HAMAS
Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance Movement, is a Palestinian Islamic political and sociopolitical movement that emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni-based
religious and political organization founded in Egypt in 1928, with branches around the
world.
The United States, Israel, the European Union and Canada consider Hamas a terrorist
organization because of
1) Its violent resistance to what it regards as the Israeli occupation of historic Palestine
(constituting present-day Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip), and
2) Its rejection of the displaced peace process involving Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) since the early 1990s.
Hamas seeks assistance and training from other Arab, Islamic and international actors
and organizations, and receives it from Iran, Syria and the Hezbollah Lebanese Shiite
militant group
Hamas activities present challenges including:
• o ati g Ha as' ilitary a d terrorist threats to Israel, its fi a ial a d s uggli g
networks and its political influence;
• deter i e i
hat ir u sta es a d ho the U ited States ould a ept the
participation of Hamas or Hamas representatives in a Palestinian Authority (PA)
government and / or Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations;
• dise gagi g Ha as fro
its o
e tio s ith Ira a d Syria; a d
• e ouragi g hu a itaria aid a d e o o i de elop e t efforts i Gaza
strengthening Hamas.
ithout
Since the start of Hamas in 1987, it has maintained its primary political support base
and military command in the Gaza Strip - a territory it has held since June 2007 - while
having a significant presence in the West Bank. The political leadership of the
movement is currently based in exile in Damascus, Syria.
The Hamas military wing, the Izz al Din Qassam Brigades, 3 killed more than 400
Israelis, 4 and at least 25 US citizens (including some Israeli citizens) in attacks since
1993.
As the Qassam Brigades developed from one small group of guerrillas in a more
sophisticated organization with access to greater resources and territorial control,
their methods of attack evolved from small kidnappings and assassinations of Israeli
military to suicide bombings and rocket attacks on Israeli civilians.
Hamas also frequently attacked or repressed Palestinian political and factional
opponents, particularly in its fight against Fatah and other groups for control in the
Gaza Strip since Israel's military withdrawal in 2005.
Hamas emerged as the main internal force of opposition to Palestinian nationalist
leader Yasser Arafat and his nationalist Fatah movement in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip in the 1980s and 1990s - largely using violence against Israeli civilian and military
targets as Arafat's PLO began to negotiate with Israel.
In 2006, a little over a year after Arafat's death and the election of Fatah President
Mahmoud Abbas to replaced him as president of the Palestinian Authority, Hamas
became the first Islamic group in the Arab world to gain power democratically. The
Fatah electoral meltdown gave it control of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)
and government ministries of the Palestinian Authority.
Subsequent efforts by Israel and the international community to neutralize or
marginalize Hamas by military, political, and economic means may have changed the
external nature of its influence but failed to stifle it.
In 2007, Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip through decisive armed victories over
the PA and Fatah forces loyal to Abbas (causing Abbas to dismiss the PA government in
the West Bank and appoint a non-Hamas government instead) . Since then, Hamas has
consolidated its power in Gaza, despite the considerable damage suffered by the
Israeli population in Gaza due to an Israeli invasion in December 2008.
In January 2009 (also known as Operation Cast Lead, which was launched by Israel in
response to repeated rocket attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian militants) and
despite ongoing restrictions (often referred to as "blocking" or "closing regime"), by
Israel and Egypt on the flow of people and goods inside and outside the territory.
By consolidating its control over Gaza and seeking popular support through resistance
to Israel, Hamas seeks to establish its indispensability to any Arab-Israeli political
arrangement.
Many analysts believe that Hamas hopes to leverage this vitality into the single or
shared leadership of the Palestinian Authority in both the West Bank and Gaza - either
through a power-sharing agreement with Abbas and its Fatah movement, or through
presidential and legislative elections (which were due to occur in January 2010 under
the PA law, but were postponed depending on a factional agreement on the conditions
for maintaining them) - and to gain membership or otherwise supplant the Fatah-
dominated PLO, which remains internationally recognized as legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people.
Fatah's political hegemony within the occupied territories was undermined by the
Fatah-dominated inability of the PLA to co-opt or incorporate Hamas, which proved
more resilient than the secular Palestinian factions to the PLO's incentives. Egyptmediated efforts to forge a PA-sharing agreement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
between Hamas and its traditionally dominant rival faction, the secular nationalist
Fatah movement, have repeatedly paralyzed.
