134 / Sarai Reader 2007: Frontiers
The ‘Law’ of the Police
Anuj Bhuwania
The ÂlawÊ of the police really marks the point in which the state, whether from impotence or
because of the immanent connections within any legal system, can no longer guarantee
through the legal system the empirical ends that it desires at any price to attain.
Walter Benjamin
What matters for the reality of legal life is he who decides.
Carl Schmitt
In this essay I will try to glean the aporetic nature of policing in the critiques of law
offered by Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt, as later commented upon directly by Jacques
Derrida and Giorgio Agamben, and as it connects in a more lateral manner with Michel
FoucaultÊs writings on discipline and biopower, through a selective reading of some of their
key texts. This uncanny mirror held to modern law by the impossibility of confining policing
within legal boundaries is first signalled in BenjaminÊs exasperation at the dissolution, with
the emergence of the modern police, of his carefully carved distinction between lawpreserving and law-making violence. It reappears when Schmitt insists on locating his
apotheosis of the decision independent of the norm on which it is ostensibly based, firmly
within the confines of the juridical realm; he limits his searing analysis to the constitutional
centralised sovereign authority alone and does not seek to apply it to everyday policing.
Derrida and Agamben have effectively underlined these dilemmas in their readings of these
two key authors of the Weimar period, but it is FoucaultÊs lack of interest in law in his
characterisation of the modern disciplinary and governmental norm that I argue provides
the key to understanding modern policing and its extraordinary (non-)legal character.
In his 1921 essay „Critique of Violence‰ (henceforth in this essay CV), Walter Benjamin
provides a critique of the use of authoritative violence1 as a means. He begins by dwelling
upon the approach that the two principal juridical schools – Natural Law and Legal
Positivism – have taken to this question. Natural law ends up justifying all violence for any
just ends, thus not really addressing the issue of violence as a means but only passing
judgment on the justness of its ends. On the other hand, positive law is only interested in
Up Close and Impersonal / 135
the legality of the (violent) means that guarantees the justness of the ends. Benjamin wants
to question the neat equations in both schools of thought, that just ends can be attained by
justified violent means. While Benjamin finds the onus of justiciability2 of violence completely
elided in natural law by its sole focus on justness of ends, he takes as his point of departure
the tenets of positive law and its central distinction between sanctioned violence and
unsanctioned violence. Benjamin tries to explore what this Weberian „monopoly of violence‰
says about the nature of violence itself. Individual violence cannot be tolerated by any state
– not because the state is threatened by the specific aims of such non-legal violence, but
because it is threatened by the very existence of such violence. What is feared is the ability
of violence to found and modify legal conditions, i.e., the inherently lawmaking character of
such violence, an ability to exceed its characterisation as a mere means. His examples of
the violence of the great criminal, the general strike and the war that culminates in a peace
agreement point to the fact that the foundations of all law eventually draw from such lawmaking violence.
In addition to this law-making function of violence is its law-preserving function as
instantiated in conscription, modern policing and the debate around the death penalty – all
modern questions. Benjamin calls this form of legal violence a threatening violence.
Contrary to common theoretical claims, this violence is not intended as a deterrent plainly
because it always lacks certainty.3 As a result, this uncertain legal threat is experienced as
fate. This ÂfatedÊ legal violence is a non-mediate violence that does not really fit into the
justified violent means/just ends logic of legal theory. Benjamin relates it to „the
fundamental undecidability of all legal problems‰ because it is not reason but „fate-imposed
violence‰ and „God‰ that decide the justification of means and justness of ends respectively
(CV, p. 294). This follows from the impossibility of generalising and applying an always
inherently indeterminate legal norm in any two different situations in accordance with
justice, a routine hermeneutical exercise in modern law. The experience of legal violence as
fate is further exacerbated with the pragmatic principle of ignorantia juris non excusat
(Latin, lit. Âignorance of the law does not excuseÊ).
