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Music and Non-Human Agency (2017)

2018, Post, Jennifer (ed., 2018), Ethnomusicology – A Contemporary Reader, Volume II, pp. 181–194. NY & London: Routledge.

A well-known definition of music states that what we understand with this term may be subsumed under "humanly organized sound:" This was formulated by John Blacking (1973, 3) in his celebrated book "How Musical is Man?" His proposal, however, was not uncontested, and many authors have tried to complement, contradict, or reaffirm this idea of how the phenomenon music could be framed. What is of interest here is the adverb "humanly," because it limits musical action and appreciation to processes that are essentially human, thereby excluding non-human agency. In this chapter, I will explore how far "the human" can be essentialized in relation to music and in which sense agency beyond the human could be, or even has to be, acknowledged within this context.

11 Music and Non-Human Agency Bernd Brabec de Mori A well-known definition of music states that what we understand with this term may be subsumed under "humanly organized sound:' This was formulated by John Blacking (1973, 3) in his celebrated book How Musical is Man? His proposal, however, was not uncontested, and many authors have tried to complement, contradict, or reaffirm this idea of how the phenomenon music could be framed. What is of interest here is the adverb humanly, because it limits musical action and appreciation ofprocesses that are essentially human, thereby excluding non-human agency. In this chapter, I will explore how far "the human" can be essentialized in relation to music and in which sense agency beyond the human could be, or even has to be, acknowledged within this context. ' One restraint, however, must be made explicit up front: In order to judge if, for example, a mockingbird or machines with artificial intelligence are able to create or understand "music:' we would need a valid definition of what "music" is. As long as this is not defined-if it can be defined at all, which I doubt-it is only possible to describe if non-human entities are able to produce and/or recognize sonic patterns that possess characteristics of what is generally subsumed under "musical" in a (Western!) human sense.' In artistic contexts, the involvement of such sources from beyond the human realm is common. . For example, Blackfoot people may tell the researcher that their songs come from the guardian spirits (NettI2010, 221), or it is a deity who sings through a Warao healer's mouth (Olsen 1996, 169). Also in Western art music, divine (or other) inspiration is often mentioned as the ultimate source of a work of music. For example, in an interview with Johannes Brahms conducted by Abell (1981 [1955]), Brahms tells the author about establishing a direct connection to God during a meditative state he achieved while composing. Hence it would be God who was actually composing while the composer would retreat to the rather simple duty of notating what he received through this inspiration. Or, for a newer case, in his film 20,000 Days on Earth, Nick Cave (Forsyth et al. 2014) says that his music depends on his mood and his mood depends on the weather, and, conversely, the weather depends on his mood (however, Cave humorously explains that he cannot control the weather because he cannot control his moods). Consequently, the weather would-in direct interaction-be responsible for Nick Cave's music, or at least for the moods communicated in his songs. Although indigenous people seem to often abandon their traditional religions, the veridity of Abell's conversation with Brahms is doubted, and Nick Cave's remark bears the characteristics of a moody provocation by a rock musician, these examples show that inspiration is a topic open 181 182 • BERND BRABEC DE MORI for vast speculation and artistic play, and is still far from being easily explained by scientific means (see e.g. Drago and Finney 2013). As the term indicates, inspiration refers to something from the outside going inside; an external source that causes creative attitude inside a human mind: Superficially, inspiration implies something outside the person, whether it is projected or not. My view of my inspiration is external; my view of my creativity is internal. We imply this in calling creativity an "innate gift:' So the difference between the two ideas, inspiration and creativity, is that on the surface at least inspiration is objective and creativity is a subjective matter. I am inspired by this, that or the other. Of course on close inspection the external inspiration is usually revealed as a projected inner energy. But broadly speaking and as a starting point we could say that inspiration comes from outside in, and creativity comes from inside out. (Deliege and Harvey 2006) Usually, today, this is considered as a unidirectional flow of information, and agency is understood to reside with the creating individual. For example, if a composer is inspired by an impressive landscape or by the cruelty of some specific battle, the composer is still the creative agent who actively perceives the landscape or acts of cruelty and transforms these impressions into musical expressions. Therefore, in current public discourse, a human author or composer can be (and has to be for copyright laws) attributed to any musical piece, despite some difficulties with "tradition als," However, the separation of an "outside inspiration" and an "interior creativity" is ultimately connected to what Descola (2005) calls the naturalistic ontology, to a conceptual bifurcation! between the outside, unintentional nature, and the interior, intentional, and human culture. Among many indigenous or traditional, as well as some New Age communities, this bifurcation is not made. Descola calls such ontologies "an imic," "analogic," and "totemic," where physicality and interiority are conceptualized differently from modern scientific thought, which is grounded in naturalistic ontology. This means that among many communities on Earth, a totally different approach to creativity and invention has to be envisioned, an approach that is ethnographically grounded. By taking the position of our research associates seriously, this approach acknowledges non-human actors as part of, or even the source of, creativity in general and creating music in particular (see Brabec de Mori 2016). I will expound on this subject in later sections of this chapter. Before that, I wish to draw your attention to more tangible non-humans like animals and plants, but also