Bachem Ba 349 Natter

Bachem Ba 349 Natter 1 1/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 2 ATENAS EDITORES ASOCIADOS 1998-2016 www.thegermanarmy.org Tittle: Bachem Ba 349 Natter © Atenas Editores Asociados 1998-2016 © Gustavo Urueña A www.thegermanarmy.org More information: http://www.thegermanarmy.org/luftwaffe/index.html First Published: Mayo 2014 We include aditional notes and text to clarify original and reproduce original text as it in original book All right reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmited in any form or by any mens, electronic, mechanical, photocopyng or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the autor or publisher. Design: Atenas Editores Asociados 1998-2016 © Atenas Editores Asociados 1998-2016 The Editors welcome all comments and observations: 1939europa@gmail.com 2/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 3 Wernher Magnus Maximilian Freiherr von Braun 3/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 4 Dates: (March 23, 1912 June 16, 1977) He was one of the leading figures in the development of rocket technology in Nazi Germany, where he was a member of the Nazi Party and the SS. Following World War II, he was moved to the United States, along with about 1,500 other scientists, technicians, and engineers, as part of Operation Paperclip, where he developed the rockets that launched the United States' first space satellite Explorer 1, and the Apollo program manned lunar landings. In his twenties and early thirties, von Braun worked in Germany's rocket development program, where he helped design and develop the V-2 rocket at Peenemünde during World War II. Following the war, von Braun worked for the United States Army on an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) program before his group was assimilated into NASA. Under NASA, he served as director of the newly formed Marshall Space Flight Center and as the chief architect of the Saturn V launch vehicle, the superbooster that propelled the Apollo spacecraft to the Moon. According to a NASA source, he is, "without doubt, the greatest rocket scientist in history", as well as the "Father of Rocket Science". In 1975, he received the National Medal of Science. He continued insisting on the human mission to Mars throughout his life. 4/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 5 Walter Wever 5/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 6 Dates: 11 November 1887 3 June 1936 He was an early proponent of the theory of strategic bombing as a means to wage war, supporting the theories of Giulio Douhet. He died in an air crash in 1936, and German efforts to build a strategic bomber force died with him. Walther Wever was born on 11 November 1887 in Wilhelmsort in the county of Bromberg (now in north-central Poland). He was the son of Arnold Wever, the one-time director of a Berlin bank and the grandson of the Prussian Prosecutor-General Dr. Carl George Wever. After his final secondary examinations, he settled in Schweidnitz where he trained as an officer. Wever saw action in World War I and served as a staff officer for the OHL (Oberste Heeresleitung, Army High Command). 6/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 7 Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen 7/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 8 Dates: born 10 October 1895 in Gut Barzdorf, Silesia; died 12 July 1945 in Bad Ischl, Austria) German Generalfeldmarschall (General Field Marshal) of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) during the Second World War. Born in 1895 to Prussian nobles, Wolfram grew up in wealthy surroundings. After attending school, he opted to join the German Army at the age of 18, rather than choose an academic career. He joined the army's Cavalry arm in 1913. 1 On the outbreak of the First World War, he fought on the Western Front, winning the Iron Cross Second Class. He was redeployed to the Eastern Front in 1915, where he stayed until 1917. The von Richthofen family produced several notable personalities that would become famous during the First War. His cousins, brothers Lothar and Manfred von Richthofen, both became flying aces and they encouraged him to join the Luftstreitkräfte (German Imperial Air Service). He did so, and joined Manfred's Geschwader (Wing), Jagdgeschwader 1 (Fighter Wing 1). Manfred, known as the Red Baron, was the highest claiming ace of the war with 80 victories. On his first mission with his cousin, Manfred was killed in April 1918. Wolfram continued flying, and went on to claim eight aerial victories before the armistice in November 1918. His other cousin, Lothar, survived the war, but was killed in a flying accident in 1922. 1 Generalfeldmarschall Wolfram von Richthofen 8/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 9 9/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 10 10/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 11 Introduction.......................................................................13 The War in the Air .............................................................13 Flying Bombs and Rockets ............................................... 55 The Armaments and Military Power of Germany ............ 66 Bachem Ba 349 Natter...................................................... 83 Luftwaffe Weapons ......................................................... 103 The Automatic Upward-firing Twin MG FF/M.............. 103 BK 3.7 Bordkanone ......................................................... 106 Bordkanone BK 5 Cannon ............................................... 111 5cm Mauser MK 214A Bordkanone................................. 113 Mauser MK 214 Bordkanone ........................................... 115 7.5cm BK 7.5 Bordkanone ............................................... 115 MG 17 Machine Gun ........................................................ 117 MG 151 Cannon ................................................................ 119 The R4M 'Orkan' Bordrakete...........................................124 The RZ 65 Tohn' Bordrakete ...........................................126 The RZ100 Bordrakete.....................................................129 The X7
