Academia.eduAcademia.edu

Hamas

Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance Movement, is a Palestinian Islamic political and socio-political movement that emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni-based religious and political organization founded in Egypt in 1928, with branches around the world. The United States, Israel, the European Union and Canada consider Hamas a terrorist organization because of 1) Its violent resistance to what it regards as the Israeli occupation of historic Palestine (constituting present-day Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip), and 2) Its rejection of the displaced peace process involving Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) since the early 1990s. Hamas seeks assistance and training from other Arab, Islamic and international actors and organizations, and receives it from Iran, Syria and the Hezbollah Lebanese Shiite militant group

HAMAS Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance Movement, is a Palestinian Islamic political and sociopolitical movement that emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni-based religious and political organization founded in Egypt in 1928, with branches around the world. The United States, Israel, the European Union and Canada consider Hamas a terrorist organization because of 1) Its violent resistance to what it regards as the Israeli occupation of historic Palestine (constituting present-day Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip), and 2) Its rejection of the displaced peace process involving Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) since the early 1990s. Hamas seeks assistance and training from other Arab, Islamic and international actors and organizations, and receives it from Iran, Syria and the Hezbollah Lebanese Shiite militant group Hamas activities present challenges including: • o ati g Ha as' ilitary a d terrorist threats to Israel, its fi a ial a d s uggli g networks and its political influence; • deter i e i hat ir u sta es a d ho the U ited States ould a ept the participation of Hamas or Hamas representatives in a Palestinian Authority (PA) government and / or Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations; • dise gagi g Ha as fro its o e tio s ith Ira a d Syria; a d • e ouragi g hu a itaria aid a d e o o i de elop e t efforts i Gaza strengthening Hamas. ithout Since the start of Hamas in 1987, it has maintained its primary political support base and military command in the Gaza Strip - a territory it has held since June 2007 - while having a significant presence in the West Bank. The political leadership of the movement is currently based in exile in Damascus, Syria. The Hamas military wing, the Izz al Din Qassam Brigades, 3 killed more than 400 Israelis, 4 and at least 25 US citizens (including some Israeli citizens) in attacks since 1993. As the Qassam Brigades developed from one small group of guerrillas in a more sophisticated organization with access to greater resources and territorial control, their methods of attack evolved from small kidnappings and assassinations of Israeli military to suicide bombings and rocket attacks on Israeli civilians. Hamas also frequently attacked or repressed Palestinian political and factional opponents, particularly in its fight against Fatah and other groups for control in the Gaza Strip since Israel's military withdrawal in 2005. Hamas emerged as the main internal force of opposition to Palestinian nationalist leader Yasser Arafat and his nationalist Fatah movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the 1980s and 1990s - largely using violence against Israeli civilian and military targets as Arafat's PLO began to negotiate with Israel. In 2006, a little over a year after Arafat's death and the election of Fatah President Mahmoud Abbas to replaced him as president of the Palestinian Authority, Hamas became the first Islamic group in the Arab world to gain power democratically. The Fatah electoral meltdown gave it control of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and government ministries of the Palestinian Authority. Subsequent efforts by Israel and the international community to neutralize or marginalize Hamas by military, political, and economic means may have changed the external nature of its influence but failed to stifle it. In 2007, Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip through decisive armed victories over the PA and Fatah forces loyal to Abbas (causing Abbas to dismiss the PA government in the West Bank and appoint a non-Hamas government instead) . Since then, Hamas has consolidated its power in Gaza, despite the considerable damage suffered by the Israeli population in Gaza due to an Israeli invasion in December 2008. In January 2009 (also known as Operation Cast Lead, which was launched by Israel in response to repeated rocket attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian militants) and despite ongoing restrictions (often referred to as "blocking" or "closing regime"), by Israel and Egypt on the flow of people and goods inside and outside the territory. By consolidating its control over Gaza and seeking popular support through resistance to Israel, Hamas seeks to establish its indispensability to any Arab-Israeli political arrangement. Many analysts believe that Hamas hopes to leverage this vitality into the single or shared leadership of the Palestinian Authority in both the West Bank and Gaza - either through a power-sharing agreement with Abbas and