planets, artifacts and software. "Musicologies" Beyond the Human For animals, a considerable amount of research has already been undertaken.' Evidence is fairly clear that certain animals, especially humpback whales and certain songbirds, are able to produce and perceive sonic patterns that may carry meaning; and what is remarkable, meaning beyond obvious signal or pseudo-linguistic character. This meaning can also be perceived, recognized, and reproduced by animals of the same species. Differences in sound structures can be observed between populations of these animals within a certain habitat compared to animals of the same species who dwell elsewhere. This phenomenon strongly suggests something "cultural" occurring within these species. Whether such utterances can be termed "music" is still open to debate. Sorce Keller stresses that "Ethnomuslcologists do not need to be reminded that the point is not to maintain that non-human animals make 'music' in the same sense that Homo sapiens does. There are MUSIC AND NON-HUMAN AGENCY • 183 things that non-human animals apparently never do. [... T]he embedding of words in a melody, following a metrical pattern, appears to be uniquely human" (2012, 176). Going further, let us consider that many plants are also ableto produce sounds. Evidence ofthis, for example, is found in acoustic emissions that can be recorded in order to diagnose dehydration distress in certain plants (Nolf et al. 2015). This ability to emit sounds extends to sonic phenomena beyond creaking in the wind: by manipulating cell membranes, or water containment in cells, vibrations can be generated that transmit energy waves to the adjacent medium, that is, into air, or soil. Usually these sounds are located beyond human hearing range, between 20 and 300 kHz, as well as between 10 and 240 Hz, but at very low intensity, still inaudible for human ears (Gagliano 2013). Following this thread of research in plant behavior sciences, it is considered possible that plants also perceive sonic events within a certain frequency range. Gagliano also suggests that plants are able to communicate by the means of sonic interaction and dispose of cognitive facilities to act and react within a surrounding soundscape. The sonic phenomena applied by plants could have a certain signal character; but likewise one could interpret this communication channel as musical, because plants seem to transmit information about their "mood" through nonverbal sonic patterns. This area, however, is totally speculative still, and despite recent advances, little reliable research is available. Finally, some neo-platonic ideas of sphere harmonies, earth tones, and planet oscillations are regarded musical among certain communities. Such ideas are present in somewhat esoteric applications of music, namely in what I call "informal music therapy" and related areas, as well as in contemporary art music.' Within these groups of people, powerful agencies are often attributed to earth tones or planet sounds. Such musical practices often yield powerful results for practitioners and participants. Although explications sometimes contrast with scientific findings-Cousto (1984), for example, renders planets' tones and related sonic derivations of astronomical number ratios executable through brilliant intellectual analogisms-an ethnomusicology of New Age musical practices has to acknowledge its research associates' ontological concepts and the validity of their practice. It may, in the preceding examples, remain unclear whether one is listening to a soundscape present in a certain environment, or one is actually confronted with something "musical" emerging from a potentially non-human source. To conclude this section, it is not so relevant if animals, plants, or planets understand the sounds they produce as musical. They are evidently able to emit something that, in the end can be interpreted as, or translated into, music. Various definitions of music allow listeners to judge whether certain sonic phenomena are musical or not. Soundscape art plays extensively with this possibility: Trafficsounds are commonly regarded non-musical noise, disturbing, and probably unhealthy in everyday life. However, if the same noise is recorded and played back in an artistic context, it may suddenly acquire characteristics of music. This is undoubtedly the case for animal sounds, even plant sounds," and the emissions of astronomical objects received with radio telescopes and transposed into audible frequency range, when they are used in compositions and renderings that target a "music-expecting" audience. R. Murray Schafer, with his influential Tuning of the World (1977), invited artists to explore environmental sounds as something one may actively listen to and work with in order to produce artwork that can definitely be regarded music. Long before that, recordlngs-i-and before recordings became available, instrumental or vocal imitations-of bird song and other non-human sounds were extensively used and implemented in musical compositions and improvisations alike. It is clear however, that in these cases, the "music" is made by human soundscapers, composers, or musicians who make use of sound sources originating (in part) from the realm ofthe non-human. Back to the beginning: That many non-human entities are apt to emit sounds is obvious. Whether they are apt to produce (or in turn perceive) music is still open to debate. 184 • BERND BRABEC DE MORI Technology If animal, plant, traffic, and planet sounds are made into music by human actors or mediators, much music that is understood as created by humans is actually mediated by musical instruments. This leads us to the problem of technological actors , of possibly creative "beings of technology" (Latour 2013). In classic actor-network theory (ANT),? any musical instrument could obtain the role of a non-human actor or mediator. In ethnomusicology, some attempts have been undertaken in order to gain insights into the active role of musical instruments. Jan Mrazek (2008), for example, presents an analysis of the Thai xylophone ranaat eek and compares it with the Javanese gambang, a xylophone very similar in construction. Mrazek's goal is to provide a comparative phenomenology of the instruments in order to dethrone Hornbostel and Sachs's (1914) omnipresent classification system of musical instruments." By describing the construction of the ranaat eek, how to learn to play it, the attitudes required from a successful player, as well as its ritual and supernatural functions, he suggests treating instruments as individuals, or