Moving Beyond Computational Cognitivism: Understanding Intentionality, Intersubjectivity and Ecology of Mind

Integr Psych Behav (2008) 42:129–136 DOI 10.1007/s12124-007-9045-4 EDITORIAL Moving Beyond Computational Cognitivism: Understanding Intentionality, Intersubjectivity and Ecology of Mind Agustín Ibáñez & Diego Cosmelli Published online: 15 January 2008 # Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007 Abstract The emergence of the Cognitive Sciences, in the middle of the 20th Century, was initially based on an abstract model of the mind: the computer metaphor. The human mind was understood in analogy to the digital computer, as a rule-based, symbol processor. As a consequence, the human being was envisioned as logically–rationally guided, radically disembodied and isolated from culture. Over the last few decades, several disciplines, such as Biology, Mathematics, Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience, have begun to address the study of intentionality, intersubjectivity and natural cognition. Searching for a better understanding of these complex issues, a number of approaches have been developed with the promise of capturing the specific qualities of human cognition, radically omitted from a computationalist view of mind. Nevertheless, since these research programs are rather recent, concrete methodological designs and empirical approaches in the form of experimentally testable hypotheses are still scarce. This special issue brings together several perspectives in order to propose alternative research approaches in the topics of Intentionality, Intersubjectivity and Ecology of Mind. We believe it is necessary to discuss and advance towards explicit empirical frames in the form of actual experiments, specific predictions and formal models. The essays presented here constitute an attempt to move in this direction, with the specific aim of reconsidering the study of some forgotten properties of brain and mind. A. Ibáñez (*) Neuroscience Laboratory, Universidad Diego Portales, Vergara 275, Santiago, Chile e-mail: agustin.ibanez@udp.cl A. Ibáñez Department of Gerontopsychiatry, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany D. Cosmelli Centro de Estudios Neurobiológicos, P. Universidad Católica de Chile, Marcoleta 391 Segundo Piso, Santiago, Chile e-mail: dcosmelli@uc.cl D. Cosmelli Escuela de Psicologia, P. Universidad Catolica de Chile, Vicuña Mackenna 4860, Macul, Santiago, Chile 130 Integr Psych Behav (2008) 42:129–136 Keywords Embodied cognition . Neurodynamics . Dynamic approaches to cognition . Situated Cognition . Brain dynamics Cognitive Sciences Versus Cognitivism The present context of cognitive sciences can be described as the questioning of a dominant classical paradigm, known as computationalism or computational cognitivism. It was established between the 60s and 70s as a multidisciplinary program to understand cognitive processes. The core concept of this revolution assumed that the mind could be understood on the basis of symbolic calculations, being explained on the basis of logical–syntactic rules and principles. Meaning lost its leading role in the mechanistic explanation of the mind, favoring syntax and objective correspondence with entities of the world. This program became a prescriptive undertaking in how to investigate, and began with great promises in the field of simulation of cognitive phenomena. It offered in itself a metaphor of the mind as a computer, updated by the image of new and sophisticated computational technology. As time passed, investigation itself within computationalism produced some insights into the program’s limitations. The strange synthesis between Cartesian dualism and the metaphysical monism of computationalism (Descombes 2001) has been criticized for its positivist assumptions and its fragmentary tendencies. The transgenerational attempt (starting with Cartesianism, passing through orthodox analytic philosophy up to the beginning of cognitivism) to reduce human reasoning to formal processes of calculation on resident representations in the mind, had already been questioned by Wittgenstein (1952) and Ryle (1949). Some of the most important original promises of the computationalistic enterprise failed (Anderson 2003; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1990; Wheeler 1996). A prototypic case was pointed out by Winograd (1984) who emphasized the insoluble limitations of computationalism in explaining the phenomenon of natural languages (Winograd and Flores 1986). Perception understood in computational terms became passive, and in clear contradiction to the natural interaction with action and environment. Simple sensorimotor functions became serious problems in the immediate planning of movable robots. On the other hand, non-representational alternatives in the field of robotics were successful (Brooks 1991; Wheeler 1996). In spite of the success of expert systems, capable of competing in chess or checkers, simulations did not manage to reproduce plasticity and human flexibility (Dietrich 2000). This difficulty was considered insurmountable using a computational approach (Shoham and Dermott 1988) since it led systems based on calculations to