Modernity and The Oblivion of Being

Introduction Given the statement: “The rock is hard”, one taking heed would pay attention to only two parts of the sentence (and naturally so), namely the subject and the predicate, or in this case, the rock and its hardness, respectively. There is a part of the sentence that remains neglected- the “is”. This “is”, to Heidegger, is not merely, as Kant would have it, the respectus logicus “Kant’s Thesis of Being”, taken from “Pathmarks”, 1988, Cambridge Press: Positing; “merely” a logical device or copula that links subjects to their respective predicates in all value judgements. “Is”, intoned, implies the most fundamental and underlying condition of every existent or being See “Identity and Difference”, translated by Joan Stambaugh, 2002, University of Chicago Press- Being. Thus, it becomes more than a copula, but that which lets beings “be” (Gelassenheit) “Letter on Humanism”, taken from “Pathmarks”, 1988, Cambridge Press: The “element” or that which enables beings to be possible . Alas, there is irrepressible proof of the oblivion of Being (Seinsvergessenheit). Considering its ontological nature, however, it seems that it was pre-destined that western metaphysics would abandon its own essence. Thus, it lies not so much on the oversight of different epochs of thought with its genesis from Platonic idealism, “ending” with Nietschean nihilism, and finally modern civilization, but rather, on the very paradox that it is. The Paradox of Being: The Concealed Source of Unconcealment There are many verbs in everyday language, but it seems that no semantic study on the verb “to be” has produced satisfactory results. And naturally so. Apparently, one cannot begin to define Being without falling victim to the absurdity of the attempt. For in order to define Being, or anything in existence for that matter, one would have to utilize the word “is”, thus using the very word that enables all definitions to be made to what is supposed to be defined. In other words, in the case of attempting any definition to be made for Being, it would be an endeavor resulting in something stated in pure tautology. It seems that our linguistic resources had been created or pre-conditioned to deal only with beings and not Being. We cannot possibly know Being. It is not a being and thus Non-being or that which enables beings to be present to Dasein and one Dasein to another. Being is not an actual being in time for if it were, one would be necessitated to view it as “something” which is and consequently recognize it as such among other beings “Time and Being”, taken from “On Time and Being”, translated by Joan Stambaugh, 2002, University of Chicago Press: beings or objects constituting ontic reality “is” or exists. But existence as equated to Being cannot be determined.. Only beings can be grasped by the intellect, granted that it is necessary for a preliminary definition of something to be made in order to know or even speak of it. Heidegger explicitly stresses the problem of Being in “The Letter on Humanism”. He asserts that Being always reveals. And in doing so, it also conceals itself. Being “contracts” into the very beings it makes manifest and hides by the very fact that it reveals. This, to Heidegger, was the reason for his fascination. He inquires Being inasmuch as it is always hidden in beings (or being with a lower case B) but remains different from Being. By virtue of being that which enables or reveals, it is “non-being “What is Metaphysics?”, taken from “Pathmarks”, 1988, Cambridge Press: it is important to note that “non-being” is in no way to be equated with “nothingness”. Paradoxically, Being (with a capital B) is concealed by the very beings that it makes manifest. Being (with a capital B) cannot be predicated unlike the case with beings or existents. In accordance to the ontological difference, Being cannot be a being or an ens per se, thus known vaguely as “non-being”. ”. It was in Heidegger’s lecture at Freiberg entitled, “What is Metaphysics?”, where he interrogates non-being. There, he says that it is precisely Being’s “hiddenness” that emerges as the essential part of the experience of Being, as far as he is concerned. Once again with reference to the “Letter on Humanism”, language was a key topic along with Dasein being the “there” or domain (a “where”, thus an ontic being) where Being discloses itself. On the very premise that language is the house of Being, Being reveals through language, which constitute Dasein’s thinking and speech. Being, then, becomes the element that “lets