UNITED NATIONS WORLD SUMMIT ON UN REFORM

UFRGSMUN 2012 Established in 1945 under the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly occupies a central position as the chief deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations. Comprising all 193 Members of the United Nations, it provides a unique forum for multilateral discussion of the full spectrum of international issues covered by the Charter. It also plays a significant role in the process of standard-setting and the codification of international law. The Assembly meets in regular sessions intensively from September to December each year, and thereafter as required. General Assembly’s resolutions are not binding and, therefore, considered recommendations, appointing and suggesting actions to be taken individually or in cooperation by member states and the United Nations. The regular flow of debate of high level plenary meetings is the General Speakers’ List and debate is moderated by the chair. All countries have one vote, either in procedural matters or substantive matters. There is no “veto power”, what means that, no matter which countries vote against, once a qualified majority (2/3 of countries in favor) is achieved in voting a resolution, it is approved. All member States take part in the sessions. However, in UFRGSMUN, the Secretariat and the Directors of the committee established a number of countries to be represented during the conference. ~1~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. Isadora Loreto da Silveira, Luíza Gimenez Cerioli, Matheus Machado Hoscheidt and Gustavo Henrique Feddersen 1.1. The Post-World War I and the Flaws of the League of Nations The League of Nations (LON) was an international organization created in 1919, right after the end of the First World War. By that time, the horrors of the conflict made nations engage in the idea of a global institution that could avoid any other possibility of war. Even though it represented a groundbreaking initiative in the field of international cooperation, it faced serious contradictions from its very beginning, which culminated with its disastrous failure to prevent the Second World War. 1.1.1. The League’s Innovations The LON is considered as an innovative mechanism for promoting peace in the international system. It brought about for the first time the notion of “inter-governmentalism” through which“which states cooperate without surrendering significant parts of their national sovereignty” (MACQUEEN, 2011). Member States participate directly in the construction of resolutions and have, therefore, greater incentives to engage in collective decision-making processes. Multilateralism, “the commitment to collective, institutional responses to international changes” (MACQUEEN, 2011: p. 4), was another important principle of the organization. It reassured the need to deal with transnational problems through collective and consensual means. The Locarno Treaties (1925)1, for example, evidences concerns with practical problems related to collective security under the aegis of the League (PEDERSEN, 2007). Another innovation of the League was its administrative structure, which was later taken as a model for the UN and several other international organizations. The League had three main organs: the Assembly, the Council and the Secretariat. The Assembly was composed by representatives of all member states, while the Council had representatives of great powers (initially the United Kingdom, Italy, France and Japan). Finally, the Secretariat was formed by a Secretary-General and his staff (PEDERSEN, 2007, p. 4-5). 1 The Locarno Treaties were an attempt made by WWI European Allies and new states of Central and Eastern Europe to settle post-war territories. ~2~ UFRGSMUN 2012 1.1.2. The Reasons for the League’s Failure Three main flaws are usually considered to be the causes of the failure of the League and its consequent ending in 1946: 1) its lack of coercive power, 2) its revanchist approach and, above all, 3) the absence of the Unites States of America. Regarding the first flaw, economic sanctions were the strongest mean of enforcement possible inside the League. But even when economic sanctions were adopted, some members chose not to support them. As a result, the League lost much of its credibility. In this context, both Italy’s attack to Abyssinia in 1935 and Japan’s aggression against China in 1931 are examples of unpunished actions taken by its members (PEDERSEN, 2007). As for the second flaw, the revanchist approach, it is important to remark that the Treaty of Versailles, the main peace treaty of the WWI, was created during the Paris Peace Conference along with the negotiations to engender the League. In this regard, the League’s role as an international organization may have been influenced by the will of the winning Allies to favor their own interests. Consequently, the League of Nations was often seen as a source of unrest by Germany. For instance, the Publicity Section of the League, which was designed to be an instrument for expression of public opinion, was a place marked by nationalist and anti-pacifist opinions by the French side (PEDERSEN, 2007). At last, the US Congress refusal to accept American participation in the League left a huge gap in the organization. Firstly, because the United States were already one of the greatest powers after the WWI, and secondly because European nations, acquainted with a more conservative diplomacy, ended up heading the organization (MACQUEEN, 2011: p. 6). In fact, the League failed by not having created attractive internal mechanisms for Great Powers to pursue their interests and, therefore, participate. In this regard, the United States, barely affected by World War I, had few incentives to join a consensus-based institution that would limit their power. 1.2. Post-World War II, the creation of the United Nations and its main purposes 1.2.1. The Founding of the UN The United Nations came into existence on October 24th , 1945, in San Francisco. Once the League failed to prevent another world war, the United Nations was founded as the second international organization committed with the preservation of peace among States. During its initial creative process, although the United Nations borrowed many characteristics from the League, the organization also created innovative mechanisms, which made the UN scope far wider than that of the LON in terms of results. Many of the negotiations for the UN foundation arose during World War II, as the frights of war led Allied Powers to recognize the ~3~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. necessity of an effective organization in the field of international cooperation and security. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference, held in Washington D.C. in 1944, for example, formulated the most important decisions and settlements prior to the creation of the UN. At this Conference, the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and China agreed on the aims, structure and functioning of a world organization. Furthermore, the Moscow (1943), Teheran (1943), and Yalta (1945) Conferences also conducted relevant negotiations about the UN2. Regarding the innovations of the UN, its institutional structure represented an important progress when compared to the League of Nations. For example, the veto power was devised to be an effective instrument to convince Great Powers, specially the United States and the USSR, to join the organization, providing them an exceptional hierarchical position inside one of the principal organs of the UN, the Security Council (UNSC)(PEDERSEN, 2007).3 The concession of such a power, however, has been a source of controversies and criticism to the UN, either concerning this mechanism as a differential and unfair treatment, or pointing out the necessity of extending the veto power to other nations. 1.2.2. The Purposes of the UN Throughout World War II, many agreements and declarations pointed out the necessity of an international organization that could truly engage in the promotion of peace and in solving global problems that the League of Nations did not manage to deal with. The Inter-Allied Declaration (1941), the Atlantic Charter (1941), and the Declaration by United Nations (1942) are just a few examples (UNITED NATIONS). All of these documents already paved the way to UN’s pursuit of its long-run goals. Actually, many of the United Nations official objectives are the same as those of the League. Besides, the fact that they are all listed right in the First Article of the UN Charter evidences the organization’s strong commitment with its purposes. The UN purposes are listed as follows: 1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; 2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 2 The origin of the name “United Nations” is related to its use in the course of the World War II. By that time, the expression was used to indicate the Allied Nations, in opposition to the Axis Powers. It was US President Franklin Roosevelt, during the Moscow and Teheran Conferences, who first suggested the expression to be the name for an international organization (UNITED NATIONS WEBSITE). 3 The veto power is the power of permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to obstacle the approval of any substantive draft Council resolution. ~4~ UFRGSMUN 2012 3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends (UNITED NATIONS)4. The obligation to the establishment of peace, the multilateral approach, the principle of self-determination of peoples, and the defense of human rights are substantive heritages from the League to the UN. On April 18th , 1946, the League of Nations transferred all its assets to the United Nations through an agreement signed by WlodzimierzModerow, representative of the United Nations, and Sean Lester, the last Secretary-General of the League of Nations (UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA WEBSITE). 1.3. The United Nations during the Cold War 1.3.1. Bipolarity and the immobilization of the UN Since the beginning of the Cold War up to the Détente5, UN actions were damaged by the increasing tensions between the USA and the URRS. Both Great Powers tried either to use the UN as a basis for pursuing selfish benefits or to block one another’s interference in the global sphere, what resulted in the period with the highest rates of veto usage in the UNSC. Still, the United Nations’ role until the Détente may be divided, for analytical purposes, into two main axes of action: the first one regarding collective security issues and the second one concerning human rights and decolonization matters (SANTOS, 2012; HARDWICK, 2011). In 1950 the UN Security Council released a Resolution allowing Member States to assist the southern part of Korea to defend herself from an invasion from the north. This decision was possible due to the Soviet Union’s boycott to the UNSC meeting, claiming for the recognition of the People’s Republic of China’s in the UNSC – by that time, Taiwan owned the Chinese seat (KISSINGER, 2011: p.138). Therefore, UN troops engaged in the Korean War, which came into a halt in 1953 and did not succeed in bringing peace to the region in a reasonable period of time. The underlying Cold War tensions between the Soviet Union and the USA hampered the adoption of an effective peaceful solution for the conflict (HARDWICK, 2011). 1.3.2. UN achievements prior to the Détente When it comes to pointing successful actions regarding the promotion of human rights and decolonization matters in the aforementioned period, the UN has more accomplishments 4 5 Full access to the Charter is available at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml> Détente was the easing of relations between the USA and the URRS during the 1970s. ~5~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. than it had on collective security subjects (HARDWICK, 2011). In 1948 the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Likewise, in 1969, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination came into force.6 Since its very beginning, the UN showed a big support to the decolonization processes. In 1960 alone 17 newly independent States joined the organization. It also worked as a platform for developing countries to struggle for participation in global politics. Williams (apud HARDWICK, 2011) says that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was created by developing countries in 1964, as a means to further their plea for economic justice with a different vision from that of the Bretton Woods institutions. 1.3.3. The Détente: undermining brinkmanship The logic of the Cold War changed in the beginning of the 1970’s. The United States and the USSR adopted a new policy, which was named Détente. Unlike the previous form of relationship embodied in the Truman Doctrine—i.e., open diplomatic and ideological conflict—this new phase of the Cold War saw an easing of the tensions between the superpowers (BOWKERL & WILLIAMS, 1988). The previous “paralysis” of the United Nations, caused by the political struggle between the superpowers was then momentarily relieved. This turn of events marked a reinvigoration of international law and, consequently, of the United Nations. The highlights of this phase were the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the Helsinki Accords. Both of them helped undermine the tension between the superpowers: while the first was an effort of bilateral talks to reduce the atomic terror by limiting the construction of new ballistic missiles (GARTHOFF, 1977), the second established a common ground in the territorial issues of the European continent (CSCE, 1975). Although international politics at the time of the Détente continued to be polarized between two opposing superpowers, it was evidently less harsh then the initial and final phases of the Cold War, and the perception of the efficacy of the United Nations grew while the use of veto prerogatives in the Security Council diminished. 1.3.4. The Reagan Doctrine and the Perestroika The end of the Détente came with the Reagan Doctrine, which found grounds to establish itself after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the end of the 1970s. The doctrine 6 Both documents are available at: <http://www.un.org/documents/instruments/docs_en.asp?year=1969> ~6~ UFRGSMUN 2012 composed the core of the rollback policy implemented by the US in the closing years of the Cold War (GARTHOFF, 1994). It marked an escalation of tensions between the superpowers and the previous institutional approximation observed in the past decade was put on hold. The Reagan Doctrine enabled a much more assertive policy against the USSR which had not been possible in the previous years due to fear of nuclear confrontation (LAGON, 1994). These fears were put aside together with the advances being made in institutional compromising of the parties. In the 1980s the USSR was struggling to maintain its centrally planned economy and communist political regime in a world where West European countries, Japan, and the “Asian Tigers” were benefiting from the results of the economic investments made by the US in the decades that followed the end of World War II. Hence, the Soviets ended up opening their economy to the global market. Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev issued two major reforms of the USSR system, the Perestroika and the Glasnost. Their role would be to adapt the communist regime to the new phase of the global economy (GORBACHEV, 1988). The result, however, was an unprepared opening of a centrally regulated system to a competitive and liberal market. The end of the USSR would occur in a peaceful way due to these reforms (VISENTINI, 2006). 1.4. The United Nations, the Post-Cold War period, and the new configuration of world power The end of the Cold War inaugurated a new reality for international politics, and, of course, for the United Nations as well. The main feature of this new reality was the absence of bipolarity. It was uncertain, however, how the division of power would now be arranged: would the world find itself under the rule of a sole hegemonic superpower, or would a bunch of new actors emerge, filling the vacuum left by the USSR, creating then a multipolar order? It was this uncertainty that the world tried to solve in the 1990s, and the UN was the stage in which many of the defining events of this decade took place. If the world had changed—and there was little doubt about that—was it not time for United Nations reforms? 1.4.1. Operation Desert Storm: a chance for multilateral cooperation? On August 2nd, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded its neighboring country, Kuwait. Orders for immediate cease of hostilities and Iraqi withdrawal were issued by the United Nations Security Council almost instantaneously (UNSC, 1990a), followed by economic sanctions (UNSC, 1990b), and naval blockade (UNSC, 1990c). After Iraq refused to leave Kuwait as long as other issues had not been resolved, UNSC passed a resolution, on November 29th, giving Hussein the deadline of January 15th, 1991, to leave Kuwait, allowing the use of force ~7~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. if Iraq did not comply (UNSC, 1990d). When the time was up, a coalition of forces, led by the United States, entered Kuwait and pushed back the Iraqi forces. This episode marked a reinvigoration of the public belief in the efficacy of the United Nations in resolving security matters that was not seen since the end of the Suez Crisis, in 1956, mainly because of the political impediments caused by the bipolar order. 