Against All Odds – The Paradoxical Victory of the West Bank Settlers

AGAINST ALL ODDS – THE PARADOXICAL VICTORY OF THE WEST BANK SETTLERS Ami Pedahzur* Department of Government The University of Texas at Austin Holly McCarthy** PhD Student – Department of History The University of Texas at Austin The settlers constitute a minority group whose goals are becoming increasingly unpopular among Israelis. As a result, the degree of legitimacy granted to them by the government gradually eroded over the years. However, their project still thrives. We attribute their impressive success to their focus on the bureaucracy. As early as the 1960s, the settlers engaged in a constant effort to identify actors in state and semi-state agencies that had common interests with them. At first they mobilized supporters from within those agencies. Later they made any effort to fill available positions with their own people. Today, the settlers’ movement in Israel has fused itself with the relevant elements within the bureaucracy to a degree that many state agencies serve as extensions of the settler movement. Keywords: West Bank; settlers; interest groups; strategy; bureaucracy * Email: pedahzur@austin.utexas.edu ** Email: hlg23@georgetown.edu INTRODUCTION During the last forty years, the dispute between the Left and the Right over the future of the territories that Israel seized during the Six Day War shaped the nature of the political system of the country. Initially, the majority of Israelis were sympathetic to initiatives of groups that set out to establish Jewish settlements in the territories.1 The core settler groups were motivated by ideological and theological fervour, but most of their supporters were simply pragmatic. Far less concerned with the biblical and sacred duty of the Jewish people to settle various parts of the promised-land, the less ideological supporters shared a sense of historical affinity towards the territories and perceived them as an important buffer zone between Israel and hostile Arab militaries. Over time, the tide of support shifted against the settlers. The peace agreement with Egypt in 1979, by alleviating much of the fear of another round of war with Israel’s most formidable enemy, was the first impetus undermining support for settling the territories for ideological reasons. Meanwhile, the territories themselves – for the most part, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 2 became sources of security concerns in their own right. Tensions in these areas reached a boiling point in late 1987 with the outbreak of the first Intifada and the devastating violence and sense of insecurity it brought with it [to both parties]. Israel’s efforts to perpetuate control over these territories consumed much of the energy of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and the intelligence community at the expense of protecting the country from other looming security threats. The continuous holding of these territories exposed Israel to liabilities as well, such as a deteriorating image in the international arena. Until the late 1960s, Israel depicted itself as the modern incarnation of Biblical David who was trying to protect himself from the mighty Goliath.3 However, the settlement project which followed in the wake of the territorial acquisitions, came at an inopportune moment in the climate of world politics and popular cultural developments in the West. It coincided with the final stages of the de-colonization era and the 1967 ‘Summer of Love’ in North America. As settlements expanded across the territories, Israel’s popularity among its allies around the world began to contract. A sobering sign of Israel’s troubled image came in 2006 when former American president Jimmy Carter offered a harsh critique of Israel’s policies in a bestselling book entitled Palestine: Peace, Not Apartheid. 4 Although Carter is known for his dovish worldview, he nevertheless had served as president of Israel’s closest ally. His critique drove home the point that Israel was losing friends. The accumulation of circumstances gradually chilled the enthusiasm of Israeli leaders from both ends of the political spectrum towards the settlers and their operations. The last prime minister who fully committed to the settlers’ vision was Yitzhak Shamir, whose tenure ended in 1992. 2 Nevertheless, the settlement project never halted. In fact, it continued to expand. In the summer of 2010 the number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank rose to a new peak – 320,157.5 FIGURE 1: SETTLEMENTS, OUTPOSTS AND SETTLERS 1976-2010 The objective of this article is to answer the question: How did the West Bank settlers’ movement,6 a small, yet highly committed group of individuals, manage to beat the odds and, even under the least favourable conditions, perpetuate and expand its control for more than four decades. '"INSIDERS VS. OUTSIDERS" – STRUCTURING CHALLENGES A consistent component of the literature inquiring into the settlers’ movement is a focus on the challenging nature of various strategies employed by the group over the years.7 These include protest,8 illegal settlement operations,9 political violence,10 and even terrorism.11 A smaller body of works deals with the less ostentatious and more cooperative strategies employed such as lobbying, representation by parties, and especially fusion with the apparatus of the state.12 In retrospect, we will argue that these lower-profile, less-explored strategies served the interests of the settlers much better than the conspicuous ones.13 The literature is rich with scholarly inquisition about questions of how ‘advocacy’, ‘pressure’ or ‘interest’ groups14 choose their strategies and under which conditions they shift from one strategy to another. One approach particularly relevant for the case of the settlers’ movement is that of Insiders vs. Outsiders. Scholars employing this paradigm tend to focus their attention on the status of the group vis-à-vis the regime as a key variable in determining the groups’ strategic choices.15 However, this 3 proposed causal mechanism was subjected to criticism over issues of cause and effect, the employment of horizontal strategies, and the existence of vertical strategies. A critical examination of these three shortcomings follows below. The Cause and Effect Challenge It is often difficult to discern whether the status of the group determines its strategy or vice versa. Maloney Jordan et al. observe that the status of a group can be determined by the degree of legitimacy granted to it by the regime. Legitimacy is measured by the level of overlap between the interests of the group and those of the administration.16 This entails an assessment of the areas of agreement between the two parties over the issues that the group advocates and only then can its strategic choices be evaluated. The Horizontal Strategies Challenge Groups often apply more than one strategy at any given point in time. In some cases such multifaceted strategies involve both challenging and cooperative elements. The convoluted nature of this situation can blur the dependent variable and consequently undermine any theoretical contribution. To obviate this difficulty, the concept of a ‘hybrid’ strategy is introduced.17 This enables a description of cases in which a group applies several strategies simultaneously. The term hybrid also serves as a mediating category between the challenging and the cooperative strategies. The Vertical Strategies Challenge Groups always operate in dynamic environments.18 Frequent turnovers of cabinets and elected officials