Rem Rev 1 Case Digests Set 1 [INC] (Atty. Custodio)

REMEDIAL​ ​LAW​ ​REVIEW​ ​1 CIVIL​ ​PROCEDURE ATTY.​ ​DEMETRIO​ ​C.​ ​CUSTODIO,​ ​JR. SARSABA​ ​v.​ ​VDA.​ ​DE​ ​TE DOCTRINE: The trial court’s jurisdiction subsists despite​ ​the​ ​death​ ​of​ ​a​ ​party. The NLRC rendered a Decision regarding the illegal dismissal of Patricio Sereno. Teodoro Gasing was ordered by the NLRC to pay Sereno’s money claims. The Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied so LA Sancho issued an Alias Writ of Execution to satisfy the judgment award. Sheriff Lavarez, Sereno, and Atty. Sarsaba levied a Fuso Truck with license plate no. LBR-514 that was in the possession of Gasing and was later sold at public auction​ ​to​ ​Sereno. Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda filed for recovery of motor vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente​ ​lite​ ​against​ ​Sarsaba,​ ​Sereno,​ ​Lavarez​ ​and​ ​NLRC. Sarsaba and the NLRC filed a Motion to Dismiss that was later denied by the RTC while Lavarez filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. On Oct. 17, 2005, Sarsaba filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants and to discharge Vda de. Te’s attorney-in-fact​ ​for​ ​lack​ ​of​ ​legal​ ​personality​ ​to​ ​sue. Fe Vda. de Te died on Apr. 12, 2005. Her lawyer filed an Opposition with the contention that failure to serve summons on Sereno was not a ground for dismissing the complaint because the other defendants have already submitted their respective responsive pleadings. Moreover, Vda. de Te’s death did not render ​functus officio her right to sue as her attorney-in-fact had long testified on the complaint and had submitted documentary​ ​exhibits​ ​in​ ​support​ ​of​ ​the​ ​complaint. The​ ​Omnibus​ ​Motion​ ​to​ ​Dismiss​ ​was​ ​denied​ ​by​ ​the​ ​RTC. Issues: 1) W/N the death of one of the principal defendants (Sereno) warrants a dismissal of the case as regards the other defendants; 2) W/N the death of Vda de.​ ​Te​ ​warrants​ ​the​ ​outright​ ​dismissal​ ​of​ ​the​ ​case. Held: 1) ​NO​. The Court’s failure to acquire jurisdiction over one’s person is a defense which is personal to the person claiming it. Sarsaba cannot invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of having the case dismissed against all the defendants. At the same time, Sarsaba only raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the person of Sereno in his Omnibus Motion to Dismiss. He was unable to raise the same in his Motion to Dismiss or in his Answer. Thus having failed to invoke this ground at the proper time (Motion to GMDP​ ​2017 1 REMEDIAL​ ​LAW​ ​REVIEW​ ​1 CIVIL​ ​PROCEDURE ATTY.​ ​DEMETRIO​ ​C.​ ​CUSTODIO,​ ​JR. Dismiss), he cannot raise it now for the first time on appeal. Failure to serve summons on Sereno's person will not be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint against the other defendants, considering that they have been served with copies of the summons and complaints and have long​ ​submitted​ ​their​ ​respective​ ​responsive​ ​pleadings. Only the case against Sereno will be dismissed and the same may be filed as a claim against the estate of Sereno but​ ​the​ ​case​ ​with​ ​respect​ ​to​ ​the​ ​three​ ​others​ ​will​ ​proceed. 2) ​NO​. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. The rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due​ ​process. Moreover, non- compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the right to due process for the heirs who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially affected by the decision rendered therein. Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings​ ​and​ ​the​ ​resulting​ ​judgment​ ​therein. The proper remedy in this case is the Substitution of Heirs. SEC. 16, RULE 3 provides for the substitution of the plaintiff who dies pending hearing of the case by his/her legal heirs. As to whether or not the heirs will still continue to engage the services of the Attorney-in-fact is another matter, which lies within the sole​ ​discretion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​heirs. GONZALES​ ​v.