Revisiting Multiculturalism in Canada: Theories, Policies and Debates

TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION AND EDUCATION Revisiting Multiculturalism in Canada Theories, Policies and Debates Shibao Guo and Lloyd Wong (Eds.) •฀ What฀is฀the฀future฀of฀multiculturalism฀and฀is฀it฀sustainable฀in฀Canada? •฀ How฀is฀multiculturalism฀related฀to฀egalitarianism,฀interculturalism,฀racism,฀national฀ identity,฀belonging฀and฀loyalties? •฀ What฀role฀does฀multiculturalism฀play฀for฀youth฀in฀terms฀of฀their฀identities฀including฀ racialization? •฀ How฀ does฀ multiculturalism฀ play฀ out฀ in฀ educational฀ policy฀ and฀ the฀ classroom฀ in฀ Canada? Revisiting Multiculturalism in Canada TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION AND EDUCATION Volume 1 Series Editors: Shibao Guo, University of Calgary, Canada Yan Guo, University of Calgary, Canada Editorial Board: Ali Abdi, University of British Columbia, Canada Mary V. Alfred, Texas A&M University, USA Vanessa de Oliveira Andreotti, University of British Columbia, Canada Gulbahar H. Beckett, Iowa State University, USA Yiping Chen, Jinan University, China Fred Dervin, University of Helsinki, Finland Allan Luke, Queensland University of Technology, Australia Linda Morrice, University of Sussex, UK Susan L. Robertson, University of Bristol, UK Annette Sprung, University of Graz, Austria Scope: Migration has been adopted by many countries as a strategy to compete for the most talented, skillful, and resourceful and to ameliorate aging populations and labour shortages. The past few decades have witnessed both an expansion and transformation of international migration flows. The resulting demographic, social and cultural changes have reconfigured the landscapes of education in the receiving societies. Transnational Migration and Education aims to bring together international scholars with contributions from new and established scholars to explore the changing landscapes of education in the age of transnational migration. The Series includes authored and edited collections offering multidisciplinary perspectives with a wide range of topics including:          global and comparative analyses of migration the impact of migration on education and society processes of exclusion and inclusion in migration and education tensions between mobility, knowledge, and recognition intersections of race, class, gender, sexual orientation and education transnationalism, diaspora, and identity transnational migration and youth race and ethnic relations ethnicity, diversity and education Revisiting Multiculturalism in Canada Theories, Policies and Debates Edited by Shibao Guo University of Calgary, Canada and Lloyd Wong University of Calgary, Canada SENSE PUBLISHERS ROTTERDAM / BOSTON / TAIPEI A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN 978-94-6300-206-6 (paperback) ISBN 978-94-6300-207-3 (hardback) ISBN 978-94-6300-208-0 (e-book) Published by: Sense Publishers, P.O. Box 21858, 3001 AW Rotterdam, The Netherlands https://www.sensepublishers.com/ All chapters in this book have undergone peer review. Printed on acid-free paper All rights reserved © 2015 Sense Publishers No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. TABLE OF CONTENTS Revisiting Multiculturalism in Canada: An Introduction Lloyd Wong and Shibao Guo 1 Section I: Theorizing and Debating Multiculturalism 1. The Three Lives of Multiculturalism Will Kymlicka 17 2. Intercultural Relations in Plural Societies: Research Derived from Canadian Multiculturalism Policy John W. Berry 37 3. A Canadian Anomaly? The Social Construction of Multicultural National Identity Elke Winter 51 4. Multiculturalism and Ethnic Pluralism in Sociology: An Analysis of the Fragmentation Position Discourse Lloyd Wong 69 5. Multiculturalism and Egalitarianism Sourayan Mookerjea 6. Canadian Multiculturalism in the 21st Century: Emerging Challenges and Debates Ho Hon Leung 91 107 Section II: Multiculturalism, Ethnicity and Belonging 7. Rethinking Multiculturalism in Canada: Tensions between Immigration, Ethnicity and Minority Rights Shibao Guo and Yan Guo 8. Canadian Jews, Dual/Divided Loyalties, and the Tebbit “Cricket” Test Morton Weinfeld 141 9. Yiddish and Multiculturalism: A Marriage Made in Heaven? Rebecca Margolis 159 10. Canadians under Suspicion: Sri Lankan Tamil Diasporic Community as a Suspect Minority Group Kalyani Thurairajah v 123 171 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section III: Youth, Identity and Racialization 11. Multiculturalism and the Forging of Identities by Lebanese-Origin Youth in Halifax Evangelia Tastsoglou and Sandy Petrinioti 189 12. Multiculturalism as an Integrational Policy: Lessons from Second Generation Racialized Minorities Dan Cui 207 13. “And He Was Dancing Like No Tomorrow”: Police and Youth “Getting to Know” Each Other Carl E. James and Selom Chapman-Nyaho 221 Section IV: Multicultural Education 14. Critical and Emerging Discourses in Multicultural Education Literature: An (Updated) Review Anna Kirova 239 15. Multiculturalism and Minority Religion in Public Schools: Perspectives of Immigrant Parents Yan Guo 255 16. From Integration to Empowerment: Multicultural Education in the Board of Education of the City of Toronto, from 1960 to 1975 Johanne Jean-Pierre and Fernando Nunes 271 17. Further Unpacking Multiculturalism in the Classroom: Continuing to Explore the Politics of Difference through Current Events Mariusz Galczynski, Vilelmini Tsagkaraki and Ratna Ghosh 289 Section V: Future of Multiculturalism 18. Beyond Multiculturalism: Managing Complex Diversities in a Postmulticultural Canada Augie Fleras 311 Notes on Contributors 335 Index 341 vi LLOYD WONG AND SHIBAO GUO REVISITING MULTICULTURALISM IN CANADA An Introduction BRIEF HISTORY AND GENEALOGY OF MULTICULTURALISM IN CANADA Multiculturalism existed demographically in Canada at the time of confederation when the country was formed in 1867. While the situation in 1867 was one of inequalitarian pluralism, with the British being dominant, much of the current historical literature refers to the colonial and confederation periods as having three founding ethnic groups, Aboriginal peoples, French, and British. However, the latter two groups are considered to have been the charter groups due to their dominance in the pre-confederation period from the early 1600s to 1867 beginning first with the French regime and then followed by the British. Shortly after confederation, from the late 1800s to the early 1900s, ethnic diversity increased with the arrival of many European groups and also some non-European groups such as the Chinese (railway workers), Japanese (agricultural workers) and Blacks (underground railway) to name a few. In the 1901 Census Canada was overwhelmingly British and French (88%) however there were twenty-five different ethnic origins listed (Basavarajappa & Ram, 1999, Table A125-163). Over one hundred years later in the 2001 Census the British and French were still the majority but less so as they comprised only 63%1 of Canada’s population and there were now over 200 different ethnic origins listed. Much of the increase in the number and proportions of non-European ethnic origins occurred after the liberalization of immigration policy in Canada in the late 1960s. Since the 1980s with an increasing number of immigrants coming from Asia, Africa, and South and Central America Canada’s ethno-cultural diversity over the past three decades has become increasingly racialized with the increase of non-white ethnic groups. In 1981, when the Canadian Census first started counting Canada’s “visible minority” population, racialized persons in Canada constituted 4.7% of the population. This proportion increased to 9.4% in 1991, to 13.4% in 2001 and to 19.1% in 2011 (Statistics Canada, 2008, 2013). Thus currently approximately one in five people in Canada are racialized persons with the proportions much higher in the larger cities of Toronto (47%), Vancouver (45.2%), and Calgary (28.1%) (Statistics Canada, 2013). While Canada began demographically as a multicultural nation the breadth and intensity of this cultural and racial diversity has increased over time. However multiculturalism, as public and state policy, has only existed since the 1970s. In 1963 Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in Canada (B and B Commission), also known as S. Guo & L. Wong (eds.), Revisiting Multiculturalism in Canada, 1–14. © 2015 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved. WONG & GUO the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission, in response to growing political discontent and unrest amongst the French in Quebec against assimilationist policies of Angloconformity. While the Quiet Revolution in Quebec had just begun in the early 1960s, with the election of the Liberal Party of Quebec under Premier Jean Lesage, not so quiet militant and violent actions began in early 1963 after the founding of the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) as one revolutionary organization of a growing independence movement in Quebec. The FLQ started a campaign of bombings in Montreal that included among other places, military barracks, federal government buildings, railways, and residential mailboxes. Thus the B and B Commission set out to investigate Quebec’s role and place in Canada and the relationship between the English and French in Canada. The B and B Commission’s tenure was from 1963 to 1969 and its most significant impact on Canada was the recommendation of the 1969 Official Languages Act. However, during the B and B Commission’s hearings across Canada, they heard from many non-British and non-French who refuted the notion that Canada was “bicultural” and who argued that Canada was more than just the two cultures of French and English. The B and B Commission acknowledged this argument, investigated further, and this resulted in one of the six volumes of their final report, entitled The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups published in 1969 as Book IV. Shortly thereafter, in 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau created Canada’s multiculturalism policy, within a bilingual framework. This meant that Canada was the first nation in the world with an official multiculturalism policy and thus was the first in terms of establishing corporate pluralism where state policy protected the cultural differences amongst groups and provided institutional means to encourage ethnically proportionate distribution of power and privilege (Marger, 2015). Subsequently, Canada’s official multiculturalism policy was written into Canada’s constitution in 1983 and then in 1988 when Canada’s first Multiculturalism Act was passed in parliament led by then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. The provinces followed suit with some form of multiculturalism policy or enacted legislation. Saskatchewan was the first in 1974, followed by Ontario in 1977, then Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and P.E.I. in the 1980s, B.C. in 1993 and finally Newfoundland in 2008. At the federal state level the chronology and genealogy of multiculturalism as public policy has been succinctly summarized by Dewing (2013) as evolving through three developmental stages: 1) incipient stage (pre-1971); 2) formative stage (1971-1981); and 3) institutionalization state (1982-present). In incipient stage (pre-1971) the stage was set for multiculturalism policy in the post-WW II period with the large wave of European immigrants and refugees from the Baltic states, the Netherlands, Italy, and Hungary mostly through Pier 21. These immigrants supplemented the previous generation of Europeans (Germans, Americans, Swedes, Ukrainians, Dutch, Icelanders, Norwegians, and Russians) who came to Canada in the early mass migration period during the early 1900s through the recruitment of Clifford Sifton, minister of the Interior, and author of Canada’s first immigration act in 1896. Also, in 1947 the Canadian Citizenship Act was passed and Canadians were no longer deemed as British subjects thus 2 REVISITING MULTICULTURALISM IN CANADA facilitating the questioning among many Canadians the legitimacy of British cultural hegemony. Thus the social and political events of the 1960s in Quebec and the establishment and report of the B and B Commission (mentioned above) meant the official end of assimilationist public policy with the introduction of multiculturalism as public policy. The following formative stage (1971-1981) began with the adoption of Multiculturalism Policy in 1971 under Prime Minister Trudeau and this policy had identified programs including ones for Multicultural Grants, Culture Development, Ethnic Histories, Canadian Ethnic Studies, Teaching of Official Languages, and Federal Cultural Agencies, as well as fourteen specific recommendations (e.g., the teaching of languages other than English and French and cultural programs in public elementary schools). Overall, the key objectives of the policy were: 1) to assist cultural groups to retain and foster their identity; 2) to assist cultural groups to overcome barriers to their full participation in Canadian society; 3) to promote exchanges amongst cultural groups; and 4) to assist immigrants to learn an official language (Dewing, 2013). Thus in this formative stage federal funds of approximately $200 million, over ten years, were allocated to implement multiculturalism policy objectives and this saw, among other things, the establishment of a Multicultural Directorate (within the Department of Secretary of State) and then a Minister and Ministry of Multiculturalism to facilitate the programs and recommendations of the policy which also included liaising ethnocultural organizations. In the institutionalization stage (1982-present), which has been the past three decades or so, multiculturalism policy became formalized and codified as official legislation with the passing of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act in 1988. However, even prior to 1988 institutionalization of multiculturalism policy was occurring that was enhancing a corporate pluralism model in Canada. While there are debates about the effectiveness of this policy, some of which will be addressed in this volume, it can be argued that institutionalization has continued over the past three decades. One of the many examples of institutionalization beyond the Act itself include the recognition in the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of Canada’s multicultural heritage and the inclusion of ethnic origin along with race, colour, religion, sex, age, and mental and physical disability under equality rights in Section 15 (1). Other examples were the passing of the Employment Equity Act in 1986 and the establishment of the Canadian Race Relations Foundation in 1996 as part of the redress to Japanese Canadian in 1988. More recent examples of continued institutionalization of multiculturalism include the establishment of Canadian Multiculturalism Day (June 27) in 2002, Asian Heritage Month (May), Canada’s Action Plan Against Racism in 2005, and in 2010 new objectives for Canada’s Multiculturalism Program were implemented (Dewing, 2013). Another approach to chronicling the genealogy of multiculturalism, as public and state policy, is to focus on its evolution with respect to its policy objectives over the past four decades. Kunz and Sykes (2007), building on the analysis of Fleras and Kunz (2001), summarize the changing focus, reference point and 3 WONG & GUO mandate of Canadian multiculturalism policy for each of the decades of the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. While their summary must be considered fairly crude and superficial, given that there were no abrupt policy shifts at the end of each of these decades, overall their analysis is insightful. For the decade of the 1970s multiculturalism policy was one of ethnicity multiculturalism with the focus on “celebrating differences,” the reference point being “culture” and the mandate of “ethnicity.” For the decade of the 1980s multiculturalism policy was one of equity multiculturalism with the focus on “managing diversity”, the reference point being “structure” and the mandate of “race relations.” For the 1990s it was civic multiculturalism, “constructive engagement,” “society building” and “citizenship.” And in the 2000s multiculturalism policy was one of integrative multiculturalism with the focus on “inclusive citizenship”, the reference point being “Canadian identity” and the mandate of “integration”. Using more colloquial terminology Canada’s multiculturalism policy has evolved from song and dance in the 1970s, to anti-racism in the 1980s, to civic participation in the 1990s, and to fitting in in the 2000s. DIMENSIONS OF MULTICULTURALISM Multiculturalism as a concept has many different layers or dimensions. These dimensions or conceptualizations are usually clarified, defined or elaborated by scholars in the beginning of their writings. For example, Garcea (2008) distinguishes between “multicultural public philosophy (ideology) and “multicultural public policy” (official state policy) in his analysis of the fragmentary effects of multiculturalism in Canada and Fleras and Elliott (2002) distinguish between official multiculturalism (policy) and critical multiculturalism (discourse). Furthermore, approaches to multiculturalism can be differentiated by disciplinary perspectives and this point will be addressed briefly in a latter section to follow. In Fleras and Elliott’s comprehensive book on multiculturalism in Canada (2002) the distinctions are made regarding the dimensions of multiculturalism as: 1) an empirical fact; 2) ideology; 3) practice; 4) critique; and 5) state policy. Multiculturalism as an empirical fact and state policy have been discussed earlier and refers to demographic diversity and corporate pluralism. Multiculturalism as ideology (or public philosophy) reflects upon the ideal of multiculturalism or what ought to be. Multiculturalism as practice reflects on what actually happens on the ground in terms of the commodification of diversity as a “resource” and the political, commercial, and minority interests in its utilization. Multiculturalism as critique involves challenging traditional authority and may involve the case where minority interests challenge multiculturalism as official policy that disguises as assimilationist or monoculturalism policy (see discussion below) or the case where official policy is absent. The distinction between multiculturalism as official state policy and multiculturalism as practiced on the ground or street has been termed multiculturalism “from above” vs. “from below.” Multiculturalism “from below” 