be” or that which enables. Therefore, thinking of Being must go by way of language. In Dasein’s nature of ek-sistence “Letter on Humanism”. Taken from “Pathmarks”, 1988, Cambridge Press: “…to stand in the light of Being”, means to be exposed and well aware of Being itself, enough to recognize the problem of Being., Being becomes nearest to Dasein. Yet this nearness remains constantly remote from it. And it is precisely this remoteness that the problem of Being becomes the least natural of all problems. It is simply the one that common sense that never poses. Or perhaps common sense does not see it as problem. Being (with a capital B) is so far from constituting a problem that it is as if such knowledge “did not exist”. On the other hand, it is worth arguing that one can only seek what one can prove has experienced. Dasein is an ontic being, but it is after the evidence of being that either the question of a creator or sustainer (the origin of “onto-theo-logy”) or the question about the very light that enables all including the divine, but flickers in a mindless void all the more as it enables, is posed. In other words, Dasein can pose the question of Being precisely because of its situated-ness in the spatio-temporal or ontic reality. Would language not make the task of speaking of Being a risk? A risk in the sense of falling victim to the impediment of an impoverished and corrupted language. After all, as mentioned earlier, what we can talk about are beings, and not Being. Once attempted, would there not be a propensity that Being becomes “something” predicated in its own discourse? Heidegger proposes a solution: the liberation of language and the revival of practical thinking Ibid: to think in order to accomplish, or in other words to think “technically”, and consequently to speak with rigid conformity to logic, grammar and science is to abscond and forget Being itself.. But maintaining primacy over these is the ontological difference, which we turn to next. The Ontological Difference Going back, Being cannot be predicated unlike the case with beings. Beings are what “are” or actual, or situated in time and space. With no hesitations, man views them as what are or what simply “exist”. Being (with a capital B) maintains the decisiveness of beings against the nothing “Metaphysics as History of Being”, taken from “The End of Philosophy”, translated by Joan Stambaugh, 2002, University of Chicago Press: “Being means that beings are, and are not non-existent.”. In other words, Being is the proverbial “primordial soup” or “pure transcendent” of beings. It is now resolved that Being should not be equated with beings. There is an underlying difference that ironically reveals to Dasein a symbiotic relationship between the two. It is a “relationship”, and knowledge of this suffices that Being and beings are necessarily distinct from one another. Heidegger accuses Western metaphysics of forgetting Being Ibid: Western metaphysics fails to acknowledge the ontological difference or the difference between Being and beings.. It is important to note that since Being, as mentioned earlier, cannot be known or as Heidegger would say, “named completely Ibid”, it is not possible to forget it. When one can say that he or she “..forgotten”, he or she has “…forgotten this” or “…forgotten that”? To be sure, when one says he or she “has forgotten”, apparently he or she “has just remembered”. Either way, only beings could be subjected to the cognitive faculty of remembering. Thus, siensvergessenheit, or forgetfulness of Being, is not to be taken in its literal sense. Rather, in speaking of this “forgottenness”, what is forgotten is the ontological difference. This is via thinking (or confusing) Being with beings, which prompts Heidegger to view the entire history of Western metaphysics as a “de-volution” of thought. It is possible that the reason for such deterrence from pondering on its own essence lies in the ambiguity of Being. In grammar, “being” could be used as a participle and as such may be used as a noun. For instance, given the statement “A human being is both passionate and rational”, the term “being” pertains to a type of existent, which in this case is the “human being”. In other words, when used as a noun, “being” becomes a word that explains what is (what is a being or seiende). “Being” can also function as an adjective with a tint of verbal utility (e.g. being hungry, we want to dine at your place). “Being” taken as a verbal adjective it designates the state by which a “being” (used as a noun) “is” (what is a being’s