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Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli peace

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Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Revisited Author(s): Ibrahim A. Karawan Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May, 1994), pp. 249-266 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/164735 . Accessed: 18/09/2013 17:51 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Journal of Middle East Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Int. J. Middle East Stud. 26 (1994), 249-266. Printed in the United States of America Ibrahim A. Karawan SADAT AND THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE REVISITED With the resumption of the search for an Arab-Israeli settlement, analysts have been debating the factors that have frustrated it for so many years. The fact that one Arab country, namely Egypt, concluded a peace treaty with Israel almost a decade and a half ago led some to reexamine that case to see what made it possible. The available literature on Egypt's disengagement from the Arab-Israeli conflict has been voluminous, as many policy makers and analysts in Egypt, Israel, the rest of the Arab world, and the United States published their accounts of this development. Despite many ideological and political differences among these writers, they all concluded that this foreign-policy shift represented a radical alteration of Arab policies toward Israel and that with Egypt out of the war equation, the regional balance of power had changed dramatically. Many of them also emphasized the centrality of President Sadat's role in explaining Egypt's exit from the conflict with Israel. One or another of Sadat's personal characteristics has been singled out by his admirers and critics alike as being the main factor behind the Egyptian foreign-policy shift. It is not that they considered other factors such as socioeconomic variables and regional or global structures irrelevant. They simply assessed them as not decisive in terms of their relative explanatory power. For former American secretary of state Henry Kissinger, who negotiated with Sadat repeatedly between 1973 and 1976, the decisive factor was Sadat's strategic thinking, an asset that enabled Sadat to identify the essentials of the situation and to rise above insignificant details. Sadat the statesman was, according to Kissinger, capable of demonstrating "to all those obsessed with the tangible, the transcendence of the visionary."' For former president Carter, Sadat's moves toward peace were attributable to a character that was "extraordinarily inclined toward boldness." For Ismail Fahmy, who was Sadat's foreign minister between 1973 and 1977, the way Egypt had disengaged from the conflict with Israel reflected Sadat's impulsive style of split-second decision making and his quest for personal aggrandizement and fame. Sadat's Jerusalem trip illustrated best, according to Fahmy, a man "consumed by his desire to become an international hero."2 Mohammed Heikal, the former editor of al-Ahram newspaper, saw it as the move of a president who misread the facts of Egypt's history and geography, suffered from IbrahimA. Karawanteaches at the Departmentof Political Science, University of Utah, 252 Orson Spencer Hall, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112, U.S.A. ? 1994 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/94 $5.00 + .00 This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 250 Ibrahim A. Karawan chronic low self-esteem, and had become obsessed with Western media in general and American television in particular.3 This article has three main objectives. The first is to examine Egypt's foreignpolicy shift, and not just the Jerusalem trip, in light of the literatureon the primacy of the role of leaders in foreign-policy making in less-developed countries (LDCs). The second is to construct an explanation of this shift that links it to aspects of Sadat's operational code and the nature of the Egyptian political system. The third is to demonstratethe inconsistencies and shortcomings in the explanations for Egypt's foreign-policy shift that focus on Sadat's belief system. THE LEADER-CENTERED ARGUMENT At the root of the aforementioned arguments about Sadat's role is the assumption that the personal characteristicsof the principal decision maker are the most important factors in determining foreign-policy outcomes. Accordingly, the best guide to understandwhy certain decisions were made is to look into the biographies, autobiographies, and psychobiographies of individual leaders.4 For the analyst who adopts this approach,the point of departureis that a state does not act, but that certain individuals in official positions who are responsible for formulating foreign policy do. More importantis that they act according to their perceptions of reality, not in response to reality itself: hence, the crucial distinction between the psychological and the operational environments. In this leadership-centeredliterature,the psychological environment of the decision maker(s) is much more importantin explaining foreign-policy outcomes than the operational environment or the distribution of power among various internationalactors. According to the basic assumptions of this perspective, the efforts of the analysts should be directed toward reconstructing the leader's "definition of the situation," or set of perceptions and misperceptions. In Michael Brecher's words, "the operational environment influences the choice among policy options-that is, the decisions themselves-only as it is filtered through the images of decision-makers." Thus, he concluded that the "decision maker's image is the most crucial input of foreign policy making."5Robert Jervis stressed that foreign-policy decisions are influenced by the way leaders simplify as well as organize a complex environment, which then determines what information they deem important, their images of other actors, and how they respond to new developments. This explains why decision makers can and do act differently when confronted with similar situations.6 To avoid a total dichotomy between the characteristics of the decision maker(s) and those of the situational setting, attempts have been made to identify certain conditions that maximize the impact of the decision maker's characteristics on foreign-policy outcomes. Foremost among these are situations characterized by a high degree of ambiguity, either due to a lack of information or to contradictory and swiftly shifting data. In such a setting, decision makers are forced to interpret these types of data through reliance on their belief systems and attitudinal prisms. A second type of situation emerges when core interests of the state are threatened in a way that requires the direct and intensive involvement of the political leader in the decision-making process (as in a crisis). A third type occurs when the politi- This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Revisited 251 cal leader enjoys wide decisional latitude and functions under minimal domestic constraints.' In fact, a major trend in the literature on LDC foreign-policy making identifies its specifics in terms of the psychological characteristics of leaders, their operational codes, and even their personal idiosyncrasies. Most studies that focus on the principal decision maker argue that he "is far more important in the analysis of developing political systems than in developed western democracies. This category refers to the hegemony over the decision making structure ... of one person who in some cases can exercise profound normative influence on the population as a whole." They also single out foreign policy where leaders insist on sheer monopoly. For instance, Heikal argues that in developing countries, which are mostly at either the traditional or the transitional stages of development, decision-making powers, particularly in the foreign-policy arena, are usually held by one individual. "This may be a hereditary monarch, a prince or a sheikh, who rules with the authority of tradition behind him. It may be a charismatic leader who enjoys popular support for freeing his people from colonial bondage, or for placing the country on the path of development. Or he could simply be a dictator."8 Leaders of LDCs often formulate foreign policy under minimal domestic political and organizational constraints. Most of these countries do not have a viable constitutional legitimacy that can impose significant constraints on foreign-policy making. Even though the institutional machinery for consultation may exist in forms such as cabinets and national security councils, its actual role is secondary, because generally it is not given important information. Such a role is usually confined to discussions, after the fact, of how to sell the decision to one constituency or another or how to mobilize support behind what has already been decided by