Losers of transition on SSR

WHAT ‘LOSERS OF TRANSITION’ THINK ABOUT THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM What ‘losers of transition’ think about the security sector reform SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY Marko Milošević1 Predrag Petrović2 Belgrade Centre for Security Policy No 20 · MAY - AUGUST 2011 Original scientific paper May 2011 UDK: 303.4:351.862.4(497.11) Abstract The aim of this paper is to find out whether there exists any connection between the characteristics of the respondents and their viewpoints about the reform of security sector in Serbia. Based on this, as well as based on other surveys, the authors attempted to operationalise so-called ‘losers of transition’ in Serbia. Then they analysed how and to what extent this loser’s status is connected with the respondents’ viewpoints on different aspects of their security. In analysing these statements, the authors used the data obtained in a public opinion survey, the data from the focus groups with losers of transition, as well as the data of other relevant researches, and, finally, the Statistical Office data. The paper provides a cue for a discussion about how extensive is the violence potential of the losers of transition and whether this population threatens to ‘hold up’ reform endeavours in the security sector. Key words: losers of transition, security sector, military, police, populations, integrations, development Introduction After eleven years of socio-political and economic reforms, Serbia concluded its ‘first’ and started its ‘second’ transition. According to Guillermo O'Donnell, this is how the road to ‘second transition’ is opened after democratically elected government is established. The presumption is that the democratically elected government becomes institutionalised, which is a prerequisite for the establishment of consolidated democracy. However, consolidation is only too often a 51 1 Contact: markomilosevic@ccmr-bg.org 2 Contact: predragpetrovic@ccmr-bg.org WBSO SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER 3 See more details in: Orlović, S. Problemi demokratske konsolidacije Srbije (Problems of the Democratic Consolidation of Serbia). In: Pavlović, Dušan & S. Antonić. (Ed.). Konsolidacija demokratskih ustanova u Srbiji: godinu dana posle (Consolidation of Democratic Institutions in Serbia: One Year After). Beograd: Sluzbeni glasnik, 2008: 85. 4 See more about different dissensions in Serbia and their impact on political divisions in: Spasojević, D. Odblokirana tranzicija – političke podele u Srbiji nakon 2000. godine (Transition Unblocked – Political Divisions in Serbia after 2000). In: Vujačić, I. (Ed.). Godišnjak 2011. Beograd: FPN, 2011: 119–139. 5 See more about who are the losers in transition on the following pages. 6 According to the indicators of the National Statistical Office, the number of employed persons in Serbia is 2,281,909 compared with 3,368,907 occupationally inactive persons. National Statistical Office. Stope aktivnosti, zaposlenosti, neaktivnosti i nezaposlenosti, 2011 (Activity, Employment, Inactivity, and Unemployment Rates, 2011) . <http://webrzs.stat.gov. rs/WebSite/Public/ReportResultView.aspx?rptKey=indId%3d 240100IND01%2635%3d6%26 6%3d1%2c2%2c3%2c4%262 %3d%23last%232%2640%3d1 5%2cL15-64%26sAreaId% 3d240100%26dType%3dName %26lType%3dSerbianCyrillic> 7 Educational structure of the population, according to the results of the 2001 census, suggests that 21.8% of Serbian citizens have not finished a primary school and 23.9% of them have finished a primary school. Secondary school was finished by 41.1% of citizens, whilst college (4.5%) and university (6.5%) education were obtained by 11% of the citizens of Serbia. Medić, S. I K. Popović, Mlanović, M. Nacionalni izveštaj o razvoju i stanju obrazovanja i učenja odraslih (National Report on the Development and the State of Affairs in Adult Education and Learning). Beograd: Ministarstvo obrazovanja RS, 2008: 4, <http://www.mp.gov.rs/resursi/d okumenti/dok233-srp-Nacionalni_izvestaj_confintea.pdf> MARKO MILOŠEVIĆ • PREDRAG PETROVIĆ longer and a more complex process than the process of the transition of society from authoritarianism to democracy (O’Donnell 1994: 56), and there is no guarantee that the second transition will take place or that it will not regress to authoritarianism. The negative consequences of the road leading from autocracy to democracy, along with the difficulties of surpassing the heritage of authoritarian regime, are all in support of what was stated above.3 Thus, different disagreements in the society4 present a considerable restricting factor in the consolidation of democratic institutions. Among the most important is the economic disagreement between citizens and their polarisation to losers and winners in transition since ‘by default, the larger number of citizens who are losing are the ones that resist reforms“ (Stojiljković 2007). The existence of a large number of losers of transition Serbia5 is suggested by some of the objective indicators of social development according to which there are more unemployed than employed, whilst the unemployment rate is 22.2%6. The educational structure of the population is very unfavourable7 and, in May 2011, average net salary in Serbia was 35,362 dinars8. These three elements – occupation, level of education, and level of income – are the objective indicators of social position which we will analyse in this paper, considering the contextual framework of transition losers and winners. Based on a rough overview of these indicators (level of education, occupation, and level of income) one may conclude that a significant part of Serbian population falls under the category of the losers of transition (considering the worsening of overall social position compared to that in the period before transition). Unfavourable global9 and local economic trends10 may only contribute to a further increase in the number of members of this category. Taking into account the above stated, and the fact that security sector reform (hereinafter SSR) is one of key elements of overall democratisation of society11, it is important to analyse what are the positions of losers of transition in this process. This analysis will enable us to answer the question whether the losers of transition constitute an obstacle for the SSR, and whether they could be the central actors in violent manifestation of discontent in Serbia. An added value of this analysis is in the fact that there are only a small number of researches of the losers of transition and they are mostly focused on examining the relation between the members of this population and the political preferences, whilst public opinion surveys pertaining to security issues are almost non-existent.12 52 WHAT ‘LOSERS OF TRANSITION’ THINK ABOUT THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Who are losers of transition? To understand the category of the losers of transition, it is important to first look at the main findings of the