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Finn Gardiner
13 December 2016
Final Essay
T H E I N D I V I D U A L S W I T H D I S A B I L I T I E S E D U C AT I O N A C T
Introduction: What Is IDEA?
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, or IDEA, is a law designed to protect
the rights of children and youth with disabilities within US state-funded schools, from
early childhood to the end of high school. Initially passed in 1975 as the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act (EHA), the bill protects the right of students with
disabilities to be educated in public schools. Under the law, public schools are required
to provide them a “free and appropriate public education,” meaning that schools must
ensure that students with disabilities are educated to the highest standard available.
Schools are required to provide comprehensive plans detailing students’ educational
needs and how they are to be met through the education system, and must provide
what is deemed a “meaningful education,” ensuring that students with disabilities are
able to derive benefit from public education in a similar fashion to non-disabled
students. Rooted in principles established during the Civil Rights Movement, IDEA
bases its principles on the Fourteenth Amendment and its equal protection clause.
Using a polity-centric approach—a framework for political analysis introduced
by Theda Skocpol (1993)—I will examine the history of the IDEA, the effects the
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disability rights movement have exerted upon its passage, and the roles civil society
and institutions of government played in developing this legislation. Under this
approach, the creation of policy is based on the intersection between identity and
affinity groups; government institutions, political parties, and the rules established by
those institutions; and the amount of access or leverage that these entities can exert on
the policymaking process (Skocpol, 1993).
Part I: History: From Pariahs to Political Actors: Pre-1970 Disability History
Historically, students with disabilities had been excluded from public education after its
mainstreaming in the twentieth century. Children and adolescents with disabilities were
more likely to be consigned to “state schools,” or institutions designed to warehouse
people with disabilities. These facilities were notorious for being devoid of educational
content, and for their squalid, Dickensian conditions—a twentieth-century American
analogue to the notoriously oppressive British poorhouses. Diagnostic labels like
“feebleminded,” “idiot,” “moron,” and “imbecile” were near-death sentences. This
systemic exclusion from mainstream education led to the de facto removal of many
people with disabilities from public life generally. People born with disabilities were not
seen as a protected category of people endowed civil rights; rather, they were the objects
of pity and derision, in contrast to people who acquired disabilities later in life, like
wounded soldiers.
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As Linton (1998) states in Claiming Disability, mainstream society treated people
with disabilities as pariahs, meant only to be hidden from the rest of society and
rendered as a threat to the established social order simply by differing from a vaunted
norm. In the United States, this represented itself as the warehousing of people with
disabilities in squalid institutions like the Willowbrook State School of New York and
Massachusetts’ Fernald State School, forced sterilization, and scapegoating by means of
eugenic theory that posited that disability was connected to criminality and degeneracy.
Though many associate eugenics and the political and medical devaluation of people
with disabilities with Nazi Germany, it is important to remember that the Nazis’
policies found their origins in the United States (Linton, 1998). Nazi violence against
disabled people was not a homegrown phenomenon; it was an American import that
Hitler and his acolytes honed and “perfected” into the Aktion T-4 extermination
program. Under Hitler, people with disabilities were considered lebensunwertes Leben, or
“lives unworthy of life”—an extreme interpretation of the pariah model of disability
(Linton, 1998).
Because people with disabilities and their allies had not become a politicized
identity group, it was impossible for them to form a workable coalition that would have
allowed them to gain access to political power and dismantle structures that upheld
systemic ableism. Without a political consciousness that afforded them the ability to
view disability as a class of people worth protecting, there was no way to challenge the
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status quo and persuade political parties or elected officials that disability rights
deserved to be protected.
The Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s served as a catalyst for the
advancement of the civil rights of people with disabilities. The actions of disability
advocates, an increased willingness to frame disability rights as civil rights, and the
burgeoning awareness of the mistreatment of disabled people in institutions by the
mainstream media helped create the coalition that would ultimately push through
legislation in the 1970s that enshrined the rights of people with disabilities to be entitled
de jure equal treatment.
