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Interpretations of capitalism: An essay review

1980, Contemporary Crises

Neo-Marxists have demoted the central contradiction in the economy, the antagonism between the social nature of production and the private appropriation of profit, and have substituted the central contradiction of the State, the incompatibility of fostering economic accumulation while maintaining political legitimacy [ 1]. This shift in emphasis reflects an objective, historical transformation of industrial capitalism in which the State's intervention was slight into advanced capitalism which requires explicit State involvement in economic and social affairs in order to maintain economic stability and growth and to stave off destructive contradictions. This latter, more recent perspective confronts directly the relation between economy and polity, raising issues which have perplexed scholars and politicians since mercantilism and the rise of national governments. These issues focus upon the nature of the economy, of the State, and of the relationship between them. Neo-Marxists, reform liberals and even conservatives look towards these major institutions for the source of the "good" society. But each ideological perspective sees a different reality [2]. Marxists and neo-marxists view the capitalist economy as that social institution in which commodities are created for exchange, labor is exploited and alienated, and the driving force is that of capital accumulation. The State serves the interests of the ruling class by maintaining social order and facilitating accumulation. Its function is to intervene to forestall the decline of capitalism through actions which prevent the revolution of the working class and solidify the position of capitalists. Reform liberals deemphasize the linkage between profit and exploitation and do not consider capitalism's central contradiction as an overwhelming evil. Instead they view the capitalist Rutgers, New Jersev, U.S.A.

Contemporary Crises 4 (1980) 103-114 © Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in the Netherlands 103 INTERPRETATIONS OF CAPITALISM: AN ESSAY REVIEW* ROBERT A. BEAUREGARD Neo-Marxists have demoted the central contradiction in the economy, the antagonism between the social nature of production and the private appropriation of profit, and have substituted the central contradiction of the State, the incompatibility of fostering economic accumulation while maintaining political legitimacy [ 1]. This shift in emphasis reflects an objective, historical transformation of industrial capitalism in which the State's intervention was slight into advanced capitalism which requires explicit State involvement in economic and social affairs in order to maintain economic stability and growth and to stave off destructive contradictions. This latter, more recent perspective confronts directly the relation between economy and polity, raising issues which have perplexed scholars and politicians since mercantilism and the rise of national governments. These issues focus upon the nature of the economy, of the State, and of the relationship between them. NeoMarxists, reform liberals and even conservatives look towards these major institutions for the source of the "good" society. But each ideological perspective sees a different reality [2]. Marxists and neo-marxists view the capitalist economy as that social institution in which commodities are created for exchange, labor is exploited and alienated, and the driving force is that of capital accumulation. The State serves the interests of the ruling class by maintaining social order and facilitating accumulation. Its function is to intervene to forestall the decline of capitalism through actions which prevent the revolution of the working class and solidify the position of capitalists. Reform liberals deemphasize the linkage between profit and exploitation and do not consider capitalism's central contradiction as an overwhelming evil. Instead they view the capitalist Rutgers, New Jersev, U.S.A. *This review comments on the following works: Albert O. Hirschman. The Passions and the Interests. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1977, 145 pp. Leon N. Lindberg, Robert Alford, Colin Crouch and Claus Offe. Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books 1975, 443 pp. Charles E. Lindblom. Politics and Markets. New York: Basic Books 1977, 389 pp. 104 economy as periodically malfunctioning and in need of restraining forces which eliminate its excesses and utilize its dynamism for social betterment. The role of the State is to intervene to reform the economy and to assure the social well-being of the populace. It is a positive force which, through promulgation of the Welfare State, furthers the development of a humane capitalism. Lastly, conservatives, i.e. classical liberals, .view capitalism as the highest form of economic organization, harnessing the interests of individuals towards both private and even collective ends. As a mode of economic production and distribution, capitalism is unexcelled. It rewards hard work, innovation, and entrepeneurship and generates, with minor discrepancies, equality