the leader and perhaps a few hand-picked aides. The weakness of cabinets and parliaments and the role of single political parties maximize the importance of the leader's role in formulating foreign policy in most of the LDCs. The lack of a well-developed bureaucracy in the area of foreign policy further enhances the centrality of the leader's role. The bureaucraticpolitics paradigm as articulated by Allison and Halperin emphasizes the multiplicity of organizational actors in foreign-policy making, the diversity of interests among those actors "depending on where each sits," and the processes of pulling and hauling, compromise, and consensus building that ultimately produces a political result, ratherthan a purposive action in foreign policy. Most of the LDCs have not developed largescale, complex, and differentiated bureaucratic institutions that play an effective role in foreign-policy formulation. Maurice East, Franklin Weinstein, Joel Migdal, and Bahgat Korany all come to similar conclusions: studying bureaucraticpolitics may be useful in explaining certain cases in American foreign policy, but it is not applicable to most LDCs.9 Applying the Argument to Egypt's Foreign Policy Shift Egypt's foreign policy has been treated not as an exception but rather as a confirmation of the proposition that the leader's operational code is the most salient factor in explaining foreign-policy formulation and change. In his 1962 study of This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 252 Ibrahim A. Karawan Egypt's foreign policy, P. J. Vatikiotis concluded that a "charismatic leader is more important in Egyptian politics than the mechanisms, checks and balances that loom large in Western political practice, because the type of leadership has always been more importantin Arab Islamic societies than the type of political institutions.... The tradition of centralized authority in Egypt facilitates the emergence of charismatic leaders." Adeed Dawisha's 1976 study of Egypt's foreign policy in the Arab world emphasized the authoritariannature of the Egyptian political system in which the study of the leader's personality and idiosyncrasies becomes essential for constructing a more accurate explanation of Egypt's foreign policy. A number of studies done during the 1980s presented similar arguments.'0 Sadat's Political Beliefs. If one starts with Sadat's belief system, or what Alexander George called philosophical beliefs (fundamental assumptions and orientations), a case could be made that two aspects of that belief system played a significant role in shaping Egypt's regional and internationalbehavior. The first was the primacy of Egyptian, as opposed to Arab, nationalism. In that respect Sadat was different from, if not the opposite of, his predecessor. Nasser believed that Egypt was destined, by the logic of history, demography, and geography, to lead the "Arab circle." He decided that the role of Arab leadership had been "wandering aimlessly in search of a hero ... [and that] this role exhausted by its wandering has at last settled down . . . near the borders of our country."11 Sadat had no Pan-Arabist designs. In his formative period, he had been greatly influenced by political movements that emphasized Islam or Egyptian nationalism. After he assumed the presidency, Sadat encouraged the trend of "Egypt first." In a symbolic move, he again changed the name of the country from the United Arab Republic, which he inherited from Nasser, to the Arab Republic of Egypt. As Fouad Ajami put it, "Sadat could hope to compete with his predecessor in Egypt proper, but in the Arab world his predecessor was larger than life. There was perhaps in Sadat's Egyptianness a desire to move from Nasser's shadow, into a smaller area in which his predecessor seems more real and less glamorized, more subject to errors and to a normal, more tangible assessment."'12 The emphasis on Egyptian as distinct from Arab identity became obvious particularly in Sadat's public statements after the 1973 war. It was then that Sadat was able to deviate from the Nasserite doctrine because, through the war, he had finally managed to establish his own legitimacy. He had emancipated himself from Nasser's shadow and thus did not have to abide by the doctrine that he had inherited and to which he had previously paid homage. In his first major postwar political document, called "the October Paper,"Sadat identified Egyptian nationalism as the most decisive influence behind the "accomplishmentof October."He elaborated on themes that had not been talked about much in Egypt since the late 1950s such as Egyptian national identity and its 7,000 years of civilization.13 Although he continued for a while to talk about Arab solidarity, he did so on the basis of broadly defined common interests, not on the ideological basis of his predecessor. It can be argued that this belief explains important components of Egypt's policy shift toward the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1973 and 1978. For example, when Sadat concluded that Egypt's interests would be best served by seeking an This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Revisited 253 immediate cease-fire in the third week of October 1973, he did not consult with other Arab leaders, or even coordinate with his Syrian war ally. On 16 October 1973, he simply announced his terms for accepting a cease-fire. Assad heard them, like many others, on the radio. When Sadat decided to accept a cease-fire on 22 October 1973, he merely informed Assad of his decision. The same pattern held true regarding Egypt's acceptance of the First and Second Disengagement Agreements with Israel (1974-75). Both moves, particularly the latter, were bitterly criticized in the Arab world. Syria and the Palestinian organizations accused Egypt of defecting from the Arab coalition in a way that left the other Arab fronts extremely vulnerable. However, Sadat did not reconsider his chosen course of action. He was firmly convinced that the alternative-linking the settlement process on all three fronts-would have given Syria and radical Palestinian groups a veto power over Egypt's policy regarding its own territory, and it would have promised no settlement at all. This was simply unacceptable from Sadat's perspective. After all, as one writer put it: "He {had) never excited a pan-Arab audience, he had never been an [Arab] hero."'4 Sadat himself repeated that he could not accept an Arab tutelage over Egypt's policy; "It is not conceivable that the fate of my country should be dependent on the consent of other Arabs."'5 Even when Sadat decided on Egypt's most dramatic policy shift and announced, on 9 November 1977, his readiness to address the Knesset in Jerusalem, he deliberately avoided any consultations with other Arab leaders. Although he exchanged views with the Syrian president three days before the trip, he did so after he had publicly committed himself to go to Israel and while preparations for the visit were already under way. In effect, Sadat decided on this move after he concluded that there was no reason to abide by the lowest common Arab denominator if it meant continued Israeli occupation of the Sinai and an indefinite extension of the state of "no war no peace" with all its negative repercussions on Egypt. If Nasser had still been in power, the argument goes, he could not have ignored his doctrine of Arab nationalism or his wide constituency in the Arab world. Because Sadat did not believe in this doctrine or have such a constituency, he was both willing and able to take this dramatic step. The second component of Sadat's belief system that could be identified as an explanatory factor of Egypt's policy shift was his anti-Sovietism.16 The evidence of his deep hostility toward the Soviet Union can be found both in Sadat's articulation of his thoughts, and in a number of major foreign-policy decisions that put him on a collision course with the Soviet Union. He emphasized his strong opposition to Soviet ideology because of its irreconcilability with Islam; as a "devout Muslim" he was vehemently anti-Communist.'7Less than two months after signing the Egyptian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in May 1971, Sadat played a major role in crushing a Communist-supported coup in Sudan in defiance of a Soviet request to recognize the new regime. In the aftermath of the Egyptian-backed countercoup, a number of the Soviet Union's best friends in Sudan were summarily executed. Among them were Abdel Khaleq Mahgoub, the secretary general of the Communist party of Sudan, and al-Shafih Ahmed alSheikh, a prominent labor leader and a recipient of the Lenin Peace Prize.18 Not unexpectedly, the Soviets were furious at this so-called Egyptian friend who used This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 254 Ibrahim A. Karawan their weapons to crush their ideological comrades and political allies. When the Soviet ambassador in Cairo asked for an explanation, Sadat