Aristotle in the 21st Century: Review Article

Cambridge Journal of Economics 1997, 2 1 , 729-744 REVIEW ARTICLE Aristotle in the 21st Century (Reviewing: Scott Meikle, Aristotle's Economic Thought, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) This review focuses upon three themes from Aristotle's Economic Thought (Meikle, 1995) to reveal how (i) Aristotle's essentiaUst metaphysics can assist in clarifying contemporary issues in (ii) value theory and (iii) economics as ethics. Essentialism allows one to pose (adequately) the central question of value, namely: what is the entity that renders incommensurable commodities commensurable? Essentialism, by discouraging the elision of differences between activities with different aims, sharply differentiates between those activities which aim at use value, and those which aim at exchange value. Pursuit of the latter encourages neglect of the former, making it difficult for society to pursue ethical aims. Introduction As the year 2000 approaches and a new set of socio-economic problems appears on the horizon, is a book written about an economy existing in 300 BC of any relevance for contemporary economists? Surprisingly the answer is yes although, unsurprisingly perhaps, its relevance is more general and theoretical in nature than specific and practical—it will not supply a policy to reduce the NAIRU! In Aristotle's Economic Thought, Scott Meikle (a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Glasgow) pursues two main themes. First, as a history of economic ideas, he offers a challenging interpretation of Aristotle as an economist. Second, by focusing upon metaphysics, value and economics as ethics he illustrates how Aristotelian thought can deepen contemporary economic theory, primarily, but not exclusively, via a reappraisal of Marx. It is the second of these themes that will form the substance of this review.1 1. Metaphysics Metaphysics is n o t (pace Robinson, 1964, p . 29) a term of abuse reserved for those whom one believes to be unscientific: it is a legitimate inquiry into the nature of being, into what Manuscript received 15 April 1996;finalversion received 8 January 1997. *De Montfort University, Leicester. I wish to thank two anonymous referees for their careful reading and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this review. 1 1 shall not enter debates over alleged mis-translations of words like chrda (need, utility, want, demand), not because this is unimportant, but because this is completely outside myfieldof competence. O Cambridge Political Economy Society 1997 Downloaded from http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 Steve Fleetwood* 730 S. Fleetwood Law The essence or nature of a diing specifies what kind of thing it is. What a diing is relates to what it can do, and that depends upon its intrinsic capacities or causal powers. One decides that some thing is an acid, and not alkaline, by ascertaining whether or not it has the capacity to turn red litmus paper blue. Knowing the essence, that is, knowing what a thing is, then, depends upon knowing the capacities or causal powers it possesses. Statements about die capacities possessed by a thing are just statements about die law governing and explaining it. Although a capacity is a property a doing necessarily has, in virtue of it being diat kind of thing, there is no necessity for that capacity to be realised: countervailing capacities can and do interact, and accidents can and do happen. These possibilities mean a law must be expressed transfactually, diat is, as a (potentially frustratable) capacity. Acid continues to have the capacity to turn red litmus paper blue even if some odier chemical neutralises the effect so that the event subsequendy observed is that the litmus paper remains red. For Humean metaphysics, by contrast: there is no distinction to be drawn between a capacity and its exercise...To say that something can do something—that is, that it has a capacity to do it—is just to say that it does do it. (Meikle, 1995, p. 114) Because of die preoccupation widi sense experience, there can be no space, as it were, between a capacity and die events it causes. If one event, (say) the immersion of red litmus paper in a fluid, is followed by anodier event, (say) the paper turning blue, dien one might suspect diat the fluid is an acid. What a thing is, on diis account, is not what it has die capacity to do, but what it is observed to do. Scientific knowledge must, therefore, be of the regular patterns or constant conjunctions, if any, diat diese events reveal. The primary objects of science become events, and laws result from recording dieir constant conjunctions. From the Humean perspective, a law is a statement about a constant conjunction of events. There is, however, a serious problem widi this notion of law. The events diat do manifest diemselves in die social world, do not do so, typically, in the form of constant conjunctions, so tiiis version of law cannot be said to govern or explain diem. Events must, therefore, eimer have no governing law and explanation, or something else must Downloaded from http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 kind of things exist. It is vital to note that engaging in metaphysics is non-optional. One cannot think about anything (including economic matters) without the aid of categories, and as soon as one chooses categories one has already made metaphysical assumptions (cf. Harre, 1988, p. 16). There are (at least) two reasons why Aristotle's thought is said to be penetrating: (a) his sensitivity towards metaphysics; and (b) the superiority of his essentialist metaphysics. Conversely, there are (at least) two reasons why much contemporary economic thought lacks penetration: (a) an insensitivity towards metaphysics; and (b) the inferiority of the Humean metaphysics it presupposes. In arguing why Aristotle's essentialist metaphysics is superior to the Humean variety, I shall restrict my comments to two issues of importance to the objective of this review: law and teleology/ie&M. Before doing this, however, it is incumbent upon a reviewer to alert the reader to the fact that essentialist metaphysics is not without its critics. They range from the wellknown anti-essentialists like Hume, Popper and Althusser, via the less well-known (and more recent) sceptical critics like Boylan and O'Gorman (1995), to constructive critics like Collier (1986). Aristotle in the 21st century 731 govern and explain them. And here the superiority of Aristotle's metaphysics is evident. The most likely candidates are the intrinsic capacities and causal powers that govern and explain the flux of events. The primary objects of science become capacities and the causal powers they possess. From the essendalist perspective, a law is a statement about capacities and causal powers. It is worth noting that if this metaphysical conception is correct, then virtually all the 'laws' of economics are misconceived.1 2. Value One of the strengths of Aristotle's thought is that it displays an unusual sensitivity towards metaphysics, especially when it comes to ensuring that differences between entities or activities are not