SPECIAL ARTICLE
An Imbalanced Ecosystem
Start-ups in India
Yves-Marie Rault, Shawn Mathew
The rapid development of various institutions
supporting company creation in India has the potential
to generate economic growth, innovation, and
economic development. However, this article shows that
the start-up ecosystem has unevenly developed across
cities and economic sectors, and has failed to empower
the overall population, so far. Using a comprehensive
database on start-ups retrieved from Tracxn, a business
data and analytics company, the authors find that
venture capital concentrates amongst graduates
stemming from a handful of prestigious education
institutes in India and abroad. The article analyses the
role of entrepreneurship policies and argues for a shift of
focus and resources towards the building of a more
inclusive start-up ecosystem.
Yves-Marie Rault (yves.marie.rault@gmail.com) is with the University
of Paris, Pantheon-Sorbonne. Shawn Mathew (smathew@iim.ac.in) is a
faculty member at the Indian Institute of Management, Jammu.
Economic & Political Weekly
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NOVEMBER 16, 2019
vol lIV no 45
T
he term “start-up” has now become a vital part of the
lexicon of policymakers globally. It is oft-used along
with the terms like “jobs,” “innovation” and “growth.”
Introduced in the 1970s by the business journalists in the
United States (US), the term initially referred to “innovative
and rapidly emerging” companies in the field of electronics
and communication, created by youngsters in Boston’s Route
128 and the Silicon Valley. However, these start-ups have come
a long way since then. Giants like Google, Apple, Facebook,
Amazon, Microsoft, Netflix, Airbnb, Tesla, and Uber that
dominate the internet today were once started by youngsters
in college or out of their parents’ garages.
These success stories spilled out to India as well, where the
instances of Azim Premji (Wipro) or N R Narayana Murthy
(Infosys)—both of whom emerged from Bengaluru, “India’s
Silicon Plateau,” in the 1980s —inspired many. The example
set by these high-tech companies was steadily emulated by
their counterparts in other metro cities of the country like
Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai and Hyderabad. The phenomenal
rise of Flipkart, Snapdeal, Ola, and Paytm, the famous
Indian “unicorns,” along with a multitude of young companies, has set an example for millions of Indians, who
have been conventionally looking for professional opportunities in one of the most saturated job markets in Asia
(UNDP 2016).
Drawing on the general enthusiasm, local bodies, states,
and the federal government, launched initiatives to facilitate
the creation of start-ups in India. It was epitomised by the
“Startup India” campaign launched in 2016 by the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry, Government of India. The soft and
hard infrastructures were set up post 2000 to assist early-stage
companies and draw on the global “best practices.” In conjunction with the development of private venture capital, the public
efforts towards a better “ease of doing business” shaped the
Indian “start-up ecosystem.”
Since 1999, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) has
been providing data on business creation around the world.
Drawing on this material, several researchers have consistently
shown that high levels of entrepreneurial activity generally have
a positive impact on economic development, though it differs
depending on the local specificities of the region or the state
(Reynolds et al 2000: Audretsch et al 2006; Acs 2006, Acs et al
2014) For instance, business creation between 1999 and 2003
had a limited impact on India’s economic growth as compared
to that of high per capita income countries (Stel et al 2005).
45
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Entrepreneurial regimes based on necessity are less conducive
to growth (Acs 2006).
In the case of India, starting a business remains to a large
extent a social necessity rather than a response to an economic
opportunity, and the recent “startup wave,” too does not stem
from the necessity to gain a livelihood: “the new generation
start-ups are emerging neither as a means of livelihood nor in
response to policy inducements. Rather, they are coming up
largely (…) in response to perceived market opportunities”
(Subrahmanya 2015). This technology/knowledge-driven entrepreneurship is part of a new regime of accumulation whose
effects on the Indian economy have been understudied so far:
“No official attempt to gather data on the number of new generation start-ups and their employment contribution has been
made so far” (Subrahmanya 2015).