4 REVISITING MULTICULTURALISM IN CANADA pertains to multiculturalism as a discourse with political dimensions played out in local communities and as distinct “from above” where the state engineers multiculturalism through policy (Werbner, 2012) and engages in the management of diversity. In this sense multiculturalism “from below” is the everyday multiculturalism pertaining to the daily life experiences and political struggles of ethno-cultural and racialized peoples. CRITIQUES OF MULTICULTURALISM Since there are many dimensions of multiculturalism the critiques of multiculturalism are equally varied. Over the past several decades multiculturalism, as ideology and as public policy, has been critiqued by scholars both from the left and the right. More recently with the increase in terrorism, particularly “home-grown” terrorism over the past decade or so, a backlash against multiculturalism has emerged particularly in Europe. Arguably, after the terrorism attacks of 9/11 in the United States, the critique of multiculturalism has grown. In Europe anti-multiculturalism, both academically and in public discourse, has been driven by terrorist attacks in the Union with major events such as the Madrid train bombings in 2004, the London bombings in the summer of 2005, and more recently in France the firebombing of the Paris offices of Charlie Hebdo in 2012 and the shootings in the Charlie Hebdo offices in early 2015. By 2011, a decade after 9/11, the three major political leaders in Europe, David Cameron (United Kingdom), Nicolas Sarkozy (France) and Angela Merkel (Germany) were making public speeches about the failure of multiculturalism and condemning it as a social and public policy. David Cameron went so far as to blame multiculturalism for fostering Islamic extremism. Academic work critiquing multiculturalism in Europe has been fairly prolific from both the right and the left. As early as 2004 Joppke (2004) was writing about the retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state and more recently Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010) have analyzed the public discourse, policies, and practices, associated with the European backlash against multiculturalism. This discourse has produced the term “post-multiculturalism” or “end of multiculturalism” that has been used by scholars to suggest the need to move beyond current policies and practices of multiculturalism and to find different approaches to the processes of immigrant and ethnic integration. The term itself “post-multiculturalism” has been particularly popularized in Europe by Vertovec (2010) who meant it to be a call for alternatives to multiculturalism that includes a search for new models that foster social cohesion and promote assimilation and a common identity. Not surprisingly then in Europe the dominant discourse, both academically and publically, views multiculturalism as a failed project. In contrast to Europe’s dominant anti-multiculturalism discourse Canada’s dominant discourse favours multiculturalism. Recent public opinion polling by the Environics Institute (2015) suggests: “An increasing majority of Canadians identify multiculturalism as one of the most important symbols of the country’s 5 WONG & GUO national identity” (p. 2). Thus, not surprisingly, mainstream politicians in Canada are either silent on multiculturalism or are vocally in favour of it. It is not within the scope of this introduction to the book to engage in a detailed description of the various critiques by scholars of multiculturalism (either as public philosophy or public policy), nor to engage in a description of the counter arguments in the literature to these critiques. Moreover, the purpose of this volume is precisely to provide a venue for the furthering of the appraisals, critiques and debates about multiculturalism. The authors in this volume have been central to many of the debates and criticisms of multiculturalism in Canada. Augie Fleras and Jean Elliott (2002) provide an informative ideal typical summation of the various critiques of Canadian multiculturalism as official public policy. He contends that there are five distinct but related types of critiques (and costs) of multiculturalism and they are as follows: 1. Multiculturalism is divisive: it undermines Canadian society (identity and coherence) by promoting cultural diversity at the expense of national unity 2. Multiculturalism is marginalizing: it ghettoizes minorities, their aspirations, and commodifies culture by invoking cultural solutions to structural problems 3. Multiculturalism is essentializing: it fossilizes differences and envisions Canada as a collection of autonomous ethnic groups that are selfcontained, determining, and controlling 4. Multiculturalism is a hoax: it does not address the root cause of inequality as it is a symbol without substance that promises much but delivers little except to delude, conceal, evade, or distort 5. Multiculturalism is hegemonic: it does not empower minorities but rather contains them as it is an instrument of control that achieves consensus by manipulating people’s consent without their awareness. (Fleras & Elliott, 2002) To each of these critiques Fleras and Elliott also summarize the opposing beneficial position where multiculturalism is praised as 1) unifying; 2) inclusive; 3) hybridizing; 4) catalyst; and 5) counter-hegemony (Fleras & Elliott, 2002). Multiculturalism in Canada and elsewhere continues to be heavily debated. Scholars in this volume are central to some of these debates in the literature. By way of an example Kymlicka (2014) challenges the essentialism critique (#3 above) by questioning whether multiculturalism is to blame and turns the argument on its head around by suggesting that liberal multiculturalism may be a remedy to essentialism. ANTHOLOGIES ON MULTICULTURALISM IN CANADA It is surprising how few anthologies exist on the topic of multiculturalism in Canada given the controversies and heavily debated nature of the topic in the academic literature. The first academic anthology on multiculturalism was 6 REVISITING MULTICULTURALISM IN CANADA published in 1989, one year after multiculturalism in Canada became an official piece of legislation with the passing of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act (1988), and was entitled Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations and edited by James Frideres (1989). This volume had leading scholars in ethnic studies at the time including Jean Burnet, who was a research associate for the B and B Commission in the late 1960s and Raymond Breton. The chapters in Frideres’ volume grappled with the fundamental theoretical and empirical issues of individual rights vs. group rights as it pertains to ethnic maintenance, retention, and relations and the involvement of the state in such matters. It is interesting to note that the issue of individual and collective (group) rights remain contentious in Canada today over a quarter-century later. In 2007 a multi-authored book, entitled Uneasy Partners (Stein et al., 2007), provided not only scholarly but also personal reflections of multiculturalism in Canada. The authors are a group of distinguished scholars and journalists with the scholars being Janice Stein, David Cameron, John Meisel, Will Kymlicka, and the journalists being John Ibbitson, Haroon Siddiqui, Michael Valpy and the introduction was written by the Hon. Fran Iacobucci. The central focus of this book was on the conflict between the Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ equality rights and multiculturalism as both policy and practice. In this book, where each author wrote one chapter, there was consensus on the meaning of multiculturalism and an acknowledgment of the positive consequences of a multicultural approach. However, there was disagreement with respect to some substantive and specific issues such as the role of religious freedom in multiculturalism (equality rights) and immigration and its conflict with social policy or lack thereof (Iacobucci 2007, p. xi). Overall this book provides practically based commentaries on multiculturalism rather than a more narrow academic focus that is historical, theoretical, philosophical, etc. Chazan, Helps, Stanley and Thakkar (2011a) edited a recent anthology that is entitled Home and Native Land: Unsettling Multiculturalism in Canada which, as they acknowledge, has the objective to unsettle multiculturalism by having authors track its manifestations in contradictory discourses such as having little to say about diversity and integration (Chazan et al., 2011b). As well another aspect of multiculturalism being unsettled is the fact that different groups and interests have taken advantage of the fluidity of multiculturalism to make a variety of claims that aim to settle identities and arrangements while contestation remains. Suffice to say that this volume does not prove a coherent critique or analysis of multiculturalism policy in Canada but many of the authors provide a coherent critique of multiculturalism from the Left and these include scholars such as Rinaldo Walcott, Himani Bannerji, Nandita Sharma, and Grace-Edward Galabuzi to name a few. In 2012 Wright, Singh and Race (2012a) edited an anthology pertaining to the viability of multicultural education. The terrain that this book covers is not only Canadian but includes the United States, Australia, and Britain as the genesis of the volume stems from a double session entitled “International Perspectives on the End(s) of Multicultural Education” at the American Association for the Advancement of Curriculum Studies Conference at the University of British 7 WONG & GUO Columbia in 2009. The volume begins with a generalized overview that contextualizes multiculturalism and multicultural education and then addresses specific issues that include topics such as critical pedagogy, critical ethnography, youth identity, teacher education, interculturalism, multicultural literacy, and education and multicultural backlash, to name just a few. The lead editor of the volume, Handel Wright, argues that the volume appears at a “… moment of danger for multiculturalism and less immediately apparent, for multicultural education” (Wright, Singh, & Race, 2012b, p. 3; Wright, 2012). The authors include a wide range from new graduate student scholars to established and distinguished scholars in the field such as Peter McLaren, Michael Singh, Shirley Steinberg and Handel Wright. Most recently Jack Jedwab (2014a) edited a volume entitled The Multicultural Question: Debating Identity in 21st-Century Canada. This volume brings together many distinguished scholars on Canadian ethnic pluralism and multiculturalism to reflect on “policy, ideology and message” and to capture the contours of the various debates (p. 5). While the term “identity” is in the title of the anthology this is a misnomer as the chapters cover a broad area of topics and do not focus particularly or specifically on the concept of identity in a social-psychological sense with perhaps the exceptions of Elke Winter’s and John Berry’s chapters. Overall this volume covers an extremely broad range of topics (e.g., Canada’s multiculturalism program, Canadian national identity, liberal multiculturalism, nationalism, interculturalism, language, immigrant integration, residential concentration) of which some pertain to the five distinct but related criticisms and debates mentioned above. An example of the latter is Randall Hansen’s chapter which argues that Canada’s multiculturalism policy is a hoax (#4 above) because it conceals the real objective of being an integration policy hence the title “Assimilation by Stealth”. Jedwab (2014b) avers in his introduction that “… the essays in this volume aim to help Canadians better understand the essence of a debate that is likely to remain with us for the foreseeable future” (p. 5). This is certainly the case as the chapters here in this volume continue to the effort to understand the various debates by revisiting and re-examining multiculturalism in Canada in terms of theory, policy, and empirical findings on specific cases. This volume brings together many distinguished Canadian researchers from a breadth of disciplines to continue the debates on multiculturalism. What is unique about this anthology, compared to the recent ones mentioned above, is that the body of work goes beyond commentaries, discourses, and reflections on multiculturalism. Similar to the most recent anthology The Multicultural Question: Debating Identity in 21st-Century Canada this volume’s scholars cover a broad range of theoretical issues and debates with critical analysis of multiculturalism. Moreover three scholars, Elke Winter, John Berry, and Will Kymlicka have written chapters for both volumes. However, what is unique about this volume is that it also presents specific case studies that are organized around thematic topics related to multiculturalism. In this sense this anthology is very much a reader, akin to Home and Native Land: Unsettling Multiculturalism in Canada (Chazan et al., 2011a) but going beyond discourse and narrative analysis. This volume, somewhat 8 REVISITING MULTICULTURALISM IN CANADA similar to Precarious International Multicultural Education (Wright et al., 2012a), provides some very concrete empirical research studies to show how multiculturalism is practiced or, in other words, how it is played out on the ground or street. For example there are chapters that examine Canadian Jews, Sri Lankan Tamils, Lebanese, Chinese, and Blacks as well as a section on multicultural education in Canada. These substantive case studies explore how the integral relationships and contestations of multiculturalism with loyalty, belonging, integration, identity, youth, religion, and education among others. OUTLINE OF THE VOLUME This volume is organized into five sections: Section I focuses on the various debates and theorizing on multiculturalism in Canada. Then in the next three sections, Sections II, III and IV, some of the debates and issues discussed in Section I are carried forward into areas and case studies in Canada. Section II contains specific case studies on multiculturalism and aspects of ethnicity and belonging. Section III relates to specific case studies on youth, identity, and racialization and Section IV examines multicultural education in the Canadian context. The volume ends with Section V, entitled Future of Multiculturalism, which entails a chapter that engages the reader to think about governance models beyond current conceptualizations of multiculturalism in a postnational society. In Chapter 1 Will Kymlicka leads off the volume and Section I by arguing that the longevity of multiculturalism policy in Canada, since 1971, is due to its evolutionary nature. He delineates the evolving shifts in multicultural policy from emphasis on ethnicity to race, and then from ethnicity and race to religion, over the past four-plus decades. His chapter is one of optimism for the continued adaptability of multiculturalism policy in Canada in the foreseeable future. John Berry follows in Chapter 2 by focusing on the social psychological dimensions of multiculturalism and extant intercultural relations in plural societies like Canada. His analysis includes an examination of three core interrelated hypotheses on intercultural relations: 1) multiculturalism hypothesis; 2) integration hypothesis; and 3) contact hypothesis. By examining these hypotheses he argues that researchers are now in a position to provide evidence-based recommendations for policymakers for long-term interests. Elke Winter, in Chapter 3, continues Kymlicka’s analysis of the longevity and resilience of multiculturalism by analyzing the changing relationship between multiculturalism in Canada and Québécois nationalism with respect to the construction of national identity. Her thesis is that English-French conflict best explains the consolidation of multicultural national identity as the dominant discourse in the 1990s. She then points out that by the 2000s, with Québécois nationalism at an ebb, there was a revival of nationalist discourse and a shallow redefinition of multiculturalism more in individualistic terms. In Chapter 4 Lloyd Wong focuses on the critiques and discourse of multiculturalism (mentioned above) that claims it is divisive and marginalizing. This is essentially the fragmentation thesis and he examines it comparatively with other models such as assimilation, cosmopolitanism and 9 WONG & GUO interactive pluralism. Then he looks at the works of popular sociologists in Canada and in Europe who have subscribed to the fragmentation thesis by using a sociology of knowledge approach to help explain their positions. He concludes by advocating an interactive pluralism approach to multiculturalism policy. Sourayan Mookerjea’s Chapter 5 assesses the current state of multiculturalism by deconstructing the Hérouxville affair and the reasonable accommodation debate in Quebec of 2006. His assessment of multiculturalism in Canada is that it is a weak policy and he critiques it utilizing the perspectives of historical sociology, transnational feminism and cultural studies and argues that multiculturalism and racism are connected. The 6th and last chapter in this section is by Ho Hon Leung who, akin to Kymlicka and Winter, demonstrates that multiculturalism is constantly evolving. He asserts that the discourse of 21st century Canadian multiculturalism is integrally related to other Canadian values and culture, identity, and nation-building. Leung ends his chapter on an optimistic note suggesting that while multiculturalism in Canada has been successful there are still many challenges and so it can be a better policy. Shibao Guo and Yan Guo open Section II in Chapter 7 with two study studies exploring the tensions between immigration, ethnicity, and minority rights. Through the examination of the role of ethno-cultural organizations in responding to the changing needs of the Chinese communities in Calgary and Edmonton, the chapter addresses the question of how multiculturalism facilitates or hinders the development of ethnic community organization in Canada. The findings reveal the salience of ethnicity as both an important resource utilized by the state as a way to mobilize ethnic political support to serve an ethno-specific community, and a liability for the state to legitimize its political agenda in multiculturizing ethnospecific organizations with an ultimate goal of assimilation. In Chapter 8 Morton Weinfeld shifts the focus from Chinese communities and draws upon the (in)famous “Tebbit cricket test” to discuss the dual and divided loyalties of Canadian Jews. Norman Tebbit, a