Ukraine Between "The Russian World" and The Black Sea

Chapter Fourteen Ukraine Between “The Russian World” and The Black Sea Lasha Tchantouridze Russia’s February 2014 invasion of Crimea, and its subsequent annexation, was a culmination of decades long tensions and disputes between Russia and Ukraine over the topic of Russia’s access to the Black Sea through the Crimean city of Sevastopol. This coupled with the Russo-Ukrainian was in the Donbass region of Ukraine constitutes the most severe clash of the all post-Soviet conflicts. The Russo-Ukrainian war represents a culmination of Ukraine’s continued struggle for self-assertion as a sovereign nation outside Russian domination and control. Although it has attracted international attention, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict can be difficult to understand not only because it is being waged between two nations that seem completely identical to an outside observer, but also due to few paradoxes that have characterized the conflict from the very beginning. The chief among these is the fact that the stakes appear to be very high for the parties involved, but few outsiders seem to understand why it is so. Further, some of the major victories in the conflict have been achieved without firing a shot, but some more minor objectives seem to be unattainable even with an application of massive force. Also, although conflict is seen as a decisive geopolitical battle influencing events for decades to come, it has remained strictly localized without involvement of major international actors. In this chapter we explore these paradoxes and attempt to address some of their implications. The process of annexation of Crimea started with the appearance in early hours of February 28, 2014 of groups of armed men in green unmarked uniforms in strategic locations around Crimea (Menon and Rumer, 2015). Subsequently dubbed the “little green men,” these troops started taking control of the peninsula after week-long protests by pro-Russian political forces supported by violent acts perpetrated by Russian paramilitary units. When questioned about the “little green men,” President Putin of Russia denied 303 9781498596541_Askerov.indd 303 5/5/20 11:51 AM 304 Lasha Tchantouridze that they were Russian troops or in any way connected with Russia (Black, 2016). At the same time, the Russian military started delivering additional troops and equipment to its bases in Crimea (Galeotti, 2019). According to bilateral agreements previously concluded between Kyiv and Moscow, Russia was granted a large naval base in Sevastopol (Zatulin, 2005). Moscow acquired the Sevastopol base rights soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, a pro-Western Ukrainian president elected in 2005 after the so-called Orange Revolution, Russian requests to extend the lease of the Sevastopol naval base beyond the initial 2017 deadline were rejected by Kyiv (Gushin, et. al. 2018). However, Yushchenko’s successor, a pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych, did grant an extension to Russia with an additional clause granting more privileges to the Russian troops in Crimea (Harding, 2010). Yanukovych was democratically elected in 2010, but fled the capital city on February 22 2014, and soon after that he left the country for Russia, following initially peaceful but in the end violent mass protests, the so-called Euromaidan, which were triggered by his reported refusal to sign the EU-Ukraine association agreement (Feffer, 2014). Rada, the Ukrainian Parliament, voted Mr. Yanukovych out of office noting his absence and dereliction of duties. The act fell few votes short of officially impeaching Yanukovych, who still had some support in the east of the country, and in Crimea, where the pro-Russian sentiments were the strongest. Rada also voted to restore the constitution of 2004, which essentially reversed the extension of the Sevastopol lease to Russia signed by Yanukovych in 2010 (ARIS, 2015). With Euromaidan prevailing in Kyiv, counter-protests in support of Yanukovych and pro-Russian policies were organized in east of Ukraine, and in Crimea, where force was used to remove regional and municipal authorities loyal to Kyiv and to replace them with pro-Russian activists, and operators (Kofman, et. al. 2017). After securing the local government offices and key strategic areas with the help of Russian troops and local paramilitaries, the pro-Russian leaders in Crimea staged a referendum asking the residents of Crimea to choose between joining the Russian Federation or restoring the Crimean Constitution of 1992, which granted greater powers to Crimea within Ukraine (Ukrainska Pravda, March 16 2014). Conducted under Russian guns on March 16, 2014, the referendum reportedly produced 83.1 percent voter turnout with 96.77 percent voting to join the Russian Federation (Gazeta, 2014). Kyiv denounced both the referendum and the results as unlawful and rigged (Zakonodavstvo Ukraiyni, 2014). Following this, the pro-Russian Crimean authorities declared independence of the Republic of Crimea and requested to be admitted in the Russian Federation as a federal entity (Rajan and Rumer, 2015). On the same day, Crimea was recognized 9781498596541_Askerov.indd 304 5/5/20 11:51 AM Ukraine Between “The Russian World” and The Black Sea 305 by Russia as a sovereign state, and within hours it was formally admitted as a federal subject of the Russian Federation (Malkova, 2015). On March 24, 2014, the Russian troops seized the Ukrainian naval base in Feodosia, followed by similar actions elsewhere in Crimea (ARIS, 2015). In response, the acting President of Ukraine Turchynov ordered the withdrawal of the Ukrainian armed forces from Crimea (Grigas, 2016). The Russian action in Crimea was