1.4.2. Agendas for Reform: Peace and Development, the legacy of Boutros Ghali In 1992 the first Heads of State meeting of the countries composing the United Nations Security Council discussed the imperatives needed to build a UN that would suit the new world order. In their statement, they agreed that [t]he absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters (UNSC, 1992). Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was invited to prepare, the “analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping” (UNSC, 1992). The report was released a few months later, entitled ‘An Agenda for Peace’. The main contribution of this report was the reshaping of the concept of peace-keeping, making it more complex and more suitable to the different realities that the world would face from then on (UNGA, 1992a). Later, following the steps of the Security Council, the General Assembly requested from the Secretary-General the elaboration of an Agenda for Development to enhance the role of the UN in promoting prosperity and cooperation (UNGA, 1992b). In 1994 the report came out, entitled “Development and International Economic Cooperation: An Agenda for Development”. Regarding the reform of the UN system, the most important section of this agenda is entitled “Enhancing the role, capacity, effectiveness and efficiency of the United Nations system in development”, that laid out the flaws of UN organs, programs, and committees, and presented means to improve them (UNGA, 1994). 1.4.3. UNAMIR and Ghali’s “step down” In the course of a hundred days in 1994 the Hutu government of Rwanda and its extremist allies very nearly succeeded in exterminating the country's Tutsi minority. Using firearms, machetes, and a variety of garden implements, Hutu militiamen, soldiers, and ordinary citizens murdered some 800,000 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu. It was the fastest, most efficient killing spree of the twentieth century. (POWER, 2001) ~8~ UFRGSMUN 2012 A number of reasons were appointed to explain why the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) failed to produce meaningful results. The most accepted explanation is the lack of compliance and engagement in the mission itself, in practical terms, by the member-states of the UN. The logic underlying this lack of compliance is simple: the memory of an American soldier being dragged to death, tied to the back of a car on the streets of Mogadishu, broadcasted worldwide, in the last peacekeeping operation that the United States participated in Africa, just a few months prior to the Civil War in Rwanda, were still fresh. “Having lost much of its early enthusiasm for peacekeeping and for the United Nations itself, Washington was nervous that the Rwanda mission would sour like so many others” (POWER, 2001). The Rwandan conflict was a harsh blow to Boutros Ghali and his plan for UN Reforms; the United States vetoed Ghali’s reelection in 1996 (CLARKE, 2004). 1.4.4. Kofi Annan’s first efforts to reform Boutros Ghali, the first Secretary-General that did not serve a second term, was replaced by Kofi Annan. In its first months in charge, Annan already started to propose new methods to reform the UN system. He appointed Maurice Strong as Under Secretary-General for Reform and merged several units into a new Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UN POST, 2009). He also made a report with more than 90 pages assessing ongoing reform methods, proposing new ones or new ways of approaching the existing efforts (UNGA, 1997). The main points approached by Annan’s report regarded reforming the leadership and management structure, and proposing a new way to think the United Nations’ “Core Activities”, such as security, economy, and human rights. In 2000, having in mind the past issues regarding UN funding problems, Kofi Annan launched the Global Compact initiative, which allowed for partnership policies between the UN and the private sector (UN, 2001). The initiative, however, received heavy criticism from the international society and NGOs, with claims that it would provide private companies with an international platform for public relations and publicity (UN POST, 2009). In the same year the Millennium Summit occurred and discussed the role of the United Nations in this new century, establishing, among other things, the “Millennium Development Goals” in the Millennium Declaration (UNGA, 2000). 1.5. The United Nations and the War on Terror For a number of reasons, the international scenario after the turning of the century was a lot different from the one observed in the early years after the end of the Cold War. Regional ~9~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. powers had more freedom to emerge and consolidate their influence in their adjacent areas; meanwhile, the United States, instead of adapting its policies to a more multilateral approach of international relations, assumed a growing unilateral position given its capability to intervene in any point of the planet within a short period of time. Any glimpse of certainty in world politics was erased with the images of two planes literally crashing on the World Trade Center. 1.5.1. America’s Unilateralism… In the early years of the 21st century, the United States of America invaded the Middle East twice. The first incursion happened shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks (WINTOUR et al, 2001), initiating the American global fight against terrorism (CARFANO, 2003). With the approval of the United Nations Security Council, American troops invaded Afghanistan, claiming that the country was housing Al-Qaeda terrorists, the same group that perpetrated the World Trade Center attacks. Even with the approval of the UNSC, the international community questioned the real interests of the United States and the lack of results of the operation in finding the Al Qaeda members (RICHISSIN, 2004). In 2003 a new intervention in the Middle East was carried out by the United States. Claiming that the Iraqi government possessed weapons of mass destruction (USA, 2003), the US tried to arrange a UNSC sanctioned intervention in the country. The Security Council, however, did not approve the intervention; even so, a coalition led by the United States and the United Kingdom invaded Iraq on May 19th, 2003. The public opinion was much more vehement in the condemnation of the unilateral actions carried out by the US government at that time than it had been in 2001. The episode marked the rising of renewed uncertainties on the perspective of UN effectiveness in maintaining peace and security (UN POST, 2009). 1.5.2 … and the emerging countries’ endeavors for multilateralism. Kofi Annan, in 2005, published a report entitled “In Larger Freedom”. This report is founded on the notion that the main goals of the United Nations could only be achieved if three basic aspects of international relations in the new century were respected: development, security, and human rights (namely, Freedom from Want, Freedom from Fear and Freedom to live in Dignity) (UNGA, 2005a). After laying down the methods to ensure those principles, he states that [c]learly our Organization, as an organization, was built for a different era. Equally clearly, not all our current practices are adapted to the needs of today. That is why Heads of State and Government, in the Millennium Declaration, recognized the need to strengthen the United Nations to make it a more effective instrument for pursuing their priorities (UN, 2005a, p.39). ~ 10 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 The rest of the report is dedicated to establishing ways of reforming the main organs, the Secretariat, the system as a whole, the regional organizations, and to updating the United Nations Charter. The same year also marked the most profound discussion regarding the reform of the composition of the United Nations Security Council, following Kofi Annan’s efforts to initiate an organizational reform of the UN. The 2005 World Summit: High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the General Assembly was held and much of the discussion regarding that topic happened at the occasion. Nevertheless, practical actions were limited at the time. For starters, the G4 – the group of countries composed by Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India – which joined efforts to induce change in the UNSC, found great opposition to its objectives (UN POST, 2009). There was also no consensus on the countries that would represent the African continent. The outcome of the meeting was a vague declaration that did not define any concrete way to reform the UNSC (UNGA, 2005c). Moreover, other punctual alterations on the organizational composition of the United Nations were made, like more substantial approaches to development, terrorism, and peacekeeping, the adoption of the concept of “Responsibility to Protect”, and minimal updates to the UN Charter (UNGA, 2005c). 1.5.3. The International Criminal Court and the Human Rights Council In discussion for several years, the International Criminal Court came to existence in 2002, with the Rome Statute being sanctioned by sixty countries, the minimum required to bring it to force (UN CONF, 1998). For the first time, an international institution could prosecute individuals and hold them accountable for human rights violations. Other innovations came about in 2006, when the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) was extinct and the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) took its place (UNGA, 2006b). The main flaw pointed by the international community in the UNCHR was the fact that many countries that internally did not respect Human Rights were members of the Commission (UN POST, 2009). 2.1. Different Interpretations of the UN Charter Dispositions The essential characteristic of the effectiveness of the UN juridical personality is its independence of action in relation to States in order to achieve the purposes set forth in the Charter, acting as a distinct member of international society. However, such an understanding ~ 11 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. does not exclude the necessity to analyze the different interpretations regarding its competencies. The more traditional line of thought advocates a literal interpretation of the UN Charter, with strict fidelity to the express provisions of the Charter. It was founded by Russian jurist Grigory Tunkin (LIMA; ÁVILA; NADER, 2005). The second line of thought – that of implied powers – presents a softer approach and it is based in the Reparations for Injuries case. According to the interpretation of that case by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1949: [It] is tantamount to [ask] whether the Organization has international personality. In answering this question which is not settled by the actual terms of the Charter, the Court goes on to consider what characteristics the Charter was intended to give to the Organization. In this connection, the Court states that the Charter conferred upon the Organization rights and obligations which are different from those of its Members (ICJ, 1949). This doctrine claims that the UN can act with implicit powers in order to achieve aimed goals, and may for that end, create bodies that were not anticipated by the original Member States of the Conference of San Francisco, or even conclude treaties with other States or international organizations. Therefore, from the perspective of international law, the UN ought to be considered as possessing powers that, even if not expressed in the Charter, are attributed to it by because they are considered fundamental to the performance of its obligations and purposes (ICJ, 1949). The third line of thought, the most radical perspective, is based on the inherent powers of the UN. According to such perspective, the UN would have an inherent legal capacity to perform any international act that it is able to perform. For Norwegian jurist Finn Seyersted, the ability of the UN as a juridical personality is inherent to its existence. Thus, it is important to understand the principles of the three doctrines because the matter of UN reform is directly linked to the type of interpretation that one makes of the UN competencies as laid out in the UN Charter (ICJ, 1949). 2.2. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Reform When the issue under discussion is the United Nations reform, the first topic that comes to mind is the remodeling of the UN Security Council. . Indeed, the UNSC is the major organ in the organization to provide and maintain international security and peace. With the end of the Cold War and the turning of the century, a more flexible scenario for international leadership emerged and along came optimistic opinions about the greater possibilities for UN actions in this new global order. However, UNSC structures have barely seen any substantive changes since the Dumbarton Oaks draft of the UN Charter in 1944 which established the five ~ 12 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 permanent members (the P-5): China, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, and the United States of America. Thus, it is clear that the organ reflects a bygone era; the geopolitics have changed drastically since then, important international actors are not properly represented and others - especially those which arose in the decolonization process—have their interests hardly represented at all. The UNSC needs to reflect the current reality, according to former Secretary General Kofi Annan: By adhering to the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States recognize that the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and agree to be bound by its decisions. It is therefore of vital importance, not only to the Organization, but to the world, that the Council should be equipped to carry out this responsibility and that its decisions should command worldwide respect (UNGA, 2005a). The discussion of UNSC’s reform goes beyond the matter of membership. In 2007 the President of the General Assembly determined five main points of reform: membership, regional representation, enlargement of the Council, veto power, and the relationship of the Council with the General Assembly. The discussions on reforms date back to the 1990s, in the General Assembly, when a broad number of members agreed that the UNSC was not fit for the world’s current needs, being unrepresentative and lacking democracy. At the 2005 World Summit leaders agreed to reform the UNSC in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient, and transparent and to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions (UNGA, 2005c). However, until this day, Member States could not reach an agreement on how the reform should be established. 