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The Occupation: War and Resistance in Iraq
National Book Critics Circle Award Finalist 2006.
In March 2003, Patrick Cockburn secretly crossed the Tigris river from Syria into Iraq just before the US/British invasion, and has covered the war ever since. In The Occupation , he provides a vivid and disturbing picture of a country in turmoil, and the dangers and privations endured by its people.
The Occupation explores the mosaic of communities in Iraq, The US and Britain’s failure to understand they country they were invading and how this led to fatal mistakes. Cockburn, who has been visiting Iraq since 1978, describes the disintegration of the country under the occupation. Travelling throughout Iraq, from the Kurdish north, to Baghdad, Falluja and Basra, he records the response of the country’s population – Shia and Sunni, Arab and Kurd – to the invasion, the growth of the resistance and its transformation into a full-scale uprising. He explains why deepening religious and ethnic divisions drove the country towards civil war.
Above all, Cockburn traces how the occupation’s failure led to the collapse of the country, and the high price paid by the Iraqis. He charts the impact of savage sectarian killings, rampant corruption and economic chaos on everyday from the near destruction of Baghdad’s al-Mutanabi book market to the failure to supply electricity, water and, ironically, fuel to Iraq’s population.
The Occupation is a compelling portrait of a ravaged country, and the appalling consequences of imperial arrogance.
In March 2003, Patrick Cockburn secretly crossed the Tigris river from Syria into Iraq just before the US/British invasion, and has covered the war ever since. In The Occupation , he provides a vivid and disturbing picture of a country in turmoil, and the dangers and privations endured by its people.
The Occupation explores the mosaic of communities in Iraq, The US and Britain’s failure to understand they country they were invading and how this led to fatal mistakes. Cockburn, who has been visiting Iraq since 1978, describes the disintegration of the country under the occupation. Travelling throughout Iraq, from the Kurdish north, to Baghdad, Falluja and Basra, he records the response of the country’s population – Shia and Sunni, Arab and Kurd – to the invasion, the growth of the resistance and its transformation into a full-scale uprising. He explains why deepening religious and ethnic divisions drove the country towards civil war.
Above all, Cockburn traces how the occupation’s failure led to the collapse of the country, and the high price paid by the Iraqis. He charts the impact of savage sectarian killings, rampant corruption and economic chaos on everyday from the near destruction of Baghdad’s al-Mutanabi book market to the failure to supply electricity, water and, ironically, fuel to Iraq’s population.
The Occupation is a compelling portrait of a ravaged country, and the appalling consequences of imperial arrogance.
229 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2006
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516 people want to read
About the author
Patrick Cockburn
35 books170 followersPatrick Oliver Cockburn is an Irish journalist who has been a Middle East correspondent since 1979 for the Financial Times and, presently, The Independent.
He has written four books on Iraq's recent history. He won the Martha Gellhorn Prize in 2005, the James Cameron Prize in 2006 and the Orwell Prize for Journalism in 2009.
He has written four books on Iraq's recent history. He won the Martha Gellhorn Prize in 2005, the James Cameron Prize in 2006 and the Orwell Prize for Journalism in 2009.
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Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews
November 22, 2012
Masterful reporting from Cockburn as always. This book is so infuriating I get exhausted just thinking about it. Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Bremer and their cronies all slunk back into their holes hoping the world will forget their crimes. I hope someday they go on trial for lying their asses off to get us into a pointless, unbelievably expensive war that made us less safe than before. Their extreme arrogance, greed and stupidity ensured the outcome before it started. Do you remember Bush's stunt where he piloted a jet fighter onto a battleship beneath the banner "MISSION ACCOMPLISHED?" Do you know how many billions went unaccounted because the Bush administration was too busy handing out no-bid contracts to buddies to bother seeing where all the money went? Do you know Bush didn't even know the difference between Shiite and Sunni when the war started? Do you know how many have died since then? FUCKING ASSHOLE. He should be in jail. They all should be in jail.
July 7, 2008
I actually had been hoping to read Cockburn's Muqtada!, but my local library didn't have it available, so I checked this out instead. Maybe it's better that I ended up with The Occupation, since I may have been attracted to Muqtada! out of excessive interest in the rise of a single charismatic leader figure, while this focuses a little more (although not comprehensively) on the different factions and sectors in the un-unifiable nation of Iraq.
It's not exactly a must-read if you've more or less kept up with the news in the past five years, but it certainly gives a lot more shades of detail and on-the-ground insight into what you've been reading about. I also like getting a somewhat better sense for some of the political figures whose names I often can't keep straight.
