Foreign Aid and Democratization in Post-conflict Societies
John Ishiyama
University of North Texas
Kathryn Sanders
University of Missouri, St. Louis
Marijke Breuning
University of North Texas
What is the relationship between development aid and the emergence of
democracy in post-conflict societies? In this study we examine twenty six
post-conflict countries that experienced civil wars ending after 1980. The
dependent variable is measured using data from the Polity IV database
(discussed below). The principal independent variables are the amount of
aid provided in the periods following the conflict settlement, the timing of aid
as well as ethno linguistic homogeneity/heterogeneity, economic
performance prior to the conflict, the extent to which the state was
democratic prior to the onset of the conflict, and the length of the conflict.
We find that none of these variables affect the emergence of democracy eight
years after the conclusion of the conflict, nor movement towards democracy
in that period, except for the length of the conflict in years. Aid and the
timing of aid have little or no effect on emergence of democracy in postconflict countries.
Introduction
What is the relationship between development aid and the emergence of
democracy in post-conflict societies? Although there has been a considerable amount
of literature that empirically investigates the relationship between development aid
and corruption (Tavares. 2003; Alessina and Weder 2002; Knack 2000; Rimmer
2000;Svensson 1998; Ijaz 1996) aid and the quality of governance (Knack 2001) aid
and ethnic conflict (Esman and Herring, 2003; Herring, 2001) and foreign aid and
post-conflict economic growth (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; 2002; Hamburg 2002;
Casella and Eichengreen 1994), no study of which we are aware has examined the
direct effects of both the quantity and timing of development aid on promoting
political democracy in post-conflict societies. Given the often publicly declared
purpose of aid as promoting peace, stability and presumably in states torn by civil
conflict (Adelman 2003; Carrothers 2003; Carapico 2002) it is important to
empirically test the asserted relationship between foreign aid provision and
democratic development and assess its effectiveness as a policy tool.
Historically much of the literature on foreign aid has concentrated on the
alleviation of poverty—if there were political effects these were considered
secondary. To a large extent, it was assumed (consistent with the modernization
paradigm familiar in the study of comparative political development) that political
Midsouth Political Science Review, 2007-2008, Vol. 9
Ishiyama, Sanders, and Breuning
| 20
development would naturally grow out of economic expansion. Thus, scholars such
as Jeffrey Sachs (2005) focus on foreign aid primarily as a means to promote
economic growth-- rather than examine the relationship between aid and democracy,
such works have analyzed the effectiveness of foreign aid and the promotion of
growth (see also Arvin and Barillas 2002). On the other hand, there are those who
argue that foreign aid only creates dependence and economic inefficiency, with little
or no evidence of economic growth (Kraay and Raddatz 2007; Frank and Baird
1975).
More recent works have examined the effect of aid on political development,
including the promotion of political and institutional stability (Hamburg 2002;
Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001). Others have examined the relationship
between aid and corruption, and the effects of aid on “political ineffectiveness”
(Djankov, Mondalvo and Reynol-Querol 2006; Werlin 2005; Knack 2001; Tornell
and Lane 1999). There have also been a few studies that have examined the
relationship between aid and democracy, such as Stephen Knack who in 2004
asserted that there is little evidence to support the proposition that aid promotes
democracy (Knack 2004; see also Djankov et al 2006). These studies, however,
focused on the broad group of lesser developed nations as opposed to post-conflict
societies. However, it is upon these very post-conflict countries, from Bosnia to
Rwanda that much of the world’s attention has been focused, and aid has been used
specifically and explicitly to promote democracy and stability. Indeed, some
literature suggests that foreign aid in post-conflict societies should be a far more
effective tool than in developing countries generally. Indeed, Collier and Hoeffler
assert that they are more responsive to the development assistance provided by
affluent countries. “Aid is considerably more effective in augmenting growth in
post-conflict situations than in other situations…aid volumes should be
approximately double those in other situations” (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, p.13).
Not only do Collier and Hoeffler contend that aid leads to economic growth in postconflict societies, but also that political stability and democracy will result. Thus, the
truest test of the proposition that aid has a direct relationship to democracy is to test
it using cases emerging from prolonged civil conflict.