All of these issues play out clearly with regard to the modern police, which as Benjamin
points out, breaks down the distinction between the two forms of violence – law-making and
law-preserving – and in which both can be found in a „spectral mixture‰. The modern police
have wide discretionary powers and they can intervene „for security reasons‰⁄ „where no
legal situation exists‰ (CV, p. 287). Benjamin almost prefigures Foucault when he says that
the police accompany „the citizen as a brutal encumbrance through a life regulated by
ordinances, or simply supervising him‰ (ibid.). While the legally adjudicated „decision‰
determined by place and time, chronotope has a „metaphysical category‰ capable of a
„critical evaluation‰; there is no essence at all to the police institution, thus making it a
„ghostly presence in the life of civilised states‰.
I now move to DerridaÊs reading of „Critique of Violence‰, in which he demonstrates how
Benjamin first proposes some key binaries for his analysis and then eventually deconstructs
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them himself. Of particular relevance here is BenjaminÊs distinction between law-making and
law-preserving violence and DerridaÊs discussion of his spectacular dissolution of it in the
figure of policing. As Derrida claims in „Force of Law‰ (henceforth in this essay FL), the lawmaking violence, which confers upon the „great criminal‰ an enormous romantic as well as
dangerous stature, does not arrive from outside law.4 In fact, it is the „mystical foundation
of authority‰ – it is the violence that might offend justice but is always justified retrospectively
by the „law to come‰ (FL, p. 991). Derrida asserts in his essay that „this founding or
revolutionary moment of law is, in law, an instance of non-law.5 But it is also the whole history
of law. This moment always takes place and never takes place in a presence. Derrida
compares a successful foundational revolution to a felicitious performative speech act that
produces „proper interpretative models‰ conferring legitimacy and meaning to the violence.
However, as opposed to BenjaminÊs attempt to sever this non-law at the heart of the
fundamental law-making violence from the everyday practices of law-preserving violence,
Derrida locates the former as always already enveloping the latter and calling for its own
repetition. The origins of law constantly need to be re-established by the violence needed
for the self-conservation of law. This inscription of „iterability in originality‰ (FL, p. 1003)
makes impossible any precise difference between lawmaking and law-preserving violence,
and thus contaminates any difference the two might have had. The non-law that remains at
the heart of any such violence, as revealed in the death penalty, for instance, makes
Benjamin find „something rotten in law‰ itself (ibid., p. 286).
It is, however, in the modern institution of the police that Benjamin himself finds the two
forms of violence most explicitly and „ignominiously‰ haunted by each other. For Derrida,
there is in BenjaminÊs discussion of the police a deconstruction of „the distinction between
the two kinds of violence that nevertheless structure the discourse that Benjamin calls a
new critique of violence‰ (FL, p. 1007). In this discussion, Derrida finds a „strange
exposition‰ of a text where a „demonstration ruins the distinctions it proposes‰, undone by
„the paradox of iterability‰ that „requires the origin to repeat itself originarily, to alter itself
so as to have the value of origin, that is, to conserve itself‰ (ibid., pp. 1007-09). The police,
after all, not only enforce the law but also legislate. And „by definition, the police are present
or represented everywhere that there is force of law‰ (ibid., p. 1009). The problem with the
police is that theirs is „a violence without a form‰ (ibid., p. 1011). According to Benjamin,
this „spirit‰ of the police is less „devastating‰ in an absolute monarchy than in a modern
democracy, because in a monarchy, with the legislative and executive powers under a
unitary authority, police violence is normal and in keeping with its spirit. In a democracy the
police are not supposed to have such wide powers, but enjoy them anyway through a core
dissimulation. Derrida finds in this condition a correspondence with the Schmittian criticism
of parliamentary democracy that is „powerless to control the police violence that
substitutes itself for it‰ (ibid., p. 1015).
