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    Iranian F-14 Tomcat Units in Combat
    Iranian F-14 Tomcat Units in Combat
    Iranian F-14 Tomcat Units in Combat
    Ebook243 pages2 hours

    Iranian F-14 Tomcat Units in Combat

    By Tom Cooper, Farzad Bishop and Chris Davey

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    This book looks at the F-14's Iranian combat history and includes first hand accounts from the pilots themselves.

    So formidable an opponent did the Iraqi airforce consider the F-14 that during the Iran-Iraq war, they ordered their pilots not to engage F-14s and the presence of one in an area was usually enough to empty it of Iraqi aircraft. Officially losses were tiny; only one F-14 was lost in aerial combat (to a MiG-21), one to a control problem and one downed by a ground-to-air missile.

    Alongside stunning illustration, the authors consider key engagements and the central figures involved, illustrating the realities, successes and failures of the Iranian air campaign.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherBloomsbury Publishing
    Release dateNov 20, 2012
    ISBN9781782007098
    Iranian F-14 Tomcat Units in Combat
    Author

    Tom Cooper

    Tom Cooper is an Austrian aerial warfare analyst and historian. Following a career in worldwide transportation business – during which he established a network of contacts in the Middle East and Africa – he moved into narrow-focus analysis and writing on small, little-known air forces and conflicts, about which he has collected extensive archives. This has resulted in specialization in such Middle Eastern air forces as of those of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, plus various African and Asian air forces. Except for authoring and co-authoring more than 30 books - including about a dozen of titles for Helion’s @War series - and over 1000 articles, Cooper is a regular correspondent for multiple defense-related publications.

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      Book preview

      Iranian F-14 Tomcat Units in Combat - Tom Cooper

      SERIES EDITOR: TONY HOLMES

      OSPREY COMBAT AIRCRAFT • 49

      IRANIAN F-14 TOMCAT UNITS IN COMBAT

      TOM COOPER AND FARZAD BISHOP

      CONTENTS

      INTRODUCTION

      CHAPTER ONE

      THE REQUIREMENT

      CHAPTER TWO

      FIRST KILLS

      CHAPTER THREE

      THREE-TO-ONE

      CHAPTER FOUR

      ATTRITION

      CHAPTER FIVE

      CRIPPLING THE WEASEL

      CHAPTER SIX

      THE FOG OF DISINFORMATION

      APPENDICES

      COLOUR PLATES COMMENTARY

      INTRODUCTION

      In the summer of 1972, a letter from Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, Shahanshah (King of Kings) and ruler of Iran, arrived at the Pentagon in Washington, DC. It announced his intention of visiting the USA to be briefed on the interceptor aircraft about to enter service with both the US Navy and Air Force. He also planned to watch flying demonstrations of these new fighter types, with the intention of acquiring examples for his favourite branch of the Iranian armed forces, the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF). The main object of his interest was Grumman’s F-14A Tomcat.

      This visit marked the beginning of a highly controversial arms sale that was to lead to the deployment by Iran of the most modern combat aircraft supplied to any US ally. This was the first time that the Americans had agreed to sell such advanced military hardware to a foreign customer. It also represented a bold move by Iran, for it was about to integrate a complex weapons system into a military organisation still gaining experience with high-technology systems, and the infrastructure necessary to ensure their successful operation.

      The foreign sale of the aircraft also meant that the whole F-14 project was rescued by Iran when it agreed to lend the Grumman Corporation the money it needed to continue Tomcat production. But the F-14’s service in Iran was to become characterised by an implausible series of controversies, ‘educated guesstimates’ that turned out to be completely wrong and not a few wild rumours based mainly on Western ignorance of the IRIAF’s true capabilities. The full background as to why this occurred is not yet clear, but it is obvious that in assessing the F-14A/AWG-9/AIM-54 system in combat, the performance of the Tomcat in Iranian service and making the comparison with contemporary interceptors and fighter-bombers, most observers have failed to offer an objective insight. Indeed, reports published to date border on fiction rather than fact.

      Similar behaviour was experienced by former Iranian F-14 pilots after they fled to the West in the wake of the 1979 revolution. Their combat accounts were generally mistrusted regardless of the available evidence. Even if they received congratulations – off the record – for their achievements, most official reaction betrayed the West’s inability to believe the extent of the F-14’s use by the IRIAF. Typical of this was the US Navy’s stubborn refusal to accept that the Iranians could deploy the F-14, and its associated AWG-9 radar and AIM-54A Phoenix missiles, effectively in combat. In fact, none of the active or former US Navy pilots or Radar Intercept Officers interviewed by the authors believed Iran still operated the Tomcat, or that its personnel were able to master its associated systems. The reaction of one when shown a photograph of an F-14 in Iranian colours – taken only weeks before – is characteristic: ‘Yeah . . . and it’s on the ground!’