Being or sein). The word itself, comporting both nominal and descriptive senses, is intrinsically laden with ambiguity. The term “being” (immaterial of meaning “Being” or “being” for this very moment) can mean either “Being” or “beings “The Duplication of Being”, taken from the chapter “On Being” from “Kant and the Platypus” by Umberto Eco”. It is for this very reason that the problem of Being becomes (and apparently was looking back at the history of metaphysics) an interrogation on beings (ontology) and the ultimate ground of beings (theology). Plato falls victim to the same ambiguity when, in the genesis of Platonism, drew a distinction between the supra-sensory world and sensory world in the “Allegory of the Cave “The Allegory of the Cave”, taken from “The Republic”, Taken from “Book 7” of Plato’s “The Republic”, translated by G.M.A Grube (Hacket Publishing co., 1992)”. The supra-sensory realm was a domain of absolutes, universals, and essences. It governs “from above” the order and meaning of the sensory world. For instance, given the statement “This is a ballpen”, one knows the ballpen from an idea of it and not much of its particularity or accidentals. When the idea of “ballpen” is taken away, all that is left is “This is..”. This idealistic tradition that holds fast its position that there is an absolute basis for all truths allegedly ends with Nietzsche in his famous (and infamous for some) line “God is dead “Nietzsche’s Word: God is Dead”, taken from “Off the Beaten Track”, 2002, Cambridge Press, translated by Julian Young et. al. ”. The abstractness of the supra-sensory is otiose to the existing, concrete individual. It simply “bestows no power Ibid: to Nietzsche, there are no objective and universal truths, especially for morality.”. He proves this in a discussion of nihilism grounded in the human being’s “will to power” Ibid: the “will to power” is the life-force. It is not the will to exist but rather the will to exist in a certain fashion. The “manly-skeptic” desires freedom from slave morality, and thus nihilates to create values that are own-most. Nihilism is not merely a disposal or “getting-rid-of” of values but also a dispensation of new ones. The “will to power” being the ground for the beingness of beings becomes Being itself for Nietzsche. . He destroys the claim of a separate realm governing essences, absolutes and essences for from his observance of history, there simply aren’t any universal and objective truths in morality. Since what governs the beingness of beings Ibid: the process or “becoming” = Being (in morality) is nihilism, whose ground is the “will to power”, Nietzsche equates the latter to Being. Both thinkers fell victim to Being’s ambiguity. They, along with Aristotle, Descartes, Aquinas, Sartre, and Hegel, to mention a few, are charged with the forgetfulness of Being for they do not go beyond the difference itself. They are ensnared in the flaw and delusion that Being and beings are one, and in doing so steered Western metaphysics towards onto-theo-logy when the path it was supposed to take was the one towards Being. But once again, it is a primeval incident that Being be interpreted both in the senses of naming (being) and describing state (Being). Consequently, metaphysics becomes an ontology and a theology. Therefore, the onto-theo-logical course metaphysics has treaded upon is rooted in the ambiguity of “Being” itself. It cements the history and destiny of metaphysics as an oblivion of Being. Historical Observation Heidegger views the entire history of Western metaphysics as a de-volution of thought. From the premise that pure thinking must be accomplished by thinking of Being, Western thought was already at a decline by forgetting Being. Of course to think of Being in its ontological sense would be a challenging task for ontic beings, for it has no “accomplishment”. Thinking has evolved into something inseparable from action. Thinking has become an action prior to action or something that must be done before acting. From the grounding of metaphysics that has forgotten Being, utility dominates starting from the infancy of the humanistic tradition in Rome, all the way to modern technity that is a consequent for globalization. We shall try to outline these turn of events. The Grounding of Metaphysics It has been the duty of metaphysics, or philosophy for that matter, to search for the ground or ultimate causes of all that is. From the pre-Socratics who attempted to explain the world in terms of its physical composition, to Plato’s idealism which paved the way to