The struggle for Black Americans to be treated equally in a country that had
systematically exploited their work and consigned them to the margins of society
helped spawn other social movements that built from a similar framework of civil
rights, social justice, and the leveraging of a collective identity to advocate for equity in
the political sphere. While the second wave of feminism and the rise of the LGBTQ
rights movement have perhaps gained more popular attention than other movements,
the disability rights movement also emerged from this collective raising of the
American consciousness. The relationship between disability rights activists and the
Civil Rights Movement went beyond a simple appropriation of the techniques used by
racial justice activists; in fact, they noted the intersection between systemic racism and
systemic ableism. They found that Black children in Missouri were disproportionately
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more likely to have diagnoses of mild intellectual disability—then called “educable
mental retardation”—than were White children, leading Black pupils to receive an
inferior education to White children even after the end of de jure segregation in schools
(Fleischer & Zames, 2011).
The mainstream media, too, would eventually play a role in drawing attention to
civil rights abuses inflicted on disabled people. Geraldo Rivera, then an investigative
reporter for a local New York television station, exposed the Willowbrook State School’s
abuses in a special called The Last Great Disgrace in 1972 (D. Brown, 2014). Though the
school had already received condemnation from Senator Robert Kennedy (D-MA), who
had called it a “snake pit,” there had been little action to reform the school before the
airing of The Last Great Disgrace (D. Brown, 2014). Willowbrook’s abuse of its residents
gained regional and national notoriety; soon after the broadcast of The Last Great
Disgrace, news publications like The New York Times covered the inhumane treatment of
Willowbrook’s prisoners (D. Brown, 2014). Like televised shots of altercations between
police officers and Black civil rights protestors in the Deep South, or the exposure of
Nazi concentration camps after Hitler’s defeat in World War II years before, The Last
Great Disgrace created a concrete image of what systemic violence towards marginalized
people looked like. Rivera himself drew the comparison between Willowbrook’s
squalor and Hitler’s Germany: he characterized Willowbrook as “not unlike Nazi death
camps,” where inmates were forced to lie in their own excrement (Linton, 1998).
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Bernard Carabello, a former resident of Willowbrook with cerebral palsy who had been
misdiagnosed with an intellectual disability, reported severe physical and sexual abuse,
including being beaten with belts and sticks (D. Brown, 2014). Another former resident,
Judy Moiseff, recalls being isolated from her parents, being taught very little, and being
sequestered inside the building with little opportunity to go outside (D. Brown, 2014).
Carabello, Moiseff, and other people with disabilities who were “educated” in
institutions like Willowbrook were the victims of a system that had not viewed people
with disabilities as being part of public life, and it took the work of wide-ranging
coalitions invested in civil rights to begin to rectify these gross abuses.
Like other civil rights movements that gained traction in the mid-twentieth
century, the disability rights movement was not without opposition, primarily from
politicians who thought laws protecting people with disabilities would present an
undue burden and dismissed the civil rights implications that the denial of disabled
people’s equal rights invited. Chief among these politicians was President Richard
Nixon, who expressed his opposition to disability rights bills introduced in Congress,
including the Rehabilitation Act. The Rehabilitation Act was a precursor to IDEA, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and other disability-related legislation that included
disability rights within a broader civil rights framework. When Congress passed the
first versions of the Rehabilitation Act in 1972 and 1973, Nixon vetoed it twice, claiming
that it was “too expensive,” and that the bill would unnecessarily shift the focus from
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employment to entitlements, a common Republican bugbear (Fleischer & Zames, 2011).
Nixon’s placing costs over the principle of equal protection is redolent of the
Republican Party’s Southern Strategy and anti-civil-rights revanchism that propelled
him to victory in the 1968 presidential election. Nixon’s vetoes of the Rehabilitation Act
were met with protests from disability activists, including a sit-in led by Judith
Heumann, an early leader in the disability rights movement (Fleischer & Zames, 2011).
