Krisis
Journal for contemporary philosophy
HUUB DIJSTELBLOEM
SCIENCE IN A NOT SO WELL -ORDERED SOCIETY :
A PRAGMATIC CRITIQUE OF PROCEDURAL POLITICAL
THEORIES OF SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY
Krisis 2014, Issue 1
www.krisis.eu
1. Changing relations between science, politics and society
A look at some recent debates on science and technology in liberal democracies, for example those concerning the possible health risks of cell
phones and the dangers of radiation posed by Universal Mobile Telecommunication Systems (Bröer, Duyvendak and Stuiver 2010; Bröer and Duyvendak 2010), the effectiveness of vaccination campaigns (Lips 2011; 2010),
and promises of shale gas (Metze 2013), easily leads to the conclusion that
either citizens have lost all their trust in science and technology or that
today’s experts and policy-makers are doing a lousy job. Technological
applications, but also scientific knowledge itself – as in the case of climate
change (Oreskes and Conway 2010) – are highly contested today.
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However, there is an incongruity here. What exactly is at stake in the present situation? Surveys still show a high degree of public trust in science in
general and an overwhelming number of technologies do not give rise to
public controversies, although their risks, costs and social consequences
are far from undisputed (Tiemeijer & de Jonge 2013; Dijstelbloem & Hagendijk 2011; Eurobarometer 2010; Eurobarometer 2005). So what is the
case if ‘trust’ and ‘reliability’ are not the issue?
This paper does not claim that ‘there is something rotten in the state of
science’ (although I cannot rule out that this is the case), nor does it state
that people have become increasingly skeptical or even cynical about science. Instead, it studies how the relationships between science, politics
and society are reformulated in current debates in liberal democracies. In
order to do so, it evaluates these relationships from different theoretical
points of view: on the one hand, a concept which holds democracy mainly as a mechanism to arrive at legitimate and justified decisions; on the
other hand, a concept which emphasizes the continuously changing societal and technological conditions under which democracy has to be reestablished.
The starting point for this discussion is a critical reading of Philip Kitcher’s
Science, Truth, and Democracy (2001) and his subsequent Science in a
Democratic Society (2011). The thesis that will be put forward is that procedural democratic approaches to issues concerning science and technology are not sufficiently equipped to do justice to the transformative nature of the issues mentioned above. This transformative nature concerns
the meaning these issues are given and conversely the epistemological and
social consequences these issues have. Issues such as shale gas have both
an epistemic and a political and social dimension. Not only do they give
rise to tensions between science and politics in terms of diverging public
and private interests and uncertainties on various levels, but they also lead
to the formation of new groups of people, ‘coalitions of unusual suspects’
consisting of concerned citizens, activists, lay experts, local companies and
NGOs, whose unlikely association in turn affects the nature and content
of the debate. As a result, these issues do not only challenge current scientific insights but also affect the existing social order.
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Journal for contemporary philosophy
Who are these people whom the sciences ought to be concerned with?
Which notion of democracy correctly takes group formation under conditions of scientific and technological uncertainty into account? Is it possible to develop a notion of politics that takes epistemic issues into consideration? And a notion of science that is sensitive to its place in society?
This paper proposes that an answer to these questions ought to be formulated within a more substantive understanding of democracy than the
procedural concept allows for, and that the political theory of classical
pragmatism offers valuable insights for doing so. I will not claim that a
fully substantive account of democracy ought to be embraced. Instead,
the aim of this paper is to show that classical pragmatism leads to a kind of
middle ground between procedural and substantive notions of democracy. As such, it is supposed to do justice to the transformative nature of the
issues mentions above.
I will develop my argument in the following steps. I will start with an
analysis of a proposal by Kitcher (2001) to arrive at a kind of ‘well-ordered
science’ to fuel the interaction between science, politics and society.
Thereafter I will debate some of the presuppositions of Kitcher’s scheme
by pointing out that his most recent (2011) defense of well-ordered science
rests on a quite narrow interpretation of the implications of a pragmatist
theory of democracy. I will then claim that Kitcher’s model is in need of a
more radical reading of some specific notions of pragmatist thought that
will lead to a better understanding of the tensions between science, politics and the public. In order to do so, I will contrast Kitcher’s ‘wellordered science’ with Dewey’s notion of ‘inquiry’. In addition, I will clarify
that a pragmatist political theory aims not just to represent or unify the
existing political community but to extend that community to new
groups and new domains. Key to this is the notion of ‘publics.’ Finally, I
will explain that pragmatist political theory emphasizes the transformative nature of publics and their environments. Crucial to this understanding is the notion of ‘experience’. Neglecting this element of the theory
means missing the content of this problem-based approach. The paper
ends with a concluding section.
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2. Well-ordered science
‘What is the role of the sciences in a democratic society?’ With his opening
sentence of Science, Truth, and Democracy (2001), Philip Kitcher makes
clear that his concerns as a philosopher of science are not restricted to
questions of a formal kind. In his subsequent work, Science in a Democratic Society (2011), he explained that his worries come from two sides.
