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2019, Journal of Political Science Education
https://doi.org/10.1080/15512169.2019.1586548…
9 pages
1 file
Political theory instructors are often familiar with the syllabus themed “Liberalism and its Critics.” Liberalism, however, is often narrowly and teleologically defined as the progressive expansion of human freedom. Further, counter or alternative narratives leave students as mere critics without constructive insight into the balance of individualism and cosmopolitanism. With these problematic approaches in mind, this article offers a civic republican viewpoint to supplement the limited approaches in “Liberalism and its Critics.” The course proposed by the authors reframes common methodology to include civic republicanism as a parallel and sympathetic intellectual development to liberalism, at times intertwined, and at others anticipating and supplementing its deficiencies. This article first shows the deficiencies of the inadequate narrative/counter-narrative approach and highlights why civic republicanism presents a novel approach to teaching theory. The authors then provide a possible course description with specific learning outcomes, a recommended course structure with suggested readings, and some concluding considerations on implementing such a course.
Social Theory and Practice, 2007
In this paper we argue that John Rawls’s account of political liberalism requires a conception of mutual respect that differs from the one advanced in A Theory of Justice. We formulate such a political liberal form of mutual respect, which we call ‘civic respect.’ We also maintain that core features of political liberalism – in particular, the ideas of ‘the burdens of judgment’ and ‘public reason’ – do not commit political liberalism to a particular ideal of personal autonomy, contrary to claims made by various commentators. Furthermore, we maintain that teaching the idea of ‘public reason’ to students in civic education courses does not threaten their ‘ethical integrity.’ On the basis of these points, we maintain – against political and educational theorists like Eamonn Callan and Amy Gutmann – that political liberalism permits, ceteris paribus, a wider range of educational policy options than most forms of comprehensive liberalism. We conclude the article by considering some such policies.
Journal of Social Philosophy, 2012
Liberal democracy and virtue have an uncomfortable relationship. The republican tradition ranging from the ancient world through the Atlantic tradition of the Founding Fathers, to present-day communitarians, argues that democracy relies uniquely on the virtue of its citizens. They hold that republics are not defeated from without, but corrupted from within. There is a dire need for a shared conception of the good life. Only then are citizens willing to act together and to make the sacrifices necessary for the common weal. Liberals, however, argue that a shared conception of the good life can be bought only at the price of freedom. Within a nation-state of our size and possessing our level of freedom, differing images of the good life are inevitable and worth respecting. Therefore, the state should not craft souls, but provide the conditions for all to flourish according to their own desired ends.
Perspectives on Political Science, 2013
Colleges and faculties of liberal arts are facing potentially devastating declines in enrollments, driven in part by their own loss of clear purpose. To stem the tide and regain their rightful place at the center of the university, liberal arts faculties need to rethink the meaning of liberal education. This article argues that education in the liberal arts should be directed above all to cultivating practical wisdom, for which a deep inquiry into the central questions of political science is especially valuable. It discusses the relation of liberal education to civic education, the proper tasks of civic education at the university level, the benefits of dialectical inquiry, and the means by which students' thoughtless relativism can be replaced with habit of moral reasoning suitable to a modern cosmopolitan society.
Philosophy Compass
John Rawls claims that the kind of citizenship education required by political liberalism demands ‘far less’ than that required by comprehensive liberalism. Many educational and political theorists who have explored the implications of political liberalism for education policy have disputed Rawls’s claim. Writing from a comprehensive liberal perspective, Amy Gutmann contends that the justificatory differences between political and comprehensive liberalism generally have no practical significance for citizenship education. Political liberals such as Stephen Macedo and Victoria Costa maintain that political liberalism requires a form of citizenship education that is far more demanding than that suggested by Rawls. Gordon Davis and Blain Neufeld, in contrast, defend Rawls’s position. These different views have implications for the content of mandatory citizenship education, how to understand the ‘common school ideal,’ and the scope for educational choice within the framework of political liberalism. However, the differences between Gutmann, Macedo, and Costa, on the one hand, and Davis and Neufeld, on the other, might be attributable, at least in part, to their different foci. Gutmann, Macedo, and Costa focus on non-ideal theory, specifically the contemporary American context, whereas Davis and Neufeld begin, as does Rawls, within ideal theory, and consider non-ideal circumstances from that perspective.