sociological and politicological survey. In this paper we therefore start from the findings made by Anđelka Milić and Mladen Lazić, according to which “the viewpoints of actors in a sub-system of economic reproduction of society (at the labour market) influences the creation of identity, values, viewpoints, and interests” (Milić 2004; Lazić 1995; Lazić 2010). Moreover, according to the researches (Komšić at al., 2003: 102) citizens’ viewpoints and their polarisation in the society are greatly influenced by their levels of education and income, as well as by their age. Accordingly, people with a lower level of education, lower income, and of older age will more commonly support the traditional values, and vice versa: the higher the level of education, the level of income, the younger the surveyed are, the more intensely manifested are their modern values. Opposite from the cultivators of modern values, traditionalists find it much harder to accept the changes and reforms. The losers of transition are generally inclined to support the traditional values, considering that “from the perspective of ideology and values, the former (losers of transition, author’s comment) are closer to the system we are leaving behind, and the latter (winners of transition, author’s comment) are closer to the system we are entering” (Mihajlović 2006: 51). Relying on previous surveys, Zoran Slavujević offered a more complex determination of the category of the losers of transition. The determinants of this position, according to his findings, may thus be either objective or subjective (Slavujević 2003: 13). Objective determination of the ‘state of losing’ is the socio-economic standing of the member of a social group, defined by the gender, place of residence, age, level of education, and level of income per a member of household. Subjective determinant arises from the self-perception of one’s own position and the position of the affiliated social group.13 It should be mentioned, however, that no clear criteria and indicators are in place to use in defining this position, since the per- 53 SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY 8 See more on the National Statistical Office website <http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/Web Site/public/PublicationView.asp x?pKey=41&pLevel=1&pubType=2&pubKey=596> 9 Global Business Barometer, The Economist, 12 November 2011 < http://www.economist. com/node/21538185> 13. 11. 2011. 10 Since 2007 the GDP in Serbia has been evidently falling (from 6.9% in 2007 to 1.6% in 2010), and it is the same with FDIs (from USD 2.523 million in 2007 to USD 1.364 million in 2010). See more in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 2010 Report, Transition Report 2010 Recovery and Reform, p. 140 http://www.ebrd.com/ downloads/research/transition/tr10.pdf 11 See more about his in: Edmunds, T. Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation. In: Fluri, Philipp & Hadzic, M. (eds.). Sourcebook on SSR. Beograd: DCAF/ CCMR, 2004: 45–63. 12 Public opinion surveys in Serbia generally cover the citizens' viewpoints regarding the security sector institutions (military and police) and their order-givers (the Ministers of Defence and Interior, President, etc).The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy is the only organisation that, in the period 2003 - 2005, in the seven rounds of survey, have systematically examined what the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro think about the reform of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, namely the Armed Forces of S&M. 13 According to the findings of the 2010 public opinion survey conducted by Friedrich Ebert, Centre for Free Elections and Democracy, and the Centre for Studies of Social Democracy, 30% of Serbian citizens see themselves as the losers of transition. Mihajlović, S. Kako građani Srbije vide tranziciju (How Serbian Citizens See the Transition), Beograd: FES, CESID, 2010: 154. No 20 · MAY - AUGUST 2011 However, before starting to analyse how the losers of transition see the SSR, we shall present the findings made in some of earlier sociological and politicological researches, which will help us explain and operationalise the terms losers of transition and security sector reform. WBSO WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY 14 Mateju, P. and Rehakova B., Simonova N. “Transition to University under Communism and after Its Demise: The Role of Socio-economic Background in the Transition between Secondary and Tertiary Education in the Czech Republic 1948–1998.” Czech Sociological Review, Vol. 39, No 3, 2003: 308. MARKO MILOŠEVIĆ • PREDRAG PETROVIĆ sons participating the surveys often describe their position as being worse or better than the one suggested by objective indicators. The losers of transitions are also mentioned by Peter Mateju (Mateju 2003: 308). He found that typical losers of transition include the population of blue-collar workers and less educated people.14 Such findings are confirmed in Serbia by Lazić who claimed that the position of blue-collar workers worsened in the post-socialist transition, but also that this category undergoes a fragmentation process: the position of highly-skilled and skilled workers has relatively improved, whilst the position of low-skilled workers, unemployed people, and people employed in the informal sector, has radically exacerbated (Lazić 2010: 231). Relying on above mentioned findings, in this paper we have looked at the category of the losers of transition from the perspective of different categories of occupation. The population of losers of transition therefore includes the members of following occupations: farmers, housekeepers, and unskilled, low-skilled, skilled, and high-skilled workers. We believe that this approach is reasonable since the type of occupation is largely connected with the level of income, and with the level of education, and we shall come back to this issue further below. The respondents who belong to above categories of occupations (which we classify under the losers of transition) have, typically, the lower income and the lower level of education at the same time. Moreover, within the May 2009 survey that CESID conducted for the requirements of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, under the name of “Social Exclusion in Serbia – Intensity, Causes, and Types”, a high level of correlation was determined among these categories. Before we take a look across these categories, however, it should be noted that, in this survey, the category of occupations did not directly include “the unemployed”, “the pensioners” (as typical losers of transition), or “entrepreneurs”, “directors, and “politicians” (as typical winners in transition), although some of these categories appear under other determinants (e.g., a housekeeper who has finished a secondary school may be an unemployed woman with secondary school degree, etc). In order to provide a better visibility of the viewpoints taken by the losers of