Features and functions of supreme audit institutions

Financial Management Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized 2 db 208 208 June 2002 !r ' ,- :!1. - --_ _Bank L Ii - 1* , I ' -. Findings reports on ongoing operational, economic, and sector work carried out by the World and its member govemments in the Africa Region. It is published periodically by the Knowledge and Learning Center on behalf of the Region. The views expressed in Findings are those of the author/s and should not be attributed to the World Bank Group. http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings Features and functions of supreme audit institutions Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Quality and Knowledge- S upreme audit institutions are national agencies responsible for auditing governent revenue and spending. Their legal mandates, reporting relationships, and effectiveness vary, reflecting different governance systems and government policies. But their primary purpose is to oversee the management of public funds and X X J Different types of supreme audit institutions Most developing countries use one of three auditing systems: Napoleonic, Westminster, or board. In the Napoleonic system the supreme audit institution-also called the cour des comptes (court of accounts)-has both judicial and ad- ministrative authority and is indethe quality and credibility of govfernments' reported financial data. pendent of the legislative and exIn the past the World Bank and ecutive branches. The institution is other donors often established par- an integral part of the judiciary, allel auditing systems for their making judgments on government eua n regulaauitig sstes ihlwlaws and fr teircompliance with cmlac developing undermining ~~~~~projects, alle countries' supreme audit institu- tions as well as ensuring that pubtions, on whose work they could not lic funds are well spent. The cour des comptes audits every governalways rely. Equally problematic ment body, including ministries have been projects that encouraged performance auditing but ignored departments, and agencies; combasic weaknesses in financial man- mercial and industrial entities under the purview of ministries; and In recent years the Bank has tried social security bodies. This model to strengthen oversight agencies Es used in the Latin countries of y Por ,t Spain such as supreme audit institutions. Europe (Francedoth This note is intended to help Bank tugal, and others), Turkey and most Latin American and staff appreciate the role and nature of these institutions, particularly in francophone African countries. In the Westminster system, used managing public spending, ensuring financial accountability, and in many Commonwealth countries (Australia, Canada, India, the strengthening public institutions strengthening pubic institutions.United Kingdom, and many Caribbean, Pacific, and Sub-Saharan African countries), the office of the auditor general is an independent body that reports to parliament. Made up of professional auditors and technical experts, the office submits periodic reports on the financial statements and operations of government entities-but with less emphasis on legal compliance than in the Napoleonic system. The office serves no judicial function but, when warranted, its findings may be passed to legal authorities for further action. The board system, prevalent in Asia, is similar to the Westminster model in that it is independent of the executive and helps parliament perform oversight. Indonesia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, for example, have an audit board composed of an audit commission (the decision-making body) and a general executive bureau (the executive organ). The president of the board is the de facto auditor general. The board's primary mandate is to analyze government spending and revenue and report its findings to parliament. Types of audits There are three basic audit types: financial (or attest), compliance, and performance (or value-formoney). Together these three types form a comprehensive audit framework that over time provides a complete view of an organization or function. In financial auditing the auditor assesses the accuracy and fairness of an organization's financial statements. In compliance auditing the auditor checks whether government revenue and spending have been authorized and used for approved purposes. Transactions are reviewed to determine if government departments and agencies have conformed to all pertinent laws and and sends its reports to the full parliament for comment and action. There are often recommendations or instructions requiring follow-up action by both the auditor general and government accounting officers. In the board system the audit board prepares and sends an annual report to the cabinet, which submits it to parliament. Board staff attend all deliberations on fiscal accounts and are expected to explain the board's opinions. In cour des comptes-style supreme audit institutions, parliaments do not automatically receive the auditors' reports, though they may receive a report on the court's Audits and the budget cycle work. There are, however, four possible forms of collaboration between Audits are an integral part of the the court and parliament: budget cycle. The budget sets out * The president of the court may, the government's fiscal policies, at his or her discretion, pass the court's findings to parliament's detailing revenue, spending, and finance committee. the economic policies on which they . A parliamentary committee may are based. As a public document the budget requires public discloask the court to conduct a specific management audit, which sure, evaluation, and auditingtypically audits the economy, efand here supreme audit instituficiency, and effectiveness of protions play a key role. Based on the cesses in the organization (or orreport by the auditor general or cour . . des comptes, a public accounting . ganizations) being audlted. is issued describing how the budt,mp epo get has been implemented and ted to parliamnt andsubmitmanaged. ted to the country's president, addresses the legal concordance between the general accounts of Role of parliament regulations. This process includes checking the spending authority in the annual budget and any relevant legislation. Performance or value-for-money auditing determines whether taxpayers have received value for their taxes. Auditors work closely with subject matter experts who offer advice and review audit results. The man-date for performance auditing varies among supreme audit institutions. Sometimes it is confined to reviewing operational efficiency. In other cases it extends to reviewing the effectiveness of government programs in achieving their objectives. In the Westminster system the supreme audit institution is a core element of parliamentary oversight. Parliaments typically rely on supreme audit institutions to audit public accounts. Then a multiparty public accounts committee usually reviews reports by the office of the auditor general, considers testimony by witnesses from government departments and agencies, the finance department and the treasury. ' In a separate document, the court prepares an annual report for parliament on the use of the resources made available by the previous year's finance act. Conditions for successful supreme audit institutions Several features are crucial