inevitably lead to repeated changes in the groups’ status. In addition, the groups themselves are not static. Their makeup and goals shift over time. Thus, their legitimacy can be compromised by changes in their own agendas which distance them even from a sympathetic administration.19 Volatile environments are particularly challenging for highly institutionalized groups, such as labour unions.20 Beyond the task of promoting their interests, such groups are also responsible for providing their members with a broad array of goods and services. Though big and powerful, these groups are also highly vulnerable. A change in their status from insiders to outsiders can threaten not only their longterm interests but also their immediate ability to provide members with those benefits which make affiliation so attractive. A suggested solution for this problem is compartmentalization through the introduction of a second layer of strategies. The first, the horizontal layer, discussed above, is reactive and aimed at influencing elected policy makers through the escalating continuum of challenging, hybrid and cooperative strategies. The groups alter their strategies in accordance with the degree of legitimacy granted to them by the elected echelons. The second layer, known as fusion21 with the 4 bureaucracy, is independent of the first and guarantees that regardless of the group's status vis-à-vis elected policy makers, its ability to provide vital services remains intact.22 The Weberian bureaucratic model portrays public servants as professionals who receive policy guidelines from elected officials. According to this model, the duty of public officials is to shape the general ideas given them by elected officials into concrete plans. Further down the line, other bureaucrats implement and enforce these policies in accordance with formal laws and regulations. However, this model of bureaucracy is merely an ideal type. 23 In reality, bureaucrats frequently wield more power than they are customarily granted. 24 Unlike elected officials, public servants spend a considerable part of their career in one ministry or office and thus acquire invaluable knowledge. They become well-versed in the maze of regulations of their bureau and are thus keenly aware of various voids and loopholes that exist in their part of the bureaucracy. Public servants thrive in ambiguous situations. During transitional periods like changes of administrations, in the face of unexpected positive events like a large wave of immigration to the country, and during cataclysmic episodes along the lines of wars, economic crises, and natural disasters, public servants who have learned the ambiguities of their administrative discretion are able to exploit the system. By way of contrast, such circumstances serve as major stressors for policy makers. They are under extreme pressure to react immediately and effectively with regard to the allocation of authority and resources in policy implementation. Guidelines must be provided for the division of labour among ministries and agencies; suitable laws and regulations need to be promulgated.25 However, elected policy makers usually lack the required degree of expertise necessary for formulating such critical and decisive policies, especially when unanticipated circumstances create high-pressure decision-making. Thus, they must rely on the knowledge and proficiency of the bureaucrats.26 The situation of ambiguity provides civil servants with an opportunity to expand their control and gain a substantial degree of influence over the policy-making process. Representatives of interest groups who are stakeholders in areas affected by force majeure circumstances that generate ambiguity between legislative and executive authority understand that cultivating relations with public servants, rather than solely focusing on elected officials, presents more opportunities for favourable outcomes for their efforts. Thus the ‘fusion strategy’ warrants a closer look and some further delineation. While the exact notion of ‘fusion’ with the bureaucracy is yet to be fully conceptualized, Oded Haklai has captured the gist of this strategy through the notion of ‘state penetration’ which he defines as ‘the ability of organized societal forces to infiltrate into arms of the civil and military bureaucracies and build alliances with 5 elements in the state apparatus such that the latter’s loyalty to state rules becomes eclipsed by sympathy to the societal group’s objectives’.27 We prefer the term ‘fusion’ due to its less forceful nature. Groups employing this strategy do more than penetrate the state. They give it a bear hug, virtually fusing with the apparatus to such a degree that the boundaries between the state and the group become indistinct. In an attempt to avoid the risk of relying on the good will of civil servants who may or may not be fully committed to their agendas, groups also try to place their own people as employees in the relevant branches of the bureaucracy and thus to turn the public administration, or at least parts of it, into a cooperative ally of their objectives. In this way, fusion is not really a variable, but rather, a constant. SETTING THE STAGE: ISRAEL AFTER 1967 Until the late 1960s, the idea of settling Jews in most parts of the biblical Promised Land was a hypothetical matter.28 The Six Day War turned the geostrategic reality in the Middle East on its head. Within a matter of one week Israel expanded its hold to territories that were more than three times as large as its sovereign boundaries.29 The swift war and vast occupation of territories posed significant challenges for Israel’s political leadership, which had no concrete contingency plan for such a scenario.30 Most members of the cabinet agreed that the territories should serve as a bargaining chip for future negotiations with the Arab countries. However, they were divided over the question of how to govern these acquisitions in the interim. Ministers shaped independent policies—a fact that generated a great amount of confusion. 31 Sharp-eyed policy entrepreneurs, 32 for the most part bureaucrats who expected to gain a great deal from the new state of affairs,33 quickly identified and filled the voids created by the disparate policies. The most powerful branch of the bureaucracy in the post war era was the military, which exercised control over the occupied territories and enjoyed an unprecedented degree of popular support. The IDF made strong strategic arguments in favour of perpetuating the hold over the new frontier in its entirety. In the months prior to the war, the Israeli public and elite were consumed by fears that the narrow borders of the state would compromise its ability to defend the Israeli heartland effectively. The Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and the West Bank provided the strategic depth for which the IDF desperately yearned. 