The Will to Believe

The Will to Believe

by William James

AND OTHER ESSAYS IN

POPULAR PHILOSOPHY

To

My Old Friend,

CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE,

  To whose philosophic comradeship in old times

  and to whose writings in more recent years

  I owe more incitement and help than

  I can express or repay.

{vii}

PREFACE.

At most of our American Colleges there are Clubs formed by the students

devoted to particular branches of learning; and these clubs have the

laudable custom of inviting once or twice a year some maturer scholar

to address them, the occasion often being made a public one.  I have

from time to time accepted such invitations, and afterwards had my

discourse printed in one or other of the Reviews.  It has seemed to me

that these addresses might now be worthy of collection in a volume, as

they shed explanatory light upon each other, and taken together express

a tolerably definite philosophic attitude in a very untechnical way.

Were I obliged to give a short name to the attitude in question, I

should call it that of _radical empiricism_, in spite of the fact that

such brief nicknames are nowhere more misleading than in philosophy.  I

say 'empiricism,' because it is contented to regard its most assured

conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to

modification in the course of future experience; and I say 'radical,'

because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis, and,

{viii} unlike so much of the half-way empiricism that is current under

the name of positivism or agnosticism or scientific naturalism, it does

not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience

has got to square.  The difference between monism and pluralism is

perhaps the most pregnant of all the differences in philosophy.  _Primâ

facie_ the world is a pluralism; as we find it, its unity seems to be

that of any collection; and our higher thinking consists chiefly of an

effort to redeem it from that first crude form.  Postulating more unity

than the first experiences yield, we also discover more.  But absolute

unity, in spite of brilliant dashes in its direction, still remains

undiscovered, still remains a _Grenzbegriff_.  Ever not quite must be

the rationalistic philosopher's last confession concerning it.  After

all that reason can do has been done, there still remains the opacity

of the finite facts as merely given, with most of their peculiarities

mutually unmediated and unexplained.  To the very last, there are the

various 'points of view' which the philosopher must distinguish in

discussing the world; and what is inwardly clear from one point remains

a bare externality and datum to the other.  The negative, the alogical,

is never wholly banished.  Something--"call it fate, chance, freedom,

spontaneity, the devil, what you will"--is still wrong and other and

outside and unincluded, from _your_ point of view, even though you be

the greatest of philosophers.  Something is always mere fact and

_givenness_; and there may be in the whole universe no one point of

view extant from which this would not be found to be the case.

Reason, as a gifted writer says, "is {ix} but one item in the

mystery; and behind the proudest consciousness that ever reigned,

reason and wonder blushed face to face.  The inevitable stales, while

doubt and hope are sisters.  Not unfortunately the universe is

wild,--game-flavored as a hawk's wing.  Nature is miracle all; the same

returns not save to bring the different.  The slow round of the

engraver's lathe gains but the breadth of a hair, but the difference is

distributed back over the whole curve, never an instant true,--ever not

quite."[1]

This is pluralism, somewhat rhapsodically expressed.  He who takes for

his hypothesis the notion that it is the permanent form of the world is

what I call a radical empiricist.  For him the crudity of experience

remains an eternal element thereof.  There is no possible point of view

from which the world can appear an absolutely single fact.  Real

possibilities, real indeterminations, real beginnings, real ends, real

evil, real crises, catastrophes, and escapes, a real God, and a real

moral life, just as common-sense conceives these things, may remain in

empiricism as conceptions which that philosophy gives up the attempt

either to 'overcome' or to reinterpret in monistic form.

Many of my professionally trained _confrères_ will smile at the

irrationalism of this view, and at the artlessness of my essays in

point of technical form.  But they should be taken as illustrations of

the radically empiricist attitude rather than as argumentations for its

validity.  That admits meanwhile of {x} being argued in as technical a

shape as any one can desire, and possibly I may be spared to do later a

share of that work.  Meanwhile these essays seem to light up with a

certain dramatic reality the attitude itself, and make it visible

alongside of the higher and lower dogmatisms between which in the pages

of philosophic history it has generally remained eclipsed from sight.

The first four essays are largely concerned with defending the

legitimacy of religious faith.  To some rationalizing readers such

advocacy will seem a sad misuse of one's professional position.

