India-Bangladesh Border Governance.pdf

Article India–Bangladesh Border Governance: Issues and Challenges International Studies 50(1&2) 109–129 2016 Jawahalal Nehru University SAGE Publications sagepub.in/home.nav DOI: 10.1177/0020881716654387 http://isq.sagepub.com Sanjay K. Bhardwaj1 Abstract All Westphalian states have a right to demarcate and defend their borders in attempt to protect their sovereignty and territoriality. However, there is a significant variation in border control priorities. Military defence and economic regulations have traditionally been central border concerns, but due to the problems of trans-national migration, infiltration, terrorism and insurgencies, many of the states are re-tooling and reconfiguring their border regulatory apparatus. The complex nature of the India–Bangladesh border and its regulation/management has always been vital for both states. Nevertheless, the new definitions of security, emphasizing human security, combined with the forces of globalization have led to restructuring of the traditional notion of border management in the recent past. In delivery, the policies of promoting border trade, market, joint ventures and business-related infrastructure have become the priorities of the governments which will improve the Human Development Index and employability among the borderland people. Linkages between internal security and the regional security environment have made the border vital for the national security strategy. However, this has vitiated the environment and impeded the emergence of cordial and development-oriented India–Bangladesh relations. Keywords Border Management, India, Bangladesh, National Security, Migration, Trafficking, Border Fencing, Agreement Introduction In order to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, India, like all other states, aspires to have proper demarcation and protection of its borders.1 Due to its Professor, South Asian Studies, School of International Studies, and Director Energy Study Programme, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. 1 Corresponding author: Sanjay K. Bhardwaj, Professor, South Asian Studies, School of International Studies, and Director Energy Study Programme, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi 110067, India. E-mail: drsbhardwaj@gmail.com 110 International Studies 50(1&2) central geographic location in the region, the country shares its borders with most of the states of South Asia. The ‘hot’ to ‘tepid’ border faces severe security threats. Incessant illegal migration sometimes related violent conflicts; human, drugs and arms trafficking; cross border movement of undesirables termed by Peter Andreas (2003) as ‘clandestine transnational actors’ (CTAs);2 and economic offenders including the Indian fake currency (IFC) swindlers are considered among the most frightening security threats. Thus, border management has become one of the most serious challenges in South Asia. The policing objective of a state is to deny territorial access to undesirable CTAs. In execution, the role of state has remained profoundly cohesive while the causes of human insecurity and development driven borderland policies remain unaddressed. India and Bangladesh have very close socio-cultural, linguistic and racial affinities which evolve from a common historical legacy and geographical proximity. India shares its longest land border (more than 4000 km) with Bangladesh, which is porous in nature. The partition of British India in 1947 divided the eastern territory between India and erstwhile East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) without considering the ground realities and people’s socio-economic needs.3 On this ruthlessly demarcated land boundary, the poor people, mostly from Bangladesh are hitherto bound to cross the border in search of socio-economic security and become victims of policing practices of border security agencies. Resultantly, the cross-border skirmishes and killings between or by the border security agencies have become regular phenomena. All these have not only spoiled the domestic environment but have also developed a deep mistrust among the neighbours. Nevertheless, the demand of self-determination by the separatists and insurgent groups with the support of external actors has made the question of border security even more complex. In fact, the state today straddles the two ends of the security spectrum: one underlines the military dimension while the other urges human security with almost no or limited use of military force. With the forces of globalization and liberalization, the post-Cold War era has emphasized upon a newly emerged definition of security, that is, human security. The Human Development Report 1994 (UNDP, 1994, pp. 22–44) stresses that security will be equated with the ‘security of individuals, not just security of territory’ (Haq, 1995). Further, UNDP has urged that the concept of security must be emphasized in two ways: from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security; and from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development. Hence, human security pertains to the safety and well-being of ‘all the people everywhere’ (Haq, 1995). Focusing upon two major components; ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’, the Canadian and Japanese (Axworthy, 1997; Ryokichi, 2000) relate human security to the protection of the individual’s personal safety and freedom from direct and indirect forms of threat. The promotion of human development and good governance, and, when necessary, the collective use of sanctions and force, are central to achieving human security. Bhardwaj 111 Nevertheless, natural disasters like tsunamis, earthquakes and hurricanes have shown that security in its ultimate analysis is a human condition which remains vulnerable to powers beyond military solutions. In the realist view, traditional security threats to states have dramatically decreased and the states are frequently confronted with intra-state conflicts, terrorism, arms, drugs and human trafficking, and natural disasters. Persistent threats to the safety and security of the people have widely been considered important in border management tactics of the South Asian states. Alongside this diminution in the importance of borders as physical barriers (or mental boundaries) is the awareness that ‘hard’ borders still exist at the edges of nation-state territories. In this interregnum, the inter-state relations are marked by a kind of turbulence on account of several trans-national non-traditional security threats and ethno-cultural conflicts. This conception can be best examined in the context of managing the India–Bangladesh Border (IBB) where the human security situation is at its worst. A common question is: for whom is this border policing done? Is