Hamas also gained popularity among many Palestinians at the expense of Fatah
because of its reputation as a less corrupt provider of social services (funded by
donations from Palestinians, other Arabs and international charities) and because of its
image of unshakeable resistance the Israeli Occupation. Some Palestinians realize that
Hamas is more rooted in the experiences and attitudes of Western bankers and Gaza
residents than Fatah. Most of Fatah's historic core leaders, including current PLO
President / President Mahmoud Abbas, spent decades in exile with Yasser Arafat's PLO
in several Arab states. Although many of Hamas's top leaders, including chief of staff
Khaled Meshaal, have also lived in exile for more than 30 years, Hamas has maintained
a strong presence within the Palestinian territories since its inception.
Hamas Poses Threats
Many Israelis fear the possible long-term threat that Hamas could pose to Israel's
physical and psychological security if its capabilities.
The ability of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to attack civilians inside Israel
(for example, through suicide bombings) has been drastically reduced in the postintifada environment after Israeli security measures have increased. A system of
heavily patrolled barriers and crossings limits access to Israel from both territories - in
the case of Gaza, almost completely. The system also includes the West Bank
separation barrier11 that some Israelis imagine as marking a border between Israel
and a future Palestinian state, despite deviating from the 1948-1967 armistice line
known as the "Green Line" in various places . Israeli military and intelligence
operations in the West Bank - including various obstacles and restrictions on
Palestinian freedom of movement (some of which are designed to protect Israeli
settlers and settlements) - reinforce the barrier system there.
Firecrackers and Contraband Tunnels
In response to restrictions on access to Israel, Hamas and other Palestinian militant
groups in Gaza have increased their strategic confidence in firing rockets and mortars
indiscriminately at Israeli targets. Rockets and the threat of future rockets with greater
geographic reach precipitated Operation Israel Lead against targets in Gaza in
December 2008. The roughly 8,350 rockets and mortars fired by Palestinians since
2001 killed at least 28 Israelis and injured dozens, 15 while the persistent rocket threat
had a wider negative psychological effect on Israelis living in target communities.
Since the end of Operation Cast Lead, Hamas has allowed fewer rockets to be fired
from Gaza by its military wing and other Palestinian militant groups, perhaps because
of a desire to avoid another large-scale Israeli attack. However, analysts and Israeli
officials say that Hamas continues to manufacture and stockpile hundreds, if not
thousands, of Qassam rockets. These rockets have limited range and are usually made
from household ingredients such as fertilizers, sugar, alcohol, fuel oil. , pipes and scrap
metal. Raw materials are usually smuggled into Gaza - thus bypassing the IsraeliEgyptian closure regime - through tunnels under the Egyptian border.
Since Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, Hamas has promoted a dramatic
expansion of the smuggling tunnel network linking Gaza to the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt.
Under the closing regime aimed at undermining Hamas control over the territory, the
tunnel network became Gaza's main economic engine and the militants' rearmament
mode.
In addition to Qassam rocket materials and other explosive devices, press and trade
reports and Israeli officials claim that thousands of mortars and hundreds of longrange rockets in the Hamas arsenal (some of which may have been manufactured in
Iran or China ) clandestinely entered Gaza through the tunnels. As of the summer of
2010, a report said that such long range rockets could include dozens of 122 mm (or
Katyushas) rockets and 230 mm Oghabs, and possibly 50 modified 240 mm Fajr
rockets. 3 rockets that could reach Tel Aviv or Israel's nuclear facilities in the Negev
desert near Dimona.
Hamas and other Palestinian militants would also have received small arms and antiaircraft and anti-tank weapons through the tunnels.
Estimation says that approximately 7,000 people work in more than 1,000 tunnels. The
tunnels are supposed to be of a generally high quality and engineering - with some
including electricity, ventilation, intercoms and a rail system. The openings for many
tunnels are found inside buildings in or around the town of Rafah, in the extreme
south of Gaza. Although Israeli air strikes made more than 100 tunnels inoperative
during Operation Cast Lead, many of them were restored in a few weeks because the
main damage was sustained in the openings, not in the intermediate sections. Israel,
Egypt, the United States, and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
countries have promised to stop or delay smuggling into Gaza by land and sea, and
some measures such as building an underground fence along the border between Gaza
and Egypt.However, anti-smoking capabilities remain limited and / or restricted.