soon followed by pro-Russian and antigovernment demonstrations in eastern Ukraine that gradually turned violent, especially in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Rajan and Rumer, 2015). In spring 2014, similar rallies and violent clashes with police and security forces of Ukraine spread to other regional centers of southeastern Ukraine, but the Ukrainian government managed to maintain control over most of this territory until August 2014, when a direct invasion from Russia under the guise of ‘humanitarian intervention’ turned the tide of conflict by enabling the insurgents to capture sizable parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (ARIS, 2015). On September 5, 2014, the Russian and Ukrainian governments, with participation of the self-proclaimed governments of Donetsk and Luhansk, signed the so-called Minsk Protocol aimed at establishing and maintaining a ceasefire (EPRS, 2015). By January 15, 2015, the ceasefire collapsed and fierce fighting resumed around, especially around the Donetsk airport. Subsequently, more than 20 ceasefires were signed, but all of them failed, with the most successful of them lasting only six weeks without combat in 2016 (BBC, 2016). The armed conflict in southeastern Ukraine started in March 2014 with groups of protesters occupying administrative buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk, and elsewhere, and proclaiming ‘peoples’ republics’ in their respective communities. By April 2014, pro-Russian groups started an open rebellion by clashing with Ukrainian police, army and security units (Grigas, 2016). The protesters were led by a small group of armed anti-Ukrainian agitators, who tried their best to provoke a violent response by the Ukrainian government (ARIS, 2015). A Russian security forces officer, Igor Girkin (a.k.a. Strelkov) and his group of armed men was the most active among these agitators. Years later, a veteran mercenary of Crimean, Chechen, Transnistrian, and Bosnian conflicts, Strelkov claimed to have singlehandedly provoked the war in southeastern Ukraine (DFRLab, 2017). The provisional government of Ukraine, in place after the departure of President Yanukovych, took the bait by announcing early April 2014 a major ‘anti-terrorist’ operation in Donetsk. Armed clashes soon followed, with the direct Russian intervention of August 2014 strengthening the insurgent positions (Kofman, et. al. 2017). On July 17, 2014, the pro-Russian insurgents used a Buk surface-to-air missile 9781498596541_Askerov.indd 305 5/5/20 11:51 AM 306 Lasha Tchantouridze to shoot down a civilian passenger jet, Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, killing all 298 people on board, many of them European citizens (GoN, May 25, 2018). The Buk in question was supplied to the insurgents by the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade of the Russian Federation (Landelijk Parket, 2018). The insurgents and the Russians blamed the Ukrainian armed forces for the attack on the passenger jet, which was likely carried out to slow down the Ukrainian offensive on the insurgent strongholds, and to make a direct Russian intervention even more urgent. After the September 2014 Minsk ceasefire, the Donbass insurgents with the Russian support retook a number of key strategic locations in the war zone, among which the fall of Debaltseve in February 2015 underlined the defeat of the Ukrainian armed forces (Marson, 2015). Debaltseve, a key town controlling the main highway connecting Donetsk and Luhansk, was surrounded by the forces backed by Russia. Its defenders were offered a safe passage, and when the Ukrainian units accepted and started to withdraw, the Russian forces attacked and destroyed them (Oliphant, 2015). A similar deception was used by the Russian army after the general ceasefire in the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war (See the South Ossetia chapter in the current volume). The war in Donbass, as the conflict in southeastern Ukraine has become known, has continued since, with dozens of combatants and civilians killed every month (RFE/RL, 2019). The March 2019 ceasefire witnessed a decrease in violent clashes, only to be replaced with renewed violence in September 2019, followed by renewed peace efforts in October by Ukraine’s new President Zelensky (BBC, 2019). The ongoing conflict consists of small-scale skirmishes, ambushes, shelling and shooting with occasional attempts at larger scale operations. The single most successful operation of the war for the Ukrainian government has been the defense of Mariupol, an industrial port city on the north coast of the Azov Sea. Mariupol, the second largest city of the Donetsk region, was kept under Ukrainian control after a battle that followed the spring 2014 pro-Russian uprising in the region. In September 2014, as the Russian forces made advances in the region, Mariupol was attacked but managed to defend itself, and so it did again in 2015, when the Russian forces once again tried to take it (Kofman, et. al. 2017). The fall of Mariupol would have connected the Russian-controlled Donetsk areas with those of the annexed Crimea thus establishing a major mainland land-bridge between Crimea and Russia—had this happened, it would have made Russia’s long-term control of Crimea much more sustainable. Also, the fall of Mariupol would have deprived Ukraine access to the Sea of Azov as well, a major strategic setback in Ukraine’s quest to eventually regain its lost territories. 