However, the research on the socioeconomics of the knowledge-intensive industries and services—popularly called, the
“new economy”—from where the new generation start-ups
derive, has remained scattered in India (Sengupta and Neogi
2009), and the policies aimed at promoting entrepreneurship
and innovation have been based to a large extent on the
empirical evidence from other economies. Barringer et al
(2005) highlighted how a few start-ups actually evolve into
mature firms and raise employment levels, while Wong et al
(2005) infers that the impact on growth depends, to a large
extent, on the type of activity developed by the new company.
The new generation start-ups, knowledge-intensive rather than
labour-intensive, might have a lesser impact on job creation in
India. Moreover, empirical evidence from the impact of new
technology ventures in the US has suggested that in certain
conditions, they can have an adverse effect on employment
levels (Mortensen and Pissarides 1998; Haltiwanger et al 2013).
Given these studies, it is therefore important to question the
role of the start-up ecosystem in fostering economic development
in the Indian context, particularly in terms of “inclusiveness.”
In this article, we focus on the following questions: Who are
the start-up founders? Whom do venture capitalists support?
Which social groups do entrepreneurship policies benefit? One
condition for entrepreneurship, to be conducive to economic
development, is the empowerment of the population as a
whole. Therefore, the problem of access to support structures
for nascent companies deserves to be raised.
We have had first-hand experiences of the Indian start-up ecosystem through semi-directed interviews with company founders
and participant observation in early stage start-up ventures,
mostly in Ahmedabad (Gujarat). For this study, we also draw on
data from Tracxn from 2005 to 2015, one of the most comprehensive databases on Indian start-ups and venture capital. One of the
major objectives of this study is to discuss the public policies,
particularly the “Startup India” action plan, and explain why
its design misses the opportunity to assert the corrective action
of the state in creating conditions for a more inclusive system.
What Is a Start-up?
Strictly speaking, a “start-up” is a newly born company, without
previous history of operations (Carter et al 1996). However,
46
the media, and increasingly the economic literature, tend to
use the term for early-stage ventures with a unique “selling
proposition.” A founder of a pharmaceutical company in
Ahmedabad in 2012 underscores this distinction:
I never considered myself as an entrepreneur. I manage a business, not
a startup. Startup is for technology companies. Actually, I am more
like a trader. It goes the same for many Gujaratis.
The distinction between new businesses and start-ups brings
us back to a recurring debate in economics concerning the
differentiation between a “small business owner” and an
“entrepreneur” (Carland et al 1988). Drawing on the tradition
of Cantillon, Mills, and Schumpeter, several scholars have
established that entrepreneurship could be distinguished from
a small business ownership by a venture strategy oriented
towards innovation, at the core (Gans et al 2002).
However, innovation is not a sufficient condition to become
a “high-growth” firm (Feeser and Willard 1990). The “gazelle”
firms, young companies growing at a rapid pace (Birch 1979),
are not necessarily innovative, but manage to build on a positive
economic environment. Recent studies have however shown
that high employment growth firms, often called “giraffes,”
rather tend to be larger and more mature firms (Audretsch 2013).
Some authors would thus prefer to use “high potential” (Autio
et al 2003) to insist on the uncertainty of the economic activity.
Most start-up practitioners take a different view as compared to most economic literature. We find an instance on the
“innovative” and “risk-taking” aspects in Ries’ (2011) definition of start-ups: “A human institution designed to create a
new product or service under conditions of extreme uncertainty”
One of the most quoted definitions of start-up—focusing on
the “speed of growth”—is, however, given by Graham (2012):
A startup is a company designed to grow fast. Being newly founded
does not in itself make a company a startup. Nor is it necessary for a
startup to work on technology, or take venture funding, or have some
sort of “exit.” The only essential thing is growth. Everything else we
associate with startups follows from growth.
An advisor to a major Indian pharmaceutical multinational
company, in charge of sanctioning start-ups prior to corporate
investment, defines it on similar lines: “My only criterion is
300% growth every month. It means that the company size
triples every month.”
However, as per the Indian government, fast growth is not a
criterion. A start-up is a knowledge/technical based small and
young company:
Startup means an entity, incorporated or registered in India not prior
to five years, with annual turnover not exceeding `25 crore in any
preceding financial year, working towards innovation, development,
deployment or commercialisation of new products, processes or
services driven by technology or intellectual property. (DIPP 2016)
Thus, the common strand of these definitions is the “potential”
that start-ups carry. In this article, we will approach startups
as young organisations with a perceived high potential. In the
absence of an actual definition of the “potential,” whether a
company is a start-up is subjected to individual appreciation.
