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The Role Theories in Conceptual
Coherence
Article in Psychological Review · August 1985
DOI: 10.1037/0033-295X.92.3.289 · Source: PubMed
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Psychological Review
V O L U M E 92
NUMBER 3
J U L Y 1985
The Role of Theories in Conceptual Coherence
Gregory L. Murphy
Douglas L. Medin
Brown University
University of Illinois
The question of what makes a concept coherent (what makes its members form
a comprehensible class) has received a variety of answers. In this article we review
accounts based on similarity, feature correlations, and various theories of categorization. We find that each theory provides an inadequate account of conceptual
coherence (or no account at all) because none provides enough constraints on
possible concepts. We propose that concepts are coherent to the extent that they
fit people's background knowledge or naive theories about the world. These
theories help to relate the concepts in a domain and to structure the attributes
that are internal to a concept. Evidence of the influence of theories on various
conceptual tasks is presented, and the possible importance of theories in cognitive
development is discussed.
Why is a given set of objects grouped
together to form a category? That is, why is
it that some groupings are informative, useful,
and efficient, whereas others are vague, absurd, or useless? The current surge of interest
in people's concepts has provided much information about conceptual structure and
content. Yet, the central question of what
makes a category seem coherent has only
been sketchily addressed and incompletely
answered.
A somewhat unusual, but nonetheless useful, example arises from an old puzzle of
biblical scholarship, the dietary rules asso-
This research was supported by United States Public
Health Service Grant MH32370 (to DLM) and by National Science Foundation Grant 83-15145 (to GLM).
This article is a fully collaborative venture, and the order
of authorship is arbitrary.
The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments
of Lawrence Barsalou, Maureen Callanan, Eve Clark,
Sarah Hampson, Reid Hastie, Robert Macauley, Barbara
Malt, Glenn Nakamura, Andrew Ortony, Elissa Newport,
Brian Ross, Ed Shoben, Richard Shweder, and Ed Smith
on an earlier draft.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Douglas Medin,
Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, 603
East Daniel, Champaign, Illinois 61820, or to Gregory
Murphy, Hunter Laboratory of Psychology, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912.
Copyright 1985 b> the A
ciated with the abominations of Leviticus,
which produce the categories clean animals
and unclean animals. Why should camels,
ostriches, crocodiles, mice, sharks, and eels
be declared unclean, whereas gazelles, frogs,
most fish, grasshoppers, and some locusts be
clean? What could chameleons, moles, and
crocodiles have in common that they should
be listed together? That is, what is there about
clean and unclean animals that makes these
categories sensible or coherent?
The main thesis of this article is that
current ideas, maxims, and theories concerning the structure of concepts are insufficient
to provide an account of conceptual coherence. All such accounts rely directly or indirectly on the notion of similarity, and we
argue that the notion of similarity relationships is not sufficiently constraining to determine which concepts will be coherent or
meaningful. These approaches are inadequate,
in part, because they fail to represent intraand inter-concept relations and more general
world knowledge. We propose a different
approach in which attention is focused on
people's theories about the world.
The keystone of our explanation is that
people's theories of the world embody conceptual knowledge and that their conceptual
Ps>i;hological Association, inc. 0033-295X/85/$00.75
289
290
GREGORY L. MURPHY AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN
organization is partly represented in their
theories. At one level, this statement is trivially
true: For example, one's understanding of
chemistry influences one's concept of substances like water. It would be very odd for
a person to believe, for example, that water
is animate, and yet to understand the phase
relations between water, ice, and steam. Surely
there is some consistency between people's
concepts and their understanding of interacting objects and forces in the world, but the
connection between the two has very seldom
been spelled out. We attempt to specify the
connection between theoretical and conceptual knowledge and to recast conceptual theory in that light.
Current theories of conceptual structure,
including those we have proposed ourselves,
represent concepts in ways that fail to bring
out this relation between conceptual and
theoretical knowledge. For example, one theory treats concepts' as exemplars organized
around a central prototype (see B. Cohen &
Murphy, 1984; Osherson & Smith, 1981). It
is difficult to see how these concepts might
be related to or constrained by one's knowledge of the world. Another influential model
(actually, a set of models) treats concepts as
collections of features of some sort (see Smith
& Medin, 1981).2 Although this model may
be broad enough to involve theoretical
knowledge, it does not particularly promote
it, nor does it suggest what concepts people
are likely to have and why. In particular, the
features suggested by most theories of concepts have excluded the theoretical connections we will discuss.
In this article, we do not propose a new
model of conceptual representation. Rather,
we present a theory of what the glue is that
holds a concept together and an account of
what sorts of concepts are easy to learn, use,
and remember, with the understanding that
conceptual models must build appropriate
structures to account for the facts discussed.
When we argue that concepts are organized
by theories, we use theory to mean any of a
host of mental "explanations," rather than a
complete, organized, scientific account. For
example, causal knowledge certainly embodies a theory of certain phenomena; scripts
may contain an implicit theory of the entailment relations between mundane events;
knowledge of rules embodies a theory of the
relations between rule constituents; and booklearned, scientific knowledge certainly contains theories. Although it may seem to be
glorifying some of these cases to call them
theories, the term connotes a complex set of
relations between concepts, usually with a
causal basis. Furthermore, these examples are
similar to theories used in scientific explanation (Achinstein, 1968). Later on, we offer
a list of some general properties of people's
theories and review examples illustrating the
utility of thinking of concepts as being
embedded in theories.
The philosopher W. V. O. Quine was one
of the first to make a case for the use of
theories in determining category membership.
In his classic article, "Natural Kinds," Quine
(1977) argued for both a psychological and a
societal progression from an innate, similarity-based conception of kinds to a theoretically
oriented, more objective basis. Whereas early
societies could only depend on perceptual
and functional qualities to differentiate objects
into classes, modern society can use techniques of chemical, physical, and genetic
analysis in order to classify. Quine further
argued that, in a true case of ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny, modern children begin
with innate, perceptually based similarity
metrics to define their kinds, only to have
them successively replaced by scientific
knowledge (to the limits of their education
and our scientific progress). As Quine (1977,
p. 171) puts it:
One's sense of similarity or one's system of kinds develops
and changes and even turns multiple as one matures,
making perhaps for increasingly dependable prediction.
And at length standards of similarity set in which are
geared to theoretical science. This development is a
development away from the immediate, subjective, animal
sense of similarity to the remoter objectivity of a similarity
1
Many authors do not clearly distinguish between
concepts and categories. We use concepts to refer to
mental representations of a certain kind, and categories
to refer to classes of objects in the world. Past writers
seem to have used category to mean the mental representation of a class of objects, or both the representation
and the objects themselves. However, this distinction is
important to account for deviations between the two, as
when someone's concept of animal does not actually
include all animals.
2
Throughout this article, we use the terms feature,
attribute, and properly interchangeably.
CONCEPTUAL COHERENCE
determined by scientific hypotheses and posits and constructs. Things are similar in the later or theoretical sense
to the degree that they are interchangeable parts of the
cosmic machine revealed by science.
Although we do not subscribe to Quine's
claims about societal progression (or the view
that the use of scientific theories is necessarily
more objective), we agree with his conclusion
that one's theories explicate the world and
differentiate it into kinds. We also concur
with him that the notion of similarity must
be extended to include theoretical knowledge.
Although we focus on explicit theories as a
source of conceptual coherence, it is likely
that a broader view of theoretical knowledge
will be needed to provide a complete account.
People use some kinds of theoretical knowledge implicitly, only becoming aware of doing
so when confronted with a mismatch or
failure of that knowledge (as may arise in
cross-cultural contact). Furthermore, even
people's explicit theories may often not reach
the rigor and consistency expected from a
scientific theory (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; A.
Tversky & Kahneman, 1980). Thus, the kind
of theory Quine had in mind (an explicit,
scientific one) is too narrow to fully explain
coherence. The next section reviews previous
approaches to conceptual coherence and their
limitations.
Approaches to Conceptual Coherence—The
Insufficiency of Similarity
We have already hinted at what we mean
by a coherent category. It is one whose members seem to hang together, a grouping of
objects that makes sense to the perceiver. We
do not give an operational definition of coherence because we do not wish to tie it to a
particular theoretical framework. There are
a number of measures that might reflect
coherence, including how easily the concept
is learned and used, and there may be others
that are not known yet.
It is important to distinguish this notion
of coherence from the related one of naturalness, as used by Keil (1981) and others.
Natural concepts are said to be those formed
out of basic ontological categories, such as
living thing or intelligent being. For example,
a category that included only thoughts and
fish would cross ontological boundaries improperly and would therefore form an unnat-
291
ural concept. However, as we show later, a
concept that is unnatural (according to this
definition) may be coherent because people
have some theory that it plays a part in. In
short, most of people's concepts are probably
natural and coherent, but the issue of what
makes a concept hang together cannot be
solved solely by recourse to such ontological
categories.
Perhaps the most powerful explanation of
conceptual coherence is that objects, events,
or entities form a concept because they are
similar to one another. The basic idea is that
objects fall into natural clusters of similar
kinds (that are dissimilar to other clusters),
and our concepts map onto these clusters.
Thus, similarity may be the glue that makes
a category learnable and useful. Although it
is true that category members seem similar,
Quine (1977) pointed out that using similarity
as the basis for concepts may raise the very
questions it was meant to answer. Without
some explanation of why things seem similar,
we are left with an equivalent problem; many
things appear to be similar just because they
are members of the same category. In more
practical terms, estimates of similarity may
be influencedsby people's knowledge that the
things being compared are in the same (or
different) categories.
To use a rough analogy, winning basketball
teams have in common scoring more points
than their opponents, but one must turn to
more basic principles to explain why they
score more points. In the same way, similarity
may be a by-product of conceptual coherence
rather than its determinant—having a theory
that relates objects may make them seem
similar. Goodman (1972, p. 437) goes so far
as to say, "Similarity, ever ready to solve
philosophical problems and overcome obstacles, is a pretender, an imposter, a quack. It
has, indeed, its place and its uses, but is more
often found where it does not belong, professing powers it does not possess."
We shall argue that, at its best, similarity
only provides a language for talking about
conceptual coherence. Certainly, objects in a
category appear similar to one another. But
does this similarity explain why the category
was formed (instead of some other) or its
ease of use? Suppose we follow A. Tversky's
(1977) influential theory of similarity, which
292
GREGORY L. MURPHY AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN
defines it as a function of common and
distinctive features weighted for salience or
importance. If similarity is the sole explanation of category structure, then an immediate
problem is that the similarity relations among
a set of entities depend heavily on the particular weights given to individual features. A
barber pole and a zebra would be more
similar than a horse and a zebra if the feature
"striped" had sufficient weight. Of course, if
these feature weights were fixed, then these
similarity relations would be constrained. But
as Tversky (1977) demonstrated convincingly,
the relative weighting of a feature (as well as
the relative importance of common and distinctive features) varies with the stimulus
context and experimental task, so that there
is no unique answer to the question of how
similar one object is to another. To further complicate matters, Ortony, Vondruska,
Jones, and Foss (1984) argued persuasively
that the weight of a feature is not independent
of the entity in which it inheres. The situation
begins to look very much as if there are more
free parameters than degrees of freedom,
making similarity too flexible to explain conceptual coherence.