2.2.1. Considerations About the Number of Members All Security Council members hold a specific kind of position of power: the member is simultaneously co-author of the decisions in the fundamental matters of international peace and security and it is also the co-author of the global security agenda (SIMÃO, 2008). It is, thus, clear why the question of being or not a member of the Council is very important to the foreign policy of the major countries: the ones that already have a seat want to maintain their power and influence; the emerging countries desire to reflect their growing international importance in the configuration of the Council; and the Third World countries want to turn the Council into an international platform to assist their main needs. The number of UN members has grown 211% since its foundation in 1945, and countries as Brazil, India, Japan, South Africa, Nigeria, and Germany are vehement supporters of including strategic countries in the main decisions of global security. This awareness is driven by broad considerations relating to the role (and responsibility) of the major actors in international relations with regard to the maintenance of international peace and ~ 13 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. security. (…) those who contribute most to the Organization financially, militarily and diplomatically should participate more in Council decision-making. The Security Council needs greater credibility, legitimacy and representation to do all that we demand of it (BLUM, 2005, p. 633). Therefore, in the last decade, many UNSC reform projects were elaborated in order to reach consensus, many of them focusing on the issues of contribution and representativeness that should be taken into consideration. Countries as Japan and Germany are among the biggest contributors to the UN budget, and others like Brazil and India are not only important growing economies with a vast population, but also important contributors to UN peacekeeping operations around the world. Those four countries are known as the G-4, which, since 2004, began to defend a reform that should include as permanent-members countries that are capable and willing to assume greater responsibilities in the safeguarding of peace and security (SIMÃO, 2008). However, the G-4 has not found enough support in their cause and other blocs of States have created their own reform proposals. The Uniting for Consensus group, also known as Coffee Club, has today more than ten members, including G-4’s regional rivals, such as Argentina, Mexico, South Korea, Italy, and Pakistan. This group contests the G-4’s request for permanent seats, proposing, instead, that the members should be elected on a regional basis to create a more equal representation. Another well-known group is the Small Five (Costa Rica, Jordan, Lichtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland) that also displayed a series of proposals for the reform, advocating for more transparency and coordination with the nonmembers countries, and also proposes that the veto power should not be used in humanitarian emergencies and genocide or war crimes, and that the P-5 countries should explain every veto to the General Assembly. More radically, the African Union, since 1997, sustains that the Council should be fully expanded, giving permanent seats and veto power to Africa and to Latin America. In December 2004 then Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed two models of reform. According to Model A, there would be nine additional seats, in which six would be permanent without veto power. Even if it is not explicit, it is easy to conclude that from those six new permanent seats, “one would go to Europe, two to Asia-Pacific, one to the Americas and two to Africa” (BLUM, 2005, p. 641). In Model B, the permanent membership would remain unchanged; a new category would be created (with eight seats) for a four-year term and renewable (instead of the current two years without direct re-election) that would be equally distributed among regions and one more two-year not-renewable seat would also be created (BLUM, 2005). In both models, we can see that Annan was certain that, if the veto power remained a P-5’s privilege, crafting, therefore, a hierarchical distribution of power, the ~ 14 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 P-5 would be more inclined to accept changes in the Council. The following year Annan would endorse his statement in the aforementioned report “In Larger Freedom: towards security, development and human rights for all”, in which he stresses the necessity of changes in the Council in order to maintain its credibility and capacity of action in the main issues of global peace and security. However, neither of the proposals was even voted by the organization. Even though almost all Member States agree on the necessity of a more inclusive and democratic reform, more than a decade has passed and nations are still debating its linings and no actual negotiation is in order. Endorsing and adding new permanent members will likely only “fuel political rivalries” (WORKSHOP ON SC REFORM, 2011) and increase the P-5’s concern with any change that might dilute or challenge their power. Moreover, in order to change the membership it would be necessary to modify the UN Charter, a move deemed extremely difficult given the required two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, followed by an equivalent number of ratifications and the endorsement of all the P-5 (PAUL; NAHORY, 2005, p.03). At the same time, “one cannot be sure that the enlargement of the Security Council will necessarily enhance its effectiveness” (BLUM, 2005, p.644). Questions may arise on how related is the concept of enlargement to the efficiency and democracy of the Council. States in favor of the enlargement often argue that new members will bring “more representativeness”, however, opponents reply that adding members only adds more States that have their own national interests, and therefore do not necessarily make the organ more democratic. “To many, the reform of the Security Council is a question of its continuing legitimacy. Expansion of the membership could help enhance its authority (…) to others, reforming the Security Council is mainly about increasing their own power” (FREIESLEBEN, 2004). On the issue of effectiveness, incredulous observers ask themselves if a larger number of members would not increase the length of the decision-making process of the Council;there are others that insist on a regional basis form of representation, instead of only expanding the number of Member States, proposing, for example, a seat to European Union(FREIESLEBEN, 2004). The discussion of enlargement is far from closuring and a great number of important international actors seem to differ about this major question that should define the distribution of global power. 2.2.2. The Veto Power Together with the enlargement of membership comes the very complicated issue of the veto power. This debate is intense and controversial since the beginning of the UN. As ~ 15 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. explained before, during the Cold War, the veto was a tool used by the USA and the USSR to block each other’s actions, turning the Security Council into an ineffective organ, preventing it to take action in important situations. From 1946 to 1989, the permanent members have casted 199 vetoes. Since the end of the Cold War, the formal use of veto has diminished drastically, about one veto per year. Nevertheless, the P-5 countries still use this device as a coercion mechanism to reach their self-interests. Those countries frequently threaten to use the veto in order to obstruct actions they oppose or to manipulate the Council’s agenda; this exercise is call “hidden” or “silent” veto (NAHORY, 2004). The hidden veto is mainly used in closed-door informal consultations, where the P-5 benefits from the absence of any records or public. Consequently, this created a situation in which the non-permanent member learns the issues that cannot be raised without the risk of a threat, being, hence, a sort of self-censorship mechanism that paralyzes the work in the Council. The Council never discusses crises that a P-5 member considers to be within its own exclusive sphere of interest. Chechnya, Tibet, Xinjiang, Northern Ireland, Sudan, Uganda and Colombia figure among the forgotten conflicts that the Council ignores. Even in earlier days, when the formal veto was used much more frequently, hidden vetoes kept key issues such as colonial wars and Cold War conflicts off the agenda (NAHORY, 2004, p. 2). The main criticism towards the UNSC veto power is that it should not be used in humanitarian crises, genocide or mass atrocities. Indeed, the Security Council “failed to act during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 due to the hidden vetoes of France and the US. Paris and Washington not only blocked UN action, but also used their hidden veto to weaken the definition of the crisis under international law” (NAHORY, 2004, p. 3). Many actors in the international system are urging the UN for more robust diplomatic efforts in the agreements between the P-5 so none of them use the veto power to block or weaken resolutions on genocide or mass atrocities. As already stressed, the different groups that advocate for reforms in the Council have different positions about the veto power. The G-4, in a realistic decision, abandoned their request for a permanent seat with veto and adopted another strategy. The Uniting for Consensus insists that any expansion of the veto power would only make the organ more undemocratic. The African Union maintained their terms of two permanent seats to Africa with veto power, as their continent is not represented in the P-5. The Non-Aligned Movement strongly opposes the veto, affirming that it guarantees an exclusive and dominant role to the Permanent Members of the Council and that it would be contrary to the aim of democratizing the UN (PAUL, 1996). A great number of the reformers seem to agree that granting more veto ~ 16 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 rights would only stanch the Council even more, rather than make it more efficient (NAHORY, 2004). 2.2.3. The UNSC Working Methods, Transparency, and Interactions Apart from the intricate discussion about the Council’s membership, many reformers are interested in changing the way the Council works within its procedures and how it interacts with other organs of the UN, mainly the General Assembly. Many delegates argue that the lack of transparency and information in closed-doors meetings—which do not provide any record to non-members—are compromising its credibility and such practices must soon be reinvigorated and restructured (UNSC, 2006). Consultations and negotiations on the released Council’s texts were defined as “sedate” and “underproductive” (WORKSHOP ON SC REFORM, 2011) and some suggested that the rules of procedure should be more dynamic and less formal, in order to bring efficiency to the flow of debate. Non-permanent members complain about the bureaucracy and the lack of information inside the Council, resulting in a clear division between them and the permanent members. Moreover, in a period of two years it is almost impossible to fully comprehend the working methods, forcing the elected delegates to avoid a more proactive position during their mandate. Furthermore, delegates urge for a more democratic interaction between the UNSC and subsidiaries bodies, such as the Peacebuilding Commission, and non-members, such as regional organizations and NGOs (WORKSHOP ON SC REFORM, 2011). The Security Council has taken, in recent years, several measures in order to increase its transparency and efficiency. Such actions were deemed possible since reforming the working methods does not require a two-third majority approval, neither demands an amendment to the Charter; also they probably present a minor danger to the interests of the many delegations (FREIESLEBEN, 2008). Indeed, probably due to the ten elected members’ pressure, the Council is slowly reforming itself7, aiming to hold more public meetings, to extend the access to the Council’s documentation and decisions (through a website), and to improve consultations with non-Council actors, experts and speakers of the civil society. Several Working Groups emerge to be the arena of such reforms, such as the “Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to Security Council” and the 7 “Initiatives included: publicizing the daily work program (S/26015); publishing tentative monthly work schedule (S/26176); making almost final (‘in blue’) draft resolutions available (S/ 1999/165); providing greater transparency on procedures of the sanctions committee (S/1995/234, S/ 1995/438, S/1996/54), on peacekeeping operations (S/PRST/1994/22); initiating meetings between Council and troop-contributing countries (S/PRST/ 1994/22); and launching ‘Arria-style meetings,’ in which a member of the Council could invite experts or representatives of civil society.” (FREIESLEBEN, 2008) ~ 17 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. “Security Council Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions”. The interaction between the Council and the subsidiary committees is directly related to its accountability. Being the UN’s most powerful organ in maintenance of global peace and security, it should be able to rapidly communicate with the other specialized branches of the organization. The organ seems to be committed with its principle, according to UNSC Notes: “The Security Council agrees to cooperate with other organs of the United Nations in synchronizing reporting obligations of the Secretariat on the same subject, if appropriate, while putting priority on the effective work of the Council” (UNSC, 2006). However, this issue is still sensitive between reformers, especially the Peacebuilding Commission and the Sanctions Committee, as shown below: The recent trend of host countries requesting the pullout of UN forces led some speakers to call for improved relations; others desired greater communications with the countries providing forces. Several members lamented the dire consequences of inadequate mission reviews (…) the Council severely lacks military expertise and procedures in general, one member observed, especially in contrast to an organization such as NATO”(WORKSHOP ON SC REFORM, 2011). In 2005, the Security Council, together with General Assembly, adopted resolutions 1645 and 60/80 that established a new Peacebuilding Commission in response to the growing criticism over the Council’s difficulty to provide a coordinated, integrated, and coherent approach to uptight post-war situations. However, criticism continued after this resolution; the biggest financial contributors or troop contributing countries to the Peacekeeping Commission are continuously demanding for more consultation and participation in Security Council decisions, such as India or Brazil. The Council has the right to establish sanctions as an enforcement tool when global security is threatened. “The range of sanctions has included comprehensive economic and trade sanctions and/or more target measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, financial or diplomatic restrictions” (UNSC, 2012). Yet, many international actors, governmental or not, have expressed their concerns with the effects of this sanctions over the economy and the negative impacts over society. The political motivations of the sanctions are also questioned, since many of the countries that received sanctions had some sort of previous tension with some of the P-5 countries. Hence, reforms in this issue should find ways to improve the approach, design, and application of sanctions to impact only specific targets and avoid collateral-effects. In 2000 the UNSC established the “Informal Working Group on General Issue of Sanctions” in order to improve the effectiveness of those measures. ~ 18 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 Apart from its relations with subsidiary committees, throughout the 1990s, the Council increased its relations with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). After the end of the Cold War, many NGOs, already active in the General Assembly, started a greater involvement with the Council as they assumed a larger role in international affairs. The Council itself needed to deliberate in diverse situations in which some NGO and agencies were specialized and active. It is easy to understand why NGOs became a provider of knowledge and information to the Council: In every crisis, NGOs were present, struggling to feed the hungry, care for the sick, shelter the homeless and protect the vulnerable. If the Council was to end such conflicts, it obviously had to seek more than formal peace agreements between belligerents. Rather, Council-built peace depended on economic and social development, respect for human rights, disarmament, and other areas of NGO expertise (PAUL, 2004, p.3). NGOs are, nowadays, an important tool to the information and analyses available to the Council. Furthermore, NGOs can work as an instrument to push the Council to greater transparency and accountability, since most of them have organized a comprehensive media system that provides reports and news to the public (PAUL, 2004). In 1995 the “NGO Working Group on the Security Council Reform” was created to be a body having regular interaction with Council members and the reform proposals. This Working Group brought a new level of openness to the Council, since the meetings are rather informal and less secretive. “The Working Group today organizes dialogue meetings between a group of about thirty major NGOs and individual Council ambassadors, as well as top-level UN officials and other key players in the international security world” (PAUL, 2010, p.1). Nonetheless, NGO actions are closely monitored by Council members, mainly the P-5, which, when the NGOs goals do not match with their interests, use their veto power (cast it or threaten to do it) to paralyze them. According to Paul (2004, p. 13), “[o]n sanctions reform, Chechnya, the Middle East, Iraq, and many other important issues, even the most vigorous NGO advocacy runs into the ‘brick wall’ of P-5 opposition”. Another issue that must be addressed is the UNSC’s relation with the General Assembly. Throughout the Cold War, while the Council was stagnated, the General Assembly was growing, with the admission of many recently independent States, many of which have begun to request more power to the organ, since it is the largest one in the UN. “In 1963, in response to the ongoing pressure from the newly enlarged Assembly, a more meaningful constitutional reform was put in place: four nonpermanent seats were added to the six already on the Security Council” (REISMAN, 1993, p. 84). Given the Council’s situation at that time, the General Assembly extended its range of activity, even dealing with issues of peace and security. In 1950 resolution “Uniting ~ 19 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. for Peace” was adopted; “Uniting for Peace, stated that when the Security Council—because of the veto power of each of its five permanent members—cannot come to agreement, the General Assembly can take up the matter” (SWART, 2008, p.24). However, with the end of the Cold War, the Council found itself suddenly more effective, with its functions renewed and also with many other activities to undertake. Perceptibly, this new revival of the Council generated tension on the issue of the two organs’ jurisdictions. Delegations in the General Assembly strongly complain about the recent attempts of the Council to take on issues that are not directly dealing with peace and security, such as climate change, diseases, arguing that they encroach the GA jurisdiction. Moreover, it has been suggested that the General Assembly should address more of security issues, since the Charter does not prohibit it and the “Uniting for Peace” resolution allows it. However, even if the GA did take up subjects such as the situation in the Middle East and Afghanistan, it is unlikely that the General Assembly as a whole would be keen to take on some of the Security Council’s unresolved issues and complaints from the Security Council could also be expected (SWART, 2008). Even if the Presidents of both organs usually meet once a month, the gap between the UNGA and the UNSC is an imperative matter that should be addressed. Furthermore, UNGA’s international image is distorted, labeled by the opposing priorities between the North and the South, and known to have an agenda that does not necessarily respond to the world’s urgent needs. On the other hand, the Security Council is known by its over-all power, with an obscure decision-making process, especially regarding the non-documented meetings between the P-5. Delegates in the UNGA argue that “the composition is not sufficiently representative of the UN’s current membership, undermining its legitimacy” (SWART, 2008, p. 22). In their defense, the P-5 (with support of many Council members) responds that countries from the South organize lobby against their measures and decisions, making the UNGA indirectly undemocratic. This disparity of power between the UNGA and the Security Council may be one of the main instigators of the UNGA revitalization debate now in order. 