The Campaign of 1812

THE

CAMPAIGN OF 1812

IN

RUSSIA.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

OF

GENERAL CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ.

 This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING

Text originally published in 1843 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2011, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED

TO

GENERAL SIR ROBERT WILSON,

WHO,

DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812 IN RUSSIA,

AS WELL AS ON FORMER AND SUBSEQUENT OCCASIONS,

BY HIS PRESENCE AND CONDUCT

AT THE HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ALLIES OF HIS COUNTRY,

CONTRIBUTED TO SUPPORT,

IN THE ESTIMATION OF CONTINENTAL SOVEREIGNS

AND NATIONS,

THE HIGH CHARACTER OF

THE BRITISH ARMY.

Contents

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. 4

EDITOR'S PREFACE. 12

CHAPTER I. 14

ARRIVAL AT WILNA. PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. CAMP OF DRISSA. 14

CHAPTER II. 31

GENERAL REVIEW OF THE INCIDENTS OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812 IN RUSSIA. 31

CHAPTER III. 55

FURTHER PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN. 55

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

THE work here translated forms a portion only of the seventh volume of a posthumous series of military treatises, which have been edited by a sister of their deceased Author, and which, as she informs their readers, were not revised or prepared by him for the press. As the Author, though his long and active services raised him to posts of trust in the service of his country, never attained a situation of independent and conspicuous command in war, a slight sketch of his biography may be necessary to enable English readers to form some estimate of his qualifications for military criticism. Carl von Clausewitz was born in 1780, in the Prussian village of Burg. He entered the military service of his country at the early age of twelve, and assisted at the campaigns of 1793 and 1794. He seems thenceforward to have applied himself to the scientific branches of his profession. In 1801 he entered the military school of Berlin, then conducted by that eminent soldier Scharnhorst, by whom he was soon distinguished and patronised. He assisted at the disastrous campaign of 1806, in which he was wounded and taken prisoner. On his return from France he was placed on the staff of his patron Scharnhorst, and employed in the secret preparations for the renovation of the military resources of Prussia, to which that officer assiduously devoted himself. He was also selected as military instructor to the Crown Prince, now the reigning sovereign. He relates in the present work the course he pursued on the occasion of the rupture between France and Russia, from which it will appear that he made the famous campaign which he describes in the Russian service, and in various capacities. After its conclusion he remained in the service of Russia, but attached to Blucher's corps, till the period of the armistice which interrupted the campaign of 1813. He was afterwards transferred, as chief of the staff, to the corps of General Wallmoden, who commanded a Russo-German division of the army of the North under Bernadotte. His name is mentioned with distinction on several occasions, and particularly in the affair of Goehrde. In 1815 he re-entered the service of his country, and made the campaign of the Netherlands as quartermaster-general to the corps of General Thielman. At the peace he was appointed by his sovereign, first to a general's command on the Rhine, and next to the direction of the military school of Berlin. This sketch may serve to show that the circumstances of his career, and his opportunities for observation and study, were such as to entitle, primâ face, his professional works to a consideration which is, we believe, in his own country a high one.

The Russian campaign, the greatest transaction of civilised warfare on record, has found several historians of merit among the eye-witnesses of its occurrences. Of their works, such as are written in the French language, and, with the exception perhaps of the Russian Buturlin, by officers in the service of Buonaparte, are best known to English readers. As a foreigner in Russia, General Clausewitz was at least free from the national partialities which to sonic extent may have influenced the pen either of a French or Russian author. As an actor, he enjoyed every facility for information, except the important one, indeed, of a knowledge of the Russian language. We learn from the preface of his sister, the Editress, that no false delicacy on her part has induced her to suppress certain remarks on individuals, which he would perhaps have been reluctant to see published in his lifetime, and which, being preserved unaltered, make him, to a certain extent, the Clarendon of the crisis he describes. With reference to these various circumstances, we have thought that this translated sample of the works of an Author much respected on the Continent might prove acceptable both to military and other readers.