answered: "I cannot allow a communist regime to be established in a country sharing my borders.... No communist regime will ever be established in this part of the world, because we are religious by nature."'9 Sadat was also convinced that the Soviets had favored his rivals in the domestic power struggle of May 1971. "The Soviets are not happy about anything which happened in Egypt after [Nasser]," he said, "I'm not their man. Moreover, I have eliminated their men."20 According to former foreign minister Ismail Fahmy, while Nasser was in Moscow for medical treatment in 1970, the Soviet premier Kosygin rathertactlessly asked him about his succession. When Nasser mentioned Sadat's name, Premier Kosygin pressed further, "Who comes after Sadat?" and was clearly satisfied to hear Nasser mention the name of Ali Sabri. "Sadat got the message and never forgot it," said Fahmy. This psychological factor later influenced Sadat's dealings with the Soviets. According to Fahmy, "With the Soviets, Sadat's attitude was one of great suspicion, and of readiness to interpret every statement [they made] as an attack against Egypt, and an insult to himself."21 An equally strong conviction confirmed by many statements made by Sadat was that the Soviets had a vested interest in the perpetuation of an Arab-Israeli stalemate in order to secure Arab dependence on them as arms suppliers. Soviet leaders refrained from providing Egypt with certain military items that Sadat deemed necessary for a limited battle in 1971, and thus helped make his much publicized "year of decision" anything but what he promised it to be.22Even a cursory reading of Sadat's statements and writings reveals how Egypt and Sadat were often used interchangeably (hence the appropriatenessof the title, "I, Egypt"). In justifying his decision to expel about 20,000 Soviet advisers from Egypt in July 1972, Sadat stated that "the main reason was the deliberate Soviet attempt to let me down through the withholding of the military equipment which I had requested, as if they were in Moscow saying to me: you could not decide upon anything without Soviet permission" (emphasis added).23His perception of a Soviet attempt to humiliate him was emphasized by one of his top aides who revealed that in his private remarks Sadat was embittered because of the difference between the way the Soviets treated him and the way they treated his predecessor. "I waited through June, July, August, and most of September for what Podgorny himself had promised, but to no avail. I often summoned the Soviet ambassador.... I wrote to the Soviet leaders frequently, but all I could receive in answer to my messages was that they were away in their Crimean summer resort!"24 It is hardly surprisingthat Sadat launcheda call for a Pax Americana while the barrels of Egypt's Soviet-made weapons were still warmin the aftermathof the 1973 war. It was a matterof faith for Sadat that the Soviets had an interest in the continuation of the state of "no war no peace," because as he repeatedlyput it, "accordingto their calculation as soon as the war is over we would no longer need them."If that was the case, why should they be expected to help in reaching a settlement that promised to rendertheir influence in the area negligible? Thus, Sadathad his own reasons to agree with Henry Kissinger on the desirability, even necessity, of excluding the Soviets from the settlement process after 1973.25 This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Revisited 255 Sadat was aware that the Soviets would not take this foreign-policy realignment lightly or without making an effort to frustrate it. In his view, they reacted to his shift toward collaboration with the United States in three ways: first, they backed Syrian, Palestinian, and Libyan opposition to the Second Disengagement Agreement known as Sinai II; second, they exerted economic and military pressures on his regime by refusing to reschedule Egypt's debts or to provide the Egyptian army with much needed spare parts, as they had done with Syria; third, they were thought by Sadat to have instigated the domestic unrest that escalated between January 1975 and July 1977 as part of a Soviet grand design to bring down his regime. The most dramaticmanifestations of unrest took place in the third week of January 1977. The government's decisions to increase the prices of some basic commodities and services were met by violent demonstrationsand riots in major cities. The main targets of these attacks by the enraged masses were symbols of affluence and state institutions. The call for Sadat's overthrow was heard frequently and supported enthusiastically during the demonstrations, which lasted two days. According to the official account, seventy-nine persons lost their lives, and hundreds were injured in clashes with security forces. The intensity of these violent demonstrations forced Sadat to retreat and cancel the price increases, order a fourteen-hour curfew, and use the army to regain control of this sociopolitical upheaval. I shall limit my focus regarding the Januaryriots to the realm of Sadat's perception of this popular uprising and its impact on Egypt's foreign-policy shift. The clearest expression of that relationship was provided in a personal interview with Deputy Prime Minister Hassan al-Tuhami. Tuhami was also Sadat's representative in the secret talks with Israel's Moshe Dayan in Morocco during the third week of September 1977. In Tuhami's words: The Januaryriots had shownus the deliberateintentionsof the Soviet Union to bringthe regimedown.The local communistsmovedall overthe country,repeatingthe sameslogans and using the same tactics. But we know that local communistscannotdo anythingby themselves,andwithoutthe orders,or at least approval,of the Soviet Union.The response of the Presidentwas a decision [the trip to Jerusalem]to kick the Soviet Union and its agentsout of the area.26 Sadat himself described the January riots as engineered by "communists who received their instructions from Moscow."27 A common explanation of Sadat's decisions to go to Jerusalem and before that to conclude the Sinai II agreement depicts them as outcomes of Sadat's deeply rooted suspicions of Soviet motives. Such a link can be established along the lines of the aforementioned Tuhami argument, through the management of the socioeconomic crisis in a way that could reduce the regime's political vulnerability to its Moscow-supported enemies. The intensification of the socioeconomic crisis was paralleled by large-scale demonstrations, strikes, political violence, and a sharp decline in the regime's legitimacy, which Sadat had believed firmly would aid the Soviet design to bring him down. Other analysts point out that because of his anti-Sovietism, Sadat decided sometime in late October or early November 1977 to subvert the diplomacy of his major ally, the United States, when the Carter administration showed an interest in bringing the Soviet Union back into This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 256 Ibrahim A. Karawan the peace process as a cosponsor of the Geneva Conference. Because of Sadat's profound suspicions of the Soviets, he saw such a development as a guarantee that no settlement would be reached and concluded that the stalemate should be brought to an end by other means, including direct and public negotiations with Israel. Sadat's Decisional Style. What about Sadat's instrumental beliefs or preferred style in foreign-policy making? Sadat's style in decision making included a frequent resort to surprises. He often described this preferred style as "the electric shock strategy," whereas others labeled it "Sadat's shock therapy."28The decision to expel the Soviet advisers in July 1972, to launch war against Israel in October 1973, to reopen the Suez Canal in June 1975, and to go to Jerusalem in November 1977 are all examples. In most of these cases, a very small number of individuals were consulted or told in advance of the president's decision (or at an earlier stage, his inclination). As Michael Handel pointed out, the effective pursuit of surprise diplomacy has to combine two interrelated elements-secrecy and shock: "Secrecy provides a safe atmosphere in which the two sides . .. can negotiate, and make the necessary preparations for fundamental policy change.... Shock is intended to throw the adversary off balance and force him to facilitate a breakthroughin stagnant situations."29The secrecy element can be found in the talks held in Morocco between Sadat's envoy, Hassan al-Tuhami, and the foreign minister of Israel, Moshe Dayan. In his report to Sadat, Tuhami indicated that Israel's position in the talks was more positive than what could be derived from Begin's public statements. In return for peace, Israel was basically ready to withdraw its forces from Sinai. As to the element of shock, one can understand it by examining the immediate context of Sadat's announcement of his readiness to address the Israeli parliament. Ironically