A further major complication derives from
the fact that no constraints have been provided on what is to count as a feature or
property in analyses of similarity. Suppose
that one is to list the attributes that plums
and lawnmowers have in common in order
to judge their similarity. It is easy to see that
the list could be infinite: Both weigh less than
10,000 kg (and less than 10,001 kg, . . .),
both did not exist 10,000,000 years ago (and
10,000,001 years ago,. . .), both cannot hear
well, both can be dropped, both take up
space, and so on. Likewise, the list of differences could be infinite. Furthermore, there
are some attributes that are true of only a
small number of the category members—
perhaps there are some orange plums or some
lawnmowers run by robots. What is the cutoff
for excluding attributes that are not universal,
or must they all be included (Murphy, 1982a)?
The point is that any two entities can be
arbitrarily similar or dissimilar by changing
the criterion of what counts as a relevant
attribute. Unless one can specify such criteria,
then the claim that categorization is based
on attribute matching is almost entirely vacuous (see Goodman, 1972).
These arguments about attributes fly in
the face of perceptual experience that seems
to naturally partition at least some entities
into categories. Of course, there are some
categorizations that blatantly contradict perceptual similarity (e.g., categorizing whales
as mammals), which indicates that one's
theories can override or at least select from
perceptual information. Yet, it is true that
the perceptual system has some built-in constraints on what will count as an attribute
and which attribute relations are salient (see
Ullman, 1979, for elegant work that gets at
some of these constraints). The problem with
the abstract notion of similarity is that it
ignores both the perceptual and theory-related
constraints on concepts, when in fact they
are doing most of the explanatory work. How
much of our conceptual system is based on
perceptually determined features and how
much on theoretical features has yet to be
determined. In general, people seem to be
flexible about similarity (even perceptual
similarity), and we know relatively little about
nonperceptual constraints. Thus, we attempt
to provide part of the answer to how people
choose relevant attributes for concepts and
how they weight those attributes in their
conceptual processes. However, we wish to
reduce the importance of individual attributes
in conceptual representations and to emphasize the interaction of concepts in theory-like
mental structures.
We now consider some candidate principles
for category coherence that rely directly or
indirectly on the notion of similarity. We
begin by considering some standard maxims
about what makes a good category and then
turn our attention to particular categorization
theories and their implications for category
structure. Finally, we examine the widespread
assumption that category judgments are based
on some form of attribute matching that
maps directly onto similarity. There are serious problems and limitations associated
with each of these principles.
The Insufficiency of Similarity-Based
Measures of Category Structure
Although we have already argued that similarity does not sufficiently constrain concepts,
it may be that there are some general pro-
CONCEPTUAL
cessing principles that are based on similarity
that have greater explanatory power. For example, there is considerable evidence that the
most useful concepts are neither the most
specific nor the most abstract, but are at an
intermediate level of abstraction (Rosch,
Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem,
1976). Although we would not want to equate
concept coherence with these basic level concepts, such concepts are obviously highly
coherent. Finding a metric that picks out
these intermediate level categories is nontrivial.
Rosch and her colleagues argued that basiclevel categories maximize cue validity (Rosch,
1978; Rosch et al., 1976), the conditional
probability that an object is in a category,
given that it has some cue (or attribute)
associated with the category. A coherent category should have many such cues, whereas
a poor category has only inconsistent cues,
or very few good ones. Categories with the
highest cue validity would be expected to be
particularly useful in perceptual categorization. Unfortunately, this measure incorrectly
predicts that superordinate (i.e., the most
inclusive) categories are always more coherent
than any of their subordinates, inasmuch as
anything that cues membership in one category also cues membership in its superordinates. For example, if something has feathers,
it is likely to be a bird, but it is at least
equally likely to be an animal. (See Murphy,
1982a, 1982b, for details and consideration
of similar measures.)
Perhaps coherent or useful categories are
the ones that allow the most inferences to be
made—after all, one purpose of categories is
to enable inferences that may not be apparent
from individual exemplars. If an object is a
dog, for example, one can infer that it has
ears, barks, has fur, and so forth, even if
those properties have not been observed,
whereas a vague category like thing or object
enables few if any inferences to be made.
Actually, this measure, which could be called
category validity, is the reverse of cue validity,
as it might be represented as the conditional
probability that something has various attributes given its category membership. Accordingly, it has the reverse problem: Medin (1983)
noted that the more specific a category, the
more inferences it allows—individual objects
being the limiting case for which one can
COHERENCE
293
specify the greatest number of correct "inferences."
It may well be possible to find measures
that pick out intermediate levels of abstraction. For example, some weighting function
combining cue validity and maximizing inferences surely would (e.g., Jones, 1983). But
even here, there is little ground for confidence
that we can measure coherence formally because the basic level appears to change with
expertise (e.g., Rosch et al., 1976). One could
reflect such changes by adding features or
modifying feature weights, but again, these
additions and modifications are doing the
explanatory work. Similarity may be able to
describe such facts, but it does not explain
them.
The Insufficiency
of Correlated Attributes
Another organizing principle for categories
is the notion of correlated attributes. Rosch
et al. (1976; Rosch, 1978) proposed that
natural categories divide the world up according to clusters of features, that they "cut
the world at its joints." That is, attributes of
the world are not randomly spread across
objects, but rather appear in clusters. Furthermore, basic categories (which are the
most useful and efficient) are said to maximize
the correlational structure of the environment
by preserving these attribute clusters.
Another motivation for the correlated attributes principle is the idea that organisms
are constantly "going beyond the information
given" to draw inferences and make predictions. For example, on the basis of seeing a
round object in a gymnasium, one might
predict with considerable confidence that it
would bounce (though this inference would
be wrong in the case of a medicine ball). In
general, these predictions or inferences prove
to be accurate to the extent that people
correctly perceive such attribute correlations.
This correlational structure account implies
that some version of the similarity models
considered above is correct at a descriptive
level because categories develop to group
objects with a cluster of features and to
exclude objects with different features. Yet,
this account also makes a stronger claim than
do those previous models: It is not undifferentiated similarity that holds a concept together, but some more elaborated structure
294
GREGORY L. MURPHY AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN
of correlations. In this sense, the correlated
attributes principle is deeper than are general
notions of similarity. That is, an organism
programmed to take advantage of attribute
correlations will tend to form categories that
have high within-category and low betweencategory similarity as a consequence of detecting correlations.
One problem with the correlated attributes
notion is that there are so many possible
correlations that it is not clear how the
correct ones get picked out (see Keil, 1981,
for an elaboration of this point). It would
seem that some additional principle is needed
to provide further constraints on category
cohesion (e.g., perhaps correlations are more
readily noticed if the parts are spatially contiguous or subserve the same function). A
cause and its effect may be highly correlated,
but they would probably be placed in different
categories. Another problem is that the mental
representation of correlated features needs to
be specified further, including a specific
mechanism that results in their making concepts more coherent.
We will not criticize this account because
we believe that concepts that preserve correlations are in fact more coherent. However,
we also believe that there are further principles
that explain this fact—that correlated attributes do not prdvide a full account of conceptual cohesiveness. To anticipate our later
arguments, we believe that feature correlations
are partly supplied by people's theories and
that the causal mechanisms contained in
theories are the means by which correlational
structure is represented.
The Insufficiency
of Categorization Theories
Smith and Medin (1981) divided theories
of category representation into three basic
approaches: the classical view, the probabilistic view, and the exemplar view. It is natural
to ask whether these theories imply useful
constraints on concept or category goodness.
For the most part, they do not.
Classical view. The classical view has it
that categories are defined by singly necessary
and jointly sufficient features. The major
problems with this view as a structural principle are that many categories may not conform to the classical view (see Medin &
Smith, 1984; Mervis & Rosen, 1981; Smith
& Medin, 1981, for reviews) and, equally
seriously, that defining attributes do not ensure coherence. This theory does not pick
out some defining feature sets as better or
more appropriate than others. For example,
a category consisting of striped things that
have more than one leg and that weigh between 11 and 240 kg satisfies a classical view
definition, but does not seem sensible or
cohesive.3
Probabilistic view. The probabilistic view
denies that there is a common core of criteria!
properties and argues that concepts may be
represented in terms of features that are
typical or characteristic, rather than defining.
First, we should note that the criticism just
made for the classical theory applies here as
well: Without supplementation, the probabilistic view cannot tell which combinations of
features form possible concepts and which
form incoherent ones. It would not rule out
the following combination of typical features:
bright red, swims, has wings, eats mealworms,
is found in Lapland, and is used for cleaning
furniture. Clearly the mere fact that this
combination is probabilistic does not mean
that it is coherent (see Murphy & Wisniewski,
1985).
Second, many processing models associated
with the probabilistic view have the general
constraint that the summary representation
coupled with appropriate processing assumptions should accept all members and reject
all nonmembers. The formal term for the
constraint that categories be partitionable on
the basis of a summing of evidence (i.e., the
presence of features) is that the categories be
separable by a linear discriminant function
(Sebetsyen, 1962). That is, categories should
3
One might argue that this concept does not seem
coherent simply because few objects actually contain all
these features. (This objection could also apply to our
first criticism of the probabilistic view below.) However,
other empty concepts are fully coherent; in fact, our
culture is full of fictional or mythical concepts that are
perfectly coherent without having any members. The
classical view does not explain why some empty categories
seem reasonable and others do not. Furthermore, if we
could provide a context in which our example became
coherent (e.g., perhaps a stage prop with those characteristics is needed), the classical view would have nothing
to say about this change.
CONCEPTUAL COHERENCE
be separable on the basis of a weighted,
additive combination of their features: Categories that are not linearly separable should
be difficult to learn and use.
Is linear separability important for actual
concepts? One way of evaluating its importance is to set up two categorization tasks
that are similar in major respects, except that
in one task the categories are linearly separable and in the other categorization task
they are not. Although this question has not
received much attention, what little evidence
there is is negative. In a series of four experiments varying instructions, category size,
and stimulus materials, Medin and Schwanenflugel (1981) found no evidence that linearly separable categories were easier to learn
than categories that were not linearly separable. Thus, linear separability does not appear to be a necessary property of "good"
concepts.