Rotkâppchen Bordrakete ................................. 131 The 21cm 'Wurfgranate 42' Bordrakete...........................134 The Wfr.Gr. 42 as a Special Air Combat Weapon ...........136 The 28/32cm Wurfkorper as a Bordwaffe.......................137 The Gerat 104 'Mûnchhausen' Bordwaffe .......................139 Dûsenkanone Dûka 88 Bordwaffe.................................. 140 Dûsenkanone Dûke 280 Bordwaffe.................................142 The 'Tonne-Seedorf TV Guidance System.......................143 The British H2S Panoramic Radar ................................. 146 Neptun Radar...................................................................147 Diagrams ......................................................................... 150 Annexes............................................................................152 Luftwaffe ..........................................................................152 Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen .................................. 164 Colonel General Ernst Udet............................................. 211 Walther Wever ................................................................ 224 Glossary........................................................................... 227 Bibliography.................................................................... 230 Index ............................................................................... 235 11/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 12 12/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 13 Introduction The War in the Air First Phase THUS far the war has been, in the air, a strange one. It has been strange in several ways. People had expected the Blitzkrieg to break in full fury in the west, but as yet no thunderbolt has fallen there. Poland felt its impact and crumpled under the stroke, though conditions there seemed, prima facie, unfavorable for the successful conduct of a lightning war. The course of the conflict has not, in fact, followed the book. There have been a number of surprises. In the operations at sea, for example, it was confidently expected that aircraft, not the submarine, would be the chief danger to maritime commerce. The airplane, we were told, would harry and dragoon belligerent and neutral shipping in the narrow waters into which the busy lanes of ocean traffic converge. Actually, the air arm has not been particularly effective at sea, though British aircraft have taken a hand with some success in hunting the submarine. That, however, had been foreseen. Certainly the achievements of the German air force in Poland fulfilled the expectations of the most sanguine adherents of the blue sky school. In conjunction with the mechanized ground forces it dominated the situation from the first. The lists were set for a tourney between the old order of warfare and the new. Germany's strength lay in her possession of the most modern instruments of mechanical destruction. Poland was, in comparison, a nineteenth century Power. Her cavalry was her pride. One could imagine her gallant horsemen galloping with Jeb Stuart or Sheridan in Virginia. Indeed, her great masses of cavalry might have thundered their way to victory in the still more appropriate setting of the mediæval era. As it was, they were a sheer anachronism. Confronted by armored cars and tanks, hammered by high explosive from the air, they were only flesh for the slaughter. The twentieth century won all along the line. The Polish defeat was a tragedy, but an ine13/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 14 vitable one. In the east, the war in the air was practically decided on the first day. On the morning of September 1, the German bombers made a vigorous attack on all the air bases in western Poland, as well as on strategic railways and junctions. The Polish aircraft, caught in their hangars, were destroyed or seriously damaged. That first sudden blow, delivered treacherously and without a declaration of war, while the Polish Government thought that negotiations were still possible, crippled the Polish air arm for the rest of the war. A gallant fight was still made by the remnant but the odds against it were too great. In any case the Polish equipment was inferior to the German. Germany had the unquestioned mastery of the air. At first the methods by which she won it were, apart from the fact that the aggression itself was utterly unjustified, fair enough in themselves. Herr Hitler had announced to the Reichstag on September 1 that he would not war against women and children. He was speaking, it will be noted, less than four weeks before the time when women and children were to be slaughtered and mutilated in Warsaw. "I have ordered my air force," he said, "to restrict itself to attacks on military objectives." Replying to President Roosevelt's appeal that civilian populations be spared the horrors of air bombardment, he defined his attitude to this question in terms which, coming from another, would have presaged the waging of a humane and chivalrous war: " . . . that it is a humanitarian principle to refrain from the bombing of non-military objectives under all circumstances in connection with military operations, corresponds completely with my own point of view and has been advocated by me before. I, therefore, unconditionally endorse the proposal that the governments taking part in the hostilities now in progress make public a declaration in this sense. For my own part, I already gave notice in my Reichstag speech of today that the German air force had received the order to restrict its operations to military objectives." That the German air force did confine itself more or less to 14/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 15 military objectives in the opening phase of the war is supported by a certain amount of independent evidence. Mr. H. C. Greene, the correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph, reported in that journal from Cernati on September 10 that military objectives such as bridges, roads, railways and aërodromes had been aimed at almost exclusively, though terrible losses had fallen on the civil population as a result of the attacks. On September 6, Mr. Butler, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated in reply to a question in the House of Commons that the information in the British Government's possession showed that the German bombing attacks had in general been directed against objectives serving a military purpose and not indiscriminately against the civil