enough at the time, the guest of honor in the People's Assembly meeting, where Sadat dropped his bombshell on 9 November 1977, was Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairmanYasser Arafat. Sadat devoted part of his speech to heaping praise on Arafat and the PLO. More intriguing, according to former foreign minister Fahmy, Sadat had insisted on Arafat'spresence as a guest of honor. On the face of it, this gesture looked like a rewardto the PLO chairmanfor his effort in mediating between Egypt and Libya, an effort encouraged by Sadat himself. After his return from the Libyan capital, Arafat informed Egyptian officials that Qaddafi was looking seriously for a reconciliation with Egypt. As signs of his good intentions, the Libyan leader reportedly expressed readiness to finance Egypt's purchase of five hundredtanks and five squadrons of fighter airplanes, and to provide an undisclosed amount of financial assistance. In return,he anticipatedthat Egypt's policy would, among other things, refrain from pursuing any partial or bilateral diplomatic settlement with Israel.30 Another reason why Sadat's Jerusalem decision came as a total surprise, which shocked even his closest aides, was the fact that its announcement came only two days before the Arab foreign ministers were to start their deliberations in Tunisia about the next stage of Arab political strategy. Any provocative or controversial step of that naturereasonably could have been expected after, not before, the conference. This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Revisited 257 Accordingly, when asked in Tunisia about Sadat's announcementof his readiness to go to Israel, Egyptian foreign minister Fahmy insisted that it was basically a publicrelations statement.31 Sadat's decisional style also included announcing deadlines by which the results of major policies were to materialize. According to him, 1971 was "the year of decision," during which an end had to be put, peacefully or otherwise, to the Israeli occupation of Sinai. When the year ended without a decision, his well-publicized commitment was mocked, and large-scale demonstrations erupted in Cairo and Alexandria, reflecting a general sense of frustration. Sadat made a similarly publicized commitment after the food riots in January 1977, by designating 1977 as "the year of the settlement" and the turning point toward prosperity. By late October and early November, it became clear that the American attempt to reconvene the Geneva Conference had reached a deadlock. Hence, Sadat felt the necessity of launching his own "peace initiative." In doing so, he was pressured by that very component of his decisional style that proved to be problematic.32 Furthermore,an argument about the significance of Sadat's belief system in explaining the policy outcome under discussion can be based on the existence of the aforementioned conditions that usually enhance the effects of the leader's personal characteristics in foreign-policy making. First among these is the ambiguity of the situation itself, characterized in conflicting statements and rapidly shifting positions. In 1977, for example, the United States had a new administration, which adopted a "comprehensive approach"in place of Kissinger's step-by-step strategy. At first, the Carter administrationreached an agreement with the Soviets about the basic principles that were to guide the settlement process. Only a few days later, however, it reformulatedits position in the face of strong Israeli opposition. Israel had a new and hawkish government under Prime Minister Menachem Begin, but it was sending signals, particularlyto Egypt, of its readiness to make importantconcessions. Syria accepted and then rejected the idea of sending a unified Arab delegation to the opening session of the peace conference. Arafat accepted and then turned down the proposal that two American professors of Palestinian origin (reportedly the suggested names included Edward Said and IbrahimAbu Lughod) represent the Palestinians in the Geneva negotiations. In such a fluid and ambiguous situation, Sadat was forced to interpretdevelopments using his operational code. A second pertinentfactor was Sadat'sdirect and intensive involvement in foreignpolicy making; obviously he was the principal decision maker. By virtue of his position and its traditionaldominance over foreign policy, he exercised what amounted to a monopoly over the formulation of Egypt's policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab world, and the superpowers.33The published memoirs of the foreign ministers who worked with Sadat lend credence to the conclusion that "the presidential center"played the predominantrole in deciding majorforeign-policy issues. "When faced with an importantissue, he retired to one of the presidential residences to be alone for a few days. He did not like reading recommendations and reports, and liked to surprisehis aides. Sadat's advisors referredto the president privately as a latter day pharaoh."34 A third and related factor is the wide decisional latitude that Sadat enjoyed, given the authoritariannature of the political system. Sadat attempted to legitimize This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 258 Ibrahim A. Karawan such latitude in sociocultural terms when he spoke of Egypt as one extended family with himself as the eldest, which Ajami aptly characterizedas "a curious avoidance of politics."35Another image favored by Sadat, that of a village headman or Cumda, is equally telling of what he expected and tried to achieve in major policy-making decisions. On the occasion of drafting a new constitution in 1971, Sadat made it clear that he wanted the new document to reflect the values of unity and respect for the head of the family and of the village: "I want it to be worded in such a way as to turn the whole of Egypt into one big village." By implication Sadat became the personification of the society's honor, or "a sort of super cumda."36 A Critique of the Leader-Centered Argument The operational-code approach relies on an analysis of speeches, statements, and writings of political leaders. In many cases, however, the researchers actually analyze material that was ghost-written to convey certain impressions that may or may not correspond accurately to the leader's beliefs. This problem has led some scholars to suggest dealing mainly with statements in press conferences when the leader has little time to plan answers. The statements are thought, then, to be closer to what Margaret Hermann has called "spontaneous material" than to "planned material."37However, this suggestion can be criticized on the ground that press conferences and interviews are often used by political leaders to send signals to other states through statements that reflect political expediency more than they do beliefs. Individual leaders may use particular language in foreign policy, not to convey political values and attitudes, but to influence or even manipulate a particulardomestic or international audience.38Particularcircumstances that surround the statements, as well as temporal inconsistency, can also be quite significant, but in a way it is not shown adequately if one relies merely on an analysis of a leader's answers in a press conference. The problem with the belief-system approach is not confined to data reliability. It has been subjected to a number of conceptual criticisms that have identified three basic problems. First, the term "belief system" has not been used in a consistent manner nor has it been clearly defined: it has been used to refer to variables ranging from attitudes and values to orientations. Second, studies based on this approach have often neglected changes in the importance or the meaning of the beliefs themselves as the particular situation changes. The third problem has been the weakness of the causal link between the beliefs of leaders and the behavior of states.39 These problems weaken the argumentthat Sadat's "belief system" offers the best explanation for Egypt's foreign-policy shift in the Arab-Israeli conflict, an argument that has many shortcomings. First, Sadat adopted diametrically opposed policies and positions in a way that could not be attributedto the same belief system. We are told that he was an Egyptian, rather than a Pan-Arabist, first. For years he had refused to negotiate with Israel, however, as long as it occupied Arab and Egyptian lands; he had characterized negotiating under these conditions as sheer surrender.In many statements before the Jerusalem trip he emphasized that "anyone who engages in negotiations while his territories are occupied is thereby capit- This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Revisited 259 ulating." When talking to an American or Western audience, his favorite rhetorical question was, "When Japan occupied the entire Pacific . . . why did the U.S. not sit at the table with Japan in order to find a peaceful solution?"40 Second, it