DerridaÊs comment allows us to segue into Carl SchmittÊs discussion of the legal form in
his book Political Theology (1922; henceforth in this essay PT ) which tries to give a
Up Close and Impersonal / 137
systematic legal-logical basis to his famous definition of sovereignty, „Sovereign is he who
decides on the exception‰. The exception is normally elided and relegated to insignificance in
modern jurisprudence.. But for Schmitt it goes to the heart of the matter because of the nature
of the legal norm.6 Contrary to the liberal view of his principal interlocutor, the renowned jurist
Hans Kelsen, Schmitt argues that this sovereign decision regarding the exception cannot be
derived entirely from the content of the norm, but always exceeds it. The decision that a real
exception exists can never „be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed
law‰ (PT, p. 6). In actual application it always depends on who decides whether a „situation of
conflict‰ exists, or whether other standard provisos such as „public safety,‰ „interest of the
state‰ or „public interest‰ are really threatened (ibid.). He defines the exception as „that which
cannot be subsumed; it defies general codification, but it simultaneously reveals a specifically
juristic element – the decision in absolute purity‰ (ibid., p. 13).
For Schmitt, two distinct elements make up the juristic – norm and decision. The legal
order rests on a decision, not on a norm. Schmitt concedes that in the normal situation,
there is very little autonomy that the decision enjoys; when it comes to the exception, the
norm is destroyed. The general norms can only be factually applied in a „normal, everyday
frame of life‰, but it is always the sovereign authority who decides that such a normal
situation actually exists (PT, p. 13). According to Schmitt, there remains a possible
separation between the everyday law and that under emergency, and conditions such as
the latter obtain only under a Constitutionally declared circumstance and not otherwise.
SchmittÊs principal move is to bring the question of sovereignty right back to the heart
of Constitutional debates, and challenge KelsenÊs liberal attempt to construct a pure
normative jurisprudence and „radically repress‰ the question of emergency powers under
the Weimar Constitution. Drawing inspiration from Hobbes, he demolishes the fundamental
liberal tenet that there has been a move in modernity from the authority of persons to the
rule of law, and that the legislature is the sole source of this law. Taking on what he calls
the „confusions‰ caused by Max WeberÊs classic account of the modern move from
substantive to formally rational law, Schmitt analyses the legal form as proposed by Weber,
for whom the formal qualities grow from codification, the professional training of lawyers,
and judges being made civil servants. These respectively conferred on the legal form
juridical recognition, evenness with regularity and calculability7 and a „ÂrationalisticÊ technical
refinement‰ (PT, pp. 27-28). According to Schmitt, this analysis has led some to compare
the legal form to the technical form. However, the technical form is more like what is
applicable to the military command, which is goal-oriented, impersonal and oriented to
action, and by its very nature free from any deliberation. On the other hand, „the legal form
is governed by the legal idea and by the necessity of applying legal thought to a factual
situation‰ (ibid., p. 28).
Additionally, the legal idea is not self-realising: it needs the form of positive law, and an
organisation to apply the norm. This has led theorists such as Kelsen to postulate an
objectivist account of the legal form by „avoiding everything personalistic and tracing the
legal order back to the impersonal validity of the impersonal norm‰, in an attempt to efface
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all traces of personality, treating them as traces of absolute monarchy (PT, p. 29-30).
Schmitt, on the other hand, argues that the legal decision can never be made purely from
the content of the legal idea or from the norm to be applied, and indeed has to be at least
partially indifferent to it, because „the circumstance that requires a decision remains an
independently determining moment‰ (ibid., p. 30). This makes the specific decision an act
of poesis in a sense, radically alienated from the content of the underlying norm.
This approximates DerridaÊs suggestion: „The law is transcendent and theological, and
so always to come, always promised, because it is immanent, finite and so already past‰
(FL, p. 993). Indeed, Schmitt even says, „Looked at normatively, the decision emanates
from nothingness ‰8 (ibid., pp. 31-32).
