Contemporary Crises 4 (1980) 103-114
© Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in the Netherlands
103
INTERPRETATIONS OF CAPITALISM: AN ESSAY REVIEW*
ROBERT A. BEAUREGARD
Neo-Marxists have demoted the central contradiction in the economy, the
antagonism between the social nature of production and the private appropriation of profit, and have substituted the central contradiction of the State,
the incompatibility of fostering economic accumulation while maintaining
political legitimacy [ 1]. This shift in emphasis reflects an objective, historical transformation of industrial capitalism in which the State's intervention
was slight into advanced capitalism which requires explicit State involvement
in economic and social affairs in order to maintain economic stability and
growth and to stave off destructive contradictions. This latter, more recent
perspective confronts directly the relation between economy and polity,
raising issues which have perplexed scholars and politicians since mercantilism
and the rise of national governments. These issues focus upon the nature of
the economy, of the State, and of the relationship between them. NeoMarxists, reform liberals and even conservatives look towards these major
institutions for the source of the "good" society. But each ideological perspective sees a different reality [2].
Marxists and neo-marxists view the capitalist economy as that social
institution in which commodities are created for exchange, labor is exploited
and alienated, and the driving force is that of capital accumulation. The
State serves the interests of the ruling class by maintaining social order and
facilitating accumulation. Its function is to intervene to forestall the decline
of capitalism through actions which prevent the revolution of the working
class and solidify the position of capitalists. Reform liberals deemphasize the
linkage between profit and exploitation and do not consider capitalism's
central contradiction as an overwhelming evil. Instead they view the capitalist
Rutgers, New Jersev, U.S.A.
*This review comments on the following works:
Albert O. Hirschman. The Passions and the Interests. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1977, 145 pp.
Leon N. Lindberg, Robert Alford, Colin Crouch and Claus Offe. Stress and Contradiction in Modern
Capitalism. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books 1975, 443 pp.
Charles E. Lindblom. Politics and Markets. New York: Basic Books 1977, 389 pp.
104
economy as periodically malfunctioning and in need of restraining forces
which eliminate its excesses and utilize its dynamism for social betterment.
The role of the State is to intervene to reform the economy and to assure the
social well-being of the populace. It is a positive force which, through promulgation of the Welfare State, furthers the development of a humane capitalism. Lastly, conservatives, i.e. classical liberals, .view capitalism as the highest
form of economic organization, harnessing the interests of individuals
towards both private and even collective ends. As a mode of economic
production and distribution, capitalism is unexcelled. It rewards hard work,
innovation, and entrepeneurship and generates, with minor discrepancies,
equality of opportunity. What flaws it exhibits stem from governmental
interference. The State's role should be confined to making and enforcing
laws, defending national interests, and providing "public" goods, e.g.
highways.
These ideological perspectives contain different interpretations of the
workings and consequences of capitalism and of the role of the State in
economic issues, and they mix empirical observations with normative interpretations. It is thus difficult to determine accurately when reality is
being discussed, criticized, or superceded. Moreover, both reality and ideas
change historically. An examination of the ideological roots of capitalism
demonstrates that the separation of economy and polity seemingly associated
with early writings on capitalism and classical liberalism is only partially
accurate. As capitalism took hold as a form of economic organization, not
only was its establishment supported by State activities [3], but certain
intellectuals saw that the rise of capitalism could have a beneficial effect
upon political behavior and the State [4].
Moneymaking was once a dishonorable activity. During medieval times,
those who secured their living through commerce were considered less
honorable than the nobility and the landed gentry. Even though the latter
groups engaged in exploitation of their subjects, their worst excesses were
seen by political philosophers to be more or less restrained by the Church.
With the weakening of feudal society and the emergence of the Renaissance,
however, " . . . moralizing philosophy and religious precept could no longer
be trusted with restraining the destructive passions of men" [5]. The foundations of religion had been seriously weakened by the emergence of rationalism and there seemed to be no forces to repress, suppress, or harness the
passions and to produce civil order.