2.3. The Revitalization of the General Assembly The General Assembly is the “chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the United Nations” (UN CHARTER, 1945) according to the most used definition in the revitalization debate, that of the UN Charter. The fact that each Member State carries equal weight in the General Assembly makes it a much more representative organ than the Security Council. Although its recommendations are not binding, it has a central role in setting standards and in the codification of international law. It possesses an incipient ~ 20 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 legislative function when informal consultations on critical issues lead to new treaty bodies and it also has the power to establish new UN entities (SWART, 2008). The proposal of some sort of restructuring of the General Assembly dates back to 1975. In that year it was one of the six topics to be discussed as a part of the restructuring of the United Nations in a special session of the General Assembly. A small group of high-level experts appointed by the Secretary-General then issued a report, after having prepared proposals for the discussion of structural reform within the UN. The “A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Cooperation” report consisted of two main areas of reform proposals: 1) how the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) should conduct their deliberative and policy-making efforts; and 2) how the organization and operation of UN programs should be structured to achieve effective implementation of goals. The group conceived important and strong roles for the General Assembly and the ECOSOC, but the report did not have a positive political outcome, excluding its use from further deliberations. However, the group’s proposals composed the substantive basis for eventual discussions within the Ad Hoc Committee on the Restructuring of the Economic and Social Sectors of the United Nations System, created in 1975 as a result of the seventh special session to work on questions of UN restructuring. The newly-formed Ad Hoc Committee then established the most important unit in its deliberative process, an informal working group. The Committee later agreed upon an agenda that framed UN restructuring considerations into eight problem areas8, with the improvement of the over-all effectiveness of the General Assembly in fulfilling its role under the UN Charter as one of them (MELTZNER, 1978). Since the beginning of the 1990s, Member States have resumed discussions and deliberations on the revitalization of the General Assembly in order to turn it into a more relevant and effective organ. The main concerns are the improvement of its working methods and the enhancement of its role and authority (SWART, 2008).The revitalization debate is treated as a political rather than a procedural matter by most Member States from the South. Hence, an essential motivating factor in the debate has certainly been the disparity of power and authority between the General Assembly and the UNSC. The former’s work should, for many Member States, mainly from the South, ideally become as important as that of the UNSC, or maybe even more important, as it is often stressed that the drafters of the UN Charter had envisioned separate but equally important roles for the UNGA and the UNSC. 8 1) Improving the overall effectiveness of the General Assembly in fulfilling its role under the Charter; 2)the role and functions of the Economic and Social Council in fulfilling its responsibilities under the Charter; 3) other United Nations forums for negotiations, programs, specialized agencies and ad hoc world conferences; 4) structures for regional and interregional cooperation; 5) operational activities of the United Nations system; 6) planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation; 7) inter-agency coordination; and 8)secretariat support services. ~ 21 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. It is the understanding of some Member States that the General Assembly should evaluate the work of the UNSC, allowing for more checks and balances in the United Nations. In this sense, there have been resolutions that asked for better UNSC annual reports and their further consideration in the UNGA and for the periodical issuance of special subject-oriented reports to the General Assembly for its consideration on issues of current international concern (SWART, 2008). Over time the General Assembly has attempted to be heard on questions related to the use of force. This represents a changing role of the UNGA by demonstrating interest and acting in the peace and security area, normally covered by the UNSC. The General Assembly is determined to express its opinion on those matters, but its power and that of the International Court of Justice – a result of UNGA deliberations –, has often been constrained by the UNSC and its resolutions. This power struggle has influenced the role of the General Assembly, forcing it to keep the UNSC accountable to the standards and rules of international law. In 2005 the General Assembly stated that they take the responsibility to help prevent genocide and human rights abuses according to the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ principles (MEYER, 2011). The image and the reputation of the UNGA are forged by a wide range of often opposite priorities among Member States and by suspicion between the North and the South. Moreover, some other problems can be named. For instance its agenda does not necessarily deal with the most urgent issues on a priority basis, its debates are repetitive and lengthy –and therefore its decision-making processes are slow –, its resolutions are often uncreative and unproductive, only reproducing preexisting ones, and they are not equipped with mechanisms to ensure or assess their implementation. According to the ambassadors of some Member States, the one body in the General Assembly that provides some sort of counterweight to the power of the Security Council is its Fifth Committee, which manages budgetary and administrative issues. Political will is fundamental for the implementation of UNGA resolutions as they are non-binding; furthermore, there is no comprehensive mechanism in place to assess the status of their implementation. Thus, Member States periodically request the Secretariat to provide informal notes or reports on the implementation of UNGA resolutions. Concerning the revitalization debate, the Secretary-General was asked, through a series of resolutions, to provide an implementation status report, the first being issued in 2006. Concerning the election of the Secretary-General, in practice, he is selected by the Security Council, normally based on a regional rotation, given that the five permanent members can veto any candidate and can even present their own candidates. The UNGA ~ 22 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 receives the UNSC’s recommendation for one candidate and then appoints the SecretaryGeneral by acclamation. However resolutions from the 51st session of the General Assembly on have made a number of recommendations concerning the selection of the SecretaryGeneral. Such resolutions show that Member States are not satisfied with the current Secretary-General selection method. The UNGA has stressed the need for improved transparency, inclusiveness, interaction with official candidates, regional rotation and gender equality, the identification of potential candidates by UNGA’s President in consultation with Member States (only when such candidates are endorsed by their own Member State) and has even made suggestions regarding the candidates’ qualifications. Finally, also since the 51st session of the General Assembly, a great number of resolutions have been issued in regard to the improvement of its working methods. The main questions consisted of streamlining and rationalizing the agenda; reducing and consolidating documentation; improving proceedings, especially concerning dates, promptness, rules of procedure and voting; reporting from the Secretary-General to Member States; and improving coordination among Main Committees and their working methods. The manner in which those questions are and will be dealt with is central to the revitalization of the General Assembly (SWART, 2008). 2.4. The Reform of the ECOSOC and of the Social and Economic Policy Process at the UN There have been initiatives to reform the ECOSOC or to create a new global decisionmaking body for social and economic matters for the past 50 years. In 1995 the Commission on Global Governance9 presented in a report a proposal for an “emerging system of economic governance” (CGG, 1995) and the retirement of the ECOSOC. In the years that followed a series of similar initiatives was presented under different names, such as World Economic Council, Council for Sustainable Development, Global Governance Group, Economic Security Council, among others. Such projects aimed at creating a global economic decisionmaking body that would be more assertive than ECOSOC and more representative than the G8. In 2002, then French president Jacques Chirac called for the creation of an Economic and Social Security Council. Former German Minister for Economic Cooperation and 9 The Commission on Global Governance was an organization established in 1992 “in the belief that international developments had created a unique opportunity for strengthening global co-operation to meet the challenge of securing peace, achieving sustainable development, and universalizing democracy”. Former West German Chancellor Willy Brand organized the international commission in order to “explore the opportunities created by the end of the cold war to build a more effective system of world security and governance”. At the time UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali commended the initiative and assured the organization of his support. Available at: <http://web.archive.org/web/20020204001556/http://www.cgg.ch/TheCommission.htm.> ~ 23 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. Development, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, has also repeatedly advocated the creation of a Global Council. To many it did not seem practical to create a new global economic council when the ECOSOC already existed, because such UN organ could take over global economic coordinating functions if it were appropriately upgraded. Such a reform would not require an amendment to the Charter, but a change in the political will of Members States (MARTENS, 2006). Throughout time, ECOSOC has been constantly overshadowed by other institutions, most notably the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Its formal oversight role towards UN specialized agencies - the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO), for instance – and in relation to its subsidiary bodies –such as the Commission on Sustainable Development – has not given it any real power. In his 2005 report ‘In Larger Freedom’, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan defended pragmatic changes such as streamlining ECOSOC debates, concentrating its agenda on selected issues and establishing an executive board. He also advocated that it should become the global forum for development and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (FUES, COOPER, 2005). In the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit, Member States endorsed the idea of ECOSOC as the main UN body dealing with economic and social matters. In order to strengthen its political significance, it was claimed that the Council shall meet once a year on a ministerial level. Its task should first and foremost consist of monitoring the implementation of the internationally agreed development goals, including the MDGs. Every two years it shall serve as a high-ranking Forum for Development Cooperation with the objective of analyzing trends in international development policies and facilitating coherence between the development goals and policies in other sectors (MARTENS, 2006). The General Assembly has been holding two simultaneous processes of consultation on development and Economic and Social Council reform (ECOSOC) based on commitments defined in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. In 2006 the UNGA adopted a resolution on follow-up to the development outcome of the World Summit, restating development commitments including the MDGs. Of the many resolutions agreed upon during the Summit, the first to become operational were the Annual Ministerial Review, a yearly convention of national and regional leaders, policymakers and scholars in which opportunities for coordination among participants towards the achievement and assessment of MDG progress are facilitated – which was held for the first time at the 2007 High-level Segment –, and the Development Cooperation Forum, which was launched the same year. ~ 24 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 Concerning the other commitments made at the 2005 World Summit, progress has been relative. On humanitarian issues, from ECOSOC 2009 Humanitarian Affairs Segment resulted a resolution on strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the UN, calling upon all States and parties to comply fully with the provisions of international humanitarian law, while also urging Member States to continue to prevent, investigate, and prosecute acts of gender-based violence, including sexual violence in humanitarian emergencies (ECOSOC Resolution 2009/3). On the 2005 Summit’s commitment to enhance coordination between ECOSOC and the Bretton Woods Institutions, there has not been much advancement. With the development of the G20 as the main forum for global economic policy definition, as well as the informal integration of the IMF and World Bank into the Group’s governance structure that followed, ECOSOC has found its position as a global economic policy-making body even more weakened (REFORM THE UN.ORG, 2010). 