Basil of Caesarea on the Primacy of the Name ‘Son’

Revue d'etudes augustiniennes etpatristiques, 57 (2011), 45-69. Basil of Caesarea on the Primacy of the Name 'Son' The name 'Unbegotten' (dYevvi]xog) was central to the Heteroousian theology of Eunomius.' It revealed that the uniqueness of the divine substance resided in its unbegottenness, precluding the possibility that the Only-Begotten God shared the same ontological status as the God over all. Eunomius's preferred name for the Only-Begotten God was 'something begotten' {ytvvr\\m) and what he considered its synonyms, 'thing made' (KOti^iia) and 'creature' (xTLO|xa). Each of these revealed not only that the Only-Begotten's substance was derivative and inferior to Unbegotten's, but also that it was essentially different from that of the one who begot, made, and created him. In his Contra Eunomium Basil of Caesarea argued that the theory of names on which Eunomius supported his Heteroousian theology was mistaken and considered the emphasis that he placed on his preferred names grossly misplaced, opposed both to tradition and good Christian theology.- Yet the names used to refer to the divine persons were just as important 1. On Eunomius and Heteroousian theology, see E . C A V A L C A N T I , Studi Eunomiani, Orientalia Christiana Analecta 202, Rome, 1976; Th.A. K O P E C E K , A History of Neo-Arianism, Patristic Monograph Series, No. 8, Cambridge, 1979; B . P O T T [ E R , Dieu et le Christ selon Gregoire de Nysse. Etude systematique du « Contre Eunoine » avec traduction des extraits d'Eunome, Tumhout, 1994; B. S E S B O D E , Saint Basile et la Trinite. Un acte theologique au IV siecle, Paris, 1998; R . P V A G G I O N E , Eunomius ofCyzicus and the Nicene Revolution, Oxford, 2000; M . R . B A R N E S , The Power of God: Avva/uig in Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology, Washington, D . C . , 2001: 173-219; S. D E S T E P H E N , "Eunomios 1", in Prosopographie du diocese d'Asie (325-641), Prosopographie chretienne du Bas-Empire 3, Paris, 2008: 295-342; A. R A D D E - G A L L w r r z , Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of Divine Simplicity, Oxford, 2009: 87-112; and M. D E L C O G L I A N O , Basil of Caesarea's Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names: Christian Theology and Late-Antique Philosophy in the Fourth-Century Trinitarian Controversy, Vigiliae Christianae, Supplements 103, Leiden, 2010: 1-134. Edition: R . P V A G G I O N E , The Extant Works, Oxford, 1987. 2. On Basil of Caesarea and his theology, see M . SlMONETTI, La Crisi Ariana nel iv secolo, Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum 11, Rome, 1975: 401-434; K O P E C E K , A History of NeoArianism, 361^40; Ph. R O U S S E A U , Basil of Caesarea, Berkeley - Los Angeles - London, 1994; V. H . D R E C O L L , Die Entwicklung der Trinitdtslehre des Basilius von Cdsarea: Sein Weg 46 MARK DELCOGLIANO for Basil as tiiey were for Eunomius. And botli theologians maintained that the divine names facilitated real knowledge of the divine persons. But they differed over precisely what kind of knowledge the divine names communicated (i.e. their rival theories of names),^ and they also disputed which divine names were primary for knowledge and worship of God. Basil argued that the names 'Father' and 'Son' were primary. Elsewhere I have outlined Basil's arguments against 'Unbegotten' in favor of 'Father'.4 His arguments were mosdy negative, arguing for the inappropriateness or incorrectness of the name, and he drew variously upon a tradition of argumentation found in Athanasius and the Homoiousians Basil of Ancyra and George of Laodicea. In the present study I turn to his arguments against 'something begotten', 'thing made', and 'creature' in favor of 'Son'. In this case Basil adopts a similar strategy, arguing against their appropriateness or correctness. But he deploys a different tactic. He contends that Eunomius's preferred names for Son are unscriptural. By this he does not simply mean that they are not found in scripture, as was pointed out for 'Unbegotten'. Rather, at least in the case of 'something begotten' and 'thing made', he argues that they contravene scriptural usage and cannot even be inferred from passages in scripture because of the exacting character of the scriptural text.-'' Hence Basil opposes a long tradition of deriving certain divine names based on what scripture says about the divine person in question. I call this the principle of scriptural implication. In confronting Eunomius in this manner, Basil displays significant originality. In his arguments against this principle, I suggest that Basil says as much about his understanding of the principles of correct scriptural exegesis as he does about the concrete interpretations of specific passages. Yet he advocates such a radical, stringent approach to exegesis that not vom Homdusianer zum Neonizdner, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 66, Gottingen, 1996; S E S B O U E , Saint Basile et la Trinite; L . A Y R E S , Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology, Oxford, 2004: 187-221; J. B E H R , The Nicene Faith, Crestwood, 2004: 263-324; S . M . HiLDEBRAND, The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea: A Synthesis of Greek Thought and Biblical Truth, Washington D . C . , 2007; R A D D E G A L L W I T Z , Divine Simplicity, 113-174; and D E L C O G L I A N O , Theory of Names, 135-260. Edition: B . S E S B O O E , G . - M . D E D U R A N D , and L . D O U T R E L E A U , Basile de Cesaree, Contre Eunome suivi de Eunome Apologie, SChr299 and 305, Paris, 1982-1983. English translation: M . D E L C O G L I A N O and A. R A D D E - G A L L W I T Z , St. Basil of Caesarea: Against Eunomius, The Fathers of the Church 122, Washington, D.C.,2011. 3. Eunomius maintained that those names uniquely applied to God disclosed or revealed the divine essence. Basil denied that God's names allowed such knowledge. In contrast, he formulated a theory of names in which not only divine names but all names fall short of disclosing essence, but nonetheless communicate accurate and useful knowledge of those who bear the names. Their respective theories of names are discussed at length in D E L C O G L I A N O , Theory of Names. 4. "The Influence of Athanasius and the Homoiousians on Basil of Caesarea's Decentralization of 'Unbegotten'," Journal of Early Christian Studies, 19, 2011: 197-223. 5. On Basil's strict adherence to the words of scripture, see D R E C O L L , Die Entwicklung, 75-84; S E S B O O E , Saint Basile et la Trinite, 150-3. BASIL OF CAESAREA ON THE PRIMACY OF THE NAME 'SON' 47 even he could apply it consistently. Nonetheless by examining Basil's refutation o f Eunomius's preferred names for the Son, we gain insight into Basil's understanding o f the role o f scripture in the theological endeavor^ This study begins with an overview o f the use o f 'something begotten', 'thing made', and 'creature' as names for the Son in the early fourth century through Eunomius i n order to contextualize Basil's arguments against these designations. Each o f Eunomius's preferred names had varying degrees o f support among previous theologians based on the principle o f scriptural implication. W h i l e some had argued against 'thing made' and 'creature', almost no one had denied that the Son was 'something begotten'. Hence Basil could not draw upon any o f his predecessors in arguing against the latter term. A t the same time, previous arguments against 'thing made' were either undeveloped (Eusebius o f Caesarea) or deemed insufficient (Athanasius), and thus were not drawn upon by Basil. In contrast to previous theologians, Basil treated 'thing made' as analogous to 'something begotten' and developed an innovative argument against both names that used technical grammatical categories to support a strict view o f the exegete's task. But for his arguments against 'creature' he drew heavily upon Eusebius o f Caesarea. This study concludes with a discussion o f Basil's scriptural arguments for the primacy of 'Son'. I n the formulation o f these exegetical and theological arguments, Basil is revealed here as a critical and creative synthesizer o f previous traditions as well as an innovator. I. - T H E NAMES 'SOMETHING B E G O T T E N ' , 'THING MADE', A N D ' C R E A T U R E ' P R I O R T O BASIL Eunomius's preferred names for the Son—'something begotten' and its synonyms, 'thing made' and 'creature' —were traditional, though not uncontroversial.^ (Note that 'creature' occurs less frequently in Eunomius and is used less prominendy than 'something begotten' and 'thing made'.) Eusebian^ theologians 6. On Basil's exegesis, see M . GiRARDI, Basilio di Cesarea interprete delta Scrittura: Lessico, principi ermeneutici, prassi, Quaderni di «Vetera Christianorum* 26, Bari, 1998. 7. See below, p.55-7. 8. 