It is also possible that Hamas has the ability to fire rockets out of Gaza. In August 2010,
rockets fired from the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt hit the neighbouring cities of Eilat, Israel
and Aqaba, Jordan, on the Red Sea coast. Israeli and Egyptian officials, along with
Palestinian Authority officials from the West Bank, said Hamas was responsible.
Gaza Militias and Security Forces
The leadership and most of the workforce - estimated at some 2,500 - from the Hamas
military wing, the Qassam Brigades, are in Gaza.
In addition, the Hamas-led government in Gaza maintains a robust contingent of
approximately 13,000-14,000 police, security and intelligence personnel, many of
whom are recruited by the Executive Force which assisted the Qassam Brigades to
defeat the Fatah-led forces in Gaza .
It seems unlikely that the Qassam Brigades and Hamas commanded Gaza's security
forces, even working in conjunction with other Gaza-based militants, could pose a
significant conventional threat to an Israeli military superior in human resources,
equipment and technology.
Ideology and Policies
Hamas combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism, although
opinions differ on how these two driving forces interact.
Some analysts insist that Hamas's actions show that it remains better defined by
reference to its charter or "alliance" of 1988, which sets a particularly militant,
uncompromising and anti-Semitic agenda. These observers hold this view despite and
perhaps cause of statements and documents issued in subsequent years by Hamas
leaders who intend to redefine the movement's agenda or distance itself from it, but
formally fail to deny it.
Other analysts see Hamas as an evolving pragmatic movement. They argue that Hamas
has already moderated its positions by participating in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative
Council elections, agreeing on short-term cease-fires with Israel through indirect
negotiations and expressing the desire to enter into a long cease-fire (or hudna) with
Israel. In addition, these observers say that Hamas signed the Mecca Agreement in
February 2007, according to which it agreed to divide power with Fatah, "respect"
previous agreements signed by the PLO and allow the PLO to negotiate with Israel and
present any agreement reached. the Palestinian people for their approval. Finally,
these observers resemble Hamas to the PLO of earlier times. The PLO, once a terrorist
group, changed some of its principles in the late 1980s and early 1990s - agreeing to
avoid violence and enter into negotiations with Israel (under the heading "land for
peace") of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 UN Security Council). 338), and
recognizes its right to exist.
Still other analysts do not assume that Hamas remains committed to every word of its
letter, but argue that a decisive majority of Hamas members is unwilling to deviate
from fundamental principles.
About the use of violence
The 1988 letter from Hamas says: "There is no solution to the Palestinian issue except
through Jihad. International initiatives, proposals and conferences are a waste of time
and vain efforts. "
In the following years, the willingness of the movement to stop violence and to
emphasize political methods to the detriment of the military in some circumstances,
most notably the decision to take part in the 2006 elections, led some analysts to
express hopes that it could contemplate demilitarization.
Nevertheless, the Hamas leadership and many other analysts insist that no matter
what other means Hamas may employ tactically from time to time, armed resistance
remains its ultimate asset.
In a July 2010 interview with the Jordanian newspaper Al Sabeel, Meshaal discussed
how having the option to use violence increases Hamas' ability to negotiate, in
contrast to the lack of influence he has said that the PLO since renouncing violence:
The PLO negotiators say: "Negotiation is the option, the course and the only plan."
They coordinate security with the enemy and implement the Road Map and their
security requirements freely, with Israel offering nothing in return. What is there to
force Olmert or Netanyahu to grant something to the Palestinians?
The negotiation in [the PLO] case is outside its objective context; is merely from the
perspective of political logic, without resistance and not based on the necessary
balance of power. The Vietnamese - for example - negotiated with the Americans
when they were retreating; so negotiations were useful to turn the last page into
American occupation and aggression. You are successful in negotiating and imposing
your conditions on the enemy, depending on the number of power cards you have on
the ground.
In his model for an Islamic state the Hamas letter predicts that Palestine will become
an Islamic society that allows the coexistence of all religions "under its wing":
The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinct Palestinian movement, whose allegiance
is to Allah and whose way of life is Islam. It strives to raise the banner of Allah on every
inch of Palestine, for under the wing of Islam, followers of all religions can coexist in
safety and security, where their lives, possessions and rights are involved. In the
absence of Islam, the strife will be abundant, oppression will spread, evil will prevail,
and schism and wars will unleash.