On the one hand, he is concerned about the erosion of scientific authority: ‘a variety of challenges to particular scientific judgments has fostered a
far more ambivalent attitude to the authority of the natural sciences’
(2011: 15). On the other hand, he is concerned about the social embedding
of science: ‘…the tangled relations now evident between Science and social decision making…call for philosophical attention’ (Kitcher, 2011:
155). What we urgently need is:
‘[…] a theory of the place of Science in a democratic society – or, if you
like, of the ways in which a system of public knowledge should be shaped
to promote democratic ideals.’ (Kitcher, 2011: 26)
I will claim that the ideal of a ‘well-ordered science’ that Kitcher proposed
in both books as a theory of this sort is too narrow a concept to combine
science and democracy and that it fails to do justice to the social ontology
that surrounds current issues. His subsequent shift (2012; 2011) to the political theory of the American philosopher John Dewey is promising in
that respect but still neglects some important elements of classical pragmatism that emphasize the mutual interaction between science, democracy and society.
The starting point for my discussion is Kitcher’s emphasis on ‘significant
truths’. Elaborating on a specific treatment of scientific realism and objectivity, Kitcher claims that the status of scientific theories and facts is epistemologically justifiable, but that there are no scientific grounds for pinning down the direction of research programs (2001, Ch. 6; 2011, Ch. 1).
Kitcher takes ‘moral and social values to be intrinsic to the practice of the
sciences’ (2001: 65) because the organization of every research program
demands not only theory-construction on a more general level in order
to arrive at a certain degree of coherence, but also many practical deci-
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Journal for contemporary philosophy
sions to be taken and priorities to be set. The course of research programs
is for a large part an historically and socially contingent process which is
not led systematically by ‘context-independent goals for inquiry’ (2001:
73). The implication is not that ‘the history of science should be viewed as
a sequence of irrational transitions’ (2011: 35). Rather, it is that decisions
about the course of science ‘cannot be reduced to simple formalisms’
(2011: 36). The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that it is questionable whether the sciences can be hierarchically unified and whether
integration within a single unified framework is possible (2001: 71). Of
more importance for the discussion here is the conclusion that the agenda
for scientific research cannot be formulated solely on scientific grounds.
Science cannot set its own agenda scientifically in a significant way.
This conclusion creates opportunities for a more comprehensive account
of agenda-setting in which the course of scientific inquiry is determined
by a variety of parties, interests and considerations. However, Kitcher is
reluctant to support a kind of stakeholder democracy of science (e.g.
Latour, 2004) in which co-construction is the aim and participation in science by laypersons or the public at large becomes an end in itself. To him,
‘vulgar democracy is a very bad idea’ (2001: 117). Instead, he advocates
what he calls a division of epistemic labor (2011: 25) and sketches an ideal
of ‘enlightened democracy’ (2001: 133-134) as a middle ground between
the pure democratic model of epistemological equality and the expertocratic model of an elite of experts.
At first glance, Kitcher’s proposal is a perfect example of what Latour
(1993) has called the ‘modernist divide,’ a separation of tasks and responsibilities between science and politics. Politics is concerned with power and
will-formation, it is aimed at decision making, and its final task in a democratic society is to attribute responsibility: the governors are accountable
to the governed. Science, on the other hand, is concerned with truth, it is
aimed at research, and its task is to arrive at rational, independent, more
or less objective descriptions and explanations of social and natural phenomena. In the end, this division of labor boils down to a strategy of ‘purification’: both sides have to be protected against contamination to prevent
irrationality and irresponsibility.
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Huub Dijstelbloem – Science in a Not So Well-Ordered Society
However, ‘well-ordered science’ is not a convenient scapegoat and the
ideas behind it are too intelligent to be accused of naive modernism.
Latour’s idea of the ‘modern constitution’ offers a telling but also somehow simplified image of the relationship between science and politics. In
fact, it sketches a conceptual image of their relationship in rather static
terms and does not offer many clues for understanding this relationship
under more dynamic conditions, when mutual interaction and actual
tensions between the two arise. Moreover, the divide is restricted to only
two ‘powers,’ but it is easy to distinguish a few more, such as the media,
the law, and economy/industry.
Kitcher focuses on the interaction between science and democracy and
moves on to ask how the aims of scientific inquiry should be determined.
With his focus on interaction Kitcher leaves the boundaries between science and democracy untouched and refrains from an analysis of real existing or imagined practices in which these (elusive) boundaries are contested or redefined. His suggestion (2001, Ch. 10; 2011, Ch. 5) is to come to a
kind of ‘well-ordered science’. This proposal aims to combine an epistemologically realistic idea of science with a procedural and deliberative account of democracy that relies heavily on Rawls’ notion of ‘public reason,’
the common reason-giving of citizens in a pluralist society.
Kitcher proposes a three-stage cycle. In the first stage, representatives of
groups in society deliberate about their preferences for scientific research.