9781498596541_Askerov.indd 306 5/5/20 11:51 AM Ukraine Between “The Russian World” and The Black Sea 307 THE HIGH STAKES FOR RUSSIA: THE BLACK SEA Although the Russo-Ukrainian conflict acquired violent and uncompromising features only in 2014, its origins were laid down in December 1991, when the Soviet Union was formally dissolved by the heads of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus. The root of the conflict was not the mythical ethnic differences between Ukrainians and Russians, but a more mundane issue of the status and ownership of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Since no naval force can survive for long when separated from its main base of operation, which for the Black Sea Fleet has been Sevastopol, and deprived of its main area of operations, in this case the Black Sea, a supposedly minor item in the dissolution of the Soviet Union became a major headache for Ukraine—one geopolitical topic upon which the newly created Russian state was not willing to compromise. Historically, Russia owed its maturation to a great power status to the military victories leading to the capture of Crimea in late 18th century—Russia’s access to the Black Sea has been crucial to its international influence since. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, and Russian conquest of parts of Georgia have secured Russia’s dominant power position in the Black Sea basin. Neither Ukraine nor any other country possesses immediate countermeasures to Russia’s southwestern expansion. Black Sea is not of vital importance to either the US or its traditional European allies—it is a backwater region that happens to affect well-being and security of three NATO allies: Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. However, all three have found their own means of accommodation with Moscow, and none of them is trying to challenge the status quo of balance of power there. On the other hand, Ukraine gaining independence in 1991 itself was a threat to Russia’s continuing presence in the Black Sea region: Ukraine inherited the most important real estate on the Black Sea coast, specifically the Crimean Peninsula, which hosts the single dominant naval forepost in the region. To complicate the RussoUkrainian rivalry further, the instabilities in Ukraine’s political life that developed in the 21st century, especially around the office of the president of Ukraine, introduced further uncertainties in Russia’s strategic plans to remain in the Black Sea area permanently. The chaotic nature of Ukrainian democracy could not have inspired a sense of predictability in Moscow, especially since Ukraine’s pro-Western political forces have been seen as hostile to Russia, and to Moscow’s long-term plan of remaining the dominant power in the Black Sea region. In response to Russia’s vital goals in the Black Sea region, Ukraine’s openly pro-Western political leaders have refused to accept the existing 9781498596541_Askerov.indd 307 5/5/20 11:51 AM 308 Lasha Tchantouridze hierarchy of power in the former Soviet Union, but instead have insisted on having equal opportunities with Moscow when it came to choosing international political and economic orientations. In this they have been encouraged, but not materially supported, by influential Western powers, including the United States, whose foreign policy officials have been accused of being actively involved in domestic politics of Ukraine in order to assist its proWestern politicians at a detriment of those who sought closer ties with Russia. American diplomats discussing the change of government in Ukraine and a distribution of governmental positions were recorded by Russian intelligence just before the overthrow of President Yanukovych (Chiacu and Mohammed, 2014). The American intervention in Ukrainian politics could not have been more blatantly incompetent—Moscow used it with great success to justify its own intervention in Ukrainian affairs (“Proslushka,” 2014). By annexing parts of Ukraine, Moscow has scored a significant victory in revising the post-Cold War European unilaterally—and this is very significant—this was only the second such instance in the post-World War II Europe following the forced separation of Kosovo from Serbia by NATO in 1999. The Black Sea basin also carries international significance for all the states in the region, as well as for the international system overall due to two factors: strategic importance of Georgia’s and Ukraine’s coastline, and oil resources of the Caucasus and Central Asia. These two closely linked issues also dwarf all others in the region, as both the Russian Federation and the United States have primarily focused on oil and the Black Sea access since the collapse of the Soviet Union. While the United States has not completely distanced itself from Ukraine, Washington’s involvement there has been mostly parochial or self-serving, as individuals with links to high offices in the United States have sought either to enrich themselves there (DW, 2019) or to use Ukraine for influencing American elections (Chait, 2019). Ukraine lost significant parts of its Black and Azov Sea possessions because it was militarily attacked by Russia, and it could not adequately protect itself. The Black Sea represents the only warm sea access for the Russian Federation, and its key lays in Crimea and Sevastopol. However, Russia’s control of Crimea, a peninsula with a narrow land-bridge to the mainland Ukraine, is unsustainable in long-term; hence Russia’s attempts to build a land corridor from Russia to Crimea by capturing parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions of southern Ukraine. During the Cold War Russia/USSR managed to maintain almost exclusive control over the Black Sea: Georgia and Ukraine belonged to the Soviet Union, and Bulgaria and Romania were members of the Soviet/ Russian dominated Warsaw Pact. In fact, during the Cold War, the Black Sea was regarded an internal sea by Moscow, especially since its dominance there was not challenged by the West—the US and other