Clarity and Distinctness in Eighteenth Century Germany

fNDICE INTRODUCCI6N, Miguel Escribano Cabeza y Manuel Sanchez Rodriguez .......... ..................................................................... 13 Primera Parte ANTECEDENTES Vitaly Ivanov, LEIBNIZ UND DIE SCHOLASTIKER UBER DIE EWIGEN WAHRHEITEN UND POSSIBILIEN .......................... .. .................... 27 Titulo: Leibniz en ditilogo Primera edici6n: Agosto 2017. Mattia Brancato, UMBRAE IDEARUM: LEIBNIZ AND THE CONFRONTATION WITH BRUNO ......................................................... 39 ©Manuel Sanchez Rodriguez y Miguel Escribano Cabeza (eds.) ©Editorial Themata 2017. Joan Lluis Llinas & Andres L. Jaume, DESCARTES, COMENIUS Y LEIBNIZ EN TORNO A LA TELEOLOGfA. .................................................. 51 1. Introducci6n ................................................................................ ................. 51 2. Comenius contra Descartes ........................................................................ 53 3. Leibniz contra Descartes ............................................................................ 57 4. Comenius y Leibniz (contra Descartes) ................................................... 59 EDITORIAL THEMATA C/ Antonio Susillo, 6. Valencina de Ia Concepci6n 41907 Sevilla, ESPANA Tif: (34) 955 720 289 E-mail: editorial@themata.net Web: www.themata.net Imagen de cubierta: Firmarnento Diseii.o de cubierta: Themata AJ Maquetaci6n: Los Papeles del Sitio Correcci6n: Themata AJ ISBN: 978-84-947082-2-0 DL: SE 1353-2017 Joan Lluis Llinas Begon & Natanael F. Pacheco Cornejo, EL A PRIORI EN DESCARTES Y LEIBNIZ ................................................................................ 61 1. Introducci6n ................................................................................................. 61 2. Dos estrategias epistemol6gicas: fenomenologia vs l6gica ................... 62 3. El a priori en Descartes y Leibniz ............................................................... 65 3.1. Las ideas simples .......... ..................... ............................................ .......... 65 3.2. Los primeros principios o axiomas de raz6n ........ ................................... 67 Imprime: ULZAMA Impreso en Espana • Printed in Spain Reservados todos los derechos exclusivos de edici6n para Editorial Themata. El contenido de esta obra esta protegido porIa Ley, que establece penas de prisi6n yI o multas, ademas de las correspondientes indemnizaciones por daii.os y perjuicios a cualquier forrna de reproducci6n, distribuci6n, comunicaci6n publica y transforrnaci6n, total o parcial, de esta obra sin contar con Ia autorizaci6n escrita de los titulares del Copyright. 4. Conclusi6n .................................................................................................... 69 Segunda Parte CONTEMPORANEOS Miguel Palomo, LA CORRESPONDENCIA ENTRE HUYGENS Y LEIBNIZ EN EL COMIENZO DE LA MECANICA MODERNA ............... 75 1. Introducci6n ................... ................ ......................................................... ..... 75 2. Comienzo de Ia correspondencia .............................................................. 77 3. Etapas y estructura de Ia correspondencia .............................................. 79 4. Conclusi6n .................................................................................................... 82 Evelyn Vargas, NORMATIVIDAD EPISTEMICA Y PROBABILISMO. LA CRITICA DE LEIBNIZ A LOCKE ................................................................. 85 1. Introducci6n ................................................................................................. 85 2. La probabilidad como apariencia segU.n Locke ...................................... 86 3. Los argumentos probabies segU.n Leibniz ............................................... 87 4. Conclusiones ................................................................................................ 93 Michael Kempe, MONADS, MUSSELS AND MOUNTAINS. LEIBNIZIAN NATURAL PHILOSOPHY INTERPRETED BY JOHANN JAKOB SCHEUCHZER (1672-1733) .................................................................... 95 Manuel Sanchez Rodriguez, CONOCIMIENTO CONFUSO Y TEODICEA EN LA DISPUTA DE LEIBNIZ CON BAYLE .................................................. 111 1. Introducci6n .................................................... ........................................... 111 2. Cognitio clara et confusa y misterios ......................................................... 114 3. Raz6n humana y finitud .................................................................. ......... 118 4. Mal y finitud ............................................................................................ .. 120 Tercera Parte LA PRIMERA RECEPCI6N DE LEIBNIZ Maria Jesus Vazquez Lobeiras, LEIBNIZ Y LA ILUSTRACI6N TEMPRANA EN ALEMANIA ........................................................................... 125 1. Leibniz y la ilustraci6n alemana ............................................................. 125 2. Christian Thomasius y Ia Friihaufkliirung ............................................... 128 3. /Filosofia escolar' (Schulphilosophie) o 'correspondencia erudita' (Gelehrtenkorrespondenz)? .............................................................................. 130 4. EI caso Thomasius-Wagner-Leibniz ...................................................... 132 Ferdinando Luigi Marcolungo, CHRISTIAN WOLFF ET LES TRADUCTIOS ALLEMANDE ET LATINE DE LA MONADOLOGIE ....... 139 1. La traduction Iatine de Ia Logique allemande .......................................... 141 2. Perception, Empfindung, perceptio ........................................................ 142 3. Detail, Inbegriff, schema .......................................................................... 145 4. Conclusion .................................................................................................. 147 J. Colin McQuillan, CLARITY AND DISCTINCTNESS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY GERMANY: METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, AESTHETICS ............... 