This definition thus allows for flexibility, since its potential is
assessed differently by venture capitalists, public authorities,
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Figure 1: Start-up Creation in India from 2005 to 2015
9,569
5,353
3,280
2,639
1,729
438
620
728
2005 2006 2007
Source: Tracxn 2016.
1,420
1,081
867
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
and entrepreneurs themselves. A start-up, rather than an
organisation with objective characteristics, is thus a concept
co-constructed by actors of the start-up ecosystem, that is the
market, public authorities, and the start-up founders.
The main source of information on this industry is collected
by Tracxn that itself is a start-up founded in 2013. As per the
Tracxn database, 27,724 start-ups were created in India between
2005 and 2015, with more than one-third of these being established in 2015 alone (Figure 1). The same year also marked
record figure for venture capital investment, with $9 billion
invested across 1,005 deals (YourStory Reserach 2015).
Who Are the Start-up Founders?
The “start-up wave,” as several observers called the rapid
emergence of multiple start-ups, should not make us forget
that India already has had a long and rich entrepreneurial history (Tripathi 2004). Despite Max Weber’s conclusion that Hinduism as a religion does not encourage entrepreneurship, India
has had its share of business communities (Mehta 1991), now
supplemented by social groups without social background in
industry or trade (Damodaran 2008). Historical patterns of
entrepreneurship in India, extensively supported by economic
capital and labour, are now increasingly challenged by entrepreneurs drawing upon technical skills. In the “new economy”
or “post-capitalist society,” as Peter Drucker (1993) would put
it, entrepreneurs are “knowledge workers,” with knowledge as
their main capital. This is visible in the evolution of the startup ecosystem, with 80% of the start-ups being in the field of
information technologies that require a good knowledge of
markets and command of new technical tools.
In a sample of 18,643 individuals who created a start-up from
2005 to 2015, almost all were found to be graduates (see Table 1).
As per their information obtained from Tracxn database, we
observed that 18% of them have obtained their degree from
an Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), the most selective
engineering colleges in Table 1: Academic Affiliation of Start-up
India; 8% from an Indian Founders, 2005 to 2015
Unfunded
Funded
Institute of Management
IIT
3,138 19%
218
9%
(IIM), the most selective
IIM
1,315
8%
232 10%
business schools in India;
Top50
1,019
6%
642 26%
9% from among the top 50 IIT/IIM/top50 554 3% 144 6%
universities in the world Other
10,192 63% 1,190 49%
as ranked by the Shang- Total
16,218 100% 2,426 100%
hai Academic Ranking of Source: Tracxn (2016).
Economic & Political Weekly
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vol lIV no 45
World Universities 2016 (ARWU 2016); and 61% have studied
in other institutes, mostly in India. For them we also find
dominance of selective institutions like the Indian Institute of
Science Bengaluru, or the Indian School of Business Hyderabad.
As for the funding, we observed that graduates from elitist
schools were more likely to get funded with 51% of the founders having accessed venture capital being graduates from the
IITs, IIMs or the top 50 global schools.
It is also helpful to understand how the education institutes
are often where entrepreneurs find partners to co-found their
venture. Among the 50 major Table 2: Curriculum Similarities of
start-ups which have been Co-founders
No of
Share in
co-founded (by a total of 162
Individuals
Total (%)
individuals), 42 of them have School
48
30
been founded by co-founders Company
41
25
who had studied in similar School/company
6
4
67
41
schools or worked in the None
162
100
same companies. According Total
Source:
Tracxn
(2016).
to Table 2, 30% of the 162
founders had studied in the same school as at least one of their
co-founders.