2.5. Human Rights Related Reforms 2.5.1. The Peacekeeping Reforms and the Concepts of ‘Human Security’ and ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’ The development of a renewed conceptual framework to address grave human rights violations and mass atrocities in the past ten years carries great importance, for the provision of a theoretical foundation is a useful mechanism in the prevention of those violations. The term ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (also known as R2P) focuses on the rights of the populations to be protected from physical harm and not so much on the right of the states to carry out humanitarian intervention. The concept refrains from the discussion on whether humanitarian interventions are legitimate and addresses the fact that certain states at certain times are incapable or do not possess the political will to offer protection to their populations, therefore, humanitarian measures must be adopted (NOTARAS; POPOVSKI, 2011). In a 2001 report, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) used R2P as a substitute for the term humanitarian intervention, what generated fierce debates on the topic. In 2005, however, due to its employment in the World Summit Outcome document, R2P became a well-established term (ibidem). According to such document, “responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” implies that: Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to ~ 25 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability (UNGA, 2005c). The concept of ‘Human Security’ is central for the comprehension of the local government capacity-building facet of UN peacekeeping missions (TADJBAKHSH, 2005). Its goal, according to Sabrina Alkire (2003), is “[…] fundamentally to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, without impeding long-term human fulfillment”. Globalization has prompted profound changes in the forms of post-Cold War human security threats and it is, therefore, necessary to build new tools that are more responsive to such threats, such as fostering government capacities (ALKIRE, 2003). UN peacekeeping has contributed to the prevention of violent intra and interstate conflicts and has supported domestic actors in post-conflict peacebuilding since 1948 (DPO & DFS, 2009). In Boutros Ghali 1992 ‘An agenda for Peace’, some important concepts were defined: 1) Preventive diplomacy , the “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur”; 2) Peacemaking, the “action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations”; 3) Peacekeeping, the “deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well”; 4) Post-conflict peacebuilding , the “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UNGA, 1992a). A new vision for UN peacekeeping was exposed in the 2000 Brahimi report, reinforcing its role, helping improve its effectiveness and reducing its costs. The elements pertaining to this new vision enabled a 500% growth in operations over the past ten years. The contemporary dimension and complexity of peacekeeping are, nevertheless, straining UN’s resources, management and staff, endangering the cohesion of such renewed vision (DPO & DFS, 2009). The post-Cold War period, especially after the 9/11 events, is witnessing a growing demands for UN peacekeeping forces to put an end to hostilities in violent environments across the globe. The nature and range of these demands have, nevertheless, strained UN’s ability to respond. UN's tasks have also increased in scope and number. It is, therefore, of paramount importance to differentiate traditional UN peacekeeping missions from new peacekeeping operations (SHAW, 1995). Common characteristics, such as the need of consent of the main parties to the conflict before the deployment of troops and the conduction of negotiations must not be overlooked. ~ 26 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 However, one important change is the expansion of the scope of new operations. While traditional operations were designed to maintain the rule of law, to monitor ceasefire agreements, and to form buffer zones between disputants, new missions must undertake humanitarian assistance, mine clearing, preventive deployment, electoral monitoring, etc (SHAW, 1995). Furthermore, in the new missions, a growing international demand to protect human rights has lifted the limitation of the UN’s interventions in civil wars due to matters of state sovereignty. Finally, in traditional missions, peacekeepers were armed only with light armaments, but following the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping troops started entering regions where there is no ceasefire and, therefore, are now more heavily armed and may use military force for peace enforcement (SHAW, 1995). The fundamental differences between the terms ‘enforcement’ and ‘peacekeeping’ must be made clear. While peacekeeping relies on the consent of the contenders and on the principle of impartiality, those two conditions are difficult to achieve in enforcement situations. Moreover, the use of military strength by peacekeepers may bring about unpredictable results in the military, political and diplomatic spheres. Force may just as well end a conflict, by convincing the parties to take part in a negotiated settlement or exacerbate it, by compromising negotiation efforts (SHAW, 1995). 2.5.2. The Creation of the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission In 2005 former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan advocated for the idea that human rights constitute one of the three pillars that account for the basis of all UN’s work, along with peace and security and economic and social development. As a result from the 2005 World Summit in the sphere of human rights, the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission were created. As a result from the 2005 World Summit in the sphere of human rights, the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission were created. The Commission on Human Rights, that preceded the Council, was created in 1946. It drafted major international human rights standards, including the two international human rights covenants, which along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) form the International Bill of Human Rights. Through a work with more substantive thematic and case specific characteristics, the commission promoted important advances in human rights protection field. Thus, creating a unique system of special procedures composed of a body of independent experts of the area and working groups that included Special Rapporteurs. Performing the function of the commission’s and now the council’s “watchmen” for human rights violations matters, they ~ 27 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. must monitor and respond to reported human rights violations across the globe. Part of their work includes visiting countries, developing studies, intervening on behalf of victims, and reporting back with recommendations for UN action (TERLINGEN, 2007). Even though Annan expected the Human Rights Council to be eventually elevated to the status of a UN main organ, it was created as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly. The council’s mandate foresaw addressing situations of human rights violations and providing prompt responses to humanitarian emergencies. A 2006 General Assembly resolution stresses the need for ‘‘objectivity and non-selectivity’’ in on the issue and defended the elimination of ‘‘double standards and politicization’’, in order to highlight the fact that political interests must never be placed above human rights (TERLINGEN, 2007). With regards to the Peacebuilding Commission, it is essential to note that here is no consensus on the definition of the concept of peace-building. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to agree on practices for achieving it. In his 1992 ‘Agenda for Peace’ former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali defined peace-building as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Nevertheless, its operational meaning varies according to the agency that uses it (BIERSTEKER, 2007). Hence, it is possible that successes in one context will be imported into another, without considering widely varying contextual, historical or situational differences between different conflict zones. The measures that seem to have worked in one region might have some relevance for another, but the demographic and resource disparities between them may render those same measures of limited utility. Biersteker (2007) considers that the Peacebuilding Commission remains today one of the most promising areas of substantive UN reform, contrasting with the “disappointing performance” of another new institutional outcome of the 2005 World Summit, the Human Rights Council, which has received heavy criticism outside and inside the UN. The UN Peacebuilding Commission reflects the UN acquired knowledge on the challenges that punctuate conflict resolution, peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding and development. The frequency with which negotiated settlements turn back into armed conflict is a source of distress for UN experts. Moreover, it has been observed that in 50% of cases countries return to violent conflict within five years of the peace settlement. 2.6 .The Enhancement of Cooperation between the UN and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security In his ‘An Agenda for Peace’, former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali proposed the greater inclusion of regional organizations in solving conflicts involving their Member States ~ 28 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 (SHAW, 1995). In the period inaugurated with the end of the Cold War it became clear that the multilateral structures, due the great demands placed upon them, from an operational standpoint, would need strengthening, especially concerning the resolution of conflicts. Regionalism then became a necessary feature of conflict resolution, with the objective of burden sharing. During the early post-Cold War years, the UN did not possess enough resources or commitment of major states to provide security globally, what created vacuums that could be filled by regional powers and institutions. Furthermore, such system contributed to the development of a self-help mechanism for weaker states to address new security threats (FAWCETT, 2008). The UN may encourage rather than take on the roles of regional organizations in the short term, according to what was stated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document. Strong states will, then, keep on considering legitimizing roles for regional institutions useful, and weaker states will benefit from the security umbrella they provide. Moreover, the ‘R2P’ concept relates closely to this topic once it defends strong regional alliances, acknowledging the importance of security regionalism (ibidem). Although the manner through which the UN should relate to regional arrangements is defined in the UN Charter, coordinating efforts remains a difficult task from an operational standpoint. During the Ivorian crisis, for example, connections between the UN and its regional and subregional counterparts were weakened, leading to suboptimal outcomes. Contenders frequently try splitting international consensus, making coordination even more complicated. Coordination challenges’ origins, nonetheless, vary greatly from region to region. The UN-AU relations are influenced by the highly developed nature of African Union structures, while the more undefined nature of Asian-Pacific arrangements, for example, generates diverse effects on the UN-ASEAN relations (CONFERENCE REPORT, 2011). It is, therefore, essential to increase the reinforcing political legitimacy that can be achieved through the cooperation between UN and regional structures, and ensure that different levels of multilateral engagement are acting in a coordinate manner both normatively and operationally. Furthermore, the United Nations and regional structures might help foster the establishment of national R2P focal points, contributing to the formation of an integrated regional and international network for response and prevention systems (CONFERENCE REPORT, 2011). 2.7. The Advancement of Environmental Governance Among the 21th century international challenges, the environmental issue definitely stands out. The Earth’s climate, biodiversity, water, forests, food, and energy supplies are ~ 29 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. threatened daily by unsustainable human practices. Emission of greenhouse gases, destruction of the ozone layer, overconsumption of critical resources, high water and food prices, pollution and climate change are frequent topics in global conferences, intergovernmental bodies and the media. Developing countries are, by far, those who suffer the most from the ecological consequences of the unsustainable exploitation of the Earth’s limited natural resources and they are determined to make the United Nations their platform to pressure for more coordinated international environmental governance. They are supported by many developed countries, especially in the European Union; as said by an EU commissioner for climate action, the 21st century must have a more intelligent growth model, or else it’s really difficult to see how we feed 7 billion people now and 9 billion people [by 2050], resources were cheap before, but it seems we are in for a period where resources become more and more expensive. Oil is coming up in price, so many other commodities are coming up in price. Food prices are rising. We need to deal with this (HARVEY, 2012). However, many argue that the European Union position is contradictory, associating it to the “Kicking away the Ladder Theory10”, because the majority of the developed countries that are today insisting in a sustained development are the same that polluted and degraded the environment the most in the past century, during their industrial expansion. The current system of international environmental governance is a network of multilateral agreements. This governance is orchestrated by every kind of actor, governmental or not, public or private, OIs and others, major groups of the international civil society (UNEP, 2012a). Regional organizations provide forums for policy development and implementation in regions and the scientific community has a specific role in providing a basis for decision-making in a scientifically sound and informed manner (UNEP, 2012b). The United Nations longs to play a leading role in the global environment governance, and fulfill that goal it created the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to be the principal body to work on this matter. Among its tasks and coordinated mechanisms, it must set the international environmental agenda and promote sustainable development (UNEP, 2012c). However, the vast majority of experts believe that the current environmental governance is unsuitable to current needs and ill-equipped to correspond to expectations. Critics say that this governance lacks necessary representation from poorer countries and accountability, especially from those countries that are the main polluters and those that oppose rules and regulations in the name of free markets and economic growth (SWART, 10 This theory was presented in Ha-Joon Chang’s work “Kicking away the ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective”. This book won the EAEPE (European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy) award for best publication in 2002. ~ 30 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 2008). Among the changes that are requested by the international community in order to provide more effectiveness in this governance, there are: a wide-ranging education system to create a workforce with skills and knowledge of Green Economy; an approximation of the Green sector to profiting market; the update of educational institutions in order to encourage research in sustainability; the implementation of renewable energy sources and the increase of the security of the world’s food supply. It is, thus, necessary to create an institutional framework that provides, to governments and civil society, the coordinates for sustainable development (NAJAM; MUÑOZ, 2008,). The UNEP, together with the General Assembly and others organs, noted the need for better coordination, treaty compliance, scientific knowledge, policy guidance, and systemwide coherence of environmental activities. Many informal consultations on environmental governance were undertaken by UNEP since early 2006 (GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, 2012) and it was expected that in 2012 the Rio+20 Convention would endorse the need for nations to dedicate themselves to environmental protection and a more cohesive collaboration towards sustained development. This need is not only to reduce the symptoms of the environmental crisis, but also to underline greater policies to long term changes. According to UNEP, to strengthened environmental governance, the actions required are: [S]upport coherent international decision-making processes for environmental governance; catalyze international efforts to pursue the implementation of internationally agreed objectives; support regional, sub-regional and national environmental governance processes and institutions; promote and support the environmental basis for sustainable development at the national level (UNEP, 2012d). 