One solution, discussed by Bacon, Spinoza, and Hume, was to develop
countervailing passions which would obviate destructive passions and vices.
To these countervailing passions was given the name "interests", and in the
early 17th century the term was used to refer to the "totality of human
aspirations". It signified rational will, Later, rational calculation and econ-
105
omic advantage were linked, thus positing moneymaking (now interest) as
the prime countervailing passion, and thus a positive and curative activity.
Self-interest, or the pursuit of economic advantage, became the basis for a
viable social order. It was predictable and constant, quite the opposite of
those passions which harmed and oppressed. Commerce came to be seen as
the "calm passion", an inoffensive and innocent activity. An ideological link
was formed between capitalism and political excesses; capitalism was the
force which would restrain destructive passions.
Montesquieu, Sir James Steuart, and John Millar (three eighteenth century
philosophers) subsequently elaborated upon this notion. Each considered the
extent to which commerce could deter the passions of the powerful and o f
the State. Montesquieu, focusing upon the bill of exchange and foreign
exchange, argued that the former, in creating "invisible wealth" and "movable
property", made it extremely difficult for the avarice of rulers to be satisfied,
while in the latter instance, arbitrary devaluation of coinage is rendered
counterproductive. Thus the development of a monetary system constrained
the passions of rulers. The traditional recklessness and violence of the powerful were held in check by the need to maintain a stable and prosperous
system of commerce. Moreover, between nations commerce led to peace
since nations became mutually dependent u p o n stable and predictable relations. Even though commerce could be dehumanizing, once joined with
political interests, it could be used to avoid political oppression and war.
Sir James Steuart in his Inquiry Into the Principles of Po!itical Economy
(1767) echoed Montesquieu. He conceived of the modern economy as a
finely tuned clock which, while it needed frequent and corrective adjustments
by an expert statesman, could not be arbitrarily and carelessly handled if its
delicate mechanism was to remain in functioning order. The complexity of
commerce and of its administration, then, required political artistry rather
than the blunt exercise of political power.
Lastly, John Millar, another member of the Scottish Enlightment, went
beyond the strictly deterrence position of Montesquieu and Steuart to argue
that advances in productivity in manufacturing and agriculture lead to greater
overall liberty in society and, most importantly, to the ability of certain
groups to undertake collective action to oppose mismanagement and oppression. Mercantile groups could use their common interests to pressure
government through interest group behavior and to obtain redress of grievances. Thus Millar both posits commerce as a deterrence to the destructive
passions and as a mechanism for collective action.
The Physiocrats and Adam Smith abandoned this line of reasoning which
posited economic activities as a constraint upon political violence and as an
inducement to positive administration. Economic motives became dominant
and material well-being became the justification for the emergence of capital-
106
ism. The countervailing argument was abandoned and the conservative
position established. As a result, this effect of capitalism has been forgotten;
" . .. capitalism was supposed to accomplish exactly what was soon to be
denounced as its worst feature" [6]. The relation between business and
government within capitalist ideology lost its purported benefits. More
importantly, it has taken on negative connotations. State economic intervention within advanced capitalist societies is highly suspect and publicly
assailed. But while the impact of government on business is frequently
lamented, the role of business in affecting governmental behavior is seldom
discussed by conservatives and reform liberals. Only one side of the Stateeconomy relationship is addressed. This myopia is somewhat odd. In both
advanced capitalist and non-capitalist countries, business holds a powerful
and privileged position. It is a pivotal institution in the attainment of a
humane quality of life, in the establishment of democracy [7], and in the
transformation of capitalism [ 8 ].