The NYT quote on the cover praises the book's accessibility, and I agree wholeheartedly. Cockburn does a nice thing by often repeating the entire names of people whose Arabic and Kurdish names are hard for my tiny mind to retain, rather than just using a surname on every reference subsequent to the first use. I like that, even though my stickler editor at work strictly prohibits it. I feel like it makes it much easier for the reader to keep track of who's who. It's a quick, light-seeming read, feeling more like an extended article than a book. Stylistically, it felt a bit klunky every once in a while, with sentences that took a few re-readings to understand or an excess of sentences that started with "In the event...". But those are pretty minor quibbles on my part.
Cockburn's writing doesn't have the overdramatic pomposity of Robert Fisk's, but for the same reason it doesn't always draw me in as grippingly as a book like Pity the Nation. He does not seem to self-dramatize his adventures, which is admirable. He'll tell his feelings of worry or hesitancy or mortal fear in a single sentence and move on to what actually was happening. Again, it shows modesty worthy of admiration, but a dash or two more of melodramatization might make it stick out a little more brightly in my mind or heart.
Also, who chooses to quit smoking in the middle of the Iraq Occupation? What's the story, dude? Don't tease your readers, give it up!
***********************
A side note: WASP icon, bourgeois feminist, and hero for daughters of Connecticut wealth everywhere Erica Jong seems to have been going out of her way to publicly prove her own imbecility lately, as with her battle of wits with Matt Taibbi (her wits being the fly and Taibbi's being the speeding Cadillac's windshield) in The Huffington Post and her parading her anti-Arabic racism and dipshittily trying to make herself out as some kind of victim. At a forum where she was challenged, she made the unbelievable allegation that “When Moqtada al-Sadr comes to power, and I am facing the firing squad, it will be for that [titling a chapter of her bestselling book 'Arabs and other animals'].”
When Moqtada al-Sadr comes to power? Um, where exactly will that be happening, Miss Jong?
The reason I bring this up here in the Cockburn book notes is that the depths of Jong's ignorance show up on page 90 of The Occupation. He notes that the Shia leaders, "particularly the clerical families of al-Sadr, al-Khoie and al-Hakim - had poured out their blood over the decades. No other religious faith in the world in the late twentieth century had provided so many martyrs to the torturer and the executioner as the Iraqi Shia." Moqtada has lost cousins, a father and I believe siblings to the firing squads that Jong only imagines in her flights of defensive rhetoric. I'm not saying Moqtada's hands are clean of blood in the sectarian clashes of Iraq, just that Jong's persecution fantasies are disgustingly out of place.
It's not exactly a must-read if you've more or less kept up with the news in the past five years, but it certainly gives a lot more shades of detail and on-the-ground insight into what you've been reading about. I also like getting a somewhat better sense for some of the political figures whose names I often can't keep straight.
The NYT quote on the cover praises the book's accessibility, and I agree wholeheartedly. Cockburn does a nice thing by often repeating the entire names of people whose Arabic and Kurdish names are hard for my tiny mind to retain, rather than just using a surname on every reference subsequent to the first use. I like that, even though my stickler editor at work strictly prohibits it. I feel like it makes it much easier for the reader to keep track of who's who. It's a quick, light-seeming read, feeling more like an extended article than a book. Stylistically, it felt a bit klunky every once in a while, with sentences that took a few re-readings to understand or an excess of sentences that started with "In the event...". But those are pretty minor quibbles on my part.
Cockburn's writing doesn't have the overdramatic pomposity of Robert Fisk's, but for the same reason it doesn't always draw me in as grippingly as a book like Pity the Nation. He does not seem to self-dramatize his adventures, which is admirable. He'll tell his feelings of worry or hesitancy or mortal fear in a single sentence and move on to what actually was happening. Again, it shows modesty worthy of admiration, but a dash or two more of melodramatization might make it stick out a little more brightly in my mind or heart.
Also, who chooses to quit smoking in the middle of the Iraq Occupation? What's the story, dude? Don't tease your readers, give it up!
***********************
A side note: WASP icon, bourgeois feminist, and hero for daughters of Connecticut wealth everywhere Erica Jong seems to have been going out of her way to publicly prove her own imbecility lately, as with her battle of wits with Matt Taibbi (her wits being the fly and Taibbi's being the speeding Cadillac's windshield) in The Huffington Post and her parading her anti-Arabic racism and dipshittily trying to make herself out as some kind of victim. At a forum where she was challenged, she made the unbelievable allegation that “When Moqtada al-Sadr comes to power, and I am facing the firing squad, it will be for that [titling a chapter of her bestselling book 'Arabs and other animals'].”
When Moqtada al-Sadr comes to power? Um, where exactly will that be happening, Miss Jong?
The reason I bring this up here in the Cockburn book notes is that the depths of Jong's ignorance show up on page 90 of The Occupation. He notes that the Shia leaders, "particularly the clerical families of al-Sadr, al-Khoie and al-Hakim - had poured out their blood over the decades. No other religious faith in the world in the late twentieth century had provided so many martyrs to the torturer and the executioner as the Iraqi Shia." Moqtada has lost cousins, a father and I believe siblings to the firing squads that Jong only imagines in her flights of defensive rhetoric. I'm not saying Moqtada's hands are clean of blood in the sectarian clashes of Iraq, just that Jong's persecution fantasies are disgustingly out of place.