of opportunity. What flaws it exhibits stem from governmental interference. The State's role should be confined to making and enforcing laws, defending national interests, and providing "public" goods, e.g. highways. These ideological perspectives contain different interpretations of the workings and consequences of capitalism and of the role of the State in economic issues, and they mix empirical observations with normative interpretations. It is thus difficult to determine accurately when reality is being discussed, criticized, or superceded. Moreover, both reality and ideas change historically. An examination of the ideological roots of capitalism demonstrates that the separation of economy and polity seemingly associated with early writings on capitalism and classical liberalism is only partially accurate. As capitalism took hold as a form of economic organization, not only was its establishment supported by State activities [3], but certain intellectuals saw that the rise of capitalism could have a beneficial effect upon political behavior and the State [4]. Moneymaking was once a dishonorable activity. During medieval times, those who secured their living through commerce were considered less honorable than the nobility and the landed gentry. Even though the latter groups engaged in exploitation of their subjects, their worst excesses were seen by political philosophers to be more or less restrained by the Church. With the weakening of feudal society and the emergence of the Renaissance, however, " . . . moralizing philosophy and religious precept could no longer be trusted with restraining the destructive passions of men" [5]. The foundations of religion had been seriously weakened by the emergence of rationalism and there seemed to be no forces to repress, suppress, or harness the passions and to produce civil order. One solution, discussed by Bacon, Spinoza, and Hume, was to develop countervailing passions which would obviate destructive passions and vices. To these countervailing passions was given the name "interests", and in the early 17th century the term was used to refer to the "totality of human aspirations". It signified rational will, Later, rational calculation and econ- 105 omic advantage were linked, thus positing moneymaking (now interest) as the prime countervailing passion, and thus a positive and curative activity. Self-interest, or the pursuit of economic advantage, became the basis for a viable social order. It was predictable and constant, quite the opposite of those passions which harmed and oppressed. Commerce came to be seen as the "calm passion", an inoffensive and innocent activity. An ideological link was formed between capitalism and political excesses; capitalism was the force which would restrain destructive passions. Montesquieu, Sir James Steuart, and John Millar (three eighteenth century philosophers) subsequently elaborated upon this notion. Each considered the extent to which commerce could deter the passions of the powerful and o f the State. Montesquieu, focusing upon the bill of exchange and foreign exchange, argued that the former, in creating "invisible wealth" and "movable property", made it extremely difficult for the avarice of rulers to be satisfied, while in the latter instance, arbitrary devaluation of coinage is rendered counterproductive. Thus the development of a monetary system constrained the passions of rulers. The traditional recklessness and violence of the powerful were held in check by the need to maintain a stable and prosperous system of commerce. Moreover, between nations commerce led to peace since nations became mutually dependent u p o n stable and predictable relations. Even though commerce could be dehumanizing, once joined with political interests, it could be used to avoid political oppression and war. Sir James Steuart in his Inquiry Into the Principles of Po!itical Economy (1767) echoed Montesquieu. He conceived of the modern economy as a finely tuned clock which, while it needed frequent and corrective adjustments by an expert statesman, could not be arbitrarily and carelessly handled if its delicate mechanism was to remain in functioning order. The complexity of commerce and of its administration, then, required political artistry rather than the blunt exercise of political power. Lastly, John Millar, another member of the Scottish Enlightment, went beyond the strictly deterrence position of Montesquieu and Steuart to argue that advances in productivity in manufacturing and agriculture lead to greater overall liberty in society and, most importantly, to the ability of certain groups to undertake collective action to oppose mismanagement and oppression. Mercantile groups could use their common interests to pressure government through interest group behavior and to obtain redress of grievances. Thus Millar both posits commerce as a deterrence to the destructive passions and as a mechanism for collective action. The Physiocrats and Adam Smith abandoned this line of reasoning which posited economic activities as a constraint upon political violence and as an inducement to positive administration. Economic motives became dominant and material