What’s with Free Will?: Ethics and Religion after Neuroscience

What’s with Free Will?

Ethics and Religion after Neuroscience

edited by

Philip Clayton

and

James W. Walters

foreword by

John Martin Fischer

What’s with Free Will?

Ethics and Religion after Neuroscience

Copyright ©

2020

Wipf and Stock Publishers. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in critical publications or reviews, no part of this book may be reproduced in any manner without prior written permission from the publisher. Write: Permissions, Wipf and Stock Publishers,

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paperback isbn: 978-1-5326-8162-2

hardcover isbn: 978-1-5326-8163-9

ebook isbn: 978-1-5326-8164-6

Cataloguing-in-Publication data:

Names: Clayton, Philip,

1956–

, editor. | Walters, James W. (James William),

1945–

, editor. | Fischer, John Martin,

1952–,

foreword writer.

Title: What’s with free will? : ethics and religion after neuroscience / edited by Philip Clayton and James W. Walters ; foreword by John Martin Fischer.

Description: Eugene, OR: Cascade Books,

2020

| Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers:

isbn 978-1-5326-8162-2 (

paperback

) | isbn 978-1-5326-8163-9 (

hardcover

) | isbn 978-1-5326-8164-6 (

ebook

)

Subjects: LCSH: Free will and determinism | Neuroscience—Religious aspects | Cognitive neuroscience—Moral and ethical aspects | Mind and body—Religious aspects—Christianity | Mind-Body Relations, Metaphysical | Brain—Religious aspects—Christianity | Christianity—Philosophy | Bioethical issues | Volition—physiology | Responsibility

Classification:

bl240 c54

2020

(print) |

bl240

(ebook)

Manufactured in the U.S.A.

03/09/20

Table of Contents

Title Page

Contributors

Foreword

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Part One: Contemporary Neuroscience: A Challenge to Traditional Free Will

Chapter 1: A Psychiatric Perspective on Free Will

Chapter 2: Neurodeterminist or Neurocontrarian

Chapter 3: Belief in Free Will Is Beneficial

Part Two: Privileging Personal Experience

Chapter 4: Genuine (but Limited) Freedom for Creatures and for a God of Love

Chapter 5: Freedom for Neighbor Love

Chapter 6: Free Will, Physics, and Personal Observation

Chapter 7: Parascience and Free Will

Chapter 8: Women’s Agency in the Context of Neoliberal Capitalism

Part Three: In What Sense Can We Say that Humans Are Free?

Chapter 9: Are We Really Free?

Chapter 10: That of Freedom

Chapter 11: Maximizing, but Limiting Reduction

Chapter 12: Science, Ethics, and Free Will

Chapter 13: Who Wants to Be Totally Free?

Conclusion

. . . some things happen of necessity (ἀνάγκη), others by chance (τύχη), others through our own agency (παρ’ ἡμᾶς).

—Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, §

133

Contributors

Mark Ard, Chief Resident, Loma Linda University Psychiatric Residency Program, Loma Linda, California.

Kendal C. Boyd, Associate Professor of Psychology, Loma Linda University, Loma Linda.

Philip Clayton, Ingraham Professor of Theology, Claremont School of Theology, Claremont, California. His publications include In Quest of Freedom: The Emergence of Spirit in the Natural World, and Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness.

Marlene M. Ferreras, Assistant Professor of Practical Theology, La Sierra University, Riverside, California.

David R. Larson, Professor of Ethical Studies, Loma Linda University. His publications include Abortion: Ethical Issues and Options, and Christianity and Homosexuality: Some Seventh-day Adventist Perspectives.

Thomas Jay Oord, Professor of Theology and Philosophy, Northwest Nazarene University, Nampa, Idaho. His publications include The Controlling Love of God: An Open and Relational Account of Providence, and Creation Made Free: Open Theology and Science.

Richard Rice, Professor of Religion, Loma Linda University. His publications include The Openness of God: The Relationship of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will, and Suffering and the Search for Meaning: Contemporary Approaches to the Problem of Pain.

Charles Scriven, an independent scholar, Scottsdale, Arizona. His publications include The Promise of Peace, and How to Believe When You Hurt.

