Promising Change, Delivering Continuity: REDD+ as Conservation Fad

World Development Vol. xx, pp. xxx–xxx, 2016 0305-750X/Ó 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.005 Promising Change, Delivering Continuity: REDD+ as Conservation Fad JENS FRIIS LUND a, ELIEZERI SUNGUSIA a,b, MATHEW BUKHI MABELE c and ANDREAS SCHEBA d,* a University of Copenhagen, Frederiksberg C, Denmark b Sokoine University of Agriculture, Tanzania c University of Zurich, Switzerland d Human Sciences Research Council, South Africa Summary. — REDD+ is an ambition to reduce carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in the Global South. This ambition has generated unprecedented commitment of political support and financial funds for the forest-development sector. Many academics and people-centered advocacy organizations have conceptualized REDD+ as an example of ‘‘green grabbing” and have voiced fears of a potential global rush for land and trees. In this paper we argue that, in practice and up until now, REDD+ resembles longstanding dynamics of the development and conservation industry, where the promise of change becomes a discursive commodity that is constantly reproduced and used to generate value and appropriate financial resources. We thus argue for a re-conceptualization of REDD+ as a conservation fad within the broader political economy of development and conservation. We derive this argument from a study that compares the emergence of REDD+ in Tanzania with that of a previous forest-policy model called Participatory Forest Management. Our study describes how the advent of REDD+ implies change at the discursive level, but also continuity and repetitiveness in terms of the initial promises and expectations leading to substantial donor financing, pilot project activities, and policy development and implementation processes. In both epochs, these have achieved little in terms of changing actual forest management and use on the ground outside selected pilot project sites, but have sustained the livelihoods of actors within the development and conservation industry, including academics. Given that there are still many who look to REDD+ in the hope of addressing global climate change, despite less than hoped for financial support at the global level, our study provides an important starting point for questioning the uses of the finances for REDD+ that are actually amassed. Ó 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Key words — development policy, conservation, forestry, REDD+, Africa 1. INTRODUCTION organizations, the notion of REDD+ as a looming ‘‘green grab” quickly took root and resulted in calls for critical scrutiny and safeguards and standards (Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones, 2012; Griffiths, 2009; No REDD, 2011). Yet, despite the resources invested by promoters and fears voiced by skeptics, REDD+ has proven much slower and costlier to realize than expected (Sunderlin et al., 2014; UNREDD, 2014). In terms of reduced deforestation and forest degradation, it ‘‘has fallen far short of what was hoped.” (Sills et al., 2014, p. 4). The idea of a unified global REDD + finance framework—be it market or fund based—is yet to materialize (Agrawal, Nepstad, & Chhatre, 2011; Sunderlin et al., 2014). A recent examination of 23 of the 300 sub-national initiatives showed that only 4 had managed to actually sell carbon credits and found that funding is a key challenge to sustain the initiatives (Sills et al., 2014). 2 Another key challenge is technical. Marketing of carbon credits under the voluntary carbon standard systems involves complex technical procedures and requirements (Leach & Scoones, 2013). For these reasons, many REDD+ projects have either been abandoned or taken on an integrated conservation and development projects approach, where performance-based payments are no longer central elements (Sunderlin et al., 2014). Beyond financial and technical challenges, REDD+ projects are also hampered by enduring problems of unclear and unstable tenure arrangements, corruption, mismanagement and The idea of REDD+ (Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries) has resulted in the mobilization of around 10 billion USD of international funding in the 2000s (IIED, 2015). This generated great excitement and expectation among the forest-development sector in the Global South and set in motion a host of multi- and bilateral REDD+ readiness programs and national- and sub-national level efforts involving donors, consultants, experts, bureaucrats, researchers, and forest-adjacent communities (Angelsen, Brockhaus, Sunderlin, & Verchot, 2012; Buizer, Humphreys, & de Jong, 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2014). Meanwhile, the number of research projects on REDD+ probably number in the thousands. 1 The REDD+ mechanism attracted vast amounts of resources because proponents successfully marketed it as a low-cost, rapid win–win solution to climate change mitigation with considerable ecological and socio-economic co-benefits (Eliasch, 2008; Stern, 2007). Governments in collaboration with non- and inter-governmental organizations consequently set out to write new and revise existing national forest strategies, policies and legislation, initiate pilot projects, create local and national capacity to monitor, report and verify forest carbon, develop guidelines and standards, and collect and disseminate findings (Angelsen et al., 2012; Sills et al., 2014). Among some academics and people-centered advocacy *Final revision accepted: August 7, 2016. 1 Please cite this article in press as: Lund, J. F. et al. Promising Change, Delivering Continuity: REDD+ as Conservation Fad, World Development (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.005 2 WORLD DEVELOPMENT unfavorable political-economies of land use. Significant local resistance to REDD+ projects has emerged, reflecting ageold conflicts over how forest resources are to be used (Buizer et al., 2014). Thus, we argue that REDD+ has not (yet) resulted in the expected ‘‘green grab” in the conventional sense of ‘‘the appropriation of land and resources for environmental ends” (Fairhead et al., 2012, p. 238) as has been observed in wildlife conservation, agribusiness, and ecotourism (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Kelly, 2011). Rather, REDD+ looks like the latest in a long row of conservation fads that have invoked great enthusiasm within the forestry-development sector, only to be dubbed a failure and abandoned at a later point in time (Fletcher, Dressler, Büscher, & Anderson, 2016; Redford, Padoch, & Sunderland, 2013). Before REDD+, the Tropical Forestry Action Plan, Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs), community forest management approaches, forest certification schemes, and recently the EU’s Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) scheme all inspired great expectations. Yet, none of them met those expectations (though the jury is arguably still out on FLEGT). Forest certification schemes for instance, though conceived to induce incentives for sustainable forest management in the tropics, have seen by far the greatest uptake in OECD countries (Carlsen, Hansen, & Lund, 2012). In many cases, these schemes have hardly moved beyond the ‘‘pilot stage”, i.e., beyond temporary, placespecific sub-national interventions or trials (e.g., Balooni & Lund, 2014; Christensen, 2004). Our re-conceptualization thus adds an important qualification to the currently dominant framing of REDD+ as a new form of ‘‘green grabbing”, understood as carbon commodification leading to a rush for control over land and trees (Fairhead et al., 2012; No REDD, 2011). We believe that at the moment REDD+ in practice resembles longstanding dynamics of the development and conservation industry, where the promise of change becomes a discursive commodity that is constantly reproduced and used to generate value and appropriate financial resources (Büscher, 2014; Fletcher et al., 2016; Mosse, 2004; Redford et al., 2013). We illustrate the analytical purchase of this conceptualization of REDD+ through a study of the dynamics of change and continuity between the participatory forest management (PFM) and REDD+ epochs in Tanzania. Specifically, we focus on the processes and activities engendered by nationallevel PFM and REDD+ policy processes, such as policy and legislative reform, feasibility studies, pilot projects, monitoring, and evaluation processes. By analyzing the changes and continuities in rhetoric and practice engendered in the process of selling REDD+ over PFM, we argue that these policy models cannot be understood only within a conventional green grabbing logic, but they reflect the political economy of the development and conservation industry more generally. In this political economy, the promise of change is continuously marketed in specific ways that ensure a continuity of financing of processes and activities that align with the competencies of certain actors in the development and conservation industry. 3 Thus, we argue that the continuity in processes and activities between policy epochs characterized by discursive change results in the appropriation of financing by donor organizations, NGOs, consultants, and researchers. This, in turn, also implies that changes in the processes that policy purports to target—in our case processes of forest management and conservation—are evasive. Our case study presentation is based on our joint experiences as students and researchers interested in forest policy formation and implementation in Tanzania. More specifically, the presentation draws on a desk study of available information on PFM and REDD+ pilot projects and policy and legislative processes in Tanzania by all authors, combined with a series of semi-structured expert interviews and informal discussions with forestry researchers/academics, forest bureaucrats at both central and local government levels, conservation NGO officials, forest consultants, and donor countries and organizations’ representatives and technical advisers (from Norwegian, Finnish and Danish embassies in Tanzania, and UN-REDD Tanzania) by Mathew Bukhi Mabele (drawing on his ongoing PhD research on the political ecology of forestry policies and conservation practices in Tanzania) and Eliezeri Sungusia in 2015. In total, 15 policy meetings’ minutes were analyzed, 34 interviews were held, and two meetings/workshops were observed. 4 The paper also draws on Andreas Scheba’s PhD research on REDD+ in Tanzania, for which he conducted fieldwork (participant observation, ethnographic interviewing, 116 recorded semi-structured interviews, 116 household surveys, one focus group discussion, and document analysis) in the Lindi region of Tanzania between August 2011 and July 2012 (Scheba, 2014). 