well-being became the justification for the emergence of capital- 106 ism. The countervailing argument was abandoned and the conservative position established. As a result, this effect of capitalism has been forgotten; " . .. capitalism was supposed to accomplish exactly what was soon to be denounced as its worst feature" [6]. The relation between business and government within capitalist ideology lost its purported benefits. More importantly, it has taken on negative connotations. State economic intervention within advanced capitalist societies is highly suspect and publicly assailed. But while the impact of government on business is frequently lamented, the role of business in affecting governmental behavior is seldom discussed by conservatives and reform liberals. Only one side of the Stateeconomy relationship is addressed. This myopia is somewhat odd. In both advanced capitalist and non-capitalist countries, business holds a powerful and privileged position. It is a pivotal institution in the attainment of a humane quality of life, in the establishment of democracy [7], and in the transformation of capitalism [ 8 ]. All political economies have their business sector, not just polyarchies (i.e. bourgoisie democracies) with markets but also authoritative political systems with planned economies. Production and distribution need to be administered and this gives rise to a business class. Simplistically delineated, political economies contain a business class which oversees exchange relationships and a class of politicians and bureaucrats who manage authority relations. In certain countries, for example China and Cuba, preceptoral systems also emerge in which education and ideology are used to motivate and guide exchange and to facilitate governance. The mixture of exchange, authority, and preceptoral relations determines the nature of the political economy. But regardless of whether capitalist or communist societies are being discussed, business holds a privileged position [9]. In capitalist markets, corporate executives function as "public officials". The decisions they make have wide ranging public consequences outside the walls of their enterprises. But most importantly, those decisions are made with little external control. Corporate decision-makers have broad discretion and are motivated by considerations related to capital accumulation. Within advanced capitalist societies, corporate decision-making is relatively independent from government controls. In fact, it has more impact on governmental decision-making than governmental decision-making has on it. The government responds positively to business interests because of the need to maintain a dynamic and accumulative economy. In capitalist polyarchies. "(e)very government . . . accepts a responsibility to do what is necessary to assure profits high enough to maintain a minimum employment and growth" [10]. Since business decision-makers have both knowledge of • and control over economic decisions, government leaders must defer to them. Of course, there are conflicts among businessmen and the government is not 107 totally subservient to their wishes and desires. Regardless, business holds a privileged position because of its " . . . extraordinary sources of funds, organizations at the ready, and special access to government" [ 1 I]. The struggle over authority within various spheres of public policy is thus fought between business controls and polyarchal (i.e. authority) controls. And since business controls are more powerful than and largely independent of electoral controls, polyarchies accommodate business and not vice versa. Additionally, business is able to mold citizen volitions through its privileged position and through class indoctrination. This establishes a situation in which the interests of citizens come to be equated with those of business. Business accomplishes this by participating politically in secondary issues and molding opinion, by persuading citizens that business controls are a legitimate part of polyarchal politics, and by creating beliefs which remove the grand issues from politics. There is an underlying and basic acceptance of the business ideology, supported by class indoctrination and mobility, which sets the context in which political choices are made. While such manipulations fall short of the silencing of political opinion which occurs in fascist and even certain contemporary communist systems, capitalist business still manages to "outtalk" and to direct citizens. In fact, business controls penetrate the government and its politics to a greater extent than they manipulate consumer choice. It is tile authority system which is distorted by business; competition of ideas is greater in the market [ 12]. Business penetration of government also occurs in communist systems. Within these political-economies, authority systems have replaced more of the economic exchange system than under capitalism. Business decisions in the most "planned" societies are ostensibly viewed as governmental decisions. But this obviates the role of the managerial class in shaping and constraining those governmental directives to the economy. Businessmen are still