population; but he also was careful to add that the latter had at the same time suffered heavy casualties. Soon, however, evidence began to accumulate that other than military objectives were being attacked and that, in fact, methods of terrorization were being adopted by the German Luftwaffe. It is true that one must always accept with caution reports from belligerent sources concerning excesses or outrages committed by the enemy. There is inevitably an element of propaganda in such reports. Further, newspaper correspondents on the spot are apt to be impressed by what is told them and are not in a position usually to know or state the other side of the case. Some of the Polish announcements were certainly examples of exaggeration, excusable, no doubt, but still unreliable. For instance, a communiqué of September 2 stated that individual farms and farmers had been bombed -- a somewhat improbable occurrence. On the other hand, it is even more improbable that the reports from many quarters about the ruthlessness of the German air force were entirely devoid of foundation. We have, in fact, unbiased evidence sufficient to convict without any need for dependence on ex parte testimony. Unquestionably, there were numerous instances of bombing objectives which by no possibility could be termed military. Among them was that of the village of Tomaszow, 15/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 16 which was the victim of "a particularly vicious bombing" according to a message to the Times of September 11 from its special correspondent on the Polish frontier. Other instances were attested by Dr. Oskar Zsolnay, a Hungarian official trade delegate who had been in Lwów and who described in a Budapest paper a large number of bombing raids on that city, nearly all of them directed against nonmilitary objectives. Some of the most important evidence was supplied by the American Ambassador to Poland, Mr. Biddle, who on September 8 furnished the State Department with particulars of cases in which non-military targets had been attacked: they included his own villa, more than ten miles outside Warsaw, a sanatorium, a refugee train, a hospital train and a hut for Girl Guides. "It is also evident," he added, "that the German bombers are releasing the bombs they carry even when they are in doubt as to the identity of their objectives." Again, on September 13, Mr. Biddle reported that the village to which he had then moved and which was, he said, "a defenseless open village" had been attacked by German bombers. On September 20 the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Information said in the House that reports from the British Ambassador to Poland supported the evidence of Mr. Biddle on the bombing of open towns. One may perhaps feel some hesitation in accepting without reservation the statement in the Polish communiqué of September 15 that the bombardment of open towns by German aircraft had "assumed the character of a systematic destruction of all built-up areas or cities without any connection with military operations," but there can be no reasonable doubt about the fact that a great number of non-military objectives were bombed. Beyond question many villages were deliberately attacked and a number of them destroyed. In Warsaw itself the Belvedere and Lazienki Palaces, the Seym (Parliament) building, the Soviet and Rumanian Embassies, the Latvian Legation, a number of churches and some hospitals had been wholly or partly demolished from the air even before the intensive bombardment from air and ground began on September 25. 16/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 17 The final state of the city was still more tragic. The correspondent of a Danish newspaper who visited it after the surrender reported that scarcely a house was undamaged and in several districts, especially the suburb of Praga, not one house was left standing. The devastation was due in part to artillery fire, but the bombs of the aircraft contributed very materially. Inevitably the losses suffered by the civil population were heavy in the extreme. It is perfectly clear that if the Germans did in fact attempt to bomb only military objectives, they failed in that attempt most lamentably. The more likely explanation is that no such attempt was made. The city was bombed indiscriminately, subjected, in fact, to a display of Nazi Schrecklichkeit. The destruction was intended as an object lesson. "I should like the gentlemen of London to see what a city looks like when it has been through what Warsaw suffered," said the German wireless announcer on October 4. "These gentlemen ought to see what might happen in their own country if they persist in their mad warmongering." The fiction that only military objectives were bombed was kept up in the German reports. A communiqué issued by the High Command on September 25 stated: "Important military objectives in Warsaw were successfully attacked in power-dives by German aircraft." It is a sufficient commentary upon this to record that when Warsaw asked for an armistice on September 27, 16,000 soldiers and 20,000 civilians lay wounded in the hospitals. There is little doubt, indeed, that Warsaw was subjected to a bombardment, from ground and air, of which the purpose was psychological, or more bluntly, to terrorize. That particular type of bombardment is nothing new in the practice of German arms. It was tried on many occasions in the Franco-German War of 1870-71. At Strasbourg, for instance, the civilian quarters of the city were shelled by siege batteries in order to "induce the inhabitants to compel the governor to surrender the fortress." The effect was simply to stiffen the determination of the garrison and the inhabitants to resist. Exactly the same tactics were employed at Warsaw nearly seventy years later, and the same effect was produced; the 17/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 18 morale of the city was unbroken, for it was lack of ammunition and supplies, not loss of courage, which finally made surrender inevitable. Methods of frightfulness defeat their aims when used against a determined people. Herr Hitler announced in his speech on September 19 that the British blockade might force him to make use of a "weapon by which we [Germany] cannot be attacked." The fresh resort to Schrecklichkeit here foreshadowed, whether it referred to the