Hinging on this question of the presence of the normative in a legal decision, Schmitt
categorises a whole school of jurisprudence in which he places himself and that he calls
Decisionist, which follows from Hobbes and rejects „all attempts to substitute an abstractly
valid order for a concrete sovereignty of the state‰ (PT, p. 33). Schmitt concludes this
discussion with a radical assertion of Hobbesian ÂpersonalismÊ: „In the contrast between the
subject and the content of a decision and in the proper meaning of the subject lies the
problem of the juristic form‰ (ibid., pp. 34-35).
While Schmitt posits that there „exists no norm that is applicable to chaos‰ (PT, p. 13),
he simultaneously insists that the „exception is different from anarchy and chaos‰ (ibid., p.
12) so that he can continue to argue that even in this state of exception, „order in the juristic
sense still prevails even if it is not of the ordinary kind‰ (ibid.). He decries any move to
relegate the question regarding the decision to „sociology‰, and instead retains the norm
alone within jurisprudence, because for him the „pure‰ decision continues to be juristic even
if it has nothing to do with the norm. Indeed, he has to do so because it only „remains a
juristic problem as long as the exception is distinguishable from a juristic chaos, from any
kind of anarchy‰ (PT, p. 14). He therefore goes to great lengths to keep this pure decision
somehow within the domain of the legal, and does not allow it to enter the realm which for
Derrida was „non-law‰, and for Benjamin was far enough from law, that it could only be
called law within quotation marks (as in this essayÊs first epigraph).
In his book State of Exception (2005), much of which takes its inspiration from the texts
discussed above, especially Political Theology, Giorgio Agamben presents a schematic
account of the use of emergency provisions in the Constitutions of the principal North Atlantic
powers, in contexts ranging from the French Revolution to the Iraq War, and convincingly
shows how endemic and closely related these states of exception have been to the naked
assertions of sovereignty in modern times. His is a contemporary reiteration of SchmittÊs
challenge to Constitutional law and its attempts to „repress sovereignty‰. My interest here is
to examine how the insights about the indeterminacy of the legal form, which bear so closely
on these constitutional debates about modern sovereignty, apply as much to the everyday
experience of policing. An explicit connection along these lines is made by Agamben in an
earlier essay where, based on BenjaminÊs „Critique of Violence‰, he argues that „the
Up Close and Impersonal / 139
rationales of Âpublic orderÊ and ÂsecurityÊ on which the police have to decide on a case-bycase basis define an area of indistinction between violence and right that is exactly
symmetrical to that of sovereignty‰9. One can now see how closely related the questions of
policing and sovereignty are – for instance, with regard to the key concept of necessity that
Agamben provides a history of, and that he posits as the basis of the state of exception;
going by the Latin adage necessitas legem non habet (necessity has no law), which could
either mean „necessity does not recognise any law‰, or „necessity creates its own law‰.
The Constitutional conundrum this causes is thus effectively summarised by Agamben:
„[⁄] the status necessitates appears as an ambiguous and uncertain zone in which de facto
proceedings, which are in themselves extra- or anti-juridical, pass over into law, and juridical
norms blur into mere fact – that is, a threshold where fact and law seem to become
undecidable‰ (Means without End, henceforth in this essay ME, p. 29). Agamben critically
analyses the telos of legality that Schmitt manages to find even in this indeterminate void zone.
Agamben compares SchmittÊs separation of the legal norm and the decision in law to
the Saussurean division between langue and parole in the domain of theoretical linguistics.10
The norm, like langue, exists but can only be manifested in a decision or parole. Just as
actual linguistic activity is made understandable by assuming that something structural on
the lines of a language exists, the norm can continue to be the reference point for a
decision even when it is departed from (ME, pp. 36-37).