'Eusebian' is a problematic term, as recently discussed by D . M . G W Y N N , The Eusebians. The Polemic of Athanasius of Alexandria and the Construction of the 'Arian controversy', Oxford, 2007.1 use 'Eusebian' in this paper in contrast to the Athanasian usage deconstructed by Gwynn and in line with other recent usage to name the ad hoc alliance of eastern bishops and theologians initially formed around the figures of Eusebius of Nicomedia and Eusebius of Caesarea that lasted from ca. 320 to ca. 355. For a definition of the category, see A Y R E S , Nicaea and its Legacy, 52, and J . T . L I E N H A R D , Contra Marcellum. Marcellus of Ancyra and Fourth-Century Theology, Washington, D . C . , 1999: 34-5. On the theological and ecclesio-political cohesiveness of the Eusebians, see M . D E L C O G L I A N O , "Eusebian Theologies of the Son as Image of God," Journal of Early Christian Studies, 14, 2006: 459-84; "The Eusebian Alliance: the Case of Theodotus of Laodicea," Zeitschrift fUr Antikes Christentum, 12, 2008: 250-66; and "George of Laodicea: A Historical Reassessment," Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 62, 2011: 667-92. MARK 48 DELCOGLIANO derived these three names from scripture based on the principle o f scriptural implication, yet for the most part used them in a highly qualified way to avoid crude materialistic interpretations o f them. A t the same time, the Eusebian usage of these names was by no means uniform. Though scripture nowhere explicitly calls the Son by any o f these names, Eusebian theologians justified them by appealing to various passages o f scripture which spoke o f God begetting, making, or creating the Son. Eunomius aligned himself with this Eusebian tradition. A . The Eusebian tradition A clear example o f this Eusebian tradition is aptly found i n Eusebius o f Nicomedia's letter to Paulinus o f Tyre. He writes o f the Son (though he never uses the name 'Son'): "We have learned from the holy scripture to say that he is created, established, and begotten in a substance and i n an immutable and inexpressible nature and in likeness to the one who has made h i m , as the L o r d himself says: God created me the beginning of his ways, and before the age he established me. Before all the hills he begot me [Prov 8:22-23, 25]."9 Eusebius believes that one can call the Son 'created' ( X T L O T O V ) , 'established' (9e(i£XLa)T6v), and 'begotten' ( y e v v T i T O v ) on the basis o f the verbs o f Proverbs 8:22-23 and 25. I t was not a far stretch for Eusebian theologians to convert these adjectival substantives, based on the principle o f scriptural implication, into their associated nouns. For example, Arius does this, explicitly using the names 'creature' and 'something begotten'.'0 Though Proverbs 8:22 (and its associated verses) is perhaps the single most discussed verse o f the era, there was many more scriptural passages treated s i m i l a r l y . " Some o f these w i l l be discussed i n what follows. Eusebian theologians were for the most part careful to qualify their usage o f ' something begotten' and 'creature'. Arius writes that the Son is "a perfect creature o f God but not as one o f the creatures, something begotten but not as one o f those who have been begotten," and then proceeds to exclude material understandings of the latter term such as the Valentinian 'issuing' (jiQo(3o?tf)) o f the Father and the Manichaean 'portion that is same in substance' (p^Qog 6px)oi)OLOv) w i t h the Father.'2 He also rejects calling the Son an 'eructation' (EQ'UY'H) fo"" similar 9. Urk. 8.4 (Athanasius Werke Ill/I: 16, 8-12 O P I T Z ) . [Urk. = H.-G. O P I T Z , Athanasius Werke mil. Urkunden zur Geschichte des arianischen Streites 318 - 328, 1-2. Lieferung, Berlin - L e i p z i g , 1934-1935.] 10. Urk. 6.2-3. Cf. Urk. 1.5. To my knowledge, no theologian ever employed a noun derived from the verb or adjective 'established'. 11. The history of the interpretation of Proverbs 8:22 has been well-studied: see the classic study of M. SiMONETTI, "Suir interpretazione patristica di Proverbi 8, 22," in Studi sull'Arianesimo, Roma, 1965: 9-87. See also A. M E R E D I T H , "Proverbes V I I I , 22 chez Origene, Athanase, Basile et Gregoire de Nysse," in Politique et theologie chez Athanase d'Alexandrie, Ch. Kannengiesser, ed., Paris, 1974: 349-357. 12. Urk. 6.2-3 (Athanasius Werke IIlll: rejection of 'issuing' and 'portion'. 12, 9-12 OPITZ). See Urk. 1.3 and 1.5 for a similar BASIL OF CAES AREA ON THE PRIMACY OF THE NAME 'SON' 49 reasons.'3 Hence Arius does not crudely assimilate the Son to the rest of created beings, though his claim that the Son is "from nothing" problematizes this.'^ Admittedly, some of Arius's early Eusebian supporters such as George of Laodicea'5 and Athanasius of Anazarbus'^ do not qualify their usage. They simply call the Son a 'creature', and immediately add that he was "one of the things made" (possibly a reference to John 1:3). 'Creature' and 'thing made' appear to have been viewed as synonymous. Asterius also exemplifies early Eusebian traditions of naming the Son, calling him a 'thing made', 'creature', and 'something begotten'.''' He offers some justification for the names he uses: they indicate that the Son has been made by the Father's wilL'^ But it would be erroneous to think that all Eusebians agreed on the names for the Son. For example, Paulinus of Tyre denies that the Son can be called either an 'issuing' (jtQ6(3>iTi|j,a) or 'something begotten' since these two designations imply corporeality. 13. Urk.\.3. 14. (7/-A-. 1.5. 15. Urk. 12-13. 16. Urk. II and Dot 12. [Dok. = H . C h . B R EN N ECKE, U . H E I L, A. V O N S T O CKH AU S EN , and A. WiNTJES, Athanasius Werke 111/1. Dokumente zur Geschichte des arianlschen Streites, 3. Lieferung, Berlin - New York, 2007.] 17. Fr. 6B/16V, I 5 B / I 9 V and 9B/34V. The Asterian fragments are numbered according to G . B A R D Y, Recherches sur Lucien d'Antioche el son ecole, Paris, 1936: 341-54 [ = B ] , and M . VI N ZEN T, Asterius von Kappadokien: Die theologischen Fragmente, Leiden, 1993 1=V]. Not every fragment in Vinzent's collection is indisputably Asterian. Here I appeal only to those fragments which are almost certainly authentically Asterian and also identified as such by Bardy. Fr. 35V, 37V, 48V, 63V, 74V and 77V also provide evidence for Eusebian names for the Son, but the Asterian provenance of these fragments is not certain. 18. Fr. 6B/16V and 15B/19V 19. Urk. 9. Note that here Paulinus is merely citing O R I GEN , Princ. 4.4.1: "Concerning the Father, although he is undivided and partless, he becomes the Father of the Son, not by issuing (nQo(3aXMv) him, as some think. For if the Son of the Father is a 'issuing' (jxeopbina) and 'something begotten' (Yevvii|xa) from him, such as begotten of animals are, he who issues and he who has been issued are necessarily bodies" [Fr. 21 KO ETS CH AU ] . In Fr. 18B/5V, Asterius appears to be referring to the same passage of Origen when he explains the content of Eusebius of Nicomedia's letter to Paulinus of Tyre: "The main point of the letter is to ascribe the generation (yeveOLv) of the Son to the will of the Father and to deny that this birth (YOVI-)V) involves suffering ( TO GO S) on the part of God. This is what the wisest of the fathers have declared in their own treatises, guarding against the impiety of heretics, who falsely alleged that God's childbearing (texvoYOvfav) was in some way corporeal and involved suffering by teaching the issuings {nQOPoXdg)." Note that Asterius, unlike Paulinus, does not deny that the Son can be called 'something begotten.' On the meaning of xcQopXrijia and nQoPoXf), see H. CR O U ZEL, Origene. Traite des principes, Paris, 1980: 4.240-1.1 translate these terms, which have problematic corporeal associations, with "issuing" rather than the usual "emanation" because of the Neoplatonist connotations of the latter. MARK 50 DELCOGLIANO This early fourth-century Eusebian usage of 'creature' and 'thing made' as names for the Son probably has its roots in Origen, who almost certainly called the Son a 'creature'.20 Though it is difficult to determine what he meant by this, Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti argue that for Origen 'making' ( j t O L e t v ) referred to the creation of the intelligible world and 'fashioning' (jiXdoaetv) to material creation, but that 'creating' (xTi^^eiv) meant any kind of divine production.2' Origen saw 'creation' ( x x L O t g ) , in the strict sense, as the unimpeded expression of the divine will.22 Origen, writes Rowan Williams, taught that the Son was "formed by the Father, directly and uniquely, in a way that sets him apart at least from what later orthodoxy understood as 'creation'."23 On Origen's understanding, then, the Son could reasonably be called a 'creature' or 'thing made', but not a 'thing fashioned' (jTMo|xa).24 For Origen the names 'creature' and 'thing made' would probably have meant that the Father is responsible for the Son's existence, but not in the same way that he is responsible for the existence of the created world. His usage appears to have been adopted by his Alexandrian successors Dionysius (who called the Son a 'thing made' and 'creature') and Theognostus ('creature' only).25 While later authors, judging Origen by a later orthodoxy, critiqued him for such usage,26 it seems that i n the early fourth century Origen's ideas about divine production - creating and making - still had adherents. Therefore, the early fourth-century Eusebian usage of these terms reflects both the legacy of the third-century Origen and a growing awareness of their problems i n the light of recent theological developments. B. Eusebius of Caesarea Eusebius of Caesarea presents a fascinating example of how a fourth-century theologian could struggle with the names for the Son and how contemporary theological developments could inform one's usage of specific terms. When it comes to naming the Son, Eusebius himself exhibits marked differences from other Eusebians, has much in common with Athanasius, and partially presages Basil of Caesarea's usage. In his early apologetic works, Eusebius primarily calls 20. R. W I LLI AM S , Arius: Heresy and Tradition, Rev. ed.. Grand Rapids, 2001: 141-2; P. WiDDICOMBE, The Fatherhood of God from Origen to Athanasius, Oxford, 1994: 89-90. IX.CKOVZEUTraiti des principes,xA?!. 22. M. H A R L, "La preexistence des ames dans Toeuvre d'Origene," in Origeniana quarta. Die Referate des 4. Internationalen Origeneskongresses (Innsbruck, 2-6 September 1985), L . Lies, ed., Innsbruck, 1987: 238-58 at 244-5; W I LLI AM S , Arius, 141; W I D D I CO M B E, Fatherhood, 90. 23. W I LLI A M S , Arius, 142. 24. Cf. Comm. y/j. 20.182, where Origen distinguishes between y.\\a\ia, n\a.(3\xa. 25. WiDDICOMBE, Fatherhood,\22-6. 