2. POLICY MODELS AS DISCURSIVE COMMODITIES We are interested in examining new policy models as discursive commodities that are marketed in ways that allow actors within the development and conservation industry to appropriate value and financial resources. We contend that examining how the promise of change invoked by REDD+ as ambition was turned into specific policy measures provides new and relevant perspectives through which we can appreciate why the hopes and fears associated with REDD+ have not materialized. Our work builds on critical scholarship on policy by examining the ‘‘social life” of REDD+ policies and projects rather than its effects on land and tree tenure. We conceptualize policy as a ‘‘curious and problematic social and cultural construct that needs to be unpacked and contextualized if its meanings are to be understood” (Shore, 2012, p. 90). 5 Rather than neutral artifacts of governance, policies are ambiguous and contested; they are performed and performed upon to create new social categories, subjectivities, and meanings that reveal larger processes of social change (Green, 2007; Mosse, 2004; Shore, 2012). The task of research on policies then becomes: ‘‘What does policy mean in this context? What work does it perform and what are its effects?” (Shore, 2012, p. 92). 6 This view of policy is keenly attentive to its instrumental purpose of securing a flow of resources to further policy development processes (Green, 2007; Mosse, 2004). In other words, public policy development becomes a means to a different end than often assumed. This instrumentalization implies that policy models’ ‘‘success” depends on the degree to which they facilitate ‘‘an influential institutional and discursive network that produces but also promotes and extends the model by means of alliance building” (Rap, 2006 as cited in Rodrı́guez de Francisco & Boelens, 2015, p. 483). In other words, more than achievements against stated objectives, successful policies are characterized by the emergence of ‘‘epistemic communities” that frame them as successes, notwithstanding any contradictory and unintended outcomes (Büscher, 2014; Goldman, 2007; Green, 2007; Haas, 1989; Mosse, 2004; Rap, 2006). Policy models are therefore dependent upon narratives and metaphors that distill complex realities to legitimate a continued flow of resources (Mosse, 2004; Rodrı́guez de Francisco & Please cite this article in press as: Lund, J. F. et al. Promising Change, Delivering Continuity: REDD+ as Conservation Fad, World Development (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.005 PROMISING CHANGE, DELIVERING CONTINUITY: REDD+ AS CONSERVATION FAD Boelens, 2015). Research in the field of conservation and development has specifically highlighted strategies of ‘‘rendering technical” and depoliticization in framing the complex and contradictory realities found on the ground (Ferguson, 1990; Li, 2007). Because the coherence of a policy model inevitably breaks down in its implementation, new metaphors, narratives, and policy models are constantly needed to conceal existing realities and reinforce authoritative interpretations (Büscher, 2014; Mosse, 2004). As Mosse (2004, p. 640), citing Edwards (1999) points out: ‘‘In the development policy marketplace the orientation is always ‘future positive’”. Büscher (2013, p. 5) argues, ‘‘in a neoliberal political economy tensions between the material realities and reified representations are political opportunities that must be exploited to gain competitive advantage”. Exploiting the cracks between representations and realities becomes necessary for the development and conservation industry’s support in the conservation marketplace, where conservation approaches and interventions must attain political and, in turn, financial support (Büscher, 2013). Drawing on Haas’s (1989, p. 384) understanding of ‘‘epistemic communities” as ‘‘a specific community of experts sharing a belief in a common set of cause-and-effect relationships as well as common values to which policies governing these relationships will be applied”, Büscher (2014) argues that in a neoliberal political economic context, ‘‘success” is increasingly sold as a knowledge commodity through ‘‘epistemic circulation”. He further argues that for policy models to become knowledge commodities and hence capital, or ‘‘value in motion”, they must be circulated and gain recognition beyond immediate project participants to include broader stakehold ers—particularly those who can perpetuate funding (academia, donors, policy makers, etc.). In this context, Büscher shows how marketing, which he understands as a ‘‘strategy to change people’s perceptions about issues or things in line with predetermined objectives and so create buy-in and legitimacy for particular product, idea, or political agenda”, plays a crucial role for consultants in the selling of policy models and themselves as success (Büscher, 2014, p. 81). Building on these insights into the broader dynamics of the development and conservation industry, we argue that REDD + represents a promise of change that is carefully managed to ensure a balance between discursive change and continuity in practice that allow certain actors within the development and conservation industry to tap into financial resources. 3. PFM: THE ANTECEDENT OF REDD+ IN TANZANIA Tanzania mainland has about 48.1 million hectares of forests covering 55% of the total land area (TFS, 2015). The main forest types are: miombo woodlands that comprise the vast majority of the forests; coastal forests or woodland mosaics in the eastern mainland; mangrove forests along the Indian Ocean coast and; closed canopy forests, which grow on the Eastern Arc mountain range in the west and on the volcanic mountains in the north and central parts of the country (Burgess et al., 2004). Forests provide around 90% of the country’s energy supplies, 75% of building supplies and are of tremendous direct importance to the livelihoods of, in particular, rural populations (Dokken & Angelsen, 2015; World Bank, 2008). Tanzania has long been seen as a country suffering dramatic rates of deforestation and forest degradation. In response to this and as part of a global trend toward decentralized and 3 participatory development approaches (Dressler et al., 2010), Participatory Forest Management (PFM) was adopted in the late 1980s amid much international attention and support (Blomley & Iddi, 2009). Practitioners at various levels now praise Tanzania’s PFM framework as ‘‘one of the most advanced community forestry jurisdictions in Africa as reflected in policy, law and practice” (Wily, 2000 cited in Blomley & Ramadhani, 2006, p. 94). In the following sections we examine the promises of Tanzania’s PFM policy from inception and early piloting in the late 1980s and 1990s to nation-wide implementation since the early 2000s- and compare these to actual achievements. (a) The promises of PFM The NORAD-funded soil conservation project HASHI 7 (1986–2004) in Shinyanga region is considered the first major effort to involve communities in addressing land and forest degradation in Tanzania (Iddi, 2002; Wily & Mbaya, 2001). The first pilot PFM project dates back to the SIDA funded Land Management Program (LAMP) 8 starting in 1989 (Blomley & Iddi, 2009; Havnevik et al., 2000). These projects produced institutions and procedures that informed the later PFM framework, and sparked further pilots 9 in the 1990s (see Table 1) that aimed to generate best practice recommendations for the development of new policies (Blomley & Ramadhani, 2006). The total estimated budget of these pilots is more than 60 million USD. 10 All the pilots involved international technical advisors working alongside government officials from the Forest and Beekeeping Division (FBD) of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) and District Councils (DCs). The Danida funded MEMA projects, with a total budget of 3.8 million USD, for instance, hired 1–2 full time international employees for 2–3 years as well as consultants costing at least 1.0 million USD on top of financing infrastructure, procurement and running of vehicles, education of staff, local consulting services, and so forth. Thus, the ‘‘core” activities of testing the implementation of PFM were enveloped in numerous other activities (Nielsen & Lund, 2012; Topp-Jørgensen, Poulsen, Lund, & Massao, 2005). The pilot projects were largely described as successes in both project evaluation reports (Danida, 2002) and academic literature (Blomley & Ramadhani, 2006; Wily, 2000) that celebrated the emergence of this new participatory approach to forest management in Tanzania. Alongside the pilot efforts, a national-level legislative process resulted in a new Forest Policy in 1998 (URT, 1998) and a Forest Act in 2002 (URT, 2002) setting out the goals and legislative background for two national approaches to participatory forestry: Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) and Joint Forest Management (JFM). CBFM recognizes villagers as owners and managers of Village Land Forest Reserves, whereas JFM aims to involve villagers in the management of government forest reserves. Under JFM, villagers and the government sign a joint management agreement detailing the terms of their collaboration (Blomley & Ramadhani, 2006). 11 The main promise of the new national forest policy was to transfer power and thus forest-based livelihood opportunities and revenues to communities (URT, 1998). The policy thus suggested that the power and benefits would generate community support for sustainable forest management (Blomley & Ramadhani, 2006). A nation-wide effort was initiated in 2001 to scale-up PFM under the National Forest Program phase I (2001–10). A PFM desk was set up at the MNRT and an international technical Please cite this article in press as: Lund, J. F. et al. Promising Change, Delivering Continuity: REDD+ as Conservation Fad, World Development (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.005 4 Recipient Project name Budget (in 2001 USD) Funded activity Norway MNRT, Shinyanga Region, IUCN HASHI, 1986–2004 Unknown Sweden FBD/MNRT, Babati, Singida, and Kiteto DCs, Orgut Consulting LAMP, 1989–2007 26 milliona The World Bank/IDA MNRT Forest Resources Management Project (FRMP), 1992–99 2.7 millionb The Netherlands IUCN (technical assistance), Rufiji DC Rufiji Environmental Management Project (REMP), 1998–2004 Unknown Denmark Uluguru Mountains Biodiversity Conservation Project (UMBCP), 1999–2002 Unknown Denmark MNRT, Birdlife International/ Danish Ornithological Society, Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania Iringa Rural District 3.8 million Targeted 23 villages to establish CBFM on app. 130,000 ha and JFM on app. 12,000 in the New Dabaga/ Ulongambi Forest Reserve and West Kilombero Scarp Forest Reserve. Involving 1–2 full time Danish employees stationed in Iringa, Tanzania for 2–3 years and inputs from numerous international and national