34 Yet strategic considerations were only one part of a much larger picture. Savvy entrepreneurs saw limitless opportunities in the vast Sinai Peninsula which is rich in natural resources. Moreover, the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza were a source of cheap labour and constituted a new market for Israeli goods. While entrepreneurs from the private sector saw the potential for making profits, civil servants identified opportunities to expand their bureaus’ areas of control. Increasing responsibilities justified requests for larger budgets from the 6 state. Enhanced budgets usually translate into a greater degree of influence. Consequentially, officeholders in these agencies stood better chances for improving their respective positions on Israel’s narrow bureaucratic ladder.35 The Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund, both quasi-state agencies belonging neither to the private nor to the public sector, were among those most eager to take advantage of the developments. Both agencies served as pillars of the Yishuv’s settlement apparatus in the pre-State era. With the declaration of the State in 1948 and the subsequent nationalization of its lands, the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund, both gigantic organizations, were rendered almost obsolete. The subsequent loss of their raison d'être presented formidable challenges for their survival. Both bodies found new operative niches by assuming secondary duties such as forestation projects, assistance to immigrants, and extra-curricular Zionist education. With the renewal of settlement, this time in the occupied territories, these nearly-defunct agencies seized the opportunity to make use of their vast knowledge in settlement affairs. More accurately, they were seized by a much more influential body in the Israeli administrative apparatus - the security establishment. This sector proved highly instrumental in reviving these moribund bodies. Through the Nahal (Fighting Pioneer Youth) branch of the IDF, members of ideological youth movements traditionally divided their time as military conscripts between military duties and the formation and maintenance of agricultural communities in the periphery.36 With the sudden acquisition of territories offering extensive land for cultivation, both the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund undertook significant facilitating roles in renewed pioneering endeavours. 37 This ‘opportunity seeking’ from both the private and public sectors was not the only the post-war territorial reality. The new borders had revitalized old ideas about a ‘Greater Israel’ that resonated with both ends of the political spectrum. 38 More importantly, the new reality of Israel’s territorial borders catalyzed an entirely new set of ideas. SEBASTIA – EVEN OUTSIDERS CAN SUCCEED The beginning was humble. A relatively small group of young activists, many of them followers of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, head of the Merkaz Harav Yeshiva,39 set the tone.40 In many accounts of this beginning, these young men and women are bundled together and are referred to as members of ‘Gush Emunim’ (Bloc of the Faithful). In fact, they constituted a network of several groups from the Gush Etzion, Hebron and the Elon More enclaves, which were socially and ideologically linked to one another. They operated semi-independently in different territorial areas and at various points in time. The ‘Gush Emunim’ group, credited as beginning of the settler movement, was not established until 1974, seven years after the Six Day War and several months after the Yom Kippur War. Its official formation could be referred to as a symbolic milestone; but by that time the settlement project was already well underway. 7 The settler, a new archetype of an activist orthodox Jew who combined religious zeal with an absolute commitment to settling the promised-land, stood in sharp contrast to the moderate image of traditional Zionist Religious leadership. Shortly after the 1967 battles ended, the followers of an activist orthodox Rabbi, Zvi Yehuda Kook, laid the foundations for a two-layered strategy. The first layer, the façade, focused on settlement initiatives and protest activities. The second layer, which was mostly hidden from the public eye, included a careful mapping of the formal and semi-formal branches of the bureaucracy that were interested in expanding their span of control to the territories. Furthermore, Kook’s students began to study the convoluted legal frameworks, which served to guide Israel’s operations in the occupied territories.41 The six-year period between the Six Day and the Yom Kippur wars could be labelled as the first golden era of the settlers. Though the settlement movment never officially adopted the ‘Allon Plan’, the Labour-led cabinets followed it. The plan, put forth by Yigal Allon in the late 1960s, advocated the settling of Jews all over the occupied territories, with the single exception of the densely populated Palestinian areas in the heart of the Samaria area. The agendas of both the cabinet and the settlers almost completely overlapped. This provided the settlers with a type of insider status that facilitated their efforts to cultivate and develop cooperative strategies within the political framework. The Yom Kippur War sent a shockwave through the political system leading to the downfall of Golda Meir’s cabinet and the formation of Yitzhak Rabin’s first cabinet in 1974. These events coincided with the founding of Gush Emunim by Rabbi Kook’s followers. Rabin’s determination to prevent the young activists from settling in the heavily populated heart of the West Bank was the source for the first significant rift between the cabinet and the settlers.42 The crisis reached its boiling point when members of the Elon Moreh enclave, who were determined to settle in Sebastia, refused to concede to Rabin’s firm decision to prevent them from attaining their goal.43 The settlers, who were well aware of schisms within Rabin’s cabinet, responded by employing a ‘hybrid strategy’ of both confrontation and negotiation. In conjunction with their continuous attempts to settle in Sebastia, which included violent clashes with the IDF, they engaged in negotiations with the hawkish faction of the Labour Party. At that time, the Labour party was led by Yigal Allon and Yisrael Galili and enjoyed resounding support from Rabin’s political archrival, Shimon Peres. Haim Gouri, a poet and a journalist, who was associated with the Labour Party but who was also an advocate of the Greater Israel ideology, was entrusted by the cabinet to negotiate with the settlers. The negotiations led to a compromise in which the settlers agreed to resettle in the nearby IDF base of Kadum, just seven miles west of Nablus. This compromise served as a milestone for the settlers. Within a short period of time they turned their stronghold in Kadum to the core of Israel’s settlements in Samaria 8 and expanded their presence in the area by establishing the settlements of Kedumim and Elon Moreh. BEGIN AND SHARON – INSIDERS OR OUTSIDERS? The pivotal moment for the settlers arrived in 1977, three years after the official formation of ‘Gush Emunim’. The right-wing bloc led by the Likud party won the elections for the first time in the history of the State of Israel. Upon taking office, Prime Minister Menahem Begin, who for decades was the main advocate of the ‘Greater Israel’ ideology, went to see Rabbi Kook and asked for his blessing. Shortly afterwards in a speech to the members of the Elon Moreh enclave, Begin vowed to establish many more such settlements, solidifying his image as the ultimate supporter of the settlers. True to his word, Begin assigned Ariel Sharon, the Minister of Agriculture, with the responsibility for expediting the formation of new settlements in the West Bank. The complete overlap between the objectives of the cabinet and those of the settlers at that point in time allowed the settlers to rely solely on cooperative strategies. One unintended consequence of the close collaboration between the bureaucrats and the leaders of the settlers was the further solidification of ties between the settlers and the bureaucracy. The settlers mobilized supporters from within the public administration and gradually placed their own group members in key bureaucratic positions.44 This strategy of essentially fusing with the state apparatus paid off more quickly than the settlers had expected. Less than two years after coming to power, however, Begin surprised the world by becoming the first Israeli leader who gave up territory (the Sinai Peninsula) for the sake of a peace treaty with an Arab country (Egypt). The loss of land and subsequent destruction of settlements was greeted with outrage by the settlers’ movement. The peace negotiations with Egypt created a rift between the settlers and the cabinet and placed the leadership of Gush Emunim in an awkward position. On the one hand, the group fiercely objected to any territorial concession. 