All political economies have their business sector, not just polyarchies (i.e.
bourgoisie democracies) with markets but also authoritative political systems
with planned economies. Production and distribution need to be administered
and this gives rise to a business class. Simplistically delineated, political
economies contain a business class which oversees exchange relationships and
a class of politicians and bureaucrats who manage authority relations. In
certain countries, for example China and Cuba, preceptoral systems also
emerge in which education and ideology are used to motivate and guide
exchange and to facilitate governance. The mixture of exchange, authority,
and preceptoral relations determines the nature of the political economy.
But regardless of whether capitalist or communist societies are being discussed,
business holds a privileged position [9].
In capitalist markets, corporate executives function as "public officials".
The decisions they make have wide ranging public consequences outside the
walls of their enterprises. But most importantly, those decisions are made
with little external control. Corporate decision-makers have broad discretion
and are motivated by considerations related to capital accumulation. Within
advanced capitalist societies, corporate decision-making is relatively independent from government controls. In fact, it has more impact on governmental decision-making than governmental decision-making has on it.
The government responds positively to business interests because of the
need to maintain a dynamic and accumulative economy. In capitalist polyarchies. "(e)very government . . . accepts a responsibility to do what is
necessary to assure profits high enough to maintain a minimum employment
and growth" [10]. Since business decision-makers have both knowledge of
• and control over economic decisions, government leaders must defer to them.
Of course, there are conflicts among businessmen and the government is not
107
totally subservient to their wishes and desires. Regardless, business holds a
privileged position because of its " . . . extraordinary sources of funds,
organizations at the ready, and special access to government" [ 1 I]. The
struggle over authority within various spheres of public policy is thus fought
between business controls and polyarchal (i.e. authority) controls. And
since business controls are more powerful than and largely independent of
electoral controls, polyarchies accommodate business and not vice versa.
Additionally, business is able to mold citizen volitions through its privileged position and through class indoctrination. This establishes a situation
in which the interests of citizens come to be equated with those of business.
Business accomplishes this by participating politically in secondary issues
and molding opinion, by persuading citizens that business controls are a
legitimate part of polyarchal politics, and by creating beliefs which remove
the grand issues from politics. There is an underlying and basic acceptance of
the business ideology, supported by class indoctrination and mobility, which
sets the context in which political choices are made. While such manipulations fall short of the silencing of political opinion which occurs in fascist
and even certain contemporary communist systems, capitalist business still
manages to "outtalk" and to direct citizens. In fact, business controls penetrate the government and its politics to a greater extent than they manipulate consumer choice. It is tile authority system which is distorted by business;
competition of ideas is greater in the market [ 12].
Business penetration of government also occurs in communist systems.
Within these political-economies, authority systems have replaced more of
the economic exchange system than under capitalism. Business decisions in
the most "planned" societies are ostensibly viewed as governmental decisions.
But this obviates the role of the managerial class in shaping and constraining
those governmental directives to the economy. Businessmen are still needed
to provide the appropriate information to the planners, to agree upon
production quotas and resource allocations, and most importantly to carry
out State directives in the most effective and efficient manner. Communist
systems realize the importance of business enterprise involvement in decisions
regarding production and distribution. The extent to which authority can
replace exchange is decidedly limited; economic controls can not be instituted
solely through the authority system.
Out of this knowledge emerges lessons for democracy. Capitalist democ~
racies have to face three problems: the most appropriate pattern of problem
solving for the society, the existence of business privilege, and the decline of
class indoctrination [ 13]. Each of these issues emanates from the relationship between exchange and authority and the forms it takes in capitalist
polyarchies. The first issue refers to the choice between synoptic or strategic
problem-solving [ 14]. The former characterizes intellectually guided societies
108
in which analysis, theory, and discovery are used to provide direction. The
search is for the correct decision, that which corresponds to man's true
physical, psychological and social needs. The economy and the polity are led
by reasoned authority. This vision of a humanitarian society is characteristic
of the ideal to which communist systems aspire. Societies in which strategic
problem-solving is the norm utilize social interaction, experience, and choice
to give direction. Correct procedures are more highly valued than correct
decisions, and it is through mutual adjustment that goals are formulated and
actions defined [15]. In less abstract terminology, the choice is between
planned economies and authoritarian governments, and, private enterprise
markets and polyarchies.