In this study we examine twenty six post-conflict countries that experienced
civil wars ending after 1980. The dependent variable democracy-autocracy is
measured using data from the Polity IV database (discussed below). The principal
independent variables are the amount of aid provided in the periods following the
conflict settlement, the timing of aid as well as ethno linguistic
homogeneity/heterogeneity, economic performance prior to the conflict, the extent to
which the state was democratic prior to the onset of the conflict, and the length of the
conflict itself.
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Foreign Aid and Democratization
Literature Review
Most of the literature on foreign aid has focused on aid and economic
development. For many scholars, large donations of aid are viewed as the primary
way to alleviate the poverty-stricken countries of the globe. Aid can promote growth
through the raising of living standards and breaking the “poverty trap”. Sachs, in The
End of Poverty, illustrates the concept of the “poverty trap” of the Third World and
claims that the only way to overcome it is with foreign assistance and Official
Development Aid (ODA).
We start with a household that is impoverished. All of its income goes to
consumption, just to stay alive…The result is a fall in capital per person
and a negative growth rate of per capita income…The solution is, where
foreign help, in the form of official development assistance (ODA), helps
to jump-start the process of capital accumulation, economic growth, and
rising household incomes (Sachs 2005, p. 246).
On the other hand, critics like Kraay and Raddatz (2007, p. 321) disagree with
the “jump-start” theory asserting that aid does not necessarily lead to sustainable
economic growth. Indeed, they are skeptical of the claim that “sufficiently large
increases in aid will have disproportionate effects on economic growth in low
income countries…[we] do not find evidence of threshold effects based on these
leading explanations for poverty traps whereby sufficiently high levels of aid are
necessary to “jump-start” a sustainable growth process” (Kraay and Raddatz 2007, p.
321).
Some scholars also claim that the aid creates economic dependency and
ultimately detracts from real economic growth (Chilcote 1978; Vengroff 1977).
Lesser developed countries begin to rely on the aid for government spending and as
a way to pay off debts. Thus if there is growth it is “façade growth”-- the recipient
nation may not be able to sustain that growth without international funding. Some
scholars such as Stephen Kosack examined the impact of aid on the quality of life
(Kosack 2003). Although he found that aid does not affect quality of life generally,
when combined with democracy, foreign aid is more likely to improve the quality of
life in a given country. He concludes the democratization would make aid more
effective in promoting growth and improvements in the quality of life.
Although there have been studies that examine the impact of aid on economic
expansion in post-conflict studies, there has been considerably less attention paid to
the relationship between aid and the development of political structures in postconflict societies. Nonetheless in the last decade or so there has been a growing
interest in the impact of aid on democracy and stability (Hartzell et al 2001; Casella
and Eichengreen 2004). Gordon Crawford has examined the impact of conditionality
on democracy from the perspective of four donor states (Crawford 2001). Stephen
Ishiyama, Sanders, and Breuning
| 22
Brown (2005) argues that international actors can, through development aid, play a
very important role in promoting (or preventing) democratization. However, many
strategic errors have been made particularly in promoting a rapid transition to a
multiparty system without paying attention to the development of political
infrastructure and stability. This rush to democracy can in fact impede further
democratization. Knack (2004) notes that foreign aid can promote democracy in
several key ways. Aid can provide for technical assistance in building and
strengthening political institutions. Aid can also indirectly promote democracy by
improving education and increasing per capita incomes (see also Almond and Powell
1965; Lipset 1959).
Others, however, argue that increasing the amount of aid in lesser developed
countries (LDCs) actually lowers the quality of governance (Knack 2001; Esman and
Herring 2001; Tornell and Lane 1999). For example, Milton Friedman (1958) argues
that since foreign aid goes directly to government this tends to strengthen the state
sector relative to the private sector, and as a result, democracy is less likely to
emerge since in aid-dependent countries most economic activity is controlled by the
state. Similarly, aid levels may also reinforce executive dominance at the expense of
other institutions in new democracies (Brautigam 2000). In addition, as Robert
Herring and Milton Esman (2001, p. 11) argue “aid often has the potential to create
the political substitution effect: meaning that the regime substitutes external props
for domestic support. Politicians come to believe that support of the international
financial institutions is more important than, and can substitute for, building
domestic coalitions for governance.” Thus, the leaders of the lesser developed
countries, because of the need for funding, begin to form policies based on what the
donors want, and are far less responsive to the wants and desires of the country’s
population. This form of aid “rentierism” thus has the great potential to detract from
the development of democracy in post-conflict societies.