Exemplar view. The exemplar view agrees
with the probabilistic view in holding that
concepts need not have criterial properties
and, further, claims that categories may be
represented by their individual exemplars
rather than by some unitary description of
the class as a whole (see Medin & SchafFer,
1978). Obviously, such a view offers no principled account of conceptual structure because it does not constrain what exemplars
are concept members. Although most exemplar theories assume that category members
are similar, we have already argued that this
alone is not a full explanation of coherence.
In brief, it seems that none of the three
major views of category representation provides a principled account of category cohesiveness.
General Insufficiency of Attribute
Matching and Similarity
Our claim is not only that approaches to
category coherence based on similarity have
to date been unsuccessful, but that, in principle, they will prove to be insufficient. We
see three major problems with an exclusive
focus on similarity and the associated practice
of breaking concepts into constituent attributes or components: First, it leads naturally
to the assumption that categorization is based
solely on attribute matching; second, it ignores
295
the problem of how one decides what is to
count as an attribute; and third, and more
generally, it engenders a tendency to view
concepts as being little more than the sum
of their constituent components. All of these
problems derive directly or indirectly from
failing to view concepts in terms of the
relations between exemplar properties and
the categorization system: Human interests,
needs, goals, and theories are ignored.
Categorization as attribute matching. Our
objection to the idea that categorization derives from attribute matching is that it may
prove to be too limited. For example, the
attributes associated with higher level concepts
may be more abstract than those of lower
level concepts or exemplars. Instead of attribute matching, categorization may be based
on an inference process (see Collins, 1978).
For example, jumping into a swimming pool
with one's clothes on is, in all probability,
not associated with the concept intoxicated,
yet that information might well be used to
decide that a person is drunk. That is, categorizing the person as intoxicated may explain
his or her behavior, even though the specific
behavior was not previously a component of
the concept. This inference process must be
fairly complex, taking into account the context: In our example, the behavior could
imply drunkenness in one context and heroism in another (e.g., jumping into the pool
to save someone from drowning). Concepts
may represent a form of shorthand for a
more elaborate theory, and a concept may be
invoked when it has a sufficient explanatory
relation to an object, rather than when it
matches an object's attributes.
A major respect in which attribute matching may be too limited is that our representations may include information concerning
operations, transformations, and (indirectly)
relations among attributes (see also Hampton,
1981). Much of our reasoning about concepts
may be based on contraints about operations
that are permissible. Consider the following
situation:4 Suppose that all the soda cans you
have come into contact with have been 7.5
cm in diameter and that all the silver dollars
" The example is based on an idea provided by Lance
Rips.
296
GREGORY L. MURPHY AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN
you have seen have been 4.0 cm in diameter.
Suppose further that you are told that some
entity has a diameter of 5.0 cm and you are
asked whether it is more likely to be a soda
can or a silver dollar. To our minds, it is
more likely to be the can. One reason for
this guess is that we know that silver dollars
are mandated by law to be a particular size,
whereas soda cans just happen to be of a
uniform size. Alternatively, one might have
made the opposite conjecture based on the
knowledge that soda cans have to be a particular size to fit soda machines, whereas
there is little reason for the particular size of
silver dollars (other than in casinos). The
point is that, whichever choice is made, it
clearly does not derive solely from attribute
matching or size similarity judgments, but
rather from our knowledge about transformations and operations associated with concepts, and this, in turn, relies heavily on our
general world knowledge.
This case could be recast as an example of
attribute matching in which the attributes
are higher order properties. For example,
one's concept of silver dollar could have the
attribute "used in machines sensitive to exact
size." Although this is technically true, it
misses the important point that the explanatory work is again being done by the theoryconstrained processes that generate these
complex attributes, rather than by attribute
matching per se. Thus, although attribute
matching could be made to be consistent
with these facts, it does not explain or predict
them by itself.
Although we believe that theoretical factors
are important in people's categorizations, it
seems likely that people can develop automatic
routines for identifying objects as members
of concepts when the concepts have consistent
perceptual features. For example, one probably does not usually invoke much theoretical
knowledge in categorizing something as a
robin. The main influence of theories on
perceptual categorization may be on novel
objects and borderline cases, and when the
categorization must be justified or explained.
In short, we emphasize the theoretical aspects
of categorization, but we do not mean to
exclude the use of primarily perceptual information. Current research on categorization
gives evidence that both are important (Kelter
et al., 1984; Murphy & Smith, 1982).
Selecting attributes. Frequently, attributes
are treated as givens or at least as sufficiently
transparent that all one has to do is to ask
experimental subjects to list them. As we
have noted, this largely ignores the problem
of what can count as an attribute. The formal
models of category coherence mentioned
above gain credence from their precise formulation of coherence, but they have no
precise way in which to choose or exclude
the attributes that form their basis.
More recently, some work has begun to be
directed at this issue. Barsalou and Bower
(1983), for example, showed that two types
of properties are likely to be activated during
processing. First, properties that have high
diagnosticity may be active inasmuch as they
are useful for distinguishing instances of a
conept from instances of other conepts. Second, properties relevant to how people typically interact with instances of a concept are
likely to be frequently active (see also Barsalou, 1982, for further arguments). Note that
forms of typical interaction themselves vary
with context (see Roth & Shoben, 1983).
Barsalou and Bower's (1983) research reinforces our thesis that the explanatory work is
on the level of determining which attributes
will be selected, with similarity being at least
as much a consequence as a cause of conceptual coherence. In addition, their reference
to typical interactions with objects suggests
the causal schemata and scripts that we have
said are important in conceptual representations. The properties that distinguish concepts
may be greatly determined by people's goals,
which are linked to their theories about the
objects.
Concepts as equivalent to their components.
The more general problem associated with
viewing concepts as equivalent to the sum of
their components has a long history. Consider
the following quote from John Stuart Mill
(1843/1965):
The laws of the phenomena of the mind are sometimes
analogous to mechanical, but sometimes also to chemical
laws. When many impressions or ideas are operating in
the mind together, there sometimes takes place a process
of a similar kind to chemical combination. When impressions have been so often experienced in conjunction, that
each of them calls up readily and instantaneously the
ideas of the whole group, those ideas sometimes melt
and coalesce into one another, and appear not several
ideas but one; in the same manner as when the seven
prismatic colors are presented to the eye in rapid succes-
CONCEPTUAL COHERENCE
sion, the sensation produced is that of white. But in this
last case it is correct to say that the seven colors when
they rapidly follow one another generate white, but not
that they actually are white; so it appears to me that the
Complex Idea, formed by the blending together of several
simpler ones, should, when it really appears simple, (that
is when the separate elements are not consciously distinguishable in it) be said to result from, or be generated
by. the simple ideas, not to consist o/them. . . . These
are cases of mental chemistry: in which it is possible to
say that the simple ideas generate, rather than that they
compose, the complex ones. (p. 29)
Although many investigators would agree that
mental chemistry is a more apt metaphor for
understanding concepts than is mental composition, the core of this distinction does not
appear to have taken hold. Again, one would
have thought that mental chemistry would
convey a concern with relations (and constraints associated with them), operations,
and transformations on components, as opposed to an exclusive focus on components
(i.e., features) as independent entities.
One defense of the attribute-matching perspective is that relations and operations themselves might be treated as attributes. To take
this step, however, is to concede that attributes
may have a complex internal structure. Relations need arguments, and arguments and
relations mutually constrain one another. This
internal structure means that one is working
with more than a list of simple attributes and
that constraints and explanatory power will
derive from this richer structure.
It also seems likely that the listing of
category attributes, although helpful for certain methodological uses (e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975), may drastically underestimate
people's categorical knowledge, because part
of their knowledge is about relations of category features to each other and of category
members to the world. Thus, a person who
simply memorized the attributes of some
categories without knowing more about the
object domain might have very different concepts than does a person with elaborated
theories. These differences would show up in
the uses of categories in language understanding, naming, problem solving, and other situations (some described below), but perhaps
not in feature listings.
Summary of the Two Approaches
In our discussion, we have lumped together
a number of accounts of concept represen-
297
tation and categorization under the general
heading of similarity-based approaches to
concepts. Although they differ in many respects, these accounts have in common the
characteristic that they treat concepts as collections of attributes. In our critique of this
approach, we argued that it is insufficient to
explain conceptual coherence and the richness
of conceptual structure. (In later sections we
review more empirical data on this issue.)
We emphasize insufficient here because we
do not want to imply that this approach is
completely wrong or misleading. It is clear
that category members seem similar to one
another, but we have argued that similarity
is too flexible to give any specific, natural
explanation of conceptual coherence. One
could see our approach as supplying the
constraints missing from the similarity explanation, rather than simply contradicting it.
Table 1 summarizes the differences of the
similarity-based approach and the theorybased approach on a number of dimensions
(some of which we have yet to address). The
entries for the similarity-based approach uses
attribute as a general term for features, propositions, and other simple chunks of knowledge. Under the theory-based approach, underlying principle is used to refer to the causal
connections, script links, and explanatory
relations that we have been invoking as parts
of theories.
In general, it can be seen that the similaritybased approach requires a minimum of conceptual organization and relations, whereas
the theory-based approach emphasizes both.
One way to describe this difference is to say
that the theory-based approach expands the
boundaries of conceptual representation: In
order to characterize knowledge about and
use of a concept, we must include all of the
relations involving that concept and the other
concepts that depend on it. To explain conceptual coherence, the processes that operate
on a concept must be considered in addition
to the information directly stored with it.
Concepts as Embedded in Theories
We have no illusions about having solved
the problem of concept coherence. Unless
one can specify constraints on what a theory
is, it may not help at all to claim that
conceptual coherence derives from having a
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GREGORY L. MURPHY AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN
Table 1
Comparison of Two Approaches to Concepts
Aspect of conceptual
theory
Similarity-based approach
Theory-based approach
Concept representation
Similarity structure, attribute lists,
correlated attributes.
Category definition
Units of analysis
Various similarity metrics,
summation of attributes.
Attributes.
Categorization basis
Attribute matching.
Weighting of attributes
Cue validity, salience.
Interconceptual structure
Hierarchy based on shared
attributes.
Conceptual development
Feature accretion.
theory. Table 2 lists five general properties
that many theories manifest, along with some
suggested roles that these properties may play
in thinking about conceptual coherence. Because theories are flexible, conceptual coherence may also be. For example, the category
apple-or-prime number does not appear to be
a very coherent concept. In our view, this
lack would derive mainly from the lack of
clear internal or external structure in a theory
about such a category. The relations that
apples participate in (e.g., eating, biological
relations) overlap very little with the relations
that prime numbers participate in.
One could develop a scenario, however, in
which this category might make sense.5 For
example, suppose that one of our colleagues
in the math department, Wilma, has only
two interests: prime numbers and apple
farming. We might, then, form the concept
prime numbers-or-apples, which is explained
as "topics of conversation with Wilma." This
explanation provides very little structure,
however, so that it would probably be less
coherent than the concept apples-or-oranges.