However, by reformulating PA institutions, laws and norms to tailor their aims - rather
than completely reformulating them - and allowing the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and other
international organizations and non-governmental organizations operating in Gaza,
Hamas chose - at least for now - for stability in relation to a comprehensive social
transformation. Hamas Interior Minister Fathi Hamad insisted: Claims that we are
trying to establish an Islamic state are false. Hamas is not the Taliban. It's not al-Qaeda.
It is a moderate and enlightened Islamic movement.
Some ideologues who believed that Hamas should or should have implemented Sharia
law and formally and fully Islamized public and private life soon after taking power
were disappointed. This deception has resulted in some Islamists joining extremist
groups, although it does not appear to present a short-term challenge to the Hamas
government and it is unclear how pronounced or significant this trend will be in the
long run.
However, there has been some movement toward greater Islamization of society
through the extensive community network of mosques, reconciliation committees,
government ministries and courts, security forces, religious scholars, and schools.
Islamic Fatwas (legal opinions) were offered as an alternative to secular justice for
some police detainees.
The morality police, judges and school principals advocate and enforce Islamic dress
codes - especially for women - in public places, although resistance to such measures
has delayed or reversed their implementation in some cases. How this affected the
minority of Palestinian Christians in Gaza are unclear. In February 2010, Interior
Minister Fathi Hamad (in a statement that some might interpret as contradicting his
quoted statement about Hamas's alleged restraint) "called for 'Da'wa's .
Use of Media
Hamas used its control over the Gaza media and a strong Internet presence to cast
Islamic, anti-Israel and anti-Semitic teachings into a narrative portraying "martyrdom"
and violence against Israel and Jews as heroic. Public dissent is suppressed, and Hamas
uses its Al Aqsa television and radio channels and summer camps to indoctrinate
children and youth with their hybrid Islamic / Palestinian nationalistic views. In 2009,
Hamas produced its first feature film celebrating the life and death of a Qassam
Brigade militant from the first intifada.
Encourages the support and often recruits of "young mosques" who help the
neighbourhood imams and sometimes act as informants for Hamas-controlled Gaza
intelligence organizations.
Hamas leaders also skilfully use regional and international media to create messages
for their various audiences: including Arabs and Muslims, Americans, Europeans and
Israelis. Israeli officials insist that Hamas gives the same message to the Arab and
Western audiences with a different tone and emphasis for each, creating what some
might call purposeful and convenient ambiguity on issues such as the possible
pragmatism of Hamas.
Leadership and Organization
Hamas has a variety of regional leadership and movement bodies, along with branches
that conduct their political, military, and welfare activities with varying levels of formal
group membership. In addition, the de facto Hamas government in Gaza has its own
structures of leadership and public stature.
Who controls overall strategy, financial policies and decisions, and how control is
exercised, remain open questions with opaque answers. Some analysts believe that
Hamas generally follows a hierarchical model in which final control resides with the 15member political cabinet (or politburo) and the advisory council of the movement
(known as the Shura council) based in Damascus.
For Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "Under this Shura
board, there are committees responsible for overseeing a wide range of activities,
from media relations to military operations. At the grassroots level in the West Bank
and Gaza, local Shura committees respond to the Shura council and execute their
decisions. " One reason to believe that substantial authority lies in the regional Shura
councils and the whole movement is that Hamas closely guarded the secrecy of the
association of these councils. Hamas also maintains branches in areas where it enjoys
support, such as Lebanon, Sudan, Gulf and possibly Iran.
Some analysts, however, believe that Hamas's formal hierarchical structures remain
subject to scattered control, as the geographical division of the organization's main
activities between Damascus and Gaza - maintained by the need for security and
survival of the organization - creates a system of mutual leverage. This system is based
on how the actions and funding flows of Hamas's political, military, and social welfare
branches affect their interactions as these interactions shape and are shaped by
events.
Hamas seeks to mitigate the inherent tension between its activities as
(1) a militant organization intransigently opposed to Israel, defying international
oppressions and countermeasures; and
(2) The government in Gaza accountable to its people for the management of
security, economics and other basic societal issues that rely heavily on Israeli and
international action.
Some may express this as Hamas' desire to maximize its power while minimizing its
responsibility. Hamas says it traces a brilliant line for the leadership of its members'
organization in the Gaza government, which, if true, helps divert responsibility. This
could discourage international actors from including Hamas in political discussions
about Palestinian governance or negotiations with Israel.