45 On the other hand, it received constant reassurance that Begin was still committed to the expansion of the West Bank settlements. Thus, they had to walk a very fine line to best protect their interests. What emerged was a ‘hybrid strategy’. While some of the movement’s activists resorted to confrontational activities by leading the struggle against relinquishing settlements in Sinai, others worked closely with the cabinet and its representatives in an attempt to capitalize on Begin’s promise to expand the Jewish presence in the West Bank. 46 In employing this dual hybrid strategy, the settlers succeeded in expanding their territorial presence despite the apparent setback. During the five year period between Anwar Sadat’s visit to Israel in 1977 and the removal of the last Israeli settlement from Sinai in 1982, the number of settlements in the West Bank more than doubled, from 41 to 91, and the number of settlers multiplied almost fivefold, from 4,400 to 21,700. 9 Notwithstanding these achievements, the evacuation and demolition of the settlements in Sinai taught Rabbi Kook’s students two valuable lessons. First, they could never put their fate in the hands of outsiders.47 Ariel Sharon, who was handpicked by Begin to serve as the project manager for the expansion of the West Bank settlements, delivered a devastating blow with the removal of the Sinai settlements, and in the eyes of the settler movement this would not be the last betrayal by Sharon. Not only did he provide the hesitant Begin with his blessing to the agreement with Egypt, but he also agreed to lead the operation for the removal of the Sinai settlements. Sharon mobilized the full might of the IDF and took advantage of the state’s formidable power to subdue a much weaker societal actor. 48 The second lesson learned was that success introduces a new set of challenges. The substantial growth in the number of settlements during Begin’s tenure increased the settlers’ dependence on state resources. 49 Thus, despite their discontent with the cabinet, the settlement leadership no longer had the privilege of alienating the state by constantly challenging it.50 INSIDERS – THE GOLDEN DECADE OF THE SETTLERS The 1980s was a turbulent and painful decade for most Israelis. The tiny nation was struggling through the debacle of the First Lebanon War [1982] and an unprecedented economic crisis. For the settlers, however, this was a golden era. In the summer of 1983 Begin stepped down as prime minister and was succeeded by the even more hawkish Yitzhak Shamir. By 1984 it became clear that while the Israeli voters were dissatisfied with the Likud’s leadership, they were not ready to move back to a Labour-led coalition. From 1984 to 1990, the Israeli political system was caught in a paralyzing gridlock that forced the Likud and Labour into National Unity Cabinets. Paradoxically, Labour’s membership in the coalitions did not slow down the rate at which the settlements expanded. At that point in time the Labour party itself was torn between hawks and doves. While it did not endorse the Likud’s goal to expand settlement activity in the heart of the West Bank, it vowed not to remove existing settlements and encouraged settlement activities consistent with the Allon plan. During the tenure of the National Unity cabinets, the settlers’ interests were represented by the ministers from the National Religious Party and the Likud. The political stalemate prevented Israel from adopting peace initiatives that might have led to further territorial concessions. This provided the settlers with an insider status which they parlayed for the most part into collaborative strategies. Consequently, for more than a decade the state offered incentives to Israelis to buy property in the West Bank. Those who were amendable to the idea of living in the West Bank, mostly young middle-class couples, were lured by a combination of cheap and spacious housing, attractive statesponsored mortgages, and excellent municipal services. Furthermore, the proximity of most West Bank settlements to Israel’s main metropolitan areas—most notably Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem— 10 allowed these young couples to improve their living standards without sacrificing their jobs or even introducing significant changes in their social lives. For purposes of illustration, the driving distance from Ariel, Israel’s largest settlement in the West Bank, is 18 miles to Tel-Aviv and 30 miles to Jerusalem. The distance from Qazrin, the largest settlement in the Golan Heights, to Tel-Aviv is 87 miles and to Jerusalem is 125 miles. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the West Bank settlements received two additional boosts. First, the influx of immigrants from the former Soviet Union created a severe shortage in the realestate market, so prices soared. Many immigrants who could not afford even small apartments in Israel’s main cities were encouraged to settle in the West Bank where they could buy spacious homes. Secondly, the state was faced with increasing demands from the Ultra-Orthodox sector and its representatives in the Knesset. The Ultra-Orthodox parties, who had always enjoyed significant degrees of political leverage, demanded that the state provide their constituents with affordable living arrangements. While the Ultra-Orthodox community constitutes only 8 percent of the Jewish population in Israel, it leads the nation in terms of population growth and poverty rates. Its neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and Bnei Brak, the largest Ultra-Orthodox centres in Israel, are overpopulated and very expensive. The combination of low income, high birth rates, and increasing demand on already expensive real estate forced the state to find cheap land in uninhabited areas located close to the Ultra-Orthodox centres. The answer was found in the West Bank. Beitar Illit was built in 1988 in Gush Etzion, a location 5 miles south-west of Jerusalem.51 Two years later Modi'in Illit was established. The town is a mile and a half east of the Green Line and only 14 miles southeast of Bnei Brak.52 OUTSIDERS, YET WINNERS! In 1992 Yoel Bin-Nun, one of the most prominent students of Rabbi Kook, published an article that several years later turned into a milestone for the West Bank settlers. Bin-Nun’s main contention was that directing massive amounts of energy from the Zionist Religious camp toward furthering the settlements’ project came at the significant expense of alienating large segments of Israeli society.53 The idea of settling the Land of Israel was an integral part of Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak HaCohen Kook’s theology, and thus the decision taken by the followers of his son, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda, to focus their energies