April 9, 2013
"Great nations do not have small wars." So said the Duke of Wellington about Britain at the height of its power and so it rings true about America during its failed attempt to "liberate" Iraq from the tyrant Saddam Hussein. What was supposed to be a quick, painless mission turned into a long, bloody disaster. What was supposed to stabilize the region led to more instability. Herein, Irish journalist Patrick Cockburn slices through the misinformation to deliver everything from personal accounts to the conflicting interests of all the concerned parties to the many reasons and justifications for the war.
The main reason for the war was imperial hubris. Many in the Bush Administration saw how well the U.S. was succeeding in Afghanistan and took advantage of the patriotic fervor after 9/11 to achieve another military victory that would make them appear even more heroic and make for an easier time demonizing their opponents. Of course, there were also oil revenues to consider and the chance to install a U.S. friendly leader in a country that could be strategically important. But, then everything went horribly wrong as the planning was far from adequate and the knowledge of Iraqi culture, history, religion, and politics was miniscule at best for most high ranking U.S. officials—especially, L. Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority. As Cockburn puts it, "Iraq is a mosaic of communities with differing interests, but during the first disastrous year of the occupation the U.S. showed a genius for offending everybody simultaneously."
In 1917, Britain allegedly liberated Iraq from Turkish rule but really imposed its own imperialism on the country. Naturally, then, Iraqis were already skeptical about foreign occupiers who claimed to be liberating them and handing them their own sovereignty. Since the U.S. delayed the Iraqi elections as long as it could, it quickly became clear to the Iraqi population that the U.S. wanted to ensure new leaders that would be friendly to the west, i.e., leaders who were not Shia, thus, almost guaranteeing that most Iraqis would oppose the occupation.
L. Paul Bremer and the CPA made matters worse by dissolving the Iraqi army and purging many members of the Baath party, which exacerbated unemployment rates. Less well known, the U.S. even angered its one staunch support group in the country, the Kurds, by insisting that the Turkish military join them to help contain the fighting on at least a few occasions. Further down the road, the U.S. had no plan to rebuild the Iraqi infrastructure when even Saddam was able to do so relatively quickly after his defeat in the first Gulf War.
With as much as the U.S. got wrong, there were many other ill-figured techniques and competing interests at play here as well. It will never fail to amaze me how many factions and factions within factions there are in countries like Iraq (though, I would assume divisions like these are not unique to that country). In the 1990s, there was a civil war between the two Kurdish communities, and throughout the early occupation, there were even feuds among Shia leaders. There was an on and off solidarity between the Shia and Sunni Muslims of the country that seemed almost impossible to keep track of or predict. As Cockburn says in typically succinct and cogent fashion, "Each Iraqi ethnic and religious community as well as every political faction sought to lure their American occupiers into aiding them in fulfilling a purely communal agenda."
And, aside from Cockburn's pointed comments, wide scope, detailed accounts, and insertions of relevant historical and religious notes, which already make the book fantastic, he incorporates more obscure information that I doubt many westerners are aware of—at least I wasn't. For example, he discusses a meeting in London of Iraqi dissidents in December of 2002. The group included members who all wanted Saddam out of power at whatever cost, including Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. He stresses how many of them were skeptical of the invasion's chances for success but pushed the U.S. to commit to it anyway. Unfortunately, the neocons already wanted to invade Iraq, so these exiles helped give them the justifications they needed. And, hence, our small war became a big one.
The main reason for the war was imperial hubris. Many in the Bush Administration saw how well the U.S. was succeeding in Afghanistan and took advantage of the patriotic fervor after 9/11 to achieve another military victory that would make them appear even more heroic and make for an easier time demonizing their opponents. Of course, there were also oil revenues to consider and the chance to install a U.S. friendly leader in a country that could be strategically important. But, then everything went horribly wrong as the planning was far from adequate and the knowledge of Iraqi culture, history, religion, and politics was miniscule at best for most high ranking U.S. officials—especially, L. Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority. As Cockburn puts it, "Iraq is a mosaic of communities with differing interests, but during the first disastrous year of the occupation the U.S. showed a genius for offending everybody simultaneously."
In 1917, Britain allegedly liberated Iraq from Turkish rule but really imposed its own imperialism on the country. Naturally, then, Iraqis were already skeptical about foreign occupiers who claimed to be liberating them and handing them their own sovereignty. Since the U.S. delayed the Iraqi elections as long as it could, it quickly became clear to the Iraqi population that the U.S. wanted to ensure new leaders that would be friendly to the west, i.e., leaders who were not Shia, thus, almost guaranteeing that most Iraqis would oppose the occupation.