conservative British politician in 1990, questioned the loyalties of Asian immigrants to the United Kingdom by asking which side they would cheer for in a cricket match between England and their Asian home country. After suggesting that divided loyalties is not a new phenomenon in Canada Weinfeld then looks at the Jewish case where he applies the Tebbit test in preliminary conversations with Canadian Jewish leaders when beginning interviews. While the results for the Tebbit test were mixed, with the majority refusing to pick a position, Weinfeld goes on to suggest that while Canadian Jews are seemingly “successful poster children” for multiculturalism in Canada the issue of dual loyalties potentially can become more serious one of divided loyalties. Furthering the case study of Canadian Jewry and multiculturalism in Chapter 9 Rebecca Margolis examines the relationship of language (Yiddish) to the practice of multiculturalism in Canada. She maps out how the use of Yiddish, as a communicative language, was impacted by multiculturalism policy as it evolved over the past several decades. Beyond a language Margolis points out that Yiddish is also an expression of symbolic ethnicity and Jewish identity. She concludes that Canadian multiculturalism policy 10 REVISITING MULTICULTURALISM IN CANADA has been a mixed blessing for Yiddish. Kalyani Thurairajah concludes this section in Chapter 10 by bringing attention back to the issue of dual and divided loyalties with a case study of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in Canada because of their homeland politics and the existence of the Tamil Tigers. She examines, using indepth interview data with second-generation Tamils, their extent of political engagement, reaction to the labelling of the Tamil Tigers as a terrorist organization and their overall Tamil identity. Thurairajah goes on to assess how multiculturalism plays out in Canada with respect to suspect minorities and the boundaries of support within the community. Section III presents concrete empirical research studies demonstrating how multiculturalism is practiced on the ground in relation to youth, identity and racialization. In Chapter 11 Evangelia Tastsoglou and Sandy Petrinioti explore the question of whether and how multiculturalism has become part of the lived experience of second-generation Canadian youth of Lebanese descent in Halifax. The authors shed light on multiculturalism as collective identity and a normative framework for national identity building in relation to individual identity negotiation and formation. They confirm the idea that ethnic identity and Canadian identity are not a zero sum game, but the two co-exist and inform each other. Dan Cui in Chapter 12 continues the examination of the lived experience of multiculturalism. Cui’s study on second-generation Chinese-Canadian youth in Alberta contextualizes two major debates of multiculturalism as a politics of recognition and as a divisive force. Her study examines racial discrimination and stereotypes in school, biased media representation, and the relationship between ethnic language maintenance, sense of belonging and multicultural policy within a bilingual framework. Cui points out that multiculturalism, as an integration policy offering symbolic recognition of different cultures, is far from adequate to address racial and ethnic relations in an increasingly diverse society. As such, she underscores the importance of racialization as an important concept and research topic in contemporary multicultural society. The 13th and last chapter of this section by Carl James and Selom Chapman-Nyaho take up some of the themes discussed by Cui. Informed by the concepts of racialization, governance, and interest-convergence, their study examines a summer employment program for racialized minority youth from Toronto’s marginalized communities. The program is designed to help them gain meaningful work experience with the Toronto Police Services and was found instrumental in helping reduce the social distance between police and racialized youth, but also worked to advance the institutional interests of policing. The authors raise important questions about how programs designed for ‘at-risk’ youth are caught up in racialized assumptions and anxieties. Multicultural education is the focus of Section IV presenting more empirical studies examining how multiculturalism is practiced in schools and classrooms. Anna Kirova opens the section in Chapter 14 with an analysis of critical and emerging discourses in the academic literature on multicultural education. In this chapter Kirova highlights a number of critiques of multicultural education and discusses implications for change in the context of post-multiculturalism. This discussion provides a useful mindmap in helping us rethink and reconceptualize 11 WONG & GUO multicultural education theory and practice. Next is Yan Guo’s Chapter 15 on multiculturalism and minority religion in public schools. As Canada’s population is becoming increasingly ethno-culturally diverse, Guo argues, it becomes imperative for schools to make necessary changes to embrace cultural and religious diversity in schools. Despite the fact that religious freedom is enshrined in Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms Guo’s study highlights the tensions and contradictions between multiculturalism and minority religion when Muslim immigrant parents came to negotiate religious practices within public schools. Chapter 16 by Johanne Jean-Pierre and Fernando Nunes is a historical-comparative analysis which traces the effects of multiculturalism on policies and practices of regional school boards. By comparing the written records of the meetings of Toronto Board of Education prior to, and after, the announcement and implementation of the Policy of Multiculturalism, the authors found a paradigm shift in the Board’s approach to diversity from an integrationist approach throughout the 1960’s to an empowerment model of multicultural education. They conclude that policies adopted at the federal level can have direct impacts on the philosophies and practices at local levels of policy and administration. In Chapter 17, Mariusz Galczynski, Vilelmini Tsagkaraki, and Ratna Ghosh unpack multiculturalism in the classroom. Through the discussion of current events in the media, the authors help to bridge the gap between theory and practice by demonstrating how to bring multiculturalism into the classroom. Their analysis also contributes to a broadened understanding of multicultural education that goes beyond students’ ethnicity and race to recognize a range of societal differences, such as gender, class, religion, sexual orientation, and (dis)ability. Augie Fleras concludes the volume with a conceptually challenging and provocative chapter that complements, as well as contrasts with, Will Kymlicka’s opening chapter. He argues that with increasing transmigration, transnationalism, fluid boundaries, deterritorialization, dual/multiple statuses (identities, and loyalties), and hyperdiversity the nation-state will no longer be the source of legitimacy (postnational) but rather the transnational community. As such Fleras anticipates that current multiculturalism policy, as a governance model, will suffer a crisis of legitimacy and lose its saliency as Canada becomes increasingly a postnational society. He begins the chapter by examining three models of diversity governance: monoculturalism, multiculturalism, and postmulticulturalism and then he advocates the latter. For Fleras the notion of postmulticulturalism is different from how the term is used earlier in this Introduction and does not mean a rejection or retreat from multiculturalism. He views postmulticulturalism governance as building upon, as well as transcending, multicultural governance hence he also refers to it as multiculturalism 2.0. He feels this latter governance model of postmulticulturalism, which is postethnic, will be necessary for managing the extremely complex mobilities, diversities, multiplicities, and identities in a postnational society that Canada is becoming. 12 REVISITING MULTICULTURALISM IN CANADA NOTE 1 This figure is complicated by the fact that “Canadian” was introduced as an ethnic origin category in the 1996 Census. REFERENCES Basavarajappa, K., & Ram, B. (1999). Section A: Population and migration. Table A125-163. Retrieved from http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-516-x/pdf/5500092-eng.pdf Chazan, M., Helps, L., Stanley, A., & Thakkar, S. (Eds.). (2011a). Home and native land: Unsettling multiculturalism in Canada. Toronto: Between the Lines. Chazan, M., Helps, L., Stanley, A., & Thakkar, S. (2011b). Introduction: Labours, lands, bodies. In M. Chazan, L. Helps, A. Stanley, & S. Thakker (Eds.), Home and native land: Unsettling multiculturalism in Canada (pp. 1-14). Toronto: Between the Lines. Environics Institute. (2015). Focus Canada-Spring 2015 – Canadian public opinion about immigration and multiculturalism. Retrieved from http://www.environicsinstitute.org Frideres, J. (Ed.). (1989). Multiculturalism and intergroup relations. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Dewing, M. (2013). Canadian multiculturalism (Background paper). Ottawa: Library of Parliament. Fleras, A. (2002). Multiculturalism as critical discourse: Contesting modernity. Canadian Issues, February, 9-11. Fleras, A., & Elliott, J. (2002). Engaging diversity: Multiculturalism in Canada (2nd ed.). Toronto: Nelson. Fleras, A., & Kunz, J. (2001). Media and minorities: Representing diversity in a multicultural Canada. Toronto: Thompson Education Publishing. Garcea, J. (2008). Postulations on the fragmentary effects of multiculturalism in Canada. Canadian Ethnic Studies, 40(1), 141-160. Iacobucci, F. (2007). Introduction. In J. Stein, D. Cameron, J. Ibbitson, W. Kymlicka, J. Meisel, H. Siddiqui, & M. Valpy (Eds.), Uneasy partners: Multiculturalism and rights in Canada (pp. vii-xiii). Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier Press. Jedwab, J. (Ed.) (2014a). The multiculturalism question: Debating identity in 21st-century Canada. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Jedwab, J. (2014b). Introduction. In J. Jedwab (Ed.), The multiculturalism question: Debating identity in 21st-century Canada (pp. 1-9). Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Joppke, C. (2004). The retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state: Theory and policy. The British Journal of Sociology, 55(2), 237-257. Kunz, J. L., & Sykes, S. (2007). From mosaic to harmony: Multicultural Canada in the 21st century. Ottawa: Policy Research Initiative. Kymlicka, W. (2014). The essentialist critique of multiculturalism: Theories, policies, ethos (EUI Working Papers). Badia Fiesolana: European University Institute. Marger, M. (2015). Race & ethnic relations: American and global perspectives (10th ed.). Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning. Statistics Canada. (2008). 2006 Census: Ethnic origin, visible minorities, place of work and mode of transportation. The Daily, Wednesday, April 2, 2008. Retrieved from http://www.statcan.gc.ca/ daily-quotidien/080402/dq080402a-eng.htm Statistics Canada. (2013). Immigration and ethnocultural diversity in Canada: National Household Survey, 2011. Catalogue no. 99-010-X2011001. Ottawa: Minister of Industry. Retrieved from http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/as-sa/99-010-x/99-010-x2011001-eng.pdf Stein, J., Cameron, D., Ibbitson, J., Kymlicka, W., Meisel, J., Siddiqui, H., & Valpy, M. (2007). Uneasy partners: Multiculturalism and rights in Canada. Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier Press. Vertovec, S. (2010). Towards post-multiculturalism? Changing communities, conditions and contexts of diversity. International Social Science Journal, 199(61), 83-95. 13 WONG & GUO Vertovec, S., & Wessendorf, S. (2010). The multiculturalism backlash: European discourses, policies and practices. London: Routledge. Werbner, P. (2012). Multiculturalism from above and below: Analysing a political discourse. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 33(2), 197-209. Wright, H. (2012). Between global demise and national complacent hegemony: Multiculturalism and multicultural education in a moment of danger. In. H. Wright, M. Singh, & R. Race (Eds.), Precarious international multicultural education: Hegemony, dissent and rising alternatives (pp. 103-114). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. Wright, H., Singh, M. & Race, R. (Eds.). (2012a). Precarious international multicultural education: Hegemony, dissent and rising alternatives. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. Wright, H., Singh, M. & Race, R. (2012b). Multiculturalism and multicultural education: Precarious hegemonic status quo and alternatives. In. H. Wright, M. Singh, & R. Race (Eds.), Precarious international multicultural education: Hegemony, dissent and rising alternatives (pp. 3-13). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. Lloyd Wong Department of Sociology University of Calgary Shibao Guo Werklund School of Education University of Calgary 14 SECTION I THEORIZING AND DEBATING MULTICULTURALISM WILL KYMLICKA 1. THE THREE LIVES OF MULTICULTURALISM INTRODUCTION Canada today faces challenges that were not foreseen when the Multiculturalism policy was first adopted in 1971, and serious doubts have been raised about whether the policy can be adapted or updated to deal with these new realities. Even those who supported multiculturalism in the past have wondered whether it is time now to move to a ‘post-multicultural’ approach, and to give multiculturalism “a dignified burial.”1 In this chapter, I will argue that multiculturalism has some life left in it, and that the original goals and tools of multiculturalism still provide a strong foundation for addressing issues of diversity and inclusion in Canada. To be sure, like all public policies, multiculturalism needs to continually adapt, but it has done so successfully in the past, and I believe it can do so again. To foreshadow my main argument, I will distinguish three stages in the unfolding saga of Canadian multiculturalism. In its original incarnation, multiculturalism was based on a logic of ethnicity – that is, the policy encouraged the self-organization, representation and participation of ethnic groups defined on the basis of their country of origin. In the 1970s and 1980s, this logic of ethnicity was supplemented by programs intended to deal with processes of racialization and racial discrimination. And, more recently, we have seen yet another basis for selforganization emerge, as groups defined by religion seek a seat at the multicultural table. As a result, we have three distinct dimensions of diversity at work in the multiculturalism policy – ethnicity, race, and religion. At first glance, it may appear that this multiplication of forms of diversity has undermined any coherence to the multiculturalism policy. Many commentators have argued that we need to pull these issues apart, and that we are likely to mismanage issues of race and religion if we address them using a policy framework initially designed for issues of ethnicity. The evolution of multiculturalism has indeed taken place in an unplanned and ad hoc way, and Canada’s approach therefore lacks the conceptual clarity or ideological purity that we can see in some other Western democracies. I will argue, however, that this is in fact a virtue of Canada’s approach. The contingencies by which the logics of ethnicity, race and religion have evolved and interacted over time in Canada have created, largely by accident, a framework that retains powerful potential to help build more inclusive models of democratic citizenship in Canada. Or so I will argue in this chapter. S. Guo & L. Wong (eds.), Revisiting Multiculturalism in Canada, 17–35. © 2015 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved. KYMLICKA My main concern is with the current and future potential of multiculturalism, but in order to assess this, we need to start by examining its history. So I will begin with the origins of multiculturalism, and attempt to identify its initial goals. I will then examine how it has evolved over time, and suggest how this evolving framework can help address the new challenges we face. I should note that my focus will be on the federal policy of multiculturalism, not on the panoply of multicultural initiatives adopted at the provincial or municipal levels across Canada, or on the many experiments in multicultural accommodations adopted within private businesses, churches or other civil society organizations. The spread of multiculturalism throughout different levels and spheres of Canadian society is testament to its powerful impact – its “long march through the institutions.” But the federal level provides the overarching legal and constitutional framework within which these more local initiatives take place, and we can most easily trace the evolution of multiculturalism by focusing on this larger framework. THE ORIGINS OF MULTICULTURALISM What then were the original goals of the federal multiculturalism policy when it was adopted in 1971? What was it intended to achieve? I would argue there were two main goals. In this first instance, multiculturalism was part of a larger political bargain designed to deal with the national unity crisis in Canada raised by the rise of Quebec nationalism. The 1960s witnessed the dramatic (re)-emergence of Quebecois nationalism, including the first manifestations of a significant secessionist movement. The federal government needed to do something to blunt this growth in separatist sentiment. It therefore undertook a series of reforms to make Quebecers feel more at home in Canada, including enhancing the status of the French language, so as to make the federal government genuinely bilingual, and to increase the representation of francophones in the civil service. More generally, the federal government sought to re-emphasize Canada’s “duality” – i.e., to re-emphasize the equality of British and French as the “founding nations.” One component of this strategy was the establishment of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963, with the mandate to explore ways of strengthening equality between the British and French. As soon as the mandate of this Commission was released, however, leaders of various “ethnic groups” expressed concern, particularly long-settled groups such as the Ukrainians, Italians, and Poles. All of the talk about “duality,” “two founding nations,” and “bilingualism and biculturalism” seemed to render these ethnic groups invisible, and ignored the