Calvin Thomsen, Assistant Professor of Religion, Loma Linda University.

James W. Walters, Professor of Ethical Studies, Loma Linda University. His publications include Choosing Who’s to Live: Ethics and Aging, and War No More? Options in Nuclear Ethics.

David W. Wilbur, now deceased, was Chief of Oncology and Hematology, Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Loma Linda. His publications include Power and Illusion: Religion and Human Need.

Gerald R. Winslow, Professor of Ethical Studies, Loma Linda University. His publications include Triage and Justice, and Facing Limits: Ethics and Health Care for the Elderly.

Zane G. Yi, Associate Professor of Philosophy, School of Religion, Loma Linda University.

Foreword

A

s Mark Ard points

out in his contribution to this volume, Albert Camus focused on suicide in his novel, The Myth of Sisyphus. He contended that this is our fundamental question every day: whether to commit suicide. He even purportedly said that every morning we have the choice of committing suicide or having a cup of coffee. It is evident from their contributions to this excellent collection that the authors would prefer coffee, even if causal or theological determinism were to hold. Appropriately enough, Jim Walters (a co-editor along with Philip Clayton) points out that the book project was conceived when the co-editors met for a cup of coffee at Starbucks, Walters driving and Clayton riding his bike.

The papers in this anthology are all rigorous, thoughtful, well-informed by the relevant scientific, philosophical, and theological literature, and bold. No decaf here! The authors take on some of the most fascinating and pressing problems related to free will, science, and religion. What does contemporary physics show about free will? One of the most important intellectual contributions of the authors in this book is to refute the common and oft-repeated view that (somehow—either via determinism or indeterminism) science shows that there is no free will. This view is associated with Sam Harris, as well as neuroscientists such as Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner. Various authors argue persuasively that we should reject this superficial interpretation of contemporary brain science.

Indeed, some offer important and original explanations of free will, even in a causally deterministic world. The most attractive framework of this sort is presented by Philip Clayton, and is referred to as nonreductive physicalism. This is a kind of compatibilism about causal determinism and human freedom (and, more broadly, meaning in life). On this view, although physical causation is present and works its way through the mind and our deliberation, the scientific level of analysis is not the only or hegemonic level. Just as materialism does not imply the ontological reduction or elimination of mental states from our conceptualization of the phenomena, so physical determinism does not imply the lack of freedom and meaning in life. Freedom emerges from complex physical systems. I highly commend the arguments against reductionism found in this book, and the compelling and attractive non-reductionist models of freedom.

How can we have the freedom required to love our neighbor and to accept God’s grace in a deterministic world? How can we have meaning in life and be morally accountable for our behavior? Of course, these are ancient concerns with respect to theological determinism, and modern puzzles for causal determinism. The authors develop strategies for addressing these questions within frameworks informed by contemporary science, from physics to psychiatry.

As with any good book, it addresses some important questions, and thereby reveals and clarifies others, thus inviting and opening the door for further explorations. Perhaps coincidentally (or should we say, fatefully?), one of the co-editors, Philip Clayton, has invited me to meet him at a local Starbucks soon . . . . He’ll be riding his bike.

John Martin Fischer

Acknowledgements

I

t is a daunting

task to take on the question of free will. The philosophical highway toward freedom is littered with the carcasses of failed attempts; and adding in the theological dimension certainly does not make the questions more simple!

Yet it turns out that free will is not a question that one can avoid. The sciences of the brain are advancing with startling rapidity, and there’s no doubt that the next two decades will bring abilities to predict human thought and influence human action to degrees that are almost unfathomable today. It’s not just professional philosophers who are asking, If that’s true, how can we claim that we are free? For most people it takes only a moment’s reflection to conclude that values and meaning—indeed our fundamental sense of ourselves as persons—would be radically transformed if it turned out that we are nothing but pre-programmed machines. If one’s character is not a choice but determined, how can we praise people for their virtues or judge them for their voices? Finally, most theists believe that God has created human beings free in at least some respects to decide for or against their Creator. What happens to religion if it should turn out that the idea of freedom is a myth?