L. Paul Bremer and the CPA made matters worse by dissolving the Iraqi army and purging many members of the Baath party, which exacerbated unemployment rates. Less well known, the U.S. even angered its one staunch support group in the country, the Kurds, by insisting that the Turkish military join them to help contain the fighting on at least a few occasions. Further down the road, the U.S. had no plan to rebuild the Iraqi infrastructure when even Saddam was able to do so relatively quickly after his defeat in the first Gulf War.
With as much as the U.S. got wrong, there were many other ill-figured techniques and competing interests at play here as well. It will never fail to amaze me how many factions and factions within factions there are in countries like Iraq (though, I would assume divisions like these are not unique to that country). In the 1990s, there was a civil war between the two Kurdish communities, and throughout the early occupation, there were even feuds among Shia leaders. There was an on and off solidarity between the Shia and Sunni Muslims of the country that seemed almost impossible to keep track of or predict. As Cockburn says in typically succinct and cogent fashion, "Each Iraqi ethnic and religious community as well as every political faction sought to lure their American occupiers into aiding them in fulfilling a purely communal agenda."
And, aside from Cockburn's pointed comments, wide scope, detailed accounts, and insertions of relevant historical and religious notes, which already make the book fantastic, he incorporates more obscure information that I doubt many westerners are aware of—at least I wasn't. For example, he discusses a meeting in London of Iraqi dissidents in December of 2002. The group included members who all wanted Saddam out of power at whatever cost, including Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. He stresses how many of them were skeptical of the invasion's chances for success but pushed the U.S. to commit to it anyway. Unfortunately, the neocons already wanted to invade Iraq, so these exiles helped give them the justifications they needed. And, hence, our small war became a big one.
September 26, 2013
SOME IMPRESSIONS OF IRAQ
Patrick Cockburn, long time Independent correspondent in the Middle East, wrote this account of the occupation of Iraq and the resistance to that occupation in 2006. Cockburn writes from the point of view of his own experiences and observations, beginning in the north of the country on the eve of invasion to his time in Baghdad, with increasingly limited and dangerous excursions into other areas of occupied Iraq.
One can't but admire his bravery, as a non-embedded journalist living in Baghdad he lives at risk from all sides but still manages to get out and see the occupation and resistance at first hand, and to speak with ordinary Iraqis. On these grounds, it is an invaluable piece of journalism. Where I feel it falls short, is in the analysis that would help the reader put the events in context in the wider world. On the context within Iraq itself Cockburn is very good, but to dismiss the debate on why the US invaded Iraq as "over-sophisticated" (which debate? In what way was it over-sophisticated?), and to simply suggest that the "main motive for going to war was that the White House thought it could win such a conflict very easily and to it's own great advantage" explains very little. While Paul Bremer receives some attention, his follow-on John Negroponte, Reagan's former Central American Tsar during the time of the Death squads, is conspicuous by his absence.
Those complaints to one side, the book is a valuable document from a journalist who is willing to make the effort, which in Iraq at that time was no small thing, to get at the story in person, speak to the people who were living through the conflict and record it for posterity.
Patrick Cockburn, long time Independent correspondent in the Middle East, wrote this account of the occupation of Iraq and the resistance to that occupation in 2006. Cockburn writes from the point of view of his own experiences and observations, beginning in the north of the country on the eve of invasion to his time in Baghdad, with increasingly limited and dangerous excursions into other areas of occupied Iraq.
One can't but admire his bravery, as a non-embedded journalist living in Baghdad he lives at risk from all sides but still manages to get out and see the occupation and resistance at first hand, and to speak with ordinary Iraqis. On these grounds, it is an invaluable piece of journalism. Where I feel it falls short, is in the analysis that would help the reader put the events in context in the wider world. On the context within Iraq itself Cockburn is very good, but to dismiss the debate on why the US invaded Iraq as "over-sophisticated" (which debate? In what way was it over-sophisticated?), and to simply suggest that the "main motive for going to war was that the White House thought it could win such a conflict very easily and to it's own great advantage" explains very little. While Paul Bremer receives some attention, his follow-on John Negroponte, Reagan's former Central American Tsar during the time of the Death squads, is conspicuous by his absence.
Those complaints to one side, the book is a valuable document from a journalist who is willing to make the effort, which in Iraq at that time was no small thing, to get at the story in person, speak to the people who were living through the conflict and record it for posterity.
November 29, 2012
Now at the end of 2006 the entire world is painfully aware that something has gone terribly wrong with the US intervention in Iraq. Weapons of mass destruction were an illusion, while the reality was murderous sectarian hatred between Shi'a and Sunni populations, both sharing hostility towards America. How did it happen? Was it inevitable?