transition, the variable occupation was taken as the main indicator of this position. Moreover, we will prove that other two variables of the social position of losers – the level of income and the level of education – are relatively firmly connected with the variable measuring the occupation. Using the statistical measures of 54 WHAT ‘LOSERS OF TRANSITION’ THINK ABOUT THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM the chi square test and contingency coefficient, we will prove that these variables are interdependent and find out how strong the connection among them is. SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY Occupation Farmer Low-skilled or medium-skilled worker Skilled or highskilled worker Technician Clerk Professional Housekeeper School/university student Total Cross-tabulation table of occupation and payment categories Payment categories RSD Up to RSD RSD 10,000– 20,000– 10,000 20,000 40,000 49 19 3 No of respondents 68.1% 26.4% 4.2% Share of respondents 39 33 8 No of respondents More than RSD 40,000 1 1.4% 2 72 100,0% 82 Total Share of respondents 47.6% 40.2% 9.8% 2.4% 100,0% No of respondents Share of respondents No of respondents Share of respondents No of respondents Share of respondents No of respondents Share of respondents No of respondents Share of respondents No of respondents Share of respondents No of respondents Share of respondents 81 35.4% 42 28.2% 19 20.2% 16 11.1% 71 57.3% 19 32.2% 336 35,3% 97 42.4% 52 34.9% 44 46.8% 42 29.2% 39 31.5% 25 42.4% 351 36.8% 43 18.8% 47 31.5% 24 25.5% 60 41.7% 9 7.3% 11 18.6% 205 21.5% 8 3.5% 8 5.4% 7 7.4% 26 18.1% 5 4.0% 4 6.8% 61 6.4% 229 100,0% 149 100,0% 94 100,0% 144 100,0% 124 100,0% 59 100,0% 953 100.0% No 20 · MAY - AUGUST 2011 Table 1: Relationship between the occupation and the level of income Chi square 188,242; p 0,000; contingency coefficient (C) 0,406; p 0,000 In the cross-table analysis of the occupation and the level of income per a member of household15, using the chi square test, we rejected the hypothesis about the two characteristics being independent from each other (when the value is less than 0.05). Hence, the level of income depends on the occupation, and using the statistical measure of contingency coefficient (to see how strong the connection is), a relatively strong connection between these two variables (C=0.406) was found. It can be rightfully said that, when we look at the losers of transition following the variable of their occupation, there is a considerable level of probability that these respondents belong to low-income categories – below the level of average income in Serbia. 55 15 In the statistical database, this determinant was named payment category. WBSO WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY MARKO MILOŠEVIĆ • PREDRAG PETROVIĆ In the cross-table analysis of occupation and the level of education, we will see similar overlaps to that in the case of the cross-table of the occupation and the level of income. The fact that the level of education as such cannot constitute a precise indicator of a division to losers and winners is illustrated by the following example: almost a third of housekeepers finished a secondary school – either a three-year or a four-year secondary school. The fact that they declare themselves as housekeepers speaks to an extent about their working status, namely about the fact that they are unemployed. If otherwise, they would declare themselves as “workers”, “clerks”, etc. Moreover, it can be noted that the workers population includes a certain number of respondents (almost a fourth are low-skilled and more than a half are high-skilled workers) who have finished a four-year secondary school. The presumptions about lower level of education of the losers of transition should not be observed separately from, but rather linked to, other indicators, in this case with occupation and level of income. Thus, this cross-table showed the interdependence between the category of occupation and the category of the finished school (value of the significance testing, chi square test, is less than 0.05). Contingency coefficient shows a strong link (0.8) between these two categories. This actually means that, based on occupation, it is relatively easy to determine the respondent’s level of education, but this is not true for the opposite case: the level of education often is not a sufficient indicator of overall social position. Taking this into consideration, it becomes obvious that, based on the category of occupation low-skilled worker, the respondent’s level of education can be reconstructed with a high level of certainty. In this case, it is a three-year secondary-school education. 56 WHAT ‘LOSERS OF TRANSITION’ THINK ABOUT THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Table 2: Relationship between the occupation and the level of education SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY Farmers Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers Skilled or highskilled workers Technicians Clerks Professionals Housekeepers Farmers Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers Skilled or highskilled workers Technicians Clerks Professionals Housekeepers Total No of respondents Share of respondents Finished school No school/ School for SeconSchool/uni College or primary blue-collar versity dary university school occupations school student 76 6 10 2 Total 94 80.9% 6.4% 10.6% 2.1% 100,0% 62 10 24 1 97 Share of respondents 63.9% 10.3% 24.7% 1.0% 100,0% No of respondents Share of respondents No of respondents Share of respondents No of respondents 23 8.3% 1 .6% 2 77 27.8% 5 2.9% 161 58.1% 155 91.2% 79 16 5.8% 9 5.3% 34 277 100,0% 170 100,0% 115 Share of respondents 1.7% 68.7% 29.6% 100,0% 1 7 168 176 Share of respondents .6% 4.0% 95.5% 100,0% No of respondents Share of respondents No of respondents Share of respondents No of respondents Share of respondents 86 60.6% 38 26.8% 23 26.7% 497 43.0% 3 2.1% 9 10.5% 242 20.9% 142 100,0% 86 100,0% 1157 100.0% No of respondents No of respondents 15 10.6% 251 21,7% 113 9.8% Chi square 2090, 504; p 0,000; contingency coefficient (C) 0,802; p 0,000 Taking into account above cross-tables, we believe that it is justifiable to, in further analysis, look at the losers of transition primarily relying on the variable of occupation. Thus, the losers of transition will be hereinafter deemed to be the respondents falling under the categories of occupations: farmers, housekeepers, and low-skilled, medium-skilled, skilled, and high-skilled workers. Within the framework of samples covered by this survey, this is 50.82% of respondents, or, in absolute numbers, 588 out of 1,157 of the respondents who have declared themselves with regard to occupation and education. Moreover, consulting the CeSID’s earlier surveys (which, for the requirements of this project, conducted the survey of focus group), similar indicators may be noted. Namely, in a survey conducted in 57 54 62.8% 54 4.7% No 20 · MAY - AUGUST 2011 Occupation Cross-table of the