By adding more explanatory links, one could
make the concept more coherent. For example, one could try to explain why Wilma has
only those two interests. Through reference
to naive personality theory and by exploring
the properties of apples and prime numbers,
one could elaborate a theory about why a
Correlated attributes plus underlying
principles that determine which
correlations are noticed.
An explanatory principle common to
category members.
Attributes plus explicitly represented
relations of attributes and concepts.
Matching plus inferential processes supplied
by underlying principles.
Determined in part by importance in the
underlying principles.
Network formed by causal and explanatory
links, as well as sharing of properties
picked out as relevant.
Changing organization and explanations of
concepts as a result of world knowledge.
person would have just these interests. If this
theory were consistent with one's other world
knowledge, then it would also supply external
structure to the concept. Whether this concept
could ever become very coherent is an open
question, depending on the status of the
theory itself and the plausibility of competing
theories. The point is that one might have a
theory that could connect (to some degree)
objects that seem to share very few features.
The rest of this article can be viewed as
an amplification of the entries in Table 2 and
in the right half of Table 1. In the following
sections, we discuss how considering theories
improves on the simple similarity accounts
of these issues.
The Role of Theories in Cognition
Our claim is that representations of concepts are best thought of as theoretical knowledge or, at least, as embedded in knowledge
that embodies a theory about the world. In
this section, we reconsider some of the issues
raised in the previous section and show how
the addition of theoretical knowledge fills
many of the gaps in explaining conceptual
coherence.
* Larry Barsalou helped to develop this example.
CONCEPTUAL COHERENCE
299
Table 2
General Properties of Theories and Their Potential Role in Understanding Conceptual Coherence
Property of theories
Speculation about role in conceptual coherence
"Explanations" of a sort, specified over some
domain of observation.
Constrains which properties will be included in a concept
representation.
Focuses on certain relationships over others in detecting
feature correlations.
Simplify reality.
Concepts may be idealizations that impose more structure
than is "objectively" present.
Have an external structure—fit in with (or do not
contradict) what is already known.
Stresses intercategory structure. Attributes are considered
essential to the degree that they play a part in related
theories (external structures).
Have an internal structure—denned in part by
relations connecting properties.
Emphasizes mutual constraints among features. May
suggest how concept attibutes are learned.
Interact with data and observations in some way.
Calls attention to inference processes in categorization
and suggests that more than attribute matching is
involved.
Theories and Attribute Selection
Earlier we raised the issue of what is to
count as an attribute. One answer is to rely
on consensual validation: If several experimental subjects list some property as an
attribute of some concept, then that attribute
is included in the concept. Rosch and Mervis
(1975) have shown that these listed attributes
can be used to predict goodness of example
ratings and times to verify that an exemplar
is a member of a category (see Mervis &
Rosch, 1981, for a review).
Although this technique has generated important data for theories of categorization to
explain, we may wish to consider the question
of how people choose attributes to list. One
might think that participants can simply retrieve the most important features of the
target concept and report them. However,
there are reasons to believe that the process
of generating attributes is more complex.
First of all, most of the research involving
attribute listing employs judge-amended tallies. The reason for this is that participants
may list attributes at one level of abstraction
and fail to include them at a lower level of
abstraction. For example, they may list "twolegged" for bird, but not for robin, eagle, and
other specific birds. B. Tversky and Hemenway (1984) analyzed this behavior in terms
of cooperative rules of communication (Grice,
1975) and implicit contrast sets (e.g., "twolegged" does not distinguish between robin
and eagle, and so it may not be listed). The
idea of implicit contrast sets may also explain
why "does not fly" is much more likely to
be listed for penguin than for rainbow trout.
Thus, the subject's conception of the relevant
contrast set, as well as the desired level of
specificity, influences the choice of which
features to list. It appears, then, that attribute
listings may be quite constrained by factors
that are only beginning to be studied.
We submit that attribute listings and the
representations behind them are further constrained by the theories that the categories
are involved in. Subjects list not everything
they know about a concept, but rather those
features that are particularly salient and diagnostic in their background knowledge (and
that seem most relevant in the situation, as
B. Tversky & Hemenway, 1984, noted). For
example, most people realize, upon reflection,
that the attribute, "flammable," applies to
wood, money, certain plastics, and (sadly)
even animals. Yet, it probably would be
found only in the conceptual representation
(and the listings) for the first of these categories, presumably because of the known role
of wood in human activities. Some attributes
are prominent in our concepts because of
their importance in our other knowledge
about the world, and others are excluded
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GREGORY L. MURPHY AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN
because of their irrelevance to our theories.
The concept money is central to our theories
of economic and social interaction, in which
the attribute of flammability plays no role.
Thus, it is apparently not part of our representation of money even though it may easily
be inferred as true of most money.
Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) also noted
the importance of theories in specifying attributes of lexical concepts. They contrast a
concept's core, which contains theory-based
attributes, with attributes that are perceptually
salient and therefore useful in identification,
but with little connection to the intrinsic
nature of the concept. They describe the
concept's core as being "an organized representation of general knowledge and beliefs
about whatever objects or events the words
[in a lexical field] denote—about what they
are and do, what can be done with them,
how they are related, what they relate to" (p.
291). They make the explicit equation: "A
conceptual core is an inchoate theory about
something" (p. 291). Although it is often
difficult to draw the line between core features
and more peripheral features, Miller and
Johnson-Laird's description emphasizes the
importance of external and internal structure
of a concept's features in the core.
Theories and Correlated Attributes
We raised the possibility earlier that coherent concepts have clusters of correlated features. We then raised the question of how
conceptual representations take advantage of
these clusters. In other words, what is the
difference between representations of categories with feature correlations and those
without feature correlations that result in the
former being more coherent than the latter?
Smith and Medin (1981, pp. 84-86) discussed two possibilities. One is to represent
correlated features as one single feature. For
example, the features "flies," "has wings,"
and "has a beak" might be combined into
one global feature. Smith and Medin pointed
out that this solution is unprincipled and
counterintuitive, in that the compound feature
really corresponds to three independent features that must be separated in other representations (e.g., bats and penguins have only
two of the three features). The other possibility
they mentioned is to link and label features
that are correlated. So, all three pairs of the
above features would have arcs labeled CORRELATED connecting them.6 This has more
intuitive appeal—its main drawback being
the explosion of feature links it would engender—and Smith and Medin tentatively accept it.
This feature-linking solution has computational tractability. It can adequately represent feature correlations that might be accessed by processes using the concept. However, this solution misses an important insight.
Features in categories are not correlated by
virtue of random combinations. Rather, correlations arise from logical and biological
necessity: Animals and artifacts have structural properties in order to fulfill various
functions, so that some structural properties
tend to occur with others, and certain structures occur with certain functions. It is no
accident that animals with wings often fly or
that objects with walls tend to have roofs.
Even less obvious correlations, such as the
one between furniture being made of wood
and also having a flat top (Malt & Smith,
1984), usually have clear explanations.
Suppose that people are not only sensitive
to feature correlations, but that they can
deduce reasons for those correlations, based
on their knowledge of the way the world
works. Perhaps, then, the connection between
those features is not a simple link, but a
whole causal explanation for how the two are
related. For example, one can connect "has
wings" to "flies" by one's intuitive knowledge
of the use of wings to support a body on air
pressure; "has walls" and "has a roof" are
connected by their common function of protection from the elements. This approach
avoids the explosion of CORRELATED links
because it draws on previously existing
knowledge about the attributes to connect
them: The links are already in memory.
Furthermore, memory research has shown
6
The links would not have to be labeled as CORRELATED—they might simply be associations that simultaneously activate two features, and this pattern of activation
could be used to infer that the features are correlated.
That is, the correlations might be computed rather than
specifically stored. However, this version is also subject
to the objections we raise to the more explicit representation of correlated attributes.
CONCEPTUAL COHERENCE
that it is difficult to remember correlated
facts through simple associations; when the
facts are tied together by a theme of previous
knowledge, memory interference is reduced
(Bower & Masling, 1978; Day & Bellezza,
1983; Smith, Adams, & Schorr, 1978).
Medin, Altom, Edelson, and Freko (1982)
found in experiments with novel categories
that people are, in fact, sensitive to feature
correlations and that they use them in their
categorization judgments (see also L. B.
Cohen & Younger, 1983; Younger & L. B.
Cohen, 1984). This was true even when overall
typicality was controlled for. Thus, people do
spontaneously use feature correlations to aid
their judgments. Notably, during the debriefing, participants frequently offered reasons
for why the correlation was present. They
were not simply computing correlations but
were developing and using theories to explain
the correlations and to structure the concept.
Theories and Concept Use
So far, we have argued on theoretical
grounds that people's concepts must be integrally tied to their theories about the world.
A large part of this discussion has been
somewhat abstract, dealing with various measures of conceptual coherence and accounts
of category structure. This approach to conceptual coherence also has empirical implications for concept use. Although many process models of concept use involve attribute
matching or similarity judgments, we argue
that a number of lines of research give evidence of the use of causal knowledge, rules,
theoretical consistency, and other theory-like
knowledge. This section reviews evidence
pertaining to how theories are involved in
specific uses of concepts.
Correlated Attributes
We have already suggested that theories
are necessary for people to explain feature
correlations. Medin et al. (1982) showed that
people are sensitive to empirical correlations
of features in their category judgments, as
Rosch et al. (1976) suggested they should be.
However, features that are correlated in people's mental representations may not always
reflect empirical relations in the world, but
301
may derive instead from people's theories
about the relations between the features. Although these theory-driven relationships may
actually exist, people may never have empirical data to confirm or disconfirm their expectancies. Examples of these feature pairs
are amount of education and income, zodiac
sign and personality, rate of speech and intelligence, and amount of rehearsal and
strength in long-term memory. Again, we
rush to point out that some of these pairs
may be truly correlated, but others probably
are not. The property that they have in
common is that they are predicted by (some)
people's theories about the world, rather than
being suggested by observation. In fact, some
of them are so theory laden that it would be
difficult to see how one could detect them
without the theory to direct measurement.
When a correlation is perceived to exist on
the basis of one's theories, but has no basis
in empirical fact, it is called an illusory
correlation.
Chapman and Chapman (1967, 1969) presented evidence that therapists and naive
subjects using certain psychodiagnostic tests
perceived correlations between test results
and psychological disorders when in fact there
were none—or even when the opposite correlation obtained. They concluded that people's expectancies prevented them from objectively evaluating the relation between the
test and mental illness. Other studies have
confirmed the effects of theories on perception
of correlations, although not always to the
same degree (Crocker, 1981; Wright & Murphy, 1984). Bower and Masling's (1978) research suggested that the important factor
may be that people be able to construct a
causal explanation for a correlation, rather
than that it match their current knowledge.