the so-called Von Neumann bottleneck. The difficulty lies in estimating adequately and in real time a decision ecologically founded on complex contexts. For that reason, the consideration of mind as a formal logical system gradually lost its credibility (Dietrich 2000). Also, authors in the field of neuroscience supported by new connectionist models criticized the logical–symbolic models of functionalism (Churchland 1986).1 1 It is important to emphasize that the notion of classic computation does not need to be exhaustive of what is a valid computational process. In other words, perhaps a biological system is a better computer than the best computer in existence. However, it still is one, only under a different paradigm of what we understand as computation (e.g.: Gabriel and Goldman 2006). See also Cosmelli et al. (2008). Integr Psych Behav (2008) 42:129–136 131 The Emergence of Post-Cognitivism Along with issues within computationalism itself, the appearance of new trends in cognition questioned the traditional view that computational cognitivism does not have major rival theories (Fodor 2000). As disappointment with cognitivism grew, alternatives departing from computational assumptions emerged. These trends have opened the field of investigation to include phenomena not tackled by the orthodox tradition; new dialogues with social and biological disciplines have been generated and many classic issues of cognitivism have been reconsidered. In this framework, the approach of situated cognition (Clark 1997; Lynn and Stein 1991; Wilson and Myers 1999, among others) assumes that knowledge is structured in the social, ecological and physical environment which shapes the experience. The Embodied cognition approach (Anderson 2003; Dourish 2001; Johnson 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Thompson and Varela 2001; Varela et al. 1991) holds that the mind is embodied and placed in a specific ecological context where cognition on a biological, psychological and cultural level is constituted by means of sensory–motor processes in the body (Cornejo et al. 2007b, c; Ibáñez et al. 2006). The extended mind (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Li 2003, among others) is concerned with the role of the environment in the genesis of the cognitive processes, emphasizing this not only as part of action, but also of thought. From the perspective of distributed cognition (Cole and Engeströn 1991; Holland et al. 2000; Hutchins 1995; among others), knowledge is taken as forming a continuum with environmental processes, so that establishing sharp distinctions between the world and the mind is sometimes a non-trivial matter. The application of activity theory in cognition (Engelsted 1993; Engeström 1991; Jones et al. 2005; among others) criticizes the use of computational simulation for the comprehension of human cognition, and assumes that psychological phenomena like intentionality cannot be understood in mechanistic terms. Dynamic approaches to cognition keep the controversial promise to be applied as much to neural interactions as to cultural phenomena, supporting their explanations in mathematical formalizations of cognitive processes. The central core of these theories is based on the metaphor of cognition as a dynamic system, sustained on a spatio-temporal topology (Ibáñez 2007a, b). Alternative approaches in cognition have drawn out a clear necessity in the field of cognitive sciences: the development of language games that are not exclusively materialistic or exclusively mentalist in the development of inter-leveled cognitive approaches. In other words, the need for a reconceptualization focused on action, intentionality of living systems and the intersubjective nature of complex cognitive phenomena. In short, the need to understand the mind as a multi-leveled process which is dependent on the interaction between mind, body, environment and culture (Cornejo et al. 2007a).2 Reductionist materialism (mathematical, physical or neurological) and de-biologized discursiveness (psychological or social) share the impossibility of tackling cognitive phenomena once their multiplicity of description levels have been accepted. Nevertheless, one must ask if the alternative approaches 2 It is important to emphasize that although a certain temporary sequence exists between classic computationalism and the alternative approaches of cognition, there are simultaneous antecedents often interwoven throughout both perspectives (Ibáñez 2007a, b). 