The second issue, that of business privilege, requires that a distinction be
made between those privileges which directly assure profitability and those
which give to corporations the autonomy to pursue profits without constraints. Regulation of business privilege which neither weakens business
leadership nor destroys financial inducements is needed. Lastly, the apparent
decline of class indoctrination has led to increased demands by unions and
groups who benefit from the Welfare State, and a concomitant decline of
acquiescence, deference and compliance to business decisions and values.
Political instability and rebellion may result as the demands of these groups
come into conflict with the privileges of business. This crippled form of
democracy (i.e. polyar, chy) may be the best that we can do; it is a " . . .
practical compromise in democratic aspiration" [ 16 ]. The major institutional
barrier to a fuller democracy is the autonomy of the private corporation, a
problem to which advanced capitalism fails to provide a solution. Neomarxists, however, resist this resignation of reform liberals and attempt to
characterize objectively the prevailing forms of interaction between capitalism and the State in order to find opportunities for a socialist transformation.
One of the major issues surrounding the leftist perspective on the relation
between the economy and the government is the extent to which centralized
planning, emanating from the State, replaces market mechanisms in the
economy. In fact, one of the key elements in the establishment of a socialist
society is the establishment of planning to guide the economy, rather than
using the individual decisions of profit-maximizing consumers and producers
[17]. Moreover, capitalist economies in their advanced stage seemingly
require government controls, such as planning, in order to resist the destructive implications of their own contradictions. Planning versus the market is
thus a major dilemma facing advanced capitalist societies. The resolution of
this dilemma will affect the ways in which inequality of condition restricts
equality of opportunity, the legitimacy and efficiency of the State, and the
dominance or vulnerability of that particular nation in the international
arena [ 18].
109
In order for the State to institute effective planning within advanced
capitalist societies, certain political conditions must be attained, experts
must give appropriate economic advice, and the limits of State intervention
into the economy must be identified. For a capitalist economy to be democratically controlled (i.e. for social objectives to be substituted for private
ones, a situation which might not include centralized planning), the State itself must be continuously controlled by a labor movement [19]. Since the
abolition of private property is not imminent within capitalist societies, in
order for the economy to be democratically controlled, labor and a labor
party would have to develop effective policies for directing the economy towards purposes collectively defined through the political process, be independent of business control, and have the requisite resources for both maintaining that independence and getting reelected. Without this type of labor
movement, advanced capitalist economies will remain in control of capitalist
firms and serve the end of profit accumulation.
Such a State, however, must go beyond a State of Permanent Receivership
in which the State socializes risk and underwrites the stability of any institution large enough to be a factor in the community [20]. This kind of State
only reinforces capitalism, establishing the Welfare State to deal with the
social consequences of capitalist production and the Corporate State to
absorb the risks and the failures of capital accumulation. A democratically
controlled State must also abandon the "offset" function of Keynesian
liberalism in which governmental policy merely compensates for " . . . deviations from the normative level of aggregate expenditures generated in the
market economy . . . " [21]. This State must be able to promulgate economic policy appropriate to prevailing economic realities. Achieving this
means going beyond "normal politics", the viewing of political change in
terms of marginal adjustments [ 22]. Government's "tireless tinkering" with
social and economic programs leaves the structure of advanced capitalist
economies unchanged. Thus problems persist. Drastic action is not taken
until a crisis unfolds, and then the action itself tends to reinforce the present
system or, as in the case of French social security system, makes it possible
for the " . . . neocapitalist economy to run even faster" [23]. A democratically controlled economy within an advanced capitalist society would
have to overcome these limitations.
But the capitalist State is faced with various constraints on its intervention into the economy [24]. It can not initiate production within private
enterprises which is not accumulative, nor can it stop production which is
accumulative. The conditions of accumulation must be sustained if it is to
maintain its own legitimacy and, moreover, its ability to assert State power.