In fact, foreign assistance may encourage political instability by making control
of the government and aid receipts a more valuable prize (Grossman 1992). More
development aid could also lower the quality of governance and democracy by
adding fuel to corrupt government practices (Nye 1967). As several scholars have
noted, donors tend to tolerate the corruption, as long as the nation puts into place
policies that reflect the values of the donors (Hanlon 2004; Alesina and Weder
2002). Joseph Hanlon (2004, p.750) argues “that the donor community is prepared to
tolerate quite blatant corruption if the elite rapidly puts into place “market friendly”
policy changes…Donors like formal democracy, although they do not seem too
concerned about how well it works”. Even though some donors may claim that good
democratic governance is being instilled in these lesser developed nations, this
usually means “market democracy”, that is defined by trade liberalization and free
market values as opposed to political democracy itself.
23 |
Foreign Aid and Democratization
Some recent studies have examined the effects of aid and the spread of
democracy within “lesser developed countries” (LDCs). Djankov et al.(2006, p.2)
demonstrated that “foreign aid actually has a negative impact on the democratic
stance of developing countries and on economic growth by reducing investment and
increasing governmental consumption.” Knack in 2004 also studied democracy and
aid, asserting that the relationship between the two was actually quite weak: “The
evidence presented here does suggest that either the favorable impacts of aid on
democratization are minor, or they are roughly balanced by other democracyundermining effects of aid dependence” (Knack 2004, p. 262). Nonetheless, both
Djankov et al (2006) and Knack (2004) focused on LDCs generally as opposed to
post-conflict societies per se.
On the other hand, some scholars have argued that aid can mitigate conflict, and,
presumably, promote democracy and stability. This is particularly true of countries
torn by ethnic conflict. Milton Esman (2001, p. 237) notes, for instance, that “there
is nothing predetermined about the interethnic effects of development assistance…
Development assistance projects may contribute to aggravating conflict among
already mobilized and politicized ethnic communities…[However] there is
convincing evidence that development assistance can be managed in ways that avert
or mitigate interethnic conflict”.
In order to analyze the effects of foreign aid, two additional variables must be
considered--- the timing of the aid and the type of political regime that was present
before the conflict began. The timing of the level of allotment has shown to be
significantly related to the stability (but not necessarily democracy) in a post-conflict
nation (Patrick 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002). Casella and Eichengreen (1996)
claim that aid provided right after the conflict gives the region more political and
economic stability, whereas aid that is given later tends to have the opposite effect.
Collier and Hoeffler (2002) go a step further asserting that aid is more effective with
a “gradual rise during the first four years [after conflict], then gradually taper back to
normal levels by the end of the first post-conflict decade”. Consequently the timing
of the distribution of aid will also be analyzed in this study to see the relationship
with the democratic development. In addition to the timing of aid, it has also been
demonstrated that the previous type of regime will also have an effect on the
potential development of democracy. Hartzell et al (2001) assert that if the regime
prior to the conflict was a democracy then peace after conflict is a more likely result
and is more resilient.
Finally, another variable that may affect political developments after the end of
the civil conflict is the length of the conflict itself. Indeed many scholars in the
conflict resolution literature have focused on the importance of “conflict fatigue”
which is the point after many years of the stalemated struggle where the populations
of both opposing groups simply tire of the conflict, and looks for means, often less
than perfect, to resolve it. At this point, there is often a pragmatic leadership on both
Ishiyama, Sanders, and Breuning
| 24
sides that emerges to forge a consensus that contends that conflict cessation, and
perhaps a potential normalization of relations, has more benefits than continuing
with the struggle (Touval and Zartman 1985). In terms of democracy, this rough
balance of representation of different interests may provide the seeds of
accommodation of different interests, which ironically may bode better for
democracy than short intense (and unresolved) conflicts, especially those that are
stopped by outside intervention.
