German Special Operations In The 1944 Ardennes Offensive

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Text originally published in 1994 under the same title.

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GERMAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN THE 1944 ARDENNES OFFENSIVE

by

JEFFREY JARKOWSKY, MAJ, USA

B.A., St Peter’s College, Jersey City, New Jersey, 1981

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

ABSTRACT 5

LIST OF FIGURES 6

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION 7

CHAPTER 2 —  SETTING THE STAGE 11

CHAPTER 3 — SPECIAL OPERATIONS PLANNING 16

CHAPTER 4 — SPECIAL OPERATIONS PREPARATION 25

CHAPTER 5 — CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 41

CHAPTER 6 — LESSONS LEARNED 66

CHAPTER 7 — CONCLUSION 75

APPENDIX A — GLOSSARY 82

APPENDIX B — CHRONOLOGY 84

APPENDIX C — FIGURES 86

APPENDIX D — BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 92

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 94

BIBLIOGRAPHY 95

Books. 95

Government Publications. 95

Manuscripts 96

European Historical Division, European Theater Historical Interrogation (ETHINT) Series 96

European Historical Division, Manuscript Series 96

U.S. Army Europe Historical Division, Battle Analysis 96

Unpublished Materials 97

ABSTRACT

GERMAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN THE 1944 ARDENNES OFFENSIVE by MAJ Jeffrey Jarkowsky, USA.

This study is a historical analysis of the German special operations conducted in support of their overall Ardennes offensive. It focuses on the two major special operations of the German offensive, Operations "Greif and Stoesser" Operation Greif was the German attempt to infiltrate a commando unit behind American lines disguised as American soldiers. Operation Stoesser, the last German airborne operation of the war, was designed to secure a key cross-roads behind American lines.

These special operations failed because of faulty planning, inadequate preparation, and a lack of coordination between the special and conventional forces. These problems, exacerbated by a lack of preparation time, resulted in a pair of ad-hoc units that were improperly manned, trained and equipped. As a result, the special operations units were unable to accomplish their primary missions, although the operations were characterized by boldness, initiative, and improvisation.

This study examines the strategic setting, planning, preparations, and conduct of these operations, as well as their impact on the overall campaign. This study also examines the key lessons-learned that can be derived from both operations. Lastly, the study explores the implications of these lessons for the U.S. military of today.

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE

1. Map of Sixth Panzer Army’s initial zone of attack

2. Initial proposed organization for Panzer Brigade 150

3. Actual task organization for Operation Greif force.

4. Kampfgruppe von der Heydte task organization

5. Map of Stielau Commando activities

6. Map of actions of Panzer Brigade 150 and Kampfgruppe Peiper

7. Map of actions of Kampfgruppe von der Heydte

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION

It was December 16th, 1944. The German offensive had just exploded along the entire Ardennes front American vehicles clogged the Belgian roads as they streamed westward. A jeep, one many, crawled down the hill leading to Huy, Belgium, its gears straining to maintain its slow pace behind the column of American trucks. The four soldiers in the jeep strained to see the bridge that spanned the Meuse River. They also looked for a spot where they could pull out of the long, retreating, convoy. Soon, they found it

Sergeant Rhode directed the driver to pull into a stretch of grassland right along the river, near the bridge. The radio operator contacted their base and relayed their vital message. They had reached the Meuse. Sergeant Rhode and his team had reached their assigned target Their mission was to conduct a reconnaissance of the Meuse River bridge at Huy, Belgium for the advancing Sixth Panzer Army. Far from being GI’s, the four soldiers were members of a German special operations unit, the Stielau Commando Company. They had successfully infiltrated almost 75 miles behind American lines to reach their target, which was a linch-pin in the German operational attack plans. They were conducting what U.S. Army special operations doctrine today calls special reconnaissance. This team, however, was only a small part of a large and complex series of operations conducted by the German military during the Second World War’s Battle of the Bulge.{1}

Along the Ardennes front and in its depths, German special operations units infiltrated American lines, maneuvered combat vehicles, and parachuted into the rear areas. Their goal was to support and to assist the offensive and help achieve its success. Ultimately, the German offensive failed. But what of these unique and special missions, did they fail too? What was their impact on the campaign? Who were these special units, what where their missions, and what did they really do? What can we learn from them?

A shroud of myth, confusion, and distortion still surrounds these units and their operations. Valuable insights and lessons remain hidden under this cloak The goal of this study is to lift the fog and to bring forth the important lessons of these operations. Successful special operations require detailed planning, thorough preparation of units, and mutual coordination among the organizations involved.