149 1. Introduction ............................................... ................................................ 149 2. Leibniz's Metaphysics .............................................................................. 149 3. Wolff's Logic and Metaphysics ........................... .. .................................. 151 4. Baumgarten's Metaphysics and Aesthetics ........................................... 152 5. Kant's Critique ............................................................. .............................. 154 6. Conclusions ................................................................................................ 157 Maximiliano Hernandez Marcos, LEIBNIZ Y El!RETORNO DE LA SENSIBILIDAD EN BAUMGARTEN Y MEIER• ............................... 161 1. La defensa de Ia sensibilidad ................................................................... 161 2. Los caminos de Ia sensibilidad de Leibniz a Baumgarten .................. 165 2.1. La claridad l6gica del conocimiento, un camino cortado ..................... .. 166 2.2. Sobre el suelo de Ia Monadologia o el sendero oscuro del alma ......... .... 168 2.3. El campo abierto de Ia Teodicea: La "bonificaci6n" estetica de Ia sensibilidad ........................................... ............................................................... 171 Nicolae Rambu, HERMENEUTISCHE BILLIGKEIT BEI LEIBNIZ UND GEORG FRIEDRICH MEIER ................................................................... 175 Alexandra Lewendoski, SER 0 NO SER OPTIMIST A, HE AQUf LA CUESTI6N. CONSECUENCIAS DE LA INTERPRETACI6N DE VOLTAIRE ............................................................................................................ 183 1. Introducci6n ......................................................................... ...................... 183 2. Voltaire y el optimismo ............................................................................ 184 3. Topos de Gunter Eich................................................................................. 190 4. Epilogo .................................. ...................................................................... 194 Ulysses Pinheiro, THE MONADOLOGY IN THE ENCYCLOPEDIE: AN EXAMINATION OF DIDEROT'S CASE ............................................ ....... 197 Nuria Sanchez Madrid, CARlOAD Y JUSTICIA GLOBAL EN LEIBNIZ Y KANT: LA PLURALIDAD DEL COSMOPOLITISMO EN LA ILUSTRACI6N ALEMAN A .............................................................................. 209 Alba Jimenez, EL CONCEPTO DE "COMPLEXI6N" EN LEIBNIZ Y LA DETERMINACI6N TEMPORAL DE LA MODALIDAD EN LA CR[TICA DE LA RAZ6N PURA DE KANT ..................................................... 223 Juan A. Garcia Gonzalez, KANT CONTRA LEIBNIZ: LOS LfMITES DE LA RAZ6N HUMANA .................................................. .............................. 233 1. Antecedentes ................................. ............................................................. 233 2. El principio de los indiscernibles de Leibniz .. ...................................... 234 3. Espacio y tiempo segtln Leibniz y Kant ................................................. 236 4. Las parejas incongruentes de Kant y su critica a la monadologia ..... 238 5. La negaci6n hegeliana de la individualidad espacio-temporal... ....... 239 6. Individualidad y facticidad ..................................................................... 240 7. La facticidad en el pensamiento contemporaneo ................................. 240 9 Cuarta Parte LA RECEPCI6N DE LEIBNIZ EN LOS SIGLOS XIX Y XX Juan J. Padial, LA M6NADA COMO SIMPLE VIDA IDEAL DEL ALMA SEG0N HEGEL ............................................................................. 245 1. La m6nada como totalidad y su vinculacion con la composici6n corp6rea ........................................ .................................................................. 245 2. El fundamento del alma ......................................................... .................. 250 Sergii Secundant, LEIBNIZ AND HEGEL: TWO WAYS OF OVERCOMING ECLECTICISM .................................................................. 257 Jorge Granados-Zuniga, ANTECEDENTES DE LA TEORIA DARWINIANA DE LA EVOLUCI6N EN LA OBRA DE LEIBNIZ .......................... 269 1. Introducci6n ........................ ....................................................................... 269 2. Metodologia .... ...................... ..................................................................... 270 3. Descripci6n de la diversidad biol6gica y explicaci6n de su origen en algunas obras de Leibniz ................................ ........................................ 271 3.1 La constituci6n de los seres vivos ................................................... ........ 271 3.2 Continuidad e inmortalidad ................................................................... 274 3.3 El cambio geologico y el cambio biol6gico ............................................. 277 3.4 Analogia entre las producciones de Ia naturaleza y las del humano ...... .278 3.5 Orden y causa motriz ............................................... .............................. 278 4. Semejanzas y diferencias entre los planteamientos de Leibniz y las teorias de evoluci6n y selecci6n natural de Darwin ................................ 280 5. Interpretaci6n de las teorias darwinianas en terminos de su originalidad versus los elementos que podria haber adoptado de Ia obra de Leibniz ....................................................................................... ................ 283 Ricardo Teruel Diaz, LEIBNIZ Y FREUD SOBRE EL INCONSCIENTE .... 285 1. Introducci6n ...................................................................... ......................... 285 2. La critica deleuziana a la tradici6n filos6fica occidental ....... .............. 285 3. Deleuze y Ia Filosofia de la diferencia .................................................... 291 4. La critica de Deleuze al modelo antropol6gico de Freud .................... 292 5. Afinidad del inconsciente Ieibniziano con el de Deleuze ............... ..... 