However, this question of applying a norm to a concrete situation is not an example of
deriving a particular instance that is already contained in a given general rule. In other
words, just like the passage from langue to parole, it is not a logical operation but a
practical activity. It involves „the passage from a generic proposition endowed with a merely
virtual reference to a concrete reference to a segment of reality‰ (ME, p. 39). The question
of the actual relation between the legal norm and its application is analogous to that
between language and the world, because in both instances, „there is no internal nexus that
allows one to be derived immediately from the other‰ (ibid., p. 40). Agamben here
compares BenvenisteÊs enunciative function11 that involves the assumption and
implementation of langue by speaking subjects, with SchmittÊs ÂDecisionismÊ theorisation
with its programmatic declaration: „What matters for the reality of legal life is he who
decides‰. What emerges for Agamben, therefore, is „a pure violence without logos‰,
because it is impossible to weld norm and reality together except by presupposing their
nexus, and thus constituting a normal sphere, as the very application of a norm creates an
exception (ibid.). Schmitt, however, still could not accept the state of exception completely
fusing its frontier with the rule. Agamben finds all theorising that attempts to place the state
of exception within law, including SchmittÊs indirect attempt to do so, fallacious because the
Âstate of exceptionÊ has no law, but is a space without law – a consequence of the force of
law being placed under the Derridean erasure.
We have seen how Schmitt dodges the radical implications of his own argument by
insisting on locating this anomic violence within the juridical realm – indeed, maintaining that
140 / Sarai Reader 2007: Frontiers
it is included within law by its very exclusion. He is unable to deal with the complete
breakdown of difference between the rule and the exception. And that is precisely what
Benjamin does in his challenge to all theorising of the state of exception in his justly famous
lines: „The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the Âstate of emergencyÊ in which we
live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in
keeping with this insight‰12. Benjamin thus unmasks any attempt to give juridical form to the
anomic violence of the state of exception. All that remains is pure violence without any
relation to law. And policing is its archetypal form.
Michel FoucaultÊs theories about the formation of the juridical subject appear to come
closest to BenjaminÊs crucial insight. In his Collége de France lectures of 1976, Foucault
recognises the co-existence of sovereignty and discipline in modern power, but constantly
de-emphasises the role of the great state legislations, focusing instead on micro-agents,
such as the police. As stated in his famous exposition of modern biopower in the last chapter
of The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: „We have entered a phase of juridical regression in
comparison with the pre-seventeenth-century societies we are acquainted with; we should not
be deceived by all the Constitutions framed throughout the world since the French
Revolution, the codes written and revised, a whole continual and clamorous legislative
activity: these were the forms that made an essentially normalising power acceptable‰ (p.
144). This is exactly the first methodological move he clarifies in his 1976 Collége de France
lectures (Society Must Be Defended, henceforth in this essay SMBD ) of placing less
emphasis on the sole central institution of power with its basis in either monarchical or
democratic sovereignty. His focus is more on the „extremities‰ of power as embodied in
local, regional and material forms and institutions, „especially at the points where this power
transgresses the rules of right that organise and delineate it‰ (SMBD, p. 27), and where „its
exercise becomes less and less juridical‰ (ibid., p. 28). An example of such a study can be
found in FoucaultÊs Discipline and Punish, (henceforth in this essay DP ), where he claims that
the powers of the prison warder have from the beginning allowed him an „arbitrariness‰ in
administering a penalty. Practices such as the excessive or „useless‰ acts of violence
perpetrated by the warder are implicitly anticipated and made possible by his acknowledged
right to act as the „sovereign in the prison‰ (DP, pp. 246-48). While the penalty itself
continues to be based on a juridical decision, it is the prison warder who enjoys an absolute
autonomy in modulating, individualising and administering this punishment.
