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A Gödelesque argument against being a pure consequentialist
A Gödelesque argument against being a pure consequentialist
A Gödelesque argument against being a pure consequentialist
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A Gödelesque argument against being a pure consequentialist

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This essay presents a case against being a pure consequentialist. Being a pure consequentialist is implausible because it is either an inconsistent position, or it implies an implausibly dogmatic stance toward pure consequentialism itself. Moreover, the case against being a pure consequentialist finds added support from consequentialist considerations, suggesting that we can also create better outcomes by not being pure consequentialists.

LanguageEnglish
Release dateOct 2, 2024
ISBN9798227972149
A Gödelesque argument against being a pure consequentialist
Author

Magnus Vinding

Magnus Vinding is the author of Speciesism: Why It Is Wrong and the Implications of Rejecting It (2015), Reflections on Intelligence (2016), You Are Them (2017), Effective Altruism: How Can We Best Help Others? (2018), Suffering-Focused Ethics: Defense and Implications (2020), Reasoned Politics (2022), and Essays on Suffering-Focused Ethics (2022).He is blogging at magnusvinding.com

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    A Gödelesque argument against being a pure consequentialist - Magnus Vinding

    The basic argument: Pure consequentialism is internally consistent or inconsistent, but implausible to endorse in either case

    There are various ways to formulate the basic argument that I will present against being a pure consequentialist, but what follows is a simple version.

    Pure consequentialism is either internally inconsistent or internally consistent. That is, assuming the normative validity or correctness of pure consequentialism will either imply that pure consequentialism is not normatively valid or correct (in which case it is internally inconsistent), or assuming its normative validity will imply no such contradiction (in which case it is internally consistent). I will focus on each of these options in

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