Connecting Cappadocia. The Contribution of the Roman Imperial Army

Interconnectivity in the Mediterranean and Pontic World during the Hellenistic and Roman Periods In Memory of Professor Heinz Heinen PONTICA ET MEDITERRANEA Vol. III Editorial Board: Victor Cojocaru (editor-in-chief) Glenn Bugh, Altay Coşkun, Mădălina Dana, Cristian Găzdac, Alexander Falileyev, and Joachim Hupe Interconnectivity in the Mediterranean and Pontic World during the Hellenistic and Roman Periods Editors: Victor Cojocaru, Altay Coşkun, Mădălina Dana he Proceedings of the International Symposium organized by the Iaşi Branch of the Romanian Academy, the Museum of National History and Archaeology Constanţa, the Research Project ‘Amici Populi Romani’ (Trier – Waterloo ON), and the Cultural Complex ‘Callatis’ Mangalia (Constanţa, July 8–12, 2013), supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientiic Research, CNCS – UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0054 Mega Publishing House Cluj-Napoca 2014 DTP and cover: Francisc Baja Cover photo: Map of the Greek geographer Claudius Ptolemy, following a 15th-century manuscript Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naţionale a României Interconnectivity in the Mediterranean and Pontic World during the Hellenistic and Roman Periods / ed.: Victor Cojocaru, altay Coşkun, Mădălina Dana. - Cluj-Napoca : Mega, 2014 Bibliogr. Index ISBN 978-606-543-526-1 I. Cojocaru, Victor (ed.) II. Coşkun, altay (ed.) III. Dana, Mădălina (ed.) 902 © Editors, 2014 Editura Mega | www.edituramega.ro e‑mail: mega@edituramega.ro Contents – Inhalt – Table des matières Preface Note on Abbreviations Contributors 9 17 19 Altay Coşkun Interconnectivity – In honorem & in memoriam Heinz Heinen (1941–2013) With a Complete Bibliography of His Scholarly Publications 25 Victor Cojocaru Die Beziehungen der nordpontischen Griechen zu den außerpontischen Regionen und Dynastien, einschließlich der römischen Hegemonialmacht: Historiographische Übersicht 73 PoNt I CA & M I CR o‑A S I At I C A Alexandru Avram La mer Noire et la Méditerranée: quelques aspects concernant la mobilité des personnes 99 Mădălina Dana D’Héraclée à trapézonte: cités pontiques ou micrasiatiques? 133 Bülent Öztürk Some observations on tianoi Abroad and the External Relations of tieion / tios (Eastern Bithynia) 155 Adrian Robu Byzance et Chalcédoine à l’époque hellénistique: entre alliances et rivalités 187 hibaut Castelli L’interconnexion des réseaux économiques: les échanges entre le nord‑ ouest du Pont‑Euxin et Rhodes à l’époque hellénistique 207 Sergej Ušakov, Sergej Bočarov Chersonesos taurike und die Ägäis im 5.–3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.: Neue archäologische Fundkomplexe 229 Florina Panait Bîrzescu Wandering Cult Images between the Aegean and the Black Sea Cities in Hellenistic and Roman times: from Dionysos Kathegemon to Dionysos Karpophoros 251 Iulian Bîrzescu Some Remarks on Hellenistic terracotta offerings in the Western Pontic Sanctuaries 269 Johannes Nollé Appearance and Non‑Appearance of Indigenous Cultural Elements on the Coins of Asia Minor and thrace 281 Costel Chiriac, Lucian Munteanu trade Connections between Asia Minor and the Western Pontic Area in the 4th Century CE. Some Sphragistic Considerations 299 S E L E u CI D I CA & M I t H RI D At I C A David Engels „Je veux être calife à la place du calife“? Überlegungen zur Funktion der titel „Großkönig“ und „König der Könige“ vom 3. zum 1. Jh. v. Chr. 333 Mustafa H. Sayar Lysimacheia. Eine hellenistische Hauptstadt zwischen zwei Kontinenten und zwei Meeren: Ein ort der Interkonnektivität 363 Glenn R. Bugh Mithridates the Great and the Freedom of the Greeks 383 Marie-Astrid Buelens A Matter of Names: King Mithridates VI and the oracle of Hystaspes 397 PoNt I CA RoM A NA Maria Bărbulescu, Livia Buzoianu L’espace ouest‑pontique sous l’empereur tibère à la lumière d’un décret inédit découvert en Dobroudja 415 David Braund Nero’s Amber‑Expedition in Context: Connectivity between the Baltic, Black Sea, Adriatic and India from Herodotus to the Roman Empire 435 Florian Matei-Popescu the Horothesia of Dionysopolis and the Integration of the Western Pontic Greek Cities in the Roman Empire 457 Ligia Ruscu Becoming Roman? Shifting Identities in the Western Pontic Greek Cities 473 Ioan Piso Le siège du gouverneur de Mésie inférieure 489 Marta Oller Guzmán Recherches sur la prosopographie des magistrats d’olbia du Pont d’après les inscriptions pour Achille Pontarchès 505 Costel Chiriac, Sever-Petru Boțan Roman Glass Vessels in the Western Pontic Area (1st–3rd Centuries CE). General Remarks 525 Giorgio Rizzo Pontus and Rome: trade in the Imperial Period 555 M I CRo‑A S I At I CA RoM A NA Federico Russo the Function of the trojan Myth in Early Roman Expansionism in Greece and Asia Minor 581 Hale Güney the Economic Activities of Roman Nicomedia and Connectivity between the Propontic and the Pontic World 605 Michael A. Speidel Connecting Cappadocia. the Contribution of the Roman Imperial Army 625 Filiz Dönmez-Öztürk (†) Erste Ergebnisse epigraphischer Feldforschungen in Bithynien (Göynük und Mudurnu) 641 Indices 663 Connecting Cappadocia. he Contribution of the Roman Imperial Army Michael A. Speidel ince globalisation studies have found their way into the ields of Archae‑ ology and Ancient History, and particularly since Peregrine Horden’s and Nicholas Purcell’s ‘Corrupting Sea’, connectivity in the Ancient World and closely related subjects have become increasingly popular objects of research.1 this welcome development also serves to remind us of the fun‑ damental fact that, particularly since the Bronze Age, the