Mankind, they will say, is only too prone to follow faith

unreasoningly, and needs no preaching nor encouragement in that

direction.  I quite agree that what mankind at large most lacks is

criticism and caution, not faith.  Its cardinal weakness is to let

belief follow recklessly upon lively conception, especially when the

conception has instinctive liking at its back.  I admit, then, that

were I addressing the Salvation Army or a miscellaneous popular crowd

it would be a misuse of opportunity to preach the liberty of believing

as I have in these pages preached it.  What such audiences most need is

that their faiths should be broken up and ventilated, that the

northwest wind of science should get into them and blow their

sickliness and barbarism away.  But academic audiences, fed already on

science, have a very different need.  Paralysis of their native

capacity for faith and timorous _abulia_ in the religious field are

their special forms of mental weakness, brought about by the notion,

carefully instilled, that there is something called scientific evidence

by {xi} waiting upon which they shall escape all danger of shipwreck in

regard to truth.  But there is really no scientific or other method by

which men can steer safely between the opposite dangers of believing

too little or of believing too much.  To face such dangers is

apparently our duty, and to hit the right channel between them is the

measure of our wisdom as men.  It does not follow, because recklessness

may be a vice in soldiers, that courage ought never to be preached to

them.  What _should_ be preached is courage weighted with

responsibility,--such courage as the Nelsons and Washingtons never

failed to show after they had taken everything into account that might

tell against their success, and made every provision to minimize

disaster in case they met defeat.  I do not think that any one can

accuse me of preaching reckless faith.  I have preached the right of

the individual to indulge his personal faith at his personal risk.  I

have discussed the kinds of risk; I have contended that none of us

escape all of them; and I have only pleaded that it is better to face

them open-eyed than to act as if we did not know them to be there.

After all, though, you will say, Why such an ado about a matter

concerning which, however we may theoretically differ, we all

practically agree?  In this age of toleration, no scientist will ever

try actively to interfere with our religious faith, provided we enjoy

it quietly with our friends and do not make a public nuisance of it in

the market-place.  But it is just on this matter of the market-place

that I think the utility of such essays as mine may turn.  If {xii}

religious hypotheses about the universe be in order at all, then the

active faiths of individuals in them, freely expressing themselves in

life, are the experimental tests by which they are verified, and the

only means by which their truth or falsehood can be wrought out.  The

truest scientific hypothesis is that which, as we say, 'works' best;

and it can be no otherwise with religious hypotheses.  Religious

history proves that one hypothesis after another has worked ill, has

crumbled at contact with a widening knowledge of the world, and has

lapsed from the minds of men.  Some articles of faith, however, have

maintained themselves through every vicissitude, and possess even more

vitality to-day than ever before: it is for the 'science of religions'

to tell us just which hypotheses these are.  Meanwhile the freest

competition of the various faiths with one another, and their openest

application to life by their several champions, are the most favorable

conditions under which the survival of the fittest can proceed.  They

ought therefore not to lie hid each under its bushel, indulged-in

quietly with friends.  They ought to live in publicity, vying with each

other; and it seems to me that (the régime of tolerance once granted,

and a fair field shown) the scientist has nothing to fear for his own

interests from the liveliest possible state of fermentation in the

religious world of his time.  Those faiths will best stand the test

which adopt also his hypotheses, and make them integral elements of

their own.  He should welcome therefore every species of religious

agitation and discussion, so long as he is willing to allow that some

religious hypothesis _may_ be {xiii} true.  Of course there are plenty

of scientists who would deny that dogmatically, maintaining that

science has already ruled all possible religious hypotheses out of

court.  Such scientists ought, I agree, to aim at imposing privacy on

religious faiths, the public manifestation of which could only be a

nuisance in their eyes.  With all such scientists, as well as with

their allies outside of science, my quarrel openly lies; and I hope

that my book may do something to persuade the reader of their crudity,

and range him on my side.  Religious fermentation is always a symptom

of the intellectual vigor of a society; and it is only when they forget

that they are hypotheses and put on rationalistic and authoritative

pretensions, that our faiths do harm.  The most interesting and

valuable things about a man are his ideals and over-beliefs.  The same

is true of nations and historic epochs; and the excesses of which the

particular individuals and epochs are guilty are compensated in the

total, and become profitable to mankind in the long run.