My thesis is that the German special operations conducted during the WW II Ardennes Offensive, "Wacht Am Rhein," were a failure because of faulty planning, inadequate preparation, and a lack of coordination between special and conventional forces. These problems, exacerbated by a lack of preparation time, resulted in a pair of ad-hoc units that were improperly manned, equipped, and trained, and that suffered from confused command and control However, despite these handicaps, the special operations forces still achieved a positive impact on the campaign resulting from a combination of the use of boldness, initiative, and improvisation.

This study is a historical analysis of the German special operations conducted during the German offensive code-named "Wacht Am Rhein" (Watch on the Rhein). The intent of the thesis is to illuminate this specific subject and to provide a consolidated, focused source outlining these operations. Unfortunately, this topic is not adequately addressed in full detail in any one single source. Although there are numerous works concerning the Battle of the Bulge, as it became known to the American side, they do not address this specific subject in great detail Also no source analyzes these operations in order to determine pertinent, historical lessons. Most importantly, no source links the wealth of valuable experience from these operations to the current U.S. Army and its special operations forces and doctrine.

This thesis will analyze the planning, conduct, and impact of these special operations in relation to the larger overall campaign they supported. The analysis will describe the specifics of the operations and their outcomes. It will focus on identifying lessons-learned from these operations and applying them to the U.S. Army of today.

This thesis will seek to answer the primary question: "What are the lessons learned from the German special operations conducted in support of Wacht Am Rhein? The thesis will provide an organized and analytical account of the German special operations from the perspective of a special operator. It will describe the missions, the units, and the leaders. It will present a mission analysis of their assigned tasks. Additionally, it will show the interface between these operations and the overall campaign, and where they stood in the big picture. It will trace the conduct of the operations and their impact on the larger campaign, and highlight their successes and failures, and their aftermaths. Finally, and most importantly, the thesis will derive and present the key lessons-learned of these operations. It will link them to current U.S. Army special operations doctrine with a view to providing a tool to aid planning and conducting, and perhaps combatting, fixture special operations.

My analysis will show that adequate resources must be available for planning, organizing, equipping, and training special operations forces properly and for coordinating with the other units or services involved. Also, I will show that special operations must not be conducted in a vacuum, but rather must be integrated into the overall campaign in order to successfully achieve the campaign objectives.

This thesis is limited to the German special operations conducted during their Ardennes Offensive, specifically Operations "Greif and "Stoesser" as the campaign’s commando and airborne operations were respectively called. It will cover the larger Ardennes campaign only to put the special operations into perspective and to show their contributions to, and integration into, the offensive. likewise, the American reactions to the operations will be addressed only to illustrate the degree of success of these missions. The thesis will introduce and explain current U.S. Army special operations doctrine only in the amount necessary to fully understand the lessons-learned, and give the reader an appreciation on how to apply these lessons in the future for both special or conventional operations.

The thesis is broken down into seven chapters, with each chapter building upon the previous one. This chapter will outline the thesis and its goals and will briefly describe special operations. Chapter 2, Setting the Stage, will show the reader where and how the special operations conducted fit into the big picture of the German campaign. This chapter will trace the genesis of the special operations missions. It will give the reader an idea of the time-line involved, the nature of the German military crisis, and the status of the opposing forces at the time of the battle. Chapter 3, Special Operations Planning, will focus on the specific planning for the German special operations missions. It will provide a mission analysis of the special tasks and describe how the operations supported the overall campaign plan.

Chapter 4, Special Operation Preparation, will outline how the special operations units were organized, trained, and equipped in preparation for their special missions. Chapter 5, Conduct of Operations, will focus on the actual execution of the operations. It will describe the sequence of activities and analyze the overall success or failure of the missions, and their impact on the campaign. Chapter 6, Lessons-Learned, will identify and analyze the lessons-learned that can be derived from these operations. Chapter 7, Conclusion, will discuss the significance of the operations and the lessons-learned, and apply them to current U.S. Army special operations. Finally, bibliographical notes will address the utility of the sources used for the preparation of the thesis. A chronology and a glossary are provided to assist the reader.

Special operations are unique, high-risk, high-payoff missions conducted in an unconventional and often covert manner by specialty selected, trained, and equipped units, usually behind enemy lines. They require accurate, timely, and precise intelligence, and thorough, detailed planning for success. They may be conducted unilaterally, or in support of a larger, conventional campaign, but their success or failure can often have significant strategic and operational impact. When conducted in conjunction with or as a part of an overall campaign, the special operations must be closely integrated and coordinated with the actions of