is not clear how to identify those particularcomponents of Sadat's belief system that are most significant in shaping the Egyptian foreign-policy shift. It may be convenient to argue that Sadat shifted policy because of the marginality of his Arab identification or the intensity of his "paranoia"toward the Soviet Union. However, the tabulation and analysis of Sadat's statements between 1970 and 1977 leave no doubt that he considered Israel to be Egypt's primary enemy and that he attributedto it expansionist and aggressive designs. His anti-Israeli and even antiJewish attitudes (at least until November 1977) were certainly not a very well-kept secret, and they fit Robert Jervis's "inherentbad faith model." Speaking about Jerusalem he vowed, "We shall take it with the help of Allah out of the hands of whom the Quran has said 'it was written of them that they shall be demeaned and made wretched'. We shall not conduct direct negotiations with them. They are a nation of liars and traitors, contrivers of plots, a people born for deeds of treachery."41 Not surprisingly, studies that analyzed the content of Sadat's speeches and interviews have found it difficult to explain Egypt's disengagement from the conflict in light of his core beliefs concerning Israel, which should have precluded major policy shifts. The author of a study that tested the utility of Margaret Hermann'sanalytic categories in explaining Middle Eastern cases has concluded that Sadat "in contrast to [King] Hussein and Assad . . . had personal traits which resembled those of aggressive leaders" and that "it was [King] Hussein or even Assad, rather than Sadat, who should have initiated conciliatory moves."42 Third, this argument ignores the existence of a similar mindset regarding the disengagement from the conflict with Israel at the highest level of the Egyptian ruling elite. It is true that Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy resigned after it became certain that the president was determined to go to Jerusalem. But it is equally true that he had cooperated with Sadat in disengaging Egypt from the conflict with Israel and shared to a great extent Sadat's belief in the central role of the United States in bringing about a settlement. In addition, he was not against direct negotiations, at some stage, with Israel. The main point in his disagreement with Sadat had to do with political tactics. Fahmy acquiredwide public recognition first when he participatedin an al-Ahramsponsored symposium in May 1972, about the state of "no war no peace." In analyzing the best policy that Egypt should adopt to end the stalemate, he advocated improving relations with the United States, distancing Egypt from the Soviet Union, and resortingto "a militaryinitiative to revitalize the crisis." Fahmyclaimed later that "Sadat'sforeign policy certainly startedchanging in the direction I have suggested." The similarity between his and Sadat'spolicy is quite evident. After the 1973 war, he sharedSadat'swillingness to adopt a policy of de facto nonbelligerency toward Israel (as evidenced by the reconstructionof the Suez Canal area). He supportedending de jure the state of belligerence with Israel in the context of the Sinai II agreement as manifested in its stipulation that the conflict between the parties and in the Middle East "would not be solved by militarymeans,"and the Egyptiancommitmentto allow nonmilitary cargoes destined for or coming from Israel to pass through the canal. This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 260 Ibrahim A. Karawan Fahmy also sharedSadat'sopposition to the Syrian proposalin 1977 of pursuingstrict linkage between all issues on all fronts or collective bargainingand mutualvetoes in the settlement of the conflict with Israel. It would require only one party, according to Fahmy, to "take too uncompromisinga position, thus totally defeating the possibility of success at Geneva."43 Moreover, Fahmy's memoirs are quite revealing concerning his readiness for direct negotiations with Israel. In the course of a discussion with Sadat, he reportedly said, "I was instrumental,and from the very beginning responsible for the success of the first and second disengagements on the Egyptian-Israeli front.... It should by now be evident that both you and I work for peace. But the point is what kind of peace.... I'm not against your meeting with Begin. I am ready to arrange for a meeting in Washington or Geneva, or even to bring Begin to Cairo, but going to Jerusalem is a different matter. By going to Jerusalem you will play all your cards for nothing."44 Fourth, both Sadat and Nasser before him acted on the basis of the primacy of Egypt's national interest regarding the conflict with Israel, despite the repeatedly emphasized differences between their belief systems. Nasser's behavior was far from that of a Pan-Arabist ideological warrior against Israel. During the first few years after seizing power, he explored possibilities of a political settlement with Israel through intermediaries who opened channels of communication between him and Moshe Sharett. Between the Suez War in 1956 and the June War in 1967, he was primarily interested in bringing about domestic changes to develop Egypt, and regional political transformations to secure its leadership of the Arab world. Thus, it is important to distinguish between the rhetoric of Egypt's declaratory posture toward Israel and its actual moderate policies. This distinction may explain why the Egyptian-Israeli borders were the quietest in the area between the 1956 and 1967 wars, the very period that witnessed the consolidation of the Nasserist regime in Egypt. When Israel was on the verge of completing its diversion of the Jordan River water, Nasser made it abundantly clear that he did not want Egypt to be dragged into a confrontation with Israel "through the precipitous action of another state," trying to outbid everyone else in terms of its commitment to the Palestinians. As one astute observer put it, "for Nasser a sense of commitment to the cause of Arab Palestine was always tempered by a pragmatic concern for Egypt's own national interest. For the Palestinians, these limitations-not fully recognized until after 1967-were a source of. . . disappointment and increasing frustration."45 Despite Palestinian objections, Nasser accepted U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 in November 1967, which recognized Israel's right to exist and treated the Palestinian issue as a mere refugee problem. In August 1970, when he perceived it to be in Egypt's national interest, he accepted the second Rogers plan, which called for a cease-fire, and the conduct of indirect negotiations with Israel through a U.N. representative on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242. Iraqi, Syrian, and Palestinian denunciations of the Egyptian acceptance mounted, but Nasser was not about to allow other Arab states and organizations to exercise a veto power over Egypt's policy, even in the name of Pan-Arabism. When a PLOoperated radio station in Cairo criticized Egypt's acceptance of the Rogers plan as This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Revisited 261 a sellout, Nasser ordered it closed and its operators as well as other Palestinian activists evicted.46 A fifth and last problem with the belief-system argument is that it does not explain adequately the timing of certain decisions along the path of disengagement. For instance, if Sadat had held his belief system for years, why did he not opt to accept a separate deal with Israel at some earlier point?47If he had consistently rejected direct political talks with Israel and emphasized that "if both the Prophet Mohammad and Jesus were to come back and try to convince Moslems and Christians among the Arabs to open borders . . with Israel they would refuse,"48and then decided to disengage Egypt from the conflict further after facing intense domestic unrest and a clear-cut regional stalemate in a way that created a much greater threat to the survival of his regime, how then can we conclude that it was not the latter factors that accounted for the policy shift or established the setting for such a shift? The main point in such criticisms of the leader-centeredexplanations for Egypt's disengagement from the Arab-Israeli conflict is not (and should not be understood to imply) that personality factors are irrelevant. The personal characteristics of the leader coupled with the features of the political system as a whole are better suited to shed light on a specific decision (the choice of going to Jerusalem) or the "how" dimension of the foreign-policy alteration (i.e., policy-making style, preference for risk maximization vs. risk avoidance, scope of interelite deliberation, and the decisional latitude of the principal policy maker). A more adequate analysis of the "why" dimension49has to go beyond the political beliefs of "the latter-day pharaoh" to examine state-society interactions and the political economy of foreignpolicy restructuring. NOTES Author's note: I am indebted to Ali Dessouki, Bahgat Korany, Arthur Stein, Louis Cantori, Afaf Marsot, Peter Diamond, and especially Richard Sklar for helpful comments on earlier versions. However, I do absolve all of them from responsibility for any errors. Personal interviews proved to be invaluable, particularly those with Tahseen Bashir, Usama al-Baz, Ismail Fahmy, Butros Ghali, and Hassan al-Tuhami. I am grateful to all of them for sharing their insights, as well as to Janessa and Suhayla Karawan for their constant support. 'Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (New York: Little Brown, 1982), 647. 