The essay 'On some Hegelisms' doubtless needs an apology for the

superficiality with which it treats a serious subject.  It was written

as a squib, to be read in a college-seminary in Hegel's logic, several

of whose members, mature men, were devout champions of the dialectical

method.  My blows therefore were aimed almost entirely at that.  I

reprint the paper here (albeit with some misgivings), partly because I

believe the dialectical method to be wholly abominable when worked by

concepts alone, and partly because the essay casts some positive light

on the pluralist-empiricist point of view.

{xiv}

The paper on Psychical Research is added to the volume for convenience

and utility.  Attracted to this study some years ago by my love of

sportsmanlike fair play in science, I have seen enough to convince me

of its great importance, and I wish to gain for it what interest I can.

The American Branch of the Society is in need of more support, and if

my article draws some new associates thereto, it will have served its

turn.

Apology is also needed for the repetition of the same passage in two

essays (pp. 59-61 and 96-7, 100-1).  My excuse is that one cannot

always express the same thought in two ways that seem equally forcible,

so one has to copy one's former words.

The Crillon-quotation on page 62 is due to Mr. W. M. Salter (who

employed it in a similar manner in the 'Index' for August 24, 1882),

and the dream-metaphor on p. 174 is a reminiscence from some novel of

George Sand's--I forget which--read by me thirty years ago.

Finally, the revision of the essays has consisted almost entirely in

excisions.  Probably less than a page and a half in all of new matter

has been added.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,

  CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS,

    December, 1896.

[1] B. P. Blood: The Flaw in Supremacy: Published by the Author,

Amsterdam, N. Y., 1893.

{x}

CONTENTS.

                                                                 PAGE

THE WILL TO BELIEVE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    1

  Hypotheses and options, 1.  Pascal's wager, 5.  Clifford's

  veto, 8.  Psychological causes of belief, 9.  Thesis of the

  Essay, 11.  Empiricism and absolutism, 12.  Objective certitude

  and its unattainability, 13. Two different sorts of risks in

  believing, 17.  Some risk unavoidable, 19.  Faith may bring

  forth its own verification, 22.  Logical conditions of religious

  belief, 25.

IS LIFE WORTH LIVING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   32

  Temperamental Optimism and Pessimism, 33.  How reconcile

  with life one bent on suicide? 38.  Religious melancholy and its

  cure, 39.  Decay of Natural Theology, 43.  Instinctive antidotes

  to pessimism, 46.  Religion involves belief in an unseen

  extension of the world, 51.  Scientific positivism, 52.  Doubt

  actuates conduct as much as belief does, 54.  To deny certain

  faiths is logically absurd, for they make their objects true, 56.

  Conclusion, 6l.

THE SENTIMENT OF RATIONALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   63

  Rationality means fluent thinking, 63.  Simplification, 65.

  Clearness, 66.  Their antagonism, 66.  Inadequacy of the

  abstract, 68.  The thought of nonentity, 71.  Mysticism, 74.  Pure

  theory cannot banish wonder, 75.  The passage to practice may

  restore the feeling of rationality, 75.  Familiarity and

  expectancy, 76.  'Substance,' 80.  A rational world must appear

{xvi}

  congruous with our powers, 82.  But these differ from man to

  man, 88.  Faith is one of them, 90.  Inseparable from doubt, 95.

  May verify itself, 96.  Its rôle in ethics, 98.  Optimism and

  pessimism, 101.  Is this a moral universe?--what does the problem

  mean? 103.  Anaesthesia _versus_ energy, 107.  Active assumption

  necessary, 107.  Conclusion, 110.

REFLEX ACTION AND THEISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  111

  Prestige of Physiology, 112.  Plan of neural action, 113.  God

  the mind's adequate object, 116.  Contrast between world as

  perceived and as conceived, 118.  God, 120.  The mind's three

  departments, 123.  Science due to a subjective demand, 129.

  Theism a mean between two extremes, 134.  Gnosticism, 137.

  No intellection except for practical ends, 140.  Conclusion, 142.