Murphy and Wisniewski (1985) provided
some preliminary evidence that theory-based
correlations are actually used to form conceptual representations.
One could imagine a case opposite to the
illusory correlation one, in which the observer
perceived a correlation but could find no
explanation for it; there might be no way to
connect the two attributes in one's mental
scheme of things. One of us (DLM) has
recently completed a set of studies in which
people were asked to sort descriptions of
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GREGORY L. MURPHY AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN
entities into categories. For example, in one
case, the descriptions were symptoms and the
categories were hypothetical diseases. The
task was set up so that people could sort on
the basis of two different sets of correlated
attributes. The two sets of correlated attributes
differed in terms of how readily people might
think of a causal association between them.
Although people are flexible enough that they
can link many pairs of symptoms, pilot work
suggested that it is easier to link some pairs
(e.g., dizziness to earaches, and weight gain
to high blood pressure) than others (e.g.,
dizziness to weight gain, or earaches to high
blood pressure). People showed a strong tendency to cluster on the basis of correlated
attributes for which a causal link could readily
be made. Furthermore, subjects mentioned
such linkages to justify their sorting. For
example, they might say that an ear infection
could disturb the vestibulary organ and produce both dizziness and earaches. Thus, feature correlations may be important in conceptual representations primarily when they
can be represented as theoretical knowledge.
There is also evidence that a prior theory
can facilitate perception or learning of con.tingencies and correlations. For example, in
processing numerical information involving
possible correlations, performance may be
improved dramatically simply by the addition
of meaningful labels for the variables that
suggest their theoretical significance (e.g.,
Adelman, 1981; Camerer, 1981; Miller, 1971;
Muchinsky & Dudycha, 1974; Wright &
Murphy, 1984). Camerer (1981) showed that
people could learn an interaction between
variables when they were labeled in accordance with prior beliefs (i.e., factors thought
to affect wheat futures in the commodity
market), but failed to learn when the same
problem was given as an abstract task involving arbitrary labels.
Linear Separability in Categorization
We mentioned earlier that linear separability does not appear to be a natural constraint on human categorization. One reason
for this may be that people's theories, and
hence their categories, typically have more
internal structure than can be captured by
an independent summing of evidence or by
similarity to a prototype. If this is true, then
if a prior theory suggests that summing or
similarity matching is appropriate, linear separability may in fact become important for
categorization.
Recent work by Wattenmaker, T. Murphy,
Dewey, Edelson, and Medin (1984) supported
this idea. In one study the descriptions were
properties of objects, and the categories were
structured such that the typical attributes for
one category would all be desirable properties
if one were searching for a substitute for a
hammer (e.g., flat surface, easy to grasp). In
one condition subjects were given the notion
of hammer substitutes, and in another condition they were not. The idea was that a
hammer would act as an ideal standard and
that subjects could judge how similar examples were to the hammer prototype (through
independent summing of features).
When prior theories were developed or
suggested, linearly separable categories were
in fact easier to learn than were nonlinearly
separable categories. The reverse held when
no theory was suggested. This result depends
on the theory evoked being compatible with
a summing of evidence. By suggesting a
different form of theory, one should be able
to reverse this pattern of results. For example,
if one category corresponded to psychologists,
one might discourage people from summing
up component information by alerting them
to the fact that there are both experimental
and clinical psychologists and that their traits
may differ considerably. The attribute "likes
computers" might predict category membership for experimental but not clinical psychologists. In a close analogue of this example,
Wattenmaker et al. (1984) found a differential
facilitation in learning categories that were
not linearly separable.
The point of these examples is quite simple.
One cannot describe some abstract conceptual
structure as simple or complex, independent
of the form of theory that might be brought
to bear on it. When theory and structure
match, the task becomes simple; when there
is a mismatch between theory and structure,
the task becomes difficult.
Theories and Prototype Structure
Assuming that most concepts have a typicality structure, people must discover this
structure when they learn a new concept.
CONCEPTUAL COHERENCE
When they encounter a new object, they must
judge how typical it is of a variety of concepts.
Both of these tasks may require use of a
theory. Barsalou's (1983, in press) research
on goal-derived categories presents a particularly clear example in which theories are
crucial to deriving conceptual structure. He
investigated categories such as things to do at
a convention. He found, first, that people are
less likely to discover that four objects are in
one of these categories when they do not
know the goal that relates them (Barsalou,
1983, Experiment 4). Second, he showed that
the typicality structure of goal-derived categories was not simple family resemblance
(similarity of the category members), but
rather how well each instance satisfies the
goal (Barsalou, in press). The reader may
wish to introspect on what the category is
that includes the objects children, jewelry,
portable TVs, paintings, manuscripts, and
photograph albums. Furthermore, which of
the items mentioned is the most typical?
Because the objects have low family resemblance, the task is nearly impossible. However,
once the theme taking things out of one's
home during afire is known, these judgments
become easy. Notice that this concept is not
a "natural" one according to the criteria
given by Keil (1981), yet it does seem to
hang together in its context. Such examples
suggest that theories can elucidate the relations among very different objects and thereby
form them into a coherent category, even if
they do not form a "natural" class.
A third interesting aspect of Barsalou's (in
press) research involves some comparisons
he made between natural and goal-derived
concepts. In the process of showing that the
exemplars of goal-derived categories had typicality ratings that correlated with the degree
to which they satisfied the relevant goal,
Barsalou performed similar computations on
common concepts. Although the underlying
dimensions for natural categories were speculative (e.g., for fruit, how much people like
it), they proved to be significantly correlated
with exemplar goodness even after the effects
of frequency and family resemblance had
been partialed out. This observation suggests
that natural concepts may be partly organized
in terms of underlying dimensions that reflect
how the concept normally interacts with people's goals and activities.
303
Fillmore (1982) made a related suggestion
about the source of typicality structures. He
argued that lexical concepts are represented
in terms of idealized cognitive models. For
example, the concept bachelor can be defined
as an unmarried adult male, in the context
of human society in which certain (idealized)
expectations about marriage and marriageable
age are realized. The existence of "poor examples" of this concept—for example, Catholic priests, homosexual men, men cohabiting
with a girlfriend—does not mean, Fillmore
argued, that the concept itself is ill-defined.
Rather, the claim is that the idealized cognitive
model does not fit the actual world perfectly
well. An entity may deviate from the concept
(i.e., may be atypical) either because it fails
to satisfy "unmarried, adult male" or because
the idealized model is imperfectly realized.
Clearly, such a model is an example of what
we have been calling theories, inasmuch as it
provides a means of connecting many concepts in order to explain diverse facts. Mohr
(1977) argued that this is the correct way to
view Platonic universals, and Lakoff(1982)
developed this notion of idealized models in
some detail.
In this view, the relation between concepts
and exemplars is analogous to the relation
between theory and data. Not only may data
be somewhat noisy, but theories also typically
involve simplifying assumptions that trade
parsimony for power. As Kuhn (1962) argued,
theories depend on a particular background
of accepted beliefs and assumptions that is
taken for granted—until contradictory data
begin to accumulate. Fillmore's (1982) point
was that categorizing objects also depends on
background assumptions about the world,
and our concepts have developed in the context of those assumptions. To some degree,
then, it may be these simplified models that
give rise to unclear cases, and when anomalous or unclear cases arise, our background
assumptions become more salient.
We may underestimate the importance of
implicit theories or background assumptions
about the world because of their very implicitness. Ziff (1972) provided some delightful
examples of the importance of implicit conceptual schemes in understanding. For example, it seems sensible to say "a cheetah
can outrun a man." But what about a 1-day
old cheetah, or an aged cheetah with arthritis,
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GREGORY L. MURPHY AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN
or a healthy cheetah with a 100-pound weight
on its back? What we mean when we say that
a cheetah can outrun a man is that under
some tantalizingly difficult-to-specify conditions, a cheetah would outrun a man. Ziff
referred to this set of conditions as a conceptual scheme and made the point that two
people understand each other to the extent
to which these conceptual schemes are shared.
These implicit theories heavily constrain our
understanding of relations among concepts.
Expertise
The prevailing view of expertise with regard
to concepts seems to be that experts differ
from novices primarily in making finer distinctions (as implicitly expressed by Dougherty, 1978; Rosch et al., 1976). In that
view, experts have many more specific categories than do novices, and they see those
categories as being very distinct. It has often
been suggested that experts should have different concepts from novices, but few studies
have actually investigated their conceptual
structure. Much of the relevant work has
involved cross-cultural comparisons in anthropological studies of lexical structure (e.g.,
Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven, 1973; Dougherty,
1978; others are cited by Mervis & Rosch,
1981). For example, members of agricultural
societies are experts on plants and animals
and have many names for specific animal
concepts, whereas Berkeley undergraduates
are novices and have few such names
(Dougherty, 1978; Rosch et al., 1976).
However, there may well be differences
between experts and novices besides the
amount they know about a category and the
number of categories they can differentiate.
Certainly, experts have better developed theories about the domain than do novices. How
would this affect their conceptual structure?
A reasonable null hypothesis would be that
experts simply know more: They have more
information about each category, and they
know more categories. Although these quantitative predictions seem likely, we do not
believe that they are the only differences.
Experts in some domain probably know more
relations between the objects in the domain.
They can see connections where novices notice none because their theories lead them to
look for certain similarities, regularities, and
cause-effect relations. For example, biologists
notice crucial similarities between shrimps,
moths, grasshoppers, spiders, and crabs, putting them together in one class (the arthropods). We assume that naive observers would
make more pragmatic distinctions, probably
separating the flying, crawling, and waterliving animals. The biologist's theories of
evolution and physiological structures express
themselves in the concept of the arthropods
and would come into play explicitly when
categorizing unfamiliar objects.
There is increasing evidence for the view
that experts make far-reaching connections
that affect their concepts, in addition to having
greater specific knowledge. Murphy and
Wright (1984) examined the concepts of experts and novices in child psychopathology.
The novices were college undergraduates with
no experience in abnormal psychology. Three
other groups ranged in expertise from beginning counselors at a summer camp for disturbed children to clinical psychologists with
extensive experience in the field. All of the
subjects listed attributes of the three major
categories of emotionally disturbed children.
Surprisingly, experts' concepts were not more
distinctive—in fact, the more expert the subjects, the more their categories seemed to
overlap.
This result is somewhat counterintuitive
because experts in clinical psychology are
expected to classify people into different
groups, and the more distinctive their concepts
of the groups, the easier this would be. This
finding points out that classification is not
the only purpose for concepts. Like all psychologists, these experts wanted to find explanations for behavior, and those explanations
point out commonalities to all cases of child
psychopathology (analogous to the zoologist's
search for organizing features in biological
classifications). For example, the professional
psychologists listed "feels angry" and "feels
sad" for all categories, presumably because
of their theories about the motivational and
cognitive concomitants of psychopathology.