292 Hernan Pringe, CASSIRER Y BOHR: TENDENCIAS LEIBNIZIANAS Y KANTIANAS EN EL SIMBOLISMO DE LA FISICA CUANTICA. .......... 297 1. La intuici6n sensible y el conocimiento simb6lico en la ciencia moderna, segU.n Cassirer ............................................................. ...................... 298 2. La intuici6n sensible y el conocimiento simb6lico en Ia fisica cuantica, segun Bohr ............................................................................................. 301 3. Conclusiones: EI simbolismo de Cassirer versus el simbolismo de Bohr ................................................................................................................. 305 10 Henrique Jales Ribeiro, SOBRE A INFLUENCIA DE A MONADOLOGIA DE LEIBNIZ: DA SECUNDA METADE DO SECULO XIX AO SECULO XX .......................................................................................................................... . 307 1. Introdu<;ao: difusao e confusao a prop6sitp de Leibniz ..................... . 307 2. Ecletismo e filosofia: e de Leibniz que efetivamente se trata? ... ...... ... 309 3. A matriz da influencia de Leibniz a Iuz de uma historiografia contextual. .................................................................. ......... .................................. 311 3.1 . Especicidade da influencia de Leibniz ..................................... ........... 313 4. Conclusao: rostos e caricaturas de Leibniz ................................. ........... 317 Federico Silvestri, LEIBNIZ RECEPTION IN ITALY (1900-1950) .............. .. 319 1. Italian idealism and Leibniz ...................... ............................. ............... .. 320 2. The raise of the neo-thomistic reading and the Italian debate on Leibniz..................................................................... ............... ......................... 323 3. Some remarks on Leibniz' s influence in Italian philosophy ............... 329 Celso Vargas, LA PRESENCIA DE LEIBNIZ EN COSTA RICA: LIBROS PUBLICADOS ENTRE LA DECADA DE 1940 Y LA DE 1990.............. ...... .. 333 1. Un breve Contexto ................................................................................... 333 2. Datos generales sobre Ia menci6n de Leibniz ........ ............................... 335 3. Aproximaci6n mas detalladas al pensamiento de Leibniz ................. 339 4. A manera de conclusi6n ........................................................................ ... 344 Quinta Parte LEIBNIZ EN EL PENSAMIENTO ESPANOL Jose Antonio Castillo Miranda, LA RECEPCI6N DE LEIBNIZ EN LA FILOSOFIA DE JAIME BALMES ..................................... .......... .................. 347 1. Introducci6n ..................................................................... ........ ........... ....... 347 2. Valoraci6n de Ia Monadologia de Leibniz en Ia Filosofia Fundamental de Balmes....................................................... ............... ....................... ........... 348 3. Analisis de Ia noci6n de espacio en Leibniz y sus aportaciones a la metafisica balmesiana ........................................... .......... .............................. 352 4. Conclusion ............................................. .. ....................... ......... ...... .... ......... 357 Hector Arevalo Benito, NUEVOS SILOGISMOS DEL PENSAMTENTO DE LENGUA ESPANOLA: LA PRESENCIA DE LEIBNIZ EN LA ESCUELA DE MADRID. PRESENCIAS DE LEIBNIZ Y ORTEGA EN ECUADOR ..... 359 1. La "Escuela de Madrid", formadora cultural del primer tercio del siglo xx espafiol: el contexto de la recepci6n ...................... .. ..................... 360 2. Morente, Gaos y Ortega: la presencia de Leibniz, en perspectiva ..... 370 3. Leibniz, Ortega y Ecuador ................................................................. ...... 376 11 Carlos Ortiz de Landazuri, LA MONADOLOGfA DEL SEGUNDO ｌｅｉｾｎｚＬ＠ 300 A.NOS DESPUES (A TRA YES DE AUSTIN, STRAWSON Y SANCHEZ-MAZAS)........................................................................................ 381 1. Sanchez-Mazas, 1951-1953: El paso de Ia monadologia del primer al segundo Leibniz ........................................................................................ 381 2. Austin, 1961: Los dos dogmas extensionales leibnizianos del neopositivismo 16gico ................................................................................... 385 3. Strawson, 1966: La monadologia intensionalleibniziana, 300 afios despues ........................................................................................................... 390 4. Sanchez-Mazas, 1953: La l6gica de la comprensi6n Ieibniziana no es aristotelica .................................................................................................. 395 5. Conclusion: zConsigui6 Leibniz superar el dogmatismo de sumonadologia? ...................................................................................................... 396 INTRODUCCION MIGUEL ESCRIBANO CABEZA MANUEL SANCHEZ RODRIGUEZ Con motivo del cumplimiento del 300 aniversario de la redacci6n de Ia Monadologia de G.W. Leibniz, se celebr6 en Granada del3 al5 de abril de 2014 elli Congreso lberoamericano Leibniz. Se trat6 del segundo congreso organizado por la Red Iberoamericana Leibniz, cuyo objetivo es coordinar y fomentar el conocimiento, la discusi6n y el desarrollo del pensamiento del fil6sofo de Hannover en el ambito cultural de Espana, Portugal y Latinoamerica. En este volumen se recoge una selecci6n de contribuciones que fueron presentadas en el congreso dentro de secciones que se dedicaron a explorar el papel de Leibniz en la historia de la filosofia: las fuentes de las que se nutrieron muchas de sus geniales ideas; su legado, que abri6 una de las etapas mas fructiferas para la filosofia alemana; y el dialogo con sus contemponineos, que Leibniz promovi6 a lo largo de su vida de un modo obsesivo. En efecto, si algo define el pensamiento leibniziano es el papel que concede al dialogo como elemento catalizador. El espiritu leibniziano para el dialogo esta orientado por una actitud conciliadora, constructiva, pero ademas creativa; asi lo ha recalcado en multiples manifestaciones el fil6sofo cuando describe la confrontaci6n de posiciones como la piedra silex