2.8. The Problem of Financing and UN’s relations with the Private Sector To fulfill its duties with the international community, answering to global problems and crises, the United Nations needs a certain amount of money to cover its expenditures. UN’s lack of adequate financing is a serious constraint to the organization, preventing it to respond to some current demands. The United Nations and all its agencies and funds spend about 30 billion dollars each year or about 4 dollars for each of the world’s inhabitants (GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, 2012). This budget, compared to the biggest economies’ GDPs or even to the world’s military spending, is a very small sum and does not correspond to all that is required from each branch of the UN System. According to the Global Policy Forum (2012), for nearly two decades, the UN is facing financial difficulties, cutting the funding of ~ 31 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. many programs and choosing one aid program over another; some observers even say that the organization is going through a financial crisis11. The UN financing system is divided in two categories: the mandatory and the voluntary contributions. The mandatory contributions are applied to all 192 Members States and the individual amount to pay is determined by the General Assembly and its Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the GA) every three years. The calculus made is based on [T]he country’s gross national income average of the last three to six years and is calculated according to particular national debt, per capita income and currency fluctuation. The ceiling rate is fixed at 22%, which is met only by the United States as the biggest donor to the UN budget. The floor rate and minimum due is 0.001% on the UN budget, which applies to the poorest countries (WEISSER, 2009, p. 2). The mandatory budget covers the UN headquarters’ activities, staff and infrastructure, as also the expenditures of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. The mandatory budget also covers the peacekeeping operations, which have, by far, the highest budget of the organization (US$7.06 billion annual budget for the period from July 2011 to June 201212) since the UN is taking on more and more regional conflicts to settle and this operations are more complex than they were in the past, with the observation of elections, the distribution of supplies, the management the refugees, among others. The voluntary contributions are sent to different UN funds and programs and those contributions do not have guidelines or limits. The majority of UN aid programs, as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Food Program (WFP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) are nourished by this voluntary budget. This financial architecture is criticized and many members urge for reforms, especially in terms of accountability. Many Member States do not respect their obligation towards the UN and are late in their payments or even have not paid their full dues at all. In December 2008, 59 member states still owed US$ 3.4 billion to the UN for the current year, which includes unpaid assessments for the Regular Budget, the Peacekeeping Operations, the International Tribunals and the Capital Master Plan. The biggest debtor is the United States, which accounts for 94% of the debt on the regular budget and more than 40% of the total debt (WEISSER, 2009). Reformers insist on a stricter managing funding system with a higher accountability and bigger consequences to those members that rescind their donations, blaming them for the ‘widespread inefficiency and discrepancies in enacting UN agendas (JAGEL, 2012). Some 11 Global Policy Forum is an independent organization that closely monitors the work of the United Nations and scrutinizes global policymaking. See also: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/about-gpf-mm/introduction.html> 12 Data From the Global Political Forum. Available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org ~ 32 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 observers say that, while many countries do not pay because they have their own financial problems, there are many other countries that choose not to pay due to political reasons, such as mistrust between Member States and within the work of certain committees. Since much of the budget of programs, funds, and specialized agencies is based on voluntary contributions, countries use their financial contributions to these institutions as a political tool to reach their goals. A greater donor can pressure the UN to act on a specific matter over another, since he is in an important position of influence. He can, also, threaten to stop financing such institution if he is in disagreement with the adopted policies. As such, “The individual programs, funds and agencies have to deal with insecurities in their financial planning. The short-term funding contradicts the long-term approach for development” (WEISSER, 2009, p. 1). Delegates are looking for ways to improve the UN financial architecture, but in a General Assembly session proposals on the matter were numerous, indicating difficulties towards an agreement (JAGEL, 2012). The majority of members agreed that the general fund for UN operations must be one of the focuses of this reform, as well as finding ways to increase the organization’s efficiency, strategic planning, and lessen the costs of its operations. In the 63rd Session of the UNGA, members directly quoted Ban Ki Moon’s concept that summarized the weaknesses of the actual funding architecture:“Volatility of resource flows, long-term decline in the share of core resources of overall contributions, fragmentation of non-core funding, and uneven burden-sharing among donors” (BAN KI MOON, 2009 apud JAGEL, 2012). The reform of the financial system of the organization is imminent; the first 15 donors of UN correspond to more than 80% of the system’s budget and, in 2009, only five members financed more than 50% of the whole UN inflow (WEISSER, 2009, p. 2). A group of reformers proposed lowering the ceiling rate from 22% to 10%, in order to limit the political influence of those bigger donors and increase the leverage of the smaller ones. Other proposals recommend a global tax, as a penalty, applicable to the consumers of energy fuel in large scale that aim to be an “additional instrument for shaping policy, for instance, on climate change and global financial structures” (WEISSER, 2009, p. 2). As States are contributing less and less to UN agencies and funds, alternative sources of funding, especially nongovernmental ones, are increasing their participation in the organization. The private sector is actively working with the United Nations, especially in issues concerning human rights, peace and security, economic and social development, and humanitarian assistance. Though the UN end-goal may differ from the profit-goals of businessmen, the organization sustains that there are many objectives in common, such as building a strong market, combating corruption, ~ 33 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. safeguarding the environment, increasing food security, and ensuring social inclusion. Thus, the private sector is becoming an important donor to UN’s activities, and almost all funds, agencies, and programs have already received deeper collaboration. The United Nations sustains that, to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, a greater engagement with the private sector is necessary. Nonetheless, there is a major concern about the role of the private sector inside the UN; delegates questioned how altruistic can a private company be on issues of development and international aid. One may ask if private companies form an alliance with UN not by their willing to cooperate in achieving the Millennium Development Goals, but because they may have particular interest in market fragilities of some determined region (GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, 2012) since most UN missions are in countries that have fragile markets, with excessive deregulation, cheap labor force, and flexible labor rights.. Thus, to avoid those problems, many delegates are asking for a more rigid control towards private sector aid. Among specific topics of concern it is possible to name the decreasing UN’s capacity regarding humanitarian intervention: the UN is increasingly turning to mercenary armies in its missions abroad. Since UN is lacking personnel and the prices are rising, there is a trend to contract private armies to protect the organization personnel and facilities, since they seem to be cheaper (GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, 2012). Many States are also worried that this trend could perceive the UN field operations’ neutrality, undermining even more the organization’s credibility. 2.9. The Increase of UN’s System-Wide Coherence The Chief Executive Board for Coordination (CEB) is a coordination body comprised of all heads of UN organs. It developed into a common UN voice that made itself heard on climate change, food security, and the global financial and economic crisis. It is difficult to develop such a common voice in a highly decentralized system, with incentives for each agency to be visible as an individual organization and where Member States do not necessarily behave in a coherent manner across the different bodies. The emergence of the CEB as an actor relates to the latest round of reform of the UN’s development cooperation system. This process initially gained momentum in the 2005 World Summit and the subsequent high-level panel on system-wide coherence in development, humanitarian assistance, and environment areas. The process main focus was the strengthening of coherence and coordination of UN operational activities. The greatest products of the system-wide coherence reform initiative so far are the General Assembly’s decision in June 2010 to merge four entities working on ~ 34 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 gender-related issues into a new organization, UN Women, as well as to improve the governance, financing, and country-level work of the UN development system by a number of reforms (WEINLICH, 2011). Furthermore, the Delivering as One (DaO) program seeks to enhance coordination between normative UN organizations, specialized organizations and civil societies, and the country level UN programs. The creation of the DaO dates back to the 2005 World Summit and the establishment the 2006 High Panel on System-wide Coherence, which recommended the initiative. At the end of 2006, eight countries volunteered to launch pilot programs of the DaO initiative. Those countries were: Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Vietnam. The programs were launched in early 2007 and transferred to UNDG leadership in 2010. The main goal was to make the UN system work in a more direct fashion with pilot country governments in order to enhance UN presence, achieve sustained results, and reduce transaction costs (JAGEL, 2012). Since 2007, in pilot countries, the UN system operates with one program, one budgetary framework, and under the authority of one leader, providing a way of building coherence from the local bodies up via the DaO initiative (WEINLICH, 2011). ! " 3.1. The United Nations 2005 World Summit The 2005 World Summit of the United Nations was held in New York City from September 14th to 16th, in 2005. Representatives of all the then 191 Member States met in the UN Headquarters. They debated some points outlined in the Millennium Declaration13 and in the Millennium Development Goals14. The Summit settled four main branches of UN actions to make decisions and recommendations on: development, peace and collective security, human rights and the rule of law, and the strengthening of the UN (UNGA, 2005c). The last point comprises a group of internal practices and policies that the UN should try to implement in order to best fit itself in the international arena. After all, “Strengthening the UN”15 is a designation for many suggestions of internal improvements that shall guarantee more efficiency and effectiveness to the organization (UN, 2012b). In the High-Level Plenary Meeting, the most relevant topic about changes in the United Nations was the one concerned with human rights and the rule of law and, later, the 13 Full text at <http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm.> 14 More information at <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals>. 15More information on Strengthening the UN is available at <http://www.un.org/en/strengtheningtheun/.> ~ 35 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. strengthening of the UN. The former's importance relies on the first official recognition of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 3.1.1. The Responsibility to Protect Since the beginning of its use, the R2P turned out to be a fundamental guideline for international actions in conflicting zones. Despite being recent, it has quickly developed since 2005. In 2008, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made a speech in Berlin to better clarify what exactly is the R2P. One year after, Ban Ki-moon released a report entitled "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect" based on paragraphs 138-139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome. The report called for a three aspects strategy for implementing the R2P, namely 1) the protection responsibilities of the state, 2) international assistance and capacity building, and 3) timely and decisive response (ICRtoP, 2012; UNGA, 2009a). On 7 October 2009, the General Assembly passed the Resolution 63/308, which reaffirmed the States' commitment with the R2P in the 2005 World Summit (UNGA, 2009b). After that, two more reports of the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon were made on this issue: the 2010 Report on Early Warning, Assessment, and the Responsibility to Protect and the 2011 Report on The Role of Regional and Sub-regional arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (UNGA 2010b; UNGA, 2011). 3.1.2. Strengthening the United Nations in the 2005 World Summit During the 2005 World Summit, Strengthening the UN decisions regarded many different and relevant improvements in the organization. They could be divided as follows: 1) changes related to the main organs, like the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Secretariat; 2) changes related to coherence of the UN System and its relations with other entities and 3) changes in the Charter of the UN (UNGA, 2005c). Each of these aspects shall be analyzed hereafter. 3.1.2.1. Decisions related to the main organs of the United Nations Firstly, concerning the General Assembly, the 2005 World Summit Outcome called for the improvement of the relationship between the General Assembly and the other principal organs of the UN. On the other hand, the proposals for the Security Council once again reaffirmed the need to make the Council more broadly representative, efficient and transparent. Furthermore, the Outcome demands the UNSC to adapt its working method so as to increase the involvement of States not members of the Council (UNGA, 2005c). ~ 36 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 Still regarding changes in the main organs, there was a great effort to revitalize the ECOSOC as the main body for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue, and recommendations related to economic and social issues. Bearing this in mind, this council should a) promote global dialogue and partnerships regarding its matters along with international financial institutions, private sector and civil society, b) hold a biannual highlevel Development Cooperation Forum, c) follow the outcomes of the conferences of the UN and d) foster and complement international efforts related to humanitarian emergencies, including natural disasters. (UNGA, 2005c). Moreover, the Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization stressed “the desirability of finding practical ways and means” to reinforce the International Court of Justice (UNGA, 2006a). In relation to the Secretariat, the member states present in the Summit reaffirmed the importance of accountability, transparency, and integrity. In addition to that, efforts were made in order to implement a gender equality perspective in the policies and decisions taken inside the UN. There was an overall agreement with the policy of zero tolerance adopted by the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan regarding sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations personnel (UNGA, 2005c). It was during the 2005 World Summit of the UN that member States took the first steps towards the creation of the Human Rights Council16. This Council was designed to have mainly three functions: to promote protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, to address human rights violations and to make recommendations related to its subjects (UNGA, 2005c; UNGA, 2006b). The creation of the Peacebuilding Commission is also a result of the High-Level Plenary, further detailed by the Resolution 60/180 on the Peacebuilding Commission (UNGA, 2005d). 3.1.2.2. The coherence of the UN System and its relations with other entities The second topics division of the Strengthening the UN in the 2005 World Summit Outcome regards changes related to coherence of the UN System and its external relations. The signatories claimed to strengthen the linkage between normative work and the operational activities of the United Nations. They also created consensus on the need to consider more tightly managed entities in the fields of development, humanitarian assistance, and environment (UNGA, 2005c). This compromise was particularly well-established and supported the decision to create the Human Rights Council. 16 Further attributions related to the Council were pointed out in General Assembly Resolution 60/251 on the Human Rights Council of April3rd, 2006. ~ 37 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. The Summit’s Outcome proposed a reinforcement of the relationship between the UN and regional organizations by making the United Nations a platform of cooperation and consultancy for regional blocs. Beyond that, the members of the Plenary Meeting highlighted the importance of improving relations with national parliaments through the InterParliamentary Union. These were endeavors to fortify the UN-System by adapting itself to new global phenomena, as regionalism and growing interdependence (UNGA, 2005c) 3.1.2.3. Changes in the Charter Finally, there were a few proposals concerned with modifications in the Charter. The first one suggested the elimination of Chapter XIII, the one which regulates the Trusteeship System, and other references to the Trusteeship Council in Chapter XII. The Trusteeship Council suspended its operations on November 1st after the independence of Palau, the last Trust Territory of the UN. Furthermore, member States resolved to delete references to “enemy States” in Articles 53, 77, and 107, understanding the outdated character of this expression. At last, Resolution XX asked the Security Council to consider some aspects of the Military Staff Committee (UN, 2005a; UNGA, 2005c). These changes reflect UN awareness of the importance of renewing institutions in order to adapt to contemporary international processes and to keep historical coherence and harmony with the Charter’s principles. 