Sources of assistance
Iran, Syria and Hezbollah
According to the US State Department, Iran provides financial and military assistance
to Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups. During a visit to Tehran in December
2009, Hamas Politburo chief Khaled Meshaal said: "Other Arab and Islamic countries
also support us. Iranian support is in the lead and therefore we thank and thank Iran
for that. " Meshaal and his Politburo colleagues, along with the shura council of the
entire Hamas movement, have safe havens in Damascus, Syria. From Damascus, the
Hamas exile leadership can direct the group's operations through financial transactions
and unrestricted access to travel and communications. The Hezbollah movement, led
by Iran in Lebanon, offers military training as well as financial and moral support, and
has acted as a mentor or model to Hamas, which sought to mimic the political and
media success of the Lebanese group. Some Palestinians who are sceptical of the ArabIsraeli peace process believe that Iranian support for Palestinian militants and
Hezbollah is a necessary lever for Israel, that the United States and Europe are unlikely
to hand over to the Palestinian Authority / PLO president, Mahmoud Abbas.
Some reports say that contributions to Hamas' political and military alliances range
from $ 20 million to $ 30 million per year. However, even if Hamas welcomes direct
and indirect assistance from Iran, Iran's reputation among Arab populations has been
strengthened in recent years.
Western and anti-Israeli positions and rhetoric, Hamas and Iran may intentionally keep
some distance from each other. An alternative interpretation is that they simply
underestimate the extent of their ties. They seem to understand the importance of
Hamas maintaining an image among its domestic constituencies as an authentic
Palestinian unfolding of the Muslim Brotherhood rather than an Iranian proxy - due to
ethnic, sectarian and linguistic differences between Palestinians (who are
predominantly Arabs, Sunnis and Arabic speakers) and Iranians (mostly non-Arabs,
Shiites and Persians).
Iran's future influence on the Palestinian political landscape appears to be linked to the
Hamas fortunes, which have been on the rise since Hamas's political rise in the late
1980s, and bolstered by its victory in the 2006 legislative council elections and by the
Gaza in 2007. Possible Smuggling of arms, money and other smugglers into the Gaza
Strip backed by Iran, along with training.
Charities and Individuals
However, it seems that, whether through the international banking system or the
Gaza-Sinai smuggling tunnels (or both), Hamas's political and military wings still receive
funding from their own networks of Islamic philanthropic institutions, including some
that have operated and can still operate in the United States, Canada and Europe. The
most illustrative case was that of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development (HLF), based in Texas, which was once the largest Islamic charity in the
United States. After US investigators determined that HLF channelled money to Hamas
and had close ties to Hamas leader Musa Abu Marzouk while living in the United States
in the early 1990s, the Treasury Department named HLF as a specially designated
global terrorist (SDGT) in 2001 and froze their assets.
In 2008, five HLF leaders (four of whom were US citizens) were found guilty of
providing more than $ 12 million in material support to Hamas (through contributions
to Hamas-linked charities) after President Bill Clinton appointed Hamas as a terrorist
organization in 1995. In order to provide funding, HLF and two affiliated organizations
were also found guilty in 2004 by the federal civil court for the 1996 Hamas
assassination by an Israeli-Israeli citizen in Jerusalem, although the verdict against HLF
has been reversed in appeal in 2007 on procedural grounds.
Some analysts believe that Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups can benefit
from trade-based money laundering. Charities, businesses and individuals buy highdemand commodities such as sugar, tea, coffee and cooking oil to be sold in
Palestinian areas because of the scarcity of these items under the Israeli-Egyptian
closure regime.
Orders can be worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Some groups, such as the AntiDefamation League, have raised concerns about American citizens' participation and
the use of American funds on protest trains (including the Mavi Marmara flotilla of
May 2010 discussed below - see "International Dimensions") aimed at the IsraeliEgyptian closure regime that collected money and donated supplies to the Palestinians
in Gaza, partly because of the difficulty in confirming that the recipients are not linked
to Hamas.
In July 2009, about 200 American activists participated in a convoy organized by the
British organization Viva Palestina (led by then-British parliamentarian George
Galloway) who entered Gaza in Egypt and donated approximately $ 500,000 in medical
supplies (purchased from funds raised in States.