at least as things with a certain "personality:' His work is not explicitly presented as an actor-network analysis but it uses some of ANT's approaches and thus deserves mention. Eliot Bates finally makes his intention clear when describing "The Social Life of Musical Instruments" (2012a). He however only scratches the surface of ANT's possibilities when summarizing some important steps in constructing, selling or giving, playing, and exhibiting long-necked lutes in the Middle East, especially the saz ? The paper is a groundbreaking step, albeit lacking the arduous in-depth empirical dimension of classic ANT in science and technology studies. In his paper "What Studios Do;' the same author (Bates 2012b) likewise flirts with ANT, highlighting the active roles recording studios play in Istanbul and elsewhere. Bates intends to explain that music recorded in a given studio is marked by the studio, because musicians have to implement what the studio provides or requires in order to be "played." P. Allen Roda (2014) uses ANT in his in-depth study of the Indian drum set tabla, focusing on the process of customized tuning of the instrument in the workshop during the process of selling, thus highlighting the influence that changes on an instrument influences the music that is played on it. Other kinds of musical instruments have appeared since the mid- twentieth century,when electronicallycreated sequences of sounds were initially applied in music composition. This resulted in newly developed instruments whose properties (or agencies) shaped entire styles and musical cultures-for example, the electric guitar or the Moog synthesizer. Consequently, electronic devices today facilitate truly non -human generation of music. With rapid advances in computer sciences and applications, it became possible to further develop the initially used random number series into series that follow given sets of rules that can also be learned by machines . Neural networks are not only able to generate data series for sonification, but rather to interpret random inspiration through a learned set of rules in order to create melodic-rhythmic structures that are undoubtedly recognized as musical by the vast majority of human listeners (see for example the "chaotic inspiration algorithm" developed by Coca et al. 2013). If the process of musical composition is mainly performed through a transformation of inspiration (data obtained through input, e.g. of a certain landscape or war-time acts of cruelty) into melodic-rhythmic structures following a certain set of rules, non-human machines are today able to compose music. Visual information, like the colors or outlines of a mountain, or numerics like the estimated ratio of deaths per time unit occurring during the battles of Verdun, may serve as inspiration for human composers or machines alike. Again, it is popular to play with such topics in artistic approaches. I only have to listen to the left and the right of my office to notice that contemporary composers are creating musical projects around computer aided and computer created music. For example, a recent performance at the institute of electronic music and acoustics at the University of Music and Performing Arts Graz presented Eiiypothese de l'Atome Primitif Sonore for digitalfeedback with live electronics by Stelios Gagliardi, with computer generated sounds based on cosmological data (the MUSIC AND NON-HUMAN AGENCY • 185 "Big Bang") in interaction with a human life performer. At the same time, Viennese composer Johannes Kretz developed his Turing Testfor Dancers-the essential part of the performance was the task given to human dancers, to convince the audience that they are interacting with an avatar projection of another human dancer instead of a machine generated avatar. These are just two random examples from my own close vicinity that underline that the ambiguity of human and machine capabilities in creating contemporary music is at the core of today's musical creativity in post-modern societies. Furthermore, the music and sound effects a computer game player hears are in some cases mediated by another kind of interface: In many contemporary games, sound is created when the player interacts with the gameworld environment in certain ways (Grimshaw et al. 2013) . Hence what the player hears is not pre-composed but "improvised:' namely by an algorithm that displays other-than-human properties. Although the algorithm was probably designed and coded by a human game sound programmer, it is not the programmer who mediates between the "environment" (the gameworld) and the listening player, but instead the algorithm itself. In ethnomusicology we often describe or faithfully reproduce what people tell us about more traditional instruments. Lutes that are persons, flutes that embody deities or spirits, drums that wield powers of dead ancestors or predator animals can be found among a variety of communities. To givejust one example,the complex of sacred wind instruments in Lowland South America is tied to the indigenous conception that the instruments are parts of the body of a divine being (Wright 2015), are worldly manifestations ("bodies") of otherworldly powers ("spirits"), or are imbued with the power of spiritual or divine entities that manifest when the instruments are blown. These wind instruments are subjected to a rigid and gendered set of taboos, in order to protect their special status, and likewise to protect humans, especially the uninitiated, from the powers of the forces associated with them." With such cases, we encounter the methodological divide between indigenous or "traditional" epistemologies (Simpson 2001; Brabec de Mori 2016) that contrast with a contemporary, disenchanted (like diagnosed by Max Weber), scientific approach to organology. On the one hand, instruments are considered "enchanted" entities in Gell's (1992) sense among non-modern communities. On the other hand, in naturalistic ontology, instruments are understood as material tools for enhancing humans' capabilities of sound production. This identifies a bifurcation that is significant to the aims of this chapter and extends to all areas mentioned above. When considered from a naturalistic, scientific point of view, music (or other) agency of animals, plants, planets, algorithms, and instruments appears to be far-fetched. The "disenchantment" of the modern world created animals, plants, and instruments that are merely automatons reacting to stimuli and being devoid of intentionality and creativity. Contemporary advances in treating this problem, like zoomusicology, animal