his agonizing attacks of jealousy, not only of men Martha knew, but even of her mother and brother. Martha, by contrast, was unchangingly certain of Freud’s love. Freud’s eldest sister Anna became engaged to Martha’s brother, Eli, at Christmas 1882, and Freud and Martha then declared their own commitment. The hardest tribulation came in June, when Emmeline returned to her former home at Wandsbek, near Hamburg, and Martha, protesting, went with her. Freud had been obliged to give up research work, and was struggling to establish a private practice. Finally, their civil wedding, on September 13, 1886 at Wandsbek, was not recognised in Austria, where a Jewish marriage was obligatory, much to Freud’s distaste. In spite of her upbringing, Martha joined Freud in his religious antipathy, and Jewish practices formed no part of their life together. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F R E U D , E R N S T (1892 –1 970) The honeymoon was largely spent in Holstein on the Baltic, and the bride, just 25, and the husband, 30, settled in Vienna at 8 Maria Theresienstrasse. Their first child, Mathilde, arrived on October 16, 1887. The marriage was remarkably happy, with no return of Freud’s early, intermittent doubts of Martha’s love. Martha was an excellent wife and mother; both were devoted parents. Two sons were born: Jean Martin (after Charcot) on December 6, 1889, and Oliver (after Cromwell) on February 19, 1891. More space was needed, and it was at 19 Bergasse that the three remaining children were born: Ernst (after Brücke) on April 6, 1892; Sophie on April 12, 1893; and Anna (after Freud’s sister) on December 3, 1895. Josefine Cihlarz, a Catholic Kinderfrau, then looked after Anna, Sophie and Ernst. About a year later, Martha’s sister Minna, whose fiancé had died, joined the family. Minna differed from Martha in both looks and temperament: large as opposed to petite; a little imperious as opposed to retiring; outspoken as opposed to discrete. But they got on well enough, and ran the home with clear boundaries between responsibilities. Freud found Minna an intellectual companion who, unlike Martha, took an interest in his developing psychological theories. Martha made it her duty to facilitate Freud’s professional work with a supportive daily routine, and their mutual devotion was unshakeable. Martha read widely and discussed with her husband the major works she read. They quoted poetry together—by Goethe, Heine, Uhland and others. Martha, whose letters were sometimes in verse, kept up with current literature to the end of her life. She entertained well; and distinguished visitors included Thomas Mann, one of her favorite authors. There were misfortunes in the family. Martha was severely ill in 1919, and in the following year Sophie’s death from a similar illness was a bitter blow. Many years later the savage disruption of the Anschluss, on March 11, 1938, signalled the end of life in Vienna. Through the good offices of Marie Bonaparte and Ernest Jones the family able to move to London, and accorded diplomatic privileges. Eventually, Martha, Sigmund Freud, and Anna settled for good at 20 Maresfield Gardens. Dorothy Burlingham was unable to join for some time; Paula Fichtl, the maidservant, was first interned in the Isle of Man; and Minna was soon admitted to a nursing home. Martha was efficient in the home even without Paula’s help. She did the shopping daily, became well INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS known to the local shopkeepers, and remained a hostess of considerable charm to the many visitors. Although Martha was deeply worried about Freud’s health, it was Anna who nursed him, making his care a duty above all others. By March 1939 he began to deteriorate, and died on the 23 September, 1939. In a response to Margarethe Nunberg’s condolences, Martha said they would have to live without his goodness and wisdom (Young-Bruehl, 1988). In spite of all her children’s love, and support from all over the world, her life, she said, had lost its sense and meaning. Minna died in 1941, and Martha’s sense of loneliness intensified. At the end of the war came the horrific news of the deaths of members of the Freud family in concentration camps, of which, hitherto, there had been no intimation. Bereaved relatives were accommodated and comforted at Maresfield Gardens. In due course Martha became chronicler of the lives of herself and her husband, and as such, a unique resource for biographers, though family letters remained private. She wrote to friends worldwide, and composed short poems for family occasions. She stayed in charge of home and garden but, increasingly frail as she approached ninety, needed home nursing. She died on November 2, 1951. CLIFFORD YORKE See also: Berggasse 19, Wien IX; Bernays, Minna; Freud, Anna; Freud, Ernst; Freud, Oliver; Judaism and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Jones, Ernest. (1957). Sigmund Freud. Life and work. London: Hogarth. Young-Bruehl, Elizabeth. (1988). Anna Freud: A biography. New York: Summit Books. FREUD, EMMANUEL See Freud, Sigmund (siblings) FREUD, ERNST (1892–1970) Ernst Freud was born on April 6, 1892, in Vienna and died April 7, 1970, in London. The fourth of six children of Sigmund and Martha Freud, he was named in honor of Ernst Brücke. As a child there were references 621 F R E U D , E R N S T (1892 –1 970) to him in his father’s correspondence, where Sigmund Freud discussed the child’s angina and various fevers. On June 12, 1900, Freud wrote, ‘‘Ernst had a fever again for four days. He has unflagging energy, even with a 38.5 [
C] fever he continues to cry out: I won’t be able to get well, I want to get up; it was only at 39.5 [
C] that this cantankerous fellow took note and became amiable.’’ He seems not to have been overly influenced by his father’s fame and chose his profession without interference. On June 15, 1909, Freud wrote to Oskar Pfister, ‘‘Ernst, who was your favorite and has almost become ours, is taking his final examination, although he is suffering from an ulcer of the small intestine and is not doing well at all. He wants to become an architect. I don’t know if I’m supposed to agree with this.’’ In fact he did become an architect, though he was often referred to as the ‘‘fortunate child’’ or, as Freud wrote to his friend Max Eitingon in London in 1938, ‘‘a tower of strength.’’ A militant Zionist, he participated in the Zionist Congress held in September 1913 in Vienna. Along with his brother Martin, he joined the army in 1914; he left for Galicia in August 1915 but returned a year later on leave to see his family, ‘‘as sprightly as ever.’’ He was demobilized without problem but suffered for years from the results of pneumonia contracted during the war. After the war he completed his studies at the Munich Technische Universität and, in December 1919, settled in Berlin, where he became engaged to Lucy Brasch, marrying her shortly afterward (‘‘Lux,’’ 1896–1989). ‘‘To all appearances a good and beautiful creature,’’ Freud wrote to Lou Andreas-Salomé. That same year Karl Abraham had, on March 13, told his father that Ernst ‘‘had attained lasting merit in setting up the clinic [and would be] universally admired.’’ Ernst and Lucy’s first child, Stefan (Stephen) Gabriel, was born July 31, 1921, ‘‘He is my fourth grandson, but I regret the absence of a grand-daughter,’’ Freud wrote to Ernest Jones, who wrote back, ‘‘I was delighted to learn that Ernst has a son: a new acquisition for Zionism.’’ Lucy, who was not Jewish, ‘‘had been so sure of having three sons that she decided from the beginning to give each of them the name of an archangel in addition to a more earthly first name.’’ (Jones, 1959, III) There followed Lucian Michael on December 8, 1922, who became a well-known painter, a friend of Francis Bacon, and of Klemens (Clement) 62 2 Raphael, who was known in Great Britain as a television host, a specialist in gastronomy, and a deputy in the Liberal Party. Freud met these friends for the first time in Berlin during Christmas 1925, and it was in Berlin, while staying with his son, that he was visited by Albert Einstein and his wife. The ‘‘architect,’’ as Ernst was known, helped renovate the Tegel clinic between 1927 and 1928. It was also in 1928 that he worked on the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute. On October 22, 1930, Freud wrote to Lou Andreas-Salomé, ‘‘Today, I gave my son Ernst the order to send you a thousand marks from the Goethe prize money he is holding for me.’’ In 1933 the rise of Nazism forced Ernst to emigrate, in spite of the fact that ‘‘he was sheltered because of his wife,’’ as Freud wrote to Jones. Moreover, it was because of his wife that he chose Great Britain, where he arrived during the summer. On June 3, 1933, Jones told Sigmund, ‘‘We were able to provide Ernst with good introductions and he has certainly lived up to his reputation as being a Glücksind (lucky person). You have nothing to worry about as far as he is concerned. We will be delighted to have him in England, even though I have wondered if, with his bubbly personality, he wouldn’t be better off in France.’’ His integration in British society was not without difficulties, in spite of the help of Jones, who commissioned him to build a wing for his cottage in 1935– 1936. On October 14, 1937, Arnold Zweig wrote to Freud, ‘‘I need to get in touch with you and let you know that I was pleased with my visit to your Ernst in London. He is tranquil, serene, and full of juvenile enthusiasm, and his home is delightful in its nobility and simple modernity.’’ Ernst traveled to Paris to meet his parents when they arrived in June 1938 and was also close by when they settled in London. Together with his sister Anna, he found the house in Maresfield Gardens, where he had an elevator installed, which Freud needed to reach his bedroom. At the time of his father’s death, he was, with Martin and Anna, appointed an executor of the will. He ran the corporation that was formed to manage the rights for Freud’s work and, with Lucy’s assistance, worked on all the major Freud publications that were to help popularize his work and psychoanalysis in general after the 1950s: his correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess (1950a), his general correspondence (1960a), INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FREUD, JAKOB KOLLOMAN (OR KELEMEN and so on. Shortly before his death, in late 1969, he had the pleasure to be given by Franz Jung, also an architect, the letters that had been kept by his father ‘‘in a document box covered with linen cloth, on which had been written in large capital letters, ÔFREUD LETTERS.’’’ Ernst Freud died on April 7, 1970. After his death, Ilse Grubrich-Simitis was asked to complete the pictorial biography he had planned to publish and on which he had worked with Lucy. The work finally appeared in 1976 as Sigmund Freud: His Life in Pictures and Words. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Berggasse 19, Wien IX; Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut; Freud-Bernays, Martha; Sigmund Freud Copyrights Limited. Bibliography Berthelsen, Detlef. (1989). Alltag bei Familie Freud. Die Erinnerungen der Paula Fichtl. Hamburg: Hoffman & Campe. Gay, Peter. (1988). Freud: A life for our time. LondonMelbourne: Dent. Jones, Ernest. (1959). Free associations. Memories of a psycho-analyst. London, New York: Basic Books. Roazen, Paul. (1993). Meeting Freud’s family. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. FREUD, ESTHER ADOLFINE (DOLFI). See Freud, Sigmund (siblings) FREUD, JAKOB KOLLOMAN (OR KELEMEN OR KALLAMON) (1815–1896) Jakob Freud, the father of Sigmund Freud, was born on April 1, 1815, (a date arbitrarily chosen by Jakob Freud) in Tysmenitz (Galicia) and died in Vienna on October 23, 1896. Of his father’s family Freud wrote, ‘‘I believe they lived a long time in Rhenish territory (Cologne), that during the persecution of Jews in the fourteenth or fifteenth century they fled east, and in the nineteenth century returned from Lithuania, through Galicia, to a German-speaking country, Austria’’ (1925d). In the ‘‘Gedenkenblatt,’’ where he entered the birth date of May 6, 1856, and circumcision on May 13 of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OR K A L L A M O N ) ( 1815 –1 896) the following year of ‘‘my son Schlomo Sigmund,’’ Jakob Freud refers to his grandfather ‘‘Rabbi Ephraim’’ and his father ‘‘Rabbi Schlomo,’’ who died in Tysmenitz on February 21, two months prior to the birth of Freud, who was given the same first name. The sources of Freud’s unconscious identifications (Mijolla, 1975/ 1981 [1975]) have been traced to the references to honorifics appearing in this genealogy. The son of Schlomo Freud and Peppi (Pesel) Hofmann, Jakob had, out of admiration for Bismarck, chosen the date of April 1 as his birth date, although in reality the date is assumed to be December 18, 1815. Born in Tysmenitz, Galicia, he was the eldest of four children. His younger brother Josef (1825–1897), arrested in 1865 and condemned in February 1866 to ten years in prison for trafficking in counterfeit rubles (Gicklhorn, 1976), was the ‘‘criminal’’ uncle (Verbrecher) who appeared in the Interpretation of Dreams and caused so much grief for his older brother. Freud wrote to his fiancée about another ‘‘uncle from Breslau,’’ Abae. ‘‘He is a younger brother of my father, a rather ordinary man, a merchant, and the story of his family is very sad. Of the four children only one daughter is normal, and married in Poland. One boy is hydrocephalic and feeble minded; another, who as a young man showed some promise, went insane at the age of nineteen, and a daughter went the same way when she was twenty-odd. I had so completely forgotten this uncle that I have always thought of my own family as free of any hereditary taint. But since I have been thinking about Breslau it all came back to me, and I am afraid the fact that one of the sons of the other (very unhappy) uncle in Vienna died an epileptic is something I cannot shift to the mother’s side, with the result that I have to acknowledge to a considerable Ôneuropathological taint,’ as it is called’’ (letter of February 10, 1886). Jakob married young, in 1832. His wife was Sally Kanner and together they had four children, two of whom survived. The elder, Emanuel, was born in 1833 (or 1832), followed by Philipp, born in 1836 (or 1834). A fabric salesman, there are references to a trip Jakob is supposed to have made with his father Schlomo and maternal grandfather Siskind Hoffmann to Freiberg in 1838–1839, then of extended stays in 1844–1845 as ‘‘tolerated Jews.’’ He spent several months there before joining his family in Tysmenitz, then received the authorization to settle in Klogsdorf, near Freiberg, in 1848. In the ‘‘register of Jews,’’ there is a record from 623 FREUD, JAKOB KOLLOMAN (OR KELEMEN OR K A L L A M O N ) (1 815 –18 96) October 31, 1852, that at their home are: Jakob Freud, thirty-eight, with his wife Rebeka, thirty-two, and the children, Emanuel, twenty-one, with his wife, eighteen years, and Filip, sixteen’’ (Sajner, 1968; Gicklhorn, 1976). Mention of this ‘‘Rebeka,’’ rather than ‘‘Sally’’ has led to much wild speculation, but it is possible that because of an administrative error or for reasons of concealment, the entry refers to the wife of his brother Joseph, Rebecca Freud-Rawnial. Whoever this ‘‘Rebeka’’ may have been, Jakob was no longer married when he met Amalia Nathanson, twenty-one years his junior. They were married according to the Jewish rites in Vienna, on July 29, 1855, before settling in Freiberg in the house at Schlossergasse 117, owned by the locksmith Zajic. In 1857 his wife was referred to as ‘‘the wife of the wool draper’’ (Wollhändlersgattin). There followed six births in ten years: Sigmund, on May 6, 1856; Julius, in October 1857, who died the following April; Anna, on December 31, 1858; Regine Debora (Rosa), on March 21, 1860; Maria (Mitzi), on March 22, 1861; Esther Adolfine (Dolfi), on July 23, 1862; Pauline Regine (Paula), on May 3, 1864; and Alexander Gotthold Efraim, on April 15 (or 19), 1866. Over this period Jakob’s situation changed. Poor business decisions forced him to emigrate to Leipzig, and then to Vienna, where he settled permanently. His sons left for Manchester, England, where they became prosperous businessmen; his wife and their two first children joined him in August 1859. Establishing a permanent residence in Vienna turned out to be extremely difficult, and bad memories of this period stayed with Sigmund Freud throughout his life. From this point on nothing is known of Jakob’s activities or the source of his income, which, although modest, allowed him to raise his large family and enabled Sigmund—the talented son he so admired—to attend school without having to earn a living to help the family. This mystery became the source of several malicious assumptions when the counterfeiting operations of Uncle Josef were revealed. The investigation led all the way to Manchester, although no evidence was found incriminating Jakob or his two émigré sons. A tall man, who according to his son resembled Garibaldi, Jakob was a calm and respected patriarch. An observant Jew close to the Haskala movement, he appears to have been more traditional than Freud claimed. Although it is not known if Sigmund himself 62 4 was bar-mitzvahed, he learned to read with the Philippson Bible, which was presented to him on his thirty-fifth birthday with a dedication in Hebrew: ‘‘My dear son Schlomo (Salomo), in the seventh . . . [illegible] of your life, the spirit of the Lord began to move you [cf. Judges, 13:25], and said to you: Go, read in My book that I have written, and there will be opened to you the sources of wisdom, or knowledge and understanding . . .. For a long time the book has been hidden [kept safe] like the fragments of the Table of the Law in the shrine of his servant, [yet] for the day on which you have completed your thirty-fifth year I have had it covered with a new leather binding and given it the name ÔSpring up, O Well! Sing ye unto it’ [cf. Numbers 21:17), and offer it to you for a remembrance and a memorial of love—From your father, who loves you with unending love—Jacob son of Rabbi [probably ‘‘Reb,’’ meaning Mr., M.K.] Sch. Freud. In the capital city of Vienna, 29 Nissan 5651, May 6, 1891’’ (Krull, 1979, p. 160). Martin Freud, his grandson, recalls his amiable nature, and his granddaughter, Judith Bernays-Heller, recalls, ‘‘[He] divided his time between reading the Talmud (in the original) at home, sitting in a coffee house, and walking in the parks. . . . Tall and broad, with a long beard, he was very kind and gentle, and humorous in the bargain—much more so than my grandmother. . . . It was not a pious household, but I do remember one Seder at which I, as the youngest at the table, had to make the responses to the reading of the song about the sacrifice of the kid. I was greatly impressed by the way my grandfather recited the ritual and the fact that he knew it by heart amazed me.’’ (1973, p. 336). For Sigmund, the son, things were less simple. There are references in The Interpretation of Dreams to his reprimands, his irritated comment, ‘‘Nothing will ever come of this boy,’’ the reproaches for his expenditures on books. On several occasions he attributes his father’s compulsion for earning money to his poor financial management. For example, on December 18, 1916, he wrote to Karl Abraham, ‘‘I have little to do, so that at Christmas, for instance. I am again faced with a blank. Leisure is not good for me, because my mental constitution urgently requires me to earn and spend money on my family as the fulfillment of my wellknown father complex’’ (1965a). He also remembered being terribly disillusioned by the sight of his father, without saying a word, picking INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F R E U D , ( J E A N ) M A R T I N (1889 –1 967) up a hat thrown into the mud by an anti-Semite. But during the republication of the book in 1908, Freud recognized, ‘‘I understood that it was part of my selfanalysis, my reaction to the death of my father, the most important event, the most terrible loss in a man’s life.’’ In fact, after his father’s illness, which began in June 1896, and his death on October 23, Freud wrote to Wilhelm Fliess, ‘‘He bore himself bravely to the end, just like the altogether unusual man he had been’’ (letter dated October 26, 1896), and ‘‘By one of those dark pathways behind the official consciousness the old man’s death has affected me deeply. I valued him highly, understood him very well, and with his peculiar mixture of deep wisdom and fantastic lightheartedness he had a significant effect on my life. By the time he died, his life had long been over, but in [my] inner self the whole past has been reawakened by this event. I now feel quite uprooted’’ (letter to Wilhelm Fliess, November 2, 1896). However, on February 8, 1897, he remarked, ‘‘Unfortunately, my own father was one of these perverts and is responsible for the hysteria of my brother (all of whose symptoms are identifications) and those of several younger sisters. The frequency of this circumstance often makes me wonder.’’ We know that the doubt would disappear during his self-analysis, which began in July, and Freud could write, on September 21, ‘‘I no longer believe in my neurotica [theory of the neuroses]’’ after being confronted by his ‘‘surprise that in all cases, the father, not excluding my own, had to be accused of being perverse.’’ On October 3, shortly before the anniversary of Jakob’s death, he confirmed, ‘‘the old man plays no active part in my case.’’ But the history of psychoanalysis bears witness to the fact that Jakob Freud did play a role in the genesis of Freudian theory and the place given in it to the representation of the father. And it was to him that, in 1904, standing on the Acropolis with his brother Alexander, Sigmund Freud’s thoughts turned, ‘‘It must be that a sense of guilt was attached to the satisfaction in having gone such a long way: there was something about it that was wrong, that from the earliest times had been forbidden. It was something to do with a child’s criticism of his father, with the undervaluation which took the place of the overvaluation of earlier childhood. It seems as though the essence of success was to have got further than one’s father, and as though to excel one’s father. . . . Our father had been in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS business, he had no secondary education, and Athens could not have meant much to him. Thus what interfered with our enjoyment of the journey to Athens was a feeling of filial piety’’ (1936a). ALAIN DE MIJOLLA Bibliography Bernays-Heller, Judith. (1973). Freud’s mother and father. In Freud as we knew him (pp. 334-340). Detroit: Wayne University Press. Bernfeld, Siegfried, and Cassirer-Bernfeld, Suzanne. (1944). Freud’s Early Childhood. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, VIII, 107–115. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I. SE, 4: 1–338; The interpretation of dreams. Part II., SE, 5: 339–625. ———. (1936a). A disturbance of memory on the Acropolis (An open letter to Romain Rolland on the occasion of his seventieth birthday). SE, 22: 239–248. Freud Sigmund, and Abraham, Karl. (1965a). A psycho-analytic dialogue: The letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham, 1907-1926 (Hilda C. Abraham and Ernst L. Freud, Eds.; Bernard Marsh and Hilda C. Abraham, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. Gicklhorn, Renée. (1976). La famille Freud à Freiberg. Études freudiennes, 11–12, 231–238. Krüll, Marianne. (1979). Freud and his father (Arnold J. Pomerans, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. Sajner, Josef. (1968). Sigmund Freuds Beziehungen zu seinem Geburtsort Freiberg (Pribor), und zu Mähren. Clio Medica, 3, 167–180. FREUD, (JEAN) MARTIN (1889–1967) Martin Freud, a lawyer and the eldest son of Sigmund Freud, was born on December 6, 1889, in Vienna, and died in 1967 in London. He was named Jean Martin in honor of Charcot. Writing to Freud, Charcot exclaimed, ‘‘Best wishes; may he be welcomed; may the Evangelist and the generous Centurion be propitious for him; may their names, which are now his as well, bring him happiness!’’ Later he dropped ‘‘Jean’’ from his name. Sigmund Freud considered his son Martin to be ‘‘very intelligent’’ and in his letters to Wilhelm Fliess, along with news about childhood illness, he made several references to the poems the boy wrote between the ages of eight and ten. He was ‘‘a strange 625 F R E U D , ( J E A N ) M A R T I N (1 889 –19 67) bird; sensitive and good-natured in his personal relationships, completely wrapped up in a humorous phantasy world of his own.’’ (letter dated July 3rd, 1899, 1985c, p358). This lightheartedness would remain with him all his life. After completing his ‘‘matura’’ (equivalent to the first year of college) in 1908, he entered the university to study law. An enthusiastic sportsman, ‘‘he had his face cut in a duel,’’ as Freud informed Carl Gustav Jung on July 7, 1909. He was also politically engaged and had joined a Zionist movement, the Kadimah. In 1910 he joined the Imperial horse artillery as a so-called one-year volunteer. In January 1911 he broke his leg in a skiing accident. When the First World War broke out, he immediately volunteered for the artillery service and was sent to Galicia in January 1915. After being slightly wounded in August 1915, he was soon promoted to lieutenant but was taken prisoner, something his uneasy family didn’t learn about until after the armistice. ‘‘Martin’s captivity has sapped my moral. Do you know anyone in Genoa? He is being held at San Benigno inferiore,’’ Freud wrote to Ernest Jones on February 18, 1919. He was released shortly thereafter, and Freud wrote to Pastor Pfister on October 5, ‘‘My son Martin, barely back from his captivity in Italy, has made himself a captive again through his engagement to the young lady of his choice, the daughter of a Viennese lawyer.’’ On December 7, 1919, he married Ernestine Drucker (Esti, 1896–1980), with whom he had two children, Anton Walter Freud, born April 3, 1921, and Myriam Sophie Loewenstein-Freud, born August 6, 1924. Because of his background—he had a law degree and was working in a bank—he became increasingly involved in Freud’s investments and helped him to manage his books. When the retirement of Adolf Joseph Storfer in 1931 revealed the poor financial situation of the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Martin took control and with his father’s help appealed to the international community to obtain the necessary funds for its survival. But in 1936, after the Nazis had come to power in Germany, they sequestered the firm’s publications and shortly after the Anschluss did the same in Vienna, where Martin was troubled by the Gestapo. Family affairs went badly, for Martin had several extramarital relations (including a very ambiguous relationship with an American patient of Freud, 62 6 Dr. Edith Jackson), which his wife didn’t discover until shortly before their departure from Austria on May 14, 1938. His wife remained in France with their daughter, while Martin went on to London, shortly before his parents. His life there was not simple. From July to November 1940 he was interned as a ‘‘foreign enemy’’ in a camp near Liverpool, Huyton Camp, under terrible conditions. Freud, in his will, had made Ernst, Martin, and Anna the executors of his estate, but by 1946 an organization, which was run for many years by Ernst, was created to ensure the survival of his work and his memory in the field of psychoanalysis. Martin had many jobs and ended up running a smoke shop near the British Museum. In 1958 he published, against Anna’s advice, his book of memoirs, Sigmund Freud: Man and Father, which remains one of the primary sources for all biographers of Freud. He died on April 25, 1967, at the age of seventy-seven. His wife Esti managed to escape France in 1940 with her daughter Sophie. They left Nice, where brother-in-law Olivier Freud lived, and traveled to Morocco, where they boarded a ship for the United States. She began a practice as a speech pathologist in the United States, where she lived until her death in 1980. She and Martin were never divorced. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Berggasse 19, Wien IX; First World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis; FreudBernays, Martha; Imago Publishing Company; Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag; Lampl, Hans; Sigmund Freud Copyrights Limited. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1985c). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887–1904 (Jeffrey M. Masson, Ed. and Trans.). Cambridge, MA, London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Freud, Martin. (1958). Sigmund Freud: Man and father. New York: J. Aronson. Gay, Peter. (1988) Freud: A life for our time. LondonMelbourne: Dent. Jones, Ernest. (1959). Free associations. Memories of a psycho-analyst. London, New York: Basic Books. Roazen, Paul. (1993). Meeting Freud’s family. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FREUD: LIVING FREUD, JOSEF (1826–1897) Josef Freud, ten years younger than his brother Jakob Freud, was born in 1826 in Tysmenitz, Galicia. We would have had no record of his existence if Freud hadn’t referred to him in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a, chap. 4) in the ‘‘dream of the uncle with the yellow beard.’’ Freud was quite open in writing, ‘‘For I have only one uncle, my Uncle Josef. His story was a sad one. More than thirty years earlier his desire for gain had misled him into an act severely punishable by the law, and he was punished accordingly. My father, whose hair turned gray with grief in a few days, always used to say that Uncle Josef had never been a bad man, he had been a numbskull; that was the expression he used.’’ For decades the complete story remained unknown, and Ernest Jones’s biography even claimed that ‘‘he was only given a fine, for the Austrian police records show no sign of his imprisonment.’’ In reality, on June 20, 1865, Uncle Josef was arrested by the police as he was about to sell counterfeit rubles. He was involved in an international money trafficking ring that had contacts in Manchester, where his nephews Emanuel and Philipp Freud lived. Although suspected, they were never implicated in the crime. The news was published in the newspapers the following day, but Freud’s name did not appear. However, during sentencing in February 1866, the Viennese press gave the story considerable coverage, announcing ‘‘ten years of forced labor for Freud.’’ He was released after four years for good behavior, but little is known about what became of him after that, or about his wife Rebecca, whom he married in 1849 in Jassy (possibly this is the ‘‘Rebeka’’ who was elsewhere documented as brother Jakob’s wife). Of their two children, only Deborah is mentioned by name; a friend of Adolfine Freud, she was a child at the time of his sentencing. He died at the Rudolf Hospital in Vienna on March 5, 1897 (Peter Swales, quoted in Grinstein, Alexander, 1990), at about the time that Freud had his dream. Requested by Siegfried Bernfeld to inquire about Freud’s youth, it was the wife of a Viennese professor, Mrs. Renée Gicklhorn, who unearthed the story, which came to light when Sigmund Freud was between nine and ten years old. It is easy to understand the affect this had on the Freud family. Josef, who had already been referred to as the ‘‘other—very INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND DYING unfortunate—uncle from Vienna’’ in a letter Sigmund wrote to his fiancée in February 1886, twenty years after the affair, now reappeared—this Verbrecher (criminal), as he is known in one of the most frequently cited passages from The Interpretation of Dreams—as the symbol of the obstacle to his nephew’s ambitions in 1897, the year Freud was so anxious to become a professor. It should not come as a surprise that this dramatic episode from Freud’s childhood has been extensively written about since its discovery. Freud’s biographers have provided more or less accurate psychological analyses of the inventor of psychoanalysis, often in the hope of clarifying what they believe to be cracks in his theory. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Interpretation of Dreams, The. Bibliography Gicklhorn, Renée. (1976). Sigmund Freud und der Onkeltraum. Dichtung und Wahrheit. Horn/Ndösterr: F. Berger. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I. SE, 4: 1–338; The interpretation of dreams. Part II, SE, 5: 339–625. Grinstein, Alexander. (1990). Freud at the Crossroads. New York: International Universities Press. Krüll, Marianne. (1979). Freud and his father. (Arnold J. Pomerans, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. Mijolla, Alain de. (1979). ‘‘Mein Onkel Josef’’ à la une! Études freudiennes, 15–16, 183–192. Rand, Nicolas, and Torok, Maria. (1995). Questions for Freud: The secret history of psychoanalysis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. FREUD, JULIUS. See Freud, Sigmund (siblings) FREUD-KLEIN CONTROVERSIES, THE. See Controversial Discussions FREUD: LIVING AND DYING Dr. Max Schur was a psychoanalytically oriented internist who became Freud’s physician in 1929. He treated Freud and members of his family until 1939, when Freud 627 FREUD MUSEUM died. Schur then emigrated to the United States. There many people tried to persuade him to write about Freud, but he was reluctant to do so out of respect for Freud’s privacy. When the correspondence between Freud and Wilhelm Fliess was published in 1950, he was impressed by the historical and scientific value of his documents on Freud and agreed to make his notes available to Ernest Jones, who was preparing a biography of Freud. Disagreeing with some of Jones assessments of Freud’s physical and neurotic symptoms, Schur decided to craft a ‘‘biographical study’’ of Freud’s life, concentrating on his changing attitudes toward life and death as revealed in his life, work, and correspondence. Schur’s book begins with a brief biographical review of Freud’s early life, incorporating recently published material that threw light on some of Freud’s reconstructions. Then, subjecting Freud’s descriptions of his symptoms in his letters to Fliess in the early 1890s to a careful review, he disputes Jones’s conclusion that Freud had a cardiac neurosis. Schur believed that the most likely diagnosis was a small coronary occlusion with typical anginal pains, arrhythmias, and mild cardiac insufficiency, aggravated by nicotine. As is well known, Freud was addicted to cigars, and he continued to find them necessary for creative concentration even when they were clearly contributing to his cancer during his last years. Schur believed that ‘‘neurotic anxiety was much less pronounced in Freud than excessive swings of mood, which at their low ebb had a definate depressive quality.’’ He also described Freud’s obsessive preoccupation with death and with dying at a certain age. During the cardiac episode Freud’s relationship with Schur, which began in mutual admiration, intensified and took on characteristics of a ‘‘transference-like’’ relationship. he endured, the tormenting prostheses he had to suffer, and the fortitude and remarkable capacity he demonstrated to continue to analyze and write despite everything. When Freud interviewed Schur before appointing Schur as his physician, he asked for two promises: that he would be told the truth and nothing but the truth, and that he would not be required to suffer unnecessarily. Schur ends with a description of how he fulfilled the second of these promises. ROY K. LILLESKOV See also: Death and psychoanalysis. Source Citation Schur, Max. (1972). Freud: Living and dying. New York: International Universities Press. Bibliography Bowlby, John. (1960). Grief and mourning in infancy and early childhood. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 15, 9–52. Freud, Anna. (1946). The ego and the mechanisms of defence. New York: International Universities Press. Freud, Sigmund. (1926). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 77–174. Hartmann, Heinz. (1958). Ego psychology and the problem of adaptation. New York: International Universities Press. Jones, Ernest. (1953–1957). Life and work of Sigmund Freud. New York: Basic Books. Kanzer, Mark (Ed.). (1971). The unconscious today. New York: International Universities Press. Loewenstein, Rudolf, et al. (Eds.). (1966). Psychoanalysis: a general psychology. New York: International Universities Press. Schur examines Freud’s self-analysis in the light of such transference. His discussion of Freud’s ‘‘Irma dream’’ demonstrates that the dream was also an unrecognized attempt to exonerate Fliess in order to preserve Freud’s idealization of Fliess. Schur also demonstrates how Freud’s self-analysis led to a breakup of his friendship with Fliess in 1904 and how ghosts of the relationship continued to haunt Freud in the form of a preoccupation with death dates based on Fliess’s numerical periods. Schur also pursues the broader theme of Freud’s attitudes toward death throughout Freud’s works, most notably when he discusses Freud’s notion of the death instinct. FREUD MUSEUM The last third of Schur’s book is a painfully moving description of Freud’s cancer, the surgical procedures The Freud Museum, at 20 Maresfield Gardens in London, was Sigmund Freud’s ‘‘last address on this 62 8 Schur, Max. (1953). The ego in anxiety. In Rudolf Loewenstein (Ed.), Drives, affects, and behavior (pp. 67–103). New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1969). The background of Freud’s disturbance on the acropolis. American Imago, 26, 303–323. Schur, Max, and Ritvo, Lucille B. (1970). The concept of development and evolution in psychoanalysis. In Lester R. Aronson et al. (Eds.), Development and evolution of behavior. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F R E U D - N A T H A N S O N , A M A L I A M A L K A (1835 –1 930) planet,’’ as he wrote to Jeanne Lampl-de Groot on August 22, 1938. He and his family moved in on September 27, 1938, and he died there on September 23, 1939. After his death his family remained in the house: the last occupant was his youngest daughter Anna, who died in 1982. As stipulated in her will, the house was turned into a museum under the auspices of the Sigmund Freud Archives and the New-Land Foundation, a charitable fund run by the family of her friend, the American psychoanalyst Muriel Gardiner. The Museum was opened to the public in 1986. Its centerpiece is Sigmund Freud’s working environment, preserved as it was during his lifetime. The study contains his personal library, his collection of antiquities, and the original couch that witnessed the discovery of psychoanalysis. When the Freud family fled from Nazi Austria in June 1938, they arrived virtually empty handed, but all their possessions were sent on afterwards. Consequently, the Museum contains all their furniture, carpets, pictures, and other belongings, in addition to Freud’s books and antiquities. Most of his papers were subsequently removed to the Sigmund Freud Archive at the U.S. Library of Congress. However, copies of many of these documents remained in the museum, and this copy archive forms a valuable resource for European scholars. The archive also includes many of Anna Freud’s papers and related documents. In addition, the Freud family photo albums form the center of an extensive photo archive. The museum attracts fourteen thousand visitors each year from all over the world. In little over a decade of existence it has also established itself as a workplace and study center, as well as a vibrant memorial to Freud’s life and work. It hosts regular national and international conferences on cultural and psychoanalytical themes, as well as lectures and study seminars, and its education program reaches out to students and schoolchildren in the local community. MICHAEL MOLNAR See also: Sigmund Freud Archives. Bibliography Appignanesi, Lisa, and Forrester, John. (1992). Freud’s women. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Bernfeld-Cassirer, Suzanne. (1951). Freud and archaeology. American Imago, 8, 107–128. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Davies, J. Keith, and Botting, Wendy. (1989). La bibliothèque de Freud. In Eric Gubel (Ed.), Le sphinx de Vienne, Sigmund Freud: l’art et l’archéologie (pp. 199–201). Gent, Belgium: Ludion. Gamwell, Lynn, and Wells, Richard (Eds.). (1989). Sigmund Freud and art: His personal collection of antiquities. London: Freud Museum. FREUD-NATHANSON, AMALIA MALKA (1835–1930) Sigmund Freud’s mother, Amalia Malka FreudNathanson, was born, according to family tradition, on August 18, 1835, in Brody, in Galicia, and died in Vienna on September 12, 1930. The daughter of Jacob Nathanson and Sara Widens, Amalia had three older brothers and one younger brother, Julius. The Jewish calendar makes Amelia’s date of birth somewhat uncertain, as Freud once told Wilhelm Fliess, but it was celebrated the same day as the birth of Emperor of Austria, Franz Josef, and the annual national holiday made it the occasion of humorous family banter. The Nathansons had lived in Galicia before moving to Odessa, then to Vienna, where Amalia, at age twenty, met Jakob Freud. Jakob shared her father’s first name and was twenty years older than she; they were married in a synagogue in 1855. She went to live with him in Freiberg, in Moravia, where on May 6, 1856, she gave birth to her son Sigmund. Other children soon followed: Julius in October 1857 (the namesake of Amalia’s younger brother, who was tubercular, both to die within a year); Anna on December 31, 1858; Regine Debora (Rosa) on March 21, 1860; Maria (Mitzi) on March 22, 1861; Esther Adolfine (Dolfi) on July 23, 1862; Pauline Regine (Pauli) on May 3, 1864; and Alexander Gotthold Efraim on April 15 (or 19), 1866. Diagnosed with tuberculosis, Amalia took frequent cures at Roznau, twenty-five kilometers from Freiberg, even after moving to Vienna in the wake of Jakob’s failed financial ventures. In August 1859 she and her two children left Freiberg on a railway journey that Freud would recall among his earliest memories during his self-analysis: At the railroad station in Breslau gas jets made him think of the ‘‘flames of hell’’ and he also recalled seeing his mother nude (‘‘matrem nudam’’ [Anzieu, Didier, 1986, p. 14]). 629 F R E U D - N A T H A N S O N , A M A L I A M A L K A (1835 –1 930) In other of Freud’s memories he recalled his mother as ‘‘slim and beautiful’’ (Gay, 1988, p. 7), and as teaching him to read and write German. Once, while at work in the kitchen, she responded to his questioning the idea that people are made of dust and therefore mortal by rubbing her hands to elicit the blackish bits of epidermis. When Freud was about ten years old, he had an anxiety dream in which he saw his ‘‘beloved mother with a peculiarly calm, sleeping facial expression, being carried into the room by two (or three) persons with bird’s beaks . . .’’ (p. 504). Amalia appears to have been an anxious mother, if one considers as exemplary the precautions that Freud took to conceal from her his adolescent plans to travel to London, or her response to the 1873 cholera epidemic that raged in Vienna while she was staying in Roznau. But she was also a supportive mother who foresaw a great destiny for Sigmund, a gifted child to whom she granted many favors, triggering jealousy among her other children. Freud would help his mother financially as soon as he began to earn a living and, together with his brother, Alexander, he would continue to support her to the end of her life. Coquettish as a young woman, she enjoyed card parties, but Amalia became difficult as she grew older. According to her grandson Martin Freud, she was a typical Galician Jewish woman; she ‘‘had great vitality and much impatience; she had a hunger for life and an indomitable spirit’’ (1958, p. 11). After she became a widow, Amalia lived with her daughter Adolfine (Dolfi), and made yearly trips to Ischl for her lung ailment. In her home on Grüne Thorgasse, by family custom, she would receive her ‘‘goldener Sigi’’ and other children and grandchildren every Sunday. Freud hid from Amalia the deaths of his daughter Sophie and her child, Heinele, and he cautiously told her about surgery on his jaw without mentioning cancer. Indeed, her old age and death presented Freud with a problem he discussed with Karl Abraham as early as May 1918: ‘‘My Mother will be eighty-three this year and is no longer very strong. I sometimes think I shall feel a little freer when she dies, for the idea that she might be told that I have died is a terrifying thought.’’ (Jones, Ernest, 1955, Vol. 2, p. 196) He brought up the problem again after the death of Max Eitingon’s mother on December 1, 1929, repeating almost word for word what he had written to Ludwig 63 0 Binswanger the previous January: ‘‘The loss of a mother must be something very strange, unlike anything else, and must arouse emotions that are hard to grasp. I myself still have a mother, and she bars my way to the longed-for rest, to eternal nothingness; I somehow could not forgive myself if I were to die before her.’’ (Freud, 1960, p. 392) Three days after her death on September 12, 1930, Freud wrote to Ernest Jones: ‘‘I will not disguise the fact that my reaction to this event because of special circumstances been a curious one. Assuredly, there is no saying, what effects such an experience may produce in deeper layers, but on the surface I can detect only two things: an increase in personal freedom, since it was always a terrifying thought that she might come to hear of my death; and secondly, the satisfaction that at last she has achieved the deliverance for which she had earned a right after such a long life. No grief otherwise, such as my ten years younger brother is painfully experiencing. I was not at the funeral; again Anna represented me as at Frankfort. Her value to me can hardly be heightened.’’ (Jones, p. 152) For all intents and purposes, Freud’s relationship with his mother may be said to have been excellent and his comment concerning Goethe is usually cited: ‘‘[I]f a man has been his mother’s undisputed darling he retains throughout his life the triumphant feeling, the confidence in success, which not seldom brings actual success along with it.’’ (Freud 1917b, p. 156) ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Freud, Jakob Kollomon (or Kelemen or Kallamon); Freud, Sigmund (siblings); Judaism and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1986). Freud’s self-analysis. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. Gay, Peter. (1988). Freud: A life for our time. New York: Doubleday. Jones, Ernest. (1953–57). Life and work of Sigmund Freud. New York: Basic Books. Freud, Martin. (1958). Sigmund Freud: Man and father. New York: Vanguard Press. Freud, Sigmund. (1917b). A childhood recollection from ‘‘Dichtung und Wahrheit.’’ SE, 17: 145–156. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F R E U D , O L I V E R (1891 –1 969) ———. (1960a). Letters of Sigmund Freud. New York: McGraw-Hill. FREUD, OLIVER (1891–1969) Oliver Freud, named after Oliver Cromwell, was the third son of Sigmund and Martha Freud. Born in Vienna on February 19, 1891, he died in Williamstown, Massachusetts, in February 1969. His mother’s favorite, Oliver’s life was less tied to that of his parents than his other brothers and sisters, in spite of the compliments paid to him by Freud for his precocious interests in mountains and railways and his gift for construction. After completing his ‘‘matura’’ (equivalent to the first year of college), in 1909 he entered the Vienna Polytechnic, a private school. He graduated with a degree in civil engineering in 1915. He was not enlisted when the First World War broke out but was put to work building a barracks, then a tunnel, until December 1916. After this he was inducted as an officer in an engineering regiment. While living in Berlin, Oliver went without work from 1932 until April 7, 1933. Freud wrote to Ernest Jones, ‘‘My unemployed son Oliver, whom I have been supporting for a year, is coming to Vienna tomorrow to discuss his future. There is little doubt that he will never find work in Berlin again (he is a civil engineer).’’ Oliver emigrated to France that same year, 1933. He first lived in Brittany, near Dinard, then in Paris, where Freud sent a letter of introduction to Arnold Zweig on October 25, 1933, ‘‘But I have a son in Paris—Oliver, who with his wife and child lives in 16me, rue George Sand. He is a civil engineer, a very talented man [ein hochbegabter Alleswisser], knows everything, excellent at his job; nice wife and charming little daughter. I’m afraid he will not achieve anything in Paris. I’d be very pleased if you could meet him.’’ In 1934 he went to Nice, where he began working as a photographer, about which Freud remarked, ‘‘At least he has found a job that satisfies his passion for tinkering’’ (letter to Zweig, June 13, 1935). Oliver remained in Nice, aside from a visit to Vienna in November 1936, until 1943. Married in December 1915, he was divorced by September 1916. Sent to Galicia in 1916, then Hungary, he returned at the end of hostilities and was discharged on December 2, 1918. In July 1919 Freud remarked that Oliver was the only one of his three sons who found work after his return. He lived in Berlin, like Ernst, and both brothers traveled to Hamburg for the funeral of their sister Sophie in January 1920. After obtaining a visa for America in 1942, Oliver, Henry, and Eva tried to leave France through Spain, but fear of deportation led them back to Nice, now under Italian occupation. René Laforgue, whose property of Garéoult was nearby, is said to have helped them obtain forged papers and leave France for the United States in 1943. But the boy was a problem for Freud. He confided in Max Eitingon on October 30, 1920, that he was often worried about this son, who ‘‘had been his pride and secret hope,’’ and suggested that Oliver ‘‘would need to be analyzed’’ because of the symptoms of obsessional neurosis. In 1921 Oliver, upon the advice of Hans Lampl, a fellow student and friend of Martin, began analysis with Franz Alexander (Roazen, 1993). But their daughter Eva, who was nineteen years old at the time, refused to go with them and remained with her fiancé on the Mediterranean coast. She was later analyzed by René Laforgue and then by Henri Stern. She died tragically from septicemia contracted after an abortion, complicated by a cerebral abscess, in the Hospital of La Timone in Marseille, on November 4, 1944. After a stay in Romania, he married Henny Fuchs (born February 11, 1892, in Berlin, died 1971 in North America) in Berlin on April 10, 1923. His mother, Martin, and Anna, after returning from Göttingen to visit Lou Andreas-Salomé, were present for the marriage. On September 3, 1924, their daughter Eva Mathilde Freud was born. Freud warmly greeted the family on Christmas 1924, not wishing to ‘‘delay any further making the acquaintance of the adorable new grandchild.’’ Her parents reached Philadelphia, where Oliver found work as an engineer with the Budd Company. He and Henny retired in Williamstown, in western Massachusetts, where he died in February 1969. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Arnold Zweig wrote to Freud from Haifa on January 21, 1934, ‘‘And since I’ve been here I have been thinking very much about this son of yours, who is also too decent to find it easy to adapt himself to life. It was shattering to observe how he talked most vividly 631 FREUD, PHILIPP and warmly when speaking about his wartime service. Just like all other men of his generation and of his circumstances who now find that they have to begin all over again at a time when they are firmly set in their ways of thought and feeling, habits and ambitions. No one can take it amiss if these men do not wish to have anything to do with the contemporary business scene and prefer to take refuge in memories of a time when a man (especially a young man) merely needed to risk his life to be fulfilling all the demands that society made upon him.’’ ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Berggasse 19, Wien IX; Freud-Bernays, Martha. Bibliography Gay, Peter. (1988). Freud: A life for our time. LondonMelbourne: Dent. Jones, Ernest. (1959). Free associations. Memories of a psycho-analyst. London, New York; Basic Books. Roazen, Paul. (1993). Meeting Freud’s family. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Second, Pierre. (1993). Eva Freud, une vie: Berlin 1924, Nice 1934, Marseille 1944. Trames, 75, 16. FREUD, PHILIPP. See Freud, Sigmund (siblings) FREUD, SIGMUND (SIBLINGS) Sigmund Freud, born May 6, 1856, was Jakob Freud’s third child. From a previous marriage, in 1832 to Sally Kanner, he had two sons, Emanuel and Philipp. After Sally died in 1852, a brief second marriage to a woman named Rebekka also ended with her death. Jakob’s third marriage, to Amalie Nathanson on July 29, 1855, produced eight more children. In addition to Sigismund (Sigmund), the firstborn, were born Julius, Anna, Rosa, Marie, Adolfine, Pauline, and Alexander. Freud, Emanuel Born in 1833 in Tysmenitz in Galicia, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Emanuel Freud worked in his father’s textile business. In 1852, he married (Kokach), who was born in Milow in Russia in 1834 (perhaps 1836). In Freiberg he settled a few blocks from his father’s home at 42, place du Marché. His 63 2 children’s nurse, Monika Zajicova, was said to also have been Sigismund’s ‘‘Nannie.’’ Freud’s oldest nephew, Johann, was born in Freiberg on August 13, 1855. I have also long known,’’ wrote Freud to Fliess in 1897, ‘‘the companion of my misdeeds between the ages of one and two years; it is my nephew, a year older than myself, who is now living in Manchester and who visited us in Vienna when I was fourteen years old. The two of us seem occasionally to have behaved cruelly to my niece, who was a year younger’’ (Freud, 1985c, p. 268) ‘‘Until the end of my third year we had been inseparable; we had loved each other and fought each other, and, as I have already hinted, this childish relation had determined all my later feelings in my intercourse with persons of my own age’’ (1900a, p. 424). Freud also wrote, ‘‘An intimate friend and a hated enemy have always been indispensable to my emotional life; I have always been able to create them anew, and not infrequently my childish ideal has been so closely approached that friend and enemy have coincided in the same person; but not simultaneously, of course, as was the case in my early childhood’’ (1900a, p. 483). Johann’s whereabouts cannot be traced after 1919, and what happened to him in later years is unknown. On November 20, 1856, Pauline Freud, Sigmund’s niece, was born in Freiberg; she would die a spinster in Manchester in 1944. The games she played with John and Sigmund in the meadow covered in yellow flowers, which Freud recalled in ‘‘Screen Memories’’ (1899a), are thought to have taken place during the summer of 1859. Freud’s unconscious fantasy of Pauline’s defloration by John and himself led some to believe that both boys sexually assaulted the little girl (Krüll, 1979). Towards 1875, it seems that Jakob Freud had the idea of sending Sigmund to England with his brothers and having him marry Pauline. On February 22, 1859, Bertha Freud was born in Freiberg. She died accidentally from a fall on a staircase in 1944. Toward 1859–1860, while Jakob and his family left Freiberg for Vienna, Emanuel emigrated with relatives and his brother Philipp to Manchester, England. Solomon Samuel (Sam) Freud, Emanuel’s fourth son, was born there on June 28, 1860. His correspondence with Sigmund Freud was eventually published (Freud 1996 [1911–38]. He died in 1945. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FREUD, SIGMUND (SIBLINGS) On May 12, 1862, Matilda Freud was born in Manchester. In 1900 Freud described Emanuel to Wilhelm Fliess (Freud 1985c, p. 417) on the occasion of his halfbrother’s trip to Vienna with his son Sam: ‘‘He brought with him a real air of refreshment because he is a marvelous man, vigorous and mentally indefatigable despite his sixty-eight or sixty-nine years, who has always meant a great deal to me.’’ Freud paid visits to Emanuel in August 1875 and to his sister Rosa in 1884–1885. He went to England for a second two-week visit to his brothers in September 1908. Emmanuel died from a fall from a train traveling between Manchester and Southport on October 17, 1914, just six days before the anniversary of Jacob’s death—a coincidence noted by Freud. Marie, Emanuel’s wife, died in Manchester in 1923. Freud, Philipp Philipp Freud was born in Tysmenitz around 1835. He would play an interesting role in his brother’s life that Freud would only reconstruct in October 1897 during his self-analysis. It was Philipp who ‘‘locked up Nannie in prison’’ for stealing shortly before the family’s departure from Freiberg. He was living across the street from Freud’s parents and was the same age as Freud’s mother, Amalie. Some authors have imagined from Freud’s fantasy that Philipp and Amalie were together as a ‘‘couple’’ with the suggestion that he had an affaire with her (Krüll, 1979). He contributed in any event to the confusion of generations in Freud’s mind that was only clarified in 1875 during his visit to England. Philipp married at about forty years old, in Manchester on January 15, 1873, to Matilda Bloome (Bloomah), from Birmingham (1839–1925). They had two children. Pauline Mary (Poppy) was born on October 23, 1873, married Frederick Oswald Hartwig and died in Bucklow/Chester on June 23, 1951. Morris Herbert Walter was born on April 2, 1876, and died in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, on November 28, 1938. Philipp died in Manchester on August 29, 1911. Freud (1989a, pp. 126–127) described this part of his family in an 1875 letter to Eduard Silberstein: ‘‘You will, no doubt, wish to know about my relatives in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS England and about my attitude toward them. I don’t think I’ve ever told you much about them. There two brothers on my father’s side, from my father’s first marriage, twenty-two years older than I, the older, Emanuel, having married in early youth, the younger, Philipp, two and a half years ago. They used to live with us in Freiberg, where the elder brother’s three oldest children were born! The unfavorable turn their business took there caused them to move to England, which they have not left since 1859. I can say that they now hold a generally respected position, not because of their wealth, for they are not rich, but because of their personal character. They are shopkeepers, i.e., merchants who have a shop, the elder selling cloth and the younger jewelry, in the sense that word seems to have in England. My two sisters-in-law are good and jolly women, one of them an English woman, which made my conversations with her extremely agreeable. Of those persons in our family whose uncle I may call myself, you are already acquainted with John, he is an Englishman in every respect, with a knowledge of languages and technical matters well beyond the usual business education. Unknown to you, and until recently, to me, are two charming nieces, Pauline, who is nineteen, and Bertha, who is seventeen, and a fifteen-year-old boy by the name of Samuel—which I believe has been fashionable in England ever since Pickwick—and who is generally considered to be a Ôsharp and deep’ young fellow’’ (pp. 126–7). Sigmund Freud was born on May 6, 1856, the first of Jacob and Amalie Freud’s eight children. Freud, Julius Julius Freud was born in October 1857 in Freiberg, when Sigmund was eighteen months old. He died the next April, the same year that Amalie’s brother, Julius’s namesake, also died. On October 3, 1897, Freud (1985e, p. 268) wrote to Wilhelm Fliess about one of the discoveries of his selfanalysis: ‘‘that I greeted my one-year-younger brother (who died after a few months) with adverse wishes and genuine childhood jealousy; and that his death left the germ of [self-] reproaches in me.’’ Bernays-Freud, Anna Anna Bernays-Freud was born on December 31, 1858, in Freiberg and died on March 11, 1955, in New York. Her relationship with her older brother was often difficult, but she was her father’s favorite daughter. In her 633 FREUD, SIGMUND (SIBLINGS) memoirs (Bernays-Freud, 1940), she recalled Sigmund’s special privileges, the fact that he enjoyed his own room, and that it was forbidden to play the piano in order not to disturb him; he also censored what she read. Anna married Martha’s oldest brother, Eli Bernays (1860-1923) on October 14, 1883, with whom Freud, who didn’t attend their wedding, felt for a time resentful regarding his sister’s dowry. Anna and Eli emigrated in the United States in 1892 with their two children, Lucy, born in 1886, and Judith born a year earlier. In 1973 the latter, Judith BernaysHeller, published a brief memoir of her visits to grandparents Jacob and Amalie (Bernays-Heller, 1973). Anna and Eli had three more children: Edward Louis was born in 1891, and Hella and Martha in 1893 and 1894, respectively. Eli, who enjoyed a brilliant career in business, was in charge of Freud’s works in the United States and he had some disagreements with Ernest Jones concerning their English translations. After Eli’s death, in 1925 Freud wrote to his son Edward in reply to the latter’s proposition: ‘‘What deprives all autobiographies of value is their tissue of lies. Let’s just say parenthetically that your publisher shows American naivete in imagining that a man, honest until now, could stoop to so low for five thousand dollars. The temptation would begin at one hundred times that sum, but even then I would renounce it after half an hour.’’ On March 8, 1920, he wrote to Ernest Jones, describing Edward as ‘‘an honest boy when I knew him. I know not how far he has become Americanized’’ (Gay 1989, p. 568) and in September he announced, to Jones’s chagrin, that his nephew would serve as literary executive for American rights to his works. Graf-Freud, Regina Deborah (Rosa) Regina Deborah Graf-Freud (Rosa) was born on March 21, 1860, and died in the Treblinka concentration camp in 1942. Considered his favorite sister, Freud in 1886 acknowledged that the beautiful Rosa, like himself, had ‘‘a nicely developed tendency toward neurasthenia’’ (Freud 1960, p. 210). On October 22, 1874, Freud wrote to Eduard Silberstein: ‘‘Rosa has entered a school of drawing and design newly established for the perfection of feminine handicrafts. I have taken charge of the rest of her education and am sacrificing one of my lectures to that end. The gods cannot possibly have rejoiced at this sacrifice as much as I did’’ (Freud 1989a, p. 67). She would return the 63 4 favor in various ways, by taking care of his laundry, for example, during his stay in Paris, later by caring for his children during vacations. Rosa’s fate was particularly unfortunate. After a disappointing love affair, she married Heinrch Graf (b. 1852), a physician, on May 17, 1896, but he died in 1908 at the age of fifty-six. Her son, Hermann Adolf, was born on July 13, 1897 and died in action during World War I, in early 1917. Finally, her daughter, Cäcilie, born October 18, 1899, and nicknamed Mausi, whom Freud called ‘‘my favorite niece,’’ a dear girl of 23, was unmarried and pregnant when she committed suicide with an overdose of the barbiturate veronal on August 18, 1922. The last document from Rosa is a letter transmitted by the International Red Cross to Freud’s address in London. Twenty five words only were authorized: ‘‘Geliebte Martha! Tief bewegt grüssen Dich Alle. Erbitten Deiner Alexanders Familie Befinden. Vier einsam. Traurig. Leidlich. Gesund. —S. fruendschaftlich. Ganze Einrichtung bestens engleagert. Graf Rosa’’ (‘‘Dear Martha! Greetings with heartfelt emotion. Wondering about the state of your Alexander’s family. Four alone. Sad. Painful. Health. Yours warmly. Best furnishings in storage. Graf Rosa.’’) Rosa was deported in Theresienstadt on August 28, 1942, at the same time as her three sisters, with whom she was living in a increasingly cramped apartment. According to a witness, during the Nuremberg trial, in October 1942 in the Treblinka concentration camp, the commandant of the camp to whom she introduced herself as Sigmund Freud’s sister, examined her identification and ‘‘said that there was probably some mistake and showed her the railroad signs, telling her that there would be a train to take her back to Vienna in two hours. She could leave her belongings, go into the showers and, after bathing, her documents and her ticket to Vienna would be ready. Rose naturally went into the showers and never returned’’ (LeupoldLöwenthal, 1989). Moritz-Freud Maria (Mitzi) Maria Moritz-Freud (Mitzi) was born on March 22, 1861, and died in the Maly Trostinec, the extermination camp, in 1942. In 1885 she had to work as a governess, which led Freud, then in Paris, while observing nannies with young children, to write Martha: ‘‘I couldn’t help thinking of poor Mitzi and grew very, very furious and full of revolutionary thoughts’’ (Freud 1960, p. 173). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FREUD, SIGMUND (SIBLINGS) In 1887 Mitzi married her Romanian cousin Moritz Freud(1857–1920). They had four children, Margarethe, born in 1887; Lilly Marlé-Freud, born in 1888, who became a well-known actress; Martha Gertrude, born in 1892, who illustrated children books under the name ‘‘Tom’’ and would commit suicide in 1930, a year after her husband the journalist Jakob Seidmann, killed himself; Theodor (Teddy) and born in 1904, whose twin was stillborn and who died from drowning in 1923 in Berlin. Martha’s daughter, Angela Seidmann, was in the care of Freud and Anna for a while before emigrating to Haı̈fa. Mitzi, reunited with her sisters in Vienna after her husband’s death, shared their fate in the Holocaust. She was deported to the concentration camp of Theresienstadt, on June 29, 1942, then to Maly Trostinec where she disappeared (Leupold-Löwenthal, 1989). Freud, Esther Adolfine (Dolfi) Esther Adolfine (Dolfi) was born on July 23, 1862, and died in 1943 in the concentration camp at Treblinka. She was unmarried and cared for her father Jakob when he fell ill, then of her mother, becoming impetuous Amalie’s constant companion, which her nephew Martin considered could not have been a welcome fate. ‘‘She was not clever or in any way remarkable, and it might be true to say that constant attendance on Amalie had suppressed her personality into a condition of dependence from which she never recovered’’ (M. Freud, 1958, p. 16). Dolfi was deported with Mitzi and Paula to the concentration camp of Theresienstadt on August 28, 1942, where she died from ‘‘internal hemorrhages’’ on February 5, 1943, according to information gathered by Harry Freud after the war, perhaps due to malnutrition. (Leupold-Löwenthal, 1989). Winternitz-Freud, Pauline Regine (Pauli) Pauline Regine Winternitz-Freud (Pauli) was born on May 3, 1864, and died in the Holocaust in 1942. She was married to Valentin Winternitz and emigrated to the United States, where their daughter, Rose Beatrice (Rosi), was born on March 18, 1896. After her husband’s death in 1900, on Freud’s advice, she returned to Berlin, where she lived with her husband’s family before joining relatives in Vienna. Deported from that city in June 1942, she was taken first to the concentration camp of Theresienstadt, then to the exterINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS mination camp or Maly Trostinec (Leupold-Löwenthal, 1989). In 1913, Rosi, just seventeen years old, developed psychological problems that suggested psychosis. Ten years later and pregnant, she married Ernst Waldinger, a young poet, but the couple was not happy and, in 1931, she had a relapse. Rosi successfully emigrated to the United States and in 1946 entered analysis with Paul Federn in New York, probably with the financial assistance of Anna Freud. Freud, Alexander Gotthold Efraim Alexander Gotthold Efraim Freud was born on April 15 (or April 19), 1866, in Vienna, and died in 1943 in Canada. The youngest of the family, his name was chosen by Freud himself at a family meeting. For a number of years Alexander was closest to his older brother, sharing with him, until Freud married, Easter and summer vacations, mainly in Italy after a first visit there in 1895. He took part in the 1897 trip during which Freud contemplated Luca Signorelli’s frescoes, and in the visit to Rome at the end of August 1901. ‘‘It was a high point of my life’’ as wrote Freud to Wilhelm Fliess. He was also with his brother on the Acropolis, during the sudden ‘‘disturbance of memory’’ in Athens in September 1904. Merry and whimsical and a music-lover, Alexander ‘‘was an excellent story-teller who could imitate the various accents of the characters in his stories, as his nephew would write (M. Freud, 1958, p. 17). He did not pursue an education but, intelligent and hardworking, became a specialist in transportation and worked at the Vienna Chamber of Commerce. On August 20, 1899, Freud wrote to Fliess: ‘‘Alexander was here for four days; he will lecture on tariff rates at the Export Academy and will be given the title and rank of professor extraordinarius after one year—much earlier in fact than I’’ (Freud, 1985c). With his expertise, he was responsible for organizing Freud’s voyage to America in 1909. Also in 1909, Alexander married Sophie Sabine Schreiber in a synagogue, in a double ceremony with his niece Mathilde. His wife gave birth on December 21, 1909, to Harry, their only child. With an excellent livelihood, he shared with Freud the support of their mother and Dolfi. He was, according to his brother, much more upset than he by Amalie’s death in 1930. In 1936 he commissioned Wilhelm Victor Krauss to paint Freud’s portrait. 635 F R E U D , S I G M U N D S C H L O M O (1856 –1 939) In March 1938, shortly after the Alexander emigrated to Switzerland. Sigmund, at the time still in Vienna wrote Ernest Jones (April 28, 1938) that his brother caused him considerable worry; he had reacted badly to the loss of his business and was in poor health. By shared decision, the brothers left a large sum (160,000 Austrian Schillings) to their four sisters that would have been sufficient for a comfortable living in Vienna; they saw no serious danger to their remaining in Vienna. Freud soon realized his mistake and at his request Marie Bonaparte attempted to secure their passage from Austria, but without success. Alexander gave up his Anglophobia and proGerman sentiments that dated to the First World War to emigrate to London in September 1938, where he also joined his son Harry. It was this latest who wrote to his aunts a letter they never receive and in which he described Sigmund’s last days. Alexander and his wife would emigrate to Canada, where he died in 1943. See also: Freud, Jacob Kolloman (or Kelemen or Kallamon); Freud-Nathanson, Amalie Malka. Bibliography Bernays-Freud, Anna. (November 1940). My brother Sigmund Freud. American Mercury 51 (203), 335–342. Bernays-Heller, Judith. (1973). Freud’s mother and father. In Freud as we knew him. (H.M. Ruitenbeck, Ed.). Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Freud, Martin. (1958). Sigmund Freud: Man and father. New York: Vanguard Press. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The Interpretation of Dreams. SE 4–5. ———. (1960). Letters. New York: Basic Books. ———. (1989). Letters of Sigmund Freud and Eduard Silberstein: 1871–1881. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Krüll, Marianne. (1979). Freud und sein Vater. Die Entstehung der Psychoanalyse und Freuds ungelöste Vaterbindung. Beck. ———. (1986). Freud and His Father. (Arnold J. Pomerans, Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton. (Original work published 1979). Leupold-Löwenthal. (1989). Die Vertreibung der Familie Freud 1938. Psyche-Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und ihre Anwendungen, 43 (10), 908–928. 63 6 FREUD, SIGMUND SCHLOMO (1856–1939) Sigmund Schlomo Freud was born on May 6, 1856, in Freiberg (now Priborg), Moravia (now the Slovak Republic), and died on September 23, 1939, in London. He was the son of Amalia Nathanson and of Jakob Freud, a draper, who had two children (Emanuel and Philipp) from a previous marriage. Freud was the first child of a couple in which the husband was forty years old, twice as old as his young wife. Over the next ten years, five daughters and two more sons would be born. He was circumcised a week after birth. When he was two years old, a younger brother, Julius, died at the age of seven months, the first of several traumas of his early childhood. Others included the arrest for theft of ‘‘Nanie’’ his nurse; the departure of his father for Austria after a series of bad business dealings; the emigration to Great Britain of his older half-brothers and their children, his first playmates; and, most crucially, his own exile at the age of three. He rejoined his father in Vienna in the company of his mother after a lengthy train trip that left a deep impression on him. He remembered his constant poverty following his arrival in the Austrian capital in 1859 and during his childhood, but alluded only once to the family’s shame after his uncle Josef was condemned to ten years of forced labor for trafficking in counterfeit currency in 1866. He was a brilliant student, however, and after completing his ‘‘matura’’ (equivalent of the first year of college), was able to choose between law and natural science. He enrolled in medical school and after briefly studying philosophy (Franz Brentano was one of his teachers), decided to major in zoology. In the summer of 1875, after a brief stay in Great Britain with his half-brothers in Manchester, he was able to put together a better idea of his place in the family genealogy. The following year he obtained a research grant to work at the Experimental Zoology Station of the University of Vienna in Trieste, where his work helped demonstrate the existence of testicles in the male eel. His work was presented to the Academy of Sciences in March 1877 and published in April (1877b), signaling his entry, at the age of twenty-one, into the world of science. In the following years his research and personal interest led him to study the anatomy of the nervous system; he hoped that through his research he would be able to achieve what he had INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F R E U D , S I G M U N D S C H L O M O (1856 –1 939) always dreamed of—financial security. But in spite of his success, his material life remained precarious. In October 1876 he entered Professor Ernst Brücke’s Physiologisches Institut, where he remained until 1882. He became friends with the two assistants, Ernst von Fleischl and Josef Breuer, and investigated the posterior nerve roots of the Petromyzon, or sea lamprey. Impressed by Ernst Brücke’s personality, he became an adept of the positivist school of Emil Du Bois-Reymond, who claimed that biology could be explained by physico-chemical forces whose effects are strictly deterministic. In March 1881, Freud was made doctor of medicine, while continuing his research and writing on subjects as distant from human clinical practice as the nerve cells of crayfish. But his future as a laboratory researcher was called into question when he met Martha Bernays, who became his wife four years later. He needed to provide an income for his future household, and followed the advice Brücke had given him in June—to abandon pure research and go into medical practice. This prospect failed to excite Freud, as he wrote many years later, ‘‘After forty one years of medical activity, my selfknowledge tells me that I have never really been a doctor in the proper sense. I became a doctor through being compelled to deviate from my original purpose; and the triumph of my life lies in my having, after a long and roundabout journey, found my way back to my earliest path. I have no knowledge of having had any craving in my early childhood to help suffering humanity. My innate sadistic disposition was not a very strong one, so that I had no need to develop this one of its derivatives. Nor did I ever play the Ôdoctor game’; my infantile curiosity evidently chose other paths. In my youth I felt an overpowering need to understand something of the riddles of the world in which we live and perhaps even to contribute something to their solution’’ (1927a). Freud worked in various departments of the Vienna General Hospital to complete his training. While continuing his research on cerebral anatomy and pathology, he became interested in psychiatry (while working with Professor Theodor Meynert) and the nascent field of neurology. This very likely contributed to Freud’s failure to reap the rewards of his research on cocaine, which he had begun in 1884. More preoccupied with its euphoric effects and what he incorrectly believed to be its ability to serve as a substitute for the opiates, he missed the opportunity to discover its local INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ocular anesthetic properties. For several years he continued to ingest a certain amount of cocaine to overcome his timidity and increase his ability to work, which he discussed openly in his correspondence. Appointed privat-docent in July 1885, he requested a grant to study neurology with Jean Martin Charcot in Paris. His internship at the Salpêtrière Hospital from October 13, 1885, to February 23, 1886 derailed his other projects, by exposing him to disturbances of mental origin. In terms of etiological research as well as his career as a specialist in neurology, the clinical lessons of the Parisian master, then at the height of his glory, demonstrated to Freud the importance of syndromes that had until then been characterized as ‘‘hysterical.’’ Charcot’s personality fascinated Freud and this first trip outside the Viennese family circle was to have a decisive effect on his future. After returning to Vienna he set up a private practice on April 25, 1886, after a short stay in Berlin working with Professor Joseph Baginsky, where he familiarized himself with pediatrics. This enabled him, over a ten-year period, to maintain a steady practice in the department of neurology that the pediatrician Max Kassowitz (1842–1923) had opened at the Vienna Institute for Child Diseases. Once established he was finally able to get married, which he did on September 13, 1886. But his attempt to become Charcot’s spokesman among Viennese neurologists and psychiatrists met with open rejection, especially from Theodor Meynert. Demanding, vulnerable, and passionate, for years he interpreted criticism or ignorance of his contributions as a form of systematic hostility that he often attributed to anti-Semitism, which was widespread in Vienna, especially in academic and medical circles. His solitude was broken by a meeting that would later develop into a close friendship that lasted for nearly fifteen years. Wilhelm Fliess, an otorhinolaryngologist (ear-nose-and-throat specialist) in Berlin, gradually became a confidant who could share some of Freud’s doubts and research activities, and a witness to the clinical experiments and theoretical hypotheses that littered the long road leading to the birth of psychoanalysis. An extensive correspondence and several meetings, referred to as ‘‘conferences,’’ enabled them to exchange ideas about their research, which often fell upon deaf ears when Freud clearly overestimated his friend’s comprehension. They also exchanged personal information. For Freud it was the anxiety about 637 F R E U D , S I G M U N D S C H L O M O (1856 –1 939) money and the birth of six children in succession, something Fliess’s theories on menstruation and the hope that they brought of a possible method of contraception failed to resolve. Their friendship gradually took the place of an earlier friendship with an older Viennese doctor, Josef Breuer. Breuer, who had helped Freud financially and professionally early in his career, had also related to him, in 1882, the story of his patient Anna O. and her treatment by the ‘‘cathartic method’’ that she and Breuer had invented. Having experimented with hypnosis for a period of time, Freud had determined that it was ineffective, especially after an 1889 visit to Nancy to see Hippolyte Bernheim, Charcot’s rival. He then decided to make use of the ‘‘talking cure’’ Breuer had mentioned. This involved, in the attempt to overcome the patient’s resistance, bringing back to consciousness an apparently forgotten memory, which had been repressed, of the first appearance of a symptom. This made hypnosis no longer necessary; gradually, the technique of incessant questioning it had given way to was in turn abandoned, in favor of the free association of ideas. Freud had developed the hypothesis of the unconscious, together with the idea that disturbances had their origin in the history of the subject’s infantile sexuality. These statements were shocking to many, especially because of Freud’s public intransigence concerning them, and it was not without considerable reluctance, ultimately leading to the end of their friendship, that Josef Breuer agreed to cosign the Studies in Hysteria in 1895. Wilhelm Fliess remained his only confidant and the only one who listened to his theoretical suggestions and the results of his day-to-day clinical observations. Sexual etiology and childhood seduction by a parent were among the earliest etiological ideas, but the death of his father in October 1896 led Freud to question these ideas, and to practice the same methods on himself he had been using on his patients. His self-analysis continued throughout the summer and fall of 1897 and the discoveries followed: psychic reality, the Oedipus complex, and so on. Under various forms Freud would continue to question himself, as shown by his statement to James Jackson Putnam in 1911—‘‘A selfanalysis must be continued indefinitely. I note, in my own case, that each new attempt has brought surprises’’ (November 5 letter)—and the article dedicated to Romain Rolland, ‘‘A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis.’’ (1936a) 63 8 Prompted by the frequency with which his patients spontaneously reported their dreams to him, Freud began to investigate their unconscious meanings. The first dream to which he applied his new method of interpretation through the fragmentation and association of ideas was the ‘‘injection given to Irma,’’ of July 23, 1895. His systematic investigation of this dream became the origin of The Interpretation of Dreams, published at the end of 1899, but dated 1900 (1900a). It is a fundamental work in what Freud had referred to for the first time in 1896 (in an article published in French in the Revue neurologique) as ‘‘psychoanalysis.’’ The book was widely praised but sold poorly (421 copies in six years), although this did not impede his work. It was a period in which he described himself as a ‘‘conquistador,’’ thereby summarizing the mixture of enthusiasm and obstinacy that characterized his personality. Anxious, suffering from hypochondriacal illnesses of the stomach and heart, preoccupied with the calculation of dates predicting his death, undecided about whether to continue or abandon smoking; there is nothing of the austere scholar depicted by his biographers. But he was primarily an indefatigable worker, who stayed up late at night to answer letters (a correspondence estimated at more than twenty thousand letters) and would fill large sheets of paper with his broad gothic handwriting. As his friendship with Fliess waned, he prepared the Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901b) and took notes for the Dora case, which was not published until 1905. Some of those who attended his courses at the university went to see him, either to be treated, like Wilhelm Stekel, or to discuss innovative theories with him. They formed the ‘‘Wednesday Psychological Society,’’ which met every week and, in 1908, became the first Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. The publication of Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905c) and Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d); followed by a collection of his earliest articles, Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre aus den Jahren 1893-1906 (1906b); helped him break out of what he described as his ‘‘splendid isolation.’’ Readers intrigued by the originality of his hypotheses came to visit him in Vienna: Max Eitingon in January 1907, Ludwig Binswanger and Carl Gustav Jung in February, Karl Abraham in December 1907, Sándor Ferenczi in February 1908. They were to form the core group of his future disciples. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F R E U D , S I G M U N D S C H L O M O (1856 –1 939) In response to the growing number of followers and the high level of interest, the first International Psychoanalytical Congress was held in Salzburg on April 27, 1908. Freud spoke for nearly five hours on the Ratman (1909d), a case which, by systematizing nondirectivity, helped establish the parameters of the psychoanalytic ‘‘framework.’’ Here the patient was stretched out on a couch with the psychoanalyst seated behind him, out of sight of the patient, sessions were held daily and lasted for about an hour, the patient was free to say whatever he wished. Freud laid down the groundwork for the theory of ‘‘transference’’ with the therapist and, in 1910, in response to Curl Gustav Jung’s affair with his patient Sabina Spielrein, the theory of the ‘‘counter-transference.’’ That same year, the risks of ‘‘wild’’ psychoanalysis led to the creation, at Ferenczi’s initiative, of an international psychoanalytic association to monitor the development of ‘‘die Sache’’ (the cause) and distinguish the wheat from the chaff among its practitioners. though Freud gradually enlarged the concept of sexuality, which the majority of his critics reduced to adult forms of genital sexuality. The concepts of ‘‘infantile sexuality’’ and ‘‘polymorphous perversity’’ were even more unacceptable to those who believed they sullied what was believed to be an original infantile purity. As is often the case in such situations, Jung’s departure in 1914 served as a spur to Freud’s creativity, who wrote ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ (1914c) and developed his analysis of the primal scene in his essay on the Wolfman, which he also completed that year (1918b [1914]). He also provided the first historical overview of the origins of psychoanalysis in On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement (1914d), which was intended to sway those who were still undecided between him and Jung. Although Freud maintained friendly relations with Sándor Ferenczi—notwithstanding periods of tension and the short analysis his younger colleague began with him in 1914—until Ferenczi’s death in 1933, his relationships with his other students were often strained. Alfred Adler, who developed a theory based on aggression, the will to power, and organ inferiority, and rejected sexual etiology, distanced himself from Freud to found a new school in 1911. He was followed by Wilhelm Stekel in 1912. But the greatest disappointment came from Carl Gustav Jung, who in 1909 had been declared ‘‘successor and crown prince’’ by Freud, who had glimpsed the doors of academic psychiatry opening to him, along with the possibility that psychoanalysis would no longer be viewed as a ‘‘Jewish matter.’’ Their personal relationship, as shown in their correspondence, and the intellectual exchange this involved, encouraged Freud to study psychosis, using the Memoirs of My Nervous Illness by Daniel Schreber (1911c), and to speculate on anthropological issues, of which Totem and Taboo (1912-1913a) is the first expression. The First World War seemed to sound the death knell for the young science of psychoanalysis. Freud’s sons were at the front and he initially supported a German victory. However, he soon revised his position, which he explained in ‘‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’’ (1915b). Times were difficult and material scarcity became a growing problem as war progressed. However, it was also a period of considerable intellectual creativity, and Freud laid out the groundwork for the broad theoretical foundations of psychoanalysis, primarily the twelve essays on metapsychology, only five of which (and the newly discovered draft of the twelfth) were published. In spite of his pessimism there was renewed interest in psychoanalysis among the public and within the medical establishment when it proved useful in treating war neuroses. The end of hostilities brought about a minor institutional triumph for, following the Fifth International Psychoanalytical Congress in Budapest (September 28–29, 1918), Béla Kun’s revolutionary government offered a university chair to Sándor Ferenczi. Another Hungarian, the rich brewer Anton von Freund, whom Freud analyzed, invested his fortune in ‘‘the cause,’’ which led to the creation of the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, but he died of cancer in 1920. However, Jung’s personality was such that he could not remain for long in the position of the submissive son, and his religious training and interest in mysticism led to no more than a superficial acceptance of Freud’s materialism and insistence on sexual etiology. This rejection of what was considered an outrageous and obscene ‘‘pansexualism’’ was fairly general, even Freud was sixty-five at this time, and around him he saw sickness and death. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g) reflected this, with its theory of the repetition compulsion and the duality between a life impulse, Eros, and a death impulse, Thanatos, whose theoretical necessity Freud maintained until his death, despite the opposition of many psychoanalysts to such INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 639 F R E U D , S I G M U N D S C H L O M O (1856 –1 939) ‘‘speculation.’’ In real life his daughter Sophie (he called her ‘‘Sunday’s child’’) died during the Spanish flu epidemic, on January 25, 1920. Three years later, in April 1923, he experienced the first signs of cancer of the jaw, which had a profound effect on the remaining sixteen years of his life; that same year, on June 19, his favorite grandson, Heinele, died. He was now sixty-seven years old and, although he often complained of growing old, this was but one of the many hypochondriacal conditions he had always referred to in his letters. His fear of death is most evident in his superstitious fears and morbid calculations, borrowed from Wilhelm Fliess, but the fateful days passed without event. Freud also showed considerable interest in telepathy and clairvoyance, and conducted experiments in this field, often together with Sándor Ferenczi. In spite of his shortness, he was still the ‘‘professor’’ and was authoritarian with his family, his students, and his patients. He showed himself to be the undisputed leader of the psychoanalytic movement, interest in which he stimulated through his many publications. He had overcome pain and disappointment, and watched as the ‘‘cause’’ to which he had devoted his life continued to grow. Interest spread to France, and its identification with a founding father, a Moses—for Freud the creator of monotheism—seemed increasingly justified. It is in this context that his decision to become his daughter Anna’s analyst must be understood. This is not as unusual as it may seem, especially for the time, and Freud speaks of it in his letters. It was only after the Second World War that Anna Freud’s accession to the status of guardian of Freudian orthodoxy cast into oblivion a form of training so inconsistent with the strict criteria that had been laid out. There was a risk the lapse would be viewed as something very nearly incestuous. With the onset of his cancer, old age and death became a reality for Freud. It was at this time that he strengthened the death instinct and deepened the concept of identification discussed in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c). He also revised the theoretical model that he had been developing for the past quarter-century with the ‘‘second topographical’’ structure introduced in The Ego and the Id (1923b). Some of his contemporaries, like Otto Rank, were reluctant to accept Freud’s newest theories, which appeared to disturb the fantastic and somewhat unreal experience represented by the birth of psychoanalysis 64 0 for those who had lived through it. Freud’s life was now marked by painful and disfiguring operations that forced him to interrupt his activities while he recovered in the Weiner Cottage-Sanatorium or the Schloss Tegel clinic, which Ernest Simmel ran from 1927 to 1931 in Berlin. The uncomfortable prosthetic devices he was required to wear caused him to remain silent for long periods of time. Change was in the works, however. There were disagreements within the secret committee, formed at the request of Ernest Jones in 1912 to provide support for Freud during Jung’s defection, and it ceased to exist entirely in 1927. The quarrels weren’t so much about who would inherit Freud’s mantle, as they were about jealousies and rivalries, all of which helped feed Freud’s increasingly pessimistic—some would say realistic—vision of the human race. The first generation of psychoanalysts had evolved and began to develop their own theories. It often fell to Freud to resolve the resulting theoretical disputes and arbitrate personal conflicts. Freud never claimed to be a great therapist and was often irritated by the ‘‘furor sanandi’’ shown by some of his followers, notably Sándor Ferenczi, as being contrary to a strictly psychoanalytic attitude. Although he had encouraged the use of ‘‘active technique’’ in 19181920, he hesitated to complete the project for a ‘‘psychoanalytic method’’ that his followers demanded of him and which he had begun to write down in 1908. During this last period of his life, he devoted himself almost exclusively to training analyses. Having been a patient of Freud was widely viewed as a kind of diploma, and there was an unending stream of candidates, especially from North and South America. His theoretical interest turned increasingly to what he felt to be his most important contribution: the importance of psychoanalysis to culture. It was in keeping with this that he resumed his anthropological ideas about the primitive horde and the murder of the primitive father, which had been introduced in Totem and Taboo (1912-1913a), extending their scope with the new theory of impulses, the importance of primal fantasies, and the concept of primary identification (in 1923b). In The Future of an Illusion (1927c), Freud analyzed religious sentiment; aside from being an affirmation of his scientific and materialist beliefs, the book also served as a warning against the religious leanings that jeopardized psychoanalysis. Civilization and its Discontents (1930a) resumed the discussion of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F R E U D , S I G M U N D S C H L O M O (1856 –1 939) human destiny, torn between its contradictory impulses and condemned to negotiate the avoidance of suffering for its survival. Freud’s focus on culture in his writings became increasingly obvious; he described a ‘‘process of civilization’’ whose evolution paralleled the process of mental development in the individual. The last essay, ‘‘Weltanschauung,’’ in the New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933a) resumed these themes, which had also been discussed in his letter to Albert Einstein, ‘‘Why War?’’ (1933b), but it was in Moses and Monotheism (1939a) that Freud outlined the last great fresco of man’s relation to culture, which continued to preoccupy him. Freud continued to refine psychoanalytic theory. The second topographical model and the theory of impulses, ‘‘our mythology,’’ as he called it in 1933, as well as upheavals in the psychoanalytic movement, led to new considerations and refinements. Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d) is a response to the reduction of the Oedipus theory to the ‘‘birth trauma’’ proposed by Otto Rank in 1924, the first manifestation of a defection that would continue until 1926. ‘‘The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex,’’ (1924d) ‘‘Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes,’’ (1925j) and ‘‘Female Sexuality’’ (1931b) provide an outline of the libido that was supported by the work of the first female psychoanalysts. The emphasis on a phallic phase responded to the criticism of Ernest Jones on Freudian views about femininity, discussed in chapter 30 of the New Introductory Lectures (1930a). There, Freud insists on the primordial role played by the threat and fear of castration. The ego defenses raised to counter the threat led Freud to introduce elements for a new approach to perversion, which he did in ‘‘Negation’’ (1925h). ‘‘Fetishism,’’ (1927e) and his final manuscript, ‘‘Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense.’’ (1940e [1938]) Freud gave increasing consideration to the death impulse in his clinical work and eventually it became not speculative but a key element of his theory, in spite of the opposition of many of his students. Some of his older students passed away—Karl Abraham in 1925 and Ferenczi, who had grown distant from him, in 1933. The most important person in Freud’s circle was now Anna, his daughter. While she was undergoing analysis, Freud arranged her initial contacts with the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, to which she was elected a member in 1922. The worsening of his cancer and subsequent infirmity led to his INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS becoming increasingly dependent on his ‘‘Antigone,’’ who began to represent him at conferences and accepted the Goethe Prize in his stead, when it was awarded in 1930 by the city of Frankfurt to acknowledge the literary value of his writing. She took his place at the funeral of his mother, Amalia FreudNathanson, who died at the age of ninety-five in September 1930. It is easy to understand why Freud looked askance at Ernest Jones and English psychoanalysts when, in 1925, they welcomed Melanie Klein and her theories, which contradicted the views of Anna Freud on child psychoanalysis. Moreover, the Old World was crumbling, incapable of stopping the rise of Adolf Hitler. Freud’s books were burned publicly in May 1933, and Jewish psychoanalysts were forced to flee or condemned to death. Initially, Freud negotiated in the hope of preserving the ‘‘cause,’’ but the Anschluss forced him to face the bleak reality. With the assistance of Princess Marie Bonaparte, who, after an analysis begun in 1925, had become an attentive and influential friend, and the U.S. Ambassador William C. Bullitt, with whom he had attempted to write a psychological study of President Woodrow Wilson (1966b), he was able to emigrate with his wife and daughter to Great Britain on June 6, 1938. His other children as well as his brother Alexander left Austria, but his four sisters remained in Vienna; they died in the Nazi concentration camps in 1942 and 1943. The ‘‘peau de chagrin’’ (Balzac’s novel was one of the last books he read) began to tighten around Freud, who had settled on the outskirts of London, where he continued to write and see patients. The onset of the Second World War on September 1, 1939, and his physical decline led him to ask Max Schur, his doctor, to keep the promise they had made when they first met: not to give him a sedative but to shorten his suffering when he felt the hour was near. He died on September 23, 1939, and three days later his ashes were placed in a Greek urn that, knowing his fondness for antiques, Marie Bonaparte had given him. Freud’s death did not go unnoticed in spite of the upheavals in Europe and elsewhere. Aside from the eulogies and numerous critical assessments, it marked the beginning of a considerable expansion of psychoanalysis that began in the United States, a country Freud claimed to have little liking for. It also resulted in an astonishing idolization of Freud in the years following the war. For a time, under the impetus of the 641 F R E U D , S I G M U N D S C H L O M O (1856 –1 939) lengthy biography written by Ernest Jones, Freud became a subject for hagiography; mention of his name took the place of original thinking and the ‘‘return to Freud’’ served as a theoretical pretext, for others as for Jacques Lacan in France. The home at Maresfield Gardens, where Martha Freud died in 1951, became, under the watchful eye of Anna Freud, the center of Freudianism and, after her death in 1982, was transformed into a museum, as was Freud’s apartment at Berggasse 19 in Vienna. In New York, Kurt Eissler began gathering documents and eye-witness accounts of Freud for the Freud Archives. However, because of his demand for secrecy, this material was for years kept from researchers, arousing their anger, exciting their curiosity, and giving rise to a number of spiteful rumors. On a more serious note, after the leading biography by Fritz Wittels, which had irritated Freud in 1924, and the monument erected by Ernest Jones from 1953 to 1957, a number of books have been written to describe Freud’s life and work, by serious scholars: Max Schur (1972), Ronald W. Clark (1980), Peter Gay (1988). Some of these presented original, and often questionable, interpretations of Freud’s work, such as the biographies by Frank Sulloway (1979) and Marianne Krüll (1979). The gradual appearance of new documents and the opening of the secret archives opened the door to future research and new assessments of Freud’s importance for the history and evolution of the civilization of his time and for human thought. By the 1960s Freud’s books were often bestsellers. The body of Freud’s writings increased with the publication of his correspondence to his students and friends. His letters to Wilhelm Fliess, purchased in 1937 by Marie Bonaparte and miraculously preserved throughout the Second World War, provided insights into the birth of psychoanalysis, a theme that was to serve as inspiration for filmmakers and dramatists (among others, John Huston’s film, Freud, of 1962). Unfortunately, some passages were censured, which led to the growth of research on an unexpurgated history of Freud and psychoanalysis. Paul Roazen helped promote these efforts with his study on the relationship between Freud and Viktor Tausk (1969), which emphasized Freud’s responsibility in the suicide of this brilliant student and triggered a backlash against ‘‘orthodox’’ Freudians by adversaries who, thirty years later, would be labeled ‘‘revisionists.’’ Ardent supporters and angry critics confronted one another on a regular basis. Freud and his ideas were called into question by an increasingly large number of people, in a way compensating for the glorious early years psychoanalysis. The number of essays and criticisms multiplied with the discovery of historical documents—some authentic, some not. The anger and bitterness of his critics became increasingly obvious, betrayed by the excess of the accusations: there was an alleged attempt on Fliess’s life, reports of lies about his patients or errors of diagnosis by a Freud who was hungry for glory, tales of a ménage à trois involving Minna Bernays, and rumors of an abortion. A band of ‘‘moralists’’ obsessed with the ‘‘truth’’ about Freud and Freudianism kept up the pressure, especially in the United States. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA 64 2 Works discussed: Autobiographical Study, An; Civilization and its Discontents; ‘‘Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest’’ ‘‘Contributions to the Psychology of Love’’; ‘‘Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming’’; ‘‘Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva’’; ‘‘Dostoyevsky and Parricide’’; Ego and the Id, The; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; ‘‘Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses’’; Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety; ‘‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’’; Interpretation of Dreams, The; Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis; Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious; ‘‘Klinische Studie über die halbseitiger Cerebrallähmung der Kinder’’ [Clinical study of infantile cerebral diplegia]; Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood; ‘‘Lines of Advance in PsychoAnalytic Therapy’’; ‘‘Metapsychologic Supplement to the Theory of Dreams’’; Moses and Monotheism; Moses of Michelangelo, The’’; ‘‘Mourning and Melancholia’’; ‘‘Negation, The’’; ‘‘Neurasthenia and Anxiety Neurosis’’; New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis; ‘‘Note upon the ÔMystic Writing Pad’, A’’; ‘‘Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis’’ (Rat Man); ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’; ‘‘On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement’’; ‘‘On the Sexual Theories of Children’’; Phylogenetic Fantasy, A: Overview of the Transference Neuroses; ‘‘On Transience’’; ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology, A’’; Question of Lay Analysis, The; ‘‘Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis’’; ‘‘Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through’’; ‘‘Repression’’; ‘‘Seventeenth-century Demonological Neurosis, A’’; ‘‘Sexual Enlightenment Of Children, The’’; ‘‘Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes’’; Studies on Hysteria; ‘‘Theme of the Three Caskets, The’’; ‘‘Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twenty-eighth President of the United States. A Psycho- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FREUD’S SELF-ANALYSIS logical Study’’; Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality; ‘‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’’; ‘‘Totem and Taboo’’; ‘‘Uncanny, The’’; ‘‘Unconscious, The’’; ‘‘Why War?’’; ‘‘ÔWild’ Psycho-Analysis.’’ Bibliography Mijolla, Alain de. (1982). Aux origines de la pratique psychanalytique. In R. Jaccard (Ed.), Histoire de la psychanalyse (v. I, pp. 11–43). Paris: Hachette. ———. (1989). Images of Freud from his correspondence. International Forum of Psychoanalysis, 5, 87–110. ———. (1993). Freud, biography, his autobiography and his biographers. Psychoanalytic History, 1 (1), 4–27. ———. (1996). Un adolescent bien tranquille. Sig(is)mund Freud, 1870–1876. Cahiers du Collège international de l’Adolescence, 1, 231–267. Wittels, Fritz. (1924). Sigmund Freud, his personality, his teaching, his school (E. and C. Paul, Trans.). London: Allen & Unwin. FREUD’S SELF-ANALYSIS Although Didier Anzieu’s doctoral thesis (1975; trans. 1986) treated Freud’s self-analysis, he had already published a briefer, more general text: L’auto-analyse: Son rôle dans la découverte de la psychanalyse par Freud, sa fonction en psychanalyse (Self-analysis: its role in the discovery of psychoanalysis by Freud and its function in psychoanalysis; 1959). There one finds, in addition to research on the self-analysis of the young Freud, a study of self-analysis in general, both in literature (the surrealists) and in the clinic, before and after treatment. Freud’s Self-analysis (1986) dropped the study of self-analysis in general and featured an epistemological and historical approach to Freud’s self-analysis, primarily as revealed in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), in relation to the discovery of psychoanalysis. Anzieu avoided classic biography (such as the one by Ernest Jones [1953–1957]) in order to apply the psychoanalytic method to its creator. His work is supported by a thorough chronological inventory of the documents of the self-analysis (dreams, screen memories, slips, instances of forgetting, and parapraxes) from 1895 to 1902, the date of the break with Wilhelm Fliess and the foundation of the Psychoanalytic Society of Vienna. A chronological list of the inventory itself is appended at the end of the work. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS The central focus of the book is essentially an investigation into the subjective conditions that led Freud to create psychoanalysis. This focus is also part of a major preoccupation of Anzieu’s, the psychoanalysis of creative genius (1974). Especially notable in Freud’s Self-Analysis are the creative subject’s masochism, the mother’s favoritism for the future genius, Freud’s mentally active attitude in relation to the primal scene, the creative subject’s ‘‘heroic identifications,’’ and also the castration anxiety that tends to paralyze or destroy creativity. In this regard Anzieu emphasizes the supportive role played by Fliess, remarking along the way that there is no serious self-analysis if it is not spoken to someone. At a time when the history of psychoanalysis still captured only limited interest in France, Didier Anzieu produced both a reference work for researchers and a valuable example of the inseparability of psychoanalytic theory from the history of the discovery of its concepts, and thus from its authors. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Anzieu, Didier; Self-analysis. Source Citation Anzieu, Didier. (1986). Freud’s self-analysis (Peter Graham, Trans.). Madison, CT: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1975) Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1959). L’auto-analyse: Son rôle dans la découverte de la psychanalyse par Freud, sa fonction en psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ———. (1974). Vers une métapsychologie de la création. In Didier Anzieu (Ed.), Psychanalyse du génie créateur (pp. 1– 30). Paris: Dunod. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1–338; 5: 339–625. Jones, Ernest. (1953–1957). Sigmund Freud: Life and work. London: Hogarth. Mellor-Picaut, Sophie. (1977). Le travail de la création dans ‘‘L’autoanalyse de Freud et la découverte de la psychanalyse’’ par Didier Anzieu. Psychanalyse à l’université. 2 (8), 707–724. 643 FREUD, THE SECRET PASSION FREUD, THE SECRET PASSION The first film made about Sigmund Freud, Freud, the Secret Passion was directed by John Huston and was based on a very long script proposed by Jean-Paul Sartre in 1958 but reworked by Charles Kaufmann and Wolfgang Reinhardt (Sartre insisted that his name not appear in the credits); it featured Montgomery Clift in the role of Freud and Susannah York in the role of Cecily Koertner. Released in 1962, it was distributed in France under the title Freud, désirs inavoués. The film tells the story of the treatment by hypnosis of an hysterical patient, Cecily, by the young Freud, who struggles to bring her into awareness of the sexual origins of her problems and runs up against hostility from those close to her. Freud almost invariably looks furious, ‘‘somber,’’ ‘‘stiff,’’ ‘‘ashen-faced’’—stuck in the shackles of his neurosis until he achieves a state of lucid Sartrean consciousness by getting rid of the protective and hated father figures with whom he had surrounded himself. Pushed by the hostility of the Viennese medical community, spurred on by antiSemitism, he becomes ‘‘engaged,’’ according to Sartre’s ideas, in a revolutionary combat for the liberation of oppressed hysterics, unjustly called ‘‘fakers.’’ He is constructed in the image of the author-philosopher, who was known for repeatedly taking a stand in defense of blacks, the Algerians, Jews, workers, or those who, like Jean Genet, had been labeled from childhood and condemned to be what others had designated them to be. It is these violent external conflicts, symbolized by the three ‘‘fathers’’ who appear—an alcoholic Theodor Meynert, a senile Jakob Freud, and a lame Josef Breuer—that for Sartre constitute the main motivation for Freud’s actions, although Sartre poses an additional, underlying question: What was Freud’s sexuality? The film glosses over this aspect of the script and of Sartre’s explanation of Freud’s violence by means of a sexual contention that remains inexplicable and unexplained. ‘‘But your Freud, he was neurotic down to the marrow!’’ Sartre once said jubilantly to Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (Pontalis in Sartre, 1984/1985). On July 15, 1958, considering Ernest Jones’s hagiography of Freud, Simone de Beauvoir noted in her journal: ‘‘Jones doesn’t explain very well what Freud’s particular neurosis was, nor how he got rid of it. Perhaps the fact that Freud’s daughter is still alive embarrasses him, but there are certain questions he doesn’t ask: Freud’s relationship with his wife, for example. It’s 64 4 easy enough to say that they [sic] were Ôexcellent’; but Freud’s depressions and migraines are either directly linked to his domestic life or they are not. Which? After all, he was an extremely vital man; witness his passionate love of travel. Monogamous, all right; but why, exactly? Jones avoids the question. . . . The most moving moment is the one where he discovers his mistake about hysteria. He had believed that all his women patients had been Ôseduced’ by their fathers . . . and he realized that his patients had invented it all. What a slap in the face! What a shock! . . . It is moving to watch these concepts that have become so scholastic, mechanical—transference for example—reveal themselves in such vital experiences’’ (1963/1965, pp. 430–431). In a 1965 interview, Huston confided to Robert Benayoun: ‘‘The basic idea of Freud the adventurer, the explorer of his own unconscious, was mine. I wanted to concentrate on this episode like in a detective plot.’’ He also explained: ‘‘To me, hypnosis is something magical, almost sacred’’ (Benayoun, 1965). And indeed, the hypnotic treatment and catharsis are what are presented to the public. Huston’s Freud conforms to the classic movie character who, one against all, and above all, against himself, must make triumphant a truth that he reveals through pain. Despite the sugar-coatings he added to the original script, Huston had to submit to the explicit and implicit imperatives of American censorship and adapt his film to the then-dominant ideological demands of the world of psychiatry and psychoanalysis. He later deplored the fact that his film had been ‘‘literally mutilated of its essential scenes’’ (Benayoun, 1965). Many were concerned that Freud’s image might be ruined by his promiscuity in overly shocking scenes. It was essentially Anna Freud who opposed the idea of any film on her father. It is known, for example, that through the intermediary of Marianne Kris, she convinced Marilyn Monroe (who had consulted her during a shoot in London) not to play the role of Cecily, which Huston had in mind for her, according to Donald Spoto’s Marilyn Monroe: The Biography (1993). She also opposed the idea of any living member of the family being represented, which explains the childless marriage attributed to Freud onscreen. The theme of prostitution, which Sartre emphasized so constantly that it can be wondered whether this was his answer to his questions about Freud’s sexuality, was also strongly challenged by Hollywood’s censors, advised by some INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F R I E D L Ä N D E R - F R Ä N K L , K A T E (1902 –1 949) eminent psychoanalysts (Walker, 1993). At the time, as Pontalis pointed out, studies of the history of psychoanalysis were virtually nonexistent. Although the film can be criticized on many counts, its great merit must be acknowledged; it helped to shatter the conventional portrait of an old, stern, bespectacled, and white-bearded Freud. Even though it may seem artificial, excessive in the grimaces and wounded looks given by Montgomery Clift, the character seen onscreen made it possible, in its day, to imagine a Freud who was closer to the young viewers discovering him for the first time. See also: Cinema and psychoanalysis; France; Sartre and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Beauvoir, Simone de. (1965) Force of circumstance: The autobiography of Simone de Beauvoir (Richard Howard, Trans.). New York: Putnam. (Original work published 1963) Benayoun, Robert. (1965). Interview de John Huston. Positif, 70. Mijolla, Alain de. (1999). Freud and the psychoanalytic situation on the screen. In Endless night. Cinema and psychoanalysis: Parallel histories (pp. 188–199). Los Angeles and London: University of California Press. (Original work published 1994) Sartre, Jean Paul. (1985). The Freud scenario (Quinton Hoare, Trans.). London: Verso. (Original work published 1984) brother, Emil (later codirector of the brewery with him), and two sisters on a magnificent property, the remains of which are still visible next to the brewery. Here Sigmund Freud spent the summer of 1918, far from the penury of wartime, receiving visits from Sandór Ferenczi, going for carriage rides along the Danube, correcting proofs of his articles, and analyzing one of von Freund’s sisters, Kata (the future wife of Lajos Lévy, a physician, analyst, and director of the Jewish Hospital). Von Freund underwent analysis with Freud and even directed a course of an analysis, which he reported on to Freud. The two men became friends, and von Freund went on to play an important role in the psychoanalytic movement. An eminent figure in Budapest, and practical and generous in temperament, he was initially the main organizer of the Fifth Congress of 1918 and was the founder of the first center for research on child psychology (for which he recruited Melanie Klein, one of Ferenczi’s patients). He financed the publishing house Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag in Vienna as well as an analytic outpatient clinic in Budapest (the latter was never actually created). He died prematurely of cancer, and Freud composed a moving obituary for this ‘‘providential’’ man. MICHELLE MOREAU RICAUD See also: Beyond the Pleasure Principle; Hungary; Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. Bibliography Spoto, Donald. (1993). Marilyn Monroe: The autobiography. New York: HarperCollins. Freud, Sigmund. (1920). Dr. Anton von Freund. SE, 18: 267–268. Walker, Janet. (1993). Couching resistance: Women, film, and psychoanalytic psychiatry, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. FRIEDLÄNDER-FRÄNKL, KATE (1902–1949) FREUND TOSZEGHY, ANTON VON (1880–1920) Kate Friedländer, psychoanalyst and physician, was born in Innsbruck, Austria in 1902, and died February 20, 1949, in London. Anton von Freund Toszeghy, director of a brewery in Budapest, Hungary, a doctor of philosophy, and a patron of the psychoanalytic movement, was born in 1880 in Budapest and died on January 20, 1920, in Vienna, Austria. The son of a rich, ennobled industrialist who founded the state brewery of Steinbuch A. G., von Freund spent an idyllic childhood with his INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Kate Friedländer’s birthplace was one of the most anti-Semitic parts of Austria, and her parents were middle-class Jews. Her two brothers both died in early childhood, and she had a gifted younger sister whom she greatly admired. She obtained her medical degree at the University in 1926, but frustrated by the narrow outlook in her 645 FRIENDSHIP native town, she left for the Weimar Republic and settled in Berlin. There she became an assistant to Professor Karl Bonhoeffer at the University psychiatric clinic (The Charité), where many of the young doctors were interested in psychoanalysis. In 1930 Kate Friedländer obtained her second medical degree. She was interested in neurology and in 1932 published a paper titled ‘‘A Clinical Entity to be separated from Multiple Sclerosis.’’ She wrote other papers, including one on general paresis and the social integration of those who had been treated for this condition with malaria therapy. This reflected her keen interest in social affairs and strong social conscience,an interest reflected in her involvement in the Juvenile Court in Berlin. Her interest in delinquency lasted all through her professional life. Two of her early papers, ‘‘The Somatic Origin of Anxiety’’ (1933) and ‘‘The Biological Basis of Freud’s Theory of Anxiety’’ (1935), proclaimed her deep interest in this subject. Friedländer’s achievements in Berlin, and her pleasure in them, were overshadowed by the success of the Nazis. Together with her husband and two-year-old daughter, she emigrated to London in 1933, to become first an associate and then a full member of the British Psychoanalytical Society. In 1936 she took her third medical degree in Edinburgh, and in 1943 her D.P.M., in London. Her husband became increasingly mentally ill and, although she fought hard to save her marriage, the first steps toward an eventual divorce were taken in 1935. Although her interests were wide, Kate Friedländer’s contributions to psychoanalysis developed along two main lines, one linked closely with Edward Glover and the other with Anna Freud. In the 1930s she had already pursued her interest in delinquency and joined Glover in the Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency; she published a book, The PsychoAnalytic Approach to Juvenile Delinquency, in 1947. With the arrival of Anna Freud she was greatly stimulated by her work with children and by the eventual creation of the War Nurseries. It was she above all who persuaded Anna Freud to found the child training course, in which she took an active part and which later became an integral part of the Hampstead Child Therapy Course and Clinic—an enterprise that would have delighted her had she lived to see it. It was her remarkable vision and energy that led her to set up Britain’s first Child Guidance Clinic—that of West Sussex, of which branches were opened in Horsham, Chichester and Worthing, supported by 64 6 enthusiastic students who had worked in the Hampstead Nurseries. These are the achievements for which she is best remembered. She played as well a full part in the life of the British Psychoanalytical Society, and submitted a number of written statements to the special meetings on the Controversial Discussions. But when Edward Glover, whom she strongly supported, resigned from the Society in 1944, she withdrew as well. She was a keen and active sportswoman, an adventurous swimmer who defied tide and uncongenial weather, fond of tennis, skiing, ice-skating, and mountaineering. She died, with a great deal still to offer, on February 20, 1949, from carcinoma of the lung with brain secondaries, at the early age of forty-six, with her second husband, a well-known radiologist, at her beside. CLIFFORD YORKE See also: Controversial Discussions; Great Britain. Bibliography Friedländer, Kate. (1940). On the longing to die. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 21, 416–426. ——— (1941). Children’s books and their function in latency and pre-puberty. Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, 26. ———. (1945). Formation of the anti-social character. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1, 189. ———. (1949). Neurosis and home background, a preliminary report. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 3–4, 423. King, Pearl H. M.; and Steiner, Riccardo. (1991). The FreudKlein Controversies, 1941–1945. London-New York: Tavistock Publications-Routledge, New Library of Psychoanalysis. FRIENDSHIP From a psychoanalytic viewpoint, friendship is one of the bonds that arise from sexual impulses when their attainment of a directly sexual goal is inhibited. However, this is a process of inhibition rather than sublimation. This approach to a sexual satisfaction that is never consummated forms the basis for especially strong and enduring ties between people. Both in adolescence and in adulthood, Freud had some intense and deep friendships, but he did not INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FRIENDSHIP write on this subject at any great length. However, friendship, as he defined it, plays a key role between individuals to the extent that it appears as a metaphor for those relationships between two people that, unlike the state of romantic love, lead to a broader form of unity. In this sense, Freud connects it with these other ties that are based on the aim-inhibited sexual impulses: the tender relationship between parent and child, and conjugal love in which the sexual relationship has gradually fallen into second place. These two bonds form the basis for the broader unity that is constituted by the family, just as friendship is the foundation for the creation of social ties. However, these different kinds of bond should not be confused, because the homosexual libido can develop into friendship whereas the conjugal bond is in essence heterosexual and the parent-child relationship involves an elaboration of the parent’s narcissistic libido. These ties can even conflict: ‘‘a pair of lovers are sufficient to themselves, and do not even need the child they have in common to make them happy’’ (1930a [1929], p. 108). At the theoretical level, Freud refined the concept of sublimation by distinguishing it from the inhibition of the aim of sexual satisfaction and, in this respect, friendship constitutes a good example. Using the examples of Plato and St. Paul (1921c), Freud emphasized that the libido corresponds to love understood in a wide sense, including, along with the state of romantic love, self-love, filial and parental love, friendship, and even the attachment to physical objects and abstract ideas. The sexual basis of these ties is attested to by the fact that they retain some of the primary sexual aims: ‘‘Even an affectionate devotee, even a friend or an admirer, desires the physical proximity and the sight of the person who is now loved only in the ÔPauline’ sense’’ (pp. 138–139). However, these aim-inhibited drives are not only capable of being combined with non-inhibited drives but can also be transformed back in the opposite direction to revert to the directly sexual form from which they have originated. Friendship, admiration, and even the religious bond therefore remain close to the sexual bond itself. There is a particular kind of friendship that merits further consideration—the form that is shared by male homosexuals and leads to the formation of social ties. In relation to Daniel Paul Schreber, Freud wrote INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS that homosexual tendencies ‘‘help to constitute the social instincts, thus contributing an erotic factor to friendship and comradeship, to esprit de corps and to the love of mankind in general. How large a contribution is in fact derived from erotic sources (with the sexual aim inhibited) could scarcely be guessed from the normal social relations of mankind’’ (1911c [1910], p. 61). He bases this on the hypothesis that the shared homosexual impulse is generally aim-inhibited and constitutes a source of unused libido that is therefore available for these various ties. Moreover, the degree of homosexual drive in an individual determines their particular capacity for forming such ties, provided that they continue to inhibit it from direct satisfaction. This highly simplistic economic perspective, which ignores the entire tradition of homosexual friendship in antiquity and mentions only the form that is not aim-inhibited, is somewhat baffling. This is a long way removed from the depth of Freud’s analysis of the resexualization of sublimated homosexual ties that leads via narcissism to paranoia (1911c [1910]). However, Freud continues to subscribe to this specific affinity between the homosexual bond and the constitution of the group through friendship and esprit de corps: ‘‘It seems certain that homosexual love is far more compatible with group ties, even when it takes the shape of uninhibited sexual tendencies’’ (1921c, p. 141). While the ‘‘social sense,’’ a ‘‘sublimated’’ (or, rather, inhibited) form of the male homosexual libido, may take the form of love of humanity, it can also be extended to a relatively large group. Solidarity is therefore the form of expression given to the recognition of what is identical to the self. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Alter ego; Double (the); Eros; Homosexuality; Persecution; ‘‘Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides).’’ Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1911c [1910]). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1–82. ———. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. 647 FRIGHT Further Reading See also: Castration complex. Rangell, Leo. (1963). On friendship. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 11, 3–54. Bibliography Rubin, Lowell B. (1986). On men and friendship. Psychoanalytic Review, 73, 165–181. Barrois, Claude. (1988). Les névroses traumatiques. Paris: Dunod. Freud, Sigmund. (1923d [1922]). A seventeenth-century demonological neurosis. SE, 19: 67–105. FRIGHT Fright, a state of sudden, extreme fear, is provoked either by a situation experienced as an external danger or by the feeling of a high probability of danger. Situations capable of causing fright are often associated with a risk of physical or mental death. The term fright appeared in the Freudian corpus for the first time in the ‘‘Preliminary communication’’ (Breuer and Freud, 1893a) to the Studies on Hysteria (1895d). In this paper Freud evokes the links between certain forms of hysteria and traumatic neurosis, combined in the term traumatic hysteria. Unlike the physical expression of hysteria, the affect of fright is mental trauma. In a clinical context, fright is accompanied by a state of shock and stupor or, more rarely, by disordered agitation. But ever since Freud, psychoanalytic clinical practice and theory have always emphasized the passivity of fright and total lack of preparedness of the subject in the face of the situation, which are due as much to the totally unforeseeable nature of the event as to the potential for concrete danger. It is in this sense that fright must be differentiated from fear (a concept implying a definite object) and anxiety (a central psychoanalytic concept connoting the anxious expectation of an external or internal danger that needs to be confronted). As with many concepts, this distinction between internal and external is primarily metaphoric. For example, ‘‘sexual fright’’ designates a cataclysmic eruption that has a disorganizing effect on the subject’s mental life. Fright is associated with the splitting of the ego, the castration complex, and the perception of reality. In light of the distinctions above, the concept of fright deserves a place in modern psychoanalysis, for it allows psychoanalysts to accurately assign theoretical and clinical categories and to avoid terminological ambiguity. CLAUDE BARROIS 64 8 ———. (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. ———. (1940c [1922]). Medusa’s head. SE, 18: 273–274. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1893a). On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomena: Preliminary communication. SE, 2: 1–17. FRINK, HORACE WESTLAKE (1883–1936) Horace Westlake Frink, American psychoanalyst and physician, was born in 1883 in Millerton, New York, and died on April 19, 1936, in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. A physician uncle in Hillsdale, NY, raised Frink, an orphan. He studied with Adolf Meyer while attending Cornell University Medical College, from which he received his medical degree in 1905. Although Abraham Arden Brill, Frink’s first analyst in 1909, considered himself the most prominent analyst in America, after James Jackson Putnam’s death in 1918 Freud was unhappy with the prospects of the direction of his movement in the United States. Between 1921 and 1923, for two periods of analysis, Frink was in treatment with Freud in Vienna, and Freud decided Frink was the most brilliant of his American disciples, and picked Frink to replace Brill as his deputy in America. Frink was married and had two children. He was a Gentile in a movement known for its many Jews, which could help account for Freud’s enthusiasm for him. At Freud’s direction he became president of the New York Psychoanalytic Society. During Frink’s second analysis with Freud, Frink underwent a psychotic breakdown which Freud failed to recognize as such. Frink suffered so much depersonalization that he had to be taken care of for a time by a male attendant. Freud interpreted Frink’s difficulties as simply part of the analysis. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ‘ ‘F R O M Earlier, back in New York, Frink had fallen in love with a patient of his, an immensely rich, Jewish, married woman named Angelika Bijur. Her husband, also in analysis, threatened a legal suit against what he thought was the misconduct of his wife’s analyst. Frink had guilt feelings about abandoning his first wife who, however, was willing to divorce for the sake of his health. Freud saw Frink’s new fiancée in Vienna and encouraged the new union. Shortly before the wedding the bride had her doubts about Frink’s stability. Freud, however, insisted that Frink’s analysis was ‘‘complete’’ and that he was fully able to go through with the marriage. Freud thought that the match would be good for the analytic movement. Bijur’s first husband died of cancer, and shortly after the wedding Frink’s own first spouse passed away. Frink felt he was unable to carry on, and put himself under the psychiatric care of Adolf Meyer. Frink’s second wife repudiated Meyer’s recommendation of patience, and ended the marriage. She was furious at the way she thought that Freud had misled her, and irritated that he had blamed her for supposedly having failed Frink over money. Frink did attempt a professional comeback after leaving the hospital. But at an analytic meeting in New York, Brill read a letter from Freud to another analyst stating that Frink was unfit to execute the commission to which Freud had appointed him, because he was suffering from a mental disorder. Frink spent the next decade raising his children. He was able to live on the money they had inherited from their mother, which Angelika had given as part of the divorce settlement. Frink re-married in 1935, but was suffering from heart disease; he died at a hospital in a state of manic excitement. Frink’s textbook Morbid Fears and Compulsions (1918) was the best psychoanalytic book of its kind in English at the time. Frink, who had become the center of a great scandal, turned against analysis but did not in the remotest way blame Freud for what had happened. Freud thought that Frink’s demise was the last straw in Freud’s efforts to help the Americans, and it confirmed Freud in his anti-American prejudices. PAUL ROAZEN See also: United States. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THE HISTORY OF AN INFANTILE NEUROSIS’’ (WOLF MAN) Bibliography Frink, Horace. (1918). Morbid fears and compulsions New York: Dodd Mead. ‘‘FROM THE HISTORY OF AN INFANTILE NEUROSIS’’ (WOLF MAN) The twenty-three-year-old Dr. Sergueı̈ Pankejeff, alias the Wolf Man, first consulted Freud in the beginning of February, 1910, and became the subject of the longest and, by general consent, greatest of Freud’s case histories. Dr. Pankejeff ’s health had collapsed in his eighteenth year after a gonorrheal infection, and by the time he met Freud, he was incapacitated and entirely dependent on an attendant. In Freud’s eyes, he had an obsessional neurosis; modern opinion favors the diagnosis of borderline pathology. Dr. Pankejeff felt that he was caught off from the world by a ‘‘veil,’’ which could be torn away only after he received an enema. In a letter addressed to Sándor Ferenczi at the very beginning of the analysis, Freud wrote about his patient, ‘‘He would like to use me from behind and shit on my head.’’ In the case history, Freud focuses on the patient’s early life. The very title of the case history, ‘‘From the history of an infantile neurosis,’’ indicates a drastic expository selection from the four and a half years of the patient’s first analysis with Freud. Freud used the case to demonstrate the lasting neurotic impact of conflicted infantile sexuality in order to refute the theories of Alfred Adler and Carl Jung. Despite Freud’s claim of a complete cure, the Wolf Man continued to be seriously ill for the remaining half century of his life and was seen by many therapists (for accounts of Dr. Pankejeff ’s second analysis with Freud and the subsequent prolonged analysis with Ruth Mack Brunswick, see Gardiner, 1971). The case history is noteworthy for having brought to attention the psychodynamics of the following phenomena: the primal scene (adults engaged in sex), the early oral organization of the libido, primary feminine impulses, deferred effects, the rare instance of a trauma arising from a manifest drama, the complexities of anal eroticism and the castration complex, and the multiple vicissitudes of an obsession. In a technical sense, the case is remarkable as an example of a most elaborate analysis of a dream, a detailed reconstruction of an infantile scene, and strategic reliance on forced 649 F R O M M , E R I C H (190 0 –1980 ) termination of the analysis. Given the paucity of transference between Dr. Pankejeff and Freud in the clinical setting, one may suspect that the case material was immeasurably better understood and more highly organized in Freud’s mind than in the patient’s. Freud described a whole range of mental disturbances in Pankejeff ’s young life, ranging from infantile anorexia and panic attacks to deficient impulse control, phobia, entrenched sadomasochistic tendencies, and various symptoms of obsession. Because he emphasized oedipal-derived pathology, Freud attributed major importance to the primal scene and the castration complex. Capital events determining the patient’s young life were a primal scene observed when he was one and a half, a threat of castration from his nursery maid Grusha about a year later, his sister’s seduction when he was three and a quarter, his traumatic dream when he was four, the outbreak of symptoms of obsession a half year later, and hallucinations at the age of five. In a mimetic gesture, Freud devotes part 4 of his case history to the traumatic dream that Pankejeff had at age four about wolves (whence the patient’s pseudonym). According to Freud’s minute reconstruction, which mined each detail of the dream, the primal scene of coitus a tergo (vaginal penetration from behind) observed by the patient as an infant finally returned much later in a dream when he was capable of a deferred understanding. After writing up the case in 1914, Freud himself had a deferred understanding about the authenticity of the early primal scene (Freud did not include that revision in part 4 but deferred its inclusion, and hence his readers’ ability to understand it, until part 5). Notwithstanding Freud’s reserve about the factuality of the primal scene, his comparative elaboration of clinical material in the case history remains problematic. According to Freud, the Grusha scene was more certain than the primal scene (1918, 113 ff.), yet he mentions the Grusha scene on 12 pages, or 10 percent of the case (115 pages), whereas he refers to the ‘‘less certain primal scene’’ on 46 pages, or about 40 percent of the case. Such a discrepancy over what is salient in the very showpiece of Freud’s case histories proportionately undercuts its intrinsic value. Another salient feature of the case history is that the initial years of treatment produced hardly any change. Freud submitted his patient to a ‘‘long education’’ 65 0 before Pankejeff would share in the work of analysis, and once he did with any success, he forsook further cooperation. He thus became ‘‘unassailably entrenched behind an attitude of obliging apathy.’’ Freud then took the drastic measure of unilaterally setting an irrevocable, fixed date for terminating treatment. Reacting to the pressure of a deadline, Pankejeff reportedly lessened his resistance and came forth with a flood of material that clarified Freud’s comprehension of the infantile neurosis. In light of the patient’s passive character and superficial compliance, many analysts hold that only Freud believed that there was a clinical breakthrough, not his patient. PATRICK MAHONY See also: Abraham, Nicolas; Disavowal; Infantile neurosis; Money and psychoanalytic treatment; Pankejeff, Sergueı̈; Primal fantasy; Primal scene. Source citation Freud Sigmund. (1918). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17, 1–122. Bibliography Freud Sigmund. (1918). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17, 1–122. Gardiner, Muriel M. (Ed.). (1971). The wolf-man by the wolf-man. New York: Basic Books. Mahony, Patrick J. (1984). Cries of the wolf man. New York: International Universities Press. Smith, Joseph, and Humphrey, Morris (Eds.). (1992). Telling facts: history and narration in psychoanalysis. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Viderman, Serge. (1970). La construction de l’espace analytique. Paris: Denoël. FROMM, ERICH (1900–1980) Erich Fromm, a German psychoanalyst and sociologist, was born on March 23, 1900, in Frankfurt, Germany, and died on March 18, 1980, in Locarno, Switzerland. He grew up in a Jewish family in Germany. From age eighteen to twenty-two he attended the University of Heidelberg, where he studied sociology, receiving his doctorate under the supervision of Alfred Weber. He wrote his thesis on Talmudic law in three separate Jewish communities. In 1924 he met Frieda Reichmann, who became his first analyst and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS F R O M M , E R I C H (1900 –1 980) later his wife. At the time she was running a small sanatorium in Frankfurt. Fromm had two other analysts before he moved to Berlin, where in 1927 he was analyzed by the Viennese Hanns Sachs. From the 1930s, after about ten years of being a traditional Freudian, Fromm began to look critically at the central moral and philosophical bases of Freud’s writings. As a Marxist, Fromm was shrewd in spotting the middle-class, liberal assumptions Freud had taken for granted. As a psychologist, Fromm’s special theoretical contribution was an understanding of the social forces that stabilize or undermine the political community. In Escape from Freedom (1941), a landmark in modern social science, Fromm enunciated the important concept of ‘‘social character’’ in building theoretical bridges between the study of the individual and the study of society. He was fascinated with the problem of social change and how sociological issues can be understood in the light of depth psychology. He also wanted to examine people in their social milieus. Fromm had his predecessors within psychoanalysis, the most notable perhaps being Wilhelm Reich, who also tried to synthesize Marxist and Freudian principles. Fromm has his detractors: not only strict psychoanalysts but also Marxist hardliners, who have been determined to dismiss Fromm as a so-called social democrat. After Fromm fled from Nazi Germany in 1933, he moved to the United States, where he was soon in contact with a whole new school of analysts, anthropologists, and sociologists that became known as the neo-Freudian movement. This group included analysts like Harry Stack Sullivan, Karen Horney, Abram Kardiner, and Clara Thompson, as well as academics such as Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Ralph Linton. Fromm found that he had been quietly dropped as a direct member of the International Psychoanalytical Association. Despite this setback, he was made clinical director of the William Alanson White Institute in New York City, which focuses on training psychoanalysts, and served from 1946 until 1950. In 1949 Fromm moved for much of the year to Mexico for his second wife’s health. There he founded the Mexican Institute of Psychoanalysis, where his ideas are still being taught in a clinical context as of 2005. He also continued to write in his isolated retreat near Mexico City. Especially in Germany, where the International Erich Fromm Society is headquartered, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS but also in Italy and elsewhere, Fromm’s clinical concepts are still being extended. Millions of people around the world read Fromm’s works, but it has usually been his social philosophy that catches the public’s attention. Works like The Sane Society (1955) represent a serious indictment of modern capitalist culture. Man for Himself (1947) was an early popular effort to extract a humanitarian core from analytic teachings. The Art of Loving (1956) is perhaps Fromm’s best-selling book. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1973) showed the comprehensive nature of Fromm’s system of thought. To Have or to Be? (1976) was a widely read restatement of his attempt to connect humanistic Marxism with analysis. More technical works like The Forgotten Language (1951) and Psychoanalysis and Religion (1950) are of direct clinical relevance, even though they are no longer studied at most professional training centers. Fromm was one of the first and boldest to challenge the ideological underpinnings of Ernest Jones’s quasiofficial three-volume life of Freud. In Sigmund Freud’s Mission (1959) he gave a path-breaking response to the orthodox version of Freud’s career and its controversies. For example, he asked some serious questions about Freud’s relationship with his mother—a subject that has not received adequate attention in the literature. Fromm also discredited Jones’s account of the supposed mental deterioration of both Sándor Ferenczi and Otto Rank. Fromm, one of the most conceptually clear-cut thinkers in the tradition of dissenting analysts, claimed to be truer to the intellectually radical implications of the spirit of Freud’s thought than the organized following generally supposed to be Freud’s heirs. One cannot correct some central problems where Freud could be mistaken by piously fixing translations or reediting Freud’s writings. By pointing out some of these central problems, Fromm ranks as an important critic of Freud’s. Part of Fromm’s strength came from a deep identification with Freud as a warrior of the spirit; to be genuinely like Freud meant also to be independentminded. Fromm proved fearless in expressing his analytic convictions, even though the orthodoxminded to reacted to him by branding him as a dissenting voice. PAUL ROAZEN 651 F R O M M - R E I C H M A N N , F R I E D A (188 9 –1957 ) See also: Germany; Horney-Danielson, Karen; International Federation of Psychoanalytic Societies; Marxism and psychoanalysis; Mexico; United States;; Politics and psychoanalysis; Sigmund Freud Institut. Bibliography Burston, Daniel. (1991). The legacy of Erich Fromm. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Fromm, Erich. (1941). Escape from freedom. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. ———. (1947). Man for himself. Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Premier Books. ———. (1950). Psychoanalysis and religion. New Haven: Yale University Press. ———. (1951). The forgotten language: An introduction to the understanding of dreams, fairy tales, and myths. New York: Rinehart. ———. (1955). The sane society. Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Premier Books. ———. (1956). The art of loving. New York: Harper. ———. (1959). Sigmund Freud’s mission: An analysis of his personality and influence. New York: Harper. ———. (1973). The anatomy of human destructiveness. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. ———. (1976). To have or to be? New York: Harper and Row. Funk, Rainer. (1982). Erich Fromm: The courage to be human (Michael Shaw, Trans.). New York: Continuum. FROMM-REICHMANN, FRIEDA (1889–1957) Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, psychoanalyst and physician, was born on October 23, 1889, in Karlsruhe, Germany, and died on April 28, 1957, in her cottage on the grounds of Chestnut Lodge, Rockville, Maryland, in the United States. Fromm-Reichmann was the oldest of three daughters. Her father was a Jewish bank personnel manager and her mother founded a girls’ school, which well prepared Frieda to be among the very first German university-trained women. She graduated in 1913 from the University of Koenigsberg medical school where her dissertation mentor was Kurt Goldstein, with whom she worked during World War I. As a major in the Prussian Army she ran a hospital for soldiers with 65 2 brain injuries. She then joined the psychotherapy staff of the Lahmann Sanitorium, Weisser Hirsch, under J. H. Schultz’s directorship (1920–1924). Fromm-Reichmann received her psychoanalytic training at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute (1925), where her training analyst was Hanns Sachs. She opened her own sanatorium where kosher food was served (nicknamed the ‘‘Thorapeuticum’’), working closely with Georg Groddeck, as well as Sándor Ferenczi. She was married to Erich Fromm, who was ten years younger than she. This marriage lasted for about four years. Along with Karl Landauer, Heinrich Meng, Georg Groddeck, Siegfried Füchs, and Franz Stein, they founded the Frankfurter Institut. With the onset of World War II she went first to Alsace-Lorraine, (1933–1934) then Palestine (1934), and in 1935 to the United States. At Chestnut Lodge, as its Director of Psychotherapy, she helped its owner and medical director, Dexter M. Bullard, Sr., make it the premier center for the psychoanalytically-oriented treatment of schizophrenia, and worked closely with Harry Stack Sullivan. She was a training analyst of the Washington-Baltimore Psychoanalytic Institute and president of its Society (1939–1941), and a popular teacher at the Washington School of Psychiatry. Her central thesis was that psychotic patients’ communications are understandable, that they magnify their sense of their destructive potential and thus isolate themselves, suffering enormous loneliness and dread. If the therapist understands his or her countertransference and thus is not made anxious by the psychotic patient, recovery is possible. Essentially all psychiatrists trained during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s read her book Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy. Joanne Greenberg, a patient of hers who recovered from schizophrenia, wrote the bestseller I Never Promised You a Rose Garden, in which Fromm-Reichmann appears as Dr. Fried. ANN-LOUISE S. SILVER See also: Germany; Psychotic transference; Schizophrenia; Sigmund Freud Institut; United States. Bibliography Bullard, Dexter. (1959). Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Selected papers of Frieda Fromm-Reichmann. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FRUSTRATION Fromm-Reichmann, Frieda. (1950). Principles of intensive psychotherapy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Greenberg, Joanne. (1964). I never promised you a rose garden. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Hornstein, Gail A. (2000). To redeem one person is to redeem the world: The life of Frieda Fromm-Reichmann. New York: The Free Press. Silver, Ann-Louise. (Ed.). (1989). Psychoanalysis and psychosis; Madison, CT: International Universities Press. FRUSTRATION The word frustration, now in common usage, refers to the state of someone who denies himself, or who is denied, drive satisfaction. Beginning with ‘‘Heredity and Aetiology of the Neuroses’’ (1896a), a paper written in French, Freud identified sexual frustration as conducive to anxiety neurosis. In ‘‘My Views on the Part Played by Sexuality in the Aetiology of Neuroses’’ (1906a), to refer to frustrated excitation, he used the word ‘‘frustrane,’’ a word probably formed from the German verb ‘‘frustrieren’’ (to frustrate), which was in everyday usage. The German language has no equivalent to the substantive form ‘‘frustration,’’ which was later used in English and the romance languages to translate ‘‘Versagung,’’ the word used by Freud in a slightly different sense from the meaning it then had of renunciation and sometimes refusal to describe frustration. Freud was aware of this difficulty and did not neglect to discuss it. In his article ‘‘Types of Onset of Neurosis’’ (1912c), Freud used the word ‘‘frustration’’ (Versagung) for the first time to describe both internal and external factors that cause neurosis. He wrote, ‘‘Psycho-analysis has warned us that we must give up the unfruitful contrast between external and internal factors, between experience and constitution, and has taught us that we shall invariably find the cause of the onset of neurotic illness in a particular psychical situation which can be brought about in a variety of ways’’ (p. 238). In essential particulars he continued to hold this view, going on to write, for example, about a narcissistic form of frustration. The concept of frustration seems to cover the idea of privation, while sometimes going beyond it. Freud was aware of a conceptual difficulty here, and he attributed its resolution to psychoanalysis rather to the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS innate genius of the German language. In The Future of an Illusion (1927c), he wrote, ‘‘For the sake of a uniform terminology we will describe the fact that an instinct cannot be satisfied as a Ôfrustration,’ the regulation by which this frustration is established as a Ôprohibition’ and the condition which is produced by the prohibition as a Ôprivation’ ’’ (p. 10). Later in this work he specified the drive urges subject to frustration, prohibition, and privation: incestuous, murderous, and cannibalistic wishes. In the view of English-language authors, Melanie Klein in particular, frustration incites the reality principle and modulates psychic functioning. ‘‘Neurotic children do not tolerate reality well, because they cannot tolerate frustrations. They protect themselves from reality by denying it. What is fundamental and decisive for their future adaptability to reality is their greater or lesser capacity to tolerate those frustrations that arise out of the Oedipus situation’’ (Klein, 1975, pp. 11–12). Here the feeling of frustration appears to complement the idealizing impulse pointed out by JeanMichel Petot (1982), who also suggested that the English term ‘‘deprivation’’ was closer to the German Versagung. The connections made by Freud among frustration, prohibition, and privation form the basis for Lacan’s discussion of the connections between castration, privation, and frustration in his seminar on the object relationship (1994). Frustration there appears as an imaginary formation caused by the symbolic mother but related to the real breast; it prevents the subject from entering the symbolic dialectic of giving and exchange. Lacan writes, ‘‘Frustration essentially belongs to the realm of protest. It relates to something that is desired and not possessed but that is desired without reference to any possibility of gratification or acquisition. Frustration itself constitutes the realm of unbridled and lawless demands. This core of the concept of frustration as such is one of the categories of lack and an imaginary damnation. It exists at the imaginary level.’’ And later, ‘‘The early experience of frustration is only of importance and interest insofar as it leads to one or other of the two levels that I have set out for you—castration or privation. In truth, castration is simply that which accords frustration its true place, transcending it and establishing it within a law that gives it another meaning.’’ Frustration for Lacan is nonetheless more than a mode of object relationship; it extends from an object 653 FUNCTIONAL PHENOMENON relationship to the very organization of speech and the ego. There is an inherent frustration in the discourse of the subject, and the feeling of frustration is a basic characteristic of the ego (Lacan, 1994). These propositions can be connected with Kleinian theories of the genesis and organization of the psychic apparatus. It should be mentioned that on two occasions Lacan made Freud’s use of the term frustration unnecessarily problematic. He asserted that it was of marginal importance in Freud’s thought, whereas in fact it is central to his thought and Lacan himself deploys it as such (1994 [1956–1957]). Ten years later, far from correcting this viewpoint, he went so far as to assert that there was not the slightest trace of the term frustration to be found in Freud’s works (1966). Lacan’s persistent slip suggests that the expansion of the concept of frustration in psychoanalysis is the result of a misunderstanding or a translation error not only among German and English and the romance languages but above all between psychoanalysis and psychology, which at the time essentially based its observations, experiments, and theories on the conflict between frustration and gratification. LUIZ EDUARDO PRADO DE OLIVEIRA See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence; Active technique; Anxiety; Archaic mother; Child analysis; Deprivation; Negative Capability; Primary need; Privation; Projection; Protothoughts; Psychological tests; Realization; Relaxation principle and neo-catharsis; Splitting; Splitting of the object; Subject’s castration, the; Symbolic realization; Thought-thinking apparatus; Want of being/lack of being. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1896a). Heredity and the aetiology of the neuroses. SE, 3: 141–156. ———. (1906a [1905]). My views on the part played by sexuality in the aetiology of the neuroses. SE, 7: 269–279. ———. (1912c). Types of onset of neurosis. SE, 12: 227– 238. ———. (1927c). The future of an illusion. SE, 21: 1–56. Klein, Melanie. (1975). The psychological foundations of child analysis. In The writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. 2: The psycho-analysis of children; Alix Strachey, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Écrits. Paris: Seuil. 65 4 ———. (1977). Écrits: A selection (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). New York: Norton. ———. (1994). Le seminaire. Book 4: La relation d’objet (1956–1957). Paris: Seuil. Petot, Jean-Michel. (1982). Mélanie Klein. (Christine Trollope, Trans.). Madison, CT: International Universities Press. Siboni, Jacques. (1996). Les mathèmes de Lacan: Anthologie des assertions entièrement transmissibles et de leurs relations dans les écrits de Jacques Lacan. Paris: Lysimaque. Further Reading Bacal, Howard. (1988). Reflections on ‘optimum frustration.’ Progress in Self Psychology, 4, 127–131. Lowenfeld, Henry. (1975). Notes on frustration. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 44, 127–138. FUNCTIONAL PHENOMENON In his study on ‘‘hypnagogic’’ states (states between being awake and falling asleep) (1909/1951), which earned immediate publication and led him to make contact with Sigmund Freud in 1909, Herbert Silberer designated by the name ‘‘autosymbolic phenomenon’’ the visual image he saw when falling asleep that, upon analysis, could be understood as a representation in image form of his ideas at that moment. He gave the name ‘‘functional phenomenon’’ to what, in this process, represented not the object of his thought but how his mind was functioning—effortlessly, cumbersomely, or vainly. In other words, the term refers to a symbolization of the thinking process itself, of the current activity of the mind, its affects, and its intentions. In ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ (1914c), Sigmund Freud, in his discussion of the role of moral conscience, offered a commentary that is as clear as it is full of praise: ‘‘It will certainly be of importance to us if evidence of the activity of this critically observing agency—which becomes heightened into conscience and philosophic introspection—can be found in other fields as well. I will mention here what Herbert Silberer has called the Ôfunctional phenomenon,’ one of the few indisputably valuable additions to the theory of dreams. Silberer, as we know, has shown that in states between sleeping and waking we can directly observe the translation of thoughts into visual images, but that in these circumstances we frequently have a representation, not of a thought-content, but of the actual state (willingness, fatigue, etc.) of the person who is strugINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FUNDAMENTAL RULE gling against sleep. Similarly, he has shown that the conclusions of some dreams or some divisions in their content merely signify the dreamer’s own perception of his sleeping and waking. Silberer has thus demonstrated the part played by observation—in the sense of the paranoic’s delusions of being watched—in the formation of dreams. This part is not a constant one. Probably the reason why I overlooked it is because it does not play any great part in my own dreams; in persons who are gifted philosophically and accustomed to introspection it may become very evident’’ (pp. 96–97). In Silberer’s thought, analysis of functional phenomena resulted in an interpretation that increasingly evolved toward abstraction and generalization—‘‘anagogical interpretation,’’ which Freud criticized. At the end of a lengthy critical examination of Silberer’s theories in his article ‘‘The Theory of Symbolism’’ (1916/1948), Ernest Jones concluded, ‘‘Silberer, by first extending the term Ôfunctional symbolism’ from its original sense to cover the concrete representations of concrete processes in general, and by then confining it to the cases where these are secondary in nature, receds from the conception of true symbolism and reaches once more the population conception of symbolism as the presentation of the abstract in terms of the concrete’’ (p. 127). ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Anagogical interpretation; Silberer, Herbert. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. Jones, Ernest. (1948). The theory of symbolism. Papers on Psychoanalysis. Boston: Beacon Press. (Original work published 1916.) Silberer, Herbert. (1911). Symbolik des Erwachens und Schwellensymbolik überhaupt. Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, 3, 621–660. ———. (1951). Report on a method of eliciting and observing certain symbolic hallucination-phenomena. In David Rapaport (Ed.), Organization and pathology of thought: Selected sources (pp. 195–207). New York: Columbia University Press. (Original work published 1909) ———. (1971). Hidden symbolism of alchemy and the occult arts (Smith Ely Jelliffe, Trans.). New York: Dover. (Original work published 1914.) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FUNDAMENTAL RULE The fundamental rule, as set forth in ‘‘Freud’s PsychoAnalytic Procedure’’ (1904a [1903]), urges that patients say ‘‘whatever comes into their heads, even if they think it unimportant or irrelevant or nonsensical . . . or embarrassing or distressing’’ (p. 251). Implicitly, the rule urges analysts to adopt a corresponding listening technique (‘‘evenly suspended attention’’), for which they are prepared by virtue of what Ferenczi (1928, pp. 88-89) called the second fundamental rule, namely the requirement that future analysts be analyzed themselves. The fundamental rule was an end-point in Freud’s development of his technique. He had begun with the "cathartic method," using hypnosis to elicit a verbal discharge of affects attached to buried traumas. In an intermediary stage, he used ‘‘free associations’’ as a way of uncovering the latent meaning of manifest phenomena such as memories, symptoms, or dreams, but without as yet forgoing the constraining use of suggestion. His adoption of the fundamental rule marked the renunciation of suggestion and of all prior assumptions on the part of the therapist. By initially and always giving the right to speak to the patient, the rule designated him or her as the source of all knowledge. By insisting that both partners in the work of analysis proceed ‘‘without any purpose in view’’ (1912e, p. 114) the rule claims implicitly to institute a kind of independent authority or "third party" before which the sequence of psychic material demanded by the rule might be manifested, perceived, and put into words. This initial positive rationality for the rule gradually came into question as the complexity of what was involved became apparent. By examining significant variations in the way the rule has been stated, it is possible to get the measure of its metapsychological implications. 1. The statement of the rule was at first intended as a purely negative recommendation: the patient must not, as he would in an ordinary conversation, reject the incidental thoughts that cross his or her mind. The idea is to lift the censorship so that the products of unconscious mental activity could be expressed. To resolve the paradox resulting from the fact that this negative prescription assumes a patient who is already in the process of speaking, the rule was subsequently pared down by Freud to: ‘‘Say whatever goes through your mind’’ (1913c, p. 135). Thus, the 655 FUNDAMENTAL RULE patient’s ‘‘choice’’ of a topic was no longer differentiated from ‘‘any intrusive ideas that may occur to you’’ (p. 134). The result of this was that the patient had to attribute two functions to the rule simultaneously, making it both a source of freedom and an obligation to ‘‘tell all.’’ 2. Freud’s formulation of the rule created a basic disjunction between ‘‘whatever goes through the mind’’ and words used to report it. At first this distinction seems clear enough: The patient’s utterances presumably result from a voluntary act, whereas ‘‘whatever goes through the mind’’ is involuntary and passively ‘‘received.’’ Thus understood, the logic of the rule combines the supposed ‘‘immunity’’ of the act of speaking with an acceptance of the idea of a ‘‘passivity’’ that implies the suspension of the usual way in which meaning is assigned. This logic is supposed to lead the patient to a positive cathexis of ‘‘whatever goes through the mind’’ and its enigmatic origins. And ‘‘whatever goes through the mind,’’ it should be recalled, is a heterogeneous category, including as it does not just ideas, images, or wishes, but also representations, sensations, feelings, pure affects (such as anxiety), bodily states, and so on. 3. Further reflection confronts us with the fact that this as-yet unverbalized material comprises ‘‘wordpresentations’’; it is therefore discursive in nature, which means that the discrepancy between what comes to mind and the act of reporting it is either invalidated or limited to the sphere of linguistic activity. We can see how Jacques Lacan, as a result of this primordial importance of speech and language, was led to propose the following wording for the rule: ‘‘Say anything at all, without being afraid of saying something stupid.’’ However, the disjunction evident in Freud’s work remains in full force. An eloquent expression of it is the metaphor of traveling in a train. The patient is compared to the passenger seated by the window, who must describe to his traveling companion the scenery passing by, without paying special attention to any given aspect on a priori grounds. For Freud, the most important point was that the countryside being traversed can never be reduced to what the passenger can perceive of it and say about it. The disjunction between psychic activity and the activity of speaking preserves the heterogeneity of relationships that word-presentations may have with the various registers of psychic and physical reality. According to Freud, ‘‘whatever comes to mind’’ tends, 65 6 through the favored mode of regression toward the visual image, toward a hallucinatory realization that is similar to the dream and its primary processes. The crucial phenomenon remains the transference, through which ‘‘what comes to mind’’ is aimed at the analyst to whom, simultaneously, the patient’s speech is addressed. The postulate of the rule is that discourse can invest this transferential relationship. The statement of the rule alludes to certain critical judgments that the patient must disregard. The judgments that something is unimportant or nonsensical naturally attest to the ordinary aspiration to say important and logical things. The judgment against things that are ‘‘distressing’’ to say summarizes all the others. Thus, the conflict whose onset is postulated in the wording of the rule is one that, by attesting to the consistency of the patient’s inner psychic conflict, ensures that the attempt to put the rule into effect will have a dynamic value. The analysand’s task is thus to confront the unpleasure of telling. At the price of this unpleasure, overcoming resistance can be productive. From a metapsychological point of view, we can consider that by requiring the lifting of repression, the rule opens up the unconscious, gives the repressed access to consciousness, under the sign of the pleasure principle. The resistances that attempt to close this door are based on ordinary rationality. However, under the aegis of an accepted rule, they are no longer anything other than rationalizations; they express the action of repression, which also derives from the pleasure principle, since its aim is to substitute a sort of flight by avoidance for the action of a psychic ‘‘reality principle’’ and the free judgment it makes possible. We can conceive that ‘‘intrusive ideas’’ are derivatives of the repressed: They can be perceived and spoken because they are not too threatening to the censorship. At a certain threshold of instinctual investment, a certain proximity to the unconscious kernel, signal-anxiety triggers repression, which manifests itself as resistance. It is because the conflict between repressing and repressed is well ‘‘organized’’ that it reveals the topographical contradictions of the pleasure principle (what is pleasure in one place becomes unpleasure in another), and that by following the associative chains and the ‘‘compromises’’ whose traces they bear and the context this process creates, the analyst is enabled to ‘‘discover the repressed instinctual impulses which are feeding the resistance,’’ according to Freud in ‘‘Remembering, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FUNDAMENTAL RULE Repeating and Working Through (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis II)’’ (1914g, p. 155). In the same essay Freud defined the cure as a ‘‘working-through of the resistances’’ (p. 155). The aim of the rule is not to ‘‘free’’ unconscious material (as in hypnosis), but rather to support the most complete and most ‘‘free’’ manifestation of conflicting forces so that their interplay may be modified. Let us highlight the complexity of the rule’s inherent stakes and their metapsychological correlates: a) The rule cannot be described as either impartial or exterior to the forces at work in the analysis. It is directly involved in the phenomena inherent in the processes of the cure and its indirect ‘‘goals’’ (symbolformation, sublimation, transference onto speech, becoming-conscious): Putting it into effect is an end as much as a means. b) Accordingly, the rule inevitably plays a role in the transference. Far from remaining a third locus, it is invested as an emanation of the analyst’s desire that it will thus be possible to satisfy or disappoint. Mobilization of the conflict in response to the rule can be expressed in the form of a transferential acting out (Agieren) inherent in the logic of the situation. But the massive nature of this mobilization and the instantaneous nature of making the rule the locus of conflict do not facilitate the task of interpretation. c) It is thus clear that the rule necessarily summons up the transgressions that contest it, the events that illustrate the impossibility of completely putting it into effect. It is only realized through that which seems to negate it: the activation of modes of ‘‘magical’’ or animistic thinking, which subvert the very existence of an observing ego, of a reality principle applied to psychic space. Any reference, even implicit, to the rule, seems to disappear at times, and it is then the sustained analytic setting that ensures through its vicariousness, until such time as a successful interpretation or a working-through makes it reappear, along with the meaning of the play of psychic forces that it represents. d) The putting into effect of the rule has its optimal relevance when, as is the case in the neurotic, the topography of the repression attests to a tempered conflict between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. Clinical work has brought to light forms of resistance linked to the unconscious of the ego and the superego that subvert the dynamics of the analytic INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS situation (interminable analysis, or even disorganizing regression). Here we shall mention only the need for punishment, linked to unconscious guilt, that can be appeased only in and through suffering. The dynamic of the rule is perverted when the unpleasure it involves satisfies this need in an overly masochistic way. The work of analysis can then no longer be based on the logic of the pleasure principle to modify this need. This is but one of the many examples that could illustrate the limits of the rule’s relevance and the need, in many cases, to situate the analysis outside its bounds. The discrepancy between the apparent programmatic rationality of the rule and the complexity of its metapsychology explains that both its practical value and the function of its statement have been relativized and indeed called into question. Many analysts believe it is superfluous to state it. Others even deem it antianalytic, because it introduces an alienating representation of a goal, that of speaking ‘‘according to’’ the rule, and they believe it is preferable that the dynamics of the analysis begin spontaneously, allowing the patient to discover its inherent rule when they can make sense of it. By contrast, one can underscore that the analytic situation could not be established by acting as if the superego-linked register of the prescription could be abolished. In this vein, one can point out that the statement of the rule, in its brilliant economy, condenses that which can be directly transmitted at the outset of the cure, and which the analyst states in the name of the analysis. In this way, it dismisses other, more implicit or more insidious prescriptions, and places the patient in the position of assuming responsibility for his or her own analysis. The statement of the rule thus takes on the meaning of a repetition of an original, founding statement of the analytic situation. While the rule was initially intended as a third locus excluding suggestion from the analytic process, through its ineluctable transferential evolution, it has proved to be the means and the place through which the effects of suggestion can be identified and analyzed in the transference. JEAN-LUC DONNET See also: Active technique; Face-to-face situation; Free association; Modesty; Obsessional neurosis (compulsive neurosis); Outline of Psychoanalysis, An; Psychoanalytic treatment; ‘‘Recommendations to Physicians Practising 657 F U S I O N /D E F U S I O N Psycho-Analysis;’’ ‘‘Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through;’’ Training analysis; Training of psychoanalysts; Transgression; Truth. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund (1904a [1903]). Freud’s psycho-analytic procedure. SE, 7, 247–254. ———. (1912e). Recommendations to physicians practising psycho-analysis. SE, 12, 109–120. ———. (1913c). On beginning the treatment (Further recommendations on technique of psycho-analysis I). SE, 12, 1–144. ———. (1914g). Remembering, repeating and workingthrough (Further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis II). SE, 12, 145–156. FUSION/DEFUSION The concepts of fusion and defusion essentially apply to the life and death instincts, which are initially closely united but later become partially differentiated, under the influence of various psychic movements. Some portion of these instincts remains fused together in the self, in the form of erotogenic masochism (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1967, pp. 244–245). The elaboration of the second theory of the instincts in ‘‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’’ (1920g) led Sigmund Freud to postulate the existence of two types of instincts: the life instinct, which forms everlarger units, and the death instinct, which disintegrates these units. Fusion of the life and death instincts is primal. Outward projection of the death instinct, when it is redirected inward toward the self, constitutes secondary masochism, Freud asserted in ‘‘The Economic Problem of Masochism’’ (1924c). But, according to Freud, a psychic movement that inhibits libidinal satisfaction, such as the movement that is the basis for the existence of the superego or the process of sublimation, by its very nature brings about a defusion of the instincts and thus unleashes destructiveness. This is what endows the Superego with a brutal and cruel aspect, Freud explained in ‘‘The Ego and the Id’’ (1923b). Benno Rosenberg, in his thorough study of the consequences of this theory of fusion of the instincts, postulated the existence of a form of ‘‘life-saving 65 8 masochism,’’ so named because it restrains primal destructiveness in its structures. Nevertheless, there is a remaining ambiguity: When Jean Laplanche in The Language of Psychoanalysis (1967, trans. 1974) deemed the term union preferable to fusion, he introduced the concept of binding (Wilfred R. Bion), which has generally supplanted the concept of fusion in the current psychoanalytic literature. However, the concept of binding/unbinding applies to that which interrelates or separates the ego and the object, and no longer applies to the two types of instincts. It has come to the point where the term fusion is often used instead of binding; there is thus a confusion between that which pertains to the integration of opposite qualities, with all the mental work that entails, and what was originally conceived as a primal attribute of the psyche. This confusion particularly affects the concept of ambivalence, which is the maintaining of two distinct qualities that exist in conjunction but not in a state of fusion. CLÉOPÂTRE ATHANASSIOU-POPESCO See also: Activity/passivity; Binding/unbinding of the instincts; Death instinct (Thanatos); Economic point of view; Eros; Free energy/bound energy; Ego and the Id, The; Life instinct (Eros); Love-Hate-Knowledge (L/H/K links); Sexuality. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1920). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18, 7–64. ———. (1923). The ego and the id. SE, 19, 12–66. ———. (1924). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19, 159–70. Laplanche, Jean, and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1974). The language of psycho-analysis. (Donald Nicholson-Smith, Trans.). New York: Norton. Rosenberg, Benno. (1991). Masochisme mortifère et masochisme gardien de la vie. (pp. 30–54). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. FUSION/DEFUSION OF INSTINCTS Freud used the terms ‘‘fusion’’ and ‘‘defusion’’ (Mischung/Entmischung), in the context of his second theory INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FUSION/DEFUSION of the instincts, to account for the ‘‘mixing’’ and separation of the life instincts and the death instincts. Throughout his work, Freud relied upon the notion of an instinctual dualism, on an opposition between two fundamental kinds of instinct, to explain the conflict inherent in mental life. In his first theory of the instincts, he contrasted sexual instincts on the one hand and self-preservative instincts (or ego-instincts) on the other. In his second theory, the life instinct, or Eros, stood opposed to the death instinct, and Freud emphasized that the antagonistic relationship between the two reflected their essential nature. The life instinct, for its part, was a force that strove to unify, and this included unifying the two fundamental instincts themselves; their intimate fusion came about through their simultaneous cathexis of the same object, which rendered them well-nigh indissoluble. At the same time, the death instinct, which promoted dissolution, worked to defuse them through a decathexis of the object, thus threatening the unity of the psyche itself. These theses were first set forth in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), where Freud, postulating the self-destructive character of the death instinct, sought to show how a portion of its self-destructiveness was immediately neutralized by the life instinct, which eroticized it. In the first edition of the work, in introducing the notion of instinctual fusion, Freud cited Alfred Adler (p. 53n), who had indeed, many years earlier, argued that instinctual energy stemmed from ‘‘two originally separate instincts,’’ the one sexual, the other aggressive, ‘‘which had subsequently intersected’’ (Adler, 1908). Freud would observe later, in ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’’ (1937c), that ‘‘The two fundamental principles of Empedocles—love and strife—are, both in name and function, the same as our two primal instincts’’ (p. 246). With The Ego and the Id (1923b), the fusion and defusion of instincts became a feature of Freud’s second topography (also known as the structural theory): defusion was now viewed as a function of the id and of the severity of the superego, while fusion was the task of the ego, both constitutionally and in its role as unifier of the three mental agencies. Instinctual defusion caused regression, and identification and sublimation themselves tended to bring about defusion. The clinical prototype of instinctual fusion was to be found in the action of sadism (which facilitated the turning of the death instinct toward the external world) and of masochism; its metapsychological prototype was INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS primary erotogenic masochism. The physiological basis of this last, namely sympathetic sexual excitation, constituted the very foundation of the Freudian theory: ‘‘It may well be that nothing of considerable importance can occur in the organism without contributing some component to the excitation of the sexual instinct’’ (1905d, p. 205; 1924c, p. 163). The fusion and defusion of the instincts (Triebmischung/Triebentmischung) needs to be clearly distinguished from the processes known as binding and unbinding (Bindung/Entbindung). Freud first used these last terms in connection with energy flows: the self-preservative instincts of the ego, he argued, tended to bind the free energy that flowed continuously from the sexual instincts; unbinding, therefore, was a discharge of free energy by the ego. In 1920, when Freud advanced the notion that union was the aim of the life instincts, he saw such union as dependent for its quality and its strength on this internal capacity of the ego’s to bind self-preservative impulses to free sexual energy (Rosenberg, 1991). The best way to keep the distinction clear between the two above-described levels of instinctual interaction—the binding/unbinding processes internal to the ego and the fusion/defusion of the life and death instincts—is to confine the original economic reading to binding/unbinding. Variations in the quantitative factor may then be said to bring about a qualitative modification of the instinctual fusion, notably in ‘‘the advance from the earlier [genital] phase to the definitive genital one’’ (1923b, p. 42). Attention to the variations of the binding/unbinding internal to the ego and the fusion/defusion of the life and death instincts has played a heuristic role in the understanding of psychosis (in the work of Melanie Klein, Piera Aulagnier, Benno Rosenberg, and others), of psychosomatic illness (for Pierre Marty), and of borderline conditions (in the ‘‘objectalizing/ deobjectalizing function’’ described by André Green). Jacques Lacan has criticized an approach that casts a positive light on instinctual binding and its agency, the ego, while condemning the fascinating and immobilizing aspects of the process. Jean Laplanche (1981) has for his part argued that sexuality should not be reduced to the unifying function of the life instinct lest it thereby be divested of its non-bound aspect, with its fundamentally destructive and even demoniacal features. JOSETTE FRAPPIER 659 FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION, THE See also: Binding/unbinding of the instincts. Bibliography Adler, Alfred. (1908). Der Aggressionstrieb im Leben und in der Neurose. Fortschrift. Med., 26. Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1– 64. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ———. (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155–170. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. Laplanche, Jean. (1981). Problématiques IV. L’Inconscient et le Ça. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Rosenberg, Benno. (1991). Masochisme mortifère et masochisme gardien de la vie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION, THE The publication of a The Future of an Illusion followed The Question of Lay Analysis (1926e) and preceded Civilization and its Discontents(1930a [1929]). Die Zukunft einer Illusion soon reached a wide audience, and was translated into English in 1928 by W. D. Robson-Scott as The Future of an Illusion, and into French in 1932 by Marie Bonaparte as L’Avenir d’une illusion. In a letter to the Swiss Calvinist pastor Oskar Pfister (November 25, 1928), Freud wrote: ‘‘I do not know if you have detected the secret link between Lay Analysisand the Illusion. In the former I wish to protect analysis from the doctors and in the latter from the priests.’’ Freud keeps his distance from the two principal custodians of secrets protected by the law. Moreover, he considers priestly knowledge, or religious dogma, a ‘‘neurotic relic’’ that it is time to replace ‘‘with the results of rational mental labor.’’ The link between The Future of an Illusion and Civilization and its Discontents was made by Romain Rolland. Liluli, the title of a play he wrote, was a play on the word ‘‘illusion.’’ In The Future of an Illusion Freud discusses the religious feelings then so essential 66 0 to Rolland’s thinking and which Freud refers to as ‘‘oceanic sensations’’; these he considers both eternal and infinite. In Civilization and its Discontents Freud explicitly refers to this concept to differentiate himself from it: ‘‘I cannot discover this Ôoceanic’ feeling in myself.’’ Freud considered religion to be a phenomenon of culture or civilization, based, like all culture, on the ‘‘rejection of instincts’’ by means of ‘‘prohibitions.’’ The gods retain ‘‘their threefold task: they must exorcize the terrors of nature,’’ (especially death), ‘‘they must reconcile man to the cruelty of fate, particularly as is shown in death, and they must compensate them for the sufferings and privations which a civilized life in common has imposed on them.’’ Religion thus constitutes a ‘‘treasure of ideas born of the need to make human misery supportable.’’ Freud used as an example one of the phases of religious evolution, ‘‘which roughly corresponds to the final form taken by our present-day, white, Christian civilization.’’ Here he makes a clean break with Jung, who based many of his ideas on the religions of India (Hinduism and Buddhism primarily). Logically, he insists on an essential characteristic of Christian religion, ‘‘the father-son relationship.’’ He asserts that ‘‘God is an exalted father, the nostalgia for the father is the root of religious need.’’ The entire work is marked by Freud’s desire to placate his friend, Pastor Pfister, who responded the following year with the publication of a pamphlet titled The Illusion of a Future (1928). Freud distinguished illusion from error: an illusion, the product of desire, is not necessarily false. Moreover, he adds a condition to a claim present in his article on ‘‘Compulsive activities and religious exercise’’ (1907b): ‘‘Religion could thus be the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity.’’ He even considers that ‘‘devout believers are safeguarded in a high degree against the risk of certain neurotic illnesses; their acceptance of the universal neurosis spares them the task of constructing a personal one.’’ Freud, who spent his life trying to destroy illusions and complete what Max Weber called the ‘‘disenchantment of the world,’’ seems to hesitate when it comes to the future of religious phenomena. He says INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FUTURE he is in favor of ‘‘retaining the religious doctrinal system as the basis of education and of man’s communal life.’’ Just as Charles Maurras at the time defended Catholicism as an element of political order in spite of his naturalist positivism, Freud, in spite of his atheism, defended Christian education (the teaching of religion was required in Austrian schools) ‘‘which is so important for the safeguarding of civilization.’’ He concludes his work with a case study of conversion, without confusing the beliefs of ‘‘inert and unintelligent’’ crowds with the more certain achievements of science. ‘‘No, our science is not an illusion.’’ ODON VALLET See also: Belief; Civilization and its Discontents; Ethics; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; Magical thinking; Mysticism; Pfister, Oskar Robert; Religion and psychoanalysis; Rite and ritual; Science and psychoanalysis; Weltanschauung. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OF AN ILLUSION, THE Source citation Freud, Sigmund. (1927c). Die Zukunft einer Illusion. Vienna; GW, XIV, p. 325–380; SE, 21: 5–56. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1907b). Compulsive activities and the exercise of religion. SE, 9: 117–127. ———. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. ———. (1926e). The question of lay analysis. SE, 20: 177–250. ———. (1927c). The future of an illusion. SE, 21: 1–56. ———. (1930a). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57–145. Freud, Sigmund and Pfister, Oskar. (1963). Psycho-analysis and faith; the letters of Sigmund Freud and Oskar Pfister. (Heinrich Meng and Ernst L. Freud, Eds., and Eric Mosbacher, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press. Pfister, Oskar. (1928). The illusion of a future. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 74, 1993, 557–579. 661 G GADDINI, EUGENIO (1916–1985) Eugenio Gaddini, president of the Italian Psychoanalytic Society from 1978 to 1982, was born in Cerignola, Foggia, Italy, on January 18, 1916, and died in Rome on September 27, 1985. A brilliant student, he developed a precocious interest in literature and philosophy. In 1942 he received his medical diploma. In 1956 he gave up his position as chief physician in a hospital in Rome to devote himself to psychoanalysis. After completing an analysis with Emilio Servadio, he was admitted in 1953 to the Società Psicoanalitica Italiana (Italian Psychoanalytic Society), in which he served as secretary (1957), vice president (1967–1969), and president (1978–1982). During his tenure as president, he worked hard to expand the society, primarily by revitalizing the Rivista de psicoanalisi (Review of psychoanalysis), of which he was editor for several years. After 1970 he worked as a teacher at the Centro Psicoanalitico Romano (Rome Psychoanalytic Center) and the Centro di Firenze (Florence Center), which he founded, surrounding himself with a circle of students who were receptive to his original ideas. Gaddini was highly esteemed within the International Psychoanalytical Association, where he assumed several high-level positions, and was known for his original contributions in the fields of metapsychology and clinical therapy. Combining Freudian psychoanalysis with the techniques of Donald Winnicott, he formulated an innovative theory of early mental states, postulating the existence of a ‘‘fundamental mental organization,’’ which serves as the basis for the formation of the self. According to Gaddini, ‘‘nonintegration anxiety’’ occurs during the transition from the ‘‘psychosensory zone,’’ characterized by a preponderance of physical sensations, to the ‘‘psycho-oral zone’’ (1987). During this process, when the basic outlines of mental structure are laid down, the mechanism of imitation plays an important role (Gaddini, 1969). Gaddini distinguished imitation from introjection and identification, which he associated with the psycho-oral zone, where the tension to ‘‘attain the object’’ was a sign of distinctness and separation. Imitation he associated with the psychosensory zone and ‘‘correlative bodily fantasies.’’ In other words, fantasies of fusion respond to bodily changes associated with becoming ‘‘the object.’’ During the course of analysis (1981), disturbances of the psychosensory zone become manifest in transference through the patientÕs use of mechanisms of imitation to reestablish fusion, as if by magic, and avoid recognition of the object as an other distinct from the self. In his writing, Gaddini suggested reconsidering the function of the father in the oedipal triangle (1989) and in aggression. Adopting the fusion theory of instincts, he hypothesized that aggression shifted the libido from its initial narcissistic position to objects (1972). His essay ‘‘Transitional objects and the process of individuation,’’ published in 1970 with his wife Renata, continued the work of Donald Winnicott. GaddiniÕs writings have been collected in Scritti, published posthumously in 1989 and translated into English in 1992. ANNA MARIA ACCERBONI See also: Italy Bibliography Gaddini, Eugenio. (1969). On imitation. International Journal of Psycho-analysis, 50, 475–484. 663 GAIN (PRIMARY AND SECONDARY) ———. (1972). Agression and the pleasure principle: Towards a psychoanalytic theory of aggression. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 53 (2). 191–198. ———. (1987). Notes on the mind-body question. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 68 (3), 315–330. ———. (1916–17a [1915–17]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. Parts I and II.SE, Part I, 15 ; Part II, 16. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19 : 1–66. ———. (1926e). The question of lay analysis. SE, 20: 177–250. ———. (1989). Scritti. Milan, Italy: Raffaello Cortina. ———. (1992). A psychoanalytic theory of infantile experience: Conceptual and clinical reflections (Adam Limentani, Ed.). London: Tavistock Publications. GARDINER, MURIEL (1901–1985) Limentani, Adam. (1986). Eugenio Gaddini (1916–1985). International Journal of Psycho-analysis, 67, 373–374. An American psychoanalyst and psychiatrist, Muriel Gardiner was born November 23, 1901 in Chicago, Illinois and died February 6, 1985 in Princeton, New Jersey. GAIN (PRIMARY AND SECONDARY) Primary and secondary gains correspond to the direct or indirect advantages that individuals gain from their illness. The primary gain is a constitutive element of the illness that is present in the very motive of the illness. The secondary gain is an addition to the primary gain and comes into play at a later stage. It consolidates the disorder. The specific term ‘‘gain’’ in relation to an illness appeared in 1897 in a letter from Freud to Wilhelm Fleiss. Secondary gain is described for the first time in 1913 in On Beginning the Treatment: here the symptom has a secondary function (1913c). In 1916 in Lecture twenty-four of Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis Freud clearly articulated the distinction between primary and secondary gain (1916–17a, [1915–17]), and again in 1923 in a footnote to the study of the case of Dora (1905e [1901]). Primary gain subdivides into two parallel aspects. In the internal part, illness remains the most economic solution in cases of conflict, and this is the ‘‘flight into illness.’’ The external part is linked to profitable arrangements occasioned in the individualÕs relational life. The secondary gain ‘‘helps the ego in its effort to incorporate the symptom.’’ (1916–17a [1915–17]) It procures a satisfaction that is narcissistic or linked to selfpreservation. DOMINIQUE BLIN See also: Flight into illness; Narcissism Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905e (1901]). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. SE, 7: 1–122. 66 4 The daughter of Edward Morris and Helen Swift, she was born into a family of wealth and privilege. During her childhood she became aware of the plight of the poor and disenfranchised and subsequently developed a life-long commitment to social and political reform. After graduating from Wellesley College in 1922 she traveled to Europe where she lived until the outbreak of World War II. In 1926 she settled in Vienna where she underwent the first of two periods of analysis with Ruth Mack Brunswick. During this period she developed an interest in applying psychoanalytic insights to education. Simultaneously with her psychoanalytic training she attended the Vienna Medical School, graduating in 1938. In 1934, in the midst of her training and a second period of analysis with Mack Brunswick, a fascist dictatorship was installed in Austria. Witnessing the brutality that accompanied these events was a turning point in GardinerÕs life. She resolved to help endangered individuals escape from fascist Europe, and for the next six years worked tirelessly in the Austrian underground. These years are vividly described in her memoir Code Name ‘‘Mary’’ (1983). After returning to the United States in 1939 Gardiner completed her analytic training at the Philadelphia Association for Psychoanalysis, with which she was associated for many years. Gardiner was appointed a training and a supervising analyst in 1955, but she never accepted any candidates. Rather she found fulfillment by using her training in psychoanalysis in her work as a consultant in schools, hospitals, and residential settings. Here she was able to offer help to children and adolescents, and to their teachers, social workers, and doctors. GardinerÕs publications include The Deadly Innocents: Portraits of Children Who Kill (1976), a book which grew out of her work with children and adolescents; and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS G A R M A , A N G E L (1904 –1 993) The Wolf-Man by the Wolf-Man (1971), which she edited. This is a compilation which includes his autobiographical reminiscences, FreudÕs original case report, Ruth Mack BrunswickÕs 1928 essay, and GardinerÕs paper recording her contacts with the Wolf Man over three decades. After the Wolf ManÕs death in 1979 she wrote The Wolf ManÕs Last Years (1983a) wherein she described his final years and gently but pointedly took issue with Karin ObholzerÕs portrayal of the Wolf Man in her 1982 book, The Wolf Man, 60 Years Later. Muriel GardinerÕs contribution to psychoanalysis goes beyond her books and papers, her generous support of the Hampstead Clinic, the Freud Archives, and the Freud Museum, and her long relationship with the Wolf Man, characterized as it was by her concern for his dignity and psychological well-being. Of equal significance was the fact that she took psychoanalytic insights and her counsel into settings—schools, hospitals, and prisons—where they are usually not found. NELLIE L. THOMPSON See also: Brunswick, Ruth Mack; Freud Museum; ‘‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’’ (Wolf Man); Pankejeff, Sergei. Bibliography Gardiner, Muriel M. (1971). The Wolf-Man by the WolfMan. New York: Basic Books. ———. (1976). The deadly innocents: Portraits of children who kill. New York: Basic Books. ———. (1983). Code name ‘‘Mary’’: Memoirs of an American woman in the Austrian underground. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. ———. (1983a). The Wolf ManÕs last years. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 31, 867–897. Guttman, Samuel A. (1985). In memoriam Muriel M. Gardiner, M.D. (1901–85). The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 40, 1–7. GARMA, ANGEL (1904–1993) A Spanish psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, Angel Garma was born June 24, 1904, in Bilbao, and died January 29, 1993, in Buenos Aires. Garma, a Basque by birth and temperament, went to Madrid at the age of seventeen to study medicine. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS After completing his studies he left for Germany, where he was a student of Robert Gaupp and Karl Bonhoeffer. In 1929 he began a training analysis with Theodor Reik at the Berlin Institute of Psychoanalysis. When he was twenty-seven Garma became a member of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Association (BPV) after presenting his now classic paper, ‘‘Die Realität und das Es in der Schizophrenie’’ (Reality and the Id in Schizophrenia), which he read in October 1931. This innovative essay questions the Freudian conception of psychosis. While Freud believed the psychotic repressed reality to satisfy the id, Garma claimed that the psychotic represses the id more than the neurotic, which disturbs his relation to reality. At the end of 1931 Garma settled in Madrid. Although he had completed his training with the Berlin Psychoanalytic Association, he soon quit the organization, decrying its growing discrimination. He remained a ‘‘direct member’’ of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) for several years. In July 1936, before the start of the Spanish Civil War and in spite of his sympathy for the Republicans, Garma went to France to avoid the fratricidal struggle taking place in his homeland. Through the Société Psychanalytique de Paris he met Celes Ernesto Cárcamo, an Argentinean who had trained in Europe before returning to Buenos Aires. He invited Garma to accompany him. Garma preferred to remain in Paris, but spurred on by the impending world war, he eventually decided to leave. Garma arrived in Argentina in June 1938 and quickly adapted to life in Buenos Aires, a progressive city where psychoanalysis was already being taught. CárcamoÕs return in 1939 gave a new impetus to the nascent psychoanalytic movement, which was soon reinforced by the arrival of Marie Langer. In late 1942 the Asociación Psicoanalı́tica Argentina (APA) was founded. Garma was its first president (1942–1944), a position he held on three other occasions during his life. He founded the Institute for Psychoanalysis, where he was a teacher for thirty-two years. During his tenure as APA president, Garma promoted scientific activity, established annual conferences, and helped organize Latin-American and PanAmerican conferences. GarmaÕs work was widely recognized during his lifetime. He was honored publicly on his seventieth birthday and, in 1983, was named honorary vice 665 G A T T E L , F E L I X (1 870 –19 04) president of the IPA. In 1989 King Juan Carlos I of Spain decorated him and the APA named the Institute of Psychoanalysis after him. A year later he was elected honorary president of the Psychoanalytic Federation of Latin America (FEPAL). An important pioneer, Garma developed a body of scientific work of considerable importance. He made significant contributions to the study of the psychoanalysis of dreams, psychoses, perversions, psychosomatic medicine, and technique. Within his extensive body of work his detailed and careful work on gastric ulcers and headache deserve special mention. Dream-like phenomena were a constant preoccupation for Garma. The doctoral dissertation he presented in Argentina, ‘‘Psicioanálisis de los sueños’’ (1940, [Psychoanalysis of Dreams]) became a classic. Garma continued to make contributions to the theory of dreams, focusing his work on the Traumdeutung, even though he sometimes disagreed with FreudÕs findings. GarmaÕs research primarily involved the theory of the traumatic genesis of dreams, the characteristics of dream-like thought, the origin of dream hallucinations, and the relation to reality. The dream originates in unconscious conflicts that configure a traumatic situation, so that, ultimately, all dreams are nightmares. The satisfaction of desire is merely an attempt to mask the traumatic situation. The dream work is not limited to providing mental content with a new form, it is a creative process, a particular type of thought, archaic and vast. GarmaÕs theory on the origin of dream hallucination and the relation to reality, which contradicts Freud, is discussed in his essay ‘‘La realidad exterior y los instintos en la esquizofrenia’’ (External Reality and the Instincts in Schizophrenia), published in 1931. Here, the relation of the subject to reality is disturbed whenever he has to abandon the satisfaction of impulsive demands and submit to internal persecutory objects that channel the death impulse. These ideas, along with others, are crystallized in two important books. Nuevos Aportaciones al psicoanálisis de los sueños (1970, [New Contributions to the Psychoanalysis of Dreams]) covers thirty years of his work, although it by no means exhausts his contributions to the field. His Tratato mayor del psicoanálisis de los sueños (1990, [Comprehensive Treaty on the Psychoanalysis of Dreams]) incorporates the work done during the last twenty years of his life. All of GarmaÕs work is a sustained and consistent effort to unmask a 66 6 fundamental structural conflict, the submission of a masochistic ego to a sadistic superego that serves as an obstacle to the free exercise of genitality. Angel Garma had two daughters, Lucinda and Isabel, with Simone Mas, his first wife. Elisabeth Goode Rasmussen, his second wife, who was with him at the height of his career, remained a steadfast caretaker during the years of his illness. An eminent psychoanalyst in her own right, she assumed the difficult role of being the wife of a great man. Angel and Elisabeth had two daughters, Carmen and Sylvia. R. HORACIO ETCHEGOYEN See also: Argentina; Colombia; Congrès des psychanalystes de langue française des pays romans; Federación psicoanalı́tica de América latina; Spain. Bibliography Garma, Angel. (1931). Die realität und das es in der schizophrenie. Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse. ———. (1970). Nuevas aportaciones al psicoanálisis de los sueñs. Buenos Aires: Paidós. ———. (1985). The psychoanalysis of dreams. New York: Jason Aronson. (Original work published 1940) ———. (1990). Tratado mayor del psicoanálisis de los sueños. Madrid: Contenido. GATTEL, FELIX (1870–1904) Felix Gattel, a medical doctor, was born in Berlin on December 14, 1870, and died in 1904. He is known in the history of psychoanalysis as Sigmund FreudÕs first student. Gattel traveled from San Francisco to Würzburg, Germany, to complete his studies. Though he specialized in neurology, he spent May to October 1897 in Vienna, studying with Freud (Masson, Jeffrey M., 1985). He published a few articles but after 1899 all trace of Gattel was lost. The exact date of his death is not known, but Wilhelm Fliess indicates in his writings that he died in 1906. Subsequent research by Michael Schröter and Ludger M. Hermanns has led to the conclusion that he died on October 17, 1904. Gattel followed the same initial scientific education as Freud, beginning his career in pathological anatomy. His interest then turned to neurosis and sexuality. He INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS G E L E E R D , E L I S A B E T H (1909 –1 969) learned about Freud while he was doing research, in particular, through an article written by Freud in collaboration with Oskar Rie on infantile cerebral hemiplegia (1891a). Gattel, aware of FreudÕs growing reputation in the field of neurasthenia and hysteria, contacted him before settling in Vienna, most likely to take advantage of FreudÕs clinical experience. Gattel remains something of a mystery to us, since there is little available biographical material. He was one of FreudÕs earliest supporters and, with Emma Eckstein, can be considered one of his first students— at least in the traditional academic sense, where a young medical student might work under the guidance of an older colleague. Eckstein can be considered the first student of analysis, since she was analyzed by Freud and then began analyzing others in turn. GattelÕs importance—although minor—in the history of psychoanalysis shows up in several ways. Freud, eager to communicate his research results, conducted experiments with him, as he did later with Heinrich Gomperz; this was classic scientific research as practiced in academic circles. As an academic Freud assigned Gattel the job of conducting field research in neurasthenia (letter to Wilhelm Fliess, January 20, 1898). Gattel was an enthusiastic and enterprising student, but not up to the theoretical level his teacher would have liked. It was through these early experiments with Gattel that Freud came to understand that conventional scientific research was not the best method for communicating his ideas. During this work, he came to understand the importance of transference between student and teacher. It is easy to understand the importance of FreudÕs first students by examining the concept of the correspondent in scientific discovery. Gattel and Fliess, although in different ways, assumed this role before the creation of the Wednesday Psychological Society. It was during these meetings that Freud was able to express himself most fully, for his audience was able to follow his ideas and spurred him on intellectually. At the same time, given the inevitable diffusion of transference in a small group, he was not overly concerned with the intensity of two-way transference. This activity preceded the evolution of the small group of the ‘‘savage horde’’ that Freud later became interested in. Gattel appears in the Freud-Fliess correspondence as someone inclined to plagiarism. He was the quintessential mediocre student. In the Swoboda affair, which INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS signaled the end of FreudÕs friendship with Fliess (Porge, Erik, 1994; Le Rider, Jacques, 1982), he is mentioned as an example of an unreliable personality. Frank J. Sulloway (1979) exaggerates his importance, but Schröter and Hermanns (1992) provide a more accurate assessment of him as a talented and hard working young man, capable of recognizing the value of a scientific discovery but unable, during his short life, to live up to the promise of his talent. NICOLAS GOUGOULIS See also: Germany; ‘‘Neurasthenia and ÔAnxiety NeurosisÕ’’. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund, and Rie, Oskar. (1891a). Klinische Studie über die halbseitige Cerebrallähmung der Kinder, Heft III der Beiträge zur Kinderheilkunde. Wien: Kassowitz. Le Rider, Jacques. (1982). L’Affaire Otto Weininger. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Masson, Jeffrey M. (1985). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887–1904. London: Belknap. Porge, Erik. (1994). Vol d’idées? Paris: Denoël. Schröter, Michael and Hermanns, Ludger. (1992). Felix Gattel, 1870–1904: Freud’s first pupil. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 19, 91–104, 97–208. Sulloway, Frank J. (1979). Freud—biologist of the mind. London: Burnett. GELEERD, ELISABETH (1909–1969) Psychoanalyst Elisabeth Geleerd was born on March 20, 1909 in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and died May 25, 1969 in New York. Elisabeth GeleerdÕs parents were Moses and Bertha (Haas) Geleerd. The eldest of three children, she and her two younger brothers, Yap and Benedictus, grew up in comfortable circumstances in Rotterdam where her fatherÕs business was outfitting ships. When she was nine or ten her mother died of tuberculosis and she was sent to live with an aunt and uncle. This was an unhappy experience and she returned to her fatherÕs house in her early teens. Several years later Yap also died of tuberculosis. The deaths of her mother and brother influenced ElisabethÕs decision to study medicine at the University of Leyden. Her father supported her ambition to become a physician. 667 GENDER IDENTITY After receiving her M.D. in 1936, she moved to Vienna in order to undertake psychoanalytic training at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute, where her analyst was Anna Freud. In 1938 the deteriorating political situation led her to move to London, where she completed her analytic training at the Institute for Psychoanalysis, the training arm of the British Psychoanalytic Society. In 1940 she arrived in the United States and worked for several years at the Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kansas before finally settling in New York in 1946. That same year she married the prominent psychoanalyst, Rudolph M. Loewenstein. In 1947 Geleerd was appointed a training analyst at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and, as a member of the Educational Committee, played a formative role in the development of the Child and Adolescent analysis program at the Institute. Recollections of Geleerd invariably note her intelligence and beauty. Her countenance has been described as neoclassical and delicate, her temperament as sensitive, searching and romantic. The congruence between her face and her character, each mirroring the other, left an indelible impression on her friends and colleagues. She was by all accounts an empathic therapist, but her approach to patients was based on a thorough grasp of psychoanalytic theory and technique. In a series of papers on the psychodynamics of childhood schizophrenia, the developmental vicissitudes of adolescence and the psychological states of fugue and amnesia, she delineated the defenses the ego utilizes in its attempt to master early, often overwhelming trauma originating in the mother-child relationship. She also sought to suggest new techniques for treating seriously disturbed children and adolescents. NELLIE L. THOMPSON See also: Loewenstein, Rudolph M. Bibliography Geleerd, Elisabeth R. (1958). Borderline states in childhood and adolescence. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 13, 279–295. ———. (1964). Child analysis: Research, treatment and prophylaxis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 44, 242–258. Kabcenell, Robert. (1970). Eulogy for Elisabeth Geleerd. Unpublished. A.A. Brill Library, the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. 66 8 Tartakoff, Helen. (1970). Obituary Elisabeth Geleerd Loewenstein. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 51, 71–73. Thompson, Nellie L. (1997). Elisabeth Geleerd. In Jewish women in America: An historical encyclopedia, Volume One. (pp. 501–502) (Paula E. Hyman and Deborah Dash Moore, Eds.) New York: Routledge. GENDER IDENTITY The term gender identity, meaning a personÕs relative sense of his or her own masculine or feminine identity, was first used in 1965 by John Money (Money, 1965). The term was introduced into the psychoanalytic literature by Robert Stoller in 1968 (Stoller, 1968). Money used the term to distinguish the subjective experience of gender from the concept of ‘‘gender role’’ which he used to describe the socially determined attributes of gender. Stoller (1968) developed the idea further to distinguish between the psychological and biological dimensions of sex. He used gender to distinguish ideas and experiences of masculinity and femininity—both socially determined psychological constructs—from sex, the biologically determined traits of maleness and femaleness.This usage has become the standard in psychoanalytically derived discussions of gender and sexuality to refer to the psychological aspects of sexuality, what Freud (1925) called ‘‘psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes.’’ Stoller (1968) further distinguishes the general sense of masculinity and femininity—gender identity—from the earlier awareness of sexual difference, what he calls core gender identity, a relatively fixed sense of maleness or femaleness usually consolidated by the second year of life, prior to the oedipal phase. Stoller identifies three components in the formation of core gender identity: 1) Biological and hormonal influences; 2) Sex assignment at birth; 3) Environmental and psychological influences with effects similar to imprinting. In contrast to FreudÕs belief that the primary identification is masculine, Stoller believes that both the boy and the girl begin with a female core gender identity obtained from the maternal symbiosis. Core gender identity is derived non-conflictually through identification and, in essence, learning. Failure to interrupt the maternal symbiosis pre-oedipally with boys may INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GENERAL THEORY OF SEDUCTION result in permanent core gender identity disorders like transsexualism. Otherwise, normal development facilitates the boyÕs shift to a male core gender identity and the subsequent oedipal conflicts associated with obtaining a masculine gender identity. GENERAL MEDICAL SOCIETY FOR PSYCHOTHERAPY (AÄGP). See Allegemeine The concept of gender identity is important historically because it separates masculine and feminine psychology from the innate biological determinism suggested by Freud. Increasing attention to the diversity and multiplicity of the origins and workings of gender have made even the terms gender identity and core gender identity less than adequate to describe the nuances of such a central organizing factor of personality and behavior. It is important to differentiate the term, gender identity, which describes the individualÕs sense of gender, from StollerÕs speculative theory about the origins of core gender identity. GENERAL THEORY OF SEDUCTION CHRISTOPHER GELBER See also: Femininity; Feminism and psychoanalysis; Identity; Imaginary identification/symbolic identification; Masculinity/femininity; Perversion; Sexual differences; Stoller, Robert J.; Transsexualism. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1925j). Some psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes, SE, 19: 241–258. Money, John (Ed.). (1965). Sex research: New developments. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Stoller, Robert. (1968). Sex and gender: On the development of masculinity and femininity. New York: Science House. Further Reading Benjamin, Jessica. (1998). Shadow of the other. Intersubjectivity and gender in psychoanalysis. New York: Routledge. Breen. Dana. (Ed.). (1993). The gender conundrum. London, New York: Routledge Chodorow, Nancy. (1978). The reproduction of mothering. Psychoanalysis and the sociology of gender. Berkeley: University of California Press. Fast, Irene. (1999). Aspects of core gender identity. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 9, 633–662. Stoller, Robert. (1985). Presentations of gender. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. Wagonfeld, S., rep. (1982). Panel: Gender and gender role. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 30, 185–196. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Ärztliche Gesellschaft für Psychotherapie Sigmund Freud developed the theory of seduction in the years 1895–1897, and then he abandoned it. The theory accounted for the genesis of the psychopathological unconscious on the basis of a complex mechanism that brought two moments into play: a scene in which a child is seduced by an adult, and the ‘‘deferred’’ reactivation of this scene at a later time. Jean Laplanche has proposed a ‘‘general theory of seduction,’’ extending the Freudian seduction theory to the genesis of the unconscious in general, and broadening its foundations to include primacy of the otherÕs enigmatic message and the theory of repression as a partial failure to translate this message. It has been said, and is incessantly repeated, that Freud abandoned his first theory of the neuroses and announced this to Wilhelm Fliess in his letter dated September 21, 1897 (SE 1, p. 259). Recrudescences and relics of this theory are nonetheless legion in FreudÕs work. What is perhaps the most surprising fact is that it was effectively tabooed and misrepresented until 1964 (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1964). Even then, when it began to attract a new interest, this was directed not to the highly complex mechanism described by Freud but instead to anecdotes of manifest sexual abuses and to the issue of whether Freud had fled, or ‘‘repressed,’’ this reality and taken refuge in the hypothesis of a pure and simple production of fantasies (Masson, 1984). FreudÕs original seduction theory was strictly confined to the realm of the psychoneuroses. It is even tempting to think that Freud posited the existence of the unconscious in neurotics alone, and that he nourished the hope that cure might come to mean the elimination of the unconscious. The theory sought to explain the development of the unconscious by the repression, in the child, of memories of sexual scenes usually experienced while in the charge of an adult. It brought three interconnected levels into play: a temporal dimension, a topographical dimension, and a language-related dimension. The temporal aspect of seduction was 669 GENEVA PSYCHOANALYTICAL SOCIETY bound up with the concept of deferred action (or ‘‘afterwardness’’ [Nachträglichkeit]), which was to survive in FreudÕs later thought. The thesis was that nothing was inscribed in the human unconscious save by way of the interrelationship between at least two events separated from one another by a period of mutation, a lapse of time that made it possible for the subject to react differently to the memory of the first experience than to the actual experience as lived. Left in suspense, the initial memory became pathogenic and traumatizing when revived by the occurrence of a second scene having some association or resonance with the first. The topographical aspect involved the theory of an ego in the process of formation, armored against attack from without but not against attack from within. Since what attacked it at the second moment was not an outside event but a memory, this ego was unprotected and could react only by repression. Lastly, a linguistic aspect of the theory was suggested by FreudÕs analogy between the barrier separating the two moments of the psychical trauma and a translation, or a partial failure of translation (letter to Fliess of December 6, 1896, SE 1, p. 235). It is thus apparent just how inadequate a response it is to reduce the seduction theory to the simplistic assertion that the adultÕs seduction of the child brings on mental disturbance. FreudÕs first theory was in fact intimately interwoven with the clinical doctrine of the time. At the close of 1897, Freud undertook a systematic critique of his theory which led him to abandon it, surrendering hysterics to their ‘‘seduction fantasies,’’ and those fantasies themselves, ultimately, to a phylogenetic determinism. The critique of a theory—its ‘‘falsification’’—may have several outcomes: rejection, partial modification, or a reexamination of its foundations. It is the last of these that Jean Laplanche has sought with his ‘‘general theory of seduction.’’ In the first place, he argues, the unconscious should not be looked upon as invariably pathological. The unconscious is part of the human condition, and there is therefore no reason to rebuke a theory or a practice for not being able to eliminate it. Secondly, the adult-child relationship ought to be viewed in a way that transcends psychopathological features specific to particular cases of perverse sexual abuse. Generally speaking, there is a basic asymmetry between the infant and the adult, stemming from the 67 0 fact that adults have already constructed a sexual unconscious for themselves and that their way of addressing themselves to children, in gestures or words, is necessarily shot through by that unconscious. Thirdly, the general theory of seduction aims to bring considerations to the fore that played little part in FreudÕs thinking. These include: the notion of the message; the priority of the adult other in the message received by the infant; and, lastly, the idea of ‘‘translation’’ as the basis for a model of repression less mechanistic than that of a pure interplay of forces, as set forth in classical psychoanalytic thought. JEAN LAPLANCHE See also: Anaclisis/anaclictic; Breastfeeding; Deferred action and trauma; Heterosexuality; Masochism; Maternal reverie, capacity for; Object; Ontogenesis; Oral stage; Proton-pseudos; Seduction; Seduction Scenes. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1896c). The aetiology of hysteria. SE, 3: 186–221. ———. (1950a [1887–1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173–280. Laplanche, Jean. (1989 [1987]). New foundations for psychoanalysis. (David Macey, Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell. Laplanche, Jean, and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1968 [1964]). Fantasy and the origins of sexuality. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 49, 1–18. Masson, Jeffrey Moussaieff. (1984). The assault on truth. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. GENEVA PSYCHOANALYTICAL SOCIETY. See Société psychanalytique de Géneve GENITAL LOVE Genital love corresponds to the type of object relation organized during the adult genital phase of libidinal development. It is characterized by the unification, under the primacy of the genital, of pregenital sexual aims and, in particular, by the reunion of the two currents of sexuality—sensuality and affection. It is difficult to provide a univocal definition of love. The Greeks differentiated among eros, philia, and agapè, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GENITAL LOVE distinctions that were picked up by Freud, who distinguished sensual love from affection and from love in the more general sense of the term. Although he leaves discussions of love to the poets, Freud refers to the polysemy of the term ‘‘love,’’ which he judges to be well founded: sexual and amorous relations between men and women, love between parents and children, friendship, self-love, the love of truth or humanity. ‘‘We are of the opinion, then, that language has carried out an entirely justifiable piece of unification in creating the word ÔloveÕ with its numerous uses, and that we cannot do better than take it as the basis of our scientific discussions and expositions as well’’ (1921c). images of the parents that were internalized during the oedipal phase have been sufficiently differentiated. In this sense genital love, that is, adult genital organization, is indeed the successor of the oedipal complex, and assumes further that it renounces the oedipal objects formed during childhood (Perron, Roger, Perron-Borelli, Michèle, 1994). Genital, or post-oedipal love, is the form of love best able to articulate the two currents—heterosexual and homosexual—of oedipal love. Positive oedipal erotic investments are reflected onto the sexual partner in the couple, while homosexual investments will nourish, in a more or less desexualized form, social and professional relations. The concept of ‘‘genital love’’ has meaning only if it is associated with the concept of the ‘‘genital phase’’ of libidinal development. It would thus stand in contrast to that which characterizes the object relations of the preceding ‘‘pregenital’’ phases. Genital love should not be understood here solely as love in the form of sexual congress, but as the type of love organized after the oedipal phase and the latency period, at the moment when the libido is sufficiently evolved to enable the organization of the adult genital phase. Michael Balint (1947) emphasized the idealist nature of a concept that would manifest no trace of ambivalence or pregenital object relation. This type of ideal object relation would, therefore, contain no oral characteristics, would have no desire to devour the object; there would be no desire to dominate or master the object, no sadistic traits and therefore no vestige of anality; there would be neither envy nor fear of the genital organs of the other sex, therefore no trace of the phallic phase or castration complex, and so on. Clearly, such love does not exist. The pregenital components cannot all be integrated and every love assumes the destruction of the narcissistic ‘‘shell.’’ We are justified, then, in emphasizing the idealist nature of such a concept, even its normative aura. This does not mean that a certain maturation of the ego and its abilities does not take place gradually when the genital phase of libidinal development is achieved. The state of being in love (David, Christian, 1996) then becomes possible: it is the result of the simultaneous activity of free sexual tendencies and inhibited tendencies and, in particular, of the union of sensuality and affection. Thus, genital love is characterized by the unification, under the primacy of the genital, of all the sexual components that have not been repressed or sublimated, and of those pregenital sexual aims that have been maintained as preliminary pleasures. This unification is prepared during the infantile genital stage and is ‘‘completed’’ only after puberty with the development of adult sexuality. During the period of oedipal decline, a new distribution of impulse cathexes will leave its traces throughout the sexual life with a new distribution of inhibited or sublimated erotic investments. In particular, there is a conjunction of the sensual erotic current and the affectionate current of adolescence following their relative disjunction during the latency phase. There is a reunion of ‘‘genital satisfaction and pregenital affection’’ (Balint, Michael, 1947). The union of these two currents brings about an equilibrium that is rarely static but can rather be compared to an interlacing, a struggle (Parat, Catherine, 1996). The model of adult genital organization implies the choice of a heterosexual object, which leads to the reproduction, in a couple, of what was for the child the representation of the couple created by his or her parents. This assumes that the sexual nature of the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS JEAN-FRANÇOIS RABAIN See also: Aberastury, Arminda, known as ‘‘La Negra’’; Adolescence; Genital stage; Love; Organization; Partial drive; Pregenital; Psychosexual development; Puberty; Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality Bibliography Balint, Michael. (1972). L’amour génital. Amour primaire et Technique psychanalytique. Paris: Payot. (Original work published 1947) David, Christian. (1996). Post-scriptum à l’état amoureux. Revue française de psychanalyse, 60 (3), 633–642. 671 GENITAL STAGE Parat, Catherine. (1996). Á propos de l’amour et de l’amour de transfert. Revue française de psychanalyse, 60 (3), 643– 662. Perron, Roger and Perron-Borelli, Michèle. (1994). Le Complexe d’Œdipe. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Revue française de psychanalyse (1996). GENITAL STAGE A stage or phase of psychosexual development, the genital stage is characterized by the organization of the component instincts under the primacy of the genital zone. It is divided into two periods separated by the latency period: first, the infantile genital organization, or phallic phase, dominated by the phallus, that is, by the male genital organ alone, and, secondly, the genital organization properly so-called, which is established at puberty. Many authors feel that the terms ‘‘genital stage’’ or ‘‘genital organization’’ should be reserved for this second period, and that the ‘‘infantile genital organization’’ or ‘‘phallic phase’’ should properly be classed with the (oral and anal) pregenital organizations that precede latency. Freud himself at first described the genital organization as linked to the discovery of the sexual object at the time of puberty (1905d). Under the primacy of the genital zone, a prerequisite to the union of the sexes, the component instincts of the young child’s ‘‘polymorphously perverse’’ sexuality were unified and integrated into sexual activity as fore-pleasure. In a paper of 1923, ‘‘The Infantile Genital Organization,’’ intended as a complement to his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud moved away from the standpoint of biological maturation, reduced the significance previously accorded to puberty, and described an organization that approximated ‘‘(in about the fifth year) to the definitive form taken by [sexuality] in the adult’’ (1923e, p. 141). There are two important points here. Objectchoices, as first made during this phase, are in every way analogous to post-pubertal choices, and this is ‘‘the closest approximation possible in childhood to the final form taken by sexual life after puberty’’ (p. 142). The second and even more important point is that the infantile genital organization, which is simultaneous with the emergence of the Oedipus complex, is marked by the presence of a particular sexual theory: 67 2 the child at this time conceives of but one kind of genital, namely the male sexual organ. This is the reason for the denomination ‘‘phallic phase’’: ‘‘At the same time, the main characteristic of this ’infantile genital organization’ is its difference from the final genital organization of the adult. This consists in the fact that, for both sexes, only one genital, namely the male one, comes into account. What is present, therefore, is not a primacy of the genitals, but a primacy of the phallus.’’ (p. 142) The idea of the primacy of the male genital organ thus became the foundation of the general theory of the castration complex, of which Freud sought thenceforward to frame feminine as well as masculine versions: ‘‘the significance of the castration complex can only be rightly appreciated if its origin in the phase of phallic primacy is also taken into account’’ (p.144). In An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, Freud placed the phallic phase as a pregenital organization following the oral and anal organizations, and reserved the term ‘‘genital organization’’ or ‘‘phase’’ for the pubertal period only. He reasserted the idea that ‘‘The complete organization is only achieved at puberty, in a fourth, genital phase’’ (1940a, p. 155). It is worth recalling here the importance of the notion of organization. Each phase of development sets up a functional system that organizes not only the current state of mental operation but also its future state. Thus, in 1923, Freud summarized the transformations that the polarity between the sexes undergoes during infantile sexual development as follows: ‘‘At the stage of the pregenital sadistic-anal organization, there is as yet no question of male and female; the antithesis between active and passive is the dominant one. At the following stage of infantile genital organization, which we now know about, maleness exists, but not femaleness. The antithesis here is between having a male genital and being castrated. It is not until development has reached its completion at puberty that the sexual polarity coincides with male and female’’ (1923e, p. 145). Even though the evolution of Freud’s view of psychosexual development led him to assimilate infantile sexuality more and more to adult sexuality, he did not alter his initial assertion: he continued to maintain that it was only with the advent of the sexual organization of puberty that the component instincts were definitively unified and a hierarchy established; the child could not emerge from the anarchy of the component INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GERMAN ROMANTICISM instincts until, at puberty, the primacy of the genital zone was assured. JEAN-FRANÇOIS RABAIN See also: Adolescent crisis; Genital love; Phobias in children; Stage (or phase). Bibliography Brusset, Bernard. (1992). Le Développement libidinal. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1923e). The infantile genital organization (An interpolation into the theory of sexuality). SE, 19: 141–145. ———. (1940a). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 139–207. Further Reading Dorsey, Denise. (1996). Castration anxiety or feminine genital anxiety? Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 44(S), 283–302. Harley, Marjorie. (1961). Some observations on the relationship between genitality and structural development at adolescence. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 9, 434–460. Roiphe, Herman. (1968). On an early genital phase: With an addendum on genesis. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 23, 348–368. GERMAN ROMANTICISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Romanticism, according to Thomas Mann, was ‘‘the most revolutionary and most radical’’ movement of the ‘‘German spirit.’’ Along with Judaism and the Enlightenment, it was one of Sigmund FreudÕs main sources of inspiration. The culture of the age of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe infused his childhood and youth, but also the whole of the nineteenth century, which was steeped in post-romantic elements such as Darwinism and the resurgence, in Germany, of Naturphilosophie, forgotten at the end of the century (Ellenberger, 1974). FreudÕs knowledge of certain romantic works of literature is attested by their presence in his library and by the 130 citations of them that appear in his writings. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS If Freud was ambivalent with regard to romanticism, this may have to do with his disillusionment, during his youth, with the pan-Germanism (part of the post-romantic trend) of student circles in Vienna when he arrived at the university in 1873 and joined the Reading Circle of Viennese Students, whose ‘‘Wagnerism’’ soon veered toward nationalism and antiSemitism (MacGrath, 1974). On the other hand, all of the themes for which romantic science and medicine had laid the groundwork were to be found in psychoanalysis a century later: dreams and their ‘‘psychic value,’’ instinct, repression, the lifting of which is the source of ‘‘the uncanny’’ (Friedrich von Schelling)—the unheimlich being a central concept in both romanticism and psychoanalysis, Friedrich SchleiermacherÕs secularized interpretations, which he even applied to speech, and of course Witz, that alloy of Jewish thought and romantic irony theorized by Jean Paul and August Wilhelm von Schegel, on whom Freud relied, along with Heinrich Heine, whose work he cited numerous times in his writings. A ‘‘defrocked romantic,’’ Heine was also FreudÕs model as an atheist Jew, a ‘‘brother in unbelief ’’ to Spinoza, one of the romanticsÕ sources. They gave Eros and sexuality an essential place, and, by elevating the individual ego, took on the conquest of inner freedom. We should also recall the ‘‘conquistador’’ status of Freud himself and the open, ‘‘interminable’’ form of his work. FreudÕs teacher Ernst Brücke had trained him in experimental physiology in a spirit of physico-chemical reductionism, which, in its opposition to the Naturphilosophie of his own teacher, Johannes von Müller, nevertheless allowed a romantic heritage to filter through in Freud’s work. It was brought forth by his self-analysis—in the tradition of the knowledge of self of the romantic Bildung—with Wilhelm Fliess, an adept of romantic biology who transmitted to him, notably, the idea of primal bisexuality. Freud then practiced hypnosis—the heritage of animal magnetism—to create, through a radical transformation, the psychoanalytic cure. At the same time, he drew upon the post-romantics of his own time to support his work: the theosophist Gustav Fechner, from whom he borrowed the concepts of topography and the pleasure principle, Theodor Lipps, for the unconscious, and Karl Scherner for dreams. At the time of the shift in his thinking in the 1920s, with the dualism of the instincts, Freud can be seen as returning to the ‘‘primal 673 GERMANY antithesis of the world’’ of Naturphilosophie, and he later took part in an essential discussion with Romain Rolland, ‘‘the last of the great French romantics.’’ In ‘‘A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis’’ (1924f) Freud alluded to romanticism as an element in the prehistory of psychoanalysis, while Ludwig Binswanger pointed out FreudÕs faithfulness to the concept of nature as ‘‘mythical essence,’’ and Thomas Mann assessed psychoanalysis as a romanticism turned scientific. MADELEINE VERMOREL AND HENRI VERMOREL See also: Goethe and psychoanalysis; Individual; Individuation (analytical psychology); Judaism and psychoanalysis; Sublimation. Bibliography Ellenberger, Henri. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry. New York: Basic Books. Freud, Sigmund. (1924f). A short account of psycho-analysis. SE, 19: 189–209. MacGrath, William J. (1974). Dionysian and populist politics in Austria. New Haven; London: Yale University Press. Mann, Thomas. (1936). Freud and the future. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 37 (1), 106–115. ———. (1941). FreudÕs position in the history of modern culture. Psychoanalytic Review, 28(1), 92–116. Vermorel, Henri, and Madeleine Vermorel. (1986). Freud et la culture allemande. Revue française de psychanalyse, 49, 1034–62. GERMANY The first contacts between psychoanalysis and Germany occurred during the discussions and correspondence between Freud and Wilhelm Fliess at the end of the 1890s and continued through FreudÕs student Felix Gattel. Between 1907 and 1910 psychiatrists who formed part of the entourage of Otto Binswanger, professor of psychiatry at Jena, became familiar with the ‘‘cathartic method.’’ They included Wolfgang Warda, Wilhelm Strohmayer, Arnold Georg Stegmann, Georg Wanke, Iwan Bloch, Arthur Muthmann, Otto Juliusburger, and Jaroslav Marcinowski. The first systematic application of psychoanalysis in Berlin was carried out by Karl Abraham, a student of 67 4 Carl Gustav Jung and Eugen Bleuler. Abraham was in close contact with Freud since 1908 and was responsible for the first meeting of the Berliner Psychoanalytische Vereinigung (Berlin Psychoanalytic Association) on August 27, 1908, which involved a group of local doctors, including Magnus Hirschfeld (a sex researcher), Iwan Bloch (dermatology, human sexuality), Otto Juliusburger (psychiatry, abstinence), and Heinrich Koerber (circle of Monists). Later its members included Max Eitingon and Mosche Wulff. In 1910 the International Psychoanalytical Association was founded on the occasion of the second international congress of psychoanalysis in Nuremberg, with the Berlin Psychoanalytic Association the leading regional group. By the end of 1911 the Berlin association had eleven members, including three women, Tatiana Rosenthal, Karen Horney, and Margarete Stegmann, the first women analysts. In June 1912 two other nonphysician women were admitted as members at large. Since German psychiatrists resisted psychoanalysis, recognition took place through various cultural movements (sexual liberation, the emancipation of women, judicial reform, monism). At the time two psychoanalytic congresses were held in Germany: the Weimar congress on September 21, 1911 and the Munich congress on September 7, 1913. The Berlin Psychoanalytic Association underwent qualitative consolidation in an effort to set itself apart from the sexual sciences (after the exclusion of Magnus Hirschfeld in 1911) and in reaction to the defection of Carl Jung, who gave up the presidency of the International Psychoanalytical Association in 1913 and was supported by the Munich group. Aside from its institutionalization, psychoanalysis received a welcome reception in literature (from authors Lou Andreas-Salomé, Hermann Hesse, Rainer Maria Rilke, Alfred Döblin). Indeed, the city of Frankfurt awarded Sigmund Freud the Goethe Prize in 1930. It was also well received in art (though the mediation of Otto Gros, who was part of the action group that included F. Pfemfert, F. Jung, E. Mühsam). Georg Wilhelm PabstÕs film Geheimnisse einer Seele (The mysteries of a soul; 1926) was made in collaboration with Karl Abraham and Hanns Sachs. Georg Groddeck, the ‘‘wild analyst’’ and the ‘‘father of psychosomatics,’’ opened a fifteen-bed clinic in Baden-Baden. During World War I, an opportunity arose to prove the effectiveness of psychoanalysis in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GERMANY treating war neuroses. This had the effect of identifying the majority of analysts with the objectives of the war (with the exception of Helene Stöcker and Siegfried Bernfeld) and enabled them to maintain international scientific dialogue (for example, through the publication of the Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse). Official recognition of psychoanalysis grew, as demonstrated by the presence of government representatives from Austria, Germany, and Hungary at the 1918 Budapest congress, whose theme was the use of psychoanalysis in treating war neuroses. It was here that Sigmund Freud spoke in favor of the use of mass psychoanalysis. In 1919 the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag (International Psychoanalytic Press) was founded in Leipzig (later in March 1936 the Nazis confiscated the firmÕs inventory). The executive board of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Association appointed Max Eitingon, Ernst Simmel, and Karl Abraham on September 26, 1919, to head the Poliklinik für psychoanalytische Behandlung nervöser Krankheiten (Polyclinic for the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Mental Illnesses), which opened on February 16, 1920. Though the Berlin Psychoanalytic Association managed the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute and the polyclinic, Max Eitingon owned the physical assets and library. He financed the association with an annual fund of 16,000 Reichsmarks. Annual elections were held for the various positions (polyclinic, teaching, candidate, cash management, and subventions). The association grew through an influx of Hungarian analysts fleeing the revolution and counterrevolution, as well as the arrival of analysts from other countries, who were attracted by the freedom and liberality of the Weimar Republic and the then favorable economic situation in Germany. From 1923 the training of analysts was systematized according to guidelines established by Max Eitingon, Carl Müller-Braunschweig, and Sándor Radó and included theoretical courses, a required analysis, and supervised analyses. In 1925 analytic treatment was recognized by a new Prussian order on honoraria (PREUGO) and the German doctorÕs agreement (ADGO). Following the death of Karl Abraham (on December 25, 1925), Ernst Simmel became director of the association (Sándor Radó was secretary, and Karen Horney was treasurer). On April 24, 1926, the association, in compliance with the international guidelines introduced by Ernest Jones, president of the International Psychoanalytical Association, became the Deutsche psychoanalytische Gesellschaft (DPG; German Psychoanalytic Society). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Germany was host to international psychoanalytic congresses in 1922 (Berlin), 1925 (Bad Homburg), and 1932 (Wiesbaden), as well as a couple of national conferences in 1924 (Würzburg) and 1930 (Dresden). Psychoanalytic work groups were formed in Leipzig in 1919 around Karl H. Voitel (from which a second group formed in September 1922 with Therese Benedek at its head), in Frankfurt in 1926 (with members Karl Landauer and Heinrich Meng), in Stuttgart in 1930 (with members Gustav Hans Graber and Hermann Gundert), and in Hamburg in 1930 (with members Clara Happel and August Watermann). In 1929 the Südwestdeutsche psychoanalytische Arbeitsgemeinschaft (Southwest German Psychoanalytic Work Group, with members Karl Landauer, Heinrich Meng, and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann) was formed in Frankfurt in close collaboration with the Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute for Social Research) (with members Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno). This work group sought to diffuse psychoanalysis by providing training analysis and classes on theory held at the university for candidates without any therapeutic training. A few psychoanalytic clinics were established, though they soon closed for lack of financing. There were the Therapeutikum (from 1924 to 1928, with room for fifteen patients), founded by Erich Fromm and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann in Heidelberg to create a bridge between orthodox Judaism and psychoanalysis, and the Schloss Tegel sanitorium in Berlin (from April 1927 to August 1931) for the treatment of serious neuroses, addictions, and character disturbances. In 1928 Max Eitingon became president of Internationaler psychoanalytischer Verlag. On January 13, 1931, he was elected president of the DPG, and was assisted by Felix Boehm, Hanns Sachs, and Ernst Simmel. On April 7, 1933, a law restoring the ‘‘office of professions’’ was issued by the National Socialist government, followed, on April 9, 1933, by an ‘‘Aryanization’’ order directed at medical organizations. On April 22, 1933, medical health insurers started excluding ‘‘nonAryan’’ doctors, and psychoanalysis was attacked as a ‘‘Jewish’’ science. Yet many eminent non-Jewish representatives of the profession, such as Felix Boehm and Carl Müller-Braunschweig, believed, as did National Socialism itself, that psychoanalysis was an effective therapeutic practice. Many eminent leftist psychoanalysts, including Wilhelm Reich, Otto Fenichel, and 675 GERMANY Ernst Simmel, considered psychoanalysis to have a worldview opposed to National Socialism. At the annual DPG meeting of May 6, 1933, when Boehm and Müller-Braunschweig proposed Aryanizing the presidency, most members voted against the change (eight out of fifteen, with five abstentions). On May 10, 1933, the works of Sigmund Freud, along with those of other psychoanalysts, were burned. On November 18, 1933, Boehm and Müller-Braunschweig assumed control of the society, and on December 31, 1933, Max Eitingon left Berlin. At the annual DPG meeting held on December 1, 1935, the society, with the assistance of Ernst Jones, president of the International Psychoanalytical Association, refused to dissolve and decided to remain within the association. However, it required its Jewish members to leave the society. By 1936, 74 analysts had left Germany. Salomea Kempner, August Watermann, and Karl Landauer did not survive their incarceration by the National Socialists. Some members of the DPG resisted the regime: Edith Jacobsohn fought with the socialist resistance group Neu Beginnen (New Beginnings). She was arrested on October 24, 1935, but managed to escape and fled to the United States. The DPG then passed a resolution that required members to abstain from politics. In February 1937 Käthe Dräger became head of the Berlin committee of the KPD-Opposition (the opposition group formed to fight the German communist party, or KPD). She wrote and distributed antifascist writings and tracts, and helped the families of comrades who had been jailed. In 1937 John Rittmeister was forced to flee Switzerland for ‘‘communist activity,’’ and in 1941 he joined the resistance group that had formed around H. Schultze-Boysen (the Rote Kapelle, or Red Orchestra). He was arrested on September 26, 1942, and executed on May 13, 1943. Fourteen psychoanalysts remained in Germany. Discussions between Felix Boehm (president of the DPG), Sigmund and Anna Freud, and other leading analysts gave Boehm the impression of a certain neutrality toward or even support for his and the DPGÕs adaptation to the National Socialist regime. But those involved did not want to further complicate matters, though they did not agree with his political views or the ideological conformism of Müller-Braunschweig. The Ministry of the Interior told Boehm that to obtain authorization to teach, he, as president of the DPG, 67 6 had to fold the other psychotherapeutic organizations into the Deutsches Institut für psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (German Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy), which was to be under National Socialist control and run by Professor Matthias Heinrich Göring. The new institute was founded in May 1936, and Max EitingonÕs assets ‘‘inventoried.’’ This was the beginning of the development of a ‘‘German psychotherapy,’’ an eclectic mix of different psychotherapeutic theories. The DPG was dissolved on November 19, 1938, after an aborted attempt by MüllerBraunschweig to transfer the Wiener Psychoanalytische Vereinigung (WPV; Vienna Psychoanalytic Society) and the publishing house to the German Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy, within which it would become working group A. Although Boehm and Müller-Braunschweig were officially banned from teaching and publishing, they were both important collaborators of the institute. They ran the polyclinic, and Boehm coordinated the working group on homosexuality, while MüllerBraunschweig coordinated the teaching program. The ban on the use of psychoanalytic terminology did not affect Harald Schultz-Hencke, however, who in 1933 developed a form of ‘‘neopsychoanalysis,’’ an amalgam of current psychoanalytic teachings, by abandoning metapsychology and other essential elements of analysis. Of the 300 members of the medical staff of the German Institute (including 17 members of the DPG/ WPV), 41 were members of the Nazi party (the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei), and of the 145 members who were not doctors (25 of whom were members of the DPG/WPV), 22 were party members. Although most of the DPG members remaining in Germany had managed to adapt to the Nazi regime, only Doctor Gerhard Scheunert was a member of the Nazi party. The German Institute, by then solidly established, was recognized by the union of German workers, financed by the Luftwaffe and private insurers, and, during the war, was ‘‘assigned to the war effort.’’ Eventually it was raised to the level of a government institute within the ReichÕs research council (Reichsinstitut im Reichsforschungsrat), with an annual budget of 880,000 Reichsmarks. After the war, though participants claimed to have sought to ‘‘save psychoanalysis’’ by their underground INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GERMANY presence, they faced considerable skepticism and criticism from colleagues living abroad. On October 16, 1945, the DPG was reestablished with MüllerBraunschweig as its first president, Boehm as representative, and Werner Kemper as the third member of the office staff. It had 35 ordinary members and 2 members at large, 12 of whom had been trained between 1936 and 1945. On April 29, 1946, it resumed activities (as the Berliner Psychoanalytische Gesellschaft until December 3, 1950), but the British military authorities forced the DPG to strike any mention of being a ‘‘member of the International Psychoanalytical Association.’’ On May 9, 1947, the Institut für Psychotherapie was founded in Berlin, with teachers from a variety of psychotherapeutic backgrounds, to provide training in psychotherapy; in 1948 the institute also began training ‘‘education counselors,’’ or Psychagogen (child and adolescent therapists). During the first postwar International Congress of Psychoanalysis, which took place in Zurich in 1949, the confrontation between Harald Schultz-HenckeÕs neopsychoanalysis and the conventional Freudian position of Müller-Braunschweig reached its culmination. The DPG was provisionally admitted to the International Psychoanalytical Association, subject to the requirement that its members state their position openly. On May 13, 1950, Müller-Braunschweig, unsuccessful in his attempts to obtain recognition from SchultzHencke, secretly founded the Deutsche psychoanalytische Vereinigung (DPV; German Psychoanalytic Association). The DPV was admitted to the International Psychoanalytical Association at the 1951 Amsterdam congress, but not the DPG. The DPG only succeeded in regaining membership as the IPA Executive Council Provisional Society at the IPA Congress in Nice in 2001. In 2004 the DPV was the second largest group within the International Psychoanalytical Association in terms of number of members. At the suggestion of Werner Schwidder (member of the DPG and student of Schultz-Hencke), the DPG, in 1962, joined with other neopsychoanalytic groups to form the Internationale Föderation psychoanalytischer Gesellschaften (International Federation of Psychoanalytic Societies), comprising twenty individual societies in Europe, North America, and South America. In spite of struggles for influence between the DPG and the DPV, which were just beginning to ease, in 1949 Wilhelm Bitter founded the Deutsche Gesellschaft für INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Psychoanalyse, Psychotherapie, Psychosomatik und Tiefenpsychologie (German Society for Psychoanalysis, Psychotherapy, Psychosomatics, and Depth Psychology), a professional organization incorporating the major trends in depth psychology (neopsychoanalysis, conventional Freudianism, Jungian analysis, Adlerian analysis). The member societies took turns supplying presidents. As of 2004, it had approximately 3,150 members in 45 institutes, which are recognized by the kassenärztliche Bundesvereinigung (German association of registered physicians) and German medical associations as establishments providing further education to become child and youth analytical psychotherapists. Outside Berlin, working groups and psychotherapeutic establishments were created in Munich (the successor of the German Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy and the mobile psychosomatic service of Johann Cremerius), Stuttgart (the working group in 1946, and in 1948 the Institut für Psychotherapie und Tiefenpsychologie [Institute for Psychotherapy and Depth Psychology], representing the various forms of depth psychology and founded by Wilhelm Bitter, Hermann Gundert, and Felix Schottlaender), Heidelberg (the department of psychosomatics run by Alexander Mitscherlich), Bremen (the working group founded by Hildegard Buder in 1949, and an institute founded by R. W. Schulte and Franz Rudolf Haarstrick in 1951), and Göttingen (the Tiefenbrunn regional hospital, founded by G. Kühnel and W. Schwidder). Later, institutes were created in all the major cities of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Berlin institute gradually lost its importance and was overshadowed by the institute founded in Frankfurt in 1961 under the direction of Alexander Mitscherlich and associated with the university. This was the Institut und Ausbildungszentrum für Psychoanalyse und psychosomatische Medizin (Institute and Learning Center for Psychoanalysis and Psychosomatic Medicine), which was renamed the Sigmund Freud Institute in 1964. Mitscherlich and his wife, Margarete MitscherlichNielsen, not only renewed relations with the Institute of Social Research (where Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno were central figures) but also initiated a dialog with the international psychoanalytic community concerning the controversies associated with GermanyÕs National Socialist past. Sparked by criticisms from the student movement, interest in social policies, group therapy, and family therapy grew (relevant authors include Horst-Eberhard Richter, Franz Heigl, Anneliese Heigl-Evers). The ‘‘Bernfeld Circle’’ 677 GERMANY (Johannes Cremerius) began to question the training and qualifications of analysts, the issue of feminism, and the various polemics surrounding psychoanalysis (Christa Rhode-Dachser). In the German Democratic Republic, ideology interfered with the resumption of a psychoanalytic tradition, although there was relative tolerance for neopsychoanalysis. In an initial phase running from 1945 to 1949, the analysts Werner Kemper (West Berlin), Alexander Mette (Weimar), and Franz Baumeyer (Arnsdorf) were among the dozen psychiatrists responsible for training and accrediting ‘‘mental health caretakers and psychotherapists.’’ In Leipzig, the neurologist A. Beerholdt, although he never completed his analytic coursework, was able to introduce psychoanalysis to several psychiatrists (Wendt, Starke, Behrendt, Böttcher). The only trained psychoanalyst remaining in the German Democratic Republic, Alexander Mette, left psychoanalysis to start a career in politics (he pursued an initial interest in health policies, then a university career, and eventually became a member of the chamber of deputies of the German Democratic Republic and a member of the central committee of the Socialist Unity Party). The contents of psychoanalytic discussions were determined by Harald SchultzHencke and his followers, Werner Schwidder, U. Derbolowsky, and G. Kühnel. Schultz-HenckeÕs appointment as professor at Humboldt University on September 29, 1949, led the DPG to issue a resolution forbidding members from taking posts in both East and West Germany, and Schultz-Hencke gave up his professorship. Following the creation of the German Democratic Republic on October 7, 1949, psychotherapeutic establishments were created in Jena and Leipzig. From 1950 to 1962, while psychoanalysis was expanding in the United States and an antipsychoanalytic movement was taking place in the Soviet Union (where FreudÕs work represented a facet of National Socialist ideology), the trend in the German Democratic Republic turned to Pavlovianism. Associated with the therapeutic tradition of Otto Binswanger, Johannes H. Schultz, Ernst Speer, and O. Vogt, in 1951 a department of psychotherapy was opened at the medical polyclinic. There they developed a medicalmaterialist ‘‘rational psychotherapy’’ intended to replace neopsychoanalysis. The period from 1963 to 1976, when H. Kleinsorge was president of the DPG, was characterized by greater 67 8 openness in discussions of psychotherapies and in international relations. In the society a number of sections were set up, organized according to method rather than their theoretical leanings: psychodynamic therapy, group therapy, autogenic training and hypnosis, infant therapy, music therapy. Between 1976 and 1984 recognition was granted to ‘‘medical specialists in psychotherapy’’ and ‘‘medical psychologists’’ (August 1978), and individual therapy was reintroduced. Fifteen regional societies of psychotherapy were created to cover psychotherapeutic needs and the basic training of doctors, and interdisciplinary working groups were formed to further integrate psychoanalysis with the medical field. After 1985 efforts were made to institutionalize psychotherapy in the universities by creating autonomous chairs of psychotherapy and medical psychology, and psychoanalytically oriented research on the body helped to conceptualize group therapy. Access to the psychoanalytic literature was still limited, however: Freud was first published in the German Democratic Republic as late as 1983. In September 1947, the Studiengesellschaft für praktische Psychologie (Research Society for Practical Psychology) was formed in West Germany for representatives of all the academic professions concerned with the individual. Ever since 1945, in the university exams given to psychologists, psychoanalysis appeared under ‘‘depth psychology and education counseling.’’ After the educational reforms of 1973, it appeared in the larger field of ‘‘clinical psychology,’’ comprising the study of testing, prevention, rehabilitation, counseling, and other areas outside the field of depth psychology. Gradually, psychoanalysis disappeared from higher education to be taught in training institutes and the psychosomatic departments of medical schools. Nonetheless, in experimental psychology, psychoanalysis remained the most systematic and most studied psychological theory in 1977. At the beginning of the 1980s, the emphasis on the interpretation of psychoanalytic texts brought about through the influence of Jacques Lacan made its appearance in German scholarship. After 1970 medical psychology and sociology, as well as psychotherapy and psychosomatics, became required material for students of medicine and resulted in the creation of the corresponding chairs and, in some cases, university departments. In 1979 the DPG created a psychoanalysis section alongside psychotherapy, and psychoanalysis became a part of the continuing training of doctors. At the start of the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GERMANY 1990s, specialist medical training included fields such as ‘‘psychotherapeutic medicine,’’ ‘‘psychiatry and psychotherapy,’’ ‘‘psychiatry and psychotherapy of children and adolescents.’’ With respect to the relations between psychoanalysis and insurers, the Einheitskrankenkasse and the Rentenversicherung, in Berlin, had financed the Zentralinstitut für psychogene Erkrankungen der Versicherungsanstalt Berlin (Central Insurance Institute of Berlin for Mental Illness), founded by Werner Kemper and Harald Schultz-Hencke. By 1955 insurance reforms in Berlin had gradually done away with many of these organizations, but the Central Insurance Institute remains. Empirical follow-up work on outpatients by Franz Baumeyer and Annemarie Dührssen made legal recognition of psychotherapy possible. In 1960 the ‘‘Munich model’’ was instituted; this system involved the sharing of medical expenses among the government (for employees), insurers, and patients, each paying a third. In 1967 psychological and psychoanalytic therapies became covered general medical expenses for which insurers were responsible, following verification of the illness. In 1968 insurers (and in 1971 mutual insurance companies as well) started covering psychotherapy under certain conditions, and they also covered child therapies. On July 1, 1976, the medical committee and insurers modified the guidelines for analytic therapies to recognize neurosis as an illness. Psychosomatic treatment became covered from October 1, 1987. In therapy, if the symptoms are recognized, reimbursement covers 160 fifty-minute hours of treatment, with 80 to 140 additional hours possible. Psychologists who have received analytic training can provide psychoanalytic treatments. With the passing of a law regulating psychotherapists (June 16, 1998), ‘‘psychological psychotherapists’’ and child and youth therapists now require a license to practice medicine. Among journals, one of the most important is Psyche, which began by focusing on depth psychology but later broadened its coverage to include cultural trends. Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse published contributions to the theory, practice, and history of psychoanalysis. Forum der Psychoanalyse and Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Theorie und Praxis are clinical in orientation. Other journals include Praxis der Psychotherapie und Psychosomatik and Zeitschrift für psychosomatische Medizin und Psychoanalyse. Until the end of the 1960s, the DPG and the DPV were separated by their divergent theoretical positions INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS concerning Harald Schultz-HenckeÕs neopsychoanalysis. Since then, the DPGÕs orientation has shifted to a more international position focused on the ego and the self and on the theory of object relations. Moreover, it has generally supported the classical Freudian position. However, there has been growing interest within both the DPV and the DPG for the Kleinian position, and contacts have developed with the ‘‘Middle Group’’ of the British Psycho-Analytical Society. Though there are a few theoretical differences (Rudolf, 1987), there are more differences in practice. For example, in training analysis the DPV recommends four sessions, and the DPG three. After accounts were settled over Alexander MitscherlichÕs involvement with National Socialism, a reckoning that took place over a twenty-five-year period following the war, the first postwar congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Germany was held in Hamburg in 1985. At the congress there was a growing interest in the history of psychoanalysis, its development (Karen Brecht, Volker Friedrich, Ludger Hermanns, Dierk Juelich, Isidor Kaminer, and Regine Lockot), and its interpretation (Hermann Beland, Ermann). In 1995 and 1996 conferences between groups of German and Israeli psychoanalysts took place (H. Beland). In 1996 the first joint DPG-DPV conference was held on ‘‘the division of the psychoanalytic community in Germany and its consequences.’’ In 1996 the two societies, the DPG and DPV, had nearly the same number of members (approximately five hundred each). REGINE LOCKOT Bibliography Haarstrick, Franz Rudolf. (1994). Die Entwicklung des Gutachterverfahrens in der Psychotherapie. Arbeitskreis Deutschen Gesellschaft für Psychoanalyse, Psychotherapie, Psychosomatik und Tiefenpsychologie/Vereinigung Analytischer Kinder—und Jugendlichen—Psychoterhapeuten, 4. Hermanns, Ludger M. (1994). Karl Abraham und die Anfänge der Berliner psychoanalytischen Vereinigung. Luzifer-Amor, 13, 30–40. Höck, Kurt. (1988). Entwicklung der Balint-Gruppenarbeit in der D.D.R. Klinik und Praxis. Berlin: Springer. Lockot, Regine. (1985). Erinnern und Durcharbeiten: zur Geschichte der Psychoanalyse und Psychotherapie im Nationalsozialismus. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. Rudolf, Gerd. (1987). Vergleich der Akzeptanz psychoanalytischer Konzepte von I.P.A.- und D.P.G.-Mitgliedern. 679 GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN The twelve volumes of the Gesammelte Schriften constitute the first publication of FreudÕs complete (or almost complete) works in his native language. They were published by the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. This edition was undoubtedly planned when Freud was ill with cancer in 1923, and it was originally limited to ten volumes. Volumes 4, 5, 7, 8, and 10 appeared in 1924, volumes 1, 2, 3, 6, and 9 in the following year. Since Freud remained productive despite his illness, an eleventh volume containing his writings from the interim was published in 1928, and in 1934 a final volume appeared that brought together ‘‘the writings of 1928–33’’ and various additions to Volumes 1– 11. Anna Freud and Adolf Josef Storfer served as editors for Volumes 1–11 and Otto Rank as their co-editor on Volumes 4, 5, 7, 8, and 10. Anna Freud and Robert Waelder made the selection and provided editorial commentary for Volume 12. As indicated on the endpapers, all volumes were ‘‘prepared with the collaboration of the author,’’ and in correspondence Freud several times referred to the Gesammelte Schriften as the ‘‘complete edition’’ of his works. This was not a critical edition, however. The somewhat random composition of Volumes 11 and 12 was the result, to be sure, of their belated conception. Volumes 1–10, envisioned as a whole, were organized by theme. Scholarly apparatus and commentary were minimal. There was no introductory statement of the principles governing the editorsÕ choices and aims, nor was any bibliography or index provided. The only editorial decision of any moment concerned The Interpretation of Dreams, the first edition of which magnum opus, FreudÕs dream-book in its initial form, was offered as the second volume of the Gesammelte Schriften, while Volume 3 assembled the many and often voluminous additions that Freud made to the book in its subsequent editions. It was Freud himself who proposed this original way of presenting his great work. Prior to the publication of the Gesammelte Schriften, Freud had for the most part published his work in the form of monographs, articles in journals or annals, or contributions to anthologies and collections. After the founding, in 1919, of his own publishing house, the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, he generally published there. It was thus the ‘‘twelve volumes in dictionary format’’ (to quote the publishersÕ 68 0 promotional matter) of the Gesammelte Schriften that gave readers their first general view of the full scope and import of FreudÕs work. ILSE GRUBRICH-SIMITIS See also: Gesammelte Werke; ‘‘Moses of Michelangelo, The’’; Studies on Hysteria Bibliography Grubrich-Simitis, Ilse. (1993). Back to FreudÕs texts. Making silent documents speak. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. ———. (2000). Metamorphosen der Traumdeutung. In Jean Starobinski, Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, and M. Solms, (Eds.) Hundert Jahre Traumdeutung von Sigmund Freud. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag. GESAMMELTE WERKE The eighteen-volume Gesammelte Werke, along with an unnumbered supplemental volume (the Nachtragsband) constitutes the second complete edition of FreudÕs work in German. In 1939, having emigrated to London, Freud founded the Imago Publishing Company as a successor to the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, shut down by the Nazis. The chief purpose was to preserve the Viennese Gesammelte Schriften, duly modified, as a new Gesammelte Werke. Work on the project was begun as early as the fall of 1938, with Freud participating. At the outset, the editorial committee consisted of Anna Freud, Edward Bibring, and Ernst Kris. Volumes 1 through 17 appeared between 1940 and 1952, which is to say after FreudÕs death. Bibring and Kris migrated to the United States in 1940–41, to be replaced by Willi Hoffer and Otto Isakower, who served as co-editors for every volume except 9 and 15, both of which were published in 1944. Marie BonaparteÕs collaboration was acknowledged in every volume. Volume 18, planned as a Gesamtregister or General Index, was prepared by Lilla Veszy-Wagner, but before the manuscript could be sent to the printer, Imago Publishing Company went bankrupt in 1961. When S. Fischer Verlag of Frankfurt acquired the rights to FreudÕs works in 1960, they also came into possession of the remaining stock of the seventeen volumes of the Gesammelte Werke and the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GESTAPO manuscript of the Gesamtregister. After a thoroughgoing revision, Volume 18, the very first general index to FreudÕs work, finally appeared in 1968. In 1987 the Nachtragsband, edited by Angela Richards with the assistance of Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, brought together all of FreudÕs psychological and psychoanalytical texts that for one reason or another had not been included in the first seventeen volumes of the Gesammelte Werke. Like the Gesammelte Schriften, the first seventeen volumes of the Gesammelte Werke cannot be described as a critical edition of FreudÕs work. Editorial comment is reduced to the bare minimum. In contrast to the approach of the Schriften, the contents of the Gesammelte Werke are ordered chronologically. Volume 2 and 3 reproduce the eighth edition of The Interpretation of Dreams, including all the added material. The Nachtragsband, however, is supplied with a serious editorial apparatus and may be considered a critical edition. It is organized by theme, but its overall arrangement is chronological. The main aim of the editors of Volumes 1-17, working from London during and immediately after the Second World War, was to make FreudÕs work available in its original language through the book trade. The editorial shortcomings resulted in part from the difficult conditions under which this second edition of FreudÕs collected works had to be produced; in light of the circumstances the undertaking constituted a remarkable rescue operation. The Nachtragsband eked out the set of texts in Volume 1-17 by adding writings that had come to light later, some of them lacking even in the Standard Edition, as for example the ‘‘Übersicht der Übertragungsneurosen’’ (Overview of the transference neuroses) of 1915. Some texts, among them the ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ and FreudÕs original notes on the ‘‘Rat Man’’ case, appeared in the Nachtragsband in freshly corrected transcriptions. Until such time, then, as a historico-critical edition is produced, the Gesammelte Werke and the Nachtragsband together constitute the most comprehensive presentation of FreudÕs work available in its original language. ILSE GRUBRICH-SIMITIS See also: Gesammelte Schriften; Imago Publishing Company. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Grubrich-Simitis, Ilse. (1987). Einleitung. In Sigmund Freud, GW, Nachtragsband, Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. ———. (1993). Back to FreudÕs texts. Making silent documents speak. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. GESTAPO It was not long after the Anschluss of March 13, 1938, that the Nazis began to take an interest in the Jew Sigmund Freud. The number of ‘‘visits’’ to the Berggasse residence increased in frequency and were often accompanied by demands for money. One Tuesday evening, on March 22, Anna Freud was held ‘‘bei Gestapo’’ for questioning, which sealed her fatherÕs decision to leave Austria. It has been suggested that ‘‘humor is a polite way of expressing despair’’ and it is not surprising that a number of jokes circulated in Austria at the time. One of them, attributed to Freud himself, has been frequently repeated ever since Ernest Jones reported it: ‘‘One of the conditions for being granted an exit visa was that he sign a document that ran as follows, ÔI Prof. Freud, hereby confirm that after the Anschluss of Austria to the German Reich I have been treated by the German authorities and particularly the Gestapo with all the respect and consideration due to my scientific reputation, that I could live and work in full freedom, that I could continue to pursue my activities in every way I desired, that I found full support from all concerned in this respect, and that I have not the slightest reason for any complaint.Õ When the Nazi officer brought it along Freud had of course no compunction in signing it, but he asked if he might be allowed to add a sentence, which was: ÔI can heartily recommend the Gestapo to anyoneÕ’’ (Jones, 1957, p. 226). This ‘‘story’’ has been repeated many times and commented on by those who treated it as genuine. Some commentators have reproached Freud for a ‘‘recommendation’’ they felt to be ambiguous; others admired his audacity. Eventually, some people ended up believing that Freud had actually added this sentence to the Nazi document. It is hard to imagine that Freud, who was aware of the difficult and costly negotiations by the U. S. ambassador to France (William C. Bullitt), Marie Bonaparte, and Ernest Jones to obtain his visa, and 681 GIFT who was responsible for the fate of his daughter and wife within the climate of the anti-Semitic hatred that had taken hold in Vienna, would have taken the risk of making a joke that in a matter of seconds might undo all their efforts. Moreover, he was depressed by the powerlessness resulting from his age and poor health, as he wrote in a letter to his son Ernst on May 12, 1938, ‘‘I am writing to you for no particular reason because here I am sitting inactive and helpless while Anna runs here and there coping with all the authorities, attending to all the business details’’ (letter number 297, p. 442). But his ‘‘official’’ biography maintained this fiction, and none of those close to Freud denied it, especially Anna Freud. The original text of the statement was found during a 1989 public auction of documents concerning the emigration of FreudÕs family. It is a more sober statement, closer to the horrible truth of those years, than the theatrical version given by Jones, and more consistent with the customary bureaucratic indifference of the Nazi machine. It was written by Alfred Indra and signed by Freud, without any additions by him. It reads: ‘‘Erklarung. Ich bestätige gerne, dass bis heute den 4. Juni 1938, keinerlie Behelligung meiner Person oder meiner Hausgenossen vorgekommen ist. Behörden und Funtionäre der Partei sind mir und meinem Hausgenossen ständig korrekt und rücksickstvoll entgegentretten. Wien, den 4. Juni 1938. Prof. Dr. Sigm. Freud.’’ (Declaration. I hereby confirm of my own free will that as of today, June 4, 1938, neither I nor those around me have been harassed. The authorities and representatives of the Party have always conducted themselves correctly and with restraint with me and with those around me. Vienna, June 4, 1938. Prof. Dr. Sigm. Freud.) FreudÕs comment was most likely introduced to mask the anguish of his departure—a form of black humor, which had close links, throughout FreudÕs life, with the tradition of Yiddish Witze, which were often also tinged with despair. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Bettelheim, Bruno; Freud, (Jean Martin); Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag; Mitscherlich, Alexander. Bibliography Jones, Ernest. (1957). Sigmund Freud. Life and work. London: Hogarth. 68 2 Mijolla, Alain de. (1989). A sale in Vienna. Journal de lÕassociation internationale dÕhistoire de la psychanalyse, 8. GIFT Gifts and money are unconsciously associated with anal eroticism. In ‘‘On Transformations of Instinct as Exemplified in Anal Erotism’’ (1916–1917e), Sigmund Freud writes, ‘‘It is probable that the first meaning which a childÕs interest in faeces develops is that of ÔgiftÕ rather than ÔgoldÕ or Ômoney.Õ . . . Since his faeces are his first gift, the child easily transfers his interest from that substance to the new one which he comes across as the most valuable gift in life. Those who question this derivation of gifts should consider their experience of psycho-analytic treatment, study the gifts they receive as doctors from their patients, and watch the storms of transference which a gift from them can rouse in their patients’’ (pp. 130–131). The gift is meaningful because of its connection to the libido and eroticism. FreudÕs investigation led him to the discovery of the unconscious link with defecation and its relation to treasure hunting. Karl Abraham (1916) examined the connection between excessive giving and anxiety. He investigated (1919) the transference meaning of the associations— occasionally excessive—presented by the patient to the psychoanalyst as a gift. This attitude is an expression of narcissism and is characterized by its view of analysis as something governed by the pleasure principle. What happens to the instinctual impulses of anal eroticism after the genital organization has been established? Freud in ‘‘On Transformations of Instinct as Exemplified in Anal Eroticism’’ (1916–17e) responds with the idea of the transformation of instinct. In this schema, gift equals excrement according to the symbolic language of the dream and daily life. The first gift is excrement, a part of the infantÕs body he gives up only upon the motherÕs insistence and through which he manifests his love for her. Defecation and its relation to the object thus become the first opportunity for the infant to choose between bodily pleasure (narcissism) and object love (sacrifice). Later in life the interest in excrement is transferred to an interest in gifts and money. The concepts of excrement, infant, and penis are poorly distinguished INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS G L O V E R , E D W A R D (1888 –1 972) and are frequently treated as if they were equivalent; they can easily be substituted for one another. Freud perceived the identity of the infant with excrement in the linguistic expression: ‘‘to give a child.’’ Similarly, Freud wrote in the ‘‘Wolf Man’’ (1918b), ‘‘By way of this detour demonstrating a common point of departure in their significance as gifts, money can now attract to itself the meaning of children, and in this way take over the expression of feminine (homosexual) satisfaction.’’ Freud views the transference relation of certain patients as a vague recollection of this problematic, arising whenever the patient wants to interrupt the unfinished treatment and place himself in a situation of disdain that originates in the outside world. The patient then replaces the urgent desire to have a child with promises of significant gifts, most often as unrealistic as the object of his past desire. This concept is developed in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g). Melanie Klein (1932–1975) demonstrated the importance of the theme of poison gifts as a source of depression and melancholy toward the object. ‘‘For the child gifts attenuate his guilt by symbolizing the free gift of what he wanted to obtain by sadistic means.’’ In this same article, Klein clarifies the role of ambivalence and sees it as a step forward compared to archaic mechanisms. The gift provides access; it is a preliminary form of sublimation within the compulsions of reparation and restitution associated with obsessive behavior. DOMINIQUE J. ARNOUX See also: Anality; Money in psychoanalytic treatment Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1966). Examen de l’étape prégénitale la plus précoce du développement de la libido. Complete works, vol. 2, 1915–1925. (pp. 231–254) (I. Barande, Trans.) Paris: Payot. (Original work published 1916) ———. (1979). A particular form of neurotic resistance against the psycho-analytic method. (pp. 303–311) In Selected papers of Karl Abraham, M.D. (Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey, Trans.) New York: Brunner/Mazel. (Original work published 1927) Freud, Sigmund. (1908b). Character and anal erotism. SE, 9: 169–175. ———. (1916–17e). On transformations of instinct as exemplified in anal erotism. SE, 17: 127–133. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ———. (1918b). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1–122. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. Klein, Melanie. (1975). The psycho-analysis of children. (Alix Strachey, Trans.) London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1932) GLOVER, EDWARD (1888–1972) Edward Glover, British psychoanalyst and physician, was born on January 13, 1998 in Lesmahagow, Scotland, and died August 16, 1972, in London. Born in a small Scottish village, he was the third and youngest son of a country schoolmaster, Matthew Glover, who, for reasons of health, had previously given up a very promising scholastic University career. His mother, Elizabeth Shanks Glover, had been raised by her uncle, a Minister of the Reformed Presbyterian Church, and she was privately educated in its very firm tenets and strict Sunday observances, as well as in domestic arts. By contrast, EdwardÕs father was Darwinian and agnostic, but Edward was raised in what he regarded as his motherÕs oppressive religious convictions. Glover is said to have inherited his literary gifts from his mother, but his fatherÕs linguistic expertise and thorough knowledge of Greek, Latin, Hebrew, French, and English must have deeply influenced him. Matthew GloverÕs interest in natural philosophy, his intellectual rigor, scientific attitude, and capacity to teach was likewise reflected in EdwardÕs selfsame gifts. But the boy hated his early years of schooling and religious instruction, describing himself as ‘‘reluctant, rebellious, contumacious, and obstinate’’ as a pupil, though he seems otherwise to have had a happy childhood. But, on entering secondary school–under his fatherÕs direction–he threw himself into his work with energy and gusto, matriculating at sixteen, starting medical training, and qualifying M.B., Ch.B. with distinction at the age of twenty-one. He was appointed House Physician to the wellknown cardiologist Professor John Cowan at Glasgow Royal Infirmary, and in the next few years learned to apply scientific method to clinical practice and undertook research. Four years later he became Senior Resident at the Glasgow ChildrenÕs Hospital, and remarked 683 G L O V E R , E D W A R D (188 8 –1972 ) that there ‘‘the facts of psychological life could no longer be gainsaid.’’ He became Assistant Physician at the Edward VII Sanatorium at Midhurst, greatly admiring the pathologist there, J.A.D. Radcliffe, whom he felt provided him with a disciplined understanding of natural scientific method. GloverÕs experience led to significant published contributions to the field of pulmonary medicine. In following his medical career he had been greatly influenced by his oldest brother, James. His dissatisfaction with a strictly organic approach to medicine–the limitations of which he discovered in the course of his own clinical practice–led him to follow his brother JamesÕs interest in FreudÕs psychology. James had moved to Brunswick Square in London to set up a psychiatric practice with Drs. Jessie Murray and Julia Turner. In 1920 the brothers went to Berlin to undergo training analyses (Edward preferred to call his an apprenticeship) with Karl Abraham, studying alongside Ella Freeman Sharpe and Mary Chadwick–also to make their names as psychoanalysts in London. Glover had an honorary appointment there, and learned as much psychiatry as he could from the hospital facilities in Berlin before returning to London, becoming an associate member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society in 1921 and a full member the following year. James, who was close to Ernest Jones, died in 1926, and Edward took over many of his commitments. He was appointed Scientific Secretary of the British Society, Director of Research, Assistant Director, under Jones, of the London Clinic of Psychoanalysis, and then Secretary of the training committee of the International Psychoanalytic Society. His influence in the British Society was second only to Jones, while his reputation among doctors outside the Society was unsurpassed. He was a fine public speaker and a very gifted writer; and although he sometimes lapsed into polemics, he produced some memorable and witty sayings in the process. Glover was sufficiently self-critical to recognize that, for a time after his qualification, he had allowed his enthusiasm for psychoanalysis to undermine, at times, the critical and scientific discipline that had become so important to him during his strictly medical work. But it was an error that he soon set about correcting. He became an enemy of what he called ‘‘unchecked speculation,’’ and became, in a series of telling critiques of analysts and former analysts published over the years (most notably, perhaps, Freud or 68 4 Jung [1950]), what someone in another field once called ‘‘the necessary antidote to everything.’’ In this he held firmly to the common ground of basic psychoanalytic concepts. Unhappily, he lived to see that ground becoming increasingly less common. Much of his work, however, consists of original contributions covering a wide range of psychoanalytic interest. These included: drug addiction; prostitution; War, Sadism, and Pacifism (1933); The Technique Of Psycho-Analysis (1955); the classification of mental disorders; the early development of mind and the nuclear theory of ego formation; education; and research methods in psychoanalysis. A selection of many key papers appeared in 1956. A classic textbook on psychoanalysis was published in 1939 and substantially enlarged for a second edition in 1949. But, perhaps above all, his contributions to the study of psychopathy and crime reflected his single greatest interest, about which he wrote a large number of papers, the bulk of them gathered together in his book The Roots of Crime (1960). From small beginnings in 1922, and in association with Grace Pailthorpe and others, the foundations were laid on which Glover later founded the Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency (ISTD), the clinical wing of which was later adopted by the National Health Service as the Portman Clinic, while the scientific and research division was funded separately. Together with Hermann Mannheim and Emanuel Miller, Glover founded The British Journal of Delinquency (later The British Journal of Criminology) in 1950 and, together with the ISTD, launched the International Library of Criminology. He was a founding member of the editorial board of The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child. Glover is often remembered in the British Psychoanalytic Society, perhaps unfairly, for the part he played in the series of Controversial Discussions, recorded with great thoroughness and scholarship by Pearl King and Riccardo Steiner in The Freud-Klein Controversies 1941–45 (1991). GloverÕs critique of Klein, later published separately, is still perhaps the most thorough and exhaustive on this topic. His dissent led him to leave the Society in 1944, but he continued to be a member the International Psychoanalytic Association through his honorary membership of the Swiss and American Societies. GloverÕs first wife, whom he married in 1918, died eighteen months later from septicemia. He married for a second time in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS G L O V E R , J A M E S (1882 –1 926) 1924, and their only child, a mentally handicapped girl, was born in 1926. CLIFFORD YORKE See also: British Psycho-Analytical Society; Splitting of the object; Controversial Discussions; Dipsomania; Great Britain; Indications and contraindications for psychoanalysis for an adult; Schmideberg-Klein, Melitta; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic. Bibliography Glover, Edward. (1933). War, sadism and pacifism. London: Allen and Unwin. ———. (1950). Freud or Jung. London: Allen and Unwin. ———. (1955). The technique of psycho-analysis. London: Bailliere, Tindall and Cox. ———. (1956). On the early development of mind. Selected papers. London: Imago Publishing. Re-issued 1970, New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1960). The roots of crime. London: Imago Publishing. Re-issued 1970, New York: International Universities Press. King, Pearl H.M.; and Steiner, Riccardo. (1991). The FreudKlein controversies 1941–1945. London and New York: Tavistock Publications-Routledge. GLOVER, JAMES (1882–1926) English psychoanalyst and physician James Glover was born in Lesmahagow, Lanarkshire, Scotland. Six years older than his well-known brother Edward, James was, after Ernest Jones, the most notable British (Scottish) psychoanalyst of his era. As he died prematurely from diabetes at the age of fourty-four, after only eight years of training and practice of psychoanalysis, he left few publications. Had not Ernest Jones devoted eight pages of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis (volume 8, 1926) to his obituary, there would be little record of his life and the name of Glover would exclusively be associated with his younger brother. James and Edward were the sons of Matthew Glover, country schoolmaster and academic, and Elizabeth Smith Shanks, who came of a farming family. There was a middle brother who died. James was regarded as the genius of the family and Edward as the more pedestrian. James received a fine Scottish INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS education, which stimulated and trained his intellect; throughout his life he maintained his knowledge of science and philosophy. At the same time, he was a writer of short stories and a great reader of literature. James qualified as a physician and surgeon in Glasgow at the early age of twenty-one. As he was already in poor health, he undertook sea voyages and spent some years in Brazil where he practiced both medicine and surgery. After some ten years his health deteriorated further and he returned to Britain where he practiced chest medicine and ear, nose, and throat surgery. His philosophical interests turned to psychology and to an interest in Freud. In 1918 he joined the Brunswick Square Clinic, the first psychotherapy center in the United Kingdom, founded by Julia Turner and Dr. Jessie Murray. They practiced an eclectic form of psychotherapy, influenced by Pierre Janet and Dejerine. James underwent a ‘‘pseudo-analysis’’ with Julia Turner and quickly became co-director of the clinic with her after the illness and death of Dr. Murray. He was very active in training psychotherapists at the clinic and was in charge of the rehabilitation of resident patients. But his skeptical and enquiring mind and strict scientific and philosophical outlook soon made him dissatisfied with eclectic psychotherapy and he decided to become a psychoanalyst. In 1920 he attended the Hague Congress of Psychoanalysis and went on to Berlin for some months of analysis with Karl Abraham and returned to him for more analysis the following year. At this time he insisted that psychoanalysis should be the only form of psychotherapy at the Brunswick Square Clinic and persuaded both the patrons and the staff to close the clinic and to transfer its funds and activities to the Psychoanalytic Society. Jones writes that he displayed tact combined with a steel-like resolution in order to get his way. Amongst the psychoanalysts who were drawn to psychotherapy through the Brunswick Square Clinic were Sylvia Payne, Mary Chadwick, Ella Sharpe, Nina Searle, Susan Isaacs, Iseult Grant-Duff, Marjorie Brierley and the Jungian Constance Long. Glover became an associate member of the newly formed Psychoanalytic Society in 1921, full member 1922, and in 1924 was appointed to the council. He arranged the transfer of the International Library of Psychoanalysis to the Hogarth Press of Leonard and Virginia Woolf. Glover was untiringly active in the Psychoanalytic Society, training, lecturing (particularly on anxiety states), and establishing the clinic of the society, and was its assistant director. 685 GOETHE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Glover was a fine lecturer and a fierce polemicist, a trait shared with his brother Edward. He was appointed chair of the medical section of the British Psychological Society, which was the meeting ground for psychotherapists of different persuasions. One of his few published papers is his contribution to a symposium ‘‘The conception of sexuality’’ (1925), in which he savagely criticized the contribution of J.A. Hadfield, a leading figure at the Tavistock Clinic. Reading his paper gives a vivid insight into the quality of GloverÕs mind; he was described by Ernest Jones as lucid, ironic, as a master of metaphor, and a searcher for truth. Glover hesitated to publish and had to be persuaded. He gave a paper ‘‘Notes on an unusual form of perversion’’, at the 1924 Salzburg Congress and it was published in The International Journal of Psychoanalysis. He gives a clear and rigorous account of the analysis of his patient who was an alcoholic fetishist. Glover showed that there was a marked oral fixation underlying the genital oedipal level: the attitude to the maternal nipple was as a source of pleasure and a focus for oral sadism. He wished to take revenge on the nipple for his weaning and for his motherÕs betrayal of him through her genital relationship to her husband. The patientÕs fetishist behavior involved shoes, which represented both the maternal phallus and a disgust for smell, which was a fecal displacement. Particularly interesting is his discussion of the fetish having been established at a phase when clear self-object differentiation had not been established. Glover died of severe diabetes: Ernest Jones wrote that this was ‘‘an inestimable loss’’ to psychoanalysis. MALCOLM PINES See also: British Psycho-Analytical Society; Glover, Edward; Great Britain. Bibliography Glover, James. (1924). Notes on an unusual form of perversion. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 8, 10–24. ——— (1925). Contribution to a symposium on the conception of sexuality. British Journal of Psychology, 5, 3. Jones, Ernest. (1927). James Glover, 1882-1926. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 8, 1–9. Pines, Malcolm. (1991). The development of the psychodynamic movement. In Berios, G.E.; and Freeman H. (Eds.). 150 years of British Psychiatry 1851 to 1991. London: Gaskell-Royal College of Psychiatrists 68 6 GOETHE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (born August 28, 1748; died March 22, 1832), poet and dramatist, dominated the German literary scene of his time. The Aufklärung, Sturm und Drang, of which he is the principal representative along with Johann Herder and Friedrich von Schiller, the German classicism he embodied along with Schiller, and German romanticism have all been referred to by Heinrich Heine as ‘‘Goethean.’’ He is one of the principle sources of Freudian thought. Freud noted GoetheÕs scientific interests (Freud, 1930e). After reading the poem, ‘‘Hymn to Nature’’— then attributed to Goethe but in reality written by Georg Christoph Tobler, a Swiss pietist—Freud decided to enter medical school, and according to Ludwig Binswanger, throughout his work remained faithful to natureÕs ‘‘mythical essence.’’ A theoretician of evolution fifty years before Darwin, Goethe inspired Freud, as shown by the ‘‘sheepÕs head’’ dream, where the dreamerÕs associations make reference to GoetheÕs research on the intermaxillary bone of the sheep. Goethe introduced the ideas of Spinoza—another of FreudÕs models—into Germany, and Freud often quoted GoetheÕs maxim: ‘‘The best of what you know/ You could not tell your students,’’ which reflected the need for dissimulation imposed by the revelation of essential truths. Freud often quoted GoetheÕs Faust; speaking through the devil, he assumed his role as (metapsychological) sorcerer in the creation of his work. He also referred to the ‘‘eternal feminine’’ and the ‘‘Mothers,’’ using the poetÕs words to flesh out his conception of the representation of the mother and woman. He made use of a number of GoetheÕs lines, such as ‘‘in the beginning was the Deed,’’ (for example, 1912–13a, p. 161) and ‘‘What thou hast inherited from thy fathers, acquire it to make it thine’’ (e.g., 1912–13a, p. 158n). Goethe was a secret advisor to the Duke of SaxeWeimar and had Johann Fichte and representatives of the first phase of German romanticism appointed to the University of Jena. Nearly contemporary with the universalism of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, he opposed a number of romantic ideas, even though the concept of Naturphilosophie was a logical outcome of his scientific research. In GoetheÕs work, the word Trieb—which became a core concept in psychoanalysis—assumes the meaning of instinct, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GOETHE PRIZE need, and mental impulse, Bildungstrieb being the secret force that animates living creatures. The model of the Urphänomen influenced the model of the primal in mental life (Vermorel, 1995). Goethe was one of FreudÕs principal models and he quotes him a hundred and ten times, according to the Concordance. He even shows up in FreudÕs dreams as a familiar character, like his family and friends. Freud identified with this creative genius, who, like him, was coddled during childhood by his mother but deeply wounded by the death of family members. According to Alain de Mijolla (1981), because he often held his father in low esteem, Freud created a double of his grandfather Schlomo in the idealized figure of the sage of Weimar. In his acknowledgments for receiving the Goethe prize, Freud recognized that the poet had emphasized Eros in mental life and appreciated the value of dreams. He said his inspiration for the term ‘‘psychoanalysis’’ came from the ‘‘chemistry’’ found in the Elective Affinities (the alchemy to which Goethe was introduced as a young man). He went so far as to turn him into a precursor of psychoanalysis, for having described in Iphigenia a kind of spiritual cure, and using conversation to heal a mental symptom experienced by Mrs. Herder (Freud, 1930e). HENRI VERMOREL See also: Act/action; Eissler, Kurt Robert; FreudNathanson, Amalia Malka; Goethe Prize; On Dreams; On Transience; Vienna, University of; Witch of Metapsychology, the. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1917b). A childhood recollection from Dichtung und Wahrheit. SE, 17: 145–156. ———. (1930e). Address delivered in the Goethe Haus at Frankfurt. SE, 21: 208–212. GOETHE PRIZE The Goethe prize was awarded by the city of Frankfurt to Sigmund Freud on August 28, 1930 in Frankfurtam-Main. The prize, instituted in 1927, was awarded annually on August 28, the anniversary of the birth of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. The sum of ten thousand Deutsche Marks was awarded to individuals ‘‘whose creative activity served to honor the memory of Goethe.’’ Before Freud the prize had been given to Stefan George (1927), Albert Schweitzer (1928), and Leopold Ziegler (1929). In 1927 Heinrich Meng and Stefan Zweig had begun a promotional campaign to propose Freud for the Nobel Prize. Members of the Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute (1929–1933), especially Heinrich Meng, also worked to ensure that Freud was awarded the Goethe prize. Because of his poor health, Freud, than seventy-four years old, was unable to accept the prize in person and sent his daughter Anna Freud to Frankfurt for the awards ceremony (1930d). The award of the Goethe prize by Frankfurt in 1930 was considered by Freud to be the culmination of his public life. Discussions by the award committee appeared to idealize psychoanalysis, but in fact it was criticized. Among the adversaries of psychoanalysis there was a general refusal to accept psychoanalysis and a converse movement to idealize Goethe, which, given the regressive nature of German society of the time, was soon to become a permanent characteristic. A few years later, in 1933, FreudÕs writings were burned by the National Socialists in Frankfurt and in other German cities. The reaction of the media to the award simply repeated the controversy that divided the award committee. The periodical Die Psychoanalytische Bewegung (1930), contains a review of the event in German. Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. (1992). Faust, a tragedy, part one. (Martin Greenberg, Trans.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Original work published 1808) ———. (1998). Faust, part two. (Martin Greenberg, Trans.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Original work published 1883) Hachet, Pascal. (1995). Les psychanalystes et Goethe. Paris: LÕHarmattan. Vermorel, Henri. (1995). La pulsion, de Goethe et de Schiller à Freud. In H. Vermorel et al. (Eds.), Freud, Judéité, Lumières et Romantisme (pp. 133–149.). Lausanne: Delachaux & Niestlé. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THOMAS PLÄNKERS See also: Freud Anna; Germany; Goethe and psychoanalysis; Meng, Heinrich. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1930d). Letter to Dr. Alfons Paquet. SE, 21: 207–207. Paquet, Alfons. (1930). Zum Goethepreis 1930. Rede im Südwestdeutschen Rundfunk am 28.8.1930. In Die Psychoanalytische Bewegung. p. 426–430. 687 GOOD-ENOUGH MOTHER Plänkers, Tomas. (1993). Vom Himmel durch die Welt zur Hölle. Zur Goethe-Preisverleihung an Sigmund Freud im Jahre 1930. Jahrbuch für Psychoanalyse. 30, p. 167–180. ———. (1996). Die Verleihung des Frankfurter GoethePreises an Sigmund Freud 1930. Die Sitzungsprotokolle des Goethe-Preiskuratoriums. In Tomas Plänkers, et al., Psychoanalyse in Frankfurt a. M. Zerstörte Anfänge, Wiederannäherung und Entwicklungen (p. 254–331). Tübingen: Diskord. GOOD-ENOUGH MOTHER The ‘‘good-enough mother’’ is a mother whose conscious and unconscious physical and emotional attunement to her baby adapts to her baby appropriately at differing stages of infancy, thus allowing an optimal environment for the healthy establishment of a separate being, eventually capable of mature object-relations. Evolving slowly, and underpinning Donald WinnicottÕs theory of early integration, personalization and object-relating, this concept includes the ‘‘ordinary devoted mother’’ (1949), and ‘‘the good-enough environment’’. It first appears clearly in WinnicottÕs ‘‘Mind and its Relation to the Psyche-Soma’’ (1949). WinnicottÕs emphasis on the particular need for maternal sensitivity begins in his paper ‘‘The Observation of Infants in a Set Situation’’ (1941), and is referred to repeatedly in his work. His statement, ‘‘There is no such thing as a baby’’ implies that without a mother, an infant cannot exist. He describes ‘‘primary maternal preoccupation’’ (1956), the psychophysiological preparedness of a new mother for motherhood, as a special phase in which a mother is able to identify closely and intuitively with her infant, in order that she may supply first body-needs, later emotional needs, and allow the beginnings of integration and ego-development. The good-enough mother is described as responding to the infantÕs gesture, allowing the infant the temporary illusion of omnipotence, the realization of hallucination, and protection from the ‘‘unthinkable anxiety’’ (primitive agonies) that threatens the immature ego in the stage of ‘‘absolute dependence.’’ Failure in this stage may result, ultimately, in psychosis. As the infant develops, the good-enough mother, unconsciously aware of her infantÕs increasing egointegration and capacity to survive, will gradually fail to be so empathic. She will unconsciously ‘‘dose’’ her failures to those that can be tolerated, and the infantÕs 68 8 developing ego is strengthened, the difference between ‘‘me’’ and ‘‘not-me’’ clarifies, omnipotence is relinquished, a sense of reality begins to emerge, mother can be increasingly seen as a separate person, and ‘‘the capacity for concern’’ can develop. Failure in this stage may result in the formation of a ‘‘false self.’’ Winnicott describes how the capacity to be alone can develop out of the experience of the infant of being alone in the presence of another. Ego-immaturity is balanced by ego-support from mother, and this ego-support is in time internalized, so that aloneness is tolerable (1958). Many writers approach environmental failure (Fairbairn, Kohut, Balint, and others); however, few describe the optimal situation in health as described by Winnicott. Winnicott is accused of romanticism, idealism and optimism in his description of the mother whose adaptation is so exquisite, and of ‘‘blaming the mother’’ when things go wrong. It is important in reading his work to realize the lack of moralism he evinces. Winnicott certainly regrets the failure of those mothers who cannot reach the state of being ‘‘goodenough,’’ but acknowledges that this state arises out of their own early relationships, and he emphasizes repeatedly the strength of innate maternal capacity. JENNIFER JOHNS See also: False self; Handling; Holding; Maternal care; Object; Self (true/false); Transitional object, space; Winnicott, Donald W. Bibliography Winnicott, Donald W. (1956). Primary maternal preoccupation. In Collected papers, through paediatrics to psychoanalysis (pp. 300–305). London: Tavistock Publications, 1958. ———. (1958). Mind and its relation to the psyche-soma. In Collected papers, through paediatrics to psychoanalysis (pp. 243–54). London: Tavistock Publications. (Reprinted from British Journal of Medical Psychology, 27, (1954), 201–209.) ———. (1958) The observation of infants in a set situation. In Collected papers, through paediatrics to psychoanalysis (pp. 52–69). London: Tavistock Publications. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 22 (1941), 229–249.) ——— (1965). The capacity to be alone. In The maturational processes and the facilitating environment (pp. 29–36). London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 39 (1958), 416–420.) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GRAF-FREUD, REGINA DEBORA (ROSA) GÖRING INSTITUTE. See Deutsches Institut für Psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (Institut Göring) GÖRING, MATTHIAS HEINRICH (1879–1945) Matthias Heinrich Göring, a German physician, psychiatrist, and Nazi, was born on April 5, 1879, in Düsseldorf, Germany and died in 1945 in captivity in Poznan, Poland. He earned a doctorate in law at Freiburg/Breisgau in 1900 and a doctorate in medicine at Bonn in 1907. Specializing in psychiatry and neurology, in 1923 Göring set up practice as a Nervenarzt in Elberfeld and subsequently underwent a training analysis with Adlerian Leonhard Seif in Münich. In 1928 he established an educational counseling service in Elberfeld and in 1929 founded a study group of psychotherapy in Wuppertal. Like fellow Adlerians Seif and Fritz Künkel, Göring placed an emphasis upon ‘‘community feeling,’’ to which he added German patriotism and Christian pietism. He was therefore critical of psychoanalysis for its alleged materialism and pansexualism. GöringÕs significance in the history of psychoanalysis stems from his career after 1933. His position as leader of organized psychotherapy in Nazi Germany stemmed from the fact that he was an elder cousin of Nazi boss Hermann Göring. In part to protect the fledgling institution of psychotherapy against Nazi medical activists and university psychiatrists, Göring (who joined the Nazi party in 1933) preached against ‘‘Jewish’’ psychoanalysis and supervised the exclusion of Jewish psychoanalysts from his society and institute. In 1934 Göring assumed leadership of the German General Medical Society for Psychotherapy and from 1936 to 1945 was director of the German Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy in Berlin. In 1938 he presided over the destruction of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute and the dissolution of the German Psychoanalytic Society, although also protecting and employing psychoanalysts August Aichhorn, Felix Boehm, and Carl Müller-Braunschweig. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS At the German Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy in Berlin and at branches elsewhere in Germany and in Vienna, however, non-Jewish psychoanalysts continued to practice, study, and train. Göring himself allegedly expressed appreciation for the expertise of the Freudians, who were especially active within the Berlin outpatient clinic. GöringÕs wife Erna was in analysis with Werner Kemper and his son Ernst underwent a training analysis with Carl Müller-Braunschweig. Outpatient director and psychoanalyst John Rittmeister, however, fell victim to charges of espionage and was executed by the Nazis in 1943. The legacy for psychoanalysts in Germany of the institutionalization of psychotherapy that Göring occasioned during the Third Reich has been one of both professional advancement and internecine ethical debate. GEOFFREY COCKS See also: Allgemeine Ärztliche Gesellschaft für Psychotherapie; Berliner Psychoanalytische Poliklinik; Deutsches Institut für Psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (Institut Göring); France; Germany; Psychopathologie de l’échec (Psychopathology of Failure). Bibliography Cocks, Geoffrey. (1985). Psychotherapy in the Third Reich: The Göring Institute (2nd ed). New York: Oxford University Press. Lockot, Regine. (1985) Erinnern und Durcharbeiten : zur Geschichte der Psychoanalyse und Psychotherapie im Nationalsozialismus. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. ———. (1994). Die Reinigung der Psychoanalyse : die deutsche psychoanalytische Gesellschaft im Spiegel von Dokumenten und Zeitzeugen (1933–1951). Tübingen: Diskord. GRADIVA. See Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva’’ GRAF-FREUD, REGINA DEBORA (ROSA). See Freud, Sigmund (siblings) 689 G R A F , H E R B E R T (1 904 –19 73) GRAF, HERBERT (1904–1973) Herbert Graf is broadly known in psychoanalysis by the name of ‘‘Little Hans.’’ Born on April 10, 1904 in Vienna, he died on April 5, 1973 in Geneva. Graf was the Stage Director at the Metropolitan Opera in New York 1936–1960, and Director of the Grand Theatre in Geneva (1965–1973). He also authored several books on opera production in America. The son of Max Graf, musicologist and critic, and Olga Graf (nee Hoenig), apparently a one-time patient of FreudÕs, Herbert Graf grew up in the avant-garde intellectual atmosphere of fin de siecle Vienna. His godfather was Gustav Mahler. He describes, in a four part interview with Francis Rizzo later in life, how he ‘‘invented’’ his study program in order to become an opera director, for which there was at that time no prescribed curriculum. In 1922 Freud published a postcript to ‘‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year old Boy’’ in which he describes a visit from ‘‘Little Hans’’ when he was a young man. Graf himself refers to this visit in the Rizzo interviews and reports that he had no recollection of the treatment until he came across FreudÕs paper in his fatherÕs study. Several place names that Freud had not altered led him to believe that the article referred to him. He sought Freud out in Berggasse 19 and the meeting is described in FreudÕs publication. GrafÕs publications were not in the field of psychoanalysis. The interviews with Rizzo are interesting for the light they shed on the attitudes towards FreudÕs theories amongst intellectuals in Vienna in the early part of the twentieth century. GrafÕs later biography had no relevance to psychoanalysis. As ‘‘Little Hans’’ he was of fundamental importance. His treatment was the very first example of a child analysis, although an unusual one, as it was carried out by his father under FreudÕs ‘‘supervision.’’ VERONIKA MÄCHTLINGER See also: ‘‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy’’ (Little Hans); Graf, Max. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a fiveyear-old boy. SE, 10: 1–149. 69 0 ———. (1922c). Postscript. SE. 10: 148. Rizzo, Francis. (1972). Memoirs of an invisible man; Herbert Graf recalls a half-century in the theater: a dialogue with Francis Rizzo, interview, with 12 illustrations and 2 sketches. Opera News 36, part I, 5 Feb. 1972, p. 24–28 ; part II : 12 Feb. 1972, p. 26–29 ; part III : 19 Feb. 1972, p. 26–29 ; part IV : 26 Feb. 1972, p. 26–29. GRAF, MAX (1873–1958) Max Graf, a composer and music critic, the father of ‘‘Little Hans,’’ was born October 1, 1873, in Vienna, where he died on June 24, 1958. The son of Joseph Graf, a Jewish writer and editor, he was educated in Vienna and Prague. After 1891 he studied at the law school of the University of Vienna but devoted most of his time to music and it was his intention to become a composer, according to Louis Rose (1986). He finished his legal studies in 1896 but devoted much of his time to music composition and criticism, and regularly took part in meetings of the literary group Jung-Wien. From 1902 to 1938 he taught the history of music and musical aesthetics at the Vienna Academy of Music, where he was appointed professor in 1909. Graf met Sigmund Freud in 1900 and his wife, Olga Graf (born Olga Hoenig), from whom he separated a few years later, was probably a patient of FreudÕs. Within the psychoanalytic movement he is known for being the father of ‘‘Little Hans,’’ Herbert Graf, who was born in 1903. It was Max who supplied Freud with the material for his paper ‘‘The Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year Old Boy’’ (1909b). At the end of 1904, he took part in sessions of the Wednesday Psychoanalytic Society and, in December 1907, wrote an essay entitled ‘‘Methodik der Dichterpsychologie’’ (Methodology of the Psychology of the Poet). In early 1906 Freud wrote a short text on a somewhat unexpected topic, ‘‘Psycopathische Personen auf der Bühne’’ (Psychopathic Characters on the Stage). The text was never published in German, but Graf, to whom Freud had given the manuscript, kept it and had an English translation published (1942a [1905–1906]). In 1909 Graf settled in Paris as a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung and translated Romain Rolland into German. ‘‘In 1910–1911 he gave up all work INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS G R A N O F F , W L A D I M I R A L E X A N D R E (1924 –2 000) with the Society. His book on the psychology of creativity appeared in 1910 and his pamphlet on Wagner in 1911. In February 1909 Freud had asked him to prepare an essay on ÔMozart and his Relation to Don Juan,Õ but Graf did not follow up on the idea. He officially withdrew in 1913’’ (Rose, 1986). On the list of members of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society for October 1913, his name is crossed off. in The Analysis of the Self, corresponds to or replaces the ‘‘purified pleasure-ego’’ posited by Sigmund Freud: The subject, center of the world, expels what is unpleasurable and preserves what is pleasurable. In theory, the instinctual grandiose self is integrated into the self to form the nucleus of the ambitions (strivings), but it cannot constitute itself or be the object of fixations, repression, or splitting. Graf emigrated to the United States in 1938 and taught until 1947 at the New School for Social Research in New York, where, in 1940, he created the first seminars in music criticism. He was a guest professor at the Carnegie Institute of Technology in Pittsburgh and at Temple University in Philadelphia. In 1947 he returned to Austria and taught music criticism at the Mozarteum in Salzburg and elsewhere. In 1953 his autobiography, Jede Stunde war erfüllt: Ein halbes Jahrhundert Musik- und Theaterleben (Every Minute Filled: A Half-Century in Music and Theater), was published in Vienna, where he died in 1958. The grandiose self, also called the narcissistic self, first appeared in KohutÕs work in 1964. A description of an aspect of the narcissistic personality, it acquired a metaspychological status in KohutÕs 1971 book. ELKE MÜHLLEITNER See also: ‘‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy’’ (Little Hans); Applied psychoanalysis and the interaction of psychoanalysis; Graf, Herbert; Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Bibliography Graf, M. (1911). Richard Wagner im ‘‘Fliegenden Holländer,’’ Ein Beitrag zur Psychologie des künstlerischen Schaffens. Leipzig-Vienna: F. Deuticke. ———. (1942). Reminiscences of Professor Sigmund Freud. Psychoanalytic Quarterly. 11, p. 465–476. ———. (1947). From Beethoven to Shostakovich: The Psychology of the Composing Process. New York: Philosophical Library. Mühlleitner, Elke. (1992). Biographisches Lexikon der Psychoanalyse (Die Mitglieder der Psychologischen MittwochGesellschaft und der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung 1902–1938). Tübingen: Diskord. Rose, Louis. (1986). The psychoanalytic movement in Vienna: Towards a science of culture. Dissertation, Princeton University. GRANDIOSE SELF The grandiose self, described and developed as a normal narcissistic configuration by Heinz Kohut in 1971 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS From a developmental point of view, the infant attempts to restore narcissistic perfection by establishing narcissistic configurations, among them the grandiose self, a structure invested with energy that is rooted in exhibitionist part-instincts. In narcissistic pathology, the activity of the grandiose self explains the intensity of the demand for attention; if it is repressed, no source is available to nourish the reality-ego, which is characterized by a lack of self-esteem, feelings of inferiority, and a tendency toward depression. In KohutÕs The Restoration of the Self (1977), the grandiose self is the pole of the self that draws its strength from the self objectsÕ responses to mirroring needs. The notion is related to mirror transference. Initially instinctual, the grandiose self was desexualized with KohutÕs generalized self psychology advanced in 1977. AGNÈS OPPENHEIMER See also: Self psychology. Bibliography Kohut, Heinz. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press, 1971. ———. (1977). The restoration of the self. New York: International Universities Press GRANOFF, WLADIMIR ALEXANDRE (1924–2000) Wladimir Alexandre Granoff, a French psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, was born September 7, 1924, in Strasbourg, and died in Neuilly-sur-Seine on February 2, 2000. 691 GRAPH OF DESIRE His family, part of the Russian intelligentsia, had moved to Alsace after emigrating from Russia. Young Granoff attended secondary school in Strasbourg. During the war, as a refugee in Nı̂mes, he discovered FreudÕs work in the local library. He began studying medicine and psychiatry in Lyon and continued his education in Paris. With the Société Psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society) he began a training analysis with Marc Schlumberger; Maurice Bouvet and then Jacques Lacan directed his group control analysis, and Francis Pasche his individual control analysis. In 1953 he began organizing the student rebellion at the Institut de Psychanalyse with Serge Leclaire and François Perrier, whom he followed during the June 1953 split. The three men were later referred to as the ‘‘Troika.’’ After their secession they participated actively in the Société Française de Psychanalyse (SFP) (French Society for Psychoanalysis), founded in 1953, leading seminars on clinical psychoanalysis together and working to ensure the organizationÕs admission into the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA). During a colloquium on female sexuality organized by the SFP in September 1960 in Amsterdam, Granoff and François Perrier presented a report on ‘‘Le problème de la perversion chez la femme et les idéaux féminins,’’ which reopened the question of female sexuality (La Psychanalyse, 1964). He played an important role in negotiations with the IPA (Pierre Turquet, Max Gitelson) because of his multilingualism (he spoke Russian, German, English, and French). In 1963, together with his friend Victor Smirnoff, he prepared a ‘‘Histoire de la psychanalyse en France,’’ in order to convey to the Anglo-American psychoanalytic community the originality and specificity of psychoanalysis in France. The article was mimeographed and translated into English, but remains unpublished at this time. Despite these efforts, Granoff sensed that their request would be rejected and that Lacan would never be admitted to the IPA. He also felt he himself had been betrayed by Lacan. So, in 1964, he helped found the Association Psychanalytique de France (French Psychoanalytic Association) and abandoned any further involvement in institutional politics, refusing even to attend IPA congresses. After years of absence from public life, he presented a paper in 1973–1974, ‘‘Filiations, lÕavenir du complexe dÕOEdipe,’’ a psychoanalytic interpretation of the 69 2 history of psychoanalysis, characterized by a return to FreudÕs writings. In 1974–1975 he gave another talk on ‘‘La pensée et le féminin.’’ These presentations were contemporaneous with those given by François Perrier and it was at this time that the two men renewed their former friendship. He was one of the first to introduce Sándor Ferenczi in France and held a conference in 1958 entitled ‘‘Ferenczi: faux problème ou vrai malentendu’’ (published in La Psychanalyse, 1961). In 1983 he published, together with philosopher Jean-Michel Rey, LÕOcculte, objet de la pensée freudienne, in which he investigated FreudÕs interest in telepathy. His withdrawal from organizational work did not mean retirement from active life, and Granoff always maintained relations with French Lacanians and foreign colleagues. Because of his broad exposure to European culture and his Slavic background, he was perhaps the most cosmopolitan, the most international French psychoanalyst of his generation. His work—in large part appearing in individual articles—focused on Freudian practice as well as the problems of translating and transmitting psychoanalysis. JACQUES SÉDAT See also: Association psychanalytique de France; Femininity; France; Psychoanalytic filiations; Société française de psychanalyse; Telepathy. Bibliography Granoff, Wladimir. (1975). Filiations. L’avenir du complexe d’Œdipe. Paris: Minuit. ———. (1976). La pensée et le féminin. Paris: Minuit. Granoff, Wladimir, and Perrier, François. (1964). Le problème de la perversion chez la femme et les idéaux féminins. Psychanalyse, 7, 141–199. ———. (1979). Le désir et le féminin. Paris: Aubier. Granoff, Wladimir, and Rey, Jean-Michel. (1983). L’Occulte, objet de la pensée freudienne. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. GRAPH OF DESIRE The Graph of Desire is a schema, or model, that Jacques Lacan began developing in his seminar on The Formations of the Unconscious (1957–58). It achieved INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GRAPH its definitive form in his essay ‘‘Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious’’ (1960/2004). Its four successive stages represent the constitution of the human subject and his desire. Nevertheless, Lacan never intended it to describe the genetic stages of a biological development. Rather, it represents the ‘‘logical moments’’ of the birth of a speaking subject. Lacan starts with what he calls the ‘‘quilting point’’ (where an upholsterer attaches a button to a sofa or mattress to prevent the batting from moving around) a kind of looping by which the signifying chain of the parental OtherÕs ‘‘discourse’’—not to be understood here as merely verbal, of course—intersects with the babyÕs expressions of need (See Figure 1). OF DESIRE discourse, from s(A) to A, and then returns, from A to s(A), along the path of the babyÕs biological impulses. In this circularity, everything comes back to the signifying structure of the OtherÕs discourse. The demand of the newborn must conform the OtherÕs ‘‘code’’ in order to be understood. In spite of this apparently closed circularity, Lacan also situates the constitution of the ego ideal at this level. By grasping upon an insignia of the OtherÕs parental power, s(A), the child anticipates its own future access to any power whatsoever. From then on, the ego ideal, I(A), is inscribed at the endpoint of trajectory delta, as an anticipated function that the child can attain in relation to the parent. The process where the ego is constituted makes up the second stage of the graph. A right-to-left vector goes from the specular image, i(a), to the constitution of the ego, m (Figure 2). This vector is essentially imaginary, which means that it belongs to the register of spatial-corporeal representation, and it is grafted as a short circuit onto the delta trajectory, which represents the pressure of need. This pressure of need is represented by a retrograde trajectory beginning at delta (d). In the course of its reverse looping, this line intersects at two successive points the vector S fi S0 , which represents the chain of the OtherÕs discourse. Because they travel in opposite directions, the two trajectories carry out this double intersection in a retroactive manner that calls to mind FreudÕs concept of ‘‘deferred action.’’ For Lacan, the point of intersection on the right, A, represents the ‘‘treasure trove of signifiers’’ (p. 292), which is LacanÕs definition of the Other as the ‘‘locus’’ of the signifying battery on which the subject depends. On the left, the other point, s(A), represents the moment at which a meaning is produced in the heart of the Other, which henceforth makes it a sign for the infant. From then on, a second circuit can be taken by returning along the signifying chain, S fi S0 . This return circuit, by which the constitution of the ego is implicated in the discourse of the Other, might constitute in itself an impasse, from which no subject could extricate himself. And this is where Lacan made one of his specific contributions to psychoanalysis by emphasizing the intrinsic doubling of the OtherÕs discourse. This first stage of the graph forms a ‘‘circuit’’ of vectors that first follows the chain of the OtherÕs We have seen that effects of meaning are manifested in the Other, s(A), where they are interposed between FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2 s(A) S S' A Signifier Voice m S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY i (a) I (A) OF PSYCHOANALYSIS S 693 GRAPH OF DESIRE FIGURE 3 s(A) A Signifier Voice m i (a) I (A) S the needs of the baby and certain signals and statements coming from the mother. The baby comes to feel capable of provoking these maternal manifestations, and at the same time develops a paranoid tendency to interpret their intentionality when they appear. Lacan developed an account of this essential phenomenon on the basis of certain linguistic facts that led him to distinguish, beyond the subject of the statement evident in the parental discourse, a more or less obscured subject of the enunciation. This implied that quite another dimension of unconsciousness was possible (Figure 3). The intentionality that is assumed to exist in the manifestations of the Other causes the child to ask— What does he want from me? This question forms the basis of the first experience of anxiety (Hilflosigkeit). Given the fundamental mirroring nature of the imaginary relation that gives the ego substance, this paranoid question—What does he want from me?—returns in the form of a question addressed to the nascent subject—What do you want? (or ‘‘Chè vuoi?’’ as Lacan puts it). This form of address, characteristic of the superego leads to the upper stage of the graph, which it takes the form of a question mark rooted in A, the place of the Other. But the Other at this stage is still not in any way the ‘‘barred’’ by the symbolization of its possible absence and not yet marked by the incompleteness of its sexual identity. At this point the Other is still the all-embracing expression of the two parents merged into a single non-castrated parent figure. It is the perception of the motherÕs lack of a penis that now plays the crucial role of representing the incompleteness of the maternal Other. 69 4 For the nascent subject, this is a transformational moment that leads to a recognition that the Other is desiring/lacking. From that moment on, the Other will be ‘‘barred,’’ S(A/), and submitted to the symbolic system of exchange that is instituted in the aftermath of the of the superegoÕs question (Chè vuoi?). It is from this point that we can conceive of the emergence of a subject in its own right. Lacan designates it with a barred S because of its fundamental dependence on a relation of at least two signifiers, one of which is necessarily the signifier of the lack in the Other—without which, Lacan said, no signifier would ever be able to represent a ‘‘person.’’ This is what can be formalized in a fourth imaginary stage wherein the subject that is detached at the point of symbolization by the Other finds a way to represent itself as having a relation with the object of desire through an unconscious fantasy, as shown in the formula S/ } a. The operation by which the Other is recognized as lacking is inscribed in a symbolic system of exchange that nevertheless includes a real ‘‘remainder’’ made up of objects that are detachable from the mother. These are the Freudian partial objects, which Lacan designates with a small a, that become part of the fantasy. Any persistent difficulty in symbolically marking the motherÕs lack interferes with the constitution of the fantasy and leads to a failure in the process of subjectivation (Figure 4). At the upper level of the graph, along the imaginary vector (d fi /S } a), desire and fantasy maintain a relation similar to the one that at the lower level governed the constitution of the ego in relation to the image of the small other, i(a). However, Lacan noted that these two imaginary stages are not in any way analogous to each other, since unconscious desire tends to present itself regularly to the ego as precisely what the ego does not want. The subject of the unconscious fantasy, in contrast to the ego, represents for Lacan ‘‘the ÔstuffÕ of the I that is primally repressed’’ (p. 302). In treatment, this subject would be the analystÕs true interlocutor. The two levels of the graph are modeled on a split that is structural in the human being (in LacanÕs terms parlêtre, or ‘‘speaking-being’’). The first level, that of the statement and of specular relations of the ego, is prior to castration. It manifests a phallic-narcissistic logic where the nascent ego remains trapped in the circle of the OtherÕs all-importance. The upper level, on the other hand, has as its keystone the signifier of the lack in the Other, S(S/), the guarantor of a discourse INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GREAT BRITAIN FIGURE 4 S s(A) D Jouissance (S brain led to mental disorders; psychiatry accepted this position (Henry Maudsley). Psychiatric treatments showed the influence of the French schools—Pierre Janet, Jules Déjerine, Hippolyte Bernheim. In 1913 the Brunswick Square Clinic, the first to offer psychotherapy, based its treatments on the theories of Janet. Castration d a) s(A) A Signifier Voice m i (a) I (A) S submitted to what Freud called the ‘‘reality of castration.’’ BERNARD PENOT See also: Jouissance (Lacan). Bibliography Lacan, Jacques. (2004). The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire in the freudian unconcsious. In Écrits: A selection. (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1960) GRATITUDE. See Envy; Envy and Gratitude GREAT BRITAIN At the end of the nineteenth century, British psychiatry was more neurological than psychological. Neurology (John Hughlings Jackson) taught that disorders of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Interest in and research on depth psychology centered in the Society for Psychical Research. Many leading scholars and intellectuals supported attempts to identify whether there was psychic survival after death, an agnostic effort to fill the fearful gap left by the loss of religious belief through the rise of scientific materialism and positivism. The first contacts with FreudÕs writings were through articles by Frederick W.H. Myers on hysteria in 1893. Myers proposed his own theory of a ‘‘subliminal’’ subconscious derived from his observations of cases of multiple personality and hysteria. The ground for receiving psychoanalytic ideas was prepared by Havelock Ellis through his encyclopedic writings of the psychology of sex (Hinshelwood, 1991). As Victorian ideas gave way to those of the Edwardian era, there was an upsurge of liberal agnostic writings that can be seen in novels, essays, and philosophical writings of the time, in particular from the Cambridge group of intellectuals who formed the nucleus of the Bloomsbury Group (Pines, 1991a). Leonard Woolf, the future husband of Virginia Woolf, was a very early reviewer of FreudÕs writings and a short story by Lytton Strachey was titled ‘‘According to Freud.’’ From the members of the Bloomsbury Group came the analysts James and Alix Strachey (the future translators of Freud); the younger brother of Virginia Woolf, Adrian Stephen: and his wife Karen. In contrast to the Viennese analysts the great majority of the early British analysts were middle-class Christian professionals. Within psychiatry, Ernest Jones takes pride of place in introducing psychoanalysis to Britain. Jones turned from neurology to psychiatry and his encounter with FreudÕs writings led to meeting first with Carl Gustav Jung in 1907 and with Sigmund Freud in 1908. Jones devoted his life to developing and protecting psychoanalysis in Britain. Initially regarded by Freud with some suspicion, the Welshman Jones gradually found acceptance. He founded the London Psycho-Analytic Society in 1913, attracting a mixed group of interested physicians, but dissolved it in 1919 because several members, especially David Eder, declared their adherence to Jung. 695 GREAT BRITAIN For some years, having failed to obtain recognition in London, Jones had worked in Toronto and was one of the founders of the American Psychoanalytic Association. Though Jones must be regarded as an outstanding figure in the development of the psychoanalytic movement, he was not alone. David Eder gave the first paper on psychoanalysis to a medical audience in 1911 at a Congress of the British Medical Association; the audience left in disgust before he had finished speaking. Henry Butter Stoddart, a distinguished psychiatrist who became a convert to psychoanalysis, was better received. He gave a series of lectures titled ‘‘The New Psychiatry’’ in Edinburgh in 1915. There he found converts as well as opponents, the most significant of the former being George Robertson, Professor of Psychiatry at Edinburgh, who thereafter declared himself a Freudian. Stoddart, a stout, good-humored man, played a quiet yet important role in establishing psychoanalysis within psychiatry, through his well respected textbook ‘‘Mind and its Disorders.’’ In these early days psychoanalytic ideas were supported and propagated by important psychiatrists and psychologists who nevertheless maintained a critical attitude and did not become members of JonesÕs reformed British Psycho-Analytical Society (1919). Eder was accepted as, after some analysis with Sándor Ferenczi, he left Jung. Bernard Hart was significant both because of the respected position he held and as author of a textbook, ‘‘The Psychology of Insanity’’ (1912), which ran through many editions and was the principal textbook in support of psychoanalysis. The influential psychologist William McDougall, the research psychologist Sir Cyril Burt, the well-known clinician William Browne, all made FreudÕs ideas accessible to their professions. Perhaps the most brilliant figure was William Halse Rivers, psychiatrist, research psychologist, and anthropologist, who died prematurely in 1922. Rivers, along with other dynamically-minded psychiatrists, treated psychiatric casualties during World War One with a psychotherapy that was strongly influenced by psychoanalysis. RiversÕs work and personality became well known through the autobiography of the poet Siegfried Sassoon who had been RiversÕ patient during the war. The novelist Pat Barker used Rivers as a central character in her three novels about psychiatry and the First World War: Regeneration, The Eye in the Door, and The Ghost Road (London, Viking). Psychoanalysis made great strides through the treatment of psychiatric cases during World War One, and 69 6 there were many chronic cases of these war casualties who had to be treated after the war. The Ministry of Pensions set up clinics to deal with these patients and their senior psychiatrist was the analyst David Forsyth. Attacks upon psychoanalysis came from many psychiatrists, notably a disciple of Hughlings Jackson, Charles Mercier. He attacked psychoanalysis as a German importation that would corrupt the minds both of doctors and of children. In his attacks he was supported by many other psychiatrists, amongst whom was the first Professor of Psychiatry in England, ShawBolton. In a critical article, ‘‘The Myth of the Unconscious Mind’’ (1926), Shaw-Bolton stated that it had been a repugnant task to write but that psychoanalysis was an insidious poison being inserted into the minds of the young. Jones reformed his Society more carefully and retained a strong control over its development for over two decades. Its outstanding supporters included the brothers James and Edward Glover. James, who died early, had been to Karl Abraham in Berlin for analysis and on his return dissolved the Brunswick Square Clinic which had been an important training institution for psychotherapy that was not psychoanalytic (Boll, 1962). Amongst its students who later became analysts were Mary Chadwick, Ella Freeman Sharpe, Nina Searl (a pioneer in child analysis), Iseult GrantDuff and Marjorie Brierley, the last of whom was to become a very influential psychoanalytic theoretician. In the 1920s psychoanalysis increased both in popularity and notoriety. The British Medical Association set up a committee to investigate and report on the subject of psychoanalysis following public disquiet over breakdowns and suicides said to be the result of psychoanalysis. This committee sat for three years and took evidence from both supporters and opponents of psychoanalysis. Ernest Jones represented psychoanalysis, and his impressive performance carried the day for the cause. The result was that the British Medical Association acknowledged psychoanalysis as an authentic form of treatment and determined that the term psychoanalysis should not be used for any other technique or theory than that of Freud. However, the committee did not record its support of psychoanalysis, solely its recognition. In the 1920s and early 1930s the Psychoanalytic Society remained quite small and London remained the only training center. Some British analysts went to Vienna for analysis (the Stracheys, Money-Kyrle, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GREAT BRITAIN Riviere), some to Berlin (James and Edward Glover, Ella Sharpe), some to Budapest (David Eder). Interest grew in child analysis and Nina Searle began to write on this topic before Melanie KleinÕs arrival in 1926 at JonesÕs invitation. Klein was introduced through Alix Strachey who had gone to Berlin for further analysis with Abraham, being dissatisfied with her experience in Vienna with Freud. The correspondence between James and Alix Strachey gives a vivid picture of the two cities, Berlin and London, and their psychoanalytic communities. Edward Glover was JonesÕs close collaborator and for many years the presumptive next president of the Society. He produced the first enquiry into the theories and practices of psychoanalysis by issuing a questionnaire to members of the British Society which later he elaborated into his authoritative textbook on the technique of psychoanalysis. Though Glover had supported Melanie Klein for some years, later he strongly opposed her, and for this reason found himself against strong opposition when preparing to succeed Jones as president. It should be recognized that a distinct ‘‘English’’ school of psychoanalysis had begun to emerge. The distance from Vienna led to independent thinking: consideration was being given to the psychic consequences of bereavement and mourning following from the great number of casualties and bereaved families left by the war. This led to a consideration of object relations in addition to libidinal forces. John Carl Flugel, who held an academic position at London University, wrote the influential ‘‘Psychoanalysis of the Family,’’ and John Bowlby researched the psychological and socially deprived backgrounds of juvenile delinquents. Donald Winnicott applied his extensive experience as a pediatrician to child analysis. British psychoanalysis was dramatically changed by the flight of Sigmund and Anna Freud and their supporters to London in 1938. It is not pleasant to find it on record that Melanie Klein thought it unfortunate that the Freuds had come to London as it would prejudice her intellectual hold on the Psycho-Analytic Society. Indeed, conflict soon broke out between the Viennese and the supporters of Melanie Klein which in wartime led to the famous ‘‘Controversial Discussions’’ that set the scene for the tripartite division of training in the British Psycho-Analytical Society after the war, the three groups of Kleinians, Freudians and the Middle, later Independent Group. This group consisted of those who did not wish to be identified with either of the warring camps. Influential teachers during this period included: for the Klein Group, Susan Isaacs, Joan Riviere, Paula Heimann, Roger MoneyKyrle; for the ‘‘Middle Group’’; Ella Freeman Sharpe, James Strachey, Sylvia Payne, Donald Winnicot, William Gillespie, Marjorie Brierley, and later Michael Balint; for the Anna Freud Group were Kate Friedlander, Ilse Hellman, and Willie Hoffer. Anna Freud virtually retired from the British Psycho-Analytical Society to build her own training center in child analysis at the Hampstead Child Therapy Clinic, though on the international scene she retained her pre-eminence in psychoanalytic theory. Melanie Klein made a powerful impact in Britain through her writings on early psychic development. She was supported by Susan Isaacs, Joan Riviere, Ernest Jones and others, although many analysts considered her ideas to be unsystematic and overly speculative. Among them, her clearest critic was Marjorie Brierley. Ronald Fairbairn, working in isolation in Edinburgh, was considerably influenced by Klein, and in turn Melanie Klein recognized that she also learned from him; impressed by his work on the schizoid personality she added ‘‘schizoid’’ to her ‘‘paranoid’’ early infantile stage, hence ‘‘paranoid-schizoid.’’ Fairbairn was the strongest revisionist of psychoanalytic theories, establishing a full object relationship theory. Jones continued to be the dominant figure in British psychoanalysis, as a result both of his writing and his personality. Influenced by Melanie KleinÕs exploration of early psychic development, he wrote on female sexuality in a way that Freud perceived as a challenge both to himself and to his daughter Anna. Jones tried to achieve a balance between the innovative British work and the more conservative Viennese mode, instituting a series of exchange lectures in an attempt to build bridges. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS British psychoanalysis has been regarded as leading the way in child analysis. This is due to several factors. The Hampstead Child Psychotherapy Clinic provided thorough training in child and adolescent analysis, as systematically organized by Anna Freud and her close collaborators. Research initiated by Joseph Sandler on the Hampstead Index (representing the ClinicÕs collection and collation of clinical experience) has lead to several important publications. Anna FreudÕs concept of ‘‘developmental lines’’ has been a significant clarification in the study of child development. Melanie 697 GREAT BRITAIN KleinÕs theories have had a major impact and many child analysts have adopted her theories. The training in infant observation and child analysis at the Tavistock Clinic is largely Klein-oriented. Some of her ideas have eventually been partly accepted by those who previously opposed them, including Anna FreudÕs followers. Klein retained a stronghold on the writings of her followers, which eventually led Paula Heimann to leave her group. In contrast to Anna Freud, Klein did not develop a systematic training in child analysis, though her influence on the Tavistock training is noticeable. Donald WinnicottÕs writings represent a distinct and different viewpoint. His vast experience as a pediatrician and his acute observational powers led him to the concepts of transitional space and transitional object, tracing the infantÕs move away from total dependence on the maternal environment. His original concepts such as holding, the use of an object, and the objectÕs survival of the infantÕs destructiveness, have been influential internationally. Originally a supporter of Melanie Klein, he became a strong critic of what he saw becoming a proselytizing movement within the British Society. Khan, an analysand of Winnicott, was a blazing comet who burnt himself out. His sparkling, erudite papers, which also bridged British and French psychoanalysis, were notable contributions though his polemical debating style demonstrated an equally noticeable self-inflation. In his later years he became isolated, somewhat paranoid and was asked to resign from the Society because many members were outraged by the anti-Semitic tone of his last book, written during his final illness. The balance between the size and influence of the three groups varies: the ‘‘Group of Independent Analysts’’ is the largest in number, followed by the Klein group and then the ‘‘Contemporary Freudian’’ as the former ‘‘B’’ (Anna Freud) group was called. There is a ‘‘gentlemanÕs agreement’’ that each group should be represented on committees and take turns in the significant roles of President, Scientific Secretary and Chairs of important committees. Total membership as of 2005 was 443 Members and Associate Members, many of whom live abroad. On qualification the student is elected to associate membership. Candidates for full membership are obliged to take part in a membership course with seminars and advanced supervision. The Institute is responsible for the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, founded by Jones in 1920; 69 8 the New Library of Psycho-Analysis, which is the successor to the original library which Jones founded in 1921 and which was published by Leonard and Virginia Woolf at the Hogarth Press; and also for the Standard Edition of FreudÕs work, which was undergoing a new revision as of 2004. Riccardo Steiner has demonstrated the political aim that Jones and his translators held in ‘‘standardizing’’Õ the language of psychoanalysis in the English version. In recent years there has been more activity devoted to making psychoanalysis better known to the general public through systematic courses of lectures and daylong and weekend meetings, which are more directed to interested professionals. It is obligatory of psychotherapy training institutions to submit to regulation and registration which has brought psychoanalysts into closer collaboration but also into conflict with other psychotherapeutic training institutions. The United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy was formed to represent and regulate psychotherapy trainings. The British Psycho-Analytical Society, together with the Society of Analytical Psychology (Jungians), the Tavistock Clinic and some other broadly psychoanalytic organizations have broken away from UKCP to form the British Confederation of Psychotherapists, so as to affirm their group identities as ‘‘psychoanalytic.’’ University College of the University of London has a privately funded Chair of Psychoanalysis which must be occupied by a psychoanalyst. Students can gain PhDs for research in the field of psychoanalysis and these students do not have to be members of the Psycho-Analytic Society. The Tavistock four-year training in psychoanalytic psychotherapy can lead to a PhD as well. For several years it has been possible to achieve psychoanalytic training in Scotland through a joint venture of the Scottish Institute of Human Relations and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis in London. Training is also possible in Northern Ireland and may become possible in other regions of the British Isles. The British Psycho-Analytical Society has coped with great dissention without splitting into conflicting units and is likely to remain one body. Psychoanalysis is still regarded as a prestigious qualification and attracts good candidates, although the number of medically-qualified applicants has diminished. The Institute has always accepted women and non-medically-qualified applicants and has recently declared itself to operate a non-discriminatory admissions policy regarding sexual orientation and ethnicity. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GREAT BRITAIN A full account of this movement, principally associated with Ronald D. Laing and David Cooper, has been provided by Digby Tantum (1991). Laing wrote his most famous and influential book, The Divided Self, when he was a senior registrar at the Tavistock Clinic and in training analysis with Dr. Charles Rycroft. Although he was accepted as an associate member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, he rapidly distanced himself from it and he and Cooper founded their own Philadelphia Association. Together they ran a community named Kingsley Hall on ‘‘antipsychiatric’’ lines. The basic tenets of anti-psychiatry are as follows: Schizophrenia is not an illness, but a label arbitrarily fixed by society and confirmed by psychiatrists; the symptoms of madness are understandable as communications; what psychiatrists call schizophrenia is either a reaction to a disturbed family or a healing voyage which would be of benefit if it could be completed without interference; and, lastly, psychiatrists and psychiatric hospitals degrade people and cause mad behavior. Laing and Arnold Esterson carried out research on families in 1958 and 1967, partly at the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations and at Villa 21, Shenley Hospital, which was directed by Cooper and which treated young schizophrenics. From their researches they concluded that schizophrenia was a reaction to familial or social pathology and that symptoms were cause by disturbed family communications. Their findings were published as ‘‘The Politics of Experience’’ (1967) and by Cooper as Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry (1967). As Tantum described it, ‘‘Many readers agreed with Laing that a plausible account of symptoms in terms of disturbed family communication was tantamount to proving that disturbed family communications caused symptoms. ÔThe Politics of ExperienceÕ was written at the height of the 1960Õs rebellion by young people against their parents generation. It was the apogee of flower power and a year before the Paris Evenements. Drug induced mysticism was fashionable and was presented as a voyage of self-discovery. It was tempting to pretend that schizophrenia was not only intelligible but intelligent’’ (1991). LaingÕs legacy survives in the Philadelphia Association and in the Arbours Association, which is led by his former associate Joseph Berke. Both these organizations have training programs and the Arbours Association provides shelter and treatment for psychotic patients in residential homes, thus avoiding hospitalization. The INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS other legacy of the anti-psychiatry movement is found in the refinement of psychiatric diagnosis and in a more psychodynamic approach to both the schizoid character and to schizophrenia. The movement has also increased the momentum away from psychiatric treatment and toward self-help circles for persons who have suffered psychotic breakdowns and who try to avoid further psychiatric involvement. Laing had relatively little direct influence within the British Psycho-Analytical Society and his theories and practices were marginalized by lack of attention. The Tavistock Clinic has a reputation for psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Founded after World War I by Hugh Crichton-Miller, it began as an eclectic center for psychotherapy where Freudians, Jungians, and Adlerians, among others, provided psychotherapeutic services. During the Second World War the director of the Tavistock Clinic, John Rawlings Rees, who was not himself a psychoanalyst, was appointed director of British Army Psychiatry. Through his influence, several future leaders of psychoanalysis, including Wilfred Bion, John Rickman, and Thomas F. Main, were given posts of high responsibility. When they returned to civilian life at the end of the war they succeeded in making the Tavistock Clinic a psychoanalytic clinic, no longer eclectic. John D. Sutherland, who succeeded Rees as director, held an early enthusiasm for group psychotherapy under the leadership of Bion (and later of Henry Ezriel). This movement eventually faded and was replaced by individual psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Over the years the Kleinian Movement became predominant and those who did not follow this school were to some extent marginalized. The most conspicuous example is that of John Bowlby, whose research into the links between ethology and psychodynamic theory was regarded as extraneous. Bowlby had created the Department of Family and Children and introduced a systems approach to the pathology of the family and because of his ‘‘contamination’’ by such ideas he was also marginalized in the British Psycho-Analytical Society, of which he had been a prominent member since the 1930s. Before his death, however, the importance of his contribution was recognized internationally and thereby he regained recognition within Britain. Michael Balint did a great deal to make the name of the Tavistock Clinic known internationally through his work with family doctors. Together with his wife Enid, he carried out extensive research into 699 GREECE psychodynamic aspects of general practice, and ‘‘Balint Groups’’ spread worldwide. Balint had succeeded Ferenczi as the Director of the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Institute but came to Britain in the 1930s as a refugee. He quickly established a strong position for himself as a representative of the Hungarian school of psychoanalysis and was recognized as one of the leaders of the ‘‘Independent’’ group, in time becoming President of the Society. He also stimulated research into brief psychotherapy, which was carried out by a group of psychoanalysts drawn from the Tavistock Clinic and the Cassel Hospital. The Cassel Hospital, too, was founded following World War I, to provide inpatient psychotherapy, and between the wars it became more psychodynamic in its approach. Following World War II, Thomas Main became its director, and the hospital became a center for psychoanalytic inpatient psychotherapy. Many psychoanalysts in training were employed there. The hospital gained a worldwide reputation for its innovations in psychodynamic nursing and for its contributions to the therapeutic community movement. The Cassel can be contrasted to the Henderson Hospital which under Maxwell Jones took an approach to inpatient psychotherapy that was socio-psychological rather than psychoanalytic. MALCOLM PINES Bibliography Cooper, David. (1967). Psychiatry and anti-psychiatry. London: Tavistock Hinshelwood, Robert D. (1991). Psychodynamic psychiatry before World War I. In Berrios and Freeman, (Eds.), 150 years of British psychiatry. London: Gaskell. Miller, P.; Rose, N.; and Pines, Malcolm.(1994). On therapeutic authority: psychoanalytic expertise under advanced liberalism. History of the Human Science, 7 (3), 9–64. Pines, Malcolm. (1991a). The development of the psychodynamic movement. In Berrios and Freeman, (Eds.), 150 years of British psychiatry. London: Gaskell. ———. (1991b). A history of psychodynamic psychiatry in Britain. In J. Holmes (Ed.): Textbook of psychotherapy in psychiatric practice. Livingstone, England: Churchill. Tantum, Digby. (1991). The anti-psychiatry movement. In Berrios and Freeman, (Eds.), 150 years of British psychiatry. London: Gaskell. 70 0 GREECE Reference to the history of psychoanalysis in Greece lends itself to reflection along two different lines. First, there is the history of events—that is, the diachronic line of events that, between 1915 and the 1980s and 1990s, sustained the slow (and somewhat difficult, owing to discontinuities) establishment of a framework for the psychoanalytic movement in Greece, with all of the consequences, both positive and negative, that such a framework entailed for psychoanalytic circles. This chronology shows that, around 1920, a circle of intellectuals and teachers were actively studying the works of Sigmund Freud and publishing on practices in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. However, the official medical community and the broader public remained indifferent or even hostile to these currents of thought. The active presence of Princess Marie Bonaparte in Athens beginning in 1946 seemed to offer a way of changing things. The interest of academics and doctors was mobilized on the occasion of a visit by Anna Freud, who was invited to Athens in 1949, but this lasted only for the short duration of her stay. Only two psychiatrists, Démétrios Kouretas and Georges Zavitzianos; a poet, Andreas Embirikos; and a physician, Nicolas Dracoulides, were interested in pursuing more in-depth psychoanalytic training. These four men formed a working group, and, supported by Marie Bonaparte, were accepted as members of the Société psychanalytique de Paris (Psychoanalytic Society of Paris) in 1950. However, the group was to be short-lived: It disbanded a year later, the four analysts having chosen to settle in three different countries. After the end of World War II and the civil war that ravaged Greece, the creation of a few institutional, psychodynamically oriented mental health centers made it feasible to organize lecture series, seminars, and group discussions in Athens; these developments seemed to portend a possible new beginning for analytic work. Colleagues from abroad—Serge Lebovici was the first—were prepared to offer assistance, beginning in 1957. Three Greek analysts working in different areas—Kouretas at the University of Athens, Pangiotis Sakellaropoulos at the Center of Thétokos, and Anna Potamianou at the Center for Mental Health and Research—provided the impetus, as hopes for a new beginning took shape. And once again, the central INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS G R E E N A C R E , P H Y L L I S (1894 –1 989) figures comprised two psychiatrists and one person from outside of that field. Numerous attempts to ensure sustained and systematic collaboration did not yield results. It was not until 1982, after countless efforts and failures, and with the help of a group of analysts who had trained overseas (Athena Alexandris, Pierre Hartocollis, Stavroula Beratis), that a ‘‘Greek psychoanalytic group’’ gained formal recognition as a study group of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA). This group, which includes four teaching analysts, ten members, eight corresponding members, and twentysix candidates, was designated by election as an IPA member society in 2001. Between 1989 and 1995, two groups inspired by the work of Jacques Lacan, the Freudian Praxis, and the Athenian Circle of the European School of Psychoanalysis, as well as another group whose members wished to remain independent of any school, were formed. Still two other groups follow the teachings of Alfred Adler. Thus, the diachronic axis in Greece reveals considerable oscillation between forward movement and movements of regression-repetition, attesting to an unconscious, but definite, fidelity to Freudian thought in connection with the psychic trajectory of individuals and groups. A second line of reflection brings out even more clearly the similarities between the course of development of psychoanalysis in Greece and the very essence of the Freudian Logos. Marked by a convergence between the Jewish soul and the Hellenistic spirit, FreudÕs thought engraved a path of complementary opposites and constraints that mirrors the history of psychoanalysis in Greece. That history, it seems, is the fruit of conflicts whose unexpected violence often astonished spectators; it is also the result of harsh schisms and mutilating projections, the revelatory details of which can be found in the writings of those involved in its difficult and laborious gestation. Opposition and indifference arose within the group; analysts departed to seek training abroad. There were abortive attempts, productive convergences, jolts, and contacts. It is certain that the development of psychoanalysis was not exempt from tumultuous adventures in any country. However, it is equally certain that in this land that engendered what for Freud doubled as the alien element of the unconscious—that is, the discourse and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS myths of the ancient Greeks—the constraint of rejection and exclusion of analytic thought exerted its influence for too long. There are a variety of reasons for this, and they have been studied and discussed by such authors as Gerosimos Stephanotos, Athanase and Hélène Tzavaras and Anna Potamianou. Currently, this constraint has been eased somewhat. For Freud, the journey leading to Athens was not easy; the price he paid in terms of his autoanalysis was considerable. For Greek analysts today, there is certainly a price to be paid so that analysis may ‘‘be’’ in their country. With regard to publications in Greek: Kouretas and Zavitzianos published numerous works, mainly concerning clinical practice and applied psychoanalysis. More recently, Greek psychoanalysts have mostly tended to publish in the language in which they received their training (English, French, or German), but numerous articles and several books, including four collaboratively written volumes, have also been written in Greek. ANNA POTAMIANOU Bibliography Potamianou, Anna. (1988). Episkepsis: Pensées autour de la visite dÕAnna Freud à Athènes. Revue internationale dÕhistoire de la psychanalyse, 1, 247–254. Stephanatos, Gerosimos. (1992). Un pari sous lÕAcropole. Bulletin dÕinformation du Quatrieme Groupe. 12, 56–63. Tzavaras, Athanase. (1993). Psychanalyse ‘‘et’’ Grèce—dix ans après. IO—Revue Internationale de Psychanalyse, 4, 157–162. Tzavaras, Hélène. (1993). Oedipe ou Ulysse? Identité et filiation de la psychanalyse en Grèce. IO—Revue Internationale de Psychanalyse, 4, 87–93. Tzavaras, Hélène, and Tzavaras, Athanase. (1995). Au pays dÕOedipe. Panoramiques, 22, 156–158. GREENACRE, PHYLLIS (1894–1989) Phyllis Greenacre, American psychoanalyst and physician, was born May 3, 1894 in Chicago, Illinois, and died October 24, 1989 in Ossining, New York. Greenacre was the fourth of seven children of Isaiah Thomas, a prominent lawyer, and Emma Russell. After graduating from Rush Medical College in Chicago, in 701 G R E E N S O N , R A L P H (1911 –1979) 1916, she became an intern and resident at the Phipps Clinic at the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore (Harley and Weil, 1990). At the Phipps Clinic, where Greenacre remained for twelve years, she came into contact with the great Swiss-American psychiatrist, Adolf Meyer. Her exposure to Meyer reinforced her conviction of the inextricable link between biology and psychology. In 1932 she began psychoanalytic training at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, graduating in 1937. In 1942 she was appointed a training analyst and henceforth served in a number of important institutional positions at the Institute. During this period there was a growing influx of émigré analysts to the United States and particularly to New York. Greenacre was influenced by two of these émigrés, Heinz Hartmann and Ernst Kris. Her friendship with Kris was particularly significant because he encouraged her to value her unique analytic vision. GreenacreÕs written contribution falls into three categories: clinical papers on development; psychoanalytic training and therapy; and studies of creativity. Her first paper, ‘‘The Predisposition to Anxiety’’ (1941), was criticized for its exploration of preverbal stages of development, and her argument that the roots of anxiety might predate the existence of the ego. This paper and its companion, ‘‘The Biological Economy of Birth’’ (1945), are also noteworthy because they announce her interest in memory and its vicissitudes. GreenacreÕs clinical work took as its point of departure her conviction of the importance of reconstruction in analytic work. She paid close attention to screen memories, believing them the path by which early preverbal experiences could be traced. In the early 1950s Greenacre began writing on fetishism, and observed that fetishists had an especially mutable body image. The fact that descriptions of bodily changes were central to the writings of Lewis Carroll and Jonathan Swift led to the biographical study Swift and Carroll (1955). She wrote a number of papers on creativity, and proposed a theory of aggression, in The Childhood of the Artist (1957), as a manifestation of a positive developmental force; aggression as a positive response by the infant to the circumstances of its earliest experiences, both frustrating and gratifying. GreenacreÕs contributions to psychoanalysis include original insights about the bodily and psychic 70 2 experiences of the preverbal child, fetishism, and the creative individual. Of equal note is the fact that she presented this material in papers and books that are characterized by beautiful, evocative prose, in the service of imaginative and bold theoretical ideas and the sensitive interpretation of clinical material. NELLIE L. THOMPSON See also: Allergy; As if personality, Identity; Imposter; Trauma of Birth, The. Bibliography Greenacre, Phyllis. (1941). The Predisposition to Anxiety. In Trauma, growth and personality (pp. 27–82). New York: W. W. Norton, 1952. ———. (1945). The Biological Economy of Birth. In Trauma, growth and personality (pp. 3–26). W. W. Norton, 1952. ———. (1955). Swift and Carroll, a psychoanalytic study of two lives. New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1957). The Childhood of the Artist: Libidinal Phase Development and Giftedness. In Emotional growth, psychoanalytic studies of the gifted and a great variety of other individuals (2 vols., p. 479–504). New York: International Universities Press. Harley, Marjorie, and Weil, Annemarie. (1990). Phyllis Greenacre, M.D. (1894–1989). International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 71, 523–525. GREENSON, RALPH (1911–1979) Ralph Greenson, American psychoanalyst and physician, was born on September 20, 1911 in Brooklyn, New York, and died on November 24, 1979 in Los Angeles, California. He was the eldest child (by ten minutes, as he was a twin) born to his physician father and pharmacist mother in Brooklyn. He completed his premedical studies at Columbia University and his medical training at the University of Bern (1930–1934) in Switzerland. In Switzerland he met Hildi Troesch; they married and had two children, Daniel and Joan. In 1935 he began an analysis with Wilhelm Stekel and undertook analytic training in the Active Psychoanalytic Institute in Vienna. Dissatisfied with the therapeutic effect of this work, he began ‘‘classical’’ INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS G R E S S O T , M I C H E L (1918 –1 975) training in Los Angeles in 1938 and had a personal analysis with Otto Fenichel. He held various positions in organized psychoanalysis, but mostly enjoyed teaching candidates, residents and medical students. He gave many public lectures which were very popular and well received. These were published in book form, as Loving, Hating, and Living Well (1993). He published 65 articles in the psychoanalytic literature, almost all of which were clinically based. Thirty-two of these appear in his book Explorations in Psychoanalysis (1978). The Technique and Practice of Psychoanalysis (1967) is still considered a classic book on analytic technique. In addition to his books on technique, his major contribution to psychoanalysis involved his emphasis on aspects of analytic work: the working alliance—the ‘‘real’’ relationship with patientÕs empathy and counter-transference, apart from transference interpretations. DANIEL GREENSON See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence; Boredom; Empathy; Identity; Silence; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Therapeutic alliance; Transference relationship. Bibliography Greenson, Ralph. (1965). The working alliance and the transference neurosis. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 34 p. 155–181. ———. (1967). The technique and practice of psychoanalysis (Vol. 1). New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1970). The exceptional position of the dream in psychoanalytic practice. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 39, 519–549. ——— (1978). The ‘‘real’’ relationship between the patient and the psychoanalyst. In Explorations in Psychoanalysis (p. 425–440). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1971) ——— (1978). Explorations in psychoanalysis. New York, International Universities Press. GRESSOT, MICHEL (1918–1975) Michel Gressot, a Swiss physician, psychoanalyst and teacher with the Société Suisse de Psychanalyse (Swiss Society for Psychoanalysis) was born in Porrentruy in 1918 and died in Geneva in 1975. He attended the Collège de Saint-Maurice (Valais), where he acquired INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS an extensive background in humanism and philosophy that was to have a profound affect on his psychoanalytic work. After studying medicine in Fribourg, Basle, and Lausanne, he specialized in psychiatry in Lausanne, in Malévoz (Valais), and in Geneva, where he settled in 1950 as a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. In 1969 he was appointed Privat Dozent at the School of Medicine of the University of Geneva. Gressot was introduced to FreudÕs work through his teachers at Saint-Maurice. Subsequently, during his psychiatric training, he began a personal analysis with Charles Odier in Lausanne. Once settled in Geneva he devoted himself almost exclusively to psychoanalysis. Raymond de Saussure, upon his return from the United States in 1952, relied on GressotÕs assistance in providing a new impetus to the development of psychoanalysis and training (after 1956 he worked with Marcelle Spira). These psychoanalytic educators played an important role in the later growth of psychoanalysis in French-speaking Switzerland, especially in Geneva. Gressot regularly gave seminars and conferences, and was an enthusiastic participant in the Congrès des psychanalystes de langue romane (Congress of romance language psychoanalysts). His career was interrupted suddenly in 1975, when he died in Geneva at the age of fifty-seven. GressotÕs most important contributions were collected by Michel de MÕUzan in a posthumous volume entitled Le Royaume intermédiaire (1979), with a preface by Michel Roch. It contains his essay, ‘‘Le Mythe dogmatique et le Système moral des manichéens,’’ which emphasizes the psychoanalytic advantage in studying Manichaeism. The book also contains two important reports on congresses held in Paris. The first, from 1955, ‘‘Psychanalyse et Connaissance: Contribution à une épistémologie psychanalytique,’’ sketches a psychoanalytic theory of knowledge. The second, from 1963, ‘‘Psychanalyse et Psychothérapie, leur commensalisme: LÕesprit de la psychanalyse est-il compatible avec la psychothérapie?’’ studies the interaction of the fields of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy from a dialectic point of view that was typical of GressotÕs style. Gressot trained a number of psychoanalysts during his career. The depth of his thought, his attention to detail as a writer, and his openness to different ideas all had a strong influence on the growth of psychoanalysis inside and outside Switzerland. JEAN-MICHEL QUINODOZ 703 GRID See also: Congrès des psychanalystes de langue française des pays romans; Switzerland (French-speaking) Bibliography Gressot, Michel. (1979). Le royaume intermédiaire. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Roch, Marcel. (1979). Préface: En hommage à Michel Gressot. In Michel Gressot, Le royaume intermédiaire. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ‘‘Dodgsonian,’’ in reference to Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll), the author of AliceÕs Adventures in Wonderland. The grid was not as ill-fated as BionÕs other notation systems and has even become emblematic of his research. Arranged along the vertical axis of the grid are the following: A) beta-elements; B) alpha-elements; C) dream thoughts, dreams, and myths; D) preconception; E) conception; F) concept; G) a scientific deductive system; H) algebraic calculus. ——— (1980). Á propos de l’histoire de la psychanalyse en Suisse romande. Bulletin de la Société suisse de psychanalyse, 10, 17–30. The horizontal axis essentially presents the functions the mind uses to have access to the real: 1) definitory hypotheses; 2) denial; 3) notation; 4) attention; 5) inquiry; 6) action. GRID If, in the horizontal axis, Bion draws from FreudÕs 1911 article, ‘‘Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning,’’ the vertical axis instead reflects the influence of Immanuel KantÕs epistemology. The grid is an instrument for classifying psychoanalytic material, coming from either the patient or the analyst, proposed by Wilfred R. Bion in his Elements of PsychoAnalysis (1963). Classification is made along two axes, with the vertical axis representing the genetic evolution of thoughts or ideas, and the horizontal axis representing the uses or functions attributed to thoughts or ideas. By combining the vertical categories with the horizontal uses or functions, a grid is obtained that makes it possible to classify the ‘‘elements of psycho-analysis’’—the term Bion applies to the thoughts and emotions of the patient-analyst dyad. Bion does not advocate using the grid as a working method during sessions. Rather, it is conceived as a tool that the analyst can use outside of the sessions to clarify their ideas or reexamine material. By means of the grid and other abstract systems of notation, Bion sought to bring a greater degree of specificity to psychoanalytic theory. For example, in the theory of the Oedipus complex that helped Sigmund Freud to found psychoanalysis, there are elements that are constants, fixed through their association with other elements. Thus, in the classic oedipal scheme, it would be impossible to detach any of the following from the whole: sexual agitation, sexual curiosity, or castration. BionÕs use of new methods of notation began with his book entitled Learning from Experience (1962) and reached its height with Transformations: Change from Learning to Growth (1965), where the reader finds a profusion of mathematical signs, Greek words, arrows, dots, and lines, the assimilation of which (when it is possible) adds little to analytic understanding. Bion himself admitted his failure, referring to his mathematics as 70 4 As a whole, the grid recalls KantÕs categories (much more than it does Dimitri Mendeleev, contrary to what some have suggested). Like in KantÕs faculty of thought, there are three levels in the grid: sensibility, understanding, and reason. Sensibility, in KantÕs work, is predominantly passive and serves to receive impressions from the outside (the equivalent of BionÕs lines A, B, and C). Understanding is active; it takes sensibilityÕs components and forms them into judgments and real knowledge (the equivalent of BionÕs lines D, E, and F). Reason is the final stage in the operations of knowledge, which are begun by the senses and continue through the understanding. For all its interest, BionÕs grid did not achieve the degree of abstraction he believed was desirable in the development of any scientific theory. The grid did not produce the desired combinatory effects, in the same way that psychoanalytic theory is not at the level of a predictive scientific system. Perhaps the ascent into abstraction is not possible for psychoanalysis, just as it is not possible for the other human sciences. Walking in the footsteps of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ernst Mach, and Bertrand Russell, Bion did not take into account the methodological obstacles raised when one attempts to assimilate the natural and human sciences—obstacles evoked by Wilhelm Dilthey in his Introduction to the Human Sciences: An Attempt to Lay a Foundation for the Study of Society and History and by Georges Politzer in his Critique of the Foundations of Psychology: The Psychology of Psychoanalysis, among others. PEDRO LUZES INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS G R O D D E C K , G E O R G W A L T H E R (1866 –1 934) BION’S GRID Definitory hypothesis 1 ␺ 2 A Beta-elements A1 A2 B Alpha-elements B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 …Bn. C Dream thoughts, dreams, and myths C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 …Cn. D Preconception D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 …Dn. E Conception E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 …En. F Concept F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 …Fn. G Scientific deductive system Notation 3 Attention 4 Inquiry 5 Action 6 …n. A6 A1 H Algebraic calculus SOURCE: In W.R. Bion, Elements of Psychoanalysis, London: Heinemann. See also: Concept; Container-contained; Learning from Experience; Maternal reverie, capacity for; Preconception. Trans.). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. (Original work published 1928) Bibliography Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht. (1963). Elements of psycho-analysis. London: Heinemann. ———. (1965). Transformations: Change from learning to growth. London: Heinemann. Politzer, Georges. (1994). Critique of the foundations of psychology: the psychology of psychoanalysis (Maurice Apprey, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GRODDECK, GEORG WALTHER (1866–1934) A German physician and the director of a clinic in Baden-Baden, in the Black Forest region, Georg Walther Groddeck was born on October 13, 1866, in Bad Kösen 705 G R O D D E C K , G E O R G W A L T H E R (1 866 –19 34) an der Saale, Germany, and died on June 11, 1934, in Knonau bei Zürich, Switzerland. Groddeck detailed his upbringing in his autobiographical writings. A saying of his motherÕs, ‘‘Big ears mean great accomplishments,’’ became his life motto. The youngest of five children in a family of aristocrats, he was educated at the school in Schulpforta where Gotthold Lessing, Otto Rank, and Friedrich Nietzsche also studied. He was a great admirer of Nietzsche and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, among others. He studied medicine with Ernst Schweninger, Otto von BismarckÕs personal physician, in keeping with a Romantic tradition of medicine based on experience, in contrast to the scientific mindset of his era. As a result of his exceptionally powerful personality, Groddeck became a renowned doctor whom patients throughout Europe came to consult about somatic and psychosomatic illnesses. He initially used hydrotherapy, dietetics, massage therapy, and psychotherapy based on authority and the power of suggestion; he later refined this approach into a form of psychoanalytic-psychosomatic therapy. In 1910, during a life crisis, he discovered the writings of Sigmund Freud, and he completed his self-analysis in the course of the 115 lectures on psychoanalysis that he delivered to patients in his clinic between 1916 and 1919. These lectures later became famous. He began corresponding with Freud in 1917 and met him personally in 1920, at the international psychoanalytic congress in the Hague. Groddeck drew a mixed reception with his presentation at the congress, which he supposedly introduced by saying, ‘‘I am a wild psychoanalyst,’’ and in which, associating freely, he spoke of his childhood enuresis. In 1920 he became a member of the Deutsche psychoanalytische Gesellschaft (German Psychoanalytic Society). But he did not fully integrate himself into the psychoanalytic movement, and he followed his own path whenever personal ties were important and institutional constraints bothersome. He took a skeptical view of the new ego psychology. Throughout his life he remained involved in sociopolitical activist groups. He refused to accept the National SocialistsÕ reining in of German psychoanalysts after 1933 and ran up against insurmountable problems with them. Finally, he had to take refuge in Switzerland. In 1917 he put forward his psychoanalytic-psychosomatic agenda in Psychische Bedingtheit und psychoanalytische Behandlung organischer Leiden (Psychic 70 6 determination and psychoanalytic treatment of organic disorders). Using examples from his clinical work and vignettes from his self-analysis, he described the relationship between somatic disorders and unconscious psychic processes. In 1921 he published Der Seelensucher: ein psychoanalytischer roman (The soul-seeker: a psychoanalytic novel), a humorous account of the adventures of a psychoanalytic Don Quixote. Groddeck considered this his best work, as did Freud; others complained that it was sexually indecent and unscientific. With the publication of the The Book of the It (1923/1928), Groddeck became famous. This was yet another extremely personal book: clinically oriented, spontaneous, unconventional. This work was followed by many lectures, articles in the journals Satanarium and Die Arche, and, in 1933, Der Mensch als Symbol: unmassgebliche Meinungen über Sprache und Kunst (Man as symbol: considerations, without pretension, on language and skills). GroddeckÕs correspondences with Freud and with Sándor Ferenczi are well known. Most of his works are available in translation in many languages. Groddeck was important above all in psychoanalytic psychosomatics. He was the first to argue for the value of psychoanalysis in theorizing about the mind and for the treatment of not just conversion but all somatic disorders, which he supported with a large amount of clinical data. His work is still controversial because his method was neither rational nor scientifically rigorous. Instead, he followed the primary processes in both his therapeutic work and his writings. Using this way of thinking, which Hanns Sachs described as a ‘‘self-portrait of the unconscious,’’ he presented psychoanalysis as an activity, not a theory. Drawing on Nietzsche and the critical philosophy of consciousness, he stressed the concept of the id, a concept that Freud took up, but in a modified form. (He advocated saying, ‘‘The id thinks in me,’’ and not ‘‘I think.’’) He recognized the significance of regression, preoedipal desires, and maternal transference, and thus had an enormous influence on Ferenczi, with whom he became friends. He was also in contact with Ernst Simmel, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, and Michael Balint. The educated public and several writers (Lawrence Durrell and Ingeborg Bachmann, among others) took a great lay interest in his work, and the French psychoanalysts Roger Lewinter, Pierre Fédida, Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, Octave Mannoni, and François Roustang were receptive to his ideas for their scientific content. HERBERT WILL INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS G R O S S , O T T O H A N S A D O L F (1877 –1 920) See also: Allgemeine Ärztliche Gesellschaft für Psychotherapie; Book of the It, The; Germany; Id; Psychic causality; Psychosomatic. Bibliography Bos, Jaap. (1992). On the origin of the id (das Es). International Review of Psychoanalysis, 19, 433–443. Chemouni, Jacquy. (1984). Georg Groddeck, psychanalyste de lÕimaginaire: psychanalyse freudienne et psychanalyse groddeckienne. Paris: Payot. Groddeck, Georg. (1917). Psychische Bedingheit und psychoanalytische Behandlung organischer Leiden. Leipzig: S. Hirzel. ———. (1928). The book of the it. Washington, DC: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co. (Original work published 1923.) ———. (1933). Der Mensch als Symbol: unmassgebliche Meinungen über Sprache und Kunst. Leipzig: Internationaler psychoanalytischer Verlag. ———. (1951). The world of man (V. M. E. Collins, Trans.). New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co. ———. (1977). The meaning of illness: selected psychoanalytic writings (Gertrud Mander, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press. Grossman, Carl M., and Grossman, Sylva. (1965). The wild analyst: the life and work of Georg Groddeck. New York: Braziller. Grotjahn, Martin. (1966). Georg Groddeck: the untamed analyst. In Franz Alexander, Samuel Eisenstein, and Martin Grotjahn (Eds.), Psychoanalytic pioneers. New York: Basic Books, 1966. Will, Herbert. (1987). Georg Groddeck: die Geburt der Psychosomatik. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag (dtv). ———. (1994). Ferenczi und Groddeck: eine Freundschaft. Psyche, 720–737. GROSS, OTTO HANS ADOLF (1877–1920) Otto Gross, a neurologist and psychoanalyst, was born March 17, 1877, in Feldbach (Styria), Austria, and died February 13, 1920, in Berlin. His father, Hans Gross, was a celebrated professor of criminal law and his mother Adèle came from a middle-class family. Young Otto Gross grew up in a well-to-do family environment and was a precocious child. On the advice of his father, he began studying medicine and completed his degree at the University of Graz in 1899 at the age of twenty-two. He was hired as a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS doctor on a cruise ship, which introduced him to South America—and drugs. He was also involved with several women during this time, something that earned him a rebuke from his father on his return, the beginning of a conflict that would last until 1907 and their final break. In 1903 he married Frieda Schloffer, ‘‘one of the only Germans I have ever liked,’’ wrote Freud. But his sexual life remained agitated, the reflection of the ‘‘sexual immorality’’ he would turn into a theoretical credo. In 1901–1902 he specialized in neurology and was especially interested in the hypotheses of Carl Wernicke on associative circuits and their separation (in a February 1908 letter to Carl Gustav Jung, Freud humorously referred to this as ‘‘sejunction’’). In 1902, he began a detoxification cure at the Burghölzli Clinic, where Jung was working, and discovered psychoanalysis. In spite of his appointment as Privat Dozent at the University of Graz, he left the city—where his father had also received an appointment—to settle, in September 1906, in Munich. Here, as an assistant to Emil Kraepelin, he spent time among the artistic and literary circles in the Schwabing quarter. The following year he went to Amsterdam for the first International Congress on Psychiatry, Psychology, and Aid to the Mentally Ill and, with Jung, defended FreudÕs theory of hysteria. His intellect and creativeness caught FreudÕs (who felt that ‘‘unfortunately he was not quite sane’’) and Ernest JonesÕs attention, and he was present at the Salzburg Congress of April 27, 1908. Gross was again hospitalized at the Burghölzli, where Jung began treating him. Jung kept Freud informed of his progress, for both men felt that because of GrossÕs intelligence this was a unique opportunity to develop further theoretical insights. Jung diagnosed an ‘‘obsessive neurosis’’ in 1908, which was confirmed by Freud. GrossÕs condition seemed to get better. He gave up drugs—opium and cocaine— but things soon got worse, and in June 1908 Jung diagnosed him as suffering from ‘‘precocious dementia’’ after Gross escaped from the clinic and displayed increasing symptoms of pathological behavior. Nonetheless, he continued to work and publish articles in which he explained his theories on the social origin of nervous disturbances. He became involved with anarchist circles, but spent increasing amounts of time in psychiatric clinics, which were paid for by his father. In 1909, his book Über psychopathische Minderwertigkeiten (On Psychopathic Inferiority) was published. 707 G R O S S , O T T O H A N S A D O L F (1877 –1920) On June 3, Freud referred to GrossÕs book, in which he establishes a connection between genius and degeneracy, as a ‘‘bold synthesis overflowing with ideas.’’ The ‘‘degenerate,’’ although appearing unsuited to current social life, can also represent the future of the culture. In 1913 Gross published, in the Expressionist review Aktion, an essay entitled ‘‘Zur Überwindug der kulturellen Krise’’ (How to Overcome the Cultural Crisis), in which he affirmed that ‘‘the psychology of the unconscious is the philosophy of revolution.’’ He referred to Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud, and one can only wonder what influence this early work may have had on the Marxist psychoanalysts of the following decades. A few months after its publication, at his fatherÕs request, Otto Gross was expelled from Germany, held in Austria at the Tulln Asylum, and placed under his fatherÕs care. The international press began to print articles about his arbitrary internment and, on January 25, 1914, he was transferred to the Troppau Asylum in Silesia, where he remained until July 8. He then followed a treatment with Wilhelm Stekel, who refused to diagnose him as a schizophrenic and spoke only of a serious neurosis accompanied by drug addiction. In the Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse und Psychotherapie, Gross published an article on the symbolics of destruction. His fatherÕs death in 1915 left Gross distraught. At the start of the First World War, he worked as a volunteer in several military hospitals but was himself hospitalized again in Romania for drug addiction at the end of 1916, before being transferred to Munich to stay with his mother, then to Vienna. His writings appeared in various political reviews and made use of psychoanalysis to criticize education, society, and the patriarchy, which communism would supposedly abolish in favor of a matriarchy (‘‘The Fundamentally Communist Conception of the Symbolics of Paradise,’’ July 1919). He is mentioned in a letter from Sándor Ferenczi to Freud on February 7, 1918: He ‘‘made his circle of disciples there, who, among other things, had the duty without exception to enter into sexual relations with Dr. GrossÕs lover, named ÔMieze.Õ They supposedly classified the young colleague, who found that repugnant, as Ômorally unreliableÕ for that reason. Incidentally, the young colleague had some time ago received news of Dr. GrossÕs death, which has, however, not been substantiated. He will still pop up here and there as a ÔGolemÕ.’’ In 1920 he published his last book, Drei aufsätze über den inneren Konflict (Three papers on the inner 70 8 conflict), this conflict being situated between the ‘‘self ’’ and the ‘‘foreign,’’ which established a conflict between Freudian sexual drives and the Adlerian ego drive. He was found unconscious on a Berlin sidewalk on February 11, 1920, and died in the Pankow sanatorium two days later from pneumonia. He was buried ‘‘by mistake’’ in the Jewish cemetery of Berlin. Known to Franz Kafka, Max Brod, Max Weber, Blaise Cendrars (who protested against his internments), and the Dadaists, this ‘‘Golem’’ continued to be referred to in connection with D. H. Lawrence (whose wife Frieda, born Frieda von Richthofen, had been his mistress in 1912) and the Bloomsbury group. Guillaume Apollinaire had written ‘‘La disparition du Dr Gross’’ in the Mercure de France on January 16, 1914, to protest his internment, and Sándor Ferenczi wrote to Freud, on March 22, 1910, ‘‘There is no doubt that, among those who have followed you up to now, he is the most significant. Too bad he had to go to pot.’’ Ernest Jones wrote in his memoirs that ‘‘[h]e was the nearest approach to a romantic ideal of a genius I have ever met. . . . He was my first instructor in the technique of psychoanalsysis’’ (Jones, 1959, p. 173). Paradoxically, the Marxist Freudians seem to have forgotten Gross, their earliest precursor. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Germany; Politics and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Dehmlow, Raimund. and Heuer, Gottfried. (1999). Otto Gross: Werkverzeichnis und Sekundärschrifttum. Hannover: Laurentius. Freud, Sigmund and Jung, Carl Gustav. (1975). The Freud/ Jung Letters: The correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung (William McGuire, Ed.; Ralph Manheim and R.F.C. Hull, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gross, Otto. (2000). Collected works. (Lois Madison, Ed. and Trans.). Hamilton, NY: Mindpiece. Hurwitz, Emmanuel. (1979). Otto Gross: Paradies-Sucher zwischen Freud und Jung. Zürich. Lawrence, David Herbert, and Richthofen, Frieda von. (1961). The memoirs and correspondence. London: E.W. Tedlock Jr. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GROUP ANALYSIS GROUP ANALYSIS Broadly defined, group analysis is a psychoanalytic approach to the experience of the unconscious in the group situation and a method for investigating the psychic structures and processes that manifest themselves in that context. It uses concepts and techniques from individual psychoanalysis, as well as original psychoanalytic observations from the study of groups. In a more restricted sense, group analysis is a technique of group psychotherapy. Trigant Burrow proposed the notion of ‘‘group analysis’’ in 1927, but it was only at the beginning of the 1940s that Siegmund Foulkes, John Rickman, and Henry Ezriel founded the ‘‘Group Analysis’’ tendency in London. Their work was informed by the structural perspective of Gestalt theory. At around the same time, Wilfred R. Bion was developing original ideas about group structures and processes based on basic concepts of psychoanalysis and Sigmund FreudÕs speculations on group psychology. FoulkesÕs initial objective was to propose an alternative to the limitations of individual therapy, while BionÕs aim was to explore the ways in which group processes could be specifically mobilized in the treatment of certain traumatic, borderline, and psychotic pathologies. In the theoretical current inspired by Foulkes, the group is a totality; the individual and the group form a figure-ground whole. Within the group, the individual is like the nodal point in a neural network. Foulkes believed that all illness is produced within a complex network of interpersonal relations. In Therapeutic Group Analysis (1964), he writes: ‘‘Group psychotherapy is an attempt to treat the entire network of problems, either at the point of origin in the primitive group of origin, or by placing the disturbed individual into the conditions of transference within an alien group.’’ The group possesses specific therapeutic properties, which are expressed in the five basic tenets of Foulkesian group analysis: the capacity to listen to, understand, and interpret the group as a totality in the ‘‘here and now’’; taking into account only the transference ‘‘of the group’’ on the analyst and not lateral transferences; the notion of ‘‘unconscious fantasmatic resonance’’ among the members of the group; ‘‘shared tension’’ and the common denominator of the unconscious fantasies of the group; and the notion of the group as a ‘‘psychic matrix’’ and frame of reference for all interactions. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS In his 1961 book Experiences in Groups, Bion distinguishes and articulates two modes of psychic functioning in groups: the ‘‘work (or W) group,’’ dominated by the processes and requirements of secondary logic; and the ‘‘basic-assumption group’’ defined by the concept of group mentality (p. 105ff). ‘‘Group culture’’ is the structure acquired by the group at a given time, its self-assigned tasks, and the organization adopted to perform them. Bion defines ‘‘group mentality’’ as the mental activity that takes shape within a group based on the opinions, will, and the unconscious, unanimous, and anonymous desires of its members. It ensures that group life will correspond to the basic assumptions that determine its course. Basic assumptions are made up of intense emotional states, primitive in their origin, that play a determining role in a groupÕs formation, the performance of its task, and the satisfaction of the needs and desires of its members. An expression of unconscious fantasies, these assumptions submit to the primary process and remain unconscious. Basic assumptions are also defensive group reactions used as magical techniques, especially for combating the psychotic anxieties reactivated by the regression the group situation imposes. Three basic assumptions govern the course of psychic phenomena specific to the group and satisfy the desires of its members. The basic assumption of dependency (baD) is grounded in the conviction that the group has come together to receive security and the satisfaction of all the needs and desires of its members from someone (therapist, leader, master) or something (idea, ideal) upon whom (or which) it is absolutely dependent. The corresponding group culture is organized around the search for a more-or-less deified leader and manifests itself in passivity and loss of critical judgment. The basic assumption of fight-flight (baF) rests on the collective fantasy that there exists an internal or external bad object embodied in an enemy: a group member, illness, an adverse or erroneous idea that the group must either attack or flee. The group finds its leader among paranoid personalities likely to feed this idea. The basic assumption of pairing (baP) is sustained by the collective fantasy that some being or event will resolve all the groupÕs problems: Messianic hope is placed in a couple whose child will save the group from hatred, destruction, or despair. Group culture is organized around the idea that the future will bring long-awaited solutions, but for the future to come, their messianic hope must never be realized. In his book Group, the Italian writer Claudio Neri 709 GROUP PHENOMENON extended and further elaborated BionÕs ideas into field theory. The French current of thought in group analysis has focused its research on the unconscious function the group fulfills for its members. Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (1963) emphasized the importance of instinctual cathexis and representations whose object is the group. According to Didier Anzieu in Le Groupe et lÕInconscient, the group, like the dream, is essentially a means and a locus for the imaginary fulfillment of the unconscious desires of its members. Although the groupÕs structures and psychic processes obey general mechanisms that are characteristic of all products of the unconscious, some of them are specific to the group situation, as witness the group illusion. The model of a group mental apparatus proposed by René Kaës (1976) describes a mechanism for linking and transforming the psychic structures committed to the group by its members. This mechanism produces the groupÕs psychic reality and processes it within the group. In his 1993 book Le Groupe et le Sujet du groupe (The group and the group subject), Kaës emphasizes the role of repression, denial, or rejection, and the unconscious alliances underlying the formation of the psychic reality of the group and its members. RENÉ KAËS See also: Anzieu, Didier; Balint group; Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht; Collective psychology; Family; Family therapy; Foulkes (Fuchs), Sigmund Heinrich; Group phenomenon; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; Group psychotherapy; Identification; Primitive horde; Second World War: The effect on the development on psychoanalysis; Sociology and psychoanalysis/ sociopsychoanalysis. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1975). The group and the unconscious. (Benjamin Kilborne, Trans.). London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984. Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht. Experiences in groups. London: Tavistock Publications, 1961. Foulkes, Siegmund Heinrich. Therapeutic group analysis. New York: International Universities Press, 1964. Kaës, René. Le groupe et le sujet du groupe. Paris: Dunod, 1993. Neri, Claudio. (1997) Group. (Christine Trollope, Trans.). Rome, London and Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley. 71 0 Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1963) Le petit groupe comme objet. In Après Freud. Parı́s: Gallimard, 1968. GROUP PHENOMENON Wilfred R. BionÕs work on group dynamics, developed in particular in his 1961 book Experiences in Groups, established a fundamental difference between individual and group mentalities; individual and group psychoanalysis must be treated differently, even though ‘‘the two methods provide the practitioner with a rudimentary binocular vision’’ and are ‘‘dealing with different facets of the same phenomena’’ (p. 8). In a group, individuals undergo a regression to defend themselves against the conflicts provoked or revealed by their participation in the group. This regression is expressed through formation of a ‘‘group mentality’’—a unanimous expression of the groupÕs will, a defensive system of avoidance and denial, and a common repository for anonymous contributions that the individual members split off or disavow (such as their hostility toward the therapist). The individual contributes to the group mentality but is nevertheless situated in opposition to it, since it threatens the satisfactions of the individualÕs needs as a group animal. The group responds to this threat by means of a compromise formation, the ‘‘group culture.’’ Bion emphasizes the importance of the work (W) group: the mental functioning (and not the individual participants) necessary to perform the joint task that the group has implicitly taken on. The work group must take reality into account (‘‘reality testing’’); its characteristics ‘‘are similar to those attributed by Freud [in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1920g] to the ego’’ (p. 143). The work groupÕs methods are ‘‘rational, and therefore, in however embryonic a form, scientific’’ (p. 143), and they depend upon cooperation among the groupÕs members, training, and the type of mental development defined by the aptitude for learning through experience. The members must undergo development rather than rely on magical efficacy. The work group has come together to undertake a creative task, such as, to resolve the psychological problems of its members. However, the work groupÕs rational intentions are, as a rule, impeded by obscure and chaotic emotional forces, which produce anomalies in the groupÕs mental activity. These emotional forces are given coherence by the supposition that the group is acting as if its goal were motivated by a basic INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GROUP PHENOMENON assumption. In contrast with the requirements of the work group, participation in an activity that depends on a basic assumption does not call for any training, experience, or individual mental development; it is instantaneous, inevitable, and instinctive, and it actually manifests an aggressive refusal to work or develop. The basic-assumption group does not make rational use of verbal communication; it does not develop language as a method of thought and instead uses words as a mode of action. The inability to form and use symbols, observed by Melanie Klein (1930) in an autistic child, extends to all individuals functioning as members of a basic-assumption group. The members seemingly wish to replace any process of elaboration with the ability to know magically, by instinct, without any development or learning, how to live and act in the group. Activity that depends on a basic assumption does not require any ability to cooperate on the part of the individual, but it supposes that the individual—unless he or she is schizophrenic—posseses a ‘‘valency,’’ defined as ‘‘the individualÕs readiness to enter into combination with another in making and acting on the basic assumption’’ (p. 116). The hostile reaction against any process of development in the basic-assumption mentality indicates that time has no place in it, and interpretations of disturbed temporal relations elicit feelings of persecution. In fact, the basic-assumption group only exists outside of time; it neither disperses nor comes together. Inevitably, the basic-assumption group develops an intolerable frustration that can only be addressed by an awareness of the passage of time, and to counter this frustration, the group immediately and automatically puts into play behaviors and beliefs that define itself. Because he considered this theoretical model of basic assumption to be inadequate, Bion elaborated it by describing its modes of dependency, fight-flight, and pairing. constitutes a work group of two people centered around the basic assumption of pairing, which endows the transference with its characteristic features and only accounts for the link between individuals in terms of the libido, the latter designating only the specific quality of the valency characteristic of the pairing group. Sigmund Freud considered the Catholic Church and the army to be groups faced with the basic assumptions of, respectively, dependency (baD) and fight-flight (baF)—in effect, ‘‘specialized work groups.’’ One of the goals of these groups is to prevent the basic assumption from being translated into action, which would require work-group methods to remain in contact with reality. The third type of specialized work group, involved in the basic assumption of pairing (baP), Bion associated with the aristocracy and its preoccupation with reproduction and good genes. However, the psychoanalytic method itself Bibliography INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A basic assumption can only be manifested in alternation with the two others. When one is active, it relegates the others to prototypes and confines them to the sphere of what Bion calls the ‘‘proto-mental.’’ In this sphere, the physical, the psychological, and the mental are not differentiated and the emotional components are blurred together because they have not yet come into being on the psychological plane. The group expresses (proto-) emotions from this sphere by putting into play a basic assumption, and the psychological expression of these emotions reinforces, invades, or dominates the groupÕs mental life. The proto-mental phase in the individual is only a part of the proto-mental system. Proto-mental phenomena cannot be understood solely as functions of the individual, but must be studied within the group. Somatic illnesses can be manifested in the individual, but their full context is in the relationship between the individual and the active basic-assumption group and in the proto-mental phases of the two other basic assumptions. The basic-assumption group that sweeps aside the essential part of individual mentality still operant in the work group thus expresses, on a level that is more neurophysiological than psychological, the primitive parts that live a group life within each individual. BERNARD DEFONTAINE See also: Family therapy; Group analysis. Bion, Wilfred R. (1961). Experiences in groups. London: Tavistock. ———. (1970). Attention and interpretation. London: Tavistock. Grinberg, León; Sor, Darı́o; and Tabak de Bianchedi, Elizabeth. (1993). New introduction to the work of Bion (rev. ed.). Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson. Meltzer, Donald. (1986). The proto-mental apparatus and soma-psychotic phenomena. In Studies in extended metapsychology. London: Clunie Press. 711 GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO Pines, Malcolm. (Ed.). (1985). Bion and group psychotherapy. London: Routledge. GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO Sigmund FreudÕs second essay, after Totem and Taboo (1912–13a), on collective psychology, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego is perhaps his fundamental work on that topic. He began contemplating the project in 1919: ‘‘I had not only completed the draft of ÔBeyond the Pleasure PrincipleÕ . . . but I also took up the little thing about the ÔuncannyÕ again, and, with a simple-minded idea [Einfall], I attempted a P" foundation for group psychology,’’ he wrote to Sándor Ferenczi on 12 May 1919 (Freud and Ferenczi, Letter 813, p. 354). His progress was slow; a first version was finished in September 1920, and the final version was finished in March 1921. It was published that summer. The close relationship between the discovery of dynamics operating in large dimensions—the theory of the life and death instincts, advanced in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g)—and the possibility of reconceptualizing group psychology is noteworthy. In contrast to Totem and Taboo, where Freud was applying psychoanalytic ideas to the psychology of groups and simultaneously acknowledging the differences between psychoanalysis and anthropology, here the brief and magisterial introductory chapter makes the claim that group psychology is part of psychoanalysis. Next he tackles a fundamental problem not elaborated in Totem and Taboo: What is the mental dynamic that holds together the individuals in a group, creates the groupÕs forms, ensures its continuity and stability, or causes its disappearance? In other words, what is the morphodynamics of groups? Repeating a significant move in psychoanalysis, his abandonment of hypnosis, Freud proposed that the libido accounts for group morphodynamics. He accomplished this epistemological operation in three chapters, borrowing from Gustave Le Bon and William McDougall to describe the prevalence of the primary processes in ephemeral groups. Freud refined his proposal by showing how two groups, the church and the army, can come apart—in their different ways—through the loss of libidinal bonds to the leader or among members, and how, in keeping with psychoanalytic dynamics, only the power 71 2 of love is capable of overcoming the narcissism and hatred that distance us from one another. It remained to identify the psychic formations that ensure group cohesion. This is the topic is addressed in the next three chapters, where, for the first time, Freud studied in detail the various known identificatory processes and distinguished the egoÕs identifications from those of the ego ideal. Hence his statement: ‘‘A primary group . . . is a number of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego’’ (p. 116). This statement holds true for passionate love and the hypnotic state, which he had used to shed light on the identificatory processes. Freud then verified its validity in the case of the primitive horde, as a structure, as discussed in Totem and Taboo. In the course of his discussion, the generic quality of alienation and submission inherent in group membership is brought to light. A final chapter sharpens the distinction between ego and ego ideal, a distinction that provides an opening for psychoanalytic investigation of the narcissistic psychoses. In important supplements to this work Freud distinguished three paradigmatic forms and dynamics of groups, based on the degree of the weakening of the ego ideal and the ego that they impose: the horde, the matriarchy, and the totemic clan. He specified that the level of elaboration allowed to groups excluded the thinking of sexual difference. He proposed that the earliest individual psychology in which the ego ideal does not appear in weakened form is that of the poet telling the totemic clan the lie that explains their origins: ‘‘the myth, then, is the step by which the individual emerges from group psychology’’ (Postscript, p. 136). He also examined the relationship between direct sexual instincts and sexual instincts whose aim is inhibited, with only the latter being mobilized and tolerated by social bonds. The notion of the intrinsic relationship between individual and group psychology—which Freud sustained throughout his work—appears the most clearly in this essay. FreudÕs bringing to light of the libidinal morphodynamics of groups made possible some fundamental work on identifications, the ego ideal, and the ego and narcissism that would be continued in The Ego and the Id (1923b). However, the mode of articulation of object relations and identifications remained enigmatic, in part. The relevance of the three forms and paradigmatic dynamics proposed is unquestionable. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPIES We can assume that these are deployed in every real human group, and that they are constantly in conflict. It should be noted that the horde of Totem and Taboo and that of Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego do not have the same status: The first is mythic and structural, while the second is actual and is endowed with active libidinal dynamics. The essayÕs lack of resonance among psychoanalysts, with regard to FreudÕs ideas about group psychology, can be explained by the fact that the majority of psychoanalysts after Freud, when working on groups, have hypothesized oedipal moments in them. Dealing with ‘‘the analysis of the ego,’’ which has been referred to frequently, is another matter altogether. At the beginning of the essay Freud made clear that he was working only on the libidinal dynamics involved in group cohesion. Three parameters were excluded: the influence of external reality on groups, the influence of ‘‘great men’’ on their level of development, and finally, an economic assessment of bonds and the role of hatred. This work was to be carried out in part in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]) and then in Moses and Monotheism (1939a [1934–1938]). MICHÈLE PORTE See also: Collective psychology. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1921c) Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse. Leipzig-Vienna-Zürich: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag; GW, XIII: 71–161; Group psychology and analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1912–13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ——— (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ——— (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57–145. ——— (1939a [1934–38]). Moses and monotheism: three essays. SE, 23: 1–137. Freud, Sigmund, and Ferenczi, Sándor. (1992–2000). The correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sándor Ferenczi, Vol. 2, 1914– 1919. (Ernst Falzeder and Eva Brabant, Eds.; Peter Hoffer, Trans.). Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Kaës, René, and Anzieu, Didier. (1976). Chronique dÕun groupe, le groupe du ÔParadis perduÕ: observation et commentaries. Paris: Dunod. Mitscherlich, Alexander. (1963). Society without the father: A contribution to social psychology. (Eric Mosbacher, Trans. New York: Schocken Books, 1970. Moscovici, Serge. (1981). The age of the crowd: A historical treatise on mass psychology. (J.C. Whitehouse, Trans. Cambridge (Cambridgeshire) and New York: Cambridge University Press. GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPIES The notion of group psychotherapies encompasses a considerable number of techniques and different theoretical points of view. Strictly speaking, group psychotherapy is a method for treating psychopathology and its concomitant suffering by means of the specific action of the groupÕs processes on the individuals who comprise it. There is also a model of group psychotherapy that seeks to treat the group as a specific whole. To accomplish its therapeutic aims and bring about the corresponding changes in personality, group psychotherapy mobilizes in the participants the psychological exploration and work that ensues necessarily as a result of the development of intersubjective and transsubjective links. Various appropriate mechanisms are directed toward this end. This method of psychotherapy is probably the oldest form of mental and psychosomatic care. Treatment regimens practiced in the Asclepion at Pergamon (Bergama) included group sessions of dream interpretation, as the ancient writings of Aelius Aristides reveal. However, the term ‘‘group psychotherapy’’ is recent: It was introduced by Jacob Moreno around 1930. Various attempts had been made prior to that, from Franz von MesmerÕs tub to the explorations of J. H. Pratt (1905) or Trigant Burrow (1914). On the eve and at the beginning of the Second World War, Kurt Lewin and his collaborators developed the basics of group dynamics, based on Gestalt theory, observations of experimental groups, and group training programs. Siegmund Foulkes and Wilfred R. Bion established the groundwork for group analysis and psychoanalytic group psychotherapy. During the 1950s and 1960s this trend saw a remarkable upsurge in the United States, Latin America (Enrique Pichon-Rivière, José Bleger), and in Europe, notably in Great Britain, France, and Italy. 713 GROUPS/ENSEMBLE There is considerable variation among the theories, practical techniques, and goals of group psychotherapies, but a certain number of characteristics are common to all its forms. The group is composed of a relatively small number of participants (from three to about a dozen) who come together for a limited time. The restricted size of the group enables each of its participants to perceive and enter into relationship with each of the others; the time limitation, whether or not it is predetermined (long-term groups, short-term therapies, groups that gradually become more open), makes it possible to work with the resistance effects provoked by the groupÕs institutionalization. Several combinable classification criteria can be used to distinguish different types of groups: monotherapy or cotherapy groups; groups centered on the group or on the individual; on speech or on nonverbal modes of expression (ergotherapies, art therapies, writing, music); on psychodramatic role-playing or on the body (bioenergy, primal scream, relaxation); on family relations (psychoanalytic and systemic family therapies); on instituted groups (therapy groups within institutions, therapeutic communities). Regardless of the form of communication used to put the therapeutic processes into play (words, screams, improvised or scripted role-playing, sculpting, painting, music, puppets), each theory has its own way of assessing the therapyÕs processes and effects. According to the psychoanalytic conception, the group constitutes a staging ground for the externalization, figuration, and contention of pathogenic representations that are unacceptable in the intrapsychic space; it is a mechanism for linking and dynamic transformation of the formations and processes that cannot be internally bound without this detour through the work of intersubjectivity. Groups result in specific modes of transference and resistance. Interpreting these produces a reorganization of the psyche in its encounter with the object-based reality of others, with the prohibitions and founding statements of psychic life and of intersubjectivity. For its members, the group constitutes a powerful identificatory anaclisis; it generates creativity and the capacity for symbolization between intrapsychic and bodily reality and intersubjective and social reality. However, numerous clinical, methodological, and theoretical problems have yet to be worked out. Group psychotherapies are not a panacea. They require a personal demand and personal training; their effectiveness 71 4 depends on the specific indications, limits, and principles involved. RENÉ KAËS See also: Group phenomenon; Group analysis; Intersubjective/intrasubjective. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht. (1965). Transformations: Change from learning to growth. London: Tavistock Publications. Bleandonu, Gérard. (1991). Les groupes thérapeutiques familiaux et institutionnels. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Foulkes, Siegmund Heinrich. (1964). Therapeutic group analysis. New York: International Universities Press. Moreno, Jacob L. (1966). The international handbook of group psychotherapy. New York: Philosophical Library. Schneider, Pierre-Bernard. (1965–1972). Pratique de la psychothérapie de groupe. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Further Reading Brown, Dennis, and Zinkin, Louis. (Eds.) (1994). The psyche and the social world: Developments in group-analytic theory. London/New York: Routledge. GROUPS/ENSEMBLE. See Topology GUEX, GERMAINE (1904–1984) Germaine Guex, a Swiss psychoanalyst and psychologist who was a teaching member of the Société suisse de psychanalyse (Swiss Psychoanalytic Society), was born in France in 1904 and died in Lausanne, Switzerland, in 1984. She studied psychology in Geneva and, after receiving her diploma from the Institut Jean-Jacques Rousseau, became Jean PiagetÕs assistant in the psychology laboratory. However, she was attracted to clinical work above all. In 1930 Guex was recruited by Dr. A. Répond, a psychoanalyst and director of the psychiatric clinic of the Swiss canton of Valais in Malévoz, to oversee a psychoanalytically inspired medical and psychological INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS G U I L B E R T , Y V E T T E (1867 –1 944) unit, the first of its kind. This consultancy was geared toward children, parents, and teachers, and its work was both therapeutic and preventive. Freud a friendship based on mutual admiration. Born Emma Laure in Paris on January 20, 1867, she died in Aix-en-Provence on February 3, 1944. During her years in Malévoz, Guex became acquainted with Sigmund FreudÕs work, especially through her connection with Dr. Répond, who was both a psychiatrist and, as a psychoanalyst, a member of the Société suisse de psychanalyse. In the 1940s she moved to Lausanne, where she practiced psychoanalysis and was active in developing psychoanalytic training in French-speaking Switzerland. She was the companion of the psychoanalyst Charles Odier. From a provincial family, her parents settled in Paris shortly before her birth. Her mother Albine owned a boutique, while her father, Hippolyte, a bon vivant who liked spending money in cabarets and enjoyed the company of women, sometimes brought her with him to the café-concerts, where she showed precocious singing talent. Seamstress, shop girl, and model, at age sixteen Guilbert came to the notice of Charles Zidler, later to become director of the Moulin Rouge, who introduced her to the world of show business. In 1950 Guex published La névrose dÕabandon (Abandonment neurosis), revised in 1973 and appearing in a second edition under the title Le syndrome dÕabandon (The abandonment syndrome). In this book she focused on the intense emotional needs and lack of security of some patients, an aspect of pregenital development that can impede working through the Oedipus complex—a new approach at that time. She believed that psychoanalytic treatment could enable such patients to have a new type of emotional experience of the transference, more conscious than unconscious, based on listening, mutual trust, and stability in the analytic relationship. Only then, she believed, could oedipal issues be analyzed. Because of the importance of its topic, La névrose dÕabandon established GuexÕs reputation and has been translated into several languages. JEAN-MICHEL QUINODOZ See also: Abandonment; Switzerland (French-speaking). Bibliography Guex, Germaine. (1950). La névrose dÕabandon. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. (2nd ed.: Le syndrome dÕabandon, 1973.) Quinodoz, Jean-Michel. (1993). The taming of solitude: separation anxiety in psychoanalysis (Philip Slotkin, Trans.). London: Routledge. Roch, Marcel. (1980). Á propos de lÕhistoire de la psychanalyse en Suisse romande. Bulletin de la Société suisse de psychanalyse, 10, 17–30. GUILBERT, YVETTE (1867–1944) A French actress, singer and storyteller, whose repertoire ranged from medieval ballads to suggestive popular songs, Yvette Guilbert shared with Sigmund INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS After performing for a time in Parisian theaters, Guilbert sang at the Eldorado in 1890, then at the Moulin Rouge, the Divan Japonais, and other venues. As a storyteller and singer with an inimitable voice, Guilbert crafted in song the Paris of Toulouse-Lautrec—who made several famous sketches of her. On June 22, 1897, Guilbert married Max Schiller, a Viennese biologist whom she met during one of her tours in New York. After the First World War, she appeared in a number of films and developed a new repertoire based on her research into the history of old French songs and medieval ballads, which she collected and published. She also wrote three volumes of memoirs: La Chanson de ma vie (1927), La Passante émerveillée (1929), and Mes lettres dÕamour (1933). On the advice of Madame Charcot, wife of the famous neurologist, Freud heard Guilbert perform for the first time in Paris in August 1889, while attending the First International Congress of Experimental and Therapeutic Hypnotism. Thereafter he never missed her concerts when she performed in Vienna. Eventually Guilbert and Freud enjoyed a friendly correspondence. In 1931, in reply to one of her letters, Freud wrote that her interpretive artistry surely arose from ‘‘repressed desires and traits that havenÕt had a chance to develop.’’ Guilbert was furious and rejected the explanation of ‘‘her very dear friend.’’ A few years later, however, in the daily newspaper Ce Soir (January 14, 1938), Guilbert wrote an article, ‘‘The ActorÕs Complex,’’ in which she employed the Freudian theories she had previously rejected. Her husbandÕs niece, Eva Rosenfeld, became a wellknown psychoanalyst as well as a friend and colleague of 715 GUILT, FEELING OF Anna Freud, with whom she worked at the Hietzing Schule, which she co-directed. At a musicale presented by Marie Bonaparte in Paris in 1938, during the XV International Congress of Psychoanalysis, Guilbert performed FreudÕs favorite song, ‘‘Dis-moi que je suis belle.’’ JEAN-PIERRE BOURGERON See also: Burlingham-Tiffany, Dorothy; France; Hietzing Schule/Burlingham Rosenfeld School. Bibliography Brécourt-Villars, Claudine. (1988). Yvette Guilbert lÕirrespectueuse. Paris: Plon. Freud, Sigmund. (1960a [1873–1939]). Letters of Sigmund Freud, 1873–1939. (Ernst L. Freud, Ed.; Tania and James Stern, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press. Guilbert, Yvette. (1902). La vedette. Paris: H. Simonis Empis. ———. (1926). Autre temps, autres chants. Paris: Robert Laffont. ———. (1992). 47 enregistrements originaux de 1897 à 1934. Paris: E.P.M. Knapp, Bettina, and Chipman, Myra. (1964). That was Yvette: The biography of the great diseuse New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964). GUILT, FEELING OF Guilt represents a sensation of intrapsychic tension, sometimes linked to apprehension of a catastrophic threat to oneself. It may also be manifest as humility, suffering, the need for punishment, remorse, and feelings of inadequacy. According to Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (1968), the term describes an emotional state that arises in consequence of some action that the subject considers reprehensible; it may also refer to a vague feeling of personal unworthiness, unconnected to any particular act. The ‘‘sense of guilt’’ appeared for the first time in FreudÕs work in his article, ‘‘Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices’’ (1907b); however, he had previously suggested its outlines in the second section of his ‘‘The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence.’’ (1894a) Freud distinguished two sources of the sense of guilt: fear of authority and fear of the superego. The former 71 6 compels renunciation of some instinctive pressure or action, while in the latter, internalization of parental authority initiates development of the superego. One of the functions of this agency (the superego), which is responsible for the evaluation and judgment of the actions of the ego, is known as moral conscience (1923b). Aggression stemming from this moral conscience prolongs and intensifies the aggression experienced from authority. Under the influence of the sense of guilt, the ego submits to the superegoÕs demands, out of fear of losing its affection and protection. According to Freud, there is a link between the sense of guilt and the Oedipus complex. Anxiety occasioned by loss (or potential loss) of the loved object is not the only manifestation of the sense of guilt. There is also the potential for psychic pain and suffering; excessive humility; repeated failures and regrets; constant asking for penitence, expiations, and renunciation; suicidal ideas; and the tendency toward self-punishment. Melanie Klein (1948), like Freud, also saw a direct relationship between the sense of guilt and fundamental ambivalence arising from the life and death instincts. She stressed that this feeling not only appears in the oedipal conflict, but also in the very earliest relationships with the nourishing mother. In her description, damaged intrapsychic objects become persecutors. In Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a), Freud described how the sense of guilt, together with the methods and mechanisms used to struggle against it, influence the individualÕs relationships, not only with their immediate family, but also other relationships within the larger social group, and even with civilization as a whole. One of the principal aims of psychoanalysis is therefore to understand how patients manage their guilt, for example, to understand the extent to which they can accept ambivalence and responsibility in the face of instinctual strivings and the feelings that generate guilt. The discovery that patients harbor feelings of both love and hate for their parents underscores the importance of guilt as a nodal area of personality development. In the first years of life, the specific ways that children respond to guilt may predispose them to neurosis and mental instability, but may also prove to be a source of success and fulfillment. Klein (1945/1975), in opposition to Freud, attempted to show, through observation of children in analysis, that the superego emerges much earlier than Freud suggested. According to her views, the Oedipus INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS GUILT, UNCONSCIOUS SENSE complex also appears much earlier, during the first six months of life. The essential nature of the sense of guilt resides in the young childÕs impression that its own experience of aggressive instincts have caused hurt to the love object. The desire to undo or to repair this damage derives from the sense of guilt. To the extent that guilt may be said to reflect, or result from, discordance between the ego and superego, emergence of the latter implies the ineluctable appearance of the sense of guilt. LEÓN GRINBERG See also: Criminology and psychoanalysis; Death instinct (Thanatos); ‘‘Dostoyevski and Parricide’’; Guilt, unconscious sense of; Law and psychoanalysis; Melancholy; Moral masochism; Need for punishment; Self-punishment; Superego. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 41–61. ———. (1907b). Obsessive actions and religious practices. SE, 9: 115–127. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ———. (1930a). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57–145. Klein, Melanie. (1948). A contribution to the theory of anxiety and guilt. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 29, 113–123. ———. (1975). The Oedipus complex in the light of early anxieties. The writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. 3, 1946– 1963). London: Hogarth. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 26 (1945), 11–33.) Laplanche, Jean; and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1973). The language of psycho-analysis. New York: Norton, 1973. Further Reading Pulver, Stanley. (1999). Shame and guilt: a synthesis. Psychoanalytical Inquiry, 19, 388–406. Sandler, Joseph, and Sandler, Anne-Marie. (1987). Past unconscious, present unconscious, and the vicissitudes of guilt. International Journal Psychoanalysis, 68, 331–342. GUILT, UNCONSCIOUS SENSE OF The unconscious sense of guilt is an ego state resulting from conflict between the aims of the superego and those of the ego. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OF As a psychoanalytical term, according to Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (1973), the ‘‘unconscious sense of guilt’’ developed a more specific meaning over time than when it was first used simply to designate a feeling in the unconscious aroused by an act considered reprehensible. Its current definition implies an unconscious relationship between the ego and superego expressed in subjective phenomena from which, in extreme instances, any conscious perception of guilt is entirely absent. The term itself appeared for the first time in Sigmund FreudÕs article ‘‘Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices’’ (1907b). ‘‘We may say that the sufferer from compulsions and prohibitions behaves as if he were dominated by a sense of guilt, of which, however, he knows nothing, so that we must call it an unconscious sense of guilt, in spite of the apparent contradiction in terms’’ (p. 123). However, the basic idea had been adumbrated much earlier, in the second part of FreudÕs ‘‘The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence’’ (1894a). In accepting the hypothesis that the sense of guilt arises simultaneously with the gradual development of the superego, it is important to stress that they both imply a social dimension, and that the superego also owes its existence to external factors and represents the demands of society to the ego. In addition, the superego not only frustrates certain tendencies of the ego, but also can divert aggression at it. When it does so, it manifests as a repetitive sense of culpability and expiation. In addition, as Freud wrote in The Ego and the Id (1923b), ‘‘One may go further and venture the hypothesis that a great part of the sense of guilt must normally remain unconscious, because the origin of conscience is intimately connected with the Oedipus complex, which belongs to the unconscious’’ (p. 52). The sense of guilt appears to dominate instinctual life not only by acting to deny gratification, but also by leading to an increase in libido and thus the provocation of masochistic pleasure. Psychoanalysts see moral masochism as an expression of an unconscious sense of guilt. Unconscious guilt is one of the most powerful factors in the gratification of passive libidinal wishes. Narcissistic patients should be helped to acknowledge the unconscious self-criticism and guilt that underlie their hostile demands for love. They must come to see how they project their thoughts and attitudes in order to regain self-esteem. What is in fact a deficiency of the superego is largely manifested as self-destructive 717 GUILT, UNCONSCIOUS SENSE OF refusal to acknowledge guilt, thereby provoking an obvious disorder of ego functioning. Trying to help such patients become aware of their unconscious guilt reveals characteristic patterns. One often encounters solid resistance to acknowledging guilt or even accepting its existence, and frequently such patients use projection as a defense. An intense battle is waged with the aim of warding off unconscious guilt, of keeping it silent and hidden. Analysis of dreams may be useful achieving a degree of acceptance. Inasmuch as unconscious guilt acts as a form of ‘‘signal anxiety,’’ we might expect it to produce defenses against a subjectÕs wishes. This indeed turns out to be the case, and the inhibitions one observes are its clinical manifestations, seen by some as representing a ‘‘signal function’’ that announces the presence of guilt. But the most important characteristic of the unconscious sense of guilt is that it deploys defenses against passive libidinal wishes, in contrast to guilt caused by active and aggressive libidinal aims. The origin and nature of unconscious guilt, and the way in which it affects psychological development are both unresolved issues. Some psychoanalytical tendencies are distinguished by the treatment techniques they employ to deal with the sense of guilt. Some analysts focus interpretatively on the necessity to ‘‘liberate’’ the patient from guilt, which they consider pathological and to which the patient is seen as submitting out of masochism. Other analysts, in sharp contrast, believe that the denial of guilt is central to all neurotic conflict, and that guilt itself is due to aggressive fantasies against objects. This controversy arises from a conflation of two distinct ideas. Grinberg (1965), from a Kleinian perspective, has suggested distinguishing ‘‘persecutory guilt’’ from ‘‘depressive guilt.’’ This distinction permits a better understanding of the dynamic of the sense of guilt and thus fosters a broader understanding of the content and quality of object relations, as well as reactions to different stimuli and the normal or pathological process of mourning. 71 8 Persecutory guilt appears very early in life, and is associated with a weak and immature ego. It develops in parallel with the anxieties of the paranoid-schizoid position, or in the wake of some frustration or of a failure of depressive guilt. Despite its early appearance, persecutory guilt has an important influence upon subsequent psychological growth and plays an important role in the development both of inhibitions and masochistic attitudes and behaviors. Despair, resentment, fear, pain and self-reproach are the symptoms of persecutory guilt, as are a compulsion to repeat and a tendency to ‘‘act out.’’ Extreme cases occur with schizophrenia, melancholia and pathological mourning. To the extent that persecutory guilt diminishes, pain and suffering caused by object loss will increase, along with a more or less depressive manifestations. Concern for self and object, responsibility and, in the final analysis, the capacity for reparation will also increase. These feelings represent a form of depressive guilt which predominates in the normal process of mourning and in activities requiring sublimation. LÉON GRINBERG See also: Guilt, feeling of. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 41–61. ———. (1907b). Obsessive actions and religious practices. SE, 9: 115–127. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. Grinberg, León. (1965). Deux sortes de culpabilité: leurs relations avec les aspects du deuil normal et pathologique. Revue française psychanalyse, 29, 2–3. Laplanche, Jean, and Pontalis Jean-Bertrand. (1973). The language of psycho-analysis (Donald Nicholson-Smith, Trans.). W. W. Norton: New York. (Original work published 1971) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS H HALBERSTADT-FREUD, SOPHIE (1893–1920) The fifth child of Sigmund and Martha Freud, Sophie Halberstadt-Freud was born on April 12, 1893, in Vienna, and died on January 25, 1920, in Hamburg. Freud’s ‘‘Sunday’s child’’ was named after Sophie Schwalb, the niece of Samuel Hammerschlag, Freud’s Hebrew teacher. Admired by her father, and her mother’s favorite, Sophie only succeeded in getting out of the house by the sudden announcement of her engagement in 1912. On July 20, Freud wrote to his sister Mitzi, ‘‘His name is Max Halberstadt, he’s thirty years old, is a distant relative of our family from Hamburg. He’s very serious, inspires confidence, and both of them seem to be in love with one another. The terms are appropriate and bourgeois. No wealth, no distinction. Something we would not be pleased with in the case of Max Halberstadt.’’ Engaged on July 28, they were married on January 14, 1913, in Hamburg. Hoffer. After marrying Irene Chambers in 1945, he himself became a psychoanalyst and, under the name Ernst W. Freud, practiced in Germany, returned to Great Britain, and finally returned to Germany. On December 8, 1918, Heinz Rudolf, called ‘‘Heinele,’’ was born in Schwerin. Sophie Halberstadt-Freud died on January 25, 1920, from complications resulting from the Spanish flu that ravaged Europe. Freud wrote to Pastor Pfister on January 27: This afternoon we received the news that our sweet Sophie in Hamburg had been snatched away by influenzal pneumonia, snatched away in the midst of glowing health, from a full and active life as a competent mother and loving wife, all in four or five days, as though she had never existed. Although we had been worried about her for a couple of days, we had nevertheless been hopeful; it is so difficult to judge from a distance. And this distance must remain distance; we were not able to travel at once, as we had intended, after the first alarming news; there was no train, not even for an emergency. The undisguised brutality of our time is weighing heavily upon us. Tomorrow she is to be cremated, our poor Sunday child! . . . Sophie leaves two sons, one of six, the other thirteen months, and an inconsolable husband who will have to pay dearly for the happiness of these seven years. The happiness existed exclusively within them; outwardly there was war, conscription, wounds, the depletion of their resources, but they had remained courageous and gay. I work as much as I can, and am thankful for the diversion. The loss of a child seems to be a serious, narcissistic injury; what is known as mourning will probably follow only later. On March 11, 1914, Ernst Wolfgang was born. The child’s spool game fascinated Freud and provided the example of repetition in ‘‘Fort-da’’ (1920g, chap. 2). On September 22, 1914, Freud wrote to Karl Abraham, ‘‘My grandson is a charming little fellow, who manages to laugh so engagingly whenever one pays attention to him; he is a decent, civilized being, which is doubly valuable in these times of unleashed bestiality. A strict upbringing by an intelligent mother enlightened by Hug-Hellmuth has done him a great deal of good.’’ Later, ‘‘little Ernst’’ would be analyzed by his aunt Anna Freud (Roazen, 1933), who hesitated to adopt him but made him her legal heir. Emigrating to Great Britain in 1938 after having traveled to Palestine, Moscow, and South Africa, he was analyzed by Willy 719 H A L L , G R A N V I L L E S T A N L E Y (1844 –1 924) He wrote of this ‘‘irreparable narcissistic wound’’ in a letter to Sándor Ferenczi on February 4. On April 11, 1929, he consoled Ludwig Binswanger, who was suffering from a similar loss: ‘‘We know that the acute sorrow we feel after such a loss will run its course, but also that we will remain inconsolable, and will never find a substitute. No matter what may come to take its place, even should it fill that place completely, it remains something else. And that is how it should be. It is the only way of perpetuating a love that we do not want to abandon.’’ Early on, commentators claimed that this grief inspired the introduction of the death impulse in Freudian theory. In fact, the war of 1914–1918 and the thoughts it inspired in Freud were sufficient for this change in his thinking (see the discussion in ‘‘Why War,’’ 1933b), but the story continues to be repeated. By December 18, 1923, Freud had indicated to Fritz Wittels, who repeated this ‘‘interpretation’’ in his biography, that the book had been written in 1919, while his daughter was still ‘‘healthy and flourishing’’ (this claim has been discussed and contradicted for some time by Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, 1993). In September he gave the manuscript to several friends in Berlin to read, including Karl Abraham. Concluding, he added, ‘‘Likelihood is not always truth.’’ Similarly, it has for a long time been believed, wrongly, that the child with the spool was Sophie’s other son, Heinz Rudolf (Heinele), who had a tragic destiny. In 1922, taken in by his aunt Mathilde, he was, according to Freud (letter to Anna von Vest, November 14, 1922), ‘‘physically very fragile, truly a child of the war, but especially intelligent and endearing.’’ He died on June 19, 1923, from miliary tuberculosis. On October 15, 1926, Freud wrote to Ludwig Binswanger, ‘‘For me, that child took the place of all my children and other grandchildren, and since then, since Heinele’s death, I have no longer cared for my grandchildren, but find no enjoyment in life either. This is also the secret of my indifference—it has been called courage—towards the threat to my own life.’’ On March 11, 1928, he returned to the subject in a letter to Ernest Jones: ‘‘Sophie was a dear daughter, to be sure, but not a child. It was only three years later, in June 1923, when little Heinele died, that I became tired of life permanently. Quite remarkably, there is a correspondence between him and your little one. He too was of superior intelligence and unspeakable spiritual 72 0 grace, and he spoke repeatedly about dying soon. How do these children know?’’ ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Beyond the Pleasure Principle; BurlinghamTiffany, Dorothy; Fort-da; Hollitscher-Freud, Mathilde; Hietzing Schule/Burlingham-Rosenfeld. Bibliography Grubrich-Simitis, Ilse. (1993). Back to Freud’s texts: Making silent documents speak. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Roazen, Paul. (1993). Meeting Freud’s family. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press. Wittels, Fritz. (1923). Sigmund Freud, his personality, his teaching, his school. (E. and C. Paul, Trans.). London: Allen & Unwin. HALL, GRANVILLE STANLEY (1844–1924) Psychologist, educator, and philosopher Granville Stanley Hall was born in Ashfield, Massachusetts, on February 1, 1844, and died on April 24, 1924 in Worcester, Massachusetts. The son of Congregationalist farmers, he spent his adolescence in rebellion against the strict authority of his father, a model of moral and religious values. He attended Williams College and Union Theological Seminary before abandoning religion for the emergent discipline of psychology. During two trips to Europe, Hall familiarized himself with currents in philosophy, became conversant with the scientific trends in physiology and psychology, and studied with biologist and philosopher Ernst Haeckel. In 1878 at Harvard University he was awarded the first American doctorate in psychology by William James himself. In Leipzig during 1879–80, he also worked with Wilhelm Wundt, who was just then establishing the first laboratory of experimental psychology. There he participated in word association tests based on Francis Galton’s psychometric experiments, which Carl Jung would later modify to confirm Freud’s theory of neuroses in a laboratory setting. After returning to the United States, in 1880 Hall began his career as an educator and psychologist, devoting himself to a systematic study of child and adolescent development. He edited several journals, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS HALLUCINATORY, THE the most important of which was the American Journal of Psychology, which eventually became a forum both to disseminate his own ideas and to publish articles on psychoanalysis. He taught at Johns Hopkins from 1883, and his interest in the human sciences and in education led to his appointment as president of Clark University in 1888, where he was also professor of philosophy and psychology and launched more reviews, including the Journal of Applied Psychology. In 1892 he also served as president of the newly founded American Psychological Association. In 1909, Hall invited Freud to deliver the series of lectures that launched the psychoanalytic movement in the United States. The correspondence between the two men, from 1908 to 1923, includes some thirty-one letters. For Hall, Freudian theory was a boon to the hereditarian approach to studying children and adolescents. Like Freud, with whose works he had been familiar since 1894, Hall was inspired by Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, and he shared a lively interest in understanding sexuality. He was electrified by Freud’s lectures in Worcester, and believed that they reduced to ashes much of the flimsy theoretical structure upon which philosophically-based laboratory psychology of the time relied. However, in a letter to Freud four years later (September 26, 1913) Hall indicated areas of skepticism and disagreement with psychoanalytic theory. Rather prophetically, he suggested that one day ‘‘specific [hereditary] influences’’ would be discovered to operate on individuals. He was also critical of extravagant use of sexual symbolism. Subsequently, he made it clear that he regarded as significant the contributions of Alfred Adler, who had rejected castration anxiety as central to the fears and anxieties of childhood. Learning of Hall’s friendly relationship with Adler, Freud wrote that he was sharply stung by what he viewed as a serious defection. However, Hall continued to support psychoanalysts in the American Psychopathological Association, and from 1917 to 1920 he served as president of the American Psychoanalytic Association. Several years later, responding to Freud’s admonition that Adler’s ideas were incompatible with psychoanalysis, Hall defended his eclecticism, suggesting that Freud should be more generous toward rebellious children of psychoanalysis like Adler and Jung. Hall’s autobiography, published in 1923, indicates that he tried self-analysis and underwent some INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS psychoanalysis; he was apparently disappointed with the results but did not disclose them. In general, while exasperated by religious and moral restrictions upon happiness and artistic creation, Hall hoped to protect the essential virtues of the ideology that he fought—the cult of work and the intricacies of moral conscience. The influence of psychoanalysis is perceptible in his 1904 two-volume work on adolescence and in his life of Jesus Christ, published in 1917. Hall died from pneumonia at eighty years of age. He is generally considered, with William James, to be one of the founders of psychology as a scientific discipline in the United States. FLORIAN HOUSSIER See also: Clark University; Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis; North America; Ontogenesis; Psychology and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Esman, Aaron H. (1993). G. Stanley Hall and the invention of the adolescence. Adolescent Psychiatry, 19, 6–20. Hale, Nathan G. Jr. (1971). Freud and the Americans: The beginnings of psychoanalysis in the United States. New York: Oxford University Press. Hall, G. Stanley. (1923). Life and confessions of a psychologist. New York: Appleton. ———. (1904). Adolescence: Its psychology and its relations to physiology, anthropology, sociology, sex, crime, religion and education. New York: Appleton. ———. (1917). Jesus, the Christ, in the light of psychology. Garden City, New York: Doubleday. Houssier, Florian. (2003). G. S. Hall (1844–1924): un pionnier dans la découverte de l’adolescence. Ses liens avec les premiers pschanalystes de l’adolescent. Psychiatrie de l’enfant, 46, 655–668. Rosenzweig, Saul. (1992). Freud, Jung, and Hall the kingmaker: The historic expedition to America (1909). St. Louis: Rana House. HALLUCINATORY, THE The basis for the transformational dynamics of representation-perception-hallucination, the hallucinatory register is a constant process of mental life, representing the instinctual impulse insofar as it is ‘‘pressure’’ (Drang) and movement (Treiberegung). 721 HALLUCINOSIS In noun form and detached from any psychiatric connotations, the term hallucinatory was introduced as a metapsychological notion in 1990 by César Botella and Sára Botella, in an attempt to broaden an analytic theory that was overly focused on the notion of representation, and that therefore could not explain certain analytic structures or why certain analytic treatments were doomed to failure. Freud used the expression ‘‘hallucinatory satisfaction of need’’ throughout his writings, and he considered the hallucinatory a basic assumption governing mental life. However, he never really developed the idea. The same was true of the post-Freudians. In ‘‘Le développement du sens de réalité et ses stades’’ (Stages in the development of the sense of reality; 1913), Sándor Ferenczi described a ‘‘hallucinatory stage’’ but did not explore it in depth. Wilfred Bion took an interest in the topic, but his notion of hallucinosis remained close to that of pathological hallucination. Jacques Lacan, in Das Ding (1959), hinted at a ‘‘fundamental hallucination,’’ but he did not develop this idea either. André Green, in The Fabric of Affect in the Psychoanalytic Discourse (1973/1999) was indisputably the first to posit a hallucinatory formation, as a ‘‘negative hallucination’’ (the representation of the absence of a representation; this is a reverse configuration, whose opposite is hallucinatory realization). According to Green, hallucination was fundamental to the structure of the psyche. In ‘‘L’hystérie, unité et diversité’’ (Hysteria, unity and diversity; 1985), Augustin Jeanneau conceptualized a ‘‘hallucinatory position’’ with the value of a mental function. The hallucinatory represents the instinctual impulse in the same way that affect represents qualitatively the quantity of the instinct, and the idea represents the instinct’s contents. It involves a process that is inseparable from the regressive pathway that opens up in dreams but that must be inhibited during the working hours in favor of ideation and perception. This notion is indispensable to psychoanalytic practice. At certain times during the session, under the influence of a formal regression of thought, ‘‘accidents of thought’’ or a quasi-hallucinatory ‘‘work of representability’’ can unexpectedly occur in the analyst without his or her conscious awareness; this may be 72 2 the only way to gain access to the meaning of the patient’s unrepresentable material. CÉSAR BOTELLA AND SÁRA BOTELLA See also: Absence; Action-(re)presentation; Amentia; Experience of satisfaction; Fantasy; Idea/representation; ‘‘Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams’’; Negative hallucination; Negative, work of; Pleasure/unpleasure principle; Primary need; Reality principle; Reality testing; Representability; Subject’s desire; Wish-fulfillment; Wish, hallucinatory satisfaction of a; Word-presentation. Bibliography Botella, César, and Botella, Sára. (1990). La problématique de la régression formelle de la pensée et de l’hallucinatoire. In La psychanalyse: Questions pour demain, colloque de la S.P.P. Unesco, Paris: Presses universitaires de France. ———. (1992). Névrose traumatique et cohérence psychique. Revue française de psychosomatique, 2. ———. (2001). La figurabilité psychique. Lausanne and Paris: Delachaux & Niestlé. Green, André. (1999). The fabric of affect in the psychoanalytic discourse (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). London: Routledge. (Original work published 1973) Jeanneau, Augustin. (1985). L’hystérie, unité et diversité. Revue française de psychanalyse, 49 (1), 258–283. HALLUCINOSIS ‘‘Hallucinosis’’ is a term coined by Wilfred Bion in ‘‘Transformations’’ (1965) to denote the mental state of the psychotic part of the personality. Psychotic panic is the experience, the O, which impels the personality to hallucinosis. Psychotic panic arises from a primitive disaster between infant and mother in which the infant’s emotional contents fail to find a container, that is to say, a mother with reverie. Undue envy and greed in the infant are significant factors in this disaster. In an effort to escape overwhelming anxiety, the infant evacuates ego functions capable of the experience of psychotic panic, along with other related contents, including space, time and meaning. Such events are in stark contrast to the normal situation where alpha-function creates a container for violent emotions. In transformations in hallucinosis there is a failure of realistic projective identification; instead there is an INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS HAMLET explosive projection in an unrestricted mental space. In a metaphor that has become well-known, Bion compares the emotional experience of psychotic space to surgical shock, in which the dilation of capillaries so increases the space in which blood circulates that the patient is at risk of bleeding to death in his own tissues. In the mental space of hallucinosis, words and images float without limits, either as debris, or, in an attempt at synthesis, as conglomerates which are bizarre objects. Such beta-elements and bizarre objects indicate a place where the object should be, but, as the container is destroyed, is not. This place feels very threatening. In transformations in hallucinosis, sense organs, instead of being used for perception, become channels for the evacuation of unwanted mental products; the musculature is also used in this way in the form of acting out. Words, too, become vehicles of evacuation rather than conveyers of meaning. Manifest hallucinations may be visual, auditory, tactile, and olfactory. If the sensorial component has been violently fragmented or pulverized during its expulsion, the hallucinations of the psychotic patient will be evanescent or even what Bion calls ‘‘invisible.’’ Transformations in hallucinosis should be contrasted with transformations in thought. This contrast is of clinical importance. In the area of thought, frustration and the absence of the object facilitate the construction of symbols. In hallucinosis there are no symbols, only representations of concrete things for the psychotic part of the personality. A sentence uttered by a psychotic patient, though it may have the same words as a sentence uttered by a neurotic patient, has a different significance. As Leon Grinberg and others remark in their overall exposition, ‘‘. . . words like yesterday, later, or some years ago may not be representations but residues of destructive dispersing attacks on time.’’ (1993, p. 94). The psychotic patient believes that his method of transformation in hallucinosis is superior to transformations in thought in that his universe provides him with freedom from reality—its restrictions, its pains—especially of frustration and absence of the object, and its threats of panic and annihilation. In analysis, hallucinosis is viewed as especially superior to the transformations in thought offered by the analyst. EDNA O’SHAUGHNESSY INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND OEDIPUS See also: Bizarre object; Hallucinatory, the; Psychotic panic; Psychotic part of the personality; Transformations. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred. (1965). Transformations: Change from learning to growth. London, Heinemann. Grinberg, Leon; Sor, Dario; and Tabak de Bianchedi, Elizabeth. (1993). New introduction to the work of Bion. Northvale, NJ; London: Jason Aronson. HAMLET AND OEDIPUS An original work of applied psychoanalysis, Hamlet and Oedipus was initially published in 1910 as an article in the American Journal of Psychology with the title ‘‘The Oedipus Complex as an Explanation of the ÔMystery of Hamlet.’’’ It was translated into German in 1911 in a brochure in the series Schriften zur angewandten Seelekunde as ‘‘Das Problem des Hamlet und der Oedipus Komplex.’’ In 1923 it appeared as the first chapter of Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis (Hogarth Press, London, 1964) as ‘‘A Psychoanalytic Study of Hamlet.’’ In its current form the work appeared in 1949 as Hamlet and Oedipus, together with an essay on the interpretation of Hamlet, an article on ‘‘The Death of Hamlet’s Father’’ signed by Jones, and an article by Ella Freeman Sharpe, ‘‘The Impatience of Hamlet,’’ which had previously appeared in 1929 in the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis. There are eight chapters in the book, which is an attempt to spread Sigmund Freud’s ideas and improve the recognition of psychoanalysis as a science. With respect to Freud, aside from the theme of parricide, the author also discussed matricide, and the homosexual and homicidal nature of the son’s aggression toward the father. Sharpe’s essay continues Jones’s work through reference to libidinal development, regression, and pregenital attachment, and shows how the difficult confrontation with the oedipal conflict results in procrastination and its transformation into blind action and violence. FRANÇOIS SACCO See also: Applied psychoanalysis and the interaction of psychoanalysis; Jones, Ernest; Eissler, Kurt Robert; Literary and artistic creation; Parricide; Phantom; Ornicar?; Shakespeare and psychoanalysis. 723 HAMPSTEAD CLINIC Source Citation Jones, Ernest. (1949). Hamlet and Oedipus. London: Hogarth Press. HAMPSTEAD CLINIC Founded in London in 1951 by Anna Freud together with Helen Ross and Dorothy Burlingham, the Hampstead Clinic set out to provide therapy and assistance to families, to treat disturbed and handicapped children irrespective of their problems, social background or past history, and at the same time to offer aspiring analysts the most balanced and rich training possible. Anna Freud saw the Clinic as an opportunity to apply the particular psychoanalytic knowledge she had acquired in the area of child guidance. Located at 31 Maresfield Gardens in Hampstead, London, the clinic began full operation only in 1952. It had many philanthropical supporters, notably the Field Foundation of Illinois, the Foundation for Research in Psychiatry, and the Yale Study Center. The establishment comprised six consulting rooms, a playroom, offices, a library, and a classroom for use in the training of therapists. In addition to the treatment of children, simultaneous mother-and-child therapy was practiced under the supervision of Dorothy Burlingham. Burlingham also promoted the creation of an index that would record data gathered during child analysis, enter it on cards, and organize it thematically in close correlation with the analytic context and with what children revealed therein. Unconscious contents, anxieties, defenses, character traits, object-relationships, and manifestations of the transference were some of the themes serving as index headings. This classification system had its origins in the methods developed by Burlingham and Anna Freud when they directed the Jackson Nursery in Vienna and later the Hampstead War Nurseries in London. For her part, Anna Freud perfected a diagnostic tool that later came to be known as the ‘‘diagnostic profile.’’ This approach used a psychological questionnaire intended to generate diagnoses on the basis of information garnered from interviews with children and their families. The goal was to increase the reliability of child analysis while making it easier for analysts to take effective therapeutic action much earlier than had hitherto been possible. 72 4 The Hampstead Clinic soon achieved a fame that allowed its founders to undertake several pathbreaking experiments. In 1954, Burlingham started the analysis of a blind child, and this marked the beginning of a long collaboration between the clinic and the Royal National Institute of the Blind. She soon opened a nursery school for blind children in a house conceived by Ernst Freud and built in the garden of the main building. Later on, a Well Baby Clinic was set up in order to help mothers respond to the physical and emotional needs of their babies, and the observation of normal children became possible thanks to the institution of a kindergarten. DELPHINE SCHILTON See also: Burlingham-Tiffany, Dorothy; Childhood; Freud, Anna; Great Britain; Hietzing Schule/BurlinghamRosenfeld; Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, The. HANDLING Handling is the way a mother manages the moment to moment physical care of her infant such that the baby gets to know his own body. It necessarily involves the mother and infant going on in a psychosomatic partnership; as if they formed one unit (Winnicott, 1962). Donald Woods Winnicott presented his ideas of infant care and its relation to psychological development to the lay public in a series of radio broadcasts and child care journals (Winnicott, 1947). He gave detailed descriptions of what happens between the mutually adapted mother and infant, for example with breastfeeding or when a mother picks up her baby. In this paper Winnicott made his famous statement, ‘‘there is no such thing as a baby. . . . A baby cannot exist alone, but is essentially part of a relationship’’ (p. 88). The description of the mother’s handling of her baby grew out of Winnicott’s detailed observations of mother-infant interactions in his work as a pediatrician and later his psychoanalytic work with both child and adult patients. Mutually attuned and sensitive physical care of the baby gives the baby a sense of his own body: ‘‘an indwelling of the psyche in the soma’’ (1970). The mother approaches her baby and picks him up as if there is a person within the body she approaches. This concept is adapted to the quality of care enacted in psychoanalytic treatment. The mother INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS H A P P E L , C L A R A (1889 –1 945) adapts herself to what the baby can understand, and to what the baby needs. Thus, Winnicott insisted that the mothering of one’s own baby is a personal job, that no one else could do as well. The mother’s handling of her own baby is so sensitive as to be unique. The baby has no experience of being a baby, so it is dependent upon the mother’s capacity to adapt to his needs in order to develop the experience of mutuality. The ‘‘good-enough mother’’ manages the baby’s body and its needs in such a way that he comes to know his body—that there is an inside and an outside, a body schema integrated with his personal psychic reality, that is: ‘‘personalization.’’ PAUL CAMPBELL See also: Breastfeeding; Good-enough mother; Holding; Integration; Maternal; Maternal care; Neutrality/benevolent neutrality; Object. Bibliography Winnicott, Donald. (1964) Further thoughts on babies as persons. In his The child, the family, and the outside world (pp. 85–92). Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books. (Original work published 1947) ———. (1965) Ego integration in child development. In his The maturational processes and the facilitating environment (pp. 56–63). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1962) ———. (1970) The mother-infant experience of mutuality. In E. Anthony and T. Bender (Eds.), Parenthood: Its Psychology and Psychopathology. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. ———. (1989) On the basis for self in body. In C. Winnicott, R. Shepherd, and M. Davis (Eds.), Psychoanalytic explorations. London: Karnac. (Original work published 1971) HAPPEL, CLARA (1889–1945) Clara Happel, a German psychoanalyst, was born on October 1, 1889, in Berlin. She committed suicide on September 16, 1945, in Detroit. While studying medicine, Happel showed an early interest in psychoanalysis, and after settling in Frankfurt in 1921, she began analysis with Hanns Sachs. The same year Max Eitingon facilitated her admission to the Berlin Psychoanalytic Society. She INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS attended the Eighth International Congress in Salzburg in 1924, where Olga Székely-Kovacs drew her caricature. In 1925 in Berlin, Happel lectured on male homosexuality. When the Berlin Psychoanalytic Society became the Deutsche psychoanalytische Gesellschaft (German Psychoanalytic Society) in 1926, Happel, with Karl Landauer, was appointed to head the Frankfurt branch. With Landauer, she participated in the foundation of the Southwest German Psychoanalytic Working Group, which operated from 1929 to 1933 and from which would emerge the Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute. In 1931 Happel moved to Hamburg, where with August Waterman she established a study group. After Hitler came to power, Happel, a Jew, firmly advocated that Jewish members of the Deutsche psychoanalytische Gesellschaft resign in protest. Her motion was rejected at a meeting on November 18, 1933. This episode earned her the enmity of Ernest Jones, who perceived it as at odds with his efforts to mediate the situation and save psychoanalysis in Germany. As late as 1936 he was reluctant to allow her to join after her resignation in protest two years earlier. Anna Freud, however, opposed this restriction. In January 1936, divorced from her husband (probably because he was not a Jew), Happel left Germany with her two children, emigrating first to Palestine and then to the United States, where she was welcomed by Sándor Radó. Within a year she was certified as training analyst. She joined the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society in 1938 but settled in Detroit, one of the developing outposts. In 1940, with Editha and Richard Sterba and Leo H. Bartemeier, Happel helped establish the Detroit Psychoanalytic Society and its training program, in which she taught, supervised, and lectured. Happel remained close to fellow émigré analysts, welcoming them as she had been embraced when she arrived in the United States. At the beginning of World War II, she was affected by legal sanctions targeting ‘‘aliens’’ in the United States when a psychotic patient denounced her. She was arrested on the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor and detained for six weeks. Her correspondence with her children, who were then attending school in New York, reveals a life that was lonely, difficult, and sad. 725 HARD SCIENCE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Happel opened a practice in New York, which enabled her to spend more time with her married son. Yet despite this success, she became depressed, and her condition worsened at the end of World War II with revelations about the Nazi death camps and the use of atomic weapons on Japan. In addition, she found it difficult to adjust to life in a country where she was denied citizenship and not recognized as a medical doctor. She recalled Stefan Zweig’s suicide several years earlier and ended her own life in September 1945. By the time he was thirty, Freud was a brilliant researcher in the field of natural science, well-versed in neuro-anatomy and neuro-physiology, in addition to having done some work in chemistry. At the laboratory of Brücke (1876–1882) he acquired an expertise in chemistry and physics, including thermodynamics (Helmholtz). As to epistemology, Freud, besides his familiarity with the German positivist school and the debates it carried on with Vienna (Brentano, Manch, Bolzmann), attended, for two years, Brentano’s seminar on Aristotle. Happel’s published work includes a paper on substitute formation in masturbation and observations on a case of pederasty. Yet she is better remembered for her training and teaching activities in Germany and United States. In his writing, Freud refers little to the hard sciences as such. He uses the German system of classification: sciences of nature and of mind, situating psychoanalysis among the former, while insisting that it is relevant to ‘‘almost all the sciences of the mind’’ (1924f). There was one exception: ‘‘Strictly speaking, there are only two sciences: psychology, pure and applied, and natural science’’ (1933a, p. 179). Freud was frankly ironic about official sciences, assuming, moreover, the following position: ‘‘Scientific thinking does not differ in its nature from the normal activity of thought, which all of us, believers and unbelievers, employ in looking after our affairs in ordinary life’’ (1933a, p. 170). ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Sterba, Richard F.; Sterba-Radanowicz-Hartmann, Editha. Bibliography Eickhoff, Friedrich-Wilhelm. (1995). The formation of the German Psychoanalytical Association (DPV): Regaining the psychoanalytical orientation lost in the Third Reich. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 76, 945–956. Friedrich, Volker. (1988). Letters of an emigrant: The psychoanalyst Clara Happel to her son Peter, 1936–1945. Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse, 1, 323–348. Happel, Clara. (1923). Onanieersatzbildungen. Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, 9, 206–209. ———. (1927). Der Mann in der Kloake. Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik, 2, 86–89. ———. (1926). Communication: Notes on an analysis of a case of paederasty. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 7, 229–236. Steiner, Riccardo. (1989). It is a new kind of Diaspora. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 16, 35–72. HARD SCIENCE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS ‘‘Hard sciences’’ are those disposing of a theory of measurement. The development of qualitative mathematics, since the middle of the 19th century, and its diverse applications have made this description questionable. 72 6 The relationship between chemistry and psychoanalysis was formed early on—the former lent some of its prestige to the latter, signifying that the scientific method was common to both of them Freud, and Freud hoped that chemistry would isolate the toxins linked to sexuality and neuroses. The contribution of thermodynamics to his dynamic and economic point of view was evident also; his use of the terms ‘‘free energy’’ and ‘‘bound energy’’ makes this clear. Considerations of stability, carried over from Fechner, equally played a part. At a time when psychoanalysis was still unsure of its foundation, Freud defended the theory of the drives by noting that physics also was unsure of its foundations. Accordingly, he placed the discoveries of Copernicus and Darwin, and his own, on the same plane, for having dealt blows to human narcissism and religious convictions. Finally, a nostalgia for energetics surfaced when he evoked the ‘‘quantitative factor,’’ decisive for symptomatology, yet unattainable. ‘‘Analysts . . . cannot repudiate their descent from exact science and their community with its representatives. . . . Instead of waiting for the moment when they will be able to escape from the constraint of the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS H A R T M A N N , H E I N Z (1894 –1 970) familiar laws of physics and chemistry, they hope for the emergence of more extensive and deeper-reaching natural laws, to which they are ready to submit’’ (1941d [1921], p. 178–79). Qualitative dynamics, which reinterprets thermodynamics, may prove to be a part of this hoped-for emergence. MICHÈLE PORTE See also: Science and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1924f). A short account of psychoanalysis. SE, 19: 189–209. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. ———. (1941d [1921]. Psycho-analysis and telepathy. SE, 18: 173–193. Lacan, Jacques. (2002). Écrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton. Further Reading Bucci, Wilma. (1997). Psychoanalysis and cognitive science. A multiple code theory. New York: Guilford Press. Holt, Robert. (1997). Psychoanalysis and the philosophy of science. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. Shevrin, Howard. (1995). Psychoanalysis: one science, two sciences, or no science?. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 43, 963–985. Strenger, Carlo. (1991). Between hermenutics and science. An essay on the epistemology of psychoanalysis. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. HARTMANN, HEINZ (1894–1970) Physician and psychoanalyst Heinz Hartmann was born in Vienna on November 4, 1894, and died in Stony Point, NY, on May 17, 1970. Hartmann’s family had been distinguished for several generations. One grandfather, Moritz Hartmann, was a well-known poet, essayist, professor, and member of parliament; the other grandfather, Rudolf Chrobak, was an eminent physician and professor. Hartmann’s father, Ludo Hartmann, was a professor of history and founder of public libraries and adult education; his mother, Grete Chrobak, was a successful sculptor and pianist. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Tutors educated Hartmann until age thirteen; he continued in public schools and at the University of Vienna, where he attended lectures in many fields, earned his medical degree, and became a psychiatrist and faculty member in Wagner-Jauregg’s clinic. He published two papers on quinine metabolism during medical school, and then published several papers on psychiatry with Paul Schilder. Becoming interested in Freud, he published, with S. Betlheim, what became a minor classic paper in experimental psychoanalysis, ‘‘On Parapraxes in Korsakov Psychosis,’’ demonstrating by experiment the validity of some of Freud’s concepts of symbolization. When Karl Abraham, with whom Hartmann had arranged to have a training analysis in Berlin, unexpectedly died, Hartmann had his first analysis with Sándor Rado; and while in Berlin wrote Die Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse (The foundations of psychoanalysis; 1927). Before 1937, he published about two dozen papers, including twin studies and studies of psychoses, neuroses, values, and cocaine; and he contributed to a major handbook on medical psychology. When Adolf Meyer offered Hartmann a full professorship at Johns Hopkins, Freud offered to analyze Hartmann free of charge if he would stay in Vienna. Hartmann was analyzed by Freud, and became a key member of his generation of Freud’s followers at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (a group including Helene and Felix Deutsche, Edward Bibring, Ernst Kris, Robert Waelder, Willy Hoffers, Hans Lampl, and Anna Freud), and co-editor of The International of Journal of Psychoanalysis. He married Dora Karplus, a pediatrician who later became a child and adult psychoanalyst. They had two sons, Ernest Hartmann and Lawrence Hartmann; one became a psychoanalyst and sleep and dream researcher, the other a child and adult psychiatrist, educator, and President of the American Psychiatric Association. In 1937, Hartmann read to the Vienna Society a paper on ego psychology that developed into a book, Ich-Psychologie und Anpassungsproblem (1939) (later published in English as Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation; 1958). Along with Anna Freud’s The Ego and Mechanisms of Defense, that work was a decisive landmark in extending psychoanalysis into the ego-psychological areas that would be central for the next several decades. In 1938, after the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany, the Hartmanns moved to Paris, then to Switzerland, and in 1941 to New York. 727 HATRED There Hartmann became a leader of the New York Psychoanalytic Society and Institute, which was energized by many illustrious immigrants. He served for many years as a training analyst and as the first director of the Institute clinic. His old close friendship with Ernst Kris developed into many years of extraordinary collaboration, and they soon invited Rudolph Loewenstein to join them. Meeting once a year for many years, the three jointly wrote a series of major papers. With Kris and, in London, Anna Freud, Hartmann founded an annual, The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, in 1945; he helped to establish and maintain it as one of the key publications in psychoanalysis for several decades. President of the International Psychoanalytic association in the 1950s, he was then elected their Honorary President for Life, and served as something of a dean of world psychoanalysis in the midtwentieth century. Hartmann was considered a major clinical analyst, teacher, theoretician, and metapsychologist, building on and extending Freud’s ideas and findings. He was frequently an integrator. A pillar of that era’s psychoanalytic establishment but not a cloistered thinker, he welcomed biopsychosocial thinking, contributions from general biology, neurobiology, and medicine; and also psychology, developmental theory, history, philosophy, anthropology, sociology, ethology, mythology, and art. He saw psychoanalysis as central to a general psychology. Hartmann is best known for his work on ego psychology and adaptation, elaboration of conflict and drive theory, neutralization of aggression, and the conflict-free ego sphere, which serve as structures for much clinical and research work. Familiar analytic concepts such as structural and developmental theory, drive, and conflict were, by Hartmann’s time, securely enough established to allow powerful additions, such as contributions from biology and interactions with average expectable (and other) environments, and such as ego functions and adaptation. His success in including mind-brain interactions, as well as centrally defining structures of mind-mind and mind-environment interactions, established some lasting solid ground, and also helped prepare the field for some subsequent analytic schools, notably object relations theory, self psychology, and continuing psychoanalytic attempts at biopsychosocial integration. LAWRENCE HARTMANN 72 8 Work discussed: Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation. Notions developed: Ego autonomy; Ego, damage inflicted on the; Ego functions; Self. See also: Adaptation; Alteration of the ego; Defense mechanisms; Desexualization; Ego; Ego (ego psychology); Ego libido/object libido; Ego psychology; France; Identification; Kris, Ernst; Lehrinstitut der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung; Loewenstein, Rudolf M.; Neutrality/benevolent neutrality; New York Psychoanalytic Institute; Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, The; Self psychology; Self-representation; Société psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris; Stage (or phase); Structural theories; United States; Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung. Bibliography Hartmann, Heinz. (1927). Die Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse. Leipzig: G. Thieme. ———. (1939). Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation. New York, International Universities Press, 1958, 122 p. ———. (1944). The psychiatric work of Paul Schilder. Psychoanalytic Review, 31, (1), p. 296. ———. (1950). Comments on the psychoanalytic theory of the ego. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 7, 9–30. ———. (1956), The ego concept in Freud’s work. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 37, 433. (1964). Essays on ego psychology. New York, International Universities Press. (Original work published 1939) Hartmann, Heinz; Kris, Ernst; and Loewenstein, Rudolf M. (1946). Comments on the formation of psychic structure.Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 2, p. 11–38. ———. (1964). Papers on psychoanalytic psychology, New York: International Universities Press. Hartmann, Lawrence. (1994). Heinz Hartmann: A memorial tribute and filial memoir. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 49, 3–11. HATRED In day-to-day use, hatred is a violent feeling that impels the subject to wish another person ill and to take pleasure in bad things that happen to that person. In ‘‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes’’ (1915c), Sigmund Freud wrote that the primal structure of hatred reflects the relationship to the external world INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS H E I M A N N , P A U L A (1899 –1 982) that is the source of stimuli: ‘‘At the very beginning, it seems, the external world, objects, and what is hated are identical’’ (p. 136). The determining factor is thus the relationship to unpleasure. Freud thus asserted that ‘‘Hate, as a relation to objects, is older than love’’ (p. 139), for this feeling originates in the ego’s selfpreservation instincts rather than in the sexual instincts (although later on hatred can bind with the latter to become ‘‘sadism’’). It can be inferred from this that ‘‘hatred is a kind of self-preservation, to the extent of destroying the other, while loving is a way . . . of making the other exist,’’ as Paul-Laurent Assoun expressed it in Portrait métapsychologique de la haine: Du symptôme au lien social (Metapsychological portrait of hatred: from symptom to the social bond; 1995). This emotion that aims to destroy thus seems to be radically opposite to love. But as Roger Dorey underscored in ‘‘L’amour au travers de la haine’’ (Love through hatred; 1986), there are deep affinities between the two: Not only does hatred precede love, but no doubt there is love only because there is hatred, at the very origin of the person’’ Indeed, in both ‘‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes’’ and ‘‘Negation’’ (1925h) Freud showed that hatred is not exclusively destructive toward the object: Acting as the first differentiating boundary between inside and outside, it ensures the permanence of that boundary and is its constituting principle. Speaking of the purified pleasure-ego, which places the characteristic of pleasure above all others, Freud wrote in ‘‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes’’ that love ‘‘is originally narcissistic, then passes over on to objects, which have been incorporated into the extended ego, and expresses the motor efforts of the ego towards these objects as sources of pleasure’’ (p. 138). But prior to the establishment of genital organization, in which love has ‘‘become the opposite of hate’’ (p. 139), the two earliest stages make no distinction between them. The oral stage involves incorporating and devouring the object; in the anal-sadistic stage, ‘‘the striving toward the object appears in the form of an urge for mastery, in which injury or annihilation of the object is a matter of indifference’’ (p. 139). It must be recalled that hatred always expresses the ego’s selfpreservation instincts and that both the will to power and the urge for mastery originate in hatred; before the genital stage, self-preservation of the ego is precisely what is endangered by the encounter with the object. The love/hate distinction that forms in the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS genital stage allows them to be linked together, bringing whole persons into being. If hatred is experienced as the unpleasure derived from the encounter with the ‘‘other’’ that threatens the ego’s integrity, the manner of being of this ‘‘other’’ must be reintroduced. With notions involving the determining role, for the baby, of the object, with its expected function as ‘‘container’’ of excitations, ‘‘toilet breast,’’ or alpha function, Donald Winnicott, Donald Meltzer, and Wilfred Bion, among others, have shed new light on the treatment of hatred. NICOLE JEAMMET See also: Aggressiveness/aggression; Aimée, case of; Ambivalence; Breast, good/bad object; Dead mother complex; Drive/instinct; Ego and the Id, The; Emotion; Erotomania; Frustration; ‘‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’’; Love-Hate-Knowledge (L/H/K links); Melancholia; Need for punishment; Negative therapeutic reaction; Negative transference; Object; Object, choice of/change of; Obsessional neurosis; Paranoia; Paranoid position; Persecution; Primary object; Projection; Racism, antiSemitism, and psychoanalysis; Reversal into the opposite; Rivalry; Self-hatred; Self-mutilation in children; Shame; Splitting of the object; Superego; Transference hatred; Turning around; ‘‘Why War?’’. Bibliography Assoun, Paul-Laurent. (1995). Portrait métapsychologique de la haine: Du symptôme au lien social. Paris: Anthropos. Dorey, Roger. (1986). L’amour au travers de la haine. Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse, 33, 75–94. Freud, Sigmund. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109–140. ———. (1925h). Negation. SE, 19: 233–239. Jeammet, Nicole. (1989). La Haine nécessaire. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. HEIMANN, PAULA (1899–1982) Paula Heimann, British physician, psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst, was born Paula Glatzko on February 3, 1899, in Danzig, Germany, and died October 22, 1982, in London. Heimann grew up in Danzig. She attended the High School for Girls and studied Medicine in Koenigsberg, 729 H E L D , R E N É (1897 –1 992) Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, and Breslau. She passed the ‘‘Staatsexamen’’ in 1925. After attaining her MD, Heimann studied at the Psychiatric University Clinic in Heidelberg, and the Charité in Berlin. She received psychoanalytic training at the Berlin Psycho-Analytic Institute (1928–1932). Her training analyst was Theodor Reik. Other teachers included Otto Fenichel, Hanns Sachs, Franz Alexander, Karen Horney and Sándor Rado. She emigrated to London in 1933, and that year became an associate member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society. Heimann became a full member in 1939, a control supervisor in 1940, and a training analyst in 1944. In 1938, she received her British medical qualification from Edinburgh. She became a Fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists in 1971. In 1924, Heimann married Franz-Anton Heimann; they had one daughter and divorced in 1933. In London Heimann became a close collaborator of Melanie Klein and in 1935 went into further analysis with her. The termination date is not known. In 1955 she left the Kleinian Group of Analysts of the British Psycho-Analytical Society. after years of increasing alienation on both sides, and she became an active member of the Independent Group of Psycho-Analysts. In 1949 she was elected a member of the Training Committee of the British PsychoAnalytical Society, becoming its training secretary in 1954. She was an esteemed teacher and a sought-after training analyst and supervisor, at first for students of the Kleinian Group and later for those of the Independent Group. After the war she helped to train German analysts and went regularly on weekends to the Psychosomatic Clinic in Heidelberg and later to the Sigmund Freud Institute in Frankfurt am Main. Psychoanalytic institutes in France, Germany, Italy, North and South America invited her to give papers and hold seminars. Paula Heimann wrote thirty papers. Her earlier contributions are of a Kleinian theoretical orientation, and two of them are contributions to the Controversial Discussions (1942–1944) of the British PsychoAnalytical Society. Her later papers mainly discuss various clinical problems and questions of technique, in particular those of transference, counter-transference, the psychoanalytic setting and different aspects of formulating and making interpretations. 