Carla Bagnoli
580 California St., Suite 400
San Francisco, CA, 94104
Ethical Objectivity: The Challenge of Time
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Abstract
Evolutionary explanations offer convincing accounts of the origin of ethics but seem to undermine the prospects of its objective foundation. On the basis of these explanations, Sharon Street and others have argued that the claim to objectivity is misplaced insofar as it commits to moral realism or it should be reinterpreted otherwise (e.g. contingent on shared values). By contrast, I argue that evolutionary explanations challenge any meta-ethics that is indifferent to the temporal dimension of normativity and, in particular, finitude as a dimension of contingency. While I share some of the premises of the anti-realist argument, I deny that they compel us to accept deflated conceptions of objectivity, e.g. in terms of intersubjective agreement or reflective endorsement. In fact, such deflationary strategies bear heavy epistemic costs and are vulnerable to the objection of bootstrapping. In contrast to debunking arguments, I suggest that evolutionary accounts of the origin of ethics provide support for a strong understanding of ethical objectivity, which requires (i) independence of practical subjects' comprehensive views, interests, and preferences; (ii) rational validity, and (agreement in judgment); (iii) authority that does not rest on power position, or rational compliance. In the main part of the paper, I offer a constructivist account of rational justification, which meets these requirements. Finally, I attempt to show that the evolutionary concept of exaptation may be of help in characterizing the sort of adjustments available to constructivism, as an alternative to bootstrapping strategies.
Related papers
The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason
Ethics, 2012
Evolutionary accounts of the origins of human morality may lead us to doubt the truth of our moral judgments. Sidgwick tried to vindicate ethics from this kind of external attack. However, he ended The Methods in despair over another problem-an apparent conflict between rational egoism and universal benevolence, which he called the "dualism of practical reason." Drawing on Sidgwick, we show that one way of defending objectivity in ethics against Sharon Street's recent evolutionary critique also puts us in a position to support a bold claim: the dualism of practical reason can be resolved in favor of impartiality. * For helpful comments, we would like to thank Derek Parfit, Folke Tersman, Gustaf Arrhenius, and Krister Bykvist, as well as participants in a discussion of the paper at a seminar at the University Center for Human Values, Princeton University, in Fall 2011. We are also most grateful to two reviewers for Ethics and four editors of Ethics, as well as to Connie Rosati, for the extraordinary amount of work they put into helping us to improve the paper we first submitted-we owe so much to them that it would be tedious to note individually every point at which we have benefited from their suggestions.
Objectivity, Evolutionism and the Moral Niche
Paradigmi, 2019
This paper aims at shedding light on the debate about Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and moral objectivity. I will assess the consequences of the evolutionary explanation of morality for moral objectivity, focusing on a recent realist argument that stems from the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes in biology. This argument presents some fallacies and thus fails in securing the realist conception of moral objectivity. I will argue that rethinking biological causation in terms of reciprocal causation rather than unidirectional causation, as the proximate/ultimate distinction presupposes, seems to push us toward a constructivist approach through the notion of niche construction.
MORAL OBJECTIVITY ORIGINS AND FOUNDATIONS (introduction)
Quaestiones Infinitae, 2019
What implications do recent empirical findings from the fields of biology, primatology, anthropology, psychology and history have for metaethical theories about moral objectivity? I defend the thesis that these findings detract from the plausibility of a realist account of moral objectivity but leave room for a more moderate, antirealist account of objectivity, framed in terms of stance-invariance. The dissertation consists of six articles written for publication in academic journals. In these articles I present two novel, empirically informed challenges to moral realism, and point out some shortcomings of existing challenges. One of the novel challenges builds on the second horn of Sharon Street’s ‘Darwinian Dilemma’, according to which moral realists are committed to an implausible evolutionary hypothesis, and extends this criticism to the historical realm. The other novel challenge is fuelled by theoretical and experimental work in moral psychology, and takes issue with the presumed advantages of moral realism in explaining the qualities of our moral experience. Apart from criticizing moral realism, I also develop and defend an alternative account of moral objectivity in antirealist terms and argue that it is as least as successful as a realist account in capturing the objectivist commitments of ordinary moral discourse. In this introductory chapter I outline the aims and methods of the dissertation and demonstrate the coherence of the treatise.