and plant cognition studies, as well as phenomenological or actor-network related analyses of musical instruments do not intend to "reenchant" these entities. Instead, they aim to show on empirical grounds that large networks of interrelatedness between these entities, historical and social environments, and human agency provide possibilities for these beings and objects to exert certain influence on what humans understand as musical creativity. Contrastingly, in non -naturalistic ontologies, active contribution to musical (or other) processes from such non-human entities goes largely unquestioned. The animic, analogic, or totemic ontologies (Descola 2005) conceptualized in many non-modern or non-Western societies enable non-human entities to have agency, even intentionality, and allow socializing with them from human side. Especially in animic ontology, in Descola's words, physicalities (i.e. bodies) are discontinuous, while interiorities (soul, mind) are continuous among beings. 111is means that animals, plants, instruments, or stars have a body different from the human but a soul, mind, or culture that is similar to the human. Therefore, these "human" interiorities in non-human entities enable the latter to be creative, intentional, and musical in the way humans are. Of course, such beings 186 • BERND BRABEC DE MORI are incompatible with a scientific conceptualization of the world . Their existence and agency has to be grounded in (religiou s) "systems of belief" or indigenous constructions of knowledge (see e.g. Simpson 2001) that ontologically contrast with scientific thought. Agency within Music Gell, in his groundbreaking though difficult work Art and Agency (1998), defines agency as a point where the possibly infinite chain of causality is broken, and a "beginning" is attributed to a certain entity. This is a very common procedure in human cognition, because it is impossible for a human mind to trace every causality back to a prior action; therefore this chain is broken at a point convenient to understanding a specific process in specific circumstances. To give a simple example: A human driver tries to start a car engine, but the engine does not respond to the driver's attempts because a connection in the car's electric system is corroded due to lack of maintenance. The driver will arrive late in her office, so she calls her boss, saying "my car doesn't want to start:' She does not have.to explain the whole causal chain of events that led to the situation. Here, the circumstances suggest to attribute agency (or delegate the guilt for being late) to "the car:' Similarly, a concert visitor may tell her friend that "the Beethoven concerto moved me deeply" instead of, for example "the way the mu sicians interpreted the score written by Beethoven triggered memories about important emotional situations in my own past" or the like. In the western Amazonian Lowlands, indigenous people say that they feel "pierced by a song" when it is well performed in a ritual setting (Brabec de Mori 2015, 27), whereas the chain of causality might be traced back through the singing style of the ritual specialist, his personal history, and his reputation that was acquired through a series of successful rituals, and so on. It is possible to attribute agency-the potential to "move" the listener "deeply" or to even "pierce" somebody-to the performance, and consequently to the music itself. Besides"moving" or "piercing:' a given melody can also obtain a state, it can be "happy:' "solemn:' or "sad;' for example. This does not mean, however, that the musicians interpreting the melody are sad themselves while perfo rming the melody. This was shown by Stoichita (2008) in his work with Romani musicians. Neither the performers on stage are sad, nor was the bandleader sad when he conceived the tune. Also in the case of written works, the composer was not necessarily sad while writing down the score. Even the listener can be happy during the piece being performed and still perceive the melody as "sad:' Therefore, the question arises, who or what is actually "sad;' who or what is in the emotional state of "sadness"? One possibility is to trace the chain of causality back to the performer or composer who has probably learned to use certain socially and historically constructed musical "tricks" (Stoichita 2008, 24) that convey the impression of sadness , and further to how these "tricks" have been developed in a certain historical and local tradition, and so on . Another possibilit y, and probably the more common one , is to break the chain and attribute "sadness" to the melody. This process corresponds to what Gell would call "enchantment:' The emotion of sadness is not a property of the sonic pressure waves perceived by the listener's ear. Within a given social and cultural context, the listener adds the notion of "sadness"to the perceived sound sequence, therefore "enchanting" it with a quality that is not a property of the object by itself (as for example "amplitude" or "pitch" would be). If the melody by itselfissad in the mind of a listener, the listener attributes the agency of conveying the feeling of sadness to the melody. This does not, in Gell's words, "impljy a] particular kind of agency, [but] only the polarity of agent/ patient relations" (1998, 66). A unique relation between one melody and one listener is constructed th at identifies the melody as agent and the listener as patient in the course of the transmission of "sadness" in a specific context. In aesthetic theorizing, the problem of emotions conveyed to a listener by (or through) a certain piece of music has received much attention, including the "persona theory" of musical emotion, as MUSIC AND NON-HUMAN AGENCY • 187 initially put forward by Levinson (1990). While prior scholars usually tended to correlate a musical persona with the composer or musician, Levinson argues that this has not been the case. He suggests that the persona can also be virtual, a non-physically-existing protagonist whose emotional trajectory is described by the musical work." Despite much criticism, this theory has gathered considerable support by other scholars; for example, by Robinson and Hatten, who conclude that "if listeners hear music as expressing emotion, it is often because they are able to infer one or more implied, virtual agents who can genuinely feel and express the trajectory of emotional states the music is heard as expressing" (2012, 104). Following their argument, it becomes convincing that a listener has at least the option to infer such an agent , a virtual persona, that