26. See W I LLI AM S , Arius, 322 n. 212 for references. n:oii](ia, and BASIL OF CAESAREA ON THE PRIMACY OF THE NAME 'SON' 51 the Son 'generate',27 'the begotten God',28 and 'something begotten'.29 While 'something begotten' is quite frequent,he never uses 'creature' or 'thing made' for the Son.3' But he does not explain why these Origenian terms are unsatisfactory. Since other non-scriptural names like 'something begotten' are thought by Eusebius to be implied by scripture,^^ ^lay be the case that Eusebius did not think 'creature' and 'thing made' could be deduced from any scriptural text. To judge by the whole of his corpus (not Just his early apologetic writings), it is not likely that Eusebius would have thought 'creature' and 'thing made' suited to the Son's nature. He distinguished between God's production of creatures and the begetting of the Son.33 He held that creatures were created ex nihilo and rejected the alleged "Arian" claim that the Son could be called a creatio ex nihilo. Furthermore, he maintained that the Son's generation was not like the creation of creatures and that the Son was from the Father. Eusebius appears to have viewed the divide between creation and divinity much like Athanasius of Alexandria did: starkly. Also like Athanasius, Eusebius also saw the Son's begetting as eternal and unique, but unlike the Alexandrian bishop denied that there was an identity of nature between them. Therefore, Eusebius may have rejected 'creature' or 'thing made' on the basis of unsuitability for the Son and not being implied by scripture. But soon after the outbreak of controversy between Arius and Alexander, we find Eusebius writing to Alexander in defense of Arius's use of 'creature' for the Son.34 Eusebius reports that Alexander had accused Arius of teaching that "the Son came to be from nothing like one of the all things."^5 Eusebius cites Arius's own letter to Alexander, in which he states that the Son is "perfect creature of God, but not as one of the creatures."^^ Arius, Eusebius explains, is not simply assimilating the Son to the rest of the creatures; he and his supporters are careful 27. EUSEBIUS, Dem. ev. 5.1.6; 6.13.2. 28. EUSEBIUS, Dem. ev. 4.2.2; 4.3.1. 29. EUSEBIUS, Dem. ev. 4.2.1 (bis); 4.15.35; 4.15.54; 4.15.64; 4.16.56, etc. 30. J. R. LYMAN, Christology and Cosmology: Models of Divine Activity in Origen, Eusebius, and Athanasius, Oxford, 1993: 113. 31. Note that he did use 6r|)iioi)0Yr|na in Dem. ev. 4.2.1. 32. Key passages for Eusebius include: Prov 8 (Praep. ev. 7.12; Dem. ev. 5.1); Ps 109 {Praep. ev. 1.12; Dem. ev. 4.15; 4.16; 5.3); Col 1:15 {Dem. ev. 5.1); and Wis 6-8 {Praep. ev. 7.12; Dem. ev. 5.1). 33. LYMAN, Christology and Cosmology, 96-113. 34. Urk. 1. 35. Urk. 7.2 {Athanasius Werke IIl/l: 14, 5-6 OPITZ). 36. Urk. 7.2 (Athanasius Werke Ill/l: 14, 10-11 OPITZ); cf. Urk. 6.2 {Athanasius Werke Ill/J: 12,9-10 OPITZ). MARK 52 DELCOGLIANO to distinguish the Son from the rest of creation. Whether Eusebius's assessment of Arius's position is correct is beside the point; more significant is the fact that Eusebius was willing to defend a term for the Son that he had until that point not used and may have deemed inappropriate. Contemporary theological developments continued to influence Eusebius. After the Councils of Antioch in 324 and of Nicaea in 325, Eusebius once again abandoned 'creature' as a suitable name for the Son. The creed of the former council stated the Son is from the Father "not as something made (JIOLTIXOV), but as something begotten in the proper sense (Yevvr|p« xupimg)" and anathematized "those who either say or think or preach that the Son of God is a creature (xTLOixa) or generated (yevvriTOv) or made (jtOLi-|x6v) and is not something truly begotten (d>,T|9(I)5 y^'^'vi^*')-"^^ The Nicene creed affirmed that the Son is "begotten not made" (yevvriBevta ov TC0Li]9evxa) and anathematized calling the Son "created" (xxiaxog). A contemporary explanation of the Nicene creed interprets these lines as a condemnation of calling the Son a 'creature' (xxia|ia) or 'thing made' (JTOLITIJXX).^'^ Eusebius concurs. He explains that 'made' (JioiT]6ev) is suitable only for creatures (xxCoiiaxa) made through the Son (cf John 1:3).39 He agrees with the condemnation of xxioxog since it is unscriptural, noting that the anathemas appended to the creed merely "prohibited the use of unscriptural terms, on account of which nearly all the church's confusion and disorder has arisen.'"^O This statement is noteworthy because Eusebius appears to be renouncing the principle of scriptural implication—at least for contested names—which he had earlier applied with such glee. The reaction against Arius caused Eusebius to reconsider his initial support of Arius's term 'creature' and revert to his earlier usage. He recognizes that the term is not scriptural. We see the same stance in his anti-Marcellan works from 337-338. Here Eusebius exphcitly denies that the Son is a xxiapa."*' He studiously avoids calling the Son a 'creature' or 'thing made', though he continues to call the Son 'something begotten'. Eusebius appears very concerned in his last writings to avoid even the appearance of classifying the Son in any way as created or made. Note that here he does present an exegetical argument against using Proverbs 8:22 37. Urk. 18.9 and 18.13 (Athanasius Werke IWI: 38, 18-19 [Greek] and 39, 16-17 [Greek] OPITZ). The Greek words come from Schwartz's retroversion of the Syriac. This exact character of this document has recently been the object of debate; see H. S T R U T W O L F , Die Trinilatstheologie und Christologie des Euseb von Caesarea. Eine dogmengeschichttiche Untersuchung seiner Platonismusreieption und Wirkungsgeschichte, Gottingen, 1999: 31^4; and B R E N N E C K E et al., Athanasius Werke lll/l, xxxiv-xxxvi. 38. Urk. 23.3. 39. Urk. 22.11. 40. Urk. 22.15 (Athanasius Werke Hill: 46, 10-12 OPITZ). 41. Eccl. theo. 1.9. BASIL OF CAESAREA ON THE PRIMACY OF THE NAME 'SON' 53 to support calling the Son a 'creature', an argument later adopted by Basil.''^ But in his corpus he never offers a detailed argument against the principle of scriptural implication as such. Regarding the name 'creature' for the Son, he merely says that it is unscriptural and should be reserved for those beings made through the Son, and denies that Proverbs 8:22 is a basis for the name. And so, except for a brief flirtation with 'creature' as a way of supporting Arius, Eusebius rejected 'creature' and 'thing made' as unsuitable for the Son. On this point he is in harmony with Athanasius and is a precursor to Basil's views. C. Athanasius Even though Eusebius came to reject 'creature' and 'thing made' as suitable for the Son, the use of these terms on the part of other Eusebians should not be interpreted as Athanasius of Alexandria did, who argued for a strict distinction between God and creation.According to Athanasius, calling the Son a 'creature' or 'thing made' placed him on the wrong side of the line dividing God from creation. It needs to be emphasized that those Eusebians who called the Son a 'creature' and 'thing made' —like Arius himself—were generally careful to distinguish him from the rest of creation, and would not have agreed with Athanasius's sharp division between God and creation. Athanasius is hostile to 'creature' and 'thing made' as names for the Son. He devotes his second Oration against the Arians to refuting the validity of these names, offering alternative interpretations of Hebrews 3:2, Acts 2:36, and Proverbs 8:22. But Athanasius not only accepts 'something begotten' as a name for the Son, but makes the term central to his understanding of the Son. For example, he says that the Father is "Father of something begotten from his own substance" (jiaxfiQ Yevvi]|iaxog ex Tfjg 16105 ovoiac,),'^^ and repeatedly defines the Son as xf]c, ovaiac, tot) Jtaxgog 'L6IOV ytvvr][ia.'^^ Even if Athanasius denied the principle of scriptural imphcation in the case of 'creature' and 'thing made', he appears to accept it in the case of 'something begotten'. Athanasius's partial denial of the principle of scriptural implication is premised on the notion that the nature of the subject under discussion determines the meaning of the verbs and nouns applied to that subject. This is best seen in his counter-exegesis of Hebrews 3:2. Athanasius denies that the Son is a 'thing made' even though this verse says that God made him. He contends that the particular expressions used when speaking about the Son do not matter as long as "what the Son is according to nature is confessed.'"'^ He writes: 42. On this, see below, p.64-6. 43. K . A N A T O L I O S , Athanasius: the Coherence of his Thought, London, 1998, calls the distinction between God and the created world an "intrinsic center of coherence in Athanasius's theology" (3). 44. A T H A N A S I U S , Or. 2.2. 45. E.g. A T H A N A S I U S , O r 1.15.1. 46. Or 2.3, 5-6 (Athanasius Werke III: 179 M E T Z L E R / SAVVIDIS): 6vo|iai;otJ0iv oi ayiot, MARK 54 DELCOGLIANO For terms do not repudiate the nature; rather, the nature draws the terms to itself and changes them. Indeed, the terms are not prior to substances, but substances are first and the terms for them are second. Therefore, when the substance is a thing made or creature, then "he has made" and "he has come to be" and "he created" are said in the proper sense in their case and they signify a thing made. But when the substance is something begotten and Son, then "he has made" and "he has come to be" and "he created" are no longer said in the proper sense in his case, nor do they signify a thing made. But instead of "he has begotten" the expression "he has made" is used indifferently.^^ Those names said "in the proper sense" (xugitog) of the subject accurately communicate the nature of the one thus named and their meanings are not altered. They are hterally true. Other names not said in the proper sense do not reflect the nature of the one thus named. They are not hterally true, but are imprecise ways of referring to or describing the natures. Hence when "to make," is said of the Son, since the Son according to Athanasius is not made but rather begotten, it means "to beget" because it is used of a being who is by nature something begotten. The nature of the subject of which the verb is used determines its meaning. Hence, "to make" in this case is synonymous with "to beget."'** The weakness of Athanasius's counter-exegesis is that he does not propose the criteria by which one can know whether a verb is used of the Son in the proper sense. What constitutes proper usage seems to be based upon prior assumptions. Peter Widdicombe is surely correct to note that for Athanasius, the Rule of Faith "provides us with the necessary prior knowledge that the Son who may be described as 'made' in any given text is in fact the Son by nature."49 But this understanding of the Rule of Faith is shaped by his own theological assumptions and his opponents would not have agreed with him.