occupation and the finished school WBSO WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY MARKO MILOŠEVIĆ • PREDRAG PETROVIĆ May 2009 for the requirements of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (“Social Exclusion in Serbia – Intensity, Causes, and Types”) correlations were noted in the operationalisation of these populations. Namely, in this survey again, the population of bluecollar workers, housekeepers, and farmers, polarised on one end of the scale of the socially excluded. This survey used a larger number of the indicators of social position: in addition to education, occupation, and level of income, the dimensions of consumption, food, clothes, availability of public services, etc. were also taken into account. The mentioned survey found that every third citizen with work capability does not have a job (30%), and that the level of education has a high impact on unemployment. Thus, this survey found that most vulnerable are the workers population and population of persons with lowest levels of education (e.g., farmers). For instance, among those with finished primary school, less than a third have a steady job. Moreover, this group includes above-average number of those who are unemployed but do not look for a job. It may be said that the respondents who have finished the schools for blue-collar occupations are below-average in respect of the employment rates – the number of full-time employed is 46%. Within this category, there is an above-average representation of those who are unemployed and look for a job. This is how the created population of the losers of transition is confirmed by the data from other researches, collected using the same methodology on a representative sample of the citizens of Serbia.16 Finally, the data used in the analysis of the losers’ of transition viewpoints about SSR included, in addition to the data obtained in a survey conducted on a representative sample of the citizens of Serbia, the answers of the participants of focus groups (also organised within this project). Based on the occupation, levels of income and education, and place of residence (towns in Serbia, Belgrade suburbia), four groups of the “losers of transition” were formed. Fifth group was the control group from Belgrade that consisted from the members of middle class, with average income and a higher level of education. It was construed as a group of the “winners of transition”. Security sector reform 16 The data obtained from CeSID: Report about the Public Opinion Survey: Social Exclusion, 14 September 2009 According to Timothy Edmunds, security sector reform is a process “through which security sector actors adapt to the political and organisational demands of transformation” (Edmunds 58 WHAT ‘LOSERS OF TRANSITION’ THINK ABOUT THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM What do losers of transition think about SSR? Good system of government The good system of government is the most complex dimension we have researched. We have tried to determine the viewpoints of this dimension using a larger number of empirical statements. Thus, the intention of asking the citizens how secure they feel, thanks to whom they feel secure or insecure, when they felt most secure, was to have the subjective perception of security and responsibility that the respondents attribute to the institutions linked with the self-estimated degree of security. Moreover, we have taken into account the questions about the trust in institutions and have used them as a control question about the work of these institutions. When asked how secure they feel in their neighbourhood, over 70% of respondents from all categories of occupation said that 59 SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY No 20 · MAY - AUGUST 2011 2007: 16), while the reformed security sector “provides security within a state in an effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic civilian control” (Edmonds, 2003: 37). Edmunds believes that the effects of security sector reform reflect on five dimensions: good system of government, economic development, professionalization, prevention of conflict, and integration with western institutions (Edmonds 2003: 37). In the analysis below, we will attempt to, in line with these dimensions, show the degree of the group’s of the “losers of transition” (dis)agreement with the security sector reform. It should be noted in the beginning that, when analysing the answers to the question about whether the armed forces have been sufficiently reformed, a relatively even distribution of answers was found with regard to all offered items. Thus, almost one third of respondents believed that the armed forces has been reformed to a sufficient degree, one third said that it is not sufficiently reformed, and a third did not know how to answer this question. We therefore consider it justifiable to focus our survey on the effects of reform and the degree of citizens’ agreement with the statements that measured the effects of security sector reform on the five dimensions mentioned above. Taking this into consideration, it will be possible to precisely determine the degree of support that the public is providing to the ruling elite with regard to particular reform actions and solutions. WBSO they feel secure. On the other hand, when they were asked about the reasons for not feeling secure, more than a half of respondents mentioned reasons such as: “I respect law and order” and “I am capable of protecting myself”. This reveals that, as perceived by respondents, government authorities, generally, do not contribute to their feeling secure. In the answers related to “good work of government authorities” as guarantors of security, there is a slight dissension between the losers and the winners of transition. Namely, losers of transition are in a somewhat larger numbers inclined to claim that government authorities do their job well, whilst this number is somewhat lower in the categories of winners (professionals, clerks, and technicians). Table 3. Respondents’ subjective assessment of the feeling of security good work of government authorities I am capable of protecting myself I respect law and order Total Farmers Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers Skilled or highskilled workers Technicians Clerks Professionals Housekeepers School/university students Total Living in a good environement If you feel secure, what is the main reason for such feeling? Don’t feel secure WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY MARKO MILOŠEVIĆ • PREDRAG PETROVIĆ 12,6% 22,1% 8,4% 12,6% 44,2% 100,0% 20,6% 24,7% 7,2% 11,3% 36,1% 100,0% 18,3% 21,9% 7,2% 10,4% 42,1% 100,0% 16,0% 14,8% 18,1% 14,7% 16,6% 22,6% 15,8% 28,7% 4,1% 5,2% 5,6% 7,0% 13,0% 7,0% 7,3% 3,5% 50,3% 50,4% 53,1% 46,2% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 12,5% 20,5% 3,4% 9,1% 54,5% 100,0% 16,4% 21,3% 6,1% 9,3% 46,9% 100,0% When asked about the reasons for feeling insecure, answers of the respondents in these two groups were again polarised; specifically, the losers of transition were less than other categories critical about the work of government authorities. 