consultants Finland MNRT, Muheza DC Matumizi Endelevu ya Misitu ya Asili—meaning sustainable utilization of natural forests (MEMA), 1999–2003 East Usambara Conservation Area Management Program (EUCAMP), 1999–2002 3.5 million Denmark MNRT, Lindi Rural and Kilwa Districts Targeted 11 villages for JFM activities, covering 4,723 ha of forest. No JFM agreement signed by the end of the project. Targeted five villages for CBFM activities covering 811 ha. Project implementation benefitted from international technical advisor and consultants inputs. Resources were also spent on training professionals on various aspects Targeted some 43 villages in Kilwa District with potential for PFM. The project managed to initiate PFM activities in six villages, out of which only two completed the full PFM planning process. Supported establishment of district PFM working teams and training of district staff. Hired consultants, individuals, and firms (e.g., Ornis Consulting A/S and University of Dar es Salaam) including international auditing firms. This project was later mainstreamed into the DANIDA PFM component (2003—2007), which did additional 17 villages in Kilwa district Targeted PFM activities in 25 districts in fourteen regions, covering 150 villages, 50,000 ha (Most of the activities for the establishment CBFM and JFM were not completed by the end of the project). Training of 150 facilitators in PFM. Rolling out of national forest and beekeeping database/monitoring system (NAFOBEDA). Supported monitoring and evaluation for PFM activities, PFM training program, and provision of forest specialist services (consultancies and technical advisers). Support to the establishment of Tanzania Forest Services (TFS) and construction of TFS headquarters (with additional funding of about $25 million) Supported PFM activities in 10 districts, targeting 200 villages covering 120,000 hectares of forest. Funded international long-term technical assistance including PFM facilitation adviser and financial management adviser, applied PFM research, short-term technical advisers, training, workshops, field visits, and setting up of PFM coordination unit/desk at the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Supported development of national PFM framework including setting up of PFM Working Group. Preparation of CBFM and JFM guidelines Supported development of National Forest Program (coordination support unit and implementation) and upscaling of PFM to national level. Targeted 16 districts covering 419,615 ha of forests; CBFM—301,519 ha and JFM—135,815 ha. International technical advisers were hired to advise the implementation of the projects. Short-term consultants were also hired for various activities Utunzaji wa Misitu—meaning forest 2.5 million management (UTUMI), 2001–2004 3.0 million The World Bank/IDA MNRT, DCs, Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) Tanzania Forest Conservation and Management Project (TFCMP), 2002–09 Denmark MNRT, Prime Minister’s Office— RALG, DCs, NGOs such as MCDI. Participatory Forest Management, 7.5 million under the National Forest Program, 2003–2007 (Extended to 2012, then to 2014). Finland MNRT, DCs, various NGOs such as TFCG, MCDI, and TNRF. National Forest Program phases I (2006–2008) and II (2009–2011), extension (2013–2015). Various projects by NGOs 10.0 million Restoration project targeting 800 villages in Shinyanga, 40% of households in these villages own ngitiri (a traditional land management system). About 71,154 ha of ngitiris under villages, institutions, groups, schools, and households ownership as of 2000. Project implementation involved technical support from IUCN, ICRAF, and a host of consultancies, mostly by Sokoine University experts Project to improve land management in four districts, targeting 48 villages and 100,000 ha of forests. Budget for 1997–2000: SEK 25 million for consultants and associate experts; SEK 13.5 million for local consultants; SEK 31 million for project support office and vehicles. Implementation involved consultants from Orgut Consulting; Legal and Human Rights Center (training of legal workers); Faculty of Forestry, SUA (inventory); KAPS (training of water committee); Intermaeco (business training); Development Strides (commercial sector support); Liz Wily (community based forestry and land issues) Piloting of JFM in Tabora; restoration of traditional land management system (ngitiri) in Tabora and Mwanza, demarcation, surveying, and titling of about 3,000 villages. Provided technical assistance in the form of hiring individual consultants and firms. Funded series of policy studies including the Forest Policy paper and series of papers on land tenure and administration. Supported preparation of land policy. Supported establishment of forest monitoring systems including the establishment of Tanzania Natural Resources Information Center (TANRIC) at the Institute of Resource Assessment, University of Dar es Salaam. Funded capacity building of forestry staff/departments of districts in Tabora and Mwanza A project to improve environmental/natural resources management, including forest management in Rufiji flood plain and delta, targeting over 160,000 ha. IUCN provided at least two technical advisers. A number of shortterm consultants were involved during implementation including the French Institute of Forestry, Agricultural and Environmental Engineering. Activities covered included boundary demarcation, zoning, and preparation of management and harvesting plans Targeted establishment of JFM in Uluguru North forest reserve, involving eight villages and covering 8,404 ha. The project also intended to build the capacity of Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania as a local civil society. International experts from Birdlife International/Danish Ornithological Society Sources: Danida (2002), Durand (2003), Havnevik et al. (2000), Iddi (2002), Orbicon and ITAD (2010), www.openaiddata.org, URT (2008, 2013), World Bank (1999, 2011) a Actual disbursement. b Estimated share of FRMP funding that went into supporting PFM related activities. WORLD DEVELOPMENT Please cite this article in press as: Lund, J. F. et al. Promising Change, Delivering Continuity: REDD+ as Conservation Fad, World Development (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.005 Table 1. Donor-funded PFM activities in Tanzania 1986–to date Donor PROMISING CHANGE, DELIVERING CONTINUITY: REDD+ AS CONSERVATION FAD advisor was hired to advise the ministry. Donors 12 provided millions of dollars of support through the MNRT, and/or directly to respective district councils (DC) and local communities and/or conservation NGOs such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (with funding from Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund and UNDP/GEF), Tanzania Forest Conservation Group, Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative (with funding from Finnida), and the MJUMITA— community forest conservation network of Tanzania. Overall, since its inception as idea and until today, development partners including Sida (Sweden), Norad (Norway), Finnida (Finland), Danida (Denmark), the Royal Netherlands Embassy (Netherlands), World Bank/IDA, UNDP/GEF, Belgian Development Agency (BTC) (Belgium), private individuals/companies, and the government of Tanzania have invested more than 60 million USD in the development of PFM policies and projects in Tanzania. 13 (b) The reality of PFM today Ten years later, as of 2012, official estimates place around 7.5 million hectares of forest in 77 districts under PFM (URT, 2012). Of the 2,285 villages involved, 1,233 are engaged in CBFM (2.4 million ha) and 1,052 in JFM (5.4 million ha). At first glance these figures portray a massive growth of PFM since the early pilot phase. Accordingly, this is a story of success—one that has circulated widely among donors, civil society and in academia (Blomley & Iddi, 2009; Blomley & Ramadhani, 2006; Kilahama, 2015; Orbicon & ITAD, 2010; Wily, 2000). However, a closer look at the data reveals that by 2012, only 409 villages had declared Village Land Forest Reserves (CBFM) and only 171 signed joint management agreements (JFM). Comparing these figures with those from 2006 shows an increase of only 80 CBFM villages and 22 JFM villages (URT, 2006). Thus, behind the impressive figures there are indications that implementation is slow and that the remarkable coverage has been achieved by casting a wide net over ‘‘work in progress”. 14 In our interviews during 2014–15 with forest officers based in Babati, Iringa, Uvinza, Rufiji, and Tandahimba districts as well as discussions with several Tanzanian researchers and NGO staff, we heard impressions from all sides on the limited reality of PFM alongside major resource deficiencies. Our finding of a halting PFM process veiled by impressive statistics is supported by a 2010 consultancy evaluation of PFM efforts. The report describes severe resource constraints to support and expand PFM in two districts and notes about the national-level statistics regarding PFM implementation progress that, ‘‘this means, in effect, that the FBD knows very little about the real state of affairs within PFM” and that there are tendencies of ‘‘‘‘over-using” and ‘‘over-reporting” the term PFM and its effects, and it is not clear how big a share of the many reported hectares under PFM represent real decentralized forest management principles with representative and active decision-making committees in place.” (Orbicon & ITAD, 2010, p. 22). In the few areas where PFM does exist as an active management practice involving village communities, research has pointed to numerous challenges. While PFM seems to work for forest conservation in some areas (Blomley & Iddi, 2009; Lund et al., 2015; Mbwambo, Eid, Malimbwi, Zahabu, Kajembe, & Luoga, 2012; Persha & Blomley, 2009), in others powerful outsiders appear to override local communities’ attempts at conservation (Treue et al., 2014). Findings also suggest that CBFM forests may increase forest exploitation outside of reserves (Robinson & Lokina, 2011; Vyamana, 2009). While expected, as villages implementing PFM cannot 5 possibly contain displacement of pressure outside their areas of jurisdiction, this ‘‘leakage” under PFM comprises a challenge to the ambitions of REDD+ (Balooni & Lund, 2014; Robinson, Albers, Meshack, & Lokina, 2013). PFM has also been plagued with governance challenges and cases of corruption, mismanagement and violence (Brockington, 2007, 2008; Lund & Treue, 2008; Nelson & Blomley, 2010; Persha & Blomley, 2009; Shahbaz, Mbeyale, & Haller, 2008) and actively resisted by subnational governments seeking to maintain forest oversight (Blomley & Iddi, 2009; Mustalahti & Lund, 2009; Nelson & Blomley, 2010). In addition, the costs associated with implementation of PFM at the local level are rarely, and more so in JFM arrangements, countered by comparable benefits (Blomley & Iddi, 2009; Nelson & Blomley, 2010; Persha & Blomley, 2009). The image of a stalling PFM implementation process and cracks in the representation of the concept itself is more recently mirrored in the funding landscape. Negotiations for a National Forest Program II in 2008 ended in a very reduced budget of six million Euros financed by Finnida alone, whereas Danida, Sida, the World Bank, and UNDP/GEF withdrew their support. 