elided. This is no less true of his work on value. According to Meikle: His metaphysics is not prominent on the surface as he develops his argument... [on value] but as is usually the case in his inquiries, it underlies his thought and governs its direction. (Meikle, 1995, p. 13) Let us see how metaphysics underlies and directs Aristotle's inquiry into value. The first thing to note is diat Book V of Nicomachean Ethics (NE), and Book I of Politics (Pol), the two key places where Aristotle discusses 'economies', are primarily works of ethics. In Pol he is concerned with the (bad) ends to which people strive when the household's activities are regulated by money. In NE the problem of exchange value is discussed within a context of various forms of justice. After discussing distributive and corrective justice, Aristode turns his attention to fairness of exchange. This ought to alert one to the fact diat exchange value is not just a matter for 'value theory" but is inextricably connected with die ethics of society. Whedier a society that pursues exchange value is one that is just and tends to pursue good ends is something Aristode is keen to pursue. He argues that should 'For a defence of Humean law, see Hume himself (1978, pp. 73-94 and 155-72). For a critical discussion of Humean law and a discussion of alternatives, see Harre and Madden (1975, pp. 1-25, 82-100, 101-6); Bhaskar (1978, chs 1, 2 and appendix); and Lawson (1994 and 1996). For contemporary developments on Aristotelian-inspired conceptions of law in economics, see Cartwright (1995); Van Eeghen (1996). 2 See Clark (1983); Wieland (1975); Meikle (1985, ch. 7). For a more recent discussion in a specifically economic context see CNeill (1995). Downloaded from http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 Teleologykelos Teleology is usually misunderstood to imply: (a) that the future (efficiently) causes the present; (b) functionalism; or (c) that things move towards some (mystical) predetermined end. This is neither how Aristotle, nor modern essentdalists use the term. 2 The telos of an entity is the final form, state or condition towards which it tends to develop by virtue of its intrinsic capacities. The word 'tends' removes all connotations of determinism by recognising that accidents or countervailing forces might frustrate any such development. Teleology is a theory of this (tendential) development. As will become clear below, telos becomes important in understanding and explaining human action. Suppose one observes two people engaging in what appears to be an identical activity. Mistaken observations aside, are they both occupied with the same activity? For Aristotle, only when one knows the telos to which that activity is directed can one know what kind of action it is. This is why when Aristotle considers some thing, he asks not only 'where did it come from and 'what is it doing now", but also 'where is it heading' and 'what is it likely to do'. 732 S. Fleetwood exchange not be based upon some principle of justice, then it will not 'hold the city together* (NE, 1132b). It is incumbent upon him, then, to consider what it is about exchange that might make it just and fair. The second thing to note is that Aristotle starts from an investigation of a real phenomena in need of an explanation. From an investigation of reality, he knows that products actually do exchange in some non-accidental proportion: Let A be a house, B ten minae, C a bed. A is half of B, if the house is worthfiveminae or equal to them; the bed, C, is a tenth of B; it is plain how many beds are equal to a house, viz.five.(NE, 1133b) to tea x coffee 3»beds z houses 1 2 10 = 100 The entries in the left-hand column collea use values as qualitatively different things. The entries in the right-hand column collect different quantities of some one substance that appears to be differentiated only in terms of quantity. Whatever this substance is, it varies only in magnitude. The task is to discover what this one common substance is that tea, coffee, beds and houses are quantities of. It now appears that in addition to use and exchange value, one needs also to consider Downloaded from http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 Yet, guided by his metaphysics, he knows that such an exchange ought to be impossible, writing that 'in truth it is impossible that things differing so much should become commensurate' (NE, 1133b). As Meikle puts matters: 'The problem of the commensurability of goods in exchange presents itself acutely for Aristotle because of his theory of substance and categories' (1995, p. 13). According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of things: (a) substances or individual entities such as societies, houses and acids with capacities or causal powers; and (b) attributes of substances such as qualities (white, just), quantities (long) heavy) and relations (north, equality). Aristotle's metaphysics strongly discourage him from 'overlooking or eliding differences of kind between things and their attributes' (Meikle, 1995, p. 13). It is difficult to overstate the importance of this, especially when considering value and the categories of quality and quantity that are necessary to understand it. A quality cannot be reduced to a quantity or to a relation any more than a number can be reduced to a house or a bed. One cannot, therefore, write 5 beds equals 1 house because, being qualitatively different kinds of things, they cannot be brought into such a relation. And, if Aristotle cannot say how diverse things are commensurable, he cannot establish a relation of equality between them, cannot establish the criterion by which justice and fairness in exchange is attained and cannot say how society holds together. There is a lot at stake. Aristotle was the first to divide what modern economists simply call value into two categories: use value and exchange value (Pol, 1.9, 1257a). 'Use value as a collective term collects substances as substances, that is, as the things they are by nature, and so use value is necessarily qualitatively differentiated and heterogeneous' (Meikle, 1995, p. 17). Exchange values are more complex. When one writes 1 hamster = 20 pencils it is not obvious what the commensurable dimension is. Such an equation is meaningless until one knows by which property they can be rendered commensurable. Meikle introduces the issue by referring to a price list: Aristotle in the 21st century 733 Aristotle's inquiry into exchange value is aimed at explaining a capacity: the capacity products have for exchanging.. .Value.. .is the name of whatever it is by virtue of which products can behave in exchange in the way that they do, that is, exchange in proportions as quantities. (Meikle, 1995, p. 113) Recall that what a thing or substance is relates to what it can do, and that depends upon its intrinsic capacities or causal powers. The substance that renders different goods commensurable and thereby facilitates exchange, must possess certain properties and capacities. The solution to the problem of commensurability, then, involves finding a substance which has specific properties and capacities. Now, in trying to solve the problem of commensurability Aristotle considers, and rejects: (a) money, (b) need, and (c) a combination of the two. (a) Money Aristode considers whether money, since it is the measure of all things, constitutes die nature of exchange value. The thinking here, according to Meikle (1995, p. 20) is that 'the existence of a common standard of measurement itself constitutes commensurability and makes die equalisation of goods possible.' After flirting with this idea, Aristode rejects it because for money to be a measure, products must already be commensurable. 