      Up until the publication of this volume, there has been no serious effort made by aviation historians to use authentic sources to research the history of the Iranian F-14 programme. Neither the many former Iranian pilots living in exile or those who remain in Iran had ever been asked about their experiences. The few media reports published in Iran were completely ignored outside the country, and Iranian F-14 pilots, active or retired, remained bemused by what was reported in the Western press.

      The results of this mis-reporting are obvious. The true role of the F-14 in Iranian service – particularly during the war with Iraq – remains unknown. Furthermore, the lack of information about the combat performance of the AWG-9/AIM-54 weapons system resulted in the US Navy making a number of controversial decisions in respect to its employment of the F-14 in fleet service.

      This book offers the first in-depth insight into the Tomcat’s service with the IRIAF. It is primarily based on a series of exhaustive interviews with retired and active Iranian F-14 pilots and RIOs, and with several ex-Iraqi Air Force officers. In addition, the authors have also drawn from official US, Iranian, Saudi and Soviet documents released to them. The resulting story shows that Iranian aircrews were not only brave and capable in combat, but that they were backed up by groundcrews who also deserve the highest respect for their technical fortitude.

      Tom Cooper & Farzad Bishop

      Austria, June 2004

      THE REQUIREMENT

      Iran’s inability to prevent overflights by Soviet MiG-25Rs is said by many Western observers to have been one of the main reasons why the country acquired the Grumman F-14. The truth is slightly different, however. Since the late 1950s, the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF), in cooperation with the USAF, had been flying highly secret reconnaissance flights over the USSR. Initially, lighter aircraft (even transports) were used, and several were shot down by Soviet fighters. After the first F-4s arrived, the IIAF also received some RF-4Es (see Combat Aircraft 37 for details), and operations were intensified.

      The Soviets were, understandably, concerned about Iran’s massive re-armament, and started their own reconnaissance missions over the country. IIAF interceptors – especially F-4Ds – repeatedly tried to catch the MiG-25Rs, but this proved a very difficult task as the routes flown by the overflying ‘Foxbats’ were carefully chosen.

      The Shah was not interested in a direct confrontation with the USSR, so as the mutual airspace violations intensified, he offered to stop IIAF – and American – overflights if the Soviets would do the same. This offer was repeated, and turned down, several times. The IIAF was therefore ordered to fly two or more missions over the USSR for every ‘Foxbat’ flight, initiating a ‘tit for tat’ campaign. But a more powerful weapon system than Sparrow-armed F-4s was needed to prevent Soviet incursions.

      Meanwhile, in line with plans for massive Iranian military development during the 1970s, as well as future cooperation with the USA, the IIAF was seeking a new interceptor that was able to meet foreseeable threats over the next 20 years. It would have to cover huge areas of Iranian airspace using powerful sensors and weaponry, and have a corresponding endurance and combat ability.

      COMPETITION AND SELECTION

      As early as 1968, the IIAF had expressed an interest in the General Dynamics F-111, but the Pentagon was not keen, preferring instead to sell Iran 32 McDonnell Douglas F-4D Phantom IIs. The Pentagon subsequently had to issue a requirement for a new naval interceptor as a result of the unsuitability of the projected F-111B for carrier operations in light of Vietnam combat experience.

      In response, the Grumman Corporation designed the F-14 Tomcat as a specialised ‘MiG killer’. It was a large, fast and powerful interceptor, with wings that could be automatically swept between 14 and 68 degrees for increased endurance, flexibility and manoeuvrability in air combat against small and nimble MiGs. It was also designed to carry the huge AN/AWG-9 pulse-Doppler radar and up to six long-range Hughes AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missiles, which were required by the US Navy to intercept the formations of Soviet bombers considered to pose the greatest threat to its fleet of aircraft carriers.

      F-14A BuNo 160299 was the very first Tomcat built for Iran, and it is seen here soon after being rolled out of the Grumman plant at Calverton, New York, in 1975 (Grumman via authors)

      The Tomcat’s AWG-9 radar and AIM-54 missile had already been in development for some years, and now they had become highly effective. So much so that the radar could not only detect airborne targets over vast distances, but also simultaneously track up to 24 targets and guide six AIM-54s against them. It also permitted the interception of low-flying cruise missiles, as well as high and fast-flying targets like the MiG-25.