Patrick Cockburn is a veteran British journalist familiar with Iraq, and his slim book is by far the most intelligent and insightful report on the war to reach this reader. Wisely he stayed away from the US authorities, both civilian and military, cultivating instead contacts with Iraqis of diverse backgrounds. In seeking such information it helps to be nimble--know when one's favorite restaurant is no longer safe, when it helps to be out of a hotel before it is bombed, also when it is prudent to retreat to the relative peace of Kurdish provinces and track the news from there. One time Cockburn arranged a meeting in a mosque, but just to be safe, sent a translator ahead to check. The translator came back and advised to stay away, it looked too much like a kidnapping set-up. Some time later an Italian journalist stepped into the trap and was indeed kidnapped; she was only released after a hefty ransom was paid.
What has gone wrong? According to Cockburn, almost everything. Quite apart from the charge of "weapons of mass destruction"--based either on shoddy intelligence or on valid intelligence overridden by politicians (pick your choice)--the US president apparently felt that Saddam was ripe for an overthrow and that the Iraqi people would welcome an invasion. A fair number of Iraqi expatriates promoted this line, and they might have been the ones who convinced George W. Bush.
The Bush administration apparently failed to recognize how badly Iraqi society was divided, that even among expatriates bitter divisions prevailed. Furthermore, these represented a westernized, educated superstructure, very different from the majority of Iraqis, many of whom had only superficial education and were (especially among the Shi'a, 60% of the population) religious fundamentalists. The Iranians were Shi'ites too, but as Cockburn noted, a huge difference existed: Iran, though ruled by religious extremists, had a long tradition of secular culture and education; Iraq's Shi'a on the other hand were largely devout and fundamentalist, with just a thin educated veneer on top.
The US was right in feeling that Saddam's rule was increasingly shaky, but it was not just because a Sunni minority ruled a Shi'ite majority. It was also destabilized by the large number of arms held by the population; Saddam ruled, more and more, by holding the balance between well-armed tribes, which he never successfully disarmed. And it was economically weak: the international sanctions, imposed after the Gulf war, did not bring down Saddam, but they did increase general poverty. The American invasion may have hastened the regime's demise, but the invaders did not realize how unstable the country already was, and how little it would take to plunge it into chaos.
Indeed, military victory was far easier than expected. The US commanders did not realize how little most Iraqi soldiers cared to fight--most low ranks were Shi'a conscripts, who preferred to desert, whereas most officers were Sunni. The Americans interpreted their easy victory to mean that the country would welcome new rulers, and decided to run it with minimal Iraqi participation. Contracts to manage the rebuilding of Iraq were advertised and given to (mostly) US companies, a very bad policy--much too slow, too expensive (much of the funding disappeared unaccountably) and rather demeaning to Iraqis.
Life in Iraq therefore grew harder, not easier. In 1991 the US bombed power stations, oil refineries, bridges and other key installations, intent on beating back Iraq's attack and using any means it had. Nevertheless, within months the power network operated again. In 2003, the US deliberately avoided bombing that network: yet for years afterwards, power was limited to certain hours per day, and even now, full service is not restored. Cockburn makes an interesting comparison with the occupation of Berlin in WW-II. There, even before all the fighting ended, a Russian general summoned all Germans responsible for public services--or if not available, their highest ranking deputies--and worked out a provisional plan for restoring such services.
Nothing like that occurred in Baghdad. The US appointed as proconsul Paul Bremer, former US ambassador to the Netherlands, and until he was removed a year later, the situation continued to deteriorate. Stress was given to "restoring democracy," to organizing elections, even devising a new flag for the nation, something viewed with disdain by the Iraqis, who saw it as a sign of how much the occupation was out of touch with reality. What Washington failed to realize was that while people by and large esteem freedom and might even recognize democracy as a good way towards it, personal security and stable livelihood come first--especially in an impoverished country, where what we take for marginal living may be the baseline from which you start. More than personal freedom, what mattered was the failure to provide security and stability.
The result, of course, was a growing resistance to the occupation, one which eroded any achievements of military victory. Was it inevitable? Cockburn feels it could have been avoided if the US paid more attention. When Saddam fell, he estimated (excluding probably the Kurdish area, which was largely self-governing, and still is), about half the population welcomed the change, while the other half sat on the sidelines, watching to see what followed. The balance shifted gradually, as the new government displayed its ineptness. It was a missed opportunity.
There is much more in the book--it merits slow reading, perhaps more than once. It is a convincing portrayal--so unlike the official Baker-Lee report, whose recommendations remind one of the folk tale of a council of mice, deciding what to do about the predatory cat: "hang a bell around the cat's neck, so that we mice can hear it approaching."