In this process of deliberation, they learn more about the preferences of
other groups. This will result in a consensus, an agreement on how to
accommodate their differences, or a vote about the issues that need to be
investigated by academics. This result goes to scientific communities,
whose role is to say ‘how’ these issues can be investigated and how probable significant results are. In this second stage, it is important to ask a diverse group of researchers to identify the probability of different scientific
ventures succeeding. This would give the decision-makers, the representatives, a more balanced view of the possibilities of contemporary science.
Just as they decided in stage one on the aims of scientific inquiry, they decide in stage three which projects to fund, based on the additional information given by researchers.
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This method forces scientists to discuss explicitly the non-scientific consequences of their work. The current, arbitrary, foundations for deciding
what lines of inquiry to follow could be replaced by a more ‘enlightened
democratic’ foundation. According to Kitcher, this would not lead to better or more truthful science, but it would be more democratic and this
would be an improvement on the current state of ‘elitism’.
In short, in the first stage, ideal deliberators, seen as representatives of civilians, make a scientifically informed choice as to what policies are worth
pursuing. In the second stage, science develops possible scenarios to pursue the policies. In the third stage, the deliberators choose which scenario
is most to their liking. The resulting policy would be the perfect combination of democratic preferences and scientific knowledge (Kitcher, 2001:
118-23).
Kitcher's ideal of Well-Ordered Science is instructive for several reasons.
First of all, his epistemologically realistic image of science is likely to correspond with the self-image many scientists have of their profession. Second, as a philosopher of science Kitcher explicitly draws attention to the
societal position of the sciences. Third, Kitcher tries to connect the position of the sciences to the demands of democratic decision-making.
Kitcher emphasized that well-ordered science is an ‘ideal’. However, this
ideal resembles many real-life policy practices in which exactly the same
order of things can be found. They start with public debate about a new
problem, for instance the need for a vaccine. The next step is scientific advice to the government about the possibility of developing a vaccine. Parliamentary discussion then follows. Finally the process ends with a decision and execution of policy programs. So why does Kitcher describe his
proposal as an ‘ideal’? He refrains from an evaluation of pre-existing decision-making processes, which come quite close to his ideal. Instead, his
aim seems to be to further polish the theoretical underpinnings of his
proposal.
Huub Dijstelbloem – Science in a Not So Well-Ordered Society
3. The turn to pragmatism
In Science in a Democratic Society (2011), Kitcher repeats the main ideas
of Science, Truth, and Democracy (2001), including his ideal of wellordered science. Also included is an application of his theoretical framework to some examples, namely debates on the history of life and evolutionary theory, biomedical technologies, genetically modified organisms
and climate change (2011, Chapter 9, ‘Actual Choices’). Theoretically, one
of the main differences between the two books is that in the latter, Kitcher
explicitly grounds his concept of democracy on Dewey’s thinking. Although Brown (2004) had encouraged Kitcher to take this direction, no
reference to that suggestion is made. Neither does Kitcher explain why he
considers a more elaborated idea of democracy necessary or in which respects his new ideas differ from his former ones.
Despite these lacunae, his turning to Dewey makes perfect sense. Key elements of Dewey's ideas are the emphasis on the political significance of
science and technology and the inseparability of democracy and education, the value of democracy as a culture and as a way of life rather than as
a set of formal political institutions, his relentless attention to the primacy
of the method, both in science and in democracy, and a continued focus
on consequences rather than principles. With respect to re-thinking democracy and the place of the sciences in modern societies, Dewey’s work
can be regarded as ‘political theory’. The development of a political theory
implies the attempt to formulate a coherent network of concepts and abstractions to investigate specific current issues in society (Wolin, 2004: 504).
‘Political theory’ differs in structure from both political philosophy and
political science. Where political science focuses on the empirical field of
‘politics,’ political theory is engaged with the meaning of ‘the political,’ as
it can also manifest itself beyond the practice of conventional politics
(Mouffe, 2005: 8). In contrast to political philosophy, political theory can
be a seen as an attempt to conceptualize ‘the political’ by addressing specific political issues instead of taking classical political-philosophical issues
as a guide.
How much does Kitcher take from this? Is he satisfied with some of Dewey’s more modest proposals to make democracy more ‘intelligent’? Or is
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he prepared to read Dewey in a more radical way and to see Dewey in opposition to many mainstream ideas of what democracy is all about? If one
hopes for the latter, the start is promising. Kitcher regards the voting concept of democracy quite inadequate and states firmly that ‘the existence of
elections and of majority rule is not constitutive of democracy. Often,
these serve as the expression of a deeper idea, that of popular control.