role they had played in building the country.2 They worried that government funds and civil service positions would be parcelled out between British and French, leaving immigrant/ethnic groups on the margins. This fear generated some of the first serious attempts at ethnic group political mobilization in Canada, at least at the federal level. Indeed, many commentators argue that the establishment of this Royal Commission was the spur that precipitated the political mobilization of “ethnic groups” as a “third force” in Canadian politics. These 18 THE THREE LIVES OF MULTICULTURALISM groups insisted that the accommodation of Quebec not be done at their expense, and that any strengthening of linguistic duality therefore be accompanied by recognition of ethnic diversity. The federal government was nervous about this unexpected hostility amongst ethnic groups to the work of the Royal Commission. The government believed that if ethnic groups strongly opposed the idea of duality, including the idea of strengthening official bilingualism, they could undermine the delicate process of accommodating Québécois nationalism. In order to defuse this problem, the Royal Commission was instructed to consider ways of recognizing the contribution of ethnic groups to Canadian society. This resulted in a series of recommendations, released by the Commission in 1969, which became the basis for the multiculturalism policy in 1971. In other words, the whole idea of multiculturalism arose as an “afterthought” (Jaworsky, 1979, p. 48), tacked on to a series of government reforms intended primarily to accommodate Québécois nationalism. And the goal of these multiculturalism reforms was primarily to gain ethnic group support for (or at least neutralize ethnic group opposition to) what the government perceived as the real issue: namely, defusing Quebec separatism. The idea of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” was, in effect, a slogan hastily devised to name a political bargain: in return for not opposing efforts to accommodate Quebec nationalism, ethnic groups would be given a measure of official recognition of their own, and modest financial support to maintain their identities. This may sound rather crass, but it has in fact been a very stable and successful bargain. Indeed, I would argue that something like ‘multiculturalism within a bilingual framework’ is the only possible basis for Canada to survive as a country. The only way to keep Quebec in the country is to re-affirm duality in the form of official bilingualism. But the only form of duality that can be politically sustained is one that does not come at the expense of ethnic groups, excluding them from public space and state resources. I see no other viable formula for keeping the country together.3 So the initial impetus for multiculturalism was a political bargain to help address the national unity crisis. But it wasn’t just a crude bargain. There were also important values and principles that inspired and guided the policy. Indeed, we could say that the bargain was only possible because it reflected the progressive and reformist spirit of the age. In particular, multiculturalism was seen as a natural and logical extension of the civil rights revolution that was sweeping Canada at the time, which was itself part of a larger post-war human rights revolution. It’s important to remember that the adoption of multiculturalism in 1971 occurred during the most concentrated period of social and political liberalization that Canada has ever witnessed. The decade between 1965 and 1975 witnessed liberalizing reforms across virtually the entire range of social policy – liberalizing abortion laws, access to contraception, and divorce laws, abolishing the death penalty, prohibiting gender and religious discrimination, decriminalizing homosexuality, amongst many other such reforms. This era is often characterized as reflecting a “human rights revolution” in Canada, and indeed it witnessed the 19 KYMLICKA establishment of human rights commissions in virtually every province, and at the federal level in 1977. Others have characterized it as the triumph of a “rights-based liberalism,” or a “civil rights liberalism,” in Canada. The adoption of multiculturalism is part of this general dynamic of liberalization. Like these other reforms, it was seen as contesting inherited prejudices and constraints that inhibited the freedom and equality of citizens. This link is not always sufficiently appreciated, in part because many commentators have assumed that multiculturalism by definition must be a conservative and collectivist doctrine, committed to the preservation of group traditions, rather than a liberal doctrine committed to individual freedom. But in fact multiculturalism, from the start, has been understood in Canada as a policy of reducing the barriers and stigmas that limit the ability of individuals to freely explore and express their ethnic identities. It insists that individuals should be free to express their ethnic identity, in public and private, and should not be subject to stigmatization, discrimination, prejudice or undue burdens for doing so. Like reforms in the sphere of gender and gay rights, multiculturalism was conceptualized as a way of expanding the scope of individual autonomy, by tackling the relations of hierarchy, stigmatization and oppression that had precluded or penalized particular life choices. This liberal impulse is reflected in the way the multiculturalism policy has been legally drafted and judicially enforced. Multiculturalism is tightly and explicitly connected to broader norms of human rights and liberal constitutionalism, both conceptually and institutionally. Consider the preamble to the Multiculturalism Act. It begins by saying that because the government of Canada is committed to civil liberties, particularly the freedom of individuals “to make the life that the individual is able and wishes to have,” and because it is committed to equality, particularly racial equality and gender equality, and because of its international human rights obligations, particularly the international convention against racial discrimination, therefore it is adopting a policy of multiculturalism. It goes on, in the main text, to reiterate human rights norms as part of the substance of the multiculturalism policy. You could hardly ask for a clearer statement that multiculturalism is to be understood as an integral part of the human rights revolution, and as an extension of, not brake on, civil rights liberalism. There is not a whiff of cultural conservatism or cultural preservationism in this statement. In fact, this point had already been made explicit in the original 1971 parliamentary statement on multiculturalism, which stated that “a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework is basically the conscious support of individual freedom of choice. We are free to be ourselves” (Trudeau, 1971, p. 8546).4 These formulations are obviously intended as an instruction to the relevant political actors, from ethnic activists to bureaucrats, that multiculturalism must be understood as a policy inspired by liberal norms. Nor was this left to chance, or to the good will of political actors. The Multiculturalism Act is located squarely within the larger institutional framework of liberal-democratic constitutionalism, and hence is legally subject to the same constitutional constraints as any other 20 THE THREE LIVES OF MULTICULTURALISM federal policy. Any federal action done in the name of multiculturalism must respect the requirements of the Charter, as interpreted and enforced by judicial bodies such as the Canadian Human Rights Commission and the Supreme Court. So the way in which multiculturalism in Canada has been legally defined makes clear that it does not exist outside the framework of liberal-democratic constitutionalism and human rights jurisprudence, or as an exception to it, or deviation from it. Rather, it is firmly embedded within that framework. It is defined as flowing from human rights norms, as embodying those norms, and as enforceable through judicial institutions whose mandate is to uphold those norms.5 In short, the second goal or function of multiculturalism was to reinterpret the role of ethnicity in light of the broader human rights revolution. And here again, I think this aspect of the original multiculturalism policy remains as relevant today as ever. While we face new challenges of diversity, the only morally acceptable and politically viable framework for addressing them is that of liberal-democratic constitutionalism and global human rights principles. AN EVOLVING POLICY: FROM ETHNICITY TO RACE So national unity and civil rights liberalism were the two key goals of the original multiculturalism policy, underpinning its adoption in 1971, and both remain relevant. Very soon thereafter, however, multiculturalism had to confront unexpected challenges. Indeed, the core constituency for multiculturalism dramatically changed. As I noted earlier, the initial push for multiculturalism came primarily from long-settled and well-established European ethnic groups – the Ukrainians, Poles, Italians etc. – the so-called “white ethnics.”6 Non-European ethnic groups – the “visible minorities” – played a peripheral role in this original debate. It was only in the late-1960s that the immigration rules were changed to admit non-European immigrants on a non-discriminatory basis, and it took several years for these new immigrant groups to settle and become politically engaged. By the mid-1970s, however, these newer immigrant groups were becoming more active. And it quickly became clear that they faced serious challenges and risks of exclusion that were not faced by, say, 2nd or 3rd-generation UkrainianCanadians. For one thing, as new immigrants, they had needs relating to settlement, integration and naturalization that were not addressed in the initial multiculturalism policy, designed for long-settled groups. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, as visible minorities, they faced barriers of racism. While Poles, Italians, and Ukrainians certainly suffered from ethnic prejudices and stereotypes when they arrived in Canada – and the original multiculturalism was designed in part to address these prejudices – they nonetheless joined the British and French on the same side of the global colour line. Throughout the 19th and early 20thcenturies, the world order had been restructured by ideologies of European racial supremacy, and in relation to that global ideology, southern and eastern Europeans shared in the white racial privilege. Newer visible minority immigrants, by contrast, suffered from the enduring effects of these long-standing ideologies and 21 KYMLICKA practices of white/European supremacism, and this called for new policy responses. At first, it was unclear whether multiculturalism could adapt to these new challenges. Indeed, some commentators write about multiculturalism as if the policy never did adapt, as if support for Ukrainian cultural activities are still the main focus of the policy (e.g., Gwyn, 1995). However, the policy did shift focus to incorporate policies of anti-racism and immigrant integration. Indeed, it shifted to such an extent that by the early 1980s, some white ethnics were saying that the policy which they had fought for had been “hijacked” by newer non-European immigrants. This two-fold shift – towards anti-racism and immigrant integration – characterized what I am calling the second stage of the multiculturalism saga. However, this shift was neither quick nor easy. Indeed, it raised profound questions about the very organizing logic of the policy. The original policy, as I noted earlier, was founded on the logic of ethnicity – that is, it encouraged immigrants to create organizations defined by their country of origin, such as the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, and created forums and mechanisms for such organizations to participate in the social and political life of the country. But this logic of ethnicity does not work well when dealing with issues of racial discrimination. Immigrants from the Caribbean are not discriminated against on the basis of their country of origin – most white Canadians probably cannot distinguish a Jamaican from a Trinidadian. Rather, they are discriminated against as blacks, on the basis of their race, with skin colour as the main marker. Similarly, immigrants from East Asia are not discriminated against primarily on the basis of their national origin as Vietnamese or Korean – many white Canadians have difficulty distinguishing these national groups – but rather are discriminated against as “Asians” or “Orientals” on the basis of their race and skin colour. Processes of racialization involve a different logic than those of ethnicity, national origin or mother-tongue, and must be tackled using different tools (Commission on Systematic Racism, 1995; Henry, 1994). The federal government recognized this fact, and so adopted new programs that encouraged self-organization and participation along racial lines, such as the Urban Alliance on Race Relations, and the National Organization of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women. However, and this is a key point, it added this new logic of anti-racism on top of, rather than in place of, the earlier logic of ethnicity. It continues to support organizations defined by ethnicity and national origin – such as the older UCC, or newer organizations such as the National Council of Trinidad and Tobago Organizations, and the National Federation of Pakistani Canadians – as well as organizations whose mandate focuses on anti-racism and race relations. Some say that this approach of supplementing ethnicity with race obscures or minimizes the problem of racism, and that it would have been better to base public policy solely on racial groups, and encourage newcomers to self-organize and engage politically as discriminated racial groups rather than as ethnic groups. This is essentially the strategy taken by the US, the UK, and (in a different way) by France. They all espouse a commitment to fight racial discrimination, but provide little or no public support to organizations defined on ethnocultural lines, often on 22 THE THREE LIVES OF MULTICULTURALISM the grounds that while racism is a profound evil that the state has a duty to tackle, there is no comparable moral justification for state support of ethnocultural diversity as such. Some critics go so far as to argue that the ongoing support for ethnically-defined groups in Canada is a deliberate attempt to weaken anti-racist alliances – a kind of modern ‘divide and conquer’ strategy to keep non-white groups focused internally on their ethnic differences, rather than cooperating together to fight their shared subordination. It is indeed true that more emphasis and resources are needed to fight racism in Canada. Yet I would argue that the decision to maintain ethnicity along with race as an organizing principle of multiculturalism was the right one, at least for Canada. There is no evidence that abandoning support for ethnic organizations is needed to combat racism, or that anti-racism measures in the US, UK or France have been more effective than in Canada. On the contrary, there is anecdotal evidence that the Canadian model of combining ethnic accommodation with antiracism is preferred by immigrants themselves. For example, a recent study interviewed Vietnamese immigrants in both Canada and the United States, and the results suggest that while the immigrants in both countries are indeed deeply concerned about being subjected to anti-Asian racism, they also care about their ethnic identity. After all, the Vietnamese have their own language, history and culture, different from that of other Asian immigrants, and they want to be able to participate in public life as Vietnamese-Canadians or Vietnamese-Americans, and not just as ‘Asians.’7 Vietnamese immigrants in the US resent the fact that they are always pigeon-holed into racial categories for the purposes of public debate and public policy, while their co-ethnics to Canada appreciate the fact that the government accords legitimacy to their ethnic identity (Bloemraad, 2006). We see similar anecdotal results from studies comparing immigrants from the Indian subcontinent to Canada and Britain. In Britain, immigrants often resent that the state views them solely through the prism of race relations rather than as bearers of distinct and valuable ethnic identities and cultures (Berns-McGown, 1999; Modood, 2003). To be sure, there is an omnipresent danger that the recognition and celebration of ethnic diversity will become a pretext for ignoring structural racism (Bannerjee, 2000). But the solution to this, I believe, is not to subordinate ethnicity to race, but precisely to highlight the role that both can play in building more inclusive models of democratic citizenship. The second distinctive challenge raised by the post-1965 influx of immigrants concerns the relationship between multiculturalism and immigrant integration. As I mentioned earlier, the policy was originally demanded by long-settled groups, and the policy as originally drafted implicitly assumed that its beneficiaries were already Canadian citizens.8 Indeed, multiculturalism was formulated as an attribute of Canadian citizenship: it was a new way of understanding Canadian citizenship, a new way of understanding one’s Canadian-ness, not an alternative to being (or becoming) a Canadian. The policy said that one appropriate and honourable way of being a Canadian is to be a proud Ukrainian-Canadian; that one worthy and 23 KYMLICKA constructive way of participating as a citizen in Canadian democracy is to participate as an Italian-Canadian. In this sense, multiculturalism in Canada is very different from Germany, for example, where (a form of) multiculturalism was adopted as a policy for “foreigners” or “aliens” who were not able or encouraged to become citizens. Multiculturalism in Germany was a consolation prize to make non-citizenship bearable (and to facilitate migrants’ return to their countries of origin). In Canada, by contrast, multiculturalism was adopted as a policy for citizens, as a way of reformulating the role of ethnic identities and ethnic organizations within the theory and practice of Canadian citizenship. This initial focus on long-settled and already-naturalized citizens, however, became a problem when dealing with newer immigrant groups, many of whose members were not yet settled, integrated or naturalized. As a result, multiculturalism programs have had to intervene earlier in the integration process, to