poison gas or to bacteriological warfare or merely to massed attack from the air on cities, will not effect its object. On that point there can be no doubt whatever. The major rôle which the German air force played in the conquest of Poland is no proof that it will achieve similar successes in the west. Poland was, in comparison with Germany, very weak in the air. That her air force, after the initial losses which it sustained on September 1, was able to resist as well as it did testifies to the gallantry of its personnel. It is the more regrettable that its achievements were magnified by some absurd propaganda. The statement in a communiqué of September 3 that 64 German machines were brought down on that day for the loss of 11 Polish machines was entirely unbelievable. The announcement a little later that Berlin had been bombed was no less unconvincing. There is no escape from the conclusion, on the known facts, that Poland was wholly outclassed in the air. The position is and will continue to be a very different one in the west. Here the German air arm is faced with a far harder task. Neither in numbers nor in quality will it be able to claim superiority over the Franco-British air strength. Indeed, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall stated in an interview in Paris on October 7 that the British and French air forces were already well on the road to establishing their supremacy in the air. Some 2,000 to 3,000 German aircraft are said to have been employed against Poland. The total first line strength at Germany's disposal in the west may be 4,000 machines or more. The Allies' effectives are probably as great. In quality of matériel there is probably not much to choose between the opposing combatants, but what little advantage there is should be on the 18/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 19 Allies' side. The German Heinkel, Junkers, Dornier and Henschel bombers are undoubtedly formidable aircraft but they are no better than the Wellingtons, Blenheims, Amiots, and Loiré et Oliviers on the other side. No German bomber, so far as is known, carries a bomb-load so large as that of the latest French heavy bomber, the Farman 223. The French Morane 406 C and Bloch 151, the British Spitfire and Hawker Hurricane are at least a match, in the fighter class, for the Messerschmitt 109 or 110 and the Heinkel 112. Sir Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for Air, declared in the House of Commons on October 10 that the latest British fighters were "definitely better than their German counterparts." The newest French fighters are also fine machines. The French air force is fortunate in that practically all its equipment is of the latest design and production. At the time of the Munich settlement the French equipment was notoriously unsatisfactory; production had fallen to around 50 machines a month and the flying squadrons were equipped with types which were obsolescent if not obsolete. Now, France has a splendid, modern air force. Her factories are pouring out machines in an increasing flow and the supplies received from America help to swell the volume. The American fighter, the Curtiss P. 36, has already acquitted itself well in action. It is already evident from the encounters which have taken place that the fighter is the master both of the bomber and of reconnaissance aircraft. That is no surprise to those who followed the air operations in Spain, where -- to quote General Duval -- "the chasse machine considers the bombing [i] machine incapable of defending itself." "It is now definitely admitted," says Captain Didier Poulain, referring to the air fighting in Spain, " that the bomber is practically [ii] without defense against the fighter." In Spain the bombers could avoid heavy casualties only by protecting themselves with screens of fighters, says F. A. Fischer von Po[iii] turzyn. "Whether in individual combat or in formation," says M. C. Rougeron, "the bomber in its present form is no 19/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 20 [iv] match for the fighter." The evidence so far obtainable in the present war confirms that afforded by Spain. When a British bombing formation made an attack on enemy warships in the Helgoland Bight on September 29, five out of the six bombers were shot down according to the German official report, which was not denied on the British side. In the epic encounter of five British bomber-reconnaissance aircraft with fifteen Messerschmitts over the western front on September 30, three of the former were shot down and a fourth made a forced landing. The fifth managed to reach its own lines after shooting down two German fighters; it had 80 bullet holes in its structure, its ailerons and rudder were damaged, both its petrol tanks were burst, its retractable undercarriage was jammed. The British fighters have been even more successful in their encounters with the German bombers. They shot down 4 out of the 12 or 14 which raided the Firth of Forth on October 16; and on the next day two bombers which approached the English east coast were both engaged and shot down. Out of 12 German bombers which attacked a convoy in the North Sea on October 21, 4 were shot down by British fighters, and 3 more, it was subsequently ascertained, failed to reach Germany. Two more bombers were brought down on October 22 and 28. The operations in Poland confirmed another lesson of the Spanish civil war -- the importance of the air arm as a tactical weapon when used in conjunction with ground forces. In Spain the technique of air support in the assault was successfully developed by the Nationalists. An American officer has described this method from personal observation. Bombing aircraft with small bombs and machine guns would fly in single file -- la cadena, it was called -over the trenches and rake them while the tanks and infantry deployed into assault formation and moved up to [v] the attack. According to a British officer, General Beauman, the principal tactical lesson of the Spanish civil war -- one which will be taken to heart by the great continental armies -- is that aircraft must be used if an attack is to ma20/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 100 to those used in the V-2 rocket. 