Novices also have theories of psychopathology,
but they are apparently more superficial,
accounting for surface differences between
the categories. For example, they listed "feels
sad" as an attribute of depressed children
CONCEPTUAL COHERENCE
only, and "feels angry" exclusively for aggressive children.
One interpretation of these findings is to
attribute them to the fuzziness or even invalidity of psychopathological categories. However, similar evidence was reported in the
realm of physics problems by Chi, Feltovich,
and Glaser (1981), who noticed that novices
classify physics problems using "surface features" that are only roughly correlated with
physical principles. Experts, on the other
hand, apparently categorized problems on
the basis of the major principles used in their
solutions. Consequently, "experts are able to
'see' the underlying similarities in a great
number of different problems, whereas novices 'see' a variety of problems that they
consider different" because the surface features differ (Chi et al., 1981, p. 130). As a
result, the experts made fewer, larger classes
than did the novices. Chi et al.'s results also
highlight the fact that similarity is in the
eyes—and theories—of the beholder.
It seems safe to assume that the physicists'
classifications were not simply fuzzier than
the novices' (as one might argue for the
clinical psychology case). Similarly, the biologist's class of arthropods is accepted as valid,
even though it is much more inclusive than
preferred novice concepts (see Berlin et al.,
1973; Rosen et al., 1976). These examples
provide evidence that people's theories may
lead them to form concepts that they would
not normally have and to alter the content
of other categories.
Cross-Cultural Research
An intriguing possible implication of the
approach we have proposed has to do with
cross-cultural differences in concepts. Clearly,
people in different cultures have different
theories about the world, which should cause
them to have different concepts. In fact, there
are a number of tantalizing examples of
cultural differences in classification tasks (see
the review by Cole & Scribner, 1974). One
well-documented culturally dependent phenomenon is the assignment of the basic level
of categorization. Rosch et al. (1976) first
noted that the basic level of their American
subjects was more general than that of people
from agricultural, nonindustrial societies (as
305
described by Berlin et al., 1972). Dougherty
(1978) and Geoghegan (1976) discussed these
differences in depth and suggested that domains that are important to a culture are
more fully individuated and elaborated both
in the language and conceptual system. The
basic level is more specific in such domains
than in others. Such cultural dependence is
evidence against the idea that the basic level
is purely determined by features in the environment. In our view, this happens because
the greater salience of a domain promotes
more elaborate knowledge structures in the
domain, which in turn can differentiate more
specific concepts.
However, these differences in salience do
not exhaust the effects of cultural knowledge
on concepts. One example is that the Karam
of New Guinea do not consider a cassowary
a bird. Bulmer (1967) argued that this is not
merely because the cassowary does not fly,
but because of its special role as a forest
creature and its resulting participation in an
elaborate antithesis in Karam thought between forest and cultivation. This antithesis
is further related to basic concerns with kinship roles and rights. Apparently, the Karam's
theories about forest life and cultivation produce different classifications than do our culture's biological theories. (For other similar
examples, see Luria, 1976; Tambiah, 1969;
and the review by Cole & Scribner, 1974.)
For categories that are more conceptual than
perceptual, cross-cultural differences may be
even more evident. Shweder and Miller (in
press) demonstrated the importance of cultural presuppositions in social categories involved in person perception, in a strong
parallel to the position of this article.
Linguistic Innovations and
Complex Concepts
Because people's representations of word
meanings are probably closely tied to their
concepts (see E. Clark, 1983), our theory
should also have implications for semantic
interpretation. This influence can probably
best be seen in the understanding of innovative
uses of language, which require modification
of existing word meanings in order to be
interpreted. A similar problem is the formation of complex concepts, in that existing
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GREGORY L. MURPHY AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN
concepts must be modified in order to create
a new meaning.
Clark and Clark (1979) discussed the creation and interpretation of denominal verbs,
which are often innovative—created for a
single use by a particular speaker—rather
than conventional like most word uses. Examples include Max teapotted the dean, and
the boy parched the newspaper, in which the
concepts teapot and porch must be modified
to produce verb interpretations. To explain
how people understand such innovations,
Clark and Clark referred to people's "generic
theories" of objects: their physical characteristics, ontogeny, and potential roles. For example, one's knowledge of boys, newspapers,
and porches allows one to conclude that the
boy parched the newspaper refers to throwing
a paper on the porch (rather than making it
into a porch or pasting it on the porch). The
same denominal verb in a different sentence
frame would involve a different interpretation,
as in the builder parched the house. People's
conceptual knowledge is heavily involved in
producing and constructing interpretations of
such sentences, and that knowledge apparently includes the origins and usual roles of
such objects, as we have argued.
Combining simple concepts into compound
concepts may involve similar processes.7 For
example, how does one generate the concept
pet fish from the concepts pet and fish? One
possibility is the "classical" method of set
intersection (Osherson & Smith, 1981). For
example, pet fish would be formed by taking
the intersection of all things that are pets and
all things that are fish. Much of the early
concept acquisition literature assumes such
an account.
Unfortunately, this view has a great deal
of trouble with many complex concepts.
Consider, for example, ocean drive, expert
repair, or horse race. These concepts are not
intersective at all. Ocean drives are not both
oceans and drives; horse races are not both
horses and races. Linguists discussing nominal
compounds have argued that the meaning of
these terms is determined by a mediating
relation between the two nouns (Kay & Zimmer, 1976), but there is no single relation
that will construct any complex concept (see
Adams, 1973). For example, a horse race is
a race of horses, but an ocean drive is not a
drive of oceans. An expert repair is a repair
done by an expert, but an engine repair is
probably not a repair done by an engine. So,
no single relation (like set intersection) can
describe all or even most compound concepts.
Furthermore, the construction of complex
concepts is not a simple operation on the
features of the two concepts, such as feature
overlap or projection. Although some of the
features of finger gp\ carried over onto finger
cup, considerable knowledge is needed to
specify which features are affected and how
they are combined with the features of cup.
Whenever people form complex concepts or
understand compound nouns, they must be
using their background knowledge of the way
the world works in order to create the correct
concept. In short, the formation of complex
concepts requires mental chemistry rather
than the simple addition of components.
B. Cohen and Murphy (1984) argued that
it is impossible to explain how people form
such compound concepts using only knowledge independent operations. That is, they
said that it is impossible to say in advance
what a complex concept XY means knowing
only the meaning of X and Y, but that
extensive knowledge relating X and Y comes
into play in order to arrive at just the right
compound. In the context of our discussion,
this point translates into the use of people's
implicit theories and operations on concepts.
For example, one's knowledge of the use of
vehicles, their parts and what they do, and
mishaps that happen to them can lead one
to combine engine and repair to get "repair
of an engine." One's knowledge about experts
leads one to combine expert and repair differently. The interpretation of a compound
concept may be thought of as a hypothesis
generated by background theories.
7
It is difficult to give operational criteria to separate
simple from complex concepts. One clue is whether the
concept has a single-word name or requires multiple
words (Berlin et al., 1973). Yet, some compound noun
phrases name unitary concepts, for example, washing
machine. Rather than argue for an operational distinction
here, we have used simple and complex concepts that
are intuitively clear: The simple concepts are described
by a single word, and they combine to form apparently
complex concepts.
CONCEPTUAL COHERENCE
Related Ideas
The notion that people's concepts are tied
up with their theories is not totally new to
psychology (note the earlier discussion of
Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976). Rumelhart
(1980) made a related analogy in describing
his theory of knowledge representation. Schemata, he suggested, are like theories in that
they embody expectations of what things cooccur and how properties are related (pp. 3738). Unfortunately, the actual schemata he
presented are not rich enough to express
people's knowledge about those relations and
co-occurrences. For example, the schema for
buy includes agents, an object being sold, the
transfer of money, and so forth, which expresses a simple theory about financial transactions. However, people's full understanding
of buying events includes information about
the motives and desires of the seller and
buyer, expectations about the relation between
the money and the purchase (that they should
be of near-equivalent worth), and a number
of legal and cultural requirements. Our intent
here is not to criticize Rumelhart's representations: It is possible that a complete schematic representation could contain all the
necessary theoretical knowledge, especially
when the relations among various schemata
are included. Our point is that the full knowledge people have about concepts goes beyond
that normally given in such discussions.
In memory research, the shift from emphasis on memory traces (the Ebbinghaus
tradition) to processes of memory construction and reconstruction (the Bartlett tradition)
has been well documented. Whereas early
memory researchers investigated the passive
laying down and decay of traces, more recent
investigators have posited active encoding and
reconstructive processes (Bransford, Barclay,
& Franks, 1972; Cofer, 1973; Jenkins, 1974).
These processes are based on the relation of
the material to the rest of the knowledge
base, rather than on abstract learning rules.
In the area of judgment and inferences, A.
Tversky and Kahneman (1980) considered
the specific place of causal knowledge in
decision making, implicating it in a number
of judgment situations. Other work suggested
that people give great weight to their theories
307
about people and the world relative to s'tatistical evidence (see Nisbett & Ross, 1981;
Wright & Murphy, 1984, for reviews). In
particular, abstract rules of judgment and
decision making (e.g., Bayes's theorem or
Luce's choice axiom) apparently do not characterize people's decisions. Although this field
has engendered much controversy (e.g., L. J.
Cohen, 1981), it seems clear that people use
specific theories of the world, sometimes inappropriately, to make predictions and decisions.
In the area of language comprehension,
people's use of theoretical knowledge has
been reflected in two ways. First, there has
been increasing interest in people's theories
of communication itself (although this factor
is not usually described in this way). Grice
(1975) first pointed out that speakers and
hearers use their beliefs about the purposes
of a conversation in order to make and
understand implications. H. Clark and Carlson (1982) and H. Clark and Murphy (1982)
discussed how listeners and readers use their
beliefs about the purposes and methods of
communication to understand reference and
various aspects of meaning. In essence, these
discussions have dealt with how implicit theories of communication come into play in
everyday language use (we have already mentioned that they may affect the listing of
concept attributes). Second, psycholinguists
have begun to emphasize how people's
knowledge of the discourse topic allows them
to fully understand the discourse. In this case,
people use their theories about the domain
being discussed to rule out anomalous interpretations and to resolve ambiguities and
vagaries. Simple models of lexical decomposition and inference no longer seem adequate
to the task of explaining the range and
depth of language understanding—see Collins,
Brown, and Larkin (1980), Johnson-Laird
(1981), Rumelhart (1981), and Schank and
Abelson (1977).
Finally, the area of problem-solving has
embraced the notion of mental models in
people's reasoning about complex systems
(see articles in Centner & Stevens, 1983).