Design and Methodology
In this paper, we are primarily concerned with testing the impact and timing of
foreign aid on the establishment and growth of democracy in post-conflict societies.
For this study twenty-six post-conflict societies will be examined: Angola, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Chad, Croatia, The Democratic Republic
of Congo, Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala,
Indonesia, Iran, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines,
Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Uganda. These nations are derived from
an adjusted list from Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and all have had major civil
conflicts (defined as resulting in at least 500 combat deaths and either resulting from
wars of contention for national power (as in Congo-Kinshasa) and wars of separation
(such as East Timor in Indonesia and Chechnya in Russia).1 Low level insurgencies
were not included in this data set. Also the data set was limited to only the first
conflicts after 1980. To be sure, many of these conflicts were only temporarily
resolved, but they resumed later (as in Angola and Chechnya in Russia). However
we concentrated only on what happened eight years after the first resolution (thus if
these countries descended again into significant conflict this was generally reflected
in the Polity scores) but we focused on what happened eight years after the first
resolution. Further we did not include conflicts where eight years have not yet
passed since the conflict was resolved (such as in Sudan between the Khartoum
government and the Southern separatists – settled in 2005, or the recently resolved
Nepalese conflict) or on continuing conflicts (as in Sri Lanka. Finally we examined
only foreign aid recipients (not net donors, so neither the United Kingdom nor Spain
were included in this study). Using these decision rules, 26 countries were included
in this study. Again, cases of post-conflict countries were chosen because they are
likely to better reflect the potential political changes caused by foreign assistance
compared to other developing countries.
In order to evaluate the relationship between aid and democracy, it is first
necessary to identify the relevant variables. For this study, the focus is on the extent
1
Azeribaijan and Armenia were also included- although the war between these two states appeared to be
an interstate war, the primary conflict was a war of separation in Nagorno Karabakh, that sought
amalgamation with Armenia. Hence, we (like Collier and Hoeffler) included this as a case of civil
conflict.
25 |
Foreign Aid and Democratization
to which aid is provided for the country that has just suffered some internal conflict.
As noted above, many scholars claim an inverse relationship between the amount of
aid and the quality of governance (Knack 2004; Djankov et al 2006). To measure the
amount of aid received, one of the primary independent variables is the amount of
aid provided per capita in 2000 constant dollars in the 8 years following conflict. The
8 year rule was used because generally this meant that at least one election (either
presidential, legislative, or a referendum or plebiscite) could be held after the end of
the conflict—given that elections are critical to any definition of democracy, this
would be a reasonable cutoff point in terms of time passed. In order to capture some
of the dynamism of the aid and democracy relationship, we also examined the
average aid received per year per capita across the eight years from the end of the
conflict. The data for the aid variables are derived from the World Bank”s World
Development Indicators.
In addition, the timing of the aid is also important. With the findings of Collier
and Hoeffler (2002) one would expect that if the aid were to be phased in, with the
larger sums arriving at least 4 years after the end of the conflict, then democracy
would flourish. In order to measure the timing of the aid, a dummy variable is
employed. If most of the aid was received in the first four years (years 1 through 4)
after the conflict it will be coded a “0”. When a country received most of its aid in
the second four year period (years 5-8 after the conflict) then it will be coded as a
“1”. Based on the previous literature, one would expect that if most of the aid were
to come in the second four year period that the country would be more democratic.
Another variable to consider is the extent to which the country was divided
along ethnic lines. Indeed, if a post-conflict society is deeply divided along ethnic
lines it may negatively affect democratic development. In order to measure the
extent to which countries are ethnically divided we employ the Ethnolinguistic
Fractionalization Index (ELF). The ELF was developed by Russian demographers in
the 1960s and later modified by Easterly and Devine (1998) as a way to measure the
effects of ethnicity on the economic development of African nations. We use the
data provided by Easterly and Devine.
