Metaphysics of causation
John Bigelow1990, Erkenntnis
Aristotle classified causes into 4 types. 1) Efficient Cause, in which a present event causes a future event. This is sometimes called a mechanical cause. 2) Final Cause, in which a future event (possible or actual) causes a present event. This is sometimes called a goal or a purpose. 3) Material Cause, such as the bronze of a statue 4) Formal Cause, such as the form of a statue. Today, thanks to Newton, and to some degree Descartes, efficient causality is the only one of these 4 that is usually considered respectable by modern science. We do speak of final causes in ordinary language to explain the behavior of persons. We say, for example, that Mary went to the Kitchen because she wanted a glass of wine. Philosopher Dan Dennett calls this way of thinking "the intentional stance", (Dennett 1989) and says that regardless of its truth or falsity, it is impossible for us to understand our fellow persons without it. However, many scientists and lovers of science argue that we have to speak this way only because we don't know enough about the efficient, mechanical causality to regularly rely on explanations like "Mary went to the kitchen because a signal went down from her brain and triggered her muscles, which then moved her bones etc." Darwinian Science is admired because it removes explanations that refer to a Divine personal agency, and replaces them with "blind" mechanisms that do not plan for the future. Explanations in Artificial Intelligence are not considered adequate until they remove all reference to a "homunculus" (little person) who is controlling the intelligent system. In short, explanations that make references to the beliefs and desires of persons are usually seen today not as "final causes", but as shorthand for mechanical "efficient" causes. Aristotle's talk of material and formal causes seems strange today. To say that the bronze is the cause of a statue makes little sense to modern ears. However, I believe that this is largely because mechanical causality has so thoroughly replaced all other forms in our best scientific thinking. Common sense language still maintains something like a commitment to material causation. We do say things like "the dynamite caused the explosion.", which seems to imply that the material called dynamite has causal powers in and of itself. But we understand this to be short hand for talking about certain kinds of events, because Aristotle's efficient causality is a connection that exists between events, not objects. It was the mosquito biting someone that caused them to catch malaria, not the mosquito itself. It was the lighting of the dynamite that caused