60 WHAT ‘LOSERS OF TRANSITION’ THINK ABOUT THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Table 4. Subjective assessment of reasons for feeling of insecurity SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY Total 2.1% 100.0% 16.5% 2.2% 5.0% 100.0% 14.7% 11.4% 13.1% 16.9% 4.7% 2.6% 4.0% 2.1% 7.1% 6.1% 9.1% 4.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 12.6% 8.0% 3.4% 100.0% 14.6% 3.2% 5.7% 100.0% 55.7% 18.6% 2.1% 18.6% 58.8% 15.4% 2.2% 58.2% 65.8% 62.5% 59.9% 14.1% 13.2% 9.7% 16.2% 1.2% .9% 1.7% 0.7% 9.5% 59.8% 61.3% 14.0% Poor economic situation and poverty 8.4% 1.3% When asked which government authorities mainly contribute to their feeling of security and insecurity, almost 60% of the losers, and nearly 70% of the winners of transition did not identify a single authority. On the other hand, among those in the category of losers who stated that the government authorities are guarantors of their security, almost 30% identified the police, and only 5% mentioned the military. It should be noted that, for the winners of transition, these shares are slightly smaller (about 25% for the police and about 2% for the military). 61 No 20 · MAY - AUGUST 2011 Unsatisfactory work of government authorities 3.1% 75.8% Drug abuse related problems 100.0% Increase in street crime and violence 6.3% I feel secure Farmers Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers Skilled or highskilled workers Technicians Clerks Professionals Housekeepers School/university students Total Behaviour of sport club supporters and other extremist groups If you feel insecure, what is the main reason for such feeling? WBSO MARKO MILOŠEVIĆ • PREDRAG PETROVIĆ Table 5. Assessment of the government authorities’ contribution to the feeling of security SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY 7.1% 2.0% 61.5% 30.9% 6.1% 1.1% 73.5% 74.8% 68.2% 60.8% 24.1% 20.0% 27.8% 35.0% 1.2% 1.7% 4.0% 2.8% 63.2% 31.0% 3.4% 65.6% 28.9% 4.0% 1.1% 100.0% 1.0% 0.4% 0.5% 100.0% 100.0% 0.6% 0.9% Total 28.6% Other government authorities 61.2% National Security Council 4.3% RS President 33.0% RS National Assembly 61.7% RS Government Military Judiciary (courts, prosecutor offices, etc) Police Farmers Low-skilled or mediumskilled workers Skilled or high-skilled workers Technicians Clerks Professionals Housekeepers School/univer sity students Total None WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER Which one among government authorities is mostly contributing to your feeling of security? 0.9% 0.6% 1.7% 0.7% .7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1.1% 1.1% 100.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.1% 0.5% 100.0% Only one fourth of losers, when asked whom would they trust to protect their security and security of their families, mentioned the statutory actors – military and police. Most respondents rely on themselves and on informal structures – friends and neighbours. 62 WHAT ‘LOSERS OF TRANSITION’ THINK ABOUT THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Table 6: Upon whom citizens rely for protection SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY 21.3% 5.3% 45.4% 5.2% 8.2% 24.7% 9.3% 50.7% 10.1% 6.9% 18.5% 47.4% 50.0% 57.6% 42.3% 5.3% 7.8% 6.2% 12.0% 9.4% 1.7% 6.2% 14.8% 19.3% 22.4% 17.5% 23.2% 60.9% 16.1% 1.1% 12.6% 50.4% 8.4% 7.6% 19.7% 7.4% 100.0% 2.1% 5.2% 100.0% 7.2% 0.7% 5.8% 100.0% 2.3% 2.6% 5.6% 0.9% 0.7% 16.4% 14.7% 6.8% 7.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 2.3% 6.9% 100.0% 0.7% 8.7% 100.0% 4.4% Although the losers, to a somewhat lesser extent than winners, hold the police responsible for their feeling of insecurity, the prevailing impression (over 80%) is that none of the government authorities is responsible for citizens’ feeling of insecurity. 63 No 20 · MAY - AUGUST 2011 Military 10.6% Total Police 5.3% Nobody Neighbours 50.0% Private security services Friends Farmers Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers Skilled or highskilled workers Technicians Clerks Professionals Housekeepers School/university students Total Myself Upon whom you mostly rely to protect you security and security of your family? WBSO MARKO MILOŠEVIĆ • PREDRAG PETROVIĆ Table 7: Contribution of government authorities to the feeling of security SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY 82.7% 6.5% 2.2% 5.8% 0.4% 74.0% 15.4% 82.5% 11.4% 73.7% 10.9% 83.2% 9.1% 0.9% 0.6% 0.6% 5.9% 1.8% 8.0% 3.5% 1.2% 0.6% 2.6% 3.4% .6% 2.1% 0.7% 87.4% 4.6% 1.1% 1.1% 3.4% 1.1% 79.1% 10.3% 1.1% .2% 5.2% 1.6% 0.1% 0.3% Total 1.0% Other government authorities 7.1% 1.1% National Security Council 2.0% Parliamentary Committee for Security 73.7% 14.1% RS President 3.2% RS Assembly RS Government 3.2% Statutory security services (SIA, military services, “secret services”) 2.1% Military Judiciary (courts, prosecutor offices, etc) Farmers Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers Skilled or highskilled workers Technicians Clerks Professionals Housekeepers School/university students Total Police 75.5% 12.8% None WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER Which government authority mostly contribute to your feeling of insecurity? 2.1% 100.0% 2.0% 100.0% 0.4% 2.2% 100.0% 0.6% 2.4% .9% 2.3% 1.4% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1.1% 100.0% 0.1% 0.1% 1.9% 100.0% The degree of citizens’ trust in the security sector institution varies. Namely, when asked for military and police, the losers and the winners gave somewhat different answers, whilst their replies concerning the Government, the President, and the National Assembly were very similar. It is evident from this that those which citizens hold responsible for their (in)security include such government authorities with which they are directly in contact (police, military, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, judiciary), whilst the executive and legislative branches are almost never associated with the security sector. 