Part II: Mobilizing for Justice: EHA and IDEA: 1970-2010
The Road to Justice: Precursors to EHA
The increased awareness of disability rights as a civil right led to concrete pushes
towards protecting the rights of children and youth with disabilities to receive an
education beyond what had been previously afforded to them by institutions. One early
disability advocate, Gunnar Dybwad, played an outsized role in educational advocacy
through his contribution to court cases that led to the passage of legislation protecting
the educational rights of children and youth with disabilities. Dybwad, who had trained
as a lawyer in his native Germany before moving to the United States, believed strongly
in the role of federal courts and the Supreme Court as a means to ensure the human
rights of people with disabilities. Inspired by the success of Brown v Board of Education,
Dybwad applied equal-protection principles drawn from the Fourteenth Amendment—
the same techniques used to successfully defend the right of Black children to attend
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integrated public schools—to advocate for equal treatment for people with disabilities
in his work collaborating with other advocates to use the court system to enshrine
disability rights (Disability Justice). Before Brown, schools engaging in racial segregation
used Plessy v Ferguson, the Supreme Court case upholding racial segregation and other
“separate-but-equal” forms of social inequity, to defend the existence of whites-only
schools (Disability Justice). Similar injustices were enacted upon students with
disabilities, who were routinely excluded from accessing the same resources that nondisabled students were granted through the school system. Though Dybwad recognized
the potential of Brown to be used for disability rights cases soon after its passage, the
opportunity to apply this principle to disability-rights-related cases would not appear
until twenty years after Brown had become the law of the land.
Two 1972 federal court cases—Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children
(PARC) v Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Mills v Board of Education of District of
Columbia—proved to be watershed cases that would enshrine the right of children and
youth with disabilities to receive a public education (Disability Justice). Like Brown v
Board of Education twenty years earlier, these court cases used the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to argue that segregation of children with
disabilities in the public school system was a violation of their equal rights (Disability
Justice). The plaintiffs in the PARC case sued the State of Pennsylvania for disallowing
children with a “mental age of less than five years” from enrolling in first grade, using
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Brown and the Fourteenth Amendment as their guide (Disability Justice). This
restriction prevented children with intellectual disabilities from accessing the same
education that their peers without an intellectual disability were able to obtain from the
state. Three judges with the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled
that the state was not allowed to deny any student under the age of 21 access to public
schools, and that schools were required to educate students “appropriate to [their]
learning capacities” (Disability Justice). Furthermore, parents were entitled to due
process remedies if schools violated this ruling and continued to deny their children
access to public education (Disability Justice).
Free and Appropriate Public Education: The Beginnings of EHA
Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, the second major court case that
would prove decisive in ensuring the right of children and youth with disabilities to
receive a free and appropriate public education, built on the foundation of the PARC
case. Like PARC, Mills was a class-action lawsuit brought on behalf of a group of
Washington, DC, children who had been rejected from public schools because of their
disabilities (Disability Justice). The children represented in the PARC case all had
intellectual disability diagnoses, but the group represented in Mills represented a wider
range of disabilities. Though the District of Columbia Board of Education admitted that
it was responsible for the education of all children in Washington, DC, it claimed that it
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did not have the resources to educate children with intense support needs beyond what
was offered by the standard curriculum. In Mills, the US District Court of the District of
Columbia ruled on the side of the plaintiffs, declaring that students with disabilities
were entitled to a free and appropriate education, and financial burden was not an
acceptable excuse to deny children the education they deserved (Disability Justice).
These court cases were an example of the confluence, or “fit,” between voluntaryassociation groups and the structures of government that Skocpol articulated in
Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: advocates working outside government itself took
advantage of a political climate that supported passing legislation based on civil-rights
principles and pushed it towards becoming government policy itself.