it against those innocent civilians whose survival depends across the border and who cannot live without the open border or for those CTAs who are involved in illegal and violent activities throughout the region? The colonial demarcation of a border has become a curse for the local people and a blessing in disguise for the transgressors. IBB management is often taken with a sense of mistrust and suspicion. Thus, this article analyzes the concept and nature of a border, border management techniques and priorities in the state policies with reference to human well-being and borderland security. Border: Concept and Evolution Borders between states are institutions and processes (Sahoo, 2009). As institutions, they are established by political decisions and regulated by legal texts. Paasi (1998) writes that boundaries are institutional constructs that are used to delimit the territorial possession of a sovereign state. At the core of such constructs, as Brunet-Jailly (2005) pointed out, are international agreements established by mutual understandings between states. These create complex, interlocked networks of government policies and functions that interact to form international boundaries delineating sovereign spaces. The modern concept of borders and boundaries emerged with the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 which marked the beginning of the era of the nation-state. In the traditional sense, borders are considered as a line separating two sovereign territories. Therefore, the power in the modernist conception flows uniformly up to the territorial limit of its operation at the border, the crossing of which is considered a violation of sovereignty (Browning & Joenniemi, 2004). However, the Treaty of Versailles (1919) had reviewed the borders at the end of the First World War. With the advent of the mapping technology borders became a real issue of the state (Brunet-Jailly, 2005). The mapping of modern borders symbolized a collective 112 International Studies 50(1&2) attempt by state elites to establish a worldwide system of clear-cut territorial jurisdictions and to have their legal and political sovereignty confirmed cartographically. The mapping of borders tended to proceed in three stages: establishment, demarcation and control of the border. Because of this, the conflicting territorial claims by neighbouring states could no longer be ignored but had to be tackled by means of negotiation, confrontation or arbitration (Baud & Van Schendel, 1997). Three words in common use, namely, ‘frontier’, ‘boundary’ and ‘border’, are technically different although often used interchangeably (Power & Standen, 1999). A fourth, now archaic, term is ‘march’, which is applied to the outer limits. ‘Frontier’ is the word with the widest meaning, although its original meaning was military—the zone in which one faced the enemy. In contemporary usage, it means the precise line at which jurisdictions meet, usually demarcated and controlled by customs, police and military personnel. Historically, border has been an all-embracing term and is now being accepted as a synonym of frontier. This article has used the term more specifically in the sense of borderline, border zone or borderland. However, to be precise, the term boundary, border, frontier and borderlands mean many things to many people. Anderson and O’dowd (1999) defined borders as ‘linear dividing lines in a particular space meant to mark the division between political and administrative unit and the frontier as a border region’. In fact, ‘frontier’, in recent times, is used to refer to borderlands that bisect the border between the two nations and the adjustment territory to the border area. Therefore, the borderland is a broader concept, including a border, boundary and borderline or frontier. However, borders are key apparatus of the nation-state, particularly in relation to management and regulation of the population. The control exercised by the state is more intense at its borders, even though these might be geographically remote from the administrative centre and at the margins of its territorial authority (Rumford, 2006). Unlike the above two terms, ‘boundary’ has a fairly well accepted meaning. It is a line without width, often having endured the process of demarcation and thus the equivalent of the ‘frontier line’. If its status has to be indicated, one may qualify it as either a ‘demarcated’ or ‘un-demarcated’ boundary (Sharma, 1989). A boundary represents the line of physical contact between states and affords opportunities for cooperation and discord. Boundaries are the frameworks of the nation (Adami, 1927). A frontier on the other hand signifies a zone or region having width as well as length, whereas a border denotes a line (Kristof, 1959). As Balibar (1998) views it, borders are both multiplied and reduced in their localization and function; they are being thinned out and doubled. The quantitative relation between ‘border’ and ‘territory’ is being inverted. In relation to theorizing borders, the idea of the borderland is an important one because it signals the spatiality of borders themselves; no longer simply lines on a map or a physical frontier between nation-states, borders have their own space and have become zones of exchange, connectivity and security (Rumford, 2006). Borders are important to the state to protect their identity, but they are frequently encountered as non-boundaries, and so for many people they are much easier to Bhardwaj 113 cross. Borders are a complex part of the state and intimately related to the nature of their physical and human environment and the state, markets and culture provide important explanatory lenses to understand them. Brunet-Jailly (2005) argues that borderland regions can be understood from the four different analytical perspectives which, according to him, can be seen from (a) market forces and trade flows; (b) policy activities of multiple levels of governments on adjacent borders; (c) the particular political clout of borderland communities; and (d) the specific culture of borderland communities. In the operational aspect, Peter Andreas (2003) has considered borders in three categories: military, economic and police borders. This categorization is a realist view of borders and territorial security and thus is fundamentally about inter-state relations. As a process, any changes in the nature of borders may be explained in terms of different historical phases in the shaping of states and territoriality, the internal relations of states and societies and their external interrelationships in the wider system of states. For example, state borders were relatively ‘open’ in the era of imperialism before World War I; they were relatively ‘closed’ with the growth of ‘national’ economic ‘self-sufficiency’ and a closer