​ ​PAGCOR DOCTRINE: ​Any interest that the plaintiff/petitioner might have had in the outcome of this case for actions which are personal and non-transferrable in nature cannot be deemed to have survived the death of the plaintiff/petitioner. Ramon Gonzales, filed a class suit that sought to restrain PAGCOR from continuing its operations. He questioned the constitutionality of the creation of PAGCOR as well as the grant of franchises by PAGCOR to SAGE, BEST WORLD,​ ​BELLE,​ ​and​ ​FILGAME. Corollary to the case, the SC decided in Del Mar v. PAGCOR that only PAGCOR is allowed to operate its franchise and not delegate the same to others. Thus, PAGCOR, BELLE, and FILGAME was enjoined from managing, maintaining and operating jai-alai games and GMDP​ ​2017 2 REMEDIAL​ ​LAW​ ​REVIEW​ ​1 CIVIL​ ​PROCEDURE ATTY.​ ​DEMETRIO​ ​C.​ ​CUSTODIO,​ ​JR. from enforcing the agreement entered into by them for that​ ​purpose. The petition was given due course by the Court and it ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. However, only PAGCOR and SAGE submitted theirs and the SC was later informed of the demise​ ​of​ ​Gonzales. Atty. Manuel Imbong and Jo Aurea Imbong filed a Motion for Substitution stating among other things that the petition instituted by Gonzales was a class suit on behalf of all Filipino citizens, taxpayers and members of the​ ​Philippine​ ​Bar​ ​and​ ​as​ ​such​ ​survives​ ​his​ ​death. PAGCOR and SAGE argue that the movants cannot substitute for Gonzales because they are neither legal representatives nor heirs of the latter within the purview of Section 16, Rule 3 of the ROC. At the same time, they maintain that neither Gonzales nor the movants have substantiated the same as a class suit so the same should be considered as a personal action which was extinguished​ ​with​ ​Gonzales’​ ​death. Issue: W/N the death of Gonzales warrants the dismissal of​ ​the​ ​case GMDP​ ​2017 Held: YES. The criteria for determining whether an action survives the death of a plaintiff/petitioner was elucidated​ ​upon​ ​in​ ​Bonilla​ ​v.​ ​Barcena​ ​as​ ​follows: x x x the question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. If the causes of action which survive the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person the property and rights of property affected being incidental.​ ​x​ ​x​ ​x In claiming standing to bring the instant suit, Gonzales necessarily asserted “a personal and substantial interest in the case” such that he “has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.” A reading of the allegations in the petition readily shows that Gonzales’ alleged interest does not involve any claim to money or property which he could have assigned to another or transmitted to his heirs. Rather, he claimed to be vindicating his rights as a citizen, taxpayer and member of the bar. Being ​personal 3 REMEDIAL​ ​LAW​ ​REVIEW​ ​1 CIVIL​ ​PROCEDURE ATTY.​ ​DEMETRIO​ ​C.​ ​CUSTODIO,​ ​JR. and non-transferable in nature​, ​any interest that he might have had in the outcome of this case cannot be deemed​ ​to​ ​have​ ​survived​ ​his​ ​death. The SC held that for the movants, the more proper procedure would have been to file a Motion for Intervention. However, even if the Motion for Intervention was timely filed, the same would still be dismissed​ ​for​ ​being​ ​moot​ ​and​ ​academic. UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. V. ROSEMOOR MINING​ ​&​ ​DEV’T.​ ​CORP. DOCTRINES: A real action should be commenced and tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies; Personal actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendants or any of the principal defendants​ ​resides,​ ​at​ ​the​ ​election​ ​of​ ​the​ ​plaintiff. Rosemoor applied for and was granted a credit facility by Westmonk Bank (now United Overseas) for P80 million. The same was secured by a real estate mortgage executed by Rosemoor and Dr. Lourdes Pascual, the former’s president. The agreement covered six parcels of land in San Miguel, Bulacan registered under Rosemoor’s name and two parcels of land in Gapan, Nueva Ecija owned and​ ​registered​ ​under​ ​Pascual. Rosemoor defaulted in the payment of its various drawings