This is the case with the three founders of BookMyShow, an
online ticketing portal for movies and events, who obtained
their MBA in 1997 from Sydhenam College in Mumbai. We also
find that 25% of the founders have worked for the same companies. Sometimes they had already found a company together, as
in the case of BigBasket, an online retail store for grocery
shopping, which was launched by the ex-co-founders of Fabmall, a chain of grocery supermarkets acquired by the Birla
group. More often, start-up founders have worked in managing
positions for multinational companies like the founders of
Delhivery, a start-up providing logistics for Indian e-commerce
companies created in Gurgaon, who were colleagues at Bain &
Company, a major management consulting firm.
Venture capitalists in start-ups: There are also several cases
of start-up entrepreneurs coming from the venture capital
industry. The co-founders of Ezetap, a mobile-based payments
service provider, previously worked for Prime Ventures, a
venture capital and equity investment firm focused on European
high-tech companies. The opposite happens sometimes for
successful entrepreneurs who start investing in other start-ups
like Kunal Bahl, who invested in several ventures including
Tripoto, Tiny Owl, and Olacabs. He started Jasper Infotech in
2007 with a seed amount of $60,000 before co-founding
Snapdeal.com, a major online marketplace in India.
According to data by Table 3: Academic Institutes of
Inc42, an analytics platform Main Angel Investors
No of
Share of
for business-to-business acti- Institutes
Investors
Investors (%)
vities, 27 of the 37 most active
IIT
6
16
angel investors in India are
IIM
3
8
found to be graduates from
Top50
13
35
prestigious institutes in India IIT/IIM/top50
5
14
or abroad (Table 3). These Other institutes
10
27
angel investors often came Total
37
100
from the Silicon Valley Source: Inc42 (2015).
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
Figure 2: Venture Capital and Private Equity Investment in India, 1998–2014
(Million $)
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
Source: India Venture Capital and Private Equity Report, 2015.
2010
2012
2014
towards the end of the 1990s and started investing in Indian IT
companies, mostly located in Bengaluru (Saxenian 1999;
Dossani and Kenney 2002). Even though most of the private
capital gets invested in mature firms, the venture industry
rapidly developed in India, leading to a substantial increase in
risk capital investment in small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) in the past decade.
The mentoring and consulting support venture capitalists
provide has generally not been found to be very significant in
helping a firm grow (Hellman and Puri 2002). Several studies,
however, acknowledged the important role of venture capital
(VC) in the development of young organisations (Davila et al
2003). In exchange for an equity stake, either in the early stages
(seed money) or later (private equity), most start-ups go through
a rigorous “due diligence” process from the “risk-investors”
side. The “due diligence” is the process of investigation of a
venture before the purchase of equities or investment. Even
though the process differs between bankers, venture capitalists
and business angels, the design of selection frameworks
for start-up investment has taken an important role in the
managerial literature, lately (Mason and Stark 2004). As a
consequence, entrepreneurs in the initial stage are expected
to do significant leg work before “pitching” their companies.
But this “objective” selection process is actually shaped
by how investors envision a potentially successful company.
Criteria such as the chief executive officer’s (CEO) public image
matter since it has an impact on the stock value of a company
(Schoar and Zuo 2016). Individuals with a high symbolic capital,
notably through their diplomas, are thus more likely to attract
investors and increase firm valuation, thereby benefiting all
shareholders of the firm. Likewise, since venture capitalist
funds with a good reputation will have a positive impact on
start-up promotion, start-up founders often accept VCs propositions according to VC reputation rather than based on the
potential support they can provide (Hsu 2004). The reputation
of a company often originates in the funding itself, thus
explaining the importance of publicising the deal in the media.
In some cases, the search for high valuation has produced
unsustainable companies like Housing.com. Its aggressive
marketing strategies failed to retain enough new customers. In
May 2015, the resignation letter of the CEO, Rahul Yadav, an IIT
alumni, sent to the company’s board of directors, highlighted
contrasting visions in management and strategies (Mehta 2015).
48
Despite those marginal cases, the requirements for funding
have generally resulted in alignment of the goals of venture
capitalists and entrepreneurs. In view of a rapid exit, venture
capitalists often consider the potential of a firm to “scale up”
rapidly, in India and outside. In the case of Indian start-ups, it
has often resulted in a race for customer acquisition and external
funding without parallel improvements in product or an increase
in the revenue stream. According to several bank analysts,
most Indian start-ups have not yet proven their sustainability
in the long run. In May 2016, an HSBC analyst reported that
a start-up like Zomato should be worth about 50% less
than what it was valued in its September 2015 funding round.