Foucault discusses how the emergence of the disciplinary power in modernity should
have logically led to the disappearance of the juridical edifice of sovereignty, being radically
heterogeneous.. However this does not happen – in fact, sovereignty gets a renewed status
as an „ideology of right‰ with the passage of the great juridical codes in 19th-century
Europe, after the Napoleonic Codes. Foucault asserts that these Codes helped to
„superimpose on the mechanism of discipline a system of right that concealed its
mechanisms and erased the element of domination and the techniques of domination
involved in discipline‰ (SMBD, p. 37). While these Codes enabled a democratisation of
sovereignty, it was severely undermined by disciplinary mechanisms. These two modalities
Up Close and Impersonal / 141
of power continued to co-exist, although always in tension with each other because „the
discourse of discipline is alien to that of the law; it is alien to the discourse that makes rules
a product of the will of the Sovereign‰; and because discipline goes by the „code of
normalisation‰ produced by the human sciences and not by the code of law (ibid., p. 38).
Besides, the techniques of discipline have invaded and found place in law. A concrete
instance of this kind of change could be found in the process by which the concept of the
„Dangerous Individual‰ becomes central to penology.13 Foucault analyses the fundamental
move from Homo Penalis to Homo Criminalis – i.e., from the Beccarian or Benthamite
model of legal sanction based on what one has done, to the criminological idea of „Social
Defence‰ based on what one is – but emphasises how throughout this process, the codes
are not explicitly changed. Indeed, Foucault concludes that a new kind of „law‰ emerged
with the carceral institutions of disciplinary power: the norm that is „a mixture of legality and
nature‰ (DP, p. 304). This norm, he later affirmed in his Collége de France lectures, actually
circulates and intersects through both discipline and biopower, acting on their respective
axes – the individual body and the population as a whole (SMBD, pp. 252-53).
For such a modern normalising power to exercise the old sovereign right to kill, it had
to become racist (SMBD, p. 256). The ur-case of such a racist power examined by Foucault
is the Nazi regime. While the Nazi state exercised rigorous disciplinary power and biological
controls over life, it also gave the power to kill to a very large body of individuals from a
plethora of security apparatus. In fact, according to Agamben, the entire ÂFinal SolutionÊ
„was conceived from the beginning to the end exclusively as a police operation. It is well
known that not a single document has ever been found that recognises the genocide as a
decision made by a sovereign organ‰, except for one „that gathered middle-level and lowerlevel police officers‰, and included Adolf Eichmann.14
I began this essay with BenjaminÊs discussion of the „law ‰ of the police. I will end with
FoucaultÊs reflections (DP, p. 283) on the archetypal figure of Vidocq, the ex-criminal and
informer who rose up to be the mythical chief of police in early 19th-century France, and
who is credited to have introduced ballistics and record-keeping to policing: „A figure had
haunted earlier times, that of the monstrous king, the source of all justice and yet
besmirched with crime; another fear now appeared, that of some dark, secret
understanding between those who enforced the law and those who violated it. The
Shakespearian age when sovereignty confronted abomination in a single character had
gone; the everyday melodrama of police and of the complicities that crime formed with
power was soon to begin‰.
Notes
1.
The German term used by Benjamin, Gewalt, has been translated simply as „Violence‰, but it also signifies
142 / Sarai Reader 2007: Frontiers
legitimate power or justified authority.
2.
As signalled by Benjamin in the famous first line of this essay: „The task of a critique of violence can be
summarised as that of expounding its relation to law and justice‰.
3.
For a recent anthropological treatment of the „uncertainty of legal rules‰, see essays by Veena Das and
Talal Asad in (eds.) Veena Das and Deborah Poole, Anthropology in the Margins of the State (School of
American Research Press, 2004). Asad points out that the acts of a state functionary routinely require
abstracting from one context and applying it to another – a decision that „is always, in a sense, uncertain‰
(p. 283). As he explains, the everyday form it takes is the series of questions that a bureaucrat asks:
„whether a particular rule applies to a particular case, and if so, how should it be applied to practice? Does
the rule conflict with other rules, and if so, how can they be reconciled? Where does the authority of laws
lie?‰ (p. 287). Asad gives an unambiguous answer: that the authority always lies beyond the written rules.
This alien authority, and not the written rules, would therefore, for him, be the law of the state.
4.
„That which threatens law already belongs to it⁄ to the origin of law‰ (p. 989).
5.
Italics mine.
6.
Schmitt here echoes SŒren KierkagaardÊs argument from Repetition : „The exception explains the general
and itself. And if one wants to study the general correctly, one only needs to look around for a true
exception. It reveals everything more clearly than does the general‰ (p. 15).
7.
As summed up by Pierre Bourdieu: „The predictability and calculability that Weber imputed to Ârational lawÊ
doubtless arise more than anything else from the consistency and homogeneity of the legal habitus ‰. See
„The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field‰, Hastings Law Review, p. 833 (July 1987).
8.
Italics mine.
9.
Giorgio Agamben. „Sovereign Police‰. In Means without End, p. 103. He also notes an „embarrassing
contiguity between sovereignty and police function‰ as „expressed in the intangible sacredness that,
according to the ancient codes, the figure of the sovereign and the figure of the executioner have in
common‰ (p. 104).
10. See Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (McGraw Hill, 1959, New York). In French
linguist Ferdinand de SaussureÊs methodology, langue denotes the abstract systematic principles of a
language, without which no meaningful utterance (parole) would be possible. Langue represents the „work
of a collective intelligence‰, which is both internal to each individual and each collective, in so far as it is
beyond the will of any individual to change. Parole, on the other hand, designates individual acts,
statements and utterances, events of language use manifesting each time as a speakerÊs ephemeral
individual will through his combination of concepts and his „phonation‰ – the formal aspects of the
utterance. The study of parole would be entirely focused on individual utterances, using all the available
resources of formal and empirical study to analyse actual statements, usually within a specific language.
The study of langue would be focused instead on generally applicable conditions of possibility. There would
be no coherent and meaningful utterance without the institution of norms that Saussure calls langue.
See http://www.litencyc.com/php/stopics.php?rec=true&UID=662
11. See Emile Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics (University of Miami Press, 1973, Miami). The
French linguist Emile Benveniste emphasises the need to make a distinction between what he calls the
subject of the énoncé and subject of the énunciation. He focuses on the role and implications of the
ubiquitous first person pronoun (and its reciprocal second person), used at least implicitly in every
language known to humans. In his essay „On the Nature of Pronouns‰ he notes that the first person, „I‰,
Up Close and Impersonal / 143
operates in a way quite unlike other pronouns because it is essentially linked to the exercise of
language. The sign I links SaussureÊs two dimensions of language, the collective intelligence of langue and
the ephemeral individual acts of parole : „[...] it is this property that establishes the basis for individual
discourse, in which each speaker takes over all the resources of language for his own behalf‰. I and you
are instances of signs empty of meaning, lacking even the possibility of material reference. These signs
„do not assert anything; they are not subject to the condition of truth, and escape all denial‰. For
Benveniste, „Consciousness of self is only possible if it is experienced by contrast⁄ I use I only when I
am speaking to someone who will be a you in my address. It is this condition of dialogue that is constitutive
of person, for it implies that reciprocally I becomes you in the address of the one who in his turn
designates himself as I ‰.
See http://courses.nus.edu.sg/course/elljwp/enunciation.htm
12. Walter Benjamin. „Theses on the Philosophy of History‰. In Illuminations, p. 257.
13. Michel Foucault. „About the Concept of the ÂDangerous IndividualÊ in Nineteenth-Century Legal Psychiatry‰.
In (ed.) James Faubion, Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Vol. 3 ), pp. 176-200. See also
Pasquale Pasquino, „Criminology: the Birth of a Special Knowledge‰, in (eds.) Burchell Graham, Colin
Gordon and Peter Miller, The Foucault Effect, pp. 235-50.
14. Giorgio Agamben, op. cit., p. 105.
References
Agamben, Giorgio. Means without End (Minnesota University Press, 2000, Minneapolis).
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