Queer Theory
The French Response
BRUNO PERREAU
(/books/title/?id=27481)
Introduction
I
n the winter of 2012–13, hundreds of thousands of people marched in
the streets of Paris to protest the legal extension of marriage and
adoption to same-sex couples. The scope of the demonstrations surprised
foreign observers: How could France, perceived as extremely liberal in
regard to sexual mores, display such hostility to the rights of gays and
lesbians?1
Public demonstrations by reactionary groups are not unusual in European
democracies, and France is no exception. It witnessed mass marches when
the legislature debated bills on abortion (1975), state supervision of Catholic
schools (1984), and civil unions (1999). The media response to the
demonstrations against gay marriage was nevertheless unparalleled; the
socialist government even backtracked on several occasions, ultimately
withdrawing measures related to equality at school and the legal status of
stepparents in order to “appease” the demonstrators. Despite passage of the
so-called marriage for all law—the Taubira Act (named after French minister
of justice Christiane Taubira, who sponsored the bill)—demonstrations
against gay marriage continue to be organized even today on a regular basis
in Paris and other large cities in France.2
On the other side of the Atlantic, one key aspect of the anti-gay-marriage
movement in France went almost unnoticed. The demonstrators were not
merely denouncing the potentially damaging effect of the law on marriage;
they were also claiming that its origin was to be found in “gender theory,” an
ideology imported from America. By gender theory they mean queer theory
in general and, more specifically, the work of philosopher Judith Butler,
whose publications were translated into French throughout the first decade
of the new millennium. French opponents of gay marriage, supported by the
Vatican, are now attacking school curricula that explore male/female
equality, which they claim is further proof of the growing empire of gender
theory. They see it as queer propaganda that will not only pervert young
people but also destroy the French nation itself. Whether through marriage,
parenthood, or school, they dread the possibility that lesbians and gay men
may find a way to literally reproduce themselves.
This book discusses various facets of the French response to queer theory,
from the mobilization of activists and the seminars of scholars to the
emergence of queer media and the decision to translate this or that kind of
work. It sheds new light on recent events around gay marriage—perceiving
queer theory as a threat to France means overlooking the fact that queer
theory itself has been largely inspired by French writers and thinkers. To a
certain extent, the book examines the return of French theory to France
from the perspective of queer theory and the polemics over marriage and
kinship, thereby exploring how France conceptualizes America. By
examining mutual influences across the Atlantic, my work analyzes changes
in the idea of national identity in France and the United States, offering
insight into recent attempts to theorize the notion of “community.”
I demonstrate that the French notion of an American invasion is a fantasy
expressing the fear of the propagation of homosexuality.3 This fear has two
interlinked dimensions, which might be described as vertical and horizontal:
the first concerns an obsession with passing homosexuality on to children;
the second, a refusal to conceptualize “the community” through a critical
reexamination of the identities generated by sexual minorities. From this
standpoint, gay marriage ushered in a new legal era but did not alter the
immunological impetus behind the way French national identity has been
forged. The national body remains defined by its effort to “immunize” itself
against minority cultures, in particular homosexuals. Rejecting both
cosmopolitanism and culturalism, I offer a theory of minority politics that
considers an ongoing critique of norms as the foundation of citizenship, in
which a feeling of belonging arises from regular reexamination of it.