The founder, Deepinder Goyal, responded vigorously in order
to justify his company’s worth, saying that HSBC “doesn’t
understand the space” (Goyal 2016).
Though venture capitalists are often perceived as “pioneers,”
“groundbreakers,” “talent scouts,” “risk-takers,” they, on the
contrary, share common investment practices directed by the
market’s perception of a “high-potential” firm, encouraging
“risk-capital” to concentrate in the hands of individuals with
certain characteristics. Richard Florida, through the study of
urban working populations in the US, calls this group of individuals the “creative class,” who contribute the most to economic
growth in a globalised context. According to his theory, the
“creative class” is composed of people with high degree of
formal education whose work extensively relies on knowledge
and creativity, and who are located in certain urban environments providing the sociocultural conditions for innovation
and entrepreneurship (Florida 2003, 2006).
An Imbalanced Ecosystem
The Martin Prosperity Index used Florida’s “creative index” to
assess the competitiveness of Indian cities and highlighted
that Delhi, Bengaluru, Mumbai, Chennai, and Hyderabad
were major hubs for fostering creativity and entrepreneurship. This concentration of resources in a handful of cities has
been observed since the 1990s with rapid urbanisation, accelerating the agglomeration economies in industrial clusters
and metropolitan regions (Cadène and Holmström 1998). The
theory of the “creative class” has had a large impact on the
practices of policymakers worldwide, with the idea that one
part of the population, highly skilled and creative, had the potential to foster economic growth.
Bengaluru, in particular, is known for a large presence of
multinational IT companies and a growing presence of “young
technocrats” participating in its growth. Since the early 2000s,
the city is a major receiver of foreign direct investments and
has become a hub for venture capitalists. Between 2005 and
2015, 536 start-ups from Bengaluru shared an investment of
$10 billion.
The city-region of Delhi, including Noida and Gurgaon, has
had an even more rapid increase in venture capital investment, with $12.2 billion invested in 544 start-ups between
2005 and 2015. Mumbai comes third in that ranking with less
than half of the funding than Delhi and Bengaluru. The ultraconcentration of venture capital in certain cities is thus very
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visible, with 97% of the total funding done in six cities, and
86% in three cities (Delhi, Bengaluru, Mumbai).
Venture capital tends to Table 4: Citywise Start-up Funding in
concentrate in a few cities India, 2005–15
Cities
Investment
Share in Total
because start-ups are usu($ billion)
Investment (%)
ally highly dependent on Delhi
12.2
39
certain conditions and re- Bengaluru
10.0
32
4.7
15
sources to sustain their Mumbai
Chennai
1.5
5
operations (Romanelli and
Hyderabad
1.2
4
Schoonhoven 2001). The
0.6
2
presence of such conditions Pune
Others (44)
0.9
3
and resources determines
Total
31.3
100
the chances for a firm to Source: Tracxn (2016).
emerge (Gilbert et al 2006),
and eventually have an important impact on their survival and
growth (Folta et al 2006). As a consequence, the few Indian
cities that can provide supporting infrastructures for start-ups
increasingly concentrate finance and entrepreneurs (see Table 4).
As Subrahmanya (2015) rightly points out, the way start-ups
have emerged is entirely new in Indian business history, with
entrepreneurs stemming from various emerging institutions
including “ICT industries, higher education institutions (HEIs),
public sector units (PSUs), research and development laboratories, technology business incubators (TBIs) and accelerators,
return migration of highly qualified and resourceful Indians
(entrepreneurs as well as former employees of MNCs) in the
form of ‘reverse brain drain’.”
These institutions, based out of the main Indian cities, mostly
encourage entrepreneurship in urban areas. The government
agencies, with their continuous support towards entrepreneurial structures, have contributed to this phenomenon of
concentration. This is the case with the technology business
incubators (TBI), hard structures, often attached to a university,
which aim at providing entrepreneurs with resources (consulting, logistics, networks, funds). While India started three pilot
TBIs in the late 1980s, till the end of the 20th century, a rather
limited number of TBI were actually built (Tang et al 2013).