5 Fig No 5 A captured Ba 349 A1 Natter Legacy French forces had captured Waldsee by 25 April 1945 and presumably took control of the Bachem-Werk. Shortly before the French troops arrived, a group of Bachem-Werk personnel set out for Austria with five A1 Natters on trailers. At Bad Wörishofen, the group waited for another squad retreating from Nabern unter Teck with one completed Natter. Both groups then set out for the Austrian Alps. One group with two Natters ended up at the junction of the river Inn and one of its tributaries, the Ötztaler Ache, at Camp Schlatt. The other group went to St. Leonhard im Pitztal with four aircraft. US troops captured the first group at Camp Schlatt around 4 May and the second group on the following day. At some time during the project, the Bachem-Werk was ordered to give complete details of the BP-20 Natter to the A captured Ba 349 A1 Natter on display for Open Days at Freeman Field, Indiana September 1945. The swastikas are neither authentic nor positioned according to German military specifications. 5 100/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 101 Japanese, but there was doubt over whether they had received them. They were, however, known to have a general knowledge of the Natter and showed considerable interest in the project. Operation Krokus launch pads at Hasenholz wood An operational launch site for the first Ba 349A-1 operational Natters under the code name Operation Krokus was being established in a small wooded area called Hasenholz, south of the Stuttgart to Munich autobahn and to the east of Nabern unter Teck. Around the end of February and the beginning of March the Todt Organisation was in action, constructing each set of the trios of concrete foundations (or "footings") for the launch towers. These three launch pads and their towers were arranged at the corners of an equilateral triangle, 120 m per side. The specific locations are said to be 48°3742.2N 9°2957.4E, 48°3742N 9°2953.5E and 48°3739.8N 9°2954E. In the centre of each of the three concrete footings is a square hole approximately 50 centimeters deep, which once served as the foundation for the launch tower. Beside each hole is a pipe, cut off at ground level, which was probably once a cable pit. These three concrete pads were noticed by a surveyor in the autumn of 1945, but not rediscovered until 1999. In March 1945 eight pilots, who were experienced, mostly highly decorated and volunteers for the first operational flights, started training at the Heuberg. This training continued until the first half of April at which time they moved to the Hasenholz operational area. The first three manned and fully armed A1 Krokus examples were scheduled to be launched from 20 April, which was Hitlers birthday. But on that day the US 10th Armored Division drove its tanks into Kirchheim unter Teck to the northwest of Hasenholz wood. The next day it crossed the autobahn and headed straight for the Natter operational area. The Natter group subsequently retreated to Waldsee. Survivor and reproductions Only one original A1 Natter survives; it is stored in the 101/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 102 Paul E. Garber Preservation, Restoration, and Storage Facility in Suitland, Maryland, USA. The evidence supports the proposition that this machine was captured at St. Leonhard im Pitztal, Austria in May 1945 by US troops. It is in a poor state of repair and is no longer accessible to the general public. The Natter displayed at the Deutsches Museum is said to have been reconstructed partly from subassemblies that survived the end of the war. This machine is of the experimental type as launched from the steel tower and is painted to look like an M17. There are several static reproductions of Natters around the world, for example at the Planes of Fame Air Museum, Chino, California and Fantasy of Flight, Polk City, Florida, USA. Specifications (Ba 349B-1) General characteristics Crew: 1 Length: 6 m (19 ft 8 in) Wingspan: 4 m (13 ft 1 in) Height: 2.25 m (7 ft 5 in) height without fins 2 Wing area: 4.7 m (51 sq ft) Empty weight: 880 kg (1,940 lb) fuel expended Gross weight: 2,232 kg (4,921 lb) Gross weight boosters jettisoned: 1,769 kg (3,900 lb) Fuel capacity: 650 kg Powerplant: 1 × Walter HWK 109-509C-1 bi-fuel rocket motor, 11.2 kN (2,500 lbf) thrust main chamber 2.9 kN (652 lbf) auxiliary chamber Powerplant: 4 × Schmidding SG 34 solid fuel booster rockets, 4.9 kN (1,100 lbf) thrust each or 2 x 9.8 kN (2,203 lbf) solid fuel booster rockets Performance Maximum speed: 1,000 km/h (621 mph; 540 kn) at 5,000 m (16,404 ft) Cruising speed: 800 km/h (497 mph; 432 kn) Range: 60 km (37 mi; 32 nmi) after climb at 3,000 m (9,843 ft) 55 km (34 mi)after climb at 6,000 m (19,685 ft) 102/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 103 42 km (26 mi)after climb at 9,000 m (29,528 ft) 40 km (25 mi)after climb at 10,000 m (32,808 ft) Endurance: 4.36 minutes at 6,000 m (19,685 ft) 3.15 minutes at 9,000 m (29,528 ft) Service ceiling: 12,000 m (39,370 ft) Rate of climb: 190 m/s (37,000 ft/min) Time to altitude: 62 seconds to 12 km (7.5 mi) Armament 24 x 73 mm (2.874 in) Henschel Hs 297 Föhn rocket shells or 33 x 55 mm (2.165 in) R4M rocket shells or 2 x 30 mm (1.181 in) MK 108 cannon with 30 rpg (proposed) Luftwaffe Weapons The Automatic Upward-firing Twin MG FF/M Commonly known as the 'Schrage Musik' (Jazz Music), this oblique upward-firing weapon developed in 1942 is reported to have been based upon a suggestion by nightfighter pilot Major Rudolf Schoenert and approved by General Kammhuber. Reflected light beams from an enemy aircraft, captured by a caesium photocell in the infra-red 'Zossen A', activated the twin 20mm MG FF/M weapons when flying beneath the enemy aircraft. Jointly developed by the AEG and Carl Zeiss firms, only a few examples of the Zossen A2 were used operationally. This infra-red sensor was also considered at one stage for installation in the Me 163B. The MG FF was a drum-fed, 20 mm aircraft autocannon, developed in 1936 by Ikaria Werke Berlin of Germany. It was a derivative of the Swiss Oerlikon FF F cannon, itself a development of the German World War I Becker 20 mm cannon, and was designed to be used in fixed or flexible mountings, as both an offensive and a defensive weapon. It saw widespread use in those roles by the German Luftwaffe, particularly during the early stages of World War II, although from 1941 onwards it was gradually replaced by the 20 mm MG 151/20. 