Gay Marriage in France: A Question of Gender
After the Assemblée Nationale passed the Taubira Act on April 23, 2013, the
act was examined by the Conseil Constitutionnel, which judged the new law
to be in keeping with the French constitution.4 It was thus proclaimed law
by the president of the French Republic on May 17, 2013. Just two days
later, the press announced the celebration of the “first” gay marriage in
France.5 It was not, however, the first gay wedding. On June 5, 2004, the
green-party mayor of Bègles, Noël Mamère, officiated over the marriage of
two men. This wedding arose from a petition launched by sociologists Didier
Eribon and Françoise Gaspard, lawyer Caroline Mécary, and legal scholar
Daniel Borrillo subsequent to a session of the seminar “The Sociology of
Homosexualities” run by Eribon and Gaspard at the École des Hautes
Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) and led by Borrillo. In a context
marked by San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom’s performance of gay
weddings and by a violent homophobic assault in northern France (where a
man was seriously burned by his attackers), this petition, dubbed “A
Manifesto for Equal Rights,” called on mayors in France to react by
performing gay marriages. Published in Le Monde on March 17, 2004, the
manifesto garnered the support of many intellectuals and artists, including
Jacques Derrida, Paul Veyne, and Jane Birkin, as well as politicians such as
Mamère. It was therefore logical that Mamère would perform a marriage
when two men presented themselves at his town hall. The conservative
government’s minister of the interior, Dominique de Villepin, suspended
Mamère from his mayoral office for one month. As the case made its way
through the courts, the marriage was annulled by the Tribunal de Grande
Instance (county court) in Bordeaux on July 24, 2004, a ruling upheld by
the Cour d’Appel on April 19, 2005, and confirmed by the highest appellate
court, the Cour de Cassation, on March 13, 2007. The courts held that only a
man and a woman could contract a marriage. Since the appeal process had
the effect of suspending the initial ruling, the marriage performed in Bègles
remained valid for nearly a year. The Socialist Party criticized Mamère’s
initiative because of the need to respect existing law, but for the first time
the party committed itself to a policy of extending marriage to same-sex
couples, at a time when other socialist parties in Europe (for example, those
in Belgium and Spain) were preparing to reform—or already had reformed—
marriage laws.6 The position adopted by the Socialist Party’s steering
committee on May 11, 2004, nevertheless consigned the issue of homosexual
parenthood to later debate, repeating the party’s highly cautious approach to
this issue during the earlier debate on civil unions.7
Public debate on marriage, previously focused on sexual orientation, swiftly
extended to the additional dimension of gender. In 2005, Camille Barré and
Monica Leon, two transsexual women (male to female), only one of whom
had had her legal status altered, went to their local mayor to be married.
Since the decision of the Tribunal de Grande Instance in Bordeaux had
stipulated that marriage was open only to couples composed of a legally
recognized male and female, Barré and Leon believed they were within their
rights. Their local mayor, the conservative politician Patrick Ollier,
nevertheless refused to publish the banns, thereby preventing the marriage
from taking place. The couple appealed this decision, but the Tribunal de
Grande Instance in Nanterre found that Barré and Leon were outside the
law because they wished to marry “as women.” The district attorney,
Bernard Pagès, even argued that “their main goal was not really marriage in
the usual sense, because it was alien to the goal of behaving like husband
and wife.”8 This decision was confirmed by an appellate court in Versailles,
which on July 8, 2005, held that Barré and Leon were trying to twist the law
purely for “activist” reasons and the law should not yield to this type of
suit.9 The affair revealed the extent to which, in France, the issue of
marriage immediately became cast in terms of gender (“as women,”
“behaving like”). If, several years later, opponents of gay marriage accused
gender theory of being the origin of the Taubira Act, they were themselves
just echoing a gendered view of marriage already part of public debate.
The incident of the marriage performed in Bègles, like the decision handed
down by the county court in Nanterre, revealed that equal rights between
homosexuals and heterosexuals were advancing at a snail’s pace in France.
Legal recognition of lesbians and gays through the Taubira Act both
maintained and created new inequalities between married heterosexual and
married homosexual couples. For example, there is no automatic
presumption of a parental tie within married homosexual couples, requiring
that a spouse’s biological child must be adopted. When that biological child
is the product of medically assisted procreation (MAP) effected abroad, some
French courts have refused to grant adoption, arguing that a 1994 law on
bioethics has been violated.10 (The law made MAP legal in France only for
heterosexual couples with medically proven cases of infertility.) The nation’s
highest appeals court had to intervene, declaring that MAP conducted
outside French borders should not be an obstacle to adoption.11 It
nevertheless remains the case that should the biological parent die before
adoption is granted, the child becomes an orphan, a situation that does not
arise within a heterosexual couple.