on the expansion of existing settlements, was understandable. However, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda’s decision to prioritize the settling effort over his father’s vision of bringing the people of Israel closer together, posed a significant challenge. The settlements became a bone of contention in Israel. Thus, lobbying within the cabinet as well as leveraging state resources, rather than mobilizing the public, became the preferred and successful path to forming new settlements.54 11 At the time Bin-Nun's article was published, the settlement project in the West Bank had reached a new peak of prosperity. The number of settlers now exceeded 100,000. However, the author's words fell on deaf ears. The settler leaders, who enjoyed close ties to Shamir’s cabinet and had tightened their grip over the bureaucracy were oblivious to the drama that was unfolding in their own backyard.55 Though the process was gradual, the first Intifada that broke out in late 1987 had a significant impact on Israeli society. Many who were previously indifferent to the perpetuation of Israel’s control over the West Bank gradually came to the realization that the costs now exceeded the benefits. Yitzhak Shamir’s reluctant acceptance of an invitation to send an Israeli delegation to the Madrid Peace Summit in early 1992 caught the settlers by surprise. Although they had no reason to suspect that Shamir was inclined to push the peace process forward and consequently commit to territorial concessions, the heads of Tehiya and Moledet, the parties with the closest ties to the settlers, decided to withdraw from Shamir’s right-wing coalition.56 In retrospect, the point of teaching Shamir a lesson proved to be a misplaced step. The collapse of Shamir’s cabinet initiated a domino effect. Political erosion within the government led to Knesset elections. It would have been logical for settlers’ parties to form a joint list in order to maximize the electoral potential of their supporters; however, personal differences resulted in six different electoral lists, three of which failed to garner enough votes to cross the representation threshold.57 For the first time in almost two decades the Israeli left managed to form a coalition without the Likud. For many years, Yitzhak Rabin, head of the Labour Party and the newly elected prime minister, was considered a hawk. During his tenure as the Minister of Defence in the 1980s and most notably following the outbreak of the Intifada, he solidified this image by instructing the IDF to crack down on Palestinian protesters. Despite his tough public image, the settlers never forgot his first tenure as prime minister and the explicit aversion that he manifested towards their project and modes of operation. In September of 1993, a little over a year after he came to power for the second time, Rabin signed the Oslo accords. Unlike the case of the Madrid peace talks, this time Israel engaged in meaningful negotiations and paved the way for the formation of the Palestinian National Authority. The settlers were infuriated. To add insult to injury, Rabin and the majority of his cabinet members distanced themselves from the settlers’ leaders. The prime minister appointed his ailing deputy Minister of Defence, Motta Gur, as the cabinet’s liaison to the settlers. This was nothing short of an earthquake for the leaders of the Yesha Council [Judea and Samaria Council], who for years enjoyed unlimited access to most ministries, and in many cases held official positions within them. Their new status as outsiders eliminated the possibility of employing cooperative strategies and left them with two complementary alternatives – massive protest and greater fusion with the bureaucracy. 12 The main advantage of the confrontational route was that it drew considerable attention to the settlers’ cause. Indeed, starting in the fall of 1993 and ending two years later with the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, the national and international media were captivated by the unprecedented wave of settlers’ protest.58 The Yesha Council, however, did not set the tone of the protest. A new movement, Zo Artzeinu [This is Our Land], emerged as the champion of the various protest groups. Their tactics were diverse, ranging from demonstrations to acts of civil disobedience and even political violence. The Yesha Council, meanwhile, focused its energy on two main objectives: The first was the maintenance of a flow of state resources to existing settlements and the second was the expansion of their project despite the given hardships. Continuous operations deep inside the state’s bureaucracy proved a wise investment. As shown in figure 1, the outcomes to the moratorium enacted by Rabin’s cabinet on the formation of new settlements , were inconclusive. While the decline in the establishment of new settlements is evident, it is also clear that the population growth of the settlers maintained its momentum.59 INSIDERS AGAIN? Benjamin Netanyahu’s victory in the 1996 national elections and the formation of a right-wing coalition provided the settlers with momentary relief after three years of continuous struggle. The new hawkish prime minister was torn, however, between a commitment to his core ideology and mounting pressures from the international community to keep the peace process alive. Thus, he made sure to slow down the pace of the talks with the Palestinians. At the same time, he chose not to return to the Shamir-Sharon policy of offering active state support for the formation of new settlements. In one stroke, the settlers lost hope of the ‘insiders’ status that they were hoping to attain under the new leadership. In January 1997, Netanyahu signed the Hebron Agreement, which led to a redeployment of the IDF in the city and allowed the Palestinian population more freedom. A year and a half later, he disappointed the settlers again by leading an Israeli delegation to the Wye Summit. The objective of the talks was to give the peace process a boost. Ariel Sharon, now Foreign Minister, was asked by the Prime Minister to provide his seal of approval for the accords, which included gradual transfer of additional West Bank territories to the Palestinian Authority. Once again, Sharon agreed to move settlers from their place and gave Netanyahu his blessing. At the same time, he encouraged the frustrated settlers to take action. This marked a major milestone for a new endeavour. Outposts would serve as the new version of settlements and would provide another way to construct Jewish strongholds in strategic areas of the West Bank.60 To use the concept coined by the renowned historian Barbara Tuchman, what unfolded next is best described as a ‘March of Folly’. 