its Fatah movement, or through presidential and legislative elections (which were due to occur in January 2010 under the PA law, but were postponed depending on a factional agreement on the conditions for maintaining them) - and to gain membership or otherwise supplant the Fatah- dominated PLO, which remains internationally recognized as legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Fatah's political hegemony within the occupied territories was undermined by the Fatah-dominated inability of the PLA to co-opt or incorporate Hamas, which proved more resilient than the secular Palestinian factions to the PLO's incentives. Egyptmediated efforts to forge a PA-sharing agreement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip between Hamas and its traditionally dominant rival faction, the secular nationalist Fatah movement, have repeatedly paralyzed. Hamas also gained popularity among many Palestinians at the expense of Fatah because of its reputation as a less corrupt provider of social services (funded by donations from Palestinians, other Arabs and international charities) and because of its image of unshakeable resistance the Israeli Occupation. Some Palestinians realize that Hamas is more rooted in the experiences and attitudes of Western bankers and Gaza residents than Fatah. Most of Fatah's historic core leaders, including current PLO President / President Mahmoud Abbas, spent decades in exile with Yasser Arafat's PLO in several Arab states. Although many of Hamas's top leaders, including chief of staff Khaled Meshaal, have also lived in exile for more than 30 years, Hamas has maintained a strong presence within the Palestinian territories since its inception. Hamas Poses Threats Many Israelis fear the possible long-term threat that Hamas could pose to Israel's physical and psychological security if its capabilities. The ability of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to attack civilians inside Israel (for example, through suicide bombings) has been drastically reduced in the postintifada environment after Israeli security measures have increased. A system of heavily patrolled barriers and crossings limits access to Israel from both territories - in the case of Gaza, almost completely. The system also includes the West Bank separation barrier11 that some Israelis imagine as marking a border between Israel and a future Palestinian state, despite deviating from the 1948-1967 armistice line known as the "Green Line" in various places . Israeli military and intelligence operations in the West Bank - including various obstacles and restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement (some of which are designed to protect Israeli settlers and settlements) - reinforce the barrier system there. Firecrackers and Contraband Tunnels In response to restrictions on access to Israel, Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups in Gaza have increased their strategic confidence in firing rockets and mortars indiscriminately at Israeli targets. Rockets and the threat of future rockets with greater geographic reach precipitated Operation Israel Lead against targets in Gaza in December 2008. The roughly 8,350 rockets and mortars fired by Palestinians since 2001 killed at least 28 Israelis and injured dozens, 15 while the persistent rocket threat had a wider negative psychological effect on Israelis living in target communities. Since the end of Operation Cast Lead, Hamas has allowed fewer rockets to be fired from Gaza by its military wing and other Palestinian militant groups, perhaps because of a desire to avoid another large-scale Israeli attack. However, analysts and Israeli officials say that Hamas continues to manufacture and stockpile hundreds, if not thousands, of Qassam rockets. These rockets have limited range and are usually made from household ingredients such as fertilizers, sugar, alcohol, fuel oil. , pipes and scrap metal. Raw materials are usually smuggled into Gaza - thus bypassing the IsraeliEgyptian closure regime - through tunnels under the Egyptian border. Since Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, Hamas has promoted a dramatic expansion of the smuggling tunnel network linking Gaza to the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt. Under the closing regime aimed at undermining Hamas control over the territory, the tunnel network became Gaza's main economic engine and the militants' rearmament mode. In addition to Qassam rocket materials and other explosive devices, press and trade reports and Israeli officials claim that thousands of mortars and hundreds of longrange rockets in the Hamas arsenal (some of which may have been manufactured in Iran or China ) clandestinely entered Gaza through the tunnels. As of the summer of 2010, a report said that such long range rockets could include dozens of 122 mm (or Katyushas) rockets and 230 mm Oghabs, and possibly 50 modified 240 mm Fajr rockets. 