under the irrevocable Letters of Credit (LCs) and promissory notes so the Bank extrajudicially foreclosed​ ​the​ ​properties. Rosemoor filed two separate complaints against the Bank, one in Manila and the other at Malolos, Bulacan. In the Manila case, the Bank moved for the dismissal of the original and amended complaints for improper venue. The same was denied by the RTC. As for the second amended complaint, the Bank again moved for its dismissal because of forum shopping as Rosemoor had filed​ ​another​ ​petition​ ​earlier​ ​before​ ​the​ ​Malolos​ ​RTC. As for the Malolos RTC, the Bank also moved for the dismissal of the complaint for forum shopping and that Pascual had no cause of action because her properties were situated in Nueva Ecija. The Malolos RTC denied the​ ​motion. Issue: Whether the venue of the action for the nullification of the foreclosure sale of the six Bulacan properties and two Nueva Ecija properties is properly laid​ ​with​ ​the​ ​Malolos​ ​RTC. Held: YES​; the venue was properly laid with the Malolos RTC although two of the properties together are situated in​ ​Nueva​ ​Ecija. GMDP​ ​2017 4 REMEDIAL​ ​LAW​ ​REVIEW​ ​1 CIVIL​ ​PROCEDURE ATTY.​ ​DEMETRIO​ ​C.​ ​CUSTODIO,​ ​JR. The Malolos case is an action to annul the foreclosure sale that is necessarily an action affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be commenced and tried in the province where the property​ ​or​ ​part​ ​thereof​ ​lies. transaction, the venue is in the court of any of the provinces​ ​wherein​ ​a​ ​parcel​ ​of​ ​land​ ​is​ ​situated. ___________________________________________________ The Manila case is a personal action involving as it does the enforcement of a contract between Rosemoor, whose office is in QC, and the Bank, whose principal office is in Binondo, Manila. Personal actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendants or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. DOCTRINE: If there is an honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee, the court still acquires jurisdiction notwithstanding the alleged​ ​insufficiency​ ​of​ ​the​ ​docket​ ​fee​ ​paid. As regards the question of whether Malolos RTC had jurisdiction over the action to nullify the foreclosure sale of the Nueva Ecija properties along with the Bulacan properties,​ ​the​ ​same​ ​is​ ​actually​ ​a​ ​question​ ​of​ ​venue. The venue of the action for the nullification of the foreclosure sale is properly laid with the Malolos RTC although two of the properties together with the Bulacan properties are situated in Nueva Ecija. Following the above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court, ​the venue of real actions affecting properties found in different provinces is determined by the singularity or plurality of the transactions involving said parcels of land. Where said parcels are the object of one and the same MAGASPI​ ​v.​ ​RAMOLETE Magaspi et al. filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages against Shell Co. Upon filing and payment of P60.00 as docketing fee and P10.00 for sheriff fees, the complaint​ ​was​ ​docketed​ ​Civil​ ​Case​ ​No.​ ​R11882. Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co. Inc. and Cebu City Savings and Loan Assn. filed a petition to compel the​ ​plaintiffs​ ​to​ ​pay​ ​the​ ​correct​ ​amount​ ​for​ ​docket​ ​fee. The motion was opposed by Magaspi et al. ​who claimed that the ​main cause of action was the recovery of a piece of land and on the ​basis of its assessed valued​, P60.00 was the correct docketing fee and that although the Revised Rules of Court do not exclude damages in the computation of the docket fee, damages are nonetheless still​ ​to​ ​be​ ​excluded. GMDP​ ​2017 5 REMEDIAL​ ​LAW​ ​REVIEW​ ​1 CIVIL​ ​PROCEDURE ATTY.​ ​DEMETRIO​ ​C.