identification of the state with capital, particularly in the inter-war period. Subsequently there was a progressive ‘(re)opening’ of borders, and this has become especially marked by the growth of transnationalism or intensified globalization from the 1970s (Anderson, 2001). Therefore, borders are the signifier by which it is possible to differentiate the self from the other, and identify when core values attributed to the self are violated, thus causing conflict (Hoseason, 2010). However, in the last few decades boundaries have become increasingly irrelevant with the advent of state-of-the-art weapon technology (inter-continental ballistic missiles [ICBMs], etc.) and communications revolution (information and communication technology [ICT]) premised on satellite and computer technologies. Thereby, the concept of border security has also undergone a sea change. The relevance of military and economic borders have significantly declined but with the growing vulnerability and trans-national illegal activities of CTAs, not only on land borders but also across the coastline and air space, the policing border has expanded considerably. The CTAs are as dramatically varied as their motives. They may be driven by high profits, market demand and the desire to carry out politically or religiously inspired acts of violence. They may be highly organized or disorganized and operate regionally or globally (Andreas, 2003). What has changed over time are the organization of CTAs and their methods and speed of cross-border movement. With manoeuvrability and scope for strategic alliances with like-minded groups, they are able to execute surprise terrorist strikes. Nevertheless, the unique nature of a border and its socio-economic and cultural complexities do not coincide with Andreas’s operational aspects of border in the case of the India–Bangladesh Border (IBB). First, given the asymmetry in the size of military of these two countries, India does not face any direct military threats from Bangladesh. Second, since the partition of India in 1947, the compressed geo-economic dependencies have constantly challenged the economic border 114 International Studies 50(1&2) between the two countries. The size of illegal trade is double the official trade. Third, the problem of illegal migration, insurgency, terrorism and trafficking correlates with underdevelopment. Thus, police border may ensure freedom from fear, but a sustainable peace could only be achieved through ensuring freedom from want. In the context of IBB, Van Schendel (2005) argues that a focus on the culture of local borderland communities would help in arriving at a better understanding of how these communities may either enhance the impact of dividing territory and communities when their culture, that is, their language, ethnicity, socio-economic status and place of belonging differs, or bridges an international boundary when they share the same culture. Hence, the complex socio-cultural nature of IBB demands ‘humanistic border’ rather nationalistic borders. India–Bangladesh Border: Origin Pre-independence India consisted of small princely states which took care of violations on their respective borders till the British established the ‘buffer system’. After independence, India, like any other country, has been adequately conscious about its borders and has reacted and defended its boundary and territory, politically and militarily. It has also signed peace and friendship treaties or boundary agreements with Bhutan (1949), Nepal (1950), Myanmar (1967) and Bangladesh (1974 and 2015). Initially, Bengal was politically stable under the total control of the East India Company and later put under different administrations of Governor, GovernorGeneral and Viceroy. Considering administrative and economic difficulties, the Secretary of State’s acceptance of the necessity of a territorial re-organization in Bengal (communicated in Lord St. John Brodrick’s dispatch of 9 June 1905 (Bourdillon, 1905, p. 112)), initiated the final phase of creating a new administration out of Assam and the eastern Bengal districts. The step had been taken, and as of 16 October 1905, the Government of India’s prestige and the responsibility for executing its policy rested with the impetuous policy (Fuller, 1905). The provinces of Bengal and Assam were divided by the then Viceroy, Lord Curzon, into two provinces: (a) Eastern Bengal and Assam with Dacca as its capital; and (b) Western Bengal with Calcutta as its capital4 (Ambedkar, 1947). The measure stirred so much public opposition that it had to be annulled in 1911 in order to keep imperial control undiminished. However, this end was a central piece in the border play of imperial strategy (Eustis & Zaidi, 1964). Within 36 years from the annulment of the first partition of Bengal, in 1947 the province was again divided into two halves along the same geographical lines mainly on communal considerations. In the process of partition, until October 1947, Lord Mountbatten, the then Governor General had a clear-cut directive from the British government to explore the options of ‘unity and division’; hence Mountbatten’s formula was ‘to divide India but retain maximum unity’ (Chandra, 1989). The legal framework and Bhardwaj 115 guidelines relating to the partition of Bengal, announced by then Prime Minister Attlee in the British Parliament on 3 June 1947, were: A Boundary Commission will be set up by the Governor-General, the membership and terms of reference of which will be settled in consultation of those concerned. It will be instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. (Banerjee, 1948; Government of India, 1949–1950) The body responsible for delineating the boundaries came to be popularly known as the ‘Radcliffe Boundary Commission’. According to the report of the ‘Radcliffe Award’ (Das, 1982), the boundary line which was drawn along East and West Bengal was clear.5 There were some pressures and counter-pressures that Radcliffe had to weigh against each other. He had to appear even-handed to all sides, while keeping in mind the imperatives of the British policy for the future of the sub-continent (Government of India, 1949–1950). Inevitably, his award pleased no one entirely, but there is little doubt that it displeased some less than others. Immediately after Partition, border disputes arose between India and erstwhile East Pakistan regarding certain territorial claims. Some of the disputes were resolved by the Bagge Awards of 1950, the Nehru–Noon Agreement of 1958, and the Swaran Singh–Ahemmad Sheikh Agreement of 1959. After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) of 1974 between Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman also tried its best to resolve the border problems. However, following a protocol on Land Boundary Agreement, 2011, the