Another ruling by the Cour de Cassation struck down an order preventing a
Moroccan national residing in France from marrying his partner, a French
citizen.12 France had signed bilateral conventions with eleven countries
stipulating that marriage laws in the country of origin would apply to
respective foreign nationals living in France (from Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Slovenia, Poland, Laos, or
Cambodia).13 A ministerial directive dated May 29, 2013, stated that
application of the Taubira Act would confirm those conventions, thereby
outlawing marriages between certain binational homosexual couples. In its
ruling, however, the Cour de Cassation pointed out that the convention
signed by France and Morocco on August 10, 1981, included a reserve clause
stating that the convention would not apply if the legal dispositions of one
state threatened public order in the other. In this instance, the judges
decided that implementation of the Taubira Act would be seriously affected
by application of the Franco-Moroccan agreement; they therefore struck
down the restrictive interpretation of homosexual marriage that the French
administration had issued in its directive of May 2013. The judges
nevertheless set two conditions on the application of their ruling: the foreign
nationals in question had to be residents of France; and their home country,
if not recognizing homosexual marriage, must not have a law explicitly
prohibiting it.
In addition to marriage-related inequality, other types of discrimination
could have been eliminated through reform but were maintained in the new
law: prohibiting MAP for single women and lesbian couples, outlawing
surrogate pregnancies (which more particularly affect gays), and
medicalizing a change in the legal status of transsexual individuals. Thanks
only to a legislative amendment passed on July 12, 2016, has change of
biological sex ceased to be a precondition for a change of legal status.
Change of gender marker must nevertheless be pronounced by a judge on
the basis of sufficient evidence. Placing marriage on the political agenda
therefore shut down what jurisprudence was having difficulty containing, the
linkage of sex and gender produced by the institution of marriage.14
Interestingly, the preamble to the bill on “marriage for all” argued for the
extension of marriage to homosexual couples in the name of a historic
process and to match more advanced legislation in other countries, yet it
made no mention of the principles of equality, liberty, and dignity.15 The
marriage-for-all law did not therefore constitute a complete success for
sexual minorities but was a kind of concession to their struggle, just as civil
unions had been in the past, legalized by the legislature only after many
years of lobbying by organizations that defended homosexuals and
spearheaded the fight against AIDS.
From this standpoint, France has experienced no clear “before-and-after”
watershed with regard to gay marriage. The study I am undertaking
therefore involves a critical analysis of the history of the present, too often
understood solely from its legal aspect. The temporal perspective is in fact
itself the object of major normative conflicts—whereas opponents to
marriage for all see the reform as a dangerous departure, proponents of
equal rights view it as part of an ongoing process. The more conservative
liberals, meanwhile, hope that the new law will satisfy gay and lesbian
demands once and for all. Conceptually grasping this temporal perspective,
and thereby transcending the mythology of victorious struggle, can thus have
political significance. Such a critique strikes me as all the more important
insofar as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) cultures
themselves exist in a queer time.16 The law, of course, provides an analytical
structure: it has recognized and provided security to many gay and lesbian
families with respect to their names, financial estates, health, and so on. Its
impact is therefore real and significant. The relationship of LGBT individuals
to the law has itself changed, especially in terms of their more frequent
recourse to jurisprudence. Yet has there been any profound change in the
modes of thought that shape sexuality and citizenship? I argue that, despite
legal reforms, the “straight mind”—that is, a mode of thought based on a
reification of the difference between the sexes17—continues to function as a
political totem in France and that the majority conceptualization of
citizenship is as operative today as it was prior to marriage for all.