exists "within" the music, in cases even independent from a composer's or interpreters' intentions. In 2012, Stoichita and Brabec de Mori introduced "sonic beings" into musical research. Stoichita (2011) suggests that Levinson'spersona can be understood as an "enchantment" of a musical piece. In any context besides the Western classical "work;' it may be difficult or meaningless to anthropomorphize one personas trajectory within one "work:' Attribution of agency or even personality may occur in certain forms of enactment during performance. For example, certain tunes or specific rhythms may "fill" a human person with non-human interiority like in Caribbean or Afro-Brazilian "possession trance" events." Furthermore, applications of specific musical techniques like "voice masking" indicate that in a given performance style, in this case vocal timbre, a non-human force makes its appearance in the way music sound s." Finally, through the interaction of specific motives, timbres, or parts of a musical piece, a series of different beings can be addressed, so that a sequence of musical items reproduces a chain of entities, a procession of "sonic beings. ?" The musical realm contains a virtual causality of its own, which animates the elements that are joined by it (Scruton 1997). That said, within music it is possible that causal relations are built between its elements (e.g. between specific pitches, like the leading-tone in major-minor tonality and the "tension resolving" tonic), relations that only exist as additions to the sonic events perceived. Thus, such relations can be understood again as an "enchantment" of the perceived stimuli. "Enchanted listening" (Stoichita and Brabec de Mori, in press) endows the listener (as Gells "patient") with the faculty of experiencing the effects of interactions, summons, transformations, etc. of those elements that are (as Gell's "agents") present within, and only within, the hearing space construed by the music. It is important to note that these agents are, like Levinson's persona, neither physically present in the sonic event, nor necessarily intended by the composer or musician, but instead added by the listener. Therefore, the sonic event becomes "enchanted:' The common Western way oflocating such experiences and attributions of agenc y is however to situate the whole process within the listener's mind. If we employ a scientific perspective, the virtual persona does not physically exist in the musical work and the sonic being is by no means more material, so they have to be located in the mind, if they exist at all.IS Conversely,in non-naturalistic ontologies, such entities are often externalized and situated in the environment. In the following, I will present two examples that illustrate the ways non-human entities can be coded in musical motives or even cause music to sound in certain ways. One is from Papua New Guinea, and the second from the South American Lowlands. Similar concepts , however, can be found elsewhere, too. The first example treats the rnuni bird and waterfalls and their interactions with the Kaluli's vocal performances. The Kaluli are an indigenous people living in Papua New Guinea, and the description of their musical relations with their environment by Feld (2012 [1982]) is now considered a milestone in the history of ethnomusicology. For certain song genres, namely in the gisalo ceremony, the language employed by the Kaluli when speaking about their "music theory" uses repeated references to waterfalls. There are different kinds of waterfalls (high and low ones, carrying much water, or little) that therefore "generate" different vocal performances. Feld writes that: At the level of conceptualization, there is a theoretical frame of reference organizing patterns of sound in intervals, contours, and phrases that descend and balance like waterfalls, ru sh 188 • BERND BRABEC DE MORI forth like white water over rocks, or gently surge gulu like even creek falls. More importantly, these notions about sonic structure, coded in metaphors of water, are explicitly linked to notions about textual structure in a concept of composition "like water falling down and mixing in a waterpool" The creative moment of text coming to mind and flowing into the pool of swirling melody is the act of musical composition. (Feld 2012[1982], 214) Feld, in 1982, called the relations between melodic and textual structure and waterfalls "metaphors:' The notion of metaphor, however, is not as simple as often taken for granted, as shown by Lakoffand Johnson (1980) , and is deeply rooted in experience. It is the distributed experience of seeing and hearing a waterfall and seeing and hearing a gisalo performance within the Kaluli framework of cosmology that makes a waterfall not merely like the song and therefore good for describing the singing verbally. It is rather a source that engenders the structure used for Kaluli vocal art. One may see this relation as a form of inspiration, like the bad English weather that is allegedly responsible for the dire moods in Nick Cave's songs. However, the waterfall (sa in Kaluli language) is not only used as a metaphor in the discourse about singing. It is an integral part oflanguage, as it is also constituent of the terms for "speaking with an inner meaning;' and for any utterances that convey text, or are performed with an association of text, like "whistling with a text in mind" (Feld 2012 [1982], 133). It denotes performance of speaking, salan, and thus acquires a status much more rooted in experience and behavior than a mere likeness. In the light of contemporary animism, the agency and animic personhood of waterfalls can account for the Kaluli's fondness of waterfalls as a source for such pre-eminently human capabilities like speaking and singing." It is the waterfall that makes the landscape speak, and the voice of Kaluli people seems to be their "waterfall:' The agency of the muni bird in Kaluli poetics and singing is more explicitly person-centered. Kaluli people hear drumming (especially by the ilib drum) as an utterance of the muni bird. The muni bird, furthermore, is heard as the crying of a child, based on the narrative "the boy who became a muni bird:' When the ilibis beaten in ceremony, Kaluli listeners are so deeply touched by the callof the bird -child that they start weeping, may collapse on the floor, or even burn dancers or the drum itself with a torch. It should be clear by now that this goes beyond a game of words: The experience of hearing the drum is so profoundly rooted in the conviction that the spirits of lost