'A measure does not create the property which it measures. Measures of length do not create spatial extension' (Meikle, 1995, pp. 22-3). It is worth putting this anodier way, because diis is an issue which still has not hit home widi many contemporary economists: 'if diere is a problem about how steel and cloth can be commensurated, then mere is also a problem about how steel and gold [as money] can be commensurable' (Meikle, 1997, p. 5). (b) Need or chreia2 Aristotle dien considers whether need {chreia), since it 'holds everydiing togedier', constitutes die nature of exchange value. That [chreia] holds things together as a single unit, is shown by the fact that when men do not need one another...they do not exchange, as we do when some one wants what one has oneself. (NE, 1133b) Unfortunately, chreia also lacks a unit of measurement and is rejected. 1 It is worth reminding oneself that exchange value appears, and can only appear, in the form of money price. Meikle takes this as read and it will be mentioned again below. 2 The term 'need' here is conceived of in Meikle's interpretation of chreia, i.e., not as demand, utility or some such. Downloaded from http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 value. Since conceptual clarity at this stage is vital, I spell out the relationships between them via an analogy with length. • There is one common substance that renders all incommensurable three-dimensional objects commensurable, namely extension in space. One refers to this substance as length. The measure of diis substance is the metre. • Similarly with value. There is one common substance that renders incommensurable commodities commensurable—although Aristotle does not know what it is. Whatever it turns out to be, one refers to this substance as value. The measure of this substance is exchange value.1 Aristotle begins the search for the common substance (value) that renders incommensurable use values commensurable by virtue of the capacity this substance has for assigning magnitudes (exchange value) to them. Significantly his metaphysics allows the problem to be posed correctly, even if he himself cannot solve it. 734 S. Fleetwood (d) Value as mere relation Some commentators have followed Bailey, Jevons, Marshall and Pareto in resolving the problem by rejecting it. Value, they argue, merely denotes the relation in which two objects stand to each other as exchangeable commodities. (e) Utility as common substance Some commentators have followed Bohm-Bawerk, Menger and Shumpeter in resolving the problem by arguing that the common substance is utility.' (f) Utility and unequal exchange Some commentators have followed Senior and Jevons in rejecting the problem by arguing that value is an attribute of mind in the form of subjective utility. Moreover, there is nothing equal about an exchange. Agent A exchanges commodity x with agent B for commodity .y. From the perspective of agent A, commodity y delivers greater utility than commodity x—and vice versa for agent B. With no need for equality of proportion, there is no need for commensurability and again the problem is solved. For economists who follow these approaches, steeped (as most of them are) in the metaphysics of Humean empiricism,2 the idea that value is a substance with attributes and capacities able to render products commensurable is, quite literally, unthinkable.3 Meikle (1995, chs 2, 6 and 9) deploys Aristotelian metaphysics to reject these approaches, although they cannot be rehearsed here. The discussion of neoclassical interpretations of value is, however, the weakest part of the book. The arguments Meikle deploys are likely to meet criticism from many 1 For an excellent rejection of the notion that utility can be the commensuraring substance of value, see Kay (1977). 2 For arguments to support the claim that most economists presuppose Humean empiricism, see Lawson (1994 and 1996). This also extends to the classical political economists I mention in the following section (g). Lawson is keen to point out that the metaphysical presuppositions held by economists strongly encourage (a) the kind of methodological approach taken, and (b) the kind of things included in, or excluded from, theories. Put starkly, choice of metaphysics restricts the choice of method and theory. 3 The exception here may be Menger. As an Aristotelian essentialist, and simultaneously a defender of subjective value theory, Menger appears to warrant a more careful investigation than has hitherto been the case. Cf. Smith (1990). Downloaded from http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 (c) Money and need Aristotle separates money as unit of measurement from need as the dimension of commensurability, so that money might be the measure of need. But something that holds needy parties together in exchange is not the same as the dimension in which things exchanged are commensurable. Eventually, Meikle argues, having run through all the possibilities, Aristotle gives up the attempt to solve the problem of commensurability, and one must conclude, therefore, that Aristotle has no theory of value at all. This has not, as Meikle is at pains to point out, prevented numerous thinkers from attempting to solve the problem of commensurability on Aristotle's behalf. The reason this is important, is that by showing why Aristotle would reject such attempts on the grounds that they would conflict with his metaphysics, one is clearly placed to see not only what is incorrect with most solutions, but also what is correct about Marx's solution. I have placed the imputed solutions to the problem of commensurability under three headings (d) to (f), although these do not exactly correspond to Meikle's order of presentation because he does not note anything corresponding to my heading (f). Aristotle in the 21st century 735 (g) Labour The final attempt to solve the problem of commensurability has been handed down from the classical political economists Smith and Ricardo to their heirs, including Sraffians and some (formalistic/quantitative) Marxists. Unlike neoclassical economists who opt for one of the perspectives noted above (d) to (f), classical political economists attempt to resolve the problem of commensurability by making labour the sought-after substance. Mainwaring's introduction to Sraffian economics, for example, deals with an undifferentiated substance called 'labour". 