Preventing any change to that conceptualization caused opponents of the law
to pour into the streets—and they continue to do so. Ultimately, performing
homosexual marriages is not the key issue behind their struggle. Even the
staunchest opponents have never tried to disrupt a wedding ceremony. Their
activism targets above all the idea of marriage as a vector of meaning and
moral values.
Since the student uprisings of May 1968, French conservatives have
criticized the moral relativism of postmodern society. Contemporary society
is purportedly undermined by its nihilism and rejection of tradition.
Conservatism is not restricted to one political party but cuts across the
political spectrum as well as social, professional, geographic, and other
categories. In fact, it is the expression of commonplaces largely reflected in
the French media where many commentators complain about how shallow
the educational system is,18 how impolite young people are, and even how
uncivil laughter can be.19 Sexuality is one of the mainsprings of this moral
reaction, as also witnessed in October 2014 by the destruction of an artwork
by Paul McCarthy by anti-gay-marriage activists: unable to bear the idea that
the middle of Place Vendôme in Paris could host a work of art in the form of
a green tree suggestive of a sex toy, they laid waste to the art and physically
attacked the artist.20 While these activists thought they were invested with
the role of saving a society corrupted by its leaders and subjected to
influential minorities, their crusade also revealed a form of fascination with
sexuality itself, a fascination more broadly typical of an attachment to
order.21
It is therefore no coincidence that the legal recognition of homosexuality is
the focus of numerous fantasies and moral tensions. Conservatives argue
that heterosexuality and homosexuality are not morally equivalent behaviors,
hence should not be considered as such by the law. Believing that their
convictions have been aggrieved, conservatives now position themselves as
the “underdog” and demand that their vision of the world be recognized in
turn. In other words, they appropriate the idea of moral relativism to their
own benefit even as they criticize it when applied to LGBT cultures. They see
themselves as majority victims of a system henceforth devised to benefit
minorities. Today they invoke neutrality of treatment toward all citizens in
order to pitch their struggle as an equivalent of the struggle for LGBT rights.
That sheds light on why it is so important to opponents of gay marriage to
credit the idea that LGBT rights are the product of a “theory.” By proceeding
in this way, they seek to legitimize their own doctrine. References to the
United States become all the more potent, allowing them to think that there
exists an organized effort to sabotage the foundations of French identity:
criticism of gay marriage is strengthened by being bound to nearly two
centuries of French fascination with, and wariness of, the United States.22
Queer Echoes
In looking back at the American shore, I adopt the notion of “fantasy echo”
developed by historian Joan W. Scott to explore the construction of
tradition. Scott shows that fantasies of the past help establish categories
used in the present. By introducing the idea of echo, she argues that this
relationship to transhistorical identity is illusory because it overlooks not
only swings in meaning that categories can assume over time but also the
complex, unstable mechanism of identification with those categories.
Starting from Scott’s notion, I intend to show that transatlantic exchanges
are the product of cultural fantasies whose effect, if not function, is to mask
their original source. Thus, “French theory” becomes American when it
returns home to France.23 This book strives to re-contextualize and
repoliticize these mutual exchanges. What is being analyzed here is the
transnational construction of the very idea of queer theory. By what
mechanisms do highly disparate theses and methods become united into a
single theoretical category? How does this operation occur, and who
participates in it? When I use the term “queer theory,” I am referring to an
intellectual approach with multifarious, variable meanings. The use of
“theory” in the singular does not mean I adhere to the idea of a coherent
corpus of theory; it would be particularly ironic to suggest that publications
and research demonstrating the uncertainty inherent in any process of
definition should be brought together under one label. The same comment
applies to my use of “French theory.” Many French intellectuals became
leading figures in critical philosophy in the United States in the 1970s and
1980s because they provided theoretical resistance to the neoliberal dogma
then sweeping across academic America. These intellectuals, who
deconstructed the social norms inscribed in language itself, soon became
identified as the representatives of French theory; they included Michel
Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Hélène Cixous, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Lacan,
Julia Kristeva, and Jean Baudrillard. The label “French theory,” however,
masks major differences between them (as well as differences in the quality
of their work). The term “French theory” became so widespread because it
generated a national identity: by lumping all writers of French nationality
under one label, French theory enabled American academics to fuel critical
analysis of American culture itself.