NATO members 9781498596541_Askerov.indd 308 5/5/20 11:51 AM Ukraine Between “The Russian World” and The Black Sea 309 respected both the Montreux Convention, and Turkey’s has behaved very cautiously avoiding a direct confrontation with Russia over the issue of the Black Sea (Tchantouridze, 2018). More recently, with Bulgaria and Romania joining NATO, and Georgia and Ukraine being aspirants of joining, Moscow has witnessed its ‘internal’ sea gradually turning into an internal lake of its main rival, NATO. Naturally, the Russian leadership has displayed anxiety regarding such a prospect, as it adamantly resists the trend of being squeezed out of the region. After the annexation of Crimea, Russia nearly restored its Soviet-era level access to, and control over the Black Sea—Moscow’s conquest in Ukraine was added to the previous military success in the war with Georgia. By capturing Abkhazia from Georgia in 2008, Russia has secured that part of north-east and east coastline and assumed ownership and control of the old Soviet diesel submarine base in Ochamchiré. Prior to the August 2008 war, Moscow had authorized a multi-billion project to make the Novorosiisk harbor suitable for its Black Sea fleet vessels (RIA, 2009). After the annexation of Crimea, Sevastopol will remain a crucial strategic point for the Russian fleet for at least a couple of decades and the combined Novorosiisk— Ochamchiré bases will add to its naval strength to enable Moscow to remain the dominant power in the region. Sevastopol is blessed with a remarkable strategic position in the ‘middle’ of the Black Sea, which allows a naval force stationed there to monitor, control, and address potential threats emerging from any direction. After securing Crimea, Moscow attacked and captured Ukrainian vessels transiting from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Straits—action clearly designed to deny Ukrainians operational capabilities in the Sea of Azov (AP, 2019). VICTORIES WITHOUT BLOODSHED The Russian takeover of Crimea in February-March 2014 was one of those events in history when major victories or conquests become possible without battles and bloodshed. The provisional Ukrainian leadership at that time was not able to defend its territory either due to incompetence or corruption, allowing an easy victory for the Russians. The Russian intelligence operatives, armed forces, and special units in coordination with local paramilitaries and political operatives captured Crimea swiftly and without much opposition. Ukraine had to face Russia alone—no country that could provide help did anything to help Ukraine defend its territory. On the other hand, the Ukrainian government and military did not do much of anything either—it appeared that no one in Kyiv understood Russia’s objectives in Crimea, although Moscow did not really hide its intentions much. Crimea 9781498596541_Askerov.indd 309 5/5/20 11:51 AM 310 Lasha Tchantouridze thus became an easy post-Olympiad bonus prize for Vladimir Putin. However, the most valued victory and the one with the longest reaching impact in the contest between Ukraine and Russia has been won by Ukraine, but not with the help of any state ally, but with the dispensation of the Patriarchate of Constantinople—the first among the equals in the Orthodox Christian church community. On October 11, 2018, the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the chief decision-making body of that church, announced its decision of granting autocephaly to the Church in Ukraine. Autocephaly for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church means the recognition of its legitimacy as a canonical Orthodox church, and its self-governance outside of Moscow’s jurisdictional boundaries. Constantinople’s decision was based on a detailed analysis of the historical documents, and previous precedents and decisions regarding the Orthodox Church and its mission. This analysis, titled “The Ecumenical Throne and the Church of Ukraine: The Documents Speak,” was published by Constantinople in September 2018 (EP, 2018). On October 11, 2018, Constantinople made an official statement in which it clarified and explained its decision. Among other things this statement approved “the decision already made that the Ecumenical Patriarchate proceed to the granting of Autocephaly to the Church of Ukraine,” and revoked “the legal binding of the Synodal Letter of the year 1686, issued for the circumstances of that time, which granted the right through oikonomia to the Patriarch of Moscow to ordain the Metropolitan of Kyiv” (Chief Secretariat, 2018). One of the provisions of the 1686 document was for “the Metropolitan of Kyiv, elected by the Clergy-Laity Assembly of his eparchy, who would commemorate the Ecumenical Patriarch [of Constantinople] as the First hierarch at any celebration, proclaiming and affirming his canonical dependence to the Mother Church of Constantinople” (EP, 2018). The history, tradition, and the ecclesiastic organization of the Orthodox Church is such that it has no single leader or an organization overseeing it. Instead, the canonical Orthodox churches are divided among self-governing or autocephalous jurisdictions all of which are canonically equal. Canonicity of the Orthodox churches is derived through the episcopal continuity which dates its origins with the apostles of Christ, and recognition of this continuity by the other sister churches, especially by the ancient patriarchates. The recognition of the Church in Ukraine has created the 16th such church; of these two are not recognized as self-governing by all (America, and Ukraine), and one, Ukraine, is so far recognized as canonical by Constantinople, Greece, and Alexandria. The jurisdictional boundaries of each church roughly correspond