help people in the first stages of their landing, settlement and integration. Since the 1980s, therefore, multiculturalism has increasingly been seen in the public’s eye as tied to processes of the integration of newcomers, and to nuts and bolts issues of social service provision, settlement services, language training, job training, and so on. But here again, this shift was a matter of supplementing, not replacing, the original emphasis on legitimizing and facilitating the role of ethnic identities and ethnic organizations in Canadian civic life generally, for long-settled groups as well as newcomers. Indeed, even as multiculturalism programs adapted to serve the needs and interests of newcomers who may not yet be citizens, it remained primarily conceptualized as a policy about what it means to be a Canadian citizen.9 Multiculturalism has never been seen in Canada as an alternative to citizenship, or as a transitional phase that immigrants pass through on the road to becoming “real” Canadians who no longer need multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is a right in Canada, but it is seen as a right that one possesses as a Canadian: it is about how we conceptualize the role of ethnic identities and ethnic organizations in our ongoing civic and political lives, and not just about techniques of newcomer integration. So even as multiculturalism expanded and adapted to deal with newcomer integration, it maintained its original focus on legitimizing and acknowledging ethnicity as a component of Canadian identity. Some critics worry that it was a mistake to maintain this original focus. They worry that while celebrating ethnic identities and ethnic heritages may have mattered for well-integrated UkrainianCanadians, it is a luxury and distraction for newcomers, who have more urgent and prosaic needs relating to housing, jobs, and social services. On this view, the very visible public support for multiculturalism as a celebration of ethnic heritage has masked our policy failures with respect to newcomer settlement and integration.10 I think this is indeed a danger. The vocal support for multiculturalism by both the Mulroney and Chretien governments masked some devastating cuts to immigrant integration programs (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002). And yet I would argue that it would have been a mistake to reduce multiculturalism to (or replace it 24 THE THREE LIVES OF MULTICULTURALISM with) a policy exclusively focused on newcomer integration. Multicultural integration works best when it is tied to ideas of multicultural citizenship. Where multiculturalism is seen entirely as a transitional strategy, relevant only to the initial stages of settlement and integration, it provides no basis for challenging exclusionary ideas of Canadian national identity, Canadian citizenship, or Canadian patriotism. On the contrary, a transitional model of multiculturalism creates the suspicion that if immigrants continue to cling to ethnic identities and ethnic organizations after the first few years of settlement, they are failing to integrate, and failing to become real or true Canadians. This is precisely the dynamic we see in Europe today, where the persistence of ethnic identities is taken as evidence for the failed integration of immigrants, and where multiculturalism is blamed for this failure. We can only avoid this poisonous dynamic by articulating models of multicultural citizenship – by showing that one way of being a proud and active Canadian citizen is by being a proud and active Vietnamese-Canadian. That, of course, is precisely what the original multiculturalism policy set out to show, and in my view, it remains an essential component of the multiculturalism policy. So if we examine the evolution of the policy from the 1970s to the 1980s, we see an interesting development. On the one hand, the policy was dramatically transformed almost beyond recognition, from a policy initially focused on acknowledging the contributions of long-settled European ethnic groups to a policy focused on facilitating the integration of newly-arriving non-European immigrants. And yet, in another sense, there were also strong continuities in the policy, as new programs were built on top of, rather than in place of, the original foundations. By the late 1980s, these first two stages of the multiculturalism saga had resulted in a policy that involved a complicated and inter-connected set of goals and tools. I’ve focused on four of these inter-connections. In the first stage, the recognition and accommodation of ethnic diversity was linked to (a) French-English linguistic duality; and (b) liberalization and human rights. In the second stage, those two initial links were preserved, but in addition, it was linked to (c) anti-racism; and (d) Canadian citizenship. In my view, all four of these links remain essential components of a successful multiculturalism policy,11 and it would be a mistake to move to a “post-multiculturalism” approach if this means abandoning or weakening any of them. In fact, much of the fragility of multiculturalism in other countries derives precisely from the fact that it isn’t tightly connected to national unity, human rights, anti-racism and citizenship. The existence of these links in the Canadian case is, to a large extent, a matter of contingency and good luck, rather than far-sighted planning. But the result, I believe, was that Canada developed by the late 1980s a distinctly creative and progressive framework for thinking about inclusive citizenship. Indeed, we can see this as an impressive example of policy adaptation and social learning, meeting new challenges while building on old strengths. Critics often bemoan the inability of public policies to adapt to changing circumstances and new challenges. But here we have an example of policy evolution that was, in broad strokes, reasonably successful. As I mentioned earlier, there are certainly shortcomings in our response 25 KYMLICKA to racism and in our integration policies, which the celebratory rhetoric of multiculturalism sometimes masks. But at least when compared to other Western democracies, there is considerable evidence that this policy framework has made a positive contribution, whether measured by levels of immigrant naturalization and political participation rates, levels of inter-ethnic trust and friendship, comfort with ethnic diversity, or low levels of support for far-right, anti-minority political parties and movements. On all these measures, Canada consistently outscores other Western democracies, and while multiculturalism is not the only factor at work here, it almost certainly is one of the sources.12 This relative success is also attested by the growth of international interest in the “Canadian model.” The first stage of multiculturalism was widely ignored by other countries as the outcome of a uniquely and parochially Canadian concern – namely, how to make sure white ethnics were not squeezed out by the accommodation of Quebecois nationalism. The second stage, however, has been intensively studied by other countries, since it addresses what are endemic issues facing all Western democracies – namely, how to integrate non-European immigrants in a way that combines and links cultural accommodation, anti-racism, human rights, and citizenship-promotion. And it has been widely acknowledged by both academic commentators and international organizations that no country has met this challenge better than Canada, even if there are doubts about whether the Canadian model can be adopted elsewhere.13 THE THIRD STAGE: FROM ETHNICITY AND RACE TO RELIGION So by the late 1980s, the second stage of multiculturalism had become more or less consolidated, reflected in the all-party endorsement of the 1988 Multiculturalism Act, which reaffirmed all of the linkages I have been discussing. However, almost immediately after the passage of this Act, a new set of challenges started to appear, challenges that were not foreseen by either the original 1971 policy or the 1988 Act. In particular, Canada started to witness the emergence of religion as a basis for multicultural claims, alongside earlier claims based on ethnicity and race. Consider the Somali community in Canada, which started to arrive in large numbers in the 1980s, and started to become organized and politically active by the end of that decade. Like previous immigrant groups, they have organized and participated on the basis of their ethnicity and national origin, by establishing ethnic organizations, like the Canadian Somali Congress. They have also participated in anti-racist organizations of Black Canadians, alongside other Canadians of African descent. But many Somalis also want to participate in Canadian life as Muslims, alongside other Canadian Muslims from different ethnic and racial backgrounds. And this has raised a problem for the multiculturalism policy. It was designed to allow and indeed encourage the participation of immigrants along lines of ethnicity and race – as Somalis and Blacks – but it was not set up to deal with representation and claims-making based on religion. 26 THE THREE LIVES OF MULTICULTURALISM There are a number of reasons for the increased prominence of religion as a basis for political participation and claims-making. In part, it reflects a global trend towards the (re)-politicization of religion, as believers of various faiths mobilize politically, and contest the attempt to exclude religion from politics and the public square. We see similar dynamics amongst conservative Protestants in the US, Hindus in India, Jews in Israel, Muslims in Egypt, and Buddhists in Sri Lanka. But it also reflects a trend towards the “ethnicization” of Muslim identities, particularly amongst secularized younger Muslim immigrants in the West. Whereas their parents may have been primarily interested in participation in organizations based on national origin – as Turks, Algerians or Somalis – the children increasingly seem more interested in participating in organizations based on religious identity, even when they themselves are not particularly devout. “Muslim,” for many in the younger generation, is not a faith, but a quasi-ethnic identity, and one which matters more to them than national origin or mother-tongue. So even secular or atheist Muslims may prefer to participate in Muslim-Canadian student organizations than in, say, Pakistani-Canadian student organizations. One reason for this, of course, is that Islamophobia affects all Muslims, no matter what their country of origin, and no matter whether they are devout or not. So there are “bottom-up” reasons why Somali immigrants have become more likely to mobilize and participate as Muslims, and not just as Somalis or Blacks. But there are also top-down reasons. The reality is that governments today, particularly after 9/11, are desperately concerned to find out what “the Muslims” think and feel, and whether they are becoming radicalized or not. They want to find interlocutors who can speak for “Muslims,” and not just interlocutors who can speak for Somalis or Blacks. They want to find Muslim organizations with whom they can enter into negotiations and partnerships to help reduce alienation, monitor radicalism, and promote cooperation with state officials. And so governments have their own reasons for creating new mechanisms for encouraging the selforganization and participation of groups defined along lines of religious affiliation. For a mixture of reasons, therefore, multiculturalism is now under pressure to add a third track of religion, alongside ethnicity and race. This, indeed, is the third stage of multiculturalism, and its evolution is still very much a work in progress. There remains much uncertainty about the role of religion within the multiculturalism policy, and about the sorts of religious organizations and faithbased claims that should be supported by the policy. For example, should multiculturalism support the funding of faith-based schools, or faith-based family law arbitration? These issues are increasingly coming to the fore, but there is no consensus even amongst the traditional defenders of multiculturalism about how to address them. While there are guidelines and principles for how multiculturalism deals with issues of ethnicity and race, there are no comparable guidelines for how to deal with religious groups or faith-based claims. Can multiculturalism adapt to this new challenge? Can it expand to deal with religion, in the same way that it earlier expanded from ethnicity to race? This is perhaps the key question for multiculturalism in Canada at the start of the 21st century. We are still at the first stages of this debate, and it is too early to tell 27 KYMLICKA where it will lead. As I said, the rise of politicized religion is a global issue that all Western countries are struggling with, and it is clear that there are no magic formulas. But I am cautiously optimistic that multiculturalism will be up to the task. I believe that we can and should take advantage of our existing multiculturalism policy, and build upon it. The basic goal of multiculturalism – namely, enabling the expression and accommodation of diversity within a larger framework of linguistic duality, human rights, anti-racism, and citizenshippromotion – is a sound one for Canada, and I think it applies as much to religion as to race and ethnicity. As with ethnic and racial minorities, religious minorities have historically suffered from various forms of discrimination, disadvantage and stigmatization in Canada – some official and state-sponsored, others informal – which have inhibited their ability to exercise full and equal citizenship, and to lead the lives they choose. And as with ethnic and racial minorities, the basic norms and strategies of multiculturalism – strategies of self-organization, participation and accommodation – can provide an effective vehicle for addressing these obstacles. So far as I can tell, all of the arguments for adopting multiculturalism as a way of tackling the legacies of ethnic and racial hierarchies apply to religion as well. To be sure, there are obvious difficulties and pitfalls. For example, how should governments decide which religiously-defined organizations to speak to? How do we ensure that the full diversity of voices within religious groups are heard, including those of women and youth, and not just the voices of conservative and patriarchal elites, or of self-declared spokesmen? How do we determine whether self-declared leaders really represent the people they claim to represent? These are critically important questions, but notice that similar questions arose during the first two stages of multiculturalism, in relation to groups based on ethnicity and race (e.g., das Gupta, 1999). As a result, we have built up a wealth of experience about how to address these issues – about how to encourage forms of organization, representation and participation that are inclusive, and that promote the policy’s objectives of freedom, gender equality, and human rights.14 This is precisely what I mean by building on our strengths: the evolution of multiculturalism has been an exercise in social learning, and we need to draw upon those lessons. Just as the second stage of multiculturalism built on the strengths of the first stage, so too we should build on the second in addressing the third stage. However, there are other deeper worries about extending multiculturalism to deal with religion. Many people worry that religious claims, more so than those based on ethnicity or race, are likely to violate the liberal ethos of multiculturalism. As I’ve emphasized, multiculturalism was originally conceived as part of the postwar human rights revolution, and as one component of a larger process of social liberalization, including gay rights and gender equality. But many people worry that faith-based claims, more so than ethnic or racial claims, are likely to be repressive of individual freedom. Conservative religious groups may seek to use the ideology and institutions of multiculturalism to defend practices that are oppressive rather than emancipatory – for example, practices of forced arranged marriages, honour killings, female genital cutting, or the preaching and teaching of hatred against homosexuals or apostates. Multiculturalism, in short, can be invoked 28 THE THREE LIVES OF MULTICULTURALISM not to contest inherited hierarchies and inequalities between minorities and the mainstream society, but rather to defend religiously-sanctioned hierarchies within the minority community. How do we ensure that the participation of religious groups and the accommodation of religious claims lead to the enhancement of individual freedom – the freedom of all Canadians “to make the life that the individual is able and wishes to have” – rather than to the suppression of individual freedom in the name of religious orthodoxy? This is indeed an important challenge, but we shouldn’t overstate it. Insofar as religious groups have attempted to make multiculturalist claims, they have rarely contested the basic liberal values of the policy. For example, there have been no attempts in Canada to defend female genital mutilation or coerced marriages.15 And even if such claims were raised, there is no chance they would be accepted by the state, or by the general public. The multiculturalism policy is framed as part of a larger human rights agenda, and principles of gender equality and human rights are clearly articulated within the policy. From a legal point of view, therefore, there is no possibility that multiculturalism can be invoked to justify abridging the rights of women or children within minority communities. However, determining the precise “limits of tolerance” remains a difficult and unresolved issue, in Canada as in all Western democracies. For example, under what conditions would the funding of faith-based schools be a threat to liberal values? There has recently been a trend for religious conservatives, from various faiths, to invoke multiculturalism to demand public funding of religious schools. This claim is understandable, particularly in provinces (like Ontario) where public funds are already provided to Catholic schools. This seems like a paradigmatic example of multiculturalism, extending to new groups a right or benefit historically granted to a dominant group. Yet we know that some of these faith-based schools would teach illiberal doctrines. Indeed, part of the motivation for demanding such schools is precisely the desire to shield their children from exposure to ideas of gay rights, feminism and indeed multiculturalism itself. Conservative Protestants, for example, initially