children call through the muni bird so that Kaluli listeners actually break into tears and collapse and retribute their grief to the musicians. Gisalo is also performed by spirit mediums in what Feld calls "seances:' The medium performs songs that likewise move people to tears, but the collapsing and burning does not take place. The medium sings similar songs in ceremonies, but Feld makes clear that "Theoretically the songs are not pre-composed or rehearsed but rather represent compositions by various spirits of the dead and local spirits of lands that are manifest through the mouth of the medium" (2012[1982], 179-180). Of course, Feld is skeptical here, and he says, "theoretically." This is due to the abovementioned bifurcation between culture and nature, between mind and environment, which is strictly upheld in Western naturalism but less pronounced or even absent in many indigenous societies. In naturalism, the agent is the singing person who intentionally changes his vocal timbre in order to make the "worshippers" "believe" that spirits are present. Among people who hold a conceptualisation of the world structured in what Descola (2005) calls animism, non-human beings like birds , waterfalls, other animals, plants, or mountains, are understood as irreducible persons who have human-like culture, and minds, too. Therefore, processes like musical creation can be externalized and attributed to "spirits;' or to personified animals, plants, and so on. One main task of specialists (like "mediums:' "priests;' "healers;' "shamans") is to gain access to socialize with such non-human entities in order to instruct them, learn from them, to drive them off, to seduce them; in short, to use these relations in MUSIC AND NON-HUMAN AGENCY • 189 order to obtain favorable results for their peers. Feld mentions that also among the Kaluli, the medium's singing allows listeners to hear which spirit or entity is singing "through the mouth of the medium" (2012, 180). Agency outside Music It is exactly this problem of mediumship that poses a methodological challenge of how to treat such performances (see also Iankowsky 2007). As scholars trained in Western academic institutions, or institutions that adhere to a naturalistic distinction between culture and nature, we are supposed to follow the principle of Ockam's razor, that is to prefer the explanation that requires fewer entities to explanations that require many entities. A sociological interpretation of such mediumship would explain the people's "belief system" based on the Durkheimian separation of the sacred and the profane: The sacred is located in a universe of symbols that stand for processes within the profane. With that, Kaluli mediumship can be understood as a belief system using certain songs and singing styles in order to symbolize and indicate certain actions and processes that should then be executed by the believers. Taking, however, our research associates seriously, we have to apply an ontological pluralism: Although we "know" that spirits do not exist outside of the human mind, people in the community in question may likewise "know" that they do exist, and that it is possible, and in certain circumstances perfectly reasonable, to socialize with a tree. Many indigenous or traditional communities, and with them a number of post-modern New Agers, and even concert audiences who "believe" in Beethoven do not employ Ockams razor. A reality with many entities is perfectly feasible.I? In the western Amazon, musical healing is widespread and frequently applied. The importance of sound for indigenous conceptions of the world is so high that Lewy (2015) terms this way of interacting with the environment "arnerindian sonorism," Sessions for curing (and likewise for sorcery) are conducted by specialists that excel in singing specific songs they claim that they have learned from spirits. As the Kaluli example demonstrates, this is not a local phenomenon. The Taiwanese Tao, for example, likewise tell that they have learned the mikarayagpolyphonic singing from the anita, spirits of the dead (Lin 2013, 236). Among Peruvian lowland people, including indigenous and mestizo populations, knowledge in general, and with that the ability of singing magical songs for healing or Witchcraft, is obtained through what is locally called "diet": a person ingests a substance, for example a decoction of a tree bark, usually repeatedly every day for a certain span of time (e.g. one week). Meanwhile, and during a decided time that follows (e.g, some weeks or months), strict alimentary and social taboos have to be followed. This procedure leads the practitioner to dreams or wake-time visions of the spirits of the plant ingested; within these dreams or visions the apprentice can obtain power, most often in the form of songs, from the spirits. When later conducting healing sessions, the healer can use the songs or the singing styleshe or she has obtained from the spirits in order to apply them in specific situations. Within the healing session, the song itself is not thought to affect the patient directly-the song serves for instructing allied beings or repelling malevolent forces (e.g. a spirit that caused an illness). Circumstances are manipulated, resulting in healing if the songs are applied correctly (see Brabec de Mori 2009, 2012, 2015). It is however not exactly the rhythmic-melodic structure of the songs that is obtained from the plant spirits. The melodies are most often learned through oral transmission from teachers. The diet instead imbues the healer with the power of socializing with the spirits. During the actual healing session, the healer "hears" or "feels" the songs performed by the spirits in the spirit world, inaudible for lay people, and sings a human song in human language in the singing style of the spirit the healer is in contact with. This contact, that is the actual presence of spirits in the healing ritual, can be heard by listeners in changes of tempo, timbre, or register. This was called "voice masking" by Dale Olsen, who remarked for the Venezulean Warao, that the 190 • BERND BRABEC DE MORI spirits "and the wisiratu [healer] are one entity during spiritual affairs such as curing; and the wisiratu's masked voice is the hebu's [spirit's] voice" (1996,162). Likewise among the Peruvian Shipibo- Konibo, the patients or audience present during a curing session can judge if spirits are present in the singer's voice, and even define the category of spiritual being (e.g. a water spirit, a celestial entity) that sings through the healer's mouth. The healer is not possessed by the