to their respective nation’s international recognized boundaries, with the exception of the ancient patriarchates—Constantinople, Alexandria, 9781498596541_Askerov.indd 310 5/5/20 11:51 AM Ukraine Between “The Russian World” and The Black Sea 311 Jerusalem and Antioch—all of these currently being in non-Christian lands— and the Russian and the Serbian churches. The jurisdictional boundaries of the Russian church extend outside the national boundaries and include Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Japan, and until recently it included Ukraine. The new self-governing churches are created by older ones—most of the current national churches were granted self-rule by one of the four ancient patriarchates. The Orthodox Church in Russia or more precisely, Moscow Patriarchate, was created in 1589 by Constantinople. However, in 1589, the territory of the Principality of Kyiv was not included in that declaration, but Kyiv remained under Constantinople, until 1686, when it was temporarily transferred to Moscow: the Church of Constantinople, being in captivity of the Ottoman Empire, had no effective means of administering and caring for its large diocese across the Black Sea (Ware, 1993). The 1686 dispensation was revoked by Constantinople in October 2018, despite the bitter opposition by the Russian Church and the Russian government. As the Soviet Union was dissolving, a group of Ukrainian clergymen and faithful decided to organize a national church—there had been a couple of failed attempts in Ukraine to override the decision of 1686. However, this time it was different: in the early 1990s autocephaly for Ukraine was requested by Russian church’s ruling bishop in Ukraine (Krawchuk and Bremer, 2016). The request was denied, but the Russian church gave no good pastoral or theological reason for the rejection: normally, in such cases requests can be denied if the mother church does not consider a new national church to be ready for self-rule. This was not the case for the church in Ukraine: many of the clergymen in the Russian church have come out of Ukraine, and in fact, historically church in Ukraine is the geographic location where Christianity started in the lands of eastern Slavs, among them the ones today belonging to the Russian state. Perhaps, this second factor was decisive in Moscow’s decision to deny autocephaly to Ukraine—the Russians proudly and justifiably consider the Orthodox Church to be the institution which has, in fact, created the Russian culture and civilization. In 988, Prince Vladimir of Kyiv was baptized, according to one account, in Crimea, after which he baptized his subjects in the principality of Kyiv, and proclaimed Christianity the religion of the land (Metropolitan Ilarion, 1986). However, Vladimir’s throne was Kyiv, and nowhere near what is today Russia. Christianity subsequently spread to the other Slav principalities ruled by Viking princes, relatives and/or competitors of Vladimir, but Moscow did not become the center of the Russian church until 1589, when the Russians managed to get their church self-rule from Constantinople. If the Russians were to accept the independence of the church in Ukraine, they should also revise the story of their church according to historic and geographic facts, which would date 9781498596541_Askerov.indd 311 5/5/20 11:51 AM 312 Lasha Tchantouridze the origins of the Russian church in the 16th century, and accept that in the previous six centuries the Russian church was as a daughter church of that in Ukraine. But this will greatly insult the imperial self-image and national pride of the Russians. Many Russians are very sensitive to the fact that Russia has a short history—even the 988 baptism removes Russia nearly a millennium from the origins of Christianity. Historically, the Russians have been so adamant to deny the fact that others nations and churches had longer histories that when the Russian Empire conquered Georgia for the first time in the early 19th century, they abolished the self-rule or autocephaly of the Church in Georgia, which dates its origins in the 4th century, and the beginning of its self-rule in the 5th. There have been intellectual attempts in Russia to revise the most commonly accepted chronology of European history, and offer an alternative historiography, according to which, Christianity originated around one thousand years ago, instead of the most commonly accepted fact that dates Christ’s missionary work in Palestine 2,000 years ago. Such radically revisionist ‘short histories’ declaring the commonly accepted world chronology to be a ‘Western hoax’ can be dismissed as a bad joke or a weird conspiracy theory, except some serious Russian intellectuals have been noted to support and promote it (Nosovskiy and Fomenko, 2004). It is no secret that traditionally the Russian leaders get things done through bullying and intimidation of others, especially when it comes to their less powerful neighbors, but the Patriarchate of Constantinople was not to be intimidated. Constantinople consulted with Moscow for years on the issue of granting self-rule to Ukraine, and of bringing all Ukrainians in the world under the roof of one mother church: there had been canonical Ukrainian churches in the United States and Canada under the jurisdiction of Constantinople, and Ukraine itself hosted two other, non-canonical Orthodox churches. This sort of jurisdictional division for one people created chaos and affected well-being of both the church and the people, but the Russians would have none of it. Right after Constantinople affirmed its decision to grant autocephaly to the Church in Ukraine in October 2018, Moscow denounced the decision and published its own document trying to refute the arguments provided by