ancient world consisted of several overlapping and interwoven networks, which, despite continuous change, together made up one interconnected ancient world that can be said to have stretched, at times, from the British Isles to China. In the opinion of Horden and Purcell, connectivity should be understood as “the various ways in which micro‑regions cohere, both internally and also one with another – in aggregates that may range in size from small clusters to something approaching the entire Mediterranean”.2 It has also been pointed out, however, that it is “hard to make any speciic claims about what ‘connectivity’ precisely entails – beyond the enormous range of phenomena it actually covers”.3 The speciic implications of connectiv‑ ity therefore did not arise simply because interconnections existed. More relevant, it seems, was one’s relative position within a given network, and, indeed, the very nature of that speciic network. this is surely also true in the case of Cappadocia, a country in Asia Minor that lies between the Pontic Mountain range (or the Black Sea, according to Strabo) in the North and the taurus Mountains in the South, with the Euphrates as its eastern border, and the Galatian steppe and Paphlago‑ nia in the West.4 In many parts, Cappadocia was fertile. Horse breeding, sheep and catle, the cultivation of grain, fruit trees and even wine, as well as mining, silver in particular were among the main sources of the coun‑ S Horden – Purcell 2000. Horden – Purcell 2000: 123. 3 Algazi 2005: 242. 4 Str. 12.1.1. 1 2 625 M ichae l A . S p e ide l try’s prosperity.5 In very general terms, this rugged highland, by coming irst under Hellenistic and then Roman rule, passed from a network (or rather: set of networks) gravitating around a centre in the East into one irmly centred in the West. For the earlier political, economic, administra‑ tive, cultural and military networks of Cappadocia focussed on Southern Mesopotamia and the Iranian plateau, whereas the new networks tied the country into the (eastern) Mediterranean world. In its new western seting Cappadocia eventually moved into a peripheral position, for it now lay on the fringes of the Roman Empire. This peripheral position, to a signiicant degree, shaped Cappadocia’s development over the following centuries, and the Roman army played a major role in this process. Long before Cappadocia was transformed into a Roman province in 17 CE, it permanently joined its new Roman framework as a dependent kingdom. As is well‑known, Cappadocia played an important role in the wars against Mithidates VI, and Pompey in 61 BCE oicially included the country among those he had defeated during his command in the East.6 the direct consequences of this early stage of integration included, for instance, Pompey’s addition to Cappadocia of parts of Lycaonia as well as Sophene, and his establishment of an eleventh Cappadocian satrapy. Julius Caesar, in 47 BCE, had the monarchs in the region promise: “to watch over and guard the (Roman) province (of Syria)”.7 Cappadocia then evidently held a irm position within Rome’s political and strategic interests. Socially and economically, however, only very litle seems to have changed at this stage. A king still ruled the country in dynastic succession. According to Strabo, leading aristocrats held an unusually strong position in Cappadocia and were, together with the king and the temple‑states, the owners of most of the country’s land. Moreover, it seems that a great many Cappadocians were legally dependent from the king, the aristo‑ cratic families or the temples. Cities, that is Greek‑style poleis, there were very few. Strabo counted only two that might have compared to the stan‑ dards of western Asia Minor: tyana and Mazaka/Caesarea.8 In another passage, however, he also called Kybistra and even Komana a polis, and there may have been one or two more, such as the city of Archelais, which Str. 11.13.8; 12.2.1f.; 12.2.9f. Cf. also Plin. Nat. 34.14.41. Flor. 3.12.4. Ath. Deip. 3.112c and 113a‑b. See e.g. Gwatkin 1930: 21f.; Teja 1980: 1092–1102; Marek 2010: esp. 498, 500, 504, 506, 511. 6 Plin. Nat. 7.26.98. Plu. Pomp. 45. 7 Str. 12.1.4; 12.2.1. B.Alex. 65: reges, tyrannos, dynastas provinciae initimos, qui omnes ad eum concurrerant, receptos in idem condicionibus impositis provinciae tuendae ac defendendae dimitit et sibi et populo Romano amicissimos. For these and the following developments see Speidel 2009a: 581–594; Marek 2010: esp. 363–388 and 401–422. 8 Str. 1.2.7. 5 626 Connecting Cappadocia. The Contribution of the Roman Imperial Army was given the status of a polis by Cappadocia’s last king only a few years before his demise in 17 CE.9 the emperor Claudius upgraded Archelais to the only Roman colony in the country for many decades to come. Cap‑ padocia, thus, remained poorly urbanised until Late Antiquity. the main forms of setlement were villages and burgs. The lack of a wide spread of urban culture was enormously consequential. It was also, no doubt, a main reason for the extremely small number of only around 850 Greek and Latin inscriptions on stone presently known from Cappadocia, which is even signiicantly less than those that have come to light in Roman Brit‑ ain (i.e. around 2’900 inscriptions on stone). However, we must also keep in mind that archaeological research and epigraphic surveys in Cappado‑ cia have not even remotely reached the intensity known in most Western provinces. therefore, many aspects of Cappadocian history remain in the dark. It is certain, however, that not even the early ties and low of informa‑ tion between Cappadocia and the centre of Roman imperial power