132 Integr Psych Behav (2008) 42:129–136 ipso facto constitute in absolute terms the aforementioned paradigmatic direction. On the other hand, these approaches may be considered as being in the process of establishing themselves as full-fledged research programs. The reconsideration of the nature of cognition which has arisen through such alternative conceptions requires a theoretical–empirical revision of its current scope. Towards a Deep Foundation of Post-Cognitivism Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of post-cognitivist alternatives is that they appeal to our common sense: we feel like beings that form part of a (natural) complex system, interconnected and interdependent: descriptions of an aspect of reality are compatible with multiple alternative descriptions and we coexist without being single-minded machines but rather ambiguous beings (in the neutral sense of the term). This intuitive compatibility between the paradigms that emphasize embodied cognition, the ecology of mind and a multi-leveled comprehension of reality, represents not only an interesting opportunity but also, we believe, hides its greatest enemy. It is one thing to talk about situated cognition but another to say how this occurs. In other words, can one formulate concrete operational conditions for these paradigms which will allow them to play a role beyond that of being an intuitively valuable description? We believe that this represents one of the greatest challenges faced by this series of paradigms towards becoming valid alternative research programs. It could be argued that, as we discussed in the first part of this editorial introduction, that it is indeed thanks to the criticism that has arisen from such new perspectives (and common sense) that the classical computationalist theoretical framework had to be revisited. Nevertheless, it is not trivial to express the same dissatisfaction in a positive way. Furthermore, we believe that the existing situation of malaise surrounding the inability of the traditional paradigms to account for such essential aspects as our being-in-the-world as intentionality, intersubjectivity and the contextual nature of cognition, calls for certain risks to be taken: What experiments and results would force us to reject a given embodied or situated perspective? What re-conceptualization of a given series of experimental data allows us to eliminate (reduce) representational language from our explanation without losing epistemological ground? What methodological and analytical frameworks are needed to tackle the problem of situated cognition and which are not? What are the limits of the new theories of cognition? Without pretending to answer all these questions, the contributions in this volume represent a concrete attempt at going beyond both the classic computational cognitive framework and the approach by intuitive analogy, towards a scientifically generative formulation of hypotheses and a methodologically rigorous framework in the study of cognition. Intentionality, Intersubjectivity and Ecology of Mind In this issue, three conceptual post-cognitive topics are tackled by the different contributions. This set of contributions is far from being homogenous and draws on Integr Psych Behav (2008) 42:129–136 133 frameworks and disciplines from very different approaches. Nevertheless, from their own heterogeneity, all contribute to a better conceptualization of alternative approaches in their respective fields of application. Intentionality Intentionality can be understood either as simple behavior aimed at minds, or intention as a macro-property of the human being. This seems to be the basis of comprehending meaning and sense in cognitive action. At a cognitive level, the actions of the body can only be understood when intentionality plays an organizing role in it. There exists a growing consensus that this is an unavoidable property of cognition that cannot be left aside once it is needed to understand the activity of an organism. Phenomenology applied to cognition (Descombes 2001), neurodynamics (Freeman 1997, 2000), neurophenomenology (Lutz and Thompson 2003; Varela et al. 1991), some trends in embodied cognition (Thompson and Varela 2001), and others in dynamic system theory (Juarrero 1999; Orsucci 1998; Tschacher and Dauwalder 2003) are representative of this perspective. In this issue, Walter Freeman tackles the problem of perception of time and causation. Taking a historical and philosophical perspective the author reappraises the importance of the Aristotelian– Thomist view of intentionality to understand the problem of time perception. Accordingly, and building upon extensive neurophysiological data, the author suggests that the solution to this question resides in the way the nervous system generates predictive action–perception cycles through the mechanism of preafference. In Freeman’s view time is therefore kinesthetically constituted as every action becomes an action of a neurally animated body into the future. Causality makes sense only in this temporal context, i.e. through the animals’ perceiving and learning the consequences of his own endogenously motivated (intentional) actions. Andrés Haye defends that because human beings are not only living but also speaking beings, a consistent framework is needed to account for the particular type of knowledge this capacity/behavior implies. He claims that if we understand intentionality solely as will or aboutness, one cannot encompass the crucial aspect of “meaning” in human cognition. As a solution, the author proposes a dialogical explanatory basis for the understanding of meaning as a virtual “contestable position” in a social context, which is taken by the participant through actual utterances (public or private). According to the author, because this type of intentionality is what distinguishes human knowledge, any viable theory of human cognition should