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This essay explores the evolution and challenges of human rights within the context of European cosmopolitanism, focusing on the historical perspectives of philosophers such as Kant and Arendt, as well as contemporary debates highlighted by Benhabib and Beck. It examines the discrepancies between universal human rights and their application, particularly regarding asylum seekers and marginalized communities, set against the backdrop of national sovereignty and nationalist movements in Europe.
2017
PDF-PowerPoint presentation of the talk I gave on Thursday, 20th July 2017 at the XXVIII World Congress on the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, School of Law of The University of Lisbon, July 16 to 21 2017 Abstract The expression „the right to have rights“, which is the title of my text, is contained in different works of Seyla Benhabib: it points, in the thought of Benhabib, to the birth of a new constellation of Human Rights. The new constellation of Human Rights consists in the claim, which every individual may raise, to be acknowledged and protected as a person by the world community. It belongs to Benhabib’s profound conviction the idea that the rights and the interpretation of the rights have profoundly changed after and because of the different covenants signed by the countries belonging to the world community for the protection of the Human Rights: this process of transformation of the interpretation of Human Rights has begun with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The new dimension of the Human Rights is a cosmopolitan one, that is, it is not a merely national dimension: this new dimension surpasses the dimension of particular countries; it promotes and, at the same time, it calls for the creation of new juridical spaces. Through this new dimension, moreover, individuals are no longer seen as being only citizens of a particular country: the individuals are elevated, thanks to the new dimension of the rights, to the condition of world citizens. Cosmopolitan norms do create a new universe of values, of juridical meanings and of social relationships that did not exist at all before the creation of these norms. Seyla Benhabib has expressed the birth of the new constellation of rights in many of her works such as, for instance, “The Rights of Others. Aliens, Residents and Citizens”, “Another Cosmopolitanism”, and “Dignity in Adversity. Human Rights in Troubled Times”. The new dimension of rights directly (that is, without mediation of a particular country) connects every individual to the world community: the right dimension does not depend on a particular country and it is not limited to the validity it possesses within a particular country. The authority that corresponds and is responsible for, at least, some rights of the individuals is the world community. The right of the men qua men, that is, the rights not depending on the possession of a determined citizenship and not coinciding with a determined citizenship do emerge step by step, even though this process is steadily being affected by backlashes. Benhabib mentions as Covenants signed by the countries of the world community towards the completion of the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights Convention, the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966, and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of 1979. Within the new constellation of Human Rights, particular countries are being surpassed by the world community: particular countries do not represent the first and last authority for the acknowledgment of rights. As a correspondence to this point, individuals possess rights qua human beings: to have rights does not depend on the individuals’ possession of a citizenship; to have rights depends on the fact that individuals belong to the mankind. A new dimension of the individuals come about: individuals are not only citizens of a country, they are, first of all, human beings, and they have to have been acknowledged as human beings. Benhabib sees a fundamental difference between the westphalian and the post-westphalian concept of country and rights. Within the westphalian interpretation of rights, countries are the first and last authority for the acknowledgment of rights. Within the post-westphalian interpretation of rights, countries do depend on common values and on common principles: countries obligate themselves to the protection of definite rights and definite principles; this means that countries acknowledge these rights and these principle as being over the sovereignty of the countries themselves. A new dimension of countries, a new dimension of rights and a new dimension of individuals arise at the same time. A right to integration can be derived from the “right to have rights”: Benhabib often express her own positions regarding the subject “integration”. An indispensable presupposition for the promotion of the integration between inhabitants of a country consists, in the opinion of Benhabib, in the citizenship not depending on the “ethnos”, that is, in not establishing the condition of belonging to a definite ethnos as the condition for the possession of a citizenship: If the condition for possessing a citizenship