de donde ha de saltar la chispa de la nueva filosofia. Esta manera constructiva de abordar el dialogo con otras opiniones y doctrinas filos6ficas contrasta con la actitud critica de muchos de sus contemporaneos, centrada antes bien en marcar negativamente la diferencia de la opinion contrapuesta para resaltar la veracidad de la propia. Se puede decir que esta actitud dialogante de Leibniz result6 escenificada en tres terrenos. Todos ellos aportan el conjunto de caracteres que nos permitirian definirla. Por un lado, el genero epistolar es el vehiculo por excelencia del pensamiento leibniziano. La correspondencia de Leibniz ha sido incluida por la UNESCO en el programa "Memory of the World". La edici6n de los originales, que coordina el Leibniz-Archiv de Hannover, estima que Leibniz intercambi6 impresiones con alrededor de 1.300 corresponsales en 13 Bien sftr, au-deJa de la controverse sur ]'hypothese de l'harmonie preetablie aussi que sur la constitution du simple, Wolff semble interesse par la vision globale de I'harmonie des choses qui trouve son expression dans l'harmonie des verites, qui doivent etre liees l'une I'autre avec une rigueur demonstrative. Mais dans le meme temps nous ne pouvons pas negliger le different milieu a partir duquelle discours de Wolff a son commencement; ce qui a ete dit a propos de l"'Empfindung" en est le temoignage. Dans Ia pensee de Wolff prevaut bien sftr !'intention methodologique, mais il s'agit d'une methodologie qui commence de 1'experience ainsi que des principes a priori : deux aspects qui doivent etre relies entre eux des le debut. Dans la traduction latine de Ia Monadologie nous ne trouvons pas le mot "notio", mais plut6t "idea", ainsi que dans Ia traduction allemande de Kohler nous trouvons deux fois le mot "Inbegriff" et le verbe "begreiffen", mais pas le substantif "Begriff". Deux mots, "Begriff" et "notio", qui se correspondent (comme l'indique le petit dictionnaire a Ia fin de la Metaphysique allemande) et qui representent une grande partie de la difference entre Leibniz et Wolff. Cela dit, nous ne pouvons pas oublier le r6le decisif joue par ces deux traductions, allemande et Iatine, dans la destinee de Ia Monadologie de Leibniz. L'empreinte de Wolff reste decisive dans le choix des termes allemands et latins, dans le passage significatif du latin de Ia Scholastique aux nouvelles langues de Ia modernite. J. COLIN MCQUILLAN CLARITY AND DISCTINCTNESS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY GERMANY: METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, AESTHETICS 1. Introduction Leibniz' s influence on philosophy in Germany during the eighteenth century is extensive, but the new definitions of clarity and distinctness he proposes in the Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas deserve special ｡ｾﾭ tention, because they played a role in so many different parts of German philosophy. In what follows, I will track the role these definitions played from Leibniz's metaphysics to Wolff's logic and metaphysics, Baumgarten' s aesthetics, and Kant's critical philosophy. Although the reign of clear and distinct ideas in German philosophy came to an end when Kant and his followers began to argue that clarity and distinctness could not explain the distinction between sensibility and the understanding; the relationship between concepts and objects; or the validity of judgments about truth and beauty, I will argue that they preserved the systematic connection between metaphysics, logic, and aesthetics that had been established by Wolff and Baumgarten using the concepts of clarity and distinctness. 2. Leibniz's Metaphysics Responding to the debate between Antoine Arnauld and Nicolas Malebranche about true and false ideas, Leibniz proposed new definitions of clarity and distinctness in his Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas•. According to Leibniz, a notion is obscure when it is not sufficient to recognize the 1 G.W. Leibniz, Meditations on Kn owledge, Truth, and Ideas, inclu ded in G.W Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, Translated and Edited by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1989: 23-27. 148 149 of the mind to perceive things distinctly, but he still thinks human beings are be unable to "direct our attention to an infinity of things at the same time," which means that many of our ideas remain confused7 • The reasons for this confusion are ultimately metaphysical: Every 'substance mirrors the entire universe, so it contains too many properties to be adequately represented by a finite mind. object it represents. It is clear when the notion is sufficient for recognizing the object it represents. Clear knowledge can be either confused or distinct. It is confused when one cannot enumerate the marks that distinguish the notion from other notions, but it is distinct when those marks are also clear. When all of the marks that distinguish a notion from other notions are clear, then the notion is adequate. Adequate notions are rare for human beings, because many things are so complex that it is virtually impossible for a finite mind to consider all of its marks at the same time. In cases where we do not have an adequate notion of a thing, Leibniz thinks we can clarify our ideas through analysis, which distinguishes the marks that constitute a thing. Leibniz' s Discourse on Metaphysics shows that the account of the clarity and distinctness he proposes in the Meditations extends well beyond Cartesian epistemology2 • When he says that everything that happens to a substance is included in its notion, along with the whole series of external things surrounding that substance in (§9) of the Discourse, Leibniz is identifying the marks that distinguish one notion from another with the predicates that distinguish one substance from another3 • The notion of a substance is its definition. Unfortunately, since each substance "expresses, however confusedly, everything that happens in the universe, whether past, present, or future," the adequate notion or real definition of any substance would require what Leibniz calls "infinite perception or knowledge" 4• The perception and knowledge of human minds is