Simultaneously, the capitalist State must deny its essence, concealing the
fact that it undertakes activities to create and maintain the conditions for
110
capital accumulation and provides physical inputs into the private production
process. This posture requires that the State organize its decision-making
process. But the three logics of policy production (bureaucracy, technical
rationality, and political consensus) individually and collectively are unable
to deal with the types of allocative and productive policies required of a
capitalist State. Moreover, reconciliation of these functions will not be
achieved through planning, an action which would promote retaliation by
capitalists. Under conditions of advanced capitalism, then, the prospects for
democratic control of the economy look bleak.
Without democratic control of political economic relations, it is doubtful
that patterns of inequality within advanced capitalist societies will be rectified. Inequalities exist within and are created by both political and economic
functions, and are a reflection, for the most part, of the class structure.
While the inequalities generated by the private ownership of capital, the
unequal distribution of wealth, and the intersection of class background,
education, and occupation have long been recognized, with the emergence of
greater attention to the role of the State in economic matters, more attention has been given to how the State perpetuates inequality through public
consumption and intervenes in the workings of the economy to dampen
inequalities. The former involves the State in the provision of certain collective goods, e.g. education, health care, which bolster capital accumulation by
siphoning off both responsibilities and by appeasing social conflict [25].
Certain modes of consumption are thus politicized and have the potential to
become the focus for popular demands. Still, collective consumption is
directed ultimately by the ruling class and one can expect only reform;
economic interests penetrate the State in order to serve their own interests.
Even while the State is absorbing functions once the sole purview of the
private sector and reflecting prevailing inequalities in the provision of collective consumption, it is also promulgating fiscal and monetary policy which
affects economic equality through consideration of unemployment and
inflation. In coping with unemployment and inflation, evils which restrict
capital accumulation and create social discontent, the State must consider
the distribution of unemployment across various occupational and industrial
categories and the control of wages and prices. It is not always clear, however, what is a fair wage structure [26]. The multitude of conflicts within
labor and capital make it difficult, but not impossible, to move wages
towards equality and thus to develop a just fiscal and monetary policy. State
incomes policy often disrupts previous arrangements made between labor
and capital. In addition, because of the particularistic interests of workers,
their support may not lead to egalitarian policy [271. Only if worker interests
are transformed into political actions directed through the State and geared
to democratic control of the economy can a just incomes policy be achieved.
111
But while collective consumption facilitates capital accumulation and
incomes policy does the same through protection of the capitalist economy
from its own excesses, State intervention can not proceed unmindful of the
State's need to maintain legitimacy and to operate efficient programs which
conserve the expenditure of its surplus [28]. These three functions are interrelated. If the State is to be seen as legitimate, it must maintain capital
accumulation and provide efficient and effective collective consumption. But
efficiency within advanced capitalism is simply the provision, restoration,
and maintenance of commodity relations. Support of commodity relations,
in turn, facilitates capital accumulation and contributes to unemployment
and wage inequality. Thus the State is faced with internal contradictions
which threaten its own position [29]. By being effective in its directive
capacity, the State enhances support from certain groups and not others.
Legitimacy as general support must therefore be differentiated from specific
support of substantive policy and compliance to governmental directives.
Effective implementation of State policies requires a mixture of all three [30].
The State, having a need for legitimacy, utilizes a variety of techniques to
achieve it, techniques directed at various classes within society. Participation
strategies, the use of symbols to shape public opinion and generate a political
following [31 ], and the depoliticization of issues through the imposition of
technical rationality (and a related sports metaphor) upon essentially political
decisions [32] all enhance legitimacy independently of the State's intervention into capital accumulation and collective consumption. These latter
two strategies, however, suggest that ideology is important for legitimization.