73 0 She read her paper on ‘‘Counter-Transference’’ (1950) at the 16th International Congress of PsychoAnalysis in 1949, in which she conceived of the phenomenon as an important tool for the understanding of patients’ communications. The paper was influential for many other authors during the 1950s and 1960s. She never wrote a comprehensive critique of Kleinian theory and technique but it is often implicit in her later papers (1955–1982). She discussed the concept of sublimation and the concept of the death instinct in their clinical relevance in early papers (1942, 1952) from a Kleinian viewpoint, but presented a revision of them in later papers (1959, 1964). Her published contributions to discussions of papers read at International Congress of Psycho-Analysis (1962, 1964, 1966, 1970) are clear critical evaluations of the main papers presented. MARGRET TONNESMANN See also: Change; Controversial Discussions; Countertransference; Dependence; Empathy; Great Britain; Paranoid position. Bibliography Heimann, Paula. (1950). On counter-transference. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 31, 81–84. ———. (1952). Certain functions of introjection and projection in early infancy. In Klein, Heimann, Isaacs, and Riviere (Eds.) Developments in Psycho-Analysis (p. 122– 168). London, Hogarth. ———. (1962). Contribution to the discussion of ‘‘The curative factors in psycho-analysis’’. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis,43, p. 228–231. ———. (1989). About children and children-no-longer. Collected papers of Paula Heimann 1942–1980. M. Tonnesmann, London/New York: Tavistock Publications/Routledge. King, Pearl H.M., and Steiner, Riccardo. (1991). The FreudKlein controversies 1941–1945. London/New York: Tavistock Publications/Routledge. HELD, RENÉ (1897–1992) René Held, a French psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, was born October 7, 1897, in Paris, where he died on February 18, 1992. He was the second son of a family that had emigrated from Russia after a short stay in Germany. His father was unable to obtain an equivalency diploma for his medical degree and held a series INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS H E L D , R E N É (1897 –1 992) of relatively minor positions with pharmaceutical companies. Consequently, Held was forced to go to considerable efforts to become fully integrated in French society. A man with curious mind, cultivated and sharp witted, Held was not immediately attracted to psychoanalysis. He was initially interested in psychiatry, which he had discovered during his medical studies at the Salpêtrière and then at Val-de-Grace during the First World War. It was here that he met André Breton and Louis Aragon. His was an inquisitive mind, and it was difficult for Held to settle into a sedentary and unchanging activity. The uncertainties of life led him to dabble in Russian revolutionary activities while he was an assistant surgeon in Kiev in 1917 (which earned him the Croix de Guerre in 1918). Through his friendship with the painters of the Paris School and his familiarity with the surrealist movement, he developed an in-depth understanding of art. It is said that the young twenty-nine-year-old psychiatrist was offered an opportunity to participate in the foundation of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society) in November 1926 and that he refused—something he regretted all his life. The story is not entirely credible, however, as Held would have been more attracted to the newly formed Évolution Psychiatrique, because he was a contributor to the first issue of that organization’s review. During the 1930s, he was much more interested in developing a clientele as an independent psychiatrist than in adopting Freudian theories that were not yet fully accepted. He got married on March 26, 1926, had a son, Jean Francis, in 1930, and had divorced by 1933. His mother, who followed Jewish family tradition closely, almost never left his side from then on. Miraculously, he managed to survive the Occupation unscathed. A disciplined Frenchman who believed in his country, Held registered as a Jew with the police in his area and returned home with a yellow star, which he decided, two days later, never to wear again. After narrowly escaping a roundup of French Jews, he left the city for the unoccupied countryside but returned to Paris, where, in spite of the seals that had been placed on the door of his apartment on avenue Raymond-Poincaré, he managed to live there, treating American pilots who had been hidden by the Resistance. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS It wasn’t until the Liberation that Held’s name began to appear on the rolls of psychoanalytic meetings. He underwent a teaching analysis with John Leuba, and was then supervised by Sacha Nacht. At a meeting of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris held in October 1947, presided over by his analyst, he gave a talk on ‘‘a phobia about knives.’’ It was here that he met Pierre Mâle, a man who was to remain a colleague and friend until his death. That same year he was made a member of the society. The following year, Professor Gilbert-Dreyfus created for him, at the La Pitié hospital, the first department of psychosomatic medicine. He was not fond of Jacques Lacan and remained faithful to his friends during the 1953 split. He was made a full member of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris on February 16, 1954, when Pierre Mâle was president, and was given responsibility for teaching activities in the new Paris Psychoanalytic Institute. He taught psychosomatic medicine in 1954, and psychoanalytic psychotherapy, with Mâle, in 1957. In 1963, during the 24th Congrès des psychanalystes de langue française des pays romans (Congress of Frenchspeaking psychoanalysts from Romance-languagespeaking countries), he presented a ‘‘Rapport clinique sur les psychothérapies d’inspiration psychanalytique freudienne,’’ which became a book, Psychothérapie et Psychanalyse (1968). He was also president of Évolution Psychiatrique and the Société de Médecine Psychosomatique (Society of Psychosomatic Medicine). Held was a brilliant improviser, simultaneously droll and wise, sometimes carried away by his garrulousness. All of his verbal eloquence has vanished but, as Gérard Mendel, one of his analysands, wrote, ‘‘We have his books, four books, in which, regardless of the subject, the man could be seen on the page, thumbing his nose at dogma and obfuscation.’’ His books include De la psychanalyse à la médicine psychosomatique (1968) and his memoir of surrealism published in 1973 as L’Oeil du psychanalyste (Payot). His last completed book—Held began dozens of unfinished projects for novels, scripts, and other writings—brings his critical faculties to bear on the then-current fashion for all things Freudian: Problèmes de la cure psychanalytique d’aujourd’hui. Us et abus de la psychanalyse (1976). Although there was much that was colorful about Held’s character, we must not overlook the originality of his ideas and his numerous contributions to the 731 H E L L E R , H U G O (18 70 –192 3) psychoanalytic conferences organized by the SPP until the 1970s. As Roland Jaccard remarked, ‘‘rationalist, atheist, and materialist, René Held was an oldfashioned psychoanalyst: sensitive and warm, he placed the interests of his patients above those of theory.’’ ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Face-to-face situation; France; Psychotherapy; Société psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris. Bibliography Held, René. (1968). De la psychanalyse à la médecine psychosomatique. Paris: Payot. ———. (1968). Psychothérapie et psychanalyse. Paris: Payot. ———. (1973). L’Œil du psychanalyste. Paris: Payot. Jaccard, Roland. (1992). La disparition de René Held: la psychanalyse et l’humour. Le Monde, Tuesday, February 25, 1992. Mendel, Gérard. (1992). René Held toujours vivant. Raison présente, 102, 120. HELLER, HUGO (1870–1923) Hugo Heller, the second Viennese publisher of Freud’s works, was born in Hungary in 1870 and died in Vienna on November 29, 1923. When he finished his secondary education, he trained as a bookseller and contributed to founding the ‘‘first populist bookshop in Vienna.’’ In 1905, he founded his own bookshop (Hugo Heller & Co.) comprising a publishing house, an art gallery, and a reception hall. Many exhibitions and conferences were organized in this richly endowed bookshop by contemporary poets and artists such as Arnold Schönberg, Rainer Maria Rilke, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Jakob Wassermann, and Thomas and Heinrich Mann. In response to the cultural orientation of this bookshop, its clients came from the intellectual elite of Vienna. Freud was one of the regular customers and in 1907 he gave a conference, ‘‘Der Dichter und das Phantasieren’’ (Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming, 1908e), to Heller’s literary-minded public. Relations between Hugo Heller and Freud were not based solely on Freud’s interest in literature; they were also consolidated by 73 2 Heller’s interest in psychoanalysis. He was of the small circle of the founding members of the Wednesday Society, where he delivered his first paper: ‘‘Zur Geschichte des Teufels’’ (On the History of the Devil). Even before Lou Andréas Salomé was invited to attend the Wednesday Society, Heller had already given them an account of the work of this author who was already enshrined in the mists of legend. His daughter, Maggie Heller, was one of the pioneers of psychoanalytic teaching. In 1906 she organized a survey of writers and scientists, asking them to list ‘‘ten good books.’’ Arthur Schnitzler, Ernst Mach, and Peter Altenberg, along with Freud and others, responded to the survey, which Heller published under the title Vom Lesen und von guten Büchern (Reading and good books). During World War I, Heller took over the scientific section of the Deuticke publishing house and became the ‘‘real publisher of the house of Freud.’’ For Heller this change in Deuticke also reflected the new interest of psychoanalysis in terms of its applications for the mind sciences and the broadening of its readership toward a more general public. In the literary, but also the social democratic context of this publishing house the following works of Freud were published: Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘‘Gradiva’’ (1907a), Totem and Taboo (1912–13a), the ‘‘Collection of short writings on the theory of the neurosis’’ (4 volumes, 1907–09) and Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916–17a). Its catalog of authors also included analysts like Otto Rank and Alfred von Winterstein. Hugo Heller also took the risk of publishing two psychoanalytic reviews, the Internationale Zeitschrift für (ärtzliche) Psychoanalyse and Imago, after several other publishers had backed down. Theodor Reik, who was working in Heller’s bookshop at the time, took charge of the two reviews. During the war the publishing house suffered from production conditions that went from bad to worse, with the result that it became problematic to produce the two reviews. Finally, Heller publications could no longer ensure a regular production of books. As a result, Freud’s work Zur Vorbereitung einer Matapsychologie (Toward the Preparation of a Metapsychology), which he had entrusted to Heller, never went to print and is considered to have been lost. After the creation of the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag in 1919, Heller handled only the distribution of periodicals and books. After World War I, although still a member of the Viennese Psychoanalytic INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS H E L L M A N N O A C H , I L S E (1908 –1 998) Association, he no longer attended their meetings. When he died on November 29, 1923, an obituary in the Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse observed that Viennese Psychoanalytic Society had lost one of its oldest members. LYDIA MARINELLI See also: Deuticke, Franz; Imago. Zeitschrift für die Anwendung der Psychoanalyse auf die Geisteswissenschaften; Internationale Zeitschrift für (ärtzliche) Psychoanalyse. Bibliography Hall, Murray G. (1985). Österreichische Verlagsgeschichte 1918–1938. Vienna-Köln-Graz. Mühlleitner, Elke. (1992). Biographisches Lexikon der Psychoanalyse (Die Mitgleider der Psychologischen MittwochGesellschaft und der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung 1902–1938). Tübingen: Diskord. Nunberg, Herman, and Federn, Ernst. (1962–78). Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. New York: International Universities Press. Worbs, Michael. (1983). Nervenkunst. Literatur und Psychoanalyse im Wien der Jahrhundertwende. Frankfurtam-Main. HELLMAN NOACH, ILSE (1908–1998) Dr. Ilse Hellman Noach, distinguished psychoanalyst and expert on child development, was born in Vienna on September 28, 1908, and died in London on December 3, 1998. Her parents, Paul and Irene Hellman, were deeply engaged in the cultural climate of the day, encouraging the arts and promoting the talents of musicians who achieved distinction. Fascinated by children, Hellman, on leaving school, completed a two-year course specializing in juvenile delinquency. She joined a home near Paris for the children of parents unable to care for them, and her fluent French allowed her to attend evening classes in psychology at the Sorbonne. The home was run on family lines, and the same staff member looked after each small group of children. On returning to Vienna, she attended the University and studied under Charlotte Buhler, Professor of Child Development, who was making detailed studies of children from birth onwards. Buhler was invited to London as visiting Professor at University College, retaining her post in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Vienna, and in 1937 she invited Hellman, who by then had been awarded her Ph.D., to join her in the study of retarded children. When Buhler was in Vienna, Hellman took charge. It was then, too, that she met the distinguished analyst and child expert, Susan Isaacs, who became a close friend. At the outbreak of war Buhler left for the United States, and the Home Office employed Ilse Hellman and other psychologists to work with children evacuated from London to escape the threat of air raids. Taken from their mothers to remote areas, many suffered disturbed sleep, eating disorders and bedwetting, and the psychologists set up special homes to cope with these problems. In 1942, Freud’s daughter Anna invited Hellman to join her war nurseries, set up to provide for children whose families were disrupted by wartime bombing, and she remained there until the nurseries closed at the end of the war. The staff was residential and, to facilitate attachment to a substitute parent, each member cared for the same small group of children (as in the French home). The three homes together cared for 150 children, and the staff slept wherever they could. The children’s development was rigorously observed and meticulously recorded, and Ilse Hellman found the experience invaluable for the understanding of the effects of separation, the restriction of the damage it occasioned, and child observational research. She continued to meet with, and evaluate, her own ‘‘war babies’’ for over fifty years. While at the nurseries, she trained in psychoanalysis, and rapidly rose to prominence in the British Psycho-Analytical Society. Her attractive and friendly personality put her on the best of terms with Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott and other well-known analysts: theoretical differences never interfered with friendship. She joined the Staff at Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham’s Hampstead Child Therapy Course and Clinic, which had quickly earned a worldwide reputation. The clinic originated major studies on child development, normative and pathological, to many of which Ilse contributed. For some years she was in charge of the department for adolescents, publishing valuable papers about the difficulties encountered with this age group. She wrote on many other subjects. She was a fine teacher. Her deeply empathic understanding of the problems encountered by students in their clinical work made her a valued mentor in work with both adults and children. Her clinical 733 HELPLESSNESS skills with children of all ages secured her international reputation. It was not until after the war that she learned that her mother and brother had died in Nazi concentration camps. It was then she met and married the art historian, Arnold Noach, who had survived the Nazi occupation of Holland. He later became Professor of the History of Art at the University of Leeds. His was a fun-loving and warm personality. He died suddenly in 1976. Hellman Noach continued her work for many years, although in the last few years she worked much less intensively. Impressed by the fact that many young people showed great trust, and a readiness to confide in her, she amusingly called herself an ‘‘analytic grandmother.’’ But, at the age of 84, increasing ill health forced her to abandon the practice of, though not the interest in, the profession she had served so well. She endured a cruelly incapacitating illness with great fortitude, always finding a warm and welcoming word for her visitors. Generations of analysts have cause to be grateful for her guidance, instruction, and, above all, her wisdom. She was survived by her one daughter, Maggie, and grandchild, Sophie. CLIFFORD YORKE See also: Great Britain. Bibliography the basis for the relationship to the real object, lost and rediscovered thanks to ‘‘indications of reality,’’ and invested with the meaning ‘‘mutual understanding.’’ Helplessness and the theory of anxiety are closely linked. The helpless baby, powerless to fulfill its needs and without any adequate means of discharging internal excitation, experiences ‘‘automatic anxiety.’’ Anticipation of helplessness triggers ‘‘signal anxiety,’’ the ego’s appeal to the ego (1926d [1925]). In a state of helplessness owing to its prematurity, the preverbal human infant cries, experiences and recognizes its powerlessness, and urgently alerts the succoring object. The ability to apprehend its helplessness depends on the protective shield against stimuli, whose action is thus the basis of relationships, the precondition of effective communication. For Melanie Klein (1952/1975), the distress associated with the death instinct, a source of tremendous persecution, precipitates projection. This is the foundation of what she calls the schizoid-paranoid position. When a human being is reduced to a state of helplessness, subjected to a primal kind of passivity by the impositions of others, he or she may seek to regain mastery through repetition of the experience. For Kreisler et al. (1966), too much distress of this kind may cause psychosomatic disorders; for Tustin (1972), the result may be recourse to autistic defenses. ANNE AUBERT-GODARD Hellman, Ilse. (1990). From war babies to grandmothers: Forty-eight years in psychoanalysis. London: Karnac. HELPLESSNESS The state of helplessness is linked to the infant’s initial powerlessness in the face of its needs. This causes distress, as the protective shield is overwhelmed; only the intervention of another person can relieve this suffering. The neurophysiological model of Sigmund Freud’s ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ (1950c [1895]) posits the baby’s original helplessness as the prototype of all traumatic situations. Helplessness and satisfaction structure the two modes of mental functioning. In the primary mode, the desired object and desired satisfaction are hallucinated immediately through recathexis of the memory traces left by the real experience. In the secondary mode, a lasting discharge forms 73 4 See also: Alpha function; Anxiety; Dependence; Illusion; Narcissitic injury; Prematurity; Transference depression; Thing, the; Trauma. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1925). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 87–172. ———. (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281–387. Klein, Melanie. (1975). Some theoretical conclusions regarding the emotional life of infants. In The writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. 3, pp. 61–93). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1952) Kreisler, Léon, Fain, Michel, and Soulé, Michel. Études sur la clinique psychosomatique du premier âge. Coliques, insomnie, mérycisme, anorexie, vomissements. Psychiatrie de l’enfant, IX (1), 89–222. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ‘ ‘H E R E D I T Y Tustin, Frances. (1972). Autism and childhood psychosis. London: Hogarth. ‘‘HEREDITY AND THE AETIOLOGY OF THE NEUROSES’’ Sigmund Freud first published this article in French in the Revue neurologique in Paris. It is important for two independent reasons. The first reason is historical, in that it contains the first occurrence of the word ‘‘psychoanalysis.’’ The second reason is more theoretical, in that the article makes a clear distinction between Freud’s theories and those deriving from Jean Martin Charcot’s teaching on the role of heredity in the etiology of the neuroses. The article goes on to provide a complete exposition of Freud’s thoughts on the sexual etiologyof neuroses, and his theory of seduction. The opening sentence reads: ‘‘I am addressing in particular the disciples of J.-M. Charcot, in order to put forward some objections to the aetiological theory of the neuroses which was handed on to us by our teacher’’ (1896a, 143). Heredity is only a ‘‘condition,’’ to borrow the term used in the distinction already made the year before (1895f), but it is the ‘‘specific causes’’ that must be sought. Referring back to the nosographical distinctions he made between hysteria, obsessional neurosis, neurasthenia, and anxiety neurosis, he affirms that these ‘‘functional pathological modifications have as their common source the subject’s sexual life, whether they lie in a disorder of his contemporary sexual life or in important events in his past life’’ (p. 149). He adds: ÔI am quite sure that this theory will call up a storm of contradictions from contemporary physicians’’ (pp. 149–50). The etiology of neurasthenia lies in immoderate onanism and spontaneous pollutions, and that of anxiety neuroses in forced abstinence, or genital irritation that does not result in orgasm. With regard to the other states: ‘‘I owe my results to a new method of psycho-analysis, Josef Breuer’s exploratory procedure; it is a little intricate, but it is irreplaceable, so fertile has it shown itself to be in throwing light upon the obscure paths of unconscious ideation’’ (p. 151). The origin of the disorders is a memory that is related to the sexual life: ‘‘The event of which the subject has retained an unconscious memory is a precocious experience of sexual relations with actual excitement of the genitals, resulting from sexual abuse committed by another INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE AETIOLOGY OF THE NEUROSES’’ person; and the period of life at which this fatal event takes place is earliest youth—the years up to the age of eight to ten, before the child has reached sexual maturity’’ (p. 152). The memory of this act passively suffered in dread: ‘‘The memory will operate as though it were a contemporary event. What happens is, as it were, a posthumous action by a sexual trauma’’ (p. 154). The precocious event can also be found in ‘‘obsessional neurosis,’’ but with a ‘‘capital’’ difference: ‘‘it is a question . . . of an event which has given pleasure, of an act of aggression inspired by desire (in the case of a boy) or of a participation in sexual relations accompanied by enjoyment (in the case of a little girl). The obsessional ideas . . . are nothing other than reproaches addressed by the subject to himself on account of this anticipated seuxal enjoyment’’ (p. 155). Sent to the Neurologisches Zentralblatt on the same day, February 5, 1896, the article Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence reviews the last two etiologies and develops the notion of repression, which is missing from the French text. Freud also adds the analysis of a ‘‘case of chronic paranoia’’ that shows that this affection also comes "from the repression of distressing memories and that its symptoms are determined in their form by the content of what has been repressed" (1896b, pp. 174–75). Of course Freud had sent these considerations to Wilhelm Fleiss a few months earlier, but they find their first public expression here. He made the following comment to Fleiss on April 26, 1896: "A lecture on the etiology of hysteria at the psychiatric society was given an icy reception by the asses and a strange evaluation by Krafft-Ebbing: ÔIt sounds like a scientific fairy tale.’ And this, after one has demonstrated to them the solution of a more-than-thousand-year-old problem, a caput Nili. They can go to hell, euphemistically expressed’’(1985c [1887-1904]). The seduction theory has often been called into question in the course of the history of psychoanalysis, from Freud’s abandonment of his ‘‘neurotica’’ in September 1897. Taken up again by Sándor Ferenczi in 1932, then by his disciples, the theory has also seen polemical use, by Jeffrey Masson in 1984. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Choice of neurosis; Constitution; France; Memories; Obsession; Reminiscence. 735 HEREDITY OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERS Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1896a). L’hérédité et l’étiologie des névroses. Revue neurologique, 4: 161–169; GW, 1: 407–422; Heredity and the aetiology of the neuroses. SE, 3: 141–156. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1895f). A reply to criticisms of my paper on anxiety neurosis. SE, 3: 118–139. ———. (1896b). Further remarks on the neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 157–185. ———. (1896c). The aetiology of hysteria. SE, 3: 186–221. ———. (1985c [1887-1904]). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887–1904 (Jeffrey M. Masson, Ed. and Trans.). Cambridge, MA : Belknap/ Harvard University Press. Masson, Jeffrey Moussaieff. (1984). The assault on truth. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. HEREDITY OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERS The expression ‘‘heredity of acquired characters’’ generally refers to the transmission to descendants of modifications taking place in the course of the individual life of a forebear, such transmission being possible by virtue of these modifications being integrated into the forebear’s genotype. Such modifications may be morphological, functional, or even behavioral (acquired through learning). This idea, which was central to the evolutionism of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, was later very largely rejected. Freud nevertheless accorded it a non-negligible role in some of his theoretical views. We have to bear in mind that psychiatry and psychology at the end of the nineteenth century were very strongly marked by the idea that individual characteristics were essentially determined by hereditary data (in the genetic sense), whether in reference to normal or pathological development, including mental pathologies. It must also be said that in this domain the theory of degeneration was well established. It is not surprising that Freud initially stood by the theory. In 1888 he wrote, in agreement with Jean Martin Charcot, that ‘‘the aetiology of the status hystericus is to be entirely looked for in the heredity’’ (1888b). However, he made a clear distinction over the following years between the inherited ‘‘constitutional’’ causes that provide the individual’s base psychic terrain, and the ‘‘occasional causes,’’ principally the 73 6 vicissitudes of sexual life, which alone could explain the appearance and form of the mental pathology. Publishing his translation of Charcot’s Leçons du mardi (Tuesday lectures), he went so far as to contradict him by writing that ‘‘the most frequent cause of agoraphobia, as well as the other phobias, does not reside in heredity but in the anomalies of sexual life’’ (1892–94a). In Studies on Hysteria (1895d) he actively criticized recourse to the notion of degeneration as an explanation of hysterical phenomena, and restated the complementary nature of constitutional and accidental causes. He never departed from this position, which he stated clearly in the manuscripts he addressed to Wilhelm Fleiss (Ms B, 1950a), then repeated in his article in French on Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses (1896a), and each time over the following years that he discussed the problem of the ‘‘choice of neurosis’’—the determination of a subject’s evolution toward hysteria or phobia. The problem took on a greater dimension when Freud undertook to answer the question that cannot fail to rise in such a perspective: where do the ‘‘constitutional causes’’ themselves come from? He answered with a thesis inspired by Charles Darwin, and even more so by Ernst Haeckel, that found its most complete formulation in Totem and Taboo (1912–13a): major events in the prehistory of humanity mark all its later development and fashion the individual development of each child. This recourse to ‘‘phylogenesis’’ was coupled with two postulates: the first borrowed from Lamarck (transmission of acquired characters), the second from Haeckel (ontogenesis recapitulates phylogenesis). He focused on the hereditary transmission of general developmental factors and psychic function, remaining more discreet on the subject of differential factors. These Freudian theses have been vigorously criticized, particularly their Lamarckian aspect which seems to have been eliminated by the victory of neoDarwinism and modern genetics. Contemporary work in molecular genetics and population genetics seems to suggest new ways of formulating the question of psychic heredity (Chiland C., Roubertoux P., 1975–1976). ROGER PERRON See also: Constitution; Cultural transmission; Identification fantasies; Instinct; Intergenerational; Phylogenesis; INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS H E R M A N N , I M R E (1889 –1 984) Phylogenetic Fantasy, A: Overview of the Transference Neuroses; Prehistory; Thalassa. A Theory of Genitality. Bibliography Chiland, Colette, and Roubertoux, Pierre. (1975–1976). Freud et l’hérédité. Bulletin de psychologie, 4–7. Freud, Sigmund. (1888b). Hysteria. SE, 1: 39–60. ———. (1892–94a). Preface and footnotes to the translation of Charcot’s ‘‘Tuesday Lectures.’’ SE, 1: 129–144. ———. (1896a). Heredity and the aetiology of the neuroses. SE, 3: 141–156. ———. (1912–13a). Totem and Taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ———. (1950a [1887–1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173–280. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria, SE, 2: 48–106. HERMANN, IMRE (1889–1984) Imre Hermann, Hungarian neurologist and psychoanalyst was born on November 13, 1889 in Budapest and died there on February 22, 1984. He spent most of his long life in Budapest where he was born. He received his medical degree in 1913. While still a university student, he became interested in experimental psychology. During the 1918–19 revolutions he was assistant professor to Géza Révész at the faculty of psychology. There he met Alice Czinner, also Révész’s student, who became an analyst herself and his life companion of fifty-three years (1922–1975). He set up analytical practice in 1919. Discounting the few months of the siege of Budapest during the German occupation, he continued his psychoanalytical practice without interruption up to the last months of his life. While a university student, he also attended Sándor Ferenczi’s lectures, and it was Ferenczi who invited Hermann to join the society. Hermann was a member of the Hungarian and International Psychoanalytical Societies from 1921; Secretary of the Hungarian Psychoanalytical Society from 1925, vicepresident between 1936–44, and president between 1945–49. An honorary professor, he lectured at the medical university and the faculty of arts in Budapest between 1946–49. His first important works were in the field of the psychology of thinking: Psychoanalyse und Logik INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (1924), Das Ich und das Denken (1929). In the first he explored the unconscious background of certain logical steps, such as doubling and reversal, based on observations of patients. In the second, he established a relationship between individual differences in thought processes with sense-organ orientation. In a series of experiments in 1921, he demonstrated, that, given a choice of identical elements, a child will select an external element, while an adult will select a center element, but that in a regressive state external selection returns. Unconscious operations also tend toward external selection. His book, Pszichoanalizis, mint módszer (Psychoanalysis as a Method, 1933; published in German in 1934; 1963) is a summary of the results of his teaching of psychoanalysis. In the 1920s his interest turned toward the behavior of primates. He noted a peculiar instinctive behavior of the offspring of anthropoid apes: they spend the first months of their lives clinging onto the fur of their mothers. He set forth his theory of the clinging instinct in detail in Az ember ôsi ösztönei (The Primeval Instincts of Man; 1943, 1984). Hermann’s interest also extended to a number of other areas. His monographs about Fechner (1925) and János Bólyai (1945) and several other writings show interest in the psychology of creativity. He also published the book, Az antiszemitizmus lélektana (The Psychology of AntiSemitism; 1945). Based on clinical observations of obsessional neurosis he identified the dissociated superego. He noted the relationship between affectivity and space perception. Toward the end of his life he found a relationship to exist between musicality and perversions. Hermann’s theory of the clinging instinct prepared the way for the work of John Bowlby and René Spitz, and supported Mihály Bálint’s theory of primary object relationship. His studies in the psychology of thinking make him one of the forerunners of ego psychology. In addition, he deserves credit for maintaining the continuity of psychoanalysis in Hungary and for reintroducing psychoanalytic training during the period of liberalization of communist dictatorship. HUNGARIAN GROUP See Also: Alcoholism; Christians and Jews: A Psychoanalytical Study; Clinging instinct; Hungarian School; Hungary; Racism, anti-Semitism and psychoanalysis; Shame. 737 HERMENEUTICS Bibliography Binet, Agnes. (1984). Útbaigazı́tás. In Hermann (Ed.): Az ember õ si ösztönei (pp. 15–33). Budapest: Magvetõ. Hermann, Imre. (1933). A pszichoanalı́zis, mint módszer. Budapest: Novák R. és Tsa. ———. (1943). Az ember õ si össztönei Pantheon. Budapest: Magvetõ, 1984. Nemes, Lı́via. (1984). Hermann Imre munkássága. In Hermann Imre ‘‘Az ember õ si ösztönei’’ (p. 586–612). Budapest: Magvetõ. Vikár, György. (1985). Obituary. Imre Hermann, 1889–1984. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 66, 111. HERMENEUTICS The term hermeneutics is used broadly to describe the process of justifying interpretation through exposing the criteria used to produce it. The form is also used, by extension, to designate a twentiethcentury philosophy for which interpretation is either a condition for accessing meaning through thought, and therefore a condition of every science of mind as such, thus implicating the normativity of logic, or the praxis of thought itself, no product of thought being capable of escaping infinite reinterpretation since it would then no longer be living thought but dead thought. In a limited sense, Logic, as understood by Aristotle’s Organon, has been and remains the framework of hermeneutics. ‘‘Hermeneia,’’ Paul Ricoeur writes, ‘‘in the fullest sense, is the meaning of the sentence’’—and goes on to criticize an ‘‘overly Ôlengthy’ concept’’ of interpretation. But this is also the case when ‘‘hermeneutics’’ is understood as biblical exegesis (an ‘‘overly restricted’’ sense). Here it is theology, understood as an exclusive theory and therefore as a preestablished doctrine, that conditions truth and falsehood, and thus access to the determination of meaning. It should not be surprising therefore to find within the result of the interpretation what we were trying to find from the start. Understood as philosophy, hermeneutics rejects the fact that logical concepts, in the Hegelian sense, can present and determine meaning, or that the ‘‘logic of the concept’’ can be its concretization; nor can the concept serve as a criterion of signification. However, hermeneutic finality can remain with the concept in 73 8 the sense of discourse, or, on the contrary, an interpretation that falls short of the separation of words and things, an interpretation of the constitution of a possible world by each and for all, or even a fundamental process of ‘‘leveling’’ the language of the unconscious. Freud considered that analytic interpretation, at the clinical situation, transmutes the patient’s dreams into the true creative and critical power of subjectivity. For this reason interpretation is not and could not be an ‘‘extension’’ of the dream, as Ludwig Wittgenstein claimed, believing to have found in this a critique of the unscientific nature of Freudian ‘‘hermeneutics.’’ Since, according to Wittgenstein, to interpret a dream is to prolong it, Freud’s method of dream interpretation remains within the dream from the point of view of its scientific value. Thus one can also say that hermeneutics risks arbitrariness or relevancy that is only superficial to the extent that it can drift into an imaginary free association of ideas in connection of symbiotic or ‘‘esoteric’’ object, whereas this free association must itself be the object of a rigorous interpretation with reorganized and shared criteria; so hermeneutics also runs the risks of falling into a ‘‘delirium of interpretation,’’ a psychotic hermeneutics used by the schizophrenic, who cultivates a discourse of paradoxes in order to protect himself from ambivalence and conflict (Paul-Claude Racamier). DOMINIQUE AUFFRET See also: Amplification (analytical psychology); Deferred action; Interpretation; Philosophy and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Ricoeur, Paul. (1965). History and truth. (Charles A. Kelbley, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1955) ———. (1970). Freud and philosophy: An essay on interpretation. (Denis Savage, Trans.). New Haven: Yale University Press. (Original work published 1965) ———. (1974). The conflict of interpretations (Don Ihde, Ed.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1969) HEROIC IDENTIFICATION Didier Anzieu proposed the notion of heroic identification in connection with his concept of the group illusion (1971). Anzieu extensively studied group INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS HEROIC SELF dynamics and made significant contributions to that field with his ideas of the skin-ego (1984, 1989) and psychic envelopes. By ‘‘group illusion,’’ he wrote, ‘‘I mean a particular mental state that is seen in natural groups as well as in therapeutic or formative groups, and that is spontaneously verbalized by group members in the following form: ÔWe are doing well together; we’re a good group; our leader or our supervisor is a good leader, a good supervisor’’ (1971). According to Anzieu, three conditions are necessary to establish the group illusion: the designation of one group member as a victim or scapegoat (‘‘One of us is bad’’), the formulation of an egalitarian theory (‘‘We are all alike’’), and finally, the refusal to take gender differences into account (‘‘We are all born outside of sexual relations’’). With regard to this last condition, he further explained, ‘‘The group illusion expresses an unconscious statement according to which group members are not born in the same way as individuals, but are instead a product of parthenogenesis, living within the body of a fertile and all-powerful mother’’ (1971). With this set of conceptual tools, Anzieu reminded us that the group derives from a founding father, and as Freud showed in ‘‘Group psychology and the analysis of the ego’’ (1921c), the great majority of group members are, or believe themselves to be, equally loved by the founding hero. ‘‘For the founder, the group serves as a fantasized resonator that gives body to his ideas, and as a mediator for making these ideas known to a broad public. For the group members, the founder satisfies their heroic desires and proves that they can obtain the love of the superego’’ (Anzieu, 1984). Such, then, are group members’ identifications with the heroism of the group’s founder and leader. As was often his practice, Anzieu drew examples from mythology to support this concept, which enriches and complements the classical Freudian views on identification. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Ego ideal/ideal ego; Group analysis; Identification. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1971). L’illusion groupale. Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse, 4, 73–93. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ———. (1984). Les groupes et leurs romans des origines. In Didier Anzieu, Bertrand Cramer, Georges David, et al., Le nouveau roman familial, ou ‘‘On te le dira quand tu seras plus grand’’ (pp. 99–109). Paris: E.S.F. ———. (1989). The skin ego (Chris Turner, Trans.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Original work published 1985) Freud, Sigmund. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. HEROIC SELF The heroic self, as understood by Riccardo Steiner (1999), refers to the creative person’s specific need to associate with, to compete with, and to surpass, the heroes of their own or of some other cultural tradition. Although the heroic self is principally a component specific to the creative personality, it is present, in varying degrees, in every single person. Steiner’s notion of the ‘‘heroic self ’’ is derived, through the work of Daniel Lagache, Hermann Numberg, Alain de Mijolla, André Green, Jacques Lacan, and other French authors, from the phenomenological differentiation of the various aspects of the ego as originally described by Freud in his paper entitled ‘‘On Narcissism: an Introduction’’ (1914c). In this work, Freud spoke of the existence of an ‘‘ideal ego’’ and of an ‘‘ego ideal,’’ and later he also mentioned the existence of a ‘‘superego.’’ The heroic self is one of the ways in which the ideal ego manifests itself. Forming part of the constitutional endowment of the creative personality, it has, of course, constitutional aspects. Yet, understood from a Kleinian point of view, the heroic self can either be fostered or inhibited, from the beginning of life, by the reverie, or by the lack of reverie, shown by the mother and the parental couple. Later on in life, it can also be fostered, or inhibited, by relatives, by teachers, by cultural or other institutions, depending on the attitude these have towards the potential heroic self of the creative personality. The heroic self manifests itself through what Steiner calls heroic projective and introjective identifications. The way in which it manifests itself depends on the individual’s previous vicissitudes. If, for instance, the heroic self has been properly fostered by the creative person’s family, or by their educational environment (by a teacher, school, etc.), at a certain moment the creator will start to feel the specific need to identify parts of the self with the heroes of their own or of 739 HEROIC SELF some other cultural tradition. They will do this via heroic projective identifications, as they will also be able to introject those same heroes via introjective identification. Particularly interesting, developmentally speaking, is the period Freud called ‘‘the family romance,’’ and during adolescence, when it is often possible to observe the first manifestations of the heroic self, although Steiner insists that the unconscious roots of the heroic self have to be traced back to the earliest object relationships and to the way they have been dealt with during the depressive position phase. Conceived in this way, the heroic self constitutes an important aspect of the creative process. Due to the creator’s constant interaction with its chosen tradition or peers, the creative process can never therefore be conceived to be developing in a socio-cultural vacuum, nor can it ever be understood as being a purely subjective process. In other words, there can never be a relationship between the creator and their unconscious which excludes all relationship with the tradition or the peers of the creator’s heroic self. For various psychopathological reasons, and as a result of events experienced during the course of infantile and adolescent development, the heroic self and its heroic introjective and projective identifications can be deeply disturbed and, in some cases, can almost cease to exist. All this can result in a megalomanic distortion of the heroic self, which comes to feel narcissistically and destructively superior to any form of dependence on peers or cultural traditions. In such cases, creators isolate themselves and refuse to learn from peer or cultural traditions. The disturbances can also manifest themselves as a profoundly paralyzing and melancholic ‘‘apathic’’ which again leads to impossibility of the individual being able to relate constructively to peers or cultural traditions, or to be able to learn from them. In order for the creative personality to be able to use their own heroic self and their heroic projective and introductive identifications, it is vitally important that help is given to the damaged creative personality, via psychoanalytic treatment, to repair not only their own internal and external objects, but their heroic self as well. This leads to it being possible for the creative personality to learn from their heroic peers, or from the heroes of the chosen tradition. And, in the case of genuinely creative personality, it leads to a capacity to tolerate the specific anxiety related to the need not 74 0 only to bypass their biological parents and their creativity, but also to bypass and to compete constructively with the great heroes of their cultural tradition, and, sometimes, with great heroic peers. Particularly important is the possibility for the creator’s heroic self to be able to identify with the creative intercourse of their parents, at least in fantasy. This does necessarily mean that the creator has to generate children! Very often, their ‘‘children’’ are their creative results. All this is possible, according to Steiner, if the creator and their heroic self have achieved a good enough, even if not absolute, capacity to function according to what Klein and her followers have called the depressive position (Segal, 1991). The notion of the‘‘heroic self ’’ and its heroic projective and introjective identifications may help one to acquire a better understanding of certain general aspects of the creative process, particularly those concerning the creator’s relationship with the cultural tradition or traditions to which they belong, or of which they make use in their own work. It can therefore lead to a better psychoanalytic understanding of cultural movements such as classicism, romanticism, futurism, and the like, because these all involve a particular unconscious and emotional relationship between creativity, individuality, originality, and the role played in it by tradition. It can also shed light on the way it is possible, from a psychoanalytic point of view, to evaluate a creative work in general. Even the reader, the literary or art critic, and so on, all have to mobilize their heroic selves and their heroic projective and introjective identifications in order to understand and evaluate a creative work. If one looks at its psychopathological manifestations, the notions of a megalomanic psychopathic heroic self (and this is something Daniel Lagache has pointed out at an individual level) can help to clarify some aspects of what could be called a ‘‘folie à plus,’’ which is to say a stimulation of the megalomanic and psychopathic aspects of the heroic self at a mass level. In order to do this, the mass needs a megalomanic and psychopathic leader. All this could help towards a better understanding of the unconscious roots of the power which appeals to groups and to the masses, based on their reference to the ‘‘heroes,’’ past or present, of a particular cultural or historical tradition, not least certain past and present-day religious figures and movements. These heroes, religious figures and movements have been used, and continue to be used, in a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS H E S N A R D , A N G É L O L O U I S M A R I E (1886 –1 969) distorted and destructive way by both old and more recent totalitarian and fundamentalist regimes. RICCARDO STEINER See also: Creativity; Ego ideal; Ego ideal/ideal ego; Grandiose self; Heroic identification; Myth of the hero; Self; Trauma of Birth, The. Bibliography Lagache, Daniel. (1982). La psychanalyse et la structure de la personnalité. In his Oeuvres (pp. 163–78). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. (Original work published 1962) Segal, Hanna. (1991). Dreams, phantasy and art. London: Routledge-The Institute of Psycho-Analysis. Steiner, Riccardo. (1999). Some notes on the Heroic Self and the meaning and importance of its reparation for the creative process and the creative personality. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis. 80, 685–718. HESNARD, ANGÉLO LOUIS MARIE (1886–1969) A psychoanalyst, doctor with the French Navy, and professor at the École Principale du Service de Santé de la Marine, Angélo Louis Marie Hesnard was born in Pontivy in the Morbihan, on May 22, 1886, and died in Rochefort-sur-Mer on April 17, 1969. He was coauthor of the first French work on psychoanalysis and one of the founding members of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris (SPP). He was the son of Angélo Théodose Hesnard and Lélia Célénis Rosalie Blancon, from a family of judges. His brother Oswald, who had a degree in German, helped him understand Freud’s writings. After completing his studies in Pontivy, he entered the École de Santé de la Marine et des Colonies in Bordeaux on October 20, 1905. A student of Albert Pitres, then of Emmanuel Régis, he wrote his dissertation in 1909 on ‘‘Les troubles de la personnalité dans les états d’asthénie psychique,’’ in which there is a reference to Freud. He continued his military career in Toulon, then, from 1910 to 1912, on the armored cruiser Amiral Charner in the Middle East. Upon his return in 1912 he was appointed assistant at the Clinique des Maladies Mentales at the University of Bordeaux, where he rejoined Emmanuel Régis, who encouraged Hesnard to study Freud. On January 2, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Freud wrote to Karl Abraham, ‘‘Today I received a letter from a student of Régis, in Bordeaux, written on his behalf, apologizing in the name of French psychiatry for its present neglect of Ya.’’ According to a letter to Ernest Jones on January 14, the reference is to the ‘‘apologies from the French nation’’ that Freud received. This was followed in 1913 by the publication of ‘‘La doctrine de Freud et de son école’’ by Emmanuel Régis and Angélo Hesnard in L’Encéphale. La Psychanalyse des névroses et des psychoses appeared in 1914. It was a lengthy précis—and as faithful as it was possible to be at the time—of Freud’s principal theories, as Sándor Ferenczi noted in the review of the book he wrote in 1915. This was followed by an examination of the criticisms the theories had received from various authors, and finally by several commentaries, of which Hesnard claimed, after Régis’ death, that he—Régis—was the principal author. They recognized that ‘‘Freud’s system seems to constitute, regardless of what one may say, one of the most important scientific movements of the current psychological period.’’ Nonetheless, their remarks essentially referred to what appeared to them to be no more than ‘‘ingenious assumptions’’ that were both original and well understood, since—and this is an argument that would be repeated for decades to come—‘‘Freud’s method of conception is based on that of Janet, whom he has constantly been inspired by. Transforming the term Ôpsychological analysis,’ employed by Janet, into psychoanalysis has changed nothing in the method used by both students of Charcot.’’ The causal importance given to sexuality or symbolism was also criticized. While Freud, in his ‘‘On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement’’ (1914d), concluded that ‘‘Régis and Hesnard (Bordeaux) have recently [1914] attempted to disperse the prejudices of their countrymen against the new ideas by an exhaustive presentation, which, however, is not always understanding and takes special exception to symbolism,’’ he reproached Hesnard for years for this type of finding. In France the work remained the only extensive essay on psychoanalysis for nearly twenty years and was reprinted in 1922 and 1929. Hesnard spent the war years in Rochefort and on September 16, 1915, married Henriette Aline Vimont. He was supposed to return to Bizerte, Tunisia, in 1917. When he returned to Paris in 1919, he was named professor at the École Principale du Service de Santé de la Marine and assistant in neuropsychiatry at the 741 H E S N A R D , A N G É L O L O U I S M A R I E (1886 – 1969) Bordeaux school of medicine. His interest in psychoanalysis did not wane, nor did his reticence, and he was appointed rapporteur to the Congrès des aliénistes et neurologistes de langue française de Besançon (Congress of francophone psychiatrists and neurologists of Besançon) in August 1923. The subject was ‘‘La Psychanalyse: Valeur étiologique, méthodologique, thérapeutique et psychiatrique de la doctrine.’’ In his conclusion Hesnard wrote, ‘‘It is in this way that psychoanalysis, freed of its terminological errors, its theoretical exaggerations, and its symbolic fictions of semiological research, joins psychiatry, from which it depends, and clinical psychology. . . . It is in this way that this still unwieldy, but highly perfectible, body of doctrine and method, has an incontestable right to our sympathy as scientists and French nationals.’’ While on a trip to Toulon he established contacts with young psychiatrists, who, back in Paris, began to practice psychoanalysis. René Laforgue was the first. It was with Laforgue that Hesnard founded, in 1925, the group and the review of the same name, L’Évolution psychiatrique, before his departure in June to the Far East. He returned in November 1925, and in August 1926 was present at the Congrès des Aliénistes in Geneva and participated in the first Conférence des Psychanalystes de Langue Française (Conference of francophone psychoanalysts) that was created at that time. Although he refused to undergo a teaching analysis (a position he maintained until the end of his life), in November 1926 he became one of the founders of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris, of which he was vice president in 1928 and president in 1930, and in 1927 helped found the Revue française de psychanalyse, where he was responsible for the ‘‘medical section.’’ He was also a member of the Commission Linguistique pour l’Unification du Vocabulaire Psychanalytique Française (Linguistic commission for the unification of French psychoanalytic vocabulary), where he fought for the harmonization of French psychoanalytic terminology. Although supported by Laforgue, he was often criticized by Freud. In 1922, in a preface to the second edition of his first important work, he wrote, ‘‘Freud’s doctrine, the product not of the French character of Charcot, as has been claimed, but rather of Germanic philosophy, has had no more useful adversary in the search for truth than Restraint, the muse of Latinity.’’ Over the years, Hesnard’s position would soften and, 74 2 in 1926, he dedicated his book, La Vie et la Mort des instincts, to Freud: ‘‘To Professor S. Freud, I offer, along with the disavowal of my unfair criticisms, the homage of my pure admiration.’’ When the book was reprinted for the third time in 1929, he noted that he had spent ‘‘ten years in understanding psychoanalysis theoretically and five years in acquiring sufficient practical knowledge,’’ and he softened his initial criticisms. Nonetheless, Hesnard remained part of a small group of psychiatrists who opposed the more cultural approach to psychoanalysis represented by Marie Bonaparte. They especially rejected the authority of the International Psychoanalytic Association, and even of Freud himself—a division that would nearly lead to a split among their ranks in the late nineteen thirties. On January 23, 1932, Hesnard wrote to Bernard Grasset, whom he was trying, in vain, to treat, ‘‘I beg you, forget all that flashiness, the grandiloquence, all those ÔOedipuses.’ You, as a subtle and marvelously intuitive Gaul, should not let yourself be misled further by those Judeo-Germanic specters of enchantment’’ (Bothorel, J., 1989). He was secretary of the Conseil Supérieur de la Marine in Paris in 1938 and was named head of the Service de Santé de la Marine in Algeria and director of the Service de Santé de la Quatrième Région Maritime in 1940, inspector general of the Service de Santé de la Marine in Africa in 1943, and spent the Second World War in Bizerte. In 1942–1943 he wrote an article entitled, ‘‘Sur l’israélisme de Freud,’’ published in 1946, which claimed to be a refutation of the apparent or claimed Jewish influence in Freud’s writings. Nonetheless, Élisabeth Roudinesco maintained that the article was anti-Semitic in spite of Hesnard’s apparent pro-Jewish sentiments (1982). Calumnied and disgraced after the Liberation, from September 1944 to June 1945, he lived with his wife and daughter in Casablanca, where he joined the Socialist Party and gave several talks before returning to Toulon. Hesnard participated indirectly in the renewal of the SPP and was also one of the members of the honor committee of the group and the review Psyché, founded by Maryse Choisy in 1946, which brought together, aside from René Laforgue, religious and academic scholars and Jungian psychologists who had not been admitted to the SPP. He participated in writing the Dictionnaire de psychanalyse et de psychotechnique, which was being prepared in 1949, under the direction of Maryse Choisy and later Daniel Lagache. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS HETEROSEXUALITY At this time Hesnard moved into the ‘‘PortHesnard’’ villa in the Mourillon quarter of Toulon, where he practiced psychoanalytic therapy. He was criticized for his lack of rigor in his work, a reproach that was used against him during the negotiations intended to reintegrate the Société Française de Psychanalyse (SFP) into the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) because he had sided with Jacques Lacan during the June 1953 split. In June 1957 he was dismissed from the SPP for ‘‘non-payment of dues and failure to participate in society activities.’’ Although he was elected president of the SFP in 1959, one of the ‘‘recommendations’’ of the IPA committee, made during the Edinburgh congress of 1961, stipulated ‘‘that the current practice of keeping Doctors Hesnard and Laforgue out of the training program be maintained. With respect to Doctor Hesnard’s students, these can participate in regular analytic training or they will not be admitted as students of the society.’’ Hesnard again sided with Lacan in 1964 during the foundation of the École freudienne de Paris (Freudian school of Paris) and, in 1968, became a member of its ‘‘accreditation committee.’’ In 1964, for family reasons, he left Toulon to settle in Nantes, near where he was born, and where he died on April 17, 1969. There have been references to the ‘‘tall, somewhat Olympian silhouette, the luminous eyes and expressiveness’’ (Picard, 1972) of this complex character, sometimes sarcastically referred to as ‘‘the admiral,’’ whose extensive body of work has had little impact on theory. Following a number of articles written before the war that fall halfway between proselytism and criticism, the bulk of his output was didactic or historical in nature. These include: Freud dans la société d’aprèsguerre (1946), L’Univers morbide de la faute (1949), Morale sans péché (1954), Psychanalyse du lien interhumain (1957), L’OEuvre de Freud et son importance pour le monde moderne (1960), Les Phobies et la Névrose phobique (1961), Psychologie du crime (1963). ALAIN DE MIJOLLA Work discussed: Psychanalyse des névroses et des psychoses, La. See also: Aimée, case of; Congrès des psychanalystes de langue française des pays romans; Disque vert, Le ; Ethics; Évolution psychiatrique (l’ -) (Developments in Psychiatry); France; Object; Psyché, revue internationale de INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS psychanalyse et des sciences de l’homme (Psyche, an international review of psychoanalysis and human sciences); Régis, Emmanuel Jean-Baptiste Joseph; Revue française de psychanalyse; Société française de psychanalyse; Société psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris. Bibliography Bothorel, Jean. (1989). Bernard Grasset: vie et passion d’un éditeur. Paris : Grasset. Hesnard, Angélo. (1960). L’Œuvre de Freud et son importance pour le monde moderne. Preface by M. MerleauPonty, Paris: Payot. Hesnard-Félix, Édith. (1984). Le Dr Hesnard et la naissance de la psychanalyse en France. Ph.D. thesis in philosophy, Paris-I. Picard, Pierre Alexandre. (1972). Hesnard et le début de la psychanalyse en France. Psychologie médicale, IV, 1, p. 73–85. Régis, Emmanuel and Hesnard, Angélo. (1913). La doctrine de Freud et de son école (1re partie). L’Encéphale, VIII, 10 April 1913, p. 356–378. ———. (1914) La psychoanalyse des névroses et des psychoses. Ses applications médicales et extra-médicales. Paris: Félix Alcan. Roudinesco, Élisabeth. (1982). La bataille de cent ans. Histoire de la psychanalyse en France (Vol. 1). Paris: Ramsay. HETEROSEXUALITY The terms to designate sexual orientation arose only in the later nineteenth century. ‘‘Homosexuality’’ owes to work by the Austro-Hungarian journalist and literary figure Károly Mária Kertbeny, who wished to reform prevailing sodomy laws in Prussia; in 1868 he coined the term to avoid the pejorative ‘‘pederast.’’ First used in a letter, it gained some currency and in 1880 its binary opposite—‘‘heterosexuality’’—appeared in a book by Kertbeny’s friend and colleague, zoologist Karl Jager. Richard von Kafft-Ebing picked up both terms, though not systematically, for use in his Psychopathia Sexualis, first published in 1886. Not long afterward, in 1894, the French intellectual Marc-André Raffalovitch used the term ‘‘heterosexual’’ in an article published in the Archives of Criminal Anthropology. In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), Freud’s developmental stage theory gave special force to the implicitly privileged status of heterosexuality in 743 H E U Y E R , G E O R G E S (188 4 –1977 ) a normative context. He outlined a biological and psychological program for each individual, to be elaborated by instinctual objects and aims in a trajectory that moves from a polymorphously perverse disposition in infancy to heterosexual object choice in adolescence. Heterosexuality in recent years has attracted attention as an aspect of gender and sexuality, a new discipline of study in Anglo-American scholarship, combining traditions of feminist scholarship, psychoanalytic theory, and cultural studies. BERTRAND VICHYN See also: Bisexuality; Ego; Homosexuality; Object, change of/choice of; Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. Katz, Ned. (1995). The invention of heterosexuality. New York: Dutton. Further Reading Chodorow, Nancy J. (1992). Heterosexuality as compromise formation: A theory of sexual development. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought. 15, 267–304. HEUYER, GEORGES (1884–1977) A professor of child psychiatry at the Paris Medical School and member of the Académie Nationale de Médecine, Georges Heuyer was born in Pacy-sur-Eure on January 30, 1884, and died in Paris on October 23, 1977. Having lost his father when he was only eighteen months old, he was placed in a boarding school in Pacy, then in Évreux, where his supervisor was the director of the psychiatric asylum—the origin of his interest in psychoanalysis. In spite of his poverty he studied medicine in Paris, where he became friendly with Georges Duhamel, Henri Queuille, Paul Chevalier, and Henri Mondor. After continuing his studies in pediatrics, neurology, and psychiatry, he became an intern, resident, and in 1923, a doctor in the Paris hospital system. In 1925 he was made director of the clinic of child neuropsychiatry, which, in 74 4 1949, created the first chair of child psychiatry in France. The founder of child psychiatry in France and an international spokesman for the field, at the time of his death, Heuyer left behind a considerable body of work, comprising at least ten books and more than eight hundred articles and publications. He was not a psychoanalyst and the great majority of his work was devoted to child neuropsychiatry, maladjusted children, and criminology. It was Heuyer who first introduced the use of trained psychoanalysts in public hospitals (Eugénie Sokolnicka at SainteAnne’s hospital in 1921). With Emmanuel Régis, Angélo Hesnard, and Édouard Pichon, he was one of the promoters of psychoanalysis in France, writing the first article on the subject for a medical treatise, Traité de pathologie médicale, which was edited by Émile Sergent in 1924. In 1925 he created a ‘‘laboratory’’ of psychoanalysis in his clinic, run by Sophie Morgenstern, with whom he published several articles. However, Heuyer wrote little on psychoanalysis with the exception of some studies in collaboration with other people. He was also far from being an uncritical supporter of the field and was always ambivalent and, somewhat later in life, often unfair in his estimate of the profession. However, he did introduce and encourage the use of psychoanalytic inquiry and treatment in child psychiatry and recommended that its practitioners have themselves analyzed or become analysts themselves. This was the case for the majority of his assistants, especially Serge Lebovici (assistant from 1946 to 1957), and of his residents, who subsequently helped psychoanalysis (‘‘which has provided us with so many new and essential concepts’’ he wrote in 1964) assume the key position it currently holds in French child psychiatry. JEAN-LOUIS LANG See also: Analytic psychodrama; Infantile psychosis; Infantile schizophrenia; Psyché, revue internationale de psychanalyse et des sciences de l’homme (Psyche, an international review of psychoanalysis and human sciences). Bibliography Heuyer, Georges. (1924). La psychanalyse. In É. Sergent (Ed.), Traité de pathologie médicale (Vol. 1, Psychiatrie, p. 35–79). Paris: Maloine. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS H I E T Z I N G S C H U L E /B U R L I N G H A M -R O S E N F E L D S C H O O L ———. (1936). Préface. In Sophie Morgenstern, Psychanalyse infantile. Paris: Denoël. Heuyer, Georges; and Morgenstern, Sophie. (1927). Un cas de mutisme chez l’enfant. Guérison par la psychanalyse. Journal de la Société de psychiatrie, 19, 6. Lang, Jean-Louis. (1995). Georges Heuyer, l’art médical et la psychanalyse. Revue de neuropsychiatrie infantile, 43 (6), 269–273. ———. (1997). Georges Heuyer, fondateur de la pédopsychiatrie: un humaniste du XXe siècle. Paris: Expansion scientifique française. HIETZING SCHULE/BURLINGHAMROSENFELD SCHOOL Founded in 1927 by Dorothy Burlingham and Eva Rosenfeld under the aegis of Anna Freud, the Hietzing Schule (Hietzing School) was an effort to create a pedagogic experience inspired by psychoanalytic principles with children who were at the same time engaged in analysis. Small and private (it was sometimes known as the ‘‘Matchbox School’’), the school was housed in a log cabin built in Eva Rosenfeld’s back yard, in the XIIIe district of Vienna. Peter Blos, who had been engaged as tutor to Burlingham’s four children, was its first administrator. He enlisted his friend Erik Homburger Erikson as one of the teachers. Rather few students attended the school, about twenty in all. They came from households in which their parents were apt to understand psychoanalysis or to themselves be in analysis. The children of Burlingham and Rosenfeld, Peter Heller (who would eventually write about his experiences), August Aichhorn’s son Walter, and Ernstl Halberstadr-Freud, participated in the project, which created something like a ‘‘psychoanalytic family.’’ Freud’s own 1918 pronouncements on the role that psychoanalysis might play in preventing psychological conflicts (1919a) undoubtedly influenced the way that the school was conceived. Siegfried Bernfeld, close to Anna Freud, a committed socialist who had himself founded the Kinderheim Baumgarten, gave a lecture on education on February 25, 1929, the contents of which were published in the Frankfurter Zeitung. Psychoanalysis, according to the article, ‘‘would provide decisive INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS arguments in favor of endeavors in modern education to promote the independent creative activity of the child and the retrenchment of authority and punishment’’ (Heller 1992, p. 80). Similarly, teaching at the Hietzing School was to be free of the constraints of a rigid or official curriculum in favor of a project-based approach. To allow free rein to curiosity and fantasy (though not to acting out) would provide a place for studying topics such as ‘‘Eskimos,’’ for example, around which would be organized ethnographic investigations, creation of drawings and objects, and games. Important debates took place between the school’s progressives and latitudinarians (Peter Blos and Erik Erikson) and others who thought it was necessary to impose some unpleasant tasks on children, including Anna Freud, Eva Rosenfeld, and August Aichhorn, who managed the school from 1931 to 1932. Anna Freud, with her teaching experience in a primary school in Vienna and analysis with her father (who was also analyst to both Dorothy Burlingham and Eva Rosenfeld), was one of the first to plan teaching programs based on psychoanalytic principles. She had almost all the children and some teachers in analysis, including Erik Erikson. Although she appreciated progressive advances in education, she was fairly conservative. The school closed in 1932, in part due to Eva Rosenfeld’s departure for Berlin. Some students found it difficult to adapt to public education; this factor subsequently influenced Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham when they founded, in London during the Second World War, the Hampstead War Nurseries and Child Therapy Clinic. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Aichhorn, August; Blos, Peter; BurlinghamTiffany, Dorothy; Erikson, Erik Homburger; Freud, Anna; Rosenfeld, Eva Marie. Bibliography Asspignanesi, Lisa and Forrester, John. (1992). Freud’s women. New York: Basic Books. Freud, Sigmund. (1919a [1918]) Lines of advance in psycho-analytic therapy. SE, 12: 159–168. Heller, Peter. (1992). Anna Freud’s letters to Eva Rosenfeld. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. 745 H I L F E R D I N G -H Ö N I G S B E R G , M A R G A R E T H E (187 1 –1942 ) HILFERDING-HÖNIGSBERG, MARGARETHE (1871–1942) Margarethe Hilferding-Hönigsberg, an Austrian physician and psychoanalyst, was born on June 20, 1871, in Vienna, and died while being deported to Maly Trostinec in September 1942. She was from a family of Jewish doctors, who were deeply involved in the social-democratic movement. She was trained to be a teacher in public and private schools, received her baccalaureate degree, and, in 1898, enrolled in the philosophy department of the University of Vienna. She switched from philosophy to medicine and obtained her doctorate in 1903—one of the first female doctors in Vienna. In 1904 she married Rudolf Hilferding, a socialist economist, future minister of finance of the Weimar Republic. In 1907–1908, the family was living in Berlin but Hilferding-Hönigsberg returned to Vienna with her two sons following her divorce. In 1910 she began practicing medicine in a workers’ quarter of Vienna, where she was also politically active with the social democrats from 1927 to 1934, working as a district councilor. In April 1910 Paul Federn proposed Margarethe Hilferding as a candidate for the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, which led to an in-depth discussion on accepting women into the organization. On April 27, 1910, she became the first woman in the society and, until her resignation, a year-and-a-half later, regularly attended meetings. During the winter 1910–1911 season, she was an auditor at Sigmund Freud’s talks at the school of medicine. In January 1911 she gave her first presentation to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society; it was titled ‘‘The Basis of Maternal Love.’’ In 1911, at the time of the split between Alfred Adler and Sigmund Freud, she sided with Adler and cosigned his letter of withdrawal. After the First World War she was very active in the Verein für Individualpsychologie (Association for Individual Psychology). She worked as a chief physician in offices providing educational counseling in individual psychology and at the Mariahilfer Ambulatorium day hospital. Her seminars, talks, and publications concerned educational issues and the problems of women. In the collection edited by Sofie Lazarsfeld in 1926, ‘‘Volkstümliche Schriftenreihe’’ (Popular Collection), she published La Régulation des naissances with a postscript by Alfred Adler. 74 6 When the National Socialists came to power, Margarethe Hilferding-Hönigsberg was unable to get out in time. She lost her apartment and was placed in a Jewish old-age asylum in Vienna. On June 28, 1942, she was deported to Theresienstadt. She died while being transported to Maly Trostinec in September 1942. ELKE MÜHLLEITNER See also: Austria; Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung. Bibliography Hilferding-Hönigsberg, Margarethe. (1919). Der Schleichhandel. Kampf, 12, p. 300–304. ———. (1920). Was kostet die auskömmliche Ernährung ? Kampf. 13, p. 101–105. ———. (1926). Geburtenregelung. Erörterungen zum 144, Nachw. A. Adler. Vienna-Leipzig: Moritz Perles. Mühlleitner, Elke. (1992). Biographisches Lexikon der Psychoanalyse (Die Mitglieder der Psychologischen MittwochGesellschaft und der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung 1902–1938). Tübingen: Diskord. HIRSCHFELD, ELFRIEDE (1873–?) Born in 1873 and raised in Frankfurt-am-Main, Elfriede Hirschfeld was a patient of Sigmund Freud. She was treated between 1908 and 1914, and appears anonymously in several articles and in his correspondence. The work of Ernst Falzeder (1994) has enabled us to identify the person behind these references. Freud was reticent about treating Hirschfeld after she had already undergone ten years of psychiatric treatment. She continued to receive treatment from several other psychoanalysts and psychiatrists but the results were inconclusive. She appears for the last time in the correspondence between Freud and Ludwig Binswanger on May 10, 1923, while she was being treated in Binswanger’s clinic. Hirschfeld appears as ‘‘Frau A.’’ in the Freud-Abraham correspondence, ‘‘Frau H.’’ in the Freud-Pfister correspondence, ‘‘Frau C.’’ in the Freud-Binswanger correspondence, and finally as the ‘‘thirty-seven year old patient’’ in the Freud-Ferenczi correspondence. She was the subject of six articles and the origin of three articles from 1913: ‘‘An Evidential Dream’’ (1913a), ‘‘Two Lies Told by Children’’ (1913g), and ‘‘The INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS H I R S C H F E L D , E L F R I E D E (1873 –?) Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis’’ (1913i). She is also directly implicated in the following articles: ‘‘Psycho-Analysis and Telepathy’’ (1941d [1921]), ‘‘Some Additional Notes on Dream-Interpretation as a Whole’’ (1925i), and finally in the chapter ‘‘Dreams and the Occult’’ in New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933a [1932]). The list is long enough to establish the importance of Falzeder’s discovery, but we can also confirm that her case serves as the background for the technical articles ‘‘Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through’’ (1914g) and ‘‘Observations on Transference Love’’ (1915a [1914]). Hirschfeld’s case was described in the three articles from 1913 and, in greater detail, in the article on obsessional neurosis. In it Freud introduced the eroticanal phase, following the phases of autoeroticism and narcissism, which was not present in the first edition of the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d). He also introduces the idea of ‘‘symptom mobility,’’ which he does not describe in detail. After six years of analysis, three articles, references in his correspondence, and in spite of the fact that Freud claimed to have ‘‘reached the hard kernel of the illness,’’ the patient had not made much progress. She was passed from doctor to doctor, seeing Carl Gustav Jung, Oskar Pfister, and finally Ludwig Binswanger, who treated her in his clinic. Freud made a comment to Binswanger that was to have considerable technical significance: ‘‘Analytic treatment should be accompanied by institutionalized control’’ (letter of April 27, 1922). This comment, along with others on then ‘‘current’’ methods of treatment that preceded analysis, appears in Freud’s correspondence with Karl Abraham. It demonstrates Freud’s pragmatism when faced with clinical difficulties. Based on the evidence, Hirschfeld pushed Freud toward his final position on transference and countertransference. We can now accept that Freud formulated his first ideas about countertransference with reference to Hirschfeld. Everyone understood the notion of healing through love, as formulated by Carl Jung and Max Eitingon (and which is also found in the Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society [Nunberg, Hermann; and Federn, Ernst, 1962]), in their own way. It is important to remember that it was during this time that Jung was deeply involved with Sabina Spielrein and Sándor Ferenczi with Elma Palos (Haynal, André, and Falzeder, Ernst, 1991). Freud was dealing with a patient who would not now be termed INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS neurotic, as he wrote, nor schizophrenic, as Eugen Bleuler claimed, but very likely borderline or suffering from ‘‘pseudoneurotic schizophrenia.’’ In these pathologies the symptoms do not mark the return of the repressed but serve as a defense against psychotic collapse. Of the hundreds of patients that Freud treated in his practice, few were the subject of a monograph (Dora, for example) or an article (the young homosexual of 1919). Some are mentioned in an article and others appear only as signs or abbreviations in the correspondence. It is clear that psychoanalysis is not a purely empirical science and that its theory is firmly based on clinical practice (Lipton, Samuel D., 1977). Additionally, contemporary witnesses and belated analyses of Freud’s treatments have contributed greatly to our understanding of Freudian practice, as well as how its theorization developed over time (Cremerius, Johannes, 1980). The case of Elfriede Hirschfeld can be read as a female pendant to the Wolfman, to the extent that their treatments took place almost simultaneously. It is worthwhile rereading the introduction of pregenitality based on this case and the use of the primal scene in Freud’s theorization of the Wolfman’s symptoms. It is certain that Freud made progress as a researcher who experimented within this atmosphere of psychiatric nihilism that consisted in providing a diagnosis, then waiting for the illness to run its course. It is likely that his patients recognized this and, depending on their capabilities, benefited from it. NICOLAS GOUGOULIS See also: Case histories. Bibliography Cremerius, Johannes. (1980). Freud bei der Arbeit über die Schulter geschaut. Beiheft zum Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse. 123–158. Falzeder, Ernst. (1994). My grand-patient, my chief tormentor: A hitherto unnoticed case of Freud’s and the consequences. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 63, 297–331. Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE: 7, 123–243. ———. (1913a). An evidential dream. SE: 12, 267–277. ———. (1913g). Two lies told by children. SE: 12, 303–309. 747 HISTORICAL REALITY ———. (1913i). The disposition to obsessional neurosis: a contribution to the problem of choice of neurosis. SE: 12, 311–326. ———. (1914g). Remembering, repeating and workingthrough (Further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis II). SE: 12, 145–156. ———. (1915a [1914]). Observations on transference love (Further recommendations on the technique of psychoanalysis III). SE: 12, 157–171. ———. (1925i). Some additional notes on dream-interpretation as a whole. SE: 19, 123–138. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE: 22, 1–182. ———. (1941d [1921]). Psycho-analysis and telepathy. SE: 18, 173–193. Hanyal, André, and Falzeder, Ernst. (1991). Healing through love? a unique dialogue in the history of psychoanalysis. Free Associations, 21 (2), 1–20. Lipton, Samuel D. (1977). The advantages of Freud’s technique as shown in the analysis of the ratman. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 58, 255–274. Nunberg, Hermann, and Federn, Ernst. (1962-1975). Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. New York: International Universities Press. HISTORICAL REALITY ‘‘Historical reality’’ refers to the real facts and events of the past as they occurred historically, whether they were external or internal to the subject confronted by them. In general, historical reality stands opposed to wishful fantasies and to everything within the mind that may be said to answer to the pleasure/unpleasure principle and its principal mechanism: hallucinatory wish-fulfillment. To better understand the relevance of historical reality to psychoanalysis, it is important to realize that the conflict between the two fundamental principles of the mental apparatus—the pleasure/unpleasure principle and the reality principle—also has an impact on the past and on the subject’s ideas about the past. On the one hand, history as retained in memory is capable of being reinterpreted and transformed on behalf of the pleasure/unpleasure principle by means of the individual’s fantasies, wishes, and defenses. A fantasy that has been cathected and activated by hallucinatory wish-fulfillment behaves as an actual reality, 74 8 interfering with the ego’s ability to differentiate real events from imagined and hallucinated ones. This view supports the belief in memory’s poor reliability when it comes to historical reality, since any memory is likely to have been reorganized on behalf of the pleasure/unpleasure principle. On the other hand, Freud—and many other psychoanalysts as well—was never able completely to overlook the impact of certain traumatic historical events in the etiology of mental suffering and symptomology. While history can be transformed for the sake of the libidinal economy of the subject, the repression of the historical reality would be incomplete, since it would leave traces as psychic events unfolded. The reality principle must also be capable of being applied to the past and of opposing the pleasure principle. In a way fantasies themselves might be said to indicate the existence of a kernel of historical reality. Fantasy and historical reality are not strict opposites. Fantasies, as Freud wrote early in his career, are of ‘‘mixed blood’’—intermediary formulations that fall somewhere between lived reality and the way in which the subject has given it meaning within his libidinal organization of the moment. Thus in addition to representative forms of the ‘‘memory’’ of events and facts in the past, forms that are likely to be subjected to different kinds of ‘‘deferred’’ reinterpretations and wishes, there are ways of directly recording lived experience that bear witness to the impact of historical reality. The work of reconstructing historical reality is, therefore, potentially possible, and indeed one of the essential goals of psychoanalytic work (Freud, 1937d) is to extend the influence of the reality principle to the past and its representation. Historical reality and mental reality are not, therefore, strictly at odds. The reality of experience marks history with an imprint that has significance within the current psychic organization, in particular during childhood, on the basis of infantile sexual theories and the narcissism of infantile animism. Debate continues to erupt, however, within psychoanalysis, over the disjunction between historical reality and mental reality, and this suggests the fragility of the synthesis mentioned above. It would seem that the question of the distribution of what is part of actual history—and therefore, ‘‘outside’’ the subject—and what is part of desire still needs to be re-examined, as if the boundary INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS HISTORICAL TRUTH between inside and outside was fluid and admitted a degree of undecidability essential to mental functioning and internal conflict. RENÉ ROUSSILLON See also: Construction de l’espace analytique, La; Event; Fantasy; History and psychoanalysis; Internal reality/ external reality; Screen memory; Seduction scenes. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1899a). Screen memories. SE, 3: 299–322. ———. (1937d). Constructions in analysis. SE, 23: 255–269. ———. (1939a). Moses and monotheism: Three essays. SE, 23: 1–137. Roussillon, René. (1995) La métapsychologie des processus et la transitionnalité. Revue française de psychanalyse, 59. Viderman, Serge. (1970) La Construction de l’espace analytique. Paris: Denoël. HISTORICAL TRUTH Historical truth, as Sigmund Freud conceived it, can be defined as a lost piece of the subject’s lived experience that is accessible only through the work of construction. The term historical here refers to origins, which explains why historical truth can be presented as a kernel of truth in formations as diverse as legends, religions, or delusions. The problem of historical truth can be theorized in a number of ways in the field of history. The fundamental split between the approach of the historian and that of the psychoanalyst has to do with their respective ways of conceiving temporality. For the psychoanalyst, time is blended: Present and past live together in repetition and in the reliving that is a part of the transference. For the historian, by contrast, the past is separate from the present, and even if there are causal links between the two, their order of succession remains immutable, since what endows an event with its historicity is precisely the fact that it occurred at one time that will never be repeated. Thus, seen from a psychoanalytic perspective, historical truth is not the material truth of an event, even if Freud may have believed this early on his works, but rather the truth of a history as it appears through an event. It is the truth of a sequence and not of a point; it requires the reconstruction of phases leading up to the constitution of an INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS element that can claim the status of truth. Accordingly, historical truth is to be distinguished from material truth—literal truth that is presumed to have a direct referent in reality. Although Freud spoke a great deal about truth throughout his work, it was toward the end of his work that he essentially developed the notion of historical truth, mainly in connection with ‘‘Constructions in Analysis’’ (1937d) and ‘‘Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays’’ (1939a [1934–38]). The idea of historical truth is very important in psychoanalysis, because it makes it possible to take off from a realistic conception of the analytic process, as it was present in Freud’s early theory centered around trauma, and move toward a more refined, perspectivebased conception where the main focus is on the notion of construction and the process of an indirect confirmation of the construction by the analysand, who can thus give it a truth value, even in the absence of a recovered memory. However, the notion of truth remains dependent upon a feeling of certainty. It is not formal, in the sense that it could be considered to be the same thing as exactness. Two factors must be taken into account here. The first relates to what Freud called intellectual feeling and concerns the degree of conviction brought by an isolated and repressed piece of truth that returns. This ‘‘kernel of truth,’’ a veritable fossil, is the basis for the irresistible claim to truth contained in religious faith as well as in delusional beliefs. This is a ‘‘historical’’ truth, that is, the truth of both the fossil kernel and the sense the subject may have of the process of distortion that is attached to it. In Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays, Freud wrote: ‘‘An idea such as this has a compulsive character: it must be believed. To the extent to which it is distorted, it may be described as a delusion; in so far as it brings a return of the past, it must be called the truth’’ (p. 130). ‘‘Historical truth’’ is thus revealed to be distinct from historical exactitude when the latter does not involve this passage by way of the repressed, and the truth is not implicit in historical narration, for this is, on the contrary, the site of compromise and dissimulation, which this time are conscious. However, as Freud wrote in Moses and Monotheism: ‘‘In its implications the distortion of a text resembles a murder: the difficulty is not in perpetrating the deed, but in getting rid of its traces’’ (p. 43); the only possibility is thus to follow these guiding fossils 749 HISTORY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS (Leitfossil) that open a pathway toward truth through these distortions. In ‘‘Constructions in Analysis,’’ the dialectic concerning truth is even more subtle, since an erroneous construction can lead the patient to remember a fragment of his or her historical truth. In this case, said Freud, citing Shakespeare’s Polonius, it is as if ‘‘our bait of falsehood had taken a carp of truth’’ (p. 262). The work of interpretation thus entails freeing the fossil from the aggregate of current material encasing it and bringing it back to the point in the past to which it belongs. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Amnesia; Anticipatory ideas; Construction de l’espace analytique, La; ‘‘Constructions in Analysis’’; Myth of origins; Paranoia; Truth. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1937d). Constructions in analysis. SE, 23: 255–269. ———. (1939a [1934–1938]). Moses and monotheism: three essays. SE, 23: 1–137. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1985). Vérité ou fantasme de vérité. Métapsychologie et Philosophie. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Viderman, Serge. (1970). La Construction de l’espace analytique. Paris: Denoël. Further Reading Mijolla, Alain de. (1996). Psychoanalysts and their history. International Psychoanalysis: The Newsletter of the IPA, 5 (1), 25–28. Spence, Donald. (1982). Narrative truth and historical truth. Meaning and interpretation in psychoanalysis, New York: W. W. Norton. HISTORY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Freud wrote little about history, in the sense that professional historians understand that term, or about its relationship to psychoanalysis. Nevertheless, three remarks are in order. From the outset, Freud posited psychoanalytic investigation as being linked to the reconstitution of the patient’s personal history. The aim was to restore this history to patients, with the goal of helping individuals emerge as the subject and agent of their own history through the lifting of the repressions that weighed 75 0 it down, and breaking the pattern of repetitions that resulted from it. Initially Freud conceived of this process as a restitution of buried traces in their entirety; he thus readily compared it with the task of the archaeologist who brings to light the strata of a buried past layer by layer. Although he always maintained his fundamental hypothesis—that the psyche forgets nothing—he came to believe that these ‘‘traces’’ undergo constant change as they are reshaped through deferred action and that they can therefore only be known through analysis in this reworked form, as he explained in ‘‘Constructions in Analysis’’ (1937). If Freud showed little interest in History as it is written by historians, by contrast he took a great interest in the prehistory and anthropology of so-called primitive peoples, above all at the time when he was seeking to substantiate his views on phylogenesis as the basis for individual psychogenesis. This was the period when he wrote Totem and Taboo (1912–13a) and A Phylogenetic Fantasy: Overview of the Transference Neuroses (1987 [1915]). Finally, on several occasions Freud undertook a psychoanalytic interpretation of significant personalities from both the past, such as Leonardo da Vinci (‘‘Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood,’’ 1910), and the present, such as President Woodrow Wilson (Thomas Woodrow Wilson, TwentyEighth President of the United States: A Psychological Study, with W. C. Bullitt, 1966). Returning to the story of Moses in Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays (1939a), he sought to show that the theory that Moses was an Egyptian would account for his mythical role of founder of a monotheistic religion. It was this type of work, known as psychobiographical studies, that was most influential on certain of his successors. Notably, in this regard, reinterpretations of Nazism in terms of Adolf Hitler’s personality and psychopathology can be cited; see, for example, Saul Friedländer’s History and Psychoanalysis: An Inquiry into the Possibilities and Limits of Psychohistory (1975/1978). These studies have often drawn criticism (for example, from Alain Besançon, after a 1974 work in which he tried this approach) for the reductionist tendency of some authors to overlook factors (cultural, economic, social, etc.) operating outside of individual psychic functioning. The historian and the psychoanalyst would seem to have common interests: both work on memory, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS H I T S C H M A N N , E D U A R D (1871 –1 957) forgetting, and the restitution of traces; for both, the temporal dimension is essential. Both admit that they construct their object of study through the combined use of techniques for gathering factual data and the work of interpretation that endows these data with meaning by fitting them together; moreover, both use narratives as their starting point, and they accept that these narratives come to them constructed through meaning and must be deconstructed and reconstructed within the framework of their discipline. See also: Andersson, Ola; Anzieu, Didier; ‘‘An Autobiographical Study’’; Bernfeld, Siegfried; Certeau, Michel de; Construction de l’espace analytique, La; Freud’s Self-Analysis; Ellenberger, Henri Frédéric; Historical truth; International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis; Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood; Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays; On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement; Prehistory; Psychoanalytic filiations; Psychoanalytic research; Psychobiography; Psychohistory. One difference between them is the fact that while the historian focuses on the effects of time in the collective memory, the psychoanalyst focuses on these effects in the case of an individual person considered as such. This difference might seem to be a minor one, were it not for the substantial difficulties in assessing how these two levels of analysis are connected: How do collective history and individual history fit together? To what extent does History depend on the contingencies of individual fates, and to what extent are these fates shaped by History? The main difficulties, however, are epistemological in nature. Besançon, Alain. (1974). L’histoire psychanalytique: Une anthologie. Paris: Mouton. These difficulties have to do with methods: While the historian is at leisure to verify and tally sources using every means at his or her disposal, the analyst is, as a matter of principle—within the framework of ‘‘classical’’ treatment—limited to only what the patient says in the analytic setting. It is impossible to establish whether a given event in the past actually took place as the patient says it did. It has been argued, justifiably, that this is a moot question, that the only event that is certain is that something has been said this way in the here and now, and that therein lies all the ‘‘material’’ of the analysis (see Viderman, 1970, 1977). Viderman, Serge. (1970). La construction de l’espace analytique. Paris: Denoël. The divergence between history and psychoanalysis exists also, and perhaps above all, at the theoretical level. Time does not have the same status in the two disciplines. The psychoanalyst, who can only know past events through their narration in the present, is led to accept two temporalities: a one-directional, linear time in which the narrated events, with their possibility causality, are ordered; and another, twodirectional time, in which an event has modified, sometimes profoundly, an earlier event that is thus reshaped. This means accepting a principle of ‘‘anterograde’’ causality that has no analogue in the study of history or, perhaps, in any other discipline. ROGER PERRON INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Friedländer, Saul. (1978). History and psychoanalysis: An inquiry into the possibilities and limits of psychohistory. (Susan Suleiman, Trans.). New York: Holmes & Meier. (Original work published 1975) Le Beuf, Diane, Perron, Roger, and Pragier, Georges (eds.). (1998). Construire l’histoire. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Mijolla, Alain de. (1996). Psychoanalysts and their history. International Psychoanalysis: The Newsletter of the IPA, 5 (1), 25–28. ———. (1977). Le céleste et le sublunaire. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. HITSCHMANN, EDUARD (1871–1957) Austrian physician and psychoanalyst Eduard Hitschmann was born in Vienna on July 28, 1871, and died in the United States on July 31, 1957. He was one of Freud’s early disciples and remained loyal to him throughout a long career. Raised in Vienna, Hitschmann was the son of a banker and the grandson of a physician. He attended the University of Vienna Medical School, received his degree in 1895, and initially practiced internal medicine. In 1905 Paul Federn brought him into the Wednesday Psychological Society. By then a well-known physician, he served for a time as the Freud family doctor. In April 1909, Hitschmann read before the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society a paper entitled ‘‘A General Presentation of Freud’s Theories’’ (Nunberg and Federn, 1962) in which he proposed to write a brief exegesis of psychoanalytic ideas. Freud cautioned Hitschmann not to present psychoanalysis as a closed system and insisted on openly acknowledging that there are 751 H O F F E R , W I L L I ( W I L H E L M ) (1 897 –19 67) domains in which psychoanalysis could lay no clear claim to knowledge. ‘‘Furthermore, this work would require that the writer refrain from expressing any of his own ideas’’ (Nunberg and Federn, 1962, p. 210). Hitschmann went on to write the first concise presentation of psychoanalysis, Freuds Neuosenlehre: Nach ihrem gegenwärtigen Stande zusammenfassend dargestellt (1911), which was translated into English as Freud’s Theories of Neurosis. He also wrote numerous biographical studies, including those of Franz Schubert, William James, and Emanuel Swedenborg; these studies were published in Great Men: Psychoanalytic Studies (1956). Hitschmann’s many psychoanalytic publications did not always receive a friendly appraisal by Freud, who maintained a certain intellectual distance in spite of their friendship. He viewed Hitschmann as ‘‘quite orthodox’’ (Freud 1974, p. 400), as he remarked to Jung. However, Freud entrusted Hitchsmann to direct the psychoanalytic outpatient clinic, or ‘‘Ambulatorium,’’ when it was established in Vienna in 1922. Hitschmann fled the Nazis in 1938 and sought refuge in London; in 1944 he emigrated to Boston where he worked as a training analyst until his death. HAROLD LEUPOLD-LÖWENTHAL See also: Internationale Zeitschrift fur Psychoanalyse; Lehrinstitut der Wiener Psychoanalystischen Vereinigung; Psychoanalystiche Bewegung; Wiener psychoanalystiche Vereinigung. Bibliography Becker, Philip L. (1966). Edward Hitschmann, 1871–1957, Psychoanalysis of great men. In Franz Alexander, Samuel Eisenstein and Martin Grotjahn (Eds.), Psychoanalytic Pioneers. New York: Basic Books Inc. Freud, Sigmund. (1974a). The Freud/Jung letters: The correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C.G.Jung. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hitschmann, Eduard. (1911). Freud’s theories of the neuroses, by Dr. Eduard Hitschmann. Authorized translation by Dr. C.R. Payne, with an introduction by Ernest Jones. New York, Moffat, Yard and company, 1917. 257 p. ———. (1956). Great men: psychoanalytic studies. New York: International Universities Press. Nunberg, Hermann; and Federn, Ernst. (1962). The Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Vol. I, 1906–1908. New York: International. Universities Press. 75 2 HOFFER, WILLI (WILHELM) (1897–1967) Willie Hoffer, British physician and psychoanalyst, was born in Luditz, Austria in 1897, and died on October 25, 1967, in London. Educated in Pilsen and Vienna, he became keenly interest in biology and psychology, and took a Ph.D., the thesis for which concerned play as a means of education. He was analyzed by Herman Nunberg from 1921 to 1922. Although he first joined the Viennese Psychoanalytical Society in 1923 as a non-medical member, he studied and qualified in medicine in 1929. In Vienna, Hoffer worked closely with Anna Freud, and when the Freud family and others left for London in 1938, he too came to London and remained a staunch supporter and in many ways a protector of Freud’s youngest daughter. Anna Freud repeatedly consulted him on many important matters and strongly relied on his judgement. He was a consultant at the Hampstead Child Therapy Course and Clinic, which was founded by Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham. Hoffer obtained a British medical qualification in 1943 and taught at the Maudsley Hospital, as Consultant Psychotherapist, from 1954 to 1962. In 1949 he was elected Editor-in-Chief of The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis. In 1957 he resigned this post to become President of the British Psycho-Analytical Society for the following three years; he had already, in 1957, been elected an Honorary Vice-President for life of the International Psychoanalytical Association. His many other honors included appointments as Abraham Flexner Lecturer in Nashville, Tennessee in 1953 and Sigmund Freud Lecturer in New York in 1966. Of his tours abroad, his help in re-establishing psychoanalysis in post-war Germany through repeated visits to teach in Frankfurt were particularly appreciated. Hoffer wrote a great deal. His best-known work is perhaps his paper on ‘‘Mouth, Hand and EgoIntegration’’ (1950), followed the next year by a paper on oral aggressiveness and ego development. He was also fascinated by young children and what could be learned by studying them. Anna Freud, in a memorial address in 1968, emphasized his ‘‘unique role in laying the foundations for a sound and well-planned approach to the study of children of all ages’’ and reminded her audience that he had set up, in Vienna, a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS HOGARTH PRESS psychoanalytic training course for teachers, graduates of which were spread all over the western world. a reputation for quality that brought the imprint renown. His interest in children was reflected in his writings on play, fairy tales, and education, but his interests were wide and his papers included work on the psychoanalytic investigation of brain damage, schizophrenia, group formation, metapsychology and analytic technique. Hoffer based much of his work on clinical observation and he was at all times a careful writer whose works were frequently revised before publication. In 1924 the Press moved to more substantial premises in Tavistock Square in London. Between 1921, when Virginia Woolf ’s Monday or Tuesday was launched, and 1938, thirty-three titles are listed in the Annals of English Literature 1475–1950, all of high quality, though the first pamphlet was published in 1917. The press became a self-supporting business with a high reputation, particularly in the area of literature. It became an allied company of Chatto and Windus in 1946. By that time, if pamphlets and little series of essays are included, 527 titles had appeared. Apart from writers either famous or later to become so, such as T.S. Eliot, Robert Graves, Katherine Mansfield, C. Day Lewis and Virginia Woolf herself, issues such as disarmament, the League of Nations, educational reform and racial prejudice were tackled. Hogarth was recognized as a foremost publisher of challenging new ideas and major writing. The Press retained this reputation after the alliance with Chatto and Windus. His warmth and personal qualities made him very popular in the British Society, and his work was appreciated by many outside his own group. His wife Hedwig was a non-medical psychoanalyst with whom he lived happily and to whom he was close in every way; her death in 1961 was a very heavy blow to him, and although he faced it bravely, it left its mark. CLIFFORD YORKE See also: Controversial Discussions; Gesammelte Werke; Great Britain; International Journal of Psychoanalysis, The; Lehrinstitut der Weiner Psychoanalytishen Vereinigung; Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung. Bibliography Hoffer, Willi. (1947). Diaries of adolescent schizophrenics (hebephrenics). Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 2, 293–312. ———. (1950). Mouth, hand and ego integration. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 3–4, 49–56. ———. (1955). Psychoanalysis: Practical and research aspects. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. ———. (1956). Transference and transference neurosis. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 37, 377–379. ———. (1968). Notes on the theory of defense. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 23, 178–188. HOGARTH PRESS The Hogarth Press was born in the dining room of the home of Leonard and Virginia Woolf (Hogarth House) in Richmond, Surrey. It was devised largely as a hobby for its owners, with whose literary views it was closely identified; but their standing as writers and critics of substance meant that the small press, concerned more with standards than with profit, attracted INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Seven psycho-analytic works, including Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920a), Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c) and the first volume of his Collected Papers, were translated from the German under the editorship of Ernest Jones, assisted by James Strachey and published in Britain between 1921 and 1924. But in that year, negotiations were completed with the Hogarth Press, who added the seven numbers of what was entitled The International Psycho-Analytical Library to its list. A partnership was struck with the Institute of Psycho-Analysis in London, who became co-publishers, Leonard Woolf retaining a right of veto, though there is no record that this was ever exercised. The Library accepted for publication only works of the highest standard, most of which were kept in print for long periods. Karl Abraham, Sandor Ferenczi, Anna Freud and Heinz Hartmann were among its many distinguished authors. The enterprise was so successful that Leonard Woolf agreed to publish a Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud in a new translation under the general editorship of James Strachey, with the collaboration of Anna Freud and the assistance of Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson. The first of twenty-four volumes appeared in 1953 and the last in 1966. The whole is a triumph of scholarship, with extensive notes and editorial 753 HOLDING introductions: no comparable collection of Freud exists anywhere in the world. Woolf is said to have described the decision to publish the work, with understatement, as ‘‘rather fortuitous.’’ Unhappily, for reasons that have never been fully disclosed, the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, against the wishes of the then editor of the International Library, Clifford Yorke, decided to discontinue the Library, and the last of the series, number 118, Freud’s Self-Analysis by Didier Anzieu, was published in 1986. However, the link with Hogarth as co-publishers of the Standard Edition, which has maintained its international success, continues. A new edition is now planned, with a scholarly update of Strachey’s editorial apparatus, with additional papers by Freud that were either unknown or unavailable at the time of the first edition, with new refinements. In this venture, the American publisher Norton will join the Hogarth Press and the Institute of PsychoAnalysis. It will be two or three years before the new edition is ready for publication. The Hogarth Press has maintained its identity, together with Chatto and Windus, even though it is now part of the Random House publishing group. CLIFFORD YORKE See also: British Psycho-Analytical Society; Glover, James; Great Britain; Jones, Ernest; Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. HOLDING Holding is the process by which the mother’s capacity to identify with her infant enables her to provide sensitive physical support, especially when the child is physiologically vulnerable. This provision of ego support is a ‘‘form of loving’’ that provides the basis for the establishment of integrated psychological development. Donald Winnicott presented his ideas on holding and infant development to the public, and to those directly responsible for infant care (1947), and formulated these in psychoanalytic terms at the 22nd International Psychoanalytic Congress at Edinburgh in his seminal paper ‘‘The Theory of the Parent-Infant Relationship’’ (1960). 75 4 Sensitive physical handling by the mother allows the baby to tolerate frustrations such as hunger and discomfort and experience the gradual diminishment of his sense of omnipotence without going to pieces. Holding, at the beginning, is a series of physical acts which include responding to the baby’s skin, feeding, and a group of sensory sensitivities built into the whole routine of day to day care. This is continued as necessary ego support throughout childhood and adolescence. When practicing as a pediatrician during and after World War II, Winnicott addressed many groups, including parents and nursery care workers, about the essential qualities of infant care. In describing the minute details of ordinary breast-feeding, he was able to demonstrate how the ‘‘good-enough mother’’ provides sensitive physical and psychological holding of her baby. She identifies with her infant to know how the child feels and to provide just what it needs. In the holding phase, this fosters the baby’s apparent belief that what it wanted, it created. It has then a hopeful sense of itself in the present and over time. Successful holding provides the baby with the feeling of reliability in the world, both internal and external. The average mother provides this reliability almost without thinking; and by small increments of frustration allows her baby to become ‘‘disillusioned’’ and aware that there is a ‘‘me’’ and ‘‘not-me’’ and a world that in fact it cannot control. Successful holding is the mothers handling of her infant through a ‘‘mutuality of cross identifications’’ and leads to an integration of the self. Winnicott is clear that these processes in infancy are not the same as the pathological mental mechanisms of the disturbed or borderline adult patient, but those infants who have been significantly ‘‘let down’’ (1970) experience unthinkable anxieties and the later possibility of schizoid states. Winnicott also described holding within the analytic relationship and more broadly in casework with adult patients (1960). When the analyst’s mind wanders, it can be experienced by the patient as a failure to ‘‘hold’’ the mind. Although mention is made of the father’s role in later phases (1960), Winnicott focuses his attention more on the immediacy of the mother-baby interaction and less on the conditions within the adult couple and family needed to foster a successful holding phase. PAUL CAMPBELL INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS H O L L I T S C H E R - F R E U D , M A T H I L D E (1887 –1 978) See also: Breastfeeding; Breakdown; Dead mother complex; Framework of the psychoanalytic treatment; Good-enough mother; Handling; Integration; Maternal; Maternal care; Object; Protective shield, breaking through the; Psychosomatic limit/boundary; Self-mutilation in children; Splitting of the object. Bibliography Anthony, E., and Benedek, T. (Eds.). (1970). Parenthood: Its psychology and psychopathology. Boston: Little, Brown. Winnicott, Donald W. (1964). Further thoughts on babies as persons. In his The child, the family and the outside world (p. 85–92). Harmondsworth, Penguin Books. (Original work published 1947) ———. (1960). The theory of parent-infant relationship. The maturational processes and the facilitating environment. London, Hogarth, 1965, p. 17–55. ———. (1970). The mother-infant experience of mutuality. In E. Anthony, T. Benedek (Eds.), Parenthood: Its psychology and psychopathology. Boston: Little, Brown. HOLLITSCHER-FREUD, MATHILDE (1887–1978) The eldest daughter of Sigmund Freud, Mathilde was born on October 16, 1887, in Vienna, and died in London on February 20, 1978. Mathilde, named after Josef Breuer’s wife, appeared in Freud’s dreams as his only reference to oedipal and fatherly feelings (1900a). A sickly child, Mathilde suffered from several serious illnesses, including bouts with diphtheria, and references to her health problems as an adolescent and even after her marriage appear often in her father’s correspondence. When she was twenty and doubted her physical appearance, Freud wrote: You know that I have always intended to keep you at home until you are at least twenty-four, until you are strong enough for the duties of marriage and possibly of bearing children, and until the weakness, which those three serious illnesses in your early life left behind, has been repaired. In social and material circumstances like ours, girls quite rightly do not marry during their early youth; otherwise their married life would be over too soon. . . . I think you probably associate the present minor complaint with an old worry about which I should very much like to talk to you for once. I have guessed for a long time INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS that in spite of all your common sense you fret because you think you are not good-looking enough and therefore might not attract a man. I have watched this with a smile, first of all because you seem quite attractive enough to me, and secondly because I know that in reality it is no longer physical beauty which decides the fate of a girl, but the impression of her whole personality. Your mirror will inform you that there is nothing common or repellent in your features. . . . The more intelligent among young men are sure to know what to look for in a wife—gentleness, cheerfulness, and the talent to make their life easier and more beautiful (March 26, 1908) (Freud 1960, pp. 271–272). Despite Freud’s vague plan that she marry Sándor Ferenczi, seven months later he announced her engagement to ‘‘a young Viennese businessman named Robert Hollitscher’’ (1875–1959) whom she married at the synagogue the same day (February 7, 1909) as her uncle, Freud’s brother Alexander, married. In September 1912 Freud interrupted his vacation to go to Mathilde’s bedside. A botched appendectomy from six years earlier, which had then carried a risk of peritonitis, had caused her to suffer a miscarriage. Mathilde remained childless but, after the death of her sister Sophie in 1920, she took charge of young Heinele (Heinz Rudolf Halberstadt). ‘‘My eldest, Math[ilde], and her husband,’’ Freud told some friends, ‘‘have virtually adopted him and have fallen in love with him so thoroughly that one could not have predicted it.’’ (Gay 1988, p. 421) But Heinele died on June 19, 1923. In Vienna, Mathilde became friends with Ruth Mack Brunswick, who named her eldest daughter after her. After her husband’s business suffered during the Great Depression, Freud helped financially while Mathilde opened a fashionable women’s clothing store. Mathilde and her husband managed to emigrate to London on May 26, 1938, and so welcomed Freud at his arrival shortly thereafter. Mathilde Hollitscher opened another clothing story on Baker Street. She retired in 1960 and died on February 20, 1978 at age ninety-two. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Berggasse 19, Wien IX; Freud-Bernays, Martha; Irma’s injection, dream of; Mathilde, case of. 755 H O L L Ó S , I S T V Á N (1872 –1957 ) Bibliography Appignanesi, Lisa; and Forrester, John. (1992). Freud’s women. New York: Basic Books. Freud, Sigmund. (1960a [1873–1939]). Letters. New York: Basic Books. Gay, Peter. (1988). Freud: A life for our time. New York: Doubleday, 1988. Gödde, Günther. (2003). Mathilde Freud. Die älteste Tocher Sigmund Freud in Briefen und Selbstzeugnissen Gieben. Giessen: Psychosozial-Verlag. Jones, Ernest. (1957). Life and work of Sigmund Freud. (Vol. 3). New York: Basic Books. HOLLÓS, ISTVÁN (1872–1957) István Hollós, the Hungarian physician, psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst, was born in Budapest in 1872 and died there in 1957. The son of a modest artisan (a Jewish tailor, called Heszler before he Magyarized his name), he studied medicine at the Royal School in Budapest. He met Sándor Ferenczi at the beginning of the century and participated in the foundation of the Psychoanalytic Association of Budapest (1913), of which he was vicepresident. He worked as an analyst, then did a short analysis with Freud in 1918, followed by control analysis in Vienna with Paul Federn, an analyst specializing in psychotic patients. He was president of the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Society from 1933 to 1939. He was appointed director of the famous Lipotmezö clinic near Budapest, also known as the ‘‘Yellow House.’’ He was close to Ferenczi’s circle and opened the doors of his asylum to writers (Kosztolànyi and Karinthy) who were interested in psychotic patients and their linguistic productions. During the period of the Hungarian Commune he taught in the university as a psychiatric ‘‘exhibitor.’’ He translated Freud into Hungarian, first The Interpretation of Dreams, finished in about 1917, revised by Ferenczi and published by Somlóin about 1934–1935; followed by The Ego and the Id with Géza Dukes, published by Pantheon in 1937. In 1925, under the anti-Semitic regime of Miklós Horthy he had to resign his position as director of the asylum. He wrote a moving testimony to the work he did there and addressed it to Freud, who was prompted to wonder about his own ‘‘intolerance’’ with regard to psychotic patients. He continued to 75 6 translate Freud and practice as an analyst while maintaining close relations with Ferenczi. In 1944 thanks to the last minute intervention of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, he and his wife, along with a few other Jews, escaped a tragic death. He wrote an account of the trauma: Letter from a Survivor (Psyche, 24 (3), 1974). Following the death of his wife and a manic episode for which he received treatment, he returned to the Yellow House, where he ended his days. Hollós was one of the pioneers of a new approach to mental patients who were, as he put it in 1927, ‘‘on strike from life.’’ His sensitivity, empathy, humanistic principles, and analytic practice helped him to transform asylum conditions, thus making him a forerunner of the movement to apply psychoanalysis in psychiatric institutions. MICHELLE MOREAU RICAUD See also: Ferenczi, Sándor; Hungary. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sándor; and Hollós, István. (1922). Zur Psychoanalyse der paralytischen Geistesstörung. Wien : Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. Hollós, István. (1914). Egy versmondo betegröl. Nyugat, 8, p. 333–340. ———. (1919). Die Phasen des Selbstbewusstseinsaktes. Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, 5, p. 93–101. ———. (1927). Mes adieux à la Maison jaune. Le CoqHéron, 100, 1986. ———. (1933). Psychopathologie alltäglicher telepathischer Erscheinungen. Imago, 19, 529–546. HOMOSEXUALITY The term homosexuality designates a sexual orientation in which a person of the same sex is the object. The term was apparently coined in 1869, from the Greek homos (‘‘same’’), by K. M. Benkert, a writer who published his works under the pseudonym Kertbeny Karoli. He was a defender of sexual rights, and he used the term ‘‘homosexual’’ during discussions on whether to change paragraph 143 of the Prussian Constitution of April 14, 1851, which punished acts of ‘‘unnatural INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS HOMOSEXUALITY indecency’’ committed between men, or between a man and an animal. It is highly surprising that Freud took no interest in this manifestation of sexual life during the first years of psychoanalysis, despite the abundant literature on the topic by such writers as Jean-Martin Charcot, Valentin Magnan, Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Albert Moll, Magnus Hirschfeld, and others. Though Freud views neurosis as the ‘‘negative of perversion’’ (without mentioning homosexuality), this is because he supposes that psychic processes do not undergo repression in the ‘‘pervert.’’ Moreover, the theory of bisexuality (Freud-Fliess) introduces the question, albeit under the veil of biology. However, Freud did undertake to analyze a homosexual patient at the end of the nineteenth century, but the patient concerned apparently committed suicide at Trafoi. The arrival of Isidore Sadger in Freud’s circle in 1906 was to be decisive. As dialogue between him and Freud led to the laying down of an ‘‘etiological formula’’: masculine homosexuality results from a boy’s childhood repression of the existence of a ‘‘strong’’ mother and a weak or absent father (Freud, 1910c). In the debate with Sadger, who adhered to the seduction theory, Freud proposed etiological variants in which the boy’s arousal is transposed from the mother onto men (1905d [1910]), or else there is identification with the mother, hatred towards boys is converted into love, there is a ‘‘narcissistic’’ fixation on the penis, or we see identification with the mother leading to repression of love for the mother (Nunberg, Federn, 1962–75). The theory of narcissism that developed in tandem with that of homosexuality opened up a path that Freud left relatively unexplored: the transmission of narcissism. Thus, Freud’s descriptions in ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ (1914c)—‘‘A person may love . . . according to the narcissistic type . . . (a) what he himself is (i.e., himself), (b) what he himself was’’ (p. 90)—could be supplemented by formulae such as ‘‘a person loves that which the other wants him to be’’ and, eventually, ‘‘a person loves in himself that which the other would have liked to have or to be’’ (p. 90). The other area barely outlined by Freud in the discussions of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society is that of the passage from autoeroticism to narcissism: ‘‘In general, man has two original sexual objects and his later life depends on the one upon which he remains fixated. These two sexual objects are, for each INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS individual, the woman (the mother, the children’s nurse, etc.) and his own person. It is a question of getting rid of both of them and not lingering over them. One’s own person is the one which, most often, is replaced by the father; the latter soon enters the hostile position. Homosexuality bifurcates at this point. The homosexual is unable to detach himself from himself so soon’’ (1914c). This heavily significant appearance of the father-figure was not followed up in the etiology of masculine homosexuality but it was later to be found in the analysis of male paranoia (the Schreber case, reported in ‘‘Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia [Dementia Paranoides]’’: 1911c [1910]), in which a pathological defense against homosexuality develops, though the role of the father is never specified. Is he an agent of culture because he brandishes castration in the name of the law that forbids masturbation and the mother? Might he not also fill a role as seducer? In 1910, homosexuality was defined by the characteristics of the object or the subject, but in 1915, in place of this distinction, Freud returned to the conception he had earlier developed with Fliess: the object is merely the reflection of the bisexual nature of the subject (‘‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,’’ 1905d [1915]). Homosexuality in women would remain less well explored (‘‘The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman,’’ 1920a), because the transposition of the etiological formula for men—specifically, excessive love for the father—often works less well. As Sándor Ferenczi remarked in 1914, drawing a distinction between ‘‘subject homoerotism’’ and ‘‘object homoerotism’’ (Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, note added in 1920, p. 147), psychoanalysis relied right from the start on a model of the ‘‘feminine man’’ and thus neglected the masculinity present in other homosexual men, just as it ignored the femininity of certain lesbians. Since the 1970s, as homosexuality became more openly discussed, several authors (Chasseguet-Smirgel, J., et al., 1964; Isay, R. A., 1986) have communicated clinical observations that suggest other etiologies. But the psychoanalytic perspective has again become clouded by the way the question of ‘‘gender’’ has been biologized (Robert Stoller). Gays themselves have embraced theories of innate or physiological homosexuality in order to defend themselves against 757 H O R N E Y -D A N I E L S O N , K A R E N (1885 –1 952) the inquisitorial persecution long meted out to them by justice, medicine, and even psychoanalysis. Nonetheless, a first step towards the lessening of homophobia, on a basis other than that of moral principles, was taken by Freud, who put forward the idea that a manifest sexual tendency (heterosexuality, for instance) could conceal another, opposite tendency that remains latent (such as homosexuality). However, although Freud went along with increasingly progressive attitudes in society, he remained just as reserved as did society—witness this rather ambiguous and nuanced letter that he wrote in 1935 to the mother of a homosexual, whose sexuality he did not view as an illness but as a case of arrested development (while only heterosexuality is treated as normal): ‘‘Homosexuality is assuredly no advantage, but it is nothing to be ashamed of, no vice, no degradation; it cannot be classified as an illness; we consider it to be a variation of the sexual function, produced by a certain arrest of sexual development. Many highly respectable individuals of ancient and modern times have been homosexuals, several of the greatest men among them. (Plato, Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, etc.) It is a great injustice to persecute homosexuality as a crime—and a cruelty, too. . . . By asking me if I can help, you mean, I suppose, if I can abolish homosexuality and make normal heterosexuality take its place. The answer is, in a general way we cannot promise to achieve it. In a certain number of cases we succeed in developing the blighted germs of heterosexual tendencies, which are present in every homosexual; in the majority of cases it is no more possible’’ (Letters of Sigmund Freud, 1856–1939, p. 423). However, such permissiveness was contradicted by the fact that from 1920 onwards many psychoanalytic societies refused to admit openly homosexual candidates. The response to the theoretical and practical debate around homosexuality was nevertheless present, in embryonic form, in Freud’s conceptualization of the sexual instinct in 1905. Indeed, at the beginning of the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality following Charcot and Magnan, he used the highly inappropriate word ‘‘inversion’’ to prove demonstrate that the instinct has no predefined object. BERTRAND VICHYN See also: Activity/passivity; Alcoholism; Anality; Dark continent; Eroticism, anal; Female sexuality; Fetishism; 75 8 Heterosexuality; Identification; ‘‘Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood’’; Libido; Narcissism, secondary; Neurosis; Paranoia; Paranoid position; Persecution; Perversion; Phallic mother; Projection; Psychology of Women, The: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation, Psychopathologie de l’échec (Psychopathology of Failure); Sadger, Isidor Isaak; Suicide; Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Bibliography Bieber, Irving, et al. (1962). Homosexuality, a psychoanalytical study. New York: Basic Books. Chasseguet-Smirgel, Jacqueline, et al. (1964). Female sexuality: New psychoanalytic views. London: Virago. Freud, Sigmund. (1960). Letters of Sigmund Freud, 1856– 1939. (Ernst L. Freud, Ed.; Tania and James Stern, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. Isay, Richard A. (1986). The development of sexual identity in homosexual men. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 41. Lewes, Kenneth. (1988). The psychoanalytic theory of male homosexuality. New York: Simon & Schuster. Socarides, Charles W. (1978). Homosexuality. New York: Jason Aronson. Further Reading Friedman, Robert. (1988). Male homosexuality. A contemporary psychoanalytic perspective. New Haven and London: Yale University Press Roughton, Ralph. (2002). Rethinking homosexuality: What it teaches us about psychoanalysis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 50, 733–764. HORNEY-DANIELSON, KAREN (1885–1952) Karen Horney, physician and psychoanalyst, was born Karen Danielson in a suburb of Hamburg, on September 15, 1885, and died December 4, 1952, in New York. Her father was a sea captain of Norwegian origin, her mother of Dutch-German extraction. She studied medicine at the Universities of Freiburg, Göttingen, and Berlin, and married Oskar Horney in 1909. She entered analysis with Karl Abraham in 1910, and became a founding member of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute in 1920. Having separated from her husband in 1926, Horney emigrated to the United States in 1932, when Franz Alexander invited her to become associate INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS H O R N E Y - D A N I E L S O N , K A R E N (1885 –1 952) director of the newly formed Chicago Psychoanalytic Society and Institute. She moved to New York in 1934 and became a member of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. In 1941, she organized the American Institute for Psychoanalysis, of which she was dean until her death in 1952. She was founding editor of The American Journal of Psychoanalysis. Horney’s thought went through three phases: in the 1920s and early 1930s, she wrote a series of essays in which she tried to modify orthodox ideas about feminine psychology while staying within the framework of Freudian theory. In 1930s, she tried to redefine psychoanalysis by replacing Freud’s biological orientation with an emphasis on culture and interpersonal relationships. In the 1940s, she developed her mature theory in which individuals cope with the anxiety produced by feeling unsafe, unloved, and unvalued by disowning their spontaneous feelings and developing elaborate strategies of defense. Disagreeing with Freud about penis envy, female masochism, and feminine development, Horney’s early essays were largely ignored until they were published in Feminine Psychology in 1967. Since then, there has been a growing recognition that Karen Horney was the first great psychoanalytic feminist. As the author of The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (1937) and New Ways in Psychoanalysis (1939), Horney is often thought of as a neo-Freudian member of ‘‘the cultural school,’’ a group that also included Erich Fromm, Harry Stack Sullivan, Clara Thompson, and Abram Kardiner. These two books proposed a model for the structure of neurosis in which adverse conditions in the environment as a whole, and especially in the family, create a ‘‘basic anxiety’’ against which the child defends itself by developing strategies of defense that are self-alienating, self-defeating, and in conflict with each other. In a striking departure from Freud, Horney advocated focusing on the current constellation of defenses and inner conflicts rather than with infantile origins. In her next book, Self-Analysis (1942), Horney presented her fullest account of how the psychoanalytic process works in terms of her structural paradigm. The object of therapy for Horney is to help people relinquish their defenses, which alienate them from their real selves, so that they can get in touch with their true likes and dislikes, hopes, fears, and desires. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS In her mature theory, developed in her last two books, Horney argued that people defend themselves against their anxieties by developing both interpersonal and intrapsychic strategies of defense. She described the interpersonal strategies most fully in Our Inner Conflicts (1945). They involve moving toward, against, or away from other people and adopting a compliant, aggressive, or detached solution. Since people tend to employ more than one of these strategies, they are beset by inner conflicts. In order to avoid being torn apart or paralyzed, they adopt a strategy consistent with their culture, temperament, and circumstances; but the repressed tendencies persist, generating inconsistencies and rising to the surface if the predominant solution fails. Karen Horney emphasized intrapsychic strategies in Neurosis and Human Growth (1950). To compensate for feelings of weakness, inadequacy, and low selfesteem, people develop an idealized image of themselves that they seek to actualize by embarking on a search for glory. The idealized image generates a pride system, which consists of neurotic pride, neurotic claims, and tyrannical shoulds, all of which instensify the self-hate against which they are intended to be a defense. The idealized image is inwardly divided, since it reflects not only the predominant interpersonal strategy but also the conflict between it and the subordinate tendencies. Horney’s mature theory helped to inspire the interpersonal school of psychoanalysis, provided a model for therapies that focus on the current situation, and influenced some of the descriptions of personality disorders in the DSM-III and -IV. It has made an important contribution to the study of literature, biography, gender, and culture. Because of her emphasis on selfrealization as the goal of life and the source of healthy values, Karen Horney was recognized by Abraham Maslow as one of the founders of humanistic psychology. Her theory has most in common, perhaps, with the work of Erich Fromm, Ernest Schachtel, Carl Rogers, and Abraham Maslow. Many of Horney’s ideas have made their way, often unacknowledged, into the array of concepts and techniques that are currently employed in clinical practice. BERNARD PARIS Work discussed: Neurosis and Human Growth 759 HOSPITALISM See also: Allgemeine Ärztliche Gesellschaft für Psychotherapie; American Academy of Psychoanalysis; Dark continent; Feminine sexuality; Femininity; Feminism and psychoanalysis; Germany; Memory; Second World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis; Splits in psychoanalysis; United States. Bibliography Horney, Karen. (1922). Feminine psychology. New York, W.W. Norton. ———. (1937). The neurotic personality of our time. New York: W. W. Norton. ———. (1939). New ways in psychoanalysis. New York, W.W. Norton. ———. (1942). Self-analysis. New York: W.W. Norton. ———. (1950). Neurosis and human growth: The Struggle toward self-realization. New York, W.W. Norton. Paris, Bernard. (1994). Karen Horney : A psychoanalyst’s search for self-understanding. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Quinn, Susan. (1987). A mind of her own: The life of Karen Horney. New York: Summit Books. Westkott, Marcia. (1986). The feminist legacy of Karen Horney. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. HOSPITALISM René Spitz introduced the term hospitalism in his work defining disorders in infants who were institutionalized for long periods and deprived of substitute maternal care. The notion was later expanded to refer more generally to severe and lasting maternal deprivation. Linked to Sigmund Freud’s concept of maternal care according to, hospitalism refers to the most radical effects of deficiencies in this area. Spitz’s defining study of the phenomenon concerned abandoned children who had been separated from their mothers at around three months and had lived for five to six months in a nursery that was said to be beyond reproach in terms of nursing care but that was isolated and devoid of human bonding relations for the babies. The pathology analyzed showed the following: overall developmental deterioration; stagnation in heightweight growth; a shift in development ratios; relational 76 0 or affective expression reduced to silence; motor and behavioral deviancies; and increased morbidity/mortality rates. Many of these forms of damage were deemed to be irreversible. Spitz categorized hospitalism as ‘‘total affective deficiency’’ and distinguished it from anaclitic depression, categorized as ‘‘partial deficiency,’’ which followed at least six months of satisfactory relations with the mother and which could improve once the child was reunited with the mother. Spitz described these two pathological forms in a pair of publications (hospitalism in 1945, anaclitic depression in 1946) jointly subtitled ‘‘An Inquiry into the Genesis of Psychiatric Conditions in Early Childhood.’’ His work emphasizes the vital importance of object relations and the serious consequences of its failure. Additionally, it underscores the relevance of direct infant observation. The baby in reality and the reconstructed baby, placed in a relation of reciprocal reassessment, make possible a wealth of discoveries that validate the research method promoted by Spitz. His concept thus brings us back to the very origins of infant psychiatry, and the first World Congress on Infant Psychiatry, in 1980, was dedicated to his memory. As a model of deprivation in institutional settings, hospitalism holds a historical place in the design of children’s shelters and child-care facilities. The notion received international exposure through a World Health Organization monograph (No. 2, 1951) entitled ‘‘Maternal Care and Mental Health’’; it was coordinated by John Bowlby, already an established presence in this field ten years prior to his shift in focus to attachment theory. Spitz’s concept of hospitalism drew a number of critical analyses, some on specific points (the inaccuracy of the term itself, lack of precision in pediatric terms, the omission of frequent repeated separation, failure to consider the father’s role, etc.), others more general in their scope. These criticisms resulted in some major reassessments in a new World Health Organization monograph published in 1962, whose principal authors included Serge Lebovici and Mary D. Ainsworth. Study of the short- and long-term consequences of a young infant being separated from its mother remained one of the foremost focuses of childhood psychiatry (Michel Soulé), constantly revised in the light of new discoveries and approaches: the competencies of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS HUG-HELLMUTH-HUG infants, relational pathologies, advances in knowledge about the infant’s mental functioning, psychosomatic repercussions as the top-ranking psychopathological expressions of frustration in early infancy (Léon Kreisler). With a few major exceptions, forms of hospitalism at the turn of the millennium are less connected to stays in institutions and more often concern the complexity of social and intrafamilial deprivation that children face in contemporary society. LÉON KREISLER See also: Abandonment; Anaclisis/anaclitic; Deprivation; Spitz, René Arpad. Bibliography Ainsworth, Mary D. Salter. (1962). The effects of maternal deprivation: a review of findings and controversy in the context of research strategy. In Mary D. Ainsworth and R. G. Andry Deprivation of maternal care. Geneva: World Health Organization. Lebovici, Serge. (1962). Sur la notion de carence maternelle. In La carence de soins maternels, réévaluation de ses effets. Geneva: Organisation Mondiale de la Santé. Soulé, Michel; Lauzanne, Kathlen; and Leblanc, Nelly. (1995). La carence de soins maternels. In Serge Lebovici, René Diatkine, and Michel Soulé (Eds.) Nouveau traité de psychiatrie de l’enfant et de l’adolescent (Vol. 4, pp. 2529– 2545). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Spitz, René A. (1945). Hospitalism: An inquiry into the genesis of psychiatric conditions in early childhood. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1, 53–74. Spitz, René A. (1946). Anaclitic depression. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 2, 313–342. Further Reading Spitz, Rene A. (1946). Hospitalism: a follow-up report. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 2, 113–118. HUG-HELLMUTH-HUG VON HUGENSTEIN, HERMINE VON (1871–1924) The Austrian psychoanalyst Hermine Hug von Hugenstein (usually known as Hermine von Hellmuth) was born in Vienna on August 31, 1871, where she was murdered on September 8 or 9, 1924. She is often regarded as the first child psychoanalyst. Hug-Hellmuth was the second daughter of Hugo Hug von Hugenstein, who served in the Austrian war INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS VON HUGENSTEIN, HERMINE VON (1871 –1 924) ministry both as a military officer (rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel) and as a civilian. The family was Catholic. After the death of her mother, who had served as her tutor, Hermine entered public school and eventually trained to become a teacher. She taught in public and private schools before entering the University of Vienna in 1897, where she studied the physical sciences. In 1909, she obtained a doctorate in physics. While a patient of the Viennese analyst Isidor Sadger, Hug-Hellmuth became interested in psychoanalysis. In 1910, she resigned her teaching post and the next year published her first paper on psychoanalysis in the Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, even before she began to take part in the meetings of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society. The title of that paper, ‘‘The Analysis of a Dream of a 5-Year Old Boy’’ already indicated her principal interest. In 1913 she published ‘‘The Nature of the Child’s Soul (Or Psyche).’’ The title of that paper subsequently served as the name of a section on child psychoanalysis that she wrote for Imago; she also became a regular contributor to the Internationale Zeitschrift für (ärztliche) Psychoanalyse. HugHellmuth first participated in meetings of the Vienna Society in 1913, and became a member of the society that fall. Active and well-known beyond Vienna, HugHellmuth became the first child analyst and contributed to the evolution of child psychoanalysis. At the International Congress in The Hague in 1920, she reported on her early efforts in her paper ‘‘On the Technique of the Analysis of Children.’’ A year later she became director of the Educational Counseling Center associated with the ‘‘Ambulatorium’’ of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Her work, critiqued by both pedagogues and psychologists, was based on observation and analysis of children’s behavior and on the possibility of applying psychoanalytic theory to education and the psychology of children. Her broad application of psychodynamic hypotheses to child behavior contributed to the rejection of psychoanalysis by the field of educational psychology. Hug-Hellmuth’s A Young Girl ’s Diary was first published anonymously in 1919 by the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, the official psychoanalytic publishing house. The book created a sensation, and was discussed in the daily newspapers as well as in medical and psychological reviews, but its authenticity was questioned. Hug-Hellmuth, who was named as 761 HUMOR the book’s ‘‘editor’’ in 1922, would not admit to being its real author. In 1927 Freud, who had written an introduction to the book, asked that it be withdrawn from bookstores. On the night of September 8–9, 1924, shortly after the completion of her book New Ways to the Understanding of Youth, Hug-Hellmuth was murdered by her eighteen-year-old nephew, Rolf. The illegitimate child of her half-sister Antoine, he had been raised by HugHellmuth since the death of his mother. According to Rolf, his aunt’s writings contained many observations of him and he testified at his trial that she had attempted to psychoanalyze him. After his trial he was sentenced to twelve years in prison. After being released from prison, he attempted to get restitution from the Vienna Psychoanalytic Association, as a victim of psychoanalysis. ELKE MÜHLLEITNER Work discussed: Young Girl’s Diary, A. See also: Child analysis; Children’s play. Bibliography Drell, Martin J. (1982). Hermine Hug-Hellmuth, A pioneer in child analysis. Bulletin of the Meninger Clinic, 46 (2), 138–150. Hug-Hellmuth, Hermine von. (1919). A study of the mental life of the child. New York and Washington; Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph series. ———. (1971). A young girl’s diary. Boston: Milford House. (Original work published 1924) MacLean, George; and Rappen, Ulrich. (1991). Hermine von Hug-Hellmuth. New York: Routledge. Roazen, Paul. (1976). Freud and his followers. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. HUMOR Humor is the name given to the psychic process that operates in the field of the preconscious, based on the dynamic interrelation between the agencies of the mind, and akin to a defense mechanism, consisting of an unexpected re-evaluation of the demands of reality that reverses their painful emotional tone and thereby offers to the triumphant ego that yield of pleasure 76 2 which enables it to demonstrate its invulnerable narcissism. Freud’s first insight into the mechanism of this phenomenon, which was entrenched in the family and community life in which he was deeply involved, came in the last pages of Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905c). It was, in fact, on the death of his father that he started to collect Jewish jokes (Witze) and, at the insistence of Wilhelm Fliess, developed a theory to explain them, bringing out how their very condition of possibility lay in the activity of this process within the humorist. Although he pointed out (1908c) the kinship between this process and children’s games, he did not elucidate it in metapsychological terms until the brief article of 1927 (1927d). Unlike comedy and wit, or even irony, all of which aim at the satisfaction of erotic or aggressive drives and necessitate, for this purpose, the effective presence of a real third party, humor involves a strictly intrapsychic process of indirection whose purpose is economic, viz., sparing the subject from the painful feelings (pity, irritation, anger, suffering, disgust, tenderness, horror, etc.) that the situation ought to occasion. The energy of these feelings is thus diverted and transformed into the moderate but triumphant pleasure (so different from the explosion of hilarity) that is expressed in the smile of humor. As a result, the humorist reaffirms his narcissistic invulnerability, assuring himself that nothing traumatic can affect him, and that he can in fact find in such things a yield of pleasure. This being the case, although humor is an autonomous process, it is encountered most often mixed with other forms of the comic, in which it finds a mode of expression, with which it is often confused, and for which it intervenes as a mechanism that inhibits any emotions that would obstruct its development. Nonetheless, Freud considers humor as a particularly salubrious activity, making of it the rarest and most elaborate form of defense. Yet its benefits turn out in fact to be costly, necessitating a large outlay, since while this economic process, being neither denial nor repression, leads to a reversal of emotional tone, it does not eliminate the painful representation. Freud explained this as the result of a new topographical arrangement: the humorist takes the psychic emphasis off the ego and displaces it onto his superego: ‘‘Look! here is the world, which seems so dangerous! It is INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS HUNGARIAN SCHOOL nothing but a game for children—just worth making a jest about!’’ (1927d, p. 166). In fact, humor leads to a set of notions whose origin, nature, history, and development thus all need to be re-examined, as they all indubitably hark back to the genesis of the ideal psychic agencies and their function in establishing a humorous attitude towards reality. All of these dimensions, indeed—whether it be the invulnerable narcissistic kernel of which the humorist is a living testimony, the exercise of the reality principle, the experience of pain, the mechanism of illusion, or the alchemy of the emotions that it produces— invite reflection on the precocious relations that were formed between the humorist and his mother who bequeathed to him this precious gift (Donnet, J.-L., 1997; Kameniak, J.-P., 1998). For example, we need to reflect—as did Freud—on the enigma of the ‘‘essence of the Super-ego,’’ a superego that manifests itself in an atypical form of functioning: as a reassuring and consoling agency—even a maternal one—that is barely consistent with the severity usually associated with it, whether in the commands it issues or in its role as representative and guardian of the reality principle. While humor was initially considered as a variety of the comic genre, in the same way as wit (with which it is often confused), Freud early on endeavored to distinguish it through topographical localization, the kind of gratification it affords, the absence of the need for a third person, and, finally, the specific nature of the process, all of which make it a character disposition or trait rather than a random production. Consequently, over and above the defensive use that has been classically recognized and associated with the process of humor, we might want to ask whether it could have a specific function of working-through, very different from the relaxation which is brought about by the comic effect, thus tempering any excess of emotion; how any real ‘‘work of humor’’ is actually accomplished; and what its nature might be. Whereas, when faced with the hostility of events, the risk of trauma may appear to be significant, humor does allow the subject to maintain the integrity of his psychic functions and their availability while also acknowledging the ‘‘disruptive’’ nature of reality. We can surely envisage the possibility (Bergeret, 1973) that there are hints of a working-through involved in humor, or, at the very least, the establishment of the framework needed for any possible integration of the sufferings inflicted on the subject. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Nevertheless, it cannot escape notice that there has been a general lack of interest and a relative silence on the part of contemporary analysts when it comes to this subject, apparently so frivolous though in fact it raises fundamental questions. Up until now, analytic literature on this theme has scarcely extended beyond a few scattered remarks or occasional articles, and most of them use humor as a generic category succeeding that of ‘‘the comic’’ proposed by Freud. Consequently, they are more likely to discuss the techniques and procedures of the modes of expression to which humor resorts than to examine the process of humor itself. JEAN-PIERRE KAMENIAK See also: Almanach der Psychoanalyse; Creativity; Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious; Paradox. Bibliography Bergeret, Jean. (1973). Pour une métapyschologie de l’humour. Revue française de psychanalyse, 37, 4. Donnet, Jean-Luc. (1997). L’humoriste et sa croyance. Revue française de psychanalyse, 61, 3. Gay, Peter. (1990). Reading Freud: Explorations and entertainments. New Haven: Yale University Press. Kamieniak, Jean-Pierre. (1998). Freud, un enfant de l’humour. Lausanne-Paris: Delachaux & Niestlé. Shentoub, Salem A. et al. (1989). L’Humour dans l’oeuvre de Freud. Paris: Two Cities. Further Reading Poland, Warren S. (1990). Gift of laughter: Development of a sense of humor in clinical analysis. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 59,197–225. HUNGARIAN SCHOOL Fundamentally, the ‘‘Hungarian School’’ denotes a trend of thought developed by psychoanalysts who worked in Budapest between the two world wars. Its representatives worked independently. They shared a theoretical view that did not recognize primary narcissism. From the beginning, they attributed a prominent role to the mother-child relationship. As part of this work, they contributed to the instinct theory (clinging instinct, Imre Hermann) and the role of psychological deficiency (Sándor Ferenczi, Michael Bálint). 763 HUNGARY Commitment to treatment was emphasized, which gave rise to methodological experiments (Ferenczi) and led to two-person psychology (Michael Bálint). They contributed to the development of ethnopsychoanalysis (Geza Róheim) and psychoanalytical psychosomatics (Franz Alexander), and the introduction of psychoanalytical pedagogics (Ferenczi, Imre Hermann, Michael Bálint). The school was founded by Ferenczi as an analytical circle around him in Budapest. In 1913 the Hungarian Psychoanalytical Society was founded which, together with the Viennese Society, became the most important intellectual center in Europe.The cultural-social atmosphere of the age was, in many respects, favorable for the development of psychoanalysis; reputed writers and also joined the group. Freud supported the idea that psychoanalysis should have several centers. At the end of WWI in 1918, the International Congress was held in Budapest and plans were made to found the first psychoanalytical institution there. The 1920s were the golden age of the Hungarian School. Ferenczi’s theoretical work and methodological experiments mark this period. Several creative analysts among his students acquired worldwide repute (Alexander, Alice Bálint, Melanie Klein, Róheim, René A. Spitz). With regard to training, Ferenczi advocated the introduction of compulsory personal analysis of greater depth than in the case of patients. This gave rise to the development of the Budapest model of supervised analysis (Vilma Kovács). Ferenczi’s death and the political situation in the 1930s, and specifically the persecution of Jews, caused many to emigrate (Sándor Radó, C. Robert Bak, Alice Bálint, Michael Bálint, Róheim), and many of those who remained in Budapest fell victim to fascism during WWII. By the end of the 1930s the Hungarian School as an intellectual community had lost its significance. Many of the emigrant analysts preserved the spirit of the School in their work in their adopted country (the Bálints and E. Gyömrôi in England; Alexander, Therése Benedek, Sándor Lóránd, Margaret Mahler, Radó, Danièle Rapaport, Róheim, and Spitz in the U.S.). The small group in Budapest continued their scientific activity. After 1945, there was a brief period of upswing, but in 1949 the communist government banned the society and psychoanalysis was forced into semi-illegality. Its representatives—led by Imre Hermann— 76 4 ensured the survival of psychoanalysis, passing on the spirit and traditions of the Hungarian School. In the 1970s, psychoanalysis was reinstituted (1975—study group; 1983—provisional society; 1989—component society). The Hungarian School may be said to have two distinctive features. One is that its original representatives catalyzed the development of psychoanalytical theory and techniques. They discovered and described a number of phenomena which have continued to constitute the foundation of psychoanalysis. The other is the ‘‘Ferenczi phenomenon,’’ according to which only the essential development of psychoanalysis makes the integration of theoretical and methodological work possible. HUNGARIAN GROUP See also: Ferenczi, Sándor; Hungary. Bibliography Harmat, Pál. (1988). Freud, Ferenczi und die Psychoanalyse in Ungarn. Tübingen: Diskord. Harmatta János, Szónyi, Gábor. (1992). Hungary. In P. Kutter (Ed.), Psychoanalysis international, a guide to psychoanalysis throughout the world, (Vol. 1, Europe, p. 173–184). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: FrommannHolzboog. Hidas, György. (1987). Die Psychoanalyse und ihre Schicksale in Ungarn. Sigmund Freud House Bulletin, 11 (2), 1–12. Nemes, Lı́via. (1985). The fate of the hungarian psychoanalysts during the time of fascism. Sigmund Freud House Bulletin, 9, 20–28. Vikár, György. (1994). Der Beitrag der Budapester psychoanalytischen Schule zur Objektbeziehungstheorie. International Forum for Psychoanalysis, 10, 52–60. HUNGARY Hungary, a country that was primarily agricultural until the mid-nineteenth century, entered the modern era in 1867 with the creation of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. At the start of the twentieth century, in Budapest, which had become a center of cultural life, a group of radical intellectuals demanded the democratization of a country that had remained semi-feudal. Unable to compete in the political sphere, they created institutions like the Free School of Social Science, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS HUNGARY reviews like Huszadik Szàzad (Twentieth Century) and Nyugat (Occident), to achieve their goal by means of education. For psychoanalysis the Hungarian intelligentsia was fertile terrain, for it held that the liberation of the individual and the liberation of society went hand in hand. Psychoanalysis was introduced to Hungary by Sándor Ferenczi, who was its leading exponent. A young neurologist, Ferenczi encountered Freudian theory through Carl Gustav Jung’s word association test and through the literature of analysis. After his first visit to Freud in February 1908, he quickly became an integral part of the Vienna group and assumed the responsibility of bringing psychoanalysis to Hungary. His efforts were well received in literary and artistic circles, as shown in the writings of Géza Csáth, Dezsö Kosztolànyi, Mihály Babits, and Frigyes Karinthy, while most physicians remained reticent. The Hungarian Psychoanalytic Association was founded by Ferenczi in 1913. In addition to Ferenczi, its members included the psychiatrist István Hollós, the physician Lajos Lévy, the medical student Sándor Radó, and the journalist and writer Hugó Ignotus (Hugó Veigelsberg), the editor-in-chief of Nyugat. During World War I, Ferenczi, who had been mobilized, cared for soldiers who had suffered trauma during combat. The psychoanalytic treatment of war neuroses drew the attention of Hungarian officials, with the result that the Fifth Congress of Psychoanalysis, organized in Budapest on September 28 and 29, 1918, was held at the Academy of Sciences in the presence of government representatives. During the congress, Antal (Anton) von Freund, who ran a large beer hall, but also had a PhD in philosophy, a patient and friend of Freud, provided funding for the creation of a psychoanalytic clinic and publishing house. Ferenczi was elected president of the International Psychoanalytic Association, but the political upheavals that shook the country, especially Hungary’s independence from Austria, the democratic revolution, the Bolshevik revolution in Budapest in 1919 and its brutal repression, forced him to yield the presidency to the Briton, Ernest Jones. During the democratic government of Mihály Károlyi, students and progressives demanded that psychoanalysis be officially recognized. Their demand reached the Commune and Ferenczi was appointed professor of psychoanalysis at the university, the first INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS in the world. When the right-wing government of Miklós Horthy came to power, the position was eliminated and, in 1920, Ferenczi was excluded from the Hungarian medical association. The 1920s turned out to be a phase of expansion for psychoanalysis in Hungary. At the end of the war, Géza Róheim, Imre Hermann, Zsigmond Pfeifer, and other leading figures joined the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Association. Cut off from playing a role in Hungarian public life, psychoanalysts consulted, taught, and published. Róheim developed the notion of psychoanalytic anthropology, Hermann worked on the psychology of creativity, Pfeifer on children’s games. This was also the period of the first wave of emigration. Sándor Radó and Jenö Hárnik moved to Berlin and participated in the creation of the Institute for Psychoanalytic Training. During the twenties, József Eisler, Sándor Feldmann, Erzsébet Révész, Béla Felszeghy, Vilma Kovács, and Alice and Mihály Bálint joined the association. Efforts were made to organize the teaching of psychoanalysis. Seminars on theory were established in 1919, and in 1925 a training method specific to Hungary was developed by Ferenczi and Vilma Kovács. In 1925, István Hollós was fired from his position as head physician at the psychiatric hospital of Lipótmezö because of his Jewish background. Two years later he published My Farewell from the Yellow House, in which he investigated psychosis from a new and innovative point of view. In 1928, Géza Róheim traveled to central Australia, Normanby Island, and America. During his research, financed by Marie Bonaparte, he combined anthropological research with psychoanalytic theory. In 1930, a psychoanalytic clinic for children was created under the direction of Margit Dubowitz. That same year Lilian Rotter and Fanny Hann joined the association. In 1931, in spite of several administrative problems, a polyclinic was opened at 12 Mészáros Street, with Ferenczi as director. The building and funding were provided by Vilma Kovács and her family; analysts from the association provided free consultations. Ferenczi’s students prepared Psychoanalytic Studies for his sixtieth birthday, but the book wasn’t published until after his death in 1933. István Hollós then 765 HUNGARY became president of the association and Mihály Bálint director of the polyclinic. In 1935 and 1937 two meetings, known as the Four Nations, were organized by the psychoanalytic associations of Vienna, Prague, Italy, and Hungary, the first in Vienna, the second in Budapest, and devoted to the problems of psychoanalytic training. At the second meeting, Vilma Kovács detailed the characteristics of the Hungarian method and Anna Freud read a paper by Helene Deutsch criticizing the method. Hungarian analysts also began a program to develop public awareness of psychoanalysis. Kata Lévy organized seminars with teachers, Alice Bálint with mothers, and Mihály Bálint held discussion groups with general practitioners. In 1933, Lilly Hajdu, a psychiatrist, joined the association. During the late thirties, threatened by the rise of anti-Semitism and fascism, a number of analysts decided to emigrate. Among them were the Bálints, Géza Róheim, Sándor Feldmann, and Edit Gyömröi. The association continued to function under police surveillance and under the direction of its non-Jewish members, Endre Almássy and Tibor Rajka. In 1944, when German troops invaded Hungary and put Hungarian Nazis in power, several analysts, including Zsigmond Pfeifer, Géza Dukes, László Révész, Miklós Gimes, and József Eisler, became victims of persecution. Imre Hermann and István Hollós barely escaped with their lives. After 1945, psychoanalysts in Hungary resumed their activities. They participated in the creation of a mental health institute and worked in dispensaries. But the Stalinist government, which came to power in 1948, forced the association to dissolve. From then on psychoanalysis survived in a semi-clandestine fashion, primarily through the help of Imre Hermann, who trained the new generation of analysts: György Vikár, Livia Nemes, Agnes Binét, Teréz Virág. The dark years after 1956 were marked by the suicide of Lilly Hajdu, whose husband was murdered by the Nazis and whose son, a friend of Imre Nagy, had been executed along with the prime minister. During the sixties, the Kádar government became more tolerant of psychoanalysis. István Székács, a member of the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Association since 1939, also began to train psychoanalysts, although not initially a member of Hermann’s group. 76 6 During the seventies, Hungarian analysts still did not have an officially recognized association, but some public manifestations of recognition took place. In 1969, for example, Imre Hermann was decorated on his eightieth birthday and, in 1974, a commemorative celebration was organized for the Ferenczi centenary. In 1987 an international congress of psychoanalysis was held in Budapest. After democracy was restored in 1989, the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Association was reconstituted and affiliated itself with the International Psychoanalytic Association. A new generation of analysts was able to practice, teach, and publish openly. The Ferenczi Society, a broad-based group of people interested in psychoanalysis, began to publish the review Thalassa. While the first generation of analysts trained by Imre Hermann was affected primarily by his ideas, contemporary psychoanalysts were reevaluating the ideas of Ferenczi, which they were forced to read in foreign editions since his complete works had not yet been published in Hungarian because of a lack of funding. They also served as an inspiration for Otto Kernberg. Hungarian psychoanalysts of the 1930s developed a number of specific ideas that justify referring to them collectively as the Budapest School. These include the importance of trauma in the etiology of mental pathology, the attention given to object relations, consideration of dyadic relations and regression, and insistence on the importance of experience in therapy. Hungarian training methods differed from other methods in that the candidate’s first control analysis was undertaken by his own analyst to further an understanding of the countertransference and better understand his own transference to the analyst. Ferenczi’s students demonstrated considerable creativity. Imre Hermann developed the theory of clinging, Géza Róheim the ontogenetic theory of culture, and Mihály Bálint the theory of primal love (and several others after his emigration). Lilian Rotter developed a body of original work on female sexuality and Alice Bálint on the mother-child relationship. István Hollós and Lilly Hajdu examined psychoses from a psychoanalytic point of view. ÉVA BRABANT-GERÖ INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS HYPERCATHEXIS Bibliography Bálint, Michael. (1968). The basic fault: Therapeutic aspects of regression. London: Tavistock Publications. Brabant-Gerö, Éva. (1993). Ferenczi et L’école hongroise de psychanalyse. Paris: L’Harmattan. Ferenczi, Sandor. (1955). Selected Papers of Sandor Ferenczi. (Vol. 3, Michael Bálint, Ed.). New York: Basic Books. Haynal, André. (1988). The technique at issue: Controversies in psychoanalysis from Freud and Ferenczi to Michael Bálint. (Elizabeth Holder, Trans.). London: Karnac. (Original work published 1986) Hermann, Imre. (1972). L’instinct filial. (G. Kassai, Trans.). Paris: Denoël. Hungarian Psychoanalytic Association. (1933).Lélekelemzési Tanulmànyok (Psychoanalytic Studies). Budapest: Somló. HYPERCATHEXIS Freud employed the term ‘‘hypercathexis’’ to designate an additional charge of instinctual energy cathecting any already cathected psychical element. The word’s primary application was in the description of the economy of consciousness, but it also served in connection with the regulation of the flow of psychic energy and the constitution of the preconscious realm. The term was first used by Freud in the ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ (1950c [1895]), where it referred to a mobile cathexis of the ego specific to consciousness, necessary to the mechanism of attention, and consisting in a supplementary cathexis of neurones already cathected by perception. In Freud’s account consciousness affected indications of quality. It arose from the excitation, during perception, of particular neurones belonging to the system W. Attention first addressed the indications of quality transmitted by these already cathected neurones, and then, via a facilitated pathway, focused on the perceptions themselves, which were thus hypercathected. ‘‘By this means [the ego] is led to cathect precisely the right perceptions or their environment’’ (p. 362). The ego was hence able to distinguish cathexes of real perceptions from cathexes of wishes, and the reality principle could be established. According to Freud, the regulation of cathexes within the psychical apparatus remained unconscious, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS and was effected automatically in accordance with the pleasure/unpleasure principle. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), he pointed out that this initial mechanism was fine-tuned by virtue of a cathexis of attention, described as a ‘‘hypercathexis set up . . . by the regulating influence of the sense organ of the Cs.’’ (p. 617), which at times could even work counter to the primary mechanism by cathecting elements that were a source of unpleasure and that would otherwise succumb to repression. In ‘‘The Unconscious’’ (1915e), Freud attributed the emergence of the preconscious to a hypercathexis of word-presentations by thing-presentations: ‘‘It is these hypercathexes, we may suppose, that bring about a higher psychical organization and make it possible for the primary process to be succeeded by the secondary process which is dominant in the Pcs. . . . A presentation which is not put into words, or a psychical act which is not hypercathected, remains thereafter in the Ucs. in a state of repression’’ (p. 202). In considering the question of traumas, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), Freud described the anti-traumatic regulatory function of hypercathectic energy, in the operation of the protective shield against stimuli, as the last line of defense in the attempt to bind the sum of excitation: ‘‘In the case of quite a number of traumas, the difference between systems that are unprepared and systems that are well prepared through being hypercathected may be a decisive factor in determining the outcome’’ (pp. 31–32). RICHARD UHL See also: Actual; Attention; Castration complex; Cathexis; Conscious processes; Consciousness; Disavowal; Facilitation; Idealization; Narcissistic defenses; Protective shield; Unconscious, the; Word-presentation. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. ———. (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159–204. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281–387. 767 HYPNOID STATES HYPNOID STATES The notion of hypnoid states appeared in section 3 of ‘‘On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary Communication,’’ published in January 1893 under the joint authorship of Sigmund Freud and Josef Breuer in preparation for their Studies on Hysteria of 1895. Hypnoid states involve a ‘‘splitting of consciousness’’ or ‘‘double conscience’’ (1893a, p. 12), in which ideas and affects are fragmented and then cut off from normal waking consciousness, but which, owing to what Freud a short time later called ‘‘false connections’’ (1895d, p. 302), can give way to new, pathogenic associations that engender hysterical symptoms. The notion of hypnoid states originated from Freud and Breuer’s interest in hypnosis. Freud and Breuer wrote that they wanted to replace ‘‘the familiar thesis that hypnosis is an artificial hysteria by another—the basis and sine qua non of hysteria is the existence of hypnoid states’’ (1893a, p. 12). In themselves, such hypnoid states are not abnormal (as witness the daydreams ‘‘to which needlework and similar occupations render women especially prone’’ [p. 13]), but the hysteric is especially predisposed to them. In fact, the notion of hypnoid states came from Breuer, who used it in a major explanatory principle in his account of the case of Anna O. and developed it in the fourth paragraph of the chapter on ‘‘theoretical considerations’’ that he wrote for Studies on Hysteria. By the time of that work, it is clear that Freud was only paying lip service to this idea as a concession to Breuer to obtain joint publication of their work. To be sure, Freud agreed that hysterical phenomena should be explained in terms of ‘‘dissociation’’ and a faulty recomposition, but unlike Breuer (who in this regard held views similar to those of Pierre Janet), he did not see in these phenomena a weakening of psychic functioning. On the contrary, he saw them as the mark of the active work of the defenses, above all repression. Freud later explained his stance on these issues, notably in ‘‘On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement’’ (1914d) and in ‘‘An Autobiographical Study’’ (1925d [1924]). Indeed, the notion of hypnoid states seems so contrary to metapsychology as a whole that it cannot be accepted as being a part of psychoanalysis. ROGER PERRON 76 8 See also: Amnesia; Anna O., case of; Breuer, Josef; Dream; Studies on Hysteria; Hypnosis; Primary process/secondary process. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1914d). On the history of the psychoanalytic movement. SE, 14: 1–66. ———. (1925d [1924]). An autobiographical study. SE, 20: 1–74. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1893a). On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomena: preliminary communication. SE, 2: 1–17. ———. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. HYPNOSIS Hypnosis is the altered state of consciousness brought on by a hypnotist using various techniques (staring at an object, verbal commands, etc.). The English physician James Braid, in his Neurhypnology (1843), popularized, or may even have coined, the word ‘‘hypnotism.’’ ‘‘Hypnosis’’ appears to have come into use later. Braid sought to replace unscientific ideas and practices with a scientific conception of a ‘‘peculiar state of the nervous system induced by a fixed and abstracted attention of the mental and visual eye." He also hoped to do away with what magnetizers called ‘‘rapport.’’ In the mid-nineteenth century, the English physiologist William Carpenter provided scientific support for ‘‘Braidism’’ by making hypnosis the paradigm of the reflexive and automatic activity that he called ‘‘unconscious cerebration.’’ Introduced to the topic by the young physiologist Charles Richet, Jean Martin Charcot experimented with hypnosis on hysterical patients in his clinic starting in 1878, basing himself on Braid’s and especially Carpenter’s neurological approach. In 1882, in an article that was noted by the Académie des Sciences, he identified a pathology unique to hysterics, the ‘‘grand hypnotism’’ characterized by three specific nervous states (catalepsy, lethargy, and somnambulism). Starting in 1860 in Nancy, where he had set up a ‘‘clinic,’’ Ambroise Liebeault also made use of hypnotism, employing methods established by J.-P. Durand de Gros, one of the proponents of Braidism in France. He paid special attention to Braid’s experiments with suggestion, using hypnotic suggestion for therapeutic purposes, unlike Charcot, whose practice was almost INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS HYPNOSIS purely experimental. Hippolyte Bernheim went even further and treated hypnosis as a particular type of suggestion. He also popularized the term ‘‘psychotherapy,’’ which he borrowed from the Briton Hack Tuke, and practiced psychotherapy by means of suggestion with and without hypnotism. After 1884 two opposing schools of hypnosis developed around Charcot and Bernheim. In Paris, the emphasis was on the idea of a pathological nervous state; in Nancy, on that of a link or psychological influence that was not necessarily pathological. Nonetheless, although they often took their cue from a particular school, some practitioners and researchers tried to look beyond prevailing theoretical and therapeutic dogmas. The psychotherapist could thus refuse merely to issue commands, and attempt through hypnosis, to discover memories forgotten during waking life that could be at the root of neurotic symptoms (see the case of Pierre Marie in L’Automatisme psychologique by Pierre Janet, 1889). Several stories of cures associated with the return of forgotten memories were published at the end of the nineteenth century. In discussions of hypnotic suggestion the question of ‘‘rapport’’ was again raised. Joseph Delboeuf introduced the idea of reciprocal suggestion. Pierre Janet and Alfred Binet spoke of ‘‘electivity,’’ of ‘‘somnambulant passion’’ and ‘‘experimental love.’’ Additionally, there was interest in the psychology of hypnotic states of consciousness. These were described in terms of dissociation (Janet) or hypnoid states (Sigmund Freud and Josef Breuer). Finally, contrary to the dominant medical view at the time, the idea arose that the unconscious was not only reflexological but psychological. Experiments with post-hypnotic suggestion, in which a subject, while awake, obeys an order given during a hypnosis that he has apparently forgotten, seemed to the philosopher Henri Bergson to prove the existence of unconscious ideas and a psychological unconscious. Freud the psychoanalyst undoubtedly emerged from this plethora of research and debate: 1885–1886 (Paris), 1889 (Nancy), and 1895 (publication of the Studies on Hysteria). Hypnosis refers both to a state of consciousness (or unconsciousness) and to a relationship. True to the legacy of Charcot and Bernheim, present-day proponents of hypnology are still divided into ‘‘statists’’ and ‘‘relationists.’’ Some points of view, especially within the relationist school, draw on psychoanalysis, while INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS others seek to reinstate hypnotism as part of an antipsychoanalytic tendency. For hypnosis, like animal magnetism before it, does not refer only to a state or to a relationship. Since the nineteenth century it has become a magical word with strong negative or positive connotations and as many staunch advocates as militant opponents—a tireless vector of fascination and stigma. The practice, phenomenology, and theory of hypnosis have evolved, of course, since the time of James Braid, and hypnosis can now be seen as a largely cultural phenomenon. All the same, some questions, contradictory and probably unanswerable, seem to remain after more than a century. Is the hypnotic state akin to sleep and dreaming, or to wakefulness and lucidity? Does it imply an unconscious dispossession, or is it a form of playacting? And is ‘‘hypnosis’’ a functional concept that can explain certain phenomenon, or a word that precipitates the very state it is supposed to account for? JACQUELINE CARROY See also: Alienation; Anna O., case of; Autosuggestion; Bernheim, Hippolyte; Cäcilie M., case of; Cathartic method; Charcot, Jean Martin; Chertok, Léon (Tchertok, Lejb); Cinema and psychoanalysis; ‘‘Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child’’; Congrès international de l’hypnotisme expérimental et scientifique, Premier; Cure; Delboeuf, Joseph Rémi Léopold; Emmy von N., case of; Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis; Freud’s Selfanalysis; Freud, the Secret Passion; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; Hypnoid states; Janet Pierre; Liebault Ambroise Auguste; ‘‘Lines of Advance in PsychoAnalytic Therapy’’; Look, gaze; Masochism; Negative hallucination; Psychoanalytic treatment; Psychotherapy; Relaxation psychotherapy; Repression, lifting of; Resistance; Self-consciousness; Studies on Hysteria; Suggestion; Trance; Qu’est-ce que la suggestion? (What is suggestion?). Bibliography Carroy, Jacqueline. (1991). Hypnose, Suggestion et Psychologie: l’invention de sujets. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Chertok, Léon, and Stengers, Isabelle. (1992). A critique of psychoanalytic reason: Hypnosis as a scientific problem from Lavoisier to Lacan (Martha Noel Evans in collaboration with the authors, Trans.). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. (Original work published 1989) 769 HYPOCHONDRIA Ellenberger, Henri F. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry. New York: Basic Books. Freud, Sigmund. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. HYPOCHONDRIA Hypochondria is a psychopathological formation whose locus of suffering, anxiety, or even (fantasized) erasure is the body or one of its parts or functions, even though the symptoms in most cases appear to have no material cause. Symptoms can range from minor, transient forms to massive, debilitating forms. Despite some strong lines of evidence pointing toward a link with various specific structural organizations of the psyche, hypochondria is currently seen as transnosographic, as present as an element in a neuropsychosis or preceding certain psychoses. Freud encountered hypochondria early on in his work. On the basis of the semantics and nosology of his era as well as his own theories, he placed hypochondria among the pure forms of ‘‘actual neurosis,’’ alongside neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis, and thus outside of the realm of the defensive neuropsychoses. His description of the actual neuroses contains the same elements as hypochondria: the patient’s representational contents have a basis in current reality and not in what has been repressed into the unconscious; the patient’s meaningful contents or unconscious overdeterminations capable of being symbolized do not indicate an internal conflict with current reality. For centuries, hypochondria has challenged medicine, philosophy, and even religion. Some ancient lines of inquiry are echoed by modern investigations, notably on the enigmatic link between psyche and soma and on similarities between hypochondria and melancholia. The absence of any material organic cause has elicited a variety of hypotheses from psychoanalysts, including accounts of pathogenicity that extend to delusions in the subject. In ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ (1914c), Freud revised his account of hypochondria in light of his theory that the libido is divided into the objectlibido and the (narcissistic) ego-libido. He placed (bodily) ego-libido, the realm of hypochondriacal anxiety, in opposition to object libido, the realm of neurotic anxiety. As a function of this opposition, the more one realm absorbs, the more the other is impoverished. Therefore, the idea of excessive, dammed-up narcissistic libido is essential to understanding hypochondria. The chosen organ of hypochondria, which has strong erotogenic potential, is nevertheless a source of unpleasure, suffering, and anxiety owing to this increase in tension, this damming up of libido. Many authors have viewed this account, a schematic model of dynamic energies, as problematic and fraught with questions. Has the enigma of hypochondria been fully deciphered by contemporary psychoanalysis? Freud acknowledged this poorly understood disorder as an awkward gap in his theories. Later it was deemed surprising that hypochondriacs had been the object of so little psychoanalytic research, but in the 1990s there were a number of studies on the topic. One reason that psychoanalysis has paid little attention to hypochondria is that the autocratic attitude of hypochondriacs has made analysts unreceptive to types of transference unconducive to analytic listening. However, a broadening of treatment indications seems to have made psychoanalysis more receptive to hypochondriacs, and this has allowed psychoanalysis to draw conclusions from them that go beyond Freud’s hypotheses. It is also true that hypochondriacal behavior can emerge in the course of any treatment, as a displacement or means of discharge when the patient’s psyche is placed under stress. During the same period, Freud tried to understand the possible relationship between hypochondria and paraphrenia. In ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ (1914c) he wrote, ‘‘We may suspect that the relation of hypochondria to paraphrenia is similar to that of the other Ôactual’ neuroses to hysteria and obsessional neurosis: we may suspect, that is, that it is dependent on ego-libido just as the others are on object-libido, and that hypochondriacal anxiety is the counterpart, as coming from ego-libido, to neurotic anxiety’’ (p. 84). In this perspective he viewed hypochondria as the first stage in delusion and linked it to narcissistic pathologies affecting the body. Three years earlier he wondered about the connections between hypochondria and paranoia. For example, in ‘‘Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)’’ (1911c [1910]), his text on Daniel Paul Schreber, he wrote, ‘‘I shall not consider any theory of paranoia trustworthy unless it 77 0 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS HYPOCRITICAL DREAM also covers the hypochondriacal symptoms by which that disorder is almost invariable accompanied’’ (pp. 56–57, n. 3). Freud thus viewed hypochondria as a precursor to psychosis and sometimes as an independent condition. Some authors have interpreted hypochondria in terms of true projections that are no longer directed outward but instead are directed at the body, like an internal paranoia. In his subsequent writings Freud did not return to the comparison with melancholia, nor did he reexamine his hypotheses in light of his second theory of the instincts or in terms of the concept of primary masochism, as later authors did, thereby somewhat undermining Freud’s classification of hypochondria as an actual neurosis. Many others, notably followers of Melanie Klein, have emphasized the close relationship between hypochondria and melancholic depression. Others have inferred a masochistic dimension or a ‘‘locked-up’’ autoerotism. In the view of still others, the ‘‘hypochondriacal solution,’’ despite its fragile and largely unstructured nature and despite being pregnant with the death instinct, is the subject’s last bastion against madness. ALAIN FINE See also: Actual neurosis/defense neurosis; Body image; Eroticism, anal; Erotogenic zone; Erotogenicity; ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’; ‘‘Neurasthenia and Anxiety Neurosis’’; Organ pleasure; Persecution; Psychoanalytical nosography. Bibliography Aisenstein, Marilia; Fine, Alain; & Pragier, Georges (Eds.). (1995). L’hypocondrie. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1898a). Sexuality in the aetiology of the neuroses. SE, 3: 259–285. ———. (1911c [1910]). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1–82. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. Jeanneau, Augustin. (1990). L’hypocondrie, ou La mentalisation de l’impossible. Cahiers du Centre pour la psychanalyse et la psychothérapie, 21, 83–99. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Perrier, François. (1994). Psychanalyse de l’hypocondriaque. In Jacques Sédat (Ed.), La Chaussée d’Antin (rev. ed.). Paris: Albin Michel. (Originally published 1959) Further Reading Rosenfeld, Herbert. (1958). Observations on the psychopathology of hypochondriacal states. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 39, 121–124. Stolorow, Robert D. (1977). Notes on the signal function of hypochondriacal anxiety. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 58, 245–246. HYPOCRITICAL DREAM A hypocritical dream is one that in which the dream’s wish is distorted (most often by the reversal of affect) such that it cannot be discerned in the manifest dream thoughts. Thus the wish is expressed ‘‘hypocritically,’’ in disguise. Freud referred to hypocritical dreams in several passages of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). He first used the term in connection with a dream in which he felt a great affection towards his friend R. But the analysis of the dream showed that in fact the latent wish was to portray R. as a simpleton (1900a, pp. 137 ff.). Freud also referred to a dream about a reconciliation with a friend in which the latent wish was to free himself from this friend completely (p. 145n.). He returned to the topic later in the book, writing that ‘‘There is one class of dreams which have a particular claim to be described as Ôhypocritical’ and which offer a hard test to the theory of wish-fulfillment’’ (p. 473). Witness the repetitive dream of the poet Rosegger in which he found himself each night back in the unfortunate situation of a apprentice tailor ill-suited for his craft (pp. 473–75). Freud referred to a similar dream of his own in which he found himself back in a laboratory where he had once worked in his younger days, ill-suited to the chemical analyses he was required to perform. This was, Freud says, a ‘‘punishment dream’’ (p. 476) that followed upon his daytime thoughts of being too proud of the success of his psychoanalyses. Such a punishment dream, he goes on, is nothing but the inverted expression of a wish. He modified this theory considerably in his theoretical revisions of the twenties (1920g, 1923b, 1924c). And the question of hypocriti771 HYSTERIA cal dreams was, for Freud, closely linked to that of repetitive dreams. The term ‘‘hypocritical dream’’ is not frequently used in present-day psychoanalysis. However, the question that Freud posed under this rubric remains essential: Is every dream the realization of a wish? ROGER PERRON See also: Dream. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ———. (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155–170. HYSTERIA Hysteria refers both to a personality type and to a cluster of psychoneurotic symptom formations. Its manifestations—dramatic, physical, and affective— may be viewed as an attempt to express and symbolize a psychosexual conflict and, at the same time, to defend against acknowledging that conflict. Symptoms range from mental anxiety and phobia to the physical signs of conversion disorder. The term derives from hustera, the Greek word for uterus, and was historically considered a female disorder. Writings on hysteria date to ancient Egypt and the Kahun papyrus (ca.1900 BCE), which described the disturbances caused by the ‘‘wandering uterus’’ that manifested as symptoms in various parts of the body. Greco-Roman doctors continued to associate hysteria with the uterus and to treat it as a female complaint. From the end of antiquity through the Middle Ages and the Inquisition, recourse to supernatural explanations made it possible to consider hysteria a form of demoniacal possession or witchcraft. The theatrical and contagious nature of hysterical symptoms may have been at the root of phenomena such as the ‘‘possessed’’ nuns of Loudun, the convulsionaries of SaintMédard, and the Salem witches. Hysterics and their putative victims were often burned at the stake. 77 2 Identification of hysteria as a distinct entity dates to 1870, when Jean Martin Charcot, a doctor at the largest hospice in France, the La Salpêtrière, segregated hysterics from other mental patients for purposes of research and investigation. As a concept hysteria acquired several meanings: 1. Conversion hysteria was a convulsive attack characterized by paralysis, muscular contractions and bodily contortions, visual disturbances, including hallucination, pain and anesthesia, and so on. 2. As a psychoneurosis, studied by psychoanalysis, it was manifested by various symptoms and inversion of affect. Thus, Sigmund Freud’s patient Dora experienced sexual excitation not as desire but as disgust, a hysterical displacement of a genital sexual conflict (1905e). 3. The term ‘‘hysteric’’ also qualifies, pejoratively, a certain type of distaff personality in which prominent use is made of dramatization, emotional exuberance, colorful and exaggerated language, continuous erotization, and seductiveness. 4. Finally, in everyday language, hysteria is the stuff of ‘‘emotional outburst’’ and ‘‘making a scene.’’ Broadly speaking, conversion hysteria led to the discovery of psychoanalysis as a method of understanding and treating psychopathological symptoms. Freud, who famously attended clinical demonstrations by Charcot, was struck by the indifference that hysterical patients displayed toward their suffering. Although for a time he suspected traumatic childhood seduction to be at the root of hysteria, he came to view such patients suffering ‘‘mainly from reminiscences’’ (1895d, p. 7)—that is, from a repressed traumatic event that remained mnemonically unintegrated, and could therefore only be expressed by conversion— through a corporeal memory, so to speak. The death of his father in 1897 and subsequent selfanalysis with Wilhelm Fliess led Freud to the discovery of his childhood passion for his mother and of his hostile feelings toward his father. Although the Oedipus complex did not appear as part of Freudian theory until later, he abandoned the theory of traumatic seduction; his key discovery was the notion of infantile sexuality, together with the importance of fantasy as a force that was both creative and disorganizing. At the same time he developed the concept of psychic defense INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS HYSTERICAL PARALYSIS and discovered in dreams and dream-work a link with hysteria. In psychoanalytic theory, a hysterical crisis might be thought of as the embodiment of a dream. Its symptoms included the same mechanisms of condensation, displacement, symbolization, and disguise through censorship. Hysteria expressed a conflict that, incapable of being elaborated mentally, is translated in altogether enigmatic fashion into physical symptoms. The associative method of psychoanalysis could be used to identify the fantasies and symbolic pathways within it. Thus Freud described a hysterical woman who, with one hand, tore off her clothes, and with the other, held them against her body, simultaneously expressing the struggle between impulse and defense, enacting in effect a sexual scene in which she represented partners of both sexes (1908a). Hysterical neurosis and hysterical relationships involve identification, constant repression, and counter-cathexis that uses the Other as the theater of conflict. Due to the absence of an organic lesion and the tendency for symptoms to disappear without a trace, as mysteriously as they came, hysterical conversion represented a provocative challenge to medicine. In general, hysterics have historically triggered irritation, accusations of lying and malingering, and rejection. Hysteria has always defied medicine and the social order because sexuality is mixed up in it—in particular, female sexuality and the associated desire for sexual pleasure. Freud, in 1937, referred to the ‘‘repudiation of femininity’’ (p. 252) in both sexes as ‘‘bedrock,’’ a stumbling block because of the mental association of the female with castration. Symptomatically, hysteria is an illness of repudiated femininity. More specifically, the anxiety that leads to this repudiation reflects the considerable libidinal energy required by the constant pressure of libido, a pressure that may be destructive of the ego. JACQUELINE SCHAEFFER See also: Activity/passivity; Actual neurosis/defense neurosis; Anna O., case of; Anxiety; Archeology, the metaphor of; Autoplastic; Autosuggestion; Breuer, Josef; Cäcilie M., case of; Charcot, Jean Martin; ‘‘Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest’’; Conflict; Defense mechanisms; ‘‘Dostoyevsky and Parricide’’; Elisabeth von R., case of; Emmy von N., case of; Fantasy; Femininity; Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis; ‘‘Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria’’ (Dora, Ida Bauer); Freud, the Secret Passion; Fright; Hypnoid states; Hysterical INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS paralysis; Indications and contraindications for psychoanalysis in adults; Janet, Pierre; Katharina, case of; Lifting of amnesia; Lucy R., case of; Mnemic symbol; Mnemic trace, memory trace; Nervous Anxiety States and their Treatment; Neurosis; Phobias in children; Phobic neurosis; Proton-pseudos; Psychoanalytical nosography; Psychogenic blindness; Psychological types (analytical psychology); Quota of affect; Reminiscence; Repression; Seduction; Seduction scenes; Sexual trauma; Somatic compliance; Studies on Hysteria; Symbol; Symptomformation. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1937). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies in hysteria. SE, 2. Jeanneau, Augustin. (1985). L’hystérie, unité et diversité. Revue française de psychanalyse, 49 (1), 258–283. Schaeffer, Jacqueline. (1986). Le rubis a horreur du rouge. Relation et contre-investissement hystériques. Revue française de psychanalyse, 50 (3), 923–944. ———. (1997). Le refus du feminine. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Further Reading Britton, Ronald. (1999). Getting in on the act: The hysterical solution. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 80, 1–14. Halberstadt-Freud, Hendrika. (1996). Studies on hysteria one hundred years on: a century of psychoanalysis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77, 983–996. Kohon, Gregory. (1984). Reflections on Dora: The case of hysteria. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 5, 73–84. HYSTERICAL PARALYSIS Hysterical paralysis designates various forms of loss of mobility of the upper or lower limbs that are present in certain patients without any indication of a direct neurological cause. Even before the Studies on Hysteria (1895d), the problems that hysterical paralysis posed for the medical diagnostic model led Freud to introduce the first elements of psychoanalysis in a work called, ‘‘Some Points for a Comparative Study of Organic and Hysterical Motor Paralyses’’ (1893c). To Freud, hysterical paralyses seemed too precisely delimited in relation to their ‘‘excessive intensity’’ 773 HYSTERICAL PARALYSIS (1893c, p. 164), and they appeared to be related more to the way patients imagined their bodies than to any distribution of lesions in real anatomy. Based as it was on the fact that peripheral points on the body are grouped at the level of the nerves that represent the medullary centers of the cortex, Freud’s neurological conception of ‘‘representation paralysis’’ went far beyond what Charcot himself (1880–1893) called a ‘‘disease of representation.’’ Freud was in effect seeking ‘‘permission to move on to psychological ground’’ (1893c, p. 170), and he crossed that border on the basis of the difference between organ and function. This amounted also to placing paralysis on the level representing both fantasy and action. By defining the hysterical paralysis of the arm as ‘‘the abolition of the associative accessibility of the conception of the arm’’ (1893c, p. 170), he raised both the question of trauma and that of the affective value of a function, so anticipating what would later be known as associative links and breaks, isolation and repression. We see here too that what would later become the ‘‘innervation’’ of the repressed idea—‘‘psychical excitation that takes a wrong path,’’ as Freud wrote in 1894 (1950a, p. 195)—did not restrict the notion of conversion to a single idea of discharge, but installed it within conflictual ambivalence, and this whether it was muscular contraction, paralysis, or anesthesia that was at issue. Thus the symptom achieves the repression of the representation and the return of the related affect to its original innocent status as action. This disconnection between affect and symptom is what Charcot referred to as the ‘‘belle indifférence’’ of hysterics (cf. Freud, 1915d, pp. 155–56). 77 4 Thus conversion holds a precise position between hypochondria, which seeks to mentalize the unrepresentable depths of the body’s interior, and, at the other extreme, psychosomatic disturbances where improvement or somatic recovery dispense with the symbolic level entirely. Between the two, conversion involves the striated musculature in order to play out a drama at the level closest to the body. The involvement of the vegetative level is not excluded here, so long as it is introduced into a fantasy, the desire of which was expressed in its negative form as a paralysis (Jeanneau, 1985). AUGUSTIN JEANNEAU See also: Charcot, Jean Martin; Conversion; Elisabeth von R., case of; Hysteria; Innervation; Psychic causality; Psychic reality; Psychotic/neurotic; Somatic compliance; Studies on Hysteria; Symptom-formation. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1950a). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173–280. ———. (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141–158. ———. (1893c). Some points for a comparative study of organic and hysterical motor paralyses. SE 1: 155–172. Freud, Sigmund and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on Hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. Jeanneau, Augustin. (1985). L’hystérie, unité et diversité. Revue française de psychanalyse, 49 (1), 258–283. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS I I The concept of the ‘‘I’’ appears in Jacques Lacan’s work as a function that derives from the mirror stage. Piera Aulagnier later develops this term in a different way and defines it as nothing other than a knowledge of itself: ‘‘the I is nothing more than the I’s knowledge of the I’’ (1975/2001, p.114). Despite their semantic proximity, the I, for both Lacan and Aulagnier, is something clearly distinct from the Freudian ego; the latter is an agency, even if it claims to represent the totality of the person, and it has to be understood in relation to the other agencies (id, superego) and to the demands of reality and the object, which it can also oppose by occupying its position and turning, narcissicistically, to the love of the id. Towards the end of his work (1923b), Freud ascribes a different origin to the ego, no longer considering it as a psychic agency or no longer defining its ‘‘character’’ only as a product of identifications but regarding it as ‘‘the mental projection of the surface of the body’’ and thus primarily as a ‘‘bodily ego’’ that is derived from sensations. Jacques Lacan introduced the concept of ‘‘I’’ with the mirror stage (1936, then 1949), in opposition not to the Freudian ego but to the philosophy derived from the Cartesian cogito. The mirror stage constitutes an identification; namely, the transformation that occurs in a subject when he assumes an image as his own. This stage constitutes a fundamental identification that precedes the moment when the subject identifies with others through the mediation of language. It comprises several phases: in the first, the child reacts joyfully to the image but identifies it as belonging to an other; in the second, he perceives its imaginary nature and seeks the other behind the mirror; in the third, the child recognizes the image as his own. For Lacan, this entails the progressive and structuring conquest of the I through the intermediary of the subject’s own body. ‘‘This Gestalt. . . symbolizes the mental permanence of the I at the same time as it prefigures its alienating destination; it is still pregnant with the correspondences that unite the I with the statue in which man projects himself, with the phantoms that dominate him, or with the automaton in which, in an ambiguous relation, the world of his own making tends to find completion’’ (1949/2002, p. 3]). Therefore the I simultaneously is alienated in this image, because it is always external to it, and finds a stability, if not a permanence, there. Here Lacan adduces the concept of alienation: ‘‘[the subject] identifies his sense of self with the image of the other and the image of the other then captivates this sense in him’’ (1946– 50). In a second temporal phase, the subject is mediated by language, thereby returning to the unconscious everything that does not pass into discourse. Piera Aulagnier fundamentally modifies the Lacanian concept of I by historicizing it, that is, by defining it in terms of the dual processes of ‘‘selfhistoricization’’ and the ‘‘identificatory project.’’ However, it is principally in the mother-child relationship, well before the mirror stage, that she locates the primary identification from which the I will subsequently emerge. For the child, this identification develops from the first experience of pleasure, and it is the mother who identifies the child as the seeker of what she is offering, which thus makes him dependent on her own imagination. Similarly, in the mirror stage, 775 ID Aulagnier emphasizes that the child, having recognized the specular image as his own, turns to his mother to seek approbation in her gaze and thus to find the ‘‘junction between the image and the legend’’ (1975/ 2001, p. 124). ‘‘She alone will be able to complete the narcissistic image, to add that Ôsomething more’ that is indispensable to its sheen and without which it would cease to be anything more than it is in the real: an effect of the laws of optics’’ (1975). For Aulagnier, however, the I is not to be confused with the precursor of the I that is constituted by the subject’s representational activity in these early stages. The I is first of all anticipated by the mother (as ‘‘word-bearer’’) and as this still-idealized I that is formed during the ‘‘representative’’ stage, that is to say the child’s psyche that represents itself as possessing an absolute and immediate power over reality. How does the I come into being? It is through the act of enunciation, but rather than just any act, it is that which names the affect: ‘‘the act of uttering a feeling is therefore at the same time the utterance of a selfnaming by the I’’ ( p. 97). To name the other with the term of beloved, for example, is to designate the subject who is naming as that of the lover. Hence the author’s formulation: ‘‘It is therefore in and by the deferred action of naming the cathected object [affect and kinship system] that the I comes about . . . the I is nothing more than the knowledge that the I may have of the I’’ (p. 98). This knowledge has a sole purpose: to guarantee to the I a knowledge of its past and its future, the former being the precondition for the representability of the latter. The I will be characterized by its work, which differs from the enacting fantasy because it entails a work of making-sense based on ‘‘ideational representatives.’’ Despite being anticipated by the mother at a primitive stage, the I can subsequently occur only by itself. The Other, the mother, no longer has the power to respond to questions such as ‘‘who am I?’’ or ‘‘what am I to become?’’: ‘‘To these two questions, which must necessarily find an answer, the I will respond on its own behalf by the continuous self-construction of an ideal image that it claims as its inalienable right and which assures it that the future will prove to be neither the result of pure chance, nor forged by the exclusive desire of another I’’ (p. 116). What is possessed in this case is nothing but an outline, but what is cathected is the ideal image, as well as 77 6 the ability to construct it and to recognize oneself through this process of construction. No philosophical observation about freedom can be dissociated from this definition of the I, as the author establishes it on the basis of the preconditions for the emergence of the I, and the way in which these preconditions can be lacking in the case of psychosis. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Alienation; Apprenti-historien et le maı́tre-sorcier (L’-) [The apprentice historian and the master sorcerer]; Aulagnier-Spairani, Piera, ex-Castoriadis-Aulagnier; Demand; Ego; Ego (ego psychology); Encounter; Graph of Desire; Ideational representation; Identificatory project; Individual; Individuation (analytical psychology); Infant observation; Infantile psychosis; Integration; Need for causality; Object; Other, The; Passion; Primal, the; Psychic temporality; Psychoanalytic treatment; Psychotic potential; Sartre and psychoanalysis; Self-consciousness; Self-image; Sense/nonsense; Subject; Subject of the drive; Truth; Violence of Interpretation, The: From Pictogram to Statement. Bibliography Castoriadis-Aulagnier, Piera. (2001). The violence of interpretation. From pictogram to statement. (Alan Sheridan, Trans.) Hove: Brunner-Routledge. (Original work published 1975) Charron, Gyslain. (1993). Le discours et le Je. Klincksieck, Canada: Presses de l’université de Laval. Lacan, Jacques. (2002). Écrits: A selection. (Bruce Fink, Trans.) London: Tavistock Publications. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie. de (1998). Penser la psychose. Une lecture de l’œuvre de Piera Aulagnier. Paris: Dunod. ID Linked with the ego and the superego, the id (das Es) is the mental agency, in Freud’s ‘‘second topography’’ of 1923, that answers to the instincts and to the greater part of the unconscious processes. In German, es is the neuter personal pronoun. Its use as a noun, with an initial capital—das Es—is perfectly regular. From the standpoint of linguistics, es presents problems at the border between semantics and the syntax of anaphora: in order to understand what it signifies one must refer to another part of the discourse that interprets it. Thus es may be interpreted as any neuter noun in German and is also used, like the English ‘‘it,’’ in many INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ID impersonal constructions. Syntactically, es may be the subject or object of transitive verbs. Consequently, an idea designated ‘‘das Es’’ is liable to be indefinite and impersonal, universal, diverse, ambiguous and equivocal, even contradictory. Georg Groddeck used this term to refer to the universal unconscious agency—as force and as substance—that he considered to be his interlocutor and object of study when he treated patients suffering from somatic illnesses: ‘‘There is something common to the body and the soul; there is an Id in them, a force by which we are lived, even as we believe we are living ourselves’’ (Groddeck to Freud, May 27, 1917). Groddeck borrowed the term from the Berlin physician Ernst Schweninger, who had written, ‘‘The id cures.’’ The idea of an energetic monism was in any case a commonplace of the German culture of the time. And of course Groddeck had been reading Freud in the 1913–1917 period. Freud first encountered the notion of the id in Groddeck’s letter. His response in a letter of June 5, 1917, was critical: ‘‘The notion of the Ucs requires no extension.’’ The Ucs (unconscious) system was adequate for dealing with organic illnesses, for it influenced somatic processes. And why ‘‘cancel the difference between psychological and physical phenomena’’? ‘‘I am afraid,’’ Freud concluded, ‘‘that you are a philosopher as well and have the monistic tendency to disparage all the beautiful differences in nature in favor of a tempting unity’’ (1960a, pp. 317–318). But in the same letter Freud had dubbed Groddeck ‘‘an analyst of the first order,’’ and subsequently he supported him, having his Book of the It published by the Internationaler Psychoanalytisher Verlag just before his own The Ego and the Id. Apropos of The Book of the It, he wrote to Groddeck on March 25, 1923 that ‘‘The work . . . expounds the theoretically important point of view which I have covered in my forthcoming The Ego and the Id’’ (1960a, p. 342). The Freudian conception of the id, which he worked out in the summer of 1922, was presented in The Ego and the Id. That work, along with Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, constituted what Freud called ‘‘the third step in the theory of the instincts’’ (1920g, p. 59). The life and death instincts (Pleasure Principle) opened up a dynamic space for the accommodation and study, in Group Psychology, of the large-scale mental formations of the ‘‘second step’’: ego, ego ideal, identifications. In INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS The Ego and the Id, moving ‘‘closer to psycho-analysis’’ (1923b, p. 12), Freud confronted the ego and its unconscious resistance on the one hand and the unconscious/preconscious-conscious (Ucs./Pcs.-Cs.) distinction on the other. As a result, this last system was now seen as local, confined to the superficial layers of the mental apparatus where the Ucs. was synonymous with the repressed; it was unable to explain the resistance of the ego and inadequate as far as practice was concerned. In order to take the ego into account it was now necessary to move from the ‘‘local’’ examination of the symptoms and their treatment to a global view of the mental personality and of psychoanalytical treatment. This shift of level implied different dynamics and forms, although it did not necessarily mean that local forms and dynamics were surpassed or modified. Freud introduced the id as alien to the ego, as ‘‘the other part of the mind,’’ global and unconscious, incorporating the repressed and the forces by which (in Groddeck’s terms) we ‘‘are lived’’: a realm large enough to be that which the ego resists (1923b, p. 23). ‘‘We shall now look upon an individual as a psychical id, unknown and unconscious, upon whose surface rests the ego, developed from its nucleus the Pcpt. [perceptual] system.’’ (p. 24). The resistance of the ego was not identical to the familiar local resistances, for it had a global aspect that it manifested in the treatment (often after the local symptomatic features had been worked on) precisely at the point where it was confronted by something alien to it. The inadequacy of the Ucs./Pcs.-Cs. opposition was thus bound up with the countertransference and with the orientation of the treatment, issues that could not be addressed solely in terms of the first topographical theory. The introduction of the notion of the id bespoke a fresh overall approach on Freud’s part to treatment and the mental personality. Because of the life and death instincts, it was possible to claim a place for this new point of view ‘‘in the structure of science’’ (1923b, p. 23) without falling into monism. The attribution of the id’s paternity to Nietzsche, inaccurate on its face, perhaps may be taken as a semantic reference to the philosopher who, in criticizing philosophies of consciousness and of the subject, did the most to thematize the dynamics of the psyche. The division of the mental personality into three provinces, id, ego, and superego, would not have been relevant had each of the three agencies not been 777 ID characterized by Freud, beginning in The Ego and the Id, by sufficient ambiguity, diversity, and even contradiction. Since he did, the concept of the id would remain stable until the end of his work. A main interpretant of the id is instinctual life. ‘‘We approach the id with analogies: we call it a chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitations. We picture it as being open at its end to somatic influences, and as there taking up into itself instinctual needs which find their psychical expression in it, but we cannot say in what substratum.’’ (1933a [1932], p. 73). Since psychoanalysis is a dynamic theory of the psyche, the ‘‘whole person’’ is an interpretant of the id (p. 105), and psychoanalysis is ‘‘a psychology of the id (and of its effects on the ego)’’ (1924f, p. 209). The prevalence of the dynamic aspect means that the ego and the superego emerge from the id as ‘‘superficial strata’’ differentiated during ontogenesis; ‘‘id and ego are originally one’’ (1937c, p. 240); the superego ‘‘is in fact a precipitate of the first object-cathexes of the id’’ (1926e, p. 223). So the ego and the superego are interpretants of the id. (In The Ego and the Id, ‘‘es’’ is related to ego and superego in an ambiguous manner.) External reality is not an interpretant of the id (since we are not dealing here with the instinctual point of view), but it does illuminate the dominance of the pleasure principle in the id. The id knows nothing of logic, nothing of negation; contrary instinctual impulses coexist within it; the mechanisms of displacement and condensation are normal; dispersal and disorganization reign. And if, ‘‘in its blind efforts for the satisfaction of its instincts, it disregarded that supreme external power,’’ the outside world, if it did not have the ego as its protective shield and guide vis-à-vis reality, then the id, motor of the psyche, ‘‘could not escape destruction’’ (1933a [1932], p. 75). The id is not only a motor—it is also the locus of the motor; and in this respect, passive—it is a reservoir, or a storehouse (in which case reality is indeed an interpretant of the id). The id is the original reservoir of libido and of the destructive instincts that cathect and nourish the ego and the superego and their cathexes; it is also a storehouse for active memory-traces and, in this capacity, indifferent to time: ‘‘Wishful impulses which have never passed beyond the id, but impressions, too, which have been sunk into the id by repression, are virtually immortal.’’ (1933a [1932], p. 74). The id embraces the repressed, and by extension the unconscious: ‘‘The impressions of early traumas 77 8 . . . are either not translated into the preconscious or are quickly put back by repression into the idcondition. Their mnemic residues are in that case unconscious and operate from the id’’ (1939a, pp. 97– 98). The id also stores up human history: ‘‘The experiences of the ego seem at first to be lost for inheritance; but, when they have been repeated often enough and with sufficient strength in many individuals in successive generations, they transform themselves, so to say, into experiences of the id, the impressions of which are preserved by heredity. Thus in the id, which is capable of being inherited, are harboured residues of the existences of countless egos; and, when the ego forms its super-ego out of the id, it may perhaps only be reviving shapes of former egos and be bringing them to resurrection’’(1923b, p. 38). Such an archaic inheritance may include symbolism, the schemata of primal fantasies, or memory-traces of the killing of the primal father by the primal horde (1939a, pp. 98–101). Although the id-ego-superego system entails not only conflicts between these agencies but also intraagency conflict, there is no conflict within the id. Clinical experience allows for part of the id’s operations to be inferred. The repressed is transformed there; the id can destroy a repressed impulse, the libido of which is diverted into other channels. The liquidation of the Oedipus complex, which is not repression but rather destruction in the id, is an example. A regression of the libidinal organization can be brought about by the id, as for example in compulsive neurosis. Since psychoanalysis is an interpretant of the id, any notion may be related to it. Furthermore, the id is neither separated nor separable from the areas onto which it opens: the somatic realm, the ego and superego, even external reality; from its dynamic dimension, where the life and death instincts are to be found; from its constituent elements: instinctual life, libido, hate, repressed material, memory-traces, the unconscious; or from the pleasure principle. The articulation of the mental personality in accordance with the ego-superego-id scheme revived discussion on the following issues: the distinction between neurosis and psychosis; the classification of individuals into ‘‘libidinal types’’ defined by the particular conflicts that predominate in each case between id, ego, superego, and reality; and the forms of resistance and the dynamics of working-through: Freud describes as ‘‘arising from the id’’ the form of resisINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ID tance that, even after ego-resistances have been relaxed, demands a ‘‘period of strenuous effort’’ in order to undo repressions (1926d, pp. 160, 159). The conduct and aims of analysis were described by Freud as follows: ‘‘During the treatment our therapeutic work is constantly swinging backwards and forwards like a pendulum between a piece of id-analysis and a piece of ego-analysis. In the one case we want to make something from the id conscious, in the other we want to correct something in the ego. . . . The therapeutic effect depends on making conscious what is repressed, in the widest sense of the word, in the id.’’ (1937c, p. 238). ‘‘Its intention is, indeed, to strengthen the ego, to make it more independent of the superego, to widen its field of perception and enlarge its organization, so that it can appropriate fresh portions of the id. Where id was, there ego shall be. It is a work of culture—not unlike the draining of the Zuider Zee’’ (1933a, p. 80). Lastly, the question of anxiety was modified by the advent of the division into id, ego, superego, and reality. Whereas anxiety had hitherto been seen as arising from repressions, it was now acknowledged as intrinsic to the psyche and indeed as a factor in the institution of these divisions: ‘‘. . . the expression Ôanxiety of the id’ would stand in need of correction, though rather as to its form than its substance. . . . The id cannot have anxiety as the ego can; for it is not an organization and cannot make a judgement about situations of danger. On the other hand it very often happens that that processes take place or begin to take place in the id which cause the ego to produce anxiety. Indeed, it is probable that the earliest repressions as well as most of the later ones are motivated by an ego-anxiety of this sort in regard to particular processes in the id’’ (1926d, p. 141). Freud distinguishes two cases: something in the id may activate a danger-situation for the ego and spark anxiety in it; alternatively, ‘‘a situation analogous to the trauma of birth is established in the id and an automatic reaction of anxiety ensues’’ (1926d, pp. 140–41). ‘‘But one cannot flee from oneself; flight is no help against internal dangers. And for that reason the defensive mechanisms of the ego are condemned to falsify one’s internal perception and to give one only an imperfect and distorted picture of one’s id’’ (1937c, p. 237). Depending on the epistemology to which one subscribes (and on the resistance by which this choice is motivated), one will be more or less inclined to INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS accept the aspects of the unknown and the possible that Freud introduced into the metapsychological realm along with the id; these aspects are correlated with intrinsic and universal psychic dynamics and cannot be reconciled with positivism, pragmatism, or structuralism. In the history of psychoanalysis, what Freud had called ‘‘the third step in the theory of the instincts’’ came, after him, to be known as the ‘‘second topography.’’ After Freud, the dynamic dimension of the id and the importance of the instincts were concealed rather than further developed by a good many psychoanalytic tendencies. The ego psychology of Heinz Hartmann and his followers, the emphasis on object relationships (Ronald Fairbairn or Michael Balint in Great Britain, Margaret Mahler and Otto Kernberg in the United States), the foregrounding of the Self (Donald Winnicott, Heinz Kohut)—all either play down the notion of instinct (or drive) to the benefit of the object or sideline it completely; in all cases the id no longer has any raison d’être. Jacques Lacan’s ‘‘unconscious structured like a language’’ gives no room to the id. Melanie Klein, although she preserves the priority of the instincts, gives pride of place to the aggressive and death instincts. However, some French analysts who are not exclusively Lacanian continue to work on the id. Freud himself gave his followers a free hand, as witness the following observation on the division into id, ego, and superego: ‘‘It must not be supposed that these very general ideas are presuppositions upon which the work of psycho-analysis depends. On the contrary, they are its latest conclusions and are Ôopen to revision.’ Psycho-analysis is founded securely upon the observation of the facts of mental life; and for that very reason its theoretical superstructure is still incomplete and subject to constant alteration’’ (1926f, p. 266). A coherent advance in metapsychology that respected Freud’s requirements with respect to mental dynamics would certainly not be able to dispense with the conceptual tools of qualitative dynamics, as developed during the nineteenth century. This approach posits spaces articulated with each other by sets of dynamics that give rise to specific forms. It would make it possible to illuminate the way in which the ego and the superego arise from the id and from reality; to specify and explain the various processes of identification; to characterize inherited memory-traces as well 779 IDEA / REPRESENTATION as types of governing dynamics; and to distinguish between energies of different kinds—and this while respecting the diversity of the id. MICHÈLE PORTE See also: Agency; Psychic apparatus; Resistance; Superego; Topographical point of view. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. ———. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1–66. ———. (1924f [1923]). A short account of psycho-analysis. SE, 19: 189–209. ———. (1926d). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. ———. (1926e). The question of lay analysis. SE, 20: 177–250. ———. (1926f). Psycho-analysis. SE, 20: 259–270. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. and sense ‘‘B,’’ which refers to one of the two expressions (or ‘‘translations’’) of a drive within psychic processes, the other being the ‘‘quota’’ or charge, of affect. Sense A is the conventional meaning in philosophy and psychology. It is also found in Freudian metapsychology, a fundamental contribution of which was to describe it according to sense B, which is specific to psychoanalysis. Thus, there are two dimensions to representation, the first focused on the internal/ external distinction (internal space of representation/ external space of perception and action), the second on psychic topography (whether it involves the first topographical subsystem of conscious/preconscious/ unconscious or the second of id/ego/superego, which does not replace the first). A full description of these two ‘‘orthogonal’’ dimensions does entail certain problems, however. At this point it would be useful to introduce some terminological guidelines. The term representation translates at least three terms used by Freud, although he never clearly distinguished among them:  Vorstellung. This is an everyday word that literally means ‘‘that which is placed before, in front of, in the foreground.’’ The implication of the word ‘‘representation’’ is obviously quite different since it can mean that a second presentation is involved (this implication is dominant in sense A, but plays a less obvious role in sense B).  Repräsentant. This is a much less common word, derived from Latin, which means ‘‘delegate,’’ ‘‘representative’’ (Repräsentantenhaus: ‘‘House of Representatives’’), and is primarily applied to sense B (the drive ‘‘delegates’’ a representation in psychic life).  Idee. The word means idea, conception, thought, and so on. It is the term Freud often used to refer to ‘‘dream thoughts.’’ ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. ———. (1939a). Moses and monotheism. SE, 23: 1–137. ———. (1960a). Letters of Sigmund Freud (Ernst L. Freud, Ed. Tania and James Stern, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. Groddeck, Georg. (1928). The book of the it: Psychoanalytic letters to a friend. Washington, DC: Nervous and Mental Disease. (Original work published 1923) ———. (1977). Ça et Moi. Lettres à Freud, Ferenczi et quelques autres (R. Lewinter, Trans.). Paris: Gallimard. Further Reading Shulman, Michael E. (1987). On the problem of the id in psychoanalytic theory. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 68, 161–174. IDEA / REPRESENTATION The term ‘‘representation’’ has two meanings in psychoanalysis: sense ‘‘A,’’ which is the conscious or preconscious evocation in internal mental space of an object or person, even an event in the external world; 78 0 It is useful to distinguish the various senses of the concept of representation from related concepts such as ‘‘figuration’’ (especially in the dream work but also in the case of many creative activities), ‘‘symbol’’ (sometimes used by Freud as a synonym for ‘‘representation’’), and ‘‘fantasy’’ (which can be considered as a representation or as a system of representations of a particular kind). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IDEA / REPRESENTATION Freud’s interest in these distinctions was evident even before the advent of psychoanalysis. In ‘‘On Aphasia: A Critical Study’’ (1891b), he defined aphasic disorders from a structural perspective, as disorders of semantic systems and, consequently, as disorders of representational systems—the ‘‘things’’ evoked by words. (We can trace the origin of the distinction he made in 1915 between ‘‘thing representation’’ and ‘‘word representation’’ to this essay.) Freud then transposed these ideas onto the problem of the psychoneuroses. Even in his earliest descriptions of the affects, he emphasized how ‘‘irreconcilable ideas [representations]’’ come to be rejected by morality. But psychoanalysis truly came into being when he referred to this rejection as ‘‘repression,’’ an active process that changes the status of representations, now unconscious but potentially active (through the return of the repressed); and when, at the same time, he also distinguished the vicissitudes of the two expressions for drives, representation and affect. Strictly speaking, it is only the representation that is subject to repression. It would be contradictory to speak of unconscious affects, emotions, or feelings, even though Freud subsequently referred to an ‘‘unconscious feeling of guilt.’’ For what is unconscious is not the feeling itself, which has disappeared, but the still active mechanisms that generated it. At this point we are confronted with, on the one hand, ‘‘floating’’ affects that are deprived of representational support and, consequently, are easily converted into anxiety, and, on the other hand, unconscious representations that attempt to return to satisfy the desire, as well as unrepressed conscious representations that in general are not, or only slightly, imbued with affect. It is these last, ‘‘suspended representations,’’ that the floating affect will invest (in the military sense of blockading, or investing, a stronghold as well as in the economic sense, the way a fluid fills a container). Through this mechanism, the unconscious representation ‘‘delegates’’ the satisfaction of the desire to a representation or a group of representations that can enter consciousness. These views, which were clearly expressed between 1894 and 1896 (Freud, 1894a, 1895c, 1895d, 1896b), were developed in 1915, especially in ‘‘Repression’’ (1915d) and ‘‘The Unconscious’’ (1915e). André Green (1973) discussed these issues in a remarkable essay. We see, then, how Freudian metapsychology attempted to differentiate the two senses: the representation INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS carries libidinal impulses that are cathected to it to the extent that it is potentially engaged with the external world, where the satisfaction will necessarily be sought. But this also raises serious problems concerning the relation between psychic reality and the reality of the external world—problems that Freud continued to struggle with throughout his career. These problems are related to the activity of perception and memory. When the representation is, in the A sense, the internal ‘‘double’’ of an object, event, or person in the external world, it is assumed that the external reality has already been perceived and some trace of the perception has been retained. It is only under these conditions that the representation, in the B sense, will be able to be invested with a ‘‘quantum of affect.’’ Freud at first followed a rather simplistic theory of perception that was consonant with the empiricistassociationist school that dominated the late nineteenth century: perception functions like a recording device that faithfully transcribes the formal qualities of the perceived object, supplying ‘‘raw’’ material for the associative process. The resulting representations are themselves preserved unchanged in the form of ‘‘memory traces.’’ But this raises a rather difficult problem: By what criteria can the subject distinguish a true perception (the German verb for perceiving is wahrnehmen, ‘‘to take to be true’’) from an illusion or hallucination? Moreover, clinical work soon revealed the extent to which memory traces were manipulated through repression when they reappeared during the return of the repressed, were recathected by an affect, or were used for the disguised fulfillment of a desire. The perception itself, initially subject to psychic conflict, cannot be mistaken for a simple record, or inscription. It took a long time before Freud was able to acknowledge that every perception, every memory trace, and therefore every representation, is ‘‘constructed’’ by the dynamics of the psyche itself and undergoes a constant process of retroactive reworking (Perron, 1995). The controversies that ensued, advanced by ‘‘ego psychology,’’ concerning basal cognitive functions conceived as ‘‘zones free of conflict,’’ fell within the framework of these problems. What enabled Freud to escape the empiricism of his early work (rather than associationism) was the awareness of desire. In ‘‘A Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ 781 IDEA / REPRESENTATION (1950c), he states that desire originates with psychic life: under cover of need it reactivates the memory of the satisfaction and ‘‘supplies something similar to a perception, in other words, a hallucination’’ (1950c.). We must learn to distinguish between them and it is at this point that the difficult question of the ‘‘reality test’’ arises. A solution was indicated in a series of Freudian texts, including ‘‘Negation’’ (1925h) and Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d). The difference can be found in the introduction of disappointment, which should be added to the schema of maternal care. While the infant’s needs are satisfied by the mother (or her substitute), his desire is associated with an object, an object that will be progressively situated ‘‘externally’’ (and verified as such through its absence). If there is no satisfaction, the need persists (or is reborn, independent of hallucinatory satisfaction), and the child situates the desired object ‘‘inside himself.’’ Subject and object come into being together, along with the representation, now defined (as distinct from hallucination) as that which exists here, in me, in my internal space, but (not necessarily) there, in the external world. In this case, the child must determine ‘‘if something present in the ego as representation can also be found in the perception (reality). As we have seen this is again a question of outside and inside. The non-real, simply represented, the subjective, is only inside; the other, the real, is also present outside’’ (1925h). Based on this information, a number of authors attempted to construct a coherent theory of the ‘‘origins of psychic life’’ (Perron-Borelli, Perron, 1997), including Donald Winnicott (transitional objects and transitional space), Wilfred Bion (the transition from beta elements to alpha elements, the function of the maternal daydream, preconceptions), and Piera Aulagnier (from the pictogram to utterances, primal— primary—secondary succession). Fundamentally, as we have seen, representation is constituted as a double of the absent object, which it can evoke or cause to exist even when it is absent from the world of perceptions and actions; it is an absent presence. However, the same is true of the symbol. And Freud often used the two terms synonymously. He established a term-for-term correspondence, where the relation between representant and represented was equivalent to the relation between symbol and symbolized. But elsewhere he introduced a completely different approach, one—referred to as ‘‘structural’’ 78 2 above—in which the material of psychic life consists of ‘‘systems’’ of representations that are more or less cathected by affects. In these systems a representation only assumes meaning and functionality through its connection to other representations. This has analogies with linguistics, especially the work done by Ferdinand de Saussure and extensively employed by structural linguistics. We know, for example, that Jacques Lacan used this as the basis for constructing a profoundly original metapsychology. It is appropriate at this point to examine the sense of the term ‘‘representation’’ that no longer refers to the product of psychic work but to the work itself, the process of representation. How is it distinguished from the process of symbolization (Gibeault, 1989)? Symbolization can be said to make use of material supplied by the systems of representation, which are themselves constantly changing. This, however, raises questions about the problem of fantasy. It is difficult, in Freud’s writing as well as in the later literature, to differentiate the two concepts. However, by consensus, the following distinctions are generally accepted: Fantasy, much more so than representation, which need not be heavily cathected with affect, is invested with desire and the hallucinatory (or quasi-hallucinatory) satisfaction of this desire. Fantasy, however, cannot simply be characterized as a strongly cathected representation. It would be preferable to treat fantasy as a particular type of representation centered on satisfaction: the typical structure of the fantasy would, therefore, comprises an agent, an action, an object of the action. Transformations of this structure (through agent/object or active/passive reversals, the substitution of agents and objects)—a good example of which is provided in Freud’s article ‘‘A Child is Being Beaten’’ (1919e)—are part of the process of representation (Perron-Borelli, 1997). The psychoanalytic process is obviously an incessant process of binding and unbinding representations and affects, giving them mobility in place of rigid and repetitive bindings. In therapeutic procedures, like those that make use of children’s drawings or psychoanalytic psychodrama, we see how perception, memory traces, figuration, and representation are interrelated. The procedure consists in encouraging the patient to produce figurations (drawings, mimetic actions) as perceptual objects. And it is preferable, to avoid confusion, to use the term ‘‘figuration,’’ which is precise where ‘‘representation’’ is ambiguous. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IDEALIZATION These figurations are based on psychic realities known as representations (and their variant, fantasies). They are present as objects of perception to the therapist and give rise in him to representations that are more or less in line with those of the patient, although not always perfectly aligned with them. These overlapping representations and their constant reworking are the very material of the therapeutic process to the extent that it attempts to remobilize the psychic life of the patient. Donald Winnicott, with his squiggle technique, and Marion Milner after him, have done a remarkable job in describing these processes. ROGER PERRON See also: Psychic representative; Representative. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1925h). Negation. SE, 19: 233–239. Gibeault, Alain. (1989). Destins de la symbolisation. Revue Française de Psychanalyse, 53, 6, 1493–1617. Green, André. (1999). The fabric of affect in the psychoanalytic discourse. (Alan Sheridan, Trans.) London, New York: Routledge. (Original work published 1973) Perron, Roger. (1995). Théories de la psychogenèse. In Encyclopédie médico-chirurgicale, volume Psychiatrie. Paris: E.M.-C., fasc. 37-810-F-30. Perron-Borelli, Michèle. (1997). Dynamique du fantasme. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Perron-Borelli, Michèle, and Perron, Roger. (1997). Fantasme, action, pensée. Algiers: Éditions de la Société algérienne de psychologie. IDEALIZATION Idealization is a concentrated libidinal investment in an object that is thus exalted and overvalued. The term first appeared in connection with Freud’s definition of narcissism (1914), but the concept can already be found in Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood (1910), where Freud speaks of the biographer who sacrifices the truth to idealize the biographical subject, ‘‘reviving in him, perhaps, the child’s idea of the father’’ (p. 130). From the time of the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), Freud used the notion of ‘‘sexual overvaluation’’ in relation to fetishism and sexual deviations. This overvaluation makes the subject dependent and submissive toward an object INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS containing traces of the earliest oedipal attachments: ‘‘One always returns to one’s first love’’ (1905d, p. 154). This attitude reappears in the subject’s passionate dependence on an idealized object. Idealization involves an object of a drive, but not the drive itself. Since the origin of this libidinal overinvestment is unconscious, the investment appears to be an effect of the superior value of the object itself. The subject denies, however, that he is overinvesting and allows the overvalued object to remain overvalued. The subject thus overcomes ambivalence toward the object. This defense mechanism promotes an illusion that has effects in reality, both for the subject and those around the subject. The latter are at times forced to conform with an alienating image, as members of an idealized nation or race. Idealization must be distinguished from both sublimation and identification with the ego ideal, even if the notion of value is prominent in each. Idealization and sublimation are comparable in that both notions involve a modification of early object choices and sexual aims. These two notions also involve a psychical working through that detaches the drive from its primitive support and sets it off in another direction as a partial drive. Finally, both concepts involve valuations expressed in the social sphere. But whereas sublimation allows the drive to deviate from its goal, idealization blocks it from attaining its goal—thus creating an inhibition—because of a feeling of inequality between the great object to be attained and the small subject who feels libidinally impoverished in comparison with the idealized object. Thus, in place of libidinal fulfillment, the subject experiences an inhibiting fascination or, as the case may be, a destructive rage. Similarly, idealization of the object is different from identification with the ego ideal, first of all because in the former case the ego has impoverished libido, while in the latter case the ego introjects both the object and its qualities. Furthermore, in idealization the object is external to the ego, while in identification the object becomes internal. Most important, in idealization the object is set up in place of the ego ideal, while in identification it is the ego that takes the place of the object. Idealization results from a failure of the superego and the ego ideal to form at the outcome of the oedipal conflict. In idealization, the ego cannot serve as the ideal in a healthy process of identification that would insure that the first idealized objects belong to the ego. 783 IDEALIZED PARENTAL IMAGO Instead, the ego is dispossessed of its narcissistic libido for the benefit of the independently existing, and thus alienating, object. It is thus forced to externalize its most important constitutive element, the ego ideal. This results in an infantile situation of helplessness, a ‘‘paralysis derived from the relation between someone with superior power and someone who is without power and helpless’’ (1921c, p. 115). The notion of idealization thus enables one to understand both individual psychological mechanisms (such as passion, perversion, and psychotic identification) and collective ones (such as a group’s fascination with its leader). Numerous authors have contributed to enriching the concept of idealization. Melanie Klein (1952) has developed the notions of the idealized good object and the persecutory bad object, Piera Aulagnier (1979) has written on idealization in passion and psychosis, and Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel (1975) has discussed the disease of ideality. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Bipolar self; Desexualization; Ego ideal; Idealizing transference; Intellectualization; Narcissistic defenses; Paranoid-schizoid position; Passion. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (1979). Les destins du plaisir: aliénation, amour, passion. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Chasseguet-Smirgel, Janine. (1985). The ego ideal: A psychoanalytic essay on the malady of the ideal (Paul Barrows, Trans.). London: Free Association Books. (Original work published 1975) and treatment implications. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 45, 565–587. IDEALIZED PARENTAL IMAGO The idealized parental imago is a narcissistic configuration that arises from the child’s attribution of former, lost narcissistic perfection to an admired and omnipotent self-object. A precursor of the Freudian ego ideal, it can be the object of a fixation and not be integrated into the self in order to lead to ideals, but instead remain a concrete self-object. This notion appeared in Heinz Kohut’s article, ‘‘Forms and Transformations of Narcissism’’ (1966), and was formalized in his Analysis of the Self (1971). The idealized parental imago accounts for the need to merge with an all-powerful object and for religious and idealistic feelings of varying degrees of intensity. It gives rise to an idealizing transference in analysis. In The Restoration of the Self (1977) Kohut conceived of it as a pole of the self, a possibility or potential for the self, which acquires its cohesion by responses of the self-objects that promote a sense of merging and calm. One pole can compensate for the other; idealization can compensate for deficient mirror responses. The self will be fragile only if both poles fail in their function. These views of Kohut have been criticized on metapsychological grounds because they are based on the notion of an independent line of development for narcissism. Freud, Sigmund. (1905). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–245. AGNÈS OPPENHEIMER ———. (1910). Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood. SE, 11: 57–137. See also: Alter ego; Bipolar self; Idealizing transference; Narcissistic transference; Twinship transference/alter ego transference. ———. (1914). On narcissism: an introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. ———. (1921). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. Bibliography Klein, Melanie. (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 27, 99–110. Kohut, Heinz. (1966). Forms and transformations of narcissism. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 14, 243–272. Further Reading ———. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press. Lachmann, Frank M., and Stolorow, Robert D. (1976). Idealization and grandiosity: developmental considerations ———. (1977). The restoration of the self. New York: International Universities Press. 78 4 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IDEATIONAL REPRESENTATION Further Reading IDEALIZING TRANSFERENCE An idealizing transference—in which an individual seems to say ‘‘you are perfect, and I am a part of you’’—is defined as the mobilization of an allpowerful object, either spontaneously or as a reaction to the loss of narcissistic equilibrium. It illustrates the need for maintaining a narcissistic fusion against feelings of emptiness and powerlessness. It emerges from a fixation point—a ‘‘prestructural imago,’’ that is, one prior to the formation of agencies. The term first appeared in 1968, in Heinz Kohut’s ‘‘The Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders,’’ and he developed the concept starting in 1971, within the framework of narcissistic transferences, which are defined as the reactivation of narcissistic configurations in analyzable narcissistic personalities. It is important to distinguish three different phenomena: the idealizing transference, the pseudoidealizations, and idealization in the treatment of neurosis. The idealizing transference central to the treatment is stable even if it is present in different degrees, from the archaic fusion to a more evolved ideal. A break in this transference leads either to a more archaic idealizing transference, or a mirror transference when the libido is withdrawn from the archaic object. The idealizing transference refers back to the imago of the idealized parent. Kohut has been accused, particularly by the Kleinians, of letting patients develop an idealization that is not a factor of development, but rather a defense. AGNÈS OPPENHEIMER See also: Idealized parental imago; Self, the. Bibliography Kohut, Heinz. (1968). The psychoanalytic treatment of narcissistic personality disorders. In The search for the self (vol. I, pp. 477–509). New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1971).The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Gedo, John E. (1975). Forms of idealization in the analytic transference. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 23, 485–506. IDEATIONAL REPRESENTATION The notion of ideational representation was proposed by Piera Aulagnier. She distinguished three levels of representation: the pictogram, the fantasy, and the idea. Involved here are the three modes (representable, figurable, thinkable) through which the psyche metabolizes the information it draws from its encounter with reality. These three modes coexist, according to Aulagnier in The Violence of Interpretation: From Pictogram to Statement (1975/2001): ‘‘Every act, every experience, gives rise conjointly to a pictogram, to a representation and to Ôsense-making’’’ (p. xxx). The ideational representation is thus at the basis of the thinkable, which can be defined as a relational schema that the I imposes on the elements of both its own internal reality and the outside world in order to make them conform and cohere with the logic of the discourse from which the I itself is produced. What distinguishes the ideational representation from the pictogram and the fantasy is the appearance on the mental stage of the word-presentation and the changes it will impose. On this point Aulagnier’s theory converges with that of Sigmund Freud, for whom an idea becomes conscious in conjunction with the appearance of the word-presentation. As he stated in ‘‘The Unconscious’’ (1915): ‘‘[T]he conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone’’ (p. 201). Aulagnier emphasized the importance of the dimension of what is heard for the mental inscription of word-presentations in The Violence of Interpretation, recalling Ernest Cassirer’s description of ‘‘the infant’s first encounters with language as a series of sound fragments, attributes of a breast that he endows with the power of speech’’ (p. 55). There is then an adjunct of this ‘‘heard’’ to the thing-presentation, but this is still within the primary system, for the system of signification remains organized based on the postulate of the omnipotence of the desire of the Other. There is thus a first step in the infant’s psychic activity during language acquisition, in which libidinal meaning has priority over linguistic 785 IDEATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE meaning. Nevertheless, according to Aulagnier, this libidinal meaning traces an access to linguistic signification ‘‘by leading the psyche to accept that this meaning exists, that it is part of the representative’s inheritance and that this meaning is not unconnected to the offer or refusal present in the psyche’s response’’ (p. 65). Alongside this, the infant’s thinking activity and thus the formation of ideational representations and language acquisition are part of what the mother expects for the child; at the same time these elements are also what will enable to child to gain its independence by keeping its thoughts secret. In contrast, if thinking is attacked by psychosis such secrecy is impossible. Aulagnier did not situate this attack, as Freud did in ‘‘The Unconscious,’’ in terms of a regressive treatment of word as thing, or of metaphor as concrete object (as Harold Searles did in ‘‘The Differentiation between Concrete and Metaphorical Thinking in the Recovering Schizophrenic Patient ’’ [1962]) but instead on the basis of the fact that thinking, which constitutes the equivalent of an erogenous zone-function, can become the object of mutilations or amputations, depending on the relational field in which it develops. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Violence of Interpretation: From Pictogram to Statement, The. Bibliography Castoriadis-Aulagnier, Piera. (2001). The violence of interpretation: From pictogram to statement (Alan Sheridan, Trans). Hove, England, and Philadelphia: Routledge.(Original work published in 1975) Freud, Sigmund. (1915e). The Unconscious. SE, 14: 159–204. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1998). Penser la psychose. Une lecture de Piera Aulagnier. Paris: Dunod. Searles, Harold F. (1962). The differentiation between concrete and metaphorical thinking in the recovering shizophrenic patient. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 10 (1), 22–49. expression of the instinctual drive), the other being its charge, or ‘‘quota’’ of affect. It was essentially in his 1915 articles brought together under the title ‘‘Metapsychology’’ (‘‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,’’ ‘‘Repression,’’ and ‘‘The Unconscious’’) that Freud dealt with these issues. The ideational representative can be conceptualized as a mnemic trace of old perceptions. Strictly speaking, repression affects only this portion of the instinct; accordingly, it can be rendered unconscious, but can later return to consciousness in disguised form, with new, ‘‘innocent’’ associations, when, under the pressure of the instinctual drive, it manages to cross the barrier of censorship (this is the ‘‘return of the repressed’’). Because of this, ideational representatives undergo constant transformations, during which they can again take on the charge of affects that had become ‘‘empty’’ at the time of repression. The other component of the psychic expression of the instinctual drive, the ‘‘quota of affect,’’ is not subject to repression; it can be ‘‘suppressed’’ (that is, undergo a quantitative attenuation that may go as far as nullification), undergo a qualitative change in nature (be felt differently), or be transformed into ‘‘free-floating’’ anxiety. Of course, questions about what becomes of ideational representatives thus rejected ‘‘into the unconscious’’ have been raised: Are they really voided of affective charge there? Do they also, in the unconscious, undergo transformations in such a way that they change from there? Such issues quickly reach the point of unknowability, since it is not possible to talk about them except on the basis of returns of the repressed. Undoubtedly, then, from a perspective that is too exclusively topographical, the danger is to reify the agencies of the psyche as ‘‘contents’’ (a notion implicit in the expression ‘‘in the unconscious’’) and to wonder about the status and fate of ideational representatives conceived as discrete elements that preserve their individuality and that can be traced. This trap can be avoided by returning to the very basis of the definition of the instinct, that is, the primacy of the economic, and by examining the conflictual dynamics at work in the transformations in question. IDEATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE The ideational representative is one of the two components of the instinctual representative (the mental 78 6 ROGER PERRON See also: Hallucinatory, the; Representative; Psychic representative; Scotomization. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IDENTIFICATION Bibliography Green, André. (1999). The fabric of affect in the psychoanalytic discourse (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge. (Original work published 1973) ———. (1995) La Causalité psychique. Entre nature et culture. Paris: Odile Jacob. Laplanche, Jean, and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis. (1973). The language of psychoanalysis. (Donald Nicholson-Smith, Trans.). London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1967) Le Guen, Claude, et al. (1986). Le refoulement (les défenses). Revue française de psychanalyse, 50, 1 IDENTIFICATION Identification is an unconscious mental process by which someone makes part of their personality conform to the personality of another, who serves as a model. Described cursorily by Freud in the context of psychopathology, the mechanism of identification has come to refer to a principal mode of relating to others and has been integrated in the processes that constitute the psyche. Identification should be distinguished from imitation, which is a voluntary and conscious act. The notion of identification, in spite of its novelty and originality in the scientific or psychological vocabulary of the time, first appeared in Freud’s writings in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess on December 17, 1896. It has always retained the meaning he gave it then: ‘‘I have confirmed, for instance, a long-standing suspicion about the mechanism of agoraphobia in women. You will guess it if you think of prostitutes. It is the repression of the impulse to take the first comer on the streets—envy of the prostitute and identification with her’’ (1985c, p. 182). Freud often associated identification and hysterical symptoms with each other in subsequent writings, but he gave the concept a greater role in the Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), especially in the commentary that follows the dream of the ‘‘spiritual butcher,’’ as Jacques Lacan referred to the dream of the dinner party where Freud refers to the wife’s identification with a friend and presumed rival (chapter 4). Freud remarks that patients can ‘‘suffer as it were for a whole host of others, and to play all the roles in a drama solely out of their own personal resources.’’ The classic definition follows: ‘‘[I]dentification is not simple imitation but assimilation on the basis of a similar aetiological INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS pretension; it expresses a resemblance and is derived from a common element which remains in the unconscious’’ (1900a, p. 150). There is little doubt for Freud that this ‘‘aetiological claim’’ and ‘‘some factor held in common’’ are sexual in nature. Freud completes his description by demonstrating the dynamic use of identification under cover of another personality or composite formation, through the process of condensation and the use of a shared trait (the einziger Zug that Jacques Lacan translated as ‘‘unary trait’’), overcome censorship and realize the forbidden infantile wishes in the dream. The concept changed little in the following years, and in the Dora case it is used to account for the complexity of hysterical phenomena. But in 1909 Sándor Ferenczi focused interest on the concept of identification when he introduced the similar notion of ‘‘introjection.’’ For Ferenczi the ego ‘‘is always searching for objects to identify with, transference objects,’’ and introjects them in order to grow. Object love is nothing but introjection. In the following years, in the study of Leonardo da Vinci (1910c), Freud explored this new pathway when he wrote that the young man who will become a homosexual ‘‘represses his love for his mother; he puts himself in her place, identifies himself with her, and takes his own person as a model in whose likeness he chooses the new objects of his love’’ (p. 100). Likewise, ‘‘little Hans’s’’ identification with the phobogenic animal, and therefore with his father (1909b), of the Rat Man with his father or mother (1909d), of little Arpad with a cock (Ferenczi, 1913), or the Wolf Man united with his parents during the primal scene (1918b [1914])—all are based on the model found in Totem and Taboo (1912–1913a), namely, the identification with the dead father during the totemic meal. The oral cannibalistic precursor of the mental mechanism of identification, named ‘‘incorporation,’’ is clearly indicated in a note added in 1915 to the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d). In 1915 the concept of identification was significantly modified, becoming a process integral to the history of the libidinal bonds woven between the ego and the other, even within the subject. The loss of an object narcissistically invested resulted in a phenomenon that Freud described in Mourning and Melancholy (1916–1917g [1915]) as ‘‘an identification of the ego with the abandoned object’’ (p. 249). It is 787 IDENTIFICATION important to understand that this identification, here referred to as ‘‘melancholic,’’ is no longer partial and determined by a common trait as was hysterical identification, but total and brought about by withdrawal of the libido, which returns from the lost object to the ego. This was soon after referred to as ‘‘narcissistic identification’’ and considered to be more primal than ordinary identification. In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c), Freud describes three forms of identification: ‘‘First, identification is the original form of emotional tie with an object; secondly, in a regressive way it becomes a substitute for a libidinal object-tie, as it were by means of introjection of the object into the ego; and thirdly, it may arise with any new perception of a common quality shared with some other person who is not an object of the sexual instinct’’ (107–108). The first of these modalities provides an opportunity for Freud to express the dialectic of being and having, which he used later on several occasions. ‘‘A little boy will exhibit a special interest in his father; he would like to grow like him and be like him, and take his place everywhere. We may say simply that he takes his father as his ideal’’ (p. 105). But the initial ambivalence evolves under the pressure of the Oedipus complex, either toward rivalry with the father or homosexual cathexis through identification with the mother. ‘‘It is easy to state in a formula the distinction between an identification with the father and the choice of the father as an object. In the first case one’s father is what one would like to be, and in the second he is what one would like to have’’ (p. 106). Seventeen years later, on July 12, 1938, this opposition would continue to disturb Freud, who left a brief trace in his writings: ‘‘ÔHaving’ and Ôbeing’ in children. Children like expressing an object-relation by an identification: ÔI am the object.’ ÔHaving’ is the later of the two; after loss of the object it relapses into Ôbeing.’ Example: the breast. ÔThe breast is a part of me, I am the breast.’ Only later: ÔI have it’—that is, ÔI am not it’’’ (1941f [1938], p. 299). The second modality indicates the replacement of an erotic attachment, associated with the Oedipus complex, through identification and regression. A little girl coughs like her mother. ‘‘You are like her, but through suffering.’’ Dora coughs like the love object, her father. In both cases identification is only partial, 78 8 entirely limited, the ego restricting itself to borrowing only one of the object’s traits. The third modality is original. It introduces the new concept of the ego ideal and embodies it in the person of the ‘‘leader.’’ This projection of the ideal promotes the social life of subjects who will be able to identify with one another through this common bond to an other, instead of considering one another as rivals to be destroyed. Young girls with a crush on the same singer are not jealous of one another; the loyal partisans of a leader forget their quarrels and differences. One point needs to be remembered, however: Identification is not here determined by the sexual bond that characterized the community of hysterical identification, which introduced the use of groups and ‘‘masses’’ in sociological research. With the introduction of the ‘‘mythology’’ of the life and death instincts, and the description of the second topographical subsystem, the concept of identification changed in ways that would continue to enrich it. The nodal situation given to the Oedipus complex led to the description of complex interconnected identifications with each of the parents, which are made and unmade based on the number of possibilities for change and the data concerning their bisexual constitution. Along with these ‘‘hysterical’’ forms of identification, narcissistic identification assumes particular importance in the formation of the subject. ‘‘Since then we have come to understand that this kind of substitution has a great share in determining the form taken by the ego and that it makes an essential contribution towards building up what is called its Ôcharacter’’’ (1923b, p. 28). A number of post-Freudian authors like Theodor Reik went so far as to see this as a formative process for the ego itself. This insight helps contextualize the following remarks by Freud concerning the necessary withdrawal of cathexis from libidinal objects, which evolutionary change forces the id to abandon: ‘‘It may be that this identification is the sole condition under which the id can give up its objects. . . . When the ego assumes the features of the object, it is forcing itself, so to speak, upon the id as a loveobject and is trying to make good the id’s loss by saying: ÔLook, you can love me too—I am so like the object’’’ (p. 29–30). Subsequently, Freud defined what he referred to as ‘‘primary identification’’ (primäre Identifizierung), a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IDENTIFICATION fundamental process in human mental development that represents a mythical moment similar to that of primary narcissism, primary repression, or even the murder of the father by the primitive horde. The term led to a number of contradictions and misunderstandings, for the term ‘‘primary identification’’ was used to refer to infantile identification of the baby with its mother, something not intended by Freud. As a sign of becoming human he understands it to mean an identification with the ‘‘father in his own personal prehistory’’ (1923b, p. 31) that occurs prior to any form of object choice. It splits the id from the ego ideal, the first split that signifies their connection, which the theory of the formation of the superego subsequently refines. The injunction associated with identification, to ‘‘You ought to be like this (like your father),’’ contradicts the later admonition: ‘‘You may not be like this (like your father)’’ (p. 34). In response to the evolution of the Oedipus complex and the fear of castration, the superego imposes itself as the introjection of the father in his controlling capacity through a later resumption of the primary identification. ‘‘Thus we have said repeatedly that the ego is formed to a great extent out of identifications which take the place of abandoned cathexes by the id; that the first of these identifications always behave as a special agency in the ego and stand apart from the ego in the form of a super-ego, while later on, as it grows stronger, the ego may become more resistant to the influences of such identifications. The super-ego owes its special position in the ego, or in relation to the ego, to a factor which must be considered from two sides: on the one hand it was the first identification and one which took place while the ego was still feeble, and on the other hand it is the heir to the Oedipus complex and has thus introduced the most momentous objects into the ego’’ (1923b, p. 48). In ‘‘The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex’’ (1924d), Freud returned to his description while emphasizing the role of the fear of castration. Because of this, ‘‘the object-cathexes are given up and replaced by identifications. The authority of the father or the parents is introjected into the ego, and there it forms the nucleus of the super-ego, which takes over the severity of the father and perpetuates his prohibition against incest, and so secures the ego from the return of the libidinal object-cathexis. The libidinal trends belonging to the Oedipus complex are in part desexualized and sublimated (a thing which probably happens with every INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS transformation into an identification) and in part inhibited in their aim and changed into impulses of affection’’ (p. 176–77). Here Freud uses the notion of introjection as a sign of a form of assimilation that is more stable and less labile than identifications would be, being closely associated with fantasy. This is a modification of the concept defined earlier by Sándor Ferenczi and another example of the terminological misunderstandings that have hampered the evolution of the concept of identification. In any case ‘‘the super-ego retained essential features of the introjected persons—their strength, their severity, their inclination to supervise and to punish’’ (p. 167), Freud wrote in ‘‘The Economic Problem of Masochism’’ (1924c). Freud’s final thoughts on identification reveal his confusion in the face of its conceptual complexity. In chapter 31 of the New Introductory Lectures (1933a), entitled, ‘‘Decomposition of the Psychic Personality,’’ he again attempts—and for the last time—to clarify the various processes he designates as being part of identification and concludes, ‘‘I am absolutely not satisfied myself with these developments concerning identification.’’ But he adds a comment that will open a pathway to research on the phenomena of transmission between generations: As a rule parents and authorities analogous to them follow the precepts of their own super-egos in educating children. Whatever understanding their ego may have come to with their super-ego, they are severe and exacting in educating children. They have forgotten the difficulties of their own childhood and they are glad to be able now to identify themselves fully with their own parents who in the past laid such severe restrictions upon them. Thus a child’s superego is in fact constructed on the model not of its parents but of its parents’ super-ego; the contents which fill it are the same and it becomes the vehicle of tradition and of all the time-resisting judgments of value which have propagated themselves in this manner from generation to generation. . . . Mankind never lives entirely in the present. The past, the tradition of the race and of the people, lives on in the ideologies of the super-ego, and yields only slowly to the influences of the present and to new changes; and so long as it operates through the super-ego it plays a powerful part in human life, independently of economic conditions (1933a, p. 67). The ‘‘cruel’’ father himself had a father whom he took as a model, as well as a mother, and they too had 789 IDENTIFICATION a mother and a father. Every parent replays in his child the world of his own childhood as it has remained engraved in his unconscious and his preconscious fantasies, far removed from the versions he communicates to others or keeps hidden from his conscious memories. It is this universe of origins that the investigative drive of every child explores to discover the secrets of its birth and identity. For its personality is formed with this material of composite images that may one day return in the form of ‘‘visitors of the ego’’ (Mijolla). Post-Freudian authors have emphasized the psychoanalytic situation surrounding the concept of identification, which Freud did not examine in terms of identification. They have insisted on the necessity and limits associated with transference identification from the patient to the analyst, emphasizing that the analyst must possess a certain amount of empathy (Einfühlung), the ability to ‘‘understand what is foreign to our ego in other persons’’ (Freud, 1921c), and even to understand and interpret the analysand’s unconscious. Identification with Freud, the founding father, although the source of intense disagreement among his contemporaries and immediate successors, nonetheless remains one of the most vital areas of interest for the analyst. Fantasies of identification, with Freud or with individuals within the ‘‘psychoanalytic genealogy’’ of analysts, can lead to an understanding of certain theoretical propositions and events in the history of psychoanalysis. Both Anna Freud, through her work on identification with the aggressor, and Melanie Klein, through her work on projective identification, have helped clarify various modes of identification that have confirmed the heuristic benefits of this evasive concept. The interest in relations with the mother has led to a misreading of primary identification, whose paternalphallic nature was identified by Freud. Following Edith Jacobsen, other authors have presented it as a pre-object archaic mother-child relation situated in a state of fusion/confusion between the self and the notself (Sandler), and have distinguished it from the concept of ‘‘imitation’’ borrowed from psychological models. The distinction between ‘‘internalization,’’ comprising incorporation, imitation, and introjection, and associated with the construction of identity (Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein), and ‘‘externalization’’ as the distinction between internal objects and 79 0 external objects, has placed identification at the crossroads of these different systems. Its narcissistic pole has also been elucidated in the so-called ‘‘mirror’’ relation between mother and child, which is distinct from the specular identification of the child at the mirror stage, described by Jacques Lacan (1949). ‘‘Secondary identifications’’ have been isolated to describe the identificatory processes associated with the appearance and growth of the object relation, of pre-oedipal, oedipal and post-oedipal relations, and so on. Psychoanalytic interest in more serious pathologies has drawn attention to the challenges to identity, whether these involve the behavioral disturbances of adolescence or the depersonalization observed in borderline or psychotic patients. Long before he addressed these issues in his essay on Justice Schreber (1912a), Freud, in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess (December 9, 1899), noted that ‘‘paranoia dissolves the identification once more; it re-establishes all the figures loved in childhood which have been abandoned . . . and it dissolves the ego itself into extraneous figures’’ (1950a, p. 280). More recently, research on identification has branched off in several directions: ‘‘counter-identification,’’ the ‘‘identificatory project’’ (Piera Aulagnier), ‘‘archaic identification,’’ ‘‘heroic identification’’ (Didier Anzieu), and ‘‘fantasies of unconscious identification’’ (Mijolla). The number of statements made to account for the richness of the concept seems interminable and psychoanalysts are still trying to determine its nature and formation. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Adhesive identification; Adolescent crisis; Allergic object relation; Alter ego; Animus-Anima (analytical psychology); As if personality; Asthma; Autohistorization; Character formation; Collective psychology; Counter-identification; Cultural transmission; Dead mother complex; Defense mechanism; ‘‘Dostoyevsky and Parricide’’; Ego; Ego and the Id, The; Ego ideal; Empathy; Fetishism; Heroic identification; Holding; Homosexuality; Hysteria; Idealization; Identification fantasies; Identification with the aggressor; Identificatory project; Identity; Imaginary identification/symbolic identification; Introjection; ‘‘Introjection and Transference’’; Little Arpåd, the boy pecked by a cock; Mastery; Megalomania; Melancholia; Melancholic depression; Midlife Crisis; ‘‘Mourning and Melancholia’’; Narcissism; Object; Orality; Object relations theory; Phantom; Primary INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IDENTIFICATION FANTASIES identification; Psychotic potential; Self-hatred; Superego; Thalassa. A Theory of Genitality; Transference (analytical psychology); Transference and Countertransference; Transference relationship; Transitional object, space. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sándor. (1916). Introjection and transference. In his Contributions to Psychoanalysis (Ernest Jones, Trans.; pp. 30–80). Boston: Richard G. Badger. (Original work published 1909) Florence, Jean. (1978). L’Identification dans la théorie freudienne. Brussels: Publications des facultés, Université Saint-Louis. Grunberger, Béla, and Chasseguet-Smirgel, Janine (Eds.). (1978). L’Identification: l’autre c’est moi. Paris: Tchou. Kanzer, Mark. (1985). Identification and its vicissitudes. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 66, 19. Mijolla, Alain de. (1986). Les Visiteurs du Moi, fantasmes d’identification, Confluents psychanalytiques (2nd ed.). Paris: Les Belles Lettres. (Original work published 1981) Mijolla, Alain de. (1987). Unconscious identification fantasies and family prehistory. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 68, 397–403. Further Reading Silverman, Martin. (2002). The will to succeed and the capacity to do so: The power of positive identifications. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 71, 777–800. Used similarly by Alain de Mijolla in ‘‘La désertion du capitaine Rimbaud’’ (‘‘Captain Rimbaud’s desertion’’; 1975/1981), the notion of identification fantasies was later used in the description of less pathological phenomena. It was especially useful in bringing a new theoretical perspective to the study of transgenerational phenomena, an area previously dominated by the overly mythical idea of ‘‘transmission from unconscious to unconscious,’’ by providing the conditions for a more psychoanalytic consideration of the fantasmatic genealogy of each individual. Transmission does indeed occur, but by way of preconscious processes involving the third-party transmitters that are the earliest objects: parents or grandparents establish a relationship between the child and preceding generations via stories, traditions, secrets, and legends, which are thus perpetuated from generation to generation with varying degrees of alteration along the way. Given this fact, it is important from a psychoanalytic point of view to substitute the term intergenerational for transgenerational (the latter in any case being borrowed from other theoretical systems). Identification fantasies often assume the guise of screen-identifications that involve a staging of personalities that are foreign to the subject, such as fashionable celebrities, idealized versions of people close to the subject, or legendary figures, but analysis can reveal their original, more modest, familial models. The term identification fantasies originally referred to imaginary constructions or even genuine unconscious fantasmatic scenarios through which the subject replaces a part of their Ego or Superego with a primordial figure from their family history, particularly the father, mother, or grandparents, such that this figure lives a small or large fragment of the individual’s own existence as a substitute. The notion of fantasies is essential, for the ‘‘truth’’ the child refers to in exploring his or her prehistory is not necessarily that of actual, recognized and dated events (although why not, if such information is available?), but can be made up of more or less disparate fragments of representations and affects. These elements are often organized into ‘‘scenes’’ that fill gaps in the individual’s history, and whose assimilation, or introjection, to use Sándor Ferenczi’s first definition of that term, enriches the Ego by providing additional coherence to the subject’s psychic universe. Such fantasies are not decorative but rather, like any other fantasy, offer libidinal satisfaction and an outlet for the actualization of desires within the dynamics of the drives. Only an interpretation that is integrated into an ongoing analytic process, where the psychoanalyst’s own identification fantasies are also activated, makes it possible to detect these fantasies and understand their meaning as expressed through symptoms, behaviors, or even delusions, in the sense that Sigmund Freud spoke of delusions in the case of the Rat Man (1909d). Grandparents, whether living or dead, are an essential part of this process of fantasmatic genealogical organization, since the conscious and unconscious representations of them that are kept and transmitted by the child’s parents are as essential to the formation of identification fantasies as the child’s own perception of external reality, if not more so. Smith, Henry. (2001). Hearing voices: The fate of the analyst’s identifications. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 49, 781–812. IDENTIFICATION FANTASIES INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 791 IDENTIFICATION WITH THE AGGRESSOR Psychoanalytic treatment is the best-adapted context for the recollection and opening up of identification fantasies, and for a repetition of the primitive quest that led to their construction. It is because the psychoanalyst allows the patient’s fantasies to resonate within himself or herself, where they awaken echoes of the analyst’s own intrapsychic explorations, that these fantasies can become a common ground where interpretation is possible and communicable. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Identification; Intergenerational; Phantom; Primal fantasy; Secret. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1909d). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151–318. Halfron, Olivier, Ansermet, François, and Blaise, Pierrehumbert (Eds.). (2000). Filiations psychiques. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Mijolla, Alain de. (1981). La désertion du capitaine Rimbaud. Les visiteurs du moi, fantasmes d’identifications. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. (Originally published 1975) Mijolla, Alain de. (1987). Unconscious identification fantasies and family prehistory. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 68, 397–403. Mijolla, Alain de. (2004). Prehistoire, de famille. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. IDENTIFICATION WITH THE AGGRESSOR Identification with the aggressor was first described by Anna Freud in her book The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, first published in German in 1936. In that book, Anna Freud drew a distinction between defenses directed against drive derivatives (to protect the ego against instinctual demands) and defenses against affects. The former included defenses that had long been recognized, such as repression, regression, reaction formation, introjection, projection, isolation, and undoing, as well as vicissitudes of instinct such as reversal and turning against the self which still need the intervention of the ego for their operation. To these nine mechanisms Anna Freud added a tenth: sublimation, or displacement of instinctual aims. Nonetheless, Anna Freud was well aware of the adaptive function of sublimation. 79 2 Defenses against painful affects (which may be regarded as ‘‘preliminary stages of defense’’) include denial in fantasy, denial in word and deed, restriction of the ego (a defensive form of altruism), and identification with the aggressor, with which we are here concerned. Jenny Wäelder, in a verbal communication to Anna Freud, had already given a striking picture of this mechanism in a five-year-old boy. Whenever the clinical material was about to touch on the question of masturbation or masturbatory fantasies, the normally inhibited little boy became extremely aggressive: for example, he would pretend to be a roaring lion and attack the analyst. He carried a rod about with him and pretended to be a devil, using it to attack the stairs and other parts of the room, and trying to strike his mother and grandmother. Matters came to a head when he began to brandish kitchen knives. Analysis showed that he was expecting punishment for what he regarded as forbidden activities. In his violent behavior he was both dramatizing and forestalling the attacks that he feared, and the kitchen knives pointed to his fear that his penis would be cut off. A little boy whose Oedipus complex was at its height used this defense mechanism to try to deal with his sexual wishes towards his mother. Hitherto his relations with her had been very happy, but were now punctuated by outbursts of resentment. He would criticize her in the strongest terms for all sorts of reasons, of which the most mysterious was curiosity. This was not too difficult to explain: in his fantasies the mother knew of his sexual wishes towards her and rejected his advances with indignation. The indignation was replicated in his own outbursts of resentment, though he did not reproach her on general grounds but on those of curiosity. But the curiosity was a feature of his own instinctual life, not his mother’s; he had found his scopophilic impulse the most difficult to master. Thus, defensively, he reversed the roles of parent and child. These and other examples are described by Anna Freud. Essentially, identification with the aggressor points to a particular phase in the development of super-ego functioning, as she pointed out. For although external criticism has been introjected, the link between the fear of punishment and the offense committed has not yet been established in the patient’s mind. Once the criticism is internalized, therefore, the offence is externalized—a maneuver that involves another mechanism, the projection of guilt. As Anna INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IDENTIFICATORY PROJECT Freud put it, intolerance of other people precedes severity towards oneself. CLIFFORD YORKE See also: Altruism; Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, The; Ego psychology; Identification. Bibliography Freud, Anna. (1946). The ego and the mechanisms of defence. New York, International Universities Press, 1966. (Original work published 1936) IDENTIFICATORY PROJECT The notion of the identificatory project was proposed by Piera Aulagnier to account for the I’s (the perceived self ’s) work of identification as a function of future time. In The Violence of Interpretation: From Pictogram to Statement (1975), Aulagnier defined the identificatory project as ‘‘that continuous self-construction of the I by the I that is necessary if that agency is to be able to project itself into a temporal movement, a projection on which the I’s very existence depends’’ (p. 114). The temporal dimension that is projected onto both the past of memory (in auto-historization) and the imagined future (in the identificatory project) is the basis for the I’s ability to respond in its own name to the unavoidable questions that sum up the identification process: ‘‘Who am I?’’ and ‘‘What must the I become?’’ Aulagnier’s theory of identification owes a great deal to Jacques Lacan. For her, it is the mother who initially identifies the preverbal infant as the entity that demands what she gives; because of this, the infant depends upon the maternal imaginary. But at the same time, the infant self-represents itself based on the ‘‘pictographic representation’’ it has of its earliest experiences of pleasure. The second phase of identification, which follows this primary period, is specular identification (the mirror stage). In Lacan’s theorization, this stage shapes the function of the I and establishes the imaginary register as the locus of the ego’s identifications (‘‘The Mirror State As Formative of the Function of the I As Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience’’ [1949/2004]). For her part, Aulagnier emphasized that after the young child recognizes the image in the mirror as being its own, it turns toward his mother seeking approval in her gaze; this enables INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the child to see in the mirror ‘‘the junction between the image and the legend’’ (p. 124). In these conditions, object-libido and ego-libido are joined together; the baby discovers in the image the entity whose presence brings pleasure to the mother and in turn derives pleasure from the valorization of this image that he knows to be his own. Hence the definition that Aulagnier proposed with regard to the second phase of identification: ‘‘To be like the image that others admire or to be like the image admired by those whom the I admires are the two formulations that the narcissistic wish borrows from the field of identifications’’ (p. 126). With the notion of ‘‘identification with the projection’’ (1968/1986), which in The Violence of Interpretation became the ‘‘identificatory project,’’ a fundamental change took place. The immediacy of the exchange of care, contact, and gazes was succeeded by the temporal distance of the project(ion) referring to a time in the future. However, the possibility of access to the dimension of a genuine future (one that is not merely a coming reactualization of the past) is not automatic, and it is the trial of castration that gives the subject such access. Aulagnier likened what she calls the identificatory project to what Freud called ‘‘ego ideals.’’ She also underscored its difficulty: ‘‘The I’s task is to become capable of thinking its own temporality. To do this it must think, anticipate, and invest in a future timespace, despite the fact that lived experience will quickly reveal that in doing so, the I is investing not only in the unforeseeable, but also in a time that it might not even have to live. In other words, the I is cathecting an Ôobject’ and a Ôgoal’ that possess the properties that it most abhors: precariousness, unpredictability, and the possibility of inadequacy.’’ In the ‘‘something less’’ borne in the present, by comparison with the ideal-filled future, Aulagnier proposed in The Violence of Interpretation to see ‘‘the assumption of the castration trial in the identificatory register’’ (p. 116), meaning that the I will never coincide with its ideal in the present of a realization, but instead will always project it forward in time. The identificatory register can thus be seen to be indissociable from the libidinal register, because a representation of the desiring subject always figures there. Being, or rather, knowing who one is, is essentially knowing who one wants to become. This opens the way for extending these ideas into clinical practice, not only 793 IDENTITY with regard to psychosis, but in other areas ranging from geriatric depression to adolescent turmoil. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: I; Identification; Mastery; Psychic temporality; Time; Violence of Interpretation, The: From Pictogram to Statement. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (1986). Demande et identification. In Un interprète en quête de sens. Paris: Ramsay. (Original work published 1968) ———. (2001). The violence of interpretation: From pictogram to statement. (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). Hove, U.K., and Philadelphia: Brunner/Routledge. (Original work published 1975) ———. (1978). La violence de l’interprétation du pictogramme à l’énoncé. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1975, 363 pp. Lacan, Jacques. (2004). The mirror state as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience. In Écrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans., pp. 3–9). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1949) Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1998). Penser la psychose. Une lecture de Piera Aulagnier. Paris: Dunod. IDENTITY Identity is not a Freudian concept. Theoreticians have defined it in very different ways: as a structure that accounts for narcissism and is part of the ego; as the ability to remain the same despite changes; as a feeling of continuity; or as the sum of representations of the self. The importance of the notion of identity in the United States is related to its use in ego-psychology, which considers the ego as a relatively autonomous and potentially conflict-free structure. Many theories of identity adapt a portion of Freud’s view of the ego. Alongside the Freudian ego, which is a structure defined by its functions, another ego—or identity related to identifications—is posited (whether inside or outside ego-psychology) and conceived of as the outcome of a process of individuation. The first mentions of the importance of the concept of identity for clinical practice and psychopathology date from the nineteen-fifties. When it first appeared 79 4 in psychoanalytic discourse, the concept of identity was associated with two approaches. The first was an attempt to extend the Freudian perspective to a general psychology that would include the ego’s relationships with the surrounding world and guide research on child development. The second sought to apply psychoanalysis to pathologies, more serious than neurosis, characterized by disturbances of identity. Phyllis Greenacre evoked the internal and external faces of identity, and described their favorable and unfavorable aspects. Ralph Greenson isolated a screen-identity syndrome. Margaret Mahler viewed identity as a facet of development connected with object-relations, symbiosis, and the possibility of separation-individuation. Two major psychoanalytical theorists have focused on identity. In 1956 Erik Erikson introduced the concept of an ego identity formed during adolescence, which served as a gauge of psychopathology. In 1961 Heinz Lichtenstein proposed giving identity the priority that the libido had for Freud. He considered it the keystone of psychopathology and eventually reframed Freudian metapsychology within a monist perspective that challenged the dualistic concept of identification. Erikson hoped to explain human development epigenetically; the various stages of his model could not be reduced to the psychosexual level. The ego was not propelled by drives alone but must confront the challenges posed by the environment. Ego identity was the adolescent stage; it took over from various identifications and its successful establishment depended on the resolution of earlier developmental crises. Erikson’s ego identity was defined by the unconscious quest for personal continuity, by the synthesis of the ego, and by group loyalties. It reflected an existential dimension of the ego. It was formed through a succession of syntheses of the ego whereby the conflicts of earlier stages were integrated. The opposite of ego identity was a diffusion of identity, a pathological syndrome in which representations of self and object are fluid and unintegrated, and oppositionalism and acting out are manifested. Otto Kernberg used this model as a diagnostic criterion for borderline states. Lichtenstein looked upon human identity as a permanent dilemma because of the absence of any form of guarantee. The theme of an invariable identity arose from an unconscious imprint derived from the mother thanks to a process of mirror reflection. Variations on this theme constituted the feeling of identity, a creation unique to the child. Pathological developments INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IDEOLOGY occurred when themes emerged that were impossible to satisfy yet necessary for the maintenance of identity. In such case a subject could be caught in a paradoxical oscillation between the search for an annihilating other and an isolating autonomy. The principle of identity was the central motivation for the human individual, who was obliged to maintain an identity under more or less continual threat. This principle replaced the reality principle in Lichtenstein’s account, and the drives as well as the repetition compulsion were subservient to it. Identity was assimilated to narcissism, described as a primary thematic with secondary variants. It left room for the self, the fourth metapsychological dimension and third paradigm of psychoanalysis. Identity was part of an evolutionist view that rejected dualism of any kind. Historically speaking, theories of identity were replaced by theories of the self and by the ‘‘self psychology’’ of Heinz Kohut. These are psychological theories in which the unconscious and libido are secondary. As Freud pointed out, however, unity and synthesis are superficial concepts. Drawing on such criticism, Kohut characterized Erikson’s identity as a descriptive psychosocial concept. Edith Jacobson questioned the relevance and universality of so-called disturbances of identity, which she considered exaggerated. Roy Schafer interpreted the emergence of the concept of identity as symptomatic of a subjectivity stripped of a mechanistic and reifying metapsychology and hence in need of reformulation. Merely descriptive theories of identity may be said to belong to the sphere of phenomenology. When the conceptual focus is on identity, the ego is cut off from its libidinal roots. Furthermore, the view that underpins these theories is exclusively developmental and completely rejects any causality based on deferred effects. AGNÈS OPPENHEIMER See also: Adhesive identification; Adolescent crisis; Anthropology and psychoanalysis; Double, the; Ego (ego psychology); Ego-identity; Identification; Imposter; Object relations theory; Principle of identity preservation; Projection and ‘‘paticipation mystique’’ (analytical psychology); Self-consciousness; Self-image; Self representation; Sexual identity; Symbiosis/symbiotic relation. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Erikson, Erik. (1956). The problem of ego identity. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association. 56–121. Greenacre, Phyllis. (1958). Early physical determinants in the development of the sense of identity. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 6, 612–627. Greenson, Roger. (1958). Variations in classical psychoanalytic technique. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 29, 200–201. Lichtenstein, Heinz. (1983). Identity and sexuality. The dilemma of human identity. New York: Jason Aronson. Mahler, Margaret. (1958). Problems of identity. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 6, 131–142. IDEOLOGY The word ideology refers to the study of ideas, a form of general or abstract discourse, immobilized thought (Piera Aulagnier, Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor), or any doctrine claiming to justify a collective activity of a political, religious, artistic, or other kind. When Antoine Destutt de Tracy in his Mémoire sur la faculté de penser (vol. 1, 1796–1798) and Élements d’idéologie (1801) coined the word as an attempt to create a science of ideas, he remained nominally a Platonist in that he did not conceive of the term as derogatory, which it has since become. However, the Platonic ‘‘ideology’’ Alexandre Kojève described in his Essai d’une histoire raisonnée de la philosophie paı̈enne (vol. II, Platon et Aristote) was not only a science of ideas but claimed to be the science of objective reality, the Cosmos noètos conceived by Plato as the real, or essential world, interposed between the One and the sensible world (Cosmos aisthètos). Destutt de Tracy claimed to be an ideologue, as did Pierre Daunou, Constantin-François Volney, Pierre Cabanis, and Dominique Garat, but the term was used deprecatingly by Napoleon and François René de Chateaubriand. In the work of Karl Marx, ideology assumed a critical sense that displayed the opposition between the ‘‘noble’’ sense given to it by Destutt de Tracy and its opposite, purely negative meaning; this opposition is itself ‘‘ideological.’’ In the German Ideology, ideology is always the reflection of an alienation, an alienation obscured by the material conditions that determine the representations that constitute that alienation. Ideology, as an expression of alienation, is essentially incapable of grasping the dialectical relationships that 795 ILLUSION unite or resist those representations. By extension any non-critical system of representation is considered an ideology, for example, Catholic ideology or even Marxist ideology understood as the dogmatization of the results of Marx’s critical thought (Leninism, Stalinism, etc.). Ideology would then be seen as the discourse of a class, a party, or an association that seeks to achieve or achieves cultural, political, economic, intellectual, spiritual, or other domination over society and individuals. The essence of ideology could therefore be to weld a ‘‘collectivity’’ into a defensive system of representations based on an unconscious causality, material or structural, involving realities such as the Family, the Nation, the Army, the Church, the State, and so on. These can then be understood as ideological entities, just as ‘‘fixed’’ as individual doctrines or representations. ‘‘System,’’ superstructure, doctrine, dogma, and so on, then become other possible synonyms for ideology. Sigmund Freud gathered up all these meanings to express a ‘‘vision of the world’’ (Weltanschauung) whose various forms of representation philosophy elaborates in thought, which would make his research into truth the pinnacle of ideology. For philosophy is the work of sublimation while ideology, as Piera Aulagnier has shown, is an avatar of the desire for ‘‘self-alienation’’ (Les Destins du plaisir, 1979). Ideology—always and everywhere—corresponds to a ‘‘sublimated abandonment to an abstract idea’’ (Freud, Sigmund, 1921c). But as Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor has noted, ‘‘it isn’t a question of sublimation but of intellectualization or desexualized abstraction; we do not give in to an idea but to its author, whether a group or an individual’’ (1992). Radical ideology might be a form of destructive madness to the extent that ideology tends to exclude conflict and sharply reduce ambivalence, thus resembling the discourse of schizophrenia. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1992). Le Plaisir de pensée. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ILLUSION Illusion is an error experienced by someone who is misled (illudere) by the nature of evidence or the seductive appearance of something that deceives. The deceiver may be personified (Descartes’s ‘‘evil genius’’) or limited to a physical or physiological cause (the illusions of the senses), or even an ontological structure (the Platonic myth of the cave). However, the subject can create his own illusion by taking his desires for reality. It is this last formulation that is embodied in the Freudian approach to illusion, defined as a belief primarily motivated by the realization of a desire. To that extent the illusion has much in common with dreams and dreaming, where the philosophers of antiquity had situated it. The concept of illusion in Freud is gradually developed, reaching its culmination in The Future of an Illusion (1927c). In the Project for a Scientific Psychology (1950c [1895]), illusion is confused with hallucination in the context of perceptual illusion. But with the Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901b), the concept is further refined. In Freud’s case it would be wrong to qualify the feeling of déjà vu or déjà éprouvé as illusion, because theycorrespond, through displacement and concealment, to an authentic unconscious daydream. Thirty-five years later in ‘‘A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis,’’ Freud would refer to false recognition (déjà vu, déjà raconté) as a part of the ‘‘illusions in which we seek to accept something as belonging to our ego, just as in the derealizations we are anxious to keep something out of us’’ (1936a, p. 245). Aulagnier, Piera. (1979). Les Destins du plaisir. Aliénation, amour, passion. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. There is a certain amount of ambiguity concerning the simple criterion that defines illusion as something that doesn’t exist in reality, to the extent that the concept of reality is reconsidered in psychoanalysis as mental reality. Moreover, the single stable criterion used to define illusion in psychoanalysis is a belief motivated by the realization of desire: ‘‘[W]e will call a belief an illusion when a wish-fulfilment is a prominent factor in its motivation, and in doing so we disregard its relations to reality, just as the illusion itself sets no store by verification’’ (1927c, p. 31). Freud, Sigmund, (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. Freud identifies illusion as being mostly associated with religion, art, and philosophy, but he also DOMINIQUE AUFFRET See also: Philosophy and psychoanalysis. Bibliography 79 6 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ILLUSION acknowledges the hypothesis that science itself could be an illusion, although he rejects it. In a deeper sense the greatest illusion would be the belief in the happiness and goodness of human nature. This pessimism, or realism, is first associated with the illusion that lasting sexual satisfaction is possible (‘‘ÔCivilized’ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness,’’ 1908d) and that social rules should be modified to procure happiness for individuals. Freud then assumes the position of a defender of a realist position, which includes negativity instead of ignoring it: ‘‘Because we destroy illusion we are accused of endangering ideals’’ (1910d, p. 147). In fact the only ideal he defends is that of truth. He further distinguishes two types of illusions: those that are not harmful since the illusion is obvious, and those that are dangerous because they take the place of an objective apprehension of reality (philosophy, ideology, and especially religion). To the first category belongs art, which is said to evolve from magic and which, as an artistic illusion, produces the same affective effects as if it involved something real (1912–1913a). ‘‘Art is said to be almost always harmless and beneficent; it does not seek to be anything but an illusion.’’ (1933a [1932], p. 160). In what sense is art an illusion? Freud is forced to make use of the concept of reality to determine this. ‘‘The substitutive satisfactions, as offered by art, are illusions in contrast with reality, but they are none the less psychically effective, thanks to the role which phantasy has assumed in mental life’’ (1930a [1929], p. 75). Illusion, and especially the ability to take pleasure in it, would therefore be the result of the magical omnipotence associated with the beginnings of mental life, which led to the separation of the life of the imagination from the mental life grafted to reality, ‘‘At the time when the development of the sense of reality took place, this region [imagination] was expressly exempted from the demands of reality-testing and was set apart for the purpose of fulfilling wishes which were difficult to carry out’’ (1930a [1929], p. 80). But reality-testing is difficult to manage when defining illusion. Freud emphasizes it when he distinguishes illusion from delusion: ‘‘Illusions need not necessarily be false—that is to say, unrealizable or in contradiction to reality’’ (1927c, p. 31). The example chosen (the illusion of a young woman of modest means of being able to marry a prince) is not convincing, because within the framework of erotomaniacal delusion, that same idea (not illusory since it is realizable, Freud says) would INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS indeed appear to contradict reality. We could therefore say that delusion has more to do with a difference in ‘‘temporality’’—hope and expectation in one case, real certainty on the other. The difference between the potential reality of the content of the illusion and the belief in its actual reality is what allows reality testing to be used to define the illusion. Illusion primarily involves the Weltanschauung and, in this regard, Freud emphasized religious illusion. All religious doctrines are ‘‘illusions and insusceptible of proof. No one can be compelled to think them true, to believe in them’’ (1927c, p. 31). The desire they realize is that of being protected and loved by a father who is more powerful than the real father. Infantile distress is the origin of religious need, which Freud criticizes because of the weight it places on education. He also feels—and this may sound paradoxical—that it is necessary to maintain religious teaching as a basis of education and human life in common. ‘‘If you want to expel religion from our European civilization, you can only do it by means of another system of doctrines; and such a system would from the outset take over all the psychological characteristics of religion—the same sanctity, rigidity and intolerance, the same prohibition of thought—for its own defense’’ (p. 51). In other words even if for Freud religion is a ‘‘serious enemy’’ of science, it would be an illusion to believe that it is possible to renounce belief for the benefit of knowledge alone. The philosophical illusion that believes it can deliver an image of the world that is coherent and without gaps is undermined by the progress of science; and political illusion, such as communism, is an example of a substitute for religion. The struggle against illusion is therefore a battle that will only yield incomplete results, following a process of maturation that is never realized: ‘‘Since we are prepared to renounce a good part of our infantile wishes, we can bear it if a few of our expectations turn out to be illusions’’ (1927c, p. 54). In psychoanalysis the concept of illusion has, in the work of Donald Woods Winnicott, undergone a completely different development than it has in Freud. Winnicott (1953/1971) defines illusion as the necessary adaptation of the mother to the needs of the baby, which allows her to experiment with narcissistic omnipotence from the beginning. This phase corresponds to the primary creativity of the infant and is prolonged during adulthood in art and religion. Winnicott’s 797 I M A G I N A R Y I D E N T I F I C A T I O N /S Y M B O L I C I D E N T I F I C A T I O N ideas extended Freudian theories of the ‘‘purified pleasure ego’’ and the ‘‘reality test.’’ Winnicott postulates the existence of ‘‘intermediate state between a baby’s inability and growing ability to recognize and accept reality’’ (1953, p. 90). This ability is strictly dependent on what the mother allows the baby to feel. ‘‘The mother’s adaptation to the infant’s needs, when good enough, gives the infant the illusion that there is an external reality that corresponds to the infant’s own capacity to create’’(p. 95). In other words, the reality test is experienced as a frontal shock, but the reality is initially constructed by the baby who perceives it as being part of himself. During a subsequent period, it will appear to be independent, but only gradually: ‘‘The mother’s eventual task is gradually to disillusion the infant, but she has no hope of success unless at first she has been able to give sufficient opportunity for illusion’’ (p. 95). But illusion as a form remains and serves as a binding factor: ‘‘We can share a respect for illusory experience, and if we wish we may collect together and form a group on the basis of the similarity of our illusory experiences. This is a natural root of grouping among human beings’’ (p. 90). This differs from the Freudian point of view, which remains dependent on a certain proscientific militancy, while Winnicott situates himself at a level that is both more metaphysical and more affective. ‘‘It is assumed here that the task of reality-acceptance is never completed, that no human being is free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality, and that relief from this strain is provided by an intermediate area of experience which is not challenged (arts, religion, etc.). This intermediate area is in direct continuity with the play area of the small child who is ‘lost’ in play’’ (p. 95). SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Belief; Certainty; Erotomania; Future of an Illusion, The; Narcissistic elation; ‘‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’’; Wish, hallucinatory satisfaction of a; Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1901b). The psychopathology of everyday life. SE, 6. ———. (1927c). The future of an illusion. SE, 21: 1–56. 79 8 ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. ———. (1936a). A disturbance of memory on the Acropolis (an open letter to Romain Rolland on the occasion of his seventieth birthday). SE, 22: 239–248. Winnicott, D. W. (1953). Transitional objects and transitional phenomena, a study of the first not-me possession. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 34, 89–97. Additional material in (1971). Playing and reality (pp. 1–30). London: Tavistock. IMAGINARY IDENTIFICATION/SYMBOLIC IDENTIFICATION Jacques Lacan differentiated between an imaginary identification, that forms the ego from a symbolic one that founds the subject. He discussed the first in his essay on the ‘‘Mirror Stage’’ (1936) and he examined the second primarily in his seminar on Identification (1961–1962). Imaginary identification involves the image of one’s ‘‘fellow being.’’ Before the subject develops the proper neurological connection, he grasps the unity of his body image by identifying with the image of the other, the ideal ego. Thus the subject escapes the feeling of having a fragmented body. The mirror stage is also the source of the aggressive tension that characterizes relations with the one’s fellow being, and it is the source of desire as the other’s. Symbolic identification, or ‘‘signifier identification,’’ involves an ideal signifier—an insignia of the Other or a unary trait—as the nucleus of the ego-ideal that the subject depends on. This situation is modeled on Freud’s second form of identification, that is, an identification by adopting a single trait taken from the object. In fact, imaginary identification depends on symbolic identification. In the mirror stage, the infant looks for a sign from the maternal Other holding him up to the mirror in order to confirm that the image is his. Behind the signifier of the ego-ideal are the Name-of-the-Father and the symbolic phallus. A subject’s sexual identity does not depend on his relation to an image, but on his position in relation to the symbolic phallus—a male subject has it, while the female subject does not have it, but is it. In the last years of his Seminar lectures, Lacan introduced the idea of identification with a symptom INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS I M A G I N A R Y , T H E (L A C A N ) and added it to the notions of imaginary and symbolic identification. MARC DARMON See also: Body image; Demand; Ego ideal/ideal ego; I; Identification; Mirror stage; Object a; Seminar, Lacan’s; Unary trait. Bibliography Lacan, Jacques. (2002). The mirror stage as formative of the I function as revealed in psychoanalytic experience. In Écrits: A selection. (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1949). ———. Le Séminaire-Livre IX, L’identification (1961–62). (unpublished seminar). IMAGINARY, THE (LACAN) In the work of Jacques Lacan, the real, the symbolic, and the imaginary are a central set of references. The imaginary is the field of the ego. In his 1936 essay ‘‘Au-delà du Ôprincipe de réalité’ ’’ (Beyond the reality principle), Lacan noted that Freud discovered a meaning in patients’ complaints that other physicians considered imaginary and thus illusory. In his first reading of Freud’s work, Lacan emphasized the notion of the image by highlighting its function: reflecting the subject’s discrete behaviors in unified images. In the mirror stage, the subject identifies with these images and develops an ego concept in relation to another. In his first seminar, Lacan acknowledged that such identification implies a radical alienation (1988a), but he considered this identification to be essential to the structure of the imaginary order and to the development of the human ego. At that time (1953–1954), he was interested in the ethological work of Nikolaas Tinbergen and Konrad Lorenz, which privileged the function of the image as gestalt in the development of the sexual instinct. Lacan believed that the development of the sexual drive of humans too is related to the imaginary function. This would account for the lure of images. As an example, he referred to the female stickleback, a fish whose copulatory dance is set in motion by the sight of a certain color patch on the male’s back. Yet a paper cutout bearing the same INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS markings can have the same effect on the female (Lacan, 1988a, pp. 122–123). What matters is that image is invested with libido. Lacan referred to libidinal investment as ‘‘what makes an object become desirable, that is to say, how it becomes confused with this more or less structured image which, in diverse ways, we carry with us’’ (1988a, p. 141). But for the subject to come into being, one must find ‘‘a guide beyond the imaginary, on the level of the symbolic plane. . . . This guide governing the subject is the ego-ideal’’ (1988a, p. 141). The ego-ideal, according to Lacan, is the Other (caregiver) speaking. From that point on, the symbolic order (language) dominates over the imaginary order, which is reduced to being a decoy. It took Lacan twenty years to restore the imaginary to its full place alongside the real and the symbolic, which he did within the topic of the Borromean knot (a set of three interlinked rings that come apart if any one is removed). In spite of Lacan’s focus, in 1982, on the importance of knotting the three consistencies (the real, the symbolic, and the imaginary), many Lacanians continue to neglect the imaginary. In his study of James Joyce (2001), however, Lacan showed the difficulties that follow from a failure to give proper place to the imaginary. According to Marie-Christine Laznik-Penot (1995), the treatment of autism also allows us to see the difficulties that can follow from failure to accord the imaginary order its proper place. MARIE-CHRISTINE LAZNIK See also: Blank/nondelusional psychoses; Demand; Desire of the subject; Ethology and psychoanalysis; Fantasy, formula of; Fort-Da; Frustration; Graph of Desire; I; Identificatory project; Imaginary identification/symbolic identification; Imago; Knot; Law of the father; Matheme; Mirror stage; Object a; Optical schema; Other, the; Phallus; Privation; Real, the (Lacan); Real, Imaginary, and Symbolic father; Schizophrenia; Self-image; Signifier; Structuralism and psychoanalysis; Subject; Subject’s castration; Symbolic, the (Lacan); Symptom/sinthome; Topology. Bibliography Lacan, Jacques. (1936). Au-delà du ‘‘principe de réalité.’’ In his Écrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966, 73–92. ———. (1982). The seminar XXII of 21 January 1975: RSI. In Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (Eds.), Feminine sexuality. New York: W. W. Norton. 799 IMAGO ———. (1988a). The seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book 1: Freud’s papers on technique (1953–1954) (John Forrester, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. ———. (1988b). The seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book 2: The ego in Freud’s theory and in the technique of psychoanalysis (1954–1955) (Sylvana Tomaselli, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. ———. (2001). Joyce: le symptôme. In his Autres écrits. Paris: Seuil. Laznik-Penot, Marie-Christine. (1995). Vers la parole: trois enfants autistes en psychanalyse. Paris: Denoël. IMAGO An unconscious prototype of personae, the imago determines the way in which the subject apprehends others. It is elaborated based on the earliest real and fantasmatic intersubjective relations with family members. The term imago first appeared in work of Carl Gustav Jung in 1912, and the same Latin word was adopted in various languages. The concept was borrowed from a novel of the same name by Carl Spitteler (1845–1924), published in 1906. In Jungian psychology, the term imago eventually replaced the term complex. The imago is linked to repression, which in neurosis, through regression, provokes the return of an old relationship or form of relationship, the reanimation of a parental imago. This regression is linked to particular quality of the unconscious, that of being constructed through historical stratification. ‘‘I have intentionally given primacy to the expression imago over the expression complex, for I wish to endow the psychical fact that I mean to designate by imago, by choosing the technical term, with living independence in the psychic hierarchy, that is, the autonomy that multiple experiences have shown us to be the essential particularity of the complex imbued with affect, and which is cast into relief by the concept of the imago,’’ Jung wrote. Jung later replaced the term imago with archetype in order to express the idea that it involves impersonal, collective motifs, but in fact this idea was already present in his earliest descriptions of imagos. In 1933 he again explained his choice of this term: ‘‘This intrapsychical image comes from two sources: the influence of the parents, on the one hand, and the child’s specific 80 0 relations, on the other. It is thus an image that only reproduces its model in an extremely conventional way.’’ Finally, he situated the imago ‘‘between the unconscious and consciousness, in a sense, as if in chiaroscuro.’’ It is a partially autonomous complex that is not completely integrated into consciousness. Sigmund Freud, ‘‘forgetting’’ that Spitteler’s novel had inspired Jung, used the same title, Imago, for the review he created with Hanns Sachs and Otto Rank in Vienna in March 1912. The concept of the imago, very seldom used by Freud, appeared in his writings for the first time that same year, in ‘‘The Dynamics of Transference’’ (1912b), where he wrote: ‘‘If the Ôfather-imago,’ to use the apt term introduced by Jung . . . is the decisive factor in bringing this about, the outcome will tally with the real relations of the subject to his doctor’’ (p. 100). In those rare texts where he used this term, the imago refers only to an erotic fixation related to real traits of primary objects. But elsewhere, Freud had already shown the importance of the child’s links with its parents and had explained that the most important thing is the way in which the child subjectively perceives its parents; these ideas are contained in the notion of the imago. He had also distinguished certain representations that had the status of the imago (the mnemic image of the mother, or the image of the phallic mother in the work of Leonardo da Vinci). However, in ‘‘The Economic Problem of Masochism’’ (1924) he used the term imago in the Jungian sense, in relation to moral masochism and the superego. Indeed, he wrote that behind the power exerted by the first objects of the libidinal instincts (the parents) was hidden the influence of the past and traditions. In his view, the figure of Destiny, the last figure in a series that begins with the parents, can come to be integrated with the agency of the superego if it is conceived of ‘‘in an impersonal way,’’ but quite often, in fact, it remains directly linked to the parental imagos. At that time the term imago was commonly used in the psychoanalytic community, but it was particularly developed in the work of Melanie Klein. Besides the classic imagos, she described ‘‘combined parental imagos’’ that provoke the most terrible states of anxiety. She linked these to the ‘‘stage of the apogee of sadism,’’ which in 1946 became the ‘‘schizoid-paranoid position.’’ The analyst’s work is to bring forth the anxiety linked to these terrifying imagos, thus facilitating the passage to ‘‘genital love’’ (which in 1934 became the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IMAGO PUBLISHING COMPANY ‘‘depressive position’’) by transforming these terrifying imagos into helpful or benevolent imagos. In her view, the young child develops cruel, aggressive fantasies about the parents. The child then projects these fantasies onto the parents, and thus has a distorted, unreal, and dangerous image of people around it. The child then introjects this image, which becomes the early superego. Klein thus described the early superego more as an imago than as an agency. Klein left it to Susan Isaacs to define what she meant by imago: an image, or imago, is what is introjected during the process of introjection. It involves a complex phenomenon that begins with the concrete external object in order to become that which has been ‘‘taken into the self ’’ (p. 89), that is, an internal object, Isaacs explained in ‘‘The Nature and Function of Phantasy’’ (1948), adding: ‘‘In psycho-analytic thought, we have heard more of ’imago’ than of image. The distinctions between an ’imago’ and ’image’ might be summarized as: (a) ’imago’ refers to an unconscious image; (b) ’imago’ usually refers to a person or part of a person, the earliest objects, whilst ’image’ may be of any object or situation, human or otherwise; and (c) ’imago’ includes all the somatic and emotional elements in the subject’s relation to the imaged person, the bodily links in unconscious phantasy with the id, the phantasy of incorporation which underlies the process of introjection; whereas in the ’image’ the somatic and much of the emotional elements are largely repressed’’ (p. 93). In his 1938 article entitled Les Complexes familiaux dans la formation de l’individu (The family complexes in the formation of the individual), Jacques Lacan drew the connection between imago and complex. It was at this time that he advanced his first theory of the Imaginary. The imago is the constitutive element of the complex; the complex makes it possible to understand the structure of a family institution, caught between the cultural dimension that determines it and the imaginary links that organize it. Lacan described three stages in it: the weaning complex, the intrusion complex (in which the mirror stage is described), and the Oedipus complex. This complex-imago structure prefigured what would become his topology of the Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic. ANTOINE DUCRET INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS See also: Combined parent figure; Idealized parental imago; Internal object; Maternal; Myth of the hero; Phallic mother; Transference depression. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1912b). The dynamics of transference. SE, 12: 97–108. ———. (1924). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155–170. Isaacs, Susan. (1948). Thje nature and function of phantasy. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 29, 73–97. Jung, Carl Gustav. (1911-12, 1925 [1952a]), Psychology of the unconscious. A study of the transformation and symbolism of the libido. A contribution to the history of the evolution of the thought. Coll. works, Vol. 5, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. Lacan, Jacques. (1984). Les Complexes familiaux dans la formation de l’individu. Paris: Navarin. (Original work published 1938) IMAGO PUBLISHING COMPANY The destruction by the Nazis of the Verlag (International Psychoanalytic Press) was a bitter blow to Freud, and when he arrived in London in 1938 he tried to find some way of restoring it. Already, in May of that year, Hanns Sachs had suggested that he establish a periodical in the Unites States that would be devoted to non-medical applications of psychoanalysis, especially to culture, and to call it the American Imago. In this way Sachs hoped to continue along the path pursued by the original Imago, founded by himself and Otto Rank in 1912, and of which he had remained co-editor. The name ‘‘Imago’’ was taken from the title of a novel by a Swiss poet, Carl Spitteler, that had underlined the importance of the unconscious in its motif, a love affair. According to Ernest Jones, Freud favored the Sachs plan, for which financial backing had been guaranteed by a well-wisher, but was somewhat reluctant to agree to the title, though he quickly gave in, and American Imago remains successful. Freud was deeply concerned about the loss of his own journals printed in German, as well as the Verlag. He found a sympathetic and gifted writer, poet, and publisher, John Rodker, who founded the Imago Publishing Company (IPC) in London. Rodker’s codirectors were Barbara Low and Martin Freud, and the headquarters of the new company were located at 6, 801 IMAGO. ZEITSCHRIFT F Ü R D I E ANWENDUNG DER PSYCHOANALYSE. . . Fitzroy Square in London. For a short time in 1939 a combined Zeitschrift and Imago were published in London, but failed to survive the beginning of the Second World War. Plans had already been made for the publication of a new edition of Freud’s collected works, and the Gesammelte Werke were published by the new company and replaced the original Gesammelte Schriften. Its eighteen volumes were undoubtedly a publishing triumph. Individual works by Freud were also published by the IPC in German, of which Aus den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse (later translated as The Origins of Psycho-Analysis (1954) by Eric Mosbacher and James Strachey and edited by Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud and Ernst Kris) was of cardinal importance, containing as it did the most important letters to Fliess on the subject as well as relevant drafts and notes. Other major Freud works published by the IPC in English translation were Three Essays of the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), The Question of Lay Analysis ( 1926e), and On Aphasia (1891b). The publishing house also issued important works by other authors, of which Twins: A Study of Three Pairs of Identical Twins (1952) by Dorothy Burlingham is exemplary. Other publishing arrangements for psychoanalytic books were well established by the time the IPC closed, shortly after its last publication in 1962. CLIFFORD YORKE See also: Gesammelte Werke; Low, Barbara. Bibliography Burlingham, Dorothy. (1952). Twins: A study of three pairs of identical twins. London: Imago Publishing Co. Freud, Sigmund. (1954a). The origins of psycho-analysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, drafts and notes: 1887–1902. (Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud, and Ernst Kris, Eds.). London: Imago Publishing Co. Grubrich-Simitis Ilse. (1995). Urbuch der Psychoanalyse. Hundert Jahre Studien über Hysterie von Josef Breuer und Sigmund Freud. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. IMAGO. ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE ANWENDUNG DER PSYCHOANALYSE AUF DIE GEISTESWISSENSCHAFTEN Following the launch of Jahrbuch für Psychoanalyse and Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, Hugo Heller, the 80 2 publisher, in 1921 created Imago, the third psychoanalytic periodical under the editorial direction of Sigmund Freud. While the two earlier publications were primarily oriented toward clinical applications and developments, Imago introduced an interdisciplinary approach to journal publishing, an approach that Freud had already tested with the series ‘‘Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde’’ (Essays on applied psychology), published by Franz Deuticke. With Imago, the concept was enlarged and expanded in periodical form. The original title of the journal had been Eros and Psyche, but that was changed to Imago, after the name of a novel by Carl Spitteler (1845–1924). For Freud, the name was sufficiently vague to be useful to his enterprise (letter to Ernest Jones, January 14, 1912). Directed toward other than clinical ends, the journal served as a forum to introduce an experimental dialogue with neighboring fields such as anthropology, philosophy, literature, theology, and linguistics (see Freud, 1913j). Consistent with this approach, the first part contains a contribution from two lay analysts, the editorsin-chief of the publication, Otto Rank and Hanns Sachs. This was ‘‘Entwicklung und Ansprüche der Psychoanalyse’’ (Development and demands of psychoanalysis), in which the authors show that the methodology of psychoanalysis, although based on concrete methods of therapy, continued to struggle, in its theoretical paradigms, with the relation between dreams and artistic, mythological, and religious fantasies. Consequently, it was necessary to test and develop the knowledge obtained through the study of dreams, neuroses, and symptom formation as part of a general science of the mind based on the unconscious. Imago was not only addressed to nonmedical lay practitioners but actively courted this target group in search of authors, thereby exposing psychoanalysis to areas of expertise outside therapy. A number of Freud’s contributions to applied psychoanalysis appeared in Imago, ranging from excerpts from Totem and Taboo in 1912 to early manuscript versions of Moses and Monotheism, which appeared in the final volume, published in Vienna in 1937. The periodical was the product of a flourishing publishing business. Its success was based not only on the quality of content but also the number of readers. Following its transfer to the Internationaler INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INCEST Psychoanalytischer Verlag (International Psychoanalytic Press), it was the largest source of income for the publisher. After the seizure of the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag by the National Socialists in 1938, Anna Freud and other émigré analysts succeeded in continuing publication of Imago until 1941, when it merged with the Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychanalyse. In 1939 Hanns Sachs, seeking to perpetuate the Imago tradition in the United States, founded American Imago, which still exists. After the Second World War a number of psychoanalytic periodicals followed in the tradition of an interdisciplinary psychoanalytic journal, first introduced by Imago. LYDIA MARINELLI See also: American Imago; Applied psychoanalysis and the interaction of psychoanalysis; First World War: The effect on the the development of psychoanalysis; Heller, Hugo; Imago Publishing Company; Internationale Zeitschrift für (ärtzliche) Psychoanalyse; Internationaler Psychoanalytisher Verlag; Rank (Rosenfeld), Otto; Sachs, Hanns. is the falsification of identity that creates the imposture, the borrowed identity being that of someone else or that of an imaginary person with a different name or a different profession. The success of the imposture may depend on the complicity of others in the lie. In truth none of the descriptions given in the literature goes much further than these relatively superficial findings. The attempt to create a composite picture of the imposter has failed because of the inaccuracy of the term itself, which is not conceptual, and the diverse personalities included under this term. However, several characteristics have been advanced as being specific to the imposter. These include the compulsion to enact the family romance, disorders in the sense of identity (which are paradoxically relieved by the borrowed identity), and a malformed superego. Considered as a form of psychopathology, imposture has been classified among the perversions. Imposters are described as having usurped the role of the oedipal father and as identifying with the maternal phallus at an early age. Bibliography ANDRÉE BAUDUIN Freud, Sigmund. (1913j). The claims of psycho-analysis to scientific interest. SE, 13: 165. See also: As if personality. Freud, Sigmund, and Abraham, Karl. (1965). A psychoanalytic dialogue: The letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham, 1907–1926 (Hilda C. Abraham and Ernst L. Freud, Eds.). New York: Basic Books. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund, and Binswanger, Ludwig. (2003). The Sigmund Freud–Ludwig Binswanger correspondence, 1908– 1938 (Gerhard Fichtner, Ed.). New York: Other Press. Deutsch, Helene. (1955). The impostor: Contribution to ego psychology of a type of psychopath. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 24, 483–505. Freud, Sigmund, and Jones, Ernest. (1993). The complete correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Ernest Jones, 1908– 1939 (R. Andrew Paskauskas, Ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Greenacre, Phyllis. (1958). Early physical determinants in the development of the sense of identity. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 6, 612–627. IMPOSTER IMPULSE. See Drive/instinct Psychoanalytic tradition considers the nature of the imposter by referring to the work of Karl Abraham originally; during the 1950s, to the work of Helene Deutsch; and later to Phyllis Greenacre. INCEST Their work contained descriptions of clinical cases as well as a comparison of famous imposters throughout history, like James MacPherson. The imposter is someone who pretends to be someone they are not. It Characterization and definitions vary across cultures, but incest refers to sexual relations between close relatives. Prohibition may be according to custom or morality, and embodied in law. In psychoanalysis, the term INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 803 INCOMPLETENESS is also and especially discussed in terms of fantasy and psychological conflict. is Paul-Claude Racamier’s interesting treatment of the ‘‘incestual’’ (1995). Freud mentioned incest for the first time in his correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess (Draft N, dated May 31, 1897), in which he explained ‘‘saintliness’’ in terms of its impious and anti-social character (1950a). A family primordially promiscuous would be forced to give up incestuous behavior in order to avoid being socially isolated. ROGER PERRON Incest subsequently became a central theme in Freud’s formulation of the Oedipus complex, defined as a child’s conflict between sexual desire for the parent of the opposite sex (the ‘‘positive’’ oedipal complex) and repression of that desire. The theory was put forth in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d) and in Freud’s discussion of the case of ‘‘Little Hans’’ (1909b), among other works. From the start Freud also discussed the incest taboo in an anthropological context, in terms of its role in the evolution of society. The first chapter of Totem and Taboo (1912–13a) was devoted to ‘‘the horror of incest’’ and was based on the work of contemporary ethnologists. For Freud it was important to establish that such a taboo operated in every human society. This view gained some support in the work of later anthropologists, including Claude Lévi-Strauss, who, however, maintained reservations regarding Freud’s obligatory corollary, that the Oedipus complex was ‘‘universal.’’ (See André Green [1995] for a discussion of Lévi-Strauss’s views.) Freud held that psychic energy which accumulates through repression of sexual gratification, prohibitions owed to the oedipal situation, becomes an essential force propelling the development of civilization, especially through channels of sublimation. In ‘‘ÔCivilized’ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness’’ (1908d), Freud suggested that repression can also provoke psychological disorders through the ‘‘dammingup’’ of libido (the ‘‘actual’’ neuroses) or by substitute symptom formation (the psychoneuroses). The price of civilized morality is high when repression adversely affects too many individuals and distorts the social fabric; Freud examined these issues in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c) and in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a). The incest theme has received little attention in contemporary psychoanalytic literature; an exception 80 4 See also: Ethics; Family romance; Framework of the psychoanalytic treatment; Law and psychoanalysis; Myth of origins; Oedipus complex; Phantom; Privation; Prohibition; Psychology of the Unconscious, The; Secret; ‘‘Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes’’; Tenderness; Totem and Taboo; Transgression. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10: 1–149. ———. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. ———. (1908d). ‘‘Civilized’’ sexual morality and modern nervous illness. SE, 9: 177–204. ———. (1912–13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. ———. (1930a). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57–145. ———. (1950a [1897]). Draft N. ‘‘Impulses, fantasies and symptoms.’’ SE, 1: 173–280. Green, André. (1995). La Casualité psychique. Paris: Odile Jacob. Propédeutique. La métapsychologie revisitée. Paris: l’Or d’Atalante. Racamier, Paul-Claude. (1995). L’inceste et l’incestuel. Paris: Éditions du Collège de psychanalyse groupale et familiale. Further Reading Simon, Bennett. (1992). Incest—see under ‘‘oedipus complex’’: the history of an error in psychoanalysis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 40, 955–988. Simon, Bennett, and Bullock, Christopher. (1994). Incest and psychoanalysis: Are we ready to fully acknowledge, bear and understand? Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 42, 1261–1282. INCOMPLETENESS In psychoanalysis, the state of ‘‘incompleteness’’ does not connote an imperfect or unfinished state, but rather implies openness and retrospective reexamination. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INCOMPLETENESS The notion of incompleteness in the work of Sigmund Freud presupposes two possibles and one constraint: the integration of new ideas and the reexamination of old ideas in retrospect, provided that the whole remains coherent. The image of the umbilical knot used by Freud in connection with dreams in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) to represent the unfathomable reaches that are endlessly saturable with meaning—the ego’s vanishing point—eventually found its homologue in the realm of reality in Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Some form of incompleteness can be deduced from the integration of the new, from the working of deferred action, from demands for the production of coherence; it is a relationship that can be located in psychoanalytic theory, clinical practice, and treatment. Incompleteness in the realm of theory can be pinpointed, in terms both of Freud’s mental moves leading to theoretical creation and of the content of his theories. Several authors, such as Didier Anzieu, Jean Guillaumin, and Jean-Paul Valabrega, have established parallels between certain of Freud’s personal mental changes and his great moments of theoretical creation: ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ (1950c [1895]); the writings included in the Metapsychology of 1915; the turning point of 1920, when dualism of the instincts was introduced into the corpus; and the years 1937–1938, when the theory of trauma from the ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ was revised to make it coherent with the apparatus of the second topography, to cite only a few. In 1895 Freud was already well advanced in his theoretical conception of neurosis, particularly hysteria. Under a certain amount of pressure from his colleagues, notably Wilhelm Fliess, who was formulating his own theory of the ‘‘periods,’’ Freud found himself urgently in need of a homogeneous, totalizing formulation of psychic mechanisms that would take into account the theory of the neuroses and the normal psychic apparatus—hence his haste in writing ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology.’’ This essay brings with it a paradox that attests to Freud’s felicitous inability to conceptualize a closed theoretical system: Based on the neurological metaphor, he provided a coherent and relatively finished system that he nonetheless called a ‘‘Project’’ in the sense of a sketch (Entwurf). History showed that this was indeed just a sketch, whose hypercoherence was dismantled beginning in September 1897—at the same time as Freud’s work of mourning INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS in connection with the death of his father—and whose elements were reworked and used in subsequent theoretical developments. Thereafter, Freud no longer allowed himself to be dominated by the desire to devise a system that would have an answer for everything. The topography, as well as his theories of anxiety, the instincts, and the neuroses, was modified in light of his clinical work, leading to new theoretical acquisitions such as the ‘‘splitting of the ego in the process of defense,’’ for example. As the foundations of the psychic apparatus, the instincts were a theoretical constant that was given even greater emphasis with the introduction of the id in the second topography. Principles and laws of psychic functioning came to modulate and use, to the benefit of ideation and meaning, the power that is inseparable from the notion of the instinct. This force can meet with two economic vicissitudes: ‘‘binding’’ and ‘‘discharge.’’ Above all, after the metapsychological complexification of the second topography, a balance between binding and discharge was imposed, even if Freud more particularly indicated the path of binding culminating in the construction of more and more representational units that can be subjectivized. After 1920, and mainly after 1923–1924, around the time of ‘‘The Ego and the Id’’ (1923b), the first trauma-based theories of 1895 were reworked so that the notion of trauma could be integrated and become a constituent part of the Metapsychology. Not only is there a traumatic kernel in neurosis, but the id, even in its normal state, is traumatic for the ego. The relations of the instincts and the other psychic contents (ideas) are marked by incompleteness. The incompleteness of the fabric of representation and the inexhaustible nature of the quest for meaning and coherence attest to the fact that the relations between the psychic agencies and objects satisfy a complex dynamic, which Freud’s successors attempted to theorize. Incompleteness is at the heart of psychoanalytic practice. Freud refused to reduce the scope of psychoanalysis to that of psychotherapy. To be sure, there are the symptoms and suffering of patients, but analysis opens up other horizons, as Freud unambiguously declared in the ‘‘New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis’’ (1933a [1932]): ‘‘I did not want to commend [psychoanalysis] to your interest as a 805 L’ I N C O N S C I E N T method of treatment but on account of the information it gives us about what concerns human beings most of all—their own nature’’ (pp. 156–157). From its own unfathomability to the multiplicity of its exterior, the subject is constantly being transformed. The essential question of psychoanalysis has become that of subjectivity, which today has plunged it into a paradoxical situation. Without doubt, Freud left it to his successors to establish a theory of the subject. They have not yet managed to construct one that would be coherent with Freudian metapsychology, and most often we must content ourselves with invoking what Raymond Cahn has called the ‘‘process of subjectivation.’’ This places the emphasis on interpretative intent in psychoanalysis, whose essential aim is no longer simply bringing material into consciousness, but also to enable a constant reworking, through discourse, of the representations and formations of desire, identifications, and affect-fixating memories upon which the analysand writes and rewrites their history. ‘‘Where id is, there ego shall be’’ (1933a [1932], p. 80). Rather than seeing in this the idealistic aim of a Freud limited by a psychotherapeutic ideal, we can infer the modesty of Freud, the psychoanalyst, revealing the magnitude of the analyst’s clinical task. It is not the completion of this task, even supposing that would be possible, that would trigger the process of the end of treatment, but perhaps the ability to work through the grieving process it entails. Whether the emphasis is placed on the subject’s coming into being or on subjectivation, this presupposes the corollary idea of maintaining that entity, which requires that it make constant adjustments in relation to the agencies, its ideals, and others. Considering the power of the drives, the state of the subject is precarious, always susceptible of dissolving into actions or symptoms, especially when it is a question of seeking out, through transference, ‘‘truths’’ and new insights, as analysis according to Freud proposes to do. The quest for truth and the quest for causality, moved by the power of the drives, endow the very process of subjectivation with its unstable and ever incomplete character. The completion and incompleteness of analysis preoccupied Freud until the end of his work, as his ‘‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’’ (1937c) attests. Today, the idea of a completed analysis is entirely relative, and opinion remains divided as to the criteria for ending treatment. Respect for the idea of 80 6 incompleteness bears with its full weight on the ethics of the psychoanalyst as one of the elements that protects the treatment from the alienation that would result if the analyst were to impose their own desire upon that of the analysand. RENÉ PÉRAN See also: Indications and contraindications for psychoanalysis for an adult. Bibliography Cahn, Raymond. (1997). Le processus de subjectivation à l’adolescence. In M. Perret Catipovic, and F. Ladame (Eds.), Adolescence et psychanalyse: une histoire (pp. 213– 227). Lausanne, France: Delachaux et Niéstle. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4: 1–338; Part II, SE, 5: 339–625. ———. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1–182. ———. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209–253. ———. (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281–387. L’INCONSCIENT The periodical, L’Inconscient, was founded by Piera Aulagnier-Spairani, who was the editor-in-chief, and Jean Clavreul and Conrad Stein. With the help of Renée Andrau and Lucio Covello as editorial secretaries, the first issue, published by Presses Universitaires de France, appeared in January-March 1967. At the time the psychoanalytic movement in France had been wracked by divisions and internal dissension. The Société Française de Psychanalyse (French Psychoanalytic Society) had been dissolved and rival institutions created. These included the Association Psychanalytique de France (French Psychoanalytic Association), which in 1965 became part of the International Psychoanalytic Association, and the École Freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris), directed by Jacques Lacan. Two students of Lacan’s organization worked with a member of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society), Conrad Stein, to create a review that was open to the opposing points of view that were tearing the French psychoanalytic movement apart. It was one INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INDIA of the attempts by psychoanalysts of the 1950s to establish connections with organizations other than the official psychoanalytic bodies, which pretended to ignore one another when they were not actively jockeying for position. Appropriately, the first issue was devoted to the topic of ‘‘transgression,’’ and included essays by Conrad Stein, Serge Leclaire, Michel Neyraut, Guy Rosolato, and Piera Aulagnier. Other issues followed; the issue devoted to perversion contained contributions from Jean Clavreul, André Green, Jean-Paul Valabrega, and Georges Daumézon. Daumézon represented the symbolic link that united these disparate personalities: The Sainte-Anne Hospital, where many of these young psychoanalysts worked. (Most were between thirty and forty years of age at the time.) Over the course of eight issues, there were contributions from a wide range of practitioners, including Serge Viderman, Lucien Israël, Irène Roublef, Christian David, Michel de M’Uzan, Francis Pasche, François Roustang, Jean-Luc Donnet, François Perrier, Jean Gillibert, Joyce McDougall, Dominique Geachan, Claude Robant, Robert Barande, and Cornélius Costoriadis. Unfortunately, dissension within the psychoanalytic community led to the cessation of publication after two years. The final issue, of October 1968, was devoted to the potentially explosive topic of psychoanalytic training. The founders argued among themselves, a reflection of the dissension within the Lacanian movement that had originated with Lacan’s statements concerning ‘‘la passe’’ in October of the previous year. A notice indicated that ‘‘the editors have been unable to agree on the direction most suitable for a review of psychoanalysis or on the role they felt it should play.’’ Five months later Piera Aulagnier founded the Quatrième Group, Organisation Psychanalytique de Langue Française (Fourth Group: French Language Psychoanalytic Organization) with François Perrier and Jean-Paul Valabrega, and the review Topique. That same year, 1969, Conrad Stein founded Études freudiennes, which also published points of view that differed from the French psychoanalytic mainstream. It was several years, however, before the psychoanalytic ecumenicalism of L’Inconscient was repeated in France. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Études freudiennes; France; Topique. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INDIA The founder’s meeting of the Indian Psychoanalytic Society took place in Calcutta in 1922 with Girindrashekhar Bose, a young Bengali doctor who had read the English translations of Freud’s work, in the chair. Of the fifteen original members, nine were college teachers of psychology or philosophy and five belonged to the medical corps of the Indian Army, including two British psychiatrists. In the same year, Bose wrote to Freud in Vienna. Freud was pleased that his ideas had spread to such a far-off land and asked Bose to write Ernest Jones, then President of the International Psychoanalytic Association, for membership of that body. Bose did so and the Indian Psychoanalytic Society, with Bose as its first president (a position he was to hold till his death in 1953) became a fullyfledged member of the international psychoanalytic community. Cut off from the debate, controversy, and ferment of the psychoanalytic centers in Europe, and dependent upon often difficult to acquire books and journals for outside intellectual sustenance, Indian psychoanalysis was nurtured through its infancy primarily by the enthusiasm and intellectual passion of its progenitor. In the informal meetings of eight to ten people held on Saturday evenings at the president’s house—which was was to become the headquarters of the Indian Society after Bose’s death—Bose read most of the papers and led almost all the discussions. Although psychoanalysis attracted some academic and intellectual interest in the 1930s and 1940s, mostly in Calcutta, the number of analysts was still small (fifteen) when in 1945 a second training center, under the leadership of an Italian expatriate, Emilio Servadio, was started in Bombay. To judge from the record of publications of its members, the small Indian society was fairly active up through the 1940s. There was a persistent concern with the illumination of Indian cultural phenomena as well as attempts to register the ‘‘Indian’’ aspects of the patients’ mental life. By the early 1950s, however, the interest in comparative and cultural aspects of mental life, as well as the freshness of the papers written by the pioneering generation of Indian psychoanalysts, was lost. Thereafter, most Indian contributions, to judge from the official journal of the Indian Society, have been neither particularly distinctive nor original. 807 INDICATIONS AND CONTRAINDICATIONS FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR AN In the public arena, psychoanalysis has generally had an indifferent, if not hostile, reception. At first glance, the Indian indifference to psychoanalysis seems surprising, given the fact that there has rarely been a civilization in human history that has concerned itself so persistently over the millennia with the nature of the ‘‘self’’ and with seeking answers to the question, ‘‘Who am I?’’ As a colonized people, however, reeling under the onslaught of a conquering European civilization that proclaimed its forms of knowledge and its political and social structures as self-evidently superior, Indian intellectuals in the early twentieth century felt the need to cling doggedly to at least a few distinctive Indian forms in order to maintain intact their civilization’s identity. The Indian concern with the ‘‘self,’’ its psycho-philosophical schools of ‘‘self-realization,’’ often appearing under the label of Indian metaphysics or ‘‘spirituality,’’ has become one of the primary ways of salvaging self-respect, even a means of affirming a superiority over a materialistic Western civilization. Psychoanalysis was seen to be a direct challenge to the Indian intellectual’s important source of self-respect; it stepped on a turf the Indian felt was uniquely his own. Another reason for the rejection of Freudian concepts had to do with their origins. Derived from clinical experience with patients growing up in a cultural environment very different from that of India, some of the concepts, when transposed, did not carry much conviction. The different patterns of family life and the role of multiple caretakers in India seemed to push in the direction of modifications of psychoanalytical theory. Similarly, Freudian views of religion, derived from the Judeo-Christian monotheistic tradition, with its emphasis on a father-god, had little relevance for the Indian religious tradition of polytheism where mother-goddesses often constituted the deepest substratum of Indian religiosity. Because of its relative isolation, Indian psychoanalysis has been decisively marked by the stamp of the first Indian analyst, Girindrashekhar Bose (1886– 1953). Without experiencing the benefits of training analysis himself, it was Bose who ‘‘analyzed’’ the other members in a more or less informal manner. He developed a method of his own, similar to the active therapy and forced fantasy method of Sándor Ferenczi, which calls for a more active, didactic stance from the analyst, and which came dangerously close to what a lawyer is forbidden to do in the courtroom, namely ‘‘lead the witness,’’ increasing the chances of 80 8 ADULT suggestion. In hindsight, Bose’s important contribution to psychoanalysis was less his ‘‘theory of opposite wishes’’ and more his questioning of some presumed psychoanalytic universals, based on his clinical experience. In his letters to Freud, Bose points out differences in the castration reactions of his Indian and European patients and notes that the desire to be a female is more easily unearthed in Indian male patients than in European. Since cultural relativism was not on the psychoanalytic agenda in the 1930s when Bose communicated his observations, they received little attention. The question of cultural relativism versus the universality of many psychoanalytic concepts and theories is very much at the heart of contemporary analyst Sudhir Kakar’s work. Based on clinical and cultural data from India, Kakar has highlighted the cultural aspects of the psyche in his many books and papers, trying to show that mental representations of the culture play a significant role in psychic life. The Indian Psychoanalytic Society has published a journal, Samiksa, the Journal of the Indian Psychoanalytical Society, since 1946. SUDHIR KAHAR Bibliography Hartnack, Christiane. (1990). Vishnu on Freud’s desk: psychoanalysis in colonial India. Social Research., 57 (4), p. 921–949. Kakar, Sudhir. (1996). Culture and psyche: Psychoanalysis and India. New York: Psyche Press. Vaidyanathan, T.G. (1996). Hinduism and psychoanalysis: A reader. Delhi, Oxford University Press. INDICATIONS AND CONTRAINDICATIONS FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR AN ADULT Borrowed from traditional medicine, the notions of indications and contraindications have been very much present in the writings of Freud and his medical following from the very beginnings of psychoanalysis. Moreover, the indications and contraindications for psychoanalysis have changed in the course of theoretical and practical developments that have profoundly altered attitudes toward psychoanalytic treatment. In Studies on Hysteria (1895d), Sigmund Freud and Josef Breuer listed certain conditions for applying the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INDICATIONS cathartic method: ‘‘The procedure is not applicable at all below a certain level of intelligence. . . . The complete consent and complete attention of the patients are needed, but above all their confidence (1895d, p. 264). In ‘‘Freud’s Psycho-Analytic Procedure’’ (1904a [1903]), Freud specified further indications and contraindications: ‘‘Chronic cases of psychoneuroses without any very violent or dangerous symptoms are the most favourable ones for psycho-analysis: thus in the first place every species of obsessional neurosis, obsessive thinking and acting, and cases of hysteria in which phobias and abulias play the most important part; further, all somatic expressions of hysteria whenever they do not, as in anorexia, require the physician to attend promptly to the speedy removal of the symptoms. . . . The patient must be capable of a psychically normal condition; during periods of confusion or melancholic depression nothing can be accomplished even in cases of hysteria. . . . Deep-rooted malformations of character, traits of an actually degenerate constitution, show themselves during treatment as sources of a resistance that can scarcely be overcome. . . . If the patient’s age is in the neighbourhood of the fifties the conditions for psycho-analysis become unfavourable’’ (pp. 253–254). Gradually, with the work of Karl Abraham, Ernst Simmel, and Wilhelm Reich, the range of cases regarded as appropriate for treatment expanded to include psychoses and borderline conditions, even perversions and drug addiction—with uneven results. As time went on, efforts were made to separate the issue of indications from medical categories and traditional diagnostic procedures, in order to create a suitable framework for understanding the metapsychological factors underlying the demand for treatment and a suitable framework allowing prediction of its results. Otto Fenichel (1945) included in his contraindications, in addition to advanced age and unfavorable life conditions, the ‘‘absence of a reasonable and cooperative ego’’ and the existence of significant secondary gains derived from symptoms. In 1955 Edward Glover, discussing the ‘‘transference potential of the patient,’’ distinguished ‘‘accessible’’ cases (psychoneuroses, reactive depressions, psychosexual inhibitions, optional bisexuality) and ‘‘moderately accessible’’ cases (obsessional neurosis, fetishism, alcoholism and drug addiction, chronic maladaptation, psychopathic delinquency) from ‘‘rebel cases’’ (psychoses, grave character disorders, and sexual INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND CONTRAINDICATIONS FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR AN ADULT disorders). The list presented by Sacha Nacht and Serge Lebovici in 1958 was fairly close to this one. The issue of indications and contraindications has acquired another dimension with the notion of ‘‘analyzability,’’ especially after the Twenty-Fifth International Congress of Psychoanalysis (Copenhagen, July 1967) and René Diatkine’s 1968 article. Diatkine proposed evaluating the patient on first encounters to prognosticate the evolution of future treatment: evaluation of imaginative capacities, flexibility in object relations, screening for an ‘‘operational idea,’’ and so on. Subsequently, McDougall (1972) used the notion of the ‘‘anti-analysand’’ to characterize a patient who dissembles normalcy, sometimes as a cover for serious relational problems—a trait that poses a risk of making analysis impossible. As a result of a growing interest in the role of the psychoanalyst’s counter-transference, whether psychoanalysis is indicated has come to mean considering the analyst’s particular capacities for empathy and tolerance for various kinds of pathologies in a candidate patient. In 1945 Otto Fenichel noted that analysis could be counterindicated with a given analyst for reasons other than the analyst’s sex or prior relationship with the candidate analysand. Robert Barande has also discussed ‘‘analyst indication.’’ The expansion of the range of indications and the multiplication of approaches in psychoanalytic and related forms of psychotherapy has modified, sometimes in the direction of excessive laxity, decisions about whether analysis is appropriate. This proliferation has even been seen as a reason for the disappointment of those who expect miracles from a psychoanalytic approach to difficult cases. Finally, it is appropriate to recall what Freud wrote to Ludwig Binswanger on May 28, 1911: ‘‘Truthfully, there is nothing that man’s organization makes him less apt for than psychoanalysis’’ (2003). ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Analyzability; Congrès des psychanalystes de langue française des pays romans. Bibliography Diatkine, René. (1969). L’enfant prépsychotique. Psychiatrie de l ’enfant, 12, 2, 413–446. 809 INDIVIDUAL Fenichel, Otto. (1945). The psychoanalytic theory of neurosis. New York: W. W. Norton. Freud, Sigmund. (1904a [1903]). Freud’s psycho-analytic procedure. SE, 7: 247–254. ———. (2003 [1908–1938]). The Sigmund Freud–Ludwig Binswanger correspondence, 1908–1938 (Arnold J. Pomerans, Trans.). New York: Other Press. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. Glover, Edward. (1955). The technique of psychoanalysis. London: Tindall and Cox. McDougall, Joyce. (1972). L’anti-analysant en analyse. Revue Française de Psychanalyse, 36, 167–206. ———. (1992). Plea for a measure of abnormality. New York: Brunner/Mazel. (Original work published 1978) Nacht, Sacha, and Lebovici, Serge. (1958). Indications et contre-indications de la psychanalyse chez l’adulte. In Sacha Nacht (Ed.), Psychanalyse d’aujourd’hui. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Further Reading Grand, Stanley. (1995). Classic revisited: Stone’s ‘‘The widening scope of indications for psychoanalysis’’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 43, 741–764. McNutt, Edith R. rep. (1992). Panel: Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy: indications, contraindications. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 40, 223–232. Stone, Leo. (1954). The widening scope of indications for psychoanalysis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 2, 567–594. INDIVIDUAL The concept of the individual is not especially Freudian, although analysis assumes that the analysand has a degree of psychic autonomy, individuality, and even identity. The term ‘‘individual’’ (Einzeln) is found in Freud, notably in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]), where it stands in opposition to culture. More broadly, the concept is central to a variety of disciplines, such as ethnology, sociology, political theory, and philosophy. Cultural historians have described the birth of individual love as an outgrowth of courtly love, the appearance of the individual feeling of finitude and death at the end of the Middle Ages, and the birth of the modern conception of childhood within the family 81 0 in the eighteenth century (Philippe Ariès). With the Enlightenment and Romanticism, the child became ‘‘the father of the man.’’ After 1900, childhood and adolescence became distinct age categories and stages of mental development. Scholars can trace the development of the concept of the individual across the political, social, cultural, and religious landscapes from the Renaissance to the Reformation to the Enlightenment. While having universal scope, psychoanalysis is nonetheless marked with the imprint of Western culture, in which it was born. According to Claude LéviStrauss, this culture ‘‘vomits up’’ the individual, in contrast with group societies (‘‘holistic’’ societies, according to Louis Dumont), which ‘‘swallow’’ the individual. Ethnopsychoanalysis (Georges Devereux) examines differences in mental development according to culture. The Oedipus complex described by Freud refers to the symbolic figure of the father in Jewish and Christian cultures, and it affords the possibility of triangulation, which leads to individuation and identity construction. Other oedipal modalities are present in matrilineal societies, where the parent is differentiated from the maternal uncle, who represents the paternal function—an arrangement consistent with limited individuality and extended dependence on the social group. The history of European culture is marked by a gradual transition from a holistic society (during the Middle Ages) to a society of individuals, and accompanying this transition was the evolution of identity formation characteristic of modernity. If a conception of the individual is a precondition for the development of psychiatry, the existence of the self, the subject, is a precondition for the creation of psychoanalysis. When the individual perceives his ego as a double and perceives the uncanny nature of his division, this perspective can be presented as a cure for the suffering that the individual experiences in the face of modernity. In Totem and Taboo (1912–1913a), Freud hypothesized that a ‘‘mass psychosis,’’ a collective soul, in his text, ‘‘culture’’ (Kultur) in the sense of a collective mental formation situated above the individual, to a large extent conditions the individual’s mental functioning. Freud elaborated the concepts of the ego ideal and superego, transitional formations located between culture and the individual. He also showed that the repression associated with anality in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INDIVIDUATION (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) modern culture has an impact on the modalities of identity formation during adolescence. During the 1950s Margaret Mahler defined ‘‘individuation’’ as a process of separation to escape the primary union of the mother-child symbiosis. Working with the uncertainties of individuation in infantile psychosis, Mahler described a ‘‘symbiotic’’ stage of child development, prior to the separation and individuation that ends absolute dependence. John Bowlby, using an ethological approach to the mental development of the infant, developed the concepts of attachment and separation. José Bleger, employing the concepts of symbiosis and ambiguity, showed that traces of primitive undifferentiation persist, even among the most evolved individuals, in the form of an ‘‘agglutinated nucleus.’’ Research by Alain de Mijolla (1981) and data from group psychoanalysis and family therapy have shown connections between subjectivity and the Other in culture, in the family, and across generations, that is, connections among the intrasubjective, intersubjective, and intergenerational dimensions of the psyché. HENRI VERMOREL See also: Adolescence; Castration complex; Constitution; I; Identity; Libidinal development; Object; Processes of development; Self-consciousness; Self (true/false); Symbiosis/symbiotic relation. Bibliography Ariès, Philippe. (1962). Centuries of childhood: A social history of family life (Robert Baldick, Trans.). New York: Vintage Books. (Original work published 1960) INDIVIDUATION (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) Carl Gustav Jung considered individuation to be a step or process that leads to a partial disengagement from the control of the unconscious and from collective rules and norms and feelings. This process is accompanied by a development of the rapport of the ego to the self, through an ever closer recognition of the forces and figures that structure—at first without our being aware of it—our representations and behavior. The earliest version of this notion can be found in Gérard Dorn, in the sixteenth century, then in the Goethean conception of the novel of apprenticeship (Bildungsroman), as well as in the works of Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche. However, in his writings of the second decade of the twentieth century, Jung gave it a whole different meaning and significance, inscribing it into his own experience, then integrating it with the successive stages of his thought on the relationship with the unconscious. Jung mentions individuation for the first time in 1916 in his Seven Sermons to the Dead and in an essay entitled ‘‘Adaptation, Individuation and Collectivity.’’ In the first of these, the emphasis was on the imperious need for everyone to undo the obscure envelope of their origin, distinguishing and differentiating themselves from it, to learn how to live as a unique being, separate and alone (‘‘einzelsein,’’ he wrote). In the second work he stressed the debt contracted and the price to pay by anyone who distances themselves from the common knowledge and collective norms of a group. ———. (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57–145. These works showed the impact of Jung’s own experience on his work after the break with Freud (during the period of 1912–1918). His experience led to the emergence of images that, under the influence of the emotions he was feeling, gradually took on voice and shape: individuation for him was not only a necessity and a principle, on the basis of which a human being is constituted in his singularity, it is also a work—Jung soon was to call it a process (ein Prozess), and even a work of long duration (the ancient alchemists, whom he studied from 1935–1936, referred to it as their opus)—which one can learn to accompany, support, and even provoke. Mijolla, Alain de. (1981). Les Visiteurs du moi: Fantasmes d’identification, confluents psychanalytiques. Paris: Belles Lettres. From one phase of his work to another, Jung was always very specific about the stakes and the risks (of exaltation, or inversely, of depression, or even psychotic Bleger, José. (1981). Symbiose et ambiguı̈té: Étude psychanalytique (A. Morvan, Trans.). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. (Original work published 1967) Dumont, Louis. (1986). Essays on individualism: Modern ideology in anthropological perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1983) Freud, Sigmund. (1912–1913a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1–161. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 811 INERTIA breakdown) of individuation, as well as its modalities, notably in the clinical conditions of analytic practice, and its effects, possible or anticipated, on the future of man and on that of the unconscious itself. In 1918, he started working on some empirical exercises in graphics that made him experience a decentralization, which he later realized was close to that produced by the use of mandalas, as well as the destabilization of the ego produced by Taoism. His reflections on the conditions of symbolic life for us today came from these studies, and also from his later analyses of the history of Christianity and his encounters with Amerindian and African religions. This includes his conception, a rather fluid one, of the self in its relations with the ego: what is at stake presently in individuation can be all the more clearly grasped as one becomes aware of its projections in ancient systems of representation and practice. Also, from his publication of The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious, in 1928, and with the help of his analyses of alchemical literature and iconography, Jung explored the diverse stages that mark the individuation process : recognition of ‘‘the shadow’’ or ‘‘shadows’’ proper to each, the more or less upsetting or mediating effects of ‘‘the anima’’ or ‘‘the animus,’’ and especially the experience of the ‘‘Self.’’ Finally it should be noted that the Jungian reflection on individuation was part of a frequenting of the unconscious that constantly assumed its compensatory capabilities and its capacity to maintain conjoined contradictory attitudes and even givens. From this perspective the quaternary model of psychic functioning that he introduced in his Psychological Types (1921) was deepened and enlarged in the forties and fifties to apply to the analysis of opposing movements (in the direction of incest and inversely towards differentiation) that are stirred by the transference, expanding also to include a reflection on the conditions for an integration of the feminine, and on the question of evil. Consequently, the Jungian problematic of individuation has provided access to and perspective on certain collective issues, but its pertinence for cultures with a different history this is unknown. CHRISTIAN GAILLARD See also: Analytical psychology; Compensation (analytical psychology); Ego (analytical psychology); Extrover81 2 sion/introversion (analytical psychology); Self (analytical psychology); Transference/counter-transference (analytical psychology). Bibliography Gaillard, Christian. (1995). Jung. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Humbert, Élie George. (1983). Jung. Paris: Éditions Universitaires. Jacoby, Mario. (1990). Individuation and narcissism: The psychology of the self in Jung and Kohut (Myron Gubitz, and, in collaboration with the author, Françoise O’Kane, Trans). London: Routledge. (Original work published 1985) Kast, Verena. (1992). The dynamics of symbols: Fundamentals of Jungian psychotherapy (Susan A. Schwarz, Trans.). New York: Fromm International. (Original work published 1990) INERTIA. See Principle of inertia INFANS The Latin term infans, derived from the Greek phèmi (‘‘I speak’’), means ‘‘one who does not (or rather, not yet) speak,’’ and refers to the baby before the acquisition of speech that marks the entry into childhood. A number of authors (notably Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott) used the term to describe those whose mode of communication is situated at a preverbal level. In the work of Jacques Lacan the term infans took on a further dimension in his discussion of language and its relation to the unconscious. Piera Aulagnier elaborated a theory of the mother-infant relation in terms of discourse (with the mother as ‘‘word-bearer’’). The discussion here will be limited to the specific reference to language implied in the notion of infans. In French translations of authors like Klein or Winnicott, terms such as bébé (baby), nourrisson (nursling), petit enfant (small/young child), or infans are used. A good many of Klein’s texts were originally written in German, and she used the word infans, which was translated in different ways in English and then in French, according to Luis E. Prado de Oliveira. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INFANS Winnicott commented on the term infant, commonly used in English, in ‘‘The Theory of the Parent-Infant Relationship,’’ originally published in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis in 1960. He explicitly referred to the fact that the infant does not yet have the use of verbal symbols or word-presentations. The baby’s dependence on the mother’s care is therefore more linked to maternal empathy than to any understanding the mother might have of what could be verbally expressed. In the work of Lacan, the ‘‘infans stage’’ precedes the advent of the subject through language. In ‘‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I As Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience’’ (1949/ 2004), he wrote: ‘‘The jubilant assumption of his specular image by the kind of being—still trapped in his motor impotence and nursling dependence—the little man at the infans stage thus seems to me to manifest in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial form, prior to being objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, its function as subject’’ (p. 4). Piera Aulagnier’s theory of the infans stage is original in that she did not stop herself with merely noting the preverbal relationship to the mother at this stage, but also emphasizes that the mother plays the role of ‘‘word-bearer’’ in relation to the preverbal infant. This can be understood only in the context of the anticipation of the baby’s I by the mother. In The Violence of Interpretation: From Pictogram to Statement (1975/ 2001), Aulagnier writes: ‘‘The mother’s words and deeds always anticipate what the infant may know of them’’ (p. 10). The idea of the mother as word-bearer draws on Lacan’s emphasis on the function of discourse. In The Violence of Interpretation, Aulagnier reminded us that ‘‘Every subject is born into a Ôspeaking space’’’ and that the I is ‘‘an agency constituted by discourse’’ (p. 71). By ‘‘bearing’’ the word, the mother effects a twofold junction: first, between the infant’s manifestations and the outside world, by verbalizing them and giving them meaning; and second, between the world and the infant, since for the baby she serves as the representative of an external order, whose laws and demands she articulates. Unlike the bodily needs that the newborn, because of its immaturity, cannot meet by itself, the psychic needs involving representation in its primal form (the pictogram) do not depend on intervention by a third INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS party. But the infant does not yet have access to the formation of ideas and naming, and it is thus in this place of lack that the mother as word-bearer is inserted. She fashions the objects that are presented to the infant by endowing them with a libidinal meaning. In Aulagnier’s words: ‘‘[F]or the senselessness of a real that could have no status in the psyche, it substitutes a reality that is human because it is cathected by the maternal libido, a reality that may be reshaped by the primal and the primary only because of that earlier work’’ (p. 74). On this point, which is crucial for thinking the relationship with the world, and which marks the way in which that relationship depends on the relationship to the other—here the mother—Aulagnier simultaneously underscores her indebtedness to Lacan and her proximity to Wilfred Bion, from whom she considered herself to be fairly distant in other respects. With regard to Lacan, she notes: ‘‘The contribution of Lacan’s theory will be recognized here: indeed it might be said that the object is capable of being metabolized by the infant’s psychical activity only if, and as such, the mother’s discourse has endowed it with a meaning as evidenced by her naming of it. In this sense Ôswallowed’ with the object, Lacan was to see the primal introjection of a signifier as the inscription of a unary trait (trait unaire)’’ (p. 73). As for Bion, she underscored her similarity to him as regarding the idea of an object that initially resided in the ‘‘maternal zone’’ and is then metabolized by the infant into a pure representation of its own relationship to the world. On the other hand, she diverged from both Lacan and Bion in her analysis of the consequences of this prosthetic function of the mother’s psyche in terms of ‘‘violence.’’ In this respect, we can assume that this notion that, a priori, seems surprising in the context of mother-child relations, came from another source—specifically, from the other violence that marks the bonds between the mother and the baby who will become psychotic, and specifically the schizophrenic. In what sense does the mother/word-bearer inflict violence upon the infans? This necessary, ‘‘primary’’ violence is violence nonetheless, in that the infant feels the imposition of the word-bearer’s interpretations of the world. As Aulagnier explained in another work, the mother maintains a ‘‘spoken shadow’’ relationship with the infant, but the infant never completely coincides with this shadow that preexists it. The ‘‘violence’’ 813 INFANT DEVELOPMENT is linked to the need to create and hold a subject-place (the spoken shadow) where there are as yet only potentialities. Accordingly, the future subject, the I, will come into being in a space preformed by expectations that are not its own. This is the necessary violence of maternal interpretation. But just as there is no such thing as a developmental tabula rasa, there can be no human subject without this pre-form. It is the discrepancy between the infant and shadow that makes it possible to situate a violence that will only really be violent (secondary violence) if the mother imposes it no longer upon the infant, but upon the I of the child. SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Apprenti-historien et le maı́tre-sorcier (L’-) [The apprentice historian and the master sorcerer]; Controversial Discussions; Demand; Graph of Desire; Helplessness; I; Ideational representation; Identificatory project; Infant development; Megalomania; Narcissism; Object; Other, the; Primary narcissism; Sense/nonsense; Violence of Interpretation, The: From Pictogram to Statement. Bibliography Castoriadis-Aulagnier, Piera (2001). The violence of interpretation: From pictogram to statement. (Alan Sheridan, Trans.).. Hove, U.K., and Philadelphia: Brunner/Routledge. (Original work published 1975) Aulagnier, Piera. (1984). L’Apprenti-historien et le maı̂tre sorcier. Du discours identificant au discours délirant. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Lacan, Jacques. (2004). The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience. In his Écrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.).. New York: W. W. Norton (Original work published 1949). Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1998). Penser la psychose: Une lecture de l’oeuvre de Piera Aulagnier. Paris: Dunod. Winnicott, Donald W. (1960). The theory of the parentinfant relationship. International Journal of PsychoAnalysis, 41 (6), 585–595. ———. (1965). The maturational processes and the facilitating environment. London: Hogarth. INFANT DEVELOPMENT The term infant development refers to the processes of psychic organization and transformation that lead the preverbal infant from absolute dependency to the 81 4 earliest integrations of the ego during the first year of life. By studying the ‘‘psychical apparatus’’ in its structures, functioning, and development, Sigmund Freud established facts and proposed hypotheses that are indispensable to the study of early development. Freud’s newborn is a being in a state of helplessness (Hilflosigkeit) whose development requires that a ‘‘mutual understanding’’ be established between it and its mother, as he explained in ‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ (1950 [1895]). The infant is active, driven by needs that give rise to the hallucination of satisfaction, which, according to The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), is the prelude to fantasies and thoughts. Its oral component-instincts trigger the fundamental mechanisms of projection and introjection, as described in ‘‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’’ (1905d) and ‘‘Negation’’ (1925h). These mechanisms gradually enable the infant to form an idea of its mother as a total object; it can then bind its autoerotism to the love-object, as described in ‘‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.’’ The parents’ narcissistic investment in the infant, described in ‘‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’’ (1914d), and the quality of the primary identifications that unite the baby with its parents, described in ‘‘The Ego and the Id’’ (1923), are the basis for its own ‘‘life and death narcissism,’’ to borrow André Green’s expression. The earliest psychoanalytic writings on the psychic life of infants came from Melanie Klein (1933) , Anna Freud (1946), Donald Winnicott (1945), René Spitz (1945), and John Bowlby (1951). From the beginning, the quality of interrelations between mother-environment and the infant was universally accepted as being a vital necessity, indispensable to human psychic and somatic development. Early work in the field produced such landmark concepts as ‘‘early organizers,’’ ‘‘prototypes of ego-defense,’’ ‘‘archaic forms of communication’’ (Spitz); ‘‘tonic dialogues’’ (Julian de Ajuriaguerra); ‘‘interactional epigenesis’’ (Erik Erikson); and ‘‘interactive spiral’’ (Serge Lebovici). Over time, Freud’s basic theories were further elaborated. Thus the conception of the oral instinct’s anaclisis on the alimentary function was broadened to include sensory, affective, and object forms of nourishment. The theory of an attachment instinct (John Bowlby) took into account the needs for contact that play a major role at birth and in the evolution of the separation-individuation process in the young infant INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INFANT DEVELOPMENT (Mary Ainsworth, Margaret Mahler). The notion of stages (Freud, Karl Abraham) was supplanted by that of ‘‘positions,’’ with its greater focus on the analysis of processes. Klein’s hypothesis of an ego that is active from birth, operating through projections and introjections, has been accepted and appears to be compatible with Freud’s theory of ‘‘primary identification with the parents’’ or fundamental narcissistic identification, set forth in ‘‘The Ego and the Id.’’ The infant’s access to a representation of the mother as total object and the prevalence of the depressive position over paranoid anxieties (Klein) precipitate the coming together of the ego. Recent works on ‘‘adhesive identity,’’ the ‘‘psychic skin,’’ and the ‘‘skin-ego’’ (Esther Bick, Frances Tustin, Didier Anzieu) have brought new developments to these problematics. The theory of an early activation of the ego’s reflexive function has also opened a field for exploration. The advent of consciousness of self, termed the ‘‘mirror stage’’ by Jacques Lacan, is, in Winnicott’s view, a construction linked to ‘‘the mirror of the mother’s face and the family.’’ According to Winnicott, interiorization of the love-object enables the infant to find or create potential spaces for representation of the self and the outside world. In another problematic, Daniel Stern described the evolution of different ‘‘senses of self ’’ and explored the primitive forms of representations that result from the ‘‘interpersonal bond.’’ Wilfred Bion (1962) analyzed how, through the earliest projections and introjections, there immediately develops between mother an infant a process of thought, or reverie, that transforms the excitations that submerge the infant into ‘‘alpha elements.’’ The latter can be considered as protorepresentations elaborated in the coalescence of ‘‘infant’s body’’ and ‘‘mother-environment’’ (Piera Castoriadis-Aulagnier, Monique Piñol-Douriez). They are the malleable foundations of psychic construction, and they undergo the transformations proper to the depressive position and later developments. Through maturation and interrelations, the ‘‘interactional epigenesis’’ leads the preverbal infant to love and to hate. At the end of the first year, the infant is ready to develop language, many of whose elements it already understands, and which it is beginning to babble. Although Freud made joint use of ‘‘direct observation and regressive analysis’’ (1905d) as working methods, some psychoanalysts believe that direct observation reflects an objectifying scientism and that INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS because it is preverbal, the very young infant cannot be subjected to a psychoanalytic approach. Nevertheless, the theories elaborated on the basis of observation of early development can feed into psychoanalytic practice, theory, and research. MONIQUE PIÑOL-DOURIEZ AND MAURICE DESPINOY See also: Adhesive identification; Anaclisis/anaclictic; Anxiety; Archaic mother; Breastfeeding; Breast, good/ bad object; Combined parent figure; Creativity; Depressive position; Early interactions; Eroticism, oral; Experience of satisfaction; Family; Good-enough mother; Handling; Helplessness; Holding; Identificatory project; Infantile omnipotence; Infant observation (therapeutic); Lack of differentiation; Maternal care; Maternal reverie, capacity for; Mirror stage; Narcissism, primary; Optical schema; Paranoid-schizoid position; Prematureness; Primal scene; Primary love; Primary object; Primary process/secondary process; Processes of development; Selfconsciousness; Self (true/false); Stranger; Sucking/ thumbsucking; Symbiosis/symbiotic relation; Thoughtthinking apparatus; Transitional object; Transitional object, space; Transitional phenomena; Wish, hallucinatory satisfaction of a. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1962). Learning from experience. London: Heinemann Medical Books. Bowlby, John. (1951). Maternal care and mental health. Geneva: W.H.O. Monographs. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams, Parts I and II. SE, 4–5. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. ———. (1914d). On narcissism: an introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. ———. (1925h). Negation. SE, 19: 233–239. Freud, Anna. (1946). The psychoanalytic treatment of children. London: Imago Publishing Co., Ltd. Klein, Melanie. (1933). The early development of conscience in the child. In S. Lorand (Ed.), Psycho-analysis Today. New York: Covici-Friede. ———. (1987). Some theoretical conclusions regarding the emotional life of the infant. In The writings of Melanie Klein: Vol. 3. Envy and gratitude and others (pp. 61–93). London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1952) Lebovici, Serge. (1983). Le Nourisson, la Mère et le Psychanalyste. Paris: Le Centurion. 815 INFANT OBSERVATION Spitz. René A. (1945). Hospitalism: an inquiry into the genesis of psychiatric conditions in early childhood. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, I, 53–74 Winnicott, Donald W. (1945). Primitive emotional development. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 26. Further Reading Tyson, Phyllis. (2002). The challenges of psychoanalytic developmental theory. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 50, 19–52. Tyson, Phyllis, and Tyson, Robert. (1990). Psychoanalytic theories of development: an integration. New Haven/ London: Yale University Press. INFANT OBSERVATION Infant observation has long been considered an important training exercise for child psychotherapists and for psychoanalysts (Bick, 1964). This has led to certain theoretical developments commonly associated with the work of Esther Bick (1968, 1986). Bick began this work in 1948, shortly after Melanie Klein had described the paranoid-schizoid position. In Klein’s view of the paranoid-schizoid position, the ego has a primary sense of a boundary between itself and the external world. Bick described a variant of this process, in which boundary of the ego is not primary, but comes from the sensations arising from skin contact. Sufficient skin sensations are necessary to give the experience of a boundary. One of the processes she noticed interpersonally was that the breaking of skin contact appeared to be experienced by the infant as a hole from which it could leak. She noticed the frequency with which infants become incontinent of excreta, as well as loosing tears from the eyes, and screams from the mouth. She believed she was watching just that process which Klein had described as the disintegration of the ego in the early stages after birth. The fragmentation takes the form of an experience of leaking into empty space. Bick described various methods by which the infant seemed to operate to plug that leaky gap. It might grasp with the mouth so that literally the hole is filled. Alternatively the hands may grasp as the mouth does; or more distantly the eyes may become fixed upon a point of light or some discrete object, as if clinging like the clenched hands. In addition the infant may fix aurally upon sounds, including the sound of its own 81 6 crying. These processes of filling, grasping, fixing, and hanging on represent a method of completing a boundary. However, the mother’s contact with the baby’s skin remains the most potent, and perhaps natural, means of completing the boundary. The theoretical ideas concerning the skin are related to the notion of the ‘‘skin egos’’ developed by Didier Anzieu (1985) and Pierre M. Turquet’s ‘‘skin-myneighbor’’ (1975). Bick’s view was that the boundary between ego and external world was first of all a phenomenon of the body ego, and specifically the skin. Also, it is not a given structure at the outset of life, but instead has to be achieved through the experience of the mother ’’giving’’ the infant a sense of being enveloped, through the mother’s innate understanding of the baby’s need for skin contact. Thus the primary object that stabilizes the ego is not Klein’s good internal object internalized inside the ego boundaries, but is the ego boundary itself. The skin is thus a bodily component of the stability of the ego, and it is gained passively, at first, from the external object (mother). Bick thought she was extending Klein’s theories, by displaying a psychic level prior to and beneath Klein’s paranoid-schizoid position. However, this has not been generally accepted. ROBERT D. HINSHELWOOD See also: Adhesive identification; Child analysis; Goodenough mother; Infant observation (direct); Lebovici, Serge Sindel Charles; Processes of development; Symbiosis/ symbiotic relation. Bibliography Bick, Esther. (1968). The experience of the skin in early object relations. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 49, 558–566. ———. (1986). Further considerations on the functioning of skin in early object relations: findings from infant observation integrated into child and adult analysis. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 2, 292–299. Pérez-Sánchez, Manuel. (1990). Baby observation. Perth: Clunie Press. Further Reading Bick, Esther. (1964). Notes on infant observation in psychoanalytic training. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 45, 558–566. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INFANT OBSERVATION (DIRECT) Boyer, Diane, and Sorensen, Pamela. (1999). Tavistock model of infant observation in neonatal intensive. Psychoanalytical Inquiry, 19,146–159. Freud, Anna. (1953). Some remarks on infant observation. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 8, 9–19. Spitz, Rene A. (1950). Relevancy of direct infant observation. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 5, 66–73. INFANT OBSERVATION (DIRECT) The direct observation of babies is a way of learning about the developing human mind. In ‘‘The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman’’ (1920), Sigmund Freud stated that if direct observation were sufficient to provide us with information on the origins of human sexuality, he would not have bothered to write his books. Arguably, we observe nothing that we do not already know, and vision, although closely linked to the scopic instinct—the foremost tool of curiosity and inquiry—is not a productive way of investigating psychic reality. Nevertheless, his observation of Little Hans, related in ‘‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-YearOld Boy’’ (1909), provided him with the essential elements of his theory of the libido and castration anxiety. He believed he was able to see directly in the child ‘‘these sexual impulses and these formations built by desire that we have such difficulty uncovering in the adult.’’ His observation of an eighteen-monthold child playing the Fort!/Da! game with a wooden reel, related in ‘‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’’ (1920), by establishing the basis for his theory of the death instinct, played a role not only in his theorizations of narcissism, but also because it provided a paradigm for numerous currents of thought in child psychoanalysis. Freud and Melanie Klein, working within different perspectives, encouraged their students to observe infants, but without making this a separate field of study. It was Donald Winnicott who, in ‘‘The Observation of Infants in a Set Situation’’ (1941), defined that field by envisioning infant observation as a ‘‘set situation’’ capable both of providing information about the infant carried by its mother and of establishing an authentic therapeutic relationship with the infant, working in a nonverbal mode. Winnicott proposed his own reading of Freud’s ‘‘game of Fort!/Da!’’ and helped us to see what distinguishes his interpretation from INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS pure behavioral observation. He analyzed the sequence of the baby’s behaviors in three stages: (a) hesitation, which he interpreted as a ‘‘sign of anxiety about something’’ and a symptom of a conflict between the infant’s desire and its interiorization of a threatening maternal imago; (b) then the expression of self-confidence—which is close to what he called ‘‘omnipotence.’’ In some cases, this phase can lead to the world of make-believe and shared play; and (c) the game of appearance/disappearance of the object, in which the infant, emerging from its depressive mood, expresses its ability to restore the object through the game. Winnicott thus establishes a difference between the primitive processes, as they can be directly observed, and the deeper processes that are already a reconstruction and elaboration of the primitive processes, linked with experience of the environment. He made it possible to utilize direct infant observation to better understand psychic reality in the process of being constructed. The postwar period, in which psychoanalysts were faced with the problem of early psychopathologies, renewed interest in observation. René Spitz and John Bowlby, borrowing their methods from genetic psychology and ethology respectively, proposed new developmental models focused on, respectively, the concept of organizers of the ego and attachment theory. An important research trend then developed, mainly in the United States, that interpreted the baby’s nonverbal behaviors as genuine mental acts. Her work informed by the theories both Klein and Wilfred Bion, the British investigator Esther Bick, in ‘‘Notes on Infant Observation in Psycho-Analytic Training’’ (1964), for her part upheld the idea that the infant’s mental life unfolds in a projective mode that must be contained by psychic structures that are sufficiently developed to support the emergence of the processes of introjection. Originally conceived as a contribution to the training of child psychotherapists and psychoanalysts, this method has been extended to other objectives: research on the beginnings of the infant’s mental and relational life, prevention and treatment techniques used in families and in various institutional settings (treatment and other centers for young children, nurseries, neonatal care services). From an epistemological point of view, Didier Houzel (1997) underscored the difference between an ethological approach and observation that he characterized as psychoanalytical, which sticks to the 817 INFANT OBSERVATION (THERAPEUTIC) proposed framework both internally (coming as close as possible to the baby’s somatopsychic experiences) and externally (type of contract established with the family, means used by the various parties to abide by or transgress the conditions, and finally the observer’s capacity for empathy). Observation thus takes place in two stages: encounter with the subject, and the deferred working-over of transferential and countertransferential material. DRINA CANDILIS-HUISMAN See also: Infant observation (therapeutic). Bibliography Bick, Esther. (1964). Notes on infant observation in psychoanalytic training. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 45, 558–566. Freud, Sigmund. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a fiveyear-old boy. SE, 10: 1–149. ———. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1–64. ———. (1920a). The psychogenesis of a case of homosexuality in a woman. SE, 18: 145–172. Winnicott, Donald. (1941) The observation of infants in a set situation. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 22, 229–249. INFANT OBSERVATION (THERAPEUTIC) The method of observing the infant in its family environment, from birth to age two, using the rigor of the analytic framework, was conceived by Esther Bick. The observer visits the infant at home for one hour once each week and maintains a strict neutrality. The field of observation is the relationship that is established between the baby and its mother, within the context of the transference instituted between the mother and the observer, and between the mother and her baby. The objective is training the observer in analytic work rather than the fabrication of an instrument for research. This method, used for the training of psychoanalysts and childhood specialists, later proved to be a remarkable tool for early treatment. In 1948, at the request of John Bowlby, Bick developed a method of infant observation in a family context. As Bick explained in ‘‘Notes on Infant Observation in Psycho-Analytic Training’’ (1964), the aim 81 8 was to provide an opportunity for practical experience as a part of first-year training for therapists at the Tavistock Clinic. In 1963, Bick presented her method of observation to the British Psychoanalytical Society (BPS). A consensus was established among the various English schools that this method would be integrated into the first-year curriculum; the attentive observation of an infant’s development enables the future analyst to live out a number of fundamental emotional experiences, then to think them through within the framework of the work group. It was Sigmund Freud’s grandson, W. Ernest Freud—the ‘‘child playing with the spool’’—who promoted this method for therapists at the Anna Freud Center, as he related in ‘‘Infant Observation: Its Relevance to Psychoanalytic Training.’’ (1975). Bick’s method of observation is a part of analytic training within the Spanish and Belgian psychoanalytic societies. Bick herself recommended training in this method for all categories of professionals involved in children’s mental health. In France, André Green strongly opposed the use of direct observation, noting in ‘‘Entretien avec Pierre Geissmann à propos de l’observation des bébés’’ (1992; Interview with Pierre Geissmann on infant observation) that it carries the risk of externalizing psychic life and confusing the infantile with the actual infant, which runs contrary to the work of representation and the spirit of psychoanalysis. Bick’s method was a conceptual innovation, described as ‘‘a stroke of genius’’ by Martha Harris. It is a precise technique used in a fixed framework, whose goal is the training of the analyst. The observer must be able to find a space within the family that is sufficiently neutral, yet not rigid, to enable him or her to experience the emotional impact of the baby’s presence, without taking action. He or she must come unburdened by theoretical preconceptions, and be receptive without interfering. After the observation, the observer writes a report that conveys his or her experiences to a work group, which keeps an eye on methodological ethics and helps to make sense of the observed material. Observing a baby presupposes an ability to identify with the different points of view of family members; this flexibility makes it a sound preparation for analytic work. Through the analysis of his or her countertransference in relation to both the mother and what he or she feels from the baby, the observer can understand the impact of the mother’s INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INFANTILE AMNESIA fantasies on the baby’s mental space and perceive the manner in which the baby responds to this. Thus, the specific type of affective and counter-transferential opening up inherent in observation makes it an aid to the development of the future analyst’s capacities for free-floating attention. The observer’s presence is a source for change. It often has beneficial effects for most families: helping the mother emerge from postpartum depression, developing the parents’ attention-giving abilities, modulating the effects of repetition of the mother’s past on the baby. Bick’s method opened the way for new therapeutic possibilities. Infant observation in day-care facilities, hospitals, and in the home has been developed to sensitize staff, as a preventive measure against early disorders, and with a view to therapeutic intervention in cases of autistic or psychotic pathologies. In day-care facilities, the main indicators for setting up observation are:   Mental dysfunction in the mother. The containing effects of observation serve as a protective shield and allow for a reshaping of the imagos; Children who have to be entrusted to a series of foster care situations owing to inadequacies on the part of the parents can benefit from the presence of an observer who follows them from one place to the next;  When a child has a disability that is traumatic for the parents. The observer tries to get them to recognize the child’s performances and the support he or she needs;  Early autistic or psychotic disorders. The observer serves as a support for child-raising and the parents. He or she identifies the sources of suffering, defense mechanisms, and factors that hinder the child’s development, and helps to improve the family’s responses in the form of caregiving and listening skills. In hospitals, in obstetrics wards and neonatal intensive care units, attention given to the baby, especially when he or she seems to be disorganized, enables both medical providers and parents to ‘‘think’’ the baby, to find meaning in interactions, and to avoid functional repetition. Observation is a remarkable tool for prevention and treatment. It is an aid to the baby, who is helpless INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS in the face of its intense anxieties, to the mother in need of solicitude, and to other caregivers. CHRISTINE ANZIEU-PREMMEREUR See also: Archaic; Infantile psychosis; Infant observation; Infant observation (direct); Premature-prematurity; Tenderness. Bibliography Bick, Esther. Notes on infant observation in psycho-analytic training. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 45, 558–566. Freud, W. Ernest. Infant observation: its relevance to psychoanalytic training. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 30, 75–94. Green, André. Entretien avec Pierre Geissmann à propos de l’observation des bébés. Journal de la psychanalyse de l ’enfant, 12, 133–153. Haag, Michel, and Geneviève Haag. L’observation des nourrissons selon Esther Bick (1901–1983) et ses applications. L’Information psychiatrique, 1 (1995): 7–17. Pérez-Sánchez, Manuel. (1981). L’observation des bébés. Paris: Clancier-Guénaud. INFANTILE AMNESIA Infantile amnesia results from the repression of childhood polymorphous sexuality and the oedipal complex during the latency period. It constitutes a reference point and a model for subsequent (especially hysterical) amnesias and repressions. It ‘‘hides the earliest beginnings’’ of our lives ‘‘up to the sixth or eighth year’’ even though we have ‘‘good reason to believe that there is no period at which the capacity of receiving and reproducing impressions is greater than precisely during the years of childhood’’ (Freud, Sigmund 1905d, p. 174–175). The notion of amnesia is defined by Freud in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), when he develops his conception of infantile sexuality. Having conceived since 1895 of the notion of hysterical amnesia, he now acknowledges an amnesia bearing upon the first six to eight years of life, contrasting with the capacity of the child’s memory and its ability to register impressions. The infantile impressions falling under this amnesia constitute the reference point and model for later amnesias in the adult, helped into being by the 819 INFANTILE NEUROSIS preexistence of a repressed that attracts to itself any elements of the subject’s current life that resemble it. See also: Memories; Memory. Freud compares infantile amnesia to the hysterical amnesia of adults and suggests that in both cases the process would consist ‘‘in a simple withholding of these impressions from consciousness, viz., in their repression’’ (1905d, p. 175). That withheld from consciousness (repressed) includes infantile sexuality, defined as ‘‘polymorphous perversity,’’ which thus allows Freud to say that ‘‘neurosis is the negative of perversion.’’ This formulation could be attributed to a belief that the lifting of amnesia (hysteric and infantile) would permit the subject to follow in a reverse direction the path that leads from a childhood that did not endure censorship to neurosis. But Freud came to distinguish between a lifting of amnesia and a true lifting of repression in ‘‘Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through’’ (1914g). In ‘‘Constructions in Analysis’’ (1937d), this belief came up against the idea of sexuality as structurally linked to anxiety through the effects of the death drive. Bibliography The sexuality of the neurotic preserves important pregenital infantile traits. The hysteric refuses the perverse dimension of these traits all the more so since the child that they once were had already refused them during the latency period. Infantile amnesia creates for everybody a kind of ‘‘enigmatic prehistory.’’ The infantile prehistory finds the infant, who is just beginning to speak, imbued with primal fantasies that become the object of a radical amnesia, primal repression. In the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, this is not specifically a question of the Oedipus complex; however, it much be understood that infantile amnesia bears upon the entire ‘‘polymorphously perverse infantile sexuality/ Oedipus complex,’’ the oedipal conflict in turn reinforcing the censorship of infantile sexuality. It is notable that Freud theorizes infantile amnesia moreover starting from the observation of children outside the analytic setting rather than from adults recalling their childhoods in analysis. Infantile amnesia covers over the mnemic traces of childhood, about which Freud says in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) that they are ‘‘outside of time’’ and ‘‘indestructible,’’ which would tend to define all unconscious psychic life as infantile in its essence, on the condition that what is psychically infantile be distinguished from the real infant. FRANÇOIS RICHARD 82 0 Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4–5: 1–751. ———. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–245. ———. (1914g). Remembering, repeating and workingthrough (further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis, II). SE, 12, 145–156.1 INFANTILE NEUROSIS A psychogenic mental disorder, infantile neurosis manifests expresses a psychic conflict that has been symbolically noted in the subject’s early childhood. The term is used to designate either a disorder characterized by neurotic pathology, with variable prognostications, or a transference neurosis, constituting the prolegomenon of adult mental problems. Infantile neurosis is organized in terms of a dependency model. This results in counter-transference reactions on the part of the adult, which can be dangerous for the future development of the child, especially if the adult concerned remains oblivious to such a possibility. ‘‘Little Hans’’ was treated by his father, who was in turn ‘‘supervised’’ by Freud. Freud himself only saw this five-year-old boy twice. Hans suffered from a phobia that prevented him from any activity, a fear that arose from having seen a horse fall on the ramp at the Vienna railroad station. When Freud saw Hans again as an adult, his parents had separated and he had drawn closer to his father. He did not recognize Freud, and he did not appear to be very healthy mentally. The son of a musician, by the end of his professional life he was director of the Geneva Opera, but his career left few traces. About all that is known about him is that he was interested in Wagner’s Ring Cycle, that he staged the story of Brunhilde and Wotan, and that he was particularly taken with Siegfried’s search for a mother in Brunhilde. One might therefore agree with Jean Bergeret, who argued that this boy had a phobia linked to the his father’s relations with his wife, who had been analyzed by Freud. Freud perhaps knew too much about this family’s secrets. Despite the appearance of having been cured of his phobia through Freud’s work of interpreINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INFANTILE NEUROSIS tation, Hans suffered from a neurosis that certainly inhibited his creativity. The cases of the ‘‘Wolf Man’’ and the ‘‘Rat Man’’ published by Freud have been the object of extensive commentary. The Wolf Man, Sergei Pankejeff, suffered from an infantile neurosis. Freud concentrated on describing the key fantasy of observing the coitus of the parents, especially in the context of the dream of wolves. In this nightmare, the patient saw immobile wolves, sitting on the branches of a tree and staring at him. Eventually the Wolf Man was declared to be psychotic. He died at the psychiatric hospital of Vienna after a number of psychotic episodes, which were treated by students of Freud. At the end of his life the Wolf Man said terrible things about Freud to a Viennese journalist. However, he had been supported by psychoanalysts, who purchased paintings in which he depicted his dream. In fact, it was on the basis of this dream that Freud had decided to study the primal scene. He wanted to determine if the wolves that observed Pankejeff were placed in a situation opposite to the real one, when, as a child, he witnessed his parents making love. It seems probable that the coitus a tergo of animals had been attributed by the child to humans. It is known that the Wolf Man had made the rounds of psychiatric services in Germany, ending up with Freud after seeing many other doctors. After he was financially ruined during the Russian Revolution, he married one of his nurses in Vienna. She was somewhat able to contain his madness. It is understandable that this man, who had paranoid tendencies, but was also persecuted in reality, would try to protect himself through various fantasies. But he needed to renounce them in order to find some peace and be able to return to a more normal life. The Rat Man, who died during World War I, was traumatized in his childhood by his relations with the nurses who raised him and who had pathological sexual experiences with him. As an adult he suffered from an obsessional neurosis; many notes about Freud were found with him; and once in the course of a transference he attempted to transform Anna Freud into one of his nurses, insulting her constantly. Neurotic symptoms in childhood do not necessarily lead to adult neuroses. In the adult, the existence of neurotic symptoms can mask an underlying psychotic structure. Furthermore, the study of the evolution of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS certain cases of autism treated by psychoanalysis demonstrates frequent obsessional masking of psychoses, as is also the case in serious obsessional neuroses in children. In Serge Lebovici’s report on the relation between infantile neurosis and transference neurosis presented to the Congrès des psychoanalystes de langue française des pays romans, he recalled Anna Freud’s theory that normal neurotic symptoms were a sign of good psychic health in a child during the oedipal phase: the repression of the drive is generally insufficient at that time, and thus transitory neurotic symptoms will arise. It has been demonstrated that the absence normal infantile neurosis is a sign of a predisposition to psychoses. However, subsequently Lebovici considered that his exposé should have been slightly rectified: normal infantile neurosis is also a sign of a solid narcissism, linked to a narcissistic cathexis with ‘‘His Majesty the Baby’’ on the part of his parents, who structure the ego of the child. The organization of intersubjectivity demonstrates the importance of family relations to the psychic life of the child. The kinship system accords a huge place to the imagined child, that is to say, to the imaginary and phantasmic child of the mother. This is contemporaneous with the child’s proto-representations. This ensemble communicates the presence of phantasmic interactions and also shows the importance of the role of the child in the psychic lives of the parents. When this double process is satisfactory, the intergenerational transmission results in a solid and flexible ego. However, when there are ‘‘ghosts in the nursery’’ (Selma Fraiberg), this double process fails and the cultural constitution of filiation becomes impossible, illustrating the importance of studying the early interactive stage. But this work comes up against various obstacles that are not oedipal. The triangulation process starts relatively early. It is preceded by a triadic arrangement, in the course of which the father and mother, in present-day society, play a specific role, allowing one to predict of the possible outcomes of triangulation. In the dull repetition of interactions, certain events are fundamental to the reconstitution of the interaction: they are ‘‘spoken backwards’’— that is to say, they become truly significant events. This perspective give understanding of the specific incidents in upbringing that demonstrate the modalities of the transmission of attachment, as 821 INFANTILE OMNIPOTENCE John Bowlby anticipated them. Mary Ainsworth has described this kind of attachment as the ‘‘strange situation,’’ transmitted according to genetic rules. The mechanisms of transmission in the adult follow the principle of a genetic transmission (Mary Main). Peter Fonagy has built on this idea, considering that children forced to deal with insecure transmission would benefit from a psychotherapeutic approach, which can modify the givens of this genetic transmission, as can be observed in thirty percent of cases. Studies on narration seem to confirm that episodic memory inscribes these givens, emphasizing the importance of the ‘‘proto-narrative envelopes’’ described by Daniel Stern. rate peoples who overestimate the power of wishful thinking and the real-world effect of psychic acts. Infantile omnipotence is also a feature of obsessional pathology, in which it appears as superstitious or magical thinking; in psychosis, as delusions of grandeur; and, finally and to a lesser extent, in creative people who are able to momentarily escape reality and manipulate a world of fantasy. Sigmund Freud treated the concept of omnipotent thinking at length through investigations of primitive peoples and their beliefs in telepathic and animistic thought, and also through pathologies such as obsessional neurosis and psychotic megalomania. SERGE LEBOVICI Although Freud did not discuss it in these terms, narcissistic regression in sleep may be viewed as putting the dreamer in a situation typical of infantile omnipotence, able to realize frustrated desires of the previous day and, on a deeper level, to fulfill repressed wishes. Dreams revive the earliest situation of the nursing infant who seeks to re-experience satisfaction through primary process thinking—that is, to use hallucination to short-circuit reality. Perceptual identity is achieved by means that are rapid, regressive, and interior to the psychic apparatus. ‘‘It was only,’’ wrote Freud, ‘‘the non-occurrence of the expected satisfaction, the disappointment experienced, that led to the abandonment of this attempt at satisfaction by means of hallucination’’ (1911b, p. 219). Omnipotence in this sense is essentially indistinguishable from the capacity of the psychic apparatus to ignore reality and has universal purchase as an archaic function of the psyche. See also: ‘‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy (Little Hans)’’; ‘‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (Wolf Man)’’; Infantile, the; Neurosis; Phobias in children; Prepsychosis; Psychoanalytical Treatment of Children; Transference neurosis. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a fiveyear-old boy. SE, 10: 1–149. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. ———. (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1–122. Lebovici, Serge. (1980). L’expérience du psychanalyste chez l’enfant et chez l’adulte devant le modèle de la névrose infantile et de la névrose de transfert. Revue Française de Psychanalyse, 64, 5–6, 733–857. Further Reading Kris, Ernst, et al. (1954). Problems of infantile neurosis. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 9, 16–71. Loewald, Hans W. (1974). Current status of the concept of infantile neurosis: Discussion. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 29, 183–190. INFANTILE OMNIPOTENCE The sense of omnipotence that arises in the fundamental misapprehension of reality which is central to the period of primary narcissism, during which the infant hallucinates its original love-object, persists into childhood and is found among prehistoric and prelite82 2 For the child, learning the limitations that the reality principle imposes on the pleasure principle is in effect a limitation on its sense of omnipotence. However, as Melanie Klein (1921 [1919]) noted, the child’s sense of omnipotence is also tied to that which it endows its parents and with which it identifies. Reality opposes it in either case. The ‘‘decline of the omnipotence-feeling that is brought about by the impulse to diminish parental perfection (which certainly assists in establishing the limits of his own as well as of their power) in turn influences the impairment of authority, so that an interaction, a reciprocal support would exist between the impairment of authority and the weakening of the omnipotence-feeling’’ (p. 17). In her view, the child’s experience of omnipotence as increasing or diminishing will determine whether he or she will become bold and optimistic or fearful and pessimistic. However, she added: ‘‘For the result of development INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INFANTILE PSYCHOSIS not to be boundless utopianism and phantasy but optimism, a timely correction must be administered by thought’’ (p. 24). A compromise thus emerges between the pleasure principle that regulates wishes and fantasies and the area in which the reality principle prevails in the sphere of thoughts and established facts. Donald W. Winnicott showed how the young child’s mental activity can transform a ‘‘good-enough’’ environment into perfect surroundings. This transformation is necessary for object constancy not to be disturbed. By contrast, a defective environment is harmful because faulty adaptation overwhelms the psyche-soma of the young child and prematurely forces it out of the its narcissistic universe. In terms of the illusion of creating the object and what he calls ‘‘transitional objects,’’ Winnicott (1952) wrote: ‘‘We allow the infant this madness, and only gradually ask for a clear distinguishing between the subjective and that which is capable of objective or scientific proof. We adults use the arts and religion for the offmoments which we all need in the course of realitytesting and reality-acceptance’’ (p. 224). Omnipotence does not disappear as childhood ends, but it delimits itself to specific areas and coexists with the recognition that reality imposes limitations upon it. Literary fiction and especially Romanesque adventure permits safe enjoyment of omnipotence through all manner of imagined danger. ‘‘It seems to me, however,’’ wrote Freud (1908a), ‘‘that through this revealing characteristic of invulnerability we can immediately recognize His Majesty the Ego, the hero alike of every day-dream and of every story’’ (1908a, p. 150). Moreover, parents transmit omnipotence to the child inasmuch as ‘‘they are inclined to suspend in the child’s favour the operation of all the cultural acquisitions which their own narcissism has been forced to respect, and to renew on his behalf the claims to privileges which were long ago given up by themselves. . . Illness, death, renunciation of enjoyment, restrictions on his own will, shall not touch him; the laws of nature and of society shall be abrogated in his favour; he shall once more really be the centre and core of creation—ÔHis Majesty the Baby’, as we once fancied ourselves’’ (1914c, p. 19). SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Alpha function; Amplification (analytical psychology); Anxiety; Arrogance; Borderline conditions; INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ‘‘Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest’’; Dead mother complex; Dependence; Ego ideal; Ego ideal/ideal ego; Encopresis; Inferiority, feeling of; Good enough mother; Holding; Illusion; Infant observation (direct); Mania; Megalomania; Narcissism; Narcissistic defenses; Narcissistic elation; Omnipotence of thought; Paranoia; Pregnancy, fantasy of; Psycho-Analysis of Children, The; Quasi-independence, Transitional stage; Rite and ritual; Self (true/ false); Self esteem; Silence; Squiggle; Suicidal behavior; Technique with children, psychoanalytic; Termination of treatment; Transference/counter-transference (analytical psychology); Transgression; Transitional phenomena; Transitional object; Transitional object, space. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1908e). Creative writers and day-dreaming. SE, 9: 141–153. ———. (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 7: 213–226. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 81–105. Klein, Melanie. (1921 [1919]). The development of a child. In: Love, guilt and reparation and other works, 1921–1945, pp. 1–53. Delacorte Press, 1975. Winnicott, Donald W. (1952). Psychosis and child care. In: Collected papers (pp. 219–228). New York: Basic Books, 1958. INFANTILE PSYCHOSIS Infantile psychosis has recently been replacing the notion of infantile schizophrenia. Infantile psychosis can be defined as precociously pathological organization that develops out of the integration of the earliest relations. Later forms of exteriorization can also be manifested in childhood. The age at the first outbreak, the greater or lesser stability of the supports of equilibrium that are constituted, and the nature of the defense mechanisms have significant repercussions on the risk and incidence of later negative developments. The principal psychic mechanisms at work lie somewhere between the neurosis-psychosis opposition, posed by Freud, and the Kleinian theory of fantasy and the precocious Oedipus: the predominance of projection and projective identification, the fusion between real and imaginary, with infiltration of primal shattering fears, direct instinctual expression and the search for satisfaction by the shortest way, principally in the register of oral drives. 823 INFANTILE PSYCHOSIS Clinical polymorphism, the absence of pathognomonic signs, and the failure of any common etiology of pathogenesis all characterize the category of the infantile psychoses in child psychiatry. Psychosis is diagnosed on the basis of the seriousness of perturbations, their atypical quality and their duration, in the context of various presenting symptoms—such as behavior problems, compromising of intellectual efficiency and functioning, retardation and/or language anomalies, expressions of great anxiety, sleep, eating, and sphincter conduit disorders; and in rare cases delirium and hallucinations. In terms of occurrence, a clear distinction has been established between schizophrenia that is declared in adolescence, without as much variety in the forms it takes, and the child schizophrenics who present more individualized particularities. In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association, psychoses are not listed as a disorder nosology, but rather placed under the rubric of ‘‘general developmental disorders’’ among which figures infantile autism. The overall ‘‘a-theoretical’’ cast of the ensemble and its descriptive corollaries suggest an organogenic and negative conception of psychosis, implying interventions that consist principally in reeducation. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, this dominant understanding of infantile psychoses was still borrowed in large measure from that of nineteenth-century psychiatry; advocating medical pedagogical treatment (Bourneville, Seguin, Vallee), as well as psychometric approaches (Binet, Simon). Backwardness, states of idiocy and insanity, and their anatomical-clinical correlations in etiological matters were some characteristics of the dominant conception. A threefold transformation of thought then contributed to the emergence of infantile psychoses:  the application to ever younger children of models coming from advances in adult psychiatry and psychoanalysis;  the rejection of these adulto-morphic models, as clinicians took account of the specificities of children;  the gradual passing of the hypothesis of homogeneity, and the recognition of the heterogeneity of clinical tableaux and their underlying conditions. 82 4 Wilhelm Weygandt, Emil Kraepelin himself, and especially Sancte de Sanctis in 1908 with ‘‘dementia praecossime,’’ described the infantile forms of early insanity. Yet all of this was merely followed the Kraepelinian model of the child. With the introduction by Eugen Bleuler of the category of schizophrenics (1911), the emphasis shifted from dementia to the dissociation of psychic functions (‘‘Spaltung’’). Among disorders called secondary—‘‘responses of the sick soul’’— was the hermetic isolation of ‘‘autism,’’ a term coined by Bleuler by subtracting ‘‘eros’’ from the Freudian notion of autoeroticism. This new dynamic approach progressively influenced studies of children. From the thirties, in the United States (Charles Bradley, Howard Potter) and Europe (Georges Heuyer, Jacob Lutz, Léon Michaux), the notion of infantile schizophrenia, an autonomous endogenic illness resulting in a dramatic alteration in the developmental curve, became a familiar one. For Lutz, it was strictly opposed to organic and encephalopathic madness, or to gradually developing retardation. An overall conception of the malady was enlarged to include different clinical types and an approach to intra-familial relations. The work of Melanie Klein and her treatment of psychotic, even autistic children (cases of Dick, 1930; Erna, 1932) was especially influential, and took place well before the descriptions of precocious infantile autism by Leo Kanner (1943) and of symbiotic psychosis by Margaret Mahler (1952). The emergence of the concept of infantile psychosis first in the United States, then in Europe, from the end of the 1940s is linked to several factors:  the dissemination of psychoanalytic works relative to children and concerning early development: Melanie Klein, already mentioned, Anna Freud, René Spitz, Donald Winnicott;  a progressive disengagement from any etiological presupposition;  a challenge to the notion of dementia as an endogenous condition with ineluctable processes which had been itself a factor in negative prognoses. Post-Kleinian authors in Great Britain attempted to make further progress in investigating the origins of thought and its disorders: Herbert Rosenfeld located the role of projective identification in the psychotic process; Wilfred Bion stressed the impact of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INFANTILE PSYCHOSIS destructive drives against activities of liaison, perception, and attention, while describing a normal projective identification; Hanna Segal developed the notion of ‘‘symbolic equation’’ in schizophrenia, where the symbol is confused with the thing it symbolizes. In France, after the early work of theorization of Serge Lebovici, René Diatkine, Conrad Stein, and Denise Kalmanson came up with a comprehensive psychological profile of infantile psychoses. The contributions of Roger Misès and Jean-Louis Lang should also be emphasized as having illuminated the rapport between psychoses and flaws in organic constitution. While the neurosis-psychosis opposition still maintains considerable heuristic value, the complexity and flexibility of the child’s systems have resulted in proposing the concepts of pre-psychosis, developmental disharmony, and para-psychosis. The British school, through Donald Meltzer, proceeded to a synthesis of the Kleinian concepts in the very unfolding of the psychoanalytic process in the child (1948) and the observation of stages of psychic growth and of ‘‘dimensionality.’’ Esther Bick’s insight into a primal mode of narcissistic identification, ‘‘adhesive identification’’ (1968), extended the hypothesis formulated by Winnicott of premature traumatic separation and psychotic depression. Subsequently, Frances Tustin developed an original conceptualization of autistic defense mechanisms, distinguishing ‘‘shell states’’ (autisms) from ‘‘confusable states’’ (schizophrenias), where there has been access to tridimensionality. Finally, the study of the competencies of the infant, coupled with direct observation as well as the notions of interactional epigenisis and phantasmic interactions (Lebovici, 1983), posed the problem of the consistency of psychoanalysis with new models of premature dysfunctionalities (Didier Houzel, Bertrand Cramer). The idea that the baby creates the mother as much as she creates the baby has contributed to reflection on the access to maternality (Racamier, 1979) and on the role maternal depression plays in the psychotic process. Leo Kanner described early infantile autism (1943), and he deduced it from the Bleulerian concept of the autism of schizophrenia. It was then applied to the ‘‘extreme autistic solitude’’ manifested from the start of life beginning in certain children. However, the question of whether this is a special category, in spite of Kanner’s integration of it in the general framework of infantile psychoses, remains unresolved. The especially INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS rigid homeostasis of their constitution locates these children in the register of the unchangeable, capable of no effect of projection, action or possession. A line can be drawn here between autism and infantile psychoses. Because the autistic system is relatively unstable, future development, once a major breakdown has been avoided, will include passage by ‘‘symbiotic’’ madness. Some authors, however, see in this a confirmation of the developmental continuity of various forms of child psychosis. Described by Margaret Mahler in the child of two to four years of age, ‘‘symbiotic psychosis’’ is based on a primal indistinction between the psyche of the baby and that of the mother, and on a regression to this state of ‘‘symbiosis.’’ Psychosis involves the tentative restitution of the mania of omnipotent fusion with the mother’s image. Marked by ambivalence, its symptomology includes a loss of functional skills and major manifestations of disturbance at the prospect of a separation from corporeal contact. Its onset is connected with maturation of the functions of the ego and the unconscious mobility of parental cathexes. A manifestly pathological ‘‘symbiotic’’ upsetting of equilibrium, a result of separation or sudden loss, can result in a secondary autistic condition. Other early developmental disharmonies, psychotic in structure and composite clinical articulation, have been described. One consideration is that psychoses that are externalized later, from the age of four-to-five to puberty, can be seen as evolving adjustments to these early forms, and in continuity with them. On the other hand, without underestimating the significance of unrecognized fault lines, they surface in children who seem safe from them. Clinical configurations correspond to variable classifications of the signs of a need for help, polymorphic in nature, as has been mentioned above. Pseudo-neurotic (phobias, obsessions) and pseudo-maladjustment forms should be remarked, as well as complex motor or instrumental disorders, and some school failures, where psychosis is a factor. The ensemble of these theories, not excluding neurobiological, environmental, and historical factors, tends to be situated outside of linear reductive causality. For René Diatkine, the understanding of psychopathology necessitates a reflection on the etiology of ‘‘normalcy.’’ From the time of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), the Freudian hypothesis of the hallucinatory return of the experience of satisfaction linked 825 INFANTILE PSYCHOSIS normal development and psychotic functioning. Melanie Klein, in her description of the precocious Oedipus and schizoid-paranoid and depressive positions, situated ‘‘early psychotic stages’’ as potentialities in any human being. Infantile psychoses were the result of fixation at this early pre-psychotic phase, in which splitting, introjection, and projection dominate. They signify the failure of the depressive phase central to the second six months of life, when the child is faced with persecutory anxieties of annihilation. Projective identification, with its dimension of aggressive intrusion into the body of the mother to control her from the inside, was the key to narcissistic object relations of the schizoid-paranoid position. However, Melanie Klein has been criticized for using metaphors borrowed from psychopathology to describe the general organization of the psyche—as well as for the absence of a clear conceptual opposition between neurosis and psychosis. Serge Lebovici and René Diatkine are of the opinion that the ensemble of psychic functioning and the economic equilibrium between different systems are what permits the differentiation of every form of psychic organization with regard to the ‘‘treatment’’ of projective identification. Consequently, according to Diatkine, ‘‘the optimal form of development of the pre-Oedipean organization’’ could be represented ‘‘as an interaction between two psychotic positions (schizoid-paranoid and depressive positions)’’ (1955) which is similar to some of Bion’s formulations. Psychosis would correspond to the relative primacy of the primal processes in the lowering of tensions and the reestablishment of economic equilibrium, a condition of psychic continuity. The tendency toward repetition of this primacy is what is pathognomonic. Cathexis and meaning would be established, consequently, accorded to a ‘‘primal’’ logic, without suppression of secondary processes. René Diatkine emphasized the crisis, decisive for psychic development, leading to the installation of the object in the second six months of life. The presence/absence opposition assumes qualitative significance, and the maternal object, lost by definition as soon as constituted, is cathected ambivalently. The working through of the ambivalence is crucial, the object of love and hate being doubly inscribed, internally and externally. Symbiotic psychosis corresponds to the impossibility of workingthrough, a consequence of serous perturbations in the earliest exchanges: painful representation becomes 82 6 non-representation. The environment can contribute to the stabilization of this pathological equilibrium or it can favor the constructive recapture of mental representations. Projective identification, which becomes very significant when introjection organizes desire permanently in the depressive position, allows the loved object to be spared by addressing itself to a third party. This primal triangulation is the jumping off point of the oedipean constitution, as in Kleinian formulations. For Wilfred R. Bion, projected hatred and envy become so intense, in the pathological projective identification, that the identificatory object, unable to contain and work through them, is experienced as a ‘‘superego,’’ crushing and destructive of the capacities of psychic development. The inversion of the alpha function necessary for the assimilation of emotional experiences results in catastrophic hallucinations and anxieties. Donald W. Winnicott regarded failures of the early processes of illusion-disillusion, shared between the mother and the child, as the source of the psychosis centered on phases of the formation of ‘‘the continuous feeling of existence.’’ The lack of access to a ‘‘primal maternal preoccupation’’ (1965) would deprive the subject of an essential early period of illusion. For Wilfred Bion, this particular maternal phase can be considered from the point of view of a mutual projective relation of identification between the mother and the baby, reintroducing the role of the object and the environment into Kleinian theories. The containing and working-through capacities of the mother are what soothe the persecutory anxiety of the child (‘‘capacity for maternal reverie’’). Lacanian theorization relative to infantile psychoses were developed on the basis of the concepts of the foreclosure (the ‘‘Verwerfung’’ of Freud) of the Nameof-the-Father and of the mirror stage as ‘‘formative of the function of the I.’’ The foreclosed signifiers, outside of symbolization, return to the heart of the Real in hallucination. The mirror phase, between six and eighteen months, marks the first version of an ego in the experience of a primal identification, anticipating a corporal unity. For Maud Mannoni, psychoses are inscribed in the maternal unconscious, with the psychotic child being unrecognized as a desiring subject, excluded from access to oedipean triangulation, and frozen as partial object subjected to maternal omnipotence. Finally, Piera Aulagnier’s notion of the ‘‘imaginary body of the child’’ should be mentioned. This INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INFANTILE SCHIZOPHRENIA introduces an imaginary working through by the mother, prior to birth and anticipating the libidinal cathexis of the baby. The pictographic representation of the complementary object zone, attached to the primal process, bears witness to the disjunctive ruptures of corporal space in psychosis. In summary, it can be affirmed that, in clinical practice, psychotic polarity is represented by projective expansion, immediate hallucinatory satisfaction and disorganization, whereas neurotic polarity is represented by the efficacy of symbolic transmission, the multiplication of liaisons, and the capacity to differentiate and work through. A desirable early psychoanalytic treatment, extended in time, in the context of flexible institutional guidelines, should go along with a recognition of the different levels, perceptible but unpredictable, of psychic functioning of patients, as well as of related family circumstances. BERNARD TOUATI See also: Adhesive identification; Anaclisis/anaclitic; Autism; Autistic capsule/nucleus; Autistic defenses; Black hole; Breakdown; Child analysis; Deprivation; Developmental disorders; Dismantling; Empty Fortress, The; Individual; Infantile schizophrenia; Lack of differentiation; Mirror stage; Primitive agony; Psychic envelope; Psychotic potential; Self-mutilation in children; Sucking/ thumbsucking; Symbiosis/ symbiotic relation; Tube-ego. Bibliography Bick, Esther. (1968). The experience of the skin in early object relations. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 49, 558–566. Bion, Wilfred R. (1963). Elements of psychoanalysis. London: Heinemann. Bleuler, Eugen. (1952). The group of schizophrenias. (Joseph Zinkin, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1911) Diatkine, René. (1994). L’enfant dans l’adulte ou l’éternelle capacité de reverie. Neuchâtel-Paris: Delachaux & Niestlé. Diatkine, René, and Simon, Janine. (1972). La psychanalyse précoce. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Kanner, Leo. (1943). Autistic disturbances of affective contact. Nervous Child, 2, 217–250. Klein, Melanie. (1948). Contributions to psychoanalysis. 1921–1945. London: Hogarth Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Lebovici, Serge. (1983). Le nourrisson, la mère et le psychanalyste. Paris: Le Centurion. Mahler, Margaret. (1952). On child psychosis and schizophrenia. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 7, 286–305. Misès, Roger, and Moniot, Marc. (1970). Les psychoses de l’enfant. In Encyclopédie médico-chirurgicale, vol. Psychiatrie. Paris: E.M.C. Racamier, Paul-Claude. (1979). La maternalité psychotique. (Commentaires et complément 1978 et 1979). Paris: Payot. Further Reading Volkan, Vamik. (1995). The infantile psychotic self and its fates. Understanding and treating schizophrenics and other difficult patient. Northvale, NJ: Aronson Inc. INFANTILE SCHIZOPHRENIA The French classification of childhood and adolescent mental disorders describes two psychoses under two rubrics: childhood-onset psychoses of the schizophrenic type and adolescence-onset psychoses of the schizophrenic type. Nineteenth-century child psychiatry, it can be assumed, followed the models proposed by adult psychiatry. Valentin Magnan applied the adult psychiatric theory of degeneration to children. In the same vein, Ernest Dupré applied the theory of constitutions to children. Later, various authors described clinical cases of children that showed obvious adult forms of schizophrenia. Thus, in 1905 Sancte de Sanctis described dementia præcocissima on analogy with dementia præcox. In 1888 Jacques-Joseph Moreau de Tours wrote the first treatise on child psychiatry, La folie chez l ’enfant (Madness in children). A year earlier, Hermann Emminghaus demonstrated that the description of mental illness in children should be separated from descriptions of adult mental illness. In 1908 Theodore Heller described dementia infantilis, a clinical group of several illnesses generally of neurological origin with various components. At the First International Congress on Child Psychiatry, held in Paris in 1937, Lutz was the first to use the notion of infantile schizophrenia, of which he made a critical study. According to him, there are very few such cases. His presentation was supported by Georges Heuyer. Already English-speaking authors had extended the concept of infantile schizophrenia to cover everything in current practice conventionally referred to as ‘‘childhood 827 INFANTILE SCHIZOPHRENIA psychoses.’’ In 1943 Leo Kanner proposed isolating a particular morbid illness under the term ‘‘infantile autism.’’ This particular psychosis does not evolve toward schizophrenia. As a matter of practice, institutions that treat children do not admit the notion of schizophrenia, while the concept of autism is very widespread. French psychiatry has described prepsychotic and parapsychotic states that evolve toward a state of disintegration accompanied by mental retardation and that can appear analogous to certain schizophrenic states in adults. In English-speaking countries, especially in institutions following the American classification in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), the notion of psychosis has disappeared and been replaced by the concepts of autism and of pervasive developmental disorders. Some of the latter disorders may develop into schizophrenia. In German psychiatry, which long maintained its influence over the Soviet and Eastern Bloc countries, childhood autism has long been described as an initial form of schizophrenia, with development into schizophrenia more or less inevitable. Schizophrenia that begins during adolescence will not be treated here, for it is generally at this age that symptoms of schizophrenia are first manifested. Many authors believe that schizophrenic adolescents, who are often extremely intelligent, already had bizarre behavioral problems in childhood. Most authors, however, believe that schizophrenia appears in the young adult out of the clear blue sky. In conformity with this view, the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10), ‘‘Classification of Mental and Behavioral Disorders’’ lists autism and childhood disintegrative disorder, but not infantile schizophrenia. Lastly, Roger Misès has described childhood borderline pathologies, within which he included states that may develop into schizophrenia. He sees this as a failure of the development of narcissism. Although it is possible to invoke some cases of infantile autism that have unquestionably evolved in the direction of schizophrenic states, the onset of schizophrenia during the latency period is altogether exceptional. Psychiatric morbidity in children whose parents suffer from mental disorders is significant. However, these disorders are usually neuroses. When one parent is schizophrenic, the child has a 20 percent chance of being schizophrenic, whereas the rate is only 3 percent when neither parent is schizophrenic. Children adopted by parents listed on the schizophrenic register 82 8 are more likely to be psychotic than those who are apparently the children of schizophrenics. These studies, carried out in Chicago and in the Scandinavian countries, seem to be more probing than research involving identical twins. Some serious neurotic states, especially obsessivecompulsive disorders, may be a neuroticization of certain childhood and adult psychoses. This is what Joyce McDougall and Serge Lebovici described in Un cas de psychose infantile (A case of infantile psychosis; 1960). They describe the case of a child whose analysis was stopped by his parents. The parents wanted to place the boy in the care of Bruno Bettelheim. The mother of this boy said the boy was suicidal, and the boy, according to his father, became a ‘‘homosexual schizophrenic’’ who was among ‘‘the wealthiest Americans.’’ At the end of his analysis, the boy would make sure that the subway had indeed stopped in each station and would go down to check its exact position. The neuroticization of his ‘‘schizophrenia’’ thus led to an obsession with checking that impeded subway trains from leaving the station. It is legitimate to wonder whether true obsessional neuroses that appear from the latency period on are not preschizophrenic. Generally, very bizarre obsessions are involved, as in the case of a boy who wanted to make certain that falling snow made no sound. These obsessional neuroses are not mild schizophrenias that have already led to a degree of defensive obsessive behavior. In adulthood, schizophrenic decompensations can emerge, as in one case of traumatic schizophrenia in a preadolescent girl who saw her sister, caught in the eddying currents of the Loire River, drown. She first blamed herself, in the manner of a delusional melancholic, then became schizophrenic. Clearly, as these few cases show, infantile schizophrenia is rare. SERGE LEBOVICI See also: Autism; Deprivation; Double bind; Infantile psychosis; Lack of differentiation. Bibliography McDougall, Joyce, and Lebovici, Serge. (1960). Un cas de psychose infantile. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Misès, Roger. (1990). Les pathologies limites de l’enfance. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INFANTILE SEXUAL CURIOSITY INFANTILE SEXUAL CURIOSITY Infantile sexual curiosity must be distinguished from the ‘‘investigative drive’’ in that the former directly cathects sexuality. Secondarily, it can stimulate the activity of the latter, which is also directed at nonsexual objects and gives rise to theories (infantile sexual theories). For Freud, in fact, the investigative drive is ‘‘awoken’’ (geweckt) by sexual curiosity, which responds to the ‘‘selfish’’ interest of self-protection from the birth of younger siblings. Sexual curiosity initially involves an interest in seeing the genital organs and sexual relations (scopophilic drive). This visual pleasure can develop into voyeurism without necessarily leading to a sublimated cathexis of the enigma surrounding sexuality and of enigmas in general. Although sexual curiosity is linked to the investigative drive and constitutes the form in which it first emerges, the quest for the sight of an object of desire nevertheless continues to play a predominant role. It may be surprising that Freud should accord this preeminent position to sexual curiosity, to the extent of regarding it as the starting point of the child’s investigative activity, whereas in fact the child displays from the earliest months an all-consuming curiosity about everything that surrounds him. In fact, this curiosity already differs from the scopophilic drive both through its choice of an absent object, the mother’s penis (cf. Little Hans, 1909b), as a preferred object and because it is not restricted to the pleasure of seeing but immediately develops into a need for self-comparison with the object being looked at (‘‘The ego is always the standard by which one measures the external world,’’ 1909b, p. 107). Unlike the scopophilic drive, which can undergo a perverse development (voyeurism) or invent the absent object by remaining fixated on it (fetishism), sexual curiosity goes beyond this register by cathecting its enigmatic dimension. In this sense, it is already undergoing a sublimatory development, even if the investigation has not yet been formulated as an independent objective. The existence of an enigma presupposes the existence of a premonitory knowledge that is not necessarily possessed. In the ‘‘Wolf Man’’ case (1918b [1914]), concerning the primal scene, Freud hypothesizes that the understanding of the sexual process, as well as its meaning, is conceivable even at such an early age, if it is compared with the instinctive knowledge of animals (instinktives Wissen). This curiosity would then be the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS disposition to cathect a scene of which the meaning is intuited, giving it an enigmatic quality. However, the value of the scene in question derives only from that which is not visible, that is to say its meaning, as distinct from what is directly perceived. Sexual curiosity differs from voyeuristic pleasure in the same way, as can be stated following Freud: ‘‘An advance in intellectuality consists in deciding against direct senseperception in favour of what are known as the higher intellectual processes—that is, memories, reflections and inferences’’ (1939a, [1934–38], pp. 117–118). Sexual curiosity (epistemophilia) was extensively discussed by Melanie Klein, who emphasized that it precedes the child’s understanding of language and, because of his immaturity, contributes a great deal of frustration and a sense of ignorance that reinforce the castration complex. Melanie Klein also emphasizes the connection of this curiosity with sadism and the analsadistic libidinal position, which makes the child want to appropriate the contents of the body and particularly the mother’s body, which is thought to possess the penis and the babies. Sexual curiosity does not necessarily mean that the child is asking questions about sexuality. Rather, this seems in fact to be displaced, with the child posing innumerable, often stereotypical questions to which he does not appear to expect answers because they substitute for those questions that repression prevents him from asking and in regard to which alone he could be satisfied. Infantile sexual curiosity, in its denied form (inhibition, disgust) or its obsessional form, plays an important role in infantile symptomatology. It has important consequences for learning at school (Klein, 1923). Freud takes this viewpoint a step further by considering the failure of infantile sexual curiosity as a paralyzing factor in later life: ‘‘The impression caused by this failure in the first attempt at intellectual independence appears to be of a lasting and deeply depressing kind’’ (1910c, p. 79). SOPHIE DE MIJOLLA-MELLOR See also: ‘‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy’’ (Little Hans); Myth of origins; ‘‘On the Sexual Theories of Children’’; Phallic stage; Phobias in children; ‘‘Sexual Enlightenment of Children, The’’; Thought. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123–243. 829 INFANTILE, THE ———. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10: 1–149. ———. (1910c). Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood. SE, 11: 57–137. ———. (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1–122. Moses and monotheism: three essays. SE, 23: 1–137. Klein, Melanie. (1923). The development of a child. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 4, 419–474. Mellor-Picaut, Sophie. (1980). La vision et l’énigme. Topique, 25. INFANTILE, THE In Au vif de l’infantile (At the heart of the infantile; 1996), Florence Guignard wrote: ‘‘The basic structure at the fringes of our animality, the repository and container for our drives, libidinal or hateful as well as epistemophilic, the infantile is the Ômalleable’ alloy of the instinctual and structural that makes one oneself and not some other person. Irreducible and unique, and by those very qualities universal, the infantile is thus what enables our psyche to come into being, in all the developments of its psychic bisexuality organized by the Oedipus complex.’’ The concept of the infantile was born with psychoanalysis in the sense that Sigmund Freud’s discovery of infantile sexuality caused the observation of psychic phenomena to move from the level of consciousness to the level of the unconscious. Both the child one sees in reality and the childhood one remembers elicit reflection about processes of secondarization, and neither constitutes the specificity of the infantile as it is revealed within the psychoanalytic setting itself. It was by thinking about the psychic causality of pathological phenomena that Freud discovered the infantile origins of the neuroses, and later the psychoses. In this way, he established a bridge between the actual structures of the mind—that of the adult analysand, but also that of the child in analysis—and the ways these structures have been informed, through deferred action during an infantile period that is reconstructed in analysis. Dreams are what give the most direct access to the infantile layers of the psyche, since the latter are so deeply hidden by the processes of primary and secondary repression. In ‘‘L’expérience du psychanalyste chez l’enfant et chez l’adulte devant de modèle de la névrose infantile et de la névrose de transfert’’ (The analyst’s experience 83 0 with children and adults in terms of the models of infantile neurosis and transference neurosis; 1980) Serge Lebovici specified the organizing aspects of infantile neurosis as opposed to neurosis in children. The taking over of neurotic elaboration by infantile neurosis enables the adult analysand to develop a genuine transference neurosis. In this conception the capacity to develop a transference neurosis is based in the formation of bonding processes. The infantile is thus what expresses a stratum of mental life that is as inaccessible to consciousness as the unconscious material that resides in it, yet it serves as a nodal point that makes it possible to go back and forth between past and present. In ‘‘L’enfant, l’infantile et la causalité psychique’’ (The child, the infantile, and psychic causality; 1994), Bernard Brusset uncoupled the infantile from the historical, thus differentiating between causal biography (that of the infantile) and reconstructed biography (that of the child). Thus the infantile can be assimilated into the unconscious (Agnès Oppenheimer), to the extent that the infantile is not observable, or that it is observable only in the form of reconstruction or deferred action. This view thus posits the infantile as a turning point in the reworking of primal fantasies. Making the infantile that which is unconscious and unrepresentable opens the way for a rethinking of the work of psychoanalytic observation both of the adult and of the child by the adult: To be truly psychoanalytic, any observation must involve a dimension in which the infantile within the observer responds to the infantile of the person being observed. It is this transferential/countertransferential echo that means that one is no longer faced with the child, but rather the approach of the infantile. This involves putting into perspective both the child and the infantile within the adult, and recognizing, in the adult’s ‘‘infantile’’ reaction, not the child he or she once was, since that child existed only for a time, but rather the infantile playing itself out within the child. CLÉOPÂTRE ATHANASSIOUS-POPESCO Bibliography Brusset, Bernard. (1994). L’enfant, l’infantile et la causalité psychique. Revue Française de Psychanalyse, 58, 3, 693. Guignard, Florence. (1996). Au vif de l’infantile. Paris: Delachaux and Niestlé. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INFERIORITY, FEELING Lebovici, Serge. (1980). L’expérience du psychanalyste chez l’enfant et chez l’adulte devant le modèle de la névrose infantile et de la névrose de transfert. Revue Française de Psychanalyse, 44, 5–6, 733–857. Oppenheimer, Agnès. (1994). Enfant, enfance, infantile. Revue Française de Psychanalyse, 58, 3, 707. OF (INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY) of a Comparative Individualistic Psychology and Psychotherapy (1912/1926). In Freud’s view, feelings of inferiority were a superficial manifestation—important in clinical work, to be sure, but understandable only within the framework of a more general metapsychology. ROGER PERRON INFERIORITY, FEELING OF The term ‘‘feeling(s) of inferiority’’ refers to a group of representations and affects that reflect an individual’s self-devaluation in relation to others. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Sigmund Freud mentioned a dream marked by both feelings of inferiority and infantile omnipotence. The thematic content of this dream is explicitly anal, which is significant, since Freud later often returned to anal issues as forces that can have a positive or negative impact on self-esteem. Freud addressed feelings of inferiority, notably, in his analyses of the cases of the Rat Man (1909d), Schreber (1911c), and the Wolf Man (1918b). He also took up this theme in his formulations on narcissism (1914c). But above all, he examined feelings of inferiority with especially keen insight within the framework of the oedipal complex. In his paper on a child’s fantasy of being beaten (1919e), he wrote that this fantasy, as well as other, analogous perverse fixations, were ‘‘precipitates of the Oedipus complex, scars, so to say, . . . just as the notorious Ôsense of inferiority’ corresponds to a narcissistic scar of the same sort’’ (p. 193). Within the oedipal framework, the threat of castration that weighs upon the little boy distorts his self-esteem, and the absence of a penis leads the little girl to devalue herself. In both cases, feelings of inferiority are intimately linked to the guilt inherent in the oedipal drama. The loss of love of the object and the sense of rejection accentuate this feeling. Freud revised these views when he formulated his structural theory of ego psychology. ‘‘There is always a feeling of triumph when something in the ego coincides with the ego ideal. And the sense of guilt (as well as the sense of inferiority) can also be understood as an expression of tension between the ego and the ego ideal,’’ Freud wrote in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c, p. 131). One can thus better understand why Freud so firmly opposed Alfred Adler when Adler wanted to make feelings of inferiority the keystone of his theoretical conceptions in The Neurotic Constitution: Outlines INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS See also: Adler, Alfred; Compulsion; Fanon, Frantz; Feeling of inferiority (individual psychology); Masculine protest (individual psychology); Social feeling (individual psychology). Bibliography Adler, Alfred. (1926). The neurotic constitution: Outlines of a comparative individualistic psychology and psychotherapy (Bernard Glueck and John E. Lind, Trans.). New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co. (Original work published 1912) Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1–338; SE, 5: 339–625. ———. (1909d). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151–318. ———. (1911c). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1–82. ———. (1914c). On narcissism: an introduction. SE, 14: 67–102. ———. (1918b). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1–122. ———. (1919e). A child is being beaten: A contribution to the study of the origin of sexual perversions. SE, 17: 175– 204. ———. (1921). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65–143. INFERIORITY, FEELING OF (INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY) As early as 1907 Alfred Adler considered the state of organic inferiority as a factor in neurosis before linking it to the newborn child’s state of physiological immaturity. This state of inferiority is the source of the feeling of inferiority that persists throughout life: ‘‘Being a man means having a feeling of inferiority that constantly demands compensation’’ (1912/2002). The life history of Alfred Adler, who suffered from rickets as a child, goes some way to explaining his insistence on the importance of the states of organic 831 INHIBITION inferiority at the root of the feeling of inferiority. He later observed the various modulations that the family and cultural environment, as well as the child’s choices, introduced into this feeling, which he saw as a stimulant to psychic life. By way of compensation the child will elaborate a directing fiction representing an ideal being who has all the qualities that the child lacks, and will project itself into the future ‘‘in the shape of the father, mother, an older brother or sister, a schoolteacher, an animal or a God’’ (1912/2002). The gap between the self and the directing fiction is all the greater if the child has suffered frustrations or ill treatment and encounters no obstacles in its imaginary world. Very early on this fiction will be adapted due to the influence of social and cultural factors and will express itself in the form of a counter-fiction (1912/2002). Psychic health is characterized by harmonious relations between the fiction and the counter-fiction, whereas the neurotic will remain under the control of the fiction, making an effort ‘‘to shine while acting modestly, to conquer while remaining humble and submissive, to humiliate others with his own apparent virtues, to disarm others with his passivity, to make others suffer through his own suffering, to pursue a virile goal with feminine means, to make himself small in order to seem big.’’ Compensation for an exacerbated feeling of inferiority can take the form of a superiority complex, the different manifestations of which Adler described in The Neurotic Constitution, whereas discouragement will take the form of an inferiority complex. In this case the subject will use neurotically rich symptoms to flee all situations that threaten its prestige, hence Adler’s definition of neurosis: ‘‘An attempt to maintain the appearance of value at all costs, while desiring this goal without paying the price’’ (1930/1927). Cultural influence manifests itself in the elaboration of the fiction through the choice of a model representing a virile ideal that leads to a mode of apperception that is in accordance with the opposition relation: masculine/dominant/superiority, feminine/defeated/ inferiority. The social influence constitutes the correcting element that determines the feeling of inferiority. These two factors make up two lines of force that are present in the formation of the child’s lifestyle, which can be compared to the program of perception and behavior with which the child complies unconsciously (1929/1964). FRANÇOIS COMPAN 83 2 See also: Cinema and psychoanalysis; Inferiority, feeling of; Grandiose self; Object; Paranoia; Penis envy; ‘‘Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes.’’ Bibliography Adler, Alfred (1972). The neurotic constitution: Outlines of a comparative individualistic psychology and psychotherapy (Bernard Glueck and John E. Lind, Trans.). Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press. (Original work published 1930) ———. (1964). Problems of neurosis: A book of case histories. (P. Mairet, Ed.). New York: Harper & Row. (Original work published 1929) ———. (2002). The neurotic character. Fundamentals of individual psychology and psychotherapy (Cees Koen, Trans.). San Franscisco: Alfred Adler Institutes. (Original work published 1912) INHIBITION Sigmund Freud defined inhibition as ‘‘the expression of a restriction of an ego-function. A restriction of this kind can itself have very different causes.’’ This definition appears in the opening pages of Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d [1925]). Analogizing from a medical definition of the concept (‘‘restriction of an organ function’’) does not perfectly express the psychopathological specificity of the notion of inhibition. Thus when Freud states that the ‘‘ego-function of an organ is impaired if its erotogenicity—its sexual significance—is increased,’’ (1926d [1925]) this mechanism, which is borrowed from the clinical psychoanalysis of hysteria, provides no psychopathological differentiation between the inhibition and the symptom. In the same volume he also underlines the links between inhibition and the concept of anxiety: ‘‘Some inhibitions obviously represent a relinquishment of a function because its exercise would produce anxiety.’’ In this way Freud tries to delineate the concept by comparing it with and distinguishing it from other notions that have been described by analytic theory, as indicated fairly clearly in the title of the work. Apart from the fact that they enable us to isolate a pure form of inhibition—‘‘The libido may simply be turned away’’—these efforts lead Freud to distinguish two types of inhibition ‘‘as a measure of precaution or INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INHIBITIONS, SYMPTOMS, brought about as a result of an impoverishment of energy.’’ The study of these different mechanisms enables him to define the modalities of the opposition between inhibition and symptoms: unlike inhibition, ‘‘the symptom cannot any longer be described as a process that takes place within, or acts upon, the ego.’’ This opposition makes it possible to define inhibition as a simple relinquishment at the level of the ego, where the symptom accomplishes a veritable compromise between the ego and the instinctual demands of the id. Freud offers an illustration of this in relation to the horse phobia in the case of Little Hans. In this case, ‘‘the inability to go out into the streets was an inhibition, a restriction which his ego had imposed on itself so as not to arouse the anxiety-symptom.’’ The phobic symptom cannot be described as such except when there has been ‘‘the replacement of his father by a horse. It is this displacement, then, which has a claim to be called a symptom.’’ Emphasizing the fundamentally imaginary status of inhibition, Jacques Lacan reviewed his study in the seminar devoted to anxiety by opposing it to the notion of an act. The latter appears as a response of the subject forced to adopt a position in relation to its splitting. Unlike inhibition, the act ‘‘après-coup’’ inaugurates a new transformed subject: ‘‘Only action engenders certitude in the subject.’’ By means of this opposition, inhibition appears as an attempt on the part of the subject to defer an option, a choice to be made in relation to its desire. Like Freud’s dissatisfied tone in relation to the theories developed in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, Lacan’s proposed extensions confirm the difficulties of apprehending the concept of inhibition but also its heuristic value. NICOLAS DISSEZ See also: Action-(re)presentation; Act, passage to the Allergy; Civilization and Its Discontents; Drive/instinct; Facilitation; Friendship; Idealization; Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety; Infantile sexual curiosity; Jokes; Knowledge or research, instinct for; Oedipus complex, early; Ontogenesis; Orgasm; Pleasure in thinking; Prepsychosis; Sexual theories of children; Smell, sense of; Thought. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75–172. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Écrits. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ANXIETY INHIBITIONS, SYMPTOMS, AND ANXIETY Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety was published in German in 1926, a year after Freud’s famous article ‘‘Negation’’ (1925h) and ‘‘An Autobiographical Study’’ (1925d). Ernest Jones wrote that the work was written in July 1925, corrected in December, and then published in the third week of 1926 by Fisher Verlag of Frankfurt. Concerning this work Sigmund Freud wrote, ‘‘It contains several new and important things, takes back and corrects many former conclusions, and in general is not good’’ (Jones, 1953–1957, vol. 3, p. 131). There were a number of ‘‘contradictions’’ in the translations, and it was not until 1936 that Alix Strachey finally produced a better translation, again according to the testimony of Ernest Jones, published by Hogarth Press in the ‘‘International Psycho-Analytical Library’’ series. In addition to Alix Strachey, ‘‘Freud had also given the translation rights to H. A. Bunker in New York without informing either translator of the other’’ (Jones, 1953–1957). At the same time a thirteenth edition of this text, lacking the passage about Alfred Adler and Carl Gustav Jung, was published in the Encyclopaedia britannica with a different title: ‘‘Psycho-Analysis: Freudian School’’ (1926f). In any event, this was obviously an extremely important essay for the evolution of Freudian thought and should be seen, in large part, as a response to the ideas of Otto Rank in The Trauma of Birth (1929). As a curious side note, it is worth noting that when Freud was writing Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, his daughter Anna was preparing ‘‘The Psychoanalytic Treatment of Children’’; that is, while the father was investigating anxiety, separation anxiety in particular, his daughter was working on the distinction between child and adult psychoanalysis. Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety is divided into ten chapters (without titles) and three addenda, entitled ‘‘Modification of Earlier Views,’’ ‘‘Supplementary Remarks on Anxiety,’’ and ‘‘Anxiety, Pain, and Mourning.’’ Some commentators saw in the fact that Freud discussed pain in the final addendum a reflection of the theoretical difficulties he had encountered in studying the phenomenon, which he had discussed earlier in Mourning and Melancholia (1916–1917g [1915]). The first chapter discusses the connections between inhibitions and symptoms. The second presents the ego as the site of anxiety (‘‘There are good grounds for 833 INITIAL INTERVIEW(S) firmly maintaining the idea that the ego is actually the site of anxiety’’) and sees the role of repression from a perspective different from Freud’s earlier one, which viewed anxiety as the automatic consequence of repression. Chapter 3 takes up the relations between the ego and superego. Chapter 4 returns to the phobia of ‘‘little Hans’’ to show that ‘‘the motive force of the repression was fear of castration’’ (p. 108). Chapter 5 focuses on obsessional neurosis and the mechanism of the formation of symptoms within this context. Chapter 6 further investigates the defense mechanisms of isolation and retroactive undoing within obsessional neurosis. Chapter 7 examines the problem of phobias. Chapter 8 provides a brief interlude in which Freud analyzes the experience of unpleasure and distinguishes object loss and the fear of object loss—a distinction that provides the framework for a discussion of automatic anxiety and signal anxiety. Chapter 9 then focuses on the relations between symptom formation and the development of anxiety. Finally, the last chapter distinguishes three factors that lead to neuroses: a biological factor (‘‘the long period of time during which the young of the human species is in a condition of helplessness and dependence’’ [p. 154]), a phylogenetic factor (the two-stage development of sexual life, with emphasis given to puberty), and a psychological factor (the defects of the mental apparatus lead Freud to treat libidinal drives as dangers in the face of which the ego can only restrain its own mechanisms and tolerate the formation of symptoms ‘‘in exchange for having impaired the instinct’’ [p. 156]). The key points in this theoretical text are the following: Freud challenges Otto Rank’s view on the trauma of birth, which Rank regarded as the prototype of all later anxieties. For Freud: In man and the higher animals it would seem that the act of birth, as the individual’s first experience of anxiety, has given the affect of anxiety certain characteristic forms of expression. But, while acknowledging this connection, we must not lay undue stress on it nor overlook the fact that biological necessity demands that a situation of danger should have an affective symbol, so that a symbol of this kind would have to be created in any case. Moreover, I do not think that we are justified in assuming that whenever there is an outbreak of anxiety something like a reproduction of the situation of birth goes on in the mind (pp. 93–94). In other words, Freud wanted to retain Otto Rank’s idea that birth provides a kind of mold or expressive 83 4 content for anxiety, but insisted that the mental content of the affect of anxiety is determined by later existential experiences and subsequent psychological reworkings of the affects. He also insisted that anxiety is experienced by the ego but not produced by it. Here he returned to his theory of anxiety by making repression not the cause but the result of anxiety. Thus, what is involved is not ‘‘automatic anxiety’’ but ‘‘signal anxiety,’’ which must now be accounted for. Signal anxiety reflects the significant adaptive and maturational progress of the child to the extent that anxiety is no longer a simple reaction to object loss but an anticipation of the threat of the loss of love from the object. Finally, the text provided Freud with an opportunity for further investigation of mental pain, which reflects a loss of a part of the self rather than a loss of the object, in the strict sense. This led Freud to recognize the importance of the more or less narcissistic valence of the lost object, which serves to demarcate mourning and melancholic depression. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Abandonment; Anxiety; Anxiety development; Castration complex; Cathexis; Defense mechanisms; Ego; Ego psychology; Erotogenicity; Isolation; Obsessional neurosis; Pain; Phobias in children; Resistance; Signal anxiety; Subsitutive formation; Undoing. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1926d [1925]). Hemmung, Symptom und Angst, Leipzig-Vienna-Zurich, Internat. Psychoanal. Verlag; G.W., 14:111-205; Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety. SE, 20: 77–172. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1916–1917g [1915]). Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14: 237–258. Jones, Ernest. (1953–1957). Sigmund Freud: Life and work. London: Hogarth Press. Rank, Otto. (1929). The trauma of birth. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. (Original work published 1924.) INITIAL INTERVIEW(S) The term initial or preliminary interview(s) refers to the meeting or meetings that take place between a psychoanalyst and the person who must decide whether INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INITIAL INTERVIEW(S) or not to enter into analysis. The purpose of the initial interview or consultation is to determine the person’s need for treatment. The initial interview became standard procedure at the same time that Sigmund Freud clearly instituted the framework for the psychoanalytic situation: patient lying down, analyst hidden from the patient’s view. These conditions in fact produce a radical change in a relationship that, during the preliminary interview, was fairly similar to consultation with a physician or psychologist, or indeed an interview for the purpose of soliciting advice of any type. The issue of course is whether analysis is indicated, and this implies referring to criteria assessing ‘‘analyzability’’ and the degree to which such an undertaking is possible. From the beginning, however, from the phone call setting up the first meeting, the subtle mechanisms of transference and counter-transference are set in motion, shedding an entirely different light on the criteria for choices. It is because of these intersubjective parameters that Freud advised, in ‘‘On Beginning the Treatment (Further Recommendations on Technique of PsychoAnalysis)’’ (1913c): I may add . . . that I have made it my habit, when I know little about a patient, only to take him on at first provisionally, for a period of one to two weeks. . . . No other kind of preliminary examination but this procedure is at our disposal; the most lengthy discussions and questionings in ordinary consultations would offer no substitute. This preliminary experiment, however, is itself the beginning of a psycho-analysis and must conform to its rules. . . . Lengthy preliminary discussions before the beginning of the analytic treatment, previous treatment by another method and also previous acquaintance between the doctor and the patient who is to be analyzed, have special disadvantageous consequences for which one must be prepared. They result in the patient’s meeting the doctor with a transference attitude which is already established and which the doctor must first slowly uncover instead of having the opportunity to observe the growth and development of the transference from the outset (pp. 123–125). In 1930, his responses to his analysand Smiley Blanton, as revealed in the latter’s Diary of My Analysis with Freud (1971), showed no change in this point of view. According to Blanton’s entry for March 7, Freud told him: ‘‘[T]he lying down is but a matter of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS convenience. But there is one point that is essential: the analysand must not see the face of the analyst. If he did, he would be influenced by the face of the analyst’’ (p. 50). In his entry for August 9, 1935, Blanton recalled: ‘‘In a discussion about technique, I asked Freud if he advocated talking to a patient several hours before analysis—or, rather, to begin an analysis with several hours of discussion. He replied, ‘‘With a student in training it may be permissible. With a patient who is there for treatment, no’’’ (p. 71). In later years, trial analysis fell out of practice, and the status of the preliminary interviews has become somewhat vague; these vary, according to different schools, in their frequency and duration, as well as in terms of whether they may be free of charge. Some practitioners limit them to one or two meetings, the latter case being intended to assess the patient’s capacity for insight and working over, following the initial meeting: Was there a dream, a parapraxis, a lifting of amnesia, or an instance of acting out? Other analysts advise having several interviews to avoid the possibility of having to interrupt an analysis that, too late, turned out to be unjustified. Several authors have emphasized the importance of preliminary interviews with borderline patients, for whom, more than with other patients, possible modifications to the analytic situation may be considered. The analyst’s listening attitude, the absence of questions of a medical nature, discreet emphasis on preconscious manifestations, recognition of mental suffering and its possible modes of expression other than acting out, and assessing possible lateral transferences (if a colleague has already interviewed the patient) are among the themes evoked most frequently by authors in their discussion of preliminary interviews. Similarly, these authors have underscored the need, once the preliminary interviews have ended and if a decision has been made to undertake analysis, to establish clearly and in detail with the patient the conditions in which the treatment will take place. Such conditions include the length and frequency of sessions, scheduled times for them, method of payment, policy in case of absence from sessions, and vacation periods. Also to be considered is certain psychoanalysts’ practice of switching to a classical analytic mode of treatment after a long series of sessions of psychoanalytically inspired therapy; in their view, this move is similar to what happens after traditional preliminary 835 INNERVATION interviews. In all cases, there remains first and foremost the problem, raised by Freud, of the psychoanalytic handling of the transference and countertransference, which in the classic view is only possible within the psychoanalytic setting. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Analyzability; Framework of the psychoanalytic cure; Psychoanalytic treatment; Face-to-face situation; Indications and contraindications for psychoanalysis for an adult; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic. Bibliography Blanton, Smiley. (1971). Diary of my analysis with Freud. New York: Hawthorn. Freud, Sigmund. (1913c). On beginning the treatment (Further recommendations on technique of psycho-analysis I). SE, 12: 121–144. Pulver, Sydney E. (1995). The technique of psychoanalysis proper. In Psycho-Analysis, the major concepts, edited by E. Moore Burness and B. D. Fine. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Quinodoz, Danielle. (1992). The psychoanalytic setting as the instrument of the container function. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 73, 627. For Freud the theory of conversion took shape within the very broad framework of these meanings: ‘‘the inhibited antithetic idea can put itself into effect by innervation of the body’’ (1892–93a, p. 122). As soon as the term conversion appeared, it was often linked to innervation. Two examples: ‘‘The affect that is torn [from the repressed idea] would be used for a somatic innervation. (That is, the excitation is Ôconverted’.)’’ (1895d, p. 285), and ‘‘in the case of conversion hysteria the ciruitous route led to the somatic innervation; the repressed impulse broke its way through at some point or other and produced symptoms’’ (1925d, p. 33). The notion is not much used by psychoanalysts today. Although linked to Freud’s earliest paraneurological speculations, it has nevertheless been retained in relation to hysteria, for example, as a reaffirmation in Freud’s opinion of a correspondence or an indissoluble continuity between the psychical and the physical. BERTRAND VICHYN See also: Conversion; Hysterical paralysis; Mnemic symbol; Psychosomatic limit/boundary; Sum of excitation; Symptom Bibliography Further Reading Console, William, et. al. (1977). The first encounter: The beginnings in psychotherapy. New York: Jason Aronson. Freud, Sigmund. (1892–93a). A case of successful treatment by hypnotism. SE, 1: 115–128. ———. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48–106. Gill, Merton, et. al. (1954). The initial interview in psychiatric practice. New York: International Universities Press. ———. (1940e [1938]). Splitting of the ego in the process of defence.SE, 23: 271–278. Jacobs, Theodore J., and Rothstein, Arnold. (Eds.), (1990). On beginning an analysis. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. INSIGHT INNERVATION Freud uses the term innervation throughout his work, both with and without reference to hysterical conversion. We find it in its physiological and anatomical meaning as an efferent or afferent mode of action of the nervous system and/or distribution of nerves in a region of the body: ‘‘sensation of innervation,’’ ‘‘voluntary or involuntary innervation of the muscles,’’ ‘‘innervation of the brain,’’ ‘‘body innervation.’’ But we also find, more rarely: ‘‘innervation (tears),’’ ‘‘sensation of the innervation of the word,’’ ‘‘sensation of speech innervation,’’ ‘‘innervation of images of movement.’’ 83 6 In psychoanalysis, insight is a process whereby one grasps a previously misunderstood aspect of one’s own mental dynamics. It refers to a specific moment, observable during the treatment, when the patient becomes aware of an inner conflict, an instinctual impulse, a defense, or the like, that was previously repressed or disavowed and that, when it emerges into consciousness, elicits surprise and a sense of discovery. Two forms of the experience have been described. The first involves a feeling of sudden discovery or illumination—a kind of ‘‘Eureka!’’ moment. The second is a slower, more gradual process where the subject and usually the analyst as well experience a sensation of the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INSTINCT obvious: ‘‘Yes, that’s how it is. We knew this, of course, but now it’s perfectly clear.’’ In all cases, something other than simple intellectual comprehension is involved. Frequently, understanding at a lower level, laden with cultural references and general, abstract concepts constructed as defenses, is replaced by deeper insight that leads patients to question their entire personal histories and thinking. This happens, for example, when patients, after making defensive comments about oedipal conflicts, relive and reabsorb their own oedipal dramas. In such cases the economic and dynamic charge of such a shift and the accompanying emotions run far deeper than mere intellectual understanding. Insight indicates a transition from the preconscious to the conscious. Attentive analysts will often anticipate a coming moment of insight, though they may feel that interpretation would be premature so long as the moment has not yet arrived. When they sense that the moment is truly imminent, they may choose to facilitate the revelation by intervening. When assessing whether psychoanalysis is indicated during initial consultations, evaluating a patient’s capacity for insight is especially important. The capacity for insight must likewise be tak