3 rockets that could reach Tel Aviv or Israel's nuclear facilities in the Negev desert near Dimona. Hamas and other Palestinian militants would also have received small arms and antiaircraft and anti-tank weapons through the tunnels. Estimation says that approximately 7,000 people work in more than 1,000 tunnels. The tunnels are supposed to be of a generally high quality and engineering - with some including electricity, ventilation, intercoms and a rail system. The openings for many tunnels are found inside buildings in or around the town of Rafah, in the extreme south of Gaza. Although Israeli air strikes made more than 100 tunnels inoperative during Operation Cast Lead, many of them were restored in a few weeks because the main damage was sustained in the openings, not in the intermediate sections. Israel, Egypt, the United States, and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries have promised to stop or delay smuggling into Gaza by land and sea, and some measures such as building an underground fence along the border between Gaza and Egypt.However, anti-smoking capabilities remain limited and / or restricted. It is also possible that Hamas has the ability to fire rockets out of Gaza. In August 2010, rockets fired from the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt hit the neighbouring cities of Eilat, Israel and Aqaba, Jordan, on the Red Sea coast. Israeli and Egyptian officials, along with Palestinian Authority officials from the West Bank, said Hamas was responsible. Gaza Militias and Security Forces The leadership and most of the workforce - estimated at some 2,500 - from the Hamas military wing, the Qassam Brigades, are in Gaza. In addition, the Hamas-led government in Gaza maintains a robust contingent of approximately 13,000-14,000 police, security and intelligence personnel, many of whom are recruited by the Executive Force which assisted the Qassam Brigades to defeat the Fatah-led forces in Gaza . It seems unlikely that the Qassam Brigades and Hamas commanded Gaza's security forces, even working in conjunction with other Gaza-based militants, could pose a significant conventional threat to an Israeli military superior in human resources, equipment and technology. Ideology and Policies Hamas combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism, although opinions differ on how these two driving forces interact. Some analysts insist that Hamas's actions show that it remains better defined by reference to its charter or "alliance" of 1988, which sets a particularly militant, uncompromising and anti-Semitic agenda. These observers hold this view despite and perhaps cause of statements and documents issued in subsequent years by Hamas leaders who intend to redefine the movement's agenda or distance itself from it, but formally fail to deny it. Other analysts see Hamas as an evolving pragmatic movement. They argue that Hamas has already moderated its positions by participating in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections, agreeing on short-term cease-fires with Israel through indirect negotiations and expressing the desire to enter into a long cease-fire (or hudna) with Israel. In addition, these observers say that Hamas signed the Mecca Agreement in February 2007, according to which it agreed to divide power with Fatah, "respect" previous agreements signed by the PLO and allow the PLO to negotiate with Israel and present any agreement reached. the Palestinian people for their approval. Finally, these observers resemble Hamas to the PLO of earlier times. The PLO, once a terrorist group, changed some of its principles in the late 1980s and early 1990s - agreeing to avoid violence and enter into negotiations with Israel (under the heading "land for peace") of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 UN Security Council). 338), and recognizes its right to exist. Still other analysts do not assume that Hamas remains committed to every word of its letter, but argue that a decisive majority of Hamas members is unwilling to deviate from fundamental principles. About the use of violence The 1988 letter from Hamas says: "There is no solution to the Palestinian issue except through Jihad. International initiatives, proposals and conferences are a waste of time and vain efforts. " In the following years, the willingness of the movement to stop violence and to emphasize political methods to the detriment of the military in some circumstances, most notably the decision to take part in the 2006 elections, led some analysts to express hopes that it could contemplate demilitarization. Nevertheless, the Hamas leadership and many other analysts insist that no matter what other means Hamas may employ tactically from time to time, armed resistance remains its ultimate asset. In a July 2010 interview with the Jordanian newspaper Al Sabeel, Meshaal discussed how having the option to use violence increases Hamas' ability to negotiate, in contrast to the lack of influence he has said that the PLO since renouncing violence: The PLO negotiators say: "Negotiation is the option, the course and the only plan." They coordinate security with the enemy and implement the Road Map and their security requirements freely, with Israel offering nothing in return. What is there to force Olmert or Netanyahu to grant something to the Palestinians? The negotiation in [the PLO] case is outside its objective context; is merely from the perspective of political logic, without resistance and not based on the necessary balance of power. The Vietnamese - for example - negotiated with the Americans when they were retreating; so negotiations were useful to turn the last page into American occupation and aggression. You are successful in negotiating and imposing your conditions on the enemy, depending on the number of power cards you have on the ground. In his model for an Islamic state the Hamas letter predicts that Palestine will become an Islamic society that allows the coexistence of all religions "under its wing": The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinct Palestinian movement, whose allegiance is to Allah and whose