THE DILEMMA OF DETERMINISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  145

  Philosophies seek a rational world, 146.  Determinism and

  Indeterminism defined, 149.  Both are postulates of rationality,

  152.  Objections to chance considered, 153.  Determinism

  involves pessimism, 159.  Escape _via_ Subjectivism, 164.

  Subjectivism leads to corruption, 170.  A world with chance in

  it is morally the less irrational alternative, 176.  Chance not

  incompatible with an ultimate Providence, 180.

THE MORAL PHILOSOPHER AND THE MORAL LIFE . . . . . . . . . . . .  184

  The moral philosopher postulates a unified system, 185.

  Origin of moral judgments, 185.  Goods and ills are created by

  judgment?, 189.  Obligations are created by demands, 192.  The

  conflict of ideals, 198.  Its solution, 205.  Impossibility of an

  abstract system of Ethics, 208.  The easy-going and the

  strenuous mood, 211.  Connection between Ethics and Religion, 212.

GREAT MEN AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  216

  Solidarity of causes in the world, 216.  The human mind abstracts

  in order to explain, 219.  Different cycles of operation in

  Nature, 220.  Darwin's distinction between causes that produce

  and causes that preserve a variation, 221.  Physiological causes

  produce, the environment only adopts or preserves, great men,

  225.  When adopted they become social ferments, 226.  Messrs.

{xvii}

  Spencer and Allen criticised, 232.  Messrs. Wallace and

  Gryzanowski quoted, 239.  The laws of history, 244.  Mental

  evolution, 245.  Analogy between original ideas and Darwin's

  accidental variations, 247.  Criticism of Spencer's views, 251.

THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUALS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  255

  Small differences may be important, 256.  Individual

  differences are important because they are the causes of social

  change, 259.  Hero-worship justified, 261.

ON SOME HEGELISMS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  263

  The world appears as a pluralism, 264.  Elements of unity in

  the pluralism, 268.  Hegel's excessive claims, 273.  He makes of

  negation a bond of union, 273.  The principle of totality, 277.

  Monism and pluralism, 279.  The fallacy of accident in Hegel,

  280.  The good and the bad infinite, 284.  Negation, 286.

  Conclusion, 292.--Note on the Anaesthetic revelation, 294.

WHAT PSYCHICAL RESEARCH HAS ACCOMPLISHED . . . . . . . . . . . .  299

  The unclassified residuum, 299.  The Society for Psychical

  Research and its history, 303.  Thought-transference, 308.

  Gurney's work, 309.  The census of hallucinations, 312.

  Mediumship, 313.  The 'subliminal self,' 315.  'Science' and her

  counter-presumptions, 317.  The scientific character of

  Mr. Myers's work, 320.  The mechanical-impersonal view of life

  versus the personal-romantic view, 324.

INDEX  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  329

{1}

ESSAYS

IN

POPULAR PHILOSOPHY.

THE WILL TO BELIEVE.[1]

In the recently published Life by Leslie Stephen of his brother,

Fitz-James, there is an account of a school to which the latter went

when he was a boy.  The teacher, a certain Mr. Guest, used to converse

with his pupils in this wise: "Gurney, what is the difference between

justification and sanctification?--Stephen, prove the omnipotence of

God!" etc.  In the midst of our Harvard freethinking and indifference

we are prone to imagine that here at your good old orthodox College

conversation continues to be somewhat upon this order; and to show you

that we at Harvard have not lost all interest in these vital subjects,

I have brought with me to-night something like a sermon on

justification by faith to read to you,--I mean an essay in

justification _of_ faith, a defence of our right to adopt a believing

attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely

logical {2} intellect may not have been coerced.  'The Will to

Believe,' accordingly, is the title of my paper.

I have long defended to my own students the lawfulness of voluntarily

adopted faith; but as soon as they have got well imbued with the

logical spirit, they have as a rule refused to admit my contention to

be lawful philosophically, even though in point of fact they were

personally all the time chock-full of some faith or other themselves.

I am all the while, however, so profoundly convinced that my own

position is correct, that your invitation has seemed to me a good

occasion to make my statements more clear.  Perhaps your minds will be

more open than those with which I have hitherto had to deal.  I will be

as little technical as I can, though I must begin by setting up some

technical distinctions that will help us in the end.

I.