disputes are finally resolved by the exchange of instrument of ratification on Land Boundary Agreement, 2015 between the Narendra Modi government and the Sheikh Hasina government. Nature of India–Bangladesh Border and Emerging Issues IBB is the longest land border that India shares with any of its neighbours. It covers a length of 4096.7 km abutting six out of seven Bangladeshi divisions (Chittagong, Dhaka, Khulna, Rajshahi, Rangpur and Sylhet) and five Indian states, namely, West Bengal (2216.7 km), Tripura (856 km), Meghalaya (443 km), Mizoram (318 km) and Assam (262 km) (MHA, 2015). The border includes plains, mountain ranges, rivers, wetlands, jungle terrain, agricultural lands, national parks, sanctuaries, reserve forests, large estuaries, char lands, and enclaves with a remarkable biological and climate diversity. The boundary cuts through rivers, mountains, char lands, agricultural lands and public institutions on border areas. This unique intermix of habitation residing close to and on the boundary itself leaves the border areas heavily populated with a density of 116 International Studies 50(1&2) 1028 per sq. km in West Bengal and 1215 per sq. km in Bangladesh (Census Report, 2011). Similarly, the people of both the countries work in close proximity and the boundary passes through the middle of the villages and even through houses, which are scattered almost along the entire stretch of the border. They use the land for cultivation till the last inch, which leads to removal of permanent boundary pillars, damages the fencing, creates patrolling problems and facilitates violent non-state actors and smugglers to cross the border for their activities. The boundary (with erstwhile East Pakistan) was determined by the Radcliffe Award of 1947. Three major land boundary disputes arose out of provisions of the award; un-demarcated land boundary of approximately 6.5 km in three sectors; exchange of enclaves; and adverse possession of land. The LBA was signed on 16 May 1974 to solve the problems of border demarcation. Bangladesh ratified the agreement, but India did not because it involved ceding territory and indicating those areas on the ground. After a long statutory and diplomatic battle, the protocol on the LBA of 2011 included four articles concerning aspects of border demarcation and exchange of enclaves. The first article of the agreement stated that the provisions of the protocol formed an integral part of the 1974 agreement. The second article of the protocol dealt with the major disputed areas between India and Bangladesh and the exchange of enclaves. Article 2 clause (II) proposes the exchange of the enclaves. There are 111 Indian enclaves (17,258.24 acres) on the Bangladesh side and 51 enclaves of Bangladesh (7083.72 acres) on the Indian side. The agreement holds that the exchange of enclaves should be transferred as per the jointly verified cadastral enclave map signed in April 1997. These should be exchanged without claiming compensation for the additional areas going to Bangladesh. The inhabitants of enclaves did not enjoy full legal rights as citizens of either country, or facilities like electricity, schools and healthcare. Law and order agencies do not have proper access to these areas. A joint headcount estimated the population in the enclaves to be around 51,549 (37,334 in the Indian enclaves within Bangladesh). After the approval from the Indian Parliament, the government of India sought to resolve border disputes as well as the exchange of enclaves. In the exchange of the Instrument of Ratification between India and Bangladesh, both the governments agreed that Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and Bangladeshi enclaves in India exchanged pursuant to the 1974 agreement and 2011 protocol would stand transferred to the other with effect from the midnight of 31 July 2015. However, prior to this appointed day, both the governments have completed all the formalities of exchange of people and their citizenship rights (MOFA, 2015). In July 2001, after breaking the existing deadlock since 1974, the West Bengal government agreed to grant access to Bangladeshis between the two enclaves of Dahagram and Angorpota through the Tin Bigha Corridor under the Lease Agreements of 1982 and 1992. In the 4th Joint Boundary Working Group (JBWG)6 meeting, both sides expressed satisfaction at the recent electrification of Dahagram and Angarpota. Both the countries also implemented 24-hour unfettered access Bhardwaj 117 through the Tin Bigha Corridor, and placed all necessary arrangements, including infrastructure and security, expeditiously. Notably, Dahagram–Angarpota is one large Bangladeshi enclave that has not changed hands in the swap between India and Bangladesh by protocol on LBA 2011. The enclave exchange treaty of 2015 has brought Tin Bigha and the Dahagram–Angarpota enclave into focus once again, with a section of the Indian population in Mekhliganj sub-division of Cooch Behar, particularly in Kuchlibari, demanding its transfer to India. Several organizations have threatened a movement and already bandhs have been observed, processions taken out and petitions filed to the chief minister, the prime minister and the Ministry of External Affairs (Nagchoudhury, 2015). Article 3 of the protocol is about redrawing the boundary in the adverse possession areas in different Indian states: West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura. In fact, the Indian ‘adverse possession’ refers to territory within Indian control, but which is legally part of Bangladesh. Residents of these adverse possessions are Indian citizens. The same applies to Bangladeshi adverse possessions. India is to receive 2777.038 acres in respect of adverse possessions, and transfer 2267.682 acres to Bangladesh (MEA, 2011). The reality, though is that the area is already in Bangladesh’s possession and its handing over is merely a procedural acceptance of the de facto situation. For the legal transfer of land, India and Bangladesh have exchanged 1114 maps. As per the exchange of Instrument of Ratification, the ground demarcation of the boundary as per the interim strip maps will be completed by the respective survey departments of the two governments by 30 June 2016 (MOFA, 2015). Most notably, the two governments have agreed to resolve (MOFA, 2015) the issue of un-demarcated 6.5 km boundaries which spreads into three sectors. First, in the Assam sector (2.5 km of Lathitila/Dhumabari area, approximately 135 acres of land), India and Bangladesh insisted on applying different maps and data as the basis for demarcation. However, the protocol (MEA, 2011) concludes that the line drawn by Radcliffe from Boundary Pillar 1397 (point Y), that is, the last demarcated boundary pillar position, straight southward to the tri-junction of Mouzas Dumabari, Lathitilla