The Technopreneur Promotion Programme (TePP), launched
by the Ministry of Science and Technology in 1998–99, was
the first major initiative to promote technology-based startups, opening 34 outreach centres across the country to promote
“individual innovators” (Subrahmanya 2015). Shortly after,
in 2000, the Department of Science and Technology (DST)
launched the TBI programme, and today 260 incubators are
supported by various government schemes.1 Being recommended,
supported or endorsed by a supported incubator, is a condition
for start-ups to be eligible for government funding support, as
stipulated in the 2016 “Startup India” programme eligibility
conditions (GOI 2016).
Behind the public support to incubators is the idea that the
interactions between the industry, science (university) and the
government—that is the triple-helix approach—are necessary
to structure and support local systems of innovation. One of
the effects of this approach was the increased concentration of
entrepreneurs in certain locations where innovation systems
have been set up. Amongst the 123 incubators recognised by
Economic & Political Weekly
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the Government of India, half of them are located across nine
cities.2 Bengaluru, Delhi, and Mumbai have more than 12
incubators each, amounting to a total of 37 incubators for those
three cities. On the contrary, a city as populated as Lucknow in
Uttar Pradesh (with three million inhabitants), does not have
any supported incubators. Only 17 of the recognised incubators
are “agnostic,” that is, without a focus on a specific sector. Most
incubators have established priority areas for the start-up they
host, with a definite bias towards new technologies. There are
no complete data on the profiles of start-up founders joining
incubators, but since they are often affiliated to top business or
technology schools, we may assume that most of them are
graduates with prestigious degrees, and thus with significant
symbolic and knowledge capital.
The current pattern of incubators’ establishment follows a
clustering strategy aimed at creating externalities between
the different actors of the system. However, those policies are
exclusive by nature and tend to reinforce the concentration of
start-ups with similar founder profiles, in the same sectors of
activity, and/or in the same cities. The Confederation of Indian
Industries’ (CII) Start-up Conclave Panel in 2015 concluded on
similar lines:
The ecosystem today is constrained to a small segment of startups
with its focus on technology and ICT startups. About 80% of investment focuses on technology and of that, 80% is especially focused on
mobile solutions, and most of that goes to enterprises based in cities
like Bangalore and Mumbai. Likewise, for incubation and mentoring,
the majority of support and advice goes to the enterprises within the
technology sector. (CII 2016)
Since the 2000s, the Indian government has acted as a
support to the start-up ecosystem rather than as a reviser of its
inefficiencies. This convergence of government policies with
market practices such as the creation of public venture capital
funds has encouraged the concentration of entrepreneurship
in cities, sectors, and social groups, with the underlying idea
that they are carrying the dynamics of development.
Making an Inclusive Ecosystem
Since IT companies create a few jobs, it is reasonable to wonder
about what those new start-ups bring to society in terms of
improvement of general well-being. With only 21% of mobile
phone users in India using a smartphone with internet access,
the products and services proposed by start-ups particularly
benefited the urban middle classes.3 Furthermore, the Kuznetsian
idea that growth is always accompanied with a decrease in
inequalities has been disproved by several economists, including Piketty (2014), who showed a historical increase of
capital wealth and income inequality in most countries since
the 18th century.
The government should, therefore, put more emphasis on
supporting start-ups with the potential to bring about economic
development rather than the potential for growth, whose social benefit is unknown. In order to benefit every population
stratum, there is a need to build a more inclusive and accessible start-up ecosystem. The intervention of government agencies at various scales can correct the tendencies of private
49
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capital to concentrate. Possible policies include the creation of
specific funds for entrepreneurs in tier-2, tier-3 cities and the
rural areas, accompanied with an active marketing of the
schemes amongst underprivileged populations; the implementation of reservations in the start-up funds created by the government based on household incomes; and the development of
Notes
1
2
3
List of incubators compiled by the MOCI retrieved from http://www.startupindia.gov.in/.
Same as note 1.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/257048/
smartphone-user-penetration-in-india/.
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NOVEMBER 16, 2019
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