way of life is Islam. It strives to raise the banner of Allah on every inch of Palestine, for under the wing of Islam, followers of all religions can coexist in safety and security, where their lives, possessions and rights are involved. In the absence of Islam, the strife will be abundant, oppression will spread, evil will prevail, and schism and wars will unleash. However, by reformulating PA institutions, laws and norms to tailor their aims - rather than completely reformulating them - and allowing the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and other international organizations and non-governmental organizations operating in Gaza, Hamas chose - at least for now - for stability in relation to a comprehensive social transformation. Hamas Interior Minister Fathi Hamad insisted: Claims that we are trying to establish an Islamic state are false. Hamas is not the Taliban. It's not al-Qaeda. It is a moderate and enlightened Islamic movement. Some ideologues who believed that Hamas should or should have implemented Sharia law and formally and fully Islamized public and private life soon after taking power were disappointed. This deception has resulted in some Islamists joining extremist groups, although it does not appear to present a short-term challenge to the Hamas government and it is unclear how pronounced or significant this trend will be in the long run. However, there has been some movement toward greater Islamization of society through the extensive community network of mosques, reconciliation committees, government ministries and courts, security forces, religious scholars, and schools. Islamic Fatwas (legal opinions) were offered as an alternative to secular justice for some police detainees. The morality police, judges and school principals advocate and enforce Islamic dress codes - especially for women - in public places, although resistance to such measures has delayed or reversed their implementation in some cases. How this affected the minority of Palestinian Christians in Gaza are unclear. In February 2010, Interior Minister Fathi Hamad (in a statement that some might interpret as contradicting his quoted statement about Hamas's alleged restraint) "called for 'Da'wa's . Use of Media Hamas used its control over the Gaza media and a strong Internet presence to cast Islamic, anti-Israel and anti-Semitic teachings into a narrative portraying "martyrdom" and violence against Israel and Jews as heroic. Public dissent is suppressed, and Hamas uses its Al Aqsa television and radio channels and summer camps to indoctrinate children and youth with their hybrid Islamic / Palestinian nationalistic views. In 2009, Hamas produced its first feature film celebrating the life and death of a Qassam Brigade militant from the first intifada. Encourages the support and often recruits of "young mosques" who help the neighbourhood imams and sometimes act as informants for Hamas-controlled Gaza intelligence organizations. Hamas leaders also skilfully use regional and international media to create messages for their various audiences: including Arabs and Muslims, Americans, Europeans and Israelis. Israeli officials insist that Hamas gives the same message to the Arab and Western audiences with a different tone and emphasis for each, creating what some might call purposeful and convenient ambiguity on issues such as the possible pragmatism of Hamas. Leadership and Organization Hamas has a variety of regional leadership and movement bodies, along with branches that conduct their political, military, and welfare activities with varying levels of formal group membership. In addition, the de facto Hamas government in Gaza has its own structures of leadership and public stature. Who controls overall strategy, financial policies and decisions, and how control is exercised, remain open questions with opaque answers. Some analysts believe that Hamas generally follows a hierarchical model in which final control resides with the 15member political cabinet (or politburo) and the advisory council of the movement (known as the Shura council) based in Damascus. For Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "Under this Shura board, there are committees responsible for overseeing a wide range of activities, from media relations to military operations. At the grassroots level in the West Bank and Gaza, local Shura committees respond to the Shura council and execute their decisions. " One reason to believe that substantial authority lies in the regional Shura councils and the whole movement is that Hamas closely guarded the secrecy of the association of these councils. Hamas also maintains branches in areas where it enjoys support, such as Lebanon, Sudan, Gulf and possibly Iran. Some analysts, however, believe that Hamas's formal hierarchical structures remain subject to scattered control, as the geographical division of the organization's main activities between Damascus and Gaza - maintained by the need for security and survival of the organization - creates a system of mutual leverage. This system is based on how the actions and funding flows of Hamas's political, military, and social welfare branches affect their interactions as these interactions shape and are shaped by events. Hamas seeks to mitigate the inherent tension between its activities as (1) a militant organization intransigently opposed to Israel, defying international oppressions and countermeasures; and (2) The government in Gaza accountable to its people for the management of security, economics and