^o Hence his argument for dSiat^OQCu xofj oi'itiaxog ovtog em xwv xoiouxcov, ecog x6 xaxoi ^iiaiv ojioXoYEixai. 47. Or. 2.3,7-14 {Athanasius Werke III: 179 M . / S.): oil yotQ a l XegEig xfiv ((jvoiv JiaoaiQoiJvaxi, dXka \iak'koy f\ xctg X E | E I 5 EI5 Eai)xf)v '€kv.ovoa nExapdXXei. x a l yde oti jTQOXEpai xwv oi(ai(i)v a l X E | E L 5 , akk' a i oi)oiat jiQwxat, x a i bziixzQm. xoiixwv a l X E I E I ? . 6t6 x a l oxav ij ovaia :rtotii|ia ^ xxto^a f|, XOXE X6 "8JIOII-|OE" x a l x6 " E Y E V E X O " x a l x6 " E X X L O E " xijQtcog EJi' atJTCbv kzyzxai XE x a l ai]naivEi x6 JtotT)|xa. "Oxav 8E ij oijaia YEvvii|a,a fi x a l vibz,, XOXE x6 "EJtoiriaE" x a l x6 " E Y E V E X O " x a l x6 "Exxiaev", oiixExi xtiQicog EJI' aijxoi) XEixat oti6E JtoiTiiia or||jaivEi- akV dvxl xoD " E Y E V V I I O E " X U "EJIOLIIOEV" d6ta(t)OQCfl5 xtg XEXQrjxai Qf]|iaxt. See W I D D I C O M B E , Fatherhood, 214-1, for a discussion of the interpretative principle Athanasius formulates here. 48. For a more detailed discussion and a comparison with Eunomius's theory of names, see D E L C O G L I A N O , Theor,'of Names, 124-7. 49. W I D D I C O M B E , Fatherhood, 215. 50. See F. Y O U N G , Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture, Cambridge, 1997: 2 9 ^ 5 , on how Athanasius interpreted the Bible according to the unitive "mind" (6idvoia) of scripture that he learned from the Rule of Faith. BASIL OF CAESAREA ON THE PRIMACY OF THE NAME 'SON' 55 which names are said properly is tendentious, even i f 'Son' has the weight of Christian tradition behind it. Basil's own rejection of the principle of scriptural implication owes nothing to Athanasius's argument. In connection with this idea of names said properly, Athanasius offers a related methodology for interpreting Hebrews 3:2, Acts 2:36, and Proverbs 8:22. Since the eternal Son is not made or created in the proper sense, to what, asks Athanasius, are these verses referring in the proper or literal sense? They cannot be talking about the eternal Son, so they must be about the incarnate Lord.''' It is in the incarnation that the Son is made and created. Here Athanasius is adopting an exegetical methodology frequently employed by Origen, sometimes called "two nature exegesis," whereby some passages are seen as references to Christ as divine and others as reference to him as human.^2 As we shall see, Basil adopts Athanasius's interpretation of Acts 2:36, but not Proverbs 8:22 (he does not deal with Heb 3:2 in Contra Eunomium). D. From the Eusebians to Eunomius Creedal documents from the 340s reflect the usage of 'creature', 'thing made', and' something begotten' on the part of the Eusebians (but not Eusebius of Caesarea himself). The second Dedication Creed (341) anathematizes those who claim that the Son is 'creature' as one of the creatures, or 'something begotten' as one of the things begotten, or 'thing made' as one of the things made because this is contrary to scriptural teaching.53 The Macrostich Creed (345) endorses Proverbs 8:22 as true of the pre-incarnate Son, but qualifies how it is to be understood: "he has not been generated in a manner similar to the creatures or to the things made that have been generated through him."54 In line with previous usage, these creeds qualify the use of 'something begotten', 'creature', and 'thing made', treat them as more or less synonymous, and appeal to Proverbs 8:22. There is no mention of any of these names in other creeds after 345. Therefore, when Eunomius came to promote 'something begotten', 'thing made', and to a lesser extent 'creature', as names for the Son in the late 350s and early 360s, it amounts to a retrieval of the earlier Eusebian tradition.^5 This may mark a departure from his teacher Aetius, in whose extant works the names 51. O r 2.7,2.12,2.45. 52. The method is classically discussed by M. W I L E S , The Spiritual Gospel: The Interpretation of Fourth Gospel in the Early Church, Cambridge, 1960: 112-28. 53. Oo/fe. 41.4.8. 54. Dok. 44.13 (Athanasius Werke III/J: 286, 5-7 B R E N N E C K E et al.). 55. 'Thing made': Apol. 12.3, 17.8-13, 20.17, 26.11 and 28.22; 'creature': Apol. 18.3-4 and '28.21-22. Note that Apol. 28 is the so-called Confessio Eunomiana that was appended to the Apologia and may not be by Eunomius himself. 56 MARK DELCOGLIANO 'creature'56 or 'thing made'^^ are never found, though of course 'something begotten' is employed in a central way.^* Eunomius's reason is simple: these names are also scriptural and, in line with his theory of names, accurately reflect the ontology of the Only-Begotten. Eunomius opens his treatment of the Son by saying: The Son is also one, for he is the Only-Begotten. Now it would be possible to get rid of all concern and trouble associated with this subject simply by quoting the sayings of the saints in which they declare that the Son is both something begotten and a thing made, thereby making the difference in substance clear by the distinctions in the names.59 And so, scripture teaches several divine names that reflect the ontology of their bearers. Of course the names 'something begotten' and 'thing made' themselves are not used in scripture about the Son. So what Eunomius must mean here is that they are implied by scripture. Hence he too appeals to the principle of scriptural implication. He seems to have connected 'something begotten' with only-begotten [John 1:18].60 The Son's status as creature follows from this: since the OnlyBegotten is different in substance from the Unbegotten, he must therefore also be a creature of the Uncreated.6' Eunomius makes a similar argument regarding 'thing made', appealing to Acts 2:36 and Proverbs 8:22.^2 Note that Eunomius does not say that Proverbs 8:22 implies 'creature' but rather 'thing made.' No doubt Eunomius was aware of the long debate over this contested verse and perhaps for this reason de-emphasized the name 'creature' and Proverbs 8:22 in his Apologia, though without rejecting the significance of either completely. While Eunomius favored 'something begotten' and 'thing made', he did not altogether omit 'creature'.^^ Eunomius, 'creature' is implied by its synonyms 56. Note that Epiphanius interprets Aetius as holding that the Son is a creature; see Pan. 16.3.110 and 7 6 . 8 . 2 . 57. But if the Expositio Patricii et Aetii is genuinely Aetian (as I believe it is), then Aetius does say: "For the image of God is not made (factus) from God but by God. If all things are made by God, the Son is also made by God though from another operation" [Historia acephala 4 . 6 ) . Though the underlying Greek is uncertain, here Aetius seems to be distinguishing between God's production of the Son and the rest of creation in a way reminiscent of Origen. 58. Note that the absence of 'creature' and 'thing made' in Aetius may simply be the result of the poor preservation of his works and the Syntagmation's focus on the relation between Yevviixog and d y E W T i T o g . 5 9 . E U N O M I U S , Apol. 12, 1-4 ( V A G G I O N E , Extant Works, 4 6 - 8 ) , cited by B A S I L at Eun. 2 . 1 , 5 - 9 (SChr 30; 10 S E S B O C S ) . By "sayings of the saints" Eunomius means the scriptures. See also Apol. n,i-]i. 6 0 . E U N O M I U S , Apol. 5, 3 ; 1 2 , 1-2; 15, 8; 1 5 , 13; 2 1 , 15; 2 2 , 2 , etc. 6 1 . E U N O M I U S , Apol. 18 and 2 8 . 2 1 - 2 2 . 6 2 . EUNOMIUS,-Vo/. 2 6 , 1 2 - 1 6 . 6 3 . In the Confessio Eunomiana {Apol. 2 8 , 2 0 - 2 2 ) , Eunomius or a later Eunomian repeats the familiar qualification that the Son is 'something begotten', 'thing made', and 'creature', but not BASIL OF CAESAREA ON THE PRIMACY OF THE NAME 'SON' 57 'thing made' and 'something begotten', which themselves are derived through the principle of scriptural implication. As 'thing made' and 'creature' convey that the Only-Begotten is unlike the Unbegotten in substance, they bear the same meaning as the preferred term 'something begotten'.Therefore, Eunomius puts forward two arguments in favor of calling the Son a 'creature' and 'thing made': (1) they are scriptural based on the principle of scriptural implication (as is 'something begotten'), and (2) they mean the same thing as 'something begotten'. I I . - B A S I L AGAINST 'SOMETHING BEGOTTEN' A N D 'THING M A D E ' Basil's arguments against 'something begotten' and 'thing made' are mainly unique to him. He could not draw on Athanasius to refute 'something begotten' since the Alexandrian bishop heavily promoted this term. He does draw on Athanasius for part of his argument against 'thing made'. But Athanasius's influence on Basil is actually minimal. For Basil rejects the principle of scriptural implication that most previous fourth-century theologians had accepted, and does so on a non-Athanasian basis. Instead he adopts the stance that theologians must limit themselves in a strict way only to the words found in scripture, which by definition are sanctioned by the Holy Spirit. In this section, I argue that Basil takes a novel approach to refuting these two terms that is grounded in a radical view of the exegete's task, and I show that in making this argument he draws on grammatical categories of terms. Basil objects to both of these names on the grounds that they contravene scriptural usage, but uses two distinct tactics: (1) scripture does not derive these terms in the case of the Son, and (2) scripture only uses these terms when it is not a question of the Son. According to Basil, the only name that scripture uses for the Son is nothing other than 'Son'. While Basil deals with 'something begotten' and 'something made' separately, there is much overlap in his arguments in each case. Accordingly, I will analyze Basil's discussion for the two cases simultaneously, noting the differences when necessary. A. Worse than an "idle word": 'something begotten'and 'thing made' as Inappropriate grammatical derivations For both 'something made' and 'something begotten', Basil searches the scriptures to determine where Eunomius might find warrant for calling the Son by such designations. Since there is no verse in which scripture explicitly refers to the Son like others with the same name, adds "just as holy scripture proclaims," and cites Proverbs 8:22. But in Conf. 3, 4-5 (from the 380s) Eunomius does quote Prov 8:22, though not specifically to argue for the validity of the name 'creature'. 