15 Finnida is now also gradually turning away from PFM in favor of development of private forestry under a 16-year project with a 20 million Euros budget whose phase I is currently underway in Njombe and Mufindi districts (URT, 2013). Overall, the excitement and momentum around PFM in the 1990s and early 2000s have clearly subsided. A new donor (BTC) has entered with seven million Euros to set up CBFM in six villages in Kilombero, Ulanga, and Rufiji districts (BTC, 2015). 16 Yet, this appears to be a return to the costly days of small-scale piloting. 4. REDD+ IN TANZANIA (a) REDD+ promises and funding While forestry departments and conservation organizations struggled to implement PFM, the Tanzanian government began to engage in the international REDD+ debate. Because of the country’s large forest estate and high deforestation rates (estimated at 1.1% annually) hopes for REDD+ were high (URT, 2013). The Tanzanian government, major conservation NGOs and research institutions promoted REDD+ as a new emerging opportunity to achieve nationwide sustainable forest management and to redress the failures of PFM, specifically regarding its promise of improving local livelihoods (Akida, Mnangwone, & Lyimo, 2012; Angelsen & Hofstad, 2008; URT, 2013; Zahabu, 2008). REDD+ was seen as a tool to consolidate previous PFM efforts. Unable to deny the challenges facing PFM as legislated and implemented, yet refusing to give up on its potentials, bureaucrats, conservation NGOs and some academics utilized the contradiction to justify a new solution, framing REDD+ as ‘‘an incentive to make people practice PFM better”. 17 Foresters came to regard PFM as a precursor and a vehicle for the implementation of REDD+ 18 (Newton et al., 2015). Angelsen and Hofstad (2008, p. 3) state in the early phase of REDD+ in Tanzania: ‘‘While even the broad elements are yet to be agreed on, REDD represents an unprecedented opportunity for countries like Tanzania to receive substantial financial rewards for actions taken to reduce DD (deforestation and forest degradation). The magnitude is highly uncertain, but simple ‘‘back of the envelope” calculations suggest that even under conservative estimates they can be hundreds of millions USD dollars per year”. Their optimistic outlook referred to calculations conducted Please cite this article in press as: Lund, J. F. et al. Promising Change, Delivering Continuity: REDD+ as Conservation Fad, World Development (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.005 6 Donor Pledged Disbursed The Royal Norwegian Government 80,200,000 62,065,401 First recipient Second recipientb Norwegian Embassy in Tanzania—80,200,000 The Government of Finland 4,200,000 4,200,000 FAO—4,200,000 University of Dar es Salaam—7,260,000 Sokoine University of Agriculture—21,000,000 Olmotonyi Forestry Training Institute—5,629,804 Government of Zanzibar—700,000 Jane Goodall Institute—2,759,641 African Wildlife Foundation—2,061,794 CARE International—5,539,175 World Wildlife Fund—3,425,587 Wildlife Conservation Society—1,328,911 Tanzania Forest Conservation Group—5,914,353 Mpingo Conservation & Development Initiative—1,948,123 Tanzania Traditional Energy Development and Environment Organization—2,400,000  Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania—4,300,000 Tanzania Forest Service (TFS)—4,200,000 UN-REDD Programe 4,200,000 4,200,000 UNDP—4,200,000 TFS—1,900,000             Funded activity  REDD+ pilot projects  Research programs  Policy development National Forest Resources Monitoring and Assessment, NAFORMA  Training and capacity building  Study visits and awareness raising Rockefeller Foundation 700,000 700,000 Clinton Foundation’s Climate Initiative— 700,000 MNRT—700,000  Capacity building  Technical meetings and workshops a Sources: Interview data and adapted from Kaijage and Kafumu (2016), final REDD+ review reports and REDD+ contracts found at http://www.norway.go.tz/News_and_events/agreements_ and_contracts/#.VhfNkOfdg75. b The disbursed column indicates amount actually received by first recipients. In some cases, the first recipients spent a share of the disbursed amount and thus less than the entire disbursed amount reached the second recipients. WORLD DEVELOPMENT Please cite this article in press as: Lund, J. F. et al. Promising Change, Delivering Continuity: REDD+ as Conservation Fad, World Development (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.005 Table 2. An overview of REDD+ financing 2009–14 (in USD)a NGO, Project title Project goals Achievements Notable project facts Unresolved issues African Wildlife Foundation, Advancing REDD in the Kolo Hills Forests (ARKFOR) Contribute to poverty reduction and climate change mitigation by enhancing Tanzania’s capacity to use REDD as a mechanism for rural communities to reap tangible benefits from improved forest management  11,006 ha of forest under JFM  Four CBFM forests established covering 1,826 ha  19 village land use plans developed  26,153 tCO2e per annum reduced emissions (not verified)  Plan Vivo Project Document validated (not verified)  Benefit sharing and sustainable alternative livelihoods  Monitoring of activities and progress  Clear forest tenure Wildlife Conservation Society, REDD+ readiness in southwest Tanzania Develop the capacity and knowledge for Tanzania to participate in REDD activities in the Southern Highlands while establishing sustainable alternative to forest resource use  250 ha woodlots established  Land cover change maps for 1984–2011  50,000 people reached with environmental education World Wildlife Foundation, Enhancing Tanzanian capacity to deliver short- and long-term data on forest carbon stocks across the country Contribute to the establishment of a national Tanzania carbon trading system to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and degradation of Tanzanian forests  128 one-hectare permanent carbon monitoring plots established and assessed  520 soil samples collected and analyzed  Land use/cover change map under two scenarios for 2025, and mean carbon stock for each class reported  Fire, forest degradation and leakage monitoring system  Sustainable alternative livelihoods  Sustained support to local forest institutions  Data harmonization with NAFORMA data collection and analysis protocols CARE International, Piloting REDD+ in Zanzibar through Community Forest Management Reduce greenhouse gas emission from deforestation and degradation in Zanzibar. Generate carbon income to provide equitable incentives to communities for forest conservation  82,754 ha of forested land in 45 established community forest management areas  VCS CCB Project Document under validation and verification  581,252 tCO2e per annum reduced emissions (not verified)  Focus on environmental and cultural co-benefits—such as water catchment Kolo rock paintings—more than large carbon emission reductions  Carbon sales insufficient to sustain conservation efforts in Kolo Hills; new income streams must be developed  Had no intention of testing REDD+ policy and delivering REDD+ results; and its activities were contrary to international standards and definitions of REDD+ readiness activities  Did not harmonize data collection and analysis protocols to NAFORMA as planned; making the data less useful in building a strong national MRV system  The project was suspended for over two years due to mismanagement of funds  Landscape approach for addressing drivers of deforestation outside the forestry sector could have brought more achievement Tanzania Forest Conservation Group, Making REDD+ and the carbon market work for communities and forest conservation in Tanzania Reduce greenhouse gas emission from deforestation and forest degradation in Tanzania in ways that provide direct and equitable incentives to rural communities to conserve and manage forests sustainably  27 CBFM forests established covering 151,867 ha, incl. village land use plans  VCS CCBA Project document for Lindi site, validated and verified  39,896 tCO2e per annum reduced emissions, verified in Lindi (2012–13)  Verified carbon units for sale available Mpingo Conservation & Development Initiative, Combining REDD, PFM and FSC certification in south-eastern Tanzania Make institutions and selected local communities in southeastern Tanzania REDD ready by January 1st 2014  10 CBFM forests established covering 96,112 ha  27,600 tCO2e per annum reduced emissions (not verified)  VCS early burning methodology developed and approved  Use of result-based carbon payments to expand PFM  Sufficient benefits flow to people  Village boundary and tenure conflicts Jane Goodall Institute, Building REDD readiness in the MasitoUgalla Ecosystem Pilot Area Enable communities and high biodiversity value forests in western Tanzania to benefit from REDD based global approaches to climate change mitigation  Community management of 90,489 ha of Miombo woodland  55,000 tCO2e per annum reduced emissions (not verified)  Management entity for 7 villages established  Volatility of carbon prices and markets greatly shape sustainability of measures that reduce deforestation  The only project to have verified its annual reduced emissions— through VCS and CCBA standards—which are ready for sale  Used 200,000 USD to expand PFM and forest certification schemes  Certified timber sales are seen as potentially providing more tangible benefits to local people than carbon sales  Project Design Document was produced regardless of uncertainties over land tenure and carbon rights  Carbon data stored in the Google cloud  Equitable and cost effective measures to reduce deforestation and degradation, and control leakage  Community-level technical capacities  Sustainable alternative livelihoods  Performance of village and district forest institutions  Proofs of additionality  Sustainable financing of alternative livelihoods  Clearly defined village boundaries  Clear land tenure arrangement  Carbon ownership rights  Performance of local forest institutions  Sustainable alternative livelihoods PROMISING CHANGE, DELIVERING CONTINUITY: REDD+ AS CONSERVATION FAD a Sources: Adapted from Mäkelä et al. (2015), Caplow, Putri, and Kweka (2014), Dokken, Putri, and Kweka (2014), Dokken, Caplow, Angelsen, and Sunderlin (2014), Kweka (2014a, 2014b), REDD+ contracts and REDD+ pilot projects’ final review reports. 