​ ​CUSTODIO,​ ​JR. The Clerk of Court was ordered to comment on the motion and opposition and she said that a reading of the complaint would show that the action is ​not only for recovery of property but also for actual and moral damages as well as for attorney’s fees so the correct amount of the legal fees should be fixed at P3,164.00 plus P2.00​ ​legal​ ​research​ ​fee. Magaspi et al. filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint so as to include the Government as a defendant. The defendants filed an Opposition to the admission of the amended complaint saying that Magaspi et al. had not yet complied with the Judge Canonoy’s​ ​Order​ ​of​ ​additional​ ​payment​ ​of​ ​docket​ ​fee. Judge Ramolete replaced Judge Canonoy and he issued an Order saying that Magaspi et al. should pay the docket​ ​fee​ ​assessed​ ​or​ ​forego​ ​the​ ​proceeding. Issue: W/N the case is deemed filed notwithstanding the failure​ ​of​ ​Magaspi​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​to​ ​pay​ ​the​ ​correct​ ​filing​ ​fee. Held: YES​. ​Under the circumstances, Civil Case No. R. 11882 was docketed upon the payment of P60.00 although said amount is insufficient. Accordingly, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings​ ​thereafter​ ​had​ ​were​ ​proper​ ​and​ ​regular. The cases cited by Ramolete in his assailed Order did not have any relevance to the case because the cited case involved timeliness of the perfection of the appeal which was made to depend in turn on the timeliness of the full payment of the docket fee and there was palpable inadequacy​ ​in​ ​the​ ​initial​ ​payment. As regards the correct amount to be paid as docket fee, the petitioner is correct in saying that the docket fee be based​ ​on​ ​the​ ​amended​ ​complaint​ ​admitted​ ​by​ ​Canonoy. "When a pleading is amended, the original pleading is deemed abandoned. The original ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The case stands for trial on the​ ​amended​ ​pleading​ ​only.​ ​" ___________________________________________________ MANCHESTER​ ​DEV’T​ ​CORP.​ ​v.​ ​CA DOCTRINE: An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based​ ​on​ ​the​ ​amounts​ ​sought​ ​in​ ​the​ ​amended​ ​pleading Manchester filed a complaint for specific performance against City Land Dev’t. Corp. to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor of the former. It also alleged that City Land forfeited its tender of payment thus​ ​causing​ ​damages​ ​amounting​ ​to​ ​P78,750,000. GMDP​ ​2017 6 REMEDIAL​ ​LAW​ ​REVIEW​ ​1 CIVIL​ ​PROCEDURE ATTY.​ ​DEMETRIO​ ​C.​ ​CUSTODIO,​ ​JR. Manchester paid only P410 as docket fee by considering the action to be merely one for specific performance. The trial court ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint. Manchester complied but it deleted from its amended complaint any mention of the amount of damages; it maintained the prayer in its original complaint. amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon​ ​the​ ​Court. Manchester then filed an amended complaint after it was ordered by the court to rectify the same by stating the amounts they were asking for. Only then did Manchester specify the amounts in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount of P10 million but no amount of damages was mentioned in the prayer. The amended complaint​ ​was​ ​admitted. Note: Manchester OVERTURNED the ruling of the SC in Magaspi _________________________________________________ Issue: W/N the filing fee is assessed on the basis of the amended​ ​complaint. Held: NO​. The allegations of the complaint, the designation and the prayer clearly show that it is an action for damages and specific performance. There could be no honest difference of opinion this the docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount​ ​of​ ​damages​ ​as​ ​alleged​ ​in​ ​the​ ​original​ ​complaint. The court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment only of P410 as docket fee. Neither can the For all legal purposes, there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken​ ​by​ ​the​ ​trial​ ​court​ ​are​ ​null​ ​and​ ​void. SUN​ ​INSURANCE​ ​OFFICE,​ ​LTD.​ ​v.​ ​ASUNCION DOCTRINE: ​Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or​ ​reglementary​ ​period. SIOL filed a complaint for consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy w/ a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against Manuel Uy Po Tiong. On the other hand, Tiong filed a complaint for refund of premiums against SIOL, E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of GMDP​ ​2017 7 REMEDIAL​ ​LAW​ ​REVIEW​ ​1 CIVIL​ ​PROCEDURE ATTY.