103/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 104 Compared to rival designs, such as the Hispano-Suiza HS.404 - which had been developed from the larger Oerlikon FF S - the MG FF had some disadvantages, such as low rate of fire and low muzzle velocity, as well as limited ammunition storage in its drums. On the other hand, it was much lighter and shorter. Wing installation on the Messerschmitt Bf 109 and Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighters was not easy, as the drum required substantial space, and as a consequence the ammunition storage was initially reduced to 60 shells per drum. An ammunition drum of 90-round nominal capacity was developed for the Fw 190 A-5, and retrofitted to some earlier variants. There were also experiments with belt feedings. The MG FF was adapted to fire a new type of high-capacity, high-explosive mine shell, called Minengeschoss that featured a projectile with thinner walls that allowed increased explosive charge. This projectile was lighter and generated less recoil than earlier projectiles requiring a modification of the recoil mechanism. With this modification it could fire the new mine shell, but accidentally using the heavier MG FF ammo could damage the gun. The now-called MG FF/M was introduced with the Bf 109 E-4 and Bf 104/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 105 110 C-4 in Summer 1940. The MG FF and FF/M saw widespread use in fighters such as the Bf 109 E-3 to F-1, Bf 110 C to F, and Fw 190 A-1 to A-5. The Fw 190 was typically fitted with an inboard pair of MG 151 and an outboard pair of MG FF, although the MG FF were sometimes removed in the field in order to save weight. 105/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 106 The cannon was also fitted to bombers such as the Do 217, Ju 88, He 111, Do 17, as well as many other aircraft. Although the MG FF was often replaced with the 20 mm MG 151/20 from 1941 onwards, it saw a come-back in 1943 as the primary Schräge Musik gun in the Bf 110 night fighters, as it fit perfectly into the rear cockpit. The MG FF fired a 134 g projectile with a muzzle velocity of some 600 m/s and a rate of fire of about 520 rounds per minute. The MG FF/M fired a 90 g HE/M (high explosive mine shell) projectile with a muzzle velocity of c. 700 m/s and a rate of fire of c. 540 rounds per minute. AP, HE and incendiary projectiles were also available (115 to 117 g projectiles, 585 m/s, c. 520 rpm) because the mine-shot was not capable of holding incendiary or tracer parts. Technical data Weight : 26.3 kg Length : 1.37 m Muzzle velocity : 600 m/s (MG FF), 585 m/s (FF/M with AP or HE), 700 m/s (MG FF/M with mine shell) Rate of fire : 520 rpm (MG FF, FF/M with AP or HE), 540 rounds per minute (MG FF/M with mine-shot) Round types: armor-piercing (AP), high-explosive (HE), incendiary, all with or without tracer; high-explosive mine-shot (HE(M)) (only MG FF/M) BK 3.7 Bordkanone Developed by the Rheinmetall-Borsig AG, this fixed forward-firing cannon, also known as the Flak 18 when used 106/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 107 by ground anti-aircraft batteries, .was a recoil-loading automatic weapon with a sliding barrel and a central locking mechanism. When installed in an aircraft, the 6-round clip was turned through 90° to the right in a weapons bay. In the Mel 10G-2/R1, it was installed in a gondola beneath the fuselage. Loading of the weapon in flight was performed by the radio operator. Firing followed electro-pneumatically after the pilot activated the safety switch on the SKK safety switch console via the B-button on the KG 13E control column. Target sighting was by the Revi C/12D. Although the BK 3.7 was a very effective weapon against four-engined bombers, it achieved wide success when used against Russian tanks. As mentioned earlier in this volume, its initiator, the Stuka-Ace and 'tank-buster' Hans-Ulrich Rudel, equipped with two of these weapons beneath the wings of his Ju 87D-3 and G-2, was able to destroy over 500 Russian tanks. The BK 3.7 was also fitted to the Hsl29B-2/R3 (12round clip), the Me 110G-2/R1, R3 and R4 (two 6-round clips), and the Ju 88P-2 and P-3. The Bordkanone BK 3,7 (onboard cannon 37) was a 37mm anti-tank/bomber autocannon based on the earlier 37 mm 107/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 108 Flak 18 made by Rheinmetall. It was mounted on World War II Luftwaffe aircraft such as the anti-tank or bomberdestroyer versions of the Junkers Ju 87D-3 and G-2, Henschel Hs 129B-2/R3, Messerschmitt Bf 110G-2/R1-3, and others. The cannon could be attached under the wings or fuselage of the aircraft as a self-contained gun pod with a 12-round magazine. It fired APCR (Tungsten hard core) ammunition or high explosive shells in 37x263B mm caliber at 160 rounds per minute. BK-37 equipped ground attack aircraft were developed for use in the anti-tank role on the Eastern Front in a somewhat desperate effort to blunt the massive numerical superiority of the Soviet T-34 as the war turned against Germany. The concept was rather rudimentary, suffered from various issues (primarily poor accuracy, severe weight penalty making the craft vulnerable to fighters, and a low ammunition capacity), but could be extremely effective when operated by a sufficiently skilled and practiced ground-attack pilot (Hans-Ulrich Rudel in his BK-37 armed Stuka being the ultimate example). The heavy caliber autocannon-armed series of Ju 88P 108/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 109 twin-engined attack aircraft series used twin BK 3,7 cannon, mounted side-by-side in a conformal ventral fuselage gun pod, in its Ju 88P-2 and P-3 versions. The P-3 version only differed through the addition of extra defensive armor. As with other examples of the P-series, the Ju 88P-2 and P-3 were perceived as failures in both anti-tank and bomber destroyer role. In contrast to the previous method (bombs delivered by dive bombing), when the BK-37 was employed in a top attack profile against the especially thin upper turret and engine compartment armor of a tank, kills could be achieved with a relatively light and cheap armor piercing projectile that could be carried in much greater quantities than bombs, but would be insufficient to penetrate if fired horizontally from the ground in the normal method. This was the first known implementation of a medium airborne cannon in the top down anti-tank role, and was the direct inspiration for later designs such as the 30mm GAU-8/A Avenger equipping the A-10 Thunderbolt II. Although revolutionary, the concept was implemented too late and in too few numbers to appreciably impact the course of the war for Germany. 