and Bara Putnigaon, that is, up to iron bridge, and thence it shall run generally southwards along the midstream of the course of Putni Chara as already demarcated on the ground, till it meets the boundary between Sylhet (Bangladesh) and Tripura (India), that is, Boundary Pillar No. 1800. The villagers of these above area had been paying taxes to the Assam government regularly. Second, in the West Bengal sector (1.5 km of Berubari Sector at Mouza Daikhata–56 Khudipara–Singhpara, around 56 acres of land), both sides agreed on using the Sui River as the demarcation. According to the protocol (2011), the boundary in this segment shall be drawn as a fixed boundary from existing boundary pillar 774/32-S in the strip sheet 444/6 along the Mouzas boundary of Daikhata-56 as surveyed in 1997-98 and thereafter will follow the southern boundary of Daikhata-56 (from east to west) up to Point No 18, and there from it will follow the western boundary of Daikhata-56 (from south to north) till it meets 118 International Studies 50(1&2) the centre of River Sui at Point No. 15 and thereafter, will run along the centre of the River Sui up to Point No. 1, the points as depicted in the sketch map jointly prepared and mutually agreed on 3 August 2011. Thereafter the International Boundary shall follow the already delineated boundary through Main Pillar (MP) 775 (MEA, 2011). Third, the Muhuri River of the Belonia Sector is part of Tripura Naokhali/ Commilla sector. In this 2.5 km boundary, due to changes in the course and the formation of Shashaner Char (46 acres in Indian Territory); Bangladesh is unwilling to apply the present river course as the boundary line (MEA, 2002a, 2002b). However, the present agreement stated that the boundary in this segment shall be drawn westwards from the existing Boundary Pillar No. 2159/48-S along the agreed line, as depicted in the index map prepared jointly, till it meets the southern limit of the Burning Ghat as shown in jointly surveyed map of Muhuri river area in 1977–1978 (Chatterjee, 2012). Thereafter, it shall follow the external limit of the Burning Ghat in the south-west direction and then turn northwards along the external limit of the Burning Ghat till it meets the centre of the existing Muhuri River. Thereafter it shall run along the mid-stream of the existing Muhuri River up to Boundary Pillar No. 2159/3-S. This boundary shall be the fixed boundary (MEA, 2011). The ground demarcation of the boundary based on these interim strip maps will be completed by 30 June 2016 (MOFA, 2015). The flows of 54 cross-border rivers constitute the approximately 1000 km long riverine borders (Jamwal, 2004). When the velocity drops, sedimentation rate increases, and the rivers change their course, braiding into multiple channels. The shifting river roots, soil erosion or frequent floods pose problems for the demarcation of borders, fixing pillars—especially when they form numerous islands and chars—leading to a host of disputes. This generates difficulties in establishing ownership of the newly created territories, for example, in the 1980s controversies surrounding sovereignty over New Moore Island (South Talpatty) dominated India–Bangladesh relations (MEA, 1992). Socio-cultural and Economic Complexities The condition on the border has become rather difficult due to an increase in the density of the population. The main reasons of the increase of the population in border areas are (a) the overall increase in the population of the country; and (b) the influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh who mostly settled in the border areas. Poor governance, economic disparities, poverty, unemployment, religious intolerance (Barkat, Zaman, Rahman & Poddar, 1997) and frequent political instability and violence in Bangladesh are the major causes of illegal movement and activities across the border. These factors compel the people to move in search of work and food security towards India. However, the people living in low-lying areas along the rivers often move up towards the mainland during floods and these internally displaced populations are also often termed as ‘illegal migrants’. It is Bhardwaj 119 important to note that not only Bangladeshis, but Indians are also crossing the border for one reason or the other. The production of goods, mostly perishable in nature does not find any market on the Indian side of the border. The poor transport and communication facilities on the Indian side force Indian producers to sell their produce in Bangladeshi markets. As in the case of the Meghalaya border, the boundary lies on the foothills towards Bangladesh, while the plains are in India where the vegetables are produced to be consumed by both sides. This did not initially matter to the people as the borders were virtually porous and people could visit each other freely. The intermingling ethnic groups continued to enter into marriage alliances and subsequently nurtured relations to the extent of settling down, particularly in Assam. Even though many of the land and railways linkages were discontinued after the India–Pakistan war of 1965, efforts continued to access the borders. Gradually, due to legal vigilance and tightening of control on the borders, particularly after 9/11, such practices have become quite difficult. The policing of border has been expanded to include mitigating the emerging threats and illegal activities of violent non-state actors and the volume of border killings have become a concern for people living around the border areas. Many of the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) personnel are also recruited from the non-bordering states of India who are unfamiliar with the complexities, realities and uniqueness of the IBB. In the last decade, more than 900 people were indiscriminately killed by the BSF (Human Rights Watch, 2010). These figures have increased due to the increasing regional security threats. The transnational terrorism and insurgency movements have compelled the states to take such cohesive measures to tackle the problem and in this exercise, innocent civilians and local villagers across the border are also becoming victims. The Indian state is compelled to expand policing of the IBB. Security Issues In recent years, all South Asian states are witnessing intertwined ideological, ethnic, communal and political conflicts. The worst part is that the increasing transnational coordination of the terrorists, insurgents and radical groups has added a critical dimension to counter terrorism. These linkages across the border support, encourage, train, arm and often direct terrorists and insurgent groups for their own motives (Sahni, 2002). Consequently, proxy wars have thrown a number of challenges before the border security agencies. Transgressions along the border were, in the