64. EUNOMIUS,/4/?o/. 18. See also G R E G O R Y O F N Y S S A , Eun. 3.1.7. 65. Basil employs a different argument against 'creature', to be discus.sed in the next section. For Basil's indebtedness to grammatical traditions, see D E L C O G L I A N O , Theory of Names, 189-260, and the studies by D . R O B E R T S O N cited there. MARK DELCOGLIANO 58 as either a yiwy\\xa oraJioiT||ia, Basil suggests that Eunomius has derived these designations for the Son from descriptions of the Father's action with regard to the Son. Indeed, this is a fair and accurate assessment of what previous generations of theologians had done based on the principle of scriptural implication. But Basil does not agree with this methodology. He proposes that Eunomius has perhaps called the Son 'something made' based on Acts 2:36; Let all the house of Israel know that God has made him Lord and Christ, this Jesus whomyou crucifiedfi^ Basil is on solid ground here. As we have seen. Acts 2:36 was a much debated verse since the beginning of the Trinitarian controversy and was proffered as aprooftext bythose advocating the position that the Son was made.*' We have seen how Eunomius was an heir of this tradition of citing Acts 2:36 to prove that the Son was made. And so, Basil has correctly identified Eunomius's source.** As for 'something begotten', Basil admits that there are many examples where it is said that the Father has begotten the Son and guesses that Eunomius has derived his description of the Son as 'something begotten' from one such passage. He offers Isaiah 9:5 as an example: For a child is begotten to us, and a son is given to us, and his name is called the angel of great counsel.^^ This choice reveals that Basil is part of an exegetical tradition that interprets the passage christologically.™Though Eunomius does not cite this passage, Basil must have chosen to cite it in order to make the following point: it is inappropriate to designate the Son as 'something begotten' simply because he is said to have been begotten. Basil observes that in the continuation of Isaiah 9:6 the child begotten to us is named, not 'something begotten', but rather the angel of great counsel. If the child and son of Isaiah 9:6 were meant tobe called 'something begotten', the passage would not have called himinstead the angel of great counsel. Hence, in the case of 'something begotten' and 'something made' the argument is the same: just because the Father is said to have made or begotten the Son, this does not make it appropriate to designate the Son as 'thing made' or 'something begotten'. In the case of 'something begotten', Basil can point to the evidence of Isaiah 9:5 itself toprove his claim, which is likely why he chose this verse as this trenchant example in the first place. 66. BASIL, Eun. 2.2. 67. See also VAGGIONE, Nicene Revolution, 392. 68. VAGGIONE, Extant Works, 49 n. 6, claims that Eunomius denied that Acts 2:36 was his basis, pointing instead to Prov 8:22 and 1 Cor 1:24; see GREGORY OF NYSSA, Eun. 3.1.21. But here Gregory merely says that Eunomius could have appealed to Prov 8:22 and 1 Cor 1:24 to support calling the Lord 'made,' not that Eunomius did so. 69. BASIL, Eun. 2.7. 70. E.g. JUSTIN MARTYR, Dem. ev. 5.10.6. Apol. 35.2; CLEMENT, Paed. 1.5.24.1; EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA, BASIL OF CAESAREA ON THE PRIMACY OF THE NAME 'SON' 59 B a s i l ' s r e a s o n i n g here m a y appear a b i t o d d . E u n o m i u s ' s p u r p o r t e d l y d e r i v e d terms 'something begotten' 'thing and m a d e ' s e e m t o be logical inferences d r a w n f r o m statements r e g a r d i n g the F a t h e r ' s b e g e t t i n g o r m a k i n g o f the Son. Previous exegetes and theologians had f o u n d this n o t i o n o f s c r i p t u r a l i m p l i c a t i o n u n p r o b l e m a t i c . W h y d o e s n ' t B a s i l g r a n t v a l i d i t y t o s u c h i n f e r e n c e s ? W h y is i t i n a p p r o p r i a t e to c a l l the S o n ' s o m e t h i n g b e g o t t e n ' i f s c r i p t u r e says t h a t G o d b e g o t h i m ? B a s i l v i e w s these d e s i g n a t i o n s as g r a m m a t i c a l ' d e r i v a t i o n s ' . H e says: " n o t e v e n E u n o m i u s w o u l d c l a i m t h a t i t is l e g i t i m a t e f o r h i m , i n d i s c u s s i o n s o f s u c h g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e , to d r e a m u p a n y d e r i v a t i o n s (jr a Qa Yt OYCC?) a n d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s ( m Qa a xr ||iaTia| xo i)5) o f terms.""" I n other words, B a s i l thinks that E u n o m i u s has d e r i v e d ' t h i n g m a d e ' ( j t o i i ] | i a ) f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t the F a t h e r is said to have made (eJTOii] o e v) , a n d ' s o m e t h i n g b e g o t t e n ' (yevvTi^xx) s i m p l y because i t is s a i d t h a t t h e F a t h e r has b e g o t t e n ( e Ye v v i i o e ) . Such language and ideas are reminiscent of grammatical discussions of d e r i v e d names. T h e l i n g u i s t i c category o f " p a r o n y m " — a t e r m not used by B a s i l to d e s c r i b e E u n o m i u s ' s d e r i v a t i o n s , b u t later used b y G r e g o r y o f N y s s a to so^2 — w a s r e c o g n i z e d as f a r b a c k as A r i s t o t l e a n d r e m a i n e d a p e r e n n i a l a m o n g philosophers and grammarians. Aristotle defined paronyms as do topic "those t h i n g s w h i c h h a v e the n a m e t h a t d e s i g n a t e s t h e m f r o m s o m e t h i n g else, w i t h a difference i n ending."^^ A c c o r d i n g to Porphyry, w h o was e x p l a i n i n g Aristotle's d e f i n i t i o n , p a r o n y m s are " t h o s e t h i n g s t h a t get t h e i r d e s i g n a t i o n f r o m a n a m e b y a g r a m m a t i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n (euro xivog 6 v 6 | i a T 0 5 JtaQeaxilH^xi^oOi])."^"' N o t e the s i m i l a r use o f J i a Q a o x T i | i a x i o | i 6 5 —B a s i l uses t h e n o u n . P o r p h y r y t h e verb. But these p h i l o s o p h e r s find precedent for Basil's terms ' d e r i v a t i o n ' and ' t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ' in grammarians w e r e t a l k i n g a b o u t t h i n g s r a t h e r t h a n t e r m s . Y e t w e also s u c h as A p o U o n i u s D y s c o l u s a n d A e l i u s H e r o d i a n u s ( b o t h 2"'' cen. C . E . ) . I n t h e g r a m m a r i a n s , ' d e r i v a t i o n ' ( j i a g a YCO Yi l ) is t h e f o r m a t i o n o f o n e w o r d from a n o t h e r b y a l t e r i n g its e n d i n g t h r o u g h the a p p e n d a g e o f c o m p o n e n t a n d t i o n ' {TcaQaax^[iO-'Cia\Ji6c,) Techne grammatike 'transforma- is the c h a n g e o f a w o r d ' s g r a m m a t i c a l form.^^ -phg attributed to D i o n y s i u s T h r a x (c. 170 - c. 9 0 B . C . E . ) lists seven k i n d s o f d e r i v a t i o n w i t h respect t o proper names: p a t r o n y m i c s , possessives, 71. BASIL, Eun. 2.2, G A L L W I T Z , Against 11-13 Eunomius, (SChr 305: 14 SESBOUE); trans. DELCOGLIANO and RADDE- 132. 72. S e e G R E G O R Y O F N Y S S A , Eun. 3.2.14, where he accuses E u n o m i u s of e m p l o y i n g paronyms and derivations in connection w i t h 'something begotten'. 73. A R I S T O T L E , C a / . I a l 2 - 1 5 . 74. P O R P H Y R Y , Ahstotelis AnsloreUs categorias categorias commentarium, isagoge et in C o m m e n t a r i a in Aristotelem G r a e c a 4.1, B e r l i n , commentarium ( A . B U S S E , Porphyrii 1887), p. 69, line 20 B u s s e ; trans, [slightly altered] S . K . S T R A N G E , Porphyry: L o n d o n , 1992, p. 50. 75. See A P O L L O N I U S D Y S C O L U S , De constructione, passim. On Aristotle Categories, 60 MARK DELCOGLIANO comparatives, superlatives, d i m i n u t i v e s , paronyms, and deverbativesJ^ Paronyms are n a m e s " m a d e f r o m a n o u n , s u c h as T h e o n " ( f r o m Geog, ' g o d ' ) , w h i l e d e v e r b a t i v e s are n a m e s " d e r i v e d f r o m a v e r b , s u c h as P h i l e m o n " ( f r o m 4)L^e(o, ' t o l o v e , r e g a r d w i t h a f f e c t i o n ' ) . ' ' ' ' H e n c e i n the Technics terminology, 'something begotten' a n d ' t h i n g m a d e ' w o u l d be d e v e r b a t i v e d e r i v a t i o n s . B u t B a s i l d o e s n o t use t h i s D i o n y s i a n technical t e r m i n o l o g y , preferring to c a l l E u n o m i u s ' s preferred names " d e r i v a t i o n s " a n d " t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . " N o t e t h a t his assessment o f his o p p o n e n t ' s d e r i v a t i o n s is n o t f a r - f e t c h e d . A later s c h o l i a s t o n the Techne n o t e d t h a t noLi]|a,a is d e r i v e d f r o m jtejtoi^inxaL ( " I h a v e m a d e " ) . ^ ^ B a s i l d i s p l a y s the same k i n d o f g r a m m a t i c a l t h i n k i n g as t h i s s c h o l i a s t . H e n c e i t appears t h a t B a s i l ' s d e s c r i p t i o n of E u n o m i u s ' s usage o f t h e n a m e s Kobi\ \ m . a n d Yevvr||j« as g r a m m a t i c a l d e r i v a t i o n s is i n d e b t e d t o g r a m m a t i c a l t r a d i t i o n s . I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d w h y B a s i l is o p p o s e d t o the f o r m a t i o n o f d e r i v a t i o n s w h e n i n t e r p r e t i n g s c r i p t u r e , w e m u s t c i t e the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the passage c i t e d a b o v e : " F o r i f w e w i l l s u f f e r c h a s t i s e m e n t on the day of judgment word e v e n f o r an idle [ M a t t 1 2 : 3 6 ] , t h e r e c a n be n o d o u b t t h a t w e w i l l h a v e to r e n d e r an a c c o u n t f o r i n n o v a t i o n i n m a t t e r s o f s u c h g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e . " ' ' ^ B a s i l here assumes t h a t E u n o m i u s has the same r e s p e c t f o r the s c r i p t u r e s t h a t he h i m s e l f has. T h e H o l y S p i r i t , as the a u t h o r o f s c r i p t u r e , has said w h a t he has s a i d . I t is i n a p p r o p r i a t e to a l t e r t h e w o r d s o f s c r i p t u r e because of the d a n g e r o f d o i n g so. B a s i l w r i t e s : " w h e n he [ i . e . E u n o m i u s ] alters the f o r m o f t h e p h r a s e he has made [Acts 2:36] so as t o c a l l t h e M a k e r o f t h e u n i v e r s e ' s o m e t h i n g m a d e , ' h o w is t h i s n o t f r a u g h t w i t h d a n g e r ? " * ^ I f e v e n a n idle word is p u n i s h e d , t a m p e r i n g w i t h t h e s c r i p t u r e s , m a k i n g t h e m say w h a t t h e y d o n o t say, i s l i a b l e t o e v e n greater j u d g m e n t . T h u s the s c r i p t u r a l e x e g e t e m u s t a b i d e b y p r e c i s e l y w h a t t h e H o l y S p i r i t has s a i d i n the s c r i p t u r e s . W h e n the H o l y S p i r i t is s i l e n t , w o r d s he n e v e r s a i d c a n n o t be a t t r i b u t e d t o him.81 T h o u g h i t is s a i d t h a t the F a t h e r " h a s m a d e , " the H o l y S p i r i t is s i l e n t o n w h e t h e r the S o n is ' s o m e t h i n g m a d e ' . I f ' t h i n g m a d e ' h a d been s u i t a b l e for the 7 6 . G . U H L I G , Dionysii Thracis Ars grammanca, G r a m m a t i c i G r a e c i 1 . 