The Mills ruling and 27 subsequent federal court cases spurred Congress to
introduce a bill—later known as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, or
EHA—that would protect the rights of children with disabilities to receive a suitable
education (Disability Justice; Fleischer & Zames, 2011). Though both the House and
Senate versions of the bill were sponsored by Democrats, EHA was ultimately signed by
a Republican president, Gerald Ford, in 1975 (Congressional Research Service). EHA
was based on the principles initially stated in Mills: that children with disabilities were
entitled to a free and appropriate public education. EHA stipulated that that state
education systems were required to identify and assess children with disabilities to
provide them with an appropriate education; and that schools were required to draw
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up an “Individualized Education Plan,” or IEP, a guide created by school officials and
professionals to identify the specific educational needs of children with disabilities
(Fleischer & Zames, 2011).
The passage of EHA did not change the climate for students with disabilities
overnight, however; enforcement of the law was haphazard and dependent on states’
willingness to advocate on behalf of disabled students. The Children’s Defense Fund,
under the aegis of Marian Wright Edelman, also found that schools in Mississippi were
using special education as a means to segregate Black from White students after the
federal government mandated legal desegregation, and obtained a consent decree to
attempt to enforce EHA (Fleischer & Zames, 2011). Before desegregation, students in
special education were White; after desegregation, they were Black (Fleischer & Zames,
2011). EHA included provisions to prevent the special education system from being
used as a vehicle for racial segregation as it had been used in states like Missouri before
its passage, but it took the work of civil society advocates to ensure that the government
of Mississippi was adhering to federal standards (Fleischer & Zames, 2011). Mississippi
was not the only state found to be noncompliant; New York City’s public schools
“allowed for greater segregation […] than would have been tolerated in Mississippi,”
spawning another series of federal lawsuits aimed at protecting the rights of students
with disabilities (Fleischer & Zames, 2011). Organizations that filed amicus curiae briefs
on behalf of the plaintiffs in one case, the Jose P. v Board of Education suit of 1979,
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included Advocates for Children, United Cerebral Palsy, and advocates working to
improve access for Latino children who were not native speakers of English (Fleischer &
Zames, 2011). Like Mills and PARC before them, Jose P. was the work of civil society
organizations using the court system in order to push the institutions of government
into action on behalf of a marginalized class of people. In addition to continued
violations of civil rights law by state and municipal governments, tension existed
between parents and professionals about the roles each faction would play in
advocating for educational rights for students with disabilities under EHA (Fleischer &
Zames, 2011). Parent advocates and their allies were concerned that professionals would
overshadow their work, especially if parents had reduced cultural capital in comparison
to professionals. Parents with limited education, incomes, or English proficiency would
be at a strategic disadvantage compared to professionals. Parents wanted to ensure that
they could maintain leverage over the process without the potential hijacking of the
education rights movement by professionals, which was an inducement to push back on
professional-centric reforms that did not place parents’ and families’ needs at the
forefront.
From EHA to IDEA
In 1986, Congress amended EHA to add provisions to add coverage from birth
for children with disabilities; previously, the law had only covered children and youth
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between the ages of 3 and 21 (OSEP, 2000). When EHA was reauthorized in 1991, the
law was given its current name, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, or
IDEA. George H.W. Bush signed the revised IDEA in 1991. In the 1990s, the federal
government and state governments placed more emphasis on the concept of “least
restrictive environment” (Fleischer & Zames, 2011). The principle of the least restrictive
environment, or LRE, posits that students with disabilities should be included with
non-disabled students as much as possible, and that they should be separated from
mainstream classrooms if and only if the mainstream classroom cannot adequately
address the child’s specific educational needs, even if supports are provided (Fleischer
& Zames, 2011). LRE was created to be similar to school desegregation, where inclusion
with non-disabled students was intended to allow dialogue and social connections
across ability levels (Fleischer & Zames, 2011). In 1997, Congress further amended IDEA
to include concrete steps for youth with disabilities transitioning out of public
education into the adult world, whether that transition entails higher education, joining
the workforce directly, or other post-secondary programs appropriate for the young
adult in question (OSEP, 2000). Schools are required to include transition planning in
students’ IEPs after students reach the age of 14 (OSEP, 2000).