past, often localized in nature and had no major security implications. Now, the pattern of border crimes has changed. The intricate relationship between narcotics smuggling, small arms proliferation and terrorist activities have far-reaching implications for internal security.7 The terrorist attacks on an Indian Army camp in Manipur is an example of trans-boundary criminal nexus. Fanatic religious ideologies help foster polarizing values in terms of right and wrong, good and evil, which has been co-opted by terrorist organizations to 120 International Studies 50(1&2) convert a ‘seeker’ into a lethal killer. The politicians have also aided terrorism to divert the problems of mass poverty and unemployment. The Islamist militant groups such as Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (close links with the Afghan Taliban), Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami Bangladesh (close links with Al-Qaeda), Hizbut Tohid in Bangladesh have consolidated and expanded their institutional transnational networks in the past decades (BIPSS, 2010). Bangladesh and Myanmar’s territories have been used by the insurgent groups of the northeast like the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam, who started getting training in the bases of Bangladesh and Myanmar in 1992. During the Director General-level talks between the BSF and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) held in New Delhi in 2002, the BSF had handed over a list of 99 training camps of northeast insurgent groups to the BDR (MEA, 2002a). Tools and Techniques of Border Management: Humanistic or Nationalistic Historically, there have been significant variations in border control priorities. Although military defence and economic regulation have traditionally been central border concerns, many of the states are retooling and reconfiguring their border regulatory mechanisms to prioritize human well-being. In the beginning of the 1970s itself, the Club of Rome group produced a series on the ‘world problematique’ premised on the idea that there is ‘a complex of problems troubling men of all nations’ (Bajpai, 2000). The Copenhagen school (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998) underlines the umbilical links between the ‘state-security’ and ‘societalsecurity’. Following the same argument, Thakur (2000) remarked that ‘to insist on national security at the expense of human security would be to trivialize “security” in many real-world circumstances to the point of sterility, bereft of any practical thinking’. In this debate, many areas of human well-being have been raised and remained unaddressed. Viewing the rapidly changing meanings of internal as well external security, it is apparent that border management is not simply a matter of policing along the border; it is an issue that needs comprehensive and holistic treatment. Indeed, it is being increasingly realized now that border management must broadly include a whole package (Singh, 2002) which involves defending the border in times of war; securing the border in times of peace; ensuring absence of unauthorized movements of humans; taking steps against smuggling of all contraband items; use of sophisticated gadgets to supplement human efforts; coordination of intelligence inputs from various agencies; and above all, ensuring socio-economic development of the border areas. The report of the Group of Ministers on National Security also accepts such a broad view of border management: ‘The term border management must be interpreted in its widest sense and should imply coordination and concerted action by political leadership and administrative, diplomatic, Bhardwaj 121 security, intelligence, legal, regulatory and economic agencies of the country’ (MHA, 2001). In reality, the historical socio-economic flows have been discontinued on the question of state security, which factored the problem of poverty and unemployment among the IBB area people. The conjunction of these factors have increased the involvement of local people in the crimes with the nexus of violent non-state actors. Throughout the history of India–Bangladesh relations, the states have constructed walls and fortifications in their respective frontiers to meet the problem of military threats, illegal trades, migration, insurgency, trafficking and smuggling. Successive governments have remained tied up with a narrow conception of border management, which envisages not more than the establishment of static border posts, regular patrols, ambushes and so on. In this backdrop, the Ministries of Home Affairs and Defence are trying hard to ensure internal security from external aggressions. Guarding borders in such close proximity of human population creates a difficult situation for the border protecting forces. There are at present 802 Border Outposts (BOPs) along the IBB. In order to reduce the inter-BOP distance to 3.5 km, a proposal for the construction of an additional 383 BOPs, at an estimated cost of `1,832.50 crores, was approved by the Indian government in 2009. The project was expected to be completed by 2013–2014 (MHA, 2015). However, the work has spilled over due to constraints like public protests, delay in land acquisition and statutory clearances, etc. The IBB is marked by a high degree of porosity and controlling illegal crossborder activities and illegal migration from Bangladesh into India have been considered major challenges. In order to prevent illegal migration and illegal activities, including anti-national activities from across the border, the Government of India had sanctioned the construction of border fencing with floodlights in two phases. The total length of IBB sanctioned for fencing is 3326.14 km, out of which about 2828 km of fencing had been completed by the end of 2014. There have been some problems in the construction of fencing in certain stretches on this border due to riverine/low-lying areas, habitations within 150 yards of the border, pending land acquisition cases and protests by the border population, which has led to a delay in the completion of the project (MHA, 2015). The entire stretch of IBB consists of plains, riverine belts, hills and jungles. The area is heavily populated and is cultivated right up to the border. Ignoring this reality, the government has further accorded top-most priority to the work of erection of fencing on the IBB. Substantial parts of the fence constructed under Phase-I in the states of West Bengal, Assam and Meghalaya have been damaged due to adverse demographic and climatic conditions and submergence. Accordingly, the Government of India has sanctioned a project (Phase-III) for the erection of 861 km fence in order to replace the entire fence constructed under Phase-I at an estimated cost of Rs. 884 crores. So far, 790 km of fencing has been replaced and the remaining work of replacement of fence along a length of 71 km is held up due to litigation, public protests, etc. However, in the process of overcoming these problems, India has reconsidered its border management policy. 