1 , L e i p z i g , 1 8 8 3 , p. 2 5 , lines 6 - 7 . F o r D i o n y s i u s , there were also derivatives of verbs and pronouns. 7 7 . U H L I G , Ars grammanca, grammaire de Denys le Thrace, 7 8 . A . H i L O A R D , Scholia p. 2 9 , lines 1 - 4 U h l i g . F o r further d i s c u s s i o n , see J . L A L L O T , La 2" edition revue et augmentee, Paris, 1 9 9 8 , : in Dionysii Thracis Artem grammaticam, 135-7. Grammatici Graeci 1.3, L e i p z i g , 1 9 0 1 , p. 3 3 7 , line 3 1 . 79. BASIL, Eun.2.2, G A L L W I T Z , Against 80. B A S I L , Eun.2.2, G A L L W I T Z , Against 14-16 Eunomius, 19-21 Eunomius, 8 1 . B A S I L , Eun. 2.2, (SChr 305: 14 SESBOUE); trans. DELCOGLIANO and RADDE- 305: 14 SESBOUE); trans. DELCOGLIANO and RADDE- 132. (SChr 132. 1 6 - 1 9 ( S C h r 3 0 5 : 1 4 S E S B O O E ) : " P e r h a p s the d i v i n e w o r d has taught us that something is said fittingly in the case of the G o d and Father, but the same is not applicable to the O n l y - B e g o t t e n — a fact w h i c h the H o l y Spirit indicates by his s i l e n c e " (trans. D E L C O G L I A N O and R A D D E - G A L L W I T Z , Against Eunomius, 132). BASIL OF CAESAREA ON THE PRIMACY OF THE NAME 'SON' 61 Son, the Holy Spirit would have used it. But he did not. Therefore one should not call the Son 'something made'. Basil further nuances these points when he discusses 'something begotten'. Appealing to the respect that a good exegete of scripture should have, he writes: Nor should we concede to himon this point that he can change and alter the form of the phrase "he has begotten," which is used with reference to the Father, in order to designate the Son of God as 'something begotten'. For it is not appropriate for him to be quick to clutch at what may be hinted at by the natural sequence of the words, as anyone trained inthe fear of God knows. Rather, one should be content with abiding by the names used in scripture, and through themrender the glorification that is appropriate for God.^^ Here Basil more or less admits that in normal circumstances, the statement that the Father has begotten would entail the Son being licitly called 'something begotten'. But scripture demands a more stringent method of interpretation. The fear of God demands such absolute respect for the integrity of the scriptures. The terms used in the scripture are specially chosen by the Holy Spirit and it is by means of these terms that we properly glorify God. To do otherwise would be to risk offending God. Since scripture itself does not derive 'thing made' and 'something begotten' from statements in which the Father is said to make or beget the Son, neither should the exegete. Basil appeals to the example of the Septuagint translators for such an exegetical methodology: The translators who first rendered Hebrew into Greek did not audaciously attempt to interpret certain names, but simply transliterated the Hebrew pronunciation into Greek, such as 'Sabaoth' and 'Adonai' and 'Eloi' and other words like these. If they showed such respect not only to the divine names but also to many others, then how much fear should we have with regard to the names of the Lord? When did these translators trust themselves to formone of the names on their own authority?After all, they did not even have the confidence totranslate some of these names, lest they water down the clarity of the term's force by introducing meanings that did not fit them.^^ The names used in scripture for the Son have a specific meaning that the Holy Spirit seeks to convey through the use of that name. Accordingly, using other names for the Son obscures what the Holy Spirit intended. Therefore, if these esteemed translators dared not to alter the words of scripture, neither should any of its latter-day interpreters. His main point is that scriptural language is so precise that it needs to be strictly adhered to. The role of the exegete is to determine the meaning of the names used by the Holy Spirit, not to invent names not given sanction by the Holy Spirit. 82. BASIL, Eun. 2.7, 19-26 (SChr 305: 30 SESBOUE). 83. BASIL, Eun. 2.7, 26-37 (SChr 305: 30 SESBOOfi); GALLWITZ, Against Eunomius, 139^0. trans. DELCOGLIANO and RADDE- 62 MARK DELCOGLIANO Therefore, drawing on technical grammar, Basil views 'something begotten' and 'thing made' as grammatical derivations. Even though scripture does not derive these names when speaking of the making or begetting of the Son, Eunomius does. Hence Eunomius is exposed as unfaithful to the scriptures. Basil likens such derivations to the interpolations of Marcion, linking Eunomius with a figure whose heresy was obvious to every fourth-century Christian.^"* It is effective rhetoric. B. "Unsuitable for the splendor of his glory": the scriptural use of 'something begotten' and 'thing made' The next step in Basil's argument is that, even though the Holy Spirit does not use 'thing made' and 'something begotten' in reference to the Son, he does use these terms for others. Hence using these designations for the Son risks confusing the Son with those other things for which they are used. When someone like Eunomius uses these names for the Son, it blurs the boundary between the created order and God. Note that Basil accepts the bifurcation promoted by Athanasius. Basil reports that when 'thing made' is used in scripture, it always refers to the created order.^^ Scripture itself derives 'thing made' from "he has made" when it is a question of created things. Hence it is permissible to call something described as made by God a 'thing made'. Basil cites Genesis 1;1, Psalm 142:5, and Romans 1:20 in support of this derivation. But when the subject is the Son, scripture never derives 'thing made' from "God has made." This in itself indicates that the Son does not belong to the created order and should not be called 'thing made'. As Basil puts it, "Thus scripture employs the termin those cases in which it is useful; in the case of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ it is passed over in silence as unsuitable for the splendor of his glory."^^ Scripture never refers to the Son as 'thing made' because the splendor of his glory demands a more suitable name. Returning to Acts 2:36, Basil notes that in this statement the Son is never called 'thing made'. He then offers an alternative interpretation of Acts 2:36 to remove every pretext of his opponent's appeal to it.^^ Basil says that it refers to the incarnate Christ, not to his substance. When God makes himLord and Christ, the Father is entrusting to Jesus his rule and power over all. Here Basil follows an interpretation of the verse adopted by Eustathius of Antioch and Athanasius. 84. BASIL, Eun. 2.8. 85. BASIL, &m. 2.2. 86. BASIL, Eun. 2.2, 29-32 (SChr 305: 14 GALLWITZ, Against Eunomius, 133. 87. BASIL, Eun. 2.3. SESBOUfi); trans. DELCOGLIANO and RADDE- 88. See EUSTATHIUS, Fr. 72; ATHANASIUS, Or. 2.11-18. 118-120; and SESBOUE, Saint Basile et la Trinite, 159-60. See DRECOLL, Die Entwicklung, BASIL OF CAESAREA ON THE PRIMACY OF THE NAME 'SON' 63 In a similar vein, calling one's offspring 'something begotten' contradicts both scriptural and common usage.^^ Basil cites several scriptural examples of human parents calling their male offspring 'child' or 'son', but finds no indication that a parent addresses his or her son as 'something begotten'. What father or mother kindly and gently disposed to his or her offspring would neglect to designate him 'my son' or 'my child' and address him as 'my something begotten'? For it says; My child, go to the vineyard [Matt 21:28]. And: God will provide himself the lamb for a burnt offering, my child [Gen 22:8]. And again Isaac: Who are you, my child? [Gen 27:18]. And: My son, do not think tightly of the training of the Lord [Prov3:ll]. And: A wise son makes his father glad [Prov 10:1]. There are more passages like these. But there is no indication anywhere that someone addresses his offspring as 'something begotten'.'"' The reason for this, claims Basil, is that 'something begotten' has a wider semantic range than 'son' and is therefore unsuitable for designating the Son: The reason is clear: 'son' and 'child' are the names of living beings, but 'something begotten' is not necessarily such a name. For that which is expelled in miscarriages that occur before full formation can be called 'something begotten', and such a thing is assuredly not even worthy of the designation 'child'. The fruits of the earth are also 'things begotten', but they are not 'children'. It says: / will not drink from what is begotten of this vine [Mark 14:25].9' Yet there is a rare case in which 'something begotten' is used of living things, when an offensive animal is employed as an image of wicked, as in Matthew 23:33; You serpents! You things begotten of vipers! [Matt 23:33].Therefore, it is because of these three connotations of 'something begotten' that Basil thinks that both common usage and the scriptures avoid it for designating offspring. Basil also notes that scripture does not use 'child' (texvov) for the Son since there is something too human about it, as evidenced by Paul's preference for calling him 'Son'.93 89. On Basil's understanding of the relation between common and scriptural usage, see R A D D E G A L L W I T Z , Divine Simplicity, 114-22; and D E L C O G L I A N O , Theoiy of Names, 158-63. For Basil they are never opposed. 