In truth, the situation has been allowed to deteriorate so far that it is hard to come up with a quick solution. The war has caused enormous damage to the US, and even greater damage to Iraq. One can only hope that by now Iraqis of all factions resent the violence so much--any violence--to be willing to call a truce, even if it means dividing up Iraq. But unless some inspired leadership emerges, that too is a long shot.
Patrick Cockburn is a veteran British journalist familiar with Iraq, and his slim book is by far the most intelligent and insightful report on the war to reach this reader. Wisely he stayed away from the US authorities, both civilian and military, cultivating instead contacts with Iraqis of diverse backgrounds. In seeking such information it helps to be nimble--know when one's favorite restaurant is no longer safe, when it helps to be out of a hotel before it is bombed, also when it is prudent to retreat to the relative peace of Kurdish provinces and track the news from there. One time Cockburn arranged a meeting in a mosque, but just to be safe, sent a translator ahead to check. The translator came back and advised to stay away, it looked too much like a kidnapping set-up. Some time later an Italian journalist stepped into the trap and was indeed kidnapped; she was only released after a hefty ransom was paid.
What has gone wrong? According to Cockburn, almost everything. Quite apart from the charge of "weapons of mass destruction"--based either on shoddy intelligence or on valid intelligence overridden by politicians (pick your choice)--the US president apparently felt that Saddam was ripe for an overthrow and that the Iraqi people would welcome an invasion. A fair number of Iraqi expatriates promoted this line, and they might have been the ones who convinced George W. Bush.
The Bush administration apparently failed to recognize how badly Iraqi society was divided, that even among expatriates bitter divisions prevailed. Furthermore, these represented a westernized, educated superstructure, very different from the majority of Iraqis, many of whom had only superficial education and were (especially among the Shi'a, 60% of the population) religious fundamentalists. The Iranians were Shi'ites too, but as Cockburn noted, a huge difference existed: Iran, though ruled by religious extremists, had a long tradition of secular culture and education; Iraq's Shi'a on the other hand were largely devout and fundamentalist, with just a thin educated veneer on top.
The US was right in feeling that Saddam's rule was increasingly shaky, but it was not just because a Sunni minority ruled a Shi'ite majority. It was also destabilized by the large number of arms held by the population; Saddam ruled, more and more, by holding the balance between well-armed tribes, which he never successfully disarmed. And it was economically weak: the international sanctions, imposed after the Gulf war, did not bring down Saddam, but they did increase general poverty. The American invasion may have hastened the regime's demise, but the invaders did not realize how unstable the country already was, and how little it would take to plunge it into chaos.
Indeed, military victory was far easier than expected. The US commanders did not realize how little most Iraqi soldiers cared to fight--most low ranks were Shi'a conscripts, who preferred to desert, whereas most officers were Sunni. The Americans interpreted their easy victory to mean that the country would welcome new rulers, and decided to run it with minimal Iraqi participation. Contracts to manage the rebuilding of Iraq were advertised and given to (mostly) US companies, a very bad policy--much too slow, too expensive (much of the funding disappeared unaccountably) and rather demeaning to Iraqis.
Life in Iraq therefore grew harder, not easier. In 1991 the US bombed power stations, oil refineries, bridges and other key installations, intent on beating back Iraq's attack and using any means it had. Nevertheless, within months the power network operated again. In 2003, the US deliberately avoided bombing that network: yet for years afterwards, power was limited to certain hours per day, and even now, full service is not restored. Cockburn makes an interesting comparison with the occupation of Berlin in WW-II. There, even before all the fighting ended, a Russian general summoned all Germans responsible for public services--or if not available, their highest ranking deputies--and worked out a provisional plan for restoring such services.
Nothing like that occurred in Baghdad. The US appointed as proconsul Paul Bremer, former US ambassador to the Netherlands, and until he was removed a year later, the situation continued to deteriorate. Stress was given to "restoring democracy," to organizing elections, even devising a new flag for the nation, something viewed with disdain by the Iraqis, who saw it as a sign of how much the occupation was out of touch with reality. What Washington failed to realize was that while people by and large esteem freedom and might even recognize democracy as a good way towards it, personal security and stable livelihood come first--especially in an impoverished country, where what we take for marginal living may be the baseline from which you start. More than personal freedom, what mattered was the failure to provide security and stability.
The result, of course, was a growing resistance to the occupation, one which eroded any achievements of military victory. Was it inevitable? Cockburn feels it could have been avoided if the US paid more attention. When Saddam fell, he estimated (excluding probably the Kurdish area, which was largely self-governing, and still is), about half the population welcomed the change, while the other half sat on the sidelines, watching to see what followed. The balance shifted gradually, as the new government displayed its ineptness. It was a missed opportunity.
There is much more in the book--it merits slow reading, perhaps more than once. It is a convincing portrayal--so unlike the official Baker-Lee report, whose recommendations remind one of the folk tale of a council of mice, deciding what to do about the predatory cat: "hang a bell around the cat's neck, so that we mice can hear it approaching."