limited, so Leibniz concludes that" the greater part of human knowledge is only confused or suppositive" 5• That Leibniz continued to defend this view in his later work is evident from the New Essays. Referring back to his Meditations, Leibniz repeats his distinctions between obscure, clear, confused, distinct, and adequate notions. He denies that we can know things distinctly through the senses, because the senses do not allow us to "distinguish their contents" and identify "the distinct properties which the idea must be found to contain when one has brought order into its confusion"•. Leibniz is more optimistic about the ability Christian Wolff acknowledges the debt he owes to Leibniz's Meditations in several places, but he makes rather different use of Leibniz' s account of clarity and distinctness than Leibniz did himself8 • This becomes apparent in Wolff s German Logic (Rational Thoughts on the Powers of the Understanding and their Right Use in the Knowledge of Truth, 1712) and German Metaphysics (Rational Thoughts on God, the World, and the Human Soul, 1719). In the first chapter of his German Logic, Wolff repeats Leibniz's distinctions between obscure, clear, confused, and distinct concepts, in order to distinguish the objects of our thoughts9 • Like Leibniz, Wolff defines an obscure concept as one that does not allow us to distinguish the object it represents, which a clear concept allows us to distinguish the object it represents. A clear concept is distinct when we can identify the marks through which we represent an object, but it is indistinct when those marks remain unclear. Instead of following Leibniz and declaring any concept whose marks are confused to be inadequate, Wolff introduces a distinction between "complete" (ausfohrlich, completa) and" adequate" (vollstiindig, adaequata) concepts'"· He considers this addition to Leibniz' s classification to be very significant, since some distinct concepts may be only partly distinct and partly confused". Partly confused concepts may be inadequ ate from the metaphysical perspective Leibniz adopts, but Wolff thinks they are perfectly sufficient for the purposes of scientific demonstration. We do not need metaphysically adequate concepts 2 Leibniz objects to Descartes use of clear and distinct ideas as a criterium veritatis in Meditations, 26. See also G.W. Leibniz, Critical Tlwugltts 011 tire General Part of tire Principles of Descartes, included in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters (2"d ed.), Edited and Translated by Leroy E. Loemker, Kluwer, Dodrecht, 1989:389. 3 G.W. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, included in G.W. Leibuiz: Philosophical Essays, Translated and Edited by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1989: 41-42. 4 Discourse on Metaphysics (Ibid., 42). 5 Discourse on Metaphysics (Ibid. 56). 6 G.W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, Edited and Translated by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996: 255-258. 7 New Essays (Ibid. 113). 8 See, for example, Chr. Wolff, Vernunftige Gedanken von den Kriiften des mensc/zlic/ren Verstmutes und ihrem riclztigen Gebrauclle in Erkeuntnis der Warlreit (Gem1a11 Logic), included in Chr. Wolff, Gesammelte Werke (1. Abt., Bd. 1), Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 2006: 109 (Vorrede zur ersten Auflage) . See also Chr. Wolff, Ausfiihrliclre Nachricht, included in Chr. Wolff, Gesammelte Werke (l. Abt., Bd. 9), Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 19%: §58. 9 German Logic, §4, §7. 10 German Logic, §15-§16. 11 Ausftihrliche Nachricht, §58. 150 3. Wolff's Logic and Metaphysics 151 to produce valid proofs in logic, though we do need relatively complete concepts in order to reason correctly'2• Leibniz' s account of clarity and distinctness also plays an important rol in Wolff's metaphysics. Instead of using adequate notions to explain the ｮ｡ｾ＠ ture of substance, Wolff uses the difference between indistinct and distinc cognition to distinguish the lower and the higher cognitive faculties. He this in a relatively informal way in the German Metaphysics, where he defines ｾ･＠ ｾｮ､ｲｳｩｧ＠ as "the faculty to represent the possible distinctly" after dtstingmshmg between thoughts that are obscure, clear, and distinct to varying degrees". This definition allows Wolff to distinguish the understandin from the imagination and the senses, whose representations are "at best and not distinct" and only become distinct "when the understanding is added"'•. Wolff employs this distinction more systematically in later works like where he uses the distinction the lower cognitive the Empirical ｐｳｹ｣ｨｯｬｧｾ［Ｌ＠ faculty, .':'hose ideas and notions are obscure and confused, and the higher Ｎ｣ｯｾｭｴｩｶ･＠ ｦ｡Ｎ｣ｵｬｾＬ＠ ｷｾｯｳ･＠ ideas and notions are distinct, as the organizing prmCiple for hiS d1Scusston of the cognitive faculties' 5• In the process, he transforms distinctness from a characteristic of some of our concepts to the defining feature of the understanding that distinguishes its cognition from the senses and the imagination. doe: ､･ｾ＠ 4. Baumgarten's Metaphysics and Aesthetics In his Metaphysics, Alexander Baumgarten adopt Wolff's distinction bethe ｬｯｷｾ＠ and higher cognitive faculties, identifying the lower cognitive faculty as the faculty of knowing something obscurely and confused1( ｾｮ､＠ ｴｾ･＠ higher cognitive faculty as "the faculty of knowing something diStinctly '•. Baumgarten also agrees with Leibniz and Wolff that "there is something obscure in every sensation and hence to some extent there is always an admixture of confusion in sensation, even a distinct one" 17• Yet he is ｾ ･ ･ｮ＠ 12 German Logic, §18. 13 Chr. Wolff, Ve rmlnftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt, und der Seele des Menschen auch allen Dingen iiberhaupt (German Metaphysics), included in Chr. Wolff, Gesammelte Werke (l. Abt., Bd. 2.1), Georg Olrns Verlag, Hildesheirn, 2009: §277 14 Gennan Metaphysics, §277. 15 Chr. Wolff, Psychologica Empirica, included in Chr. Wolff, Gesamme/te Werke (II. Abt., Bd. 3), Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 2001: §54-§55, §275. 