the dualistic tradition Christianity today follows, to Aristotle’s realist tradition, to Aquinas’ Christianized Aristotelian philosophy, to Descartes’ conundrum of the body and spirit, to Hegelian absolutism, and finally “dying” with Nietzschean nihilism. The meaning and form metaphysics has taken for itself to this day is a result of transitions from these different epochs of truth. To Heidegger, these epochs of truth exhibit different interpretations of the disclosure of Being, affected by the cultural mode and stature of thought of the time. Thus, to Heidegger, an interrogation or inquiry into the grounding of metaphysics is an interrogation or inquiry on its history. Heidegger’s preoccupation has been to lay the foundation of metaphysics. The endeavor had its beginnings from an access to literature on the philosophical world of the Greeks. Most accounts would say that it was particularly the teachings of Aristotle that exposed him to the problem of Being. Heidegger was so fascinated with the word “is”. It isn’t simply a copula but the most fundamental and underlying condition of all things. It has a privileged possession of an inconceivable polyvalence without determinant to the unity of itself Quoted from “What is Called Thinking?”, translated and published by Harper and Row Publishers inc. copyright 1992 . This unity is Being itself- that which “makes-possible” all things. But as proven earlier, the paradox of Being is that it conceals itself through revealing. Nothing can be said of it. Aristotle asks: “what are beings as beings?”. During his time, this was the supposed concern of metaphysics. Notwithstanding the fact that it did forget Being in the eyes of Heidegger, it was still a metaphysical question for it follows that the inquiry produces a “passing beyond” beings to that which makes them “be”- their being-ness. Since beings are those that constitute apparent reality are “concrete”, they can be considered “physical”. From the premise that the inquiry of beings as beings leads to an examination by which how these beings are (a “passing beyond” or “transcendence”). Ergo, metaphysics means the transcendence of beings to their Being in such a way that beings are thusly considered beings. Though Aristotle seems to have “pioneered” metaphysics, he isn’t its founder. Heidegger claims that it starts with Plato when he drew a distinction between things of experience and the being-ness of these beings as a world of ideas. His pattern of thought can be observed from a symbolic interpretation of his “allegory of the cave”. He elucidates of “going beyond” the veil of tears that is this world to the world of ideas “The Allegory of the Cave”. Taken from “Book 7” of Plato’s “The Republic”, translated by G.M.A Grube (Hacket Publishing co., 1992). For all practical purposes, the sense of metaphysics is apparently disengaged. The grounding does not cease here. For if it is clear that metaphysics thinks beings as beings, would it not be equally clear that they appear as what they are because of some strange light that renders them unconcealed before, to and in the metaphysical gaze? And from this, the paradox arises. The paradox is that in rendering things unconcealed, Being remains concealed. This is the question that metaphysics never posed (and one that the entire post-Aristotelian tradition has avoided). It is, however, a question that must be posed for metaphysics’ sake, since this “light” is the element that lets metaphysical thinking “be “Letter on Humanism”. Taken from “Pathmarks”, 1988, Cambridge Press: because the lighting-process by which beings appear as beings is Being itself. ”. This question of Being must be posed. It is the ground-question. Unfortunately, it is not and cannot be the task of metaphysics as such, concerned and able only to deal with beings as beings to pose it. Indeed, metaphysical thinking has Being as its subject, but only in the sense that it is the total ensemble of all beings, or of being-ness, with all the ambiguity which, as we have seen a number of times, it implies. The point is, metaphysics cannot pose such a question. To think Being, metaphysics must be “overcome “Overcoming Metaphysics”. Taken from “The End of Philosophy”, translated by Joan Stambaugh, 2002, University of Chicago Press: “overcome” is not synonymous to “abolition”. ”. As long as it fixes its gaze towards beings, it only “enjoys” the light of Being, similar to the case of the prodigal son and the ousia. The son enjoys the gift of comfort but cannot gain possession of it The symbolism of “The Prodigal Son” was