The economic and political situation of the country before the conflict is also
important to the effectiveness of foreign aid on democracy. Thus, we examine two
additional independent variables are employed-- estimated pre conflict GNP per
capita and pre conflict regime type. In order to measure pre conflict wealth, the
estimated average GNP per capita for the decade before the end of the conflict will
be used. To measure the next two variables (the final independent variable and the
dependent variable), we employ the often used Polity IV data base. The Polity IV
measure was developed at the University of Maryland College Park in order to
demonstrate the degree to which a political system is autocratic or democratic. It
uses different measures of constraints on the chief executive, the openness and
competitiveness of executive recruitment and the competitiveness of political
Ishiyama, Sanders, and Breuning
| 26
participation. These scores are then combined onto a scale ranging from -10 to +10,
with -10 being the most autocratic and +10 being the most democratic. In order to
measure the past regime type, the Polity IV score will be used for the year before the
start of the conflict within that nation.
As mentioned above the pre-conflict regime type is also an important
independent variable. As noted above, democracies are more likely to recover than
non democracies. Put another way, regimes that were less autocratic are more likely
to redemocratize than regimes that were autocratic prior to the conflict. If the state
before the conflict was autocratic, democracy building is far more difficult then
regimes that “return” to democracy. In order to measure the type of regime the state
had before the conflict we recode the combined polity score in the year just prior to
the onset of the conflict. For countries that scored less than zero these were wholly
autocratic and scored a “1”. For those countries that scored zero and higher, these
were relatively less autocratic and scored a “0”. The measure differentiates between
autocratic previous regimes, and less autocratic regimes.2
In order to fully study the effects of aid on democracy in post-conflict societies
we also measure the level of democracy after the conflict. This dependent variable is
measured through the use of the combined Polity IV score for 8th year after the end
of the conflict. The reason why we use resulting score after eight years, as opposed
to a yearly measure, is that we are most interested in whether democracy results (or
not). To merely examine “first differences” or changes over time would weight a
score moving from -10 to -7 equally to a score that moves from +1 to a +4. Thus,
countries that remain thoroughly authoritarian would remain thoroughly
authoritarian, but would have a score equal to a country that is becoming clearly
democratic. Hence we focus on outcome as opposed to change in terms of the polity
score in this paper. In sum, Table 1 on the following page reports the data for this
project.
Results
Table 2 reports the results of an Ordinal Logistic regression analysis (ordered
logit) for the dependent variable of the combined polity IV score for 2003. Since the
dependent variable is ordinally measured (as is the Polity IV measure for
democracy/autocracy which ranges from -10 to +10), the ordered logit procedure is
most appropriate for this situation.
2
Although one might consider keeping the ordinal measure as opposed to dummying up these variables,
we have opted to use dummies, largely because of the critique many scholars have made regarding the use
of endogenous ordinal variables in regression equations (for a summary see Fox, 1991). Essentially there
is some question of interpreting the coefficient sizes associated with ordinal variables, and what they
mean in regression analysis. A preferred technique is thus using dummy variables (given that what is
interpreted generally is the significance and sign of the coefficient).
27 |
Foreign Aid and Democratization
Table 1. Data for Independent and Dependent Variables
Years
of
Conflict
75-91
88-94
88-94
91-94
88
80-88
91-95
Aid
Provided
Timing
of
Aid
Dummy
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
Ethno Linguistic
Fractionalization
Index
0.78
0.13
0.31
0.67
0.31
0.86
0.42
1
Country
Angola
28.00
Armenia
60.41
Azerbaijan
21.56
Bosnia
203.33
Burundi
40.25
Chad
39.22
Croatia
18.44
Dem Rep of
96-97
22.22
1
0.90
Congo
Rep of
97
32.63
0
0.68
Congo
El Salvador
79-92
49.67
0
0.16
Ethiopia
74-91
16.75
0
0.77
Georgia
91-93
44.89
0
0.49
Guatemala
78-84
20.89
1
0.76
Indonesia
75-82
6.56
1
0.76
Iran
81-82
1.00
1
0.75
Morocco
75-89
29.11
0
0.40
Mozambiqu
76-92
65.44
0
0.70
e
Nicaragua
82-90
129.89
1
0.39
Nigeria
80-84
1.78
1
0.86
Peru
82-96
17.33
1
0.51
Philippines
72-96
8.44
0
0.86
Russia
94-96
2.32
0
0.33
Rwanda
90-94
63.89
0
0.26
Somalia
88-92
.