needed to provide the appropriate information to the planners, to agree upon production quotas and resource allocations, and most importantly to carry out State directives in the most effective and efficient manner. Communist systems realize the importance of business enterprise involvement in decisions regarding production and distribution. The extent to which authority can replace exchange is decidedly limited; economic controls can not be instituted solely through the authority system. Out of this knowledge emerges lessons for democracy. Capitalist democ~ racies have to face three problems: the most appropriate pattern of problem solving for the society, the existence of business privilege, and the decline of class indoctrination [ 13]. Each of these issues emanates from the relationship between exchange and authority and the forms it takes in capitalist polyarchies. The first issue refers to the choice between synoptic or strategic problem-solving [ 14]. The former characterizes intellectually guided societies 108 in which analysis, theory, and discovery are used to provide direction. The search is for the correct decision, that which corresponds to man's true physical, psychological and social needs. The economy and the polity are led by reasoned authority. This vision of a humanitarian society is characteristic of the ideal to which communist systems aspire. Societies in which strategic problem-solving is the norm utilize social interaction, experience, and choice to give direction. Correct procedures are more highly valued than correct decisions, and it is through mutual adjustment that goals are formulated and actions defined [15]. In less abstract terminology, the choice is between planned economies and authoritarian governments, and, private enterprise markets and polyarchies. The second issue, that of business privilege, requires that a distinction be made between those privileges which directly assure profitability and those which give to corporations the autonomy to pursue profits without constraints. Regulation of business privilege which neither weakens business leadership nor destroys financial inducements is needed. Lastly, the apparent decline of class indoctrination has led to increased demands by unions and groups who benefit from the Welfare State, and a concomitant decline of acquiescence, deference and compliance to business decisions and values. Political instability and rebellion may result as the demands of these groups come into conflict with the privileges of business. This crippled form of democracy (i.e. polyar, chy) may be the best that we can do; it is a " . . . practical compromise in democratic aspiration" [ 16 ]. The major institutional barrier to a fuller democracy is the autonomy of the private corporation, a problem to which advanced capitalism fails to provide a solution. Neomarxists, however, resist this resignation of reform liberals and attempt to characterize objectively the prevailing forms of interaction between capitalism and the State in order to find opportunities for a socialist transformation. One of the major issues surrounding the leftist perspective on the relation between the economy and the government is the extent to which centralized planning, emanating from the State, replaces market mechanisms in the economy. In fact, one of the key elements in the establishment of a socialist society is the establishment of planning to guide the economy, rather than using the individual decisions of profit-maximizing consumers and producers [17]. Moreover, capitalist economies in their advanced stage seemingly require government controls, such as planning, in order to resist the destructive implications of their own contradictions. Planning versus the market is thus a major dilemma facing advanced capitalist societies. The resolution of this dilemma will affect the ways in which inequality of condition restricts equality of opportunity, the legitimacy and efficiency of the State, and the dominance or vulnerability of that particular nation in the international arena [ 18]. 109 In order for the State to institute effective planning within advanced capitalist societies, certain political conditions must be attained, experts must give appropriate economic advice, and the limits of State intervention into the economy must be identified. For a capitalist economy to be democratically controlled (i.e. for social objectives to be substituted for private ones, a situation which might not include centralized planning), the State itself must be continuously controlled by a labor movement [19]. Since the abolition of private property is not imminent within capitalist societies, in order for the economy to be democratically controlled, labor and a labor party would have to develop effective policies for directing the economy towards purposes collectively defined through the political process, be independent of business control, and have the requisite resources for both maintaining that independence and getting reelected. Without this type of labor movement, advanced capitalist economies will remain in control of capitalist firms and serve the end of profit accumulation. Such a State, however, must