2001
Liberal democratic states, like all complex communities, are constantly forced to make hard choices between incommensurable values. In this instance, the choice appears to be between personal freedom and autonomy, on one hand, and civic virtue and good citizenship, on the other. To promote a reasonably high level of civic virtue and good citizenship, freedom and autonomy may need to be limited in appreciable ways. Likewise, to secure a high level of freedom and autonomy, liberal democratic societies will likely have to endure a scarcity of virtue. This paper argues that liberal democratic states may safely promote civic education, but only when it is based on civic pluralism, as opposed to some unitary scheme. Young citizens (at about secondary education level) could be exposed to a range of rival views of good citizenship, rather than indoctrinated into any officially prescribed view. Similarly, the workings of the current U.S. political system could be presented with explicit reference to different modes of political participation. The paper examines prominent civic and liberal theories of civic education and argues that neither is likely to provide a sufficient pool of civic capital for liberal democracies. It limits discussion to a few representative figures. The paper elaborates on the suggestion that liberal democracies are best served by civic education based on civic pluralism. Finally, it explains why (and how) the number and range of views of good citizenship presented to young citizens must be limited, even within a pluralistic scheme of civic education. Includes 73 notes. (BT) Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document.
Studies in Philosophy and Education, 2017
The republican political tradition, which originated in Ancient Rome and picked up by several early-modern thinkers, has been revived in the last couple of decades following the seminal works of historian Quentin Skinner and political theorist Philip Pettit. Although educational questions do not normally occupy the center stage in republican theory, various theorists working within this framework have already highlighted the significance of education for any functioning republic. Looking at educational questions through the lens of freedom as non-domination has already yielded important insights to discussions of political education. However, consideration of the existing republican educational discourse in light of the wide range of issues discussed in Pettit's recent works reveals that it suffers from two major lacunae. First, it does not take into consideration the distinction (and deep connection) between democracy and social justice that has become central to Pettit's republicanism. Thus, the current discussion focuses almost exclusively on education for democratic citizenship and hardly touches upon social justice. Second, the current literature thinks mainly in terms of educating future citizens, rather than conceiving of students also as political agents in the present, and of school itself as a site of non-domination. This paper aims at filling these voids, and it will therefore be oriented along two intersecting axes: the one between democracy and justice, and the other between future citizenship in the state and present citizenship at school. The resulting four categories will organize the discussion: future citizens and democracy; future citizens and social justice; present citizens and democracy; present citizens and social justice. This will not only enable us to draw a clearer line between the civic republican and liberal educational
Policy Futures in Education, 2004
Neo-liberalism has reached a new stage in the United States, buttressed largely by the almost seamless alliances formed among the Bush administration, religious fundamentalists, neo-conservative extremists, the dominant media, and corporate elites. This article explores the various ways in which neo-liberal cultural politics works as a form of public pedagogy to devalue the meaning of the social contract, education, and citizenship by defining higher education primarily as a financial investment and learning as a form of training for the workforce. Aggressively fostering its attack on the welfare state, unions, non-commodified public spheres, and any critical vestige of critical education, neo-liberal politics makes it increasingly more difficult to address the necessity of a political education in which active and critical political agents have to be formed, educated, and socialized into the world of politics. This article explores how the intersection of cultural studies and publi...
Policy Futures in Education, 2016
The neo-republican political philosophy (sometimes referred to as civic republicanism) advances the idea of freedom as non-domination, in an attempt to provide democracy with a solid normative foundation upon which concrete principles and institutions can be erected so as to make freedom a reality. However, attempts to develop a republican educational theory are still hesitant, and fail to take the republican radical conception of freedom to its full conclusions. This article suggests that dialogue between neo-republicanism and critical pedagogy can be mutually productive. In the first part of the article we present the neo-republican theory, and contrast it with traditional liberalism. In the second we focus on existing neo-republican theories of education, and claim that they do not take the republican presuppositions to their necessary conclusion, namely to an educational theory fully committed to the idea of freedom as non-domination. A republican educational theory, we argue, must take into consideration not only the freedom students will have in the future, but also their freedom in the present: it should think of school as a small-scale republic, which prepares its inhabitants to be future citizens of the state while at the same time treating them as free citizens in their own right. In the third part we use insights taken from critical pedagogy to chart the direction republican education must take by applying three key republican notions—democratic control, civic contestation, and trust. In the fourth and last part we outline four aspects in which neo-republicanism can shed new light on contemporary debates in critical pedagogy: the connection between democracy and justice, the multiplicity of forms of domination, critical education within schools, and work with students from relatively privileged backgrounds.
2022
Offering the first developed account of political liberal education, this book combines a thorough analysis of the theoretical groundwork of political liberal education with application-oriented approaches to contemporary educational challenges. Following in depth engagement with the shortcomings of Rawls’ theory and addressing some key objections to neutrality-based restrictions in education, the volume moves on to provide an insightful discussion of topics such as same-sex relations in sex-education, the position of migrant children and the rights of religious parents to determine the education of their children. This book outlines a political liberal account of education which provides a useful contribution to the current debates about liberalism and education in a way unprecedented in the literature on political liberalism so far. It is of interest to anyone working at the intersection of political philosophy and philosophy of education as well as for scholars with a broader interest in how liberalism can respond to the challenges of value pluralism.