90. B A S J L , Eun. 2.8, 14-23 (SChr 305: 32 S E S B O O E ) ; trans. D E L C O G L I A N O and RADDE- G A L L W I T Z , Against Eimomius, 140-1. This passage is the sole instance in which Basil employs motherhood in his argument about the divine names. 91. B A S I L , Eun. 2.8, 23-30 (SChr 305: 32-4 S E S B O U E ) ; trans. D E L C O G L I A N O and R A D D E - G A L L w r x z , Against Eunomius, 141. Basil's text of Mark 14:25 reads y e w T j i i a x o g ("thing begotten") in place of the yevfuiaxog ("thing generated, fruit"). As far as I can tell, this variant is not attested in any ancient mss. for Mark 14:25 or its parallels Matt 26:29 and Luke 22:18. (N. b. Sesboue incorrectly sees this quotation as Matt 26:29; but the omission of COT' aQxi between oi) (XT) niui and TOV YEvvfjiiaxog makes this unlikely.) 92. The traditional English translation is of course: "brood of vipers." 93. Is 9:6 employs uaiSiov, not TEXVOV. 64 MARK DELCOGLIANO Therefore, Basil has shown that scripture derives 'thing made' only in the case of created beings and never when speaking about the Son and that scripture never uses 'something begotten' in place of 'son' (a point backed up by common usage). By reason of scriptural usage, then, both names are unsuitable for the Son. Nonetheless Basil is somewhat ambiguous with regard to 'something begotten'. Even though Basil puts 'something begotten' on par with 'thing made', seeing both as equally foreign to scripture, and even though Basil excoriates Eunomius for using 'something begotten' for the Son, Basil himself sees value in the term and in fact at times calls the Son 'something begotten'. After exposing 'something begotten' as "foreign to both common usage and scriptural usage,"^^ g^sil adopts another tactic for refuting Eunomius's claim that 'something begotten' communicates substance. Here Basil claims that 'something begotten' is a relative term, which by definition communicates a relative property, not substance.95 Hence Basil appears to endorse the usage of 'something begotten' for the Son if it is understood that it is a relative term that communicates the Son's natural relation to the Father and for this reason does not communicate substance as Eunomius claimed.^^ Basil repeats this point in one of his homilies: "the Son exists from the Father in a begotten way ... As something begotten, he preserves sameness in substance."97 Clearly, the name is not primary for Basil as for Athanasius or Eunomius, but at the same time it is not altogether without usefulness. Such, however, cannot be said about 'thing made', a name which Basil never used for the Son. Nonetheless, with regard to 'something begotten' Basil failed to abide by the strict view of scripture that he promoted against Eunomius. I I I . - B A S I L AGAINST 'CREATURE' Basil deploys a different tactic in his argument against 'creature'. Unlike his refutation of the names 'something begotten' and 'thing made', where he formulated a unique argument against their usage, Basil's arguments against 'creature' are drawn from Eusebius of Caesarea, who as mentioned above was opposed to this name. This move on the part of Basil is somewhat surprising, since 'creature' is never used in scripture to describe the Son and thus could have also been cat- 94. B A S I L , Eun. 2.8, 46-47 (SChr 305: 34 SESBOUfi); trans. D E L C O G L I A N O and R A D D E - Gl^LLWTZ, Against Eunomius, 141. 95. B A S I L , Eun. 2.9-10. For Basil's understanding of how relative names function in theological grammar, see D E L C O G L I A N O , Theory of Names, 222-53. 96. Of. B A S I L , Eun. 2.23, 55-62 (SChr 305: 96 S E S B O O E ) . 97. B A S I L , Hom. 24.4 (PG 31: 608a2-5); my translation. The editor, J . Gamier, is baffled by Basil's use of yEvvrina here: "When Basil wrote the books Against Eunomius, the term yewTjua was so displeasing to him that he reproved Eunomius for using it; nor can I muster sufficient astonishment at his willingness to use the same term. I think that Basil wrote it from carelessness, or because he saw that the word had already been appropriated by many others, whose example he thought he could now follow." BASIL OF CAESAREA ON THE PRIMACY OF THE NAME 'SON' 65 egorized as a grammatical derivation based on Proverbs 8;22. It too is susceptible to Basil's argument against the principle of scriptural implication. Instead, the entirety of Basil's refutation of Eunomius on this point is a counter-interpretation of Proverbs 8:22, or rather, an explanation of why placing so much weight on an interpretation of this verse is misguided. I have shown elsewhere how Basil is mainly dependent on Eusebius of Caesarea and not Athanasius for his argument about Proverbs 8:22.^^ So here I will simply summarize its main steps. Basil begins his refutation of 'creature' by noting that the Heteroousians —like many before them—appealed to Proverbs 8:22 as their justification.He then gives three reasons why such an appeal is unjustified. First, this is the only passage in scripture that speaks of the creation of the Son: "But for my part, I have many things to say about this line. First of all, this is said only once in all the scriptures (OTL ojia^ ev Jtdoaig xaig YQa(j)ai5)."'*' In other words, the saying is a hapax legomenon. The implication here is that because scripture speaks of the Son's creation only in this verse, it should be discounted in the face of abundant scriptural evidence elsewhere that the Son is begotten and not created. Second, Basil points out the impenetrable obscurity of the Book of Proverbs: "In this book a great deal of the meaning is hidden and on the whole it proceeds by means of proverbs, parables, dark sayings, and enigmas [cf. Prov 1:6], such that no one may take anything from it that is either indisputable or crystal-clear.""" Basil uniquely claims that no interpretation of Proverbs 8:22 is persuasive. He rejects the optimism of his predecessors that one could convincingly interpret what Wisdom meant when he said that the Lord created him. Basil's third point is as follows: Let us be sure not to let the following point go unnoticed: that other translators, who have hit upon the meaning of the Hebrew words in a more appropriate way, render it as 'he acquired me' instead of he created me. This is going to be a great obstacle for themagainst their blasphemous term'creature.' For the one who said: / have acquired a man through God [Gen. 4:1] clearly used this term, not because he hadcreated Cain, but rather because he had begotten him."^^ 98. M. DELCOGLIANO, "Basil of Caesarea on Proverbs 8:22 and the Sources of Pro-Nicene Theology," Journal of Theological Studies, n.s. 59, 2008; 183-190. See also DRECOLL, Die Entwicklung, 80-1; and SESBOUE, Saint Basile et la Trinite, 162-3. 99. BASIL, Eun. 2.20, 21-25 (SChr 305; 82 SESBOUE). 100. BASIL, Eun. 2.20, 25-27 (SChr 305; 82 SESBOUI5); trans. DELCOGLIANO and RADDEGALLWITZ, Against Eunomius, 160. 101. BASIL, Eun. 2.20, 27-31 (SChr 305: 82 SESBOUE); trans. DELCOGUANO and RADDEGALLWITZ, Against Eunomius, 160. 102. BASIL, Eun. 2.20, 37-44 (SChr 305; 84 SESBOUE); ; trans. DELCOGLIANO and RADDEGALLWTL, Against Eunomius, 160-1. MARK 66 DELCOGLIANO Here Basil appeals to the alternative rendition of Proverbs 8:22 produced by the post-Septuagint translators of the Hebrew scriptures into Greek, Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion. All of them translated it as 'he acquired me' (exxfiaaxo (J£) instead of the Septuagint's 'he created me' (exxLoev |xe)."'3 In addition, scriptural usage shows that "he acquired' is synonymous with "he begot." Thus there is no basis for calling the Son a 'creature' based on this verse. In interpreting Proverbs 8:22, Basil not only advanced three discrete arguments against calling the Son a 'creature' by appeal to Proverbs 8:22, but also endorsed three exegetical principles. (l)Good biblical theology takes into account the whole of the scriptures and does not allow a single verse to outweigh the rest of scripture when there is a contradiction, or at least a conflict. (2) Recognizing the limitations of genre is critical. Some biblical books like Proverbs are purposely obscure and do not lend themselves to irrefutable interpretations. Thus a hapax legomenon from a puzzling book should not override the multitude of passages from less obtuse books. (3) Recourse to the Hebrew text is the ultimate arbiter of correct exegesis. Not knowing Hebrew himself, Basil appeals to the scholarship of the post-Septuagint translators (albeit through the scholarship of Eusebius). These three elements of Basil's methodology are strikingly critical (and daresay modern). One may speculate that Basil chose not to use the same argument against 'creature' as he had for 'something begotten' and 'thing made' because he found the argument of Eusebius sufficient. Another reason for the different approach may be that, since 'creature' was not as central for Eunomius as the other two names were, Basil could content himself with briefly summarizing Eusebius rather than devoting many lines against this termas he had for 'something begotten' and 'thing made'. IV. - BASIL'S ARGUMENT FOR THE PRIMACY OF 'SON' We have seen how Basil demonstrated that one cannot call the Son a novt\\iXi based on the fact that it is said that the Father has made (ejtoiTioev), a YevvT|[j,a simply because it is said that the Father has begotten (eYevvi]ae), and a xxLOfixx based on the exxtoev of Proverbs 8:22. Rather, one must stick to the names for the Son which scripture uses, which by definition reflects the intent and teaching of the Spirit. And so Basil argues that Scripture's preferred designation for the Son is nothing other than 'Son'. His approach to prove this is to cite examples: "Peter ... did not say: 'you are something begotten,' but rather: You are the Christ, the Son of the living God 103. See EUSEBIUS, Ecd. KLOSTERMANN / HANSEN); cf. theo. 3.2.15 (GCS 14, Eusebius Werke IV: 142,1 - 142,5 3.2.20 (GCS 14, Eusebius Werke IV: 142, 33-35 K. / H.). 