109/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 110 One of the two surviving Junkers Ju 87s is a G-2 model displayed at the Royal Air Force Museum London. The aircraft's wings have the attachment points for BK 37 gun pods, but it is not displayed with them fitted. Specifications Type: single-barrel automatic cannon Caliber: 37 mm (1.46 in) 110/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 111 Cartridge: 37 mm x 263 Operation: Short Recoil Length: 3.63 m (11 ft 11 in) Weight: 295 kg (650 lb) Rate of fire: 160 rpm Muzzle velocity: 1,170 to 780 m/s (3,836 to 2,557 ft/s) Projectile weight: APCR 380 g, HE 640 g, AT 685 g Bordkanone BK 5 Cannon Also developed by Rheinmetall-Borsig in response to the demand for a heavier-calibre weapon for anti-tank use on the Eastern Front in 1943, the BK 5 stemmed from the KWK 39 Kampfwagenkanone (armoured-car or tank cannon). For effective use against enemy bombers, the BK5 was installed on the Me410A-2/U4 operated by Zerstorer squadrons. In order to modify the KWK 39 into an aircraft weapon, the most significant alteration was the provision of an automatic cartridge feed which formed a circular belt at the rear. Since the BK 5 did not have a reciprocating belt to feed the cartridges, a compressed air-driven rammer was built onto the rear of the gun, the rammer driving a 50mm cartridge out of the feed belt into the gun breech and ramming it into the chamber for firing. Weapon reload was possible during flight it the crew when installed in the Ju 88. On other types of aircraft, a pre-loaded quantity ol ammunition was carried: on the Me410A 2/U4 (with a 22round magazine) it weighed 650kg (l,4331b). The BK5 was also installed in the Ju88P-4 and for the Me 262, was lo have been overcome by use of a 22-round magazine. Air-firing trials against a ground target in 1944 were highly successful, but plans lo equip two other Me 262s were not carried out. For attacking heavily armoured targets, the BK 5 was also planned for installation in the Hel77A-3, Jul88S and Ju 288 bombers. A single hit with a c. 1.6kg (3.51b) weight projectile was sufficient to bring down a four-engined heavy bomber. At a greater range, the trajectory of the heavy cannon shell fell off appreciably. After 111/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 112 the war, a captured BK5 was put on display in the USAF Museum in Dayton, Ohio. The Bordkanone 5, or BK 5 for short, was a 50 mm autocannon intended primarily for use against Allied heavy bombers, especially the United States Army Air Forces's (USAAF) Boeing B-17. The large calibre shells had very high momentum, allowing them to be accurately fired from long ranges, well outside the range of the defensive guns mounted on the bombers. Rheinmetall was given a contract in 1943 to adapt the 50 mm KwK 39 tank gun, from the Panzer III tank, for aerial use in the twin-engined Me 410 Hornisse bomber destroyer. They were installed as Umrüst-Bausätze (Factory Modification) 4 in the Me 410 A-1/U4, and experimentally, in two Me 262 A-1a/U4 jet fighter prototypes (though these were not used operationally), as the MK 214 cannon of similar caliber was not yet available. The semi-circular magazine held 21 rounds. Approximately 300 were produced and it saw only limited action, most notably in the Me 410 A-1/U4 aircraft that served with the II. Gruppe of Zerstörergeschwader 26 (ZG 26). It was also mounted on the Junkers Ju 88 P-4 night attack aircraft. Intended for long-range shots, the cannon was given a telescopic sight in addition to the Me 410's standard Revi C12C gunsight. This proved to be more of a hindrance than a help in the turning fights in which the Me 410s often found themselves, as the maneuvering targets easily escaped from the telescopic sight's small field of view. As installed in the Me 262, the cannon was found to be prone to jamming, and if fired at night the BK 5's muzzle flash tended to temporarily blind the pilot's night vision. According to the account of the engagements against the USAAF by II./ZG 26 from late February through mid-April 1944 mentioned at a German language website, the 53 Me 410 Hornissen of that Zerstörergruppe equipped with the BK 5 - as the Umrüst-Bausätze factory modification designated /U4 for the Me 410 series of aircraft - were said to have to shot down a total of 129 B-17 Flying Fortress 112/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 113 and four B-24 Liberator heavy bomber aircraft, distributed over a series of five or six interceptions, all while losing only nine of their own Me 410 BK 5 Bordkanone - data 5cm Mauser MK 214A Bordkanone The Rheinmetall-Borsig BK 5 and the Mauser MK214 were being developed in parallel. Because of the excessively high 990kg (2,183 Ib) installation weight of the 55mm Rheinmetall-Borsig MK114, the two firms were given contracts to produce an improved and lighter weapon. The BK 214A weapon demonstrated by Mauser at the end of 1944 represented largely a further development of the BK 5, but due to its 390 individual parts and various alterations to the locking and loading procedures, became too complex for aircraft installation. The 3.500kg (7.716 Ib) recoil force was absorbed by a hydraulic braking system. 6 The second prototype of the MK 214A was installed in the Me262A (Werk Nr. 111899), first flown by Karl Baur in late February 1945, and both ground and air firing trials were conducted during March 1945. Another Me 262A (Werk Nr. 170083) was equipped with the third prototype MK214A, but although Two views of the 5cm Mauser MK 214A Bordkanone, a further development of the BK 5. 