16 A.G. Baumgarten, Metaphysics, Edited and Translated by Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers, Bloomsbury, London, 2013: §520, §624. . 17 . Metaphysics, §544. It is curious that Baumgarten adds " even a distinct one" (etiam distincta) m thiS passage, because he is generally very consistent in denying the possibility that any thing twilling to dismiss sensible cognition, simply because it is indistinct. Inno d he proposes a new standard for the perfection of cognition that breaks stea , . . 'th the precedent set by Leibniz and Wolff. Baumgarten asks us to nnagme Wl h . h " clear thoughts of equally clear marks, where 6ne thoug t contams t ree 0 tw ks and the other contains six"'3 • By drawing the obvious conclusion and rnar h 'th affirming that the thought with six marks is clearer than the thoug t wt three marks, Baumgarten shows that one does not need ｾｯ＠ ｡ｮｬ ｾ ｺ･＠ the _marks of our concepts in order to achieve greater degrees of clanty. By mcreasmg the mber rather than the clarity of marks, the sensible cognition of the lower nu d' d 'tive faculty can be improved without the addition of the un erstan mg. cogru f . Clarity without distinctness constitutes a new standard of sensible per ection, which Baumgarten uses as the basis for a new science of aesthetics. At the end of the Reflec itons on Poetn;, Baumgarten introduces this new science through an analogy with logic. Just as logic guides the intellectual cognition of the higher cognitive faculty to perfection, aesthetics will guide 19 the sensible cognition of the lower cognitive faculty to perfection • The reason these two sciences cannot be reduced to one another concerns the distinctness of the cognition with which logic and aesthetics are concerned. While the perfect intellectual cognition that logic strives to achieve is distinct, the sensible cognition of aesthetics will always remain confused. Baumgarten uses the concept of extensive clarity to explain the confused perfection of sensible cognition in the Reflections on Poetn;, but he calls the perfection of sensible cognition "beauty" in the Aesthetics20• This represents a considerable advance on his earlier account of the perfection of sensible cognition, because it identifies ＿ ｾ＠ of this a perfection that only sensible cognition can possess. The ｩ､ ｾ ｮｴｩｦ｣｡ perfection justifies the systematic investigation of the senstble cognttion ｾ｡ｴ＠ Baumgarten undertakes in the Aesthetics and shows that confused senstble cognition can be just as perfect as distinct intellectual cognition. The analogy between aesthetics and logic that Baumgarten proposes in the Refiectwns on Poetn; reflects the difference between the perfections of beautiful and distinct sensible could be distinct. He even identifies sensible rep resentation as " a representation that is not distinct" in Metaphysics, §521. 18 Metaphysics, §531 (translation modified). 19 A.G. Baumgarten, Reflections 0 11 Poetry, Edited and Translated by Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1954: §115. On the analogr. between aesthetics and logic, see U. Franke, Kunst als Erkenntnis: Die Rolle der Smnllchkett HIder Asthetik des Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Studia Leibnitiana Su pp!ementa, Bd. IX, 37-39. 20 Reflections on Poetry, §17. See also A.G. Bau mgarten, Asthettk (TeLl I), Edited and Translated into German by Dagmar Mirbach, Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 2007: §14. 153 152 cognition that he develops in the Aesthetics, while eliminating the hierarchy that Leibniz and Wolff had established between them. 5. Kant's Critique Figures like Georg Friedrich Meier, Moses Mendelssohn, and Johann August Eberhard made great use of the conceptions of clarity and distinctness that had emerged in German philosophy during the eighteenth century2•. Yet appeals to these concepts in works on metaphysics, logic, and aesthetics started to decline at the end of the eighteenth century, when Immanuel Kant and his followers began their attack on the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, they played almost no role in German philosophy. Kant's critique of clarity and distinctness can be traced back to his inaugural dissertation On the Fonn and Principles of the Sensible and the Intellectual World. In the second section, immediately before he defines metaphysics as "the philosophy which contains the first principles of the use of the pure understanding," Kant criticizes Wolff's account of the difference between sensible and intellectual cognition, precisely because it relies on the distinction between confused and distinct cognition22• Kant argues "the sensible is poorly defined as that which is more confusedly cognized, and that which belongs to the understanding as that of which there is a distinct cognition," because "sensitive representations can be very distinct and representations which belong to the understanding can be extremely confused" 23 • Because sensible and intellectual cognition can be either confused or distinct without ceasing to be sensible or intellectual, Kant concludes that Wolff's distinction between the senses and the understanding is "merely logical" and" does not touch at all the things given, which underlie every logical comparison" 2•. That is why he introSee, for example, G.F. Meier, Anfimgsgnlmie nller sclronen wissensclmften (2. Auf, 1. Teil), Magdeburg,1754: §1-§6. See also G.F. Meier, Auszug nus der Vemrmftlelrre, included m Kant s Gesammelte Sclrriften (Bd. XVI), Edited by Erich Adickes, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1924: §22; M. Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lechms 011 God's Existence, Translated by Daniel 0. Dahlstrom and Corey Dyck, Springer, Dodrecht, 2011: 101-103; J.A. Eberhard, "Ober den wesentlich Unterschied der Erkenntnis durch die Sinne und durch den Verstand", in: Marion Lauschke and Manfred Zahn (eds.), Immanuel Kant: Der Streit mit johann August Eberlmrd, Meiner, Hamburg, 1998: 60-69. 22 I. Kant, Tireoreticnl Philosophy Before 1770 (Inaugural Dissertation: On the Fom1 and Principles of tire Sensible nnd the Intelligible World), Edited and Translated by David Walford and Ralf Meerbote, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992: §8. 