104. Nonetheless, in practice Basil appealed little to the Hebrew text; see W.A. TiECK, "Basil of Caesarea and the Bible"(Ph.D. diss., Columbia, 1953), 96. BASIL OF CAESAREA ON THE PRIMACY OF THE NAME SON' 67 [Matt 16:16]."'05 George of Laodicea had appealed to this same verse when arguing that the Son should be called 'Son' and not 'begotten'. 106The full significance of the point being made here by Basil and by George only becomes evident if one recalls the context of this verse.'"'' After Peter makes this statement, Jesus replies: Blessed are you, Simon Barjona! For flesh and blood have not revealed this to you, by my Father who is in heaven [Matt 16:17]. Peter's use of 'Son' is but a mediation of the Father's own name for the Son. Therefore, 'Son' does not merely have scriptural warrant, but is the Father's preferred name for his Son. What more authority does one need? Yet to bolster his point and to demonstrate how a Christian of unimpeachable piety uses the names for the Son sanctioned by the Father, Basil further discusses Pauline usage. He notes that Paul everywhere uses 'Son' and nowhere 'something begotten'.' OS Basil explains: It is a dreadful thing for us to address himby one of our own names when God has bestowed on him the name which is above every name [Phil 2:9]. He says: For you are my Son, today I have begotten you [Ps 2:7]. Designating himhere as 'something begotten' because he was begotten and not 'Son' would have been more consistent with their [i.e. the Eunomians'] reasoning. But that's not what has beensaid. Therefore, whoever keeps before his eyes the tribunal of Christ and sees howdangerous it is to subtract from or add anything to what the Spirit handed down should not endeavor to innovate on his own, but acquiesceto what the saints announcedbeforehand.'09 Hence 'Son' is preferred not merely because Paul used and approved it, but because it is the very name that the Father bestowed upon the Son. Basil makes an unusual exegetical move here. The name above every name in Philippians 2:9 is generally taken as 'Jesus', as shown by Philippians 2:10: that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth and so forth. In contrast, Basil views the name above every name as 'Son', and cites Psalm 2:7 in support of this. Athanasius had frequently cited this verse as proof of the Son's natural sonship of the Father."0 But the function of the verse in Basil's argument is different. His use of Psalm2:7 is clever because it demonstrates that when 105. BASIL, Eun.2.1, 12-15 (SChr 305: 28 SESBOOE); trans. DELCOGLIANO and RADDEGALLWITZ, Against Eunomius, 139. Note that Eunomius refers to Matt 16:17 in Apol.26 in defense of his appeal toActs 2:36. 106. EPIPHANIUS, Pan. 73.20.3-4. Some have denied George's role in the authorship of the Homoiousian document preserved in Po/i. 73.12-22. These claims are refuted in M. DELCOGLIANO, "The Literary Corpus of George of Laodicea," Vigiliae Christianae, 65, 2011: 150-169. 107. On George's interpretation of Matt 16:16-17, see DELCOGLIANO, 'The Influence of Athanasius and the Homoiousians," 215. 108. BASIL, Eun. 2.7. 109. BASIL, Eun.2.8, 2-12 (SChr 305: 30-2 SESBOOE); GALLWITZ, Against Eunomius, 140. 110. ATHANASIUS, Or. 2.23, Or. 2.57, and Deer. 13 trans. DELCOGLIANO and RADDE- 68 MARK DELCOGLIANO the Father begets the Son, he himself names him, not 'something begotten', but 'Son'.'" It is the same argument used for Isaiah 9:6, as discussed above. Thus the proper designation for one who is begotten of God the Father is 'Son', not 'something begotten', in contrast to what Eunomius claimed based on a long exegetical tradition rooted in the principle of scriptural implication. Basil employed this interpretation of Philippians 2:9 elsewhere, though there it is coupled with Acts 4:12, not Psalm2:7. "2 In the citation above, Basil concludes with the point that the scriptures are not to be tampered with. Scripture uses 'Son' and the responsible exegete must abide by the words of the Spirit. He implies that Eunomius has tampered with the scriptures, echoing his earlier association of him with Marcion. Once again we see his strict view of the way in which the scriptural text should be used. Scriptural usage, which reflects the Father's own usage, demands that only 'Son' be used for the Son. V. - CONCLUSION In this study we have seen how Basil's arguments against Eunomius's preferred names 'something begotten', 'thing made', and 'creature' and for the primacy of 'Son' are both rooted in the work of his predecessors and highly innovative. While there are traces of indebtedness to Athanasius in his exegesis of Acts 2:36 and to George of Laodicea in his use of Matthew 16:16, his critique of using Proverbs 8:22 as the basis for calling the Son a 'creature' is mostly based on Eusebius of Caesarea. Yet Basil also took novel approaches. Indeed, his very rejection of 'something begotten' is surprising, given its centrality in Athanasius, though the dismissiveness with which he treats it is understandable given Eunomius's vigorous advocacy of this term. His arguments against 'something begotten' and 'thing made' as grammatical derivations and their scriptural usage is also unique. Here Basil speaks as much about the interpretation of these specific passages of scripture as about how all of scripture is to be interpreted. Basil went further than the traditional view, found in Athanasius, Eusebius of Caesarea, and even the Homoiousians, that certain words were scriptural and others were not. He denied the established principle that certain names for God were implied by scripture, even though ordinary logic would allow for such derivations. He enunciates a radical viewof the interpretive task in which the exegete is limited only to the words explicitly used in scripture. This attitude is based on the viewthat the Holy Spirit is the author of scripture. What the Holy Spirit intends to teach is expressed in scripture; what is not stated in scripture indicates the silence of the Holy Spirit, pointing to what is foreign to the Spirit's teaching. Any deviation from this approach is tantamount to tampering with the scriptures. Yet as we saw even Basil himself could not maintain this high standard. Nonetheless the 11). See BASIL, Eun. 112. Ep. 210.4. 2.20. BASIL OF CAESAREA ON THE PRIMACY OF THE NAME SON' 69 exegetical methodology he outlined in the Contra Eimomium always remained a latent feature of his approach. It helps perhaps to explain his well-known theological reticence, especially in his perceived "failure" to call the Holy Spirit 'God'. Therefore, in his exegetical refutation of Eunomius's preferred names for the Son, Basil at the same time oudines the principles of responsible exegesis. Rejecting the principle of scriptural implication endorsed by his predecessors, he himself implies that Eunomius is irresponsible as an exegete. And so, Basil suggests that bad exegesis, in addition to a flawed theory of names, has resulted in bad theology. Mark D E L C O G L I A N O University of St. Thomas A B S T R A C T : This paper examines Basil of Caesarea's arguments against the traditional names for the Son preferred by his opponent Eunomius, "something begotten" (yevvriiia), "thing made" (jioii](xa), and "creature" (XTIO|JXJI), and in favor of his preferred name, "Son" (tJlog). In order to contextualize Basil's arguments, a survey of earlier fourth-century usage and opinions about Eunomius's preferred names is provided, revealing that Basil's approach is both rooted in the tradition and innovative. While in his arguments against "creature" he draws upon Eusebius of Caesarea, against "something begotten" and "thing made" Basil argues that these names contravene scriptural usage and cannot even be inferred from passages in scripture because of the exacting character of the scriptural text, thereby opposing a long tradition of doing precisely this. Here he uses technical grammatical categories to support his strict view of the exegete's task, which he sees as limited only to the words explicitly used in scripture. Thus in these arguments over names Basil says as much about his understanding of the principles of correct scriptural exegesis as he does about the concrete interpretations of specific passages. R E S U M E : Cet article etudie les raisons avancees par Basile de Cesaree pour refuser les denominations traditionnelles du Fils preferees par son adversaire Eunome: « e n g e n d r e » (yevvTinct), «(etre) ayant ete fabrique» (jtoi^T|na), et « c r e a t u r e » (HXtO(xa), de meme que les raisons avancees en faveur du nom qu'il prefere: « F i l s » (Dtog). Dans le but de contextualiser ces noms, on se livre ici a une enquete sur I'utilisation anterieure, durant le IV« siecle, des noms preferes par Eunome, et sur les opinions qui lui sont relatives. Nous montrons alors que I'approche de Basile est ancree dans la tradition, en meme temps qu'innovatrice. Alors que, dans ses critiques du nom de « c r e a t u r e » , il s'appuie sur Eusebe de Cesaree, lorsqu'il prend position contre le terme d ' « e n g e n d r e » ou (etre) « a y a n t ete fabrique», Basile fait valoir que ces noms contreviennent a I'usage scripturaire et ne peuvent meme pas etre inferes en s'appuyant sur les passages de I'Ecriture, en raison des exigences liees au texte scripturaire. II s'oppose ainsi a une longue tradition qui avait preconise ces emprunts. II se sert des categories techniques grammaticales pour delimiter la tache de I'exegete, qu'il considere devoir se limiter aux mots explicitement utilises dans I'Ecriture. Ainsi, dans son argumentation relative aux noms, Basile nous en revele autant sur sa comprehension de ce que doivent etre les principes corrects de I'exegese scripturaire que sur I'interpretation concrete de passages specifiques.