Airpower And The 1972 Easter Offensive

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AIRPOWER AND THE 1972 EASTER OFFENSIVE

BY

LT COL MATTHEW C. BRAND.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

ABSTRACT 5

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 6

ACRONYMS 7

ILLUSTRATIONS 8

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION 9

The Easter Offensive: The Strategic and Operational View 11

The Three Key Battles 15

South Vietnam’s Defenses 15

The Battle for Quang Tri and Hue 15

The Battle for Kontum in Military Region II 16

The Siege of An Loc 16

Airpower’s Contribution 17

The Theater Air Control System 17

Forward Air Controllers 18

US Deploys More Airpower 18

Strategic Bombing 18

Creative Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 19

CHAPTER 2 — THE EASTER OFFENSIVE: THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL VIEW 20

Prelude to Invasion: 1969 to 1971 20

1972: The Offensive 24

Post-script: 1973 to 1975 31

CHAPTER 3 — THE TACTICAL FIGHT IN THREE KEY BATTLEFIELD AREAS: MILITARY REGIONS I, II, AND III 33

South Vietnam’s Defensive Organization 33

Military Region I—The Battle for Quang Tri and Hue 35

Military Region II—Saving Kontum 43

Military Region III—The Siege at An Loc 47

The After-Action Tactical Summary 54

CHAPTER 4 — AIRPOWER’S CONTRIBUTION 56

The Theater Air Control System 57

The Strategic Deployment of United States Airpower 59

The Strategic Bombing and Operational Interdiction Campaign 61

New Innovative Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 62

CHAPTER 5 — CONCLUSION AND RELEVANCE TODAY 65

Airpower’s Contribution 65

The Asymmetrical Advantage of United States Airpower 66

Relevance Today 68

GLOSSARY 71

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 74

BIBLIOGRAPHY 75

Books 75

Government Documents 76

Other Sources 76

ABSTRACT

AIRPOWER AND THE 1972 EASTER OFFENSIVE, by Lt Col Matthew C. Brand.

In the spring of 1972, North Vietnam launched a massive, three-pronged attack into South Vietnam that was eventually repulsed by South Vietnamese forces, United States (US) advisors and massive amounts of American airpower. The problem is determining what factors were key to South Vietnam’s successful defense. To that point, this thesis will address the overall effectiveness of US airpower in defeating North Vietnam’s attack. This paper first examines the strategic and operational environment surrounding the 1972 offensive, including the role and influence that the leaders of the US, Saigon, Hanoi, China, and the Soviet Union had on the conflict. It then shifts to the three primary tactical battles, describing each in detail, from the initial communist successes to their ultimate defeat. Finally, the analysis focuses specifically on airpower’s role, from the massive strategic deployment that doubled the available assets in theater in just over a month, to its operational success striking targets in North Vietnam, to its tactical successes on the various battlefields of South Vietnam. Ultimately, this analysis determines that US airpower, with US advisors playing a critical enabling role, was the decisive element in the defeat of North Vietnam’s Easter Offensive.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Completing this thesis required the cooperation and assistance of a variety of professional colleagues and also would not have been possible without sacrifices by members of my family. First, let me thank my faculty committee members, each of whom brought a unique perspective to my research. My committee chair, Dr James Willbanks, was able to give me key research advice based on his own Ph.D. experience. More importantly, as a former US Army captain advisor who was wounded during the valiant defense of An Loc during the Easter Offensive who has written two books on the topic, Dr Willbanks gave absolutely crucial input that could only have come from someone so intimately familiar with the topic. Colonel David El Cid Neuenswander, a combat veteran fighter pilot, was a former commander of the United States Air Force’s Air Ground Operations School and is the current Director of the United States Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Air Force Element. His experience and professional military education mark his airpower expertise, and his advice was invaluable to the completion of this thesis. Lt Col William Jay Martin, the final member of my committee, was a great help to making my paper more readable with his remarkable ability to read and edit text. His recommendations were almost always right on target and much appreciated.

Lastly, I also greatly appreciate the sacrifice my family has made allowing me to take away valuable family time and apply it towards the completion of this degree, particularly during a year where I spent a large amount of time away from home performing job-related temporary duty. Thank you very much Julie, Madison, and Seth.

ACRONYMS

AAA—Anti-aircraft Artillery

ALO—Air Liaison Officer

ARVN—Army of the Republic of Vietnam

CAS—Close Air Support

DASC—Direct Air Support Center

DMZ—Demilitarized Zone

FAC—Forward Air Controller

FAC-A—Forward Air Controller-Airborne

FSB—Fire Support Base

JGS—Joint General Staff

LGB—Laser-guided Bomb

MACV—Military Assistance Command Vietnam

MR—Military Region

NSC—National Security Council

NVA—North Vietnamese Army

RVNAF—Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

SAM—Surface-to-Air Missile

TACC—Tactical Air Control Center

TACP—Tactical Air Control Party

TACS—Tactical Air Control System

TF—Task Force

TTP—Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

US—United States

USAF—United States Air Force

VC—Viet Cong

VNAF—Vietnamese Air Force

VNMC—Vietnamese Marine Corps

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1. North Vietnam’s 1972 Easter Offensive

Figure 2. Republic of Vietnam Military Regions and Major South Vietnamese Units just Prior to the Easter Offensive

Figure 3. Key Locations and Fire Support Bases in MR I

Figure 4. The Timeline of the NVA Assault on Quang Tri

Figure 5. NVA Attack Plan in Binh Long Province

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION

On this question of the B-52s and the tac air, it’s very clear to me that—as far as my view on this is concerned—that this government would now have fallen, and this country would now be gone, and we wouldn’t be meeting here today, if it hadn’t been for the B-52s and the tac air.{1} — General Creighton W. Abrams

On 30 March 1972, North Vietnam launched a massive offensive into South Vietnam along several fronts. After prepping the battlefield with heavy artillery barrages, 40,000 North Vietnamese troops poured into South Vietnam unexpectedly through the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that separated the two nations.{2} An additional 20,000 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops, many of whom had infiltrated South Vietnam ahead of time, lodged in the rugged, forested highland area north and west of Pleiku.{3} Their third and final major thrust was just north and northwest of Saigon, ultimately sending three divisions totaling 35,000 into Binh Long Province on 5 April.{4}

Both sides recognized the great significance of the moment. South Vietnam President Nguyen Van Thieu described the invasion as the final battle to decide the survival of the [South Vietnamese] people, and North Vietnam had grand visions of potentially hastening the early defeat of South Vietnam.{5} The outcome of this great campaign is now known. South Vietnam, the United States (US) and their allies stopped the offensive, took the initiative, and drove the Communists back in most areas. This thesis will determine to what extent US airpower played the key role in this unfolding drama. Were US air forces the most decisive factor to the defeat of North Vietnam’s Easter Offensive, or were they just one of many equally effective elements to the defense of South Vietnam?

The US military had been in Vietnam since the 1950s, initially providing mainly counterinsurgency advice and training. This mission began to shift as American forces began to take a more direct combat role. With this shift, the US had contributed larger amounts of conventional forces starting in 1965, topping out with over half a million by 1969.{6} However, President Nixon’s election in 1968 marked a strategic shift in the US Vietnam policy. Soon after his inauguration in January 1969, Nixon began making good on his promises to bring American troops home from Vietnam and bring an honorable peace to the war-torn Southeast Asian nation. In the summer of that year, Nixon, along with President Nguyen Van Thieu, announced their plan for Vietnamization of the war in South Vietnam. They would gradually