be constructed on this ground. Intersubjectivity Another idea radically opposed to orthodox computational reasoning resides in the notion of intersubjectivity. This is compatible with the acceptance of intentionality, since it implies subjectivity and subjectivity does not appear to be a solipsist property. The inclusion of intersubjectivity is nothing but the acceptance that all cognitive development is set in an inherent dialogicity upon which all development of cognitive capacities is maintained. There exists a corpus of theories that have argued for this on the basis of the study and theorization of intersubjectivity in the 134 Integr Psych Behav (2008) 42:129–136 heart of cognitive phenomena. Among them, it is possible to point out theory of the mind studies (Chandler and Carpendale 1998; Whiten 1991); development theories based on intersubjectivity (Tomasello and Carpenter 2007; Hobson 1993; Trevarthen and Aitken 2001) and the so-called simulation theories (Decety and Grezes 2006; Gallese and Goldman 1998). In this issue, the contribution of Carlos Cornejo assumes that the origins of meaning are assessed in the intersubjective space contingently formed between a subject (S), an other (O) and a common object (T), which they are talking about. The so observed synchronized co-feeling among subjects, upon which language comprehension takes place, is called by Cornejo ‘cophenomenology.’ When analyzed in this way, intersubjectivity shows at the same time its social, phenomenological and biological dimensions. Later, Luis Flores tackles the intersubjectivity as the core element of consciousness, regards to the dynamic and relational property of being-in-the-world. The embodied, temporal and intentional aspects of consciousness are immersed with others in the world. To take this fact into account has several consequences for cognitive theories consciousness. Ecology of Mind The idea that the mind can only be understood as a process that happens in a certain context is another central dimension of non-orthodox theories of cognition. Under this perspective, mind is related not only to the intentional action of the body and to the dialogicity between cognitive agents, but also contained in a specific situation, with an environmental framework that comprises the cognitive processes in which they are developed. There exists an intrinsic co-constitution between organism and environment, understanding the latter as a domain of interaction for the intentions of the organism. Starting with the pioneering contributions of ecological psychology (Gibson 1979), and including theory of activity applied to cognition (Engeström 1991; Jones et al. 2005, among others), approaches of embodied and situated cognition (Anderson 2003; Dourish 2001; Clark 1997; Wilson and Myers 1999, among others), extended mind (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Li 2003), distributed cognition (Cole and Engeströn 1991; Holland et al. 2000; Hutchins 1995, among others), and dynamic approaches of cognition (Fischer and Bidell 2005), numerous approaches have called attention to the ecological dimension of cognition and the development of corresponding valid models. In this issue, Lucia Faiciuc asses that most of the existing theories explaining deductive reasoning could be included in a classic computationalist approach of the cognitive processes. But are there weak points of such an approach? What would be the reasons for which new perspectives, dynamic and ecological ones, could gain in credibility? What could be their most important tenets? The answers given to those questions in the paper include two main points. The first one is that the present empirical data do not sustain unambiguously a symbolic computationalist perspective. The second one is that approaching deductive reasoning dynamically could have a significant advantage: the possibility to integrate more easily the research regarding the deductive reasoning with the results obtained in other domains of the psychology, in artificial intelligence or in neurophysiology. Finally, Aldo Mascareño outlines a theory of cognition where the “social” is proposed to be dealt with from the very beginning. 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His research areas of interest are related to electrophysiological studies of ecological clues in language and social processes, in healthy participants, schizophrenics and Alzheimer patients. At theoretical level, he is interested in explanatory pluralism and dynamic approaches to cognition. Diego Cosmelli holds a Ph.D. in Cognitive Science from the Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France. After a postdoctoral work on enactive approaches to consciousness at York University in Toronto, Canada, he returned to Chile. He is an Associate Researcher at the Laboratorio de Neurociencias Cognitivas, Dep. de Psiquiatría of the P. Universidad Católica and at the School of Psychology of the same university. He is also Principal Investigator of the Sensory Neuroscience Ring for Science and Technology ACT45. His current research is centered on the relation between sensorimotor processes, biological organization and conscious perception in human beings.