entity; he or she is still consciously active as a translator: The spirits' inaudible song is performed in a way that human audience can hear and understand it. The singing style, that is the voice mask, indicates that the performed song is actually a powerful spiritual entity's song (cf. Brabec de Mori 2015) . Here, the voice mask indexes the powerful beings at work. The difference between the Kaluli hearing and imitating the muni bird, and for example the Shipibo-Konibo hearing and imitating the matataon bird, was formulated by Brabec de Mori and Seeger (2013, 272). One can imitate the acoustic shape of a bird call, but on the other hand, it makes sense in an animist world to translate a birds calling or singing into a human song with human lyrics. In both cases, however, the source for the song itself, for its lyrics, or its sound (the voice mask) is definitely regarded non-human and exteriorized. It is either the bird (embodying a child spirit) calling , the-waterfall "speaking;' or the spirit person of a plant, animal, or another entity that is the "composer" or source of the music finally heard by the audience or recorded on tape or flashcard: "Although in general it is rather assumed that the bobinsana-person or the kawoka-spirit do not exist in a literal, 'physical' sense, they are evident as musical motifs or music-inspiring agents. They manifest themselves in sound transmission and execute agency via music performance" (Brabec de Mori and Seeger 2013,282). Conclusion: Musical Agency Correlated It is rather difficult to judge if non-human entities, ranging from animals, plants , mountains, or waterfalls to planets, computers, or spirits and divine forces , are able to produce music. In some cases it is even difficult to define their ontological status (whether spirits exist) or their capability to initiate action (do mountains want to sound in the wind?). Finally it is impossible to determine if what they produce is music. It may be in good time to reiterate here that agency should not be confused with intentionality. For the New Age people listening to planet sounds on the Klangwirkstofflabel, Jupiter has power (Cousto 1984), and maybe is conceptualized in a person-like way. Among the indigenous Venezulean Hohodene, wind instruments are the body of the divine Kuwai (Wright 2015). For the Kaluli people, the muni bird embodies the spirit of a lost child, and even songs or drum sounds that sound alike to the bird's call transport the grief for the loss (Feld 2012 [1982]). A Shipibo-Konibo healer performs the song of the bobinsana-plant spirit he hears sounding "from the spirit world" (Brabec de Mori 2015). In any case, the translation of sound emitted by non-humans, regardless if they are conceptualized as physical or ethereal , into patterns recognized as music or music's corresponding local terms, is mediated by humans. Artists, guides, and specialists, like healers, apply techniques and methods of translation and transmutation (Severi 2014) of non-human agency into what human audiences understand as music. Agency can be attributed, in Gell's sense, to any entity in the chain of causality. The planet emits electromagnetic waves that can be transposed to sounds, and if these sounds have meaning to a certain audience, this audience can legitimately attribute musical agency to the planet. If for a specific audience, a musical instrument "speaks:' it has agency. But attributing intentionality is different. If the entity in question shall have the intention to produce music, song, or power and meaningful sound, it needs human or human-like qualities, human-like "cultural" understanding, and a human-like mind. Therefore , human-like qualities are attributed to entities in an animist ontology, in order to understand their intentionality. It is counterintuitive for a naturalist to assume that birds , plants, or computers have the intention to MUSIC AND NON-HUMAN AGENCY • 191 make music . But if the birds, plants, and computers are conceptu alized as persons, it becom es perfectly possible. Finally,there are some specificcharacteristics of sonic occurrences on the one hand, and musical phenomena on the other, that seem meaningful for the question of non-human agency. This is mainly the property that sounds can be heard in a way we termed "enchanted:' Musical motives or passages can be sensed either as expressions of a virtual persona or as elements that relate to each other, "sonic beings" that can be endowed with an agency of their own. Consequently, such "mu sical entities" can easily be correlated with extra-musical entities. This is what Lowland South Americans do: They hear the voice mask of a singing healer, a specific quality of timbre, for example. The healer sings in a harsh voice, summoning, identifying, and repelling the spiritual cause of the illness, before calling upon his or her benevolent allied beings, thereby changing the tone of voice. Towards the end of the ritual singing , when the patient is going to be cured, the song has another quality, perfectly observable in sound recordings. The entities correlated with the sonic phenomenon are distinct: First, the illness, the malevolent spirits, are made present within the audio space and in the end the celestial allies are heard by the patient and aud ience. Such processes, however, are not confined to societies with an animist ontology. Agency can be attributed to exteriorized malevolent and benevolent spirits, but likewise to other entities. For example, in Western music entrainment therapy-lacking any traceable connections to indigenous animism-something very similar occurs: First, therapist and patient together identify musical sounds that "sound like the pain:' Then, a sonic quality is again agreed upon that "sounds like painless wellbeing:' After these definitions are done , the therapist (or the patient, or both, depending on the situation) improvises a piece of music, starting by emphasizing the "pain sound" and transforming the piece to finish by exclusivelyusing the "wellbeing sound:' This method is evidently effective (Bradt 2010). The principle in these two examples is the same: A specific quality of sound is correlated to a specific extra-sonic quality ; in the beginning with the illness-causing spirit or the perception of pain, and towards the end with the allied benevolent spirit or the feeling of wellbeing. From one perspective, the music is created by non-musical agents (spirits and pain); from another perspective, the music itself exerts agency on non-musical entities (again, spirits and pain). And in both cases, intentionality