And it was precisely to interrogate analytical categories that Scott suggested
conceiving fantasy and echo in the formation of cultural identities:
The term signifies the repetition of something imagined or an imagined repetition.
In either case the repetition is not exact since an echo is an imperfect return of
sound. Fantasy, as noun or adjective, refers to plays of the mind that are creative
and not always rational. For thinking the problem of retrospective identification it
may not matter which is the noun and which the adjective. Retrospective
identifications, after all, are imagined repetitions and repetitions of imagined
resemblances.24
Scott underscores the immanence of the making of identities—the fantasy
echo is not an imaginative construct exterior to the individual; it is the very
setting in which identity manufactures itself (through empathy, analogy,
opposition, and so on). In other words, cultural fantasy invents a point of
reference (here, American queer theory), clings to it, and by force of
repeated telling, effaces the very traces of its making. This is the echo in the
fantasy; like a sound diffracted many times, it becomes hard to pinpoint it
with any accuracy. The original can no longer be distinguished from its
many reverberations. Thus, when the category “queer” travels from one
shore of the Atlantic to the other, it retains the same terms, but its meaning
is literally distorted. It does not lose impact or fade but changes mode, like
an accidental placed before a note on a musical score.25 The accidentals are
what I am examining here. I bring to light the numerous modulations of
queer theory, showing how sexuality, nation, and community are
conceptually and politically interwoven. This modulating approach
introduces a critical fluidity into the making of identities since it postulates
that both identities and processes of identification can oscillate. It provides a
further dimension to theories of intersectionality that have difficulty
functioning without a fixed point of reference, without an “order of things.”
An Archaeology of Propagation
My work differs from two traditional approaches to transnational cultural
analyses: comparative cultural sociology and theories of sovereignty.
Although I do discuss the careers of individuals and institutions that have
reacted to queer theory in France, above all I analyze the role of sexuality in
official and unofficial narratives of identity. My approach is therefore
indebted to anthropologist Mary Douglas’s analyses of the way institutions
confer identity.26 Here I explore how invoking queer theory can facilitate the
functioning of political routine. Thus, this book does not present a sociology
of cultural repertoires but an archaeology of discourses.27 I favor a more
heterodox approach that seeks to counter the marked academic impact of
comparative sociology in the United States, in particular its
overspecialization.28 Insofar as my archaeological approach considers
discourse as the very site of power relationships, it is indebted to Foucault.
Foucault thought that archaeology is a “play on words,”29 because it seeks to
reveal not a structure (arche) but the conditions of the possibility of
believing in that structure, in “discursive practices that serve as
intermediaries between words and things.”30 Where genealogical analysis
carries out a historical, surface-level investigation into the discontinuity of
events, archaeological analysis interrogates discursive regularities.
Anticommunitarian rhetoric in France, for example, is employed not only by
activists in the anti-gay-marriage camp but also by left-wingers in the
administration. The archaeological task entails resituating these discourses
and deconstructing their mechanisms. It therefore also differs from theories
of sovereignty, which address cultural exchanges based on an abstract
definition of territorial authority. These theories tend to reinforce the idea
that each country is exceptional in nature—which consequently seems to
exclude analysis of hybrid cultural forms.31 They furthermore erect a border
between “interior” and “exterior,” which the intersecting history of France
and America challenges at every point.
France’s anxiety about becoming Americanized is not just a simple question
of loss of sovereignty. The idea of foreign cultural invasion is a direct echo of
the fantasy of an enemy within, one who will multiply uncontrollably. Thus,
it is directly linked to the idea of the propagation of homosexuality, which
functions on many layers of discourse: contamination (which combines
mental pathology and physiological illness), corruption (the destruction of
the natural order through pagan practices), loss of distinctions (androgyny
and transsexuality), and conversion (enlistment in an activist movement not
unlike a religious conversion). This book analyzes these various registers
with their many connections, not overlooking their incompatibilities. I show
that the fantasy of the contagiousness of homosexuality underpins France’s
republican values even today, as it did throughout the twentieth century.