Content-free reasoning strategies such as
means-ends analysis or logical deduction seem
unable to account for the relative difficulty
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GREGORY L. MURPHY AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN
of different problems or for individual differences. Instead, investigators have suggested
that subjects form a simplified mental model
of a system and simulate its behavior in order
to make a prediction or evaluation. Clearly,
the subject's theory about the system and the
domain it operates in will greatly determine
his or her problem solution. Furthermore,
concepts in the domain are determined to a
great extent by the whole model in which
they operate.
Although the psychological domains we
have discussed are disparate, there is a clear
theme running through them. In each case,
a simple model based on invariant principles
of organization or process has been found
too inflexible to account for human abilities.
People appear to use content-specific knowledge or theories to process information and
to represent new knowledge. The importance
of these constructive, knowledge-based processes appears to be well established for these
fields.
It is interesting to note that procedural
approaches to categorization from artificial
intelligence have sometimes depended on theory-like structures. For example, the sorting
algorithm that seems to best capture people's
free sorting of entities into categories is not
an exclusively bottom-up processor (Michalski, 1983; Michalski, Stepp, & Diday, 1981).
Rather, the basic procedure of Michalski's
program operates on the level of descriptions
of clusters and aims to maximize criteria
having to do with what represents a good
description. These criteria include such factors
as simplicity, the fit between descriptions and
the entities, and a bias for conjunctive descriptions. Therefore, a good description can
be thought of as having the character of a
good theory (the former is a consequence of
the latter).
Philosophy of science has long considered
the question of whether concepts are integrally
bound up with theories. Unfortunately, there
is little agreement on the answer, with opinions ranging across the extremes. Philosophers
such as Kuhn and Feyerabend argued that
scientists with different theories about a domain must have different concepts in the
domain, even if their concepts have the same
names. For example, physicists who held the
wave theory of light had concepts of light,
color, and the like that differed from those of
physicists who held the particle theory. Other
philosophers have downplayed this possibility
or have argued that any such conceptual
differences are usually insignificant; Suppe
(1977) provides a complete discussion of both
sides. Although this issue remains controversial, it does seem clear that present-day scientific concepts are quite different from past
understanding of the same concepts as a
result of new theories and knowledge. Current
work in philosophy of science focuses on the
boundaries of such conceptual differences.
Conceptual Development
The study of children's concepts and semantic development may be a crucial area
for showing the importance of theories in
conceptual structure. Not only do children
lack words for many of the entities, events,
and situations that adults have words for,
they may have quite different theories about
how those entities, events, and situations are
related. Although there is still no consensus
on children's cognitive and linguistic representations, we believe that some of the accepted findings speak to the issues we have
raised.
The most influential theory of semantic
development in recent years has been Eve
Clark's Semantic Feature Hypothesis (E.
Clark, 1973a, 1973b; Richards, 1979). Following accepted linguistic analyses, Clark used
sets of components or features as semantic
representations. She suggested that children's
first semantic representations of a word are
a subset of the adult features (although occasionally completely incorrect features will
sneak in) and that development consists primarily of adding features as they are learned.
The Semantic Feature Hypothesis successfully
described much of the data, including the
order of acquisition of words in many domains and common naming errors (see E.
Clark, 1973a, 1973b, 1983).
For a variety of reasons, this theory is no
longer widely accepted in its original form
(see Carey, 1982; E. Clark, 1983; Richards,
1979), a trend that is consistent with our
previous arguments about the insufficiency
of feature-based models of concepts. It is not
our purpose to review the literature in se-
CONCEPTUAL
mantic development here, but we would like
to highlight the studies that shed light on
how theories might influence conceptual development and that contrast with the featural
view.
One of the first studies was E. Clark's
(1973b) demonstration of nonlinguistic "biases."
Previous data had suggested that children
learned locative prepositions in the order, in,
on, under. For some time, they treated under
as if it meant in or on. One explanation for
these data was that all three words had the
same semantic representation at first, and
that with increasing experience, children
added features to differentiate them. However,
Clark showed that children had biases about
spatial arrangements that influenced their
performance in comprehension tasks. That
is, if told, "Put the block under the crib,"
they might put it in the crib instead, because
of their knowledge of usual spatial relations.
In fact, they made the same error even when
imitating nonverbal actions. Clark suggested
that the youngest children tested (about 21
months old) know only that in, on and under
are spatial terms and that they use spatial
strategies to respond to those words. Children
depend on their knowledge of supporting
surfaces and containers, and the usual orientation of objects to interpret utterances
with locative prepositions (see also H. Clark,
1973). In a sense, they are depending on
implicit theories of spatial relations to understand and learn new words. Semantic development, therefore, consists of coordinating
one's conceptual knowledge with the conventions of word use. As E. Clark (1973b) remarked, in this view it becomes very difficult
to determine when a child knows the correct
meaning of a word: One must try to access
linguistic knowledge separately from the conceptual basis, which may be impossible in
practice.
Carey (1982) also provided a critique of
the notion of feature accretion as an explanation of semantic development. The acquisition of spatial adjectives like big, little, tall,
short, thick, and thin had been taken to be
evidence for the Semantic Feature Hypothesis:
Big-little were analyzed as having relatively
few semantic components, tall-short as having
additional features specifying orientation, and
thick-thin as having yet more features (see
COHERENCE
309
below). The order of acquisition followed this
analysis. Carey, however, argued that the difficulty of learning thick-thin was not the
mere number of features it contains, but
rather that it requires attending to "theoryladen" features specifying that the dimension
being referred to is "tertiary." In order to
resolve the meaning of these terms, Carey
claimed that children must learn the complex
spatial system we use in our culture to assign
such spatial adjectives, and that this system
is not part of their beginning theories about
the world. Presumably, the learning of this
spatial system goes hand in hand with learning
the language. We would add that the child
must also have extensive background knowledge about individual objects in order to
determine their primary and tertiary dimensions. This knowledge is necessary to interpret
the use of thick when applied to objects as
diverse as doors, lines drawn on a page,
people, and bicycle tires.
Keil and Carroll (1980) provided a demonstration that children do not represent
spatial terms as abstract features, but that
their understanding of them was inextricably
bound up in their knowledge of the world.
They demonstrated that children's willingness
to describe something as tall depended on
what they believed they were naming. A child
might be able to pick out the tallest of a trio
of mountains, but not the tallest of a trio of
blanket piles—even though the same picture
was used for both. Keil and Carroll proposed
that the children had not yet extracted the
abstract meaning of tall, but they did know
some things that tall is used to describe (e.g.,
people, houses, mountains). Until they learn
the full meaning, they depend on some primitive theory of what tall things are like.
The work of Ellen Markman and her colleagues (see Markman & Callanan, 1984) is
also suggestive in this context. It is known
that young children have difficulty learning
and using superordinate concepts (Horton &
Markman, 1980; Mervis & Crisafi, 1982;
Rosch et al., 1976), which is not surprising,
given their loose structure. Presumably, it is
difficult for children to infer the functional
relationship that often characterizes superordinates (furniture, tool, vehicle, weapon,
etc.). Callanan & Markman (1982) suggested
that 2- and 3-year-old children understand
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GREGORY L. MURPHY AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN
superordinates not as classes, but as collections of objects. That is, rather than thinking
of furniture as a name that applies to individual objects, they think of it as a name for a
group or configuration of a number of objects.
They may believe that furniture refers to an
arrangement of chairs and couches around a
table in the living room. However, children
do not seem to have the same problem with
most basic concepts, which are much more
perceptually based (Callanan & Markman,
1982).
These results are consistent with the interpretation that children cannot simply memorize that couches, chairs, tables, and bureaus
are all furniture—they seem to need an explanation for this grouping, which might
otherwise be incoherent. For them, the most
reasonable explanation may be a spatial configuration rather than the more abstract functional explanation that adults use. If this is
true, then it demonstrates the importance of
underlying relationships in learning concepts.
(See Gentner, 1983, for a similar claim concerning analogical transfer.)
Finally, in considering children's errors in
learning noun and verb meanings, Carey
(1982) argued that children's problems arise
not from faulty linguistic abilities, but rather
from an impoverished conceptual structure.
For example, to fully understand a word like
buy may require a sophisticated understanding
of monetary exchange. But children may
interpret buy merely as "get at a store." More
generally,
The components revealed by semantic analyses of the
adult lexicon cannot be expected to be the primitives
over which the child forms his hypotheses about the
meanings of words. Often those components are theoretical
terms in theories the child has not yet encountered, and
they therefore require theory building on his part before
they are available to his conceptual system. (Carey, 1982,
p. 374)
Of course, the relation cuts both ways: An
impoverished conceptual structure might
prevent someone from learning a word fully,
but in other cases, language learning influences the conceptual structure. A child may
learn about monetary exchanges through
learning the meaning of buy and sell rather
than through direct experience or lessons in
economics. As the child learns about the
distinction between buy, sell, trade, give, and
so forth, he or she learns complex concepts
that are central to understanding society.
In her own studies of biological concepts
(as described in Carey, 1982), Carey followed
the development of concepts like animal and
living thing. She attempted to empirically
test Quine's theory that an innate similarity
metric is replaced by a scientific metric as
the basis of concepts. She did find some
evidence for such a shift; children first organize properties of animals around their applicability to humans, but later develop a
more systematic organization based on biological functions. However, even the youngest
children (4 years old) showed some use of
biological knowledge in their categorizations.
Adults and children both rated a toy monkey
as being more similar to people than a worm
was. However, adults and children also agreed
that the worm was more likely to have a
spleen than was the toy monkey (a spleen
was described as "a green thing inside people"). Apparently, even the youngest children
differentiated surface similarity from category
membership. Although worms may be less
similar to people than are toy monkeys, they
are more similar in some respects, namely,
common biological functions. Carey's results
demonstrate that it is those respects that
determine category membership, rather than
similarity as a whole. As Carey (1982, p.
386) put it, "The child's rudimentary biological knowledge influences the structure of his
concept animal in several ways, even for
children as young as 4. To that extent, animal
functions as a natural kind concept by Quine's
characterization."
A crucial question that arises in considering
theories in conceptual development is when
they make their first appearance. One might
argue that children form their first concepts
through perceptual similarity; then, as they
learn more about the world, they incorporate
knowledge into their concepts, where it has
increasing importance. On this view, the similarity-based accounts of coherence are correct
for early concepts, at least, to the extent that
we can ascertain built-in constraints on the
perception of similarity. The question, then,
is just when theories begin to have an effect.
Our view is that theories are important very
early: E. Clark's (1973b) results showed that
children under 2 years old demonstrated a
CONCEPTUAL COHERENCE
variety of spatial biases. Other researchers
have found that very young children can
distinguish the sorts of objects that receive
proper names from those that do not, presumably reflecting a theory of individuality
(Gelman & Taylor, 1984; Katz, Baker, &
Macnamara, 1974). As we argued earlier,
these biases and preconceptions may be biologically determined to some extent through
perceptual and cognitive structures (see H.