      All these abilities were combined in a single airframe to produce the world’s first ‘superfighter’ – an interceptor able to confront most threats. It was also the most costly and complex fighter built to date. It was not long, therefore, before controversy arose in the US resulting from development problems, cost overruns (caused by rampant inflation) and a debate centring on whether such an expensive aircraft was needed at all. As a result, both Grumman and the US Navy were seeking an additional customer to share the cost of further development and production.

      By October 1971, Grumman had established the first contacts with the Iranian government, and the following March Gen Hassan Toufanian was allowed to see secret information pertaining to the F-14. Toufanian was a military advisor to the Shah, as well as Deputy Minister of War and Director of the Arms Industries and Military Procurement Organisation. Soon, the Shah himself was showing an interest in the aircraft.

      In agreement with the IIAF leadership – which had already concluded that the F-14 was the interceptor it was seeking – a letter was sent to the Pentagon to start the acquisition process, although the Iranians still offered McDonnell Douglas the chance to demonstrate its F-15A Eagle.

      Early F-14 pilot Capt Rassi (the names of all F-14 pilots and RIOs interviewed for this book, active or retired, have been changed for security reasons) explained why the Iranians were so interested in the Tomcat:

      ‘There were several factors which influenced the selection of the F-14. Iran’s northern border with the USSR, and those to the west and southwest with Iraq, are guarded by high mountains. Our Air Defence Command was building radar outposts on many peaks for better radar coverage, but we could never improve the situation with ground-based radar alone. There were too many blind spots in this coverage, and the big white domes of our radar stations were also excellent targets, visible from up to 50 miles away. Intelligence information obtained at the time verified that the Soviets would indeed strike them first.

      ‘In the south, along the Persian Gulf coast, we had only US-supplied radars, which did not work properly in hot and humid conditions – that is, for ten months of the year – and otherwise also had poor performance, despite several upgrades. All the radars supplied to the IIAF as part of Military Assistance Program projects were far from being top-of-the-line. The Americans gave us what they wanted to give, not what we needed.

      ‘For two years – 1973–74 – a group of Iranian radar instructors, including Col Iradj Ghaffari (the first Iranian tactical radar instructor), studied coverage problems associated with Radar Sites Reinforcement, but could not find a solution. Eventually, it was decided that a flying radar would eliminate the terrain masking problems. That flying radar would also have to be able to defend itself. It is beyond doubt that during the war with Iraq, the F-14 proved that it was exactly what we needed.

      ‘Before these studies were conducted within IIAF circles – at the time we were still flying F-5A/B Freedom Fighters and F-4D Phantom IIs – we started looking for a top-of-the-line fighter interceptor. The result of these studies, directed by Gen Mehdi Rouhani, was a requirement for F-14s and AEW aircraft. US briefings on F-14s and F-15s undoubtedly helped us to formulate our requirement. We created the plan to purchase eight AEW aircraft – initially four, followed by four more – and the F-14s. Eventually, four orders were issued – the first for 30 Tomcats and the second for 50. There was one for Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS, followed by one for two communication satellites, which would enable all these aircraft to communicate securely with each other.’

      Unaware that the Iranians had already identified the F-14 as the right aircraft for their unique operational requirements, the US Navy and Grumman started an intensive campaign to ‘sell the Shah’, which included sending the F-14 Program Coordinator of the Chief of Naval Operations, Capt Mitchell, to Tehran twice to brief the Shah and IIAF commanders on the Tomcat’s capabilities. This culminated in a spectacular fly-off in July 1973 at Andrews AFB, Maryland, for the Shah and a group of high-ranking Iranian officers.

      While many US officials and Navy officers still believe that this stunning show put on by Grumman test pilots influenced the Shah’s final decision to order the F-14, Iranian officers interviewed by the authors strongly disagree. One of the first to fly the Tomcat was Maj Ali. He had experience of the F-4, as well as having exchange tours with the USAF, Israeli Defence Force /Air Force (IDF/AF), Luftwaffe, US Navy, RAF and Pakistani Air Force to his credit. He was later to score more than five aerial victories against Iraq, and he offered a further insight into the background to the Iranian order:

      ‘Both the IIAF and the Shah had studied the F-14A and the F-15A since their inception. In 1972, very early on in our studies, we learned that the F-15A with the AIM-7F missile was to be a deadly fighter-weapon mix, but not as deadly as the AIM-54-armed F-14A. It was clear to us that the F-14/AWG-9 pulse-Doppler radar/AIM-54 combination would be unequalled in the world – which it remains today. The AWG-9 enabled us to engage at ranges that F-15 pilots could only dream of. We could even use AIM-7s and AIM-9s at longer ranges than the Eagle. Yet this complex radar

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