Quite the contrary. The advanced capitalist State finds its support and stability outside of symbols. Even the existence of intellectual critiques of
capitalism are tolerated because they are not a threat and, to some extent,
help to legitimize the rules of liberal democracy [33]. These techniques are
secondary to the State's facilitation of capital accumulation for the ruling
class. Its legitimacy reduces to efficiency and effectiveness in facilitating
private appropriation and to provision of the materials for collective
consumption.
In executing these functions the advanced capitalist Stage cannot ignore
political economic relations occurring at the international level. The international flow of capital establishes relations between countries which require
political actions to be taken to foster or to protect oneself from economic
exploitation. Thus the world economy becomes salient for national States in
their pursuit of accumulation and legitimacy. Economic internationalization
affects relations within capitalist states, among them, between advanced
capitalist countries and communist countries, and at the level of the global
system itself [34]. The rise of the nation state and the spread of industrial
capitalism led historically to increased national rivalry and eventually to the
112
weakening of labor movements within advanced capitalist countries through
the use of surplus populations in economically backward countries and in
backward sectors in advanced capitalist countries [35]. Now, multinational
corporations require social and economic concessions from host nations and
foster interests consistent with the dominant classes of those countries thus
making demands upon the host State, creating dependencies, and strengthening the grip of the ruling classes over that State [36]. In turn, these multinationals threaten through job loss the labor unions of the parent countries
and through their overwhelming power and restructuring of work they
weaken the influence of labor unions in the host countries [37]. International labor organizations and international political bodies are required to
cope with this internationalization of capital. But while many assymetric
dependencies result from advanced capitalist countries penetrating other
nations, the end result is a diverse mix of dominance and vulnerability for
the nations involved [38]. In all cases, the State must respond to the initiatives of capital. Economic relations, both national and international, provide
the structure within which the politics of State intervention and of labor
movements take place.
This basically neo-Marxist perspective, then, attempts to discover within
advanced capitalism the forms of political-economic relations which will
provide nonreformist reforms for bringing about a society devoid of sharp
inequalities, oppression, alienation, and human misery [39]. By developing a
clear understanding of the role of the State, it is hoped that political action
directed at this goal can be made more effective. But the movement of
advanced capitalism beyond its present stage requires that the contradictions
which contain the seeds for its demise be allowed to flourish, not that they
be constantly postponed through State intervention. The dominant interests,
particularly business, most likely will continue to control the State, more or
less, in the near future and thus continue to encourage its protection of their
interests. The countervailing power of commerce does not exist. Further
heightening pessimism is the political stance of labor, including surplus labor.
Their support of the expansion of Welfare State programs serves also to prop
up capitalism by alleviating the misery of the working class and thus making
revolutionary action too costly. The emergence of a socialist society depends
upon the establishment of relations between the State and the economy
which work towards the elimination of the capitalist mode of production
and distribution and of capital's control over the State. Such changes require
a correct understanding of the role of the State and of the nature of historical
forces governing both advanced capitalist and non-capitalist nations.
113
Notes
1 See Miliband, Ralph (1969). The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books; and
O'Connor, James (1973). The Fiscal Crisis o f the State, New York: St Martin's Press.
2 Alford, Robert R. provides an overview of three similar ideologies: pluralist, elite, and class. See
his "Paradigms of Relations Between State and Society". in Lindberg, Leon N. et. al. (eds.)
(1975). Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism, Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington
Books, pp. 145-160.
3 Polanyi, Karl (1957). The Great Transformation, Boston: Beacon Press.
4 Hirschman, Albert O. (1977). The Passions and the Interests, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
5 Hirschman, op. eit., p. 15.
6 Ibid., p. 132.
7 Charles E. Lindblom maintains that the role of the business enterprise is unincorporated into
liberal theory concerning the government. This, along with the impact of business on democracy,
is a major theme in Lindblom, Charles E. (1977). Politics and Markets, New York: Basic Books.
8 Heilbroner, Robert L. (1966). The Limits of American Capitalism, New York: Harper and Row,
pp. 6 5 - 1 3 4 .