were few and far between.10 thus, tiberius took on the defence of king Arche‑ laus in Spain, when local rivals of the late Hellenistic dynast accused their king.11 During a period in which Archelaus was (allegedly) in ill health, Augustus had him temporarily replaced by a Roman procurator, who secured the king’s rule.12 Finally, Archelaus vastly expanded his dominion during the many decades of his reign. In the end, it included, apart from Cappadocia, the kingdoms of Pontus and Armenia Minor, as well as large parts of Cilicia, while his grandson tigranes ruled Arme‑ nia. In a very physical sense, therefore, the kingdom of Cappadocia, for a few years during the end of Archelaus’ reign, actually connected the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. Also, Archelaus was personally very well connected with the dynastic networks of Asia Minor and the Near East.13 Augustus counted Archelaus among his close and trusted friends, and he surely also included Cappadocia among the membra partesque imperii.14 These admitedly cursory and summarizing remarks show that Cappadocia was, in quite a number of respects, already irmly integrated within the networks of the Roman world when tiberius ter‑ minated royal rule in 17 CE, and, at the same time, that Rome was well informed, through many channels, of all Cappadocian maters of stra‑ tegic interest. Str. 12.2.3. Teja 1980: 1105–1108. See esp. Speidel 2009a: 582–585 for what follows. 11 Suet. Tib. 8. D.C. 57.17.3f. Levick 1999: 20. 12 D.C. 57.17.4f.; Suet. Aug. 48. 13 Cf. Sullivan 1980. 14 Suet. Aug. 48; cf. also 60. Str. 6.4.2; 16.1.28; 17.3.25. tac. Ann. 4.5. 9 10 627 M ichae l A . S p e ide l Nevertheless, when tiberius terminated the reign of Archelaus in 17 CE and turned Cappadocia into a Roman province, the country entered a new phase of increased connectivity with the Mediterranean.15 this transition entailed, above all, political, administrative, iscal, economic and military changes. In terms of physical power and Roman personnel, the Roman army caused the most visible changes. At the top of the provincial military hierarchy stood the commander of the Roman army in Cappadocia. the question, exactly which position this Roman oicial held, raises the irst of many conundrums with respect to the Roman army in Cappadocia.16 Evidently, the man locally in command was the provincial governor, for Roman governors were just as much military leaders as supreme judges or chief administrators. And as Rome’s leading representative in the prov‑ ince, he was of course a major factor within the networks of power that connected Cappadocia with Rome. According to Suetonius and Cassius Dio, a Roman knight governed Cappadocia before the Flavian period.17 As a man of equestrian rank, this oicial evidently had no legionary soldiers under his command. His title, however, is not on record. Yet, it seems likely that he was a praefectus, just as his colleague in Commagene, which was provincialized in the same year and under practically the same circumstances.18 Commagene was atached to the province of Syria, and this seems also to have been the solution, which Rome found for Cappadocia. For the governor of Syria is on record for having militarily intervened in Cappadocia, which surely would not have been possible if Cappadocia had been an entirely independent prov‑ ince.19 Moreover, tacitus and Josephus describe the military duties of the consular Syrian governor during the reigns of tiberius and Claudius as reaching as far North as Iberia and Albania in the Caucasus region. According to Josephus, as many as 3000 legionary soldiers from the Syr‑ ian army garrisoned the eastern shores of the Black Sea during the reign of Nero.20 thus, the new Roman army in Cappadocia in the period between 17 and 70 CE was part of an enormous military network that comprised several dependant allied kingdoms as well as various Roman administra‑ tive units, and that connected the Black Sea with the Mediterranean East See esp. Speidel 2009a: 584–594 for details and references. Cf. in particular Speidel 2009a: 589–591. 17 Suet. Ves. 8; D.C. 57.17.7. 18 See Speidel 2009a: 563–580. 19 For the superordinate role in the East of the Roman governor of Syria in this period cf. tac. Ann. 6.32 and Speidel 2009a: 591–593 with further literature. 20 tac. Ann. 4.5: dehinc initio ab Syriae usque ad lumen Euphraten, quantum ingenti terrarum sinu ambitur, quatuor legionibus coercita, accolis Hibero Albanoque et aliis regibus qui magnitudine nostra proteguntur adversum externa imperia. J. BJ 2.16.4. Wheeler 2012a, however, high‑ handedly discards Josephus’ statement. 15 16 628 Connecting Cappadocia. The Contribution of the Roman Imperial Army coast and the Red Sea under the command of the Roman governor in Syr‑ ia.21 Concrete, every day implications of Cappadocia’s troops belonging to the Syrian army would at least have involved areas of recruitment, the low of military information, deployment and lines of communication, as well as basic supplies and pay.22 Yet some scholars suggested that not even regular auxiliary troops of the Roman army were stationed in Cappadocia when it was turned into a Roman province.23 this opinion is based mainly on two passages, one in Josephus and another in tacitus.24 Josephus counted Cappadocia among the unarmed provinces of the Roman Empire, which (as borne out by the context of the passage in question) is no more than a reference to the absence of a garrison of legionary soldiers, whereas tacitus’ ambiguous description of the Roman troops in Cappadocia as auxilia provincialium has been taken to refer to irregular units only. Yet, in another passage