We acknowledge the brilliant work of the men and women who have written the following chapters in order to introduce readers to the issues and offer them guidance in sorting out the questions. Each author is a leading scientist, philosopher, or theologian; and each has worked hard to understand the issues raised in their neighboring disciplines. We thank each one for taking the time to lay out the core insights from their own field, so that readers will have in hand the information they need to understand the dilemmas of neuroscience and free will. And we thank them for their bold exploration of possible paths that one can take as we seek answers to one of the most serious dilemmas of our age.

Four individual acknowledgments should be made as well. This book would not exist without the efforts of our two able assistants: Robert McDonald, who brought his sharp editorial eye and knowledge of the Chicago Manual of Style to the book manuscript; and John Lou, whose general coordination and editing made substantial contributions to the book.

Of course, the individual chapters would never have been commissioned without the major conference on neuroscience and free will hosted by Loma Linda University. We thank the university for its generosity; Dr. Jon Paulien, Dean of Loma Linda’s School of Religion, for sponsoring this conference; and Magi Armany for her able and friendly assistance in its organization.

Philip Clayton and James W. Walters

Introduction

Why the Perennial Conundrum of Free Will Matters Even More Today

—James W. Walters

T

his book sprouted in

a Claremont Starbucks, where Philip Clayton arrived by bicycle and I by car. But the seed had earlier found fertile ground in both our minds. For some time, we’d informally spoken of a free-will event. Clayton has long been interested in the challenges that neuroscience poses to belief—he had already published a leading book on the topic, In Quest of Freedom: The Emergence of Spirit in the Natural World (

2009

), as well as numerous articles. As a theological ethicist, I was keenly aware of how belief in God—and in basic right and wrong—presupposes personal freedom. But does free will really exist? Are we oblivious puppets, or wise planners? Did Clayton and I freely decide to publish this book, or were we unwitting lap dogs pulled into a decision by our genetic and environmental leashes?

At that Starbucks we, two religion professors, readily agreed: the issue of free will is the most philosophically challenging and existentially important issue confronting belief today. Belief not only in God—but in political elections, criminal justice, creative endeavors, and hard work. As one of this book’s authors contends, civilization itself presupposes that individuals freely choose or reject ideas about how we should live.¹

We conceptualized themes and discussed presenters that afternoon for a conference that we would direct, to be held at Loma Linda University (where I teach). The discussion was to be mind-broadening for the well-read layperson while probing the deepest challenges that current science presents, as understood from diverse perspectives. The

2017

conference was a hybrid event—two plenary addresses and the discussion of papers. Philip Clayton and Thomas Oord lectured to the general public in a large campus amphitheater on successive evenings; and, for two days, one dozen scholars sat in easy chairs around an oval conference table in a book-laden library, with twenty-five interested attendees on the perimeter who occasionally entered into the discussion (some with brilliant insights!). Previously circulated papers were summarized, followed by vigorous discussion. Papers were then revised—some several times—and this volume is the harvest.

This book is divided into three sections. First, the mounting evidence against traditional notions of free will is laid out. Second, how we live our everyday lives—our personal experience—is examined for its relevance. And third, informed scholars of religion grapple with the scientific, philosophical, and theological aspects of the free will—both challenges and affirmations. Finally, Clayton draws on the volume’s diverse chapters, highlighting several themes, as he further develops his own considerable thinking on human freedom.

Before introducing the value of the three clusters of essays, I introduce the authors taken as a whole.

•The writers of this book’s chapters are professionally diverse, representing physics, psychology, psychiatry, internal medicine, ethics, theology, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of science.

•All have a Christian background, most very active in congregational life. Their views about God vary widely.

•Not one is anti-free will, but descriptions of freedom vary widely.

•All but one author is male, and this is regrettable. It’s not because Clayton and I didn’t try to involve more women.

•All agree that current neuroscience forces us to accept a limited view of human freedom.

•All applaud neuroscience and welcome its results.