cited from the chapter “The Crossing of Being”. Taken from Jean-Luc Marion’s “God Without Being”. The focus of metaphysics profits from the light of Being by reflecting on beings-as-they-are but cannot reflect on the light itself for it does not manifest itself as a being but only in the beings that it enlightens. Heidegger meditates further on the Aristotelian formula of beings as beings and concluded that the formula itself is essentially ambiguous for it can mean whole of beings considered in terms of what makes them “be” (being-ness). This can again be dichotomized into the common denominator of all beings (thus becomes an ontology) or into the ultimate ground of existence where there is a supreme being (thus a theology). Humanism Heidegger observed that Western metaphysics has constantly been obsessed with different interpretations of the disclosure of Being. Thus, metaphysics becomes the ground for the genesis and development of modern technity (e.g. the scientific revolution and the renaissance) and the humanistic tradition. Every facet of it, be it science, art, politics and even the logic governing its development is grounded in a metaphysics or is the ground of one “Letter on Humanism”. Taken from “Pathmarks”, 1988, Cambridge Press. The humanistic tradition brings forth an age of utility where only instrumental reason can flourish. Consequently, philosophy has constantly been struggling with the issue of coming up with an overwhelming justification of itself towards the sciences. It was not long that as the progression went on, there emerged an oblivion of Being. Any critique made by Heidegger towards Western metaphysics, accordingly becomes a critique towards the humanistic tradition. Humanism, requires redefinition. It must also concern itself with its most fundamental condition- Being. Heidegger observes that (seemingly enough) it has been the destiny of Western metaphysics that it would abscond Being. Metaphysics becomes impoverished. And in observance with this, Heidegger asserts that Being’s task should be left to practical thinking, uncorrupted by modernity. This thinking must embrace Being before its laws have become organized into different sectors of reality as dictated by this age of utility. Dasein, according to Heidegger, should stand in the light of Being. And in the task of thinking, the sein (being) becomes the da (“there”) or domain where Being discloses itself. The age of modernization brings with it the age of utility. This age of utility demands thinking technically Ibid: done in order to accomplish, thus an oblivion of Being in itself.. Thinking, not only in western metaphysics but in all aspects of society, has become an action prior to an action. From the premise that Being be the true subject matter of thought, thinking can in no way be considered an action, for action necessitates accomplishment, and accomplishment implies ontic efficacity. Therefore, to think technically is to abandon Being. To be the thinker or spokesperson of Being amidst beings is Dasein’s “ek-sistence”. With the logic of modernity, metaphysics has only viewed man as a being that “exists” but fails to consider the relation between man’s essence and Being. Modern Technity And what of modern technity? As explained earlier, the humanistic tradition gives rise to modernity. And with it, technology. Technology can mean techniques, devices, systems and production processes usually associated with industrialism. It can also mean the rationalist, scientific, commercialist, utilitarian, anthropocentric, secular worldview usually associated with modernity. And finally, the contemporary mode of understanding or disclosing things which makes possible both industrial production processes and modernist worldview Quoted from “Heidegger’s Confrontation of Modernity”, by Micheal Zimmerman, 1990, Indiana University Press. Thus, Heidegger makes it clear that technology is not simply the emergence of objects created in a state of civilization, but also emerging and developing entities of reason (e.g. in the sciences, and in semantics). At long last, man has reached the “golden age” where objectivity dominates with a relieving air. Modern technity gives to man the view point and refuge of that which can be proven empirically. To burrow the cliché, technology makes life easier and more secure. The ease and security serves as the refuge of the “they”. Inauthenticity follows. In essence, it is when true thinking ceases that a person becomes inauthentic. The thinking Heidegger has in mind, as mentioned earlier, is the