7 Please cite this article in press as: Lund, J. F. et al. Promising Change, Delivering Continuity: REDD+ as Conservation Fad, World Development (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.005 Table 3. An overview of REDD+ pilot projects 2009–14a 8 WORLD DEVELOPMENT by Zahabu, Skutsch, Sosovele, and Malimbwi (2007) who suggested that Tanzania could potentially earn 630 million USD annually, or 119 USD per rural household, if all deforestation and degradation were halted. Largely supported by the Government of Norway (through the Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative— ICFI), the Tanzanian state initiated the REDD+ readiness process in 2008, commencing with the development of an institutional and policy framework (Norad, 2014). While some REDD+ funding indirectly went into previous PFM activities 19 donors’ growing interest in REDD+ saw most of the PFM implementing agencies (mainly NGOs and district councils) incorporating new REDD+ elements in their programing. For instance, WWF, TFCG, and MCDI all adapted their strategies to demonstrate the piloting of REDD+. In rearranging their activities accordingly, they succeeded in receiving extensive support from international donors, which accounted for about 92.6% of all REDD+ funding received in the country (Kaijage & Kafumu, 2016). Table 2 provides an overview of Tanzanian REDD+ finance distributed to beneficiary institutions. Some of the REDD+ finances shown in Table 2 were used to establish new institutions such as the interim REDD+ task force, consisting of technical advisers from key ministries and NGOs. Five working groups—based on thematic areas— assisted the task force (URT, 2013). Resources were also spent on developing the national REDD+ strategy over three phases: a preliminary analytical phase, stakeholder consultation and piloting phase, and strategy development and consolidation phase (URT, 2013). These activities were facilitated by an interim National REDD+ Secretariat consisting of the Institute of Resource Assessment at the University of Dar es Salaam and the Division of Environment under the Vice President’s Office (VPO, 2013a, 2013b). 20 Meanwhile, local and international research and academic institutions—mostly from Tanzania and Norway—received about 25% of the committed REDD+ funds to implement three research projects (Kaijage & Kafumu, 2016). 21 Finally, to establish a ‘‘national REDD+ regime” and draw lessons from the pilot and research projects with regard to MRV 22, Norad supported the establishment of a REDD+ Unit at the Division of Environment and a National Carbon Monitoring Centre at Sokoine University of Agriculture. 23 Piloting received a considerable share of REDD+ resources. As with PFM, piloting was promoted as a means to generate new REDD+ policies (Burgess, Bahane, Clairs, Danielsen, Dalsgaard, & Funder, 2010; URT, 2013). Nine local and international conservation NGOs 24 received about 40% of the committed REDD+ funding as secondary recipients (Kaijage & Kafumu, 2016), to implement pilot projects across different agro-ecological zones of Tanzania (see Table 3). Conservation NGOs sought to build local REDD+ readiness, including establishing local institutional arrangements for carbon stock monitoring, accounting, marketing, and financing and test policies for broad stakeholder involvement, benefit sharing, participatory monitoring, and mechanisms to address drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (Mäkelä et al., 2015). (b) REDD+ pilots and predicaments Based on project targets documented in contracts and reports, 25 the performance of REDD+ in Tanzania was mixed. Table 3 provides an overview of pilot projects achievements, unresolved issues, and overall performance over the five-year period. Similar to previous PFM projects, the piloting of REDD+ consumed considerable donor funding to cover consultancy and administrative expenses. The African Wildlife Foundation project spent about 763,557 USD for personnel, staffing, and administration issues (NIRAS, 2015a). CARE’s project spent nearly 1.9 million USD on staffing and benefits, procurement of materials and equipment, and traveling (NIRAS, 2015b). 26 TFCG spent over 2.5 million USD on personnel, vehicles, equipment, and administration (NIRAS, 2015c). Indufor (2014) observes similar spending in JGI’s project, with over half of the project budget (1.5 million USD) spent on staffing and administration costs. Whether such costs are needed or justified is, of course, subject to debate. Yet, the costs associated with policy implementation obviously follow from the way that policy is framed—in more or less technical and input-demanding ways (see Lund, 2015)—and it seems unlikely that such resource intensive implementation would ever be possible at a national-level scale. The pilot projects succeeded in multiple objectives including the establishment of several thousands of hectares of CBFM forests alongside new forest governance institutions, detailed land use maps and forest carbon monitoring technologies. 27 Yet, even in this context of well-funded small-scale pilots, meeting the overall project objectives proved challenging. 28 No pilot managed to sell carbon (though some used donor funding to test payment modalities). High opportunity costs of reduced deforestation and forest degradation also became evident. The current voluntary market carbon price of around five USD per ton appears insufficient to compensate forgone opportunities such as agriculture and charcoal production. Fisher et al. (2011) estimate the opportunity costs—rents from the most important proximate causes—at USD 6.50, and implementation costs—for addressing leakages—at USD 12. Hofstad and Araya (2015) give an opportunity cost of USD 10–20 per ton of carbon in eastern Tanzania; and Nuru, Abdallah, and Ngaga (2014) set the cost at USD 23 in the southern highlands. Increasing prices for crops such as sesame and maize at national and international levels escalate demand for more agricultural land in southeastern Tanzania. 29 With current REDD+ funding uncertainties and low carbon prices, it remains more profitable for rural people to cut down trees for farmland expansion than to leave them standing for carbon sequestration. 30 The REDD+ projects struggled to generate alternative longterm livelihood opportunities. The African Wildlife Foundation project has been criticized for failing to achieve alternative viable livelihood options despite apparently having piggybacked REDD+ funding onto support to alternative livelihood activities (conservation/sustainable agriculture) funded by other sources (NIRAS, 2015a; Svarstad & Benjaminsen, in press). CARE’s 120,000 USD spent on alternative income-generating activities such as beekeeping, butterfly farming, crab fattening, conservation agriculture, and vegetable farming, only benefited 400 out of 23,874 households in their project area (NIRAS, 2015b). Wildlife Conservation Society intended to develop woodlots as an alternative income-generating activity but only managed to plant 250 out of the planned 1,200 ha, and survival rates of the planted trees were not documented (NIRAS, 2015d). The broad tendency to view the forestry sector in isolation from other sectors resulted in little success in addressing the main drivers of deforestation—farmland expansion and demand for charcoal and firewood (Mäkelä et al., 2015, p. 10; Sunderlin & Atmadja, 2009, p. 47). Moreover, those projects that focused on traditional drivers of deforestation neglected the broader political economy of forestry and public policies. Please cite this article in press as: Lund, J. F. et al. Promising Change, Delivering Continuity: REDD+ as Conservation Fad, World Development (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.005 PROMISING CHANGE, DELIVERING CONTINUITY: REDD+ AS CONSERVATION FAD Thus, one might say that whether evaluated as REDD+, PFM or integrated conservation and development projects, the REDD+ pilots all struggled with delivering on the win–win promise of livelihoods improvements and forest conservation in spite of the intensive investments made. Tenure conflicts and uncertainty, lack of local governance capacity, and non-enforcement were key challenges across projects (Indufor, 2014; Kweka, 2014a; NIRAS, 2015a, 2015c, 2015f). The pilot projects also struggled to demonstrate additionality in distinguishing impacts of REDD+ projects versus prior PFM activities. 31 32 Finally, despite being implemented by NGOs with experience in the areas and with generous budgets for oversight and implementation, some projects appear to have involved problematic practices of coercive displacements of people (Carr, 2015), thereby confirming some of the fears expressed by skeptics of REDD+. Today, the honeymoon days with REDD+ in Tanzania have been replaced by a sense of disappointment and scepticism. Participants to a workshop 33 in August 2015 to launch the final REDD+ evaluation reports pointed to more resources as fundamental to scaling up lessons learned so far. 34 Yet since 2010, no financial commitments for REDD + have been made. Until 2020, REDD+ funding is secured from Norway’s ICFI, but beyond that a new commitment from the Norwegian parliament will be required 35. An ICFI evaluation report identified the lack of national government ownership in terms of decision making and co-financing during the REDD+ readiness process as a major impeding factor (Norad, 2011, 2014). In a comparative analysis of 12 REDD+ countries, Korhonen-Kurki, Sehring, Brockhaus, and di Gregorio (2014) give a zero score to Tanzania on this issue. Perhaps worse, the Tanzanian government has been seen to perform poorly in coordinating vital REDD+ related activities such as approving village land use plans and enforcing laws against logging and charcoal production (Ravikumar et al., 2015). However, the global difficulties regarding REDD+ financial mechanisms are surely also a part of this story (see Agrawal et al., 2011; Sills et al., 2014; Streck, 2012). Given the financial uncertainties, the future of REDD+ in Tanzania appears bleak 36. This means that ‘‘funding for follow-up activities beyond piloting and readiness is not secure, a fact which could significantly impact the ability to motivate communities already engaged in REDD+ activities throughout the country” (Kaijage & Kuhanwa 2013, p. 13). This matters not least in light of the raised expectations and consequential action undertaken by so many people in the REDD+ pilot sites (Benjaminsen, 2014; Mustalahti & Rakotonarivo, 2014). The rigorous and costly technical undertakings in REDD+ processes such as MRV also threaten the future of REDD+ in Tanzania. ‘‘It took people by surprise to learn and experience how technical and complex REDD+ is” 37 a policy advisor who had been intimately involved in the Tanzanian REDD+ process stated in an interview. Yet, this view of the process fails to acknowledge that a technical and complex version of REDD+ did not fall from the sky. Rather, REDD+ has been made technical and complex through the approach taken by government officials, consultants, forestry, and development experts to operationalize the idea of REDD+(Leach & Scoones, 2013). In doing this, REDD+ has been turned into a policy model that may be, in effect, unimplementable (Mosse, 2004), while lending itself to the kinds of processes and activities that the actors in the development and conservation industry are able to support. In an early piece about REDD+ in Tanzania, Burgess et al. (2010) argued for the need for capacity building in dealing with technical inadequacies. 