Constantinople (ROC, 2018). Of Moscow’s counter-arguments, the only valid point that Moscow has provided is a canonical provision, according to which, the jurisdictional boundaries of the Orthodox church cannot be changed without an explicit agreement by the local ruling bishop—this rule is observed by all canonical Orthodox jurisdictions—and in this case the de facto ruling bishop, Patriarch of Moscow, was against it. However, when it comes to the Russian Orthodox Church, there have been notable exceptions and precedents to the contrary, especially after the Russian Revolution and civil war: the Russian church was oppressed by the Bolshevik regime, and the parishes of 9781498596541_Askerov.indd 312 5/5/20 11:51 AM Ukraine Between “The Russian World” and The Black Sea 313 the Russian church in Europe, especially those in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Finland, found themselves without established ecclesiastic structures. Constantinople had to intervene in the 1920s and the 1930s and to organize national dioceses for those churches, which are not self-ruled or autonomous. In the 1990s, similar events surrounded the Church in Estonia. Moscow has shown flexibility regarding the European matters, but it is adamantly defending its positions in Ukraine even at the cost of going into schism with Constantinople—the first such event of canonical Christian churches breaking-up relationship with each other since 1054, when Rome and Constantinople broke relations with each other in an act subsequently known as the Great Schism (Ware, 1993). The difference in the current case is that only Moscow has announced severing all relations with Constantinople, but Constantinople has not done so, meaning that it continues to recognize Moscow as a canonical church except on the territory of Ukraine. It should be noted that there are no doctrinal disagreements between the churches in terms of theology or religious dogma, but Moscow went into schism over the issue of geographic boundaries. Moscow also called the other national Orthodox churches to side with Russia in an attempt to isolate Constantinople, but the others churches initially remained silent on the matter, breaking relations with neither Moscow nor Constantinople—some of them, perhaps, sincerely sympathizing with Moscow, others being afraid of its retaliatory steps, while no one willing to break with Constantinople. As of November 2019, the Patriarchate of Alexandria and the Church of Greece also recognized the independent church in Ukraine, and in time, most other churches are likely to follow their example. Indeed, Moscow has taken a rather drastic and dramatically unusual step by condemning a sister church not on any issue of the doctrine or theology, but on a matter of geographic boundaries, which traditionally have been determined by political realities. The authorities in Moscow, whether secular or ecclesiastic, appear to be extremely keen to undermine Ukraine’s national institutions and identity. Regardless, as 70% of Ukrainians identify themselves as Orthodox Christians, the creation of a national church goes a long way toward creating a major national institution that supports the development of Ukraine’s national identity (Hanson, 2019). Even though Moscow maintains its own autonomous church structure in Ukraine, its long-term survival is highly doubtful except in the regions militarily occupied by Russia. The Patriarchate of Moscow has tried very hard to portray itself as a supranational entity, not as a national church of Russia. However, officially the church also calls itself “The Russian Orthodox Church” (ROC). Moreover, it is seen as a purely national entity by the government of Russia: as the current dispute between Constantinople and Moscow unfolded, the Russian government under President Putin convened 9781498596541_Askerov.indd 313 5/5/20 11:51 AM 314 Lasha Tchantouridze an extraordinary meeting of Security Council to discuss “situation of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine” (Prezident Rossii, 2018). On November 3 2018, President Poroshenko of Ukraine visited the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople and signed a cooperation agreement, according to which the Patriarchate of Constantinople will assist the Church of Ukraine in the process of establishing its autocephaly (BBC Ukraine, 2008). Poroshenko’s successor, Zelensky, will not reverse autocephaly, but he is less interested in its promotion (Goble, 2019). In practical terms, if Moscow does not adjust its policies toward Ukraine, its effective influence in that country may end up limited to the territory currently annexed by Russia (i.e. Crimea) and controlled by the pro-Russian rebels (i.e. the Donetsk and Luhansk districts). Even if Russia manages to maintain its church in Ukraine-proper long-term, the President of Ukraine, the political successor of the Ataman of Kyiv mentioned in the 1686 dispensation, is not likely to approve the next Metropolitan presented to him by Moscow—this is a required condition for a ruling bishop to assume his seat in Kyiv, according to the 1686 document. If Moscow does not present the next appointee to the office of Metropolitan of Kyiv (the title of the ruling bishop of the Russian Church in Ukraine) to the President of Ukraine, the required clause for the legitimacy of this office, which in fact Moscow has ignored for a long time, the appointment will not be valid even according to the most pro-Moscow interpretation of the 1686 dispensation. However, the considerations of legitimacy will not likely deter Moscow’s complains on the matter for many years to come. A LOCALIZED CONFLICT Despite the fact that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict threatens to endow Europe with