'The labour theory of value', he writes, 'retains the principle of homogeneity of inputs and outputs by measuring both in terms of labour embodied' (1984, p. 22). Equal parcels, packages or quanta of this undifferentiated substance, its dimension being time, are embodied in commodities during the production process, conferring value upon them and rendering them commensurable. Labour appears to be & particular. This attempt to use labour as the commensurating substance is, however, metaphysically incorrect. Aristotle did not make such an attempt on account of his theory of action, whereby labours differ from each other in each having a different end aim or telos. Labours or actions cannot therefore be added up or aggregated so they could not constitute the uniform substance of something clearly non-natural, conventional, and undifferentiated as exchange value. The feature that makes beds and houses commensurable could not, for Aristotle, have been labour, because the labours that produced these things were no more commensurable...than the things themselves. (Meikle, 1995, p. 184) One cannot solve the problem of incommensurable commodities by moving backwards one stage to what are, in reality, the equally incommensurable, concrete labours that produced them. This simply pushes the question back one stage. Guided by his metaphysics, Aristotle did not attempt such a backward move. For him, a collective term can be used correctly to collect things that have ends only if the ends are similar. If the collective term 'labour' is to be used correctly it must collect labours with similar ends. But Aristotle knows full well that labours have different ends because they aim at producing different things. If Aristotle had used labour as the sought-after commensurating substance, he would have been inconsistent with his own metaphysics. As Meikle puts it: Aristotle's metaphysics was a metaphysics of the solid world of use value, and because of that he was able to frame the problem of exchange value. But he was unable to solve it for the same reasons. On Downloaded from http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 economists because they fail to consider more recent neoclassical approaches to value such as the shift from cardinal to ordinal utility, and to the use of indifference analysis. If a consumer is willing to substitute x units of tea for y units of coffee, the fact that the units are qualitatively different is irrelevant. Having said that, Meikle can, at least partially, be excused for deploying relatively weak arguments for two reasons. First, his book only brushes on neoclassical value theory where it has been used to interpret Aristotle and, second, because contemporary neoclassical theory is itself extremely confused on the nature of value and utility. Which of the above conceptualisations, (d), (e) or (f), underpins contemporary neoclassical theory? Does indifference analysis conflict with, compliment, or extend these conceptualisations? It is difficult to say, because issues of value are hardly ever posed in such fundamental terms, and the metaphysics of value is never considered. A critique of the metaphysics of contemporary neoclassical value theory would be a fruitful line of inquiry. 736 S. Fleetwood his metaphysics, the concepts needed for the solution are conceptual impossibilities. (Meikle, 1995, p. 190) 1 Meikle notes, but makes nothing of, several observations about the nature of substance in Aristotle that are pertinent to Marx. Exchange value as mere quantity is 'undifFerentiated, homogeneous, and lacks species'. It can neither, therefore,'strictly" be a substance nor have a nature (Meikle, 1995, p. 17). Meikle suggests that exchange value can be treated as if it were a substance and had a nature, because one can attribute per se being to it in rather the same way as one might attribute per u being to justice. Now what is true of exchange value is also true of value, so value is not strictly a substance either. Classical political economists treat value as a pure substance—i.e., as the particular, concrete labour. Marx, however, treats value as a peculiar kind of substance—i.e., as the universal, abstract labour. The term 'substance', however, has the unfortunate and misleading connotation of actual, perhaps even physical or at least tangible stuff. Concrete labour embodied has this connotation. In fact, so tangible is this substance that one can observe and measure it. In the hands of Marx, however, abstract labour is clearly not the same kind of tangible thing. Mirowski (1989, pp. 174-92) grasps some of the problems with treating labour as a substance with his distinction between Marx's substance or crystalised labour theory, and nascent field or real-cost theory. See p. 707, n.3. Downloaded from http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 It appears that, from an Aristotelian perspective, all the above attempts to solve the problem of commensurability, including that proffered by classical political economists, are rejected. There might, however, be one thinker who has solved the problem of commensurability, and it is significant that he is a fully paid-up member of Aristotelian essentialism— Marx. While it does appear that what has just been said of classical political economy extends to Marx, so that the rejection of the classical labour theory of value is also a rejection of Marx's labour theory of value, this appearance is false. Marx's solution to the problem, while sharing some of the outward forms and terminology of classical political economy, is grounded firmly in a completely different metaphysics. Marx's theory of value is fundamentally different. How does Marx succeed where classical political economists and neoclassical economists fail? While this issue is in a sense interwoven throughout Meikle's 1995 book (especially pp. 183—90), the most concise statement appears in his 1994 paper (pp. 927—8), and it is from this source that the following argument is lifted. like classical political economists, Marx understands that the sought-after commensurating substance is labour. Unlike classical political economy, he deconstructs, to coin a post-modern phrase, the category of labour into subcategories including (but not exhausting): concrete, individual, abstract and social. The kind of labour he seeks cannot be naturally occurring, because naturally occurring labour is concrete labour which, as demonstrated above, is incommensurable. The commensurating substance must, therefore, be non-natural (Marx uses the term ubernaturlich) or conventional. 