61 Netanyahu, like his mentor Shamir eight years earlier, deliberately dragged his feet and proved excessively hesitant in following the stipulations of the Wye 13 River Memorandum at a time when the outposts operation gathered momentum. In an unfortunate turn for the settlers, the Moledet party along with two Hawkish parliament members from the Likud decided to protest against the Wye Memorandum by casting a non-confidence ballot. As a result, Netanyahu’s tenure came to an abrupt end. The resulting process took the same path as that in 1992. Zealous Knesset members brought down a right-wing cabinet over what they presented as the interests of the settlers. And once again, in the ensuing elections, the Israeli voter brought to power the Labour Party, this time led by Ehud Barak, over the incumbent right-wing Prime Minister. This outcome should have been devastating to the settlers’ objectives. OUTSIDERS AND STILL WINNERS Barak resolved to follow in Rabin’s footsteps, as he promised during the election campaign. Indeed, a year after assuming office, Barak led an Israeli delegation to Camp-David, where under the sponsorship of president Clinton, he and the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat were expected to bring the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians to a conclusion once and for all. The problem that became clear was that neither the Israeli nor the Palestinian main political factions were ready for reconciliation. The talks hit a dead end.62 To head off criticism upon his return to Israel, Barak declared that his real goal in going to Camp David was to unveil the true character of the Palestinian leader who, Barak insisted, never intended to sign a peace treaty. [This does not blend with the immediately preceding remarks] But Barak’s political fate was already sealed. His coalition partners, most notably the religious parties, departed from the cabinet in protest of his apparent willingness to make significant territorial concessions. On September 27, 2000, The Second (Al-Aqsa) Intifada broke out and the entire peace process collapsed. For a brief moment, things seemed to go in the settlers’ direction. Then in March of 2001 Ariel Sharon, who led the Likud, delivered a major defeat to Ehud Barak in special prime ministerial elections. The Intifada brought three years of continuous suicide attacks to the Israeli heartland. The fact that most of the victims of terrorism were not settlers yielded unexpected consequences.63 Public opinion polls detected a new trend among Israelis. On the one hand, they showed that the Jewish public in Israel shared the settlers’ view of the Palestinians and had given up on the peace process. On the other hand, they illuminated growing Israeli support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state—even at the price of evacuating settlements. The Jews in Israel had grown tired of their forced marriage to the Palestinians. 64 Their willingness to cede territories in the West Bank (not the entire West Bank, as some interpret it) resulted from the fear that the perpetual control over the Palestinians in the West Bank would bring more waves of terrorism to the Israeli population. Most 14 Israelis were also concerned that once the number of settlers in the West Bank reached a critical mass, the de-facto annexation of the territories would become inevitable. Under such circumstances Israel would face increasing demands to grant its Palestinian residents full citizenship rights—a step that would unavoidably turn Israel into a bi-national state in which the Jews would be a minority.65 Here stood the point of departure for two consecutive processes that Sharon initiated and which had the potential of pushing the settlers towards the ‘outside’ end of the legitimacy spectrum. The first process was the erection of the security barrier in the West Bank. Despite the unequivocal denial of Sharon’s spokesmen, the barrier became a de-facto border between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, a fact that shattered any prospect for the realization of the ‘Greater Israel’ ideology. Sixty percent of the West Bank settlements remained on the Palestinian side of the border. However, since the majority of the settlers reside in close proximity to the ‘Green Line’, 76.2 percent of them remained on the Israeli side of the fence. The second process was the implementation of the ‘Disengagement Plan’ in the summer of 2005. The withdrawal from Gaza, as well as the removal of four settlements in the Northern part of the West Bank, brought the official number of settlements from 146 down to 125. These numbers, however, distort the real picture. By 2005 there were actually over 200 settlements. Yet, many of them were not labelled as such. As mentioned earlier, settlements established after the signing of the Oslo Accords—many of them as a result Ariel Sharon’s initiatives—were labelled as ‘outposts’.66 Furthermore, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), despite the implementation of the disengagement plan, the number of settlers had actually increased from 243,900 in 2004 (prior to the disengagement) to 289,600 in 2008—a growth of nearly 16 percent. To add to the puzzle, during those years the cabinet was led by Sharon and later by his successor, Ehud Olmert. Olmert's main campaign promise was to execute the ‘Realignment Plan’, a sequel to the disengagement, the goal of which was to minimize Israeli control over territories in the West Bank.67 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS An article written in Ha'aretz in March of 2010 would have alarmed the average Israeli had it been written ten years earlier. The headline read: 'Twenty-One Percent of the Settlers Believe that an Evacuation should be subverted by all Means'. Among the many findings, one in particular stood out. Fifty-four percent of the settlers claimed that the government had no legitimacy to evacuate settlements.68 Political leaders from the Right, most notably Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who was ardently opposed to the formation of an independent Palestinian state, were becoming amenable to that very idea. This trend increased concerns that a cabinet decision to evacuate settlements in the West Bank was imminent. This would then have served as a strong indicator that 15 the Israeli society was approaching an unprecedented crisis that could quickly escalate to a civil war.69 However, the level of concern among most Israelis including the settlers seemed surprisingly mild. It is not that the potential for violence in the settlements diminished—quite the contrary. In recent years, young settlers have perpetrated more violent attacks than ever before, mostly against Palestinians. Settlers' goals are becoming increasingly unpopular among Israelis.70 As a result, the degree of legitimacy granted to them by different cabinets, including those from the right-wing, gradually eroded over the years. This fact led them to the ‘outsiders’ end of the legitimacy scale. At an early stage in the group’s existence the leadership realized that basing their strategies on the degree of overlap between their goals and those of the rapidly changing cabinets was dangerous. More than once they were caught off guard by politicians who seemed supportive of the settlers’ cause, but after coming to office, turned into formidable foes. Furthermore, the turn toward contentious strategies has proven to be a double edged sword. On the one hand, it drew a lot of attention to their cause. On the other hand, these strategies often alienated the very constituents whose support the settlers were trying to mobilize. Thus, the conventional strategies that interest groups around the world tend to apply were not enough. The impressive success stemmed from their secondary strategy. Political savvy led them to the understanding that, beyond their unpredictable behaviour, elected politicians also hold their positions for limited periods of time. Bureaucrats, on the other hand, can remain in the same position for decades. Furthermore, high turnover rates among elected policy makers increases their reliance on professional civil servants. Unlike other minority groups, the settlers have realized that the key for success is located in the bureaucracy. Thus, as early as the 1960s, they engaged in a constant effort to identify state and semi-state agencies that had common interests with them. On an individual level, they mobilized supporters from within the state apparatus. Finally, they made indefatigable efforts to fill available positions with their own people. Today, the settlers’ movement in Israel has fused itself with the relevant elements within the bureaucracy to a degree that many state agencies serve as extensions of the settler movement. 