Cold War-style dividing lines, the reaction by the West to the RussoUkrainian conflict has been muted. A resurrection of a Cold War-style stand-off in Europe will be damaging for all involved: for Russia it will mean the dividing line with the West moving from Berlin to Donetsk, for the energy hungry Europe it will signal a beginning of frosty relations with its main energy supplier, and for Ukraine the hard demarcation line with both Crimea and the occupied Luhansk and Donetsk territories will set in concrete for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, Ukraine has no hope of recovering its lost territories through any means, diplomatic or military, and the West is not about to help Ukraine in any meaningful way—again, upsetting Russia or supporting Ukraine’s war efforts may drag some European states into the conflict, and may disrupt the energy flow from Russia 9781498596541_Askerov.indd 314 5/5/20 11:51 AM Ukraine Between “The Russian World” and The Black Sea 315 to Europe. That is why the status quo looks beneficial to both the West and Russia, with Ukraine playing the role of a buffer state. On the other hand, it is clear that Europeans do not like the Russians, and Moscow remains highly distrustful of the Europeans—an international balance of power that is very much reminiscent of a 19th century era ‘Concert of Europe’ balance of power arrangement—major European powers maintaining uneasy peace by sacrificing interests of smaller buffer states. In October 2019, President Zelensky of Ukraine accepted the so-called Steinmeier Formula designed to freeze the conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk, provided all the sides accept the proposal, remove armed formations from the contact lines, and hold free and democratic elections under the supervision of the OSCE (Miller, 2019). The balance of threat around the Russo-Ukrainian conflict favors Russia: Europe wants to resolve the conflict as soon as possible, the United States, for a number of reasons, wants to play nice with Russia, and Ukraine has no choice but to settle. President Trump’s July 25, 2019 phone conversation with President Zelensky of Ukraine is a good example of a Western effort to keep Russia appeased with regards to the Ukrainian affair. In the transcript of the phone conversation between the two presidents released by the White House following a whistleblower complaint, President Trump tells his Ukrainian counterpart: “Germany does almost nothing for you [Ukraine]. All they do is talk… When I was speaking with Angela Merkel, she talks Ukraine, but she does not do anything. A lot of European countries are the same way…” (Jackson and Fritze, 2019). Zelensky seemed to agree with Trump’s sentiments that Europe was not doing nearly enough, and also agreed with him that America was more helpful than Europe. Trump’s promises of help and support; however, also appeared to be if not hollow, at least highly conditional: it was subsequently revealed that just before the phone call Trump had ordered the military aid to Ukraine to be suspended or delayed (Collins and Ward, 2019). With the annexation of Crimea and the war continuing in Ukraine, it should be clear that something resembling the good old European great power politics must be back on the agenda in many Western capitals. Misleading and deceptive pledges and public pronouncements have become very common in West’s relations with Russia; however, this should not be surprising: if in the spirit of realpolitik Western capitals now are concerned with real things in international relations, such as spheres of influence, material resources, economic gains, etc. they should not worry too much about Ukrainians and Russians killing each other as no one really loses anything except those in Ukraine and Russia, provided this conflict remains low scale and protracted. In the years to come, the conflict will weaken both Russia and Ukraine, in which case West’s relative strength will grow, not diminish vs. Russia. 9781498596541_Askerov.indd 315 5/5/20 11:51 AM 316 Lasha Tchantouridze Meanwhile, a strong Russia remains dangerous and this has forced the Europeans to reconsider their previous attitudes toward Russia so prevalent in the 1990s that ignored Russian continental interests altogether. This, no doubt, pleases many in Moscow, but in the long run Russia’s engagement in low scale regional conflicts will drain its resources and generate an internal political instability. This coupled with an inevitable eventual leadership change in Moscow may hand victory to the West while both Ukraine and Russia may end up losers, engaged in negative interdependency with each other. The bottom line of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is that Ukraine cannot rely on outside help while Russia does not need anyone’s help. The Europeans mostly have been watching quietly, barring occasional complaints and protests, as Russia advanced first into Georgia, and then into Crimea and eastern Ukraine. European protests only became somewhat vocal after a Malaysian aircraft filled with European citizens was shot down by a Russian operated missile system over the rebel held territory in eastern Ukraine. Even then the Europeans could not demonstrate unity among themselves or with Washington. The United States itself has not demonstrated willingness to engage Russia at some serious level and remains more concerned with developments elsewhere in the world, and when it comes to Ukraine, both Obama and Trump administrations appeared to be more interested with the activities by the Biden family there, albeit for different reasons. Washington is not going to do anything dramatic vis-à-vis Russia, provided Moscow continues to demonstrate its respect for free trade and financial