Moral Objectivity, Autonomy, And Reasons: The Constructivist Challenge To Realism
2011
This dissertation defends realist views in ethics against arguments advanced by ethical constructivists. Realists think that ethical truth obtains independently of any preferred perspective. That is, it is at bottom independent of whatever beliefs, desires, or other forms of commitment we have. Constructivists, in contrast, deny this. But this could mean different things, and there is currently no consensus on what constructivism involves exactly or how we ought to understand this dispute. Consequently, it has been difficult to evaluate the merits of constructivist arguments. This work attempts to remedy these deficiencies by developing a framework for both interpreting and evaluating the nature and scope of the constructivist's challenge. In the first two chapters, I address some of the larger interpretative disputes. In Chapter 1, I argue that there are two main ways of understanding constructivism. Each of these corresponds to the rejection of a particular commitment of realism. In Chapter 2, however, I argue that neither of these should be understood as representing a freestanding view in metaethics. Rather, each takes aim at a narrower target: viz., the realist's conception of ethical objectivity. The first type of constructivist challenge rejects realist claims about the nature of ethical objectivity; the second type accepts these but rejects claims about it scope. In the final three chapters, I evaluate these two versions of the challenge. In Chapter 3, I argue that if the constructivist rejects all stance-independent ethical truth, she commits herself to absurd results within ethical theory. This prompts me to consider more modest constructivist theses, ones that allow for some stanceindependent ethical truths but that also significantly restrict the scope that such truths play within an ethical theory. In Chapters 4 and 5, however, I argue that the best arguments for this more modest constructivism also fail because the ethical considerations they appeal to-i.e., moral rationalism and autonomy-can be equally accommodated by a robust moral realism.
Related papers
Naturalising Ethics: The Implications of Darwinism for the Study of Moral Philosophy
Science & Education, 2009
The nature of moral values has occupied philosophers and educationalists for centuries and a variety of claims have been made about their origin and status. One tradition suggests they may be thoughts in the mind of God; another that they are eternal truths to be reached by rational reflection (much like the truths of mathematics) or alternatively through intuition; another that they are social conventions; and another (from the logical positivists) that they are not verifiable facts but simply the expression of emotional likes and dislikes. Standard introductory texts (e.g., Bowie 2004; Vardy and Grosch 1999) on the subject of ethics rarely mention Darwin or Darwinism (Mepham 2005 is a useful exception) possibly mindful of the fact that the relationship of evolutionary biology to moral questions has had a troublesome history. The effect of this has been that whole generations of moral philosophers have given the biological sciences a wide berth and consequently often remain poorly informed about recent advances in evolutionary thought and the neurosciences. On the other hand, scientists have developed interesting models of the evolution of the moral sentiments and are using new imaging techniques to explore the centres of the brain associated with emotion and motivation, but many have been fearful of committing the naturalistic fallacy and so have steered clear of extrapolating their findings to ethical questions. No one after all wants to be seen to be committing an elementary logical blunder. But in the last 20 years, evolutionary biologists have regained the confidence to explore the implications of evolution for the study of ethics (de Waal 1996; Wilson 1998; Wright 1994; Greene 2003). This paper is designed to encourage those entrusted with the teaching of ethics to be open to the potential of Darwinism as a source of ideas on the origins and status of ethical thought and behaviour. It is also hoped that it will illustrate for science educators the enormous explanatory power inherent in Darwinian thought.
Evolutionary Ethics? Substantiators, Skeptics, and Moral Realism
2013
Hardly a week passes without new findings emerging from evolutionary psychology regarding how our view of morality has been influenced by our biological evolution. Evolutionary ethics is a normative project built upon these scientific insights. Evolutionary ethicists fall into two groups: substantiators or skeptics. Substantiators believe moral ideas can now be scientifically proven. Skeptics believe there are no moral truths because morality is just a biological adaptation. I believe the project of evolutionary ethics is misconceived. I argue that both the substantiators and the skeptics fail to show the direct relevance of biology to ethics. Moral truths can be established. But biology cannot support nor undercut these truths. I present the doctrine of moral realism as embodying the proper process of ethical inquiry, and I defend moral realism from evolutionary psychology's skeptical conclusions. I determine that biology can indirectly inform ethics, but never guide it. The ethical realm is independent. * At times, insisting on the distinction between ethics and morality can be awkward, since it is completely overlooked by EP's normative project. † I also call descriptive is statements facts, and prescriptive ought statements norms or values, unless otherwise stated. * In considering EP's normative capacity, the question of its descriptive capacity can be bracketed. Even if EP described, with perfect accuracy, why we hold our ethical beliefs, its normative pertinence would not follow.