Despite strong efforts to enforce IDEA and promote accessible education for
students with disabilities, there were still school districts and opponents to strict
enforcement of special-education law that proved recalcitrant, citing budgetary
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constraints and other excuses as a means to continue segregating students. New York
City, already the subject of lawsuits in the 1970s and 80s, continued to prove
problematic for students with disabilities; in 1994, only 7% of students were in
mainstream classrooms, in comparison to Vermont, where 87% of students were
mainstreamed (Fleischer & Zames, 2011). Television commentators, parents of nondisabled children, journalists, and others whose children did not directly benefit from
special education would harangue about the high costs of special education and that the
education of non-disabled or intellectually gifted children was being shortchanged to
serve students with more intense support needs (Fleischer & Zames, 2011).
There have been some arguments from disability scholars, however, that IDEA in
its current incarnation does not go far enough in redressing the systemic ableism that
students with disabilities face in the school system (Beratan, 2006). This opposition
serves as a counterpoint to the standard objections to IDEA; rather than going too far to
accommodate the needs of a protected class, it upholds some of the structural barriers
that it was intended to dismantle. Under the IDEA, students are entitled to be educated
to inclusion “to the maximum extent appropriate”—without an explicit definition of
“appropriate”—and“appropriate” education can be used to segregate students who are
determined not to fit in the mainstream classroom, or to provide disabled students with
the bare minimum of supports, rather like the situation in New York City’s public
schools even after the passage of IDEA (Beratan, 2006). Beratan also believes that the
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IDEA is steeped in the deficit model, which views disability as a fault within the
individual, rather than a natural part of human existence. The wording of
“appropriateness” is connected to this attitude, where school systems can get away with
denying a student the chance to excel because an affirming environment is
“inappropriate.” Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in the Hendrick Hudson Central School
District v Amy Rowley Supreme Court case of 1982 found that education for children
with disabilities was not required to be at a “greater standard than would be necessary
to make such access meaningful,” and that it was not intended to “guarantee any
particular level of education once inside” the mainstream classroom (Beratan, 2006). The
Rowley ruling allows schools serving students with disabilities to help them get by,
rather than to get ahead (Fleischer and Zames, 2011).
Part III: Contemporary Issues: Educational Justice in the Age of Trump
The Trump Card
The enforcement of IDEA may be under threat from an incoming Donald Trump
administration: both Trump himself and his appointees have demonstrated both
indirect and direct hostility towards people with disabilities. Trump has been dismissive
to people with disabilities; in 2015, he faced public censure for mocking a reporter with
a disability, Serge Kovaleski of the New York Times. He has also referred frequently to his
IQ and “great genes,” recalling eugenic ideals that were thought to have been largely
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repudiated after the Second World War (Mortimer, 2016). Senator Jeff Sessions, a
Republican from Alabama and Trump’s top choice for Attorney General, dismissed the
effects of IDEA, despite strong bipartisan support in Congress and the approval of three
Republican presidents. In a speech he gave in 2000, Sessions claimed that IDEA was
“the single most irritating problem for teachers throughout America today,” and that
litigation had led to “special treatment” for students receiving accommodations under
disability-rights legislation (Strauss, 2016). While Sessions also claimed that he did not
support dismantling IDEA entirely, his comments about the legislation indicate that he
is not a fervent supporter. If the Senate confirms him—which is likely, given Republican
control—then there is a risk of increasingly lax federal enforcement of IDEA compared
to that of previous administrations. A similar threat occurs in the form of Trump’s
choice for Secretary of Education, Betsy DeVos. DeVos is an advocate of “school choice,”
preferring to issue vouchers for private schools rather than funding public education.