'It must be a peculiar kind of labour which is without species or differences of quality, like exchange value itself (1994, p. 927). Marx calls this substance abstract labour.1 Now Marx knows this appears to be an impossibility, as it raises a similar problem to that facing Aristotle, namely, that different commodities must, and yet cannot, be commensurable. The difference is that in Marx's day, unlike Aristotle's, the bizarre workings of the market turn this impossibility into a possibility. Under market conditions, natural labour (concrete) doubles into a synthesis of itself and non-natural labour (abstract). The specific properties possessed by abstract labour are the opposite of concrete labour. Unlike concrete labour, it is not denned by ends (e.g., making a shin or a table) and is not, therefore, differentiated into kinds (e.g., tailoring or carpentry). Unlike concrete labour, it is not measured in units of observable, measurable time, like hours of embodied labour time, but rather in aliquot parts of society's total labour—or, more accurately, in aliquot parts of society's labour whose products are destined for the sphere of exchange. Abstract Aristotle in the 21st century 737 labour, then, is unobservable and immeasurable. The relation between the part and the whole of society's total abstract labour is that of a particular to a universal. As Marx puts it: Within the value relation... the abstractly general counts not as a property of the concrete, sensibly real; but on the contrary the sensibly-concrete counts as the mere form of appearance...of the abstractly general. Being human labour counts as its essence, being the labour of tailoring counts only as the form of appearance...of this essence...This inversion by which the sensibly-concrete counts only as the form of appearance of the abstractly general and not, on the contrary, the abstractly general as property of the concrete characterises the value-expression. At the same time, it makes understanding it difficult. (1978, p. 140)1 1 See also Arthur (1979) and Rubin (1978). It is, of course, only at thU point, in the sphere of market exchange where labour is 'socialised', niat one can ascertain whether the concrete labour embodied was socially necessary or not. This need not detain us here. 5 This might be an explanation of why Marx himself spends the first thret chapters of Capital, Volume I discussing money. He knows the expenditure of labour power can only be reflected in the money price of the commodity produced. This also hints at why the transformation 'problem' is misconceived, although I cannot elaborate here. See p. 706, n. 1. 2 Downloaded from http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 Marx's observation that this makes 'understanding difficult' is somewhat of an understatement and I offer the following interpretation. Any particular labouring activity is concrete and, because performed by an isolated producer, individual. But such particular labouring activity is carried out with the aim or telos of producing a commodity which will be placed on the market alongside all other commodities. When the commodity (potentially or actually) enters the sphere of exchange, the concrete and individual labour that produced it become abstract and social. Through commodities, concrete and individual labouring activity is related and compared to all other concrete and individual labouring activities.2 To be strictly accurate, the labour does not cease to be concrete and individual, rather it doubles into a synthesis of concrete and individual, and abstract and social. Any particular labour is immediately an instance of society's total labouring activity, of labour in general, of universal labour. That one cannot observe or measure this universal, does not make it a figment of Hegelian idealism. This universal captures the fact that as a worker applies his/her individual and concrete labour at some spatio-temporal location to produce a commodity, s/hc forms part of a dense web or social network of thousands of other workers in other spatio-temporal locations doing likewise. His/her particular concrete and individual labour is also social and abstract, and so forms part of universal labour. Abstract labour is a (concrete or real) universal. At this point, if I have interpreted Marx and Meikle correctly, one can understand Meikle's claim that labour is not measured in units of observable, measurable time, like hours of embodied labour time, but rather in aliquot parts of society's total labour. Hours of labour embodied can only be the measure of concrete labour. The measure of abstract labour, and this is the coup de grace, can only be money price. Any investigation of value, it appears, cannot be completed until money has been understood and introduced. 3 Although sharing certain superficial similarities with the classical political economist's category of 'labour', Marx's category of 'labour1 is a completely different kettle of fish. And it is also completely diflFerent from the category of 'labour" used by contemporary neoclassical economists. When labour appears in an equation as a function of some other variable(s), its form is that of a variable: it appears as pure quantity. Yet how exactly such an undifferentiated (homogeneous) variable can arise out of differentiated (heterogeneous) labours is never given a second thought. Sensitivity to metaphysics would prevent thin illicit procedure occurring in both neoclassical economics and classical 738 S. Fleetwood 3. Economics as ethics, and the ethics of market economies The section on metaphysics noted the primacy Aristotle gives to the end, aim, or telos of things. In his investigation of use and exchange value, he inquires into the end of each, and finds they are different. He then sets out to assess the compatibility of each of these ends with what the proper end of society ought to be, namely the good life for its citizens. In Politics Book I, Aristotle discusses oikonomike, the art of household management, which today would be called something like the theory of production. One central aspect of oikonomike is chrematistike, the art of wealth getting, and this in turn consists of two different kinds. (i) Natural or good chrematistike Natural chrematistike relates to getting true wealth, which according to Aristotle 'consists of using things rather than owning them' (Meikle, 1995, p. 48). True wealth comes in the form of tools and useful tilings. These things are 'limited in size and number by the ends diey serve, with the consequence that the good life and its constitutive ends set the standard for deciding how much wealth is enough' (Meikle, 1995, p. 45). Notice that natural chrematistike refers to the acquisition of use values: the aim of acquiring and using use values is to pursue the good life. It is impossible to discuss at length what constitutes the good life here, other than to note that if it is to be attained, citizens must not only live, but live well. Citizens live by having access to the material necessities of life such as unadulterated food, shelter and a healthy, safe environment. Citizens live well by flourishing. Just as plants need water and sunlight if they are to flourish, so humans need conditions under which the capacities and 1 Such a statement is, in fact, quite meaningless. It compares the incomparable. Downloaded from http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 political economy. Recalling Section 1 above where the metaphysics of law was discussed, one can now grasp what Marx means (and does not mean) by the law of value. • A law is a statement about what a thing has the (transfactual) power or capacity to do. The law of value is a statement about a substance, abstract labour, and the capacity this substance has for rendering incommensurable commodities commensurable. • A law is not a statement about what a thing is empirically observed to do. For example, the law of value is not a statement of how far the concrete labour time actually embodied in a commodity (which can be observed and measured) diverges from the abstract labour time reflected in its money price (which cannot). 