122 International Studies 50(1&2) The conclusion of the Land Boundary Agreement in 2015 is the best step in this direction. Knowing the overall situation across the border, and to ensure an effective, stable and humanistic border, India and Bangladesh must adopt an integrated, comprehensive and constructive policy approach. With a view of ameliorating the miseries of the people of the Indian side of the border, the Indian government has initiated an integrated scheme under the Border Area Development Programme (BADP), which is focusing mainly on social and economic development of the border areas. Capacity-building, skill-development and employment-generation in the border areas are amongst some of the focus areas of the programme. The BADP became functional in the Seventh Plan period with the twin objectives of balanced development of border areas through adequate provision of infrastructure facilities and promotion of a sense of security amongst the local population (Department of Border Management, 2014). In order to reduce the problem of migration and ensuring human security on either side of the border, a collaborative India–Bangladesh approach should be adopted either under the on-going BADP or some separate initiatives. This will also break the nexus between the transgressors and local people. The following policy initiatives could be considered in order to develop a comprehensive border area management policy: 1. Migration and national security have become intertwined in this age of globalization. The state must consider them in an integrated manner in order to understand the implications of human flows, to maximize their benefits and to respond to the challenges. Granting special work permits in some cases can be an effective mechanism to control the migration-related conflict in India. It can also range from creating ‘no man’s land’, awareness programmes among the border-area inhabitants and allocating unique identification (UID) to the population of the border regions as quickly as possible. However, instead of devising futuristic policies, more time and energy is invested on the controversy of illegal migrants who have already arrived and living in India for some time. Most of the debates and incidents of protests are on the issue of driving away of the foreigners rather than on stopping or limiting the fresh influx. Detection, deletion and deportation is virtually impossible. First, there is no easy mechanism of identification and second, the Bangladesh government still declines to take back any socalled deported Bangladeshis. Again, such an attitude towards the migrants would result in their alienation rather than integration. Indian governments, both union and state, must look beyond their narrow political gains and ambitions while handling the issue of illegal migration: violent non-state actors are taking advantage of the issue which is morphing into local politics. The incident of Burdwan is indicates the concocting of trouble in the affected areas and the dilemma of the federal polity. 2. Prior to partition, people were dependent on common markets and livelihood, which continued illegally subsequently as well. Availability of a Bhardwaj 123 large markets and rail links near the border makes it easy and attractive for smugglers to indulge in informal trade. It is carried out mostly by way of head loads, bicycles, rickshaws, vans and boats. The amount of illegal trade is more than double the legal trade; reasons range from evasion of tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTB) to differences in the rates and high demand. Informal trade with low risk and high profit is more appreciated than formal trade because of complexities of the economic border (Basu & Dutta, 2007). The IBB has a higher potential for beneficial trade than any other border of India (Rahman, 2000). Therefore, both the governments must take immediate measures for the removal of all tariff and NTB to ensure legal trade. 3. When the whole world is getting closely integrated, India and Bangladesh should also reduce their distance. Both the countries have recently agreed to organize border haats on a pilot basis at few selected areas, like Sunamganj bordering Meghalaya and Kurigram. They have identified 13 items for trading at the border haats since February 2011. Liberalizing immigration and the visa policy, facilitating trade and investments are also significant measures to minimize the illegal trade and migration across the border. This will support the economic regulatory border over the IBB. 4. ‘Joint Indo-Bangladesh Guidelines 1975’ (Jamwal, 2004) were framed for the border-guarding forces of both the countries. The aim of these guidelines was to ensure cooperation between both the border-guarding forces to exchange the information and intelligence at appropriate levels. In reality, these guidelines provided neither side should have development work of any nature including road, bridges and fencings within 150 yards on either side of the international border. However, in deviation from the agreement, as reported in The Daily Star on 18 October 2010, both the countries reached an understanding whereby India will be in a position to construct on 12 points and Bangladesh 11 points within 150 yards of the zero line, which includes a bridge in Laxmipur, expansion of a wall in Hili, construction of approach roads in Moulvibazar and Bhorma, etc. India is still seeking to undertake such initiatives and other development works at 46 points. Similar mutual initiatives can create a conducive environment to remove the fear psychosis among the people of the border areas. 5. Holding meetings of the JBWG on a regular basis will also ease the borders between the two countries. Many JBWG meetings were held as a positive gesture where all outstanding issues pertaining to the land boundary were discussed, with a view to arrive at a comprehensive solution. In a recent visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, both the sides agreed on sharing of information, joint patrolling to check terrorism, smuggling and trafficking of women and children and not to open fire on innocent people. They have also agreed to take up programmes to develop awareness among the people living along bordering areas to obey rules. Such bilateral mechanisms for the exchange of information on border areas, implementation of a Single 124 International Studies 50(1&2) Information System with databases, intelligence gathering, joint training and certification of personnel directly involved in border control activities would make a stable and peaceful border (Joint Declaration, 2015). 