fought tooth and nail against the introduction of multiculturalism into the public schools in Ontario, fearing it would undermine the privileged position of Christianity, and expose their children to other faiths. Having lost that battle, these groups now (paradoxically) invoke multiculturalism to demand publicly-funded religious schools in which they can again avoid having to teach multiculturalism (Davies, 1999). Some people worry that we can only ensure that children receive a liberal and tolerant education if we reject all public funding of religious schools. But others argue that since a liberal state cannot prohibit privately-funded religious schools, the better solution is to ensure that all schools, public or private, teach the essentials of democratic citizenship, including human rights, gender equality and multicultural tolerance. And if these essentials are taught, then perhaps there is no reason to rule out public funding of faith-based schools, particularly where other types of private schools or charter schools receive public funding. Indeed, public 29 KYMLICKA funding can be used as an incentive to ensure that these core requirements are fulfilled. This issue of religious schooling remains deeply contested and unresolved in several Western democracies. Another controversial example involves attempts to invoke multiculturalism to defend faith-based arbitration of family law disputes. Here again, there is no obvious answer about which models of private arbitration best fulfil the emancipatory aims of the multiculturalism policy. There is ample evidence that allowing for alternative dispute resolution can provide parties with valuable options that are not available through the normal family law courts, which are notoriously slow, expensive, adversarial and often insensitive to the needs of immigrants and minorities. Yet there is equally ample evidence that the enhanced flexibility provided by private arbitration can increase the vulnerability of weaker parties, who lack the procedural safeguards provided by the regular legal system. Any liberal conception of multiculturalism has to balance these competing considerations. Banning all private arbitration, like banning all private schools, would be a radical solution, difficult to reconcile with a liberal constitutional order. Yet we are far from having a consensus on what kind of private arbitration, subject to what kinds of safeguards and monitoring, is appropriate.16 As I said, we are at the first stages of these debates, and I do not intend to resolve them here. In my view, we need to look at these issues case-by-case. Some claims for religious accommodation promote individual freedom and equal citizenship, others threaten it. So too with faith-based education or faith-based arbitration. Some versions of these proposals are consistent with a liberaldemocratic human rights framework of multiculturalism, others are not. We need to take our time, and do the due diligence. We need to create better mechanisms of consultation with all the affected parties, consider the experiences of other countries, examine the full range of alternatives, and assess their likely impacts in light of the broader goals of the policy. There is no shortcut here. Unfortunately, all too often, commentators have tried to take a short-cut, by ruling out all faith-based claims in principle, on the grounds that they violate the principle of secularism. According to this view, the problem with extending multiculturalism to deal with religion is not just the logistics of determining which religious groups to invite to participate, nor the danger that certain religious claims will be oppressive of individual freedom. The deeper problem is with the very idea that the state should be involved with religion. According to some commentators, extending multiculturalism from ethnicity and race to religion violates a fundamental principle of liberal democracy – namely, the separation of state and church, or secularism. On this view, while the evolution from ethnicity to race can be seen as extending the liberal logic of multiculturalism, extending it further to religion violates that logic. For example, many of the groups that mobilized against the proposal for faith-based family-law arbitration in Ontario did so, not on the grounds that it jeopardized the rights or interests of vulnerable individuals, but on the grounds that it violated “secularism.” In my view, this is a serious misunderstanding which impedes our ability to think through the issues. For one thing, these appeals to secularism often smack of 30 THE THREE LIVES OF MULTICULTURALISM double-standards, if not hypocrisy. After all, Canadian governments have a long history of making special accommodations for Christians and Jews, of funding Catholic and Protestant schools, and of invoking Christian symbols and language in state symbols and rituals. It often appears that secularism is only invoked when it is Muslims who ask for accommodation and recognition. But in any event, this is a misinterpretation of the principle of secularism, and of the role it plays in liberal-democratic theory. A secular state is one that does not affiliate itself with any particular religion – the state is not an instrument for promoting one religion over others, or for promoting faith over non-belief. But by itself, this does not resolve the question of whether or how such a secular state should accommodate religious beliefs, fund religious institutions, or deliver services through faith-based organizations. A secular state can provide tax breaks to religious institutions, as indeed virtually Western democracies do; it can exempt religious believers from certain laws, such as animal slaughter laws or dress codes, as most Western democracies do; it can provide funding to faith-based schools, or deliver health care or other social services through faith-based organizations, as many Western democracies do. So long as these policies are adopted in an evenhanded way, rather than privileging some religions over others, then there is no violation of secularism. So very few, if any, of the religious-based claims being raised in Canada today threaten the principle of secularism. No one is seriously proposing to replace the secular state with a religious state, or to privilege one faith over others in tax codes or service delivery. The real issue, I believe, is not secularism, but human rights, and in particular norms of individual freedom and equal citizenship. The task for the third stage of multiculturalism is to determine which claims for religious accommodation enhance the freedom of individuals to lead the kinds of lives they choose, strengthen their ability to participate as democratic citizens in our collective life, and remedy the inherited stigmas and burdens that minorities have faced. As I said, this can only be done on a case-by-case basis: there is no magic formula, such as ‘secularism,’ that can solve all these issues at once. And we can only address these case-by-case issues if we create new mechanisms of consultation, participation and deliberation that enable the expression of the full range of voices within religious communities. This will require a major rethinking of our existing models and mechanisms of multiculturalism in Canada. Many people who have grown comfortable with the first two stages of multiculturalism feel a deep anxiety about this emerging third stage, and understandably so. But as I have tried to emphasize throughout this chapter, we are not starting from scratch. We have developed a framework for thinking about diversity that has proven its strengths and its adaptability, and if we take advantage of that strong foundation, I’m cautiously optimistic that we can convert the challenges of religious accommodation into an opportunity for building an even more inclusive model of Canadian citizenship. 31 KYMLICKA NOTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 32 The quote is from Trevor Phillips, head of Britain’s Commission for Racial Equality. For discussion of the new ‘post-multiculturalism’ literature, and its difference from the older ‘antimulticulturalism’ literature, see Alibhai-Brown (2000, 2004), Ley (2005), Vertovec (2005), and Wong, Garcea and Kirova (2005). It also, of course, rendered invisible the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. However, Aboriginals did not view the B&B Commission as a direct threat to their rights and status, which had a separate legal basis that fell outside the B&B’s mandate, and so did not mobilize strongly against it. They mobilized much more strongly a few years later, in response to the 1969 White Paper on Indian policy, which did directly threaten their treaty rights and status. Since then, these two struggles – by ethnic groups for multiculturalism and by Aboriginal peoples for Aboriginal rights – have moved on legal and political separate tracks. Each is a response to the potential exclusion of the original “two nations” picture, but they have responded in different ways, with different claims. I explore the relationship between these two tracks in Kymlicka (2007a). The role of multiculturalism as a constituent of national unity was reaffirmed in the 1995 referendum in Quebec, when the immigrant vote tipped the balance in favour of federalism over secession. It was the commitment of immigrants to the model of a bilingual and multicultural Canada that prevented the country from breaking up. Cf. “Multiculturalism appeals to the common understanding of freedom as choice” (Forbes, 1994, p. 94). This liberal impulse is confirmed by the nature of the political coalitions and public opinion that generated and supported Multiculturalism. Multiculturalism has always been supported primarily by the socially liberal segment of the Canadian populace – the same segment that supports gender equality and gay rights – who view this set of reforms as expressions of a single logic of civil rights liberalism (Adams, 2000; Dasko, 2005; Howard-Hassman, 2003). The liberal character of multiculturalism was often just taken for granted. After all, the groups who initially demanded multiculturalism – such as the Ukrainians – were widely seen as falling well inside the mainstream liberal-democratic consensus. Many of them had fought loyally in World War II, were staunchly anti-communist in the Cold War, and were well-integrated into the Canadian democratic process. The thought that these groups might attempt to use multiculturalism to challenge liberal-democratic values did not occur to anyone. That the Ukrainian-Canadian activists viewed their struggle as part of civil rights liberalism is made clear in Manoly Lupul’s memoirs about the mobilization for multiculturalism (Lupul, 2005). For the role of white ethnic groups in the process, see Blanshay (2001), Jaworksy (1979), and Lupul (2005). Indeed, since one of the standard tropes of white racism is to deny that non-European peoples are capable of producing admirable or worthy forms of culture, multiculturalist policies that accord public recognition to ethnic cultures can themselves be seen as anti-racist. This connection between multiculturalism and citizenship is implicit in multiculturalism’s two original functions: both the national unity and liberal human rights motivations for multiculturalism presuppose that members of ethnic groups are citizens. This link between multiculturalism and citizenship is clear from public discourse. If members of an immigrant group said that they wanted multiculturalism but didn’t want to become Canadian citizens, the response from the general public (and indeed from policy-makers) would almost certainly be hostility and resentment. Multiculturalism is conceived of as a way of belonging to Canada, not as a way of avoiding a commitment to the country. This criticism parallels those who argue that preserving ethnic-based multiculturalism distracts from the more urgent issues of anti-racism. These linkages are sometimes described as involving a “delicate balance” between multiculturalism and, say, bilingualism, human rights, or citizenship. But this is misleading. Talk of a “balance” implies that there is an inherent opposition between (say) multiculturalism and human rights (or THE THREE LIVES OF MULTICULTURALISM 12 13 14 15 16 bilingualism, or citizenship), and that our aim is to split the difference between these opposing values, as if more of one automatically entailed less of another. In fact, these linkages are mutually supportive: we can have more of both. Indeed since the 1960s, Canada the strengthening of multiculturalism has gone hand in hand with the strengthening of bilingualism, human rights protection, anti-racism and citizenship-promotion. For relevant evidence, see Adams (2007), Bloemraad (2006), Kymlicka (1998, 2012), and Parkin and Mendelsohn (2003). On the international diffusion of multiculturalism, see Kymlicka (2007b). For example, while many critics argue that claims for sharia-based family law arbitration in Ontario are an example of ‘multiculturalism run amok,’ it’s important to remember that many of the Muslim women’s groups that contested this proposal were themselves funded by the multiculturalism program, precisely to ensure that the interests and voices of Muslim women were heard. If multiculturalism created the political space for the voicing of claims for faith-based arbitration, it also supported the organizations and forums through which Muslims and others challenged the representativeness of the original claimants, and contested their claims in the name of the broader human rights principles of the policy. This is how multiculturalism is supposed to work: it is an ongoing process of claims-making, contestation, and deliberation and policy-making guided by the overarching values of the policy. There were disagreements within various groups about how best to end these illiberal practices, but not over whether they should be ended. On the case of female genital mutilation, for example, see Government of Canada (1995), Levine (1999), and OHRC (1995). I discuss the sharia tribunal debate and its relationship to multiculturalism in Kymlicka (2005). On the tendency to deny religious accommodations to newly-settled groups that were historically granted to Christian or Jewish groups, and the genuine dilemmas this raises for multiculturalism, see Kymlicka (2009). REFERENCES Abu-Laban, Y., & Gabriel, C. (2002). Selling diversity: Immigration, multiculturalism, employment equity and globalization. Peterborough: Broadview. Adams, M. (2000). Better happy than rich? Toronto, Ontario: Penguin. Adams, M. (2007). Unlikely utopia: The surprising triumph of Canadian pluralism. Toronto, Ontario: Viking. Alibhai-Brown, Y. (2000). After multiculturalism. London: Foreign Policy Centre. Alibhai-Brown, Y. (2004). Beyond multiculturalism. Canadian Diversity/Diversité Canadienne, 3(2), 51-54. Bannerji, H. (2000). The dark side of the nation: Essays on multiculturalism, nationalism and gender. Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press. Berns-McGown, R. (1999). Muslims in the diaspora: The Somali communities of London and Toronto. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Blanshay, L. (2001). The Nationalisation of ethnicity: A study of the proliferation of national monoethnocultural umbrella organisations in Canada. Glasgow, Scotland: Department of Sociology, University of Glasgow. Bloemraad, I. (2006). Becoming a citizen: Incorporating immigrants and refugees in the United States and Canada. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Berkeley. Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System. (1995). Racism behind bars: The treatment of Black and other racial minority prisoners in Ontario prison. Toronto: Interim Report. Das Gupta, T. (1999). The politics of multiculturalism: ‘Immigrant women’ and the Canadian state. In E. Dua & A. Robertson (Eds.), Scratching the surface: Canadian anti-racist feminist thought (pp. 187205). Toronto, Ontario: Women’s Press. 33 KYMLICKA Dasko, D. (2005). Public attitudes towards multiculturalism and bilingualism in Canada. In M. Adsett, C. Mallandain, & S. Stettner (Eds.), Canadian and French perspectives on diversity: Conference proceedings (pp. 119-125). Ottawa: Department of Canadian Heritage. Davies, S. (1999). From moral duty to cultural rights: A case study of political framing in education. Sociology of Education, 72(1), 1-21. Forbes, D. (1994). Canada: From bilingualism to multiculturalism. In L. Diamond & M. Plattner (Eds.), Nationalism, ethnic conflict and democracy (pp. 86-101). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Government of Canada. (1995). Female genital mutilation: Report on consultations held in Ottawa and Montreal (Research, Statistics and Evaluation Directorate, WD1995-8e). Ottawa: Department of Justice. Gywn, R. (1995). Nationalism without walls: The unbearable lightness of being Canadian. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Henry, F. (1994). The Caribbean diaspora in Toronto: Learning to live with racism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Howard-Hassmann, R. (2003). Compassionate Canadians: Civic leaders discuss human rights. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Jaworsky, J. (1979). A case study of the Canadian Federal Government’s multiculturalism policy. Carleton: MA Thesis, Dept. of Political Science, Carleton University. Kymlicka, W. (1998). Finding our way: Rethinking ethnocultural relations in Canada. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Kymlicka, W. (2005). Testing the bounds of liberal multiculturalism? Presented at the conference on Muslim Women’s Equality Rights in the Justice System: Gender, Religion and Pluralism. Canadian Council of Muslim Women, April 2005. Translated into French as “Tester les limites de multiculturalisme libéral? Le cas des tribunaux en droit familial,” Éthique publique, 9(1) (2007), pp. 27-39. Kymlicka, W. (2007a). Ethnocultural diversity in a liberal state: Making sense of the Canadian model(s). In K. Banting, T. Courchene, & L. Seidle (Eds), Belonging? Diversity, recognition and shared citizenship in Canada (pp. 39-86). Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy. Kymlicka, W. (2007b). Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the new international politics of diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kymlicka, W. (2009). The governance of religious diversity: The old and the new. In P. Bramadat & M. Koenig (Eds), International migration and the governance of religious diversity (pp. 323-334). Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Kymlicka, W. (2012) Multiculturalism: Success, failure, and the future. In Migration Policy Institute (Ed.), Rethinking national identity in the age of migration (pp. 33-78). Berlin: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung. Levine, A. (1999). Female genital operations: Canadian realities, concerns and policy recommendations. In H. Troper & M. Weinfeld (Eds.), Ethnicity, politics and public policy (pp. 26-53). Toronto: University of Toronto Press). Ley, D. (2005) Post-multiculturalism? Working Paper Series No. 05-18. Research on Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis, Vancouver Centre of Excellence. Lupul, M. (2005). The politics of multiculturalism: A Ukrainian-Canadian memoir. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. McAndrew, M., Helly, D., & Tessier, C. (2005). Pour un débat éclairé sur la politique Canadienne du multiculturalisme: Une analyse de la nature des organismes et des projets Subventionnés (1983-2002). Politiques et Sociétes, 24(1), 49-71. Modood, T. (2003). Muslims and the politics of difference. In S. Spencer (Ed.), The politics of migration: Managing opportunity, conflict and change. Oxford: The Political Quarterly, Blackwell. OHRC – Ontario Human Rights Commission. (1996). Policy on female genital mutilation. Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission. Parkin, A., & Mendelsohn, M. (2003). A new Canada: An identity shaped by diversity. CRIC paper #11, October. Montreal: Centre for Research and Information on Canada. 34 THE THREE LIVES OF MULTICULTURALISM Trudeau, P. (1971). Statement to the House of Commons on Multiculturalism. House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 28th Parliament, 3rd Session, 8 October 1971, pp. 8545-46. Vertovec, S. (2005). Pre-, high-, anti- and post-multiculturalism. Oxford: ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford. Wong, L., Garcea, J., & Kirova, A. (2005). An analysis of the “anti- and post-multiculturalism” discourses: The fragmentation position. Edmonton, Alberta: Prairie Centre for Excellence in Research on Immigration and Integration. Will Kymlicka Department of Philosophy Queen’s University 35 JOHN W. BERRY 2. INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS IN PLURAL SOCIETIES Research Derived from Canadian Multiculturalism Policy INTRODUCTION One result of the intake and settlement of migrants is the formation of culturally plural societies. In the contemporary world, all societies are now culturally plural, with many ethnocultural groups living in daily interaction. A second result is that intercultural relations become a focus of public and private concern, as the newcomers interact with established populations (both indigenous and earlier migrants). How, and how well, these intercultural interactions work out is one of the main contemporary issues to be addressed by researchers, policy-makers, institutions, communities, families and individuals. This existing cultural diversity will become more and more so over the coming years. With research, it may be possible to discern some basic cultural, social and psychological principles that underpin the processes and outcomes of intercultural relations in these plural societies. Much of this research has been carried out within the fields of cross-cultural psychology (Berry, Poortinga, Breugelsman, Chasiotis, & Sam, 2011) and acculturation psychology (Sam & Berry, 2006). THE MULTICULTURAL VISION There are two contrasting, usually implicit, models of intercultural relations and acculturation in plural societies and institutions. In one (the melting pot model), the view is that there is (or should be) one dominant (or mainstream) society, on the margins of which are various non-dominant (or minority) groups. These nondominant groups typically remain there, unless they are incorporated as indistinguishable components into the mainstream. Many societies have this implicit model, including France (where the image is of the “unité de l hexagon,” that is, of one people with one language and one shared identity, within the borders of the country; see Sabatier & Boutry, 2006), and the USA (where the motto is “e pluribus unum” or “out of many, one”: see Nguyen, 2006). In the other (the multicultural model), there is a national social framework of institutions (called the larger society) that accommodates the interests and needs of the numerous cultural groups, and which are fully incorporated as ethnocultural groups (rather than minorities) into this national framework. The concept of the larger society refers to the civic arrangement in a plural society, within which all S. Guo & L. Wong (eds.), Revisiting Multiculturalism in Canada, 37–49. © 2015 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved. BERRY ethnocultural groups (dominant and non-dominant, indigenous and immigrant) attempt to carry out their lives together. It is constantly changing, through negotiation, compromise and mutual accommodations. It surely does not represent the way of life of the “mainstream,” which is typically that preferred by the dominant group, and which became established in the public institutions that they created. All groups in such a conception of a larger society are ethnocultural groups (rather than “minorities”), who possess cultures and who have equal cultural and other rights, regardless of their size or power. In such complex plural societies, there is no assumption that some groups should assimilate or become absorbed into another group. Hence intercultural relations and change are not viewed as unidirectional, but as mutual and reciprocal. This is the conception that has informed the multicultural vision in Canada (1971), and more recently, in the European Union (2005). Both implicit models refer to possible arrangements in plural societies: the mainstream-minority view is that cultural pluralism is a problem and should be reduced, even eliminated; the multicultural view is that cultural pluralism is a resource, and inclusiveness should be nurtured with supportive policies and programmes. The first Multiculturalism Policy was advanced by the Government of Canada (1971): A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework … (is) the most suitable means of assuring the cultural freedom of all Canadians. Such a policy should help to break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies. National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on confidence on one’s own individual identity; out of this can grow respect for that of others, and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assumptions … The Government will support and encourage the various cultural and ethnic groups that give structure and vitality to our society. They will be encouraged to share their cultural expression and values with other Canadians and so contribute to a richer life for all. (Government of Canada, 1971, p. 1121) There are three main components to this policy. The first component was the goal “to break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies.” That is, to enhance mutual acceptance among all cultural groups in order to improve intercultural relations. This goal is to be approached through two main program components. One is the cultural component, which is to be achieved by providing support and encouragement for cultural maintenance and development among all cultural groups. The other is the social (or intercultural) component, which promotes the sharing of cultural expressions among ethnocultural groups by providing opportunities for intergroup contact, and the removal of barriers to full and equitable participation in the daily life of the larger society. A third component acknowledged the importance of learning a common language(s) in order to permit intercultural participation among all groups. Most recently (2011), the Canadian Federal Government has asserted that: 38 INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS IN PLURAL SOCIETIES Integration is a two-way process, requiring adjustment on the part of both newcomers and host communities … the successful integration of permanent residents into Canada involves mutual obligations for new immigrants and Canadian society. Ultimately, the goal is to support newcomers to become fully engaged in the social, economic, political, and cultural life of Canada. (p. 2) Together, and by balancing these components, it should be possible to achieve the core goal of the policy: the improvement of intercultural relations in Canada, where all groups and individuals have a place, both within their own heritage environment and within the larger society. In this sense, multiculturalism is for everyone, not only for non-dominant groups. This aspect emphasizes that all groups and individuals are engaged in a process of cultural and psychological change. Research on the acceptance of this policy, and its various programmes, shows a high level of support in Canada (Berry, 2013; Berry, Kalin, & Taylor, 1977; Berry & Kalin, 2000; see also Adams, 2007, and Kymlicka, 2007). The European Union adopted a set of “Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration” in 2005. The first of these principles is: Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States. Integration is a dynamic, longterm, and continuous two-way process of mutual accommodation, not a static outcome. It demands the participation not only of immigrants and their descendants but of every resident. The integration process involves adaptation by immigrants, both men and women, who all have rights and responsibilities in relation to their new country of residence. It also involves the receiving society, which should create the opportunities for the immigrants’ full economic, social, cultural, and political participation. Accordingly, Member States are encouraged to consider and involve both immigrants and national citizens in integration policy, and to communicate clearly their mutual rights and responsibilities. (p. 6) While little-known and even less well-accepted, this EU statement contains the three cornerstones of multiculturalism: the right of all peoples to maintain their cultures; the right to participate fully in the life of the larger society; and the obligation for all groups (both the dominant and non-dominant) to engage in a process of mutual change. Research on the acceptance of this policy in Europe has only just begun. However, there is some indication (e.g., van de Vijver et al., 2008) that Europeans make a clear distinction between the right of immigrants to maintain their cultures in private (i.e., in their families and communities), and the right to expect changes to the public culture of the society of settlement. In much of this research, it was found that it is acceptable to express one’s heritage culture in the family and in the community, but that it should not be expressed in the public domains, such as in educational or work institutions. This view is opposed to the basic principles outlined by the European Union, where the process is identified as one of mutual accommodation. 39 BERRY However, in much of Europe, there is a common misunderstanding that multiculturalism means only the presence of many non-dominant cultural communities in a society (i.e., only the cultural maintenance component), without their equitable participation and incorporation into a larger society. It is this erroneous view that has led some in Europe to declare that “Multiculturalism has failed” (Berry & Sam, 2013). However, from the perspective of the Canadian Multiculturalism policy, it has not failed because it has not even been tried! I have been involved in the examination and evaluation of the Canadian Multiculturalism Policy on two previous occasions. The first evaluation (Berry, 1984) was ten years after the policy was first announced. In that evaluation, I proposed that a number of core policy elements (and linkages among elements) formed a coherent set of social psychological concepts, principles and hypotheses. Ten years later (Berry & Laponce, 1994), I co-edited a volume that included essays that examined a number of facets of the policy. From the original policy statement, I discerned a number of ideas that were ripe for social psychological examination; Figure 1 portrays some of these (from Berry, 1984). The clear and fundamental goal of the policy is to enhance mutual acceptance and to improve intercultural relations among all ethnocultural groups (upper right). This goal is to be approached through three programme components. On the upper left is the cultural component of the policy, which is to be achieved by providing support and encouragement for cultural maintenance and development among all ethnocultural groups. The second component is the social (or intercultural) component (lower left), which seeks to support the sharing of cultural expressions, by providing opportunities for intergroup contact, and the removal of barriers to full and equitable participation in the daily life of the larger society. The last feature is the intercultural communication component, in the lower right corner of Figure 1. This represents the bilingual reality of the larger society of Canada, and promotes the learning of one or both Official Languages (English and French) as a means for all ethnocultural groups to interact with each other, and to participate in national life. In addition to these four components, there are links among them. The first, termed the multiculturalism hypothesis, is expressed in the policy statement as the belief that confidence in one’s identity will lead to sharing, to respect for others, and to the reduction of discriminatory attitudes. Berry, Kalin and Taylor (1977) identified this belief as an assumption with psychological roots, and as being amenable to empirical evaluation. A second link in Figure 1 is the hypothesis that when individuals and groups are “doubly engaged” (in both their heritage cultures and in the larger society), they will be more successful in their lives. This is essentially a higher level of wellbeing, in both psychological and social domains. This is the integration hypothesis, in which involvement with, and competence in both cultural communities provides the social capital to succeed in intercultural living in plural societies. 40 INTERCULTUR RAL RELATION NS IN PLURAL S SOCIETIES Figure 1. Com mponents and linnkages in the Caanadian Multiculturalism Policcy ( (from Berry 19884). A tthird link porttrayed in Figuure 1 is the coontact hypotheesis, by whichh contact and shharing is consiidered to prom mote mutual aacceptance under certain coonditions, includding especiallyy that of equaliity and voluntaariness of conntact. All three hypotheeses are now bbeing examineed in over 20 pplural societiees around many, India, Inndonesia, the woorld (such as Australia, Brrazil, Canada, China, Germ and Ruussia). The prooject is calledd Mutual Interccultural Relatiions in Plural Societies (http:///www.victoriaa.ac.nz/cacr/reesearch/miripss). Guided by these hypothheses, the purposse of this reseearch is to disscover whetheer there are anny regularities in how individduals and grooups engage eeach other intterculturally. And if there are, can some general g principples be discerrned that will aassist plural soocieties to devvelop and implem ment policies aand programm mes that will im mprove their intercultural reelations. 41 BERRY Y INTERCULTURAL ST TRATEGIES The quuestion of how w groups and individuals enngage in theirr intercultural relations has coome to be exam mined with thee concept of inntercultural sttrategies. Fourr ways of engagiing in interculltural relationss have been dderived from tw wo basic issues facing all peooples in culturrally plural soocieties. Thesee issues are baased on the diistinction betweeen orientationns towards onne’s own grouup, and those towards otheer groups (Berryy, 1974; 1980)). This distincction is rendeered as a relattive preferencce for (1) maintaaining one’s hheritage culturre and identitty, and (2) a rrelative preferrence for havingg contact witth and participating in thhe larger sociiety along wiith other ethnoccultural group ups. These aare the sam me two issuees that undeerlie the multicculturalism poolicies outlineed above (i.ee., the “culturral” and the “social” compoonents). Theese two issuess can be respoonded to on aattitudinal dim mensions, rangging from generaally positive orr negative orieentations to thhese issues; theeir intersectionn defines four sttrategies, portrrayed in Figurre 2. On the left are the orienntations from the point of view w of ethnoculltural peoples (of both groupps and individduals); on the right are the vieews held by thhe larger societty (such as puublic policies and a public attittudes). Figure 2. V Varieties of inteercultural strateegies in ethnocuultural groups andd in the larger society. 42 INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS IN PLURAL SOCIETIES Among ethnocultural groups, when they do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and seek daily interaction with other cultures, the Assimilation strategy is defined. In contrast, when individuals place a value on holding on to their original culture, and at the same time wish to avoid interaction with others, then the Separation alternative is defined. When there is an interest in both maintaining ones original culture, while in daily interactions with other groups, Integration is the option. In this case, there is some degree of cultural integrity maintained, while at the same time seeking, as a member of an ethnocultural group, to participate as an integral part of the larger social network. Finally, when there is little possibility or interest in cultural maintenance (often for reasons of forced cultural loss), and little engagement with the larger society (often for reasons of exclusion or discrimination), then Marginalization is defined. These two basic issues were initially approached from the point of view of the non-dominant ethnocultural groups. However, there is a powerful role played by the dominant group in influencing the way in which ethnocultural individuals’ groups would relate (Berry, 1974). The addition of the views of the larger society produces the right side of Figure 2. From the point of view of the larger society, Assimilation when sought by the dominant group is termed the Melting Pot. When Separation is forced by the dominant group, it is called Segregation. Marginalisation, when imposed by the dominant group, is termed Exclusion. Finally, when both diversity maintenance and equitable participation are widelyaccepted features of the society as a whole, Integration is called Multiculturalism. It is important to emphasize that within this framework, the concept of integration involves engagement with both cultures. It is not a euphemism for assimilation, which involves engagement with only the larger society; that is, cultural maintenance is a core part of the concept of integration. And the concept of multiculturalism does not refer to engagement only within their own ethnocultural groups (i.e., separation); members of these communities also engage with, and become constituents of, the larger society. These intercultural strategies are related to a number of psychological and social factors. The most important is the discrimination experienced by an individual; less discrimination is usually reported by those opting for integration and assimilation, while more is experienced by those opting for separation or marginalization (see Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006). This is an example of the reciprocity of intercultural attitudes found in the literature (Berry, 2006); if persons (such as immigrants or members of ethnocultural groups) feel rejected by others in the larger society, they reciprocate this rejection by choosing a strategy that avoids contact with others outside their own group. We now examine three hypotheses that lie at the core of intercultural relations research: the multiculturalism hypothesis, the integration hypothesis, and the contact hypothesis. As we shall see, they are very much inter-related, each one influencing the conditions under which the others may be supported by empirical evidence. 