​ ​DEMETRIO​ ​C.​ ​CUSTODIO,​ ​JR. actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about​ ​P50​ ​million. Tiong only paid P210 as docket fee thus prompting SIOL’s objection. Judge Castro disregarded the objection but upon order of the SC, the records of the case along with 22 others were under investigation for under-assessment​ ​of​ ​docket​ ​fees. Judge Asuncion issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties to comment on the Clerk’s letter-report that said she had difficulty in complying with the SC’s Resolution as Tiong’s pleadings did not indicate the exact amount to be recovered. Tiong then filed a Compliance and Second Amended Complaint which was admitted by Asuncion. Issue: W/N the court acquired jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that Tiong ONLY paid the additional docket fee after the judgment of the CA ordering​ ​the​ ​reassessment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​appropriate​ ​docket​ ​fee Held: YES​. The principle in the Manchester case could be very well applied in this case as the pattern and intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but​ ​also​ ​in​ ​the​ ​filing​ ​of​ ​the​ ​second​ ​amended​ ​complaint. However, unlike in the Manchester case, Tiong demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required thus the SC called​ ​for​ ​a​ ​more​ ​liberal​ ​interpretation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​rules. Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a ​matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private respondent​ ​to​ ​pay​ ​the​ ​same. Thus,​ ​the​ ​Court​ ​rules​ ​as​ ​follows: 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary​ ​period. GMDP​ ​2017 8 REMEDIAL​ ​LAW​ ​REVIEW​ ​1 CIVIL​ ​PROCEDURE ATTY.​ ​DEMETRIO​ ​C.​ ​CUSTODIO,​ ​JR. 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary​ ​period. 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect​ ​the​ ​additional​ ​fee. ___________________________________________________ HEIRS​ ​OF​ ​RUBEN​ ​REINOSO​ ​SR​ ​v.​ ​CA DOCTRINE: There is a need to suspend the struict application of the rules considering that the matter of non-payment of docket fees was never an issue raised in​ ​the​ ​RTC​ ​(original​ ​jurisdiction) A passenger jeep and truck collided along E. Rodriguez Avenue that resulted in the death of Ruben Reinoso Sr. The heirs of Reinoso filed a complaint for damages against Tapales and Guballa, owners of the jeep and truck,​ ​respectively. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the heirs and Tapales then on appeal, the CA set aside and reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint due to non-payment of docket fees as laid down in Manchester v. CA. In addition, the CA ruled that since prescription had already set in, petitioners could no longer pay the required​ ​docket​ ​fees. Issue​: W/N the court had jurisdiction notwithstanding the failure to pay the proper docket fees within the prescribed​ ​period. Held: YES. The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory, as enunciated in the ​Manchester case. However two years later, the same rule was relaxed in the ​Sun Insurance Office case wherein the SC decreed that were the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the​ ​applicable​ ​prescriptive​ ​or​ ​reglementary​ ​period. In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated before the RTC and said trial court had already rendered a decision. While it was at that level, the matter of GMDP​ ​2017 9 REMEDIAL​ ​LAW​ ​REVIEW​ ​1 CIVIL​ ​PROCEDURE ATTY.​ ​DEMETRIO​ ​C.​ ​CUSTODIO,​ ​JR. non-payment of docket fees was never an issue. It was only the CA which ​motu propio dismissed the case for said​ ​reason. The heirs are liable for the difference between the actual fees paid and correct payable docket fees to be assessed by the Clerk which shall constitute a lien on the judgment​ ​pursuant​ ​to​ ​Sec.​ ​2,​ ​Rule​ ​141. ___________________________________________________ GMDP​ ​2017 10