16 Notes We will use the neutral term territories, rather than the politically contentious ‘occupied’, ‘held’ or ‘liberated’ territories. 1 Most Israelis refer to these territories as Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. These names are considered politically loaded and less known beyond Israel. Hence, for the sake of non-Israeli readers as well as for the purpose of avoiding the use of terms which could be indicative of a certain political inclination, we chose to use the more neutral and better known appellations: the West Bank and Gaza. 2 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881-2001, 1st Vintage Books ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 2001). 3 4 Jimmy Carter, Palestine: Peace not Apartheid (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). This number does not include the greater Jerusalem area. For further details see: Ami Pedahzur, The Triumph of Israel's Radical Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 5 We use the term “settlers’ movement” in an attempt to break away from the scholarly tradition which focuses on a single group such as ‘Gush Emunim’ or the ‘Yesha Council’. Part of our argument is that the settlers could never have reached such a success if they chose to operate within the framework of a well-defined and static organization. 6 See Yael Yishai, Land of paradoxes : interest politics in Israel, SUNY series in Israeli studies (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1991). 7 Gideon Aran and Michael Fiege, "The Movement to Stop the Withdrawal in Sinai: A Sociological Perspective," Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 23, no. 1 (1987); Ian Lustick, For the land and the Lord : Jewish fundamentalism in Israel (New York, N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988); Gadi Wolfsfeld, The politics of provocation : participation and protest in Israel, SUNY series in Israeli studies (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1988). 8 Ehud Sprinzak, Gush emunim : the politics of Zionist fundamentalism in Israel (New York, NY: American Jewish Committee, Institute of Human Relations, 1986). 9 Ehud Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Ehud Sprinzak, Brother against brother : violence and extremism in Israeli politics from Altalena to the Rabin assassination (New York, NY: Free Press, 1999). 10 Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, Jewish terrorism in Israel, Columbia studies in terrorism and irregular warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 11 For some exceptions, see Israel Drori, Foreign workers in Israel: Global Perspectives, Suny series in Israeli studies (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009); Oded Haklai, "Religious-nationalist mobilization and state penetration - Lessons from Jewish settlers' activism in Israel and the West Bank," Comparative Political Studies 40(2007); Anat. Rot, Sod ha-koah: Moetset Yesha u-maavakeha be-geder ha-hafradah uve-tokhnit ha-hitnatkut, Neyar emdah mis. 61 (Yerushalayim: ha-Makhon ha-Yisreeli le-demokratyah, 2005). (Hebrew); Yishai, Land of paradoxes : interest politics in Israel. 12 13 14 Alan Arian, The Second Republic: Politics in Israel (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1998). The various terms are used in the literature interchangeably. 17 William A. Maloney, Grant Jordan, and Andrew M. McLaughlin, "Interest Groups and Public Policy: The Insider/Outsider Model Revisited," Journal of Public Policy 14, no. 1 (1994). Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, Organized interests and American democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1986).; Edward C. Page, "The insider/outsider distinction: an empirical investigation," The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 1, no. 2 (1999).:205-14. 15 Maloney, Jordan, and McLaughlin, "Interest Groups and Public Policy: The Insider/Outsider Model Revisited.". 16 Paul. Burstein and April. Linton, "The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence and Theoretical Concerns," Social Forces 81, no. 2 (2002). 17 Yair Zalmanovitch, "Transitions in Israel's policymaking network," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 555(1998). 18 Ami Pedahzur, "The Golan Residents Committee: From an Ally to a Foe" (University of Haifa, 1996). MA Thesis. Department of Political Science (Hebrew). 19 Robert H. Salisbury et al., "Who Works with Whom? Interest Group Alliances and Opposition," The American Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (1987). 1217-34. 20 We borrow the term fusion from the psychological literature. See Ángel Gómez et al., "On the Nature of Identity Fusion: Insights into the Construct and a New Measure," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 100, no. 5 (2011). 21 Yael. Yishai, "Interest-Groups and Bureaucrats in a Party-Democracy - The Case Of Israel," Public Administration 70, no. 2 (1992).: 269-85. 22 23 G. Auerbach and I. Sharkansky, Politics and planning in the Holy City (Transaction Publishers, 2007). Haklai, "Religious-nationalist mobilization and state penetration - Lessons from Jewish settlers' activism in Israel and the West Bank."; David Lehmann and Batia Siebzehner, Remaking Israeli Judaism: the challenge of Shas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 24 Ira Sharkansky and Yair Zalmanovitch, "Improvisation in public administration and policy making in Israel," Public Administration Review 60, no. 4 (2000). 321-29. 25 Ira Sharkansky and Asher Friedberg, "Ambiguities in Policymaking and Administration: A Typology," International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior 1, no. 1 (1998).. 26 Haklai, "Religious-nationalist mobilization and state penetration - Lessons from Jewish settlers' activism in Israel and the West Bank.". 27 Nadav Shelef, Evolving nationalism: homeland, identity, and religion in Israel, 1925-2005 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010). 28 Michael Oren, Six days of war: June 1967 and the making of the modern Middle East, 1st Presidio Press ed. (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003). 29 Tom Segev, 1967 : Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East, 1st U.S. ed. (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007). 30 31 Reuven Pedatzur, The triumph of embarrassment; Israel and the territories after the Six-Day War [The triumph of embarrassment; Israel and the territories after the Six-Day War] (Tel-Aviv Yad Tabenkin, Mekhon Gelili,: Bitan, 1996). (Hebrew) 18 For an elaboration of the concept, see M. Mintrom, "Policy entrepreneurs and the diffusion of innovation," American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (1997); M. Mintrom and S. Vergari, "Policy networks and innovation diffusion: The case of state education reforms," Journal of Politics 60, no. 1 (1998).. 32 33 Segev, 1967 : Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East. Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land: The War Over Israel's Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967-2007 (New York: Nation Books, 2007). 34 35 Segev, 1967 : Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East. From 1967 until 1980 more than 40 settlements were established by the Nahal in areas seized by Israel in 1967. 