Clark, 1973; Keil, 1981). Although young
children may not have scientific theories or
sophisticated schemata, they may well use
their understanding of their world, or prototheories, in forming concepts (see KarmiloffSmith & Inhelder, 1974/1975, for more direct
evidence). Rather than a shift from similaritybased concepts to more theoretically-based
concepts, perhaps all concepts are integrated
with theories, but children's theories change
radically.
Some studies of infants' categories have
shown prototype structures in children a few
months old (e.g., L. B. Cohen & Younger,
1983). The age of the children and the structure of the stimuli leave little doubt that the
infants are forming concepts based on perceptual similarity. However, as we have already noted, similarity itself is not an unanalyzable relation, and perceived similarity
also changes with development (see Kemler,
1982). It is certainly possible that children's
prototheories of the functions, relations, and
importance of objects have effects quite early.
Exactly when they do is an empirical question,
one that we hope will get some attention.
The Classical Theory of Concepts
A major bone of contention in the theory
of concepts has been the question of whether
concepts can be specified by necessary
and sufficient features. Wittgenstein (1953)
sparked the debate among philosophers, which
continues today among psychologists and linguists as well. Although this classical theory
appeared to be dead (see, e.g., Smith &
Medin, 1981), a number of hybrid theories
have arisen. Osherson and Smith (1981), for
example, suggested that the conceptual core
is all or none, and that prototypes and other
nonessential information about a concept are
used mainly for identification, but are not
311
strictly part of the concept. McNamara and
Steinberg (1983) argued for a mixed theory,
in which concepts are represented by both
defining (necessary and sufficient) and characteristic features.
We do not mean to resolve the philosophical issues here. Regardless of one's theory of
concepts, it is a fact that most people believe
that there are necessary and sufficient features
that define concepts. McNamara and Sternberg (1983) documented this fact convincingly, and informal questioning reveals that
naive subjects are loathe to admit that there
are no truly defining features, even when
they cannot produce any (Rosch & Mervis,
1975). Armstrong, Gleitman, and Gleitman
(1983) asked subjects whether they thought
certain categories were all or none or had
graded membership. For their natural categories, the percentage of subjects who responded "all or none" ranged from 24% (for
vehicle) to 71% (for sport). People apparently
have a strongly held belief that there are
defining attributes for categories, in spite of
the failure of psychologists, linguists, and
philosophers to find any. (Suggestions for
necessary features have been made, but these
never seem to define the concept sufficiently;
e.g., perhaps all trips involve motion, but this
does not separate them from innumerable
other events.) What we will try to explain is,
where do these beliefs come from?
A natural prediction from our previous
discussion is that naive theories in a domain
suggest that certain features are "defining."
We have already claimed that theoretical and
conceptual knowledge are closely intertwined.
Perhaps, then, the reason that people believe
in a necessary basis for their concepts is that
much of their knowledge of the world depends
on correctly differentiating things into categories. Suggesting that concepts are ill-defined
or fuzzy might cast doubt on much of one's
knowledge.
However, not all features are perceived as
defining; "defining" features, on our account,
are those that are most central to our understanding of the world. In Fillmore's (1982)
terms, those features that are most integrally
involved with our idealized cognitive models
will appear to be defining. For example, if it
turned out that carrots weren't made of cells,
then we would have to reconsider most of
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GREGORY L. MURPHY AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN
our other beliefs about carrots as well as
about plants in general (for example, our
theories of plant growth). Or if it turned out
that some diamonds are really quite soft,
then we would have to re-explain our past
experiences with diamonds (or things we
believed to be diamonds), the numerous
claims people make about diamond hardness,
our beliefs about diamond formation, and
anything we might have known about crystal
structures. Thus, being made of cells for
carrots might be considered a denning feature,
as might hardness for diamonds, because
these features are so closely tied to other
information about those categories.
If some of our characteristic features turned
out to be wrong, a much smaller change in
the knowledge base would be required. For
example, if carrots weren't really orange, one
could just assume they have been systematically dyed by unscrupulous grocers or farmers.
This new information would probably not
affect our concepts of plant life in general. If
diamonds weren't really found in belowground mines, none of the knowledge mentioned above would need to be reconsidered.
One could assume that jewelers or diamond
suppliers had lied in order to protect their
market. In short, defining features are those
at the meeting point of much of our knowledge.8 Characteristic features are those toward
the periphery of our knowledge base. More
precisely, when a feature is involved in many
causal links, rules, or scripts, it is perceived
as "more denning" than a feature that is
involved in few of them. The features at
either end of the spectrum appear to be
clearly denning or characteristic; those in the
middle (involved in a moderate number of
theoretical links) are the ones that cause
arguments.
It is important here to separate the psychological question of denning and characteristic features from the philosophical-semantic issue. We think that, on reflection,
most people would agree that it might be
possible to find (or make) a soft diamond.
Therefore, hardness is in some sense only a
characteristic feature. Yet McNamara and
Sternberg (1983) found that people say that
being the hardest substance known is necessary for being a diamond. It seems likely that
when people list such defining features, they
are answering the question of which attributes
are most central to their concepts, rather
than which include all (potential) members
and exclude all nonmembers. (An examination of other features given by McNamara &
Sternberg's subjects reinforces this view.) Even
if no feature is truly denning in a semantictheoretical sense, people may put great weight
on those that are tied up with much of their
knowledge.
Conclusion
We have been arguing that people's theories
and knowledge of the real world play a major
role in conceptual coherence. This tendency
to relate concepts and theories may be such
that people impose more structure on concepts than simple similarity would seem to
license.
Consider again the abominations of Leviticus, in which the animals that are clean and
unclean for the people of Israel are listed in
great detail. Over the years there have been
many speculations concerning what properties
of animals gave rise to their being listed as
clean or unclean, as the overall similarity of
the animals in each group is so low. To our
minds, the most cogent speculation concerning this classification rule, developed in Mary
Douglas's (1966) intriguing book, Purity and
Danger, is that there should be a correlation
between type of habitat, biological structure,
and form of locomotion. Creatures of the
water should have fins and scales, and swim;
creatures of the land should have four legs
and jump or walk; and creatures of the air
should fly with feathered wings. Any class of
8
Quine (1961) used a similar line of reasoning to
argue against the existence of analytic truths, that is,
statements that are necessarily true by virtue of the
language. A prime candidate for such analytic truths has
been to ascribe denning features to a concept, like
"carrots are made of cells." Quine (1961, p. 43) pointed
out that virtually any feature can be taken away from a
category (e.g., hardness could be taken away from diamonds), but when some features are removed, a global
reorganization of one's knowledge base is necessary. The
larger this reorganization, the more analytic (denning)
the feature is. Thus, he argued for a continuum of
analytic to synthetic truths rather than a dichotomy. This
philosophical argument parallels our psychological argument for why people perceive some features to be denning,
although the two issues are potentially independent.
CONCEPTUAL
creature not equipped for the right kind of
locomotion in its element is unclean. For
example, ostriches would be unclean because
they do not fly. Crocodiles are unclean because their front appendages look like hands,
and yet they walk on all fours. If this analysis
is correct, then there was a theory of appropriate physiological structure associated with
each type of environment, and any animal
that did not meet its standards was unclean.
The category dean animals, then, comprises
a coherent set of entities, even though the
overall similarity of the members is very low.
Although most categories probably have a
better similarity structure than these examples,
the point is clear that theories can impose
coherence even when similarity is low.9
We think that there are two components
to conceptual coherence. The first component
involves the internal structure of a particular
conceptual domain (see Table 2). Concepts
that have their features connected by structure-function relationships or by causal schemata of one sort or another will be more
coherent than those that do not. Although
these correlations may be strictly empirical,
in most cases they will be driven by expectations and hypotheses. In this way, the concept is integrated with the rest of the knowledge base. Other properties such as high
within-category similarity and low betweencategory similarity may be by-products of
this internal structure.
The second component of coherence has
to do with the position of the concept in the
complete knowledge base, rather than its
internal structure (see Table 2). This component is the question of how the concept
fits into "the cosmic machine revealed by
science" (Quine, 1977, p. 171)—or, more
accurately, the cosmic machine represented
in people's heads. Concepts that have no
interaction with the rest of the knowledge
base will be unstable and probably soon
forgotten. This component is also important
in the formation of new concepts.
One objection to the theory-based approach
that might be raised is that it is circular. How
can mental theories explain concepts, the
objection goes, when theories themselves are
made out of concepts? The answer is that we
are not attempting to reduce issues of conceptual representation to theoretical repre-
COHERENCE
313
sentation. On the contrary, we believe that
the influence is bidirectional—one cannot
talk about theories or knowledge representation in a domain without specifying the concepts people have in the domain. (In fact,
research on people's naive theories has typically included discussion of their relevant
concepts; see Centner & Stevens, 1983.) Concepts and theories must live in harmony in
the same mental space; they therefore constrain each other both in content and in
representational format. Our point is that
these constraints will provide insight into the
structure of both areas, not that one can be
replaced by the other. We agree that theories
are made up of concepts (to a great extent)
and urge that this fact be employed in our
theories of concepts.
In our criticism of similarity as the sole
basis of conceptual coherence, we pointed
out that similarity needs to be greatly constrained before it makes any predictions.
However, we should point out that the notion
of a good theory is not yet fully constrained:
We gave some idea in Tables 1 and 2 of what
constitutes a good theory, but there is clearly
more work to be done here. In fact, the point
of this article is not to provide a complete
account of the use of theories in conceptual
structure, but is rather to demonstrate that
theories are indeed important and to encourage future research to detail exactly how they
are involved in concept formation and use.
We do not wish to suggest that previous
studies on novel concepts that are divorced
from real-world knowledge have no worth,
nor that future such studies will be of little
interest. These studies have provided the basis
for our own theorizing, and they represent a
necessary technique for studying conceptual
structure. Our main point is that these studies
and associated categorization theories relying
exclusively on similarity relations are insufficient to provide a theory of concepts. We
have argued that a coherent concept is one
that we have a good theory about and that
fits well with our other knowledge. This ap-
9
We are guilty of oversimplifying here. No doubt the
conceptual scheme associated with the division of clean
and unclean animals is more elaborated and more intertwined with the culture that gave rise to these concepts
than this example implies.
314
GREGORY L. MURPHY AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN
proach raises a number of empirical questions, many of them related to the question
of how concepts are initially acquired and
how expertise in a domain affects the concepts
of that domain. The exact details of how
theories affect internal and external conceptual structure have yet to be specified. Future
research on concepts and categories can help
answer these questions not by controlling the
effects of world knowledge and experience,
but by exploiting them—by bringing the concepts into contact with the whole cognitive
system that created them.
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