23 Inaugural Dissertation, §7. 24 Inaugural Dissertation, §7. 21 ｾ･ｭｲ､Ｌ＠ 154 d ces his own distinction between sensibility and the understanding, based u the receptivity of sensibility and the spontaneity of the understanding; the ｾ ･ ｲ･ｮｴ＠ objects of their cognition; and the different kinds of relationships that btain between sensible and intellectual cognitidn and their objects25• Kant's 0 bsequent correspondence shows that he thought this way of distinguishing ｾ＠ ' the sensible and the intellectual was one of the most important contr1'b utions of his dissertation26• Kant continued his attack on the concepts of clarity and distinctness in the Critique of Pure Reason, the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, and later works like On a Discoven;. It is noteworthy that while Kant's views on the faculties of sensibility and the understanding, the objects of our cognition, and the kind of relationship that obtains between our cognition and its objects changed considerably in the period between the publication of his inaugural dissertation and the Critique of Pure Reason, his objection to the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy remained largely the same. In the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' of the first Critique, he complains that "the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy has ... directed all investigations of the nature and origin of our cognitions to an entirely unjust point of view considering the distinction between sensibility and the intellectual as merely logical, since it is obviously transcendental and does not concern merely the form of distinctness or indistinctness, but its origin and content" 27 • The only real difference between this objection and the one Kant raised in his inaugural dissertation is his insistence, in the first Critique, that the distinction between sensibility and the understanding is transcendental. This means that Kant now regards the distinction between sensibility and the understanding as a universal and necessary condition of all possible experience, which can be demonstrated a priori2B. Kant did not hold this view in his inaugural dissertation, where he argued that it was necessary to distinguish sensible and intellectual cognition, so that everything sensible could be excluded from metaphysics29 • Yet his disdain for "merely logical" distinctions based on confusion and distinctness is evident from works belonging to both the pre-critical and critical periods 30• 25 Inaugural Dissertation, §3-§4. 26 I. Kant, Correspondence (Kant to Lilmber, September 20, 1770 and Kant to Herz, June 7, 1771), Edited and Translated by Amulf Zweig, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999: 107-109, 126-128 (X: 96-99, 121-124). 27 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Edited and Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998 (A44/ B61-B62). 28 Critique of Pure Reason, A1-A2, A11-A13/ B24-B26. 29 Inaugural Dissertation, §8. . .. 30 In addition to the objections in Kant's inaugural d issertahon and Cr1trque of Pure Reason, 155 ｾｹ＠ of Kant's followers ｳｨ｡ｾ･､＠ his disdain for the concepts of clarity and distinctness. A good example IS Johann Schultz, who asserts in his Exposition of the Kant's Critique of Pure Reason that "Leibniz intellectualized mere appearances and regarded them as representations of things in themselves which were distinguished from the concepts of the understanding mere! logically with respect to distinctness because they were made confused by the senses"3 ' . Pressing his attack, Schultz claims that "in the case of ｳ･ｮｩ｢ｬｾ＠ objects, Leibniz pays no regard to the special conditions of their intuition ... " 32 Schultz's charges are very similar to the criticisms Kant leveled against the ｌ･ｩ｢ｾｺ｡ｮＭｗｯｬｦ＠ philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason, but not every Kantian agreed that clarity and distinctness were empty and fallacious. Karl Leonhard Reinhold, who may have done more to promote the Kantian philosophy than anyone else in Germany, actually thought clarity and distinctness had an important role to play in the development of the critical philosophy. In ｾ･＠ ｴｨｩｲｾ＠ book of his Attempt at a New Theory of the Human Faculty ofRepresentatzon, Reinhold argues that clarity and distinctness are the two most basic features of consciousness in general, because it is impossible to distinguish the subject and object of our representations when our consciousness unclear or 33 indistinct - He even goes so far as to say that distinct consciousness is the key to self-consciousness, since it is only when I have a distinct concept of myself as a subject representing an object in my consciousness that I can claim to be self-conscious34 • The German idealists do not seem to have thought very much of this aspect of Reinhold's Elementarphilosophie, because similar claims about the clarity and distinctness of consciousness are nowhere to be found in the works of Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel35 • The rise and subsequent radicalization of Kantian idealism seems to have eliminated any systematic significance the concepts of clarity and distinctness may have had by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Philosophy After 1781 (Prolegomena, 1783; On a Discooery, 1790; What Real see I. Kant, ｔｬｲ･ｯｴｩｾ｡＠ Progress, c. 1793), Ed1ted and Translated by Heruy Allison and Peter Heath, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002: 85,310, 368 (IV:290, VIII: 219-220, XX:277). 31 J. Schultz, Exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by James C. Morrison, University of Ottawa Press, Ottawa, 1995: 48 (81). 32 Exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 48 (81). . 33 K.L. Reinhold, Versuch Einer Neuen Tlreorie des menschliclren Vostellungsvenuogens, W1dtrnann and Mauke, Prague, 1795: Bk. 3, §38-§40. 34 Versuch Einer Neuen Theorie, Bk. 3, §40. 