1 • A law is not a statement about what a thing would do under certain conditions, usually specified as assumptions—assumptions which are, typically, necessary only for mathematical tractability. The law of value cannot be translated into a formal statement about the amount of concrete labour time necessary for the production of a commodity. For example, the law of value is not a statement to the effect that 'the labour value of one unit of corn [denoted x] is the sum of all labour inputs [where a denotes units of seed corn and b units of labour] in the (infinite) past: x = b + ab + a2b...' (Elster, 1987, p. 129). Attempts to treat the law of value in this and other similar ways (such as empirically estimating labour values) suggest a complete misunderstanding of Marx's essentdalist metaphysics. If Meikle's book does nothing else, it ought to serve as a valuable lesson against this kind of'value theory'. Aristotle in the 21st century 739 powers they have, in virtue of them being the kind of thing they are, can flourish rather than be frustrated or constrained. Flourishing, for Aristotle, centres around having time to enjoy leisure, aesthetic and physical pursuits and to engage in the political activity of a citizen. Of significance is the limit placed upon economic activity. As Booth (1993, p. 45)' puts it: Once a level of wealth had been achieved which would make possible such a life of leisure or political activity, the goal seems to have been to withdraw from the economy rather then to reinvest. This notion of engaging in economic activity until one has enough wealth, then withdrawing to flourish as a human, will be returned to in a moment. acquiring exchange values is to acquire money. Actions are denned by their aims, and since the aims of these two arts are quite different, they are quite different undertakings. Meikle employs Marx's notation to illustrate the difference between these two arts, and their link with use and exchange values. Aristotle is aware of: exchange via direct barter (C-C); exchange mediated by money C - M - Q exchange for the purpose of acquiring money M - C - M ' . C-C is concerned with natural chrematistike and acquiring true wealth. C-M-C is a little more complicated as it does involve money (Meikle, 1995, pp. 54-6), but for the purposes of this paper the complications can be ignored. Transactions of the form C-M-C bring together a specific use value and a need. Because the end is good, the use of the product is good, as is the use made of the money. C-M-C is, therefore, concerned with natural chrematistike and acquiring true wealth. M-C-M', by contrast, is concerned with unnatural chrematistike and acquiring spurious wealth. In the pursuit of this art, Aristotle sees a violation of the proper aim of society. What is it about the nature of the transactions involved in M - C - M that leads Aristotle to this conclusion? Apparently, this form of exchange: is only concerned with getting a fund of money, and that only by the method of conducting the exchange of commodities...[C]urrency is the starting-point, as it is also the goal... [T]he wealth produced by this form of the art of acquisition is unlimited. (Politics, 1257b) The aim of unnatural chrematistike is merely the expansion of spurious wealth, viz. a sum of money. Since there is no qualitative difference between one sum of money and another, only a quantitative one, the only aim of this form of transaction is the expansion of money. Moreover, there is no limit or terminus to this process: if M can be advanced to become M', then this can be advanced to become M", ad infinitum.2 The individual cannot pursue the good life for a number of reasons, although the central one is probably that the continual drive to accumulate more wealth than is needed, denies leisure time. Moreover, the community cannot pursue the good life either, again for a number of reasons, the essential one being that the economy is directed towards an unnatural aim. What this means can be illustrated by considering two examples: the Delphic knife and the Sophists. The Delphic knife appears to be a cheap, crude, tool made for many uses when, 1 2 Fora fuller exposition, see Booth (1993, pp. 34-55). Compare this with Boom's comments (above) about the withdrawal from the economic sphere. Downloaded from http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 (ii) Unnatural or bad chrematistike Unnatural chrematistike relates to getting spurious wealth in the form of money. It will be noticed that unnatural chrematistike refers to the acquisition of exchange values: the aim of 740 S. Fleetwood If [end] A is a good end and B a bad one, then the point will be to get people to stop pursuing B in the false hope that they are pursuing A, and this is ethics. (Meikle, 1994, p. 933) On this definition, then, ethics is about identifying ends that ensure the good life, and (minimally) suggesting that people initiate action to bring this end about. Let us now apply the points raised in this paper to an investigation of the ethics of contemporary capitalism. As the realised capacities of two different substances, namely concrete and abstract labour, use and exchange value are the outcomes of pursuing two different ends although, importantly, they reside in the same body—i.e., the commodity. When individuals initiate actions involving commodities, they are led to quite different kinds of behaviour depending upon which of the ends is pursued. • If use value is pursued, some human agency must employ the knowledge of what is needed, then, subsequendy, deploy society's productive capacities to meet these needs. Products will be made with one and only one end: to meet their intended purpose. • If, however, exchange value is pursued, productive capacities are not deployed to meet predetermined needs, but rather to satisfy a different end: the expansion of value. This alien objective of our productive efforts decides for us which capacities are developed and whether or not they are deployed, and which needs are met and how satisfactorily. (Meikle, 1991, p. 315) In other words, when the two ends become entangled, which diey inevitably must in a world of commodities, then the two aims may conflict and, if so, something has to give. The result is, like the Delphic knife and the practice of Sophistry, that the nature of use value can be 'compromised, subordinated, or, in the worst case, entirely replaced by the end of getting money' (Meikle, 1995, p. 71). When exchange value latches onto othei activities...its own particular aim is transferred to them. The trouble is that each of these activities,fromsport to education, already has an aim or point of its own. (1995, p. 199) 1 1 thank Scott Meikle for this translation, obtained in private correspondence. Downloaded from http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 according to Aristotle, 'every instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses' (Pol, 1252b). 