A Critical Analysis of South Africa’s Foreign Policy towards Zimbabwe

UNIVERSITY OF THE FREE STATE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Topic: A Critical Analysis of South Africa’s Foreign Policy towards Zimbabwe Name of student: Patricia Mapipi Student number: 2011121247 Module: POLS6816 Lecturer: Mr E. Coetzee Due date: 21/04/15 I am familiar with the UFS policy on plagiarism and the departmental/university penalty clauses. I declare that the enclosed assignment is my own work, that I have acknowledged all my sources, and that I have not lent out my work to a fellow student. Signature: P.Mapipi Date: 21/04/15  Table of Contents Introduction………………………..……………………………………………...1 Contextual Orientation…………………………………………………………...2 Ethics and Moral Conduct in Foreign Policy…………………………………...3 Human Rights and Human Security in IR and Foreign Policy……………….4 Critical Analysis of South Africa’s Foreign Policy towards Zimbabwe………5 China’s foreign policy towards Africa…………………………………………...7 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………8 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………….9 Introduction ‘In no time at all the turbulent waves from the Zimbabwe crisis were breaking on the shores of neighbouring countries: refugees were streaming across the border; the export of wheat and corn was drying up and international investors were signaling a lack of confidence in the region as a whole’ (Nathan, 2013:66). Little did we know that this phenomenon would advance another set of catastrophic events and innocent people would be massacred in the name of national interest. A recent, chilling example of this occurred in the streets of Johannesburg on the seventeenth of April. As stated by Evans (2015:Internet) ‘metro police clashed with an angry mob of people who were attempting to set two men alight in Protea Glen after they allegedly tried to rob a Pakistani businessman.’ These atrocious, xenophobic attacks on foreigners in South Africa will have detrimental effects on the country because a globalized world such as ours creates a necessity for trust. Investors need to believe that their effort to do business in your land is not an exercise in futility. These attacks, however, make it seem like it is and a number of investors have begun to pull out of the state in fear of making a loss.A poignant instance of this is the car dealers of Daihatsu: ‘small-car specialist Daihatsu has achieved great success in South Africa with its popular range of Terios compact SUVs and Gran Max pick-ups. There exists a car park of nearly 30 000 Daihatsu vehicles in this country and the brand has built an outstanding reputation for reliability and quality. It may therefore come as quite a surprise to find out that the brand has made the decision to stop importing new vehicles to South Africa as of this month’(Oosthuizen, 2015:internet). This definitely will have an impact on the future face of South Africa’s foreign policy. At the moment officials have two choices: they can either listen to the hungry, agitated voices of their own people at the expense of creating a bad name for the country internationally or they can side with the innocent foreigners who are being brutally attacked and whose businesses are being burnt to the ground. However, the latter still paints a bleak picture because the government would lose faith with a huge chunk of the poverty-stricken population at home should they decide to take the foreigners under their wing. If there was ever a time when South Africa was (literally) stuck in between a rock and a hard place, then this is it. In light of the above, the aim of this paper is to discuss South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. Is it in accordance with and based on the promotion of human rights and human security? In the first section a brief contextual orientation shall be supplied to clarify the more technical terms in this essay, the second section will deal with ethics and moral conduct in foreign policy. The third section will deal with human rights and human security in international relations and foreign policy. The fourth section will consist of a critical analysis of South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. The fifth section will briefly focus on China’s foreign policy towards Africa to contrast the agreements made between Africa and nations from other continents with agreements made exclusively between countries in the region.The aim of this is to suss out if the two are interlinked in any way at all. Finally, a brief conclusion shall summarize the paper and pull all the main points together. The sources used to do this were books, journals and the internet. The topic has been interpreted in such a way that it, unfortunately, throws a negative light on the current foreign policy in South Africa. This should come as no surprise considering all the recent events, for they clearly demonstrate that the policy is defective. If the issue of the Zimbabwean government abusing its citizens had been resolved more effectively in the past then perhaps the influx of foreigners into South Africa would not have been so severe and the attacks, in turn, would not have occurred. Contextual Orientation Foreign Policy: theforeign policy of a state is concerned with the behaviour of a state towards other states. It refers to the ways in which the central governments of sovereign states relate to each other and to the global system in order to achieve various goals or objectives. Foreign policy, is thus, the use of