.
0.03
Tajikistan
92-97
19.56
1
0.55
Uganda
80-88
33.22
1
0.92
1. (pc-- 2000 constant US$ avg per year for 8 years following conflict
2. 8th year after conflict ended
Estimated
GNP/pc
prior
to conflict
1875.00
3309.00
2617.00
10065.18
840.98
765.36
10065.18
Autocracy
dummy
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
Postconflict
Polity
Score2
-3
5
-7
0
11
-2
7
958.60
1
0
1244.67
1
-4
5095.73
866.00
4499.75
3633.57
1100.00
4897.99
2395.00
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
7
1
5
8
7
2
-6
694.00
0
6
4555.98
935.25
5512.66
3543.00
7576.47
1175.82
0.00
2096.92
892.00
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
8
4
9
8
7
-3
0
-3
-4
Table 2. Coefficient Estimates and Colinearity Statistics, Ordered Logit
Procedure
Average Aid Per GDP
provided in post-conflict
period
Timing of Aid Dummy
ELF
Pre conflict GDP/capita
Pre Conflict Polity Dummy
Length of Conflict in years
Coefficient
Std. Error
VIF
.002
.01
1.28
1.46
1.08
1.11
.00
.00
1.94
-3.57
1.86
.28***
1.99
1.17
.10
1.73
1.10
1.20
Pseudo R-Square = .12; * = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01
Ishiyama, Sanders, and Breuning
| 28
As indicated in Table 2, neither the amount of aid per capita on average provided for
the first eight years after the conflict ended (coefficient =.002 and standard error =
.01), nor the timing of aid (coefficient =1.46 and the standard error = 1.08) was
statistically significant in relationship with the dependent variable of the postconflict democracy score (i.e. neither had a p value of less than or equal to .05). This
generally supports the findings of scholars like Knack (2004) who found similar
results regarding democracy scores and aid for LDCs in general. To be sure, it
should be noted that these findings do not necessarily refute the previous findings by
scholars like Collier and Hoeffler (2002) who argued that aid promotes growth (but
perhaps not democracy) or Casella and Eichengreen (1996) or Patrick (2000) who
argued that aid promotes stability. Nonetheless, there is little evidence that foreign
aid in post-conflict countries supports the growth of democracy. In addition, the
results do not lend support to the assertion made by Hartzell et al (2001) that the
regime type prior to the conflict has any effect on the emergence of democracy after
the conflict (again where the coefficient for the pre conflict dummy variable for
democracy was 1.86 and the standard error was 1.17)
Further the alterative contextual variables (the ELF and the GNP per capita prior
to the conflict) also had little in the way of an effect on the post-conflict
development of democracy (neither coefficient was statistically significant).
However, there is the possibility that the significance of the coefficients are distorted
by problems with multicolinearity. Multicolinearity results when the independent
variables have some significant interdependence, which can result in numerically
unstable estimates of the regression coefficients (small changes in X can result in
large changes to the estimated regression coefficients). The variance inflation factor
(VIF) can be used to detect if multicolinearity is problem – generally if the VIF score
exceeds “4” than it is a potential problem. However as indicated for the VIF scores
for each of the independent variables in the model there is little in the way of a
multicolinearity problem with the model (VIF scores are all less than 2).
The one independent variable that does exhibit a positive and statistically
significant relationship is the length in years the conflict took place (coefficient = .28
and standard error = .10). Interestingly the positive sign of the coefficient indicates
that the longer the conflict took place, the more likely the regime scored higher on
the Polity IV combined polity score in the eighth year following the end of the
conflict. Although beyond the scope of this project, this is a curious result. Perhaps
the longer the conflict the more exhausted the combatant parties become, and the
more willing they are to seek an enduring accommodation. It could also indicate that
the longer the conflict, the more like the sides are equally matched, suggesting that a
post-conflict settlement requires some power sharing agreement that guarantees
representation of government and opposition. Whatever the case, fully investigating
the relationship between the length of the conflict and the development of
democracy is currently beyond the scope of this project.