2For Carter's views, see Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (Toronto: Bantam House, 1982), 282-83. For Fahmy's assessment, see Ismail Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 283-90. 3See Mohamed Heikal, Autumnof Fury: The Assassination of Sadat (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), chap. 1; idem, "Egyptian Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 56, 4 (July 1978): 714-27; idem, Hadith al-Mubaidara (The Talk of the Initiative) (Beirut: Sharikat al-Matbi'at, 1978); Salwa Shacrawi Jum'a, al-Dibliimasiyya al-Misriyya fi 'Aqd al-Sab'indt (Egyptian Diplomacy in the Decade of the Seventies) (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1988); Jamal Zahran, al-Siyaissa alKhdrijiyya li-Misr (The Foreign Policy of Egypt) (Cairo: Madbuli, 1988); Muhammed 'Abd al-Salam al-Zayyat, al-Sadat: al-Qiniic wa-al-Haqiqa (Sadat: The Mask and the Reality) (Cairo: Kitab al-Ahali, 1989); 'Abd al-Alim Muhammed, al-Khitaibal-Sddati (The Sadatist Discourse) (Cairo: Kitab al-Ahali, 1990), 244-71; Lutfi al-Khiili, "Madrasatal-Sadat al-Siyasiyya" (Sadat's Political School), a series of articles published in al-Ahrdm between 13 June and 20 August 1975; Raphael Israeli with Carol Bardenstein, Man of Defiance (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1985), 216-47; Shaheen Ayubi, Sadat and This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 262 Ibrahim A. Karawan Nasser (Wakefield, N.H.: Longwood Academic, 1992); David Hirst and Irene Beeson, Sadat (London: Faber and Faber, 1981); Mattityahu Peled, "The Year of Sadat's Initiative," in Great Power Intervention in the Middle East, ed. Milton Leitenberg and Gabriel Sheffer (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), 301-12. Relatively fewer studies presented alternative conceptualizations of Egypt's disengagement from the Arab-Israeli conflict. These include Bahgat Korany, "Egypt's Dependent Development: Pattern of Inter-Arab Politics and the Making of the Camp David Agreements" (Paper presented to the Middle East Studies Association Meeting in San Francisco, 28 November-i December 1984); Ali Dessouki, "The Primacy of Economics: The Foreign Policy of Egypt," in The Foreign Policies of Arab States, ed. Bahgat Korany and Ali Hillal Dessouki (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984); Shibley Telhami, Power and Leadership in International Bargaining, the Path to the Camp David Accords (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). 4See G. H. Stassen, "Individual Preferences versus Role-Constraint in Policy Making," World Politics 25, 1 (October 1972): 96-119; M. J. Shapiro and G. M. Bonham, "Cognitive Processes and Foreign Policy Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly 17, 2 (June 1973): 147-74; Margaret Hermann, "Leader Personality and Foreign Policy Behavior," in Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and Methods, ed. James Rosenau (New York: Halsted, 1974), 201-34; idem, "Effects of Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders on Foreign Policy," in Why Nations Act, ed. Maurice East, Stephen Salmore, and Charles Hermann (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978); idem, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders," International Studies Quarterly 24, 1 (March 1980): 7-46. 5Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), 11; see also Ole Holsti, "Individual Differences in 'Definition of the Situation'," Journal of Conflict Resolution 14, 3 (September 1970): 303-10; Alexander George, "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly 13, 2 (June 1969): 190-222; Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). 6Brecher, Foreign Policy System, 28-29; see also by Robert Jervis, "Political Decision Making: Recent Contributions,"Political Psychology 2 (1980): 86-101. A useful overview of this approach can be found in Alexander George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980). In this study, George defined the leader's belief system as a "prism or filter that influences the actor's perception and diagnosis of political situations, and that provides norms and standards to guide and channel his choices of action in specific situations" (ibid., 45). For a critical evaluation of this literature, see Martha Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Influence of Cognition (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 5-31. 7MargaretHermann, "Effects of Personal Characteristics,"51. For another typology that identified seven situations under which the personal characteristics of political leaders play a decisive role in foreign policy, see Ole Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively," in Structure of Decision, ed. Robert Axelrod (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 30. For studies that adopted this perspective to explain the specificity of LDC foreign policy, see James Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966); W. Scott Thompson, The Foreign Policy of Ghana 1957-1966 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969); I. William Zartman,International Relations in the New Africa (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966); P. J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation (New York: St. Martin, 1978); Raphael Israeli, "I, Egypt": Aspects of President Anwar Al-Sadat's Political Thought (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1981); Adeed Dawisha, Syria and the Lebanese Crisis (New York: St. Martin, 1980); Christopher Clapham, "Sub-Saharan Africa," in Foreign Policy Making in Developing States, ed. ChristopherClapham (Westmead, Eng.: Saxon House, 1977), 76-109; Michael Leifer, "South East Asia," ibid., 18-41. 8On the general characteristics of personal regimes, see Robert Jackson and Carl Roseberg, "Personal Rule: Theory and Practices in Africa," Comparative Politics 16, 4 (July 1984): 421-42. For Middle Eastern cases, see A. Dawisha, "The Middle East," in Foreign Policy Making, 62-63; Mohamad Hassanein Heikal, "Egyptian Foreign Policy," ibid., 714-15; P. J. Vatikiotis, "The Foreign Policy of Egypt," in Foreign Policy in World Politics, ed. Roy Macridis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1962), 304. This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Revisited 263 9Although the Egyptian Foreign Ministry has its specialized structuresand highly competent diplomats, its role concerning importantmatters has been limited. For the general argument on bureaucratic politics, see Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review 63, 3 (September 1969): 689-718; Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," World Politics 24 (Spring 1972): 40-80; Stephen D. Krasner, "Allison's Wonderland: Are Bureaucrats Important?"Foreign Policy 7 (Summer 1972): 159-79. For discussions of Third World cases, see Maurice East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior," World Politics 25, 4 (July 1973): 556-76; idem, "Foreign Policy Making in Small States," Policy Sciences 4, 4 (December 1973): 491-508; Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less-Developed Countries," World Politics 24, 3 (April 1972): 356-81; idem, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemmas of Dependence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976). For studies that aimed at formulating general propositions to explain LDC foreign policy, see Joel Migdal, "InternationalStructures and External Behavior: Explaining Foreign Policy of the Third World States," International Relations 4, 5 (May 1974): 51025; Bahgat Korany, "Foreign Policy in the Third World," International Political Science Review 5, 1 (1984): 7-20; idem, "Foreign Policy Models and Their Empirical Relevance to Third World Countries," International Social Science Journal 26, 1 (March 1976): 70-94. 10P.J. Vatikiotis, "Foreign Policy of Egypt," in Foreign Policy in World Politics, 340; A. I. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy (London: Macmillan, 1976), 107. See also Muhammad el-Sayyid Salim, al-Tahlll al-Siyasi al-Nisiri (Nasserist Political Analysis) (Beirut: Markaz Diriasaital-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1983); Salwa Sharawi Gomaa, "Egyptian Diplomacy in the Seventies: A Case Study in Leadership"(Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1986). 11Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955), 87-88. See also Marlyn Nasr, al-Tasawwur al-Qawmi al-'Arabifi Fikr Jamil 'Abd al-Nasir (The Arab Nationalist Conception in the Thought of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir) (Beirut: Markaz Dirasaital-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1981). 2Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1981), 94. 13Ibid., 99; Amatzia Baram, "TerritorialNationalism in the Middle East," Middle Eastern Studies 26, 4 (October 1990): 431-32; Raphael Israeli, "Sadat between Arabism and Africanism," Middle East Review 11, 3 (Spring 1979): 39-48. See Shlomo Aronson, Sadat's Initiative and Israel's Response: The Strategy of Peace and the Strategy of Strategy, n. 14 (Los Angeles, Calif.: Center for Arms Control and InternationalSecurity, UCLA, 1978), 1-5; R. Michael Burrell and Abbas Kelidar, Egypt: The Dilemmas of a Nation (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977), 58. Salwa Gomaa argued that Sadat's selfimage played a predominantrole in influencing his objectives and actions. According to her, in studying his foreign policy, one of the main questions has to be: "Did Sadat see himself as an Arab or an Egyptian? ... The question of identity is very importantbecause if Sadat saw himself principally as an Arab, then his definition of any given situation, his objectives, and his strategy have to be tied to Arab aspirations, acceptance, and support. But if he saw himself as an Egyptian first of all, then his definition of the situation would be more flexible." Gomaa, Egyptian Diplomacy in the Seventies, 12-13, 53-56. Another study based in part on analyzing the political language used by Egyptian leaders concluded that, whereas "Nasser perceived Egypt as merely a part of the Arab ummah, Sadat perceived Egypt as a nation by itself." MuhammadHussein Mustafa, "The Role of Cognitive Perceptions: Nasser and Sadat"(Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1985), 377. For the detailed comparison, see ibid., 348-425. 14Ajami, Arab Predicament, 94. 15Daniel Dishon, "Sadat's Arab Adversaries," Jerusalem Quarterly 8 (Summer 1978): 13-15. According to Quandt, Sadat had "informed Secretary [of State Cyrus] Vance in August 1977 that a single Arab delegation [to the suggested Geneva conference would] lead to an 'explosion', because of attempts by each Arab party to impose its will on the others. Egypt in particular . .. could not accept Arab dictation of what it can and cannot accept." William Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986), 88, 135. During the summer and early fall of 1977, Syria insisted that any peace negotiations would have to take place between a unified Arab delegation, including the PLO, and Israel according to a formula characterized on the Arab side by collective bargaining and mutual vetoes. On 22 October 1977, Assad's envoy, General Naji al-Jamil, discussed the Syrian position with Sadat and reportedly lectured him "on his duty as an Arab nationalist, which This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 264 Ibrahim A. Karawan greatly irritated the Egyptian leader." (ibid., 142). See also al-Ahram, 27 November 1977; Ibrahim Karawan, "Sadat on the Road to Jerusalem: Four Levels of Analysis" (Paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association Annual meeting in Seattle, November 1981), 23-24. '6Many studies focused on Sadat's anti-Sovietism as an explanation of his pursuit of a separatepeace with Israel, particularly after the Soviet-American communique of 1 October 1977. For examples, see Robert Tucker, "The Middle East: For a Separate Peace," Commentary65, 3 (March 1978): 25-31; Shlomo Avineri, "Peacemaking: The Arab-Israeli Conflict," Foreign Affairs 57, 1 (Fall 1978): 51-69; Gabriel Ben-Dor, interview with Point International, 19 December 1977, 16. However, in assessing this argument it is important first to recall that the communique mentioned earlier did not last more than a few days due to opposition by Israel and the pro-Israeli lobby in the United States; see Raymond Cohen, "Israel and the Soviet-American Statement of October 1, 1977: The Limits of Patron-Client Influence," Orbis 22, 3 (Fall 1978): 613-33. Second, Sadat's assessment of the communique was rather mixed. On the one hand, in his public statements (which aimed primarily at ridiculing the Soviet Union's leftist friends in Egypt and the Arab world), he characterizedthe communique as one more proof of the similarity of the basic positions of the superpowers, regardless of any allegations to the contrary. As Sadat pointed out, the communique had shown that the Soviet position has taken a step backwardby supporting normalizationof relations between the parties, dropping the PLO's name as far as Palestinian representation was concerned, and accepting less than total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands. The American position took a step forward by accepting to treat the Palestinian problem as a core issue of the conflict and recognizing the "national rights of the Palestinian people." See al-Ahram, 7 October 1977 and Akhbar al-Yawm, 16 October 1977. On the other hand, in his dealings with American officials he described the communique as "a brilliant maneuver"to pressure Syria to adopt a more flexible position in the Geneva conference; see Ambassador Hermann Eilts, "The Syrians Have Been Their Own Worst Enemies," New YorkTimes, 12 January 1982; Quandt, Camp David, 123. 17Raphael Israeli, "The Role of Islam in President Sadat's Thought," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 4, 4 (1980), 1. 1Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar (London: Collins, 1978), 231-32. 19Anwarel-Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Harper& Row, 1978), 284. 20Anwaral-Sadat, Wasiyyati (My Will) (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1982), 151-52. 21Fahmy,Negotiating for Peace, 135-37. 22See quotations from Sadat's speeches in Zahran, al-Siyasa al-Khdrijiyya li-Misr, 259-79. For more, see Alvin Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977); Petro Ramet, Sadat and the Kremlin (Los Angeles: California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1980). 23Zahran,al-Siyasa al-Khdrijiyya li-Misr, 260. See also the statement by Sadat: "Since I became President, there has hardly been a day without some quarrel with the Russians. They never trusted me. They said I was pro-American and convinced Ali Sabri that I was selling Egypt out to the Americans," Newsweek, 7 August 1972. 24Interviewwith a former high-ranking official, Cairo, September 1979; also see Sadat, In Search of Identity, 225-26. 25Al-Ahrdm,27 November 1977. On the foreign-policy and security implications of Egypt's global realignment in the mid-1970s, see Ibrahim Karawan, "Egypt and the Western Alliance: The Politics of Westomania?" in The Middle East and the Western Alliance, ed. Steven Spiegel (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), 163-81; idem, "Egypt's Defense Policy," in Defense Planning in Less-Industrialized States, ed. Stephanie Neuman (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1984), 147-65. 26Personalinterview with Hassan al-Tuhami, deputy prime minister in the presidential palace, Cairo, 23 September 1979. See Tuhami's interview in Ruizal-Yusif, no. 2695, 4 February 1980, 12-13, and in al-Musawwar, no. 3007, 28 May 1982. 27Quotedin Martin Indyk, To the Ends of the Earth: Sadat's Jerusalem Initiative (Cambridge: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, HarvardUniversity, 1984), 20. See also Husayn 'Abdal-Raziq, Misrfi 18 wa-19 Yandyir(Egypt on the 18th and 19th of January)(Beirut: Dar al-Kalima, 1984), 13-86; Hasan Abui Baishai,Mudhakkirdtfi al-Amn wa-al-Siydsa (Memoirs in Security and Politics) (Cairo: Dar alHillal, 1990), 50-55. 28Anan Safadi, "Sadat's Second Surprise,"Jerusalem Post Magazine, 18 November 1977, 4-5. This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Revisited 265 29Michael Handel, "Surprise and Change in International Politics," International Security 4, 4 (Spring 1980): 61; see also Michael Handel, The Diplomacy of Surprise: Hitler, Nixon, and Sadat (Cambridge: Center for InternationalAffairs, HarvardUniversity, 1981). 30See Ismail Fahmy's statement in al-Mustaqbal (Paris), 12 December 1977; and the statement by Hani al-Hassan, Arafat's political adviser, in al-Sdfir (Beirut), 21 November 1977. 31New YorkTimes, 13 November 1977; and Fahmy's statements in MahmuidFawzi, Kamb Dayfid fi 'Aql Wuzard' Khdrijiyyat Misr (Camp David in the Mind of Egypt's Foreign Ministers) (Cairo: Madbuli, 1990), 85. 32See quotations from Sadat's speeches examined in Zahran, al-Siyasa al-Kharijiyya li-Misr, 329, 371; Derek Hopwood, Egypt, Politics and Society, 1945-1981 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 107; Ahmad Bahia al-DIn, Muhawarati Maca al-Sddit (My Conversations with Sadat) (Cairo: Dar al-Hillal, 1987), 123-33. 33Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World, 97. For an opposing viewpoint, see Melvin Friedlander, Sadat and Begin: The Domestic Politics of Peacemaking (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), 239-40. In the doctoral dissertation upon which this book is based, Friedlanderargued that "Sadat had neither the latitude nor opportunity to simply will a decision.... He had to bargain, cajole, often gently and persuasively, sometimes officiously. In short Egypt's leader succeeded [in disengaging his country from the Arab-Israeli conflict], because he was an expert at implementing strategies not too dissimilar from adroit managers of parliamentaryor coalition governing bodies"; see Melvin A. Friedlander,"The Management of Peacemaking in Egypt and Israel: 1977-1979" (Ph.D. diss., The American University, Washington D.C., 1982), xi-xii, 586-87. For critical assessments of the implications of the decisional unit on bargaining positions see Tariq al-Mahdawi, "'Amaliyyat SunCal-Qararfi al-Siyasa al-Kharijiyya al-Misriyya" (The Process of Decision Making in the Egyptian Foreign Policy), al-Mawqifal-'Arabi 12, 94 (February-March 1988): 132-40; Shibley Telhami, "Evaluating Bargaining Performance,"Political Science Quarterly 107, 4 (Winter 1992-93): 643-45. 34EhudYaari et al., The Yearof the Dove (New York: Bantam, 1979), 22; see also idem, "Sadat'sPyramid of Power," Jerusalem Quarterly 14 (Winter 1980): 110-21. On the general characteristicsof the predominantleader as a type of "ultimatedecision units," see MargaretHermannand Charles Hermann, "Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How," InternationalStudies Quarterly 33 (1989): 363-66. 35FouadAjami, "The Struggle for Egypt's Soul," Foreign Policy 35 (Summer 1979): 29. Salwa Gomaa concluded that "Sadat's conception of the Egyptian political system as one big family where the president plays the role of the father who must be obeyed . . . approached to a large degree the Weberian patriarchalsystem" (see her study, Egyptian Diplomacy in the Seventies, 58-59). 36RaphaelIsraeli, Peace is in the Eye of the Beholder (Berlin: Mouton Publishers, 1985), 114-17, 183-89; John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 383. 37MargaretHermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior," 15. For a critique of Hermann's proposal, see Karen Rasler, William Thompson, and Kathleen Chester, "Foreign Policy Makers, Personality Attributes, and Interviews," International Studies Quarterly 24, 1 (March 1980): 47-66. 38Rasleret al., "Foreign Policy Makers," 52-53. On the reliability of representationalversus instrumental modes of communication in operational code research, see Deborah Welch Larson, "Problems of Content Analysis in Foreign-Policy Research," International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988): 247-50. 39MarthaCottam, "Cognitive Limitations and Foreign Policy Decision Making" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1983), 15, 28. 40RaphaelIsraeli, The Public Diary of President Sadat (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978), 1: 250. 41Quoted in Israeli, "The Role of Islam in President Sadat's Thought," 7-8. See also, idem, "I, Egypt," 117-43; Hirst and Beeson, Sadat, 277-78. On Sadat's perceptions of Israel and Zionism as aggressive, destructive, and expansionist, see Zahran,al-Siydisaal-Kharijiyya li-Misr, 78-81. 42Ibid.,73-99, and in particular,379; Saliba George Sarsar,"The Effects of Defense and War Costs and Personal Traits on Change in Foreign Policy Orientations:A Case Study of Sadat's Egypt" (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1984), 84-115, particularly 107-108. Less than six weeks before his assassination, Sadat described to Saad Ibrahimthe ordeal he went throughwhile visiting Israel and meeting most of its leaders; see Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim, Icadat al-ltibar lil-Ra'is al-Sddadt(The Rehabilitation of President Sadat) (Cairo: Dar al-Shuriiq, 1992), 25-26. This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 266 Ibrahim A. Karawan 43Fahmy,Negotiatingffor Peace, 7-8, 15-16, 80, 159-60, 192; FawzI, Kamb Dayfidfi cAqlWuzara' Kharijiyyat Misr, 31-33; William Quandt, Decade of Decisions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 265-75. 44Fahmy,Negotiating for Peace, 256-58. 45RaymondBaker, Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1978), 37; idem, Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 94; Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World, 43; Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 126; Nadav Safran, "Dimensions of the Middle East Problem," in Foreign Policy in World Politics, ed. Roy Macridis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1985), 353; Usama al-Ghazali Harb, "al-Muwajaha al-CArabiyya-al-Isra'iliyyawa-Daynamiyyat Cal-Dawla' wa Cal-Sharciyya'fi al-calam al-CArabi"(The Arab-Israeli Confrontationand the Dynamics of the State and Legitimacy in the Arab World), ShuaunFilastiniyya, 160-61 (July-August 1986): 1736, particularly 23. For more on Egyptian-Israeli contacts during the first few years after Nasser's ascendence to power, see Ahmad Hamriish, Kharif 'Abd al-Nasir (The Autumn of 'Abd al-Nasir) (Cairo: Madbuli, 1984), 18-25; Michael Oren, "From Revolution to Crisis: Egypt-Israel Relations" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1986); idem, "The First Egyptian to Visit Israel," Middle East Review (Spring 1989): 39-46; and his more recent article, "Secret Egypt-Israel Peace Initiatives Prior to the Suez Campaign," Middle Eastern Studies 26, 3 (July 1990): 351-70. 46See the statement by Egypt's official spokesman in al-Ahram, 29 July 1970, 1, and 17 August 1970, 1. A first-page comment in al-Ahram referred to slogans by Palestinian organizations according to which they refused any sponsorship over their decision making. In response, the Egyptian leadership stated that "it categorically rejects any wisaya (sponsorship) on it and on the Egyptian people, and the Egyptian revolution by any of those who repeat these slogans without understandingwhat they mean," al-Ahrdm, 1 August 1970, 1. In these comments the word "Egypt," and not the "United Arab Republic," was used more frequently than before. A meeting chaired by Nasser stressed that "Egypt's acceptance of a ceasefire... falls within Egypt's responsibility, because it was Egypt and not other Arab states that cancelled the unlimited ceasefire which the other Arab fronts continue to abide by" (al-Ahrdm, 2 August 1970, 1). See the text of Nasser's sharp letter to the Iraqi president in al-Ahram, 3 August 1970, which made clear that he did not consult Arab leaders before accepting Rogers's proposals, although he met with six of them in the Libyan capital two weeks earlier. According to Heikal, if Egypt had asked for an Arab vote on its move, "it could not have moved. Egypt had to assume its responsibility and to act." See Muhammad Haykal, "Qadaya Asasiyya lil-Munaiqasha"(Basic Questions for Discussion), al-Ahram, 7 August 1970, 3; idem, "Misr: al-Iltizaimwa-al-Qadar"(Egypt: The Commitment and the Destiny), alAhram, 4 September 1970. Moreover, Heikal, who had earlier characterized opposition to Egypt's foreign policy by other Pan-Arabist forces as "childish," posed this challenge to them: "If you do not like the way we fight, let us see how the fighting ought to be" (al-Ahram, 13 August 1970, 9). 47Accordingto Arnold de Borschgrave, Newsweek's political correspondentin the Middle East in the 1970s, President Sadat told him as early as February 1972 that "it was necessary to open a direct dialogue with Israel as a way of bypassing the two superpowers and liberating Egypt's policy from their influence. However, he asked him not to publish that part then" (al-Nahar al-'Arabt wa-al Dawli, 10 December 1977). See, along similar lines, the memoirs of former deputy prime minister Muhammad 'Abdal-Salaimal-Zayyat in al-Ahali (Cairo), 25 November 1987, 10. 48As quoted in the New YorkTimes, 19 January 1977. 49Fora discussion of Third World and specifically Arab cases, see Bahgat Korany, "The Take-Off of Third World Studies? The Case of Foreign Policy," World Politics 35, 3 (April 1983): 456-87; idem, "When and How Do Personality Factors Influence Foreign Policy?" Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 9, 3 (Spring 1986): 35-59; idem, "Dirasatal-Siyaisatal-'Arabiyya al-Kharijiyya:Taqyim wa-Naqd" (The Study of Arab Foreign Policies: An Evaluation and Critique), al-Majalla al-CArabiyya lil-Dirdsdt al-Dawliyya 1, 1 (Winter 1978-88): 5-28. For more on the political economy of the Egyptian case, see Ibrahim Karawan, "Foreign Policy Restructuring:Egypt's Disengagement from the ArabIsraeli Conflict Reconsidered" (Unpublished manuscript, Political Science Department, University of Utah, August 1993). This content downloaded from 198.246.0.72 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 17:51:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions