CfP: Nationalism in a Transnational Age

2005

In contemporary Europe, there can be noted the overlapping and rivalry of the two signifi cant tendencies, which are becoming stronger and stronger. On one hand, one can notice multilevel processes of integration and conditions connected with them and that are concerned with democracy, tolerance, globalization, etc. On the other hand, one can observe disintegrative factors of various kind, which refer to actions and postures connected with chauvinism, xenophobia, neofascism and separatism. In the second view, especially in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), various aspects connected with nationalism seem to be of great signifi cance. ! is is clearly refl ected by the events which took place in, for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo or Macedonia. THE PICTURE OF CONTEMPORARY

In Eastern Europe the successful populist parties are mostly Right-wing nationalist (for instance the Hungarian Fidesz and the Polish Law and Justice) or exceptionally Left-wing populist (for instance Slovak Direction – Social Democracy in Slovakia) with a huge nationalist sentiment. It seems to be that in this region populism and nationalism have been closely related or merged. Moreover, following the traditional literature on populism (Ghita Ionescu, Ernest Gellner), we can easily say that our contemporary “populist Zeitgeist” can be seen as some kind of (post)modern nationalism. In this paper, I am dealing with the problem, how can we define and analyse populism in Eastern Europe. It is hard to say that populism and nationalism have nothing to do with each other, but I am convinced that populism cannot be identified with nationalism. That is why, I introduce the term of historical-theoretical complex of nationalism and populism. According to post-Marxist, critical and discursive literature (Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe) it is obviously that populism is not just a Right-wing phenomenon and there is a thing which can be called transnational Left-wing populism (Benjamin Moffitt, Panos Panayotu). This version of populism is not an unknow phenomenon in this part of Europe, because the Communist regimes before 1989 a transnational populist agenda has been created (Antal, 2017b), but the Left-wing populism is seriously underrepresented in contemporary Eastern Europe. I am investigating here the political theoretical (Antal, 2017a) and historical background of nationalist populism of our time in Eastern Europe analysing examples from the following countries of this region: Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania. My main thought is that the politics in this region has always been populist in that sense there is a constant need to contrast “the people” (as a large powerless group) and “the elite” (a small powerful group). This “never ending” political tradition of Eastern European populism turned up in the history once in nationalist and other times in transnational perspectives. However, the contemporary Right-wing nationalist populism means a relatively new phenomenon, but it has deeply historical ground in the interwar Right-wing nationalism. According to my other hypothesis, the governing Right-wing populist parties (especially the Fidesz in Hungary) use the nationalist discourse to create permanent political enemies inside and outside of the nation (Brubaker argues that this kind of nationalism appears as civilizationsim). These parties belong to the political elite and use populist discourse to cover up their corrupt politics which does not serve the interest of the people. In my view there is a new chapter in historical-theoretical complex of nationalism and populism in Eastern Europe, this is the emergence of populist entrepreneurs using nationalism to maintain their governing power based on populism, which raises several dangers. I will put forward here that the contemporary Right-wing in Eastern Europe was able to rebuild its nationalism as a 21st century populism and the Left said goodbye its nationalist and populist roots and did not reconfigure its populism in transnational scales.

1996

Abstract. This article compares the ‘new nationalism’ in post-communist countries since the 1980s with the ‘classical’ national movements o the nineteenth century. Looking for analogies and differences between these two processes, it seeks to achieve a better understanding and more profound interpretation of contemporary ‘nationalism’. Most important analogies are: both national movements emerged as a result of (and as an answer to) the crisis and disintegration of an old regime and its value system; in both cases we observe a low level of political experience among the population, the stereotype of a personalised nation, and of a defensive position. Similarly both movements define their national border by both ethnic and historical borders: in both cases, the nationally relevant conflict of interests plays a decisive role. Among the differences are: the extremely high level of social communication in the twentieth-century movements, combined with a ‘vacuum at the top’ (the need for...

2016

The growth of nationalism and na tivist parties and movements has raised political and scholarly debates about the future viability of European welfare states and democracies. These projects are sparkled by reactions to the global war on terror and the economic and financial crises followed by austerity politics, growing securization, unemployment and poverty across the continent. The nationalist trend has been visible in national elections and culminated in the European Parliamentary elections in 2014, where Rightwing Populist parties increased their presence. European scholars have pointed towards the growth of exclusive welfare nationalism fueled by global mobility and increased migration. Feminist scholars have started to analyse the articulation of welfare and citizenship in nationalist projects. The theoretical section revisits approaches to gender nationalism arguing that in order to understand contemporary nationalist policies gendered approaches need to evolve beyond notion...

Introduction for the volume Nationalism in a Transnational Age, co-ed. with Carsten Schapkow (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021). Nationalism was declared to be dead too early. A postnational age was announced, and liberalism claimed to have been victorious by the end of the Cold War. At the same time postnational order was proclaimed in which transnational alliances like the European Union were supposed to become more important in international relations. But we witnessed the rise a strong nationalism during the early 21st century instead, and right wing parties are able to gain more and more votes in elections that are often characterized by nationalist agendas.

In Eastern Europe the successful populist parties are mostly right-wing nationalist (for instance the Hungarian Fidesz and the Polish Law and Justice) or exceptionally left-wing populist (for instance Slovak Direction – Social Democracy in Slovakia) with a huge nationalist sentiment. It seems to be that in this region populism and nationalism have been closely related or merged. Moreover, following the traditional literature on populism (Ghita Ionescu, Ernest Gellner), we can easily say that our contemporary “populist Zeitgeist” can be seen as some kind of (post)modern nationalism. In this paper, I am dealing with the problem, how can we define and analyse populism in Eastern Europe. It is hard to say that populism and nationalism have nothing to do with each other, but I am convinced that populism cannot be identified with nationalism. That is why, I introduce the term of historical-theoretical complex of nationalism and populism. According to post-Marxist, critical and discursive literature (Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe) it is obviously that populism is not just a right-wing phenomenon and there is a thing which can be called transnational left-wing populism (Benjamin Moffitt, Panos Panayotu). This version of populism is not an unknow phenomenon in this part of Europe, because the Communist regimes before 1989 a transnational populist agenda has been created (Antal, 2017b), but the Left-wing populism is seriously underrepresented in contemporary Eastern Europe. I am investigating here the political theoretical (Antal, 2017a) and historical background of nationalist populism of our time in Eastern Europe analysing examples from the following countries of this region: Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania. My main thought is that the politics in this region has always been populist in that sense there is a constant need to contrast “the people” (as a large powerless group) and “the elite” (a small powerful group). This “never ending” political tradition of Eastern European populism turned up in the history once in nationalist and other times in transnational perspectives. However, the contemporary Right-wing nationalist populism means a relatively new phenomenon, but it has deeply historical ground in the interwar Right-wing nationalism. According to my other hypothesis, the governing Right-wing populist parties (especially the Fidesz in Hungary) use the nationalist discourse to create permanent political enemies inside and outside of the nation (Brubaker argues that this kind of nationalism appears as civilizationsim). These parties belong to the political elite and use populist discourse to cover up their corrupt politics which does not serve the interest of the people. In my view there is a new chapter in historical-theoretical complex of nationalism and populism in Eastern Europe, this is the emergence of populist entrepreneurs using nationalism to maintain their governing power based on populism, which raises several dangers.

Right-wing and far right-wing parties are growing stronger in Europe in the past years. With Austria, Hungary, Sweden, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, France, Germany and Britain ahead of the list - Finland, the Netherlands, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Cyprus are not far back on the same track (Aisch & Pearce, 2016; BBC, 2016). The main concern for this research is to identify the causality of rising nationalism in Europe. This great endeavour divides the effort into two parts. Over the first part, the reader will find a historical approach to the origins of liberal democracy and the nation-state, in order to understand where nationalism comes from. To do this, the structuralist and slightly constructivist method of ‘discourse analysis’ is used to separate liberalism from democracy. The finding is a marvellous construction of Marxist core principles embedded in liberal democracy and building the sediments for the nationalistic proneness of Europe. These findings are to be used as a methodology for the second part. In order to advance to the empirical part of the paper, a second methodology is presented to find nationalism in the centre of a mega social policy endeavour crisscrossing borders by bringing together domestic and international high politics. This is achieved by securitising immigration with the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory. Immigration is thereon taken as a national security issue which finds its origins immediately after the Second World War. With the creation of the UN and its sister organisations, a web of international immigration containment through international development policies is understood. On the domestic side multiculturalism and outlawing of the foreigner is studied. By the final section of this work. Nationalism is explained on one side, through a fear of citizens to lose protection of the welfare democracy and on the other side it is governments who fear the loss of sovereignty. Two core elements that sustain liberal democracies. Immigration threatens both, making it a matter of high national and international politics. The European analysis will be narrowed down to the study of Germany, Britain and France as case studies. Although data for further countries in the Scandinavian region and in the South of Europe has been prepared, it was not included in this paper for reasons of space limit. In the conclusions, a broader analysis about the situation of nationalism in Europe and the causes of it will be made. Further studies are, nevertheless, required to make a full understanding of the current situation.

Journal of Gender Studies, 1992

This issue of the Journal takes up the problematic relationship between gender and nationalism. The ambiguity of this relationship derives mainly from the two-sided character of nationalism. The feminist struggle is one for liberation from gender oppression; to the extent that it stands aside from other struggles against oppression (bourgeois feminists who ignore class oppression, white feminists who ignore racism), it becomes limited and partial: that is, it fails to recognise the gendered ways in which racial and class oppression operate, and thereby accepts the oppression of some women. Similarly, foreign domination and ethnic oppression also affect women in specific ways, and a feminism which stands for the liberation of all women cannot be neutral: it has to take a stand against oppression and for liberation.

2019

The extreme right wing is on the rise. And there are signs that part of the political mainstream in Europe, the US, and beyond is considering going along with far-right populist parties and their divisive, ethno-nationalist programmes. Europe at the Crossroads is an urgent scholarly response to the sociopolitical challenges that far-right programmes pose to the idea of a more egalitarian world. It offers an interdisciplinary explanation and critique of the dynamics of the far right in Europe – from Poland to the UK, from Sweden to Greece. The authors present immediate alternatives when tackling the exclusionary rhetoric and the politics of resentment. In formulating alternatives for a ‘social Europe’, each contributor critically assesses the current advance of far-right populism and the threat to liberal democracy since the global financial crisis of 2008 and the European refugee movement of 2015. Each chapter addresses the historical roots and normalization of the extreme right, whether Orbanism in Central and Eastern Europe since 2014, the Brexit campaign and referendum in the UK in 2016. As the slogan ‘Fortress Europe’ – once a pejorative term – now appeals to large numbers of voters, the authors also analyse the flash points in the run-up to the European Parliament elections in May 2019.