3.2. Boutros Boutros-Ghalli’s Agendas The process of reforming the United Nations started its main advances with the arrival of a new Secretary-General in 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghalli, and the acknowledgment of the need to adapt the organization to post-Cold War reality. Two different, yet complementary, agendas were issued by him in order to set guidance to the efforts of reforming the United Nations: the Agenda for Peace and the Agenda for Development. Answering the request made by the UNSC Summit of 1992, Boutros-Ghalli created the Agenda for Peace, laying out the new strategy that the UN should strive for when dealing with security concerns (UNGA, 1992a). There were five interconnected principles expressed in this document, which should guide UN's role in establishing peace in the world: preventive diplomacy, peace-enforcement, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-building (DOYLE; OTUNNU, 1998). Another underlying logic, that guided international politics after the World War II, had disappeared with the end of the Cold War: the practice, by the superpowers, of using investment and cooperation to create spheres of influence (ADVEMEG, 2012). The majority of the developing countries feared the end of the funding development projects. In this ~ 38 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 context, the Secretary-General was called by the 47th General Assembly of 1992 to establish an Agenda for Development to guide nations in promoting social and economic development in the new era (UNGA, 1992b). The main ideas that Boutros-Ghalli addressed in the report can be summarized in seven points (ADVEMEG, 2012). Firstly, although the Nation-State should continue to have the main role when striving for development, the UN should utilize its vast experience to act as a facilitator in such pursuit. However, the second point stresses that the national government should not be regarded as a paramount economic agent, given the internationalization of trade flows. It should, notwithstanding, provide a framework for ensuring social safety and a competitive market system. The third point states that economic growth should not be an end in itself, but rather a mean for poverty reduction and promotion of full employment. The fourth point is a critic that there is no mechanism to ensure that major economies could be induced to promote economic structural changes to benefit international economy. The fifth point argues that sustainability is paramount for development. The sixth point defends social integration as an underlining logic for development. The seven and last point accounts for the parallel processes of development and democracy, since social participation in decision-making is linked to the legitimacy of governmental development programs. The Secretary-General ends its report noting that these should be the principles that would enable United Nations engagement in social and economic development. 3.3. Kofi Annan: Further Changes and Larger Freedom Upon taking office, in 1997, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan, together with Maurice Strong, started his efforts to reform the United Nations by issuing a report entitled Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform (UNGA, 1997). The main objective of such Programme was to establish a practical guide for achieving the guidelines exposed in the 1995 Commission on Global Governance report, entitled Our Global Neighborhood (ECO, 1997). The main new feature introduced in this 1995 report was a reassessment of national sovereignty. The world was facing new security concerns, which, since then, started to encompass not only the traditional “external threat” notion, but also the hazards brought by hunger, disease, repression and the like. Although developed countries focused mainly in the efforts of reducing the “bloated world-wide bureaucracy”, these reports also strived to tackle the new security menaces. An adaptation of the concept of sovereignty was proposed in the first report, affirming that a state’s right of autonomy should not be weighed against human’s right for security (CGO, 1995). The Pregramme for Reform focused mainly on management, administration, and coherence in UN activities around the world. ~ 39 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. The turning of the century brought the Millenium Development Goals, which were outlined by the Millenium Assembly. As a follow-up to this declaration, Kofi Annan, two years later, issued the report Strengthening of the United Nations: an Agenda for Further Change, intending to highlight ways for the United Nations to help nation-states achieve the Millenium Goals. As stated in the introduction of such report: The present report suggests a number of improvements aimed at ensuring that the Organization devotes its attention to the priorities fixed by the Member States, and that the Secretariat gives better service. However, the intergovernmental organs must also change. The General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council both need to adapt in order to realize their potential, while the stalled process of Security Council reform needs new impetus. The work programme of the Organization as a whole should be better focused, with fewer but more productive meetings and fewer but more useful documents (UNGA, 2002, p.2). In its first section, the report asseses what has been done in terms of a comprehensive reform of the United Nations and what should lie ahead, such as strenghtening the General Assembly, enhancing the role of the Economic and Social Council, resuming the process of reforming the Security Council and reducing the number of unnecessary meetings. The following sections propose ways to do so, by aligning the activities of the Organization with its priorities; serving the member states better; promoting institutional coordination and partnerships; reforming the planning and buget process to better allocate resources; and investing in the excellence of the United Nations staff (UNGA, 2002). In 2005 another major report was issued by Kofi Annan, as a five-year assessment of the progress made under the Millenium Declaration, entitled In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, which focuses mainly on progress that should be made in assuring freedom through the end of want, the end of fear, and the end of human rights violations (UNGA, 2005a). For the United Nations to achieve a main role in promoting this new world, the system as a role should be updated. In the report, after adressing the three main concerns in promoting freedom, the Secretary-General issued the guidelines in reforming the General Assembly, the Councils, the Secretariat, the System Coherence, the regional organizations, and the United Nations Charter (UNGA, 2005a). # ! Japan defends the UN reform, but usually focuses on the reform of the Security Council. The Japanese government argues that such a change would increase UN’s efficiency, effectiveness, legitimacy, and representativeness, once there is a lack of proportionality between the amount of present seats in the UNSC and the huge enlargement of United Nations membership during the last decades. Besides, Japan demands changes in the regional ~ 40 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 composition of membership, since Asia holds more than a half of global population, but has only one permanent member and two non-permanent members in the UNSC (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, 2011). Japan’s defense of its addition as a permanent member is based mainly on 3 points: a) Japan is the second-largest contributor to the UN budgets among the Member States, bearing 12.5% of the total budget; b) Japan is one of the major contributors to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, having already sent 10 dispatches of self-defense forces and civilian police personnel. Japan additionally has established 14 peacebuilding actions in Africa; c) Japan is the biggest supporter of disarmament and non-proliferation policies and, for instance, has putted forward a resolution on nuclear disarmament to the UN General Assembly every year since 1994 (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, 2011). Apart from the reforms in the UNSC, Japan addresses further demands. Among them, the country asks for the rationalization of the agenda in the General Assembly, conducting a more timely debate on the highest priorities problems. (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, 2006). South Africa’s claims for changes in the membership of the United Nations Security Council usually come along under the IBSA forum. India, Brazil, and South Africa stress the need to expand both permanent and non-permanent seats in the UNSC, granting larger emphasis to an increasing participation of developing countries (IBSA, 2010). Regarding the UN as a whole, South Africa has expressed the will of creating new and improved relations between the UN and regional organizations. This concern is related to its leading role in the African Union. (IRCD, 2012). South Africa argues that developing and underdeveloped countries are the most damaged by economic and financial global crises. The internal costs of their contributions are much heavier and, therefore, United Nations must always try to improve its efficiency, raising accountability standards. Brazil has strongly supported the adaptation of UN institution to the new international context, so as to, according to the Brazilian argument, make the UN a more efficient and legitimate organization. Regarding the reforms in the Security Council, Brazil has striven to increase its representativeness and transparency, through the enlargement of both permanent and non-permanent seats. Moreover, Brazil wishes to own one of these permanent seats. She is a really active member of the G4, having upheld the L. 64, a Draft Resolution that proposed an extended Security Council with up to 25 members17. . Until now, 89 out of 192 member States of the United Nations support Brazilian pretensions to a permanent seat, including 17 According to the proposal, six more permanent members would make part of the UNSC, two of them from Africa, another two from Asia, a single one from Western Europe and the last one from Latin America and Caribbean. ~ 41 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. France and United Kingdom. (MREa; MREb). Considering reforms not only of the Security Council, Brazil supported the creation of the Human Rights Council during the 2005 World Summit. At this same Summit, Brazilian representatives also defended the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission, pondering that the Brazilian position was essential for its creation. Additionally, Brazil has assisted the Development Cooperation Forum in order to properly strengthen the functions of the Economic and Social Council. (MREa). India strongly stresses the necessity of reforms in the structure of membership of the United Nations Security Council. As the other G4 nations, its demands range from permanent to non-permanent seats. Inside the UN, India showed great support to the creation of the UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women (UN Women) (MEA, 2010). Besides reforms of the UNSC, the Indian government actively discusses “the revitalization of the UN General Assembly and the strengthening of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in the UN’s development-related efforts” (MEA, 2011: p. 12). As the top three troop contributing country of the UN, India endorses many sorts of peacekeeping operations. (MEA, 2011). Recently, India has decided to join the L69 Group, a bloc composed by 41 countries that seek to achieve the lasting reform of the UN (GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, 2012). Mexico supports many projects of reform in the United Nations. In 2004, its officials struggled for the creation of the Group of Friends for the United Nations Reform, a bloc that points demands for specific topics for the reform of the organization. Mexico has declared the will to cooperate with projects of reform in the Security Council, General Assembly, ECOSOC, Secretariat, and other organs. In this regard, the country proposed many procedural changes that could fasten the negotiation process in the fora of discussion of the UN (MEXICO, 2005). Mexico is also known for its participation in the “Uniting for Consensus”, also called Coffee Club, a movement created in 1995, which stands against the enlargement of permanent seats in the Security Council. Basically, the Coffee Club members defend the extension of non-permanent seats up to 20 members, but they claim for no changes in the structure of membership of permanent members (UNGA, 2005b). The Russian Federation states its position as a supporter of greater synergy among UN bodies, especially between the Security Council and regional organizations (RUSSIA, 2009). Regarding the topic of the Security Council reform, this country defends that, given the importance of this body in assuring global stability, any reform has to be made patiently, taking in account the harmonization of all the positions concerning this topic (RUSSIA, 2005). Given that no results made by intergovernmental negotiation have received wide support, Russia believes that setting artificial deadlines and forcing a specific model to vote ~ 42 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 prior to this harmonization would polarize the countries, leading to a nefarious deadlock in the talks. The country defends also that the size of the council should continue to be compact, no greater than twenty and a few, to assure its effectiveness, and that the veto power should not be changed (RUSSIA, 2010). The People’s Republic of China, stressing the importance of the General Assembly and the Security Council as the two main bodies of the United Nations, calls for the revitalization of the former and the reform of the later as top goals of the institution reform, focusing on consensus and deliberation as a way of achieving it (CHINA, 2008). The UN Security Council should be enlarged, according to this country, and a greater number of developing countries, especially African ones, should be present in the Council (CHINA, 2012). Still regarding UNSC, China also calls for the improvement of its working method, in order to enhance its efficiency and transparency. Just as Russia, the PRC does not believe in imposing time boundaries for the reform (CHINA, 2006b). On the topic of UN funding, China advocates attaining to the principle of “capacity to pay” (CHINA, 2006a). The Argentine Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Italian Republic and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan are part of the group “Uniting for Consensus”, formerly known as Coffee Club. The group defends that, on the topic of the United Nations Security Council reform, the changes should only be done unanimously (UNGA, 2005b). The objective is to delay the process so that regional powers, such as the G4, do not arise to a permanent spot with veto power in the Council. The practical proposal of the group is to increase nonpermanent seats in the Council to twenty (UNGA, 2005b). Pakistan itself, together with Viet Nam and six other countries are the pilots of the endeavor known as the “Delivering as One” project (UNDG, 2010). This project aims to combine comparative advantages of Member States and more coherent programs of the institution in order to increase the impact of UN efforts and reduce its costs. Turkey is also a member of the Uniting for Consensus faction, which opposes to the addition of new permanent members to the Security Council (SWART, 2009). Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has stated that the United Nations Security Council must be reformed, since it is impossible for the UNSC to deliver justice to the world with its current structure. He also stated that “the world is running under the hegemony of five countries and only what permanent members say is done” (AKPARTI, 2012). The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam sees that a comprehensive United Nations reform goes through the revitalization of the General Assembly. In order to raise the position of this body, the country defends its responsibility of being a policy making agency and main representative of the institution, as well as any reform should increase its role in the process of ~ 43 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. setting up standards, compiling international law, and selecting and appointing senior UN officials (BAO, 2011). The country defends that the reform should benefit all Member States, advocating mutual consultations to achieve a better system-wide coherence (VNA, 2009). The country hosts a pilot of the “Delivering as One” project, as stated in the previous paragraph (UNDG, 2010). Regarding the UN Security Council reform, Viet Nam believes not only in expanding the numbers of permanent and non-permanent seats, but also that the reform should make the Council more transparent and accountable for its actions (VNA, 2009). The Arab Republic of Egypt strives for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council and it defends the right of African countries to have two permanent and five non-permanent seats in this committee (EGYPT, 2010). Also, the country is in favor of granting more powers to the General Assembly (EGYPT, 2009). Regarding operational activities, Egypt believes that they should be enhanced by the reform process, and that the Economic and Social Council should have the role of supervising them, as well as coordinating and highlighting its orientations and policies (EGYPT, 2011). Nigeria is in favor of the reform of the UN Security Council and aims at becoming a permanent member as an African representative. On the initiative of the former Nigerian President and then African Union Chairman, Olusegun Obasanjo, African leaders at the African Union summit worked towards two-consensus candidates - the Ezulwin consensus in Swaziland, February 2005, supporting Nigeria’s pledge. This event followed the growth of US interest in Egypt and South Africa. This consensus building was threatened at the AU Sirte Summit in July 2005, when the countries competing for the seats rose from the four original countries (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa) to eight, the four new ones being Gambia, Kenya, Senegal, and Libya (AKPOTOR, AGBEBAKU, 2010). At the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Nigerian President Goodluck E. Jonathan restated the Nigerian position on UNSC reform (NIGERIA, 2011). Germany welcomes the fact that it was possible for a few additional proposals for reform of the United Nations to be implemented in recent years: with the establishment of the intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission by the Security Council and the General Assembly in December 2005, the implementation of the “One UN” initiative and it has welcomed the creation of UN Women (GERMANY, 2012). Germany still supports a European seat officially, according to the government’s coalition agreement signed after the September 2009 general election. The coalition agreement also states that as the UK and France would probably not agree with such proposal, “in the interim, Germany remains prepared to assume greater international responsibility with a permanent seat on the Security Council.” Germany is the EU’s most populous country and the UN’s third-largest financial ~ 44 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 contributor. Moreover, German soldiers are part of UN contingents in Afghanistan, in Kosovo, and off the coast of Lebanon (NEUKIRCH, 2010). Although France admits the need for the adaptation of the Security Council to the realities of this century, the French position is that the Council must remain capable of performing its attributions effectively. France is in favor of an expanded number of permanent and non-permanent seats in the Council, so that its composition reflects the emergence of new powers willing and able to assume great responsibilities. France supports the accession of Germany, Brazil, India, and Japan to permanent member status and an increased presence of African countries within the Council, in particular among its permanent members. France, along with the UK, advocates for an intermediate reform proposal, which could include a new category of seats, with a longer term than that of the currently elected members. At the end of this intermediate period, a review should take place to convert these new seats into permanent seats (FRANCE, 2012). The United States of America supported the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2005. Nevertheless, American Ambassador Bolton stated that management and budget reform are more of a priority for the United States than the Commission (US MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 2005). The country generally supported the establishment of a Human Rights Council to replace the Commission on Human Rights. The previous Commission was criticized by the United States and other countries over the composition of its membership when countries perceived by many to have poor human rights standards were elected as members. However, in March 2006, when the UN General Assembly agreed to a resolution creating the new Council, the United States was one of four countries to vote against it, on the grounds that the new Council was not equipped with stronger mechanisms to maintain credible membership. The US also expressed disappointment with the Council’s work during its initial sessions, which focused primarily on alleged Israel’s human rights abuses in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and in Lebanon. The US also identifies economic development as a UN reform priority (BLANCHFIELD, 2011). The US agrees with a Security Council reform, but only if an increase in its effectiveness accompanied such change. Furthermore, the country supports Japan as a permanent Security Council member due to its “democratic and human rights record”, and its role as the second largest contributor to the United Nations. The US government believes that developing countries deserve representation in the Council, but maintains that any new potential permanent member should meet specific criteria i.e. dimension of economy and population, military capacity, contributions to peacekeeping operations, commitment to ~ 45 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. democracy, respect for human rights, financial contributions to the UN, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism records and equitable geographic balance (ibidem). The United States agrees in principle with a minor expansion of both permanent and non-permanent members and defends that any consideration of an expansion of permanent members must be focused on a specific country. Furthermore, the United States is not open to an enlargement of the Council that changes the current veto structure (DICARLO, 2010). In January 2009 the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France launched an initiative aiming at improving the way in which the UN Security Council mandates and reviews UN peacekeeping operations. The initiative includes the enhancement of coordination with countries that contribute with civilians, police, and troops to UN peacekeeping operations (UK, 2010). As for the Security Council reform, the UK continues to support permanent membership for Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India, as well as permanent African representation. Any increase in the size of the Council, however, should be followed by the expansion of the non-permanent category also. Moreover, according to the British government, an intermediate model could provide a means of advancement towards permanent reform, stressing that such reform must not reduce the Council’s capacity to perform its functions (UK, 2012). Concerning the reform of the UNSC, the Republic of Korea’s government addresses the need for more transparent periodic elections of Council Members in order to achieve a more legitimate representation. Moreover, the veto should be exercised with restraint and the reason for its use should be explained. During the Annual Debate on Security Council Reform, South Korean delegation “believed the ‘Intermediary approach’ with the establishment of longer-term seats would help break the ‘deadlock’” (UNGA, 2010c). Besides, it called for improving transparency, effectiveness and inclusiveness of the Council (UNGA, 2010c). South Korean representatives usually state that the reforms must be achieved through a two-thirds majority voting process and also that dialogue ought to be especially intensified among the Permanent Members of the UNSC (DONG-IK, 2012). The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly urges for reforms in the Security Council, calling for an increase in its permanent seats. It suggests that collective action is the best way to defeat the unfair structure of the UNSC and that the General Assembly is the real symbol of the United Nations. Iranian representatives reiterate that the more than one billion Muslim population around the world should own a permanent seat at the Security Council (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF IRAN 2011). The United Nations has played a crucial role in Bosnia and Herzegovina statebuilding after the Dayton Agreement, in 1995, which formalized the ending of the Bosnian ~ 46 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 War (GUIMARÃES, 2012). After the conclusion of the UN mandate in the country, it fell upon the European Union to conduct state building operations there. These factors, allied with the will of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be a part both of the EU and NATO, set the main guidelines regarding the foreign policy of the country. Regarding the Security Council reform, the country defends the position adopted by neighboring states, namely to create a new permanent seat in the Council for Eastern Europe members (LUND, 2009). For Canada, strengthening the United Nations System is fundamental for the maintenance of the organization’s efficiency and capacity to deliver results to the international community. Canada affirms the need to better manage the organization’s funds, focusing in accountability, integrity, and value for money, creating a true international civil service that is flexible, mobile, and has the specialized skills and training to respond to the demands of UN’s global operations (CANADA PERMANENT MISSION, 2012). In the topic of Security Council’s reform, Canada belongs to the United for Consensus group, which proposes an adding of non-permanent seats reflecting regional distribution of power. However, this group does not believe that by the addition of new permanent members the problem would be solved, because it would only insert more differences between nations. Canada also belongs to the Utstein Group of donor countries and to the Geneva Group (the top 14 contributors to UN budgets) (CANADA PERMANENT MISSION, 2012). One of the major concerns of the international community is the question of development and, for that, Canada strongly urges the creation of a UN Sustainable Development Security Council, a high-level decision-making organ with coordination powers over specialized agencies (CANADA PERMANENT MISSION, 2011). Moreover, Canada sustains that organizations like ECOSOC should be more efficient in order to achieve the Millennium Goals. Australia affirms that UN reform must focus on two main questions: the lack of funds for the organization and the necessity of readapt the structures of the Security Council (PARLAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, 2001). For Australia, nations should focus on how UN’s internal financial instability can be controlled and reorganized, and the country strongly supports the intergovernmental meetings to debate such matter. Australia is not bound to any of the groups for the Security Council reform, and, for them, the reform must include new permanents and non-permanent seats and focus on eliminating – or just putting on oblivion – the veto power. The Australian delegation supports reforms in the administrations, including stronger mandates, better planning of missions and operations, efficient financial management, and transparent accountable systems in all organs(PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, 2001). ~ 47 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. Colombia belongs to the United for Consensus group for reform of the Security Council. .. For Colombia, any reform in the Council should aim broader regional representation, restrictions on the use of the veto, and greater transparency in the decisionmaking process (BLUM, 2009). According to Colombia, there must be a reform aiming to reorganize the relationship among the organization’s organs. All organs, including – and primarily – the Security Council must be accountable to the General Assembly, since this is the main organ that gathers all Member States. Periodical meetings between the Presidents of the General Assembly, the ECOSOC, and the Security Council for the presentation of analytical reports by the Council to the Assembly are essential to Colombian delegates. For Colombia, the greatest threat to the international community is the question of development and poverty and, for that, United Nations and the multilateral financial institutions must develop a new framework to prevent and respond to economic crises and instabilities (SOTO, 2000). Also, UN’s system reform should also focus on the new treats of the 21st century, such as illicit drug and arms traffic and terrorism (BLUM, 2009). According to the president of Venezuela, Hugo Chaves, in a speech at the General Assembly in 2005, the United Nation has exhausted its model and the 21st century claims for deep changes in the organization. For him, there are four indispensable points that must guide any reform in the organization: the question of expanding Security Council seats – both permanent and non-permanent ones –, the improvement of the work methods of all organs in order to increase transparency, the elimination of the veto power, and the strengthening of the role of the Secretary-General.. In order to make the organization more democratic, Venezuela believes that the veto power must be abolished and that the election for Secretary General must be open and transparent. Venezuela also demands a reform of international financial institutions to secure true representation of developing countries (CHAVEZ, 2005), strengthening the regional financial architecture and reviewing the Bretton Woods institutions. To Saudi Arabia, there must be a real reform in UN structures, mainly in the Security Council, which needs to be more representative, corresponding to the nowadays balance of power among countries. Therefore, it urges the UN Security Council to improve geographical representation, promote transparency, avoid the application of double standards, and ensure the adoption of measures to enhance the credibility of its work and guarantee respect for, and compliance with its resolutions (MADANI, 2004). According to Saudi Arabia, the veto power is one of the major obstacles to transparence and democracy in the Council, and for that this power should be rationalized. It is also imperative to reorganize the balance between the General Assembly and the Security Council, and also enhance the role of the ECOSOC and ~ 48 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 its coordination with UN funds and programs (MADANI, 2004). Being part of a region that is so unstable as the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is clearly worried with terrorism proliferation, the illicit arms traffic, and poverty; for that, this country urges greater cooperation in the international community for fight those humanitarian threats (ibidem). Israel supports the increase of membership in the UNSC with as much consensus as possible. The main concern of Israeli representatives in this matter regards the revision of priorities in the General Assembly, arguing that bodies like the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the Division for Palestinian Rights in the DPA, the Special Information Programme on the Question of Palestine in the DPI, and the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices aim only to disseminate a partisan view of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Furthermore, according to its representatives, many of the UNGA resolutions related to Israel are antiquated and redundant (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL, 2005). Together with Japan, Serbia wishes to achieve a meaningful result on Security Council reform so as to make the Security Council more representative, effective, and responsive to the necessities of the international community (JAPAN, 2011). Serbia supports the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), but admits that “(n)either the armed KFOR contingent, nor the […] (UNMIK) has managed a solution to the SerbianAlbanian conflict which has dogged the province for centuries.” (SERBIA MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS). Recently, the Serbian government expressed its concerns with what it considers a violation of its rights under the UN Charter, namely the independence of Kosovo (SERBIA, 2012). Rwanda in one of the ‘One UN’ pilot countries for UN reform. The Rwandan government is committed to fulfilling international development objectives such as the Millennium Development Goals for poverty eradication and sustainable development. In October 2010, however, the Draft UN Mapping Report in the DRC was published by the UN, after being leaked earlier the same year. The report about the Congo wars caused the Rwandan government to threaten to withdraw its troops from UN missions and to issue the “Official Government of Rwanda Comments on the Draft UN Mapping Report on the DRC” (RWANDA, 2010). $ % ! 1) How could the UNSC reform be achieved and what form should it take? 2) Could the UN debates become more horizontal through the revitalization of the General Assembly? ~ 49 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. 3) Would economic and developmental issues receive a better treatment through a reform of the ECOSOC and Social and Economic Policy Process at the UN? 4) Will the Human Rights Council generate better results than its predecessor? Could peacekeeping reforms and the influence of concepts such as “Human Security” and “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” promote the increase of respect for human rights and protection of civilians? 6) Could the enhancement of cooperation between the UN and regional arrangements or agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security be achieved and be carried out effectively? A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, New York. 2009. Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf>. Access: 01 May 2012. ADVEMEG. Economic and Social Development - The 1994 agenda for development. 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