systems, and remains committed to market-guided access to oil and natural gas resources. As President Trump’s own behavior has demonstrated, Washington’s actions are as different from its words as those uttered in other Western capitals. Promises made in Western capitals have diverged from actual policies not the first time. Despite the verbal promises made by Western leaders to the Soviet leadership at the end of the Cold War, NATO started to enlarge in late 1990s despite vocal protests from Moscow. Obviously, it was Russia’s perceived weakness that gave the Western allies a sense of self-confidence and righteousness. This was enough to convince Moscow that, despite the end of the Cold War, international politics continued to be a zero-sum game—the territories ‘conceded’ by the Soviets as their sphere of influence was ‘overtaken’ by its former adversary (Tchantouridze, 2000). Since the NATO enlargement debate opened in late 1990s, Moscow has insisted that the process of NATO’s eastward expansion was against its vital interests, especially if the crucial states, Ukraine and Georgia, joined the alliance. Russia’s primary objective in Georgia and Ukraine has been to deter NATO’s further expansion, to void these states’ ability to use the NATO card in their policies with Moscow, and to reestablish its exclusive control over the Eurasian landmass. 9781498596541_Askerov.indd 316 5/5/20 11:51 AM Ukraine Between “The Russian World” and The Black Sea 317 NATO had initiated and contributed to processes that it was subsequently unable to control, and this has played out in Russia’s favor. Except the brief period in the 1990s, which ended with the Kosovo war, Moscow has never seen European politics in any other way but power struggles among dominant great powers (Smith, 2009). Now Russia holds the upper hand vs. NATO, and its leaders are quite willing to demonstrate unilateralism in Russian foreign policy and defense initiatives by ignoring all the complaints and hot air issued in the Western European capitals. NATO’s inability to do anything effective or credible during and after the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war only boosted Moscow’s self-confidence. This trend has continued with the Russo-Ukrainian war. NATO has had options: it could have responded by significantly increasing its permanent naval presence in the Black Sea, tying their military deployment there with Russia’s permanent deployment of troops south of the Caucasus Mountains, blockading Sevastopol after Russia’s take-over of Crimea, supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity by arming its armed forces with modern weapons, deploying aerial drones against illicit Russia formations in Crimea or southern or even organizing international efforts to expel Russia from important (for the Russians) organizations, such as the Olympic movement or FIFA. Something could have been done and can be done to send a strong message to the Russians of West’s displeasure of Moscow’s unilateral actions, but no significant step has been taken in this direction, which suggests that either the West is entirely impotent or it does not care what goes in the east of the Carpathian Mountains (Shear, 2014). Even after the setbacks in Donetsk and Luhansk, if Ukraine were to be accepted as a new member by NATO, and if American troops were to deploy there with long-term base rights, the new dividing line between Russia and Europe will be drawn just outside the Donetsk airport—a significant pushback from Berlin—and that will no longer look like a victory for Putin or Russia, but a major defeat and setback. However, the West will not do this hoping that the Russian leadership will eventually be undermined by its own misguided economic policies, as it has happened many times in the past. CONCLUSION In his 2019 book, Upheaval, Jared Diamond analyzes Finland’s position and policies before, during, and after the 1939 Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union. Diamond concludes that Finland did most, if not all things right, and survived by relying on its own strength and resources. Although countless words of sympathy and support was expressed toward Finland in other European capitals, the country was left standing alone facing a great 9781498596541_Askerov.indd 317 5/5/20 11:51 AM 318 Lasha Tchantouridze and aggressive adversary. But in 1939, dictatorships were prevalent in Europe—most of the European countries lived under some form of dictatorial or authoritarian regime. In 2019, liberal democracy is prevalent in Europe, but when it comes to facing a great and aggressive adversary on the battlefield, countries like Ukraine cannot count on anyone’s support, but have to face national crises alone. The difference between Finland circa 1939 and Ukraine circa 2019: while the Finnish political leaders understood their predicament very well, no political leader of Ukraine seems to get it. Regardless, the main lesson of Ukraine’s conflict with Russia is this: Russia’s smaller neighbors are on their own when facing Russia. If push comes to shove, they will be abandoned by their allies who may have encourage them entering into conflict with Russia in the first place. If any neighbor of Russia threatens Russian security even a little, it will undermine its own security. At the same time, as the church policies in Ukraine have demonstrated, it is possible for smaller post-Soviet states to distance themselves from Russian influence by developing their own national institutions. This requires neither threats or interventions by those who are potential rivals of Russia, but a steady and rational approach guided by own resources and aimed at strengthening national capabilities. 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