35 Fichte makes passing reference to "clear and distinct presentation" of his ideas in Some Lectures Concerning tire Vo_cation o(tiU: _Scholar and in various iterations of the Wissenschaftslehre, but I have found no systematically Significant reference to clarity and distinctness in any of the works of the Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel. 156 6. Conclusions One could argue that the role clarity and distinctness played in eightnth century German philosophy is of merely historical interest. However, ｾｷｯｵｬ､＠ argue that the account I have sketched in this paper can also tell us a great deal about the nature of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy; the the ｷｾｹ＠ those systems way that philosophical systems are structured; ｡ｾ､＠ played change. If this is true, then I think the role that clanty_and ､ｩｳｾ｣ｴｮ･＠ in philosophy in Germany in the eighteenth century IS of genume phtlosophical interest as well. . First, the account of clarity and distinctness that I have presented m was ｮｾｴ＠ a monothis paper shows that the Leibnizian-Wolffian ｰｨｩｬｯｳｾｹ＠ lithic doctrine. This view of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy IS perhaps less common than it used to be, but it is still important to demonstrate that words like "traditional" and "scholastic" do not adequately describe its form or content. It is evident even from the different ways they use the concepts of clarity and distinctness that the relationship between Leibniz and Wolff is not merely the relationship between a master and his discipleJ'>. It ｡ｬｳｾ＠ ｳｨｯｾ＠ that relationship between Wolff and his followers is more than a relationship between summarizers and popularizersl7 • If these relationships were really so simple, then clarity and distinctness would play the same role in Leibniz' s and Wolff's metaphysics and Wolff and Baumgarten would have the same view of the relationship between sensibility and the understanding. The fact that Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten differ on all of these issues shows that the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy not a monolithic doctrine. The way the concepts of clarity and distinctness are used to structur_e the relationship between the different parts of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy is also instructive, because it shows how different kinds of philomuch is ｣ｬｾ｡ｲ＠ sophical problems can solved using a few basic concepts. ｔｾｩｳ＠ from the way that clarity and distinctness are employed m metaphys1cs, ｾ｡ｹ＠ these logic, and aesthetics. What is perhaps even more interesting is ｴｨｾ＠ concepts are used to organize philosophy itself. Wolff makes distinct con36 On the differences between Leibniz and Wolff, see C. A. Corr, Christian Wolff and l..eibniz, Journal of the History of Ideas, 1975, 36 (2), 241-262. .. , . Ｌ＠ Radikaler 37 On the relationship between Wolff and his followers, see G. ｍｩｨｬｰｦｾ､ｴ Wolffianismus: Zur Differenzierung und Wirkung der Wolffschen Schle ab 1735 , ｾ､＠ N. Hamun t · "Chr1"sti"an Wolff und rue Universitaten: Zur Wirkungsgeschichte des ｗｯｬｦｩ｡ｮｾｳｭｵ＠ ｾ＠ M" 18. Jahrhundter", both included in: Werner Schneiders (ed.), Christian Wolff 1679-1754, emer, Hamburg, 1986: 237-253, 266-277. 157 cepts a precondition for metaphysics in his logic, but he also situates the faculties of confused and distinct cognition within his metaphysics, in order to define the relationship between the faculties of sensibility and the un. derstanding38 • While Wolff suggests that there is a hierarchical relationship between sensibility and the understanding, Baumgarten maintains that the cognition of the lower and higher faculties each have their own perfection, so that the sciences that are concerned with that cognition stand in an analogous rather than hierarchical relation to one another. By situating aesthetics in relation to logic within the framework of metaphysics, Baumgarten does more than introduce a new science. He defines the structure of the philosophy itself. Finally, the success of the Kantian campaign against clarity and distinctness should not lead us to conclude that philosophy changes when a great philosopher sees the fatal flaw in the works of his predecessors and proposes a new system that gains an enthusiastic following. These narratives are common in the history of philosophy, because they are both convenient and easily comprehensible. However, the truth is almost always more complicated. That is certainly true in this case, because Kant preserves the relationship between metaphysics, logic, and aesthetics that was established in the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy, despite his hostility to the concepts of clarity and distinctness and the way Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten used them to distinguish sensible and intellectual cognition. That Kant reaffirms the relationship between metaphysics, logic, and aesthetics that was established in the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition is evident from the Critique of Pure Reason, which is presented as a work on metaphysics, whose elements include a transcendental aesthetic and a transcendental logic. Kant even defines the elements of his new metaphysics in terms very similar to the ones Baumgarten uses. He says, for example, that the transcendental aesthetic is "the science of all principles of a priori sensibility," while transcendental logic "has to do merely with the laws of the understanding and reason"l'l. Kant refers to principles of a priori sensibility, rather than the perfection of sensible cognition, and he does not say understanding and reason belong to the higher cognitive faculty in this passage; yet the structure of the first Critique reproduces the complementary relationship between aesthetics and logic that developed within the context of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philos- f ct that Kant rejected the grounds for this relationship while ophY· ｔｾ･＠ ;eir consequences makes the task of understanding the changes h'l sophy at the end of the eighteenth centupreservmg . G k place m erman p 1 o k that too h licated than historians 'of philosophy usually ta e that muc more comp ry theiil to be. 38 On the relationship between logic and metaphysics in Wolff, see J.C. McQuillan, Wolffs Logic, Ka11t's Critique, a11d the ｆｯｵｾｴ､｡ｩｬＡｳ＠ of Metaphysics (Forthcoming). 39 Critique of Pure Reason, A21/B35, A57/681. 159 158