Unlike public schools, private schools are not under the same obligation to provide free
and appropriate education to students with disabilities (E. Brown, 2016).
In addition to the spectre of an imminent Trump administration and its potential
deleterious effects on public education protections for children and youth with
disabilities, another blow may come to students with disabilities by means of an
upcoming Supreme Court ruling. Endrew v Douglas County School District, which the
Court will hear on 11 January 2017 (Jones, 2016). The US Court of Appeals for the 10th
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Circuit—along with five other circuit courts—ruled that the IDEA merely required that
IEPs provide “some educational benefit,” in contrast to the “meaningful education” that
two other circuit courts ruled that IDEA requires a higher standard in order for
education to be considered “meaningful” (Jones, 2016). The Obama Administration
encouraged the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. If the plaintiffs lose the case, schools
will be able to provide a lower standard of education than had been previously
mandated under the Court’s interpretation of EHA with the Rowley ruling, and
situations like New York’s haphazard interpretation of IDEA may become more
prevalent in other states. If state school systems are allowed to have more leniency with
IDEA, then this development may give them carte blanche to segregate students with
disabilities and offer them substandard educations under the cover of providing them
“some educational benefit,” since some education would be considered better than no
education.
It stands to reason that the enforcement of IDEA and other pro-disability national
statutes may shift to the states under a potentially hostile or apathetic Trump
administration, especially considering previous attitudes demonstrated by Trump,
Sessions, and DeVos. Civil society organizations may change their targets from national
figures like Congress, the President and the Department of Justice to statehouses and
governors in order to maximize their results. This shift to state-level advocacy may be
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further compounded if the Supreme Court rules on the side of the defendants in the
forthcoming Endrew case.
Conclusion
The processes that led to the passage and enforcement of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act are emblematic of the polity-centric approach that Skocpol
articulated in Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: the interactions between politicized
identity groups, civil society organizations, government actors, and the institutions of
government that allow policy to be created and enforced. This was particularly evident
in the use of the court system in order to enshrine civil rights, an approach that had its
origins in the seminal Brown v. Board of Education ruling. The growth of the disability
rights movement as an integral part of the Civil Rights Movement allowed for different
groups to agitate for policy that benefited a community that had once been consigned to
pariah status, and take advantage of a political climate that had become more sensitive
to the demands of marginalized groups seeking justice and liberation.
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References
1. Beratan, G. (2006). Institutionalizing inequity: Ableism, racism and IDEA 2004.
Disability Studies Quarterly, 26(2). Accessed 12 December 2016.
2. Board of Educ. v. Rowley 458 U.S. 176 (1982). Justia Law. Accessed 12 December 2016.
3. Brown, D. (2014). The horrifying truth uncovered: Willowbrook State School. Rooted
in Rights. Accessed 8 December 2016.
4. Brown, E. (23 November 2016). Trump selects school-choice advocate Betsy DeVos
as education secretary. The Boston Globe. Accessed 13 December 2016.
5. Congressional Research Service. Summary for S.6 - An Act to amend the Education of
the Handicapped Act to provide educational assistance to all handicapped children, and for
other purposes, PL 94-142 (1975). Accessed 11 December 2016.
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education. University of Miami Law Review, 38 (321).
9. Mortimer, C. (30 September 2016). Donald Trump believes he has superior genes,
biographer claims. The Independent. Accessed 13 December 2016.
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10. Jones, A. (2016). Supreme Court to hear Endrew special education case. Rooted in
Rights. Accessed 12 December 2016.
11. Linton, S. (1998). Claiming Disability. New York: New York University Press.
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Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities Through IDEA. Washington, DC:
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13. Skocpol, T. (1993). Protecting Soldiers and Mothers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard.
14. Strauss, V. (2 December 2016). Trump’s pick for attorney general once linked special
education law to “decline in civility” in classrooms. Washington Post. Accessed 12
December 2016.