depends on the belonging to a definite ethnos, all the inhabitants of a country not belonging to the definite ethnos are automatically excluded from the citizenship. This kind of condition for possessing the citizenship of a country is steadily being used to bring about the exclusion of definite inhabitants and of groups of inhabitants, for instance, the exclusion of all the inhabitants that have been compelled to or are compelled to migrate to a country. Benhabib strongly differentiates between the concepts of ethnos and of demos as criteria for the possession of the citizenship: Whereas the concept “ethnos” represents a closed concept, the concept “demos” does represent a completely different conception: demos is a flexible concept, since demos can always be modified by the political decision. Benhabib is particularly severe as to all the structures founding the right to citizenship on the belonging to an ethnos and as to all the structures excluding a priori inhabitants of a country from the right to citizenship: a democratic institution may not afford to forever exclude inhabitants from the acquisition of the citizenship; every kind of such an exclusion is in the opinion of Benhabib simply not compatible with a democratic order. About the acquisition of a citizenship Benhabib pleads for the concept of Jus Soli as the condition for the possession of the citizenship of a country. As a conclusion of this short presentation of my contribution it has, in my opinion, to be pointed out that Benhabib endorses a kind of flexible, dynamic interpretation regarding concepts like “civilization”, “identity”, “culture”: this means that neither civilizations, nor cultures, nor identities constitute unchangeable patterns; cultures, identities, civilizations are structures continuously changing: they are dynamic patterns. Moreover, Benhabib considers every individual as not being a prisoner of his own culture; Benhabib does not accept concepts like culture essentialism or culture reductions, as if individuals essentially belonged to only a culture and as if individuals could be reduced to only a culture: individuals possess identities, they are not possessed by them. Every individual maintains, in the opinion, of Benhabib an autonomy in relation to his own culture: individuals are more than only a culture.
'The equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world' (UNHR,1948:Preamble). The universalist conception of human rights as enshrined within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights dictates that the rights set forth therein be applicable to every human being without qualification. Based upon this understanding 'human rights are equal rights: One either is or is not a human being, and therefore has the same rights as everyone else (or none at all)' (Donnelly, 2003:2-3). Nobel indeed may have been the intent which inspired the configuration and ratification of such ideals, however, the sad reality for much of the worlds migrating population, the language of human rights in reality resembles nothing but phatic and inane abstraction, when individuals are denied the effective recourse to claim and protect said rights.
Canadian Journal of Political Science, 2018
We would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to the organization (National Human Rights Commission) for giving us the golden opportunity to do this wonderful project on the topic Human Rights and Refugee Protection, which also helped me in doing a lot of Research and we came to know about so many new things we are really thankful to them for their able guidance and support.
Human Rights Review, 2007
Global Justice: Theory, Practice, Rhetoric, 2017
Few concepts in Arendt scholarship have spawned such a volume of literature, and perhaps none have provoked as much interest outside of the field of philosophy, as ‘the right to have rights.’ Contrary to Arendt’s ultimate aims however, ‘the right to have rights’ has largely receded to a position of complicity with the very tradition of politics as state sovereignty whose untenability the refugee crisis exposes. Although Arendt’s conceptualization of this problem, circa 1951, arguably remains unsurpassed in its diagnosis of the political situation of statelessness, as well as its intimate description of the human cost of what she refers to as ‘world loss,’ I suggest that the conversation is stalled on at least two fronts: first by Arendt’s unfortunate characterization of refugee politics as essentially impotent, and second, by popular misreadings, in both Arendt scholarship and human rights literature, of ‘the right to have rights.’ In what follows, I suggest that ‘the right to have rights’ is best interpreted as a politics of non-sovereignty oriented by a robust sense of belonging that is closely related to, and indeed enables, theories of action as plural performativity that we see in Judith Butler's work, and action as ‘dissensus’ in the work of Jacques Rancière. This entails an argument for the absolute primacy of political belonging in Arendt’s political theory, a view that only becomes plausible if we return to Arendt's work on refugees, taking it as seriously as her later philosophical texts. This article was awarded the Jonathan Trejo Mathys Memorial Essay Prize in 2017.