9 Yet, a few years later—and with 100 million USD spent on, among other, capacity building—the problem of capacity persists along with many other challenges for REDD+ in Tanzania to become a reality outside of a few selected project sites and NGO and government offices. 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION In Tanzania, REDD+ was promoted by international donors, government departments and local and international conservation NGOs as a strategy to tackle previous failures with the implementation of PFM in the country (Burgess et al., 2010; URT, 2013). A remarkable amount of funds and technical, legal, and human resources were mustered to support the development and implementation of the REDD + policy model. Yet, despite the hopes and investments REDD+ has faced the same challenges as PFM. These include considerable financial, technical, and human resource requirements, 38 high dependence on donors, inability to address drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, conflicts over tenure and ownership rights, weak local governance, and rule enforcement. In addition to well-known problems under PFM, the REDD+ mechanism introduced additional challenges related to new infrastructure and modalities for forest carbon MRV, the marketing and sale of forest carbon, and the distribution of carbon payments (Kweka, Carmenta, Hyle, Mustalahti, Dokken, & Brockhaus, 2015). We recognize that REDD+ is still largely in the ‘‘readiness” phase and that we therefore, of course, cannot rule out the possibility that REDD+ will overcome some of these challenges, old and new. Yet, we see no reason to believe that it will become the first true ‘‘silver bullet” in the history of conservation (Fletcher et al., 2016; Redford et al., 2013). Rather, the growing evidence of REDD+ readiness activities indicates that, where events are taking off on the ground, REDD+ results in adverse livelihoods impacts at the local level through exclusion, resettlement, and economic displacement (Carr, 2015; Fairhead et al., 2012; Sills et al., 2014; Svarstad & Benjaminsen, in press). Prior to the implementation phase, REDD+ advocates and analysts in Tanzania were aware of some of the challenges that would emerge (Burgess et al., 2010). Nonetheless, REDD+ was pitched as a new promising policy model that justified the release of millions of USD toward building technical, legal, and institutional capacity at the multiple levels. The national REDD+ strategy stated: ‘‘Given that REDD+ is a new policy initiative requiring application of new and complex technologies in various areas, capacity building in terms of training and infrastructure development is needed at all levels” (URT, 2013, p. xiv). REDD+ proponents legitimated these enormous investments by suggesting that a new robust REDD+ institutional framework would solve previous governance challenges and enable successful implementation of PFM activities (Burgess et al., 2010). Informed by critical scholarship in conservation and development (Büscher, 2013; Büscher, 2014; Fletcher et al., 2016; Li, 2007; Mosse, 2004) we argue that the optimistic representation of REDD+ as a means to resolve previous conservation challenges was no coincidence. Instead, it followed the logic of the development and conservation industry more generally, which continuously produces and feeds off the development and testing of new policy models, or conservation fads (Redford et al., 2013). In the case of REDD+ and other market-based conservation approaches, this logic may be further fueled by the promise of market demand creating an Please cite this article in press as: Lund, J. F. et al. Promising Change, Delivering Continuity: REDD+ as Conservation Fad, World Development (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.005 10 WORLD DEVELOPMENT ‘‘economy of expectations” (Fletcher et al., 2016). While there is little doubt that the rural communities that have been enrolled in this ‘‘economy of expectations” through readiness activities and pilot projects have had their hopes thoroughly crushed, the official evaluations of REDD+ in Tanzania by actors within the development and conservation industry follow the logic of the development marketplace. The recent project evaluations conducted by NIRAS and Indufor, for instance, illustrate the tendency of embracing successes, sidelining unresolved challenges, and re-negotiating the cracks between expectations and realities. Despite recognizing the many challenges and unresolved issues of the REDD+ pilot projects, NIRAS and Indufor have portrayed the projects’ performances as satisfactory. Even during the launch of the final evaluation reports, project proponents and government representatives were quite positive about the performance of the projects, claiming to be ‘‘REDD+ ready”. We argue that the most likely explanation for this assessment is the need for REDD+ proponents to frame, validate, and circulate their interventions as ‘‘success”, in order to maintain a coalition of REDD+ proponents and moreover, the continued flow of financial resources (Büscher, 2014; Mosse, 2004). In recognizing certain shortcomings of the mechanism yet never questioning outright its legitimacy, REDD+ proponents succeed not only in maintaining their promise of change but also the value of new avenues for policy development and interventions. New interventions are being proposed, aimed at addressing identified shortcomings, which releases new resources to be captured. Our study has demonstrated that the large investments by donors in REDD+ in Tanzania have benefitted mainly government departments, academia, consultants, and conservation NGOs. REDD+ processes were supported by some 100 million USD to finance REDD+ readiness activities and a set of pilot projects. Yet, despite the massive financial support, taken overall the projects appear to have been unable to resolve the key challenges of deforestation and forest degradation that also hampered the achievement of ambitions under the previous PFM model. Many have, in fact, used REDD+ financing to further develop, support, and expand existing conservation and forest management practices in areas where they already were active in promoting similar approaches. In doing this, some of the pilot projects appear to have confirmed the fears of REDD+ as a new harbinger of conservationrelated exclusion, displacement, and resettlement for forestdependent communities (Carr, 2015; Svarstad & Benjaminsen, in press). 39 Serious questions around the financial sustainability of the REDD+ mechanism, its methodological requirements, and how it is affected by a weak governance context and unfavorable political-economic context of land use remain valid and mostly unanswered. Despite a growing sense of skepticism and many uncertainties over the future of REDD+ in the country, REDD+ proponents continue to sell the framework as a ‘‘success” and in need of further development. This echoes the rise and fall of the previous forestry policy model in Tanzania. PFM was supported by at least 60 million USD (which converted to 2012 compares with the REDD+ financing), experienced a phase of celebrated pilots and legislative development and a short-lived attempt at nation-wide implementation where the challenges of going beyond the pilot phase became apparent. Our study has shown the continuities between the two policy epochs of PFM and REDD+ in Tanzania in terms of initial promises and expectations that led to substantial donor financing of particular activities, i.e., pilot project activities, and policy development and implementation processes. While these particular activities have achieved little in terms of changing actual forest management and use on the ground at a larger scale, 40 they have allowed development and environment professionals, including academics, to tap into significant amounts of finances. Our paper thus contributes to the critical literature on REDD+ that has hitherto overwhelmingly conceptualized it as a new form of ‘‘green grabbing” (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Fairhead et al., 2012). We argue that REDD+ processes must be conceptualized both within a political economy of forestry and land (as per the ‘‘green grabbing” logic) and within a broader political economy of conservation and development in which change is a discursive commodity that is carefully promoted in particular ways that allow actors within the development and conservation industry access to financial resources (cf., Büscher, 2013, 2014). Re-conceptualizing REDD+ as representing a discursive commodity also contributes to resolve some of the observed paradoxes of the global REDD+ process. In analyzing public REDD+ discourse in seven countries, Di Gregorio, Brockhaus, Cronin, Muharrom, Mardiah, and Santoso (2015) observe a lack of attention to addressing drivers of deforestation in policies, and the absence of actors from other sectors than forestry that are nonetheless important to REDD +, such as agriculture, infrastructure development, and mining. This immediate paradox becomes logical when considering that REDD+ policy development is also driven by logic of accessing development finance. We thus support the re-conceptualization of REDD+ as a conservation fad (Redford et al., 2013). Yet, we are also critical of the connotations of innocence and naivety inherent in the notion of ‘‘fad” as ‘‘an intense and widely shared enthusiasm for something, especially one that is short-lived” (Redford et al. 2013, p. 437). We believe that this perspective is insufficient as an explanation for the specific patterns and trajectories of the emergence and fading of conservation fads over the past decades. It, for instance, cannot explain the tendencies of ‘‘selling success” (Büscher, 2014) in conservation that we also observed in our case, for instance in the over-reporting of implementation progress of PFM in national-level statistics. Thus, we welcome Fletcher et al.’s (2016) recent contribution to the debate about REDD+, which points to the trend toward market-based conservation policies and asks of conservation professionals and academics to re-think the way conservation is pursued. We add to this that such a rethinking should also include critical scrutiny of the patterns of practices and processes engendered