1 His criticism is aimed not at the poor workmanship of the producer, but at the fact that 'the use value has been compromised and diminished by design out of considerations of exchange value' (Meikle, 1995, p. 56). The Delphic knife possesses the shortcomings it does because M is the maker's aim. Aristode criticises the Sophists for similar reasons. The Sophist, declares Aristotle, 'is one who makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom' (Meikle, 1995, p. 70). Sophistry is money making, not philosophy. Sophistry appears to be similar to philosophy because it turns on the same class of things as philosophy, but Sophistry and philosophy differ in respect of their aims. The same sort of argument can be extended to any professional activity (e.g., medical, military) which is capable of being used for the pursuit of money or 'making a living', as Aristotle puts it. Activities such as production and the provision of services appear to be similar whether their aim is natural or unnatural chrematistike. Observing them, one would not perceive the difference. But when activities previously aimed at natural chrematistike become entangled with activities aimed at unnatural chrematistike, men the two aims may conflict. What does all this mean for the ediics of a market economy? Meikle does not pursue the point directly in the book, but by combining comments from two of his other papers, one can at least attempt an answer to the question. First, however, one needs a definition of ethics: Aristotle in the 21st century 741 Such things arc said to be efficient, and they are if efficiency is denned as whatever produces exchange value. They are not efficient as use values: The system of value as a whole is not efficient at satisfying human need, which remains unmet on a vast scale everywhere. (Meikle, 1991, p. 315) Once one understands that use and exchange values aim at different things, one is able to see that any inquiry into a system based upon exchange value is simultaneously an inquiry into the ethics of that society. Meikle, closely following Aristotle, argues that a society based upon exchange value cannot be one that identifies needs and sets about deploying capacities to meet them for the purpose of bringing about the good life.2 Put this way, the argument that a system based upon exchange value cannot bring about the good life is, I submit, spectacularly obvious—although this does not make it correct. But because it is never put this way, the obviousness remains hidden from view. Why, then, is the argument never put this way? Three reasons seem to be buried within Meikle's book. First, Adam Smith recognises that M - C - M ' characterises the aim of individual business people. However, he considers that the overall result of individuals having this aim is that C-M-C characterises the aims of society as a whole. From a Smithian perspective, die pursuit of exchange value, despite misleading appearances, really serves the end of use value. Neoclassical economic theory, notorious in taking its cue from carefully selected aspects of Smith's work, turns the idea that' [i] t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from regard to their own interest* (Smith, 1979, p. 119) into an unquestionable and unquestioned dogma. As a consequence, even the possibility that die dominance of exchange over use value might lead to an unethical economic system becomes, quite literally, unthinkable. 3 1 A De Montfort University supplement to the University newsletter 'Foursite' (March, 1996, no. 2) 'outlines some of the activities staff might find useful in helping to "convert" initial enquiries into firm choices'—i.e., recruit students. Activity no. 10 reads: 'Remember to sell your courses—give reasons why a student should definitely stick with the special attributes of your course'. Is it not revealing that I was reminded of this when considering Aristotle's view of the Sophists? 2 For a slightly longer discussion of ethics, utilitarianism and economics, see Meikle (1997). 3 As one anonymous referee pointed out, there is a seeming paradox here; a paradox which strengthens the Smithian defence of the status quo. Capitalist societies, where the lofty ideals of the good life/use value are not pursued, might actually be better able to achieve these ideals than societies that do, in the sense of their ability to generate fantastic levels of wealth. However, as noted above, die good life is not simply about tiving, but also about living well, and here capitalism falls down. As Marx put it: 'In bourgeois economics—and in the epoch of production to which it corresponds—this complete working out of the human content appears as a complete emptying out...as total alienation and the tearing down of all limited, one sided aims as sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external end.' Antiquity delivers 'satisfaction from a limited standpoint; while the modem [epoch] gives no satisfaction; or where it appears satisfied with itself, it is vulgar' (1973, p. 488). Downloaded from http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 Because commodities are not made as use values per se but as means to attaining exchange value form, they are made to the extent that they satisfy, and in a form most conducive to meeting, the end of exchange value. Making commodities deliberately badly, or not making some commodities for which there is an overwhelming need, become possible aims for society. Hence one sees things like deliberate adulteration; planned obsolescence; inability to supply use values such as good-quality housing and health care to increasingly large sections of society in the First World; inability to meet basic needs of Third World peoples, and so on.1 Moreover, because there is no limit to the M - C - M process, there is no limit to accumulation and the pressure for continual expansion of economic output, with disastrous consequences for leisure time and the environment. The perversion that results from the pursuit of exchange value does not go unnoticed by Meikle: 742 S. Fleetwood Second, as capitalism establishes itself, not just individuals, but society as a whole becomes organised via decision-making centred upon the pursuit of exchange value. This real, historic development has profound effects upon the conception of ethics and its relation to economics. Economics becomes the science of exchange value, its magnitudes, movements and the pursuit of its ends. The place of use value shifts from end to means as usefulness becomes merely a means to meet the new end of exchange value. Real ethical questions about ends are expunged from economic theory only to be replaced by utilitarianism. Utilitarianism collapses the twin ends of use and exchange value into the single end of utility, where there is no analytical space, as it were, to conceive the possibility of a contradiction or evaluate different forms of human action. Actions, from this perspective, differ not by their real ends, but by their efficacy in promoting the pseudo end of utility. If a market in orphans were permitted, it would not only produce the exchange value of an orphan, as Meikle observes (1995, p. 196), but this state of affairs would be judged solely on this market's efficacy in increasing utility. Third, the empiricist metaphysics, typically