64 WHAT ‘LOSERS OF TRANSITION’ THINK ABOUT THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Military Farmers Low-skilled or mediumskilled workers Skilled or high-skilled workers Technicians Clerks Professionals Housekeepers School/university students Does not know, refuses to answer 9.6 Grade 1 or 2 12.7 Grade 3, 4, or 5 77.7 9.3 8.3 82.4 8.7 18 73.3 12.6 15.3 17.4 11.9 12.6 15.3 16.6 19.8 74.8 69.4 66 68.3 19.5 9.1 71.4 Does not know, refuses to answer 9.5 Grade 1 or 2 22.1 Grade 3, 4, or 5 68.4 4.1 23.4 72.5 5.8 22.3 71.9 7 6.5 6.1 2.8 19.7 30.3 28.7 22.2 73.3 63.2 65.2 75 4.6 27.5 67.9 Police Farmers Low-skilled or mediumskilled workers Skilled or high-skilled workers Technicians Clerks Professionals Housekeepers School/university students Even if citizens do not see the security sector as a party responsible for their feeling of security, the trust that the losers of transition have in traditional security sector actors – military and police, is somewhat higher. The lack of critical attitude towards the security sector may be an argument that reforms are not all that necessary, and that present situation is satisfactory. On the other hand, the fact that respondents see themselves, and not the institutions, as most deserving for their feeling of security, intimates at the defective government which is not capable to provide the services which it had undertook to provide, security services included. Economic development resulting from SSR Within this survey, citizens were given a possibility to express their opinion about the correlation between security sector reform and economic development; as a rule, this was when they answered the 65 SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY No 20 · MAY - AUGUST 2011 Table 8: Assessment of the work of military and police WBSO WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY MARKO MILOŠEVIĆ • PREDRAG PETROVIĆ questions related to the security integrations into EU and NATO. The impression is that citizens do not detect a sufficiently clear connection between security sector reform and economic development, as it is obvious from a large number of questions to which citizens did not know answers or refused to answer (“does not know/refuses to answer”), which sometimes amounted to as much as 40% of answers to the questions. When asked whether joining EU would further impoverish Serbia, approximately 30% of losers of transition gave a positive answer, below 30% of them abstained, whilst more than 40% answered negatively. On the other hand, winners were less reserved and about 13% of them refused to answer, whilst more than a half believed that EU membership will not impoverish Serbia. Moreover, although 42% of the losers believed that EU membership will contribute to raising living standards of Serbian citizens, 30% of respondents abstained, and 28% did not agree with this statement. Table 9: Citizens’ viewpoints on EU integration and impoverishment Completely agrees Total Farmers 23.4% 13.8% 26.6% 13.8% 22.3% 100.0% Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers 30.6% 11.2% 30.6% 14.3% 13.3% 100.0% Skilled or high-skilled workers 28.0% 14.7% 25.4% 11.5% 20.4% 100.0% Technicians 30.2% 19.5% 16.6% 16.0% 17.8% 100.0% Clerks Professionals Housekeepers 34.2% 38.1% 17.6% 26.3% 25.0% 23.9% 14.0% 8.0% 34.5% 11.4% 21.0% 7.7% 14.0% 8.0% 16.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% School/university students 33.3% 27.6% 19.5% 8.0% 11.5% 100.0% Total 29.4% 19.8% 21.6% 13.3% 15.9% 100.0% Absolutely does not agree Mostly does not agree Does not know, is undecided Mostly agrees If Serbia joins EU, it will be further impoverished Citizens’ attitudes with regard to the accession to NATO show that citizens have similar arguments with regard to economic development and membership in this Organisation. Namely, almost a half of the losers of transition believe that membership in NATO may contribute to the impoverishment of the country, whilst about 20% do not agree with such statement. Moreover, almost a third of 66 WHAT ‘LOSERS OF TRANSITION’ THINK ABOUT THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY No 20 · MAY - AUGUST 2011 respondents refused to declare themselves about the issue. Twenty percent of the losers think that entry to NATO will result in the inflow of foreign investments, whilst this possibility is rejected by more than 40% of losers. A slightly higher percent of winners believe that inflow of foreign investments will increase – almost a third of this population. Significant abstention (nearly 40%) was manifested by the losers when they answered the question about whether Serbian accession to NATO will increase the military industry business and export volumes. Almost one fourth of respondents in this population agreed with this statement, whilst a third did not accept this statement. In the case of the winners of transition, the distribution is identical – a third agrees, a third does not agree, and a third is abstinent. We can therefore say that the losers of transition have a mottled attitude with regard to NATO. Table 10: Citizens’ attitudes on NATO integration and impoverishment Completely agrees Total Farmers 12.6% 3.2% 32.6% 15.8% 35.8% 100.0% Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers 17.5% 9.3% 28.9% 17.5% 26.8% 100.0% Skilled or high-skilled workers 12.2% 9.7% 31.7% 12.6% 33.8% 100.0% Technicians 20.6% 6.5% 25.3% 16.5% 31.2% 100.0% Clerks Professionals Housekeepers 16.5% 13.9% 30.4% 14.8% 24.3% 100.0% 21.7% 5.6% 8.6% 5.6% 26.3% 34.3% 19.4% 20.3% 24.0% 34.3% 100.0% 100.0% School/university students 15.9% 8.0% 43.2% 17.0% 15.9% 100.0% Total 15.2% 8.3% 30.8% 16.4% 29.3% 100.0% Absolutely does not agree Mostly does not agree Does not know, is undecided Mostly agrees If Serbia accedes to NATO, it will be further impoverished Theoretically, economic development should arise out of the security sector reform. Although the losers deem that EU membership will contribute to raising the living standards for citizens and do not expect further impoverishment, they still reason that membership in NATO would lead to the impoverishment of citizens. Most citizens did not declare themselves with regard to the military industry’s capacity for development. 67 WBSO MARKO MILOŠEVIĆ • PREDRAG PETROVIĆ WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY Professionalization The losers’ of transition attitudes with regard to professionalization was measured by asking two questions that are control questions to each other. First question related to the assessment of the level to which the return of general military obligation will contribute to the maintenance of Serbian security. Second question was asked from the other end of the matter and citizens were expected to answer whether the introduction of professional army influences the security of Serbia. Table 11: How do the return of general military obligation and the introduction of professional army influence the security? Return of general military obligation and its effect on the security of Serbia Answer Occupation No effect Does not know/ Refuses to answer There is effect 29.7 22.3 47.8 24.5 26.5 48.9 40.3 21.9 37.7 Technicians 26.8 35.9 37.3 Clerks 48.3 23.5 27.2 Professionals 45.6 29.8 26.5 Housekeepers 56.2 13.6 30.2 School/university students 39.5 24.4 36.1 Farmers Low-skilled or mediumskilled workers Skilled or high-skilled workers  Are there any effects of professional armed forces on security Does not know/ There are Answer No effect Refuses to answer effects Occupation Farmers 53.2 24.5 22.3 Low-skilled or mediumskilled workers Skilled or high-skilled workers Technicians 38.1 29.9 32 38.5 29.9 31.7 35 45.5 29.6 Clerks 33.2 24.9 42 Professionals 43.9 21.1 35.1 Housekeepers 32.2 21.6 47.2 School/university students 39.5 24.1 43.7 68 WHAT ‘LOSERS OF TRANSITION’ THINK ABOUT THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM The first question measured how particular populations assess the level to