when new conservation approaches are embraced. This might avoid the further promotion of an industry which has displayed a habit of embracing discursive change, while delivering a continuity in practices that appears to defeat its self-declared purposes of changing the conservation and management of the environment at a larger scale. In Tanzania, REDD+ could, arguably, have been designed as merely a national-level financial mechanism to ensure implementation of PFM at a higher speed linked with national-level forest carbon monitoring mechanism to assess development in carbon sequestration. This could have been done without many of the activities we have described above, saving millions of USD dollars that could have been spent elsewhere. Yet, by discursively setting REDD+ apart from the existing PFM policy model, the development and environmental professionals in embassies, NGOs, research, and consultancy institutions and ministries—intentionally or not— reproduced a continuity—i.e., the need for the development and testing of policies, implementation guidelines, payment vehicles, safeguard mechanisms, and so forth. In return this Please cite this article in press as: Lund, J. F. et al. Promising Change, Delivering Continuity: REDD+ as Conservation Fad, World Development (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.005 PROMISING CHANGE, DELIVERING CONTINUITY: REDD+ AS CONSERVATION FAD paper aimed to reinsert the new REDD+ policy framework into a longitudinal analysis of the political economy of forestry interventions and policy development in Tanzania with 11 the intention to push us to learn from history in a moment in time when we cannot afford to waste financial resources on hot air. NOTES 1. A Google Scholar search done July 9, 2015 on ‘‘reducing deforestation and forest degradation” yielded 73,200 hits, whereas older forest conservation programs such as ‘‘forest stewardship certification” and ‘‘FLEGT” yielded a mere 32,000 and 3,500 hits respectively. and donor had left (Massawe, 2001). LAMP initially targeted DuruHaitemba forest reserves in Babati District and SULEDO forest reserves in Kiteto District and later on Mgori forest reserves in Singida District (Havnevik, Rwebangira, & Tivell, 2000). 2. The 23 projects were selected on the basis of their intention to ‘‘monitor, report, and/or transact reductions in carbon emissions or increases in carbon stock (in a quantified manner)” (Sills et al., 2014, p. 10), i.e., they were not readiness projects but attempts at creating carbon credits for sale. 9. Early efforts were directed toward involving communities in the management of forest reserves in the Eastern Arc Mountain in Tanga region (Gologolo and Kipumbwi forest reserves) and Iringa region (Udzungwa forest reserve) with funding from SIDA, Sweden (Kigula, Pers. Commun.). The Norwegian government through Management of Natural Resources Program (MNRP) supported piloting of JFM in Morogoro, Tanga, Arusha, and Kilimanjaro. The Finnish government supported piloting of community forestry in the management of Amani Nature Reserve through the East Usambara Conservation Area Management Project (EUCAMP) for a total budget of around 3.5 million USD. DANIDA funded initiatives, namely MEMA (3.8 million USD) and UTUMI (2.5 million USD) extended the piloting of JFM in Iringa and Lindi region respectively. 3. Given the global coverage of REDD+ and the importance of context, we do not want to argue for a universal hierarchy between REDD+ as green grabbing in the conventional sense and as a discursive commodity. We believe both processes can be occurring and whether REDD+ is more of the former or the latter depends on the specific time and place. 4 . The two meetings observed were a workshop to phase out and discuss REDD+ pilot evaluation report and a workshop to discuss Tanzania’s Forest Reference Emission Level (FREL) and launch the National Carbon Monitoring Centre (NCMC). 5. This view challenges the conventional ‘‘policy cycle” model in which rational actors, called ‘‘policy makers”, create policy through a process of calculation and authorization. In contrast to this linear, instrumental conceptualization of policymaking, anthropological policy studies emphasize the complex and contradictory social practices and processes behind the formulation of policies and the larger social system in which they are embedded. 6. Through studying these questions in the field of development practice, anthropologists have gained critical insights into the wider political economy of development policies and how they consolidate or create new regimes of governance, power, and knowledge (Green, 2007; Li, 2007; Mosse, 2004). In this context Mosse (2004) has famously argued that development policies are less meant to be implemented than to generate political support and resources that can be tapped into by development professionals. In his view policy is ‘‘an end rather than a cause” meaning that the ‘‘gap between policy and practice is constantly negotiated away” in order to sustain policy models and with them the resources they attract. Accordingly, ‘‘development projects are ‘successful’ not because they turn design into reality, but because they sustain policy models offering a significant interpretation of events”. 10. The sum of the figures in Table 1 is 59 million USD but this includes a mix of pledged and disbursed amounts and for some project we were unable to find any figures. 11. Tanzania’s National Forest Policy of 1998 promises to devolve decision-making powers over forest to communities (villagers as forest managers and not as passive beneficiaries) (URT, 1998). The underlying assumption is that with economic incentives derived from sustainable utilization of forests, communities will be enabled to pursue sustainable forest management. In order to provide financial benefits needed to make sustainable forest management a lucrative land-based activity for villagers implementing CBFM, the government promises to do a number of things such as to waive state royalties on forest produce, allow villagers to retain 100% of revenue from sale of forest products, empower villages to levy and retain fines, and empower villages to confiscate forest produce and equipment from illegal harvesting. The policy promises to share with participating communities the benefits arising from joint forest management of government forests. In brief, the new PFM policy suggested three promises: improving rural livelihoods, conserving and regenerating forest resources and promoting good governance (Blomley & Iddi, 2009). 12. Including the Tanzania Forest Management and Conservation Project (World Bank/IDA and UNDP/GEF, 3.1 million USD, PFM component), DANIDA PFM-Component (DKK 57.5 million = 7.5 million USD), and the Government of Finland (no less than 2.7 million USD) (URT, 2008). 7. The HASHI (Hifadhi Ardhi Shinyanga—meaning land conservation in Shinyanga) project was a collaborative effort involving MNRT/FBD, Shinyanga regional, districts authorities, and expert advisers from Sokoine University of Agriculture, IUCN, and ICRAF. HASHI aimed at building upon the tradition of Ngitiri, a system of setting aside pasture for drought periods to set aside land to allow for recovery of woodlands. Ngitiri managed by communities using customary rules thus metamorphosed to become village forest reserves (Wily & Mbaya, 2001). 13. Funding data was obtained mainly from project documents, evaluation reports, and www.openaiddata.org. We used actual disbursements where available; otherwise we relied on budgeted amounts. All currencies were converted United States Dollars using historical exchange rates from www.oanda.com. All were expressed in year 2001 US Dollars. 8. As well as involving Tanzania government officials, designing and implementation of LAMP were facilitated by Orgut Consulting AB. Two field-based expatriate advisors from the Swedish-based consulting firm provided technical advice to the program from the start. The heavy dependency on donor support for technical advice and funding was always a concern as it was not clear what would happen after technical advisors 14. The ‘‘Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania Facts and Figures—December 2012” report specifically states to include in its overall figures of PFM coverage ‘‘villages with signed agreements and plans and those who are working towards this.” (URT, 2012, p. 2). People we have spoken to who have been closely involved in the Tanzanian PFM process expressed doubts about the 2012 figures. Please cite this article in press as: Lund, J. F. et al. Promising Change, Delivering Continuity: REDD+ as Conservation Fad, World Development (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.005 12 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 15. Denmark continued to support PFM activities up to 2014 but not under the National Forest Program II umbrella. Phase II of the National Forest Program (2009—11) supported by Finland was meant to complete PFM activities in 16 districts (old districts) included in phase I and start working in additional 11 districts (new districts) making a total of 27 districts for a budget of Euro 6 million. By 2013, only 50% of the money had been disbursed indicating dismal performance. A consultant was engaged in 2011 to determine the way forward. As a result, the Finnish government and MNRT negotiated another extension for a period of 2013–15 using the remainder of funds (Euro three million). It was noted that progress in 11 new districts was slow and the decision was made to include only four new districts with ‘‘the most potential in forestry” for support under National Forest and Beekeeping Program 2013–15 extension, christened the ‘‘second generation CBFM”. Adding 12 best performing old districts, this phase (2013—15) supported PFM activities in 16 districts. A Natural Resource Specialist at the Finnish Embassy in Dar es Salaam says the emphasis in the ‘‘second generation CBFM” is on realizing the revenue potential of forest resources for livelihood improvements at the local level rather than setting up new village forest reserves, which was the focus of the ‘‘first generation CBFM” (Interview No. 2, August 2015, Dar es Salaam). It involves supporting activities intended to commercialize timber, honey, and other forest products. Of the pledged Euro six million under the current support, all has been disbursed up to 2015. The Finnish support to PFM through NFP II is ending in 2015 and planning for new projects has been commissioned. 16. Interview No. 2, August 2015, Dar es Salaam. 17. Interview No. 21, August 18, 2015 in Morogoro. 18. Interview No. 1, August 2015, Dar es Salaam. 19. Interview No. 1, August 2015, Dar es Salaam. 20. Interview No. 18, August 14, 2015 in Dar es Salaam. 21. Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) coordinated the projects in Tanzania, while the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU) was the coordinator in Norway. The first one was the ‘‘Climate Change Impact, Adaptation and Mitigation Research Programme” (CCIAM). The 93.88 million NOK (approximately 16.7 million USD) program aimed to achieve better management of natural resources and the environment through appropriate adaptation and mitigation strategies and participation in climate change initiatives. The second project entitled, ‘‘Enhancing the measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) of forests in Tanzania through the application of advanced remote sensing techniques”, had the purpose of designing and developing ‘‘efficient methodologies for MRV that utilize a combination of ground data and remote sensing techniques. . .”. Norad provided 27.5 million NOK (approximately four million USD) to the SUA to implement the project. The last project is the Forest Training Institute’s (FTI) ‘‘Empowering communities through training on Participatory Forest Management, REDD+ and climate change initiatives”. As per the agreement signed by the government of Tanzania and Norad, FTI will receive funding not exceeding 40 million NOK (5,629,804 USD) for the planned project period between July 1st 2012 and June 30th 2017, to build the capacity of community groups in Tanzania in managing their forest resources more sustainably and profitably. 22. Interview No. 19, August 17, 2015 in Dar es Salaam. 23. On 2nd September 2015, a grant agreement to commit worth 37 million NOK (4,515,586 USD) was signed between Norad and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to support NCMC’s functioning over a 3-year period (2015–18). The NCMC will be a depository that would collate all carbon data and make it available for national communication and GHGs reporting. Two notable aspects from functioning of the existing and newly established REDD-related institutions—both public and private—were inter-governmental struggles over REDD+ existing and prospective finances, and distrust between government forestry agencies and conservation NGOs on the national REDD+ financial mechanism. These are crucial steps. However, Tanzanian foresters contest the placement of the REDD+ Unit at the DoE. They argue for the Unit’s placement at TFS, which has technical and manpower capacities to implement REDD+ activities, and it has legal mandate to oversee forestry issues in the country. On the other hand, the DoE has legal mandate to coordinate international environmental agreements; as REDD+ emerged through UNFCCC, the DoE is legally obligated to coordinate it. Ideally, DoE would have been coordinating REDD+ policy perspectives across all relevant sectors, and TFS taking roles in implementing REDD+ activities on the ground. But, there is distrust between the two institutions, as TFS feels that DoE hijacked the REDD+ initiative and DoE sees the contestation as resentment from a missed opportunity for TFS to have financial resources accompanying REDD+. Likewise, bureaucrats at DoE contested the idea of having an executive agency placed at an academic institution; on 31st July 2014 a memorandum of understanding had to be signed between VPO and SUA to resolve the matter. As the host institution, SUA will be receiving funds to coordinate and implement NCMC’s responsibilities. These cases demonstrate typical power struggles over financial resources (and prospects for more resources), especially when the involved institutions are lowly funded ones in the global South. Such tensions and resulting poor coordination between DoE and TFS threaten the future capacity of the government to effectively carry out pivotal REDD+ activities (Ravikumar, Larson, Duchelle, Myers, & Tovar, 2015).The second institutional tension is situated on the proposed national REDD+ financing structure. The National REDD+ Task Force (NRTF) in collaboration with the interim National REDD+ Secretariat at IRA, played greater roles in influencing the development of the national REDD+ Trust Fund. The purpose of the Fund is to consolidate and distribute funds to different national stakeholders based on their efforts and performance in implementing REDD+. During the development of the REDD+ Strategy, implementing NGOs rejected the proposed centralized REDD+ financial mechanism, in favor of a nested mechanism (Rantala & di Gregorio, 2014), that would allow ‘‘international payments to be directed to projects without government intermediation” (Ravikumar et al., 2015, p. 11). They based their rejection on historical experiences of public sector financial management; whereby, rewards from natural resources usually do not reach those who bear most the costs of resource management. Forestry bureaucrats and members of the NRTF favored the mechanism, arguing that a centralized funding system put the state in a better position to ‘‘oversee equitable distribution of benefits and to protect unprepared rural communities from the tricky business of carbon trading” (Rantala & di Gregorio, 2014, p. 70). However, literature also hypothesizes that a centrally controlled REDD+ financial mechanism may incentivize state forestry bureaucrats to retain and extend control over forest resources, and thus undermine decentralized forestry (Sandbrook, Nelson, Adams, & Agrawal, 2010). According to Ravikumar et al. (2015, p. 11), this situation ‘‘reflects tensions between projects and the national government”, as it seems proponents of the nested approach are sceptical whether the Tanzanian government ‘‘is a trustworthy partner” in implementing REDD+ initiatives (Ibid.). Interview No. 19, August 17, 2015 in Dar es Salaam. 24. They included: Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (TFCG) and Community Forest Conservation Network (MJUMITA) with a project in montane and lowland coastal/Miombo forests in Eastern Arc Mountains and coastal forest biodiversity hotspots; CARE International in upland and mangrove forests of Unguja and Pemba Islands; the Jane Goodall Institute (JGI) in Masito Ugalla Ecosystem Area; the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) in Miombo forests of central Tanzania; the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) with a unique that mostly ‘‘aimed at creating detailed carbon baseline data and building capacity of Tanzanian professionals in MRV” (Mäkelä et al., 2015, p. 1); the Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative (MCDI) in the Miombo Please cite this article in press as: Lund, J. F. et al. Promising Change, Delivering Continuity: REDD+ as Conservation Fad, World Development (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.005 PROMISING CHANGE, DELIVERING CONTINUITY: REDD+ AS CONSERVATION FAD woodlands southeastern Tanzania; and the Wildlife Conservation Society in the montane forests of southern highlands. However, due to mismanagement of funds, Norad had to stop funds disbursement for two projects, Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania’s and TaTEDO’s. Seven out of the initial nine projects were therefore completed and evaluate; and they are the focus of this paper. 25. Norad commissioned NIRAS Finland Oy to conduct an external final evaluation of six of the seven pilot projects in between January and May 2015 (Mäkelä et al., 2015). Indufor Asia Pacific had already conducted a final evaluation of the JGI project in 2014, as it was completed in 2013. 26. Questionable spending was also noticed on WWF’s project, as the unit cost of establishing one carbon plot [6,874 USD, excluding costs for equipment, vehicles, coordination, and consultancies from the UK] was too high when compared to the average plot cost of NAFORMA, which was slightly above 1,000 USD (NIRAS, 2015e). Likewise, the costs of buying seedlings within the largest budgeted [295,668 USD] activity in Wildlife Conservation Society’s project, woodlot development, were extremely high as compared to other proxy figures for Tanzania (NIRAS, 2015d). 27. MCDI developed a method of early burning in the Miombo woodlands, which was approved by Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) and can now in principle be replicated throughout the southern Africa Miombo landscape (NIRAS, 2015f). WWF developed land use and land cover maps under ‘‘business as usual” (BAU) and ‘‘green economy” (GE) scenarios until 2025; showing that under BAU scenario carbon loss would be 1.25 Pg [1 Pg = 109 tonnes], and carbon gain would be 0.76 Pg under GE scenario (NIRAS, 2015e, p. 9). WWF also tested LiDAR technology in Tanzanian forest habitats and established 128 one-hectare baseline carbon plots in 10 different vegetation types across Tanzania (NIRAS, 2015e). JGI involved villagers in carbon assessment and monitoring, using Android technology in the form tablets and smartphones (Indufor, 2014). The collected data was stored in Google Cloud Geodatabase, ‘‘consolidated and reported using a combination of free online tools for building data entry forms for use in Open Data Kit (ODK)” (Indufor, 2014, p. 12); making them accessible to any user with good Internet connection through GIS software such as ArcGIS. 28. The pilots are all fairly small in scale and, therefore, have only an insignificant effect on their own. Thus, they should be seen as contributing to paving the way for larger-scale implementation efforts. The organizations implementing the pilots have all worked in areas—even with villages—that they were active in before. Indeed, prior work experiences with the communities in the proposed project sites was one of the 13 conditions for accessing funds to pilot REDD+ through the Norwegian’s ICFI. This, of course, makes good sense from an organizational point of view. Most have worked with existing forest management modalities, primarily PFM, seeking to modify these as to fit the expected changes with an emerging REDD+ market for carbon credits. Some have come far in this direction (Tanzania Forest Conservation Group, Wildlife Conservation Society), some less so (Jane Goodall Institute, Tanzania Traditional Energy Development Organization, Wildlife Conservation Society Tanzania), while some have changed strategy upon realizing that the REDD+ market may not materialize in the foreseeable future (Mpingo Conservation & Development Initiative). Mpingo Conservation & Development Initiative managed to get forests certified and get some timber sold— which are remarkable achievements. 29. Interview No. 12, August 06, 2015 in Dar es Salaam. 30. Interview No. 08, July 30, 2015 in Dar es Salaam. 31. Interview No. 08, July 30, 2015 in Dar es Salaam. 32. Interview No. 08, July 30, 2015 in Dar es Salaam. 33. One of the authors attended the launch that took place on August 11th 2015 in Dar es Salaam. 34. Participants were donor representatives, conservation NGOs officials, consultants, academics, and government officials. 35. 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