adopted by neoclassical economics, is necessarily concerned with surface appearances, and while it may probe beneath the surface to some extent, what it cannot do is entertain an essentialist metaphysics of capacities. If there is no distinction to be drawn between a capacity and its exercise, then to say that something can do something is just to say that it does do it. This metaphysics cannot, therefore, entertain the notion of telos, end or aim, and so cannot maintain a (genuine) distinction between use and exchange value. Utilitarianism complements this metaphysics, by offering a consistent ethics whereby actions differ not by their real ends, but by their efficacy in promoting the pseudo end of utility. This discussion of economics as ethics results in Meikle making two correct (in my opinion) claims, but then drawing a conclusion that seems to me incorrect. First, he claims that the theory of ethics employed by neoclassical economics is inadequate. In fact, he goes further and claims that 'ethics and economics are competitors over the same ground' (1995, p. 109). Second, he claims that 'Aristotle's inquiries are therefore ethical and metaphysical, not economic' {ibid., p. 198). He then concludes that the analysis of exchange value is not a matter for economics, but for metaphysics or social philosophy (ibid., p. 200). There are, however, two response to the claim that the analysis of exchange value is part of philosophy, not economics. First, it begs the question of which economics? Although hegemonic, neoclassical economics does not exhaust the subject. Marxist 'economies', because it is partly 'the metaphysics of exchange' (1995, p. 197, m. 31) appears to be one alternative to neoclassical economics mat can accommodate an adequate metaphysics: Menger's economics might be another. If so, then there are other (adequate) branches of economics that can accomodate real metaphysics, and this leads to the second response. An either/or approach to economics and philosophy is unlikely to be fruitful. Surely what is required is a totalising subject: a syndiesis of (adequate) economics and philosophy that does not fracture precisely at the joints where maximum strength is required. Meikle's own comments notwithstanding, this is the lesson I draw from his book. Downloaded from http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 Utilitarianism, unsurprisingly, fits the requirements of economics...because it had been designed for this supporting and subordinate role in thefirstplace.. .There is only one end, pleasure or utility, and all actions are means to it. They are therefore to be judged only on their efiBcacy in promoting that end, so that only the consequences of actions are significant, not the actions themselves. (Meikle, 1995, p. 107) Aristotle in the 21 st century 743 Conclusion As the year 2000 approaches and a new set of socio-economic problems appears on the horizon, contemporary theory seems increasingly unable even to frame the problems correctly, never mind solve them. 1 Meikle's book puts Aristotelian metaphysics back on the agenda for anyone who is seriously concerned to understand the fundamental issues of the nature of value and its correlative, the (un)ethical nature of contemporary capitalism. There are very few issues that are more fundamental and more relevant than these. Bibliography 1 Fleetwood (1997) highlights economists' inability to deal adequately with the effects of atypical employment arrangements on the conceptualisation and measurement of unemployment, owing, primarily, to eliding important differences between qualitative and quantitative categories. Downloaded from http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 Aristotle, 1925. Ethica Nichomachea, translated by Ross, W., Oxford, Clarendon Press Aristotle, 1946. The Politics, translated by Barker, E., Oxford, Clarendon Press Arthur, C. 1979. Dialectics and labour, in Mepham, J. and Ruben, D.-H. (eds), Issues in Marxist Philosophy VoL I, Brighton, Harvester Bhaskar, R. 1978. A Realist Theory of Science, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf Booth, W. 1993. Households, Ithaca Press, NY Boylan, T. and O'Gorman, P. 1995. Beyond Rhetoric and Realism in Economics: Towards a Reformulation of Economic Methodology, London, Roudedge Cartwright, N. 1995. Ceteris paribus laws and socio-economic machines, TheMonist, vol. 78, no. 3 , 276-94 Clark, S. 1983. The Ergon Argument in Aristotle's Man: Speculations Upon Aristotelian Anthropology, Oxford, Clarendon Press Collier A. 1986. Aristotelian Marx, Inquiry, no. 29,459-70 Eeghen, van P. 1996. Towards a methodology of tendencies, Journal of Economic Methodology, vol. 3, no. 2, 261-84 Elster, J. 1987. Making Sense of Marx, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Fleetwood, S. 1997. 'Conceptualising Employment and Unemployment in a Period of Atypical Employment Arrangements: The Inadequacies of Positivism,' De Montfort University Discussion Papers Harre, R. 1988. The Philosophies of Science, Oxford, Oxford University Press Harre, R. and Madden, E. 1975. Causal Powers, Oxford, Blackwell Hume, D. 1978. A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford, Clarendon Press Kay, G. 1977. Why labour is the starting point of capital, Critique, no. 7, 53-68 Lawson, T. 1994. A realist dieory for economics, in Backhouse, R. (ed.), New Directions in Economic Methodology, London, Routledge Lawson, T. 1996. Economics and Reality, London, Routledge Mainwaring, L. 1984. Value and Distribution in Capitalist Economies: An Introduction to Sraffian Economics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Marx, K. 1973. Grundrisse, translated by Nicolaus, M., London, Pelican Marx, K. 1978. The value form, Capital and Class, no. 4, 130-50 Meikle, S. 1985. Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx, London, Duckworth Meikle, S. 1991. History of philosophy: the metaphysics of substance in Marx, in Carver, T . (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Marx, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Meikle, S. 1994. Was Marx an economist? in Dunleavy, P. and Stanyer, J. (eds), Contemporary Political Studies VoL II, Proceedings of the Political Studies Annual Conference, University of Belfast Meikle, S. 1997. 'The Metaphysical Construction of the Economic Realm unpublished paper, Glasgow University Department of Philosophy Mirowski, P. 1989. More Heat Than Light: Economics as Social Physics: Physics as Nature's Economics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press O'Neill.J. 1995. Essences and markets, The Monist, vol. 78, no. 3, 258-75 744 S. Fleetwood Robinson, J. 1964. Economic Philosophy, Hannondsworth, Penguin Rubin, I. 1978. Abstract labour and value in Marx's system, Capital and Class, no. 4 Smith, A. 1986. The Wealth of Nations, London, Penguin Smith, B. 1990. Aristotle, Manger and Mises: as essay in the metaphysics of economics, History of Political Economy, supplement to vol. 22,263-88 Wieland, W. 1975. The problem of teleology, in Barnes, J. a al. (eds), Articles on Aristotle, VoL I, London, Duckworth Downloaded from http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 View publication stats