go beyond a State of Permanent Receivership in which the State socializes risk and underwrites the stability of any institution large enough to be a factor in the community [20]. This kind of State only reinforces capitalism, establishing the Welfare State to deal with the social consequences of capitalist production and the Corporate State to absorb the risks and the failures of capital accumulation. A democratically controlled State must also abandon the "offset" function of Keynesian liberalism in which governmental policy merely compensates for " . . . deviations from the normative level of aggregate expenditures generated in the market economy . . . " [21]. This State must be able to promulgate economic policy appropriate to prevailing economic realities. Achieving this means going beyond "normal politics", the viewing of political change in terms of marginal adjustments [ 22]. Government's "tireless tinkering" with social and economic programs leaves the structure of advanced capitalist economies unchanged. Thus problems persist. Drastic action is not taken until a crisis unfolds, and then the action itself tends to reinforce the present system or, as in the case of French social security system, makes it possible for the " . . . neocapitalist economy to run even faster" [23]. A democratically controlled economy within an advanced capitalist society would have to overcome these limitations. But the capitalist State is faced with various constraints on its intervention into the economy [24]. It can not initiate production within private enterprises which is not accumulative, nor can it stop production which is accumulative. The conditions of accumulation must be sustained if it is to maintain its own legitimacy and, moreover, its ability to assert State power. Simultaneously, the capitalist State must deny its essence, concealing the fact that it undertakes activities to create and maintain the conditions for 110 capital accumulation and provides physical inputs into the private production process. This posture requires that the State organize its decision-making process. But the three logics of policy production (bureaucracy, technical rationality, and political consensus) individually and collectively are unable to deal with the types of allocative and productive policies required of a capitalist State. Moreover, reconciliation of these functions will not be achieved through planning, an action which would promote retaliation by capitalists. Under conditions of advanced capitalism, then, the prospects for democratic control of the economy look bleak. Without democratic control of political economic relations, it is doubtful that patterns of inequality within advanced capitalist societies will be rectified. Inequalities exist within and are created by both political and economic functions, and are a reflection, for the most part, of the class structure. While the inequalities generated by the private ownership of capital, the unequal distribution of wealth, and the intersection of class background, education, and occupation have long been recognized, with the emergence of greater attention to the role of the State in economic matters, more attention has been given to how the State perpetuates inequality through public consumption and intervenes in the workings of the economy to dampen inequalities. The former involves the State in the provision of certain collective goods, e.g. education, health care, which bolster capital accumulation by siphoning off both responsibilities and by appeasing social conflict [25]. Certain modes of consumption are thus politicized and have the potential to become the focus for popular demands. Still, collective consumption is directed ultimately by the ruling class and one can expect only reform; economic interests penetrate the State in order to serve their own interests. Even while the State is absorbing functions once the sole purview of the private sector and reflecting prevailing inequalities in the provision of collective consumption, it is also promulgating fiscal and monetary policy which affects economic equality through consideration of unemployment and inflation. In coping with unemployment and inflation, evils which restrict capital accumulation and create social discontent, the State must consider the distribution of unemployment across various occupational and industrial categories and the control of wages and prices. It is not always clear, however, what is a fair wage structure [26]. The multitude of conflicts within labor and capital make it difficult, but not impossible, to move wages towards equality and thus to develop a just fiscal and monetary policy. State incomes policy often disrupts previous arrangements made between labor and capital. In addition, because of the particularistic interests of workers, their support may not lead to egalitarian policy [271. Only if worker interests are transformed into political actions directed through the State and geared to democratic control of the economy can a just incomes policy be achieved. 