29 |
Foreign Aid and Democratization
Perhaps the amount and timing of aid affects the progress towards democracy,
i.e. that although aid may not produce democracies as an outcome, they are more
likely to promote movement towards democracy? To test this proposition, we
operationalized the dependent variable as the difference between the polity IV
autocracy-democracy score, comparing the value in the year the conflict ended and
eight years after the end of the conflict. This variable was coded as a binary result, 0
if no positive movement was recorded, and “1” if there was at least positive
movement (meaning a move from a lower value on the polity scale, to a higher
value). This provides us with some sense of movement over time, and tests the
proposition that the provision of development aid may not result in democracy, but
at least promotes some movement towards democracy.
The results in Table 3 are remarkably similar to the results reported in Table 2-again neither the amount of aid per capita on average provided for the first eight
years after the conflict ended (coefficient =-.01 and standard error = .02), nor the
timing of aid (coefficient =.55 and the standard error = 1.26) was statistically
significant in relationship with the dependent variable of the post-conflict democracy
score . The pre conflict GDP/capita and Democracy dummy variables were also not
significant, which is consistent with the findings in Table 2. Further again, the longer
the conflict, the more likely the move towards democracy (but the relationship is
somewhat less robust). The only difference in terms of the change model as opposed
to the outcome model in Table 2 is the ELF score—in Table 3, the greater the degree
of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, the more likely the country would move towards
democracy (this is an interesting finding, and may have to do with the greater
attention to settlement issues and issues of representation in countries that emerge
from ethnically based conflicts).
Table 3. Coefficient Estimates and Colinearity Statistics, Binary Logit
Procedure
Coefficient
Std. Error
VIF
Average Aid Per GDP
provided in post-conflict
period
Timing of Aid Dummy
ELF
Pre conflict GDP/capita
Pre Conflict Polity Dummy
Length of Conflict in years
-.01
.02
1.28
.55
1.26
1.11
9.40**
4.60
1.94
.00
.04
.26*
.21
1.78
.15
1.73
1.10
1.20
Pseudo R-Square = .39; * = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01
Ishiyama, Sanders, and Breuning
| 30
Conclusion
What is the relationship between development aid and the development of
democracy in post-conflict societies? The above results indicate that there is no
evidence to support the notion that aid (the amount or the timing) has a positive
effect on the development of democracy in post-conflict societies either in terms of
outcome nor in terms of movement towards democracy once the conflict has ended.
This supports the findings of some scholars (like Knack and Djankov et al) who
argued that aid has no effect on democracy generally among developing countries.
Thus, even when testing under the more rigorous conditions of the post-conflict
societies, there was no relationship between neither the timing nor the amount of aid
on the subsequent level of democracy. This finding also does not support some other
scholars who contended that aid may have a positive effect on democracy. Although
it may be the case that the ultimate effects of foreign aid can only be discerned after
many years have passed, the initial track record of aid provision and the timing of
aid has not been particularly promising when it comes to building democracy in
post-conflict countries.
One very interesting finding, although this is beyond the scope of the current
study, is the relationship between the length of the conflict and the development of
democracy-- the longer the conflict the more democratic the country. This might
support the literature from conflict studies (like Touval and Zartman, 1985) that
suggests that the longer the conflict the more likely a military stalemate emerges,
thus compelling the different sides to seek a lasting settlement and accommodation.
This bodes better for democracy than short intense (and presumably less likely to be
fully resolved) conflicts.
Although these findings are somewhat preliminary, the above results suggest
further questions for future investigation. First, what is the precise relationship
between the length of the conflict and the provision, and timing, of foreign aid.
Perhaps the provision of aid works best under conditions of short and quick
conflicts, or vice versa. Second, perhaps it is not the amount of aid, nor the timing,
that makes a difference in promoting political democracy, but the type. In other
words, perhaps aid that is designed to promote civil society institutions may be more
effective and providing voice to potentially disaffected populations and hence better
promote political democracy. Although the evidence thus far cannot yet answer these
questions, the findings above indicate that further investigation into political
consequences of foreign aid in post-conflict societies is warranted, and represents a
potentially promising avenue for future inquiry.
31 |
Foreign Aid and Democratization
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