of his Annales, tacitus actually spells out that regular cohortes and alae were sta‑ tioned in Cappadocia, which is indeed what might be expected.25 unfor‑ tunately we cannot exactly determine the size of the Roman army in Cap‑ padocia during the Julio‑Claudian period. Inscriptions suggest it to have comprised several units of Eastern origin, such as ala I Augusta gemina colonorum, ala Augusta Germaniciana, cohors I Bosporanorum, and cohors I Apamenorum. other units were brought in from the West, such as cohorts I and II Hispanorum.26 It is perhaps surprising to ind that we have no evidence of any Roman auxiliary units raised from Cappadocians. the case of Judaea reveals what might otherwise have been expected. For when this kingdom was trans‑ formed into a prefecture in 6 CE, it also received a new Roman garrison of auxiliary units.27 Regiments of the former royal army were transformed into Roman auxiliary units and integrated into this new Roman garrison.28 Com‑ Cilicia: tac. Ann. 6.41 and 12.55; Armenia: tac. Ann. 12.45–48. Cf. also the two previous notes. For the Nabataean kingdom being within the sphere of responsibility of the Roman governor of Syria see e.g. tac. Ann. 2.57; J. AJ 16.9.1–3 (271–290); 17.3.2 (57); 18.5.1–3 (115– 126) with tac. Ann. 6.32; D.C. 68.14.5. Red Sea: Peripl.M.Rubr. 19 with Speidel (forthcoming). 22 Cf. also Butcher – Ponting 2009 for the production of silver coins. 23 Gwatkin 1930: 36f.; Mitford 1980: 1174; Levick 1999: 141; Mitchell 1993: 63; Heil 1997: 208. Wheeler 2012a: n. 83 bases his argument on tac. Ann. 13.8: additis cohortibus aliisque, quae Cappadocia hiemabant, claiming that hiemabant “seems unlikely for units regularly sta‑ tioned in the province”. Yet tacitus’ use of the verb hiemare and of the term (castra) hiberna suggests otherwise: see e.g. tac. Ann. 1.39, and tac. Ann. 1.27; 1.30; 1.38; 2.79. tac. Hist. 1.52; 1.57; 2.80; 3.1; 4.12; 4.15; 4.25; 4.33; 4.39; 4.54; 4.61; 5.22. But cf. Hist. 4.3. 24 J. BJ 2.16.4; tac. Ann. 12.49. Cf. Speidel 2009a: 589f. 25 tac. Ann. 13.8 (see n. 21 above). Cf. also Ann. 15.6 and Hist. 2.6. 26 Speidel 2009a: 620. 27 See Speidel 1992: 224–231. 28 Speidel 1992: 224f.; Millar 1993: 45. 21 629 M ichae l A . S p e ide l parable developments probably also took place in Commagene in 17/8 CE, for at least one ala Commagenorum, and possibly six cohortes Commagenorum were in existence already by the mid-irst century CE.29 Archelaus, the last king of Cappadocia, no doubt also had an army with infantry and cavalry soldiers. However, nothing as yet is known of this army, nor are there any traces of transformed royal Cappadocian units in the auxilia of the Roman army anywhere in the Empire. Perhaps tiberius refrained from forcibly rais‑ ing Cappadocian auxiliary units as one of the measures he took to render Roman rule in Cappadocia more acceptable, just as he did, for instance, by cuting the former royal tax rates in half.30 Be that as it may, Cappadocians, at times, were nevertheless recruited into other units of the Roman army, as was for instance the case during Corbulo’s preparations for Nero’s Parthian war.31 Routine recruiting paterns, however, remain elusive. the Neronian war under the command of Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo in Armenia and against the Parthians, and the ensuing reorganisation of the north eastern frontier by the Flavian rulers brought along profound changes in Cappadocia’s military structure and further increased the province’s con‑ nectivity with the Mediterranean basin. In 64 CE the kingdom of Polemon II, the Pontus Polemoniacus, was integrated into the Roman province of Cappadocia.32 the former Pontic royal regiments were transformed into Roman cohorts and a Roman leet was established at Trapezus on the Black Sea.33 Further naval bases included Sinope and Amastris, as well as forts on the Colchian coast, which Vespasian later ordered his troops to occu‑ py.34 According to Suetonius, Vespasian also ordered a military upgrade of Cappadocia “because of the frequent incursions of the barbarians”.35 More important, however, surely was the lesson from the Neronian war, which was that Armenia could not be relied upon to fulil the strategic role Rome had expected it to. At any rate, in 70 CE titus sent a legion to Melitene in Cappadocia and personally met with a Parthian embassy at Syrian Zeug‑ ma.36 In 72/3 CE royal rule was terminated in neighbouring Commagene (for the third time) and Armenia Minor, and other small dependent king‑ doms in the region (Chalcidice, Emesa) also disappeared in these years.37 At P.Heid.Lat. 8 = ChLA XI 501 from 48–52 CE. Cf. Speidel 2009a: 577. tac. Ann. 2.56. 31 tac. Ann. 13.35. 32 Marek 2010: 420. 33 tac. Hist. 3.47. Cf. J. BJ 2.16.4. Speidel 2009a: 601f. See also Saddington 2010. Wheeler 2012a. 34 Plin. Nat. 6.4.12f. 35 Suet. Ves. 8.4: propter adsiduos barbarorum incursus. 36 J. BJ 7.1.2; 7.5.2. 37 Cf. e.g. Mitchell 1993: 118; Gebhardt 2002: 43; Facella 2006: 225–338; Eck 2007: 190– 201; Speidel 2009a: 563–580; Marek 2010: 422–427. For Galatia cf. below. the exact relation 29 30 630 Connecting Cappadocia. The Contribution of the Roman Imperial Army nearly the same time we hear of a dangerous military escalation between Rome and Parthia.38 Legionary bases were established near Commagenian Samosata in 73 and at Cappadocian Satala by the mid 70’s. Roman legions moved in and became permanent garrisons: legio XII Fulminata at Meli‑ tene39 and irst legio VI Flavia irma and then (probably early in Hadrian’s reign) legio XV Apollinaris at Satala.40 Also, a number of cohorts were trans‑ ferred from Syria into Cappadocia during the course of the 70s and 80s of the irst century CE.41 the new Roman army in Cappadocia thus included, at the turn of the irst to the second century CE, two legions, at least four alae, and perhaps some ifteen or more cohorts. Of the later at least three were milliary. Excluding the irregulars, the auxiliary army at that time thus counted at least 11’000 men. A fourth (?) milliary cohort was transferred to Cappadocia towards the end of trajan’s reign.42 But Vespasian not only moved a major Roman army as a permanent provincial garrison into Cap‑ padocia, he also reunited Galatia and Cappadocia under the responsibility of a single Roman oicial, as they had been, at times, during the Neronian wars.43 the troops, however, were practically all concentrated in the Cap‑ padocian east and along the Colchian coast of the Black Sea.44 the reasons for the formation of this enormous new province are not on record, but it seems likely that Corbulo’s experiences with supplying his troops during Nero’s Parthian war, as well as logistical and other considerations related to Cappadocia’s large new garrison and its detachment from Syria played an important role (cf. also below). Major construction work ensued. Garrison places, old and new,45 turned into building sites, and a new and wide infrastructure network was set up in eastern Asia Minor and North Syria that intended to secure the logistical support and the operational readiness of the Roman army on the eastern frontier.46 No doubt, Corbulo’s experiences with supplying the army during Nero’s Parthian war had produced essential information and expertise that were now put to use. Legio V Macedonia’s failure to join Paetus’ Armenian campaign of 62 in time, and the revolt of Anicetus in 69 further underscored between the creation of the new province Lycia et Pamphylia in ca. 71 (cf. now Adak – Wil‑ son 2012) and Vespasian’s reorganization of the eastern frontier is not entirely clear. 38 Plin. Pan. 9.2; 14.1; 16.1; 58.3; 89.3. ILS 8970. Dąbrowa 1998: 64–67. Cf. Speidel 2009a: 124f. 39 J. BJ 7.1.2. 40 Mitford 1997: 140–146; Wheeler 2000: 293–296. 41 Speidel 2009a: 620f. 42 Speidel 2009a: 623–626. 43 See Eck 2007: esp. 199. 44 Speidel 2009a: 620–623 and 627; Wheeler 2012b: 621. 45 Despite several laws and errors, misrepresentations and speculations, the lengthy dis‑ cussion of ND, or. 38 by Wheeler 2012b ofers the most recent and comprehensive atempt to locate and identify garrison places of the Cappadocian army. 46 tac. Ann. 13.39; 15.12. van Berchem 1985: esp. 76.; Speidel 2012a. Speidel 2014: 91–93. 631 M ichae l A . S p e ide l Rome’s strategic need to dispose of and securely control the overland and maritime connections in eastern Anatolia, Colchis, and northern Syria. the large scale construction programme thus included canals and locks on the orontes river, above and below Antioch, as well as the improvement and the extension of a vast network of roads in Galatia, Cappadocia, Pontus, Pisidia, Paphlagonia, Lycaonia, and Armenia Minor that was completed only under Domitian’s governor of Galatia‑Cappadocia, Aulus Caesennius Gallus.47 Cappadocia’s new military role also afected the neighbouring regions, Galatia above all. By the reign of Domitian, its capital Ancyra was the seat of a collegium veteranorum and had begun to develop into an increasingly important military hub that saw great numbers of troops and supplies move to and from the war zones in the east.48 this aspect of Ancyra’s history continued to intensify even after Galatia’s detachment from Cappadocia in the early second century, and appears to have had an important impact on the urbanization of central Anatolia.49 Further, several military bases (dating, it seems, mainly from the second century and later) were installed along the main roads through Asia Minor to the eastern frontier as well as in the military concentration areas along the Euphrates. these bases apparently served logistical purposes for the many detachments on their march to and from the eastern war zones.50 on the Pontic coast, trapezus, which had been heavily involved in logistic operations during Corbulo’s campaign’s, also developed into a major military centre, controlling lines of communication and supply. It was the initial base of the Roman classis Pontica, and connected the army in Cappadocia with the Black Sea forts on the Colchian coast. Hadrian built a new harbour, and at an unknown point in time during the second century a permanent fortress for detach‑ ments of the Cappadocian legions was constructed.51 Yet, it was not only during wartime that trapezus played an important logistical role for the Cappadocian army, as it was the main harbour through which supplies and grain from the Bosporan Kingdom and elsewhere were imported.52 47 Gallus: PIR2 C 170. Cf. e.g. ILS 263. Cumont 1923: 110 and 123; Mitchell 1993: 124f. Marek 2010: 467. French 2012: nos. 7; 8; 38; 67; 103; 117; 122; 128. French 2013: no. 66. Speidel 2014: 92. 48 Cf. I.Ankara I 46, 72, 81, 156–190 etc. 49 Coşkun 2013: 175f. with further literature. 50 See Speidel 2009a: 255–281; Speidel 2009b and Speidel (forthcoming); Coşkun 2013: 173. 51 Harbour: Arr. Peripl.M.Eux. 16. Cf. D.C. 69.5.3; Wheeler 2007: 246. Fortress: CIL III 6745 and 6747; AE 1975, 783 = AE 1993, 1562. Cf. Wheeler 2000: 301f.; Wheeler 2012a. Not until the reign of Diocletian, however, was the fortress at trapezus the actual headquarters of a legion: the newly raised legio I Pontica: CIL III 6746 = ILS 639. Cf. AE 1972, 636; ND, or. 38.16; Speidel 2009a: 597. 52 Wheeler 2007: 246. the harbor of Amisus may also have played a role as a logistical base for the exercitus Capadocicus. Not all the grain for the Cappadocian army, however, needed to be imported. 632 Connecting Cappadocia. The Contribution of the Roman Imperial Army the reign of Vespasian, above all, thus saw Cappadocia being upgraded in several steps to a consular province with a major military garrison. Rome’s dramatically increased interest in Cappadocia, of course, relected the country’s new strategic position. Cappadocia’s governor was therefore a man of high social standing and considerable political inluence. In all of Asia Minor, he was junior in rank and age only to the proconsul Asiae. Who‑ ever managed to establish or even maintain direct contact to the consularis had connected to the highest level of Rome’s political networks. this was just as true for those of local descent as it was for anyone who, for what‑ ever reason, had come to the province. thus, Flavius Arrianus’s Periplus gives an example of how the consular Roman governor was visible to, and interacted with the many soldiers in his province. For Arrian records how, as legatus Augusti of Cappadocia, he sailed on a routine journey from tra‑ pezus to visit and inspect the auxiliary forts along the eastern coast of the Black Sea and how, on this highly symbolic occasion, he distributed pay to the soldiers in the context of a ceremonial parade.53 Evidently, such journeys were absolutely essential to the functioning of the Roman Empire. What the distribution of soldiers’ pay actually involved can be estimated in the case of Arrian’s irst stop, Apsaros, which had a garrison of ive cohorts (thus, theoretically, some 2,500 soldiers). If we just calculate with basic rates of pay, Arrian would have handed out the equivalent of over 208’000 denarii or over 700 kg of silver at Apsaros. By the second century, it appears, many of the coins that actually arrived in and circulated around the forts on the Colchian coast were minted at trapezus.54 The inlux of large sums of coined money three times per year thus surely had signiicant efects on the economic development of this region on the far periphery of the Roman Empire. of course, much of the money would be used for the upkeep and provisioning of the gar‑ rison, and thus large sums left the region again (or maybe never even arrived, see below). However, much money also remained in a local mon‑ etary circuit. In either case, however, spending this money outside the immediate military community signiicantly increased the entire region’s connectivity. Arrian’s journey thus helps us to understand how the sheer size of Cap‑ padocia’s new garrison must have had very noticeable implications on the country’s social and economic structures, and particularly on Cappadocia’s interconnections with the Mediterranean world on several accounts, even though our sources relect these developments only very inadequately. Imports, for instance, had to cover all the needs of the army that could not be produced locally. Bosporan grain, already mentioned, was but one 53 54 Arr. Peripl.M.Eux. 6 and 10. thus Wheeler 2000: 301, n. 243 with bibliography. 633 M ichae l A . S p e ide l item on the list of such imports, which was no doubt substantial. unfortu‑ nately, any atempt at reconstructing a list of military imports to Cappado‑ cia seems futile considering the enormous lack of local documentary and archaeological data. Nevertheless, a papyrus from 138 CE, now kept at Warsaw, might give an impression of what was involved. It preserves an order for military clothes for the Cappadocian army that were to be pro‑ duced in a village in Egypt. The text speciied that the clothes were to be “from ine, soft, white wool without any dirt, well-woven and well-edged, pleasing and undamaged”.55 According to the papyrus, this speciic order involved agents, contracts, leters, money credits, travels, producers and products, transports and payments, and connected far‑away places and diverse cultures with each other. Yet there is nothing to suggest that this procedure was in any way exceptional. It rather appears to have been one of a great many routine transactions that were necessary for the upkeep of the Cappadocian army. Cappadocia also exported local products for the Roman army. Silver coins minted at Caesarea, the Cappadocian capital, for instance, appear, at times, to have been exported to Syria.56 the most famous export, however, were Cappadocian horses, renowned for their speed.57 Papyrological evi‑ dence atests their use in the army of Dura Europos, for instance.58 As else‑ where, service in the Roman army also ofered access to Roman networks and exposure to Roman culture (albeit of a speciic military lavour).59 Moreover, it provided opportunities to consort with fellow soldiers from many diferent parts of the Roman world, and, on occasion, to serve out‑ side one’s native province. the recorded movements of troops, soldiers and oicers in and out of Cappadocia thus betray the fact that all Roman soldiers of the exercitus Cappadocicus belonged to an empire‑wide imperial network, which the Roman army was.60 While most of the described efects of provincialization can also be observed in other heavily garrisoned frontier provinces, there are also a few phenomena that seem to be typical for Cappadocia. thus, considering the enormous size of the Roman garrison of the province, the army must have absorbed a great many recruits. However, the number of known Roman soldiers of Cappadocian origin anywhere in the Roman Empire is exceedingly small, as is the overall number of soldiers’ gravestones found BGu VII 1564 = Sel.Pap. II 395. Butcher – Ponting 2009. 57 E.g. Str. 11.13.7; Hdt. 3.90. Cf. X. Cyr. 2.1.5; Arr. An. 3.11.7; Diod. 18.16; Plu. Eum. 4; opp. C. 1.197f.; Vegetius, Mulomedicina 3.6; HA Gord. 4.5. Cf. also Mitchell 2014: 256f. 58 P.Dur. 56 A‑C = RMR 99,3,3. 59 on the subject in general see Speidel 2009a: 22–35 and 515–544; Speidel 2012b. 60 Speidel 2009a: 620–627. 55 56 634 Connecting Cappadocia. The Contribution of the Roman Imperial Army within Cappadocia.61 the dearth of epigraphic evidence from Cappadocia is of course just as much a consequence of the very low degree of urbaniza‑ tion as it is due to the lack of archaeological investigations. Nearly all Cap‑ padocian fortresses of the Roman army as well as their necropoleis await discovery and investigation. However, that does not explain the dearth of data from outside the province. Fortunately, the data provided by the military diplomas sheds a litle more light on some issues concerning the Roman army of Cappado‑ cia, which after all was one of Rome’s largest military provinces. We currently know of only three fragmentary diplomas for soldiers from auxiliary troops that belonged to the Roman army of Cappadocia. they date to the years 94, 100, and 101 CE.62 The irst is very fragmentary, and the second was the copy of an exceptional constitution that was issued for only two soldiers. the third diploma, which is as yet still unpub‑ lished, is fairly complete. Considering the size of the Cappadocian army and the number of auxiliary units, this is an exceedingly small number of surviving military diplomas. We know of at least ive times as many diplomas from other provinces with Roman garrisons of comparable size. the number of known diplomas for a particular province depends on several factors. one is of course the amount of diplomas that was once issued for that province, which in the case of Cappadocia ought to be considerable. Another factor is the intensity of archaeological investiga‑ tion within a provincial area. this is comparatively low in the regions that once made up the Roman province of Cappadocia, which seems to go well with the very small number of Cappadocian diplomas. However, only about one third of the diplomas hitherto known for Lower Germany or Britain have been found within the conines of these two major Roman military provinces, despite the widespread and intensive archaeological work conducted in these regions. In the case of the exercitus Syriacus, even all 18 diplomas hitherto known were found outside provincia Syria.63 the ind spots of these diplomas are oicially recorded as ‘unknown’, but specialists are in no doubt that most of them come from illegal ‘excava‑ tions’ in the Balkans.64 that also goes well with the recorded origins of the recipients of these diplomas, for most of them were issued to veterans from thrace and the Lower Danube who returned to their homes after military service. the large number of such diplomas further emphasises See e.g. Mitchell 1994. For the legions Forni 1953: 94, 184; Forni 1992: 104, 122f., 126, 136. See also Eck 2009 for the auxilia in Asia Minor. 62 AE 2004, 1920; AE 2004, 1913. Cf. Speidel 2009a: 605f. 63 For the later see Weiss 2006. Eck – Pangerl 2014. 64 Eck 2012: 30. 61 635 M ichae l A . S p e ide l the importance of Thrace and the Balkans as a major recruiting ield for the Roman army.65 the small number of known military diplomas for soldiers of the exercitus Cappadocicus thus indicates that recruitment from the Balkans for military units in Cappadocia was, surprisingly, signiicantly less common than for other large provincial armies, despite the relative geographical proximity. Moreover, the three hitherto known Cappadocian constitu‑ tions concern soldiers recruited during the years between around 70 and 75 CE. this was precisely the period, in which the Cappadocian army was massively built up and it is not unlikely, therefore, that in these years large numbers of recruits (including recruits from the Balkans) were moved into Cappadocia. Further, the merger of Cappadocia and Galatia to a single major province in the same period may have been a measure to secure the supplies and a suicient number of legionary recruits for the new Cap‑ padocian army. For the Roman colonies and other veteran setlements in Southern Galatia, Pisidia and Lycaonia were ideal recruiting grounds for the Roman legions in Cappadocia, while governors had no right to independently recruit soldiers beyond the conines of their province.66 the renewed detachment of Galatia from Cappadocia on the eve of tra‑ jan’s Parthian war may therefore (at least in part) have been linked to new recruitment paterns.67 the surprisingly small number of known soldiers from the Cappadocian legions is therefore perhaps indeed due to their recruitment from areas within Galatia and Cappadocia that have seen litle or no archaeological investigation. the same might be true for the auxilia, as there is no reason to believe that Cappadocia could not supply a sui‑ cient number of recruits for the cohortes and alae stationed in the province. Finally, the careers of equestrian oicers, also reveal a remarkable patern: the majority of equestrian oicers, regardless of their origins, commanded more than one unit in eastern Anatolia.68 therefore, it seems that in the case of the Cappadocian army more than elsewhere, recruitment and mis‑ sion may have been a predominantly Anatolian afair. A senator from Cappadocia (ti. Claudius Gordianus, from tyana) is known from the reign of Commodus.69 Interestingly, however, there seems to be no known equestrian commander of a Roman auxiliary unit of Cap‑ padocian origin. Again, this is most likely, in the irst instance, due to the Amm.Marc. 26.7.5: bellatrices Thraciae gentes. Expositio totius mundi 50 = Riese 1887: 117: Thracia provincia ... maximos habens viros et fortes in bello. Propterquod et frequenter inde milites tolluntur. 