111 But while collective consumption facilitates capital accumulation and incomes policy does the same through protection of the capitalist economy from its own excesses, State intervention can not proceed unmindful of the State's need to maintain legitimacy and to operate efficient programs which conserve the expenditure of its surplus [28]. These three functions are interrelated. If the State is to be seen as legitimate, it must maintain capital accumulation and provide efficient and effective collective consumption. But efficiency within advanced capitalism is simply the provision, restoration, and maintenance of commodity relations. Support of commodity relations, in turn, facilitates capital accumulation and contributes to unemployment and wage inequality. Thus the State is faced with internal contradictions which threaten its own position [29]. By being effective in its directive capacity, the State enhances support from certain groups and not others. Legitimacy as general support must therefore be differentiated from specific support of substantive policy and compliance to governmental directives. Effective implementation of State policies requires a mixture of all three [30]. The State, having a need for legitimacy, utilizes a variety of techniques to achieve it, techniques directed at various classes within society. Participation strategies, the use of symbols to shape public opinion and generate a political following [31 ], and the depoliticization of issues through the imposition of technical rationality (and a related sports metaphor) upon essentially political decisions [32] all enhance legitimacy independently of the State's intervention into capital accumulation and collective consumption. These latter two strategies, however, suggest that ideology is important for legitimization. Quite the contrary. The advanced capitalist State finds its support and stability outside of symbols. Even the existence of intellectual critiques of capitalism are tolerated because they are not a threat and, to some extent, help to legitimize the rules of liberal democracy [33]. These techniques are secondary to the State's facilitation of capital accumulation for the ruling class. Its legitimacy reduces to efficiency and effectiveness in facilitating private appropriation and to provision of the materials for collective consumption. In executing these functions the advanced capitalist Stage cannot ignore political economic relations occurring at the international level. The international flow of capital establishes relations between countries which require political actions to be taken to foster or to protect oneself from economic exploitation. Thus the world economy becomes salient for national States in their pursuit of accumulation and legitimacy. Economic internationalization affects relations within capitalist states, among them, between advanced capitalist countries and communist countries, and at the level of the global system itself [34]. The rise of the nation state and the spread of industrial capitalism led historically to increased national rivalry and eventually to the 112 weakening of labor movements within advanced capitalist countries through the use of surplus populations in economically backward countries and in backward sectors in advanced capitalist countries [35]. Now, multinational corporations require social and economic concessions from host nations and foster interests consistent with the dominant classes of those countries thus making demands upon the host State, creating dependencies, and strengthening the grip of the ruling classes over that State [36]. In turn, these multinationals threaten through job loss the labor unions of the parent countries and through their overwhelming power and restructuring of work they weaken the influence of labor unions in the host countries [37]. International labor organizations and international political bodies are required to cope with this internationalization of capital. But while many assymetric dependencies result from advanced capitalist countries penetrating other nations, the end result is a diverse mix of dominance and vulnerability for the nations involved [38]. In all cases, the State must respond to the initiatives of capital. Economic relations, both national and international, provide the structure within which the politics of State intervention and of labor movements take place. This basically neo-Marxist perspective, then, attempts to discover within advanced capitalism the forms of political-economic relations which will provide nonreformist reforms for bringing about a society devoid of sharp inequalities, oppression, alienation, and human misery [39]. By developing a clear understanding of the role of the State, it is hoped that political action directed at this goal can be made more effective. But the movement of advanced capitalism beyond its present stage requires that the contradictions which contain the seeds for its demise be allowed to flourish, not that they be constantly postponed through State intervention. The dominant interests, particularly business, most likely will continue to control the State, more or less, in the near future and thus continue to encourage its protection of their interests. The countervailing power of commerce does not exist. Further heightening pessimism is the political stance of labor, including surplus labor. Their support of the expansion of Welfare State programs serves also to prop up capitalism by alleviating the misery of the working class and thus making revolutionary action too costly. The emergence of a socialist society depends upon the establishment of relations between the State and the economy which work towards the elimination of the capitalist mode of production and distribution and of capital's control over the State. Such changes require a correct understanding of the role of the State and of the nature of historical forces governing both advanced capitalist and non-capitalist nations. 