Nevertheless, they may not even be expressions of that idea but betrayals
of it’ [original emphasis] (Kitcher, 2011: 65). Climate policy is one such example. According to Kitcher (2011: 128) climate policies are hijacked by
short-term wishes such as maintaining the usual energy consumption to
the effect that democracy fails to represent the interest of the people (i.e.
political action to prevent harm and to mitigate the consequences) but
focuses on various misguided preferences instead. He therefore agrees
with Dewey that ‘democracy is more than a form of government’ that it is
‘primarily a mode of associated living’ and that it is concerned with ‘a way
of life’ (Kitcher, 2011: 69-70). According to Kitcher, Dewey connected freedom to self-realization and stressed both the need for positive freedom as
well as for certain levels of protection (2011: 70). As a consequence, Dewey’s idea of democracy is perfectly suitable for addressing what Kitcher
considers to be one of the major problems of contemporary societies,
namely ‘the problem of unidentifiable oppression [original emphasis],
where the limitations on freedom are either not felt, or, if felt, are difficult
to trace to their source because no single agency is involved’ (Kitcher,
2011: 78).
To prevent such oppression in general and to mitigate negative consequences of science and technology in particular, he proposes that science,
and the public system of knowledge in which it is embedded, serve the
purposes of citizens of a democratic society by way of ‘investigation’. Soon,
however, it turns out that the idea of ‘investigation’ has little to do with
the kind of joint problem-solving or co-production of knowledge that has
drawn ample attention in, for instance, the fields of Science and Technology Studies and Policy Analysis. Instead, it is to be understood in the more
narrow meaning of ‘responsible decision making’ (Kitcher, 2011: 114). As a
result, Kitcher’s reading of Dewey’s political theory is in line with the
widespread view that holds Dewey as a deliberative democrat avant la lettre (e.g. Bernstein, 2012).
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Central to deliberative democracy is the idea that a system of elections to
represent citizens preferences (‘votes’) is not sufficient to arrive at reasonable legitimate grounds for binding collective decisions. Instead, broader
support based on shared argumentations (‘voices’) is vital to an inclusive
model of democracy, which has collective will -formation at its center.
This ideal, however, faces some serious constraints. The scale of contemporary democratic nation states, the transnational nature of many issues,
the complexity of the problems and the difficulty of arriving at consensus
put limits on the feasibility of deliberative processes. In practice, therefore,
deliberative processes come not as an alternative but in addition to representational democracy. They are mainly focused on specific topics and
include selections of stakeholders.
The same is the case in Kitcher’s account. But this gives rise to fundamental questions. The range of people involved in debates and the energetic
and emotional nature of controversies in today’s media culture have given rise to some criticisms of the ideal and practice of deliberative approaches to democracy. His approach will have to clarify what kind of
framework should be used to decide who are appropriate participants in
collective decision-making processes. It needs to point out what arguments can be used in favor of, or against, including representatives in the
policy-making process (Shapiro, 1996: 233-234). In addition, it will have to
formulate criteria for deciding what means of persuasion are legitimate in
the deliberative process (Nussbaum, 2001). Such an approach has to be
careful not to overestimate the possibility of certain groups with a lessdeveloped social position to transform themselves into active citizens
(Young, 1997: 60-75). Science’s authority is put to the test in media cultures and the unpredictable dynamics of social media affect political and
scientific communities (Hajer 2009). Under such conditions both moral as
well as epistemic authority has to be co-produced in mutual interaction
(Brown 2009). ‘Who is entitled to speak on which topic and who is granted
the authority to do so’ and ‘who is entitled to act on behalf of the people
and who is in the legitimate place to do so’ are questions that remain to be
answered.
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At this point, one would expect a reaction from Kitcher, because clearly a
choice has to be made: either he regards himself as a deliberative democrat
and comes up with a defense against these accusations, or he holds that
pragmatist political theory purports something quite distinct, or at least
proposes a specific version of deliberative democracy and makes this more
explicit. Kitcher implicitly chooses the former and replies to these criticisms with mere practical considerations. However, these criticisms of
pragmatist political theory demand a more fundamental reply to the following: does pragmatist political theory essentially consist of a procedural
or a substantive account of democracy?
Kitcher neglects this question. Its urgency, however, is emphasized by Talisse (2007) who stressed that substantive interpretations of pragmatism
may be incompatible with pluralism in some respects. Talisse’s analysis is
based on the well-known distinction between ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ accounts of democracy, the first being a notion that regards democracy as a process for arriving at collective will-formation and decisionmaking in a legitimate and justified way, and the second claiming that
democracy demands something ‘stronger’ and ‘deeper’ such as a shared
idea of what it means to be a citizen, to have rights, to live in freedom, or
even a common agenda to broaden the project of democracy to less empowered groups. Or, as Rosanvallon (2011: 4) has described the two positions, on the one hand we have an account of legitimacy based on social
recognition of some kind of power, and on the other hand an account of
legitimacy based on conformity to some norm or system of values.
The merit of the procedural notion of democracy is that it allows for the
inclusion of a variety of perspectives in decision-making processes and refrains from a substantive account of what democratic outcomes ought to
be. Conversely, from the perspective of this approach substantive accounts of democracy run the risk of being incompatible with pluralism
and as such with the kind of freedoms defended by Dewey and Kitcher. To
Talisse (2007), Dewey’s particular comprehensive doctrine is even oppressive, since it ‘unavoidably involves the coercion of reasonable persons to
live within civic and political institutions and structures that are organized around a comprehensive moral vision of human flourishing that
they could reasonably reject’ (Talisse, 2007: 46).