In truth, the situation has been allowed to deteriorate so far that it is hard to come up with a quick solution. The war has caused enormous damage to the US, and even greater damage to Iraq. One can only hope that by now Iraqis of all factions resent the violence so much--any violence--to be willing to call a truce, even if it means dividing up Iraq. But unless some inspired leadership emerges, that too is a long shot.
May 10, 2017
Excellent and relatively concise journalistic account of what it looked like on the ground in Iraq in the first three years of the US occupation. The author does a great job of weaving between background information and personal observations and anecdotes, all of which are sprinkled with grim sarcasm and dry humor. Indeed the best aspect of the book was probably the skill at which the author portrays the daily absurdities of Iraq as it slowly but surely unraveled between 2003 and 2006.
August 1, 2024
felt more like a memoir of his time in iraq than anything else, which is no bad thing. a horrible picture of a society slowly torn apart, interspersed w anecdotes from those profiting and far more from their victims
October 23, 2022
Not as fantastic or polished as the Cockburn brothers' OG *chef's kiss* "Out of the Ashes" - but excellent nonetheless! 🤠🤠🤠🤠
February 11, 2021
Iraqis have endured more suffering and hardship over the course of nearly half a century than most people can even begin to imagine. A country that has been plagued by a U.S backed dictator for decades, that blighted the lives of generations of ordinary Iraqis and who instilled an atmosphere of evil that haunted and seeped into almost every crevice of Iraqi’s civil and economic life. They went through a ferocious war with it’s “unfriendly” neighbour Iran (Saddam was backed and armed by the U.S, even after his usage of poison gas, which triggered Iran’s urge to acquire WMD) that accomplished nothing except a gigantic pile of corpses on both sides, accumulating to about 1.5 million dead and dragging on for 8 years, becoming the longest conventional military conflict in the 20th century. Saddam then used chemical weapons on the Kurdish people of Halabja because they sided with Iran in the battle and the U.S even vetoed a resolution condemning the attacks (This crime was then rehashed to build-up support for the war in 2003). Then when Saddam acted out of the interests of flattering his own vanity by invading Kuwait, another war ensued - much, much shorter this time - that ended with highly toxic uranium oxide permeating the air of Iraq after the usage of depleted uranium by the U.S military that increased cancer rates, congenital diseases and fetal deformities.
Following the first Gulf War, Bush Sr. called on Iraqis to rise up against Saddam. He then he callously turned his back on them as Saddam brutally crushed the Shiite and Kurdish intifada. Resulting from Saddam’s decision to annex Kuwait, one of the most cruel and devastating collective punishments ensued in the form crippling U.S/U.K economic sanctions that were genocidal in their intent, destroying Iraq’s infrastructure and leaving most of the roads and hospitals in dilapidated states that made it virtually impossible to transfer food stuffs and medicine from city to city and ended up killing over a million people (including half a million children) while strengthening Saddam’s regime. The US even blocked water tankers from reaching Iraq on the grounds so illegitimate that the UN arms experts rejected them. And perhaps most devastating, after 9/11, a decade long war and occupation by The Coalition forces began, that again, given recent upsurge in violence by extremely oppressed Sunnis against ordinary Iraqis, seems to have accomplished nothing except the overthrow of an extremely oppressive dictator, replaced by another authoritative ruler and huge piles of corpses with some estimates having the death toll as high as 1.3 million and wasted trillions of dollars.
The consequence of the war is now on full display in Iraq today, as that poor country is going through one of the most vicious sectarian conflict since the apogee of the Iraq war and the inevitable Yugoslavia-like split really breaks my heart. And if you’re interested in understanding the obvious link between the recent violence and the decade long occupation, I’d suggest you peruse through this extraordinarily indispensable book.
HUGE REPARATIONS need to be paid to Iraqis for the suffering they’ve had to endure for decades which the U.S/U.K bares a huge majority of the brunt and I still yearn for the day when Blair and Bush are hanged at liberation square for their crimes.
Following the first Gulf War, Bush Sr. called on Iraqis to rise up against Saddam. He then he callously turned his back on them as Saddam brutally crushed the Shiite and Kurdish intifada. Resulting from Saddam’s decision to annex Kuwait, one of the most cruel and devastating collective punishments ensued in the form crippling U.S/U.K economic sanctions that were genocidal in their intent, destroying Iraq’s infrastructure and leaving most of the roads and hospitals in dilapidated states that made it virtually impossible to transfer food stuffs and medicine from city to city and ended up killing over a million people (including half a million children) while strengthening Saddam’s regime. The US even blocked water tankers from reaching Iraq on the grounds so illegitimate that the UN arms experts rejected them. And perhaps most devastating, after 9/11, a decade long war and occupation by The Coalition forces began, that again, given recent upsurge in violence by extremely oppressed Sunnis against ordinary Iraqis, seems to have accomplished nothing except the overthrow of an extremely oppressive dictator, replaced by another authoritative ruler and huge piles of corpses with some estimates having the death toll as high as 1.3 million and wasted trillions of dollars.