Nothing in Ethics Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution? Natural Goodness, Normativity, and Naturalism
, along with other philosophers, have argued for a metaethical position, the natural goodness approach, that claims moral judgments are, or are on a par with, teleological claims made in the biological sciences. Specifically, an organism's flourishing is characterized by how well they function as specified by the species to which they belong. In this essay, I first sketch the Neo-Aristotelian natural goodness approach. Second, I argue that critics who claim that this sort of approach is inconsistent with evolutionary biology due to its species essentialism are incorrect. Third, I contend that combining the natural goodness account of natural-historical judgments with our best account of natural normativity, the selected effects theory of function, leads to implausible moral judgments. This is so if selected effects function are understood in terms of evolution by natural selection, but also if they are characterized in terms of cultural evolution. Thus, I conclude that proponents of the natural goodness approach must either embrace non-naturalistic vitalism or troubling moral revisionism. "If we try to paint normative life as a part of nature, crucial parts keep looking off shape." (Gibbard 1990, 23)
NATURALISTIC METAETHICS, EXTERNAL REASONS, AND THE NATURE OF MORAL ARGUMENT
Desire-based accounts of practical argument about incompatible ends seem limited either to advice about means or to coercive threats. This paper argues that this can be avoided if the parties to the dispute desire its resolution by means other than force more than they desire the satisfaction of any particular ends. In effect, this means they must argue as if in a position of equal power. This leads to an explanation of the apparent objectivity of moral claims and of why moral reasons appear to be categorical and external. It also explains how notions such as reciprocal altruism and TIT-FOR-TAT can play a role in an evolutionary account of morality. The paper concludes with an argument to the effect that a desire-based metaethic must accept the is-ought gap and explains why there may appear to be no is-ought gap from within a given norma-tive perspective. naturalistic meta-ethic, insofar as it is a metaethics that seeks a " reduction of morality to desire, " 1 needs to explain, or explain away, at least three apparent features of moral argument. Firstly, there is the apparent objectivity of moral argument. As Jonathan Dancy puts it, " In moral choice, we struggle to fi nd, not any answer that we can bring ourselves to accept, nor any answer that we can accept in consistency with previous answers, but the right answer. We present our search to ourselves as one governed by a criterion which does not lie in ourselves. " 2 The term " objective, " Michael Smith notes, seems to signify " the possibility of a convergence in moral views. " 3 Second, there is the apparent practicality of moral argument, that is, that the conclusion of the argument is thought to have an action-guiding force, not merely informing the participants that some particular action possesses the property of
University of Utrecht,
17-4-2018
Ethical Objectivity: The Challenge of Time
Carla Bagnoli
Abstract
Evolutionary explanations offer convincing accounts of the origin of ethics but seem to undermine the prospects of its objective foundation. On the basis of these explanations, Sharon Street and others have argued that the claim to objectivity is misplaced insofar as it commits to moral realism or it should be reinterpreted otherwise (e.g. contingent on shared values). By contrast, I argue that evolutionary explanations challenge any meta-ethics that is indifferent to the temporal dimension of normativity and, in particular, finitude as a dimension of contingency.
While I share some of the premises of the anti-realist argument, I deny that they compel us to accept deflated conceptions of objectivity, e.g. in terms of intersubjective agreement or reflective endorsement. In fact, such deflationary strategies bear heavy epistemic costs and are vulnerable to the objection of bootstrapping.
In contrast to debunking arguments, I suggest that evolutionary accounts of the origin of ethics provide support for a strong understanding of ethical objectivity, which requires (i) independence of practical subjects’ comprehensive views, interests, and preferences; (ii) rational validity, and (agreement in judgment); (iii) authority that does not rest on power position, or rational compliance.
In the main part of the paper, I offer a constructivist account of rational justification, which meets these requirements. Finally, I attempt to show that the evolutionary concept of exaptation may be of help in characterizing the sort of adjustments available to constructivism, as an alternative to bootstrapping strategies.
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Many have argued – quite plausibly, in my view – that evolution “may have played a tremendous role in shaping the content of human evaluative attitudes” (Street 2006: 109). This hypothesis has some significant epistemic purchase, as it might be the best explanation of some homogeneity in some moral practices, which seem ubiquitous, e.g. holding each other moral responsible, punishing for crimes against members a one’s own group or some variation of the golden rule. From an evolutionary perspective, these practices emerge from corresponding primitive/more basic evaluative tendencies of our evolutionary ancestors. Their resistance through time seem to show that they were adaptive, e.g. also more fitness-enhancing for humans than their opposites would have been. This is the broad and most common form of the evolutionary explanation of the fact that specific moral norms are considered to be objectively true in all human cultures.
The question we are asked to address is whether and how this broad impact meta-ethical theories such as moral realism. Moral realism is the view that the standards of objectivity in ethics are robust, and concern claims that are independent of the mind of the evaluators. Are such standards also independent of the natural history of human culture, including its adaptive (e.g. non-intentional) strategies?
Debunkers
Bootstrapping
The test of time
Finite interdependent agents
The argument from change
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