The book begins with Mark Ard, our only practicing medical clinician. As a senior psychiatry resident, Ard deals directly with the human brain in its many manifestations. He sees close links to its electro-biochemical composition and how chemical and electric interventions make a difference. It is from this perspective that he assesses the ability of distressed patients to overcome or succumb to what is arguably the most dire possible outcome—suicide. Interestingly, this author—who has studied ethics and went into psychiatry because this area of medicine deals with the most conceptually challenging issues faced by physicians—is perhaps the most guarded about the prospects of human freedom.

The next two authors in the first section of the book, Calvin Thomsen and Kendal Boyd, are both well versed in the behavioral sciences. Both steer clear of the deeper philosophical/theological dimensions of freedom, choosing to focus on the benefits and limitations of what the social and neurosciences say about the benefits and limitations of people’s sense of freedom. Thomsen is particularly skeptical of many claims constituting what he terms neuromania, and Boyd cites many studies that demonstrate, without doubt, how persons who believe and act on the basis of free will are more psychologically and physically whole. Belief in free will enhances academic performance, inspires creativity, increases gratitude, elevates job performance, etc. Thomsen and Boyd are clear that neuroscience cannot disprove human freedom, although science demonstrates that the strong effect of both nurture and nature surely limit free will.

The next section of the book takes up the value of our lived, personal experience. Both Gerald Winslow and Thomas Oord take an explicitly religious approach to underscore the importance of our common experience of living. Winslow focuses on God’s second commandment, neighbor love, saying that such a command makes no sense if there is no human freedom. In fact, all of life makes no sense unless we value the absolute importance of our common intuition about our ability to choose and act. Oord agrees, calling this intuition hard core common sense—an idea that can’t logically be consistently denied in our experience. Winslow alludes to arguments for free will that involve three theories—quantum theory, chaos theory, and emergence—before concluding that the phenomenology of our lived experience trumps them of all. Our experience of free will undergirds volitional, self-giving love. Oord is more theological in developing at some length how human freedom relies on God’s loving power. Oord’s God is everywhere, at all times, and in everything empowering complex human creatures with genuine but limited freedom. Free choice, for Oord, is the freedom to choose among a limited number of relevant options.

Scriven critiques the parascience—the apparent science—of those who would advance a dehumanizing ideology by using the language and prestige of science. Parascientists view science as the only path to true knowledge, and the laws of physics as the key to unraveling the intricacies of the human mind. He argues his case through the insights of Wendell Berry and Marilynne Robinson, both of whom highly regard science but contend that subjective experience is vital, empirical evidence for the study of mind. Berry and Robinson are Christian writers who invoke the best of Western humanistic values in their arguments for free will.

David Wilbur² is up front in confessing how his experience of the ever-evolving world provides evidence—not proof—of a type of choice evident even in fruit flies. Wilbur brings a broad background from which to experience life—degrees in biophysics and medicine, as well as a life-long study of philosophy and religion. Based on his personal experience and wide reading, the question isn’t whether there is freedom in animal life; rather, it is a matter of how much. Some argue that even creativity is determined by genetics and environment, but Wilbur contends that they limit creativity: nurture and nature limit the possible alternatives available, but our brains, with billions of neurons, freely choose among options that an agent can reasonably realize.

Marlene Ferreras, a practical and pastoral theologian, writes in a different key as she explores the freedom of working women from the Global South. Compared to the abstract deliberation on freedom by and for more fortunate people, she contends that the agency of working women is equally important for discussion. She criticizes current neoliberal capitalism and classic Western philosophy and theology for their devaluation of women, going so far as to state that philosophies of knowledge in the Global North are guilty of epistemicide in their failure to recognize the wisdom of the "lxs hijxs de maíz."³ Questioning the sufficiency of Western universal truths, Ferreras calls for an ideological pluriverse which includes the thinking of the Other.