43 BERRY MULTICULTURALISM HYPOTHESIS The multicultural vision enunciated in Canada in 1971 had a key section with implications for research on intercultural relations. Berry et al. (1977) developed the multiculturalism hypothesis, based on the assertion in the policy that freedom from discrimination “must be founded on confidence in one’s own individual identity” (Government of Canada, 1971, p. 1121). The basic notion is that only when people are secure in their identities will they be in a position to accept those who differ from them; conversely, when people feel threatened, they will develop prejudice and engage in discrimination (see also Stephan et al. 2005). The multiculturalism hypothesis is thus: only when people are secure in their own identity will they be in a position to accept those who differ from them (ie. when there is no threat to their culture and identity). There is now substantial evidence to support this hypothesis. For example, in two national surveys in Canada (Berry et al., 1977; Berry & Kalin, 2000), measures of cultural security/threat and economic security/threat were created with respect to extant diversity and the continuing flow of immigration. These two security scores were correlated positively with each other and with various intercultural attitudes. Cultural security was negatively correlated with ethnocentrism, and positively with multicultural ideology and with perceived consequences of multiculturalism. Economic security had a similar pattern of correlations with these variables. In New Zealand, using a structural model, Ward and Masgoret (2008) found that security was positively related to multicultural ideology and with attitudes towards immigrants. In Russia, Lebedeva and Tatarko (2012) studied migrants from the Cacausus to Moscow and resident Muscovites. They found that cultural security predicted tolerance, integration and social equality in both groups, but to a lesser extent among Muscovites. Most recently, a representative sample of Russian speakers in Estonia was asked about their intercultural strategies, their ethnic self-esteem, their experience of discrimination, and their level of cultural threat, civic engagement and economic and political satisfaction (Kruusvall, Vetik, & Berry, 2009). The four usual intercultural strategies were found. Groups following the separation and marginalization strategies had the highest levels of threat and lowest levels of self-esteem and civic engagement. In contrast, the integration and assimilation groups had the lowest threat and discrimination, and highest civic engagement and satisfaction. Public policy attempts in Estonia (which are largely assimilationist) seek to make the Russian-speaking population “more Estonian,” while placing barriers to achieving this. Such a policy appears to have led to the development of a “reactive identity” among Russian-speakers, and their turning away from the country of Estonia. From this sampling of empirical studies, it is possible to conclude that security in one’s own identity underlies the possibility of accepting “others.” This acceptance includes being tolerant, accepting cultural diversity in society, and accepting immigrants to, and ethnocultural groups in, that society. In contrast, threatening an individual’s or a group’s identity and place in a plural society is likely to lead to hostility. 44 INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS IN PLURAL SOCIETIES INTEGRATION HYPOTHESIS In much research on intercultural relations, the integration strategy has often been found to be the strategy that leads to better adaptation than other strategies (Berry, 1997). A possible explanation is that those who are “doubly engaged” with both cultures receive support and resources from both, and are competent in dealing with both cultures. The social capital afforded by these multiple social and cultural engagements may well offer the route to success in plural societies. The evidence for integration being associated with better adaptation has been reviewed (Berry, 2011). More recently, Nguyen and Benet-Martínez (2013) carried out a metaanalysis across 83 studies and over 20,000 participants. They found that integration (“biculturalism” in their terms) was found to have a significant and positive relationship with both psychological adaptation (e.g., life satisfaction, positive affect, self-esteem) and sociocultural adaptation (e.g., academic achievement, career success, social skills, lack of behavioral problems). These general relationships have been further examined in some specific contrasts between societies that have different immigration and settlement policies. In one, second- generation immigrant youth in Canada and France were compared (Berry & Sabatier, 2010). The national public policy and attitude context was found to influence the young immigrants’ acculturation strategies and the relationship with their adaptation. In France, there was more discrimination, less orientation to their heritage culture (identity, behaviour), and poorer adaptation (lower self-esteem and higher deviance). Within both samples, integration was found to be associated with better adaptation, and marginalisation with poorer adaptation. However, the magnitude of this relationship was less pronounced in France than in Canada. This difference was interpreted as a result of it being more psychologically costly to express one’s ethnicity in France than in Canada, and to be related to differences in national policy and practices. Overall, it is now clear that when individuals are engaged in both their heritage cultures and (are accepted in) the larger society, there are higher levels of both psychological and sociocultural wellbeing. The integration hypothesis is now well supported in comparative research. CONTACT HYPOTHESIS The contact hypothesis asserts that “Prejudice … may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals” (Allport, 1954, p.12). However, Allport proposed that the hypothesis is more likely to be supported when certain conditions are present in the intercultural encounter. The effect of contact is predicted to be stronger when: there is contact between groups of roughly equal social and economic status; when the contact is voluntary (sought by both groups, rather than imposed); and when supported by society through norms and laws promoting contact and prohibiting discrimination. A good deal of research has been carried out to test this hypothesis. In a massive comparative examination, Pettigrew and Tropp (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of hundreds of studies of the contact hypothesis, which came from many countries 45 BERRY and many diverse settings (schools, work, experiments). Their findings provide general support for the contact hypothesis: intergroup contact does generally relate negatively to prejudice in both dominant and non-dominant samples: overall, the results from the meta-analysis reveal that greater levels of intergroup contact are typically associated with lower level of prejudice. This effect was stronger where there were structured programs that incorporated the conditions outlined by Allport than when these conditions were not present. One remaining issue is whether the association between intercultural contact and positive attitudes is due to situations where those individuals with positive attitudes seek more intercultural contact, or whether more such contact leads to more positive attitudes. In the national surveys in Canada, we found substantial support for this relationship, especially when status is controlled. For example, Kalin and Berry (1982), using data from a national survey in Canada, examined the ethnic attitudes of members of particular ethnocultural groups towards members of other ethnocultural groups. Their attitude data were aggregated by census tracts (essentially neighbourhoods), in which the proportion of particular ethnocultural groups was also known from the Census. They found that the higher the proportion of members of a particular group in a neighbourhood, the more positive were the attitudes of non-members towards that group. This kind of ecological analysis permits the suggestion that contact actually leads to more positive intercultural attitudes. The alternative possibility is that individuals actually move to particular neighbourhoods where already-liked ethnocultural groups are residing. More such research is needed, and in other intercultural settings, before firm conclusions can be drawn. Longitudinal studies are very important to the disentangling of the direction of the relationship between intercultural contact and attitudes. One study (Binder et al., 2009) has shown an interactive effect of contact and intercultural attitudes. They conducted a longitudinal field survey in Germany, Belgium, and England with school student samples of members of both ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities. They assessed both intercultural contact and attitudes at two points in time. Contact was assessed by both the quality and quantity of contact. Attitudes were assessed by social distance and negative feelings. The pattern of intercorrelations, at both times, supported the positive relationship between contact and attitudes. Beyond this correlational analysis, path analyses yielded evidence for the relationship working in both directions: contact reduced prejudice, but prejudice also reduced contact. Thus, in this study, support for the contact hypothesis is partial: contact can lead to more positive attitudes, but initial positive attitudes can lead people into contact with each other. A key element in the contact hypothesis is the set of conditions that may be necessary in order for contact to lead to more positive intercultural relations. The three hypotheses are linked because the first two hypotheses speak to some of these conditions under which contact can have positive outcomes. First, for the multiculturalism hypothesis, we saw that when the cultural identities of individuals and groups are threatened, and their place in the plural society is questioned, more negative attitudes are likely to characterize their relationships. This consequence 46 INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS IN PLURAL SOCIETIES applies to all ethnocultural groups, both dominant and non-dominant. For example, when members of the larger society feel threatened by immigration, and when members of particular groups have their rights to maintain their heritage cultures and/or to participate in the larger society questioned or denied, a mutual hostility is likely to ensue. Under these conditions, increased contact is not likely to lead to more positive intercultural attitudes. Second, for the integration hypothesis, we saw that “double engagement” (that is, maintaining contact with, and participating in both the heritage culture and the larger society) is associated with better wellbeing, including greater self-esteem and life satisfaction. When psychological and social wellbeing are low (that is, when confidence in one’s identity is low) there can be little basis for engaging in intercultural contact. And when contact does occur, as we saw for the multiculturalism hypothesis, it is likely to lead to more hostile mutual attitudes. The evidence is now widespread across cultures that greater intercultural contact is associated with more positive intercultural attitudes, and lower levels of prejudice. This generalisation has to be qualified by two cautions. First, the appropriate conditions need to be present in order for contact to lead to positive intercultural attitudes. And second, there exists many examples of the opposite effect, where increased contact is associated with greater conflict. The conditions (cultural, political, economic) under which these opposite outcomes arise are in urgent need of examination. CONCLUSION Intercultural relations research has been guided by a number of concepts, and has resulted in a number of findings. First, we always need to understand the cultural underpinnings of individual human behaviour; no person develops or acts in a cultural vacuum. Second, in addition to examining these hypotheses in Canada, we need to carry out research comparatively; research findings from one cultural or social setting alone are never a valid basis for understanding intercultural behaviour in another setting. Comparative research is also required if we are to achieve an understanding of some general principles that underpin intercultural behaviour. Third, policies and programs for improving intercultural relations take many forms. Some have been shown to threaten individuals and groups, and provide the conditions that generate mutual hostility. Conversely, there are policies and programs (termed integration and multicultural in this paper) that appear to provide the cultural and psychological bases for enhancing positive intercultural relations. Plural societies now have the possibility to use concepts, hypotheses and findings from research to guide the development and implementation of policies and programmes that will improve intercultural relations. This way forward stands in sharp contrast to using preconceptions and prejudices that are currently often the basis for intercultural policies. In my experience, policymakers would usually prefer to make informed decisions which are more likely to achieve their goals in the long run, than are decisions based on short-term interests. As researchers, we 47 BERRY now have the opportunity to provide the information required for such effective policy decisions, and in a form that can be used. REFERENCES Adams, M. (2007). Unlikely utopia: The surprising triumph of Canadian pluralism. Toronto: Viking. Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Berry, J. W. (1974). Psychological aspects of cultural pluralism: Unity and identity reconsidered. 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Immigrant youth in cultural transitions: Acculturation, identity, and adaptation across national contexts. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Brugelmans, S., Chasiotis, A., & Sam, D. L. (2011). Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Binder, J., Zagefka, H., Brown, R., Funke, F., Kessler, T., Mummendey, A., Maquil, A., Demoulin, S., & Leyens, J. (2009). Does contact reduce prejudice or does prejudice reduce contact? A longitudinal test of the contact hypothesis among majority and minority groups in three European countries. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(4), 843-856. European Union. (2005). Common basic principles for immigrant integration policy in the EU. Brussels: Author. Retrieved from: www.iccsi.ie/resources/EU%20Basic%20Principles. Government of Canada. (1971). Multicultural policy: Statement to House of Commons. Ottawa: Canada Government of Canada, Citizenship and Immigration (2011). Statement on integration. Ottawa: Canada Kalin, R., & Berry, J.W. (1982). Social ecology of ethnic attitudes in Canada. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 14(1), 97-109. Kruusvall, J., Vetik, R., & Berry, J.W. (2009). The strategies of inter-ethnic adaptation of Estonian – Russians. Studies of Transition States and Societies, 1(1), 3-24. 48 INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS IN PLURAL SOCIETIES Kymlicka, W. (2007). Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the new international politics of diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lebedeva, N., & Tatarko, A. (2012). Immigration and intercultural interaction strategies in post-Soviet Russia. In E. Tartakovsky (Ed.), Immigration: Policies, Challenges and impacts (pp. 179-192). New York: Nova Science Publishers. Nguyen, H. (2006). Acculturation in the United States. In D. L. Sam & J. W. Berry (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of acculturation psychology (pp. 311-330). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nguyen, H., & Benet-Martinez, V. (2013). Biculturalism and wellbeing: A meta-analysis. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 44(1), 122-159. Pettigrew, T., & Tropp, L. (2011). When groups meet. London: Psychology Press. Sabatier, C., & Boutry, V. (2006). Acculturation in francophone European countries. In D. L. Sam & J. W. Berry (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of acculturation psychology (pp. 349-367). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sam, D. L., & Berry, J.W. (Eds.). (2006). Handbook of acculturation psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stephan, W., Renfro, C. L., Esses, V., Stephan, C., & Martin, T. (2005). The effects of feeling threatened on attitudes toward immigrants. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 29(1), 1-19. van de Vijver, F. J. R., Breugelmans, S. M., & Schalk-Soekar, S. (2008). Multiculturalism: Construct validity and stability. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 32(2), 93-104. Ward, C., & Masgoret, A-M. (2008). Attitudes toward immigrants, immigration, and multiculturalism in New Zealand: A social psychological analysis. International Migration Review, 42(1), 222-243. John W. Berry Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada, and National Research University, Moscow, Russia 49