which the return of general military obligation will influence the increase of Serbian citizens’ security. The answers of the losers and that of the winners of transition clearly polarised. The losers are convinced that the return of recruitment system will contribute to greater security of Serbia. One interpretation may be that the losers of transition have this attitude because they are influenced by traditional values (M. Lazić and S. Cvejić 2004: 63). Joining the army, according to traditional norms, is an important step in life that helps the realisation of other social connections (job, marriage), and acquirement of other social recognitions. On the other hand, betteroff populations, namely the winners of transition, do not share this view; for them, joining the army means the thwarted career, pointless interruption of employment. Citizens were then asked about the consequences of introducing the professional army. The distribution of answers is similar to that with regard to previous question, which further confirms the findings that the losers of transition do not see that professionalization influences the increase of security. The strongest “resistance” to professionalization comes from farmers with more than 50% of the members of this population disagreeing with professionalization. Moreover, almost a half of housekeepers abstained even though, among those who declared themselves in this respect, the ones that oppose the professionalization of army prevail. 69 SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY No 20 · MAY - AUGUST 2011 Graph 1: How does the return of general military obligation influence security WBSO WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY MARKO MILOŠEVIĆ • PREDRAG PETROVIĆ Graph 2: How is the introduction of professional army influencing the security Indirectly we have tried to identify citizens’ viewpoint about the achievements of military reform. How some of the effects of reform are manifested and is it clear to citizens that those are the effects of reform? It was indicative that citizens greatly abstained, on occasion more than a half of answers were not given. Among those who did declare themselves, a larger number of losers of transition believed that the military is influenced by political parties (about a third of respondents), whilst almost a third believed that the military is corrupted. More than a half of losers of transition think that the military is inadequately equipped, whilst about 40% of them believe that the military is not numerous enough. On the other hand, losers of transition believe that the military is capable of defending Serbia, and that it is sufficiently trained (more than a half of losers of transition share this opinion). Accordingly, this population doubts that material resources are adequate and believes that human resources are at a satisfactory level. The government could be blamed for material resources (corruption), whilst human resources reflect the trust in the institution of the military (which may be served, at one and the same time, by a son, a spouse, a relative, a neighbour, etc). The viewpoint prevailing with regard to corruption and politicisation is that these phenomena are now wide-spread in the military too. This is confirmed by earlier results of CeSID surveys (2005 - 2010) which show 70 WHAT ‘LOSERS OF TRANSITION’ THINK ABOUT THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Prevention of conflict When asked whether they feel secure, losers of transition mostly replied that they feel secure (about 60%). The list of threats to personal security of citizens is dominated by economic threats. In order to feel secure, the majority of these respondents primarily rely on “their own selves” (about 50% vs. almost 20% of those who rely on police), which suggests the possibility that they “take law into their own hands”. The former possibility was tested in focus groups in which citizens’ readiness to take violent action was investigated. Such a result may be interpreted based on their position of the losers of transition and their perception of dominant threats, i.e., economic threats: citizens would take part in violent social protests and industrial actions but they would not take part in (although they would silently support) the violence against minority populations. Moreover, these populations of workers and housekeepers, in a much higher percent than other categories, see the cause of insecurity in adverse economic situation and poverty (Table 4). On the other hand, economic factors provoke fear even in citizens with above-average income (more than RSD 60,000 din); they, more than those with lower income, fear social protests, strikes, and financial over-indebtedness of Serbia. It is reasonable to presuppose that this population is “naturally more sensitised” to economic causes of insecurity since they can compromise their social-economic position. Social polarisation is evident in this case, too: the losers of transition fear adverse economic situation and poverty; they are willing to take active part in violent social protests. It is this type of protests that worries the population of the winners of transition. With regard to achievement of national security goals, citizens give priority to peaceful means. Accordingly, about one fourth of losers think that the nation should use diplomatic means to take care of 71 SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY No 20 · MAY - AUGUST 2011 that normally high level of trust in the military is divided into two components: the armed forces as an institution in which the recruits are serving their military duty is much more trusted than are the managerial bodies of the army (the Chief of the General Staff, the Minister, the military leadership). A conclusion may be drawn from the above answers that the professionalization of armed forces is not desirable for the losers of transition. This population does not see any interconnection between the reform – democratic and civilian control – and the decreased influence of political parties and corruption on the military. its own security. Contrary to this, a third of the winners of transition declared themselves like this. The primacy to economic means was given by almost one fourth of surveyed losers. Although they give primacy to the economy and diplomatic means, the losers of transition are very different when they answer the question about the use of military means. More than 10% (on average) of losers of transition think that these means are legitimate, whilst about 3% of the winners of transition were for this option. Table 12: What means should a nation use to take care of its security 21.4 21.4 13.3 13.7 26.4 21.8 Clerks 19.4 15.1 4.3 6.5 2.0 22.4 11.2 4.1 4.1 9.4 3.6 24.9 16.2 2.2 3.6 23.9 11.3 0.7 21.1 14.1 2.8 4.2 11.8 34.7 1.2 2.9 22.4 17.1 3.5 6.5 Professionals 13.9 28.7 7.0 2.6 22.6 20.9 0.9 3.5 Housekeepers School/university students 6.8 34.7 4.5 4.5 28.4 17.6 1.7 1.7 23.0 24.1 3.4 5.7 27.6 8.0 3.4 4.6 Farmers Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers Skilled or highskilled workers Technicians Membership in international organisations Other means 9.7 Remaining disengaged 28.0 Stricter laws 17.2 Economic means Military means What means should the nation to which you belong use to take care of its security? Diplomatic means WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY MARKO MILOŠEVIĆ • PREDRAG PETROVIĆ Does not know WBSO Analysis of the answers reveal that citizens are more willing to resort to violence with the aim to achieve socio-economic interests, but they give primacy to peaceful means when the aim is to achieve national security goals. 