9 Lindblom's assertion of this privileged position of business is bold and provocative given his past
association with pluralism. See his "The Rediscovery of the Market" The Public Interest 4 (Summer,
1960): 89-101. See also Heilbroner, op. cit., pp. 3 - 6 1 .
10 Lindblom, op. cir., p. 174.
11 Ibid., p. 194.
12 Ibid., p. 221.
13 Ibid.,p. 344-356.
14 Lindblom terms the first Model 1 and the second Model 2. Ibid., pp. 247-260.
15 This strategic problem-solving strategy was originally developed in Braybrooke, David and Charles
E. Lindblom (1963).A Strategy of Decision, New York: The Free Press.
16 Lindblom, op. cit., p. 354.
17 Huberman, Leo and Paul M. Sweezy (1968). Introduction to Socialism, New York: Monthly
Review Press, pp. 6 0 - 6 5 .
18 These are the four themes which are used to organize the essays in Lindberg, et. al., op. cit.
19 Martin, Andrew "Is Democratic Control of Capitalism Economies Possible?" Ibid., pp. 13-56.
20 Lowi, Theodore J. "Toward A Politics of Economics: The State of Permanent Receivership", Ibid.,
pp. 115-124.
21 Solo, Robert A. "The Economist and the Economic Roles of the Political Authority in Advanced
Industrial So cieties", Ibid., pp. 99 - 113.
22 Cohen, Stephen S. and Charles Goldfinger, "From Permacrisis to Real Crisis in French Social
Security: The Limits to Normal Politics", Ibid., pp. 5 7 - 9 8 .
23 Ibid., p. 92.
24 Offe, Claus "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation", Lindberg,
et. al., op. cir., pp. 125-144.
25 Castells, Manuel "Advanced Capitalism, Collective Consumption, and Urban Contradictions: New
Sources of Inequality and New Models for Change", Ibid., pp. 175-197.
26 Rein, Martin and Peter Marris, "Equality, Inflation, and Wage Control", Ibid., pp. 199-213.
27 Crouch, Colin "The Drive for Equality: Experience of Incomes Policy in Britain", Ibid., pp.
215-241.
28 Beauregaxd, Robert A. (1978). "Planning in an Advanced Capitalist State", Burchell, Robert W.
and George Sternlieb (eds.), Planning Theory in the 1980's, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Center
for Urban Policy Research, pp. 235-254.
29 Offe, Claus "Introduction to Part III", Lindberg, et. al., op. cir., pp. 2 4 5 - 2 5 9 .
30 Mayntz, Renate "Legitimacy and the Directive Capacity of the Political System", Ibid., pp.
261-274.
31 Edelman, Murray "Symbolism in Politics", Ibid., pp. 3 0 9 - 3 2 0 .
32 Balbus, Ike "Politics as Sport: An Interpretation of the Political Ascendency of the Sports
Metaphor in America", Ibid., pp. 3 2 1 - 336.
114
33 Mann, Michael "The Ideology of Intellectuals and Other People in the Development of Capitalism",
Ibid., pp. 275-307.
34 Lindberg, Leon N. "Introduction to Part IV", Ibid., pp. 339-553.
35 Hymer, Stephen "International Politics and International Economics: A Radical Approach", Ibid.,
pp. 355-372.
36 Kurth, James R. "The International Politics of Postindustrial Societies: The Role of the Multinational Corporation", Ibid., pp. 373-392.
37 Martinelli, Alberto "Multinational Corporations, National Economic Policies, and Labor Unions",
Ibid., pp. 425-443.
38 Hassner, Pierre "Dominant States and Vulnerable Societies: The East-West Case", Ibid., pp.
393-423.
39 Nonreformist reforms are those which involve marginal changes in capitalist relations which set the
stage for the demise of capitalism. See Gorz, Andre (1967). Strategy for Labor, Boston: Beacon
Press.