Following the work of George Mosse, many historians have explored the
connections between homosexuality and political regime.32 Florence
Tamagne, for example, studied the rise of nationalism in Europe from the
perspective of sex scandals during the interwar period.33 Shari Benstock has
examined the liaisons dangereuses between certain lesbian salons on the
Left Bank of Paris and far-right movements.34
I demonstrate that one of the mechanisms of the consolidation of the French
nation is the fantasy of a homosexual secret society governed by its own
rules, cultural references, and language, all of which make it possible to
define—through negative contrast—the ideal citizen. The fear of
homosexuality and its contagiousness, as expressed during marches against
gay marriage, cannot therefore be limited to individual aversion—it is the
product of a collective discourse that is now muted but still remains
powerful. Despite major changes in French law since the decriminalization
of homosexuality in 1982, there survives the idea that the lifestyles invented
by gays and lesbians represent a danger for the republic because these
lifestyles are seen as harder to control through normal governmental powers.
Lesbians and gays, who during their lives develop multiple emotional ties
(their original families, the peers among whom they acquire a different
culture, their emotional and sexual networks), are perceived to destabilize
the “good-citizen psychology,”35 on which the feeling of national belonging
depends. My analysis of this fantasy of the propagation of homosexuality
and disloyalty toward the country is the basis of my discussion of the
reaction to queer theory and the issue of the sense of belonging.
Notes
1. Alexander Stille, “An Anti-Gay-Marriage Tea Party, French Style?,” New
Yorker, March 18, 2014.
2. “Manif pour Tous: ‘Nous reviendrons!,’” Libération, October 5, 2014.
3. The French term here, as elsewhere in the book, is transmission, which
neatly functions both horizontally (as in the spread of a disease) and
vertically (the passing down of a culture or heritage). For the sake of fluency
and comprehension, the predominant English meaning (contagion,
inheritance) has dictated choice of translation.
4. Conseil Constitutionnel, decision 2013-669, May 17, 2013,
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2013/2013-669-dc/decisionn-2013-669-dc-du-17-mai-2013.137046.html (http://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/decision/2013/2013-669-dc/decision-n-2013-669-dc-du17-mai-2013.137046.html).
5. “Le premier mariage homosexuel de France célébré à Montpellier,” Le
Monde, May 29, 2013.
6. David Paternotte has documented the importance of communication and
coordination among activists in Europe as the law becomes increasingly
Europeanized. David Paternotte, Revendiquer le “mariage gay”: Belgique,
France, Espagne (Brussels: Éditions de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles,
2011).
7. A French law passed on November 15, 1999, authorized both homosexual
and heterosexual couples to enter into a civil union, known as a Pacte Civil
de Solidarité (PACS).
8. “Mariage trans-travesti: le procureur s’oppose,” Le Nouvel Observateur,
May 31, 2005.
9. On the elaboration of the legal sphere in connection with public debate,
see Edward Schiappa, “Defining Marriage in California: An Analysis of
Public and Technical Arguments,” Argumentation and Advocacy 48, no. 4
(2012): 216–30.
10. Tribunal de Grande Instance, Versailles, 13/00168, April 29, 2014.
11. Cour de Cassation, decisions (avis) G1470006 and J1470007, September
23, 2014,
https://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/avis_15/integralite_avis_cl
asses_annees_239/2014_6164/22_septembre_2014_1470006_6868/15011_
22_30158.html
(https://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/avis_15/integralite_avis_
classes_annees_239/2014_6164/22_septembre_2014_1470006_6868/1501
1_22_30158.html) and
https://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/Communique_avis_AMP_140923.pdf
(https://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/Communique_avis_AMP_140923.pdf
).