72 WHAT ‘LOSERS OF TRANSITION’ THINK ABOUT THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM The interpretation of the last dimension of security sector reform was attempted based on citizens’ viewpoints about EU and NATO. Generally speaking, with regard to the integration into western institutions, there is a somewhat lower degree of acceptance and a somewhat higher degree of rejection between the losers and winners of transition. The losers and winners of transition are more inclined towards the integration into EU, whilst a high degree of disagreement with the integration into NATO was observed. Table 13: Should Serbia join EU? Should Serbia join EU? (in %) Yes No Does not know 38.9 34.7 26.3 Farmers Low-skilled or mediumskilled workers Skilled or high-skilled workers Technicians Clerks Professionals Housekeepers School/university students 51.0 24.5 24.5 57.9 26.3 15.8 45.8 63.5 66.1 77.8 28.2 21.2 21.7 15.9 26.1 15.3 12.2 6.3 66.7 20.7 12.6 Although they give primacy to EU integrations, a much small number of losers (almost 20%) support this type of integrations. Moreover, the losers were reserved (about 10%) when answering this question. When asked whether joining EU would enhance the security of citizens, about 40% of the losers agreed with this statement, and as much as a third gave a negative answer to this question. The answers to the questions about integration into NATO were evenly distributed. Both populations are explicitly against the accession to NATO, which we can reasonably believe to be a consequence of 1999 NATO bombing campaign. Thus, 54% of losers and 58% of winners do not think that the membership in this Organisation would contribute to the enhancement of the security of Serbia. Quite to the contrary, when asked whether the strengthening of alliance with Russia would contribute to enhancement of Serbian security, the losers of transition supported this statement by 58%, and only 18% did not support it. 73 SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY No 20 · MAY - AUGUST 2011 Integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions WBSO WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY MARKO MILOŠEVIĆ • PREDRAG PETROVIĆ Table 14: Should Serbia become a NATO member state? Should Serbia become a NATO member state? (in %) Yes No Does not know Farmers 12.8 72.3 14.9 Low-skilled or mediumskilled workers Skilled or high-skilled workers Technicians Clerks Professionals Housekeepers School/university students 18.2 58.6 23.2 16.5 69.4 14.0 8.5 21.2 9.6 21.0 64.1 60.6 70.2 65.3 27.5 18.2 20.2 13.6 12.5 67.0 20.5 It is hard to establish the degree to which citizens are willing to support the joining of western institutions considering that both populations reject the integration into NATO and, at the same time, even though the losers of transition are reserved, agree with EU integrations. Again, the willingness for alliance with Russia is incongruent with the theory proclaimed with the indicator of willingness for integrations into western institutions and, in this respect, the population of losers is a potential inhibitor of reforms. *** When you look at the five dimensions of the security sector reform manifestation, you can see, to a lesser or greater degree, the polarisation between the viewpoints taken by the losers of transition and those taken by the winners in transition. Losers of transition have negative attitudes with regard to integrations and professionalization, and they do not have sufficient trust in economic development which would be a result of the SSR. This suggests that they can be a barrier to further reform of security sector. A matter of further concern is the willingness of citizens to resort to violence in order to realise their socio-economic interests. Although in a number of cases the values that were measured were not extreme and only slightly exceeded the values measured in the winners of transition, the indicators of the Statistical Office worryingly show that this population encompasses the majority of Serbian population. A note should also be taken of the fact that current negative global and local economic trends can only increase the number of losers of transition. These indicators also indicate the partial success of the post-socialist trans- 74 WHAT ‘LOSERS OF TRANSITION’ THINK ABOUT THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM formation project and the insufficient legitimacy of the government. It then stands to reason to wonder what direction and pace Serbian government will take to implement the SSR. Will the government, with the aim of gaining a wider support of voters, postpone the reforms, or give them up completely? SERBIA’S PUBLIC ON SECURITY Edmonds, Timoti. 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(Ed.). Društvena transformacija i strategije društvenih grupa: svakodnevica Srbije na početku trećeg milenijuma (Social Transformation and Strategies of Social Groups: Everyday Life in Serbia in the Beginning of Third Millennium). Beograd: Institut za Sociološka istraživanja, 2004 Lazić, Mladen. Čekajući kapitalizam (Awaiting the Capitalism). Beograd: Službeni glasnik RS, 2010 Mateju, Petr et al. „Transition to University under Communism and after Its Demise: The Role of Socio-economic Background in the Transition between Secondary and Tertiary Education in the Czech Republic 1948–1998.” Czech Sociological Review, vol. 39, No. 3, 2003. O’Donnell, Guillermo. „Delegative Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 5, 1994: 56. Orazen, F. Peter. and Vodopivec, Milan. Winners and Losers in Transition. Policy Survey Working Paper. The World Bank Policy Survey Department, 1994. Orlović, Slaviša. Problemi demokratske konsolidacije Srbije (Problems of the Democratic Consolidation of Srbia). In: Pavlović, Dušan & S. Antonić (Ed.). Konsolidacija demokratskih ustanova u Srbiji: godinu dana posle (Consolidation of Democratic Institution in Serbia: a Year After). Beograd: Službeni glasnik RS, 2008 Spasojević, Dušan. Odblokirana tranzicija – političke podele u Srbiji nakon 2000. Godine (Transition Unblocked – Political Division in Serbia after 2000). In: Vujačić, I. (Ed.). Almanac 2011. Beograd: FPN, 2011: 119–139. Wulf, Herbert. Security sector reform in developing and transitional countries. Berghof Conflict Survey, 2004. 75 No 20 · MAY - AUGUST 2011 Literature: