Institutionalized and internalized, competence intersubjectivity contain many user-illusions and an imaginary or manifest image of reality, including of themselves (Dennett and Sellars),. This can be contrasted we a...
moreInstitutionalized and internalized, competence intersubjectivity contain many user-illusions and an imaginary or manifest image of reality, including of themselves (Dennett and Sellars),. This can be contrasted we a comprehension or comprehensive, understanding intersubjectivity. It is possible and perhaps even necessary to transform or replace the competence intersubjectivity to a comprehension or understanding (scientific, Dennett and Sellars) image of reality and themselves.Ethics and morality and studies of ethics and morality deal with the reality of competence intersubjectivity (by means of socio-cultural practices that are derived from, based on an created by means of this restrictive, misleading, unreal, illusory, unrealistic intersubjectivity and the life-worlds associated with it) and human life-worlds constituted on the basis of and in terms of this intersubjectivity. This is why I am a nihilist, a libertarian, at least a minarchist or rather an anarchist and epistemologically a sceptic.
Kant’s things in themselves are similar to Dennett and Searle’s notions of manifest and scientific image. With my addition that we are socialized and internalize the competent, know how to do it, institutionalized manifest, everyday intersubjectivity, instead of the comprehension, insights and understanding knowing that, scientific intersubjectivity of all scientific disciplines.
This piece can be read as independent as comments on meta-ethics, or it can be read as a chapter in my Book ‘Intersubjectivity (continued)’, or it can be read as an introduction to my thoughts on philosophy and more specifically Intersubjectivity as –
Determining the nature of philosophy
Determining the nature of the subject-matter of philosophy, sociology, social psychology, aspects of cognitive sciences, ethics, epistemology, etc,
Determining the nature of philosophical methodology and approaches.
Reasons why I have refrained from reflecting and writing on ethics and morality -
a) The intersubjectivity that are institutionalized, socialized and internalize and therefore being employed to constitute reality, life-worlds, selves, discourses and socio-cultural practices, including specialized disciplines, eg philosophy, is that of Kantian things-for-us or Searle’ and Dennett’s notion of manifest, imaginary, competent or know-how, knowing-how-to images. This kind of intersubjectivity underlies human morality and ethics, as well as approaches of philosophers to these and other branches of philosophy.
b) How philosophers exist and how they live, their attitudes and beliefs, are very different from the theories of human existence, consciousness, selves, ethics, morality, epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, etc they advocate or express in and as their theories. Philosophers have their own private ways or personal styles of im/morality and being a-ethical while they advocate theories of ethics (and other branches of philosophy) that are completely different from their real attitudes and beliefs.
c) As far as institutionalized and lived ethics and morality go I am a nihilist, an anarchist, or at least a minarchist, a Pyrrhonist, or at least a Humean or Kantian sceptic if not a fallibilist.
A suggestion before I paste the usual, contemporary encyclopaedic notions of ethics as a branch of philosophy and present notions of the ‘division’ of the subject and approaches to ethics and meta-ethics.
When a compatibilist says free will and determinism are compatible, and critics say they are mistaken – see below – they talk about specific situations, while those who points out that there do exists some kinds of determinisms after all, the latter take a more general, big picture view and make a statement on a greater or higher level of generality or generalization.