We must, however, declare in limine, that the style of the Author is dry, and his treatment of his subject professional. Those who seek for those adornments of language, to which that subject so strongly invites an eyewitness of horrors which no language can fully describe, much less exaggerate, will do better to turn to the pages of Segur, La Baume, and others. The second division of the work is out of its place, and unconnected with the other two, being a mere detail of dates, movements, and numbers, affording to a professional reader means of easy and we presume accurate reference, but destitute of the interest which, in the case of the other two, attaches to the Author's personal narrative. Of this, perhaps the most interesting portion is that which concerns the famous York convention. In the former part of the campaign, while the Author was serving with the main army, his ignorance of the Russian language made him little more than an intelligent spectator, embarrassed rather than assisted by nominal functions.

In this transaction he became an useful and trusted agent to General Diebitsch, himself a Prussian; and many of the details which he is thus enabled to give of the conduct and bearing of the Monk of Prussia are, we apprehend, new to the world. The situation of York, as described by the Author, though without any attempt to quit his usual dry and matter-of-fact style, is essentially dramatic, and the allusion of the Author to the Wallenstein of Schiller's tragedy is just and appropriate. We know of no situation in history which renders it more difficult for the reader of after-times to pass a verdict clear and satisfactory to himself on the principal actor. The prejudices and partialities of the time, national and political, might easily have hurried men to a decision, and made of York a traitor or an hero; but when these have passed away the question becomes nicer. Our own opinion is, that the action cannot be fully justified, and yet we give that opinion somewhat in the spirit of the Irish counsel, who, while dilating, as his brief required, on the enormity committed by a party to a duel, was suddenly asked by the judge how he would have himself acted towards his client under the circumstances, and replied, By the living G—d, my Lord, I would have dilacerated him upon the spot. Without endeavouring further to adjust the balance between impeachment and apology, we content ourselves with the quotation of Thomson's well-known line applied by him to a case of nearly equal delicacy—

Say, ye severest, what would you have done?

The Author's account of the affair of the Beresina is instructive as to the movements of the different Russian corps, and the causes of their failure; which, as he was then serving with Wittgenstein's army, he was favourably situated for observing. Tschitschagow has usually borne the blame of Buonaparte's escape on that occasion, and he expiated the mistakes be unquestionably committed by years of exile and disgrace. From the Author's account we gather, that Wittgenstein was not totally blameless. It is difficult, however, to avoid the conclusion, that Kutusow was the most culpable of the three, unless the two positive statements of the Author be disputed—first, that the Admiral received from Kutusow himself the erroneous statement of Buonaparte's direction, which led to his own false movement to the south; and next, that, in spite of all previous mistakes, Kutusow had time to have brought up his own troops at the critical place and hour. It is pretty clear, that all the Russian generals hesitated positively to drive the hunted animal to bay. It has been said of Buonaparte in his great campaigns, that his presence on any point was usually reckoned, by military calculators on either side, at the value of 40,000 men. Its moral value, perhaps, never stood him in better stead than at this most critical and desperate passage of his fortunes — the bridge of Studianka. We almost doubt whether the great qualities either of the French army or its chief were so conspicuous in the conception and execution of their most brilliant victories, as in this, the last scene of the Russian tragedy.

The reader will find at p. 158. some remarks on a particular passage of the battle of Borodino, which, we apprehend, will be found to be at variance with the views of many other authorities, and especially with those of Russians in general. We allude to his narrative of the cavalry attack under Ouwarow, made, or rather intended to be made, on the French left flank and rear during the heat of the action. This movement has usually been considered a deep-laid scheme of Kutusow, probably forming an important feature in his plan for the operations of the day. The Author positively states it to have been an accident, suggested at the moment by a chance observation of Platoff, and adopted without much inquiry or consideration by Kutusow.