Let us give the name of _hypothesis_ to anything that may be proposed

to our belief; and just as the electricians speak of live and dead

wires, let us speak of any hypothesis as either _live_ or _dead_.  A

live hypothesis is one which appeals as a real possibility to him to

whom it is proposed.  If I ask you to believe in the Mahdi, the notion

makes no electric connection with your nature,--it refuses to

scintillate with any credibility at all.  As an hypothesis it is

completely dead.  To an Arab, however (even if he be not one of the

Mahdi's followers), the hypothesis is among the mind's possibilities:

it is alive.  This shows that deadness and liveness in an hypothesis

are not intrinsic properties, but relations to the {3} individual

thinker.  They are measured by his willingness to act.  The maximum of

liveness in an hypothesis means willingness to act irrevocably.

Practically, that means belief; but there is some believing tendency

wherever there is willingness to act at all.

Next, let us call the decision between two hypotheses an _option_.

Options may be of several kinds.  They may be--1, _living_ or _dead_;

2, _forced_ or _avoidable_; 3, _momentous_ or _trivial_; and for our

purposes we may call an option a _genuine_ option when it is of the

forced, living, and momentous kind.

1.  A living option is one in which both hypotheses are live ones.  If

I say to you: Be a theosophist or be a Mohammedan, it is probably a

dead option, because for you neither hypothesis is likely to be alive.

But if I say: Be an agnostic or be a Christian, it is otherwise:

trained as you are, each hypothesis makes some appeal, however small,

to your belief.

2.  Next, if I say to you: "Choose between going out with your umbrella

or without it," I do not offer you a genuine option, for it is not

forced.  You can easily avoid it by not going out at all.  Similarly,

if I say, Either love me or hate me, "Either call my theory true or

call it false," your option is avoidable.  You may remain indifferent

to me, neither loving nor hating, and you may decline to offer any

judgment as to my theory.  But if I say, "Either accept this truth or

go without it," I put on you a forced option, for there is no standing

place outside of the alternative.  Every dilemma based on a complete

logical disjunction, with no possibility of not choosing, is an option

of this forced kind.

{4}

3.  Finally, if I were Dr. Nansen and proposed to you to join my North

Pole expedition, your option would be momentous; for this would

probably be your only similar opportunity, and your choice now would

either exclude you from the North Pole sort of immortality altogether

or put at least the chance of it into your hands.  He who refuses to

embrace a unique opportunity loses the prize as surely as if he tried

and failed.  _Per contra_, the option is trivial when the opportunity

is not unique, when the stake is insignificant, or when the decision is

reversible if it later prove unwise.  Such trivial options abound in

the scientific life.  A chemist finds an hypothesis live enough to

spend a year in its verification: he believes in it to that extent.

But if his experiments prove inconclusive either way, he is quit for

his loss of time, no vital harm being done.

It will facilitate our discussion if we keep all these distinctions

well in mind.

II.

The next matter to consider is the actual psychology of human opinion.

When we look at certain facts, it seems as if our passional and

volitional nature lay at the root of all our convictions.  When we look

at others, it seems as if they could do nothing when the intellect had

once said its say.  Let us take the latter facts up first.

Does it not seem preposterous on the very face of it to talk of our

opinions being modifiable at will?  Can our will either help or hinder

our intellect in its perceptions of truth?  Can we, by just willing it,

believe that Abraham Lincoln's existence is a myth, {5} and that the

portraits of him in McClure's Magazine are all of some one else?  Can

we, by any effort of our will, or by any strength of wish that it were

true, believe ourselves well and about when we are roaring with

rheumatism in bed, or feel certain that the sum of the two one-dollar

bills in our pocket must be a hundred dollars?  We can say any of these

things, but we are absolutely impotent to believe them; and of just

such things is the whole fabric of the truths that we do believe in

made up,--matters of fact, immediate or remote, as Hume said, and

relations between ideas, which are either there or not there for us if

we see them so, and which if not there cannot be put there by any

action of our own.

In Pascal's Thoughts there is a celebrated passage known in literature

as Pascal's wager.  In it he tries to force us into Christianity by

reasoning as if our concern with truth resembled our concern with the

stakes in a game of chance.  Translated freely his words are these: You