The final section of this book deals head-on with the

800

-pound behemoth in this volume: are humans free? If so, just what does that mean? Richard Rice argues for the continuing relevance of the biblical idea that humans, created in God’s image, are unique—different in kind from other creatures. We are material, finite, and free. He builds a case against a scientific reductionism that relegates mental functions to mere material explanations, invoking theories such as emergence, non-reductive physicalism, and downward causation. In a related move, he thinks about thinking, observing that reductionists and non-reductionists alike unreflectively accept that the mind can arrive at knowledge. Both sides agree that it’s important to conduct research and make arguments for their particular cases, and they further agree that persons have the capacity to know the sounder position. Then comes Rice’s logical clincher: the ability to determine the sounder position necessarily entails the presence of a knowing self—an agent. Of course, it is here that the non-reductionist and reductionist disagree. Rice’s point? Agency is better explained by non-reductionism than reductionism. The reductionist who denies the concept of agency, by the very act, affirms her- or himself as agent. Rice concludes that neuroscientific data and philosophical reflection both support the biblical concept of a free, self-determining person created in God’s image.

Larson agrees with Rice’s conclusion about the absolute indispensability of seeing the self as agent, but he advances a different line of reasoning—accepting the contention of process philosophy for a type of agency from the most basic physical entity up to the human mind. He is a self-described free-will libertarian. For Larson, the issue of free will isn’t one of whether, but of degree. Larson invites us to take a free-will journey, visiting several philosophical camps—from substance dualism (Descartes), to nonreductive physicalism (Murphy), emergentism (Clayton), and Larson’s favorite—organic realism (Whitehead). Whiteheadian philosophy particularly rebels against modern Western dualism’s original positing of brute, valueless, purposeless matter. According to Larson, Whitehead’s organic realism portrays a comprehensive account of existence—integrating not only mind and matter, but also thinking and feeling, science and religion, as well as God and the world. In a word, Larson provides a layperson’s guide to process thought, with free will as his interpretative key. Free will is a natural fit, as freedom is everywhere and all the way down.

Whereas Rice uses the logic of transcendental philosophy to argue for free will, and Larson embraces process philosophy’s case for our common sense of freedom, Zane Yi examines a core question of philosophical science: if all of life has emerged from physiochemical entities, can the human mind effect changes in the physical world? In other words, is top-down causality real? Yi examines the thought of Nancey Murphy, the leading advocate for non-reductive physicalism (NRP), as developed in light of critics such as philosopher Jaegwon Kim. Kim claims that Murphy’s NRP violates a principle basic to science, causal closure—the claim that physical events have sufficient physical causes. Murphy agrees that most brain events can be traced directly to neurobiological causes, but she opposes "a total causal reduction." She questions the linear and mechanistic rationale of reductionists. Instead, she sees the intricacy of the brain as a part of an exceedingly complex whole—one subsystem in a bodily system, itself the product of genes and complex environmental factors, interacting within a dynamic physical/sociocultural world. Murphy maximizes reduction in seeing that most brain events reduce to the physical, but a limited number of mental actions are not reducible to the merely physical and have genuine causal force. Yi argues that Murphy succeeds in answering Kim’s charge of violation against causal closure because of her strong case for the host of multifaceted factors that impinge on an already exceedingly complex brain.

My chapter complements Yi’s focus on Murphy insofar as I explain and critique the thought of (arguably) the leading emergentist advocate for free will—my co-editor, Philip Clayton. First, I place Clayton in the context of atheists Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett, both of whom have far-reaching similarities and differences with him. Whereas Clayton differs with Harris on both religion and free will, he differs with Dennett on religion as much as he agrees on free will. While both Clayton and Dennett agree on the strong naturalistic basis for any mature human’s free will, Clayton goes further, arguing that genuine freedom is reserved for the theist—although the believer’s freedom possesses no discernable difference. I suggest that Clayton’s theological basis for free will would be even stronger if the distinction between natural and genuine freedom were not so finely drawn.

As mentioned earlier, all of our authors agree on the limited nature of freedom. The popular notion that we can freely choose from a vast array of options at any moment is false. Neuroscience shows that most choices are directly traceable to nature and nurture; additionally, those actions have detectable roots in the subconscious a split second before conscious decisions.

Because our authors accept the findings of neuroscience, they are modest about their claims regarding free will. For example, Wilbur speaks of choosing between alternatives that the agent could reasonably realize. Oord speaks of freely choosing in a particular moment, among a limited number of relevant options. Even Larson, who is most bullish on free will, writes of decisions which are not entirely caused by what has happened. Yi points to Murphy’s criteria for relatively free agents: a sense of self, as well as an ability to imagine,