political influence in order to induce other states to exercise their law-making power in a manner desired by the states concerned: it is an interaction between forces originating outside the country’s borders and those working with them (Rizwan,2009:internet). Human Security:refers tothe securityof people, including their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity, and the protection of their human rights(Baylis, Smith and Owens 2011:566). Human Rights: human rights are rights to which people are entitled by virtue of being human; they are a modern and secular version of natural rights. Human rights are universal in the sense that they belong to all humans rather than to members of any particular state, race, religion, gender or other group (Heywood,2007:328). Quiet Diplomacy:is defined as a combination of measures that include behindthe scene engagements, secret negotiations, and subtle coaxing. In the case of South Africa and Zimbabwe this refers, for example, to aseries of bilateral meetings between the two presidents and senior governmentofficials, the defense of Zimbabwe against criticism in international organizations,the endorsement of questionable election results and the provision of a ‘life line’ toRobert Mugabe in the form of financial and energy resources. The stated goal ofthese policies was to facilitate change within Zimbabwe by the Zimbabweansthemselves rather than imposing it from the outside(Prys, 2009:195). Morality and Ethics: morality means the customs, the special do-s and don't-s that areshared and widely accepted as standard in asociety or community of people — acceptedas a basis of life that doesn't have to be rationallyquestioned. Ethics on the other hand isthe philosophical reflection upon these rulesand ways of living together, the customs andhabits of individuals, groups or mankind assuch (Gammel,2006:internet).Samovar, Porter and McDaniel (2010:404) state that ethics refers to judgments that focus on degrees of rightness and wrongness, virtue and vice, and obligation in human behavior. Xenophobia:Procter, Ilson and Ayto (1978:1605) indicate that the word xenophobia is derived from the Greek words “xeno", meaning stranger or foreigner and “phobia”, meaning fear. It thus implies an unreasonable, intense fear (or pathological dislike) of foreigners or strangers. It describes attitudes, prejudices and behavior that reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity.In other words, xenophobia is a feeling or a perception based on socially constructed images and ideas and not on rational or objective facts. A xenophobic perception of the world reduces complex social and cultural phenomena to simplistic good and bad scenarios. For instance: “We”-the locals-are the good and normal ones while “They”-the strangers- are the delinquents, the threat, the disturbance, the vagrants, the violent ones, the burglars and so on (Buthelezi,2009:7). Sovereignty:state sovereignty means being in a position to decide, a condition which is usually signified by the term ‘independence’: sovereign states are postulated as independent of other sovereign states. Each state is formally the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey (Jackson and Sorensen, 2007:81). Ethics and Moral Conduct in Foreign Policy To substantiate the importance of ethics and moral conduct in foreign policy one needs to look no further than the following statement by Luard (1992:143) ‘If it is utopian to ignore the element of power, it is a real unkindness on the part of realism to ignore the element of morality in any world order. Just as within the state every government, though it needs power as a basis of authority, also needs the moral basis of the consent of the governed. International order cannot be based on power alone, for the simple reason that mankind will in the long run always revolt against naked power.Burchill,et al. (2013:50-51) reiterates this point by saying that ‘states sometimes, even frequently, value compliance with ethical and humanitarian norms for reasons that have little or nothing to do with the threat of coercive enforcement. Foreign Policy is driven by the intersection of multiple motives, some of which are ethical in a large number of countries. This might be costly but no political goals can be achieved without cost. The proper course is to weigh the costs and benefits of pursuing any and all relevant interests, moral and non-moral interests alike. Moral values are indeed values and therefore must be taken into account in any truly reasonable and realistic political calculus.’ In other words, the main premise is that it is prudent for government officials to find a balance between international and domestic values, norms and goals and not endorse a foreign policy that is centered on the acquisition of power. This is because they will inevitably step on someone’s toes and suffer retaliation. For we live in a place where seclusion from and non-compliance to international norms creates a situation where states and people become pariahs which ultimately leads to their demise. This point is frequently sidestepped by realists. However, a number of realists might respond to this claim by pointing out that realist theories do not exclude the possibility of international cooperation. ‘The tradition of realpolitik as practiced by Bismarck and Metternich includes many attempts to use diplomacy to manage crises, forge alliances and prevent war. States, realists note, do in fact form a primitive society with rules, norms and values such as respect for territorial sovereignty (Vincent, 1986:123-125).One could, in turn say that there is an ‘ethics’ and a sense of duty in realist thought. It ultimately is an obligation to the state. It is also interesting to note that not all people agree with how successfully ethics can be integrated into foreign policy. Bulley (2014:172) for example, points out that the attempt by states to internalize ethics it can be a source of pestilence: ’the way that ethics are translated into the foreign policy behavior of states is a structural constraint and incentive to particular actions, not a choice.’ This notion of pressure by the international community on states to act virtuously and be inclusive or liberal towards others seems to stem from a realist perspective. Why you ask? This is because a statement that claims that countries are actually forced to act in good conscience towards one another suggests that they won’t do it naturally or out of their free will which, in turn, means they are inherently power-seeking and egoistic. However, in complying with ethics and morality, leaders (especially on the African continent) frequently tend to miss the mark. A case in point is South Africa’s response to the Zimbabwean crisis. By trying to do ‘the right thing’ in respecting the sovereignty of Zimbabwe officials in South Africa seemed to, in the eyes of the international community, stand back while gross violations of human rights were being committed by the Mugabe administration against its own people. This is quite a dramatic change from the tactics employed by South African statesmen in the past, as noted by Hutson (1978:138) ‘It was South African Prime Minister BJ Vorster, under pressure from London and Washington, who threatened to cut off all support to Salisbury thereby compelling the recalcitrant Ian Smith to the Lancaster House negotiating table in 1978 and ending his minority-white rule. That is what paved the way for the creation of a democratic Zimbabwe.’ More depth shall be given to the discussion of the Zimbabwean crisis in the sections that follow. Human Rights and Human Security in International Relations and Foreign Policy ‘Because the world is a more dangerous place, the international community dare not relinquish its commitment to human rights. This appeal also has a special significance for South Africa. The anti-apartheid campaign was the most important human rights crusade of the post-World War II era. Its success was a demonstration, in my opinion, of the oneness of our common humanity: in these troubled times, its passion should not be lost. Consequently, South Africa will not be indifferent to the rights of others. Human rights will be the light that guides our foreign affairs’ (Mandela, 1993:87-88). In light of the above statement, when it comes to human rights in international relations or foreign policy, few could boast of the extensive amount of eloquence and dignity with which the subject matter has been handled like South Africa can. Solomon (2010:internet) seems to hint that the reasons for advocating for human rights might not be as altruistic as policy makers claim: ‘Post-apartheid South Africa can and should be playing a key role in defendingthe human rights of Africa’s citizens both on moral grounds and in its ownenlightened self-interest. From anenlightened national self-interest perspective, war in one country means refugees inanother.’ As was mentioned in the introduction, one of the most explicit instances of this is seen by the throng of Zimbabweans crossing the border into South Africa in search of sanctuary from an authoritative, abusive regime back at home. Consequently, it is in South Africa’s best interest that its neighbouring countries are safe and stable. This can only be realised if human rights are the foundation on which state institutions are erected. Some of the reasons why South Africa’s foreign policy has failed, even in the wake of a legacy as massive as Nelson Mandela’s, shall be discussed in the section below but before that let’s briefly look at what human security actually entails. Human security is “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear”: positive and negative freedoms and rights. Firstly, it is normativein the sense that it argues that there is an ethical responsibility to reorientsecurity around the individual in a redistributive sense, in the context of changesin political community and the emergence of transnational norms relating to human rights. Secondly, itrests upon empirical reasoning regarding the foundations of stability within andbetween states. There is greater understanding that human security deprivation—such as socioeconomic deprivation and exclusion, egregious abuses of humanrights, and widespread epidemiological threats such as AIDS—has a direct impactupon peace and stability within and between states(Newman, 2001:240-241). In other words, human rights have specific visions of and ideas about how foreign policyought to be conducted. These ideas obviously lean towards holding states morally accountable for their actions. Such a notion also has pragmatic implications in that volatile situations occurring in one state could have spill over effects on your front door.Debiel and Werthes (2006:26) take this a step further by stating: ‘one might argue that human rights and human security have become starting pointsfor an ethical foreign policy orientation.Whereas human rights abuses are common rhetorical figures in the debates on a new interventionism,human security is discussedas a benchmark for globalsecurity and a point of reference for global action.’Solomon (2001:26) also echoes this point by claiming: ‘it has become obvious that the way in which states (agents) relate to their domestic constituencies can also serve to undermine international peace and security and hence endanger the national interests of other states. Recognising that insecurity anywhere is a threat to security everywhere, states have decided to band together for the cause of international security.’ Critical Analysis of South Africa’s Foreign Policy towards Zimbabwe ‘Democrats in South Africa, Zimbabwe and elsewhere hoped that Pretoria would apply pressure on Harare. Instead Mbeki adopted a policy of quiet diplomacy, generating a great deal of local and international surprise and dismay’ (Alden and le Pere, 2003:284).This obviously makes one question the motives behind Mbeki’s ‘soft’ stance on the Zimbabwean crisis and there are various answers to this complex question but the most prominent one has to do with the notion of state sovereignty and a shared history between the corresponding states. During the era of apartheid in South Africa, various member of the African National Congress (ANC) fled the state in search of refuge in the arms of their brothers so that they could keep the burning embers of the struggle to liberation alive. In addition, another motive behind the sudden bolt out of the country was to gain support for the cause from the outside. Zimbabwe was one of the many states to take these men into a warm embrace of understanding. Now, these same people feel indebted to states like Zimbabwe for their help and are repaying it in the form of non-interventionism. For instance, the ANC’s chief of international affairs and policy during Mbeki’s reign, Mavivi Myakayaka, criticised those in South Africa who wanted to see a stronger position assumed by the state against the Mugabe regime. He stated, ‘We can’t do that as the ANC. We have historical ties ... These are our comrades we fought with in the struggle ... Our relations have been sealed in blood’ (Schoeman and Alden, 2003:2). By taking such a stanceofficials in South Africa seemed to, in the eyes of the international community, stand back while gross human rights violations were being committed by the Mugabe administration against its own people.As stated by Nathan (2013:77) ‘Pretoria was concerned that taking a strong stand against human rights abuses in Zimbabwe would breach the principle of African solidarity and weaken South Africa’s influence on the continent.’ More than anything, South Africa felt it ‘needed to avoid being seen as a western puppet’ (Prys, 2009:213). This point is reiterated by Bischoff (2003:189) who states that ‘the legacy of apartheid and liberation politics had given rise to a balance of power based more on history and ideology than on formal power, inhibiting Pretoria from playing the role of a local hegemon and enabling Zimbabwe to pose a rival source of influence.’ All this is quite astonishing considering the fact that the current foreign policy of South Africa, as stated above, is based heavily on human rights, inclusivity and in normal circumstances would allow South African executives to be on Zimbabwe’s case like white on rice. Graham (2006:120) taps into this same line of thinking by stating that “In the Zimbabwean case, South Africa’s policies reflect a self-perceptionand self-positioning as a mediator between the West and thetension between good global and good regional relationships. These tensions seem to have beenresolved in favour of the latter. Most public statements have conformed toSouth Africa’s desired identity as a genuinely ‘African state’ that opposes externalinterferences into African or Southern African affairs. This conception as an'African state’ can be linked to its struggle with its own identity, and its continuousattempts to gain acceptance among its neighbours. Multilateralism and consensus building are therefore emphasizedas the norm of African solidarity.” The second motivation for officials in South Africa to refrain from intervening more forcefully was because the Mandela administration was met with reproach in trying to solve the civil unrest in Nigeria during the late 90s. As stated by Solomon (2010:internet)‘others have pointed to the surprisingly disappointing human rights foreign policy of the Mandela administration, which Mbeki was loathe to repeat. In late 1995, President Mandela led a one-man campaign against Nigeria on account of the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other Ogoni activists. Nigerian President Sani Abacha was unmoved. Africa was embarrassed, and distanced itself from Pretoria’s stance, both at the levels of SADC and the AU’s predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity/OAU.’ The third reason why South Africa abstained from using force against Zimbabwe, in a sense, was due to pure laziness and a feeling of being ill-equipped to handle the situation. As stated by Nathan (2011:60) ‘Pretoria believed that the international community was much more likely to induce positive change in pariah regimes-like like Zimbabwe, Burma, Iran, and Sudan-through diplomatic engagement. Condemnation, coercion, and isolation, it argued, would only heighten the regime’s intransigence.’ Lastly, the factor that largely clarifies South Africa’s stance on Zimbabwe was the anti-colonialist make-up of Pretoria’s foreign policy. It was based on three paradigms: democratic, Africanist and anti-imperialist. Whereas the Africanist and anti-imperialist paradigms were seldom if ever in conflict with each other, both were occasionally in conflict with the democratic paradigm. In these instances, the democratic position gave way. The anti-imperialist thrust revolved around the following themes: the political and economic power imbalance between the north and the South, to the great detriment of the poor; the need to transform the UN and other international bodies in order to address global inequities; the domineering, hypocritical and self-serving approach of Western countries that chide and bully developing states; South-South co-operation and solidarity; and multilateralism and respect for international law in the conduct of international relations (Nathan,2005:368-369). In the end South Africa’s decision making was ineffective and left the Zimbabwean crisis to fester like a sore wound. Already, at the turn of the century Venter (2005:31) predicted the catastrophic outcome of this: ‘A real regional threat is the unknown but large number of illegal immigrants from the region that are overwhelming the resources of the country. This question is becoming uppermost in the minds of the poor and unemployed South Africans. A type of xenophobia against illegal immigrants is developing. The so-called Zimbabwe factor in South Africa’s regional environment does not allude to the neighbouring state threatening South Africa militarily. It means that should economic circumstances in Zimbabwe further worsen, South Africa could be facing millions of economic refugees-overburdening the Government’s economic and social-welfare capacity.’ What of the current Zuma administration? It seems that not much has changed as stated by Landsberg (2014:159) “apartfrom being against the use of the term ‘quiet’, in practice, the conflict resolution posture adopted by Zuma is similar to that adopted by the Mbeki administration. The Zuma presidency also displays a preference for non-confrontational, accommodative and mediated solutions to conflict and deadly wars in Africa.”This is quite a dramatic change from the tactics employed by South African statesmen in the past, as noted by Hutson (1978:138) ‘Itwas South African Prime Minister BJ Vorster, under pressure from London andWashington, who threatened to cut off all support to Salisbury thereby compellingthe recalcitrant Ian Smith to the Lancaster House negotiating table in 1978 and ending his minority-white rule .That is what paved the way for the creation of a democratic Zimbabwe.’ China’s Foreign Policy towards Africa Africa is reaping the benefits from this (relatively) fresh venture in numerous ways. China is supplying the essential life blood of any state in our modern day and age: foreign investment and access to low-priced consumer produce.Oil fields are expanding,mining operations have been revived and revenue has been made by African states.Theunissen&Akkerman (2005:202-203) voice this same notion by stating that ‘resource-seeking investments have different advantages: investments, particularly from Asia, often increase the supply of entrepreneurs through immigration. South-South resource-seeking investments also embody business models which are less corporatized and more informal than western models, which is more appropriate to the host country context. Finally, resource-seeking investment will have some impact on employment promotion and exports. This might, in turn have an impact on the transfer into the host economy of technology and new business models and on establishing or improving productive infrastructure.’ China, in addition, has embarked on a benevolent project of infrastructure right across the continent.This endeavor was ventured into, to provide tangible proof of the advantages of this new partnership.As stated by Alden (2005:150-151):‘a great deal of Chinese economic engagement in African states revolves around the construction of large prestige projects linked to institutional interests within these states. From the construction of new foreign ministry buildings in Uganda and Djibouti to the construction of stadiums in Mali and the Central African Republic and even houses of parliament in Mozambique and Gabon, China's support is in step with its past endeavours in Africa such as the construction of the TanZam railroad.’ However, other factors that are not so optimistic need to be included in the argument as well. Thomson (2010:173) points this out by stating: ‘Yet, this activity does come at a price.As with their Western corporate competitors there is little evidence of Chinese companies attempting to stimulate economic development that will benefit domestic African economies.As before,productive capital tends to be exported,rather than invested locally.The objective is the expansion of the Chinese economy,not a strategy of developing African manufacturing.’ The same point is reverberated by Harbeson & Rothchild (2009:336) by stating that ‘African countries have to recognize that China will not per se have a positive impact on their economies because they are not driven by altruistic motives. To date nothing indicates that Africa will be able to compete successfully with China, a result of which is that exports to China are by and large limited to capital-intensive commodities. If anything, this imbalance may have had the effect of Africa creating jobs in China while Chinese imports have undermined job markets in Africa.Therefore African governments would be naïve to take Beijing’s rhetoric of South-South solidarity at face value.’ In all truth and honesty, the bleak reality is that China is just as self-centered and egotistical as any other state.’Strauss and Saavedra (2009:559) agree with the above mentioned premise in saying: ‘while the argument has been made that China offers African partners a counter balanceand alternative to the often overbearing, domineering, exploitative and misguided interventions of the West but Chinese investors, managers, aid personnel and small entrepreneurs are not so unlike Western investors and aid personnel who go to Africa.’ This is due to the fact that they also construe African realities from their own perspectives, which, at best are inadequate and at worst the source of serious impairment. In light of the above, one of the main issues that must be taken into consideration for African development in general is enhancing governance. Ofcourse, in this, the diversity of the various states has to be respected and ruminated.A related constriction on African development is the feebleness, and even utter lack, of a thriving civil society within many countries on the continent. So the important question is, with regards to the equilibrium of costs and benefits of FDI in Africa, how can local and international actors have a better impact on the promotion of domestic businesses? Conclusion The aim of this paper was to discuss South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. Is it in accordance with and based on the promotion of human rights and human security? Surprisingly, in light of all the points made throughout the essay, it’s not. This is not to say that the attempt to make human rights the bedrock of South Africa’s constitution and foreign policy isn’t admirable, but, unfortunately, the way it’s being implemented fails to take this vital element into consideration. Some of the reasons why South Africa’s foreign policy has failed, even in the wake of a legacy as massive as Nelson Mandela’s, were discussed in the previous sections. This is quite paradoxical because it’s actually in South Africa’s best interest that its neighbouring countries are safe and stable. This can only be realised if human rights are the foundation on which state institutions are erected. Solomon (2001:26) claims that we, instead, have to make sovereignty the starting point: ‘reconstructing sovereignty as responsibility gives a revitalised SADC the motivation to hold, for example, President Robert Mugabe accountable for the human rights violations currently occurring in his country. After all, the spill over effects of his policies are felt not only by Zimbabweans themselves, but also by neighbouring countries that now have to play host to those fleeing from his autocratic regime. From a theoretical point of view, reconstructing sovereignty as responsibility not only bridges state and human security concerns, but also lends a humanitarian face to realism.’ In the first section of this paper a brief contextual orientation was supplied to clarify the more technical terms in this essay. The second section dealt with ethics and moral conduct in foreign policy. The third section concerned itself with human rights and human security in international relations and foreign policy. The fourth section consisted of a critical analysis of South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. Finally, the fifth section briefly focused on China’s foreign policy towards Africa to contrast the agreements made between Africa and nations from other continents with agreements made exclusively between countries in the region. Clearly there is a discrepancy in the South Africa-Zimbabwe case and the China-South Africa-case. The foreign policy towards the former is too mellow, open and accommodating. As stated by Moore (2013:557) ’South Africa’s foreign policy posture lacked the sharp-edged concern with national interests that would befit the external relations of Africa’s largest economy.’ The latter, however, is quite ruthlessly state-centric. As stated by Thomson (2010: 173) ‘there is little evidence of Chinese companies attempting to stimulate economic development that will benefit domestic African economies. As before, productive capital tends to be exported, rather than invested locally. The objective is the expansion of the Chinese economy, not a strategy of developing African manufacturing.’ It seems that South African officials are still lost when it comes to finding the right balance between what’s right for the state and what’s right for interstate dealings. We are currently suffering from a type of ‘goldilocks syndrome.’ We’ve tried something hot (i.e. Mandela’s headfirst dive into Nigeria’s affairs) and we’ve something cold (i.e. non-interventionism in the case of Zimbabwe), hopefully the next time our foreign policy will be ‘just the temperature.’ As stated by Lawson (2003:91) ‘there is a recognition that human rights are not equivalent to state rights and, indeed, the pursuit of so-called state rights-or a narrowly defined national interest-has often been at the expense of the very people that states are supposed to protect.’ In order to counter this situation South Africa’s foreign policy towards the internal condition in Zimbabwe-proven by the contentious land reformation act, the damage done to democracy, the corrosion of the rule of law and the continuous deterioration of their economy-must be evaluated on the basis of standards and values of ethical behaviour in international relations. 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