The consequence of the war is now on full display in Iraq today, as that poor country is going through one of the most vicious sectarian conflict since the apogee of the Iraq war and the inevitable Yugoslavia-like split really breaks my heart. And if you’re interested in understanding the obvious link between the recent violence and the decade long occupation, I’d suggest you peruse through this extraordinarily indispensable book.
HUGE REPARATIONS need to be paid to Iraqis for the suffering they’ve had to endure for decades which the U.S/U.K bares a huge majority of the brunt and I still yearn for the day when Blair and Bush are hanged at liberation square for their crimes.
March 19, 2009
a journalist with the liberal British daily newspaper, The Independent. Patrick Cockburn wrote the book after spending several years in Iraq and composed most of his writings based on journal entries he was making since the invasion of Iraq by the United States. Cockburn has spent more than 20 years covering the Middle East and he had written two books about Saddam Hussein before the invasion of Iraq. Patrick Cockburn offers a very personal view of the war in Iraq and his book is very easy to read due to the simple journalistic style he has mastered over the years as a reporter. The Occupation was nominated in 2006 by the non-profit organization, the National Book Critics Circle, for an award in the nonfiction category.
March 4, 2015
The 2nd half of the book is better than the first half. mainly because alot of what is said in the first half is better and more thoroughly explained in Cockburns's Muqtada al Sadr book. The second half however deals with the insurgency in Fallujah, the awful corruption(8 billion unaccounted for under Bremer's watch), the "official civil war" between Sunnis and Shias after 2006(the twin Imam al- Askari bombings). The deterioration of all essential life necessities, especially the lack of electrocity, the kidnapping, and the lack of security.
August 7, 2011
More documentation about how ineptly the occupation of Iraq was handled. Didn't like this as much as The End of Iraq. It's really hard to follow any timeline. The author frequently jumps anywhere between 2003-2006, which weren't necessarily equivalent in the short history of the occupation to that point, or even more confusingly, back to the 1991 Gulf War. For all that, you have to admire the author's willingness to get out and talk with ordinary Iraqis at enormous personal risk.
August 2, 2007
Excellent overview of the horrendous experience of Iraq and Iraqis since 2003. Mostly he wisely lets the facts -- and many, many tragic stories he's witnessed and heard about -- speak for themselves. I wouldn't say that his writing style is outstanding, but it's certainly crisp and clear, and the reportage is superb -- incredibly, dangerously thorough.
May 10, 2009
Awesome and sincere account of an embedded journalist. This book offers a lot of insight into what went on post-invasion, and how Iraqis were dealing with life among armies and insurgents. Cockburn really uncovers all that was left behind the curtains of American media. The language in the book is also very easy to digest, making for an easy read.
December 20, 2015
Essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the mess which Bush and Blair made of the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent attempts at political settlement. Makes me feel shame by association. It also makes it pretty clear how this mess led to the rise of ISIS and the problems the world is currently facing in both Iraq and Syria.
January 15, 2008
This book was educational. I didn't know much about the American occupation in Iraq but after reading this book, I feel even more strongly that we should not be in this war. The only gripe is all the names. I couldn't keep them all straight.
January 27, 2008
I had frequently read this author's reports from Iraq in the daily newspaper, the English Independent, and had admired his journalism. This guy really put his life on the line to try to deliver the truth about what was going on in Iraq from 2003 onwards. A really educating read.
May 2, 2009
the book is great!!! can not imagine a person-a foreigner, who could know Iraq and it's multiplicity better.
but the things you learn are frustrating...fucking stupid American Administration's decisions.
but the things you learn are frustrating...fucking stupid American Administration's decisions.
September 2, 2007
Depressing and frustrating of course, but nothing particularly nuanced, except for the occasional discussions and analyses on sectarian relations over the past several decades
October 20, 2007
We need information on Iraqis, but this way too hastily put together pastiche needs a good editor and something like narrative coherence.
January 26, 2008
a quick, short look at around the first two years of the US occupation of iraq. full of telling anecdotal stories and written in a simple, non-encumbered style.
February 18, 2008
I didn't want to like this book, but it was well written and I don't think Cockburn was lying or exaggerating. For anyone who enjoys a good Bush-bashing this will probably be a 5 star publication.
Want to read
May 11, 2009I must have to read it.
August 29, 2009
A perceptive and detailed volume of a British journalist's observations in Iraq from 2003-2006; even-handed and memorable.
February 11, 2013
Best stuff on the war.
September 20, 2014
Perfect. Read this thing.
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