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Kitcher does not attempt to answer this accusation. By neglecting it, the
suggestion is made that a pragmatist political theory is only viable in a
procedural sense. In the following, two objections will be raised which
may counter the aforementioned accusations. The aim is to show that
pragmatist political theory offers more substance than Kitcher’s reading
allows for and that a more substantive interpretation of pragmatism does
not need to end up in republican theories or in communitarianism. I will
build up my argument in two subsequent steps. First I will introduce
Dewey’s notion of ‘inquiry’ as a much more comprehensive attempt than
Kitcher’s ‘well-ordered science’ to integrate the methods of science with
those of democracies. I will clarify that pragmatist political theory aims
not to represent or unify the existing political community but to extend
that community to new groups and new domains. Key to this objection is
the notion of ‘publics’. Thereafter, I will explain that pragmatist political
theory emphasizes the transformative nature of publics and their environments. Crucial to this understanding is the notion of ‘experience’. Neglecting this element of the theory means missing the content of this
problem-based approach.
4. Inquiry and the coming-into-being of publics
Dewey’s ideal of fuelling democracy with intelligence was more ambitious
than Kitcher’s ideal of ‘well-ordered science’. It may have been a bit naïve
in that it had some blind spots for power relations but it certainly aimed at
much more than arriving at legitimate decisions. Central to Dewey’s philosophy is his notion of ‘inquiry’. In Logic, The Theory of Inquiry (1938),
he explained this idea:
‘Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate
situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and
relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified
whole.’ (Dewey, 1938: 104)
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When Kitcher (2012) reflects on this notion in his lecture The importance
of Dewey for philosophy (and for much else besides) he regards it as simi-
lar to what he now calls his ideal of ‘well-ordered inquiry’. Kitcher rightfully points out that crucial to the notion of inquiry is the presupposed
‘we’ that will conduct it. He agrees with Dewey that this ‘we’ is a fiction.
However, as I will suggest in the following, Dewey’s idea is not just to restore the collective nature of the democratic project but to redefine it altogether into a search for the fragmented public. Contrary to this, Kitcher
strives to combine Dewey’s broad democratic ideals with a procedural account of democracy aimed at decision-making that is simply too narrow
to do justice to the full implications of pragmatist political theory. However, Dewey’s position is clearly distinguished from those who consider
science as merely a puzzling or scientific problem-solving activity separated from politics or from societal tasks. To Dewey, science begins in medias
res and takes a situation that is ‘disturbed, troubled, ambiguous, confused,
full of conflicting tendencies’ as its legitimate starting point. In order to
so, he broadens the task of the sciences by redefining its methods. Instead
of emphasizing the differences in aims and methods of science and democracy, Dewey sees a close resemblance between the two when it comes
to the iteration between means and ends.
This point of view has been criticized for paying little attention to questions of power and passion. Wolin (2004), for instance, has criticized Dewey for identifying democracy ‘with a method of discussion that assimilates
it to science, while science is consistently described in communal terms
that make it appear naturally democratic’ (Wolin 2004: 517). In other
words, by comparing science to democracy and democracy to science,
Dewey leaves out import elements of both and reduces them to a ‘method’. In addition, this method has been described as a ‘process without purpose’ (Diggins 1994) and as offering ‘unjustifiable social hope’ (Rorty 1999)
because in the end it would lack a clear direction and an ideological horizon. Instead, I will argue that Dewey’s political theory may lack sensitivity
for power relations, but that it is passionate through and through by being infused with a strong desire to accommodate technological societies
with an appropriate notion of democracy. In that sense, I will follow
Brown (2009: 153) in that ‘despite common misunderstandings, Dewey’s
notion of inquiry as purposive interaction goes beyond a rationalistic, in45
Huub Dijstelbloem – Science in a Not So Well-Ordered Society
strumental understanding of science, and as part of human experience in
general, is a fundamentally passionate and moral enterprise.’
Particularly in the period 1920-1950, Dewey was driven by the question of
how to explain to the American people that a proper organization and use
of science and technology can contribute to the intellectual and moral
development of society and of citizens (Russil 2005; Wolin 2004: 504). Science, technology and industry determined the new face of the American
society at the beginning of the twentieth century as it finally pulled into
the machine age. Dewey emphasized the self-realization of people. Selfrealization can come about when people create relationships with their
environment, similar to the way in which Woodrow Wilson talked about
The Great Society at that time as ‘a new era of human relationships’. Scientific and technological developments are not seen by Dewey as a ‘danger’, but judged on their capacity to make new viable linkages. This idea
turns out to be fertile ground for redefining democracy.
Democracy is, in the famous words of Abraham Lincoln, ‘the government
of the people, by the people, for the people.’ The sovereignty of free citizens is thus reflected in their reconcilability in a political ideal. This phrase
aptly illustrates the idea behind the democratic project, but the question
is how the people can be brought together in this ideal and what their
connectedness consists of. Today's networks of roads, housing and wiring
are not just the cement of society because they make available the facilities
along which normal human traffic can take its course. Scientific and
technological developments transform the social contexts in which people find themselves. They establish the relationships that bind them again
for discussion.