to the success of a supreme audit institution. Supportive environment Supreme audit institutions function within a wider institutional setting. Thus they areeffective only to the extent that they are permitted to conduct their work and their reports are used to promote accountability. In many countries public accounts are poorly maintained, parliament may be weak, and the ministry of finance may not ensure that audit issues are addressed. Flagrant abuses identified by supreme audit institutions may not be prosecuted-and in some cases their work may be sabotaged. Clear mandates Auditing mandates should be anchored in rules set by parliament. Before drafting such legislation, supreme audit institutions and governments must determine the auditors' independence and reporting responsibilities, the scope of audits, and the entities to be audited-elements shaped by national legislation and domestic conditions. In Westminster parliamentary systems an audit also ensures that the supreme audit institution addresses all the issues parliament wants scrutinized by an independent body. Independence Independence is a basic feature of supreme audit institutions in industrial countries. Autonomy is essential for an auditor general given the need to report directly to parliament without interference from other branches of government. The leader of a supreme audit institution needs both legal and traditional status to ensure that senior bureaucrats will make information available and respond appropriately to recommendations. Independence can be strengthened by setting out the auditor general's role in the country's constitutionas in India, Indonesia, Japan, Uganda, and Zambia. In the Napoleonic model, for example, the autonomy of the cour des comptes is guaranteed by its status as a court, by the security of tenure of its magistrate members, and by its right to design its own program of activities. Adequate funding, facilities, and staff Supreme audit institutions require adequate funding, equipment, and facilities. In the developing world, where such elements are often inadequate, there is potential for supreme audit institutions to operate more efficiently. But it is unlikely that increased efficiency alone would generate enough savings to provide competitive salaries and modern technology. Governments need to recognize the costs as well as the high returns of audits, and provide commensurate funding. To ensure high-quality work, supreme audit institutions need wellqualified, adequately remunerated staff who are encouraged to continuously improve, especially in their areas of expertise. For example, auditors can enhance their skills in fraud detection and information technology through a combination of training, education, and experience. The number of authorized personnel should be determined independently of government control. For example, in the board model the audit commission determines the number of workers in the general executive bureau. To maintain their credibility, supreme audit institutions should be managed such that a performance audit of their operations would result in a favorable report. Sharing of knowledge and experience International exchanges of ideas, knowledge, and experience improve audits, harmonize standards, promote best practices, and generally help supreme audit institutions fulfill their mandates. International congresses and training seminars, regional and interregional conferences, and international publications have promoted the development of auditing. Moreover, supreme audit institutions should work closely with enforcement officials in government agencies to share skills and insights and to become more adept at uncovering corruption. Adherence to international auditing standards Audits are more effective when supreme audit institutions adhere to professional auditing standards, such as those promulgated by the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) or international professional accountancy bodies. Limitations Supreme audit institutions face different limitations because of countries' distinct constitutional, legal, political, social, and economic systems, making it impossible to offer universal remedies. The main limitations are: *Limits on independence. *A shortage of qualified, experienced personnel-a severe problem for many institutions because staff cannot keep up with the changing scope, techniques, Role in curbing corruption Although preventing corruption is not an explicit responsibility of supreme audit institutions, audits may detect fraud and abuse. Fostering strong financial management, based on reliable reporting and internal controls, is a crucial part of detecting and preventing and complexities of their work. corruption because it promotes *A lack of adequate monitoring and follow-up of audit findings. Control over public funds is less ef- transparency and accountability in government programs and actions. fmmetivedifauditn qeries and rwec ommendations are not followed up by parliament and acted on by the executive branch, *Limits on the scope of audits. Restricted audits undermine the effectiveness of supreme audit nsitutions and call into question instiemotutions and call r existxinstithce.Some motvosuorem tr ence. Some supreme audit institutions cannot audit enterprises if the state has only a limited financial interest; others cannot conduct external control over international organizations. Further reading Rick and Kenneth, Dye, Stapenhurst. 1998. Pillars of Integrity: Importance of Supreme Audit Institutions in Curbing Corruption.Washington, D.C.. World Bank Institute. INTOSAI (International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions). 1977. "Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts." Ninth Congress of INTOSAI Lima, Peru. Mbanefo, Uche. 1998. "Strengthening African Supreme Audit Institutions. A Strategy Paper and Finding s Action Plan." World Bank, Africa Region, Operational Quality and Knowledge Services, Washington, D.C. Sahgal, Vinod. 1998. Strengthening Legislative Audit Institutions: A Catalyst to Enhance Governance and Combat Corruption. Ottawa, Ontario: Office of the Auditor General of Canada. This note was originallypublished as PREM note No. 59, October2001, and was written by Rick Stapenhurst (Senior Public Sector Management Specialist, World Bank Institute) and Jack Titsworth, Consultant, Africa Region), drawing on and substantially extending the analysis in Dye and Stapenhurst (1998). The note incorporatesasubstantial contribution from David Shand (FinancialManagement Adviser,FinancialManagement Board) and several other reviewers both inside and outside the World Bank. The authors also acknowledge the contribution of William Dorotinksy and Anand Rajaram as well as the Public Expenditure Thematic Group. Finally, the authors are grateful to Lisa Borgattifor excellent research assistance. Findings can be accessed via the World Bank Group's website at http://www.worldbank.orgl Click on Publications, then Periodicals. Or, click on Countries and Regions, then Africa Findings would also be of interest to: Name Institution _ Address - Letters, comments, and requests for publications not available at the World Bank Bookstore should be addressed to: Editor, Findings Operational Quality and Knowledge Services Africa Region, The World Bank 1818 H Street NW, Room J-5-055 Washington, D.C. 20433 e-mail: pmohan@worldbank.org