thinking of Being. Its difficulty was also demonstrated earlier. Now apparently, society gravitates towards what is easy and would offer an indubitable sense of security. This is when thinking dies. The death of thinking is either its reduction to an action prior to an action (where one has to “think” in order to accomplish something), or in an existential sense, to correspond to a certain fact whether through reason or faith “The Myth of Questioning”. Taken from the chapter “Heidegger’s Revolution” from John Caputo’s “Demythologizing Heidegger”, 1993, Indiana University Press. Both scenarios depend on a sort of “ground”, which can be reason or society. Thus, no real thinking takes place for it is, in essence, really a specular repetition of formulas. To Heidegger, thinking and philosophy flourishes when there is a “daring Ibid: a faculty for “revolutionary thinking”. This thinking can be interpreted as one that provokes radical questioning to “break new ground”, not to be utilized to the times, but to “open up a new space of time, a new age, a new order, a new beginning””. This daring erodes the very ground that supports beings by assailing the same ground with a malignant “why”. Such questioning makes the questioner tremble with fear and insecurity, and is the questioning of Being. Evidently, philosophy does not offer shortcuts or easy ways. It necessarily makes things more difficult. And for this reason, it gives back importance to things Ibid: “Making things difficult gives the weight (Being) back to beings”. To take philosophy an turn it into a tool for efficiency is a perversion for it will take beings lightly and rob them of their depth and importance. . Conclusion The forgottenness of Being can be traced back to the very roots of philosophy. And it is ironic that in the particular branch that is metaphysics, which deals with beings, it does not meditate on the ground or Being itself. As proven, Being cannot be thought of, even in metaphysics. Therefore, to the seeker of Being, one must not think under the labels of metaphysics, logic, reason and grammar, for these allow only a grasp of beings. The light still remains concealed. This thinking can only but prompt one to ask: “What for?”. Heidegger fell victim to the same responses of pragmatism from his fellow Germans. Such a question is becoming of the modern subjectivity or the inauthentic man who adheres to the logic of modernity, which is at the same time an age of utility. This age views man as a producer and consumer (if not just “animal rationale), esteeming man too low to the level of an object or tool. Therefore, the questioning of the groundless (of Being) is proper to Dasein. The act establishes a mode of existence far different from all other beings. Simply put, human beings become more of what they are in such thinking for it becomes proof that to view humans as tools for profit and convenience is a perversion. References Heidegger, Martin. “Kant’s Thesis of Being”. from “Pathmarks”. Cambridge Press. 1988 Heidegger, Martin. “Identity and Difference”. translated by Joan Stambaugh. University of Chicago Press, 2002 Heidegger, Martin. “Letter on Humanism”. from “Pathmarks. Cambridge Press. 1988 Heidegger, Martin. “Time and Being”. from “On Time and Being”. translated by Joan Stambaugh. University of Chicago Press, 2002 Heidegger, Martin. “What is Metaphysics?”. from “Pathmarks”. Cambridge Press. 1988 Heidegger, Martin. “Metaphysics as a History of Being”. from “The End of Philosophy”. translated by Joan Stambaugh. University of Chicago Press, 2002 Eco, Umberto. “The Duplication of Being”. from “Kant and the Platypus”. Vintage. 2000 Plato. “The Allegory of the Cave”. cited from “Book 7” of “The Republic”. translated by G.M.A. Grube. Hacket Publishing co. 1992 Heidegger, Martin. “Nietzsche’s Word: God is Dead”. from “Off the Beaten Track”. translated by Julian Young et. Al. Cambridge Press. 2002 Heidegger, Martin. “What is Called Thinking?”. translated and published Harper and Rows Publishing inc. 1992 Heidegger, Martin. “Overcoming Metaphysics”. from “The End of Philosophy”. translated by Joan Stambaugh. University of Chicago Press, 2002 Marion, Jean-Luc. symbolism of the parable “The Prodigal Son”. from the chapter “The Crossing of Being”. from “God Without Being” Zimmerman, Micheal. “Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity”. Indiana University Press. 1990 Caputo, John D. “The Myth of Questioning”. from the chapter “Heidegger’s Revolution”. from “Demythologizing Heidegger”. 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