6. In a comprehensive and integrated developmental policy perspective, India and Bangladesh have signed a deal of US$ 1 billion in 2011 and US$ 2 billion lines of credit in 2015 as soft loans. This is to finance development projects of Bangladesh, particularly for infrastructure building and rail, road and sea connectivity. India and Bangladesh have also agreed, in principle, to enjoy transit facilities to connect with Nepal and Bhutan and India’s North Eastern states. These programmes would help in bridging the critical gaps in the social and physical infrastructures on either side of the border and inculcate a sense of security and integration among the population of eastern South Asian sub-region. 7. Inclusion of local self-government and local people and civic bodies (Gram Panchayat and Union Parishad or Salish) in areas of the IBB would help in factoring the aspirations of the border population into a comprehensive border management policy. The coordination between the local law enforcement agencies, civil administration and civil society stakeholders can build a humanistic border. The Indian experience in Jammu & Kashmir has shown that the recruitment of local youth as Special Police Officers and the setting of Village Defence Committees have a positive impact as far as border control and counter-terrorism operations are concerned. A similar mechanism could also be applied in the context of joint IndoBangladesh border management programmes. Conclusion Considering the vital interest in developing the eastern part of India, the Indian government has given non-reciprocal concessions in the Land Boundary Agreement, 2015. India is taking the lead in settling all existing irritants and disputes. Given the current state of mutual trust and the levels of confidence and comfort between Bangladesh and India, there is enough scope to tap full potential of the two countries. The agreement between India and Bangladesh will certainly reduce the security concerns of India and help to facilitate modernized and well equipped security mechanisms along the border. However, in addressing the problem of terrorism, IFC nexus and drugs and arms trafficking more effectively, a three layers security networks between the security agencies of two countries is essential. Frist, at the regular flag meetings between the border security forces, (BSF and BGB) the concern Station House officers (SHOs) of bordering districts must be invited. Second, at the eastern commander level meeting, the Superintendent of Police (SP) of concern district should be invited. They should also exchange their telephonic contacts for urgent communications. Third, at the state level meeting, all Bhardwaj 125 the intelligence officers (CID and NIA) and border security officers and district police officers should be connected between New Delhi-Kolkata-Dhaka through video conferencing under a highly secured network. On a positive note, all major stakeholders have shown magnanimity and extended unreserved support to the Land Boundary Agreement, 2015. This in itself is an indicator of how much these states have been subjected to illegal activities due to the un-demarcated land boundary and adversely possessed land and enclaves. This is a very significant milestone in India’s foreign policy/neighbourhood policy as the LBA bill has been approved by both houses of Indian parliament. Constructive unilateralism has been identified in the modi’s ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’. This is an expansion of ‘Gujral Doctrine’ which was initiated in mid1990s. However, the lenient approach adopted by the UPA government has been taken forward emphatically by the present NDA government. However, numerous challenges will have to be faced when the question of implementation of the LBA arises. The exchange of adversely possessed land and rehabilitation of the people of the enclaves and giving full citizenship rights will be a great test before the central as well as the state governments. In deliberations, a few stakeholders will gain and a few others will certainly lose. In a nutshell, it will address the broader security issues of India and pacify bilateral irritants between the two countries. Some of the recent initiatives may ensure freedom from fear, but freedom from want can only be achieved by the improvement in the human development index through bilateral and comprehensive border development approaches. In the process of capacity building, the local civic bodies and stakeholders of the border area can be involved in holding of joint socio-cultural and economic activities like organizing melas, extensive and regular haats, joint Puja, Eid and cultural programmes and developing joint ventures and infrastructures in the border areas. In ensuring human security, sustainable peace and development, the Modi government should encourage joint ventures, programmes and develop business-related infrastructure in border areas, which will focus on improving employability and developing entrepreneurship. There is a correlation between a more prosperous Bangladesh and the simultaneous receding of migration, border crime and illegal activities. The politics of aid and development also might keep the state security at check and be in the larger interest of human security. In Bangladesh, non-confrontational politics, anti-corruption drive and national consensus on development plan has to be affirmed by the major political alliance in the country. These measures would ensure that the IBB becomes more humanistic. People of both the countries have given a mandate on the single agenda of development. Therefore, it is in the interest of both the governments that there should be close cooperation and interaction between Bangladesh and India on the issues of economic prosperity. Bangladesh must also develop a consensus-based policy approach on all the contentious issues, namely, protection of minorities, national identity, political stability and development strategy. 126 International Studies 50(1&2) Acknowledgement A version of this article was presented at the Annual International Studies Convention 2013, organised by the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi during 10–12 December 2013 with generous support from Public Diplomacy Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India; Indian Council of Social Science Research; University of Calcutta, Kolkata; Central University of Gujarat, Gandhinagar; University of Pune; University of Hyderabad; Pondicherry University, Puducherry; Panjab University, Chandigarh and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Notes 1. This research article is an updated and more detailed version of author’s previous writings on Border related issues. 2. 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