12. Cour de Cassation, decision (arrêt) 96, January 28, 2015,
https://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile_
568/96_28_30981.html
(https://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile
_568/96_28_30981.html).
13. See Malick W. Ghachem, “Accommodating Empire: Comparing French
and American Paths to the Legalization of Gay Marriage,” Southern
California Law Review 88, no. 3 (March 2015): 529–32.
14. The main arguments in favor of gay marriage also help cut off this
question by focusing solely on recognition of homosexual love. Paisley
Currah noted the same effect in the United States. Paisley Currah, “Queer
Theory, Lesbian and Gay Rights, and Transsexual Marriages,” in Sexual
Identities. Queer Politics, ed. Mark Blasius (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2001), 192.
15. “Projet de loi ouvrant le mariage aux couples de personnes de même
sexe,” Assemblée Nationale, November 7, 2012, http://www.assembleenationale.fr/14/projets/pl0344.asp (http://www.assembleenationale.fr/14/projets/pl0344.asp).
16. Jack Halberstam, In a Queer Time & Space: Transgender Bodies,
Subcultural Lives (New York: NYU Press, 2005).
17. Monique Wittig, The Straight Mind: And Other Essays (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1992).
18. Michel Onfray, “Aujourd’hui à l’école, on apprend le tri des déchets ou la
théorie du genre,” L’Express, November 12, 2014.
19. Alain Finkielkraut, “Le rire contemporain est une forme d’incivilité,” Du
Fil à Retordre (blog), May 2, 2010, http://blog.lefigaro.fr/lefol/2010/05/finkielkraut-le-rire-contemporain-est-une-formedincivilite.html (http://blog.lefigaro.fr/le-fol/2010/05/finkielkraut-le-rirecontemporain-est-une-forme-dincivilite.html).
20. “McCarthy agressé pour l’érection d’un arbre de Noël ambigu, place
Vendôme,” Le Monde, October 17, 2014.
21. Jean Laplanche has shown how sexuality “makes sense” through the
interrelationship between sensual experience and institutions. Jean
Laplanche, La Sexualité humaine: biologisme et biologie (Paris: Les
Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 1999), 83.
22. Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik, and Marie-France Toinet, eds., The Rise
and Fall of AntiAmericanism: A Century of French Perception (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1990).
23. Édouard Glissant evoked a similar idea when he referred to “worldechoes.” Édouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation, trans. Betsy Wing (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 178.
24. Joan W. Scott, “Fantasy Echo: History and the Construction of Identity,”
Critical Inquiry 27, no. 2 (2001): 287.
25. Bernard Sève, L’ Altération musicale (Paris: Seuil, 2002).
26. Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse
University Press, 1986): 55–67.
27. Michèle Lamont and Laurent Thévenot, eds., Rethinking Comparative
Cultural Sociology: Repertoires of Evaluation in France and the United
States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
28. Etienne Ollion, “De la sociologie en Amérique: éléments pour une
sociologie de la sociologie états-unienne contemporaine,” Sociologie 2, no. 3
(2011): 277–94.
29. Michel Foucault, “Birth of a World,” trans. John Johnston, in Foucault
Live: Interviews 1961–84, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, trans. Lysa Hochroth and
John Johnston (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), 65.
30. Michel Foucault, “Michel Foucault explique son dernier livre,” in Dits et
Écrits I, 1954–1975 (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 804.
31. Peter H. Schuck and James Q. Wilson, eds., Understanding America:
The Anatomy of an Exceptional Nation (New York: Public Affairs, 2009).
32. George L. Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and
Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe (New York: Howard Fertig, 1985).
33. Florence Tamagne, “Le ‘Crime du Palace’: homosexualité, médias et
politique dans la France des années 30,” Revue d’Histoire Moderne et
Contemporaine 53, no. 4 (December 2006): 128–49.
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