Phenomenology and sociality

Although cognitive science has recently asked how human sociality is constituted, there is no clear and consistent account of the emergence of human style social agency. Previously, we have critiqued views based on 'participatory sense-making' by arguing that agency requires a distinctive kind of phenomenology that enables a diachronic social experience. In advancing the positive argument, we link developmental psychology to phenomenological insights by focusing on child-caregiver dynamics around the middle of the second year. Having developed very basic social skills, an infant comes to feel normative perturbances impinging on her in a way that leads to new modes of action. Accordingly, we trace agency and linguistic competencies how these kinds of coordination intermesh. Nascent capabilities for predicating draw on the child's history of coping with norms and rules that are imposed by caretakers. Developmental events thus transform the child's experience and drive the emergence of social agency. Once the child has successfully dealt with the environment's normative perturbations she is able to develop the skills of a fully-fledged human social agent. Résumé : Si les sciences cognitives ont récemment commencé à interroger la manière dont la sociabilité humaine se met en place, elles n'offrent pas d'explication cohérente concernant l'émergence

Human Studies, 1996

The focus of this chapter is on the relationship between child development and socio-cultural context from a discursive practice approach. It addresses the central and constructive role played by language in the forming and structuring of self and identity. Specifically, it aims at investigating how communicative practices in early family conversations can be considered as reflecting cultural models that will also become evident in the narrative self in adulthood. Our intention is to identify developmental precursors of identity formation with regard to the dimensions of autonomy and relatedness. In doing this, we hope to contribute to the understanding of the dialogical relationship between culture and self. We will first give a theoretical outline of the interplay between self, narrative, and culture from a developmental perspective, followed by some empirical evidence from a longitudinal study to support our claim. We will conclude with a discussion of the presented data in light of the dynamic nature of culture and self over the lifespan.

2009

Continental Philosophy Review, 2020

We explore relationships between phenomenology and developmental psychology through an in-depth analysis of a particular problem in social cognition: the most fundamental access to other minds. In the first part of the paper, we examine how developmental science can benefit phenomenology. We explicate the connection between cognitive psychology and developmental phenomenology as a form of constructive phenomenological psychology. Nativism in contemporary science constitutes a strong impulse to conceive of the possibility of an innate ability to perceive others’ mental states, an idea which also has a transcendental implication. In the second part, we consider how phenomenology can contribute to developmental science. Phenomenology can go beyond the necessary evaluation and reinterpretation of experimental results. Some phenomenological notions and theories can be put forward on a par with alternative cognitive-psychological models and compete with them on grounds of empirical adequa...

Continental Philosophy Review 54 (2): 183 – 199 , 2021

We explore relationships between phenomenology and developmental psychology through an in-depth analysis of a particular problem in social cognition: the most fundamental access to other minds. In the first part of the paper, we examine how developmental science can benefit phenomenology. We explicate the connection between cognitive psychology and developmental phenomenology as a form of constructive phenomenological psychology. Nativism in contemporary science constitutes a strong impulse to conceive of the possibility of an innate ability to perceive others' mental states, an idea which also has a transcendental implication. In the second part, we consider how phenomenology can contribute to developmental science. Phenomenology can go beyond the necessary evaluation and reinterpretation of experimental results. Some phenomenological notions and theories can be put forward on a par with alternative cognitive-psychological models and compete with them on grounds of empirical adequacy. For example, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty's notion of pairing can constitute a viable account of how infants access other minds. We outline a number of ways in which this account can be tested and can thus contribute to generating empirical knowledge.

Handbook of Social Development, 1992

Advances in child development and behavior, 2012

Theoretical rationality and practical rationality are, respectively, properties of an individual's belief system and decision system. While reasoning about instrumental actions complies with practical rationality, understanding communicative actions complies with the principle of relevance. Section 2 reviews the evidence showing that young infants can reason about an agent's instrumental action by representing her subjective motivations and the episodic contents of her epistemic states (including false beliefs). Section 3 reviews the evidence showing special sensitivity in young human infants to some ostensive behavioral signals encoding an agent's communicative intention. We also address the puzzle of imitative learning of novel means actions by 1-year olds and argue that it can be resolved only by assuming that the infant construes the model's demonstration as a communicative, not an instrumental, action. Section 4 reviews the evidence for natural pedagogy, a speci...

2011

There are two respects in which the medium of film and the discipline of philosophy intersect. First, the philosophy of film asks philosophical questions about the nature of film. Second, the notion of film as philosophy (FAP) proposes that films themselves can contribute to a range of philosophical debates. FAP raises some troubling conceptual problems. How is it possible for film to contribute to philosophical debate? And, if it is possible, why should we turn to film for those contributions rather than to traditional academic sources? I address these problems with a "Socratic Model" of the role of film in philosophical debate. I argue that the representational limitations of motion pictures are compatible with film acting as a "midwife" for philosophical insights in its audience. Furthermore, where a film facilitates insights into the philosophy of film, I argue that it can be better positioned to prompt those realisations than an academic text. I put this mod...