other basic societal issues that rely heavily on Israeli and international action. Some may express this as Hamas' desire to maximize its power while minimizing its responsibility. Hamas says it traces a brilliant line for the leadership of its members' organization in the Gaza government, which, if true, helps divert responsibility. This could discourage international actors from including Hamas in political discussions about Palestinian governance or negotiations with Israel. Sources of assistance Iran, Syria and Hezbollah According to the US State Department, Iran provides financial and military assistance to Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups. During a visit to Tehran in December 2009, Hamas Politburo chief Khaled Meshaal said: "Other Arab and Islamic countries also support us. Iranian support is in the lead and therefore we thank and thank Iran for that. " Meshaal and his Politburo colleagues, along with the shura council of the entire Hamas movement, have safe havens in Damascus, Syria. From Damascus, the Hamas exile leadership can direct the group's operations through financial transactions and unrestricted access to travel and communications. The Hezbollah movement, led by Iran in Lebanon, offers military training as well as financial and moral support, and has acted as a mentor or model to Hamas, which sought to mimic the political and media success of the Lebanese group. Some Palestinians who are sceptical of the ArabIsraeli peace process believe that Iranian support for Palestinian militants and Hezbollah is a necessary lever for Israel, that the United States and Europe are unlikely to hand over to the Palestinian Authority / PLO president, Mahmoud Abbas. Some reports say that contributions to Hamas' political and military alliances range from $ 20 million to $ 30 million per year. However, even if Hamas welcomes direct and indirect assistance from Iran, Iran's reputation among Arab populations has been strengthened in recent years. Western and anti-Israeli positions and rhetoric, Hamas and Iran may intentionally keep some distance from each other. An alternative interpretation is that they simply underestimate the extent of their ties. They seem to understand the importance of Hamas maintaining an image among its domestic constituencies as an authentic Palestinian unfolding of the Muslim Brotherhood rather than an Iranian proxy - due to ethnic, sectarian and linguistic differences between Palestinians (who are predominantly Arabs, Sunnis and Arabic speakers) and Iranians (mostly non-Arabs, Shiites and Persians). Iran's future influence on the Palestinian political landscape appears to be linked to the Hamas fortunes, which have been on the rise since Hamas's political rise in the late 1980s, and bolstered by its victory in the 2006 legislative council elections and by the Gaza in 2007. Possible Smuggling of arms, money and other smugglers into the Gaza Strip backed by Iran, along with training. Charities and Individuals However, it seems that, whether through the international banking system or the Gaza-Sinai smuggling tunnels (or both), Hamas's political and military wings still receive funding from their own networks of Islamic philanthropic institutions, including some that have operated and can still operate in the United States, Canada and Europe. The most illustrative case was that of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), based in Texas, which was once the largest Islamic charity in the United States. After US investigators determined that HLF channelled money to Hamas and had close ties to Hamas leader Musa Abu Marzouk while living in the United States in the early 1990s, the Treasury Department named HLF as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) in 2001 and froze their assets. In 2008, five HLF leaders (four of whom were US citizens) were found guilty of providing more than $ 12 million in material support to Hamas (through contributions to Hamas-linked charities) after President Bill Clinton appointed Hamas as a terrorist organization in 1995. In order to provide funding, HLF and two affiliated organizations were also found guilty in 2004 by the federal civil court for the 1996 Hamas assassination by an Israeli-Israeli citizen in Jerusalem, although the verdict against HLF has been reversed in appeal in 2007 on procedural grounds. Some analysts believe that Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups can benefit from trade-based money laundering. Charities, businesses and individuals buy highdemand commodities such as sugar, tea, coffee and cooking oil to be sold in Palestinian areas because of the scarcity of these items under the Israeli-Egyptian closure regime. Orders can be worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Some groups, such as the AntiDefamation League, have raised concerns about American citizens' participation and the use of American funds on protest trains (including the Mavi Marmara flotilla of May 2010 discussed below - see "International Dimensions") aimed at the IsraeliEgyptian closure regime that collected money and donated supplies to the Palestinians in Gaza, partly because of the difficulty in confirming that the recipients are not linked to Hamas. In July 2009, about 200 American activists participated in a convoy organized by the British organization Viva Palestina (led by then-British parliamentarian George Galloway) who entered Gaza in Egypt and donated approximately $ 500,000 in medical supplies (purchased from funds raised in States.