is located with the human healer or therapist, but agency is attributed to the spirits, or the musical sounds respectively. One way to approach non-human agency in musical processes is therefore to look at and listen to non -human beings and try to determine their role in musical proce sses, as I demonstrated in the first part of this chapter. Another way is to listen to music or other vocal or instrumental expression in order to correlate properties of the sound, or properties of the sound's enchantments with non-human agents, as was exemplified in the subsequent sections. It was demonstrated in this chapter that non-human agency in music production and perception is a complex issue, especially for the ethnomusicologist who is not only indebted to scholarly scrutiny but also to her or his research associates and their respective ontological positioning. Ethnomusicological research can contribute to social and cosmological understanding by analyzing how music is brought into the world and how it is perceived , received, and made effective by the respective audience. When treating issues of agency, the question of whether sounds produced or mediated by non-humans "are" music cannot be answered , because a valid definition of what music "is" among humans is still lacking. Maybe future research will show, or refute, that a lark hears bird song in a way similar to humans who listen to music, or even that one tree perceives the vibrations caused by another "as mu sic:' Anyway, intentionality, that is to purposefully make music, at this point cannot be attributed to most non-human agents. It seems that in order to be able to speak of music, sound must either be made into music by human mediators, for example by inspired composers, soundscape artists, New Age performers, or Amazonian indigenous healers; or human intentionality and therefore human interiority has to be attributed to non-humans, as it is done in animist societies. 192 • BERND BRABEC DE MORI Maybe music is a phenomenon tied to humanity, although its distribution among a multitude of non-human agents is evident, too. Notes 1. Agency beyond the human is no t by any means a new topic to the study of mu sic. Long before the era of enligh tenment and the bIrth of what we kn ow tod ay as musicology. divine Intervention and Inspiration were often taken for gra nted or were subjec ted to mor e or less spec ulative musings about meaning. origin. or teleology of music. Likewise. th inking about the POSl ible musicality ofani mal . especially birds, has bee n common among specla lists and lay people respectively since Immemorial times. However. du ring the histor y of academic musicology. the seriou consideration of other-than -human musical ou rces is rather ne w. 2. For discussions on how music can be defined see e.g. Nettl (2010, 216- 227). 3. This distin ction of nature from cultu re was initially criticized by Alfred Whitehe ad who defin ed it as the "great Bifurcation." For contempo rary trea tm ent of the top ic see e.g., Descola and Pdlsson (1996). Descola (2005). and Latour (2013); in conn ection with music. see Lewy (2015) and Brabec de Mori and Seeger (20 13). among others. 4. For examples and overviews see Mache (1997), Martinelli (2009). and Sorce Keller (2012). 5. See e.g. Laack (2012) for the Glastonbury neo-pagan communities, or check the German mus ic label Klangwirkstoff that focuses on astronomical ana logisms. Also the work by Stelios Gagliardi present ed in the next section makes use of data gathered from calculating the un iverse. 6. For example. conside r the curre nt project 1\ Stage for a 'free Audiellceby German artistic researcher Lucie Strecker to be realized at Wha repuke Sculp ture Tra il in New Zealand in 20 17. 7. For introductions to and the appli cability of ANT see, for example. Calion and Latour (1981) , Latour (2005), and Bueger and tockbruegger (20 16). 8. Mraze k argue that thinking in Hornbostel-Sachs (HS) categories directs one's understanding toward s mat erialism , suppressi ng any pheno mena more mean ingful to players, builders, aud ience , and scholars, especially "all ambig uities an d shade of meaning" (Mrazek 2008, 96). He the reby compar es the HS system with George Or well's "Newspeak:' Taking into account the power of the HS system, the system by itself has to be acknowledged as an influential actor in the past centu ry of organology. 9. Note that contrarily to Mrazek, Bates doe s make use of the category "long -necked lute" from the HS system without critic ism. 10. For det ails see the volum e Burst of Breath. edited by Hill and Chaum eil (2011). 11. Note that the persona theory is centered on Western "classical" art mus ic in Levinson's analysis. 12. See Schaffler and Brabe c de Mori (2015), or more generally Rouget (1985), Gell (1998, 70), and Jankowsky (2007). 13. See Olsen (1996, 169), for further examples see also Brabec de Mori (2012, 2015). 14. See also Brabec de Mor i and Seeger (2013) for a more detailed account, and Severi (2014) for some very good exam ples from South America . 15. 'Ole mentioned "Western" point of view relics muc h on the psychoanalytic idea that the human mind i able to create many entities within . However. more recent psychologica l and anth ropological approaches propose a more externa lized interpretatio n. too. see for examp le th e concepts of "dis tribuled cog nition" (Salomon 1997). or the "distributed person" an d "the extended mind" proposed by Gell (1998). 16. Among the Ecuadorian Achuar (Mader 1999), water falls are th e hom e of Arutam, the primordial power of being likewise respon sible for many forms of mu sic (cr. Bummer de Rod riguez 2015). 17. On e main point in the discussion about th e "ontological turn" in anth ropology is the effect th at ont ological pluralism creates "realities" that are inflated with bein gs and con tradic tion s that can often easily be refuted from a strong naturalistic position . References Abell, Arthur M. 1981[1955]. 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Stoichita, Victor A. and Bernd Brabec de Mor i. In press. "Postures of Listening: An Ontology of Sonic Percepts from an Anthropological Perspec tive:' Terrain: Anthropologie & sciencies humaines. Wrigh t, Robin M. 2015. "Musical Body of the Universe: Unity and Multiplicity in the Spiritualized Cos mos of the Hoho dene ," Tipiti:Journal of theSocietyfor the Anthropology ofLowlandSouth America 13(1): 1-22. hllp:ll digita1commons. trilli ty.edu/lipitilvol13/issl/8 ETHNOMUSICOLOGY A Contemporary Reader, Volume II Edited by Jennifer C. Post セ ゥ ーオ[セ ョ ッ NEW YORK AND LONDON