His description is rather graphic of the old Tartar, with his head confused by the rapid strokes of the hammer which the Thor of modern history was wielding about his ears, yielding at once a portion of a precious reserve to the solicitation of some young and ardent subordinates. Supposing the Author's personal observation to have guided him to the truth in this particular, we are yet inclined to doubt, whether he does not rather undervalue even the actual as well as the probable effect of the operation. There can be no question now, that it was undertaken on too small a scale for its purpose at so early a period of the battle; and, perhaps, as little can it be questioned, that the endeavour at its execution was feeble, even with reference to that scale. It would appear, however, from other accounts, that, inadequate as it was in means, and feeble in their employment, it excited much alarm in the enemy's ranks, and caused hesitation and delay in the advance of Eugene. It is surely not beyond reasonable calculation to suppose, that a dashing partisan like Tchernicheff might, even without committing his horsemen to certain destruction, have improved an advantage, which even Ouwarow's over-caution could not altogether neutralise. To kill the poys and the luggage is, we know, against the law of arms; but even Colonel Fluellen would have seen no impropriety in cutting up traces, horses, and riders, of reserve artillery; and Buonaparte's own bulletin from Waterloo acknowledges the effect of such an operation, as executed by General Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, which reached the reserve batteries of D'Erlon's division, and effectually disorganised them; and this not by an unforeseen flank or rear attack, but by a fair rush at and through the front. Observing that our Author mentioned Italian troops as opposed to Ouwarow, we examined a history of the campaign by an officer of that nation, avowedly composed for the record and glorification of the gallant actions — and very gallant we believe they were—of his countrymen in Russia. We found in it, as we hoped, special mention of the incident of the battle in question; and as the writer, whether qualified and accurate or not in other respects, is a competent witness to the moral effect produced at the moment on himself and his companions in arms, we shall quote some of his narrative. After describing the movement he proceeds:-

This movement not only afforded the hope of an useful and powerful diversion, calculated to liberate the centre which had been compromised, but flattered the Russians with the prospect of new and immense results. Every unexpected incident in war is an occasion for terror. It is certain that this unexpected irruption would have spread disorder and confusion in the rear of the French army amid that immense accumulation of artillery, baggage, camp followers, wounded, &c., in the fields near the great road. These, flying to and collecting on the ground where the army was struggling with an obstinate enemy, would have made it uncertain in its blows, and doubtful in its movements; or else, wandering where chance led them, would have been an easy prey to the Russians. An army, distant 600 miles from its resources and reinforcements, or any point of support, might, without imputation of timidity, show a momentary apprehension at such an unexpected aggression, which threatened to deprive it of every means of salvation and escape.

The writer proceeds to describe in the style of a French bulletin, which contrasts strongly with the Teutonic simplicity of our Author, how the guard, having just obtained permission to march on the great redoubt which had hitherto foiled the efforts of Gerard and others, were just encountering, with great satisfaction to themselves, the fire of 100 pieces of artillery, and replying with shouts of Viva 1'Imperatore! to the various agreeable noises of such an orchestra, which he enumerates with much particularity. He next relates the dismay produced by the reports of Ouwarow's appearance, and of the expected retirement of Delzons and Ornano, and the exposure of the Italian batteries, the baggage, and the villages of Woina and Borodino. He says further, The enemy's movement was calculated with wisdom, for, in case of reverse, he had his retreat secured by the cross roads which terminate in the great Moscow road, the only one occupied by the French in their rear. If this movement had produced nothing more than the massacre of the unfortunates in the rear, the capture of the reserve park and ammunition, the diversion from its place of a corps of reserve, so preciously husbanded by the Emperor, the stagnation of the French movements, and the audacity infused into those of Russia, would have effected much.

We omit the details by which the Italian aggrandises into a splendid feat of arms the repulse of a comparatively small body of cavalry, which was of course foiled when it hesitated. The writer states, however, positively, that the guard was checked in its advance and hurried back to the point threatened. He adds, This diversion, though unsuccessful, was of advantage to Kutusow, as it had excited uneasiness in the mind of Napoleon, who could not know the precise nature of the attack, or guess its results. It retarded the attack of the principal redoubt, a circumstance fatal, not only on account of loss of time, but because the Italian artillery, which was to co-operate in its assault, began to be overmatched by the Russian pieces, which they had taken the opportunity of the delay to dispose to advantage in the works.{1}

We infer altogether that the principle of the attack was sound, and that Platoff at least deserves more credit for its suggestion than the Author is willing to allow. In the Russian summer manoeuvres of 1839, when the drama of Borodino was represented for a second time, but without French performers, Ouwarow's episode was repeated with great applause, but, as we understand, on a much more effective scale than on the first performance.{2}

Of all the opinions, however, put forward by the Author, the one most at variance with the commonly received version of events, and we must say in every point of view the most paradoxical, is his theory as to the motive and object of Buonaparte's movement from Moscow towards Kaluga.{3} It has been usually imagined — we are not aware that the idea has ever before been controverted — that Buonaparte intended by this movement to throw at least his main and fighting force on a new line of retreat, that which leads to Smolensko from Kaluga by Jelnia, one which would, as has been always alleged, have led him through a richer and unexhausted territory. His enormous train of wounded, baggage, &c., we presume in this case would have taken, under sufficient escort, the route to Smolensko by which the army had marched on Moscow. How this column might have fared at the hands of Winzingerode's corps from the north, it is not within our province to conjecture. It is said, indeed, that at an earlier period Buonaparte, with a view of easing the exhausted road to Smolensko, had contemplated a line of retreat more to the north by Bjeloi, direct to Witebsk, leaving Smolensko to the south.{4} However this may have been, it has hardly before been doubted that the movement towards Kaluga was adopted with an earnest intention to reach that place, and then to take the new line of retreat by Jelnia. The belief has been equally general, that one of the great misfortunes of the campaign was the failure of this project; and that, though Kutusow was defeated at Malo Jaroslawetz, that defeat was in its results a victory; because the resistance of the Russians was sufficient to compel Buonaparte to revert to the main road by which he had advanced. According to our Author, the reason and motive of Buonaparte's movement was merely this: Kutusow from the camp of Tarutino had three marches less to make to Smolensko than Buonaparte. It was necessary, therefore, for Buonaparte to begin his retreat by attacking and stunning him, unless he could manoeuvre him to a sufficient distance. He says that with regard to the line of Jelnia, it was impossible that Buonaparte should have contemplated it, for he had no magazines on that road, no time to profit by the supposed resources of that line of country, and would have been starved in a week. This reasoning may be very sound, and may contain what would have been at the time good advice to Buonaparte. There is, however, a dispatch extant from him containing orders to Marshal Victor, which appear to us completely to confirm the usual version of Buonaparte's views and  intentions, and to disprove that of our Author. It is dated Borowsk, October 24., the day of the affair of Malo Jaroslawetz, of which Buonaparte could not yet have known the result. It directs that if possible the division of Gerard and a brigade of light cavalry should march forthwith on Jelnia, and thence on the road to Kaluga, there to meet with and join the army. Meanwhile, he says, is and pending this junction, I am beginning to establish my line of operation by Wiazma, Juchnow, and Kamenskoie, which I shall then (i. e. in case of the junction) change for Jelnia and Smolensko. If this movement can be executed on the 20th, Gerard will, on the 30th, be distant five marches from Kaluga." He then gives directions for the occupation of the road by detachments; and he adds, that the army is directing itself on Kaluga, the most abundant province of Russia-

We think that the whole tenor of this dispatch leaves no doubt as to the facts of the case, and as to Buonaparte's desire and intention, if possible, to He evidently, it is true, at take the Jelnia road. He evidently, it is true, at this late date begins to doubt the possibility of the operation, and contemplates the necessity of its abandonment, which a few hours afterwards he decided upon, as is generally supposed, at the instance of his generals, and against his own judgment, which inclined him rather to renew the action of Malo Jaroslawetz. Whether he would have fared better on the new line, than he afterwards did on the old, is a speculative question which we are not competent to discuss, but he evidently did not expect to be starved on it; and it would appear that he calculated on giving Kutusow such a defeat as would have afforded time to make further arrangements for the subsistence of his troops,