36 For elaboration see Zertal and Eldar, Lords of the Land: The War Over Israel's Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967-2007 37 Rael Jean Isaac, Israel divided : idealogical politics in the Jewish State (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). 38 Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook developed the ideology of his father, Abraham Isaac Kook. According to Kook senior, the formation of the state of Israel was the first step in the redemption of the Jewish people. His son considered the outcomes of the Six Day War as yet another step in the redemption process and encouraged his followers to settle in every part of the territories. 39 Gideon Aran, Erets Yisrael ben dat u-politikah : ha-tenuah la-atsirat ha-nesigah be-Sinai u-lekaheha [Eretz Israel between politics and religion], Mehkere Mekhon Yerushalayim le-heker Yisrael (Yerushalayim: Mekhon Yerushalayim le-heker Yisrael, 1985).(Hebrew); Gideon. Aran, "From Religious Zionism to Zionist Religion: The Roots of Gush Emunim and its Culture" (The Hebrew University, 1987); Michael Feige, Settling in the hearts : Jewish fundamentalism in the occupied territories, Raphael Patai series in Jewish folklore and anthropology (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2009); Lustick, For the land and the Lord : Jewish fundamentalism in Israel; Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right. 40 Zertal and Eldar, Lords of the Land: The War Over Israel's Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 19672007 41 Earlier protests of Kook’s followers against Golda Meir’s cabinet were linked to the armistice talks with Syria. 42 43 Yitzhak Rabin and Dov Goldstein, Pinkas sherut, 1st ed. (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Maariv, 1979). 44 For elaboration see: Pedahzur, The Triumph of Israel's Radical Right. Aran, Erets Yisrael ben dat u-politikah : ha-tenuah la-atsirat ha-nesigah be-Sinai u-lekaheha; Sprinzak, Gush emunim : the politics of Zionist fundamentalism in Israel. 45 Aran, Erets Yisrael ben dat u-politikah : ha-tenuah la-atsirat ha-nesigah be-Sinai u-lekaheha.(Hebrew); Haggai Segal, Yamit, sof: ha-maavak la-`atsirat ha-nesigah be-Sinai [Yamit, End: The Struggle against the Withdrawal in Sinai] (Mizrah Binyamin: Sifriyat Bet El; Gush Katif: Midreshet ha-darom, 1999).(Hebrew) 46 Nir Hefez and Gadi Bloom, ha-Roeh: sipur hayav shel Ariel Sharon [Ariel Sharon: a Life] (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Aharonot : Sifre Hemed, 2005). [Hebrew] 47 For more about the strong state theory, see Haklai, "Religious-nationalist mobilization and state penetration - Lessons from Jewish settlers' activism in Israel and the West Bank."; Joel Migdal, Strong 19 48 societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). See Feige, Settling in the hearts : Jewish fundamentalism in the occupied territories; Rot, Sod ha-koah: Moetset Yesha u-maavakeha be-geder ha-hafradah uve-tokhnit ha-hitnatkut; Yishai, Land of paradoxes : interest politics in Israel. 49 Lars Christiansen and Keith Dowding, "Pluralism or State Autonomy? The Case of Amnesty International (British Section): the Insider/Outsider Group," Political Studies 42, no. 1 (1994); Maloney, Jordan, and McLaughlin, "Interest Groups and Public Policy: The Insider/Outsider Model Revisited." 50 By 2010 the population of the city was over 36,000 with an average annual increase rate of 6.5 percent. 51 52 By 2010 the population of the city was over 48,000 with an average annual increase rate of 7.9 percent. 53 Yoel Bin-Nun, "We did not Succeed to Settle in the Hearts," Nekuda, April, 1992 1992.(Hebrew) 2 Oded. Haklai, "Religious-Nationalist Mobilization and State Penetration - Lessons from Jewish Settlers' Activism in Israel and the West Bank," Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 6 (2007). 54 For detailed examples see: Akiva Eldar and Idith Zertal, Adone ha-arets : ha-mitnahalim u-medinat Yisrael, 1967-2004 (Or Yehudah: Kineret, Zemorah-Bitan, Devir, 2004); Haklai, "Religiousnationalist mobilization and state penetration - Lessons from Jewish settlers' activism in Israel and the West Bank."; Menachem Klein, "The Next Big Confrontation," Haaretz, March 8 2010. 55 A third party – Tzomet – departed from the coalition earlier as a result of Shamir’s refusal to lead the comprehensive electoral reform to which he committed when the party was lured to join his coalition. 56 See: Ami Pedahzur, The Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Israel: Eemergence and Decline? (Tel-Aviv: Ramot: Tel-Aviv University, 2000).(Hebrew) 57 Yoram Peri, Yad ish be-ahiv: retsah Rabin u-milhemet ha-tarbut be-Yisrael [Brothers at war: Rabin's assassination and the cultural war in Israel] (Tel Aviv: Bavel, 2005). [Hebrew] 58 59 Eldar and Zertal, Adone ha-arets : ha-mitnahalim u-medinat Yisrael, 1967-2004; Avraham Shevut, "The Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria in Oslo Era," in Ascent to the mountains: renewal of Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria, ed. Avraham Shevut (Yerushalayim: Sifriyat Bet El; Ari'el: ha-Mikhlalah ha-akademit Yehudah ve-Shomron: 2002); Avraham Shevut, "The 'Temporary Center' as an Element in the Evolution of Yesha Settlements," in Ascent to the mountains: renewal of Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria, ed. Avraham Shevut (Yerushalayim: Sifriyat Bet El; Ariel: ha-Mikhlalah ha-akademit Yehudah ve-Shomron: 2002). Talya Sason, "Summary of the Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts," (Jerusalem2005). The State of Israel The Office of the Prime-Minister (Hebrew) 60 Barbara Wertheim Tuchman, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam, 1st Ballantine Books ed. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1985). 61 Aaron David Miller, The Much too Promised Land : America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (New York: Bantam Books, 2008). 62 Daphna Canetti-Nisim, Gustavo Mesch, and Ami Pedahzur, "Victimization from Terrorist Attacks: Randomness or Routine Activities?," Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 4 (2006); Yariv 20 63 Feniger and Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar, "Risk Groups in Exposure to Terror: The Case of Israel's Citizens," Social Forces 88, no. 3 (2010). Sammy Smooha, "The mass immigrations to Israel: A comparison of the failure of the Mizrahi immigrants of the 1950s with the success of the Russian immigrants of the 1990s," Journal of Israeli History 27, no. 1 (2008).: 1-27. 64 Jonathan Rynhold and Dov Waxman, "Ideological Change and Israel's Disengagement from Gaza," Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 1 (2008); Dov. Waxman, "From Controversy to Consensus: Cultural Conflict and the Israeli Debate over Territorial Withdrawal," Israel Studies 13, no. 2 (2008).: 73-96. 65 66 Sason, "Summary of the Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts." 67 Both Shas and Yisrael Beitenu were members of Olmert’s cabinet, the latter for a relatively short period of time. However, based on their agendas and actual policies, neither of these parties can be considered settler parties. 68 Akiva Eldar, "The End of Oslo," Haaretz, October 25 2010.(Hebrew) Sprinzak, Brother against brother : violence and extremism in Israeli politics from Altalena to the Rabin assassination. 69 See: Ephraim. Ya'ar and Tamar. Hermann, "The "Peace Index" " (The Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution at Tel Aviv University and The Israel Democracy Institute, 2011). 70 21