In Dewey's pragmatist political theory as formulated in The Public and Its
Problems (1927), democracy is neither based on a ‘collective,’ nor grounded on the protection of ‘individual’ rights or interests. Instead, he proposes an approach in which the size and scope of political issues should be
determined. Dewey is interested in the effects of new problems. The ‘people,’ the demos, is a phantom, a ghost, which has to be discovered. Dewey
spoke of ‘the eclipse of the public’ which seemed to be lost and bewildered.
It is not a given, but depends on the issue at stake. To allow for the
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changeable nature of the various groupings that shape society, Dewey introduced a different view of who the demoi or the relevant communities
are in a democracy. Instead of the demos, or the people, he speaks of the
public.
From this view, politics is not primarily a matter of a community of people who consult one another, but a thing that arises from the fact that
private actions and transactions may affect strangers who are not directly
involved in those transactions or transaction consequences. In his famous
definition, he stated that ‘the public consists of all those who are affected
by the indirect consequences of human action’ (Dewey, 1927: 15). The
public is not an a priori notion but something that comes into being a posteriori.
This notion of the public is neither a liberal nor a republican or communitarian one. It breaks with the individual nature of the former and with the
notion of the common good in the latter. As such, the notion offers an
opportunity to break with the aforementioned dichotomy between procedural and substantive accounts of democracy. A promising way to arrive at a middle ground between these diverging ideas has been offered by
Shapiro (1996). Shapiro distinguished between three notions of democracy, the first having to do with principles of democratic governance, the
second with the underlying metrics of value, i.e. with which principles of
justice are applied, and the third with ways for advancing democratic
principles in everyday life. The first notion entails a substantive account of
democracy, the second a procedural account, and the third emphasizes
the importance of a certain ‘method’ which makes democracy viable in
everyday life.
The advantage of adding the third perspective is that it breaks down the
stalemate position between the first and second option. Proponents of a
substantive account of democracy criticize the procedural account for
being empty and focusing solely on questions of redistribution. It is accused of having a blind spot for already existing power relations and inequalities and for refraining from doing justice to all kinds of minorities
and immaterial claims. Conversely, proponents of a procedural account
of democracy question the idea that there is some way, independent of
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what democratic procedures generate, to determine what outcomes are
genuinely democratic.
The third perspective somehow offers an alternative by shifting the attention to the question of how political innovation is to be arrived at. Neither
the first nor the second option suggests how a political philosophy,
whether it is a substantive or procedural one, can relate to the social
world, i.e. how one can aspire to its ideals under the constraints of social
reality. This leads Shapiro (1996: 130) to say that ‘designing democratic
institutional constraints is inevitably a pragmatic business, best pursued in
a context-sensitive and incremental way’. He supports this statement with
three reasons. First of all, democratic maps of an uncultivated social terrain are bound to run aground when the sheer complexity of social life is
not taken into account. Second, any procedure ought to be open to various kinds of initiatives of self-organization in order to allow people ‘to
discover ways to democratize things for themselves’. Third, thinking in
terms of systems and blue-prints leads to a state-centric view of politics. As
a result, Shapiro (1996: 123) typified his desired account of democracy as
‘more than process, less than substance’.
Dewey’s account of democracy, however, is much more than ‘a way out’
in a solidified philosophical debate. It opens up an innovative point of view
on social dynamics and the interaction between people, politics, science
and technology. To grasp this dynamics, it is important to emphasize that
in Dewey’s account the distinction between the public and the private
does not coincide with that between the social and the individual. A social
action has a private character as long as the consequences do not transcend the stakeholders involved. In contrast, an individual act can be of a
public nature because the consequences relate to people who were not
initially taken into consideration (Dewey, 1927: 12-14). He thus speaks of
the public as an effect of unforeseen consequences. Technologies, whether they are the industrial powers of the ‘‘machine age’ or today’s information technologies, connect humans and machines, or (as Latour would
say) ‘humans and nonhumans,’ and shape associations of people, a ‘community of the affected’ (Marres, 2012: 43). These publics are not preexisting groups of people, but come into being as constructed assemblages.
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5. Experience as democratic energy
The second distinctive feature of pragmatism that is important to stress is
the notion of ‘experience’. The dynamics of current debates concerning
science and technology are hard to grasp when their emotional and energetic nature is not taken into account. Not because people today are overexcited or because the media focus only on scandals and hypes, but because the very relationship between people’s expectations, political decision-making and the course of scientific research and technological innovation is driven by a ‘political economy of hope’ (Rose 2001). Contrary to
Kitcher’s ‘rationalized’ reading, this notion of experience is central to classical pragmatism. It does not only have psychological meaning but democratic consequences as well. Moreover, the notion of experience is crucial
for understanding the transformative nature of issues in which publics are
related to questions of science and technology.