113 Notes 1 See Miliband, Ralph (1969). The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books; and O'Connor, James (1973). The Fiscal Crisis o f the State, New York: St Martin's Press. 2 Alford, Robert R. provides an overview of three similar ideologies: pluralist, elite, and class. See his "Paradigms of Relations Between State and Society". in Lindberg, Leon N. et. al. (eds.) (1975). Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism, Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, pp. 145-160. 3 Polanyi, Karl (1957). The Great Transformation, Boston: Beacon Press. 4 Hirschman, Albert O. (1977). The Passions and the Interests, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 5 Hirschman, op. eit., p. 15. 6 Ibid., p. 132. 7 Charles E. Lindblom maintains that the role of the business enterprise is unincorporated into liberal theory concerning the government. This, along with the impact of business on democracy, is a major theme in Lindblom, Charles E. (1977). Politics and Markets, New York: Basic Books. 8 Heilbroner, Robert L. (1966). The Limits of American Capitalism, New York: Harper and Row, pp. 6 5 - 1 3 4 . 9 Lindblom's assertion of this privileged position of business is bold and provocative given his past association with pluralism. See his "The Rediscovery of the Market" The Public Interest 4 (Summer, 1960): 89-101. See also Heilbroner, op. cit., pp. 3 - 6 1 . 10 Lindblom, op. cir., p. 174. 11 Ibid., p. 194. 12 Ibid., p. 221. 13 Ibid.,p. 344-356. 14 Lindblom terms the first Model 1 and the second Model 2. Ibid., pp. 247-260. 15 This strategic problem-solving strategy was originally developed in Braybrooke, David and Charles E. Lindblom (1963).A Strategy of Decision, New York: The Free Press. 16 Lindblom, op. cit., p. 354. 17 Huberman, Leo and Paul M. Sweezy (1968). Introduction to Socialism, New York: Monthly Review Press, pp. 6 0 - 6 5 . 18 These are the four themes which are used to organize the essays in Lindberg, et. al., op. cit. 19 Martin, Andrew "Is Democratic Control of Capitalism Economies Possible?" Ibid., pp. 13-56. 20 Lowi, Theodore J. "Toward A Politics of Economics: The State of Permanent Receivership", Ibid., pp. 115-124. 21 Solo, Robert A. "The Economist and the Economic Roles of the Political Authority in Advanced Industrial So cieties", Ibid., pp. 99 - 113. 22 Cohen, Stephen S. and Charles Goldfinger, "From Permacrisis to Real Crisis in French Social Security: The Limits to Normal Politics", Ibid., pp. 5 7 - 9 8 . 23 Ibid., p. 92. 24 Offe, Claus "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation", Lindberg, et. al., op. cir., pp. 125-144. 25 Castells, Manuel "Advanced Capitalism, Collective Consumption, and Urban Contradictions: New Sources of Inequality and New Models for Change", Ibid., pp. 175-197. 26 Rein, Martin and Peter Marris, "Equality, Inflation, and Wage Control", Ibid., pp. 199-213. 27 Crouch, Colin "The Drive for Equality: Experience of Incomes Policy in Britain", Ibid., pp. 215-241. 28 Beauregaxd, Robert A. (1978). "Planning in an Advanced Capitalist State", Burchell, Robert W. and George Sternlieb (eds.), Planning Theory in the 1980's, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Center for Urban Policy Research, pp. 235-254. 29 Offe, Claus "Introduction to Part III", Lindberg, et. al., op. cir., pp. 2 4 5 - 2 5 9 . 30 Mayntz, Renate "Legitimacy and the Directive Capacity of the Political System", Ibid., pp. 261-274. 31 Edelman, Murray "Symbolism in Politics", Ibid., pp. 3 0 9 - 3 2 0 . 32 Balbus, Ike "Politics as Sport: An Interpretation of the Political Ascendency of the Sports Metaphor in America", Ibid., pp. 3 2 1 - 336. 114 33 Mann, Michael "The Ideology of Intellectuals and Other People in the Development of Capitalism", Ibid., pp. 275-307. 34 Lindberg, Leon N. "Introduction to Part IV", Ibid., pp. 339-553. 35 Hymer, Stephen "International Politics and International Economics: A Radical Approach", Ibid., pp. 355-372. 36 Kurth, James R. "The International Politics of Postindustrial Societies: The Role of the Multinational Corporation", Ibid., pp. 373-392. 37 Martinelli, Alberto "Multinational Corporations, National Economic Policies, and Labor Unions", Ibid., pp. 425-443. 38 Hassner, Pierre "Dominant States and Vulnerable Societies: The East-West Case", Ibid., pp. 393-423. 39 Nonreformist reforms are those which involve marginal changes in capitalist relations which set the stage for the demise of capitalism. See Gorz, Andre (1967). Strategy for Labor, Boston: Beacon Press.