66 Dig. 1.16.1; 1.18.3; 48.4.3. tac. Ann. 13.7; 14.38. D.C. 53.15.6; 53.17.5f. on the subject see Speidel 2009a: 213–234. 67 Detachment: Eck 2007: 201. 68 Speidel 2009a: 606 with further bibliography. 69 AE 1953, 138 (Lambaesis). Cf. PIR2 C 880. DNP Claudius II 33. 65 636 Connecting Cappadocia. The Contribution of the Roman Imperial Army lack of archaeological investigation and the low degree of urbanisation in the area of the former Roman province. Yet, another factor may also have contributed. The irst members of the ordo equester of Cappadocian descent show up in our sources about three generations after the creation of the Roman province. Juvenal and Martial made fun of these Cappado‑ cian equites, calling them slave‑born liars.70 Also, Philostratus, when com‑ menting in his ‘Lives of the Sophists’ on the style and Greek diction of many sophists from throughout the Roman Empire, refers to only one case in which the orator revealed a local accent, that of Pausanias of Caesarea in Cappadocia. this late second century orator, according to Philostra‑ tus, spoke “with a coarse and heavy accent (glōta), as is the case with Cappadocians”.71 Cappadocians, it seems, had the reputation of being backward. No doubt, the Roman army had a major impact on the social, economic, and cultural history of Cappadocia. It established and ofered access to numerous Mediterranean based networks and thereby signiicantly increased Cappadocia’s connectivity with the rest of the Empire. How‑ ever, the evidence also seems to suggest that there may have been, for a number of reasons, a limit to what the connectivity generated by the Roman army could achieve in Cappadocia. Michael A. Speidel university of Bern Bern, Swizerland mspeidel@sunrise.ch Bibliography Adak, Mustafa – Wilson, Mark 2012: Das Vespasiansmonument von Döşeme und die Gründung der Doppelprovinz Lycia et Pamphylia, Gephyra 9, 1–40. Algazi, Gadi 2005: Diversity Rules: Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell’s the Corrupting Sea, MHR 20, 227–245. van Berchem, Denis 1985: Le port de Séleucie de Piérie et l’infrastructure logis‑ tique des guerres parthiques, BJ 185, 47–87. Butcher, Kevin – Ponting, Mathew 2009: The silver coinage of Roman Syria under the Julio‑Claudian emperors, Levant 41, 59–78. Coşkun, Altay 2013: VON ‚ANATOLIA‘ BIS ‚INSCRIPTIONS OF ANKARA‘: Zwanzig Jahre Forschungen zum antiken Galatien (1993–2012), Anatolica 39, 169–195. 70 71 Juv. 7.15; Mart. 10.76.3. Philostr. 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S p e ide l Abstract: During the Hellenistic period, Cappadocia, a country in eastern Asia Minor, gradually moved from its age‑old position within networks centred in the East (Iran and Southern Mesopotamia) into a new frame‑ work of politico-military, economic and cultural ties that signiicantly intensiied the country’s connectivity with the Mediterranean and Pontic worlds. Initially, this process was driven by Hellenistic and Roman mili‑ tary enterprises. Yet, even well after Cappadocia was politically and mili‑ tarily irmly integrated into its new Western seting (with political bound‑ aries that, at times, reached from the northern shores of the Black Sea to the Mediterranean), the Roman army continued to play an important (yet in some respects also surprisingly limited) role in the country’s multifaceted connectivity with the West. Zusammenfassung: In hellenistischer Zeit entfernte sich Kappadokien, ein Land im osten Kleinasiens, allmählich von seinem uralten, im osten (Iran und Südmesopotamien) zentrierten Bezugssystem in einen neuen Zusammenhang von politischen, militärischen, wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Nezwerken, die das Land immer fester an die Welten des Mitelmeers und des Schwarzen Meers banden. Zunächst lösten diesen Prozess hauptsächlich hellenistische und römische Kriegszügen aus. Doch selbst als Kappadokien politisch und militärisch bereits fester Bestandteil der westlichen Welt geworden war (mit Grenzen, durch die das Land zeit‑ weise die Nordküste des Schwarzen Meeres mit dem Mitelmeer direkt verband), spielte das römische Heer bei der weiteren, vielschichtigen Einbindung des Landes weiterhin eine wichtige (in mancher Hinsicht aber auch unerwartet beschränkte) Rolle. Résumé: Pendant l’époque hellénistique, la Cappadoce, pays de l’Anatolie orientale, s’est graduellement éloignée de ses réseaux stratégiques anciens, qui reliaient ce pays avec l’orient (l’Iran et la Mésopotamie du Sud), pour entrer dans de nouveaux contextes politiques, militaires, économiques et culturels, qui l’ancraient de plus en plus dans les mondes méditerranéen et pontique. Dès le départ, ce processus fut encouragé par des opérations militaires hellénistiques et romaines. Alors, au moment où la Cappadoce a été incorporée, du point de vue politique et militaire, dans l’empire romain (avec des frontières qui reliaient, en ce moment, la côte septentrionale de la mer Noire à la Méditerranée), l’armée romaine a continué à jouer un rôle important, et parfois surprenant, dans l’intégration du pays. Note: A new military diploma with the text of an imperial constitution from 99 CE for the auxiliary forces of Galatia et Cappadocia further con‑ irms the interpretation presented above. The new diploma was issued for a Roman citizen, perhaps from one of the Roman colonies in Asia Minor. It will be published by W. Eck and A. Pangerl, Das vierte Diplom für die Provinz Galatia et Cappadocia, ausgestellt im Jahr 99, ZPE 194, 2014 (forthcoming). 640