In his essay On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings (1899), William James
famously described how certain events, such as crossing Brooklyn Ferry,
connect people to one another. James himself once wrote that the piece
contained ‘the perception on which my whole individualistic philosophy
is based’ (Richardson, 2012: 145). In a poetical way, with many references
to Robert Louis Stevenson, Wordsworth, Whitman and others, James argued that doing things together unites people and transforms strangers
into what is now called a ‘community of fate’. Experiences blur the
boundary between the individual person and the social group. This notion of ‘experience’ is also central to Dewey’s thought. To Dewey, experience is a path into the world. In The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy
(1917), he explained that in the following way:
‘Experience is primarily a process of undergoing: a process of standing
something; of suffering and passion, of affection, in the literal sense of
these words. The organism has to endure, to undergo, the consequences
of its own actions. […] Undergoing, however, is not mere passivity […].
Our undergoings are experiments in varying the course of events; our active tryings are trials and tests of ourselves.’ (Dewey, 1917: 49)
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Huub Dijstelbloem – Science in a Not So Well-Ordered Society
As such, experience allows for a specific relationship between humans and
nature, between the inside and the outside world. It is not ‘a veil that
shuts man off from nature’ but ‘a means of penetrating continually further into the heart of nature’ (Dewey, 1925: 4-5).
In the revival of pragmatist philosophy in the 1980s and 1990s, most notably in the works of Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty, this notion of experience was concealed behind a somewhat analytic and linguistic interpretation of classical pragmatism. In addition, Putnam and Rorty have put
more emphasis on the epistemological aspects of pragmatism than on the
political theory, although Rorty’s later works, especially Achieving our
Country (1998), may count as an exception. Kloppenberg (1999), for instance, remarked that:
‘[...] the early pragmatists emphasized ‘experience,’ whereas some contemporary philosophers and critics who have taken ‘the linguistic turn’
are uneasy with that concept. […] Language was thus crucial for understanding the experience of others, but for James and Dewey language was
only one important part of a richer, broader range that included interpersonal, aesthetic, spiritual, religious, and other prelinguistic or nonlinguistic forms of experience.’ (Kloppenberg, 1999: 86-87)
Recently, some authors have related this notion of experience in classical
pragmatist philosophy to its political theory in more explicit and lively
ways (Livingston, 2012; Ferguson, 2007). Dewey’s theory offers many clues
but James’s is more complicated, one reason being that it remains debatable whether James actually developed anything like a ‘political theory’.
Attempts to reconstruct James’s political theory often take his ‘radical
pluralism’ as a starting point. The Great San Francisco Earthquake of
April 18, 1906 is a good example of how a single event has very distinct
consequences for different people and finally can even be regarded as a
collective name for a ‘whole series of geological slippages, fractures, and
vibrations that constitute seismic activity’ (Livingston 2012: 1). In On Some
Mental Effects of the Earthquake (1987), James described how he was
thrown face-first from his bed as the earthquake shook his bedroom ‘exactly as a terrier shakes a rat’ (Livingston 2012: 1). He reported:
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Journal for contemporary philosophy
‘Everybody was excited, but the excitement at first, at any rate, seemed to
be almost joyous. Here at last was a real earthquake after so many years of
harmless waggle! Above all, there was an irresistible desire to talk about it,
and exchange experiences.’
Here it becomes clear how the notion of experience contains a democratic
meaning in that it connects the coming into being of publics to their variable material environment. As such, the notion refers to the transformative nature of both publics and the issues they are confronted with. To
James, the earthquake served as an emblematic example of how experiences both unite people as well as throw them back on themselves. On
the one hand, the seismic event was a dreadful nightmare for everybody,
leaving three thousand dead and a quarter-million residents homeless and
hundreds of thousands in shock. On the other hand, the meaning and
impact of the earthquake were different for many people and had varying
consequences, so that the experience remained an individualistic affair in
the end (Ferguson, 2007: 61). In a passage in Lecture 4, ‘The One and the
Many,’ of his Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking
(1907), James described what he had in mind:
‘The world is full of partial stories that run parallel to one another, beginning and ending at odd times. They mutually interlace and interfere at
points, but we cannot unify them completely in our minds.’ (James, 1907:
71)
Dewey certainly would not disagree, but to him there is more communality in experiences. This communality is achieved by following the transformation processes publics and their environments undergo. Creating
common experiences from fragmented events is a task he explicitly attributes to science and philosophy and most of all to democracy itself. It
ought to be central to a political theory of science. Neglecting the notion
of experience impedes a substantive interpretation of democracy that emphasizes the mobilizing role of hopes and expectations and, most notably,
the formation of new publics that are gathered together by the emotional
energies of society.
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Huub Dijstelbloem – Science in a Not So Well-Ordered Society
6. Conclusions
Kitcher’s ‘enlightened democracy’, the three-stage process of well-ordered
science, takes the place of ‘science in society’ into account and does justice
to the idea that the sciences ought not to set their agenda in splendid isolation. However, Kitcher’s idea of democracy is mainly aimed at making
justifiable decisions. Although he shifts from relying heavily on the political philosophy of Rawls’s in Science, Truth, and Democracy (2001) to following Dewey’s political theory in his subsequent work, Science in a
Democratic Society (2011), his concept of democracy is a deliberative one
in the procedural sense. The main criticism which has been brought forward here is that from a pragmatist account of democracy, this concept is
too restrictive. Instead, classical pragmatism, most notably the works of
James and Dewey, allows for a broader account of democracy.