6 113/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 114 both machines were captured by US Forces, it is not known if the latter aircraft was flown with the weapon. Prior to installation in the Me262As, the MK 214A had only been test-flown in a Ju 88. Proposals also existed for its installation in the Dornier P 252/3, Heinkel Hel62A, Messerschmitt Me262A-la/U4 and Me262E-l. As 1 indicated in the data table, work on an improved fully-automatic MK214B of 55mm calibre of lower weight and higher rate of fire was under way in April 1944, but had not been tested up to the end of the war. 114/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 115 Mauser MK 214 Bordkanone 7.5cm BK 7.5 Bordkanone From 1942 onwards, German fighter pilots increasingly established that the Allied bombers sported stronger armour protection and increased armament positions. The 13mm MG131 and 20mm MG151/20 weapons were bordering on their limits insofar as the enemy forced the fighter pilots to open fire from long range and remain 'on the ball' until the enemy was destroyed. Fast-firing Bordkanone of heavier calibre and armour-piercing shells were already under development in 1942, but were not yet ready for service use. To overcome this desperate situation, the German weapons experts sought after solutions. 7 7 Junkers Ju 88P-1 Flying Flak with the 7.5cm Bordkanone 115/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 116 In the summer of 1942, the first trials were undertaken by Junkers with a 7.5cm (2.95in) -anti-tank projectile - the Pak 40L equipped with a 10-round magazine, and especially suited for the anti-tank role. The weapon was housed in a ventral gondola beneath a Ju 88A-4 fuselage, and in an emergency, could be completely jettisoned. Production aircraft so equipped bore the RLM designation Ju 88P-1. From its 3.625m (lift 10%in) long container, the Pak 40 gun barrel projected 85cm (33 1/2in) ahead of the aircraft nose, ending in the over-dimensioned VI3 muzzle brake which deflected the gas pressure and together with the sliding barrel, captured the recoil force. The projectile could be fired singly or in series. After each firing, the barrel travelled back 90cm (35 1/2in), opening the seal and ejecting the spent cartridges, manual loading being undertaken by the crew mechanic. The weapon was centred for a target distance of 650m (711yds) ahead, with sighting by the Revi C12D. Besides Sprenggranate (high-explosive shells), the Pak 40L and the improved BK7.5 fired the Panzergranate 39 (armour-piercing shell) that could pierce 13cm (Sin) thick armoured steel at a 90° angle at 1.000m (1.093yds). Only four Ju88P-ls were equipped with this weapon as its rate of fire was too low, and in practice was limited to only a few rounds capable of being fired during a single target approach. For day-fighting purposes, the Ju 88P-1 was too 116/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 117 slow, especially when it had to escape from enemy fire and was therefore only used in the anti-tank role. In addition to the Ju 88P-1, the Pak 40L was fitted beneath the nose of the Hel77A-l/Rl. The BK7.5 was installed in some 20 Hsl29B-2/R4 aircraft and the Me 41OA-2. After only five Hel77A-3/R5s had been so fitted, the plan to equip further examples was abandoned on account of strong vibrations. The Me 262 'Schnellbomber II' and Ju388J were also planned to be fitted with this weapon. Because of its limited possibilities of installation and use by the end of 1944, less than 30 examples of the BK7.5 were completed. MG 17 Machine Gun The MG 17 was a 7.92 mm machine gun produced by Rheinmetall-Borsig for use at fixed mountings in many World War II Luftwaffe aircraft. A mainstay fixed machine gun in German built aircraft (many of which were sold to other countries) well before World War II, by 1940 it was starting to be replaced with heavier caliber machine gun and cannons. By 1945 very few if any aircraft mounted the MG 17. The MG 17 was installed in the Messerschmitt Bf 109, Messerschmitt Bf 110, Focke-Wulf Fw 190, Junkers Ju 87, Junkers Ju 88C Nightfighter, Heinkel He 111, Dornier Do 17/215 Nightfighter, Focke-Wulf Fw 189 and many other aircraft. Many MG 17s were later modified for infantry use as heavier weapons replaced them on Luftwaffe aircraft. Official numbers of conversions was about 24,271 by January 1, 1944, although additional conversions may have been done as well. 117/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 118 Specifications Calibre: 7.9 +/- .04 mm Cartridge: 8x57 mm IS Round weight: 35.5 grams (cartridge 24 grams, bullet 11.5 grams) Muzzle velocity: from 855 m/s (Phosphor "B" round ) to 905 m/s (Armor Piercing Tracer "SmK L'spur" round) Rate of fire: 1200 rpm Dimensions Length: 1175 mm Weight: 10.2 kg Action: Recoil Feed system: Belt magazine Sights Remotely located, various types 118/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 119 BK7.5 Bordkanone - data MG 151 Cannon The MG 151 (MG 151/15) was a 15 mm aircraft-mounted autocannon produced by Waffenfabrik Mauser during World War II. It was the prototype for the 20 mm MG 151/20 cannon widely used on German Luftwaffe fighters, night fighters, fighter-bombers, bombers and ground-attack aircraft. Salvaged guns saw post-war use by other nations. Development and wartime history (MG 151/20) The pre-war German doctrine for arming single-engine fighter aircraft mirrored that of the French. This doctrine favored a powerful autocannon mounted between the cylinder blocks of a V engine and firing through the prope- 119/235 Bachem Ba 349 Natter 120 ller hub, known as a moteur-canon in French (from its first use with the Hispano-Suiza HS.8C engine in World War I, on the SPAD S.XII) and by the cognate Motorkanone in German by the 1930s. The weapon preferred by the French in this role was the most powerful 20mm Oerlikon of the time, namely the FFS model, but this proved too big for German engines. Mauser was tasked to develop a gun that would fit, with a minimum sacrifice in performance. (As a stop-gap measure, the MG FF cannon was developed and put in widespread use, but its performance was lackluster.) Production of the MG 151 in its original 15 mm calibre format began in 1940. After combat evaluation of the 15 mm cartridge as the main armament of early Messerschmitt Bf 109F-2 fighters, the cannon was redesigned as the 20 mm MG 151/20 in 1941 to fire a 20 mm cartridge. The combat experience showed that a more powerful explosive shell was preferable to a higher projectile velocity. The MG 151/20 cartridge was created by expanding the neck of the cartridge to hold the larger explosive shell used in the MG FF cannon, and shortening the length of the cartridge case holding the longer 20 mm shell to match the overall length of the original 15 mm cartridge. These measures simplified conversion of the 15 mm to the 20 mm MG 151/20 simply 120/235