Pragmatist political theory in general and Dewey’s ideas of democracy in
particular have been the subject of much criticism. This varies from the
accusation that Dewey’s mingling of the procedures of democracy with
the methods of science into a thing called ‘inquiry’ leads to a kind of ‘social engineering’ to the fear that this inquiry is easily captured by private
interests and is susceptible to the influence of self-assertive, well-organized
groups (e.g. Zakaria 2003).
A viable reading of pragmatist political theory demands a stronger elaboration of the notion of ‘radical pluralism’ and the way scientific and technological developments both unite as well as divide people. Key to such an
understanding are the notions of ‘publics’ and of ‘experience’. If one
agrees with the pragmatist imperative that actions, including thoughtacts and speech-acts, are to be judged by their consequences, a pragmatist
political theory ought to be sensitive to the idea that it need not give a
priori justifications for decision-making processes, but instead should focus on the consequences, i.e. on the a posteriori effects of science and
technology. This is exactly what Dewey was aiming for with his notion of
‘the public’. The conclusion he arrived at was that unforeseen consequences lead to publics who have to be taken care of democratically.
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Kitcher’s ‘enlightened democracy,’ however, emphasizes the epistemic
and procedural aspects of decision-making processes while neglecting
public emotions and energies which are not unusual in the ‘economies of
hope’ and the ‘politics of expectations’ (Brown 2003; Brown and Michael
2003) that surround scientific and technological promises, as in the case of
biofuels, GMOs, shale gas or the development of new therapies and pharmaceutical drugs. Moreover, procedural approaches to democracy tend to
neglect the substantive idea of ‘experience’ as a cornerstone for arriving at
shared ideas and images. As such, they are blind to the political consequences of social-technological change, for instance the rise of groups of
unusual suspects and the shaping of unlikely coalitions such as inhabitants, environmentalists, activists, water corporations and beer breweries in
the case of shale gas, which led to ‘pop-up publics’.
As Honneth (1998: 780) already concluded, Dewey’s notion of democracy
leads to a third road between ‘an overethicized republicanism and an
empty proceduralism’. Although Kitcher’s procedural account is too narrow, pragmatist political theory differs from substantive concepts of democracy in that it is not primarily aimed at the formulation of the common good or a binding general will. Geuss (2001) therefore suggested that
Dewey’s democracy ‘is not at all intended as a concept with application to
the political system of a state, but as the ideal of a liberal community
which, like ancient direct democracy, lacks state-structures’ (Geuss, 2001:
127).
Perhaps the distinction between a substantive and a procedural theory is
not the crucial issue here. If the goal of the distinction is mainly to arrive
at some analytical clarity, replacing the dichotomy existing between procedural and substantive concepts of democracy for the more empirical
distinction between representative and deliberative forms of democracy is
a first option. In doing so, it becomes much clearer that despite the differences, pragmatist political theory is part of the ‘deliberative family’ which
has a bare individualistic notion of representative democracy as its counterpoint.
However, something more important is at stake here. The ‘substance’ of
pragmatist political theory bears a different meaning of ‘the political’ alto49
Huub Dijstelbloem – Science in a Not So Well-Ordered Society
gether. Pragmatism, I would claim, emphasizes the transformative nature
of reality and regards both science and democracy as more or less collec-
tive enterprises aimed at ‘inquiry’. Issues relating to science and technology will have to be investigated in a continuous iteration between means
and ends to arrive at a viable place in society. This ought to result in the
identification of publics who deserve special treatment because they are
likely to experience the consequences of science, technology and related
policy programs in a distinctive way. As such, pragmatist political theory
exchanges the general idea of ‘membership’ of deliberative theory for a
much more contextualized and partial account, not as a substitution for
but as a supplement to the existing political community. Only when this
element is fully taken into account, will a political philosophy of science
and democracy based on classical pragmatism become viable.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Mark Brown, Hans Radder, the participants of the Science in Transition Workshop on ‘Democracy and Communication’, Utrecht, June 28, 2013 and the anonymous reviewers for
their comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Huub Dijstelbloem is Professor of Philosophy of Science and Politics at the
University of Amsterdam and Senior Research Fellow at the Scientific
Council for Government Policy (WRR), The Hague, The Netherlands. He
is interested in questions concerning science, technology and politics and
positions himself disciplinary at the intersection of STS, Political Theory
and Philosophy of Science. His current research is focused on three topics:
(a) the digitization of border controls, migration policies and mobility
management; (b) the governance of food networks; and (c) the contested
authority of science. He is author and co-editor of several volumes and coedited Migration and the New Technological Borders of Europe (2011)
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
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Journal for contemporary philosophy
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